Transnational European Union: Towards a Common Political Space (Routledge Research in Transnationalism)

Transnational European Union

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the European Union is an increasingly dense transnational social and political space. More and more non-governmental organizations are developing transnational links, which are usually more intensive within the EU even if they often extend beyond its borders to the wider world. This multi-disciplinary volume explores the importance of these structures, actors and relations for EU and European governance in the context of the theoretical debate about European integration in the social sciences. This book includes: ●

●

Theoretical chapters examining and discussing the main conceptual perspectives to studying the transnational EU to provide a current overview. Empirical case studies of transnationalism in practice on transnational party, trade union and police cooperation to transnational education policy-making and transnational consensus-building in EMU governance.

This volume will be of great interest to students and researchers of transnationalism and European Union studies within the social sciences, contemporary history and law. Wolfram Kaiser is Professor of European Studies at the University of Portsmouth and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. His most recent books include (ed. with J. Elvert) European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History (2004); (ed. with M. Gehler) Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945 (2004); Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945–1963 (1999). He is currently writing a book on Transnational Christian Democracy in twentieth-century Europe. Peter Starie is Principal Lecturer in Politics at the University of Portsmouth. He has published numerous articles and chapters on policy networks and European integration.

Transnationalism Series Editor: Steven Vertovec University of Oxford

‘Transnationalism’ broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states. Today myriad systems of relationship, exchange and mobility function intensively and in real time while being spread across the world. New technologies, especially involving telecommunications, serve to connect such networks. Despite great distances and notwithstanding the presence of international borders (and all the laws, regulations and national narratives they represent), many forms of association have been globally intensified and now take place paradoxically in a planet-spanning yet common arena of activity. In some instances, transnational forms and processes serve to speed-up or exacerbate historical patterns of activity, in others, they represent arguably new forms of human interaction. Transnational practices and their consequent configurations of power are shaping the world of the twenty-first century. This book forms part of a series of volumes concerned with describing and analysing a range of phenomena surrounding this field. Serving to ground theory and research on ‘globalization’, the Routledge book series on ‘Transnationalism’ offers the latest empirical studies and ground-breaking theoretical works on contemporary socio-economic, political and cultural processes which span international boundaries. Contributions to the series are drawn from Sociology, Economics, Anthropology, Politics, Geography, International Relations, Business Studies and Cultural Studies. The ‘Transnationalism’ series grew out of the Transnational Communities Research Programme of the Economic and Social Research Council (see http:// www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk). It is currently associated with the Research Council’s Centre on Migration, Policy and Society located at the University of Oxford (see http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk). The series consists of two strands: Transnationalism aims to address the needs of students and teachers and these titles will be published in hardback and paperback. Titles include: Culture and Politics in the Information Age A new politics? Edited by Frank Webster Transnational Democracy Political spaces and border crossings Edited by James Anderson

Routledge Research in Transnationalism is a forum for innovative new research intended for a high-level specialist readership and the titles will be available in hardback only. Titles include:

1 New Transnational Social Spaces International migration and transnational companies in the early 21st century Edited by Ludger Pries 2 Transnational Muslim Politics* Reimagining the Umma Peter G. Mandaville 3 New Approaches to Migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home Edited by Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser 4 Work and Migration Life and livelihoods in a globalizing world Edited by Ninna Nyberg Sorensen and Karen Fog Olwig 5 Communities across Borders New immigrants and transnational cultures Edited by Paul Kennedy and Victor Roudometof 6 Transnational Spaces Edited by Peter Jackson, Phil Crang and Claire Dwyer 7 The Media of Diaspora Edited by Karim H. Karim 8 Transnational Politics Turks and Kurds in Germany Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 9 Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora Edited by Bhikhu Parekh, Gurharpal Singh and Steven Vertovec 10 International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics Edited by Rey Koslowski * Also available in paperback.

11 Gender in Transnationalism Home, longing and belonging among Moroccan migrant women Ruba Salih 12 State/Nation/Transnation Perspectives on transnationalism in the Asia-Pacific Edited by Brenda S. A. Yeoh and Katie Willis 13 Transnational Activism in Asia Problems of power and democracy Edited by Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin 14 Diaspora, Identity and Religion New directions in theory and research Edited by Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Tölölyan and Carolin Alfonso 15 Cross-Border Governance in the European Union Edited by Olivier Thomas Kramsch and Barbara Hooper 16 Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf Edited by Madawi Al-Rasheed 17 Central Asia and the Caucasus Transnationalism and diaspora Edited by Touraj Atabaki and Sanjyot Mehendale 18 International Migration and Security Opportunities and challenges Edited by Elspeth Guild and Joanne van Selm 19 Transnational European Union Towards a common political space Edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie

Transnational European Union Towards a common political space

Edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie

First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2005 Selection and editorial matter: Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie; individual chapters the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Transnational European Union: towards a common political space / edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie. p. cm. – (Transnationalism. Routledge research in transnationalism; 19) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. European Union. 2. European cooperation. 3. Europe–Politics and government–1945– I. Kaiser, Wolfram, 1966– II. Staire, Peter, 1962– III. Series. JN30.T696 2005 341.242⬘2–dc22 ISBN 0-203-01653-X Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0–415–36512–0 (Print Edition)

2005001944

Contents

List of illustrations List of contributors Acknowledgements List of abbreviations The European Union as a transnational political space: introduction

ix x xi xii

1

WO L F R AM K A ISER AND PET ER STARIE

PART I

Conceptual perspectives 1 Transnational Western Europe since 1945: integration as political society formation

15

17

WO L F R AM K A ISER

2 Transnational networks: informal governance in the European political space

36

K AR E N HE A R D -LAU RÉOT E

3 Transnational socialization: community-building in an integrated Europe

61

FR AN K S C H I MMELFENNIG

4 Transnational business: power structures in Europe’s political economy

83

BA S T I A AN VA N APELD O O RN

PART II

Transnationalism in practice 5 Trade unions as a transnational movement in the European space 1955–65: falling short of ambitions? PAT R I C K PA S T U RE

107

109

viii

Contents

6 The alliance of European Christian Democracy and Conservatism: convergence through networking

131

K A R L M AGN US JO HANSSO N

7 German political foundations: transnational party go-betweens in the EU enlargement process

150

D O ROTA DAKOW SKA

8 Transnational actors in the European Higher Education Area: European opportunities and institutional embeddedness

170

E R I C BE E R K E N S

9 Copweb Europe: venues, virtues and vexations of transnational policing

191

M O N I C A D E N BO ER

10 Transnational consensus building in EMU economic governance: elite interaction and national preference formation

210

DA N I E L A S C HWARZ ER

Index

228

Illustrations

Figure 10.1

National preference formation and transnational interaction

225

Tables 3.1 3.2 8.1 8.2

Mechanisms of socialization Conditions of rule adoption Performance, institutional fit and the correlation between them Institutional fit for the different institutional forms

64 65 181 182

Contributors

Eric Beerkens is Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of Policy and Practice at the University of Sydney, Australia. Dorota Dakowska is Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Paris 10-Nanterre and about to finish her PhD on the German political foundations at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris in France. Monica den Boer is Professor of Comparative Public Administration at the Free University of Amsterdam and Director of Research at the National Police Academy in the Netherlands. Karen Heard-Lauréote is a research student at the University of Portsmouth in the United Kingdom and about to finish her PhD on functional representation in European agricultural governance. Karl Magnus Johansson is Associate Professor in Political Science at Södertörn University College in Sweden. Wolfram Kaiser is Professor of European Studies at the University of Portsmouth in the United Kingdom and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium. Patrick Pasture is Assistant Research Professor in the Department of History at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium. Frank Schimmelfennig is Senior Research Fellow at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research in Germany. Daniela Schwarzer is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, Germany and a journalist with the Financial Times Deutschland acting previously as France correspondent and leader writer. Peter Starie is Principal Lecturer in Politics at the University of Portsmouth in the United Kingdom. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam in the Netherlands.

Acknowledgements

We are indebted to several institutions and colleagues who have helped us to bring this project to fruition. In particular, we wish to thank the European Science Foundation in Strasbourg for funding a workshop at the University of Portsmouth, which allowed us to put together a very cohesive book, and for their financial assistance towards the preparation of the manuscript; the Centre for European and International Studies Research (CEISR) at the University of Portsmouth for providing a stimulating intellectual environment and for supporting our research over the years; Heidi Bagtazo, our Routledge editor, for her support, and Avril Ehrlich for preparing the index. We would like to dedicate this book to our parents, and especially in memory of Joe Starie who sadly died during the course of the project.

Abbreviations

AA Foreign Ministry ABVV/FGTB Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond/Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique (Belgium) ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework ACUE American Committee for a United Europe AFL American Federation of Labor AP Alianza Popular BEPG Broad Economic Policy Guidelines BEUC European Consumers’ Organization BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) BNFF Bureau of Nordic Family Forestry BOND British Overseas NGOs for Development CAP Common Agricultural Policy CCTV Circuit Camera Television CDA Christen Democratisch Appèl CDS Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (France) CDS Partido do Centro Démocratico Social (Portugal) CDU Christian Democratic Union (Germany)/ Christlich-Demokratische Union CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries CEMR Council of European Municipalities and Regions CEPF Confederation of European Forest Owners CEPOL European Police College CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies CERC Confederation of EU Rector’s Conference CFS Centre for Financial Studies CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CGT Confédération Générale du Travail (France) CIA Central Intelligence Agency CISC International Federation of Christian Trade Unions

Abbreviations xiii CISL CLAT COCDYC COGECA CONCORD COREPER CPE CRD CRE CSM CSU CSV CVP CVP DC DEA DEMYC DGB DR EC ECB ECIU ECSC ECTS ED EDG EDP EDS EDU EEB EEC EFC EFDS EFR EFTA EHEA ELDR ELEC EMMI EMSU EMU EP EPC EPP

Confederazione italiana dei sindacati lavoratori (Italy) Central Latinoamerico de Trabajodores Conservative and Christian Democrat Youth Community General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union Confederation for Cooperation of Relief and Development Committee of Permanent Representatives European Farmers Coordination Conservative Research Department Association of European Universities Centre for International Relations Christian Social Union (Bavaria/Germany) Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (Luxembourg) Christelijke Volkspartij (Flemish) Christliche Volkspartei (Switzerland) Democrazia Cristiana Drug Enforcement Administration Democrat Youth Community of Europe Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Germany) Democratic Rally European Community European Central Bank European Consortium of Innovative Universities European Coal and Steel Community European Credit Transfer System European Democrats European Democratic Group European Democrat Party European Democrat Students European Democrat Union European Environmental Bureau European Economic Community Economic and Financial Committee European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity European Financial Services Roundtable European Free Trade Association European Higher Education Area European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party European League for Economic Cooperation European Multi Media Information European Medium and Small Business Union European Monetary Union European Parliament European Political Cooperation European People’s Party

xiv

Abbreviations

EPP-ED ERO ERP ERT ETUC ETUS EU EUCD Europol EUW FBI FDP FERN FES FGTB FIDESZ FNS FO FPÖ HBS HSS ICC ICFTU ILO IMF IPE ITS JHA KAS LI ND NEI NGO ODCA OECD OEEC OEEC-TUAC OIPGs OLAF ÖVP PES PN PODACS

Group of the European People’s Party and European Democrats European Regional Organization European Recovery Programme European Round Table of Industrialists European Trade Union Confederation European Trade Union Secretariat European Union European Union of Christian Democrats EU Police Office European Union of Women Federal Bureau of Investigation Free Democratic Party (Germany) Forests and the European Union Resource Network Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany) Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique Hungarian Alliance of Young Democrats Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (Germany) Confédération Générale du Travail – Force Ouvrière (France) Freedom Party (Austria) Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Germany) Hanns Seidel Stiftung (Germany) Informatie en Coordinate Centrum International Confederation of Free Trade Unions International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund International Political Economy International Trade Secretariats Justice and Home Affairs (EU) Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Germany) Liberal International Nea Demokratia Nouvelles Equipes Internationales Non-governmental Organization Organización Demócrata Cristiana de América Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for European Economic Cooperation OEEC Trade Union Advisory Committee Operationeel Invalspunt Aan de grens Office de la Lutte Anti-Fraude Österreichische Volkspartei Party of European Socialists Partit Nazzjonalista (Malta) Police Data Computer System

Abbreviations xv PP PSC PSD PSL PSOE RLS RPR RS AWS SDK SI SLD SPD SWP TNC TOBB TUAC TUC TUSIAD UCD UDF UIL UMP UNICE US UW WFTU WWF YEF YEPP ZEI

Partido Popular Walloon Parti Social Chrétien Partido Social Democrata (Portugal) Peasant Party (Poland) Partido Socialista Obrero Español Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (Germany) Rassemblement pour la République (France) Polish Social Movement Solidarity Slovak Democratic Coalition Socialist International Democratic Left Alliance (Poland) Social Democratic Party (Germany) German Institute for International Security Transnational Corporation Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Commerce and Commodity Exchanges Trade Union Advisory Committee Trades Union Congress (Britain) Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association Unión de Centro Democrático (Spain) Union pour la Démocratie Française Unione italiana del lavoro (Italy) Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (France) Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe Czech Union for Freedom Union of Freedom World Federation of Trade Unions Worldwide Fund for Nature Young European Federalists Youth of EPP Center for European Integration Studies

The European Union as a transnational political space Introduction Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the European Union is an increasingly dense transnational political space. Political parties are intensifying their transnational cooperation in policy-making at the European level. Foundations and think tanks organize the exchange of ideas and the transfer of policy concepts across borders. Business associations and trade unions work together and coordinate their responses to comparable globalization pressures. Multinational companies and individual business leaders forge contacts in order to influence the agenda at all levels of governance. More and more non-governmental organizations develop transnational links which are usually more intensive within the European Union, even if they often extend beyond its borders to the wider world. To a large extent, this process of transnationalization has been induced by European constitutionalization, which not only results in new opportunities for transnational actors to influence policy-making at the European level. It also expands the scope for cross-border exchanges, transnational socialization and policy transfer below the EU level. Transnationalization does not only result from further supranational integration, however. It also has roots in the longer term historical, socio-economic and cultural similarities of European states and societies and transnational links. The process is further supported by transnationally constituted social institutions like the Catholic Church. In an age of globalization, it is also strengthened by comparable economic challenges and similar needs for societal reforms. In view of these challenges, national societies need to be fully integrated in transnational networks and socialization processes if they do not want to be left behind. Up to a point, this process of growing transnationalization remains elite driven. For a number of reasons, the European Union and its institutions are still not particularly suitable or important sites of mass social action (Imig and Tarrow, 2001). Indeed, in some ways global events like the summits of the G-8 appear to be more attractive for transnational protest movements that wish to secure media attention for their causes. In contrast, non-governmental organizations involved in lobbying at the European level usually find it difficult to get their members more interested and involved in EU politics, as they are often more focussed on global questions of poverty or environmental pollution, for example (Greenwood, 2003: 269–70). Nevertheless, transnationalization at the elite level appears to be embedded

2 Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie in a more profound process of incipient European society formation which increasingly engages more and more European citizens, and does so in a variety of ways. These include, for example, expanding educational exchanges and mass tourism. The formation of a European society is also reflected in increasing numbers of inter-marriages and dual citizenship across member states.

Towards conceptualizing transnational European Union The process of European transnationalization in itself is an important contemporary phenomenon. As such and not just because of its relevance for European-level policy-making, it deserves greater attention from the social sciences and related disciplines. So far, several questions remain unexplored. It would be important to conceptualize and understand, for example, how the ‘Third Way’ ideology and rhetoric – albeit adjusted to different national circumstances (Cuperus and Duffek, 2001) – became a European strategy for the reinvention and reconstruction of Social Democracy. Such Europeanization of a national political strategy and its implementation in regional and national political contexts can be explained convincingly by the transmission function of transnational networks of political parties, foundations and think tanks. These can play an important, pro-active agenda-setting role. In contrast, state institutions such as national ministries, even if they also have cross-border contacts partially induced by EU integration and ultimately draft legislation, tend to be much more reactive and conservative in protecting national traditions and existing legal and socio-economic structures. Indirectly, the formation of an increasingly dense transnational political space has important repercussions for the way in which we conceptualize European integration and governance (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999; Rumford, 2002). If, for example, this process of society-formation extending beyond small economic, academic and political elites strengthens the European dimension of citizens’ identities and their allegiance to the European Union, this would have obvious consequences for how we conceive the democratic legitimacy of policy-making at the European level and for the criteria we wish to apply to its evaluation (Lord, 2003). At the same time, transnationalization and transnational politics matter more directly for agenda setting and bargaining in the European Union, thus influencing the outcomes of integration. Whereas the study of transnationalization as such was neglected for a long time in the social sciences and related disciplines, the role of transnational actors in the integration process has traditionally been an important feature of neo-functionalist accounts of the integration process from Ernst B. Haas (1958) onwards. In his transactionalist approach to community formation, moreover, Karl W. Deutsch (1957) already emphasized the importance of growing transnational contacts and communication for identity convergence and learning processes. In the study of global politics, this same trend to assess the transformative impact of transnationalization was reflected in studies by authors such as Karl Kaiser (1969) and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1971).

Introduction

3

The early neo-functionalist accounts focussed almost exclusively on the role of transnational business associations and trade unions in the integration process. They tended to emphasize their close collaboration with supranational institutions and technocratic elites in agenda-setting and advancing the integration process in the context of sectoral economic or political ‘spill-over’. In this framework, transnationalization often appeared to be conflated with supranationalization. None of these basic assumptions are particularly relevant for the study of the current European Union, however (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998). Thus, it is widely acknowledged that transnational European-level associations are very heterogeneous and usually formulate policy at the lowest common denominator (Greenwood, 2003: 75–85). As was first shown by Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman (1989), it was the largely informal European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) and individual, transnationally connected business leaders not business associations who successfully pushed for the Single Market Programme. At the same time, transnational actors develop multiple links with governmental actors at all levels in order to influence European policy-making. This includes representatives of the member states in the Council of Ministers, not just the European Commission and the European Parliament (EP). Finally, the early assumptions about ‘spill-over’ were much too determinist. In fact, transnationally networked business leaders may well favour negative market integration, but could be opposed to positive political integration for fear that this might lead to more economic interventionism by central institutions in Brussels. These inadequacies of early neo-functionalism, combined with the contemporary experience of politically weak Commissions and underdeveloped pluralism and interest group politics at the European level until the mid-1980s, brought about a temporary upsurge in state-centred intergovernmentalist explanations of European integration. Compared to earlier criticisms of neo-functionalism by authors like Stanley Hoffmann (1966), Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1998) has also explained integration outcomes as the result of inter-state bargaining, but on the basis of a more sophisticated understanding of national preference formation in domestic political contexts. His liberal intergovernmentalism usefully reminded students of the European Union of the resilience of the nation-states and their institutions which were not of course becoming completely ineffective and obsolete, as some of the more radical studies of incipient globalization would have it at that time. On the other hand, intergovernmentalism proved to be a narrow approach to studying European integration in several different ways. Thus, the exclusive concentration on treaty-revising ‘grand bargains’ failed to explain the arguably much more important political and legislative process of the European Union and its outcomes within its respective constitutional setting. Moreover, as a result of its fixation with state interaction, intergovernmentalist accounts downplayed the role of the Commission as a mere ‘facilitator’ of bargains and largely ignored the growing importance of the European Parliament or the Court of Justice. More importantly, these studies explained preference formation in a purely national context, insisting (without actually studying them) that transnational actors were marginal to the integration process and had no significant

4 Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie influence on integration outcomes. Even within the very narrow context of ‘grand bargains’, however, other authors have in fact demonstrated the importance of transnational actors for agenda setting, if not perhaps the detailed negotiation of treaty clauses. Thus, Karl Magnus Johansson (2002) has shown, for example, that the transnational coordination of Christian democratic leaders had a significant influence on the Maastricht Treaty agenda. At the same time, the day-to-day politics of the European Union is structurally very much more open towards such influence of different transnational actors so that their effective exclusion from intergovernmentalist accounts is unjustified. In fact, intergovernmentalism is now quite marginal to the study of a European Union that has acquired more competencies, with the increased involvement of the EP in law-making. Whether one prefers to conceptualize the European Union as a political system ‘sui generis’ or as one with more and more federal features, albeit with a weak centre, it is obvious that it is no longer a traditional form of an international organization, easily dominated by its constituent member states and their institutions. This is also why scholars of comparative politics like Simon Hix (1994) have argued that the international relations approaches to studying the European Union are now obsolete. While some state-like features of the European Union are increasingly difficult to dispute, however, comparative politics approaches sometimes replace the ‘international’ state-centrism of intergovernmentalism with their own ‘domestic’ state-centrism in which the European Union almost appears like any other (federal) nation-state. Such an approach runs the risk of focussing too exclusively on the interaction of ‘state’ institutions, although from this perspective, they would include the supranational Europeanlevel institutions and the sub-national level of regional government. Moreover, when societal forces are seen as relevant for European politics, studies of comparative politics tend to treat them as intra-EU social formations without much autonomy, locating their influence at one or more levels of the system of ‘multilevel governance’, with an almost exclusive focus on EU-level policy-making. Crucially, however, transnational actors cut across and also help to connect the different levels of government and governance. Further, they cannot simply be equated with national societal actors because they tend to be culturally more diverse and socioeconomically and politically more heterogeneous. In fact, the structural identities and functional roles of transnational actors constitute a very important part of the specificity of the European political space compared to more homogeneous nation-states whether they are more centralized or federal. From this perspective, the study of transnational structures and actors and their influence on European policy-making across different levels seems of crucial importance for a durable conceptualization of the European Union as a political system. Against this background, Thomas Risse (1995) first demanded to ‘bring transnational relations back in’. At the time, however, his proposal was mainly directed at a re-conceptualization of the new emerging global politics which increasingly appeared not only to be de-territorialized and massively influenced by multinational businesses and their economic interests but also to be characterized by the growing presence of global non-governmental organizations. In the

Introduction

5

same book, however, David R. Cameron (1995) argued that transnational relations had also been neglected in the study of the European Union. Since then, research on the process of transnationalization has developed in various academic sub-disciplines. This research still focusses more on European-level structures and the role of transnational actors in European policy-making. It can link up very well with another recent trend in EU studies, namely Europeanization. Cross-border convergence is often induced or at least channelled by transnational actors as well as by European institutions and national governments, although certainly not a necessary outcome of transnationalization. Not surprisingly, perhaps, in the light of these conceptual connections, the role of transnational actors in the Europeanization of newly acceded and future member states has been a major point of focus of incipient research on European transnationalization (e.g. Ortuño Anaya, 2002; Schimmelfennig, 2003a; Kaiser and Elvert, 2004). In this and other contexts, most authors now prefer a more open definition of what constitutes a transnational actor in the first place. Whereas the scholars of international relations studying the role of non-governmental organizations in global politics initially emphasized the structural identity of transnational actors as bridging territorial boundaries and being partially detached from them and as in no way institutionally linked to or dependent on states and their institutions, recent studies of European transnationalization focus on the functional roles of actors. In this perspective, political parties and party foundations are transnational actors, for example, despite the fact that they are state-funded in many European countries. However, even if they often closely interact with state institutions, their functional role and actual political behaviour is almost entirely independent of the state. With such a functional definition of transnational actorness, it is even possible to analyse the interaction of ministers and civil servants in non-institutionalized informal consultative settings such as economic policy coordination in the Euro-12 group as transnational politics. In fact, it is exactly these grey areas of overlap between inter-state and non-state transnational activities which appear to be most promising for future research. This holds true not only for supranational EU politics, but also for what Helen Wallace (2000) – adopting ideas in Anne-Marie Slaughter (1997) for Europe – has termed the increasing ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ below the EU level. This transgovernmentalism often relies on the agenda-setting role of transnational actors and is characterized by close interaction between state and non-state actors with sometimes mixed functional identities.

Conceptual perspectives and empirical case studies While it has already resulted in a variety of important findings in academic sub-disciplines ranging from International Relations to sociologically informed political science, (International) Political Economy, contemporary history and social-science informed law, research on European transnationalization is still highly fragmented. In order to systematically represent the state-of-the-art and to take this innovative research agenda forward, this book provides the reader

6 Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie with a systematically structured comprehensive introduction to European transnationalization. It does so primarily through combining four conceptual chapters in the first part of the book. These four chapters discuss the most important theoretical-disciplinary approaches to studying the phenomenon of transnational European Union, including methodological issues, drawing upon recent studies that illustrate the possibilities and possibly, limits of these approaches. The second part combines six more empirical chapters that draw on these conceptual approaches to study different cases of transnationalization ranging from the contemporary history of the West European trade unions and their involvement in early European integration in the first years of the European Economic Community (EEC) to transnational consensus building in European economic governance. These chapters illustrate the thematic range of the emerging research on European transnationalization. They also allow some general concluding observations on transnationalization in practice and illustrate similar methodological challenges. In the first of four conceptual chapters, Wolfram Kaiser discusses the contemporary historical dimension of European transnationalization since 1945. He argues that the state-centred approach of much of the recent contemporary historical literature on the evolution of the European Union reflects the traditionally dominant national focus of modern European history as well as methodological and practical research problems. Whether it explains ‘national interests’ and their inter-state bargaining in predominantly economic (Milward, 1992; Milward et al., 1993), political or security terms (as most contributions in e.g. Loth 2001), the intergovernmental approach fails to understand the role of transnational elite networks for integration in postwar western Europe and ignores their importance for sub-EU cross-border exchanges of ideas and policy concepts. The transnational approach is not only important for an improved understanding of the growth of European societal structures and their importance for integration in a historical perspective but also for the analysis of contemporary European politics. As Kaiser shows, contemporary historical research could contribute to the empirical testing of theoretical hypotheses. Moreover, it could help to explain change over time in the process of transnationalization and its influence on actor socialization and policy-making – something for which social science approaches are often ill-equipped (Marsh, 1998: 192; Schimmelfennig, 2003b: 421–2). In her chapter, Karen Heard-Lauréote discusses one of the most important approaches in political science for analysing the process of European transnationalization: the network concept, which is theoretically neutral and which is partially replacing older pluralist and corporatist concepts for understanding governance more generally. This concept was originally developed for re-conceptualizing public policy-making in the national context at a time of the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state. It has, however, been recently extended to studying the European political space. Heard-Lauréote distinguishes between three main approaches under the network label. The first is policy networks. In the context of European Union (as well as national) policy-making, they are usually defined as sectorally specific and

Introduction

7

geared towards influencing the policy-making process in a limited field. The term may also be used for larger, more open and less clearly functionally defined networks like Progressive Governance, however, a network of social democratic parties, think tanks and foundations. The second approach is advocacy coalitions, which span a number of different transnationally constituted societal actors and interact with state institutions. The third is epistemic communities of actors like scientists and bureaucrats with crucial, specialized scientific and other knowledge, that is important for policy-making. As Heard-Lauréote shows, networks also differ in terms of their predominant functional roles. Some are exclusively geared towards influencing EU-level policy-making, while others have a much larger scope and also facilitate the cross-border negotiation and exchange of ideas and policy concepts below the EU level (see also Stone, 2004). As Frank Schimmelfennig demonstrates in Chapter 3 the study of transnational socialization (which is often mediated by transnational networks) is on the rise again, after allegedly having become ‘obsolete’ (Haas, 1976) together with the neo-functionalist theory of European integration in the mid-1970s. It still draws on neo-functionalist propositions of political and economic spill-over but is also theoretically informed by a variety of ‘institutionalisms’ in the social sciences. Up to a point, the new approaches to transnational EU socialization link up with the analysis of policy networks as discussed by Heard-Lauréote. While the latter tends to be more preoccupied with the emergence of transnational structures of networks and their external interaction, research on socialization and social learning focusses more on the processes and their effects within these structural contexts. In discussing different approaches to studying actor socialization and social learning within the European Union and extending to state and societal actors on the EU periphery and to future member states, Schimmelfennig outlines ways in which such processes and their impact on political behaviour and policy-making can actually be traced and measured. Finally, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn discusses different approaches in International Political Economy to studying the transnational relations of often particularly densely networked socio-economic actors, especially business actors. He argues that the earlier neo-functionalism focussed too much on institutionalized interest groups and their rational agency and was initially too deterministic about their influence on the functionalist logic of spill-over in the integration process. Instead, more informal transnational business structures appear to be increasingly important in influencing the political agenda of the European Union and may be better captured with a neo-Gramscian approach to understanding cross-border business links as transnational capitalist class-formation which emphasizes the importance of extremely disparate socio-economic resources and the resulting political power for agenda-setting. Such an approach would also embed an improved understanding of transnational business in Europe within the context of globalization and transnationalization that extends beyond the dense transnational political space of the European Union. While propagating such a neoGramscian approach to studying transnational business based on a neo-Marxist ontology, however, van Apeldoorn suggests that there may be other fruitful ways

8 Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie of re-conceptualizing socio-economic transnationalization within pluralist theoretical frameworks. In the first of the empirical chapters, Patrick Pasture analyses – based on archival sources – the transnational organization of West European trade unions and their influence on European policy-making in the early years of the EEC. European trade unions had formed transnational links in the nineteenth century and institutionalized them in Europe between the world wars. After the Second World War, they split into the pro-Western International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and its European Regional Organization (ERO) on the one hand and the communist unions on the other. Whereas the ERO was highly institutionalized, Pasture shows that their formally integrated structure did not translate into coherent policy formulation because of internal lack of homogeneity among the member associations and national divergences of traditions and policies. The existing differences were accentuated by the competitive constitutionalization of different European integration concepts in the EEC and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), moreover, further limiting any influence that the trade unions might have exercised on the integration process. The role of transnational trade unionism was largely restricted to agenda setting in the form of proposals for a partial Europeanization of social policies. It remained quite ineffective after the creation of the united, but even more internally disparate, European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). In his chapter, Karl Magnus Johansson traces the evolution of transnational party cooperation between European Christian democrats and conservatives at the European level. Having largely developed out of the tradition of political Catholicism, continental Christian democrats were initially quite cohesive after the Second World War and influential in the formation of the ‘core Europe’ of the EEC (Gehler and Kaiser, 2004a,b; Kaiser, forthcoming). The Italian, Belgian, Dutch and French parties saw themselves as centrist ones and initially disowned the conservative parties of Britain and Scandinavia. In contrast, the German Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) regarded themselves as role models of a centre-right people’s party combining social Catholic, liberal and conservative traditions. Not least to avoid the marginalization of Christian democratic parties in the EP after the enlargement of the EC, they aimed at a rapprochement with the British, Danish and other conservative parties, eventually resulting in the creation of the European Democrat Union (EDU) in 1978. As Johansson illustrates, their denser transnational networks have facilitated the ‘European’ socialization of the ‘newcomers’ and a degree of ideological convergence. Their transnational links have also led to closer cooperation between the two political groups in an EP that has recently become more politicized along the traditional left–right divide. Closely linked to parties and party networks are their associated think tanks and foundations, which undertake extensive transnational activities. In her chapter, Dorota Dakowska analyses the role of the German party foundations – especially the Christian democratic Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the social democratic Friedrich Ebert Foundation – for the inclusion of Polish elites into predominantly

Introduction

9

EU-based networks and for their socialization into Western European party ideology, norms and values and EU policy-making. Using their ‘NGO image’, the publicly funded, but functionally independent, foundations act as ‘go-betweens’ between state institutions and non-governmental organizations. In some cases, the German party foundations have played an important role in reconstructing national party systems as in the case of Konrad Adenauer Foundation support for the reorganization of the anti-Meliar opposition in Slovakia, where it promoted Mikulám Dzurinda as the leader of the movement, who in 1998 became Prime Minister. In this way, although with mixed success, the party foundations have also played an important role in facilitating the search of EU parties for suitable partners in those states which acceeded to the European Union in 2004. Whereas the German party foundations receive state funding, they nevertheless largely act autonomously. In contrast, universities across Europe have traditionally not only depended on state funding, but also enjoyed limited organizational autonomy. Nevertheless, as Eric Beerkens illustrates in his discussion of European discourses and policies on creating a common European space of higher education, the increased cross-border movement of academics and students first induced by the Erasmus exchange programme encouraged the formation of transnational associations, networks, consortia and universities. Although the Sorbonne and Bologna declarations about the European space of higher education are intergovernmental agreements, Beerkens argues that a number of transnational actors have cooperated closely with the European Commission to take the process forward. They have not worked towards the supranational organization of education policy but have aimed at enhancing their autonomy from national state administrations and creating more space for greater transnational coordination without replacing national state control with European control. In structural terms, national police forces are even more clearly state actors than the still largely state-funded, but increasingly autonomous universities. Yet, as Monica den Boer demonstrates in her chapter on transnational policing, individual liaison officers and sections of national police forces who deal with issues of cross-border crime, terrorism and similar deterritorialized security challenges have developed numerous networks and forms of cooperation. Functionally, these cross-border cooperation patterns qualify up to a point, as a form of transnationalization, as they are often characterized by personal and group-led initiatives of a highly informal character in fields that are not as yet legally well-structured, rule-bound or institutionalized. Den Boer also points to another aspect of police cooperation as transnationalization. More recently, many member states have begun to privatize and outsource security functions to private security companies that also execute tasks for private businesses. Increasingly, these private companies are not only organized transnationally, as any other business interests, but they also fulfil many of their functions in transnational contexts, which creates yet another challenge to the traditional state monopoly of violence. In a final example of state-actors who – in specific institutional and political settings – perform functionally as transnational actors, Daniela Schwarzer analyses the emerging transnational structures for European consensus-building in EMU

10 Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie governance. Her research shows that the assets of informal policy coordination by finance ministers in the so-called Eurogroup chiefly consist of the smallness of the group, the collegial and confidential atmosphere, ample time for in-depth debate and the perceived need to act together. Transnational policy coordination can influence agenda setting and national preference formation at all levels. Its effects can also be undermined by national actors like prime ministers, however, who are more driven by purely domestic electoral and other political concerns. As Schwarzer demonstrates, it is important in view of the various influences pulling policy-makers in different directions that informal policy coordination is increasingly embedded in an emerging transnationalized expert sphere of economic policy researchers and analysts, which in turn is linked to national and European public spheres through media reporting of economic policy-making.

Aspects of European transnationalization In conjunction with the conceptual chapters, these more empirical case studies of European transnationalization illustrate a number of important points which are relevant for future research. To begin with, research on transnationalization and on the European Union in general needs to take full account of the formation of cross-border networks and economic, social and political activities at all levels. So far, research on the European Union has concentrated too much on Europeanlevel institutionalization and policy-making. Much transnationalization certainly aims at organizing social and political forces to influence EU-level policy-making. However, this is only one very important focus. Many transnational activities concentrate instead on transnational cooperation, communication, socialization and policy transfer of functionally transnational actors below the EU level, as in the case of left-wing think tanks and party foundations and their coordinated debate about a ‘Third Way’ for a reconstructed European social democracy. True, these transnational contacts often have repercussions for policy-making at the EU level. This could be in the form of social democrat-led, national governments beginning to favour less state interventionism in the economy as a result of their cooperation, for example. Yet, any such indirect repercussions do not justify analysing all forms of transnationalization from the supranational perspective, as many EU scholars do, or, largely ignoring them, as do most scholars of national political systems of member states. Also, transnational relations can take many different institutional forms. Some forms of institutionalization are highly developed with hierarchical structures and rules for decision-making. However as studies of transnational business associations, trade unions and others show, their high degree of formal institutionalization is not a reliable index of their importance for the effective socialization of their members or for their influence on transgovernmental or EU-level policymaking. Indeed, it seems that the converse is true: the more informal the network structures and activities, the more influential they are. Informal mechanisms guarantee a high level of in-group cohesion, which often facilitates decision-making. Moreover, the lack of public visibility of these forms of transnationalization

Introduction

11

means that they are politically not so contentious and do not provoke attempts by member states and European institutions to regain control over transnational structures and activities through institutionalization and rule definition that could inhibit transnationalization. It is clear, for example, that the European network of Christian democrats has been more effective in influencing European integration when their leaders met informally to coordinate their views and positions, as in the case of their meetings in the Geneva Circle during 1948–51 (Gehler and Kaiser, 2004b) and in the final stages of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations ( Johansson, 2002), than when their transnational party bodies hold conferences and pass resolutions. Similarly, the ERT has obviously had a much greater influence on economic policy-making at the EU level (mainly, but not exclusively in the context of the Single Market Programme) than the various business associations which are internally divided along national, sectoral and other faultlines (van Apeldoorn, 2002). It is also important to distinguish different functional roles of transnational actors. One such functional role is the socialization of their new members – be they a new generation of political leaders who are no longer influenced in their European thinking by the experiences of the Second World War, for example, or the emerging elites from accession states who might lack contacts and compatible values. Importantly, to be successful, such socialization has to take place within stable structures and with a long-term perspective, as other domestic and international influences and interests may pull the participants in such networks into other directions. In addition, transnational actors can play a leading role in agenda setting at all levels of domestic, transgovernmental and European politics and policy-making. Indeed, state actors often rely on them for the ‘vision thing’ because transnational non-state actors, somewhat detached from the demands of day-to-day politics, do not depend on electoral support, are not under constant media scrutiny and can often invest more resources into thinking about the future. Finally, transnational actors contribute to actual policy-making and up to a point, policy implementation. On the balance of the available evidence, however, they tend to play a greater role in the non-politicized contexts of detailed policymaking, especially at the EU level, than in the final stages of the actual inter-state negotiations of ‘grand bargains’. The informality of transnational structures and actors and their activities poses many methodological challenges for research in the social sciences and related disciplines. Many of these challenges are raised and addressed in the four conceptual and in the empirical chapters in this book. On the whole, the description of the institutional structures and the analysis of the internal operating mechanisms of transnational networks pose no insurmountable methodological problems. The main challenge appears to be to establish causal links between the activities of transnational actors and national, transgovernmental and EU-level policy outcomes and to make them plausible beyond reasonable doubt. In many ways, the study of intergovernmental bargaining is in fact confronted with very similar problems of establishing causal links between concrete domestic pressures and the behaviour of governments as well as between intergovernmental

12 Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie negotiations and policy outcomes. However, intergovernmental contacts and negotiations are more institutionalized and also more visible in the media. Structurally, moreover, the chapters in this book show just how suitable are studies of transnationalization for bridging established rigid sub-disciplinary divisions. Conceptually and methodologically, the study of transnationalization is fully compatible with a number of different ontological approaches. Research on transnational socialization, for example, might well emphasize the importance of material incentives for rule adoption from a more rational-choice perspective or social communication and norm internalization from an idealist constructivist perspective (Checkel, 2001). Moreover, while they tend to be biased (in the neo-functionalist tradition) towards agency, some studies of transnationalization – especially those in the neo-Marxist tradition – have also focussed on (socioeconomic) structures (Bieler and Morton, 2001; Cafruny and Ryner, 2003). Thus, research on the process of transnationalization could not only contribute to closer inter-disciplinary collaboration in the study of the European Union and the wider Europe, but also more generally, to more fruitful debates across several deep ontological faultlines in the social sciences and related disciplines. To conceptualize the European Union as a transnationally constituted political space in the different perspectives discussed in this book is crucial for our understanding of what is specific about the European Union. The intergovernmental approach to studying ‘grand bargains’ essentially continues to treat the European Union as a traditional international organization dominated by member states and governments. Yet, even the more recent comparative politics approaches to studying integration fail to understand that European transnationalization as society formation for the foreseeable future makes the European Union qualitatively as different from (even de-centralized) national political systems as from international organizations. At the same time, neo-functionalism has traditionally adopted a narrow notion of the transnational in relation to supranational institutions and policy-making, which is also too state-focussed, albeit at EU level. Therefore, the embeddedness of European integration and EU politics in a more far-ranging process of transnational society formation remains to be explored more exhaustively. States do not develop societies. Societies develop states.

References Bieler, Andreas and Morton, Adam David (eds) (2001) Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Cafruny, Alan W. and Ryner, Magnus (eds) (2003) A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Cameron, David R. (1995) ‘Transnational relations and the development of European economic and monetary union’, in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37–78. Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001) ‘Why comply? Social learning and European identity change’, International Organization, 55(3): 553–88.

Introduction

13

Cuperus, René and Duffek, Karl A. (eds) (2001) Multiple Third Ways, Amsterdam–Berlin– Vienna: Forum Scholars for Social Democracy. Deutsch, Karl (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gehler, Michael and Kaiser, Wolfram (eds) (2004a) Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945, London: Routledge. —— (2004b) Transnationale Parteienkooperation der europäischen Christdemokraten. Dokumente 1945–1965, Munich: K. G. Saur. Greenwood, Justin (2003) Interest Representation in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Haas, Ernst B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950–1957, Standford, CA: Stanford University Press. —— (1976) ‘Turbulent fields and the theory of regional integration’, International Organization, 30(2): 173–212. Hix, Simon (1994) ‘The study of the European community: the challenge to comparative politics’, West European Politics, 17(1): 1–30. Hoffmann, Stanley (1966) ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation state and the case of Western Europe’, Daedalus, 95: 862–915. Imig, Doug and Tarrow, Sidney (eds) (2001) Contentious: Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity, London: Rowman & Littlefield. Johansson, Karl Magnus (2002) ‘Another road to Maastricht: the Christian democratic coalition and the quest for European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5): 871–93. Kaiser, Karl (1969) ‘Transnationale Politik’, in Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.), Die anachronistische Souveränität, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 80–109. Kaiser, Wolfram (forthcoming) Transnational Christian Democracy in Twentieth-Century Europe: Towards ‘Core Europe’. Kaiser, Wolfram and Elvert, Jürgen (eds) (2004) European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History, London: Routledge. Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph (eds) (1971) Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kohler-Koch, Beate and Eising, Rainer (eds) (1999) The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, London: Routledge. Lord, Christopher (2003) A Democratic Audit of the European Union, London: Palgrave. Loth, Wilfried (ed.) (2001) Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–1969, BadenBaden: Nomos. Marsh, David (1998) ‘The utility and future of policy network analysis’, in David Marsh (ed.), Comparing Policy Networks, Buckingham and Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, pp. 185–97. Milward, Alan S. (1992) The European Rescue of the Nation State, London: Routledge. Milward, Alan S., Lynch, Frances M. B., Romero, Federico, Ranieri, Ruggero, Sørensen, Vibeke (1993) The Frontiers of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, London: Routledge. Moravcsik, Andrew (1993) ‘Preferences and power in the European community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4): 473–534. —— (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ortuño Anaya, Pilar (2002) European Socialists and Spain: The Transition to Democracy, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.) (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

14 Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie Rumford, Chris (2002) The European Union: A Political Sociology, Oxford: Blackwell. Sandholtz, Wayne and Stone Sweet, Alec (eds) (1998) European Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sandholtz, Wayne and Zysman, John (1989) ‘1992: Recasting the European bargain’, World Politics, 42: 95–128. Schimmelfennig, Frank (2003a) The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (2003b) ‘Internationale Sozialisation: Von einem “erschöpften” zu einem produktiven Forschungsprogramm?’, in Gunter Hellmann, Klaus Dieter Wolf and Michael Zürn (eds), Forschungsstand und Perspektiven der Internationalen Beziehungen in Deutschland, Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 401–27. Slaughter, Anne-Marie (1997) ‘The real new world order’, Foreign Affairs, 76(5): 183–97. Stone, Diane (2004) ‘Transfer agents and global networks in the “transnationalisation” of policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11(3): 545–66. Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan (2002) Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration, London: Routledge. Wallace, Helen (2000) ‘An institutional anatomy with five policy modes’, in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–37.

Part I

Conceptual perspectives

1

Transnational Western Europe since 1945 Integration as political society formation Wolfram Kaiser

Modern European history has for a long time been treated as little more than the collation of clearly delineated national histories. Although competing for hegemony within European historiography between the 1960s and the 1990s, both the diplomatic history as well as the social history of Europe since the French Revolution have been equally characterized by ‘fictions of [national] autonomy’ (Geyer, 1989: 317; Hobsbawm, 2002: 18). Diplomatic history is traditionally based on implicit realist assumptions about the dominant role of states and political and military power in international relations and their control by small and largely self-contained foreign policy-making elites defining ‘national interests’. At the same time, social history has mostly concentrated on micro social phenomena as well as the evolution of national welfare state models since the mid-nineteenth century and at best, their comparison. It has generally emphasized national specificities in the context of the thesis about a German ‘special path’. Neither historiographical tradition has ever developed a convincing notion of the common European dimension of modern European history, or of its constitution through multiple cross-border societal as well as governmental contacts. When traditional ‘inter-national’ concepts such as ‘influence’ have been applied, it has usually been in the context of state foreign policy, colonial history and the ‘Europeanization’ of the world (Olsen, 2002: 937–40), not European history itself. Moreover, with its heavy emphasis on the formation of national (political) cultures in the nineteenth century, cultural history has contributed very little to undermining the predominant nation-state perspective. While discarding this traditional framework, finally, micro-histories have withdrawn to the individual and local and have also shown no significant interest in the transnational dimension of modern Europe. Only economic history has been a partial exception to the general rule, for example through its analysis of the growth of the European dominated world economy in the second half of the nineteenth century, but it has hardly affected the general historiography of modern Europe. Several historians have recently criticized the nationally introspective approach to understanding modern Europe which tends to ignore or play down its transnational dimension and the resulting commonalities. Hans-Peter Schwarz (1986: 451) and others (Kaiser, 1997) have demanded an improved understanding of the role of domestic politics and transnational actors for European policy-making in

18

Wolfram Kaiser

pluralist democracies, and for the integration process after 1945. More generally, historians of international relations have recently discovered and have begun to explore the history of transnational European and global ‘civil society’ (Boli and Thomas, 1999; Geyer and Paulmann, 2001; Gienow-Hecht and Schumacher, 2003). They have also shown a growing interest in the cross-border constitution and transfer of policies and cultural practices (Muhs et al., 1998; Espagne, 1999). At the same time, older forms of nationally focussed social history have been heavily criticized for largely ignoring that ‘societal developments are never internal processes within one society, but derive from expansion and inter-societal links through conquest, occupation, colonisation, unification, interweaving and other forms of expansion’ (Tenbruck, 1989: 432). As Jürgen Osterhammel has insisted (Osterhammel, 1996: 154), national societies or even larger civilizations are never ‘self-contained, “chemically pure” analytical categories’, always demanding the integral analysis of cross-border links even for traditional nationally comparative histories. Their importance is such that recent attempts to reconstruct comparative European social history as ‘transnational history’ through the subordinate inclusion of the inter-societal dimension (Kaelble and Schriewer, 2001) are neither terminologically nor substantially convincing or, indeed, compatible with social science definitions and concepts. Overcoming the rather rigid national paradigm established originally by nationalist historians in the second half of the nineteenth century would also help the historiography of modern Europe to reconnect with that of early modern, medieval and ancient Europe. These sub-disciplines have always regarded the nation-state paradigm as very time-specific and have actually produced a plethora of important historical research on cross-border (not, in their perspective, trans-national ) phenomena like trade, migration and intercultural exchange. In so far as the historiography of modern Europe is already responding to demands to overcome the national paradigm, however, it has concentrated more on cross-border societal phenomena with limited direct relevance for political institutions and processes. The extensive research on migration and transnational ethnic and social communities is the best example of this phenomenon. This trend appears to reflect the widespread aversion to older forms of the history of ‘high politics’ and the rather slow re-definition in recent historiography of what constitutes politics and political processes. At the same time, it may also be due to the low level of international and transnational institutionalization in Europe and the world before 1945 and the relatively slow expansion of contemporary history into postwar (West) European history in the last 20 years. Where the historiography of modern Europe has begun to analyse transnational phenomena, moreover, it has not always used concepts derived from the social sciences, thus complicating its integration with recent trends in political science and sociology. ‘Acculturation’, for example, is a frequently used term (Werner and Zimmermann, 2002: 613) reflecting a much less ‘political’ concept than ‘socialization’ as it is currently applied by political scientists (Schimmelfennig, 2003) to international democratization processes or, indeed, the study of the European Union (EU). Against this general background, this chapter discusses how contemporary historical research on transnational (Western) Europe since 1945 could in future

Transnational Western Europe since 1945 19 contribute to a better understanding of the progressive emergence of a much more than purely inter-governmental European polity with growing transnational societal links, as well as to social science debates about European transnationalization. It does so by first elaborating on the relationship between theory and history and the relevance to contemporary history of different social science approaches to studying transnationalism. It then proceeds to discuss the various ways in which contemporary history may contribute to theory formation, theory testing and the disclosure of empirical evidence of transnationalization processes in Europe, especially since 1945. Furthermore, historical research on aspects of transnational Western Europe since 1945 faces methodological challenges, some of which are comparable to similar issues in the social sciences whereas others are related to the source base and are more discipline-specific. These issues will also be outlined. At the same time, however, like any other source-based history, the more historically descriptive, inductive research on European transnationalism cannot fulfil the requirements for theoretical sophistication and empirical ‘proof ’ of the social sciences with their orientation towards testable theories and models.

Theory and history In an ambitious, programmatic statement in the first issue of the Journal of European Integration History, Alan S. Milward predicted (Milward, 1995: 7) that integration history would in future develop ‘its own theories and a research agenda which derives from them’, and that it would even reverse ‘the theoretical flow . . . from historical research to the social sciences’. Nothing, however, could be further from the reality of integration history research. Milward’s argument about integration after 1945 as a state-controlled framework for the ‘rescue of the European nation-state’ (Milward, 1992) although original in some ways, largely agreed with the long-standing arguments of dissident realists like Stanley Hoffman and liberal intergovernmentalists like Andrew Moravcsik about the resilience of the nation-state and its controlling influence over the integration process. At best, it is a highly generalizing history of early integration with a major interpretative thesis, but it is by no means a ‘theory’ which can be tested by the standards of the social sciences. As a discipline, modern history (with the exception of orthodox historical materialism) tends to favour an eclectic approach to theory, selecting and assimilating available theoretical concepts and approaches, but without applying them rigidly to sources. Despite attempts by some social historians during the 1960s and 1970s to transform history into a ‘historical social science’, modern history has stubbornly remained an essentially empirical discipline averse to theoretical overgeneralizations that are often not supported by the wealth of diverse original sources available to researchers, especially of post-war Europe. At the same time, contemporary history has an inbuilt bias towards agency, as social scientists call it. Although historians of contemporary Europe will not deny the relevance of structural economic or institutional factors for long-term transformations (as emphasized by Milward, for example), they tend as a general rule to be more

20

Wolfram Kaiser

interested in explaining the specificities of particular political, economic or institutional developments in integration and of concrete decisions at given points in time. There is no doubt, for example, that general economic trends and pressures mitigated in favour of British membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) from the mid-1950s onwards, but this alone does not explain (Kaiser, 1999) why the British government first applied for full membership in 1961 and not in 1958 or 1970 or, indeed, why it did not seek free trade association with the EC to safeguard its core economic interests in 1972, as Sweden and Switzerland did. The same can be said of other ‘latecomers’ in the integration process (Kaiser and Elvert, 2004). With a few exceptions (Milward, 1992; Milward et al., 1993; Kaiser, 2001), most contemporary historians of integration have not even made an effort to relate to the theory debate in the social sciences in a systematic way, let alone develop their own ‘theories’. On the whole, the research field is still characterized by the dominance of traditional diplomatic history accounts alongside some economic history, based almost exclusively on national governmental sources. More specifically, although the contemporary history of European integration has actually produced a growing literature on transnational phenomena in the wider context of the integration process, it has not so far responded to the related social science agenda that originally started with neo-functionalism, or adopted any of its concepts and approaches for its empirical research. Of those concepts that are discussed in this volume, the political economy of socio-economic (interest) groups is probably least useful for explaining early European integration post-1945. This is especially true of the neo-Gramscian notion of a ‘transnational capitalist class’ (van Apeldoorn, 2002) as the dominant actor in the integration process as economic liberalization. At the time, European integration was definitely an anti-communist project, but this does not automatically make it a ‘capitalist’ project controlled by a relatively cohesive ‘transnational capitalist class’. Historical research on the role of the coal and steel industry in early European integration, while demonstrating its interest in ‘core Europe’ integration, has shown (Berger, 1997; Wilkens, 1998) its internal deep division between private and public companies and between those in favour of more liberal transatlantic trade and those opposed to it, as well as its complete failure to impose its traditional preference for cartelization on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) founded in 1951–2. Research on lobbying by individual firms and their leading representatives, moreover, demonstrates its narrow limits in postwar integration. The multinational firm Philips, for example, first considered opening a corporate office in Brussels in 1958, but only sent a lobbyist in 1966. He quickly became disillusioned and actually proposed closing the office again just over a year later because he saw no real opportunities for influencing European policy-making (Chanier, 1993: 107). Indeed, if any distinctive social group managed to dominate the integration agenda in the first two decades after the war, it was the farmers and their partially transnationally organized interest groups with their close organic links with Christian democracy. They influenced national agricultural subsidy policies to a great extent and later, the evolution of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 1960s.

Transnational Western Europe since 1945 21 In contrast, transnational networks as cohesive policy communities and ‘sites of strategic action’ (Marsh, 1998: 186), also discussed by Karen Heard-Lauréote’s (Chapter 2, this volume), appears to be a more promising approach to studying the role of transnationally organized non-governmental actors and their influence on the integration process in the post-war period. Even within a pluralist framework as opposed to the neo-Gramscian one, however, the prevalent bias towards transnational private economic actors appears excessive in relation to early European integration. Especially for the short period between the end of the war and ‘core Europe’ institutionalization in the ECSC/EEC, other actors such as transnational pro-integration popular and elite organizations as well as informal political networks often played a more important role than did industrialists (especially from heavy industry), who were often politically discredited by their support for fascism or their collaboration with the German occupier. At the same time, trade unions were internally fragmented and also largely incapable of strategic action and of exerting substantial influence on the integration process (Pasture, 1995; Guasconi, 1998), as Patrick Pasture shows in Chapter 5 (this volume). In contrast, Karl Magnus Johansson’s study of the informal cooperation of Christian democratic party leaders during the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty and their agenda setting role especially in relation to economic and monetary union in the early 1990s ( Johansson, 2002) provides a fascinating parallel to recent historical research on comparable ‘transnational coalition opportunities’ for the politically dominant Christian democrats in the early stages of ‘core Europe’ integration (Gehler and Kaiser, 2001, 2004). Although recent diplomatic and economic history research on early integration has exaggerated the resilience of the nation-state and governments as the only significant actors in European policy-making after 1945, it remains true that governments initially retained a relatively high degree of autonomy in policymaking because of the more limited economic and institutional competition and underdeveloped pluralism in Western Europe compared to the early twenty-first century. As a result, historical research will find it easier to relate to more modest concepts of networks as instrumental in the formation of transnational political coalitions and as strategically supportive of governmental action, but only capable in exceptional circumstances of completely bypassing intergovernmental channels – rather than understanding networks as a new form of governance. At the same time, the alleged dichotomy (Marsh and Smith, 2000) in social science research on networks between structure and agency, network and context and network and outcome appears of limited relevance to historical research which has never experienced such a fragmentation of research perspectives. Closely linked to the network approach although theoretically distinct, the concept of advocacy coalitions could also prove useful for historical research. In binding together networks and policy communities from different sectors of a polity and in transnational contexts at the European level, such advocacy coalitions stand a much better chance of effectively influencing the policy-making process in the institutionally complex system in the current European Union. The close structural and personal links between Christian democratic parties and the agricultural lobby and their policy coordination would be one such example

22

Wolfram Kaiser

of an effective advocacy coalition spanning different sectors of the EEC in the late 1950s and the 1960s. It has to be said, however, that the early ECSC and EEC were much less complex institutions compared to the post-Maastricht European Union. Not only was this still a community of only six member states, but the European Parliament (EP) had limited influence until its direct election in 1979 and the introduction of the co-decision procedure in 1992–3. In such a relatively less complex institutional environment, it is usually easier to construct transnational political majorities. The permissive consensus about integration in ‘core Europe’ was also much more pronounced in the early post-war period, especially after the decline of communism in Western Europe and the conversion of the ‘Euro-Communists’ to European integration. The limited public scrutiny of policy-making compared to current EU politics also opened up political opportunities for ‘epistemic communities’ as a particular structural form of policy network. According to Peter M. Haas (Haas, 1992: 3), they are networks ‘of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’. Such political opportunities existed, first of all, for civil servants with specialist expertise. Contemporary historians have demonstrated, for example (Küsters, 1982; Roussel, 1996), the extent to which the Spaak Report of April 1956, which already outlined many of the solutions later agreed in the EEC Treaty, resulted from the very close cooperation of a few highly committed ‘Europeanist’ civil servants – especially from France and West Germany – working under the direction of the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, at a time when their governments were still far from having secured domestic majorities for any future treaties. Following on from this, networks of national civil servants specialized in European affairs and how they interacted with officials in the newly constituted European Commission in the 1960s would be a fascinating topic for future research in this direction. Other types of epistemic communities appear to have played a significant role in early integration, too. Frans van Waarden and Michaela Drahos (2002: 928) have recently suggested that the convergence of national competition policies in the European Union has largely resulted from the emergence of an expert community in competition law including judges, lawyers and officials, which acts as ‘a channel of information exchange, learning, imitation, and for the explicit transfer of legal concepts and arguments’. While their thesis is plausible, however, it is only weakly supported with empirical evidence. Historical research could adopt the same approach for studies of the origins in early integration of such cohesive expert groups with shared causal beliefs and policy aims and at the same time help to generate more empirical evidence to support arguments about their influence both on the emergence of community policies, such as competition policy in the 1960s, and the convergence of national policies and administrative practices. Finally, the contemporary history of European integration could also profitably engage with research on political ‘socialization’ (as also discussed by Frank

Transnational Western Europe since 1945 23 Schimmelfennig, Chapter 3, this volume) as ‘a social process through which agent properties and preferences change as a result of interaction’ (Checkel, 2001a: 220) – whether it is of the more rational choice variety emphasizing rhetorical action and the manipulative use of socialization or of the constructivist ‘modernist’ variety emphasizing persuasion and argumentation and the resulting internalization of norms. In fact, Alan S. Milward encouraged historians of the integration process as early as 1995 (Milward, 1995: 11) to re-visit Karl Deutsch’s theory of transactionalism (Deutsch, 1957) and to test his assumptions about a sudden upward leap in transnational individual and collective social contacts and any linked (partial) loyalty transfer from the national to the European level and the European identity formation resulting from integration in this way. Unlike contemporary theories of socialization, Deutsch had a historical approach and actually developed it with a view to post-1945 European and Atlantic integration, so that it might well be worthwhile re-considering his ideas and assumptions. At the same time, however, it would be more fruitful for the contemporary history of European integration to link up with the ongoing debate in the social sciences. In fact, research on social interaction and its influence on norm transfer and convergence has now reached a much more advanced stage including the construction (Checkel, 2001b: 562–3) of empirical hypotheses which can be tested about the conditions under which socialization is most effective.

History and theory Against this background, the contemporary history of European integration could contribute to the emerging transnational research agenda in a variety of ways. Due to its more empirical character it is unlikely to ever make a major contribution to theory formation. Contemporary historical research is quite capable, however, of conceptualizing transnationalization and of possibly contributing useful concepts and terminology to theoretical discourses in the social sciences, especially in relation to agency in transnational communities. One such concept is that of ‘conversion’ which tries to capture the conditions under which individuals call into question their previously held deep core beliefs and adopt a different set of beliefs and commitments. Historians could (re-)consider, for example, to what extent the fundamental experience of totalitarian government, collaboration and the Second World War facilitated the conversion of politicians in Western Europe after 1945 to the European ‘idea’ and associated values and norms – or their much more principled commitment to integration compared to interwar Europe when many of those ideas already circulated, but were perhaps used in a more rhetorical and manipulative way to advance nationalist claims. The concept of conversion can usefully be applied to individuals within transnational communities, too. It is clear, for example (Soutou, 1991; Gehler and Kaiser, 2004), that the experience in the context of informal transnational party contacts in the so-called Geneva Circle after 1947, of the convergence and compatibility of French and West German Christian democratic interpretations of the recent past and of their policy concepts induced the conversion of Georges

24

Wolfram Kaiser

Bidault during 1947–9 to the idea of an integrated ‘core Europe’ directed against the Soviet Union and excluding Britain. In another example of conversion, Jean Monnet and his Action Committee for a United States of Europe founded in 1955 played a key role in the transformation of the thinking and policies on ‘core Europe’ of social democrat leaders in West Germany and France (Duchêne, 1994: 286–8), thus broadening significantly the political support for this concept in these two countries and clearing the path to the Treaties of Rome signed in 1957. Following on from such individual and collective conversions, which can be very important for the effective functioning of transnational elite networks, contemporary history could also contribute to the better conceptualization of identity change over time and the growth of what Milward (Milward, 1995) has called (secondary) ‘allegiance’ to ‘Europe’ – with such allegiance resulting from the growing transnational social contacts as well as the actual Community policies. Regarding the internal operating mechanisms of transnational networks, the concept of ‘trust’, which was initially developed by economic historians for understanding the conditions for economic transactions in insecure institutional environments, could prove useful, too (Bluhm, 2003). Trust can only develop and grow over longer periods of time and is thus difficult to adequately capture for social science research which tends to take ‘snapshots’ of currently prevailing conditions for the operation of a network, advocacy coalition or epistemic community. Within transnational contexts, trust can derive from stable and consistently communicated beliefs and preferences and from political action that conforms to those beliefs and preferences. It will be undermined, however, if the communication of beliefs and preferences in transnational elite contexts on one side and rhetorical strategies in domestic political contexts and actual policies in intergovernmental relations on the other, diverge significantly. Once substantial social capital has been accumulated within a transnational community, however, it will decisively help to stabilize it and to guarantee its effective functioning even in the face of externally induced crises and temporarily diverging beliefs and preferences, as long as the behaviour of the relevant actors remains reliable. Contemporary historical research can also generate empirical evidence (Lipgens and Loth, 1991), which may not only be useful for the study of transnationalization in Western Europe after 1945, but also for testing theoretical hypotheses. Historians will be apprehensive, however, lest their empirical evidence is only used selectively for the purpose of sustaining a particular theory and its overgeneralizations. This is the case, for example, in Moravscik’s use (Moravscik, 1998) of historical examples from the 1960s for a defence of his thesis that integration has always been controlled by the member states whose ‘national interests’ in inter-state bargaining are largely derived from domestic economic interest group pressures (Merkel, 1999: 313–15; Trachtenberg, 2000). Social scientists should preferably formulate hypotheses but work with historians to empirically test them in relation to historical events on the basis of the much wider range of sources usually available to them. Checkel’s hypotheses (Checkel, 2001a: 222) about the best conditions for what he calls ‘argumentative persuasion’, for example, could well be tested for transnational networks in early European integration.

Transnational Western Europe since 1945 25 They certainly appear plausible on the basis of the currently available historical research, for example, on the informal cooperation of Christian democratic party leaders in the Geneva Circle (Gehler and Kaiser, 2001, 2004). Historical research can also develop new aspects of transnationalism on the basis of a wider range of sources and a different set of questions on the past derived from the social sciences and contemporary experience, which were not used by social scientists. Thus, recent research has established (Berghahn, 2001) how all pervasive the financial support of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and American philanthropic institutions like the Ford Foundation was post1945 for almost all non-communist ‘pro-European’ transnational organizations. Anne-Myriam Dutrieue and Michel Dumoulin have demonstrated (Dutrieue, 1993: 217; Dumoulin and Dutrieue, 1993), for example, that the formation of the European League for Economic Cooperation (ELEC) was originally the idea of Paul G. Hoffman, the director of the Ford Foundation, which also financed it in the initial stages. In his study of transnational cooperation of cities in the context of the Council of European Municipalities founded in January 1951, Oscar Gaspari shows (Gaspari, 2002: 612) that the key actors like Adriano Olivetti had close links with the first CIA Director, Allen Dulles, the American Committee for a United Europe (ACUE) and the Ford Foundation, which provided crucial financial assistance. The ACUE also largely funded the European Youth Campaign during 1951–8, which concentrated on the ‘core Europe’ states, with 1,900 workshops, congresses and other activities to win over the non-communist youth to the idea of supranational integration (Palayret, 1995: 49). It would be a mistake, however, to infer from the massive American support behind the scenes for transnational organizations working for integration in Western Europe that the ‘core Europe’ institutionalization was a US-driven project. The Europeans and the Americans were in agreement on some basic assumptions such as their anti-communism and their desire for meaningful political integration to strengthen Western Europe in the Cold War. This did not preclude transnational European networks from accepting the funding and developing their own ideas for European integration embedded in European traditions and values such as agricultural protection to support small-scale farming, the mixed economy and neo-corporatist forms of governance, even if this led to friction with the USA, for example over agricultural trade in the 1960s (Kaiser, 2003). Recent historical research has also demonstrated the limits to the ‘Americanization’ of Western Europe after 1945 as further supported by transnational links, especially in hegemonic contexts when the socialization effects appear to have remained quite superficial or limited to everyday culture of popular music and Coca Cola, without much influence on political attitudes and preferences. Archive-based evidence can also illustrate the way in which networks of networks operated in Western Europe after 1945. At the elite level they were often held together by a relatively small number of key actors who were involved in different networks and who played an important role for the transmission of ideas and policy concepts and for the formation of advocacy coalitions. To give but two

26

Wolfram Kaiser

examples, they included P.J.S. Serrarens, the long-standing Dutch Secretary General of the Christian trade union movement, who also participated in the Geneva Circle and in the formal organization for Christian democratic party cooperation, the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales, as well as in other transnational networks (Pasture, 1995; Gehler and Kaiser, 2004) and Hendrik Brugmans who was President of the European federalist movement from 1947 and was also Rector of the College of Europe in Bruges from 1952 to 1970 (Vermeulen, 2000). The postgraduate College of Europe developed into an informal École Nationale d’Administration for ‘core Europe’, shaping the intellectual formation of many young civil servants at the European and national levels and of academics specialized in European integration who in turn were to play an important role in the ‘European’ education of students in different disciplines at national universities. Moreover, through the analysis of networks of networks, historical research can also contribute to a better understanding of policy outcomes as a result of compromises between different advocacy coalitions. Thus, by the early 1950s, Christian democracy, heavy industry and some trade unions were united behind the aim of ‘core Europe’ integration, but were not strong enough to impose their vision for an integrated Europe. Neo-liberals like the West German Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, socialist parties and trade unions, who were sceptical about a too economically protectionist and/or culturally Catholic-influenced ‘core Europe’ without the inclusion of Britain and Scandinavia, only supported the ECSC on the condition that it would suppress cartels and have a relatively liberal policy on external trade (Spierenburg and Poidevin, 1994; Kipping, 1996). Such historical analysis must fully integrate the crucial role of transnational networks in making specific ideas and policy concepts hegemonic. It is inadequate to explain preference formation in a purely national context, as in Parsons’ recent ideational interpretation of the origins of the ECSC in France (Parsons, 2002, 2003). Many historians who tend to emphasize agency over structure will be able to relate to his central thesis that, in a situation where supranational ‘core Europe’ integration was in fact hotly contested in France, its adoption for the ECSC was only possible as a result of the ‘entrepreneurial leadership’ in the centrist parties of committed advocates like Robert Schuman of the ‘new ideology of integration’ (Parsons, 2002: 48). Yet, his interpretation is only very partially based on the recent archive-based historical literature and underestimates the extent to which, especially, the Mouvement Républicain Populaire and its leaders like Schuman and Bidault, were actually very united behind the ‘core Europe’ concept, although they did not necessarily agree on its exact institutional design (Gillingham, 1991: 150; Soutou, 1991; Gehler and Kaiser, 2004). More importantly, it fails to realize the extent to which their preference formation had taken place in the context of transnational party cooperation and how they used their transnational contacts to marginalize domestic opposition and to prevail in the struggle for the ‘core Europe’ concept. Finally, history as a discipline is mainly concerned with explaining change over time. David Marsh (1998: 192) has criticized network analysis for being too static

Transnational Western Europe since 1945 27 and for not understanding long-term change well. Equally, Schimmelfennig (2003: 421–2) has pointed to the weakness of the short time horizon of socialization research that fails to establish the durability of norm internalization. Against this background, historical research can demonstrate, first of all, the extent to which transnationalization preceded European institutionalization such as in the context of the interwar cooperation of trade unions (Pasture, 2001) and of conservative intellectual elites, for example (Müller and Plichta, 1999; Keller, 2001; Müller, 2001). In conjunction with incentives for transnationalization from the process of internationalization and globalization, a more long-term historical perspective therefore provides an explanatory corrective to ascribing too much importance to the European Union as a highly institutionalized system of governance for inducing transnationalization. Moreover, it brings out long-term continuities even over major transformations such as the Second World War, for example in the transnational network and its membership of steel producers in Western Europe who even continued to have very close cooperation during the war and again from quite shortly after the war onwards (Berger, 1997; Wilkens, 1998; Bührer, 1999). The historical perspective is also important for conceptualizing more precisely the ideal conditions and internal mechanisms for guaranteeing the structural and interpersonal stability of networks, advocacy coalitions, and epistemic communities and their policies over time. Historians find that ideas, values and norms evolve over long periods of time and are quite resilient. Their adoption, convergence and internalization in transnational contexts need to be culturally embedded to be successful and durable. Cultural institutions like the Catholic Church, for example, can play a crucial role in this respect and can act as societal carriers of ‘supranational’ (or any other set of ) ideas, values and norms to which networks can relate (Canavero and Durand, 1999). Although after 1945, the Pope and the Catholic hierarchy refrained from direct intervention in the transnational cooperation of Christian democrats and their European policies, which the parties rightly thought would be counterproductive, it continued to provide value guidance on fundamental principles such as anti-communism, suspicion of the centralized nationstate and preference for European federalism curtailed by subsidiarity – a political principle derived from Catholic social thought (Chenaux, 1990). Historical research also shows how transnational communities develop informal mechanisms in order to exclude members of their own national parties, pressure groups or other non-governmental organizations who do not respect the prevailing equally informal in-group rules about acceptable ideas, values and behaviour. One such example would be the way in which Konrad Adenauer, the then Christian democratic party leader in the British zone of occupation, first marginalized and then completely excluded intra-party opponents like Jakob Kaiser from transnational party cooperation (Gehler and Kaiser, 2004). This happened with the full support of Adenauer’s French partners who of course preferred his policy of almost unconditional Western integration to Kaiser’s preference for German unification under democratic auspices. Similarly, transnational Christian democracy made sure that neither the neo-liberals within their parties, who were

28

Wolfram Kaiser

sceptical about ‘core Europe’ integration, nor, later, the ‘Gaullists’, who supported a much more independent policy from the USA, could play any significant role in party cooperation. Their ability to influence policy in more than one country was thus sharply reduced, and they were often compensated domestically with control over other policies not immediately relevant to ‘Europe’. Transnational Christian democracy also used its network and cooperation with other ‘pro-European’ actors not only to influence the shape of the new European institutions, but also to guarantee that the key personnel had compatible ideas, values and policies. This was true, for example, of the first Christian democratic members of the EEC Commission like its President, Walter Hallstein. Similarly, the European Parliament largely self-selected its mostly federalist-leaning members from the European transnational networks of Christian democrats, social democrats and liberals, so that it effectively acted for a very long time as a kind of transnational federalist pressure group. Finally, in the context of change over time, historical research could also profitably analyse the significance of European institutionalization for the reorientation and possibly, reorganization of transnational communities and socialization processes. Such research is best conducted in a comparative framework, for example of the EEC and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s. As Patrick Pasture shows in his contribution to this book, the institutionalization in two different types of regional organizations certainly contributed to the further fragmentation of European trade unionism. It also induced much more intensive intra-EEC and intra-EFTA contacts of political parties, which may have contributed to the (temporary) hardening of diverging attitudes to the question of supranational governance versus intergovernmental cooperation, as well as other related issues. Although almost all archival sources for the 1960s are now accessible, such research into the relationship between European institutionalization and transnationalization in historical perspective is not even in its infancy.

Methodological challenges Research into the growth of an increasingly transnationally constituted European society within the ever more institutionalized EU faces a number of methodological challenges, some of which are comparable to similar ones in the social sciences, while others are related to the source base and are more discipline-specific. First of all, there is a marked absence of quantitative mapping of transnational networks to assess their internal constitution, their overlap with other networks, which can facilitate the formation of advocacy coalitions, and the frequency of transnational contacts and their relative importance in terms of invested resources compared to national activities. Such research could help beyond the identification of the role of particular individuals as information brokers and mediators between different networks. It could also identify overlap between transnational political activities and intergovernmental forums as well as interaction between them. Historians face the methodological problem, however, that

Transnational Western Europe since 1945 29 such quantitative research on transnational networks is even more difficult and time-consuming for them than in the social sciences as the necessary information on network membership and invested resources is often fragmented and scattered. In the debate on networks, Keith Dowding (2001: 90) has, moreover, argued that social scientists ‘should not disparage careful discriptive history’. However, he has also insisted that such descriptive histories often fail to capture all relevant causal factors that explain policy outcomes and certainly cannot establish ‘which of the causal factors are most important’. According to Dowding, this requires formal modelling to abstract important explanatory features which can then be examined ‘more closely in reality’. It has to be said that in relation to transnational networks in post-war Europe, it is certainly easier to capture the role of transnational networks and epistemic communities in the cross-border transfer of formal institutions, policies and norms and values below the supranational level, as they often function as the only mediators in such transfer processes, than their influence on intergovernmental and supranational policy-making in the EU context. In order to also better specify their influence on EU policy-making, contemporary historians could borrow some of Parsons’ ideas (Parsons, 2002: 48) for ‘isolating ideas as causes’. In particular, they should concentrate on studying historical decision-making situations in which ideas and material interests did not overlap in the interest formation of (crucially) fragmented pressure groups, coalitions and parties affording ‘entrepreneurial leaders’ the opportunity to set policy agendas not least through their transnational coordination and to decisively influence the outcome of parallel or subsequent formal intergovernmental negotiating processes. More than many social scientists, contemporary historians also tend to make ‘heuristic claims’ (Checkel, 2001b: 557) about socialization and compliance in transnational cooperation which are ‘intuitively or empirically plausible but insufficiently elaborated to allow for empirical testing and generalising to other contexts’. To begin with, historical research often proceeds inductively and is not, as a general rule, interested so much in the generalizing of its results to other forms of transnationalism, time spans or institutional contexts. There is a temptation, moreover, to infer from the study of transnational relations that policy changes must be the outcome of effective socialization, whereas it is possible that they could also reflect external pressures or domestic political incentives. It is clear, for example, that the German Social Democrats’ policy change on ‘Europe’ in the mid-1950s also resulted from the party’s desire to break free of the nationalist legacy of Kurt Schumacher, its first post-war leader, in order to become more electable, not just from the transnational contacts of its leaders in the Socialist International and with the trade union network. In this context, contemporary historians could profit from recent attempts by social scientists (Checkel, 2001a,b) to delineate transnational socialization processes more clearly and to develop an appropriate methodology to capture them. This would include systematic interviews with individuals asking them to reflect on and to characterize past social processes of transnational socialization and norm internalization and habitualization. Such research methods could help make arguments more plausible that the

30

Wolfram Kaiser

preferences and behaviour of political actors would have been different without their inclusion in intensive transnationalism. Other methodological challenges relate to the enlarged source base of contemporary history compared to social science research. Access to written sources that are inaccessible to researchers for a period of up to 30 years (as in the case of most government records) or even, in some cases, longer, is of course one of the main advantages of historical research, and what also potentially makes its results especially relevant for social science research. However, the larger source base is a mixed blessing. Most importantly, governmental sources are much more systematically preserved than those of transnational actors because state institutions are legally obliged to keep records and also have the financial resources to do so systematically in their own archives. Such record keeping is not nearly as important for non-state actors and their transnational networks, whose documents are often fragmented and scattered, resulting in a source-related bias of contemporary historical research towards the ‘safer’ study of state actors and intergovernmental relations – and resulting in exaggerating their dominance. However, the ideas on customs union integration of a minor civil servant in a trade ministry are not more important than those of a transnationally networked leading banker and informal government adviser, just because they are better documented in written form. Related to the varying levels of preservation of written sources, transnational phenomena were not insignificant simply because they are not comprehensively documented in the preserved written sources. Many of the most important transnational contacts within networks and between them and governmental actors were (and still are) of a highly informal character, in the form of private meetings and electronic communication, especially by telephone. The detailed documentation in the form of word protocols of the informal Christian democratic party cooperation in the Geneva Circle (Gehler and Kaiser, 2004) in itself is exceptional for transnational networks in the early post-war period. Many more informal contacts existed beyond the private meetings in Geneva, however, including through intercultural ‘messengers’ like Victor Koutzine, the co-founder and secretary of the Geneva Circle, who often commuted between Paris and Bonn, as well as telephone conversations, for example, to coordinate the filling of positions in the ECSC High Authority or the EEC Commission. To compensate for the fragmented written documentation, contemporary historians need to make greater use of interviews with key actors in a more systematic way than they did in the past. Thirty years after the studied events, many actors may already have expired. If they are still alive, their memory would be quite patchy and probably distorted by a growing desire to create a particular image of one’s past political behaviour to sustain an important place in European collective memory. Such problems could be partially overcome through the more systematic interviewing of actors closer to the actual events, but at a point when they are sufficiently disinterested in current politics to be able to talk freely. Such interviewing would certainly benefit from greater interdisciplinary cooperation between contemporary history and the social sciences. Even if this can be achieved, however, interviews with actors about their activities in transnational

Transnational Western Europe since 1945 31 contexts and how they influenced their ideas, behaviour and policies have pitfalls. In particular, many actors may tend to overemphasize the socialization effects and the political influence of transnational contacts as they could reflect in an advantageous way on their ‘European’ identities and political roles. These and other methodological challenges to contemporary historical research on transnationalization processes in the context of integration should be taken seriously and addressed in an appropriate manner to achieve greater recognition for this dimension of postwar European history by more traditional diplomatic and economic historians as well as social scientists. Yet, many of these methodological issues are equally relevant for rational choice analyses of ‘national’ preference formation and intergovernmental bargaining, for example, and are certainly not a compelling reason to call the importance of the transnational research dimension as such into question.

Conclusion As early as 1995, David R. Cameron (1995: 38) suggested in relation to the origins of economic and monetary union that ‘transnational politics have been neglected in relation to the study of the EC’. In fact, they had been neglected in relation to European politics much more generally, at the sub-European level as well. Whereas in the meantime, the social sciences have made some progress towards remedying the situation, contemporary historical research on post-war (Western) Europe has been even slower at analysing the growth of transnational societal structures within the context of institutionalized integration and their influence on European politics in the current European Union. Research on integration history has been dominated by traditional realist diplomatic history and economic history. Although they compete with each other and emphasize different political or economic factors, both approaches are in fact very similar in their narrow focus on national European policy-making by governments. Transnationalization was an important phenomenon in its own right. It deserves to be studied as such. It is however probably true that governments enjoyed a greater autonomy in their European policy-making after 1945, as opposed to the EU of the present time. It therefore requires further clarification to what extent it also mattered for integration outcomes. The examples mentioned in this chapter underline, however, that it would be very important to arrive at such a better understanding of transnational factors in the integration process and for West European history, in general. A more comprehensive societal perspective on postwar Western Europe would also be more in line with the progressing re-conceptualization of modern European history more broadly and its relativizing of the narrow nation-state framework which has tended to emphasize conflict and difference over cross-border links and commonalities. Contemporary history could then also make a major contribution to research on transnationalism in the European Union and the resulting Europeanization effects. This is facilitated by four main factors which have recently led to a renewed valuation of historical research as having important explanatory value for contemporary phenomena: the bizarre

32

Wolfram Kaiser

character of exaggerated over-generalizations of some social science (and integration) theories and models; the fundamental disillusionment with the predictive value of social science theory during the breakdown of the Soviet bloc in 1989–91; the growth of theoretical approaches in the social sciences (also applied to the European Union) such as historical institutionalism and constructivism, which emphasize the path-dependency and cultural embeddedness (and therefore, historical depth) of preferences and policies; and lastly, the contemporary experience of the force of ‘history’ in European and world politics. In this increasingly auspicious climate for interdisciplinary cooperation, contemporary history can contribute to the emerging research on transnationalism in the European Union in a number of important ways – through conceptualizing transnational relations; generating empirical evidence on an enlarged source base for testing theoretical hypotheses; identifying new aspects of transnationalism previously unexplored by the social sciences in different contemporary circumstances or because of a lack of access to sources; and most importantly perhaps, through contributing to the better understanding of change over time in transnational networks, cross-border socialization and the influence of transnational factors on national and European policy-making. In this way, contemporary history could help to understand European integration in a more comprehensive way as the growth of a partially transnationally constituted European society and polity, going beyond the narrower concentration on EU institutions, national policy-making and inter-state bargaining. ‘Europe’ was neither made then nor is now by governments alone.

References Berger, Françoise (1997) ‘Les sidérurgistes français et allemands face à l’Europe: convergences et divergences de conception et d’intérêts 1932–1952’, Journal of European Integration History, 3(2): 35–52. Berghahn, Volker R. (2001) America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philantrophy, Academy, and Diplomacy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bluhm, Gesa (2003) ‘Vertrauensarbeit. Deutsch-französische Beziehungen nach 1945’, in Ute Frevert (ed.), Vertrauen. Historische Annäherungen, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 365–93. Boli, John and Thomas, George M. (eds) (1999) Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Bührer, Werner (1999) Ruhrstahl und Europa: Die Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie und die Anfänge der europäischen Integration 1945–1952, Munich: Oldenbourg. Cameron, David R. (1995) ‘Transnational relations and the development of economic and monetary union’, in Thomas Risse (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37–78. Canavero, Alfredo and Durand, Jean-Dominique (eds) (1999) Il fattore religioso nell’integrazione europea, Milan: Edizioni Unicopli. Chanier, Christophe (1993) ‘Entreprise et intégration européenne: le cas de la multinationale Philips’, in Michael Dumoulin, René Girault and Gilbert Trausch (eds), L’Europe du patronat. De la guerre froide aux années soixante, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, pp. 101–10.

Transnational Western Europe since 1945 33 Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001a) ‘From meta- to substantive theory? Social constructivism and the study of Europe’, European Union Politics, 2(2): 219–26. —— (2001b) ‘Why comply? Social learning and European identity change’, International Organization, 55(3): 553–88. Chenaux, Philippe (1990) Une Europe vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et les Traités de Rome, Brussels: éditions ciaco. Deutsch, Karl (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dowding, Keith (2001) ‘There must be end to confusion: policy networks, intellectual fatigue and the need for political science methods courses in British universities’, Political Studies, 49: 89–105. Duchêne, François (1994) Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence, New York and London: W. W. Norton. Dumoulin, Michael and Dutrieue, Anne-Myriam (1993) La Ligue Européenne de Coopération Économique (1946–1981), Un group d’étude et de pression dans la construction européenne, Berne: Peter Lang. Dutrieue, Anne-Myriam (1993) ‘Le CEPES, un mouvement patronal européen? (1952–1967)’, in Michel Dumoulin, René Girault and Gilbert Trausch (eds), L’Europe du patronat: De la guerre froide aux années soixante, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, pp. 213–30. Espagne, Michel (ed.) (1999) Les Transferts Culturels Franco-Allemands, Paris: Presses Universitaire de France. Gaspari, Oscar (2002) ‘Cities against States? Hopes, dreams and shortcomings of the European municipal movement, 1900–1960’, Contemporary European History, 11(4): 597–621. Gehler, Michael and Kaiser, Wolfram (2001) ‘Transnationalism and early European integration: the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales and the Geneva Circle, 1947–1957’, The Historical Journal, 44(3): 773–98. —— (2004) Transnationale Parteienkooperation europäischer Christdemokraten. Dokumente 1945–1965, Munich: K. G. Saur. Geyer, Martin H. and Paulmann, Johannes (eds) (2001) The Mechanics of Internationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Geyer, Michael (1989) ‘Historical fictions of autonomy and the Europeanization of national history’, Central European History, 22(3–4): 316–42. Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C. E. and Schumacher, Frank (eds) (2003) Culture and International History, New York: Berghahn. Gillingham, John (1991) Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Guasconi, Maria Eleonora (1998) ‘The international confederation of free trade union’s policy towards the European integration process from 1950 to 1957’, in Eric Bussière and Michel Dumoulin (eds), Milieux économiques et intégration européenne en Europe occidentale au xxe siècle, Arras: Artois Presses Université, pp. 359–70. Haas, Peter M. (1992) ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy co-ordination’, International Organization, 46: 1–35. Hobsbawm, Eric (2002) ‘Old Marxist still sorting global fact from fiction’, Times Higher Education Supplement, 12: 18–19. Johansson, Karl Magnus (2002) ‘Another road to Maastricht: the Christian democrat coalition and the quest for European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(3): 871–93. Kaelble, Hartmut and Schriewer, Jürgen (eds) (2001) Vergleich und Transfer: Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus.

34

Wolfram Kaiser

Kaiser, Wolfram (1997) ‘Globalisierung und Geschichte: Einige methodische Überlegungen zur Zeitgeschichtsschreibung der internationalen Beziehungen’, in Guido Müller (ed.), Deutschland und der Westen, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, pp. 31–48. —— (1999) Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945–1963, Basingstoke: Macmillan. —— (2001) ‘Culturally embedded and path-dependent: peripheral alternatives to ECSC/EEC “core Europe” since 1945’, Journal of European Integration History, 7(2): 11–36. —— (2003) ‘Trigger-happy Protestant materialists? The European Christian democrats and the United States’, in Marc Trachtenberg (ed.), Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 63–82. Kaiser, Wolfram and Elvert, Jürgen (eds) (2004) European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History, London: Routledge. Keller, Thomas (2001) Deutsch-französische Dritte-Weg-Diskurse: Personalistische Intellektuellen-Debatten der Zwischenkriegszeit, Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. Kipping, Matthias (1996) Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz. Der Schuman-Plan und die Ursprünge der europäischen Einigung 1944–1952, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Küsters, Hanns Jürgen (1982) Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, BadenBaden: Nomos. Lipgens, Walter and Loth, Wilfried (eds) (1991) Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol. 4: Transnational Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Struggle for European Union, 1945–1950, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. Marsh, David (1998) ‘The utility and future of policy network analysis’, in David Marsh (ed.), Comparing Policy Networks, Buckingham and Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, pp. 185–97. Marsh, David and Smith, Martin (2000) ‘Understanding policy networks: towards a dialectical approach’, Political Studies, 48: 4–21. Merkel, Wolfgang (1999) ‘Die Europäische Integration und das Elend der Theorie’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 25(2): 302–38. Milward, Alan S. (1992) The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London: Routledge. —— (1995) ‘Allegiance: the past and the future’, Journal of European Integration History, 1(1): 7–19. Milward, Alan S., Lynch, Frances M. B., Romero, Federico, Ranieri, Ruggero and Sørensen, Vibeke (1993) The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945–1992, London: Routledge. Moravscik, Andrew (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Muhs, Rudolf, Paulmann, Johannes and Steinmetz, Willibald (eds) (1998) Aneignung und Abwehr: Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19: Jahrhundert, Bodenheim: Philo. Müller, Guido (2001) ‘Jenseits des Nationalismus? “Europa” als Konzept grenzübergreifender adlig-bürgerlicher Elitendiskurse zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen’, in Heinz Reif (ed.), Adel und Bürgertum in Deutschland, Vol. II: Elitenwandel in der Moderne, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, pp. 235–68. Müller, Guido and Plichta, Vanessa (1999) ‘Zwischen Rhein und Donau: Abendländisches Denken zwischen deutsch-französischen Verständigungsinitiativen und konservativkatholischen Integrationsmodellen 1923–1957’, Journal of European Integration History, 5(2): 17–47. Olsen, Johan P. (2002) ‘The many faces of Europeanization’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5): 921–52.

Transnational Western Europe since 1945 35 Osterhammel, Jürgen (1996) ‘Sozialgeschichte im Zivilisationsvergleich: zu künftigen Möglichkeiten komparativer Geschichtswissenschaft’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 22(2): 143–64. Palayret, Jean Marie (1995) ‘Eduquer les jeunes à l’Union: la campagne européenne de la jeunesse 1951–1958’, Journal of European Integration History, 1(2): 47–60. Parsons, Craig (2002) ‘Showing ideas as causes: the origins of the European Union’, International Organization, 56(1): 47–84. —— (2003) A Certain Idea of Europe, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pasture, Patrick (1995) ‘The fist of the dwarf: formation, organization and representation of the Christian trade unions as a European pressure group (1945–1958)’, Journal of European Integration History, 1(2): 5–26. —— (2001) ‘The interwar origins of international labour’s European commitment (1919–1934)’, Contemporary European History, 10(2): 221–37. Roussel, Eric (1996) Jean Monnet, Paris: Fayard. Schimmelfennig, Frank (2003), ‘Internationale Sozialisation: Von einem “erschöpften” zu einem produktiven Forschungsprogramm?’, in Gunter Hellmann, Klaus Dieter Wolf and Michael Zürn (eds), Forschungsstand und Perspektiven der Internationalen Beziehungen in Deutschland, Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 401–27. Schwarz, Hans-Peter (1986) ‘Die Straßburger Anfänge multinationaler IntegrationsHistoriographie’, in Raymond Poidevin (ed.), Histoire des Débuts de la Construction Européenne (Mars 1948–Mai 1950), Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 447–57. Soutou, Georges-Henri (1991) ‘Georges Bidault et la construction européenne: 1944–1954’, Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique, 105: 267–306. Spierenburg, Dirk and Poidevin, Raymond (1994) The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Tenbruck, Friedrich H. (1989) ‘Gesellschaftsgeschichte als Weltgeschichte?’, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 41(3): 417–39. Trachtenberg, Marc (2000) ‘De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and Europe’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 2(3): 101–16. Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan (2002) Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration, London: Routledge. Van Waarden, Frans and Drahos, Michaela (2002) ‘Courts and (epistemic) communities in the convergence of competition policies’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6): 913–34. Vermeulen, Caroline (2000) Le Collège de l’Europe à l’ère des pionniers (1950–1960), Brussels: Peter Lang. Werner, Michael and Zimmermann, Bénédicte (2002) ‘Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung: der Ansatz der histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 28(4): 607–36. Wilkens, Andreas (1998) ‘L’Europe des ententes ou l’Europe de l’intégration? Les industries française et allemande et les débuts de la construction européenne (1948–1952)’, in Eric Bussière and Michel Dumoulin (eds), Milieux économiques et intégration européenne en Europe occidentale au xxe siècle, Arras: Artois Presses Université, pp. 267–83.

2

Transnational networks Informal governance in the European political space Karen Heard-Lauréote

Transnational networks of public, quasi-public and private actors are increasingly omnipresent both within the European Union and beyond. Examples of such networks include the European Financial Services Roundtable (EFR), the Network for Progressive Governance, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) and the European Farmers Coordination (CPE). Nevertheless, it is significant that although they may share the same generic label, transnational networks are functionally varied. For example, the EFR, made up of the heads of leading banks and insurers, exists to provide a strong industry voice on European policy issues relating to financial services and to support the completion of the single market in financial services. However, the Network for Progressive Governance is in essence a social democratic network originating in Europe (although it has some extensions beyond). It brings together current and former heads of state and government, ‘progressive’ politicians, thinkers and strategists from throughout Europe by providing a forum for strategic discussions. This assists the exchange of concrete measures and methods applicable to daily government so as to facilitate the shaping of the European Union, national and regional politics as well as idea and policy transfer. Furthermore, while the CEMR, comprised of national associations of towns, municipalities and regions from 30 European countries, aims to promote the particular interests of local and regional government, the CPE is a pan-European network comprised of and defending the interests of almost 20 farming and rural organizations from 11 European countries. Transnational networks are a product of a wider and growing movement of ‘transnationalism’, a term which broadly refers to the numerous and increasing ties and connections that link people and/or institutions across borders, be they national, regional or local. This dynamic movement responds to the basic processes of globalization. These processes encapsulate the way in which people, goods, money and ideas are transferred more rapidly and inexpensively today around the world than ever before due to innovations in transport, communication and technology. Globalization erodes (national) sovereign authority to the extent that it encourages processes of deregulation, privatization, de-territorialization (of people, employment and industry), a process of Europeanization upward, devolution or regionalism downward and the creation of and increased reliance on

Transnational networks 37 supranational institutions such as the European Union. These various processes facilitate the formation of transnational or even worldwide networks and these in turn incite and necessitate the coordination of resources, information and technology across national borders. In recent years, increasing individual and financial mobility and the development of communication have intensified such transborder relations, leading to both social and political mobilization beyond boundaries: transnational networks. To understand why transnational networks are becoming increasingly active at the European level requires an understanding that EU governance is fundamentally different from nation-state governance. Unlike the latter, EU governance is not based on hierarchical coordination by government-like structures or on a strong authoritative basis. Rather, European governance takes place through a process of negotiations in network settings that link public and private actors of different levels (regional, national and European) and dimensions ( legislature, judiciary and executive) of government. In such contexts, political power is exercised by sharing and pooling resources through the establishment of networks. The value of transnational networks is their ability to make sense of dynamic policy-making processes in both the wider European and the local context as well as their contribution to political exchanges; policy-making and policy transfer below the EU level. Although, such cross-border cooperation is also partly induced and strengthened by supra-national integration, networks also build on traditional societal links as well as shared socio-economic and political attributes to further collaboration. One of the most important approaches to analysing the process of European transnationalization is the network concept. To explore the process and the concept, this chapter is organized in the following way. First, it discusses how although the network concept was originally developed as a means to re-conceptualize public policy-making in the national context at a time of the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state, the concept has recently been extended to studying the emerging European polity. In this context, three main approaches under the network label are distinguished and elaborated upon; policy networks, advocacy coalitions and epistemic communities. As a way of exploring some of the more general methodological issues involved in studying transnational networks, the chapter then proceeds to outline some of the major criticisms addressed at the networks approach. Following on from this, some examples of transnational networks research in the European Union are examined. The discussion closes upon some brief conclusions and ideas on a future research agenda.

Theoretical perspectives The empirical multiplication of networks signalled earlier has encouraged the development of an abundant literature on the network approach. The latter was originally developed as a means to re-conceptualize public policy within national contexts. Subsequently, in political studies, the dominant variant of network analysis that emerged in the 1990s became known as the ‘policy networks’ approach and

38

Karen Heard-Lauréote

provided a theoretical framework by which to analyse decision-making processes in a centreless state involving a multitude of individual and collective and public and private actors. However, although, this public policy approach was initially limited to domestic settings, over the years it has broadened in its application to networks in the European Union and has since been applied in general to transnational politics. The policy network idea initially developed as an approach to analyse statebusiness interest relations in national contexts. Traditionally, two basic types of relationship between interests and the state are deemed possible and these two approaches are usually related to the concepts of pluralism and corporatism. In the pluralist approach there is competition between interest groups to gain access to the policy-making procedures of the state to influence political decisions. Furthermore, a large number of interest groups are generally considered relevant to the analysis. In the corporatist approach there is cooperation between interests and between interests and the state while political influence is seen as restricted to a limited number of privileged participants ( Jordan and Schubert, 1992: 7). Although the types of advantaged interests varied according to different national contexts and policy sectors, these generally tended to represent the peak associations of business and trades unions. Waarden amongst others has argued that the concept of policy network ‘seems to have replaced corporatism [itself a critique of pluralism] as the fashionable catch phrase in the study of interest group politics’ (1992: 30). Indeed, since the 1970s, when the corporatist approach was at its height, particularly in the study of the Dutch, Swiss, Austrian, Swedish, Norwegian and Danish political systems, recent decades have witnessed significant changes in the political reality. These include the emergence of a society based on organized collectivities; a sectorization trend in policy-making; an increased mobilization of competing interests leading to over crowded policy-making; an increase in the scope and complexity of state policy-making, which has led to an increasing reliance by the government upon professional associations, pressure groups, think tanks and private sector companies for the formulation and implementation of politics and the decentralization or fragmentation of the state and the blurring of boundaries between the public and private (Kenis and Schneider, 1991). The political science discipline accordingly responded to these modified policy-making arrangements by developing the new terminology of ‘policy networks’. The development of the policy network approach was not, however, a uniform process. In fact, certain geographically distinct variations exist. The most striking distinction is that between the British and American literature and that between the German and Dutch literature. The former two schools have tended to have a narrower focus than the latter two concentrating on the role that networks play in the development and implementation of policy, especially analyses of intergovernmental relations, interest group intermediations and sub-governments (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974; Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Grant et al., 1988; Rhodes, 1988; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). The latter literature is considered to be more

Transnational networks 39 ambitious (Marsh and Smith, 2000: 4) and some of its leading writers treat networks as a new form of governance providing an alternative to markets and hierarchies (e.g. Kenis and Schneider, 1991; Kooiman, 1993). Many such scholars form part of what has been called the Max-Planck School and they stress policy networks as a form of social organization in response to political problems of coordination (Schneider, 1988; Knoke, 1990; Lehmbruch, 1991; Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Mayntz, 1994; Sciarini, 1996; Börzel, 1997). The Dutch literature also emphasizes the various mechanisms of managing networks for public policy introducing the concept of network management (Kickert et al., 1999). A French version of a policy network account has also emerged in recent years and resulted in an edited book by Le Galès and Thatcher (1995). The main exponent and investigator is, however, Pierre Muller who has espoused policy networks as a form of social mediation ( Muller, 1984, 1989; Jobert and Muller, 1987). His empirical findings confirm differences between policy sectors and relatively stable closed policy communities originally the focus of much British literature. Whichever school of thought network scholars adhere to, the concept of governance is paramount in network analyses. Indeed, the ascendance of the policy networks approach is intrinsically linked to the governance discourse. The term governance has multiple facets and a variety of meanings. Bevir and Rhodes even quote a colleague who described it as ‘a weasel word – slippery and elusive, used to obscure not to shed light’ (2003: 41). Nonetheless, one of the five overlapping usages detected by Hirst is the ‘practice of coordinating activities through networks, partnerships and deliberative forums that have grown up on the ruins of more centralized and hierarchical corporatist representation of the period up to the 1970s’ (2000: 19). Thus, in this interpretation, governance stands for a change in the meaning of government and reflects the movement from a unitary state forming the kernel of state-centred government to the so-called centreless society of today. Moreover, governance explores the changing boundaries between state and civil society signalling how the informal authority of networks increasingly supplements and even supplants the formal authority of nation-state institutions resulting in governance in and by networks (Rhodes, 1997, 2000; Stoker, 1999, 2000; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003). In sum, policies and politics are increasingly differentiated and fragmented across sectors and institutions rendering functional and institutional specialization essential elements in order to deliver effective government. This differentiated polity (Rhodes, 1997: 7) is partly explained by the ‘hollowing-out of the state’, a phrase which refers to the loss of functions and policy-making by the national government in three directions; upwards to the European Union and beyond through processes of Europeanization and globalization, downwards to special-purpose bodies in the face of decentralization, and outwards to agencies in the face of privatization (Rhodes, 1997: 17). To account for and make sense of this changed governance context, ‘the “network paradigm” in all its mysterious guises is reshaping the political, economic and social landscape of the advanced industrial societies’ (Hay, 1998: 33) to the extent that, if we believe Castells (1996), today, we live in a ‘network society’.

40

Karen Heard-Lauréote

De Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof have defined a policy network as ‘an entity consisting of public, quasi-public, or private actors who are dependent on each other and, as a consequence of this dependence, maintain relations with each other’ (1995: 163). In sum, three elements of the approach are intrinsic: (a) a set of interdependent actors (b) who share a common broad interest and (c) operate within a functionally defined policy area. However, despite this relatively simple definition, over recent years the concept of networks has been used with different and more or less complex meanings. Nonetheless, some common characteristics can be found throughout the literature. The first is that interdependencies between actors are a pre-condition for networks. This notion of interdependency is borrowed from the power-dependence model of inter-organizational relations, which assumes that all organizations are dependent on others for resources. Therefore, organizations need to exchange resources, involving bargaining within and between themselves, in order to achieve their individual goals (Rhodes, 1981: 97–133). Interdependence facilitates the construction of policy networks, because actors within a policy sector are dependent upon each other for resources and are thus connected together as a network. The second common characteristic is an acceptance that policy-making is not uniform across the government. Indeed, the British literature, in its attempt to explain relations between the central and local (periphery) government (Rhodes, 1988) and between the government and pressure groups (Smith, 1993), stressed the importance of disaggregating the policy-making process into discrete policy sectors and network structures were shown to vary considerably between such sectors. Third, networks consist of a variety of actors each with their own goals and relations of a more or less lasting nature between these actors. In fact, the number of interested policy actors, their goals and resources and their consequent relations will depend significantly upon the different traditions, routines and environments of policy sectors as well as the salient issues within these. Under the policy networks approach, based on different criteria such as the level of institutionalization or integration, stability, the scope of the policy-making arrangement (sectoral or trans-sectoral focus) and exclusiveness or the number of participants, different competing models and typologies emerged and developed throughout the 1990s. Rod Rhodes, one of the most influential British academics on this subject, and later Marsh and Rhodes, developed an elaborate typology of different kinds of policy networks along a continuum (Rhodes, 1988: 253–366; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). One extreme on this continuum is a policy community. It is a tight, closed, consensual, highly integrated and highly institutionalized network in which membership is very restricted and all members have significant resources to exchange with a relative balance of power existing between actors. Because radical change would threaten the consensus on which the community is based, policy decisions taken in this type of network are marginal, incremental adjustments that provoke only limited change. Non-public, routinized relations between dominant interests and civil servants who share interests and a commitment to the policy also characterize policy communities. There is substantial trust between actors to observe the ‘rules of the game’. Authors also sometimes stress that members of policy communities often share a policy paradigm, that is, a view

Transnational networks 41 of the world which consists of the most urgent problems that need to be dealt with, the actors who are part of the community, and the main instruments, which can or need to be used to tackle the perceived problems. At the other extreme of the Marsh/Rhodes continuum (1992) is an issue network in which access is relatively wide and open and in which many loosely bound actors with unequal resources participate. Here relations may be characterized as conflictual and there is an unequal distribution of power between actors. Because the degrees of integration and institutionalization are low, the network is basically unstable. Advocacy coalitions and epistemic communities represent alternative but related concepts to network analysis. All recognize the complexity of public policy and assume the involvement of public and private actors in network type structures. However, whereas policy networks stress the importance of resources in the structuring of relationships between actors, advocacy coalitions and epistemic communities represent an attempt to develop network analysis from metaphorical and typological debates and disputes by introducing the notion of policy ‘ideas’, their generation by technical experts and professionals and their importance in structuring network relationships. Their essential difference is that while epistemic communities of actors debate common sets of ideas, such as on the international politics of the environment (Haas, 1992), advocacy coalitions of actors within the same policy domain engage in policy-orientated learning ( Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). An epistemic community as defined by Peter Haas is ‘a professional group that believes in the same cause and effect relationships, truth tests to assess them, and shares common values’ (1990: 55) and later as ‘channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country’ (Haas, 1992: 27). In simpler terms, it is a network of experts who share a common understanding of the scientific and political nature of a particular problem (Betsill and Bulkerley, 2004: 4). These experts maintain contact with each other across their various geographical locations and fields of interest. In this way they create valuable channels for information flow, heighten the possibility of introducing and discussing new perspectives and provide an informal basis from which to make public pronouncements to the media for example, especially if the epistemic community includes a few prominent and respected individuals. The fundamental idea behind the epistemic community notion is to regard international agreements as the result of the emergence of common belief systems leading to policy convergence rather than as the result of power bargaining games between self-interested nation-states. The increasing influence wielded by such communities within international regimes is by virtue of their authoritative knowledge claims and their ability to create a scientific consensus on the issue at hand, to which policymakers turn under conditions of uncertainty (Haas, 1990: 55; Paterson, 1996: 136–7). As a network, epistemic communities are thus seen as a group of individuals who foster policy learning through the dissemination of factual, consensual knowledge (Betsill and Bulkerley, 2004: 4). Zito (2001: 589) argues that the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) provides a useful elaboration of the epistemic community concept. While both

42

Karen Heard-Lauréote

focus on the role of knowledge in influencing policy change, the ACF is a broader concept of groups driven by core beliefs. Indeed, advocacy coalitions as developed by Sabatier (1998) form on the basis of shared beliefs and values, the core argument being that actors/institutions who share a similar perspective will forge coalition type relationships with each other. They therefore consist of various different actors, including government agencies, associations, civil society organizations, think tanks, academics, media institutions and prominent individuals. The ACF has four ‘basic premises’. First, an evaluation of the effects of policy (as it completes a cycle) and policy change requires a time perspective of at least ten years. Second, the focus should be on the interaction of actors from different institutions who follow and seek to influence, governmental decisions in a policy area. Third, attention should be concentrated institutionally between central, regional and local levels of government since actors from all these levels are involved. Finally, public policies can be conceptualized as belief systems, which are conceived of as ‘sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realize them’ ( Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994: 178). According to this framework, there are competing advocacy coalitions within each policy domain and in general one of these coalitions will be dominant and wield greater power over the policy process than other coalitions. Recent years have seen the emergence of the concept of ‘transnational advocacy networks’ based on this advocacy coalition framework. According to Keck and Sikkink (1998: 2) this type of network ‘includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services’. These voluntary networks are said to comprise of both state and nonstate actors as well as organizations and individuals and operate simultaneously both within domestic and international political arenas. However, they are most frequently found in issues where there are easily identified principled positions (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004: 474). Transnational advocacy networks are forged in a variety of contexts whereby domestic actors find their influence over nationstates blocked and turn to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or other nation-states for support; when policy entrepreneurs believe it to be in the best interest of their organization; or through connections established within the burgeoning number of international policy/activist arenas (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 12–16). Moreover, their structure is maintained through the dissemination of information and the production of shared values while their information, ideas and strategies constitute the power they use to alter the information and value contexts within which states make policies. Equipped with this broad overview of the historical perspectives and the defining characteristics of the political science approach of policy networks and the related concepts of advocacy coalitions and epistemic communities, the added value of the application of the network approach to the study of European policy-making and governance may be assessed. If we accept that the varied and complex nature of European policy-making processes cannot necessarily be explained by one grand macro theory, the network approach’s ability to separate such processes into its component parts; distinguish between policy sectors (some open, some

Transnational networks 43 closed) and national contexts; allow for the incorporation of the constellation of different actors involved in these processes (experts, professional associations, pressure groups, think tanks, etc.); consider the ideas and resource dependencies of these actors, undoubtedly render it a valuable and functional research device. Furthermore, European governance arguably provides the best opportunity yet for exploring the potential of the network approach to move beyond its reputation for being no more than an analytical toolbox and be accepted as a real theoretical approach. Whereas state-centric theories defend a concept of governance based on a national or supranational authority for hierarchical coordination in public policy-making, the network approach is better equipped to encapsulate the new and unique nature of the European Union as a system of ‘governance without government’. In fact, it is not through hierarchical coordination by national governments joined in the Council of Ministers or by a supranational actor like the Commission that European governance takes place. Rather, it is through non-hierarchical bargaining and negotiations between public, quasipublic and private actors from different levels of government and spheres of society that coordinate interests and resources. Notwithstanding the added value of the network approach to the study of European policy-making and governance outlined hereto, over the years, the network approach has been subject to much criticism. The following discussion seeks to address a selection of the major methodological issues associated with the network approach.

Methodological issues Since its inception, the networks approach has grown to become one of the dominant approaches to understanding policy-making, governance and transnationalism in advanced industrialized democracies. The approach’s usefulness arguably resides in its ability to capture ideas of complexity, multiple public and private actors and interdependence. Indeed, one of its central virtues is its ability to map policy-making and provide a typology of the different relationships between actors. However, although the approach is generally accepted as providing useful insights into such areas, it has not escaped criticism amongst scholars. Its most commonly cited faults are its metaphorical basis, which renders it too descriptive and its failure to adequately explain social and political change. One of the most common criticisms directed at the network approach is that the model is better at describing than explaining. Indeed, the origins of the terms ‘policy community’ and ‘policy network’ are essentially metaphorical, used to characterize relationships between groups and governments. Particularly in the British literature, the concept of network has been predominantly employed in the same style as Beck’s London Underground map, which represents a simplified, schematic version of reality (Parsons, 1995: 60). This is not to say however that the network ‘map’ is not useful for policy analysis. Used as they have been in this metaphorical sense, as a model, image or figurative diagram of reality (Hanf and Scharpf, 1977; Heclo, 1978; Katzenstein, 1978), networks arguably help to make sense of complex and chaotic modern political realities. Notwithstanding

44

Karen Heard-Lauréote

these advantages, inescapably, the descriptive and metaphorical character of the term policy network has invited various definitional disputes (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992: 158). In fact, since the outset, new terminologies, exclusive definitions, network varieties and typologies have been regularly introduced, discussed and developed to the extent that networks have become a ubiquitous concept (Rhodes, 1990: 293). This has led British pioneers of the approach such as Jordan to clamour for semantic rigour and consistency in the terminology or ‘jargon’ used in the policy networks approach before the ‘debate degenerates as contributors offer their arguments in a private code that cannot be refuted’ ( Jordan, 1990: 319; Jordan and Schubert, 1992; Van Waarden, 1992). Arguably, the lack of semantic clarity renders the definition and qualification of what constitutes a policy network, problematic. Despite the lack of semantic rigour engendered by the approach, its metaphorical nature and ambiguities surrounding the use of terms, the perspective, nonetheless, provides a useful heuristic tool for students of policy-making. This has led scholars like Dowding (1995) to argue that because such descriptive uses and terminological debates will not yield advances in the approach’s explanatory power or conceptual integration, the approach should move beyond metaphor, ‘thick description’ and classification towards better empirical use. Hay and Richards note that policy networks are often portrayed as ‘Static, indeed torpid phenomena’ (2000: 2). This appraisal introduces a second fundamental criticism directed at the network approach – that is its perceived lack of conceptual tools to sufficiently explain change over time. Although scholars note that ‘(network) metaphors are heuristically useful’ (Dowding, 1995: 139) and their study has ‘provided useful snapshots of the policy process at a particular point in time’ (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992: 172), it is often argued that less attention has been devoted to changes in policy processes and outcomes and that networks are ‘incapable of explaining transformation’ such as the phenomena of policy community collapse or the forceful entry of other groups into an issue network or indeed the overall dynamics of change (Dowding, 1995: 139). As Smith explains, As a meso-level approach, it found itself in ‘no-man’s land’; it did not have the conceptual tools to explain policy change and consequently failed to understand how networks sponsor, resist and react to change by precisely specifying ‘the mechanisms through which change occurs’. (1993: 97) In sum, although the network approach discusses patterns of interaction among various actors, the content of these actions, the structures that channel communication and the policy outcomes generated by structural characteristics, it is posited that the approach nevertheless fails to explain how networks change and how the relationship between network change and policy change may be determined. Arguably, network approach proponents have nonetheless tried to address the question of policy outcomes to a certain extent. Some have argued that the

Transnational networks 45 existence of a network and its predominant endogenous characteristics that is whether it is characterized better as a policy community or an issue network, has a shaping effect on policy outcomes and may or may not constrain the policy agenda. Although the shape of policy networks and policy outcomes may change, the very existence of a policy network or community acts as a major constraint upon the degree of policy change. On the one hand, certain policy networks are very effective at resisting policy changes. Indeed, rigid closed policy network structures such as policy communities are closely associated with policy continuity – that is, stable, routine, policy-making in which outputs tend to incrementally advance the particular interests of subsystem members. The European Christian Democrat party network may be considered an illustrative example of a structure stimulating such stability. Kaiser (forthcoming) argues that this party network played a major role in establishing ‘core Europe’ in 1951–2 and 1957–8 and in stabilizing some of its key aspects such as its long-term federalist goal across the various EU enlargements. Likewise, its influence has been felt on the stabilization of the EU’s institutional structure and a number of its common policies, notably the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Moreover, within the same policy sector, the network of the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations in the European Union and the General Confederation of Agricultural Co-operatives in the European Union (COGECA) has demonstrably influenced the evolution of the CAP. Indeed, it is arguable that the existence and maintenance of a relatively closed policy network comprising COGECA and the Commission’s Directorate General for Agriculture has been a key cause of policy continuity since this policy’s inception in the early 1960s. On the other hand, the issue network, a more flexible and less rigid type of structure is associated with a different, more open policy process and a propensity for the adoption of more innovative policies. Arguably, the European Commission’s Environment DG is an example of such an issue network (Bomberg, 1998). Its boundaries and its culture are more open to a wider and diverse set of actors, particularly when compared to its agriculture counterpart. This is perhaps due to the DG’s relative immaturity; EU environmental action only began in 1972 (and this despite its omission in the 1957 Treaty of Rome). Whatever the reasons, DG Environment has earned a reputation for almost systematically carrying out extensive preliminary consultations with representatives of governments, green political parties, environmental NGOs, industry, special interest groups and where necessary, technical experts, prior to issuing any draft legislation. It is certainly true that this sector has been an extremely dynamic one and has led to the proliferation of environmental legislation. Indeed, today there are over 700 individual pieces of legislation constituting a comprehensive system of environmental control throughout the Union. Regarding this question of why and how networks may or may not change and consequent policy adjustments several scholars have stressed either endogenous or exogenous explanatory factors. For example, Dowding (1995) suggests that policy changes result from a change in the pattern of resource dependencies within the network. In contrast, Rhodes and Marsh (1992) argue that most network change

46

Karen Heard-Lauréote

results from four major exogenous factors; economic, ideological, political and knowledge-based. However, Marsh and Smith (2000: 4) contend that both these approaches have limitations, the most important being that the distinction between exogenous and endogenous is difficult to sustain. Indeed, they assert that it is erroneous to focus upon the question of whether and to what extent, networks affect policy outcomes since the relationship between networks and outcomes is not a simple, unidimensional one. They suggest instead that to understand how networks affect outcomes, it is necessary to recognize that policy outcomes also directly affect the shape of the policy network as well as impacting upon the structural position of certain interests in civil society and the strategic learning of actors in the networks (2000: 9). Marsh and Smith, broadly argue that there is a dialectical relationship between the network and the broader context within which it is located. To aid this understanding they develop a dialectical model of the role that policy networks play in any explanation of policy outcomes. The dialectical relationship refers to an interactive relationship between two variables in which each affects the other in a continuing iterative process. They argue that there are three interactive or dialectical relationships involved between: the structure of the network and the agents operating within them; the network and the context within which it operates; and the network and the policy outcome. In sum these authors claim that policy networks can and do affect policy outcomes and that in order to understand how that happens, we need to appreciate the role played by those three dialectical relationships. A further underlying problem of early literature on the network approach according to Watt (1997: 896–7) is that it assumes that such networks ‘exist’ and it fails thus to substantially account for how and why such networks were originally established. Advocacy coalitions have been particularly criticized for failing to include the study of nascent or developing networks (Watt, 1997: 897). In response, Hay and Richards have argued that the idea of a network ‘is neither a neutral nor an uncontested concept’ and that ‘decisions to participate in networks are, in some sense, strategic’ (Hay and Richards, 2000: 12–13). Indeed, these scholars have posited the following three strategic and contextual conditions for network formation to take place: first, recognition of the potential mutual advantages to be gained through collective (as opposed to individual) action is necessary. In this way it must entail a positive-sum game for all those participating in a particular network form; second, there must be recognition that the pooling of strategic resources will potentially enhance the strategic capacities of participant organizations; finally, recognition of the importance of and/or the establishment of the conditions of network feasibility is essential; feasibility being itself dependent on a degree of geographical or communicative proximity between potential network partners, a degree of shared cultural norms and values and the availability and/or willingness of organizations to devote sufficient time, capital and personnel resources to the network (2000: 17). Through their analysis, these scholars have therefore sought to establish a theory of network dynamism (2000: 25) to address such oversights in network formation. Whereas network analyses may once have constituted a series of bland and hollow metaphors, the contemporary network research related to change (Hay and

Transnational networks 47 Richards, 2000; Marsh and Smith, 2000) demonstrates that today networks embody a dynamic approach to understanding modern governance and constitute a relatively robust and sophisticated model of policy-making. It is worth noting nevertheless that as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999) have argued, one of the four ‘basic premises’ of their ACF is that a time perspective of at least a decade is required to evaluate the effects of policy (as it completes a cycle). Therefore, a long-term study is essential if one is to comprehensively account for policy change using a network approach. In this way, as Kaiser demonstrates in his chapter of this book, further advances in understanding change may well be facilitated by contributions from contemporary historical research, which may make a useful input to the better understanding of change over time in transnational networks, crossborder socialization and the influence of transnational factors on national and European policy-making. A final methodological consideration concerns the application of what has been until very recently a nationally developed network approach to the EU level and the additional methodological problems that this presents. An obvious but significant concern is the size, scope and cultural and political heterogeneity of transnational European networks compared to their nationally delimited counterparts. A transnational EU network may operate across a veritable plethora of local, regional and national contexts, as many different cultural and political traditions and with communication between actors involving 20 or more languages. Practically therefore, the empirical study of such networks requires larger research budgets to be able to meet the costs of longer-term projects, larger research teams with appropriate linguistic skills and multi-site empirical data collection. Similarly, transnational EU networks are in many cases newer, less developed, more transient and more informal than national networks. Undoubtedly, links between transnational actors are harder to cultivate and maintain than national ones due in part to the aforementioned heterogeneity of participating actors, linguistic and cultural barriers as well as geographical distance separating actors. Certainly, the heterogeneous and ephemeral nature of transnational actor links and the related difficulty of assessing the concrete impact of such networks on European policy-making processes may render them more difficult to empirically capture, unravel and analyse by researchers. However, notwithstanding the various methodological challenges posed by its European level application, today the network approach remains an accepted, dynamic and vibrant tool available to research scholars studying European governance. To illustrate its contemporary use, this discussion now considers a selection of examples of contemporary research employing the network approach.

Examples of research Transnational networks differ from policy networks in that they are not confined to any one national policy arena or sector. Whereas it has been noted that most of the burgeoning policy network literature is predominantly focussed on such national policy-making, as the following discussion seeks to demonstrate, over

48

Karen Heard-Lauréote

recent years the network view has been increasingly applied to the European and transnational level as well. Transnational European networks are functionally varied. With this in mind, so as to provide a flavour of the different roles networks fulfil at this level and the research surrounding them, this final section is structured according to four of their major functional roles. Initially, networks that exist to influence European policy-making in general or European policy sectors in particular are examined. Thereafter, networks that aid European society formation through the transfer of ideas and knowledge are observed. The third functional role analysed is socialization while finally, the discussion turns to networks’ role as a potential means by which to alleviate European governance accountability deficits. Arguably, the most common functional role occupied by European transnational networks is to influence European policy-making in general or in a particular policy sector. Peterson posits that, ‘the EU is a “hothouse” for different types of policy network’ (1995: 69). For an idea of the multitude of networks that exist to fulfil this role, the ‘Euractive’ policy portal boasts ‘10,000 EU actors’ including institutions (national and regional representations), industry federations, direct company representations, trades unions, NGOs, public affairs consultants, lawyers firms, lobbying bodies, public relations firms and think tanks. As was originally the case in early nationally set network literature, an initial wave of research scholars has examined such transnational networks that exist to influence European governance. From this perspective, the network approach is either employed (a) as a heuristic tool to simplify complex EU processes and governance arrangements (multi-actor, multi-venue, multi-level), (b) to explain the effect of transnational networks on European policy-making in general or in a particular policy sector or (c) to analyse the contribution of such networks to EU level policy change and/or major reform. With regard to the simplification of complex governance processes, Peterson (1995) has argued that the fluidity and complexity of the EU institutional architecture has occasioned the emergence of network research. The aim of such research is to clarify based on the understanding that policy networks may help make sense of complex policy-making situations that feature multiple actors. Pappi and Henning’s (1999) study constitutes an illustrative example. So as to simplify and describe the density of access routes open to national agriculture interest groups to the EU’s governance system, notably through national agriculture ministries and the Council of Ministers or through the European peak organization COGECA, these authors use a network approach to examine the organization of influence on the CAP. A further example of transnational networks evolving at the EU level to influence policy decisions is networks of NGOs or federations. The European Environmental Bureau (EEB), the Worldwide Fund for Nature ( WWF ), the European Consumers’ Organization (BEUC) and COGECA are examples of these. Each network has offices in Brussels whose primary aim is to exercise an influence over particular policy sectors at the different EU institutional venues. Multiple examples of research focussing on these transnational networks exist. For example, drawing on the advocacy coalition framework, Weber and

Transnational networks 49 Christophersen (2002) examine the political influence of a selection of transnational networks. In particular, they look at the impact on the EU habitats directive 92/43/EEC and the creation of the ‘Natura 2000’ network of the forest owner associations and the environmental NGOs. The former comprise the Confederation of European Forest Owners (CEPF) and the Bureau of Nordic Family Forestry (BNFF) while the latter comprise the WWF European Policy Office and the Forests and the European Union Resource Network (FERN). The authors describe a strategic alliance between DG Environment and the WWF who share the common goal of successfully establishing Natura 2000. However, this project was opposed by a less firmly established and less influential coalition of land users and DG Agriculture. Similarly, based on the advocacy coalition approach, Warleigh (2000) examines the lobbying undertaken by NGOs and their effect on European policy-making outcomes in three different areas of legislation: the Drinking Water, Auto Oil and Unit Pricing Directives. He argues that networks of NGOs can influence the shape of EU legislation. However, success is dependent upon (a) ensuring membership of the relevant policy coalition composed of unstable, ad hoc alliances; (b) using information supply (by closing an information gap and/or providing a different perspective from established interest groups) in order to shape contributions to legislation and (c) adopting an effective coalitionbuilding strategy. This leads Warleigh to conclude that the principal dynamic of European level interest group representation is issue-specific coalition formation. Notwithstanding these examples, it is important to note that the study of transnational networks in the European Union need not be restricted to such transnational networks of interest groups and in fact includes other types of transnational actors. Essentially, the actors involved vary according to the functional role of the networks. As well as simplifying complex processes and influencing European policymaking, the network approach has equally been employed to analyse policy change and/or major policy reform in European policy-making. At a basic level, Daugbjerg (1997) develops a theoretical network model to compare and explain reform outcomes in the national Swedish and European agricultural policy in 1992 arguing that reform success is dependent on the type of network existing in a given sector. Whereas highly cohesive networks resist change and defend established policy, less cohesive structures have a reduced amount of power to oppose reform. Parrish (2003) adopts a more sophisticated advocacy coalition approach as a means to explain the process through which the Single Market advocacy coalition, which once dominated European level sports policy, was later challenged by other socio-cultural actors. He demonstrates how, in order to penetrate the insulated Single Market coalition and confront the established legal/ regulatory definition of sport, the socio-cultural actors have venue-shopped at different available institutional access routes in the EU’s multi-level governance system in order to effect a redefinition of sports policy objectives and subsequently change the direction of sports policy. Furthermore, using three case studies, Radaelli (1999) employs an epistemic community approach to examine the role of expertise in the negotiation of economic and monetary union (EMU, following

50

Karen Heard-Lauréote

the work done by Verdun, 1999) direct tax policy and media ownership regulation. He explains how epistemic communities were influential in the design of the single currency and particularly highlights the role of the Delors Committee, which, he explains, was responsible for the single currency blueprint. He argues that although there was an epistemic logic at work in the Delors Committee, because the charismatic leader of the Commission, Jacques Delors who provided the momentum to keep the EMU process moving forward, chaired it, this committee was far more than a network of bankers with a common policy goal. Empirical studies have equally identified transnational networks as important players in the overall course of Europeanization because some networks fulfil a role of advocating and facilitating European integration. An example of such a network whose rationale is to encourage and smooth the progress of policy convergence across EU member countries in particular is the European Financial Services Round Table. This network, made up of chairmen and chief executives from many of Europe’s leading banks and insurers, has commissioned and funded extensive research over recent years as a means to inject dynamism into the process of completion of the Single Market in financial services. Although so far relatively absent, in the future, quantitative transnational network studies may develop and thus provide a means to help further current understanding of policy change and/or major policy reform in European policymaking. Quantitative network studies or network analysis measures the occurrence or frequency of relationships between network members by drawing on the ‘graph theory’ branch of mathematics to analyse network properties and structure. The research implications are that network structure – whether determined from within or from without networks – counts as it affects the information flows and thus the distribution of power across social organizations ( John, 2004). A rich vein of quantitative network literature is currently developing in European and trans-Atlantic domestic settings (for a brief review see John, 2004). Indeed, in 1998, a collection of papers was brought together in a special edition of the Journal of Theoretical Politics called ‘Modeling Policy Networks’. It remains to be seen whether quantitative accounts of transnational networks will follow suit. Moreover, the value of the contribution offered by such quantitative network studies has not yet been clearly established. John (2004) highlights three limitations of the research tool and its application. First, it is far from clear what the network measures; a simple counting of contacts is descriptive and offers little causal analysis or possibility to measure policy influence. Second, network boundaries are notoriously unclear. Thus the precise measures used in network analysis impose an arbitrary simplicity onto a complex context. Finally, network analysis is usually cross-sectional providing a simple snapshot of fluid relationships. However, if networks change rapidly, it is hard to generalize precisely about what relationships the network measures capture. How far such limitations may be overcome in the future is as yet uncertain. Just as the primary role of some transnational European networks is to influence European policy-making, others participate in a wider phenomenon of European society formation. Although the EU policy-making system is structurally and

Transnational networks 51 institutionally complicated, it is also a culturally complex entity. Today, the European Union stretches from the Atlantic to the Baltic and from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean and is characterized by linguistic and religious density with 20 official languages and 5 significant religious currents (Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Greek Orthodoxy as well as Russian Orthodox and Muslim minorities). Equally, the European Union is home to contrasting historical and political experiences and varying government systems. Whereas Spain’s past is characterized by conservative authoritarianism, Italy and Germany have experienced Fascism and Nazism respectively. Furthermore, the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have a predominantly communist past whereas Greece once had a military regime, and the United Kingdom has a tradition of liberal parliamentary democracy. In such a linguistically, culturally and historically complex context, scholars have used the network approach to describe how network structures serve a role of political society formation by translating policy concepts and ideas within the European Union, from one specific national and cultural context into another. This process does not simply occur from one state context to another, but also for example from one tradition of socialism to another. Certain transnational networks fulfil a role of society formation by transferring ideas between elites based on specific political schools of thought such as social democracy or Christian democracy. Indeed, two recent initiatives in the creation of such transnational networks are soon likely to generate new research in this area. The first of these is the Network for Progressive Governance. This network was created in 2000 by Policy Network, an international think tank launched in December 2000 with the support of Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder, Giuliano Amato and Göran Persson following three Progressive Governance Summits in New York, Florence and Berlin. This think tank also organized the London Progressive Governance Conference in July 2003, which brought together think tanks, politicians and academics as well as world leaders, former heads of state and government, and progressive politicians. The stated rationale behind the network’s creation is that ‘Progressive governments and parties in Europe are increasingly facing similar problems and looking for modern social democratic responses’ (Progressive Governance Network, 2000). In such a context, the network is intended to facilitate the exchange of ‘practical experiences from daily governance’ and to develop the transfer of ‘progressive’ ideas, values and policies (Progressive Governance Network, 2000). Similarly, the European Ideas Network is another example of a transnational network initiative set up in August 2002 to facilitate idea transfer. This is a centre-right network of pan-European think tanks sponsored by the Christian democratic European People’s Party (EPP) and European Democrats (ED) Group in the European Parliament (EP). Its working group structure is designed to evolve new strategies and exchange ideas and thinking on the key challenges facing EU countries and it brings together politicians, businessmen, academics, journalists and party activists sharing a common Europe-wide outlook, as well as outside experts interested in the public policy issues being addressed. These examples

52

Karen Heard-Lauréote

emphasize the transfer of political ideas and concepts via transnational networks. However, the latter may also be the conduits of theological information. Indeed, the Conference of European Churches is a Christian network composed of 127 Anglican, Old Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant Churches across the European continent and focusses on the exchange of theological and socio-ethical issues. Although, this network was particularly active throughout the drafting of the European Constitution in 2003, advocating an explicit reference to the Christian roots of European culture in the new EU constitution, its more general role is as a vehicle for the promotion of Churches as value-based communities that may support the European integration process in general. Transnational networks are not only active in the transfer of political and theological ideas across boundaries; be they local, regional or national. Such networks also serve a role of information and knowledge transfer. Using the epistemic community approach, Van Waarden and Drahos (2002) study the convergence of competition policies in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. They highlight the importance of transnational expert communities of competition lawyers for channelling the exchange of information, learning and imitation as well as for the explicit transfer of legal concepts, ideas, solutions and arguments between the different national systems and levels of law. It is in this way that the transnational network contributes to the convergence of competition policy across national boundaries. Transnational networks may also fulfil a function of socialization. This is an important notion since it arguably has the potential to help further our understanding of network stability. In Chapter 3 in this book Frank Schimmelfennig demonstrates how the socialization of the CEECs to the European Union has helped to stabilize policy through the socialization of these new participants into an existing consensus. Transnational socialization in the European Union is defined by Schimmelfennig as ‘the process of inducting nationally constituted societal and governmental actors into adapting the constitutive schemata and rules of the EU community’. In a study of the expansion of foreign and security, policy cooperation in the European Union and how this has increasingly penetrated into member states domestic politics, Michael Smith (2000) examines the transgovernmental aspects of political cooperation, which lead to the gradual internalization of cooperative habits and common views within the structures of member states. He argues that foreign and security problem-solving fundamentally depends on the extent to which relevant decision makers are socialized into the system. His empirical findings, drawn from memoirs and interviews with European Political Cooperation and Common Foreign and Security Policy (EPC/CFSP) insiders, consistently reveal the importance of elite socialization and demonstrate that ‘Most of this socialization takes place in and is encouraged by an increasingly dense, institutionalized, transgovernmental communications network’ (ibid.: 618). He adds that ‘it is even possible that such intensive deliberation within the EPC/CFSP working groups encourages the formation of nascent “epistemic communities” of technical experts devoted to solving particular problems’ (ibid.). Charles de Gaulle apparently referred to such friendly, ‘old-boy’

Transnational networks 53 networks among transnational/EU experts concerning specific policy problems as a process of ‘copinage technocratique’ and considered them a threat to the sovereignity of the EU member states. In a similar socialization vein, Pilar Ortuño Anaya (2002) has recently examined the international dimensions of the Spanish transition to democracy. She has argued that specific individuals and organizations made a significant contribution to the Spanish democratization process in the first half of the 1970s. In her analysis of the importance of party cooperation and political foundation work, she examines in particular, the socialization role played by European socialist and trade union organizations and political parties such as the German Social Democratic Party and its affiliated unions, the Labour movements in the United Kingdom and the French Socialists. This socialization took the form of encouragement by other European nations of the democratization process within the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE). As opposed to its former traditional left-wing party current, under the leadership of Filipe Gonzales, at that time – a young lawyer and subsequently Spanish prime minister – a new democratic party trend emerged which eventually led to the party’s adoption of an increasingly pro-EC and even, a pro-NATO policy stance. Furthermore, Dorota Dakowska’s chapter (Chapter 7, this volume) examines the important socialization role played by German political foundations in facilitating party cooperation in countries in transition and more recently in the context of the transformation of CEECs. This research suggests that the socialization capacity of transnational networks is arguably one of the most propitious avenues for further research. Indeed, Kubiceck (2004) has recently explored an exciting avenue of new research for the socialization effects of networks in Turkey. The importance of domestic networks such as the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) and its links to the transnational network, Eurochambers are recognized. With the support of the Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Commerce and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the EC Delegation in Ankara, Eurochambers coordinates the Turkish Chamber Development Programme that has been developed under the EU’s ‘Civil Society Development Programme’. Its broad objective is to reinforce civil society in Turkey with a view to propel the Turkish reform process towards European integration. Because the network concept discusses the distribution of power, the exclusion of weak groups from public decision-making arenas and the power that such hidden networks of actors wield in certain policy areas, it is also a useful tool to highlight one of the central problems encountered by liberal democracies; the tension that exists between the public aim of public accountability and the public’s inaccessibility to the policy-making process ( John, 2004). However, beyond simply highlighting the problem, a so far underdeveloped functional role of transnational European networks is their contribution to alleviating such accountability deficits particularly within European governance. A comprehensive reform of the latter was launched by the European Commission as a strategic objective in 2000 and subsequently set out in a White Paper (European Commission, 2001). This acknowledged the ‘disenchantment’ and alienation that citizens feel from the European Union and the

54

Karen Heard-Lauréote

‘widening gulf between the EU and the people it serves’ (European Commission, 2001: 7). As part of the remedy, the White Paper recognizes the multiplication of networks occurring as a result of the combined factors of European integration, new technologies, cultural changes and global interdependence (European Commission, 2001: 18). Regarding their role, it is noted that the Union’s legitimacy ‘depends on involvement and participation’ in which ideas and networks are paramount. Indeed, the White Paper advocates more effective communication between the Commission, stakeholders and their political representatives in order to initiate a so-called ‘virtuous’ circle based on feedback, networks and involvement from policy creation to implementation at all levels’ (European Commission, 2001: 11). An important body of research is subsequently emerging to take account of networks’ contribution to the legitimization process. Indeed, scholars are investigating the participation of collective actors in decision-making, in institutionalized and informal networks in the European decision-making process and suggesting that this may constitute a potential source of additional legitimacy for the European polity, the European Commission and for specific policy sectors (Hirst, 1990, 1994; Andersen and Burns, 1996: 227; Heritier, 1999; Wessels, 1999: 64; Smismans, 2003; Heard-Lauréote, 2005). For example, Heard-Lauréote (2005) examines how institutionalized networks of collective actors in the agricultural advisory committees may constitute a potential, additional source of legitimacy for the European Commission’s activities in the European agricultural policy sector. Many of the transnational networks and associated research examples considered in this chapter may appear at first sight to be EU-centred. However, many of them actually have a regional and global reach beyond the European Union. For example, the European Farmers Coordination network is plugged into a larger global network entitled Via Compesina. This is a worldwide peasant organization movement comprising small-scale producers, agricultural workers, rural women and indigenous communities from Asia, America and Europe. All are joined in defending economic and social justice, land preservation, food sovereignty and sustainable agricultural production. Another fertile area for European Union focussed transnational networks with a global outreach is European development policy. Here a variety of European networks comprising parties, think tanks, foundations, charities and NGOs work closely with member state or EU institutions like the Commission, to fulfil a democratization role whereby democratic ideas and concepts associated with the European Union as a civil power are exported to the rest of the world. The Foreign Policy Centre is a European think tank, which operates according to such a global perspective. One of its current programs of research; ‘Civility’ aims to promote communications and cooperation between Western and Middle Eastern Civil Society to encourage reform in the Greater Middle East. Moreover, Richard Youngs, the ‘Civility’ program coordinator, has particularly focussed a recent publication on the role of Western governments, international NGOs and multinational companies and how they have sought to influence democratic trends in developing countries (see also Youngs, 2001; Gillespie and Youngs, 2002). The British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) constitutes a further example of a transnational network

Transnational networks 55 promoting democratization and development. Its structure also vividly portrays the intertwinement of national, European and global networks. A member state based network, it is itself a member of an EU-wide network (the Confederation for Co-operation of Relief and Development NGOs – CONCORD) of over 1,000 international development NGOs, which is in turn a member of a global network of over 650 organizations and networks entitled CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation. Clearly, the far reaching nature of these intricately entangled web-like networks across multiple governance layers underlines the important links existing between European and global transnationalization.

Conclusion Since its inception, the network approach has endured much. Researchers have regularly refuted the usefulness of the various models and typologies it has generated, but phoenix-like it regularly re-appears in a new form and succeeds in re-igniting debates and begetting new research. Arguably, something can be learnt from its longevity and its ability to sustain debate. These are signs that its proponents must be on to something, or it would not have survived its many refutations. Indeed, the research examples cited in this chapter signal that from a number of perspectives, the network approach, in all its various guises of policy networks, advocacy coalitions or epistemic communities etc. remains a valuable concept for studying the European political space. From a methodological perspective, the approach’s functionality is manifest in its cross-disciplinary nature. Its applicability in political science, policy science, social sciences, interorganizational relations, international relations, governance and public management research, to name but a few, is proof enough of its flexibility. Not only does it cut across various disciplines, it also effectively transpierces the major ontological fault lines to the extent that adherents of the various classic macro-level theories concerning the distribution of power within contemporary society, be they pluralists, Marxists, constructivists or rationalists or other, may all find metaphorical shelter under this approach. Its agility may be reinforced by a final methodological remark. Whereas in its simplest form, the approach may be employed figuratively to decipher complex governance arrangements or disentangle multiple actors, it may equally serve as a theoretical framework to explain change and policy outcomes. Notwithstanding the above, the methodological perspective certainly does not have the monopoly over explicating the approach’s usefulness. Similarly, from an empirical perspective, its value is evident. This is especially the case with regard to policy-making at EU level. Broadly, the network approach provides a more complete and realistic account of interest group intermediation than the two previously dominant models – pluralism and corporatism. Arguably, neither of these provided a realistic picture of interest intermediation relations to the extent that the model they offered was too general and it did not take into account variations between policy sectors. Indeed, the strengths of the network approach are that it emphasizes the need to disaggregate policy analysis and stresses the importance

56

Karen Heard-Lauréote

of the sectorization of policy. Moreover, it recognizes that in many policy areas a limited number of actors are involved in the policy-making process, that policymaking often takes place in continuous, closed communities of actors that are impenetrable by unrecognized groups and the general public. The European Union is a multi-level, differentiated polity, akin to an institutional and cultural maze. The network approach is a useful tool to understand this rabbit warren of political reality and the way in which individuals connect with each other within it. The approach is not merely a response to EU complexity but to contemporary public policy processes in general. We live in an increasingly decentralized and fragmentized society based on organized collectivities; policymaking continues to follow a trend of sectorization; for countless reasons competing groups of interests are mobilized to influence policy-making, which in turn leads to overcrowding; the boundaries between the public and private are becoming increasingly blurred as closed communities of actors formulate policy in isolation and in the face of decreasing electoral turnout, political representatives must promise more and intervene within an ever increasing scope. Certainly, the network approach has a role to play in making sense of today’s complex and intricate political realities especially at the level of EU governance. However, networks serve other functional roles apart from describing, simplifying and explaining EU policy processes. Network formation and social communication is encouraged in reaction to the economic and social regulatory pressures imposed on its member states by the European Union’s institutional framework, whereby there is an increasingly informal and formal homogenization of policy responses fostered by a transnational transfer of ideas and policy concepts. Networks serve a functional role of channelling such ideas. However, while structures like the Progressive Governance Network and the European Ideas Network are increasingly frequent; as yet, their research potential has hardly been exploited and thus offer promising future avenues. In addition to conveying ideas within and between member states, the network approach may also serve a functional role in explaining how policy ideas and concepts are exported beyond the current, recently expanded EU borders. Indeed, by way of a spillover type effect, parties, think tanks, foundations and charities contribute to a kind of political socialization in new and future member states and associated countries, even to the rest of the world. Whereas, in some cases this socialization takes place in part collaboration with the European Union and member state institutions, in others very different agendas may be being followed. At once, useful for understanding and capturing the European Union and understanding its role as a civil power in globalization and world politics, the network approach is alive and well enjoying the prospect of a bright research future.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Wolfram Kaiser, Lucy Makins, Peter Starie and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn for their extensive and useful comments on the earlier drafts of this chapter.

Transnational networks 57

References Anaya, Pilar Ortuño (2002) European Socialists and Spain: The Transition to Democracy, 1959–77, New York: Palgrave. Andersen, Svein S. and Burns, Tom R. (1996) ‘The European Union and the erosion of parliamentary democracy: a study of post-parliamentary governance’, in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen (eds), The European Union: How Democratic Is It? London: Sage Publications, pp. 227–51. Atkinson, Michael and Coleman, William D. (1992) ‘Policy networks, policy communities and the problems of governance’, Governance, 5(2): 154–80. Betsill, Michele and Bulkeley, Harriet (2004) ‘Transnational networks and global environmental governance: the cities for climate protection program’, International Studies Quarterly, 48: 471–93. Bevir, Mark and Rhodes, Rod (2003) ‘Searching for civil society: changing patterns of governance in Britain’, Public Administration, 81(1): 41–62. Bomberg, Elizabeth (1998) ‘Issue networks and the environment: explaining European Union environmental policy’, in David Marsh (ed.), Comparing Policy Networks, Buckingham: Open University Press, pp. 167–84. Börzel, Tanja (1997) ‘What’s so special about policy networks? An exploration of the concept and its usefulness in studying European governance’, European Integration online Papers ( EIoP ), 1(No. 16). http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997/-016a.htm (Accessed: 5 July 2004). Castells, Manuel (1996) The Rise of the Network Society, Oxford: Blackwell. Daugbjerg, Carsten (1997) ‘Policy networks and agricultural policy reforms: explaining deregulation in Sweden and re-regulation in the European Community’, Governance, 10(2): 123–42. De Bruijn, Johan A. and ten Heuvelhof, Ernst F. (1995) ‘Policy networks and governance’, in David L. Weimer (ed.), Institutional Design, Boston, MA: Kluwer, pp. 161–81. Dowding, Keith (1995) ‘Model or metaphor? A critical review of the policy network approach’, Political Studies, 43(2): 136–58. European Commission (2001) ‘European governance: a white paper’, COM(2001) 428 of 25 July 2001 (Online). http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/com/cnc/2001/ com2001_0428en01.pdf (Accessed: 15 July 2004). Gillespie, Richard and Youngs, Richard (eds) (2002) The European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa, London: Frank Cass. Grant, Wyn, Paterson, William and Whitson, Collin (1988) Government and the Chemical Industry, Oxford: Clarendon. Haas, Peter (1989) ‘Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control’, International Organization, 43: 377–403. —— (1990) Saving the Mediterranean, New York: Columbia University Press. —— (1992) ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy co-ordination’, International Organization, 46: 1–35. Hanf, Kenneth and Scharpf, Fritz W. (1977) Interorganizational Policy-Making: Limits to Co-ordination and Central Control, London: Sage. Hay, Colin (1998) ‘The tangled webs we weave: the discourse, strategy and practice of Networking’, in David Marsh (ed.), Comparing Policy Networks, Buckingham: Open University Press, pp. 33–51. Hay, Colin and David, Richards (2000) ‘The tangled webs of Westminster and Whitehall: the discourse, strategic and practice of networking within the British core executive’, Public Administration, 78(1): 1–28.

58

Karen Heard-Lauréote

Heard-Lauréote, Karen (2005) ‘Born on the wrong side of the blanket? The institutional legitimacy of the European Commission’s agricultural advisory committees’ (tbc), PhD, University of Portsmouth. Heclo, Hugh (1978) ‘Issue networks and the executive establishment’, in Anthony King (ed.), The New American Political System, Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 87–124. Heclo, Hugh and Wildavsky, Aaron (1974) The Private Government of Public Money, London: Macmillan. Heritier, Adrienne (1999) ‘Elements of democratic legitimation in Europe: an alternative perspective’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(2): 269–82. Hirst, Paul (1990) Representative Democracy and its Limits, Cambridge: Polity Press. —— (1994) Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press. —— (2000) ‘Democracy and governance’, in Jon Pierre (ed.), Debating Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 13–35. Jenkins-Smith, Hank C. and Sabatier, Paul A. (1993) ‘Methodological appendix: measuring longitudinal change in elite beliefs using content analysis of public documents’, in Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds), Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 237–59. —— (1994) ‘Evaluating the advocacy coalition framework’, Journal of Public Policy, 14(2): 175–203. Jenkins-Smith, Hank, St Clair, Gilbert and Woods, Brain (1991) and ‘Explaining change in policy subsystems: analysis of coalition stability and defection overtime’, American Journal of Political Science, 35: 851–80. Jobert, Bruno and Muller, Pierre (1987) L’Etat en action, Politiques publiques et corporatismes, Paris: Presses universities de France. John, Peter (2004) ‘Policy networks’, in Kate Nash and Alan Scott (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology (essay 13), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 139–48. Jordan, Grant (1990) ‘Sub-governments, policy communities and networks: refilling the old bottles?’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2(3): 319–38. Jordan, Grant and Schubert, Klaus (1992) ‘A preliminary ordering of policy network labels’, European Journal of Political Research, 21(1–2): 7–27. Kaiser, Wolfram (forthcoming) Transnational Christian Democracy: Towards Core Europe in the Twentieth Century. Katzenstein, Peter J. (1978) Between Power and Plenty, Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Keck, Margaret and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kenis, Patrick and Schneider, Volker (1991) ‘Policy networks and policy analysis: scrutinizing a new analytical toolbox’, in Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz (eds), Policy Network: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, Frankfurt am Campus: Verlag Main, pp. 25–59. Kickert, Walter J. M., Klijn, Erik-Hans and Koppenjan, Joop F. M. (1999) Managing Complex Networks, London: Sage. Knoke, David (1990) Political Networks: The Structural Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kooiman, Jan (1993) Modern Governance, London: Sage. Kubicek, Paul (2004) ‘Turkish accession to the EU in comparative perspective’, South East European Studies Programme (SEESP), Occasional Paper No. 1/04, Oxford: University of Oxford, European Studies Centre.

Transnational networks 59 Le Galès, Patrick and Thatcher, Mark (1995) Les Réseaux de Politique Publique, Débats Autour des ‘Policy Networks’, Paris: L’Harmattan. Lehmbruch, Gerhard (1991) ‘The organisation of society, administrative strategies and policy Networks’, in Roland M. Czada and Adrienne Windoff-Héritier (eds), Political Choice Institutions, Rules and the Limits of Rationality, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, pp. 25–59. Marin, Bernd and Mayntz, Renate (1991) Policy Network: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. Marsh, David and Rhodes, Rod (eds) (1992) Policy Networks in British Government, Oxford: Clarendon. Marsh, David and Smith, Martin (2000) ‘Understanding policy networks: towards a dialectical approach’, Political Studies, 48(1): 4–21. Mayntz, Renate (1994) ‘Modernization and the logic of interorganizational networks’, MIPGF Working Paper No. 4, Koln: Max-Planck-Institute Für Gesellschaftsforschung. Muller, Pierre (1984) Le Technocrate et le Paysan. Essai sur la politique française de modernisation de l’agriculture de 1945 à nos jours, Paris: éditions ouvrières. —— (1989) Airbus: l’ambition européenne. Logique d’état, logique de marché, Paris: L’Hartmann. Pappi, Franz U. and Henning, Christian H. C. A. (1999) ‘The organization of influence on the EC’s common agricultural policy: a network approach’, European Journal of Political Research, 36: 257–81. Parrish, Richard (2003) ‘The politics of sports regulation in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10(2): 246–62. Parsons, Wayne (1995) Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. Paterson, Mathew (1996) Global Warming and Global Politics, London: Routledge. Peterson, John C. (1995) ‘Decision-making in the European Union: towards a framework for analysis’, Journal of European Public Policy, 2(1): 69–93. Progressive Governance Network (2000) ‘A progressive agenda for democracy and development’, Press release 14–15 September, Stockholm, (Online). http://www.progressivegovernance.net/php/section.php?sid=5 (Accessed: 14 July 2004). Radaelli, Claudio M. (1999) ‘The public policy of the European Union: whither politics of expertise?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(5): 757–74. Rhodes, Rod (1981) Control and Power in Central-Local Relations, Aldershot: Gower. —— (1986) The National World of Local Governance, London: Unwin Hyman. —— (1988) Beyond Westminster and Whitehall, London: Unwin Hyman. —— (1990) ‘Policy networks: a British perspective’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2(3): 293–317. —— (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability, Buckingham: Oxford University Press. Rhodes, Rod and Marsh, David (1992) ‘New directions in the study of policy networks’, European Journal of Political Research, 31: 181–205. Richardson, Jeremy J. and Jordan, Andrew G. (1979) Governing Under Pressure, Oxford: Martin Robertson. Sabatier, Paul (1998) ‘The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1): 98–130. Sabatier, Paul and Jenkins-Smith, Hank (1993) Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy: Coalition Approach, Oxford: Westview Press. —— (1999) ‘The advocacy coalition framework: an assessment’, in Paul Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 119–47.

60

Karen Heard-Lauréote

Schneider, Volker (1988) Politiknetzwerke der Chemikalienkontrolle: Eine Analyse einer transnationalen Politikentwicklung, Berlin: de Gruyter. Sciarini, Pascal (1996) ‘Elaboration of the Swiss agricultural policy for the GATT negotiations: a network analysis’, Schweizer Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 22(1): 85–115. Smismans, Stijn (2003) ‘Representation through interest committees: the case of the tripartite Advisory Committee for safety, hygiene and health protection at work’, in Sabine Saurugger (ed.), Les modes de représentation dans l’Union européenne, Paris: L’Harmattan, pp. 249–78. Smith, Martin (1993) State Autonomy and Policy Networks in Britain and the US, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Smith, Michael E. (2000) ‘Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy co-operation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7(4): 613–31. Stoker, Gerry (ed.) (1999) The New Management of British Local Governance, London: Macmillan. —— (ed.) (2000) The New Politics of British Local Governance, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Verdun, Amy (1999) ‘The role of the Delors Committee in the creation of EMU: an epi-stemic community?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(2): 308–28. Waarden, Frans van (1992) ‘Dimensions and types of policy networks’, European Journal of Political Research, 21: 29–52. Waarden, Frans van and Drahos, Michaela (2002) ‘Courts and (epistemic) communities in the convergence of competition policies’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6): 913–34. Warleigh, Alex (2000) ‘The hustle: citizenship practice, NGOs and “policy coalitions” in the European Union – the cases of auto oil, drinking water and unit pricing’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7(2): 229–43. Watt, Robert (1997) ‘Policy networks in theoretical perspective’, Contemporary Political Studies Annual Conference Papers, (Online). http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/1997%5Cwatt.pdf (Accessed: 5 July 2004). Weber, Norbert and Christophersen, Tim (2002) ‘The influence of non-governmental organisations on the creation of Natura 2000 during the European Policy process’, Forest Policy and Economics, 4: 1–12. Wessels, Wolfgang (1999) ‘Comitology as a research subject: a new legitimacy mix?’, in Christian Joerges and Ellen Vos (eds), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 259–69. Wilks, Stephen and Wright, Maurice (1987) Comparative Government-Industry Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Youngs, Richard (2001) The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe’s Mediterranean and East Asian Policies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— (2004) International Democracy and the West: The Roles of Governments, NGOs and Multinationals, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zito, Anthony R. (2001) ‘Epistemic communities, collective entrepreneurship and European integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 8(4): 585–603.

3

Transnational socialization Community-building in an integrated Europe Frank Schimmelfennig

In the early days of regional integration theory, ‘transnational socialization’ was a major subject of interest and inquiry in both neo-functionalism and Karl Deutsch’s transactionalist theory. Ernst Haas defined political integration as ‘the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre’ (1968: 16), yielding ‘a new national consciousness of the new political community’ (1968: 14). Haas conceived this process as a predominantly transnational process of ‘political spill-over’ (1968: 283–317; cf. Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991: 13–15). To the extent that it helps them realize their political goals better, nationally constituted political elites (in interest groups, parties and bureaucracies) orient their expectations and activities toward the integrated level of decision-making, build transnational coalitions (with the support of the supranational organizations) and develop supranational perspectives on their political problems and their solutions. Karl Deutsch defined integration as the ‘attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” ’ – understood as the ‘belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change” ’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5). Such a group then qualifies as a ‘security community’. Whether a security community exists among formally sovereign states (pluralistic security community) or has some kind of common government (amalgamated community) was of secondary importance for Deutsch. Instead, he focussed on the quantity of transnational exchanges and communications (as triggers of social learning processes and evidence of mutual relevance) as well as their quality in terms of the compatibility of major values and mutual responsiveness (Deutsch, 1964: 67–9). In its later development, the focus of regional integration theory has shifted away from the cognitive, intersubjective dimension of integration toward its institutional dimension. Deutsch’s transactionalism has fallen into disuse. Secondgeneration neo-functionalists deleted the building of new identities and the shift of loyalties from the definitions of integration and focussed instead on the study of collective decisions and the scope and level of the supranational institutions that result from them (Schmitter, 1969: 162): ‘Changes in either systemic or identitive support . . . will be treated as a factor that may cause or help to explain growth

62

Frank Schimmelfennig

or integration . . . not as a part of the definition itself ’ (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 99; see also Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 300). Whereas Lindberg and Scheingold still postulated ‘actor socialization’ as one of the fundamental mechanisms of growth in ‘Europe’s would-be polity’ (1970: 119), empirical tests of this expectation – mainly published in the 1970s – proved disappointing (Riggs, 1977; cf. Peck, 1979; Pollack, 1998). Whereas empirical studies generally found evidence of cognitive change – individuals involved in integrated decision-making processes became more interested in and knowledgeable about international organizations – they detected little in the way of positive affective change, especially if factors like self-selection, national and party affiliation had been controlled (cf. e.g. Kerr, 1973). Thus, when the main protagonist of neo-functionalism declared regional integration theory ‘obsolete’ in the mid-1970s (Haas, 1976), this also applied to the study of ‘socialization’ in particular. The new theoretical debate in regional integration theory developed at the end of the 1980s between two theories based on rationalist theories of international institutions. Both theorize integration as the product of exogenous state or societal preferences. Whereas intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998) claims that societal demands for integration are channelled through state preferences and intergovernmental bargaining processes and that the integration process remains firmly under state control, supranationalism (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997) argues that integration triggers both transnational lobbying in the supranational arena and institutional dynamics beyond the control of governments. These dynamics, however, are attributed to ‘path-dependencies’ rather than socialization. Societal actors do not change their identities and interests but react to, and further elaborate, changed institutional opportunities and constraints (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 310–11). Governments face unanticipated and unintended consequences of integration, which they cannot and do not want to redress because of institutional ‘lock-in’ (Pierson, 1996). In International Relations in general, renewed interest in socialization processes has mainly been the result of the ‘constructivist turn’ in the discipline (Checkel, 1998). Summarized, social constructivism postulates that the identities and interests of international actors are endogenous, that is, constructed through international social interaction and involvement in international institutions. In such a perspective on international politics, international socialization is a key, indeed, the most integral process. Correspondingly, it has again become an important subject of general International Relations theory and research (see e.g. Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Risse and Sikkink, 1999; Schimmelfennig, 2000; Checkel, 2001; Johnston, 2001). By contrast, in an introduction to a set of articles originally published as a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy in 1999, Christiansen et al. (2001: 11) were surprised to find that, in EU studies, ‘a research programme similar to that of constructivism in International Relations has not been developed, even though both the rationale for, and the building blocks of, such a programme are clearly there’. In this chapter, I will provide a conceptual and theoretical foundation for the study of transnational socialization in the European Union. I define socialization,

Transnational socialization 63 distinguish causal mechanisms of socialization, present conditions under which these mechanisms are likely to operate and be successful and discuss prerequisites of transnational socialization in particular. Finally, I will present examples of recent research from the study of transnational socialization in the European Union.

Theoretical perspectives I propose to define international socialization as the process of inducting actors into adopting the constitutive schemata and rules of an international community (cf. Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 11; Schimmelfennig, 2000: 111–12, 2003a). This definition has some important conceptual, methodological and theoretical implications. First, if socialization is defined as a process, it remains open, in principle, whether and to what extent actors indeed adopt the constitutive schemata and rules of the international community. Thus defined, socialization processes may fail or succeed to varying degrees and it is the task of theories and empirical research to establish under which conditions one or the other is the case. Second, the concepts of inducting and adopting are sufficiently open to cover different theoretical mechanisms of socialization. Despite its close affinity with the constructivist turn in International Relations, studies of socialization are not confined to processes of persuasion and internalization but include more ‘rationalist’ mechanisms such as bargaining and reinforcement. Third, the outcome of the socialization process is some degree of rule adoption. Adoption refers to the extent to which mechanisms internal to the actor ensure compliance with the community rules. Fully socialized community members regard the community rules as their own rules and comply with them without the threat or use of external sanctions. Fourth, socialization refers to the constitutive schemata and rules of a community, that is, those schemata and rules that define the collective identity of the community – ‘who we are’ and ‘how we see and do things’ – and distinguish community members from outsiders (for the conceptual link between membership and socialization, see Schimmelfennig, 1994: 335–7; Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 11; Johnston, 2001: 494). For the purpose of this book, the relevant international community is the community of EU member states and societies. Its identity or constitutive schemata and rules can be inferred from legal texts such as the preambles and general articles of the Treaties and the membership criteria of the European, or official discourse about, for example, the distinctive features of EU member states, the social purpose of the European Union and its distinctive way of policy-making. Although the constitutive rules and schemata are always subject to change and interpretation, the most fundamental and durable elements of the EU identity are the EU’s commitment to liberal norms such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the market economy, to the peaceful, multilateral and negotiated settlement of interstate conflict, to the pooling and delegation of sovereignty and to a consensus-oriented style of decision-making (Schimmelfennig, 2003b: 77–85). Finally, how should we distinguish ‘transnational socialization’ from other processes of socialization? First, there are two types of actors, the socialization

64

Frank Schimmelfennig

agencies and the target actors, that can qualify as transnational. A restrictive definition would then require both the socialization agencies and the target actors to be transnational organizations and networks. More loosely defined, socialization activities pursued by member state governments or intergovernmental organizations would still qualify as ‘transnational socialization’ provided that they directly target domestic or transnational actors rather than governments. Second, definitions of ‘transnational actors’ may be restricted to societal actors such as interest groups and parties. However, the standard definitions of transnational relations in International Relations also include ‘transgovernmental relations’, that is, autonomous interactions of individual ministries or state agencies such as central banks across borders. In sum, in line with the idea of transnational socialization in neo-functionalist regional integration theory, I will define transnational socialization in the European Union as the process of inducting nationally constituted societal and governmental actors into adopting the constitutive schemata and rules of the EU community. These actors may be located inside or outside the European Union. On the basis of this definition, what are the causal mechanisms of inducting national actors into adopting international schemata and rules proposed in the literature? I propose to base the typology of socialization mechanisms on March and Olsen’s distinction of two fundamental logics of social action: the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness (1989: 160–1). According to the logic of consequentiality, actors act instrumentally. Among different behavioural options, they choose the one that helps them attain their goals most effectively, efficiently and maximizes their utility. Appropriate action, however, ‘involves determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligations of that role in that situation are’ (March and Olsen, 1989: 160). Actors do not judge alternative courses of action by the consequences for their own utility but by their conformity to institutional rules or social identities. Two different socialization mechanisms can be subsumed under each logic: imitation and social learning under the logic of appropriateness and social influence and bargaining under the logic of consequentiality (Table 3.1). Imitation According to the mechanism of imitation, the community rules are templates that help actors understand and interpret social situations and provide scripts for the roles that the ‘socializees’ are supposed to play in the international Table 3.1 Mechanisms of socialization

Rules

Logic of appropriateness

Logic of consequentiality

Imitation

Social influence

Social learning

Templates, Validity claims scripts Instruments Role models, Arguing role-playing Adoption Habitualization Internalization

Bargaining

Conditions of rewards and punishments Social incentives Material incentives and disincentives and disincentives Adaptation

Transnational socialization 65 community. The socialization agency provides a role model and demonstrates appropriate ways of behaviour, which the socializees learn through dense contacts and role-playing. Typically, the ‘socializees’ adopt international rules as a result of unreflective processes of habitualization. Social learning In social learning, the community rules are validity claims argumentatively justified by the socialization agencies in international discourses. Thanks to the ‘power of the better argument’, ‘socializees’ are persuaded by the legitimacy of the validity claims and change their identity and interests accordingly (Risse, 2000; Checkel, 2001). Thus, social learning implies a reflective process of normative internalization. Social influence Social influence is based on the use of social incentives and disincentives such as image or status ( Johnston, 2001). Social rewards such as popularity, respect, and a positive image require the adoption of the community norms. Otherwise, socializees are threatened with social punishments such as shaming and shunning. Bargaining By contrast, according to the bargaining mechanism, the incentives and disincentives are of a material nature. ‘Socializees’ are promised material rewards (such as financial aid or military protection) if they adopt the community rules (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). In both consequentialist processes, socialization does not aim at the transformation of actor identities or interests. Rather, rule-conforming behaviour is reinforced over time as a result of stable social or material incentives and disincentives, until it becomes habitual. Then, the actor is successfully socialized. The literature further distinguishes system-structural, process and domesticstructural conditions under which these mechanisms should operate successfully. Table 3.2 summarizes the most important conditions. For the mechanism of social learning or persuasion, Checkel (2001: 562–3) and Johnston (2001: 498–9) have defined a fairly congruent catalogue of conditions (cf. also Risse, 2000: 19). According to this catalogue, social learning is most likely to Table 3.2 Conditions of rule adoption Logic of appropriateness

Logic of consequentiality

Imitation

Social influence

Social learning

System structure

Authority (agency), legitimacy (rules), identification noviceness (target actors)

Process

Duration and intensity of contact, deliberation and non-public setting (social learning) Resonance

Domestic structure

Bargaining

Power (agency) determinacy (rules) Credibility of threats and promises publicity/ information symmetry Adoption costs, veto players

66

Frank Schimmelfennig

lead to rule adoption (a) if the socializee ‘is in a novel and uncertain environment’ (Checkel, 2001: 562), the socialization agency ‘is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs or wants to belong’ (authority and identification; Checkel, 2001: 563), and the rules are legitimate (see Franck, 1990: 38) – these are the systemic-structural conditions;1 (b) if the process of arguing and persuasion comes close to a Habermasian ‘ideal speech situation’, that is, follows principles of deliberation and takes place in a non-coercive, preferably also nonpoliticized, private setting, or if the socializee is confronted, over a long period of time, with new and consistent international information that contradicts its prior beliefs – these are the process conditions; (c) if the socializee ‘has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the persuader’s message’ (Checkel, 2001: 563) or, put positively, the rules of the community resonate well with extant domestic political culture, rules and traditions (Checkel, 1999: 86–7; Cortell and Davis, 2000) – these are the domestic-structural conditions. On closer inspection, however, most of these conditions do not apply exclusively to the social learning mechanism of socialization – and not even to those mechanisms following a logic of appropriateness. Noviceness and uncertainty, the duration and intensity of role-playing, the authority of the socialization agency, the legitimacy of schemata and rules, the absence of ingrained domestic schemata and rules – all of that is also conducive to effective imitation (cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 69–70). The mechanism of social influence requires similar conditions ( Johnston, 2001: 499; Schimmelfennig, 2003b: 214–15): social rewards and punishments fail to elicit rule-conforming behaviour, if the ‘socializee’ does not identify itself with the community of the socialization agency. Highly legitimate and resonant schemata enhance the shaming effect if violated. Novices in an uncertain social environment pay particularly great attention to indications of approval and disapproval from their aspiration group. Social influence, moreover, increases if the signals of this aspiration group are internally consistent and are sent quickly and frequently as a result of durable and intense contact between socialization agency and ‘socializee’. In contrast with the social learning mechanism, however, publicity facilitates social influence because the image gains of public recognition and the pain of public shaming and shunning exceed that of private social influence and because publicity strengthens the binding force of rhetorical actor commitments to the community schemata and rules. Moreover, the threat of social punishments and the promise of social rewards need to be credible. The bargaining mechanism, however, generally requires alternative conditions of rule adoption:2 not the authority of the socialization agency but its bargaining power; not the legitimacy of schemata and rules but their determinacy as conditions of rewards; not identification with the international community but its material attractiveness; not the deliberative quality of the socialization process but the credibility of the socialization agency’s threats and promises and the information necessary to monitor the target countries’ compliance with the community rules; not the domestic resonance of community schemata and rules but the size of the adoption costs and the number of domestic veto players (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 1–28).

Transnational socialization 67 The mechanisms and conditions outlined above generally also apply to processes of transnational socialization, in which the target actors are societal groups and organizations and individual bureaucracies and bureaucrats. According to the ‘social’ mechanisms of socialization, socialization agencies, be they transnational or intergovernmental, need to have authority, promote legitimate rules, engage in intense, preferably deliberative, contact, send consistent messages and must be regarded as representatives of an ‘aspiration group’, with which the socializees identify. With regard to the socializees in transnational processes, rule adoption will be facilitated if the target actors are ‘novices’ in the EU environment and if their own ‘cognitive priors’ do not contradict but rather resonate with the community rules. The consequentialist mechanisms require that transnational socialization agencies have the resources and bargaining power to provide sufficiently strong social or material incentives and disincentives for the societal actors to change their ways of behaviour. In addition, however, an account of transnational socialization needs to show why and how, in the setting of the European Union, transnational rather than international or national socialization should take place. The first question is why the potential socialization agencies should enter into transnational relations rather than focus on the states or governments as actors to be socialized? Second, why should societal actors orient themselves toward the transnational sphere rather than toward member governments? Third, why should governments permit, and why are they not able to prevent, the transnational socialization of societal and individual bureaucratic actors? None of these questions is trivial, since member state governments are the most powerful actors in EU politics and the nation-state is the traditional site of political socialization. Thus, successful transnational socialization not only requires that the general conditions of successful socialization hold but also that these conditions are particularly favourable at the transnational level. The transnational or supranational level does not only have to be more attractive than the national level for domestic actors but these domestic actors must also be more attractive, accessible or pliable socializees than governments. Finally, governments must either have an interest in transnational socialization or lack the capability to fully control transnational processes. In the following, I present some conjectures that can be derived from the general conditions of socialization and/or from the literature on European integration. Authority and legitimacy Transnational socialization is more likely if domestic actors regard the European Union as a higher or more legitimate authority than the national government. This may be the result of, for example, major state failure, governmental crises or the delegitimatization of authoritarian states, or the consequence of the supranational organizations’ progressive acquisition of political competences. The same may be said about the legitimacy of specific EU rules in comparison with national rules. Moreover, one would expect the European Union to bypass the government and seek direct contact with societal actors if the European Union regards a state as lacking authority and legitimacy. Identification Transnational socialization is more likely if domestic actors identify more strongly with the European Union than with their nation-state.

68

Frank Schimmelfennig

First, it may be the case that, for example, national minorities identify themselves more strongly with the European Union (or some EU member state where they are the majority nation) than with the state they live in. Second, identification with the European Union may be significantly stronger among the society than in the government of a state. That would explain why the EU privileges transnational relations and is more successful at transnational socialization. Deliberation and setting Transnational socialization is more likely to provide a deliberative and in camera setting. The theory of social learning postulates that socialization is more successful if the process is non-public and deliberative. To the extent that transnational relations are less politicized and publicized than intergovernmental relations, that would explain why supranational socialization agencies may privilege transnational socialization and why the socialization of domestic actors acting transnationally may be more successful than the socialization of governments. Domestic resonance Transnational socialization is more likely if resonance is higher within society than at the state level. In this case, the socialization agency seeks contact with societal actors – and vice versa – to overcome the ‘learning blockade’ of governmental actors and to bring their influence to bear both ‘from above’ and ‘from below’. Structural compatibility and opportunities Transnational socialization is more likely if the supranational and domestic structures are conducive to transnational relations and influences. This applies, first, to the socialization agency and the community to which the socializees are to be socialized. Here, indeed, one could argue that governance in the European Union is characterized by sectoral network governance, which empowers and privileges transnational networks of experts and interest groups (see e.g. Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999). This mode of governance should, then, also privilege transnational socialization. At the same time, it should be attractive for domestic actors to the extent that it gives them a more powerful role than national modes of governance, allows them to bypass their own governments, increases their autonomy in policy-making processes and decreases the information asymmetry between governments and societal actors. Second, it applies to the domestic structure of the target countries. Here, it is argued that society-dominated, pluralist domestic structures are most accessible to transnational influences (see e.g. Risse-Kappen, 1995: 25–8). Third, societal actors are more or less capable of benefiting from political opportunities at the EU level (Marks and McAdam, 1996). This concerns their resources as well as dominant group ideologies. Transaction costs Transnational socialization is more likely if the transaction costs of transnational coordination are low. The higher the transaction costs (caused by language barriers, lack of mutual awareness and information, lack of resources for travel, etc.), the lower the incentives and capacities for domestic actors or supranational agencies to bypass the government and enter into direct and sustained contact (cf. Imig and Tarrow, 2001: 17). Adoption costs Transnational socialization is more likely if societal costs of rule adoption are lower than governmental costs of rule adoption. According to the

Transnational socialization 69 bargaining mechanism, international socialization will not be effective if, for the government, the costs of rule adoption exceed the benefits. If, however, the costbenefit calculation is different for powerful societal actors, that is, the costs of adoption are lower and/or the opportunity costs of non-adoption are higher, both supranational agencies and societal actors have an incentive to collaborate to increase the pressure on the government to adopt the rules. This is close to the neo-functionalist idea of political spill-over: societal interest groups interested in the expansion of transnational transactions and in the replacement of national rules by supranational ones cooperate among each other and with supranational organizations to increase the scope and level of integration against the interest of governments to preserve their autonomy.

Methodological issues The preceding definition of socialization, discussion of mechanisms and conditions and distinction of transnational socialization processes implies four sets of methodological issues. First, how do we know that a given process of social interaction is a socialization process? How do we distinguish transnational socialization processes from other transnational processes? Second, what counts as ‘adoption’? Third, how do we know that a given belief or behaviour results from transnational socialization – rather than intergovernmental socialization or some other interaction process? Finally, how can we distinguish different mechanisms of socialization empirically? First, on the issue of process identification, we have to be careful not to infer the existence of a socialization process from its successful outcome (adoption of rules and schemata). Otherwise, we are unable to recognize ‘failed socialization’ and to study the conditions under which socialization leads to rule adoption. Thus, every effort, whether ultimately successful or not, to induct actors into the constitutive rules and schemata of the community qualifies as ‘socialization’. On the other hand, we have to be careful not to limit socialization processes to the intended and purposive acts by socialization agencies. Rule adoption may be the unintended, spontaneous outcome of an interaction in which neither side planned to teach or learn the community rules. In such interaction processes, however, it is nearly impossible to identify a socialization process independently of its outcome. Rather, ‘failed socialization’ only reveals itself by comparison – if we study two similar processes of interaction, one results in the adoption of schemata and rules and the other does not. Second, how do we determine whether an actor has adopted the constitutive schemata and rules of the EU community? The literature generally distinguishes three conceptions of normative impact: the formal, the behavioural and the communicative (or cognitive) conception (cf. Hasenclever et al., 1997: 14–21; Raymond, 1997: 217–18; Cortell and Davis, 2000: 70–1). According to the formal conception, adoption will be seen in the transfer of community schemata and rules to national constitutions and laws or in the establishment of formal domestic organizations and procedures that correspond to and help to enforce them.

70

Frank Schimmelfennig

According to the behavioural conception, the socialization effects are measured by the extent to which the relevant behaviour of the targeted actors corresponds to the behaviour stipulated by the community schemata and rules. By contrast, according to the communicative conception of norms, socialization will primarily affect the communication or discourse among domestic actors. In this case, socialization will have been successful if actors regularly refer to the community schemata and rules when they justify their political positions and proposals. Third, on the issue of causal relevance, a double counterfactual needs to be considered. To show that a given behaviour or belief is the effect of EU socialization, researchers not only have to make a plausible case that, in the absence of EU socialization, the behaviour or belief would most likely have been different, but they also have to demonstrate that compliance with EU schemata and rules was subsequently generated as a result of adoption, that is, by mechanisms internal to the actor and not externally induced. The study of transnational socialization requires one extra step. It must focus on the origins and effects of the beliefs and practices of societal and individual governmental actors. Finally, to establish the mechanism of socialization, we need to go beyond the analysis of mere correlations between EU rules and actor behaviour and engage in theoretically informed process-tracing analysis. We need to specify, for each mechanism, which features of the socialization process it entails and then check the evidence on the process for features typically associated with a specific socialization mechanism.

Examples of research In the following brief survey, I will sort the literature by the three relevant target groups of European transnational socialization: publics, elites and non-member societies. The neo-functionalist ‘politicization’ hypothesis of integration (Schmitter, 1969: 165–6) claimed that ‘national actors find themselves gradually embroiled in ever more salient or controversial areas of policy-making’, as the scope and level of integration increases. ‘Politicization . . . refers initially to a process whereby the controversiality of joint decision-making goes up. This in turn is likely to lead to a widening of the audience or clientele interested and active in integration. Somewhere along the line a manifest redefinition of mutual objectives will probably occur’, eventually resulting in ‘a shift in actor expectations and loyalty toward the new regional center’ (Schmitter, 1969: 166). However, neo-functionalism conceived European integration mainly as an elite process involving interest groups and bureaucrats rather than the larger public. Socialization was thought to change the political attitudes and habits of those directly involved in and affected by, the integration process (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 119). Beyond the elites, integration appeared to require and elicit a mere ‘permissive consensus’: the general acceptance of the European Union as ‘part of the political landscape’ and the absence of strong antipathies to the Community and its organizations – not a positive transfer of loyalty, a change in identity or the adoption of prointegration beliefs and practices (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 41, 62).

Transnational socialization 71 In addition, neo-functionalists expected transnational socialization to occur not only as a result of ‘political spill-over’ from below but also of ‘cultivated spill-over’ from above. The supranational organizations of the European Union were expected to build and support transnational coordination and cooperation in order to mobilize support for further integration against reluctant member states. The survey is not intended as a comprehensive overview of the state-of-the-art. Rather, I present the major fields of recent research and some exemplary findings and controversies and seek to detect, to the extent possible, general patterns and results. Regarding publics, the weakness of political community and the absence of a European demos are widely accepted fundamental facts about European integration in the normative debate about the democratic deficit of the European Union. Rather, the issues are whether these facts undermine the legitimacy of the Union and its further development and whether or how the European Union could be democratized in the absence of a strong collective identity (for an overview of the debate see Schimmelfennig, 1996; Wolf, 2000: 153–211). For the study of transnational socialization, then, the challenge is to find out whether and under what circumstances, these assumed fundamentals are likely to change. Recent research has focused on three sets of questions: first, do we have evidence of a growing European identity in member societies – and, if so, how do we explain growth? Second, do we have evidence of an emerging European public sphere – a less demanding form of integration and community at the societal level? Finally, are political protest activities shifting from the national to the European level? In two recent summaries of ‘what we know’ about European identity, Risse (2003, 2004) claims that it is now generally accepted that individuals hold multiple social identities. A strong identification with the nation-state does not necessarily exclude identification with Europe. First, however, among those individuals who identify with Europe, national identity is generally stronger than European identity. Second, people attach different meanings to the ‘Europe’ with which they identify. And third, it is not at all clear that identification with Europe is an effect of transnational socialization. Rather, the meaning that people attach to ‘Europe’ appears to follow entrenched schemata of national political culture and the variation in identification with Europe across the member states, that is, between more Euro-sceptic and more Euro-friendly publics, reflects an enduring pattern with little change over time.3 As for change, Risse (2004) reports that during the 1990s, ‘the number of those who felt only attachment to their nation-state declined by almost twenty percent across the EU 15, while the percentage of those who perceived some sense of belonging to their nation-state and to Europe increased by about the same number’. To explain this development, Risse refers to the socio-psychological concept of ‘entitativity’. The more an organization or community is perceived to be ‘real’ and tangible, the more directly it affects the daily lives of people and the more it represents common values and a common destiny, the more likely a sense of belonging to this entity will develop.4 Arguably, the entitativity of the European

72

Frank Schimmelfennig

Union has increased and continues to increase with the introduction of the single market, Schengen, and the Euro. A second strand of research studies the emergence of a European public sphere, understood as the sphere in which EU issues and institutions are debated. In contrast to the public opinion surveys used in the study of citizens’ identification with Europe, research on a European public sphere typically analyzes media reporting (see Risse and Van de Steeg, 2003). Studies both measure the relative attention national media pays to European issues in comparison with domestic issues and the degree of similarity in media reporting with regard to timing, intensity and meaning structures across member state countries. The findings partly mirror those on identity: while domestic issues clearly dominate media reporting, the relative frequency of reporting on ‘Europe’ is on the rise. Moreover, the dominant European themes and their framing are rather similar across countries. Klaus Eder and Hans Jörg Trenz characterize the European public sphere as dominated by short-lived and partial publics constituted by specific political issues and events (see e.g. Trenz, 2002; Eder, 2003). Moreover, they see these publics as orchestrated ‘top-down’ to generate support for European organizations rather than as an autonomous sphere of reflection and criticism of these organizations. In its ‘routine mode’, EU network governance relies on relatively closed sectoral elite publics largely detached from mass media reporting and scrutiny (Trenz, 2002: 34–41). However, European organizations, in particular the Commission, are increasingly in need of creating symbolic integration and legitimacy beyond technocratic efficiency and issue-specific networks because of their growing competencies and the waning permissive consensus (Trenz, 2002: 182; Eder, 2003: 95–6, 99). But in the absence of a European demos with real collective power, the ‘European public’ has to be mobilized ad hoc by scandalizing individual political issues and cannot be sustained beyond the life cycle of the scandal or campaign (Trenz, 2002: 182; Eder, 2003: 104–8). Finally, the limits of a European public sphere can also be seen in the elections to the European Parliament (EP). They lack truly European issues, debates and candidates. Voters not only orient their voting behaviour towards domestic issues and conflicts but also abstain in greater numbers than in national elections or use their vote as a cheap protest vote. Thus, the characterization of EP elections as secondary national by-elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) still holds. In their edited volume on ‘Contentious Europeans’, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001) start from the basically neo-functionalist proposition that ‘if Europe is becoming a polity . . . sooner or later ordinary citizens will turn their claims and their forms of contentious politics beyond their borders and towards this new level of governance’ (2001: 7). As the focus of policy-making moves from national to supranational institutions, this will lead societal actors to ‘shift their claims from the national to the European level’, ‘model their repertoires of action around the forms of collective action that work best at that level’ and form transnational networks and common identities across national boundaries. The general finding of the Imig and Tarrow volume is, however, that whereas ‘Europeans are increasingly protesting against EU policies’, they do

Transnational socialization 73 so ‘on domestic soil and not directly against the institutions that produce them’ (2001: 3). The general pattern is one of what they call ‘domestication’. ‘Domestic groups target national or subnational agents in response to their claims against the European Union’ (2001: 18). The explanation they advance for this pattern is based on a rationalist, transaction-cost argument. For societal actors – and this is especially true for grass-roots social movements – targeting the European Union involves substantial transaction costs. They are unfamiliar with the EU’s institutional structure and workings; they do not know who is responsible for their grievances; Brussels is distant and they might not know the language. Instead, ‘claims are more likely to be directed to where people possess dense social networks, organizational resources and visible political opportunities’ (2001: 17; cf. Tarrow, 2001: 237). If low entitativity and high transaction costs are central factors in the explanation of the low (if rising) degree of European identity and European activities of ordinary citizens and social movements, one would expect the orientation towards Europe to be significantly stronger among the social and political elites who possess not only the knowledge and the other organizational resources to act successfully at the European level but also are more directly affected by EU policymaking and legislation than ordinary citizens. Indeed, identification with Europe is considerably stronger among elites than general publics (Risse, 2004). Interest group representation and activities have strongly grown at the EU level in response to the increasing importance of EU policy-making and the high accessibility of EU institutions to interest group lobbying and the protest activities against the European Union by farmers and other professional interest groups affected by EU subsidies (or EU prohibition of subsidies) exceed those of the new social movements by far (Imig and Tarrow, 2003: 141). As in the case of the European public sphere, interest group activity at the EU level is also assumed to be the result of ‘cultivated spill-over’. It has been in the interest of the European Commission to cultivate interest group representation and involvement at the EU level to obtain information, to increase pressure on the member governments and support its legitimacy in the EU system and vis-à-vis the European citizens (see Mazey and Richardson, 2001). The Commission has supported the creation of EU-wide federations of interest groups and has been extremely accessible to them. Imig and Tarrow add that the activities and influence of lobbyists at the EU level do not derive from their backing by social movements but from the resources of the Commission and its interest in creating legitimacy for its role and policies (Imig and Tarrow, 2003: 143). Thus, in contrast to social movements and grassroots contention, ‘domestication’ is not the dominant pattern in the sphere of interest group politics. But what evidence is there of transnational socialization, the change of interest group schemata and practices not only at the European level but also in domestic politics? Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson point out that the European Union is a ‘multi-venue system’ providing interest groups with high incentives to go ‘venueshopping’ implying that they will try to influence EU policy-making wherever they have the opportunity and consider it instrumental to do so – and that it will be difficult for the Commission and other supranational organizations to turn

74

Frank Schimmelfennig

them into reliable pro-integration agents (2001: 72–3). However, they also note some indications of transnational socialization. First, they point to some general rules of the game, which have developed from successful tactics and have become embedded as norms to which interest groups adhere in EU lobbying. Among these are the need to develop a European rather than national problem-solving perspective, to view European policy as an opportunity, rather than a threat, to seek consensus and present technical arguments based on reliable data (2001: 83). Second, they suggest that the process of consultation leads to mutual preference changes and the building of trust among the participants (2001: 91). Researchers are generally more sceptical about the eventual impact of these processes on EU policy outcomes and their feedback into domestic beliefs and practices. Justin Greenwood (2003) emphasizes the substantial variation of interest group influence on EU integration and policy integration – depending, for instance, on the technicality of the issue or the concentration of expertise with interest groups. However, he argues that the weak authority of the EU system itself, its fragmentation and dispersal of power, on the one hand and the weak autonomy of EU interest organizations, on the other, limit the power of interest groups in the European Union in general. What is more, they have failed to an even greater extent to provide a link between supranational organizations and individual citizens, to socialize them and strengthen their ‘European’ loyalties (see also Warleigh, 2001). Finally, Rainer Eising and Beate Kohler-Koch point out that even in policy fields with strong Community competence, public–private interaction at the national level has not decreased but conversely become more intense (2003). Many studies concur in the finding that national political elites acting at the European level develop multiple-role identities (see Risse 2004 for an overview). Morten Egeberg (1999, 2002) and Jarle Trondal (2002) argue that national bureaucrats involved in Commission and Council committees develop new role conceptions – but their primary allegiance remains with their state. Jeffrey Lewis describes how officials at the Coreper (the Committee of Permanent Representatives) are socialized into integrative habits and develop a ‘janus-faced’ role identity as both national representatives and European problem-solvers (2002). The socialization mechanism in these studies is much less clear. The evidence may be read as enduring identity change but also as strategic adaptation of elites to new contexts of interaction in order to increase their autonomy and pursue their objectives efficiently. Traditionally, research on transnational socialization in the context of European integration has focused on groups and elites in the member states. However, the European Union also disseminates its constitutive schemata and rules beyond its legal borders. This is most obviously the case with candidate states or with non-member countries that are planning to become candidates for membership. As a fundamental precondition, the European Union requires European non-member states to adopt the constitutive liberal-democratic norms on which its identity is based. Only after states have institutionalized these norms does the European Union enter into accession negotiations with candidate countries, during which the focus is on the transposition of the more specific EU rules of the

Transnational socialization 75 acquis communautaire. In recent years, a growing body of literature on the international socialization of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to the European Union has emerged (see e.g. Schimmelfennig, 2000; Pridham, 2001; Vachudova, 2001; Zielonka and Pravda, 2001; Kelley, 2002; Linden, 2002; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). What are the relevant mechanisms and conditions of socialization in this context? And how important is transnational socialization? Studies of the EU impact on the CEECs generally agree that the dominant socialization strategy of the European Union is ‘democratic conditionality’. It offers technical and financial assistance and expanding institutional ties to the CEECs – on the condition that they fulfil the liberal-democratic standards set by the European Union. Democratic conditionality thus works through an incentivebased bargaining mechanism of socialization. These studies also confirm many of the conditions under which the bargaining mechanism is assumed to lead to rule adoption. First, the systemic-structural conditions for the bargaining mechanism to work are fulfilled in principle because of the strong asymmetry in interdependence and power between the European Union and the CEECs (see Schimmelfennig, 2000: 124–5; Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003). A second prerequisite of successful democratic conditionality is the credibility of the EU threats (to withhold or withdraw assistance and block the way to membership) and promises (of assistance or membership). The importance of this condition was demonstrated in the cases of Slovakia (where the refusal of the European Union to open accession negotiations with the authoritarian Mecˇiar government helped to bring about a change in government) and Turkey (where the European Union’s credible offer of a membership perspective in 1999 spurred unprecedented democratic and human rights reforms; see Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). However, even high asymmetry and credibility did not bring about domestic change if domestic adoption costs exceeded the benefits of membership for the CEE governments – especially for the authoritarian, nationalist, and/or rentseeking elites, which have come to power in several CEECs after the downfall of communism (Vachudova, 2001; Kelley, 2002; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). To what extent has this process been a process of transnational socialization and how much did transnational socialization matter for the adoption of EU rules in the candidate countries? This is still a controversial issue which calls for further research paying close attention to the methodological problems of establishing transnational socialization effects. There is no question that transnational socialization processes have been going on since the onset of the democratic transitions – and even before (Thomas, 1999). International organizations and non-governmental consultancies and foundations (such as the German party foundations and the Soros Foundation) have been actively involved in the liberaldemocratic consolidation of the CEECs ‘from below’; and, as Dorota Dakowska also shows in Chapter 7 of this volume, the European party federations have established links with the newly founded political parties in the CEECs. Rather the question is whether EU ties to, and influence on, societal actors have been a necessary and sufficient condition of the socialization of these countries to the Western community of states.

76

Frank Schimmelfennig

One group of countries engaged in ‘anticipatory socialization’ early on (cf. Haggard et al., 1993). For instance, in the Central European countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, new elites committed to liberal democracy supported by societies with a strong desire to ‘return to Europe’ introduced basic liberal democratic norms immediately after the fall of the communist regimes and it is plausible to assume that they would have stayed course even without explicit socialization efforts by the European Union. What about the more problematic countries in which reform-adverse, authoritarian, and/or nationalist forces remained in, or came to, power in the aftermath of regime change? Milada Vachudova (2001: 28–9) argues that the European Union played a pivotal role in the replacement of reform-adverse governments by supporting oppositions and influencing the electorate. By contrast, in the analysis of Schimmelfennig et al. (2003: 499), electorates in the CEECs have been more concerned with personal security and welfare than with their government’s compliance with EU norms. Changes in government have been caused by societal dissatisfaction with the hardships of economic change, economic mismanagement by incumbent governments and corruption scandals, and this dissatisfaction has turned against reform-adverse and reform-friendly governments alike. Rather than being the effect of transnational socialization, the election of reform-friendly parties has provided an opening for improved compliance which, in turn, led to higher financial assistance and stronger institutional ties with the European Union. These benefits and ties created ‘lock-in’ effects, which persisted even when, as in Romania or Croatia, the old, previously reform-adverse parties returned to power. Finally, in his case study of transnational party linkages in Slovakia, Geoffrey Pridham comes to the conclusion that ‘the domestic impact of transnational linkages is normally marginal as those tend to enjoy little public resonance’ (1999: 1236). This finding also applies to the later process of Eastern enlargement: societal actors have played a marginal role – both on the part of the European Union (Sedelmeier and Wallace, 2000) and in the CEECs. EU rule transfer has been organized as a ‘top-down’ intergovernmental process between the European Commission and the candidate state governments. Domestic actors in the CEECs as well as EU-CEE transnational networks have been weak and largely irrelevant in the accession process (cf. e.g. Dimitrova, 2002; Sissenich, 2002).

Conclusion The study of transnational socialization in Europe is clearly on the rise again, after having become ‘obsolete’ together with the neo-functionalist theory of European integration in the mid-1970s. It still draws on neo-functionalist propositions of political and cultivated spill over but is also theoretically informed by the variety of ‘institutionalisms’ in International Relations and Comparative Politics. In this chapter, I have discussed conceptual and methodological issues in the study of socialization and summarized the major theoretical mechanisms and conditions of socialization in the literature.

Transnational socialization 77 Whereas we possess a fairly well developed theoretical toolbox for the study of transnational socialization in Europe, empirical research using it has only recently taken off. As all those contributing to the research in this field repeatedly emphasize, it is still in its infancy, producing sketchy and tentative findings (see e.g. Imig and Tarrow, 2003: 144; Risse and Van de Steeg, 2003; Risse, 2004). Most studies focus on finding descriptive evidence on whether, or to what extent, there is adoption of European identities, values and norms among member and candidate societies. This is no minor feat given the methodological problems of ascertaining socialization effects and the fact that identity and normative change is not an ‘either/or’ phenomenon. It also presents us with interesting patterns and puzzles in need of explanation. From the descriptive evidence gathered in recent studies, the general pattern seems to consist in four major facts and tendencies. First, the national context is still the site of primary political socialization. In general, EU citizens, political activists, interest group representatives and bureaucrats first go through processes of national political socialization by national schools, mass media, social organizations and bureaucracies. Second, European transnational socialization adds a further layer to, rather than replace, beliefs and practices learned in the domestic context. As the examples of current research have shown, European identities develop alongside national identities; a European public sphere emerges in the context of national media; protest activities triggered by EU policies are predominantly targeted at national governments; interest group activities at the European level increase together with domestic activities; government officials involved in European activities develop supplementary allegiances to European organizations alongside their loyalties to national governments; transition to democracy and market economies in the candidate countries goes hand in hand with ‘Europeanization’. Third, however, national socialization still matters most overall. National identities are stronger than European identities; the meanings of Europe are shaped by national political culture; domestic issues dominate the public spheres; interest group and social movement activities are predominantly targeted at domestic actors; the primary allegiances of national bureaucrats involved in EU policy-making is to the nation-state and national government; the success of the European socialization of candidate countries depends most strongly on domestic adoption costs and resonance. Finally, whereas this is true overall, there is a marked difference between the elites and the ordinary citizens. Elites have a stronger European identity, have oriented their perceptions and activities more strongly beyond national borders, and are, on an average, more integration-friendly. When it comes to explaining these patterns as well as the specific socialization processes, the literature is even less homogeneous and developed (cf. Risse, 2004). The main agreement appears to be that the effects of European transnational socialization are likely to increase with the ‘entitativity’ of the European Union, that is, the more it becomes a tangible and persisting ‘reality’ with immediate and direct relevance for, and impact on, the daily lives and activities of individuals and organizations. This, however, mainly seems to be a necessary condition of effective transnational socialization. The same degree of relevance and impact

78

Frank Schimmelfennig

may still trigger divergent reactions ranging from adoption to rejection.5 Moreover, it is not clear what the dominant logic or mechanism of socialization is – once the European Union has become relevant. Many studies do not explicitly address or answer this question (see e.g. Egeberg, 2002 and Trondal, 2002 on the socialization of bureaucrats). Sometimes the evidence can be read both ways (see Zürn, 2003). For instance, is the adoption of ‘integrative habits’ by government officials in the Coreper (Lewis, 2002) evidence of an imitation or persuasion process or is it the effect of group pressure or ‘simple learning’: that one has to adapt to the rules of the game in order to act successfully in the EU context? Then again, the mechanisms seem to differ by context or target group. Whereas political conditionality vis-à-vis the candidate states and the cultivation of transnational activities by the Commission follow a logic of consequentiality, the instrumental dimension of socialization becomes less clear the more we get down to the attitudes of ordinary citizens at the grass roots. Thus, besides improving and refining the descriptive evidence on transnational socialization in the European Union, future research needs to pay particular attention to the analysis of causal mechanisms and conditions. It has been the purpose of this chapter to provide conceptual, theoretical and methodological foundations for this research and to point out the major empirical issues to which this research could be applied.

Notes 1 Note, however, that the condition of ‘identification’ is only useful if ‘identity’ is not also the dependent variable of international socialization. Otherwise, it will lead to tautological reasoning. 2 However, Moravcsik points out that Checkel’s conditions of social learning correspond to rationalist theories of Bayesian learning and signalling (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001: 232–4). 3 Jachtenfuchs et al. (1998) as well as Marcussen et al. (1999) show that meanings of Europe both vary significantly across countries and have not changed significantly over time. According to Risse (2004), the findings of the entire research volume on EU-induced identity change are not conclusive. 4 This concept is similar to the condition of ‘duration and intensity of contact’ in Table 3.2. 5 For a scrutiny of the contact hypothesis and an argument that the duration and intensity of contact alone do not explain socialization, see Beyers (2002).

References Beyers, Jan (2002) Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of EU Council Officials, paper presented at IDNET Workshop ‘International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe’, European University Institute. Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1998) ‘The constructivist turn in international relations theory’, World Politics, 50(2): 324–48. —— (1999) ‘Norms, institutions, and national identity in contemporary Europe’, International Studies Quarterly, 43(1): 83–114.

Transnational socialization 79 —— (2001) ‘Why comply? Social learning and European identity change’, International Organization, 55(3): 553–88. Checkel, Jeffrey T. and Moravcsik, Andrew (2001) ‘A constructivist research program in EU studies?’, European Union Politics, 2(2): 219–49. Christiansen, Thomas, Jørgensen, Knud Erik and Wiener, Antje (2001) ‘Introduction’, in Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen and Antje Wiener (eds), The Social Construction of Europe, London: Sage, pp. 1–19. Cortell, Andrew P. and Davis, James W. Jr (2000) ‘Understanding the domestic impact of international norms: a research agenda’, International Studies Review, 2(1): 65–87. Deutsch, Karl W. (1964) ‘Multipolar power systems and international stability’, World Politics, 16(3): 390–406. Deutsch, Karl W., Burrell, Sidney A., Khan, Robert A., Lee, M., Jr and Waganen, van N. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. DiMaggio, Paul J. and Powell, Walter W. (1991) ‘The Iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields’, in Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 63–82. Dimitrova, Antoaneta (2002) ‘Enlargement, institution-building and the EU’s administrative capacity requirement’, West European Politics, 25(4): 171–90. Eder, Klaus (2003) ‘Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie’, in Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (eds), Europäische Integration, 2nd edn, Opladen: Leske  Budrich (UTB), pp. 85–120. Egeberg, Morten (1999) ‘Transcending intergovernmentalism? Identity and role perceptions of national officials’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(3): 456–74. —— (2002) Organizational Structures and Socialization: The Case of EU Committees and National Officials, paper presented at IDNET Workshop ‘International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe’, European University Institute. Eising, Rainer and Kohler-Koch, Beate (2005) ‘Interessenpolitik im europäischen Mehrebenensystem’, in Rainer Eising and Beate Kohler-Koch (eds), Interessenpolitik in Europa, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Finnemore, Martha (1996) National Interests in International Society, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998) ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, International Organization, 52(4): 887–917. Franck, Thomas M. (1990) The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, New York: Oxford University Press. Greenwood, Justin (2003) Interest Representation in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Haas, Ernst B. (1968) The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950–1957, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. —— (1976) ‘Turbulent fields and the theory of regional integration’, International Organization, 30(2): 173–212. Haggard, Stephen, Levy, Marc A., Moravcsik, Andrew and Nicolaidis, Kalypso (1993) ‘Integrating the two halves of Europe: theories of interests, bargaining, and institutions’, in Keohane, Robert O., Nye, Joseph S. and Hoffmann, Stanley (eds), After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991, Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, pp. 173–95. Hasenclever, Andreas, Mayer, Peter and Rittberger, Volker (1997) Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

80

Frank Schimmelfennig

Ikenberry, G. J. and Kupchan, Charles A. (1990) ‘Socialization and hegemonic power’, International Organization, 44(3): 283–315. Imig, Doug and Tarrow, Sidney (2001) ‘Studying contention in an emerging polity’, in Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (eds), Contentious Europeans. Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 3–26. —— (2003) ‘Politischer Protest im Europäischen Mehrebenensystem’, in Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (eds), Europäische Integration, 2nd edn, Opladen: Leske  Budrich (UTB), pp. 121–49. Jachtenfuchs, Markus, Diez, Thomas and Jung, Sabine (1998) ‘Which Europe? Conflicting models of a legitimate European political order’, European Journal of International Relations, 4(4): 409–45. Johnston, Alistair I. (2001) ‘Treating international institutions as social environments’, International Studies Quarterly, 45(4): 487–515. Kelley, Judith (2002) Unpacking Socialization: Persuasion, Incentives and Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe, paper presented at IDNET Workshop ‘International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe’, European University Institute. Kerr, Henry H. (1973) ‘Changing attitudes through international participation: European parliamentarians and integration’, International Organization, 27(1): 45–83. Kohler-Koch, Beate and Eising, Rainer (eds) (1999) The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, London: Routledge. Lewis, Jeff (2002) Nesting Identities in Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision-Making in the European Union, paper presented at IDNET Workshop ‘International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe’, European University Institute. Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A. (1970) Europe’s Would-Be Polity. Patterns of Change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Linden, Ronald H. (ed.) (2002) Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern European States, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics, New York: Free Press. Marcussen, Martin, Risse, Thomas, Engelmann-Martin, Daniela and Knopf, HansJoachim (1999) ‘Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation state identities’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4): 614–33. Marks, Gary and McAdam, Doug (1996) ‘Social movements and the changing structure of political opportunity in the European Union’, West European Politics, 19(2): 249–78. Mazey, Sonia and Richardson, Jeremy (2001) ‘Institutionalizing promiscuity: commissioninterest group relations in the European Union’, in Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz and Neil Fligstein (eds), The Institutionalization of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 71–93. Moravcsik, Andrew (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Moravcsik, Andrew and Vachudova, Milada A. (2003) ‘National interests, state power, EU enlargement’, East European Politics and Societies, 17(1): 42–57. Peck, Richard (1979) ‘Socialization of permanent representatives in the United Nations: some evidence’, International Organization, 33(3): 365–90. Pierson, Paul (1996) ‘The path to European integration: a historical institutionalist analysis’, Comparative Political Studies, 29(2): 123–63. Pollack, Mark A. (1998) Constructivism, Social Psychology, and Elite Attitude Change: Lessons From an Exhausted Research Program, unpublished paper, Baltimore, MD: Conference of Europeanists, 26 February–1 March.

Transnational socialization 81 Pridham, Geoffrey (1999) ‘Complying with the European Union’s democratic conditionality: transnational party’, Europe–Asia Studies, 51(7): 1221–44. —— (2001) ‘External causes of democratization in postcommunist Europe: problems of theory and application’, Central European Political Science Review, 2(3): 6–23. Raymond, Gregory A. (1997) ‘Problems and prospects in the study of international norms’, Mershon International Studies Review, 41(2): 205–45. Reif, Karlheinz and Schmitt, Hermann (1980) ‘Nine second-order national elections: a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results’, European Journal of Political Research, 8(1): 3–45. Riggs, Robert E. (1977) ‘One small step for functionalism: UN participation and congressional attitude change’, International Organization, 31(3): 515–39. Risse, Thomas (2000) ‘ “Let’s Argue!” Communicative action in world politics’, International Organization, 54(1): 1–39. —— (2003) ‘The Euro between national and European identity’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10(4): 487–505. —— (2004) ‘European institutions and identity change: what have we learned?’, in Richard Herrmann, Thomas Risse and Marilynn Brewer (eds), Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU, New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Risse, Thomas and Sikkink, Kathryn (1999) ‘The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction’, in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights, International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–38. Risse, Thomas and Van de Steeg, Marianne (2003) An Emerging European Public Sphere. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Clarifications, paper presented to the Conference on the ‘Europeanization of Public Spheres, Political Mobilization, Public Communication and the European Union’, Berlin. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995) ‘Bringing transnational relations back in: introduction’, in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–33. Schimmelfennig, Frank (1994) ‘Internationale Sozialisation neuer Staaten. Heuristische Überlegungen zu einem Forschungsdesiderat’, Zeitschrift Für Internationale Beziehungen, 1(2): 335–55. —— (1996) Legitimate Rule in the European Union, Berkeley, CA: University of California, Center for German and European Studies. —— (2000) ‘International socialization in the new Europe. Rational action in an institutional environment’, European Journal of International Relations, 6(1): 109–39. —— (2003a) ‘Internationale Sozialisation: Von einem “erschöpften” zu einem produktiven Forschungsprogramm?’ in Gunther Hellmann, Klaus Dieter Wolf and Michael Zürn (eds), Die Neuen Internationalen Beziehungen. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland, Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 401–27. —— (2003b) The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2005) ‘Introduction. Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe’, in Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Schimmelfennig, Frank, Engert, Stefan and Knobel, Heiko (2003) ‘Cost, commitment and compliance: the impact of EU democratic conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(3): 495–518.

82

Frank Schimmelfennig

Schmitter, Philippe C. (1969) ‘Three neo-functional hypotheses about international integration’, International Organization, 23(1): 161–6. Sedelmeier, Ulrich and Wallace, Helen (2000) ‘Eastern enlargement. Strategy or second thoughts?’, in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 427–60. Sissenich, Beate (2002) ‘The diffusion of EU social and employment legislation in Poland and Hungary’, in Ronald H. Linden (ed.), Norms and Nannies. The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 287–315. Stone Sweet, Alex and Sandholtz, Wayne (1997) ‘European integration and supranational governance’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4(3): 297–317. Tarrow, Sidney (2001) ‘Contentious politics in a composite polity’, in Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (eds), Contentious Europeans. Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 233–51. Thomas, Daniel C. (1999) ‘The Helsinki accords and political change in Eastern Europe’, in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 205–33. Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe (1991) ‘Neo-functionalism: obstinate or obsolete? A reappraisal in the light of new dynamism of the EC’, Millennium, 20(1): 1–22. Trenz, Hans-Jörg (2002) Zur Konstitution politischer Öffentlichkeit in der Europäischen Union. Zivilgesellschaftliche Subpolitik oder schaupolitische Inszenierung?, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Trondal, Jarle (2002) Why Europeanization Happens? The Socializing Power of EU Committees, paper presented at IDNET Workshop ‘International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe’, European University Institute. Vachudova, Milada A. (2001) The Leverage of International Institutions on Democratizing States: Eastern Europe and the European Union, EUI working paper, San Domenico: European University Institute. Warleigh, Alex (2001) ‘ “Europeanizing” civil society: NGOs as agents of political socialization’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(4): 619–39. Wolf, Klaus Dieter (2000) Die Neue Staatsräson. Zwischenstaatliche Kooperation als Demokratieproblem in der Weltgesellschaft, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Zielonka, Jan and Pravda, Alex (eds) (2001) Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 2: International and Transnational Factors, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zürn, Michael (2003) Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Socialization Research between Constructivism and Rationalism, paper prepared for IDNET Project ‘International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe’, University of Bremen (unpublished manuscript).

4

Transnational business Power structures in Europe’s political economy Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

Transnationalization can be seen as an important aspect of the European integration process, with the evolving European Union polity being supported by a particularly dense network of transnational social relations, that is, by a transnational civil society. Arguably, within this society, transnational business is amongst the most prominent of transnational actors. Within political science debates, the focus on the role of transnational society is associated with a long theoretical tradition going back to neo-functionalism, whereas, on the opposite end of the ‘classical debate’ on European integration, intergovernmentalists have been much more sceptical and have disputed the role of transnational actors regarding the dynamics of European integration. In fact, the dispute has focussed in particular on the alleged role of transnational business when at the end of the 1980s, explanations were sought for the unexpected revival of the integration process with the single market programme (cf. Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; Moravcsik, 1991, 1998). With the focus of contemporary studies of the European Union (EU) having largely shifted to the analysis of policy-making and governance, the question about the role of such actors has not lost its pertinence. Indeed, in analysing socio-economic policy-making in particular, much research has been conducted regarding the role of lobbying, EU-level interest intermediation, policy networks, etc., that is, on the role of private (non-state) actors in EU governance. Amongst these actors, the focus is more often than not on business groups. Within the domain of socio-economic actors, organized labour is generally acknowledged to be rather weak at the European level and certainly no match for the economic, organizational and political power of transnational business, as Patrick Pasture also shows in his chapter in this book. How, then, to conceptualize this apparently key transnational actor? In fact, how to conceptualize both its transnationality and its actorness and with regard to the latter, how to understand its possible role in the politics of European integration and of EU policy-making? And how can we actually study these phenomena empirically? And in what ways can such a study of transnational business contribute to our understanding of transnationalism in the emerging European political space? It is these questions that will concern us in this chapter, which is organized into three sections. The first and central one, critically reviews

84

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

the major theoretical perspectives on the role of transnational business in general, and in relation to European integration in particular, as they have developed within political science, especially in the fields of International Relations and International Political Economy (IPE). The next section then discusses some of the meta-theoretical and methodological issues involved in doing research on European transnational business, while the third section examines some examples of research in this area. The chapter ends with some brief conclusions and a research agenda.

Theoretical perspectives The central question of this chapter is how to conceptualize the phenomenon of transnational business as an actor in European integration and EU politics and how different conceptualizations may or may not contribute to our general understanding of transnationalism in the European Union. Here my review of contending theoretical perspectives will be particularly informed by the following four considerations. First, if a theoretical approach is to meet the goal of contributing to an understanding of European transnationalism in general, it should at least have some theorization of ‘the transnational’, that is, it should inform us what it consists of and how we can go about understanding and/or explaining it. What are transnational relations and how do they relate to the more familiar international relations? What is specific about ‘the transnational’, how might we account for its emergence and how can we understand its implications for studying diverse social and political phenomena? Second, and in relation to the first point, no matter how we define ‘the transnational’, it should not be conceived in terms of a level, that is, as somehow a level in addition to, for example, the national, European or global levels, or in fact be seen as synonymous with either of the latter two. Rather, I would suggest that the whole language of levels (common in International Relations discourse) is missing the fundamental point about transnationalism, which is that it precisely refers to social phenomena that link different levels. Transnationalism is hence by definition a multi-level phenomenon, linking actors and processes across territorial boundaries and at the same time possibly also becoming somewhat detached from those territories (see also Anderson, 2002: 16; van Apeldoorn, 2004a). Transnationalism might be confined to a particular region (e.g. Europe) or it might be global in scope. It is important that transnational relations should not be seen as replacing international relations but rather existing alongside it and as a matter of fact necessarily so as the latter is by definition a precondition for the former. Moreover, historically the two have evolved together especially since the modern state system became embedded within a world market constituting transnational economic as well as political, cultural, links. Third, as transnational business is conceived as an actor, the question is raised how this particular actor might relate to any particular structures. The relationship between agency and structure is one of the key debates in social theory. Suffice to say here that all theories take at least an implicit position with regard to

Transnational business 85 this meta-theoretical question. I will note that in fact quite a few theoretical approaches to transnational relations, including those focusing on transnational socio-economic actors such as business, are rather actor-centred, often to the extent of ignoring structures – or viewing them as mere constraints on the rational behaviour of otherwise autonomous actors. The problem with talking about actors without referring to any structures, however, is that the actors themselves – their emergence, their identities and interests – are left unexplained (cf. Wendt, 1987: 343). In the case of transnational business as an actor this means that we have no theoretical understanding of what accounts for the rise of this actor and for what, according to some, must be seen as its growing political power. Nor will we find it easy to account for any process of structural change in which, for instance, the agency of transnational business itself might be involved. We cannot grasp either how actors are constituted by structures nor how they, at the same time through their agency, reproduce or transform those structures (on the latter notion see Bhaskar, 1979; see also Wendt, 1987). Fourth, and finally, as our focus is on transnationalism in the European Union, we need to answer the question as to what is specific about transnational relations in an EU context, and, conversely, to which extent we should relate processes of European transnationalization to wider, global processes rather than view it as a sui generis phenomenon. In fact, I will argue later, that many approaches to the study of transnational business, or rather of transnational private interests in the European Union in general, seem to imply that processes of transnationalization stop at the borders of the European Union, from both sides, and that transnational actors can be fully understood within the context of the European polity, which is hence taken in isolation from the rest of the world. Although there might very well be transnational phenomena and actors that are restricted to a specific region such as Europe, or even just the European Union, those associated with transnational business definitely are not. We might thus miss how transnational business, as an actor, is inextricably bound up with global structures and related processes. This kind of EU-centrism, moreover, may also end up in reproducing at the European/EU level the state-centrism that transnationalist approaches are supposed to transcend. With these four points in mind, let us now review some major theoretical perspectives as relevant for the study of the role transnational business in European integration. I will start by looking at general approaches within mainstream International Relations/IPE to the phenomenon of transnational relations and then move on to examine the much more specific established theories of European integration and what could be called theories of European governance and European public policy. All of these theoretical perspectives in fact share more or less the same liberal/pluralist premises in their view of ‘transnational’ society. I argue that this pluralist approach can be criticized for failing to understand the underlying social structures that generate structural inequalities of power between different groups – a point that is particularly relevant when studying the power of transnational business. For the purposes of this chapter, however, the most serious limitation of much of the established conceptualizations of the

86

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

role of transnational business (and transnational actors generally) within the European Union is the tendency toward EU-centrism, earlier noted. This section will therefore be concluded by considering an alternative approach to transnational relations – one deriving from a historical materialist perspective within IPE, that in principle, might be seen as seeking to transcend some of these limits. This approach, here labelled neo-Gramscian transnationalism, however, in turn may be criticized for not taking the European Union seriously enough or at the least needing to further theorize the effects of EU governance structures and processes on European transnational actors.

Transnational relations and transnational business in International Relations discourse In mainstream International Relations discourse transnational relations were first ‘discovered’ in the 1970s, with Transnational Corporations (TNCs) inter alia being seen as important non-state actors in what became an emergent ‘pluralist’ conception of world politics (Keohane and Nye, 1972). However, before this new perspective could be further developed and to bear more fruit empirically, the state-centric orthodoxy was firmly re-established within the American International Relations community as it turned to neo-realism (Waltz, 1979) and an almost equally state-centric neo-liberalism (Keohane, 1984). The study of TNCs was subsequently relegated to IPE – seen by the dominant neo-realists as a somewhat separate sub-discipline of International Relations – but without much being done in terms of theory development. Within the mainstream IPE, moreover, the attempt to ‘bring the firm back in’ (Eden, 1991; see also Stopford and Strange, 1991; Strange, 1991, 1996) has often tended to take transnational actors such as TNCs as external to national societies rather than as part of a transnationalization of formerly national state–society relations, hence, in my view, missing the essence of ‘transnationality’. Focusing on ‘the tension between states and multinationals’ (Eden, 1991: 197, my emphasis), or their opposing interests in a globally competitive environment (Stopford and Strange, 1991), such a framework tends to see the TNC more as an ‘appropriate counterpoint’ (Eden, 1991: 197) to the state, influencing it from the ‘outside’. This way one misses how, as a transnational actor, TNCs influence states from the ‘inside’ as well.1 Within mainstream International Relations theory, meanwhile, it was only in 1995 (Risse-Kappen, 1995) that an attempt was made to ‘bring transnational relations back in’. Not unlike the earlier but less refined conceptualization of Keohane and Nye, the proposed framework of Risse-Kappen is in fact more a theory about transnational actors than about transnational relations in the sense of the structures by virtue of which these actors may be said to exist. This actorcentredness (see also Risse, 2002) may be seen to reveal a rather individualist conception of transnational relations, in which transnational actors are taken as autonomous entities rather than as embedded in, and indeed constituted by, transnational structures (even concurrently also constitutive of those structures). Thus, whereas for instance Risse-Kappen et al. (Risse-Kappen, 1995a) very usefully

Transnational business 87 focus on domestic structures as ‘intervening variables’ constraining and enabling the agency of transnational actors, and determining their success in influencing state policies (see the editor’s introduction, Risse-Kappen, 1995b), their conception of structures beyond national state-society complexes remains limited to a focus on international institutions (such as international organizations, international regimes, etc.). There is thus no conceptualization of for instance global and transnational (economic) structures engendering particular forms of transnational agency. In this liberal perspective, the rising significance of transnational relations within contemporary world politics remains unexplained, as are the interests of transnational actors. Maybe in line with its neglect of global (economic) structures, most of the empirical work that has come out of this agenda has, moreover, focussed on the role of so-called ‘principled’ NGOs rather than on socio-economic actors such as transnational business (see e.g. Risse et al., 1999). In fact, this particular transnationalist agenda has merged with, or one might say, been overtaken by, the emerging liberal constructivist research agenda within the International Relations, with a concern with ‘constructivist issues’ dominating the search for an understanding of the transnational. In sum, in mainstream International Relations, then, and in spite of all the globalization literature, the concept of transnationalism remains theoretically underdeveloped. The contribution to understanding the role of transnational business in European integration from this perspective is thus limited. Let us therefore now turn to some theoretical perspectives more explicitly oriented toward the European Union.

‘Classical’ integration theory: the neo-functionalist legacy Although in part deriving its concepts from general International Relations theory, the first and most classical integration theory has rather developed outside the mainstream of the International Relations discipline, and, moreover, has implicitly come to view, as Andrew Moravcsik has observed (1993: 474), the development of the later European Union as a sui generis phenomenon to which apparently, general theories of international politics, could not be applied. Rather than being rooted in an International Relations discourse, maintaining a strict separation between domestic and international (or rather, interstate) politics, neo-functionalism was heavily steeped in pluralist political science, giving, in the words of one of the theory’s leading proponents, a ‘central place to phenomena of group conflict, to the beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies of groups participating in the process of policy formation’ (Lindberg, 1963: 9). In contrast, to realist International Relations which saw the state as the container of national society, as well as autonomous from that society in exercising its external sovereignty, neo-functionalism was a society-centred approach that crucially, saw society – and thus group conflict – as potentially overflowing national borders and thus establishing transnational linkages embedding states and interstate relations. It was for Western Europe that this process was seen as concomitant

88

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

to a gradual formation of a new supranational political community superseding the nation-state (see Haas, 1958). A precondition for such a political community, Ernst Haas stressed, was the development of a ‘transnational ideology’ (Haas: 5, passim) which would hold interest groups together at the new supranational level in spite of their otherwise opposing ideologies. Interest groups were at the same time also – together with political parties – the actors through which this transnational ideology would come about as, via the process of integration, their loyalties would shift to the new European central political institutions (Haas, 1958; see also the Chapter 3 by Frank Schimmelfennig, this volume). Thus, what was called political spill-over, that is, the process whereby private mostly socio-economic actors would come to support the integration process by organizing their interests at the new supranational level, was seen as a critical element of the self-expanding logic of European integration. As Haas put it: ‘group pressure will spill over into the federal sphere and thereby add to the integrative impulse’ (Haas, 1968: xxxiii). In that sense, neo-functionalism does provide us with some kind of theory of European transnational relations but in my view, not a very satisfactory one. Viewing European transnationalism as a sui generis phenomenon, the rise of European transnational actors is fully explained in terms of the integration process itself, thus presenting the European Union as a self-contained entity, acting as a container of self-engendered transnational social forces and a priori excluding the possibility of these in fact being embedded within wider, global structures of transnationalization. Neo-functionalism in the end tends to equate transnationalism with European supranationalism, that is, with the new emerging central or federal level (Haas used the terms supranational, central and federal interchangeably, see Haas, 1958: 9). Stressing the dynamics of integration as leading gradually towards a new supranational state, neo-functionalism inasmuch as being concerned with transnational relations, viewed them as eventually replacing rather than existing alongside and critically shaping international relations. Rather than implying a shift from a focus on what happens inside to what happens across national borders, the latter is only seen as a temporary phenomenon leading up to the point where integration all but ends the significance of old national boundaries as in fact a new European nation-state is created. This becomes apparent when Haas’s ‘transnational ideology’ (see earlier) turns out to be not so transnational after all as he writes that his definition of political integration ‘assumes that [it] will yield a new national consciousness of the new political community’, in other words, Haas continues, ‘the advent of a new nationalism [implying] a proportional diminution of loyalty to and expectations from the former separate national governments’ (1958: 14). Neo-functionalism did not focus on business in terms of a privileged socioeconomic actor but rather devoted equal attention to both ‘trade associations’ and ‘trade unions’ (Haas, 1958) as a result of its adherence to a pluralist theory holding that the rise of one particular socio-economic interest would ‘lead toward the formation of countervailing aggregates of economic interests’ (1958: 359). As a matter of fact, interestingly, Haas here spoke of business as the countervailing force as he saw labour – due to its ‘supranational ideology’ – as more

Transnational business 89 advanced in terms of transnational organization (ibid.). Given its firm pluralist commitments, there is thus no appreciation of possible structural inequalities of power between social groups. As such, as James Caporaso (1998: 9) notes, ‘neo-functionalism had no explanation for which groups should succeed, form coalitions, mobilize interests, have access to policy-makers and affect policy’. It also has to be noted that neo-functionalism at the time did not focus on transnational business as such, which in Europe at the time was also rather underdeveloped, as Wolfram Kaiser also shows in his chapter in this book, but rather on the transnational organization of national business interests, which in fact something fundamentally different. Transnational business, and in particular an elite associated with Europe’s rising transnational corporations, was given a prominent place in the supranationalist perspective that emerged in the revived integration debate of the end of 1980s onwards and that formed the counter-point to the liberal intergovernmentalist approach that denied any substantial weight to this, or for that matter to any other transnational actor (Moravcsik, 1991, 1998). Thus, in particular, Sandholtz and Zysman’s 1989 account of the single market programme Europe 1992 as an elite bargain in response to structural changes in the world economy and struck by the Commission on the one hand, and a rising transnational business elite, on the other, was the first to bring the latter to the theoretical limelight although earlier scholarly accounts had also drawn attention to the role of transnational business, in particular the European Round Table of Industrialists (see especially van Tulder and Junne, 1988). Supranationalism, however, does reveal a neo-functionalist bias as regards its treatment of transnational socio-economic actors as being instrumental to an expansionary integration logic. Although distancing themselves from neo-functionalism, Sandholtz and Zysman’s analysis, as Moravcsik (1991: 77) also noted, in fact fits well into that theoretical tradition. Thus the role of transnational business is seen not only in response to a changing global environment, but also to the institutional changes (i.e. the Single European Act) that were already taking place and were perceived as ‘irreversible’ (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989: 116). In the end, the coalition of big business and the Commission is really seen as dominated by the latter. It was the Commission’s role as ‘policy entrepreneur’ that brought the internal market back on the agenda, while business played a critical role in supporting these political initiatives (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989: 117). In this way, then, big business is not seen as an autonomous transnational social force, but rather as a ‘political interest group [constituted] by Community action’ (ibid.). In contrast to the more ad hoc (though inspired by neo-functionalist) explanation of Europe’s relaunching offered by Sandholtz and Zysman, the edited volume by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998) seeks to offer a more systematic theoretical grounding of supranationalism. In fact, their theory of ‘supranational governance’ presents an even more direct return to the neo-functionalist legacy of Haas (as well as the transactions-based theory of Karl Deutsch). In this theory, integration is seen as driven by the rise of cross-border transactions which will ‘increase the perceived need for European-level rules, coordination and regulation’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 11), a need to which transnational

90

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

private interests will respond by organizing themselves supranationally, demanding more supranational rule-making, and so on. As with neo-functionalism, then, transnational actors by now primarily transnational business, are regarded as playing a critical role, but first and foremost as agents bound up with the ‘inherently expansionary process’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 25) of European integration. What they call ‘transnational society’ (ibid.: 9f f.) is thus seen as one of the key constituent elements of the latter process, but beyond its role in the integrative logic though, this theory does not offer much of an understanding of this transnational society in terms of the social structures it is made up of. In fact, its transaction-based approach makes for a sociologically rather thin conception of society, focusing on the quantitative phenomenon of cross-border movements and conceptualizing transnational actors as ‘transactors’, that is rational, economic agents engaging in cross-border transactions. These actors are, moreover, seen as operating only within the confines of the European Union, as non-governmental actors engaging in ‘intra-EC exchanges’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 9). The possible links of these intra-European transactions and ‘transactors’ with a set of transnational economic relations extending beyond the boundaries of the European Union is thus ignored here. To sum up, the contribution of integration theory to our understanding of transnational business within the European Union and the larger European political space is to a large degree shaped by a neo-functionalist legacy, the limits of which lie mainly in its restricted view of ‘the transnational’ as a wholly sui generis phenomenon. Of course, the great merit of the neo-functionalist and supranationalist perspectives is that they acknowledge what is obvious to most contemporary observers of EU politics, namely the significance of transnational relations in the first place, in contrast to the rival theory of intergovernmentalism. In this respect, it remains puzzling that Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 1998) in his liberal intergovernmentalism seeks to break open the black box of the national state to look for what is inside, but fails to find any transnationalized social or political actors. Meanwhile, the neo-functionalist legacy, as will be observed below, continues to leave its mark on the studies of those many EU scholars for whom the significance of transnational (socio-economic) actors within EU politics is indeed self-evident, namely those studying the European Union as representing its own unique system of governance, whose public policies we can analyse with ordinary tools of political science, such as interest group analysis.

European governance and public policy: interest group pluralism Moving from the process of European integration to the analysis of European governance (Hix, 1998), scholars in recent years have sought to abandon the old dichotomy between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The so called multi-level governance approach (see especially Marks et al., 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001), explicitly does not seek to explain the process of European integration but rather to interpret the polity – describing ‘the nature of the beast’

Transnational business 91 (Risse-Kappen, 1996) – that the European Union has already turned into. The added value of this approach from our perspective is that it, on the one hand, does away with the fiction that the nation-state is about to disappear altogether (states in fact, continue to take a very prominent role in European politics), but on the other hand, also stresses that these continuing international relations within the European Union are increasingly embedded within and shaped by transnational relations. The multi-level governance perspective emphasizes that private actors do not just operate in discrete national arenas but also in the supranational arena: ‘States no longer serve as the exclusive nexus between domestic and international relations’ (Marks et al., 1996: 372). As transnational actors also constitute the nexus between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’, the dichotomy between the latter levels that has been the hallmark of much of International Relations discourse is transcended. In this conceptualization then, transnational actors can indeed be seen as linking the different levels of Europe’s multi-level polity. From the perspective of understanding the role of transnational socioeconomic actors in the European integration process, the multi-level governance approach – precisely because it is a descriptive and not an explanatory theory – is less helpful when it comes to explaining the rise of transnational actors in EU politics, or to understanding how, and to what effect they shape the process of European integration. Thus, although stressing that EU politics is about political struggles not just on the classical axis of intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism, but also along the (horizontal) left–right axis, Hooghe and Marks (1999) in their analysis of rival projects for European integration can neither explain the origins of these different projects nor why eventually in their confrontation, one triumphed over the other. Reflecting the shift from the process to the analysis of governance, and in more than one way also reflecting the earlier concerns of neo-functionalism, public policy analysts have also increasingly turned their attention to the European Union and sparked different literature such as those on policy networks (see Chapter 2 by Karen Heard-Lauréote, this volume) and on interest groups (see e.g. cf. Streeck and Schmitter, 1991; Greenwood et al., 1992; Mazey and Richardson, 1993a; Kohler-Koch, 1997; for recent overviews, see Cowles, 2002; Greenwood, 2003; Hosli et al., 2004). Focusing here on the latter, the growing literature on European interest representation and European lobbying was, on the one hand, a response to the increasing number and apparently growing importance of so called Eurogroups after the Single European Act (as it elevated the status of Brussels as a supranational centre of policy-making, see Mazey and Richardson, 1993b: 6), and, on the other hand, a continuation of the neo-functionalist legacy to the extent that much of this literature shares the assumption that the European Union, although not a state, can be seen as having ‘state-like properties’ and in this sense can be analysed as one would the nation-state in its interaction with interest groups (Greenwood et al., 1992: 17–20). It has been public policy studies focusing on European interest representation that in particular, in addition to the earlier discussed supranationalist perspective, have drawn our attention to the role of transnational business as a pre-eminent

92

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

actor within EU politics. Indeed, and in response to the actual rise of European TNCs that could be witnessed from the 1960s onwards, it has been within this context that transnational business as such, rather than transnational organizations of business, has really come to the limelight. Moving beyond neo-functionalism, then, recent studies often have recognized that whereas the former was often rather exclusively focussed on formal interest associations, much of the action actually might be going on elsewhere. Thus whilst neofunctionalism saw the formation of European interests groups in the form of supranational trade associations (sectoral and peak) as well as supranational trade unions as the inevitable corollary of the creation of a new political community, McLaughlin et al. (1993: 192) observe that in the 1980s it turned out that ‘Euro-groups, far from being dynamic agents of integration, have tended to be rather ineffective bodies unable to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Commission’. It has been in this context that the focus has also shifted to the individual firm as an actor (Grant et al., 1989; McLaughlin et al., 1993; Coen, 1997; see also Junne, 1994). The literature on European interest representation is wide and diverse and it is difficult to bring it under one common theoretical denominator. In fact, if one thing can be observed as regards much of these public policy studies, it is its empiricist character and lack of theoretical grounding. Nevertheless, inasmuch as, theoretical commitments can be traced, often more implicitly the limits of this literature in terms of our understanding of transnational business as indeed a transnational phenomenon also become apparent. Even if also looking at transnational firms as individual actors, the focus often tends to be at the European, supranational level at which either the (individual) lobbying activities or the more quasi-corporatist formal forms of interests representation are seen to take place. There is hence less theoretical understanding of the underlying transnational social forces – linking different levels – that may or may not manifest their agency through either individual or collective actors in Brussels. To the extent that the latter in fact as opposed to many of the interest groups studied by neo-functionalism represent transnational, rather than an aggregation of national interests, the significance of this transnationalization in terms of underlying structures is not acknowledged. Thus the structural power that transnational capital may be argued to derive precisely from its transnationality (see p. 94) is left out of the analysis. Indeed, as was the case with neo-functionalism, much of the interest group literature is implicitly grounded in a pluralist conception of society in which interests tend to be viewed as being in some kind of competitive equilibrium. Whether or not one tends to share this kind of pluralism, the fact is that most of these studies are more interested in studying individual cases of interest representation and less in analysing the larger picture in which for instance some interests rather than some particular interest organizations might be seen as more powerful than others. What all of this boils down to is a rather strong bias towards agency to the neglect of structures. The actors are taken for granted, their interests, identities, their ‘transnationality’ or otherwise does not need to be explained.

Transnational business 93 Focussing on the supranational level of interest group politics within the European Union rather than on underlying social forces that may or may not also extend beyond the boundaries of the European polity, the interest group literature finally also tends to be rather completely EU-centric in its conceptualization of transnational interests. Indeed, the latter are hardly recognized (let alone theorized) as transnational at all, even within the confines of the European Union. On the one hand, transnational relations within the European Union seem to be so self-evident for these public policy analysts as not to need any conceptualization. For instance, Greenwood’s lengthy and authoritative (2003) study does not discuss or even mention the concept. On the other hand, which is more damaging from our perspective, the transnational in fact tends to be equated with the supranational level. Theoretically, this position is best represented by Hix (1994, 1999) who claims that the European Union can just be studied like any national polity, thus missing its multi-level and transnational character. Though the latter is acknowledged by the multi-level governance approach, the latter perspective, as argued above, lacks a firm theoretical grounding providing us with the conceptual tools to make sense of this transnational polity and of the transnational actors operating within it. Below, I review a perspective which arguably does offer such a theoretical grounding, via a radical non-state centric ontology embedded within a historical materialist framework. Rather than as an interest group, possibly seen as engendered by the integration process itself, transnational business is here interpreted in terms of a transnational capitalist class operating within but also beyond the European arena.

Neo-Gramscian transnationalism: transnational business as a class actor What is denoted here as neo-Gramscian transnationalism (see van Apeldoorn, 2002) must be located within the broad array of neo-Gramscian perspectives (Morton, 2001) as have been developed within IPE over the past two decades, and which increasingly have also found their application to the critical study of European integration (Holman, 1992, 1996; Bieler, 2000, 2002; Bieling and Steinhilber, 2000; van Apeldoorn, 2000, 2002; Bieler and Morton, 2001; Cafruny and Ryner, 2003). The approach as outlined here, in particular, builds upon the work of the so-called Amsterdam IPE project (see van der Pijl, 1984, 1989a, 1998; Overbeek, 1993, 2004; van Apeldoorn, 2004b), and has also been labelled transnational historical materialism.2 In fact, it takes ‘as its point of departure the proposition that international politics as we know it is historically embedded in, and internally related to, capitalist social relations’ (Rupert, 1993: 84, his emphasis), and would add to this the claim that these social relations have increasingly become transnationalized. International relations are thus shaped by transnational relations, engendered by the transnational structures of global capitalism. The transnationalization of capitalist production and finance is also seen as generating a transnationalization of social forces, in particular a process of transnational class formation. It is thus that unlike the (pluralist) approaches discussed so far,

94

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

this particular perspective would define transnational business as a class actor, rather than, for example, an ‘interest group’, thus making specific claims about the social nature of its actorness in terms of underlying social structures and concomitant power relations thus linking structure and agency. Neo-Gramscian transnationalism thus offers a theory of the role of transnational relations in world politics that forms a radical departure from the liberal transnationalist paradigm discussed earlier. This perspective also moves us beyond established approaches to European integration inasmuch as it views European transnationalism as inextricably bound up with global or at least larger-thanregional processes of transnationalization rather than as a sui generis phenomenon contained within the boundaries of the European Union. The ‘transnational’ is not a level but a set of relations spanning different levels within and beyond the European arena. Transnational capital, in particular does not operate only within the European but also within the global political economy (see van Apeldoorn, 2002). As indicated, the transnational is in this perspective argued to be constituted in the first instance by a transnationalization of capital, tendentially engendering a transnational capitalist class, which consists of those people that own and/or control sections of transnational capital that form links across national boundaries (van Apeldoorn, 2002; Holman and van der Pijl, 2003). Moving away from any structuralist Marxism, it is emphasized that this process is always a political one of the formation collective consciousness, taking place through such organizational channels as corporate interlocking connections, but also through elite socialization in all kinds of transnational forums or what van der Pijl (1998) identifies as ‘planning groups’ in which top executives of TNCs and those who have substantial property interests in transnational capital, as well as sometimes key political and opinion leaders (or globalizing political elites that transnational capital seeks to coopt), meet to exchange ideas and if possible forge a common outlook and strategy. However, to avoid a common misunderstanding, the transnational capitalist class is according to this approach not by definition a unitary actor. Rather, unity is something that different groups within the capitalist class may strive for but can only be achieved temporarily – as the outcome of political and ideological struggles within the bourgeoisie, with one particular ‘fraction’ taking the lead over the others (see van der Pijl, 1989b: 11). The process of transnational capitalist class formation is thus argued to be partially fragmented along both functional as well as geographical lines. With regard to the latter, it must be emphasized that the process of transnational class formation always takes place within certain historical and institutional settings that may be more or less encompassing in terms of geographical scope (even if always transcending single states). In particular, we may identify, at least in the case of Europe, certain macro-regional patterns of transnational class formation within an overall global pattern of capitalist integration. From this perspective we may conceptualize the European Union as a political arena in which an emergent transnational capitalist class – consisting of those controlling and/or owning large sections of European transnational

Transnational business 95 capital – takes the European region as its primary frame of reference and organizes itself to influence the (socio-economic) governance of that region (cf. Holman and van der Pijl, 2003). As indicated, moving beyond an EU-centric analysis, this conceptualization of transnational business in fact emphasizes its global context, arguing (van Apeldoorn, 2002) that transnational capital and the associated class agency constitute a mediating force between ‘the global’ and ‘the European’. The world of those top executives that make up the core of Europe’s transnational capitalist class can be argued to be, on the one hand, the world of the global and globalizing market place, and it is this world that to a large extent shapes their identity and interests. On the other hand, as their companies are headquartered in Western Europe mainly the European Union, which is often also still their largest market, their daily world as heads of these companies is thus also one shaped by the economic, social and political institutions, as well as the prevalent government policies and regulations within this region of the global economy. It is because of the latter that they have an interest in influencing the institutions and policies that make up what we could call the EU’s socio-economic governance regime. The role of transnational business thus conceived has been central in various studies within this perspective, in particular those on the transnational class agency of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) (see Holman, 1992; van Apeldoorn, 2000, 2002; Holman and van der Pijl, 2003). In contrast to neo-functionalist explanations, the approach here emphasizes the pro-active and initiating role of transnational business as a political actor. Unlike interest group approaches, neo-Gramscian transnationalism locates the agency of transnational business not so much at the level of the actual (interest) organizations but at the level of underlying transnational social (class) forces which may or may not operate through specific (informal or formal) groups. Also, unlike most public policy analysis of transnational interests, this perspective focuses less on the role of business groups with regard to particular policy areas or, even more narrowly, issues within those domains, but rather on what it claims to be the more general role of a transnational business elite vis-à-vis European governance and European integration as a whole. This role, then, is conceptualized as taking place at the level of ideas and ideology rather than at the level of lobbying for more narrowly conceived corporate interests. In my view, then, in light of the four considerations that this theoretical exploration started out with, this approach transcends a number of the limits inherent in the liberal-pluralist mainstream perspectives on the role of transnational business as an actor. Nevertheless, and, apart from any fundamental objections that others may have to its underlying historical materialist ontology of social life, it may, as indicated, be pointed out that whereas the global context is justifiably emphasized, the European or even European Union specificity that transnational social forces operating within the European arena may nevertheless be argued to possess, is as yet less well theorized, even if in principle acknowledged. Although I have referred to European executives moving in two worlds, and a European transnational capitalist class adopting a regional frame of reference (see also Holman and van der Pijl, 2003), these arguments so far have not been very well elaborated theoretically. Whereas the neo-Gramscian transnational approach

96

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

emphasizes the primacy of societal forces, as relating to the social relations of production, in explaining the European integration process, this should not a priori exclude the possibility that the institutional structures – and the dynamics going along with it – that are set up as a consequence of that process, may in their turn also have an effect on, for instance, the process of transnational class formation. This is not about falling back to the reductionism of the neo-functionalist claim of the primacy of ‘Community action’ in constituting ‘transnational interest groups’, but rather about taking the notion of state-society complexes as a relational whole (see Cox, 1986) even more seriously, and rethinking this at the level of the European Union as a transnational and multi-level state-society complex.

Methodological issues Creating a bridge between a critical review of theoretical perspectives to an examination of some pertinent empirical research in the next section, let us discuss some methodological challenges that arise in doing research on the power of transnational business, whether conceived as class actor or in more traditional pluralist terms as one interest group amongst others. A first remark that needs to be made is that methodology cannot be entirely be separated from meta-theory. For instance, how one views the relationship between structure and agency has clear implications for the kind of research one does, the kind of questions one poses, and the kind of methods one would use to answer them. For instance, if one is interested in explaining structural change, this already implies that one has a certain conception of structure, but also of agency, because without it, structures cannot be changed. Thus from this perspective, which views structure and agency as presupposing each other (Bhaskar, 1979) and as mutually constitutive (Wendt, 1987), one would be interested in actors but at the same time also in the structures that make these actors what they are. Thus one would be sceptical, for instance, about an analysis which focussed on the behaviour of interest groups and then leave it at that without probing to which extent and how the interests these groups represent are structured in a certain way. Moving from meta-theory to doing actual research, again we first need to define the question. With regard to transnational business, I think the relevant question is to what extent, how and why the agency of that actor is significant in terms of either the overall course of the integration process (of course within a particular time frame) or, more restrictedly, for the content of (certain aspects/areas of ) European (socio-economic) governance. This still leaves open the possibility of rival theoretical perspectives with regard to the question of how to conceptualize European business. I would define here significance in terms of the counter-factual argument that without this actor the outcome would have been different. We are thus interested in the political power or influence of transnational business (however defined). In my view this leads to the following two main methodological challenges. First, we should know where to look when speaking about the power, or the significant agency of transnational business: where and how might such power be exercised? Second, how do we know that

Transnational business 97 the observed outcome can actually be attributed (largely) to the agency of transnational business rather then to other actors or processes? With regard to the first question it is quite useful to distinguish between different forms or levels of significant agency (somewhat comparable to what in other literatures is referred to as different forms or faces of power). Here I propose that we may analytically distinguish three levels of significant agency that may or may not be exercised by particular concrete groups/organizations. The first level is the least strategic one and concerns what normally is labelled lobbying, and focuses on specific issues, such as concrete pieces of proposed legislation that the lobbying group seeks to promote/stop/modify depending on their particular perceived narrow interests. This kind of agency is therefore primarily reactive. The second level I distinguish, following Maria Cowles (1994, 1995), is that of agenda setting. This agency is more proactive and involves the politics of putting an issue on the agenda where otherwise it would not have. A third level, related to but at the same time transcending the agenda-setting level as understood here, may be best described as the level of discourse production, or the level of ideological power. It is important here to note that the term discourse production does not mean that a discourse is constructed de novo, rather existing (ideological) discourses are transformed through the re-articulation of their elements, changing the meaning of those elements. Of course, the distinction between these three (inter-related) levels is an analytical one and empirically the lines between them will be blurred. Nevertheless, the distinction is useful precisely because the last two levels of agenda setting and discourse production are often missed in pluralist interest group analysis which usually tends to focus on reactive lobbying or interest representation only, and, at most, considers agenda-setting with regard to a single theme or issue. Indeed, the analysis of the ideological power of transnational business is beyond the scope of these approaches as the very concept of ideological power implies a certain notion of structures that these approaches lack. Thus, the kind of power we are interested in, shapes where we look for evidence. In addition, whereas some groups representing transnational business are mainly formal interest groups that specialize in exercising agency at the first level, the agency of other groups, often more informal, transcends that level by engaging in agenda setting, and above, all in shaping the discourse in which policy-making is embedded. The second question then can be reformulated as how we can actually go about assessing whether ‘significant agency’ at these three different levels has been exercised. We should engage here above all in careful historical reconstruction and process-tracing, within which a variety of more specific research methods may be employed. A first step in the analysis would be to simply compare the outcome with the (perceived) interests or ideas of the actor concerned. This is easiest at the level of lobbying, but can also be done at the discursive level as long as there are actually discourses to be compared, for instance in the published documents of a transnational business forum on the one hand, and those of a particular policy-making institution, for example, the Commission, on the other. This first step thus entails the analysis of policy documents and other texts, which may or may not involve rather

98

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

sophisticated methods of discourse analysis. Of course, discursive correspondence between texts does not imply any causality, so one has to move beyond this point. A second step, then, is determining timing. To give an example, there is evidence (see van Apeldoorn, 2002: 175–6) that in the case of the important (permeating all of current EU policy discourse) concept of ‘benchmarking’, the ERT used and promoted this concept before the Commission did so. Of course, a concept often has different sources, and as such this does not provide any evidence of a causal link. Nevertheless, the issue of timing does add to the plausibility of a claim of influence or power. One may further add to that plausibility by showing that a particular actor has in fact access to relevant policy channels. In the case of lobbying, direct access is indeed crucial whereas in the case of agenda setting or discursive power, access may be more indirect as, for instance, one helps to shape policy-making through critically influencing the public debate. In any case, there need to be certain transmission mechanisms available to the actor through which it can effectively propagate its ideas and interests. A key research method to determine access is that of elite interviewing. In addition, more quantitative social network analysis may also be helpful and so far has been done very little, actually, only within transnational business itself (that is through research on interlocking directorates). If a certain actor can be shown to possess a high degree of (elite) access, this is itself often an indication of the (structural) power of this particular actor. Indeed, by analysing the structural sources of the power of transnational business, one can explain why this actor may have more privileged access than other actors and why policy actors would have good reasons to listen to transnational business. As Wolfgang Streeck (1993) once remarked, it makes a difference when the CEO of Philips makes a call to the President of the Commission rather than the average shop floor worker of that corporation (if indeed, he, or she would actually get through). The analysis of access then, together with the structural power behind it, again adds to the plausibility. I would suggest that combining these elements together, carefully checking and comparing different sources, can already provide one with strong circumstantial evidence. Sometimes that is all that can be hoped for, but in other cases more direct evidence is available again through elite interviews, correspondence between relevant actors, documents that are normally not within the public domain but that one can get access to through elite contacts (for an excellent example of such a study making use such methods, see Cowles, 1994). What all of this boils down to is that (elite) access is also very important for the researcher in question.

Examples of research This section will not so much give an overview of all the empirical work that has been done from within all the different theoretical perspectives that we have discussed above, as much as focus on research done on the role of transnational business as such within European integration and European governance, and in

Transnational business 99 particular from the perspective that emphasizes the class dimension of that agency. In light of the centrality of transnational business in certain theoretical disputes, it is surprising how little actual systematic research has been done on the political role of transnational business, above all beyond narrow interest representation or the level of lobbying. Nevertheless, a number of interesting findings with regard to the rise of a transnational business elite as an important constituent element of the evolving transnational society of the European Union may be noted. The first important study to point to the significance of business in this context focussed mainly on the process of transatlantic class formation. At the time, European business as such was hardly transnationalized but rather still contained both economically and politically by the national state. But, as Kees van der Pijl has shown in his detailed empirical study (1984), elements of these national bourgeoisies were, gradually incorporated into an emergent Atlantic ruling class. This incorporation followed the expansion of US capital to Western Europe on the basis of the successful US-sponsored European Coal and Steel Community that helped to introduce a Fordist accumulation regime in Europe. This analysis thus provides an important contribution to the explanation of the origins and early evolution of the then European Community (EC) on the basis of an argument about the US hegemony as seen in terms of a transnationalization of the dominant section of its capitalist class. This project of American hegemony entered into its first crisis in the 1970s and it was at that time that we also observe the first signs of an emancipation of an emergent European capitalist class vis-à-vis American capital. The expansion of the world economy under the Bretton Woods system as well as the Common Market led to the rise of a whole class of European TNCs, which, if not directly challenging the hegemony of US capital, at least intensified the competition. In this context, the relaunching of Europe in the 1980s coincided with the development of a self-confident European transnational capitalist class that specifically adopted a European frame of reference, and initially even tended to define its interests, in opposition to, American capital elsewhere (see van Apeldoorn, 2002). In the context of a global restructuring process that engendered a further deepening of the transnationalization of capital, we can also observe a deepening transnationalization of Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, that is, the further growth of a transnational society with a European transnational capitalist class at its apex. It is therefore no coincidence that others, not employing a class-theoretical framework, have in this period also started to recognize the growing role of transnational business as an actor in the European integration process. I have already discussed the supranationalist thesis about the role of transnational business in the coalition that supported the revitalization of the European project through the internal market. Those that proposed this thesis did not substantiate it empirically, however. This empirical gap has been most convincingly filled by Maria Cowles’s (1994, 1995) study on the politics of big business, however, without offering a theoretical framework to interpret those politics. Nevertheless, her

100

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

work – and especially her study of the ERT – has been very important for our empirical understanding of the rise of European transnational capitalist elite within the European arena. Others (Fielder, 1997, 2000; Nollert and Fielder, 2000) – have later followed up on this. As I have argued at length, elsewhere (van Apeldoorn, 2002), and building upon earlier work by Holman (1992), this new role of big business, and not just with regard to Europe 1992, can also be interpreted in terms of a process of transnational class formation. Organization is a key variable in this process. Through more informal (elite) organizations, the transnational capitalist class is constituted as a social and political actor consciously pursuing a certain collective strategy. A key organization here is the aforementioned ERT, which can be argued to be neither a lobby group nor an association but rather a private forum of this emergent class (van Apeldoorn, 2000, 2002). Indeed, my empirical study of the ERT sought to show that this club can be interpreted as both a manifestation of the process of transnational class formation and at the same time an organization through which that process takes place, as well as demonstrating a critical role in shaping some of the EU’s dominant socio-economic discourse in the 1990s, thus arguing for the importance of analysing the role of transnational class strategy in European governance. The rise of a new European transnational business class cannot just be observed with the role played by the ERT as this capitalist class elite has in fact come to dominate also the whole landscape of European business interest representation, reflecting a new logic of collective action that has to be explained by referring to the structural power of transnationally mobile capital itself. Thus, also in traditional interest groups such as the Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the interests of TNCs have come to dominate, whereas groups such as the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (Cowles, 2001) and the recently formed European Roundtable of Financial Services (see Financial Times, 2 March 2001) show that the model of the ERT – of less formal business groups with the CEOs themselves being involved and exercising leadership on the basis of their prestige gained as members of a global power elite – is in fact proving a success. The proliferation of such groups, as well as the increasingly central role played by TNCs and their CEOs in more formal business groups, clearly reflects the rise of a transnational business elite as a political actor within EU politics and shows the continuing relevance of research focusing on this particular transnational actor within the European Union.

Conclusion In conclusion I wish to return to the four considerations with which I started my theoretical discussion by suggesting how in the light of my critical review of existing perspectives and research, our understanding of transnational business as an actor in the European Union may yet be better adapted to our need to understand the phenomenon of transnationalism in the European Union in general and to pursue fruitful empirical research in this area.

Transnational business 101 With regard to the first consideration I have noted the need for theory in understanding transnational business as a transnational actor. Though the presence of transnational actors in EU politics may be obvious to many contemporary analysts, there is still a need for a theoretical framework that can answer questions like what in fact makes these actors transnational; how can we account for the rise of such transnational actors and their power? In fact, it is the transnationality of business that explains part of its power. This, then, would be missed in approaches that do not make a clear analytical distinction between national and transnational actors, indeed do not have a clear conceptualization of the transnational. This is especially the case for pluralist interest group analysis as well as for more broadly, many European governance and public policy studies. In order for those approaches to advance our understanding of transnationalism in the European Union, one should seek to articulate their empirical focus on interest group politics with more theoretical concerns on the transnational nature of the arena in which this politics takes place. Here, one could draw on the multilevel governance approach, but this in itself, as I have argued, does not provide us with any explanatory theory with regard to the role of transnational socioeconomic actors in the European integration process. For this one would also need a more explicit theoretical account of power (structures) which, in much pluralist interest group analysis, is rather noticeably absent. What is not helpful in order to understand the nature of European transnationalism, as studies of European interest groups in fact often tend to do, is to conflate ‘the transnational’ with ‘the supranational’, and thus to identify the former with the emerging European ‘level’ of governance. So, on the basis of the second consideration, that the transnational by definition cuts across different levels, it was argued that much of the current literature on non-state actors, including transnational business, in the European Union, is inadequate inasmuch as it reflects this legacy of neo-functionalism. With regard to the third consideration, both contemporary interest group (governance) studies as well as more theoretically grounded approaches to transnational relations within mainstream International Relations, were argued to be rather actor-centred to the neglect of structures. Again, the structural power of an actor like transnational business is thus ignored, nor can we in general make sense of this or other transnational actors in terms of what brought them into existence, what accounts for their identities and their interests. In terms of the relation between structure and agency, the original neo-functionalism, on the other hand, is somewhat of a mixed bag, a mix that combines the reductionism of both individualism and holism. On the one hand, neo-functionalism stresses in a pluralist fashion the rational agency of interest groups, on the other hand, in a determinist fashion, its stresses the inexorable functionalist logic of the integration which somehow appears to operate regardless of any particular agency. Even without needing to be committed to one particular meta-theory in this respect, it would be fruitful for any research on EU transnationalism to distinguish between both transnational structures and transnational actors, as well as to the processes that connect those two. Neo-Gramscian transnationalism offers one particular

102

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

way of doing so. To be sure, the particular historical materialist ontology that this perspective is based upon does not exhaust the possibilities here. As a fourth point, the claim was made that we should not conceive of the European Union as a self-contained entity and therefore also not as the supranational container of transnational social forces that are thus conceived as being confined to the boundaries of the European Union. On the contrary, in order to make sense of European transnationalism, it is critical that we examine how this phenomenon is linked to wider, global, processes of transnationalization. This becomes particularly important when we study transnational business which in fact constitutes a mediating force between the global and the European. We cannot understand transnational business, its rise, its power, its interests, if we do not place it in a global structural context. This global context is in fact often never taken into account by both early and contemporary approaches to European integration which all – again reflecting the legacy of neo-functionalism – tend to (often implicitly) view the transnationalism in the European Union as a completely sui generis phenomenon. This EU-centrism when combined with a focus on the supranational level might even end up in recreating a kind of state-centrism at the EU level. Again what we need here is more theoretical reflection on the concept of transnationalism. It is in fact remarkable that many approaches to so called non-state actors in the European Union hardly draw upon available theorizations of transnational relations within International Relations, even if it has to be said that many of those are also not very much interested in global structures and processes, and focus instead on actors. I have made the case that neo-Gramscian transnationalism (offering a historically grounded political economy explanation of the rising transnationalization of Europe) offers an alternative that might prove worthwhile inasmuch as it is able to transcend many of these observed limits of the other perspectives. With its class-theoretical interpretation it, moreover, offers a framework that stresses the social power underpinning the evolving European order, in particular, the power of a transnational capitalist class to shape European socio-economic governance. However, also within this research programme, as in others, more theoretical and empirical work needs to be done on the nature of transnationalism in the European Union in order to advance this important ongoing research agenda.

Notes 1 Although it has to be pointed out that, for instance, Stopford and Strange’s (1991: 37) concept of a ‘privileged transnational business civilisation’ does emphasize this transnational dimension. However, this concept has not really been elaborated by them either theoretically or empirically. 2 This approach is also inspired by the work of Robert Cox (1986, 1987) and Stephen Gill (1990), two authors who from a neo-Gramscian perspective have drawn our attention to the transnationalization of the capitalist class. However, as this latter thesis has been elaborated more by the Amsterdam group, and as the author happens to be part of that group, it is on this particular version of this broadly shared transnationalist perspective that I will focus here.

Transnational business 103

References Anderson, James (2002) ‘Questions of democracy, territoriality and globalisation’, in James Anderson (ed.), Transnational Democracy: Political Spaces and Border Crossings, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 6–39. Bhaskar, Roy (1979) The Possibility of Naturalism. A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences, Brighton: Harvester Press. Bieler, Andreas (2000) Globalisation and Enlargement of the EU: Austrian and Swedish Social Forces in the Struggle over Membership, London and New York: Routledge. —— (2002) ‘The struggle over EU enlargement: a historical materialist analysis of European integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(4): 575–97. Bieler, Andreas and Morton, Adam David (eds) (2001) Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Bieling, Hans-Jürgen and Steinhilber, Jochen (eds) (2000) Die Konfiguration Europas: Dimensionen einer kritischen Integrationstheorie, Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Cafruny, Alan and Ryner, Magnus (eds) (2003) A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Caporaso, James A. (1998) ‘Regional integration theory: understanding our past and anticipating our future’, Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1): 1–16. Coen, David (1997) ‘The evolution of the large firm as a political actor in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1): 91–108. Cowles, Maria Green (1994) The Politics of Big Business in the European Community: Setting the Agenda for a New Europe, unpublished PhD dissertation, Washington, DC: The American University. —— (1995) ‘Setting the agenda for a New Europe: the ERT and EC 1992’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33(4): 501–26. —— (2001) ‘The TABD and domestic business-government relations: challenge and opportunities’, in Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse (eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 159–79. —— (2002) ‘Non-state actors and false dichotomies: reviewing IR/IPE approaches to European integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6): 102–20. Cox, Robert W. (1986) ‘Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 204–53. —— (1987) Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, New York: Columbia University Press. Eden, Lorraine (1991) ‘Bringing the firm back in: multinationals in international political economy’, Millennium, 20(2): 197–224. Fielder, Nicola (1997) Western European Integration in the 1980s: The Origins of the Single Market, Bern: Peter Lang. —— (2000) ‘The origins of the Single Market’, in Volker Bornschier (ed.), State-building in Europe: The Revitalization of Western European Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 75–92. Gill, Stephen (1990) American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grant, Wyn, Martinelli, Alberto and Paterson, William (1989) ‘Large firms as political actors: a comparative analysis of the chemical industry in Britain, Italy and West Germany’, West European Politics, 12(2): 72–90.

104

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

Greenwood, Justin (2003) Interest Representation in the European Union, London: Palgrave. Greenwood, Justin, Grote, Jürgen and Ronit, Karsten (1992) ‘Introduction: organized interests and the transnational dimension’, in Justin Greenwood, Jürgen Grote and Karsten Ronit (eds), Organized Interests and the European Community, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 1–41. Haas, Ernst B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–1957, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. —— (1968) [1958, with 1968 preface] The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–1957, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hix, Simon (1994) ‘The study of the European community: the challenge to comparative politics’, West European Politics, 17(1): 1–30. —— (1998) ‘The Study of the European Union II: the “new governance agenda” and its rival’, Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1): 38–65. —— (1999) The Political System of the European Union, London: Macmillan. Holman, Otto (1992) ‘Transnational class strategy and the new Europe’, International Journal of Political Economy, 22(1): 3–22. —— (1996) Integrating Southern Europe: EC Expansion and the Transnationalization of Spain, London and New York: Routledge. Holman, Otto and van der Pijl, Kees (2003) ‘Structure and process in transnational European business’, in Alan W. Cafruny and Magnus Ryner (eds), A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 71–94. Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks, Gary (1999) ‘The making of a polity: the struggle over European integration’, in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks and John D. Stephens (eds), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 70–97. —— (2001) Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Hosli, Madeleine, Nölke, Andreas and Beyers, Jan (2004) ‘Contending political-economy perspectives on European interest group activity’, in Andreas Warntjen and Arndt Wonka (eds), Governance: The Role of Interest Groups, Nomos: Baden-Baden, pp. 42–56. Junne, Gerd (1994) ‘Multinational enterprises as actors’, in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds), European Foreign Policy, The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe, London; Thousand Oaks, CA; New Delhi: Sage, pp. 84–102. Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (1972) Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kohler-Koch, Beate (1997) ‘Organized interests in the EC and the European Parliament’, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 1(9); http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-009a.htm Lindberg, Leon N. (1963) The Political Dynamics of European Integration, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Mclaughlin, Andrew M., Jordan, Grant and Maloney, William A. (1993) ‘Corporate lobbying in the European Community’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(2): 191–212. Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbet and Blank, Kermit (1996) ‘European integration from the 1980s: state-centric versus multi-level governance’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(3): 341–78. Mazey, Sonia and Richardson, Jeremy (eds) (1993a) Lobbying in the European Community, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Transnational business 105 —— (1993b) ‘Introduction: transference of power, decision rules, and rules of the game’, in Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson (eds), Lobbying in the European Community, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–26. Moravcsik, Andrew (1991) ‘Negotiating the single European Act’, in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds), The New European Community, Decision-making and Institutional Change, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 41–84. —— (1993) ‘Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4): 473–524. —— (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Morton, Adam David (2001) ‘The sociology of theorising and neo-Gramscian perspectives: the problems of “school” formation in IPE’, in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (eds), Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe, London: Palgrave, pp. 25–43. Nollert, Michael and Fielder, Nicola (2000) ‘Lobbying for a Europe of big business: the European roundtable of industrialists’, in Volker Bornschier (ed.), State-building in Europe: The Revitalization of Western European Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 187–209. Overbeek, Henk (ed.) (1993) Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The rise of Transnational Neo-liberalism in the 1980s, London: Routledge. —— (2004) ‘Transnational class formation and concepts of control: notes towards a geneaology of the Amsterdam Project in Internatational Political Economy’, in Bastiaan van Apeldoorn (ed.), ‘Transnational Historical Materialism: The Amsterdam International Political Economy Project’, Journal of International Relations and Development, Special Issue, 7(2): 113–41. Risse, Thomas (2002) ‘Transnational actors and world politics’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage, pp. 255–74. Risse, Thomas, Ropp, Stephen C. and Sikking, Kathryn (eds) (1999) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.) (1995a) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (1995b) ‘Bringing translational relations back in: introduction’, in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–36. —— (1996) ‘Exploring the nature of the beast: international relations theory and comparative policy analysis meet the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(1): 53–80. Rupert, Mark (1993) ‘Alienation, capitalism, and the inter-state system: towards a Marxian/Gramscian critique’, in Stephen Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 67–92. Sandholtz, Wayne and Stone Sweet, Alec (eds) (1998) European Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sandholtz, Wayne and Zysman, John (1989) ‘1992: recasting the European bargain’, World Politics, 42: 5–128. Stone Sweet, Alec and Sandholtz, Wayne (1998) ‘Integration, supranational governance, and the institutionalization of the European polity’, in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–26. Stopford, John and Strange, Susan (1991) Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

106

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn

Strange, Susan (1991) ‘Big business and the state’, Millennium, 20(2): 245–50. —— (1996) The Retreat of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Streeck, Wolfgang (1993) From Market-making to State-Building? Reflections on the Political Economy of European Social Policy, paper presented at the 89th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Miami, Florida, 13–17 August. Streeck, Wolfgang and Schmitter, Philippe C. (1991) ‘From national corporatism to transnational pluralism: organized interests in the Single European Market’, Politics and Society, 19(2): 133–64. Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan (2000) ‘Transnational class agency and European governance: the case of the European round table of industrialists’, New Political Economy, 5(2): 157–81. —— (2002) Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration, London and New York: Routledge. —— (ed.) (2004a) ‘Transnational historical materialism: the Amsterdam international political economy project’, Journal of International Relations and Development, Special Issue, 7(2): 110–12. —— (2004b) ‘Theorizing the transnational: a historical materialist approach’, in Bastiaan van Apeldoorn (ed.), ‘Transnational historical materialism: the Amsterdam international political economy project’, Journal of International Relations and Development, Special Issue, 7(2): 142–76. Van der Pijl, Kees (1984) The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, London: Verso. —— (ed.) (1989a) ‘Transnational relations and class strategy’, International Journal of Political Economy, Special Issue, 19(3). —— (1989b) ‘Ruling classes, hegemony and the state system: theoretical and historical considerations’, International Journal of Political Economy, 19(3): 7–35. —— (1998) Transnational Classes and International Relations, London and New York: Routledge. Van Tulder, Rob and Gerd Junne (1988) European Multinationals in Core Technologies, New York: Wiley. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Wendt, Alexander (1987) ‘The agent-structure problem in international relations’, International Organization, 41(2): 335–70.

Part II

Transnationalism in practice

5

Trade unions as a transnational movement in the European space 1955–65 Falling short of ambitions? Patrick Pasture

If there is one actor that comes to mind when one looks for transnationalism in the early European Union, it is the trade unions. In the first place, the trade unions have a long tradition of ‘internationalism’, expressed in transnational associations of labour organizations going back into the nineteenth century. Moreover, they were associated early on with European institutions. Indeed, the unions that supported the Marshall Plan were granted an important consultative position in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). Their role was also institutionally established in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Does that make unions transnational movements? In the 1990s, historians have deconstructed the inter- and transnational image of the unions (Strikwerda, 1997; Berger and Smith, 1998; Pasture and Verberckmoes, 1998). In this chapter though, I will rather emphasize those elements in trade union politics where the unions, at least to some extent, transcended national boundaries and acted as a transnational actor in the European space. Based on new archival research, the focus is on the formative decade from the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) to the so-called ‘empty chair’ crisis of 1965, when the French for months – from June 1965 to January 1966 – boycotted the European institutions. However, it is inevitable to situate this period in a larger chronological framework (earlier periods are discussed in Pasture, 2000, 2001a, 2002).

Original European involvement After the Second World War, trade unionists were convinced Europeans. Rather than a concrete form of an internationalist working-class ideology, this Europeanism was essentially rooted in the experiences after the First World War, when the drive for autarchy and economic nationalism had all but ruined the continent. In contrast, European trade unions had developed a firm belief in the importance of free trade, controlled by international institutions to avoid the formation of monopolies and cartels. If there was some sort of ‘collective conversion’ to Europe, it was then rather than in 1945. The 1930s added the concept of international economic planning to this essentially liberal framework. However, in practice, planning was conceived very much in a national perspective (Pasture, 2001b). Notwithstanding the divisions created by the war, the Second

110

Patrick Pasture

World War strengthened the idea of a collective European responsibility, even destiny. It contributed to a sense of unity – a sense of unity though that quickly evaporated (Pasture, 2004). The desire for labour unity materialized in the formation of unitary unions in the former Axis countries and of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which was established in 1945, uniting socialist and communist unions from the whole world (Carew, 2000a; see also Antonioli et al., 1999). However, the (relative) unity did not last long. In the wake of the Marshall Plan the unitary confederations in Italy and France broke up. Furthermore, the non-communist unions separated from the WFTU and in 1949, together with the American Federation of Labor (AFL), joined a new International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The so-called ‘Christian’ trade unions, however – still significant in France, Switzerland and the Benelux countries – remained independent (Pasture, 1999; Carew, 2000b; Ciampani, 2000). Support for the Marshall Plan and hence also for a US-inspired project of European integration was the ‘crowbar’ for the split of the WFTU; it remained the basis of cooperation, identification and unity of all involved, also at the domestic level. This was particularly the case for the French Confédération Générale du Travail – Force Ouvrière (FO) (Pernot, 2001; Régin, 2003; Roussel, 2003) and the Confederazione italiana dei sindacati lavoratori (CISL) in Italy (Formigoni, 1995). Since 1947, the communist trade unions considered European integration as a capitalist and American-imperialist strategy, and objected to it, an appreciation and strategy that would only slowly start to change in the 1960s (Maggiorani, 1998; Pernot, 2001; Verbist, 2001). Already in the late 1940s, two different views on a European organization can be discerned. On the one hand, some continental unions strove for real economic integration, as in the customs union between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In contrast, the British Trades Union Congress (TUC), originally in part motivated by its desire to save the WFTU, was less than lukewarm about European integration (Newman, 1993; Ciampani, 1995; Guasconi, 1995). Nevertheless, at the founding conference of the ICFTU in London the unions approved the Marshall Plan or European Recovery Programme (ERP), and acknowledged ‘the urgency of the unification of Europe’, even if not all – in particular the TUC and the Scandinavian unions – were enthusiastic about that decision (Carew, 2000b; Ciampani, 2000). The unions that opposed the decision believed that their main objective – full employment – could only be realized through a nationally planned economy as the cornerstone of the national welfare state.

International trade union organization: cradle of European transnationalism? After the Second World War, the international organization of the trade unions was an important international issue that largely extended the trade union world. In 1950 three important international confederations existed: the International

Trade unions as a transnational movement 111 Federation of Christian Trade Unions (CISC), by far the smallest; the WFTU, which after the split was left with the unions that remained obedient to Moscow; and the ICFTU, the haven of the non-communist (and in practice non-Christian), free and democratic trade unions, whose formation directly followed from the Marshall Plan. It is important to note that these international organizations united the trade union confederations and not the industrial unions. This is important because in many countries the confederations were and still are rather weak bodies, competent mainly for political representation and coordination, but as a rule not for collective bargaining and calling strikes, arguably the core of trade unionism (van der Linden, 2000). Neither the TUC nor the West German confederation, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), for instance, are competent to conclude collective agreements. For the confederations and their leaders, transnational representation was one way to enhance their authority (Pasture, 2000; Pernot, 2001: 35–7), but one should not overestimate their importance. The industrial unions, on whose shoulders real trade union power in reality rests, are also organized at the transnational level. The relationship between these bodies and the international confederations was always difficult (see especially McShane, 1992; van der Linden, 2000). The International Trade Secretariats (ITS) in 1951 concluded an agreement with the ICFTU which gave the confederation authority over the general political orientation of the transnational free trade union movement, but they were never formally affiliated to it. International action was defined mainly as political, which from the outset was in the competence of the (con-) federations. This also explains the relative absence of the industrial trade union bodies at European level, since European integration was perceived as primarily a political issue. In the ECSC, however, the industrial unions of miners and metalworkers managed to obtain a decisive influence in the so-called ‘Committee of the 21’, which was composed of metalworkers’ and miners’ unions as well as the confederations of the countries involved (for the following see in greater detail Pasture, 2001a). Hence, they bypassed the ICFTU European Regional Organization (ERO), which concentrated on particular problems such as housing and vocational training, and focused on the OEEC. Obviously, there was considerable competition and resentment between the ERO and the Committee of the 21. The members of the OEEC Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) also acted more or less independent from the ERO. The ERO claimed to be competent for the economic integration of Europe and its social aspects, in particular the activities of the Economic Committee for Europe in the UN, the Green Pool, the Council of Europe, the unification of European transport and migration and European issues at the International Labour Organization (ILO). In reality, though, partly because the AFL distrusted the ERO’s Secretary-General Walter Schevenels for his initial involvement with the WFTU, the ICFTU Executive Board undermined the ERO’s authority, even with regard to the OEEC. The world federation indeed usurped all matters concerning ‘war and peace’ (especially regarding NATO and the European Defence Community, even concerning their social and economic effects in Europe,

112

Patrick Pasture

and regarding the rearmament of Germany), arguing that these had repercussions far beyond the old continent. Hence a Joint ICFTU-ERO Committee on European Social Integration was established, which focused mainly on the ILO, the Council of Europe and the OEEC. Continental Western European unions, moreover, considered the ERO a dependency of the TUC. There was some ground for that presumption, with Charles J. Geddes, Secretary-General of the Union of Post Office Workers, affiliated to the TUC, being the President of the ERO and the anglophile Schevenels its Secretary-General (Guasconi, 1998: 363–4). Obviously, the European free trade union movement was deeply divided and weak. Competences were fragmented and the unions remained strongly attached to national and industrial allegiances. A proposition in September 1954 by André Renard, Vice-President of the ECSC Consultative Committee, to transform the Committee of the 21 from a loose coordinating body into a real supranational organization failed, for example, because of the opposition of the other unions, particularly the French. But the internal structures of the Committee were somewhat strengthened. Nevertheless, unanimity was still needed for giving binding directions to the trade union representatives in the ECSC Consultative Committee. But as Ernst Haas concluded in 1958, ‘on most crucial ECSC issues, no unanimity could ever be obtained’ (Haas, 1958: 370). As was the case in the OEEC TUAC, these representatives acted fairly autonomously, and arguably also more from a national perspective than as representatives of a transnational movement (Haas, 1958: 369–70; Meynaud and Sidjanski, 1969: 247). Furthermore, after the association of the United Kingdom with the ECSC in 1954, the Committee of the 21 in 1955 admitted representatives of the British miners’ and metalworkers’ unions as observers, something it had always refused to do before. Its relations with the ICFTU and the ERO deteriorated below freezing point, and the ICFTU refused to subsidize the Committee any further. The ERO underwent some minor changes in 1955. However, the organization did not anticipate properly the new impetus given to European integration with the conference of Messina in June 1955 which laid the the basis for the creation of the EEC and Euratom, although the organization did organize an important conference on the relaunch of European integration on 25–27 August 1955. The ICFTU rather than the ERO tried to determine the main political line of conduct, although neither of them was able to impose a common policy. Obviously, the unions of the European countries not directly involved in the negotiations would have liked the ERO to become the central axis of the new structure. The confederations of what became known as ‘little Europe’, however, argued for a special body, separate from the ERO, for their action towards the EEC and Euratom. On the initiative of the Dutch and Belgian confederations, they convened informally in Paris, and hence were called ‘le bureau de Paris’, the Paris Bureau (Gobin, 1996: 201). The Committee of the 21, on the other hand, in which the industrial perspectives of miners and metalworkers dominated, believed national industrial unions should constitute the nucleus of the new organization. The miners’ and metalworkers’ ITSs supported this view, for they too were quite suspicious about the priority the confederations gave to the political

Trade unions as a transnational movement

113

ideal of a unified Europe above more concrete further progress in the social and economic field in the ECSC (Beever, 1960: 59–60). The problem became even more difficult when the British proposed to create a free trade area, which drove a deep wedge between the unions of the ‘little Europe’ – the six EEC countries – and the unions from the ‘outer seven’ European countries that did not join the new organization. However, the confederations of the ‘little Europe’ managed to push their views through. In December 1957, a European Trade Union Secretariat (ETUS) was established for the coordination of trade union action in the three communities. The Committee of the 21 reluctantly confined itself to the ECSC and transformed itself into the Metalworkers’ and Miners’ Inter-Trade Committee (ICFTU-ECSC) (see also in detail Gobin, 1996: 200–13). The ETUS served as the main trade union body for the EEC as well as Euratom. Furthermore, several industrial committees for the different industrial sectors in the EEC (transport, agriculture, chemicals, textiles, etc.) were created. The relations between the ETUS and the industrial committees were never clearly outlined, however, and were a source of continuous friction (Gobin, 1996: 319, 351). In practice, several industrial committees worked on a national level, and directly contacted the EEC institutions. The ETUS consisted of representatives of the confederations of ‘little Europe’ and delegates of the ERO and the new Metalworkers’ and Miners’ Inter-Trade Committee. It also included observers from the ITSs. The national industrial unions were also represented through extra large national delegations in the ETUS General Assembly and through collaboration in the industrial committees. The Dutchman Harm G. Buiter, until then the Secretary of the Committee of the 21, became the Secretary-General of the new ETUS and he would turn it, although officially nothing more than a ‘simple organism created following the opportunity of the moment’ whose function ‘should not go beyond that framework’,1 into something as a European trade union pressure group. The ETUS entertained contacts with the socialist members of the European General Assembly as well as with the Commission directorates, particularly with the Directorate General for Social Affairs. The ERO continued to organize the larger European trade union movement, but did not grant the ETUS direct representation in its governing bodies. It constituted an Economic Committee, which was entrusted with the responsibility of ‘discussing and reaching agreement on common trade union policies to be urged on the Governments in regard to detailed conditions of the Treaty [on the creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – P.P.] and their future implementation’.2 By its very existence, the ERO prevented an even deeper split between the unions of the ‘little Europe’ and the ‘outer seven’. However, especially the Scandinavian confederations expressed doubts about the viability and activities of the ERO. At the end of 1959, they demanded a serious downsizing of it, even its abolishment.3 The unions of the EFTA countries effectively created their own EFTA trade union committee.4 However, the ERO remained in place, and a special committee was created to maintain contacts between the unions of the ‘little Europe’ and of the ‘outer seven’.

114

Patrick Pasture

In 1968, the unions of the EFTA established a little secretariat, which sealed the fate of the ERO. It was finally dissolved in 1969. In the same year, the ETUS transformed itself into the European Confederation of Free Trade Unions in the EC. Only with the creation of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) in 1973, the split between the unions of the ‘two Europes’ was finally healed. Unlike the ERO or the ETUS, the ETUC is an autonomous transnational trade union confederation, and not part of the ICFTU. This allowed its extension towards Christian and even communist unions (see inter alia Barnouin, 1986; Gobin, 1996; Pernot, 2001). But the organizational unity of the ETUC did not immediately lead to more cohesion, rather on the contrary, and did not entail greater strength, since the ETUC suffers from many of the institutional and political weaknesses of the European trade union organization of the post-war era.

Resuming European integration By 1955, the trade unions in the ECSC in principle favoured further integration, although their concrete stance towards the ECSC was ambiguous. On the one hand, some unionists tried to push for more social competences, but became frustrated. This was surely the case with the vice-president of the Consultative Committee (from 1955 onwards the president), the Belgian trade union leader André Renard. As we have seen, his proposals to make the Committee of the 21 more effective, were dwarfed. His plan to enhance the competence of the ECSC, in particular in the field of investment policy, price and wage setting, living standards and social harmonization in general, also came to nothing, as did his suggestion, following a demand of the Belgian socialist metalworkers’ union, to introduce collective bargaining at the level of the ECSC as a means to realize social harmonization in the community. These failures were not only due to external resistance of the employers, but also have to be ascribed to the opposition of the other (national) trade unions. Notwithstanding their pleas for supranational European institutions, they were not willing to transfer part of their competences to a supranational authority (Mechi, 1995, 2000b; Gobin, 1996: 175; Pasture, 2001a). On the other hand, the ECSC and the Consultative Committee did develop a proper social policy (Mechi, 2000a). Moreover, thanks to a concerted transnational action, through their contacts with the administration and via diplomatic channels, the trade unions obtained that the High Authority established a special labour division with the purpose of supporting the trade union delegates in the Consultative Committee (Haas, 1958: 366–7). In the consultative committee, intense contacts were established between trade union leaders through concrete dossiers rather than general policy meetings. In practice, the unions set up quite friendly working relations with the ECSC High Authority and also with the Christian trade unions with whom the ‘free’ unions otherwise entertained a rather conflictual relationship (Pasture, 1999). The ECSC often turned out a more reliable and effective source of information for labour than employers and

Trade unions as a transnational movement 115 national public authorities. This was an important argument for the West German DGB to continue to support European integration, and a major incentive for the West German Social Democratic Party to abandon its anti-European stance and to opt for integration, too (Duchêne, 1994: 286). Nevertheless, in 1955 the unions considered the record of the actual achievements of the ECSC in the social field quite disappointing (Pasture, 2001a), even if later they would look back to these years with nostalgia (Pernot, 2001: 427). In fact, according to François Duchêne, precisely because of their disappointment with the ECSC, the West German trade unions in January 1955 appealed to Jean Monnet for a new initiative to further European integration. It crystallized in the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, the so-called ‘Monnet Committee’. This interest was mutual, since Monnet considered labour unions as genuine transnational actors, capable – in contrast to employers, which he ignored – of acting in the general interest (Duchêne, 1994: 284–87; Varsori, 1995). Although there was some distrust as well,5 many leading trade unionists of the ‘little Europe’ responded enthusiastically to Monnet’s proposals – of the 35 founding members of the Monnet Committee, 14 were trade unionists, among whom were the main leaders of all major confederations. They probably not only joined since they basically shared his views on the future of Europe, but also because they hoped it would be an important pressure group so that they could influence the European construction (Guichaoua, 1994; Pasture, 1995, 2001a; Bossuat, 2003). This surely was the case for FO Secretary-General Robert Bothereau, his organization always being reluctant about European federalism (Pernot, 2001: 428–30). However, for reasons of political independence – an independence that was cherished in principle, but never prevented the unions from entertaining close relations with political parties and movements, also at European level – European trade union organizations – in contrast to political parties – could not affiliate directly to the Monnet Committee. This is also why the ERO turned down a proposal of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe – in which also numerous trade unionists were involved (Bossuat, 2003) – to jointly organize a major conference in favour of European integration.6 The unions of the ‘little Europe’ moved towards more intense collaboration and European unity – although more on paper than in practice, as Renard’s shattered dream about European collective bargaining illustrates. At the same time, within the ERO, several unions, and especially Schevenels, continued to aspire for a greater Europe on the basis of the OEEC (Pasture, 2001a: 87). Even after the Messina conference the ICFTU/ERO continued to focus on the ILO and the Council of Europe. According to the Joint ICFTU-ERO Committee on European Social Integration in April 1956, the Council of Europe was ‘the appropriate institution for setting up a European Social and Economic Council’ in close collaboration with the ILO, the OEEC and the ECSC, and for a European Social Charter.7 The ICFTU/ERO deeply regretted the economic division of Western Europe and thus followed the policy of the lowest common denominator – the views of the British TUC – and hence ignored the actual developments and in particular the creation of the EEC in 1957–8 and EFTA in 1959–60. It was largely

116

Patrick Pasture

in vain though. The quest for a European Social Charter resembled a wild-goose chase and epitomized the incapacity of European labour to realize tangible social progress in Europe (Pasture, 1999: 276–7, 2001a). As a consequence, the West German confederation DGB soon withdrew its support for a European Social and Economic Council as ‘yet another international institution’. Particularly, the ERO’s passive role and political choices with regard to the European integration process raised its anger.8 As regards the EEC, the unions demanded that in the new treaty, concrete and precise objectives would be formulated: particular measures should be aimed at raising the living standards and the well-being of the Europeans, and upward social harmonization should be pursued actively.9 The Treaty poorly responded to their demands, though it did provide for the establishment of an Economic and Social Committee along the lines of the unions’ demands – that was enough to support it. It changed the role of the Council of Europe, the OEEC and the ILO with regard to the European continent though.10 In the following years, partly in response of the coal crisis of the late 1950s but also because they considered the start of the EEC hardly satisfactory, the trade unions of the ‘little Europe’ argued for a democratic form of European social and economic integration. This implied the creation of a truly supranational authority, in which the unions should be represented. The unions also demanded a European Parliament (EP) elected by universal suffrage, a closer association of the unions with the activities of the European commissions, and one single seat for the three Communities. From the start they supported the idea of a merger of the executives and the creation of a single executive – which would have to count at least one representative of the unions, ‘capable of negotiating on equal footing with national governments’, as was the case in the ECSC High Authority.11 In contrast to the unions of the ‘outer seven’, the ETUS considered full economic integration far more than the creation of a customs union only.12 Hence, they also opposed the French President Charles De Gaulle’s view of Europe as a Europe of the Fatherlands.13 In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the ETUS supported the Hallstein Plan, which aimed at reinforcing the supranational character of the EEC and particularly of the European Commission. It considered such a strengthening of the Commission as necessary for the pursuit of an active economic policy of full employment, economic planning targeting underdeveloped regions, and hence as a precondition for social progress and harmonization at the highest level.14 In the first place, however, the European trade unions devoted their attention and energy to guaranteeing effective trade union representation in the European institutions (Pasture, 2000, 2001a). Nevertheless, the interest of the unions in Europe had broadened, as did, it must be emphasized, the interest of the EEC Commission itself in social policy. Indeed, the Commission was determined to exploit its social competences and to develop a social policy that focused on social harmonization. It found a close ally in the ETUS. Already in March–July 1960, the Directorate General of Social Affairs organized several round tables with the ETUS to discuss social problems in the EEC. Particularly during the first months of 1962, a relatively intense

Trade unions as a transnational movement 117 collaboration started which involved both the ETUS and the national unions in investigating the social conditions in the different European countries.15 In response, the ETUS tried to draw up a strong socio-economic programme – a difficult endeavour though, since trade union opinions and practices within the EEC diverged widely.16 The programme focused on economic planning and suggested the creation of an office for European planning, a regional expansion policy, greater opportunities for vocational training and free movement of labour. Concrete social demands included the introduction of the five days working week, the prolongation of annual holidays and guaranteed income in case of illness, involuntary absence and work accident. An international conference, involving trade unionists, employers, European civil servants and social scientists, was organized in December 1962 to study the possibilities for harmonizing social security systems.17 The harmonization of social security was indeed an extremely complex issue, given the huge differences between national welfare and social security regimes. Even within countries, different systems existed for different areas of welfare and kinds of workers. However, what mattered most was that through initiatives like this, the trade unions forced the employers together with the administration and national civil servants to think and discuss jointly.18

EFTA – an alternative to the European Communities? In the meantime, the countries that did not join the EEC created EFTA (Kaiser, 1997) in 1959–60. The unions in these countries hesitatingly supported this initiative, apparently ‘in the hope that the six will become more amenable to resume negotiations for a large economic association in Europe’. Indeed, they considered the free trade area ‘not . . . as an end in itself, but as a step to the main objective, full European cooperation in all fields’.19 The whole free trade union movement feared a possible division and even ‘economic war’ between both areas, and they decided to exert pressure upon their respective governments as well as the EEC and the EFTA negotiators to avoid such a split.20 Remarkably, the demands of the trade unions from the ‘outer seven’ for EFTA to some extent paralleled the union demands in the EEC. They shared the idea that a unified market was necessary for industrial specialization, higher productivity, and thus higher and more equal living conditions. The belief in the link between productivity and social progress was reinforced through the intense contacts and exchange programmes with the USA in the framework of the European Productivity Agency (Carew, 1987; Boel, 1998). However, they accepted the principle that countries could impose quotas in case of balance of payments difficulties, and that they had the right to be selective in the removal of quotas. Furthermore, they insisted not only on the formulation of social objectives, in particular full employment, but also that the ways and methods were specified how these objectives could be realized by the different industries and countries.21 In an unpublished document, the ERO even agreed upon a series of

118

Patrick Pasture

demands on the economic and social provisions in the EFTA, including the creation of an investment bank, an employment service, and a social fund similar to the one in the EEC.22 They insisted that they were in favour of ‘harmonization of social conditions in Europe towards the highest level’, although they stressed the difficulties of achieving that with an increasing number of countries. Hence, they refrained from demanding concrete measures.23 The reality of the EFTA would, however, prove to be far removed from all this. The Stockholm Convention did contain a reference to full employment as a general objective, but no concrete obligations for the member states. Hence, the trade unions insisted to be associated in some way with EFTA via a Joint Advisory Committee in order to be able to discuss policies and to influence the decisions.24 Notwithstanding some parallels between the interests of the unions of the ‘little’ and the ‘outer Europe’, meetings between unions of both areas in the late 1950s and early 1960s only confirmed the gap between them. This came clearly to the fore with regard to the Hallstein Plan to reinforce the European Commission. The EFTA unions hoped that the creation of EFTA would offer the basis for a closer multinational cooperation in the larger Europe; indeed, that it would enhance talks about a greater EFTA-like association which would include and supplant the European Communities. The implementation of the Hallstein Plan on the contrary would only reinforce the differences. The support of the unions of the ‘little Europe’ for the Plan astonished the EFTA unions, who considered it a deadly blow to European trade union cooperation.25 The TUC alongside the Swiss and Norwegian unions argued for strengthening the OEEC as a basis of European economic cooperation, to realize not only a general reduction of trade barriers but also greater cooperation, in particular as regards the means to increase productivity and to enhance social harmonization.26 Despite these differences, parallel to the negotiations between the EFTA and the EEC, working relations between the unions of both organizations improved. In early 1960, it was decided to form a joint committee in which the secretarygenerals and representatives of each national confederation would meet on a regular basis. However, the initiative did not really take off because of the obstruction of the Danish confederation.27 Moreover, while the ERO tried to bridge the gap between the European Communities and the EFTA, the ETUS demanded further measures for the economic and social integration in the European Communities. In May 1961, Ludwig Rosenberg, the main architect of the West German confederation’s international policy (Braun, 1995: 74) and the director of its Economic Department – and in November 1962 to become DGB President (1962–9) – expressed concerns that the economic progress of the EEC would hinder the affiliation of the United Kingdom.28 To be sure, the TUC, which always had been in favour of a cautious and pragmatic stance towards Europe (Kaiser, 1999: 146, 173), was impressed by the unexpectedly successful start of the EEC, and more and more British unions seriously considered supporting British affiliation with it (Lieber, 1970: 106–7; Kaiser, 1999: 172). Relations with the Commonwealth, the ‘unsatisfactory’ provisions in the Rome Treaty to realize full employment,

Trade unions as a transnational movement 119 and the strong supranational competences of the European institutions were deemed to be the main impediments. Though it was recognized that in practice employment in the EEC (except in Southern Italy) reached similar levels as in the United Kingdom, the TUC insisted upon the inclusion of an additional article in the Rome Treaty with a general obligation for each member state to pursue a policy of full employment. The TUC also demanded a considerable extension of the authority of the Economic and Social Committee, among which the right ‘to enable it to convene its own meetings and to issue opinions on all Community matters’. Significantly, the TUC argued that Commonwealth citizens would enjoy priority access to the UK labour market over EEC workers.29 Similar concerns about the protection of the national labour markets and industrial interests were expressed by the Scandinavian – particularly the Danish – unions, united in the Nordens Faglige Samorganisasjon.30 However, while the TUC emphasized the parallels between the EEC and EFTA, the TUC memorandum on ‘full employment and the provisions of the Rome Treaty’ submitted to the EEC trade union national centres on 30 November 1961 in fact all too clearly demonstrated the fundamental difference in perspective: the text mainly consists of references to the obligations of ‘each member state’, but says nothing about common European policies.31 The British demand to revise the Rome Treaty in order to reinforce the social and trade union provisions, raised concerns among the unions of the ‘little Europe’ that the outcome of a renegotiation would be a reduced level of integration. While they hoped for the full adhesion of Britain to the European Communities, they did not want a dilution into an extended customs union. Bothereau – no doubt speaking as a Frenchman rather than as the President of the ETUS – moreover feared a British ‘invasion’ in union matters.32 This reaction may be surprising, since FO is supposed to have been strongly in favour of the British entry in the EEC (Pernot, 2001: 424–35). However, although there was agreement to consider full employment the prime goal of European policy, the unions of the ‘little Europe’ regarded the British views as ineffective and even dangerous, because they located the responsibility for realizing full employment with the national governments and not at European level.33 The main difficulties though concerned the question of free circulation of labour and the relations with the Commonwealth on the one hand and the European (French) Overseas Territories on the other.

Trade unions in the ‘two Europes’ Notwithstanding their differences, the unions of both the ‘little Europe’ and the ‘outer seven’ regretted the failure of the British accession negotiations in January 1963. Especially the West German DGB was a fervent supporter of Britain’s accession – much more so than the West German Christian democrat-led government. The ETUS considered De Gaulle to be an authoritarian leader. Moreover, the French President’s veto appeared as a rejection of the transatlantic solidarity that the unions unanimously cherished. They saw an integrated Europe

120

Patrick Pasture

as a prerequisite for establishing an equal partnership with the USA as a longterm objective, which included the membership of the United Kingdom. This is also the reason why they vehemently rejected the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship of January 1963, calling it – at least in private – an ‘institutional attack on the Rome Treaties’ (Harm Buiter), a model of an authoritarian, closed Europe dominated by France and Germany – but as usual using much more diplomatic language in public.34 On 6 July 1963, the ETUS organized a manifestation in Dortmund – Rosenberg would later call it ‘a meeting in a fancy environment’ rather than a mass rally – where the trade unions of the ‘little Europe’ pleaded for the constitution of the democratic United States of Europe, with the inclusion of Britain, instead of alliances of nation-states as the French propagated, for example in the Fouchet Plan of November 1961 for foreign policy cooperation.35 FO, however, and in particular its Secretary-General Bothereau, who was also President of the ETUC, showed sympathy for De Gaulle’s standpoint.36 The French position was motivated by domestic concerns as well as their dissatisfaction with the international politics of the ICFTU in general, and of the TUC in particular. This concerned especially their anti-colonial stance – FO supported the French colonial policy in Algeria – and the contacts of the TUC and other ICFTU unions with the communist trade unions behind the Iron Curtain (Pernot, 2001: 436–50). At the same time, the EEC unions experienced more difficulties, as the Commission relied more on experts instead of social organizations, and the Council of Ministers in turn curtailed the autonomy of the Commission.37 In any case, relations between the ETUS and the European Communities only had an informal and occasional, not institutional and permanent character, because of the opposition of some countries.38 For example, the unions were not associated with the EEC’s administrative commission on the social security of migrant workers. To remedy this situation, they attempted a concerted action via the national unions – which was hardly implemented and remained unsuccessful.39 Even the activities concerning social harmonization, which signified the start of improved relations with the Commission, came to nothing, while the governments took the initiative.40 Even among the unions of the ‘little Europe’, however, fundamental divergences appeared. Under the impulse of the Benelux and West German unions, the ETUS advocated the merger of the three executives and insisted that the trade unions be associated with economic planning in the EEC. However, in 1964, the French and Italian unions started to explicitly distance themselves from that strategy, arguing that the unions should not become too much integrated within the system and should avoid being made responsible for European policy.41 In particular, the French and West German governments opposed close relations between the Commission and the unions and vetoed any proposal to coopt a trade union delegate in the new executive. The ETUS Secretariat continued to try to develop a trade union social programme and a strategy for cooperation with the European Commission. It supported an initiative by the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs Gerard Veldkamp – backed up by the Commission – to organize

Trade unions as a transnational movement 121 a meeting between the Ministers of Labour, the Commission, the trade unions and the employers, which was prevented by the French and West German governments, however.42 While the unions defended the merger of the executives, they opposed the fusion of the treaties. A merger of the executives would enhance the authority of the Commission, but with a fusion of the treaties, the unions would lose their representation in the ECSC High Authority. The whole question led to an intense debate in the European trade union movement, opposing at times the ETUS, more inclined to compromise, and the ICFTU-ECSC, which saw its position in the ECSC jeopardized and considered the merger as a social regression. They even considered organizing a European strike. The ETUS, however, limited its protest to a press conference, considering that the unions did not have the power to win a battle with the European governments over this issue.43 Simultaneously, the ETUS presented a social action programme, focused on European labour relations and ‘economic democracy’ (along with social protection of women and the young, working time, revenue policy and the study of social security). The challenge turned out to be more difficult than ever, however. Labour relations in Europe had developed in extremely divergent ways, and while the DGB strongly promoted the West German model of co-determination (Mitbestimmung) also at European level, France (FO), Italy (the CISL and the Unione italiana del lavoro (UIL)) and Belgium Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond/ Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique (ABVV/FGTB) resisted such union integration into the capitalist system.44 Significantly, an agreement was sought with the EFTA unions.45 The EEC crisis of the mid-1960s, with the so-called ‘empty chair’ policy of De Gaulle, again demonstrated the weakness of the unions. They tried to advance their views, but even refrained from condemning De Gaulle. In part, for reasons of French domestic politics, FO even increasingly shared the views of De Gaulle, considering supranational institutions as a long-term objective, but certainly not something to realize in the short term (Pernot, 2001: 436–50). This situation finally provoked a new discussion and reassessment of the basic orientations of the unions’ European action, or lack of it, which finally led to the creation of the ETUC. The ETUC largely suffered from the same impediments that hampered its predecessors, however, lack of internal cohesion, lack of resources and above all, the continuing orientation of the unions towards social progress within the framework of the nation-state (cf. Visser and Ebbinghaus, 1992; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1997; Dølvik, 1999; Martin and Ross, 1999; Greenwood, 2003).

Conclusion As a transnational political pressure group at the European level, the trade union movement largely failed (cf. Gobin, 1998). To be effective, the trade unions were indeed far too fragmented, lacked hierarchical and supranational structures with real authority, and invested far too little (see Hoskyns, 1996; Waterman, 2001; Reinalda, 2003 for illuminating comparisons with other transnational

122

Patrick Pasture

pressure groups). However, they declared themselves strongly in favour of European integration and supported it with their actual involvement in European integration initiatives – from the OEEC to the ECSC and the EEC to EFTA – by exerting pressure upon national political parties, ministries and governments, and by propagating a European identity among their members. This European conviction was primarily rooted in pre-war analyses of the weaknesses of the continent, which were confirmed by the Second World War. Other factors played a role as well. For many unions, ‘Europe’ offered an important source of symbolic power. Western Europe after the war saw the great breakthrough and the political and socio-economic recognition of the trade unions, who were accepted as the legitimate spokespersons of the working class. This recognition was continued at the European level. In turn, this recognition strengthened the position of the unions and was therefore actively pursued by them as well. As we have seen, Europeanism was also a strategy of the confederations and their leaders to enhance their authority in the domestic sphere (see also Braun, 1995; Pernot, 2001: 35–7). Moreover, after the trade union splits of 1947–9 and the adoption of the Marshall Plan, Europe – more than transatlantism – offered a source of identification and solidarity. The FO, for example, saw in the ideal of the ‘United States of Europe’ a way to transcend internal divisions (Pernot, 2001; Régin, 2003: 52–4). Equally, the international trade union movement offered the West German unions from soon after the war legitimacy and an opportunity to participate fully in the European construction. In contrast to the West German Social Democrats, the DGB was strongly in favour of the Schuman Plan and European integration in general (Haas, 1958: 219–20; Braun, 1995). Hence, it was subsequently highly rewarded by the West German government in terms of appointments to the ECSC and, on the domestic level, a law on co-determination largely in accordance with its demands (Braun, 1995; Kaiser, 1996: xliii; Guinand, 2001; Erne, 2002). The European recognition of the trade unions, however, was motivated by their support for the Marshall Plan, considered essential, as well as for the Schuman Plan; also for Monnet it was important that the unions backed his plans for the EEC. The importance of union support decreased somewhat in the 1960s, however. On the one hand, as the Spaak Committee set up in 1955 after the Messina conference to prepare options for further integration demonstrated, union support was no longer viewed to be as important as in 1947. On the other hand, the unions had gained their place in society; hence, the backing of Europe became less essential. In the case of the FO, for example, references to Europe turned into mere rhetoric (Pernot, 2001; Régin, 2003). At the same time, the prosperous welfare states appeared to prove that the nation-state offered the best opportunities for social progress. It was their experiences in the ECSC including all its flaws and deficiencies, and its inability to impose a supranational policy and to prevent the coal crisis of 1958 (cf. Mioche, 2001), which turned the European unions from the ‘little Europe’ into even more convinced ‘Europeans’. It made them strong advocates of the creation of the EEC and Euratom, and later even favour the merger of the

Trade unions as a transnational movement 123 three executives, even if it entailed a step backwards for them compared to the ECSC. The latter policy may surprise, but it illustrates that the unions in the end, as in the 1920s, considered European integration primarily as a means to create the economic and political conditions for social progress, even if they sought some means to realize additional progress and upward social harmonization through European action as well. This perspective was to a certain extent shared by the EFTA unions that (as the TUC used to emphasize) were also more eager to promote European integration than their governments, or socialist parties for that matter. Notwithstanding the mutual incomprehension, the experiences and analyses of the unions in the ‘little Europe’ had an influence on how the unions of the EFTA unions, and the TUC in particular, considered the EEC and viewed their position in EFTA. Moreover, the communists also were seduced. In the view of the obvious progress of the European Communities, in the 1960s some communist unions slowly reconsidered their opposition to European integration and in 1966, the French and Italian communist unions, with support from the Belgian Communist Party, established a common committee and office in Brussels to influence European policy (Pernot, 2001: 310–27; Verbist, 2001). Between the European union bodies on the one hand and the European Commission on the other hand, a close and mutually beneficial relationship developed. Moreover, the actual collaboration between unions of different countries and of different ideological outlook did smoothen their mutual relations. Notwithstanding ideological differences and strategic considerations, this was undoubtedly the case for the Christian and socialist trade unions in the different European institutions (Pasture, 1999: 377–404). Tania Régin has recently shown that the European integration equally had a notable positive effect on French domestic inter-trade union relations (Régin, 2003). In addition, the transnational European trade union elite – limited in numbers, but outstanding in authority and prestige (Pasture, 2000; Régin, 2003) – shared a common culture with the burgeoning European administration, particularly in the social departments. Trade unionists figured prominently in European networks and pressure groups, and intermingled there with politicians and civil servants. The European administration offered one of the very few career opportunities for trade union officials outside the unions. The unions entertained an excellent relationship with Monnet, as with many other key European leaders such as René Mayer, then his successor as President of the High Authority, and (considerably less though) Walter Hallstein, the President of the European Commission from 1958 to 1967. It seems that their access to influential European political circles – such as the Spaak Committee that prepared the negotiation of the Rome Treaties – declined though. Some later European leaders – particularly Jacques Delors – had trade union roots, however. While their position in Europe weakened, the unions did try to reinforce their European organization and action. A rapprochement occurred between all unions of different ideological orientation – in fact they largely lost their ideological distinctiveness – which resulted in the creation of the ETUC. According to Jelle Visser, ‘measured by its scope, resources and impact, the ETUC is without parallel in the world’ (Visser, 1998: 236). Nevertheless, since its creation, the

124

Patrick Pasture

ETUC has played hardly any role in the European integration (Middlemas, 1995; Erne, 2002; Greenwood, 2003). While the ideological diversity in the European trade union world may have dwindled, the unions have definitely not given up their strong national orientation. Only in the 1990s, when in most countries – most notably Britain and France – they suffered huge losses of membership and political influence, did the unions start to develop real and effective transnational structures, albeit still relatively marginal compared to the weight of the national dimension (Dølvik, 1999, 2002; Dølvik and Visser, 2001).

Acknowledgement I wish to express my appreciation for the critical comments of the editors on an earlier version of this text.

Notes 1 Procès verbal de la réunion du Comité élargi sur les questions d’organisation, Rome, 3 May 1961 (Amsterdam, International Institute for Social History, Archives of the European Trade Union Confederation [hereafter Arch. ETUC], 441). 2 ERO-ICFTU, Resolution on the Free Trade Area (‘for internal use only’), European Regional Conference, Brussels, 12–14 May 1958 (Arch. ETUC, 301). 3 Doc. ERO/EC/72 17th ERO Executive Committee meeting [hereafter Ex.Com.], Frankfurt, 27 June 1959 and correspondence Scandinavian unions – Schevenels 1 April 1959 and 22 May 1959 (Arch. ETUC, 1281); Summary report of the 18th ERO Ex.Com., Brussels, 29 January 1960 (Amsterdam, International Institute for Social History, Archives of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions [hereafter Arch. ICFTU], 1283); Statement of Four Presidents – Scandinavian National Centres, and Secretariats comments on . . . , 12 May 1960, Doc. ERO/EC/19/2 and 3, Summary report of the 19th ERO Ex.Com., Brussels, 12 May 1960; Summary report of the 20th ERO Ex.Com., Brussels, 14 September 1960 (Arch. ICFTU, 1283). 4 ‘Memorandum of the Trade Union Committee of EFTA Countries’, Vienna, 10–11 March 1960 (Arch. ETUC, 302); Arch. ETUC, 305. 5 Summary report of the 4th ERO Ex.Com., Brussels, 3 November 1955 (Arch. ICFTU, 1281). 6 Ibid. and correspondence in Arch. ETUC, 263. 7 Recommendations on the European Economic and Social Council, Joint ICFTU-ERO Committee on European Social Integration, Brussels, 5–6 April 1956 (Arch. ICFTU, 1428). 8 ICFTU, Rapport sur la Conférence régionale européenne, 4th session, Frankfurt, 22–24 May 1956 (Arch. ETUC, 8). 9 Summary report of the 9th Ex.Com. of the ERO/ICFTU, Brussels, 13 January 1957; ‘Observations relative to the Draft European Common Market Treaty submitted to the President of the Ministerial Committee by the Free Trade Union Organisation of the Community’, Brussels, 30th January 1957 (Arch. ETUC, 1281); ORE-ICFTU, Résolution sur l’harmonisation sociale en Europe, Conférence régionale européenne, Bruxelles, 12–14 May 1958 (Arch. ETUC, 10). 10 See particularly the note on recent developments and plans in the field of European social integration, agenda item 3 for the Joint ICFTU-ERO Committee on European Social Integration, Brussels, 22–23 October 1957 (Arch. ICFTU, 1428). 11 See the documents, among which the resolutions, of the 2nd General Assembly of the Free Trade Unions of the Member States of the European Communities, Luxembourg,

Trade unions as a transnational movement 125

12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

5–6 March 1959 (Arch. ETUC, 480); Declaration of the ETUS, 12 October 1960 (Arch. ETUC, 440); Nota [Theo Rasschaert], La fusion des exécutifs, ETUS Ex.Com., Rome, 14 May 1961 (Arch. ETUC, 441). See reports of the meetings, letters and declarations of the ETUS, in particular the minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Rome, 14 May 1961 (Arch. ETUC, 441). Nota Harm G. Buiter, s.d., ETUS Ex.Com., Paris, 25 November 1960 (Arch. ETUC, 440). For example, ETUS, Déclaration des représentants des Centres syndicaux à l’occasion de la réunion avec les parlementaires européens, 25 September 1958; Prise de position du Comité exécutif du Secrétariat syndical européen (CISL) [ ETUS] sur les dispositions sociales du Traité de la CEE, Geneva, 9 June 1960 (Arch. ETUC, 438, 439). Bruno Storti, Perspectives d’une politique syndicale, ETUS Ex.Com. Brussels, 5–6 April 1962 and Harm G. Buiter to Walter Hallstein, President of the Ex.Com. of the EEC, 28 February 1962 (Arch. ETUC 443). See the documents and minutes (in particular the introduction to the discussion on the draft social programme by Gaetano Zingone) of the ETUS Ex.Com., Rome 14 May 1961 (Arch. ETUC, 441). See the documents, report and resolution of the third General Assembly of the free trade unions of the six member states of the European Communities, Brussels, 10–12 January 1962 (Arch. ETUC, 481). See in particular the minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com. Brussels, 3–8 October 1962 (Arch. ETUC, 445). Walter Schevenels to George Woodcock, TUC Ass. General Secretary, May 1958 (Arch. ETUC, 10). See also ICFTU, Rapport sur la Conférence régionale européenne, 5th session, Brussels, 12–14 May 1958 (Arch. ETUC, 10; ICFTU, 1312–13); Statement of Policy of the TUC, 9 June 1959 (Arch. ETUC, 300). On the attitude and policies of the TUC see Lieber, 1970: 38–45, 86–9. Summary report of the ERO Economic Committee, 11–12 November 1958 (Arch. ETUC, 1287). ERO-ICFTU Statement of Policy on the European Free Trade Area, by the European Trade Union Conference on the Common Market, Brussels, 16–17 May 1957 (Arch. ICFTU, 1318). ERO/ICFTU Memorandum of viewpoints and conclusions retained by the free trade union movement of Europe in respect of the Free Trade Area (sessions of Economic Committee of 9–11 June and 15–16 July 1958). According to the minutes of the last meeting, the memorandum was agreed upon, but only ‘for internal use’ and it was not published (ETUC, 1287). ERO-ICFTU Statement of Policy on the European Free Trade Area, by the European Trade Union Conference on the Common Market, Brussels, 16–17 May 1957 (Arch. ICFTU, 1318). Memorandum of the Trade Union Committee of EFTA Countries, Vienna, 10–11 March 1960 (Arch. ETUC, 302). Letters of Franz Olah, President of the Austrian trades union congress ÖGB, to Walter Schevenels and to Arne Geijer, President of the Swedish-LO [and of the ICFTU], 30 March 1960 (Arch. ETUC, 304). Report of a Meeting of Representatives of National Centres in the EFTA, London, 26 May 1960 (Arch. ETUC, 305). Correspondence in Arch. ETUC, 304. Minutes of the Ex.Com. of the ETUS, Rome, 14 May 1961 (Arch. ETUC, 441). European Economic Unity – A Background Note, TUC, 10 July 1961 and Memorandum to the EEC Trade Union National Centres: TUC views on full employment and the labour provisions of the Rome Treaty, 30 November 1961 (Arch. ETUC, 306). Dossier regarding the European Communities’ enlargement for the Ex.Com. of the ETUS, Brussels, 9 January 1962 (Arch. ETUC, 441).

126

Patrick Pasture

31 TUC, Memorandum to the EEC Trade Union National Centres on Full Employment and the Labour Provisions of the Rome Treaty, 30 November 1961 (Arch. ETUC, 306 – also contains preparatory notes and minutes of a meeting 8 November 1961). Compare Lieber, 1970: 106–12. 32 Minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Brussels, 9 January 1962 (Arch. ETUC, 442). 33 Report of a meeting between delegates of the ETUS and the TUC for the Ex.Com. ETUS, 5–6 April 1962; Geneva, 13–14 June 1962 (Arch. ETUC, 443–4). 34 Minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Brussels, 8–9 March 1963 (Arch. ETUC, 447). The stress on the authoritarian implication was also motivated by the French contacts with the Franco regime in Spain. 35 See the documents in Arch. ETUC, 449. 36 For example, Minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Brussels, 8–9 March 1963 (Arch. ETUC, 447). 37 Minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Brussels, 9–10 May 1963 (Arch. ETUC, 448); the Stellungnahme des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes zur mittelfristigen Wirtschaftspolitik der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft . . . and minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Brussels, 6–7 December 1963 (Arch. ETUC, 450); Problèmes sociaux, and minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Amsterdam, 22 October 1964 (Arch. ETUC, 455). 38 Minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Brussels, 9–10 May 1963 (Arch. ETUC, 447) and following. 39 Minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Brussels, 8–9 March, 9–10 May 1963 (Arch. ETUC, 447–8). See also Guinand, 2001. 40 Note au Comité Exécutif concernant l’état des travaux en matière d’harmonisation sociale, 3 December 1963, discussed at the Ex.Com., Brussels, 6–7 December 1963 (Arch. ETUC, 451). 41 Minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Brussels, 21 April 1964 (Arch. ETUC, 453). On the reorientation of FO, opposing trade union integration in the political and socioeconomic structures (and in particular Planism) see Pernot, 2001: 459–66. 42 Doc. and Minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Brussels, 8–9 July 1964 (Arch. ETUC, 454); Minutes of the ETUS Ex.Com., Amsterdam, 22 October 1964 (Arch. ETUC, 455). 43 See esp. ETUS Ex.Com., 14 January 1965 and the letter of Harm G. Buiter to A. Misslin, Secretary of the ECSC Inter Trade Liaison Committee, Luxembourg, 24 December 1964 (referring also to a resolution of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe subscribed by ten members of the ETUS Ex.Com.), discussions at the ETUS Ex.Com., 8 April 1965 (Arch. ETUC, 457). 44 See especially the documents and discussions and documents at the ETUS ‘enlarged’ Ex.Com., Amsterdam, 22 October 1964, 4 February 1965 (Arch. ETUC, 455–6). 45 ETUS ‘Enlarged’ Ex.Com. with delegates of the AELE [EFTA] (Britain and Sweden), 4 February 1965 (Arch. ETUC, 457).

References Antonioli, Maurizio, Bergamaschi, Miriam and Romero, Federico (eds) (1999) Le Scissioni Sindacali: Italia e Europa, Pisa: BFS Edizioni. Barnouin, Barbara (1986) The European Labour Movement and European Integration, London: Frances Pinter. Beever, Colin R. (1960) European Unity and the Trade Union Movements, Leiden, AW: Sythoff. Berger, Stefan and Smith, Angel (eds) (1998) Nationalism, Labour and Ethnicity 1870–1939, Manchester, NH: Manchester University Press. Boel, Bent (1998) ‘The European productivity agency: a faithful prophet of the American model?’, in Matthias Kipping and Ove Bjarnar (eds), The Americanisation of European

Trade unions as a transnational movement 127 Business: The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of US Management, London: Routledge, pp. 37–54. Bossuat, Gérard (2003) ‘Les euro-socialistes de la SFIO. Réseaux et influence’, in Gérard Bossuat (ed.), Inventer l’Europe: Histoire nouvelle des groupes d’influence et des acteurs de l’unité eurpéenne, Brussels: Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes/Peter Lang, pp. 409–29. Braun, Michael (1995) ‘Il sindacato tedesco nella prima fase dell’unificazione europea (1949–1952)’, in Andrea Ciampani (ed.), L’altra via per l’Europa: Forze sociali e organizzazione degli interessi nell’integrazione europea (1947–1957), Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 66–97. Carew, Anthony (1987) Labour Under the Marshall Plan, Manchester, NH: Manchester University Press. —— (2000a) ‘A false dawn: the World Federation of Trade Unions (1945–1949)’, in Anthony Carew, Michel Dreyfus, Geert van Goethem, Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick and Marcel van der Linden (eds), The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Bern/ New York: Peter Lang, pp. 165–84. —— (2000b) ‘Towards a free trade union centre: the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (1949–1972)’, in Anthony Carew, Michel Dreyfus, Geert van Goethem, Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick and Marcel van der Linden (eds), The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Bern/New York: Peter Lang, pp. 187–339. Ciampani, Andrea (1995) ‘Il dilemma dell’ “Europa sindacale” tra cooperazione ed integrazione europea: l’Organizzazione regionale europea della “Confederazione internazionale dei sindacati liberi” (1950–1957)’, in Andrea Ciampani (ed.), L’altra via per l’Europa – Forze sociali e organizzazione degli interessi nell’integrazione europea (1947–1957), Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 200–29. —— (2000) La Cisl tra integrazione europea e mondializzazione – Profilo storico del ‘sindacato nuovo’ nelle relazioni internazionali: dalla Conferenza di Londra al Trattato di Amsterdam, Rome: Edizioni Lavoro. Dølvik, Jan Erik (1999) An Emerging Island? ETUC, Social Dialogue and the Europeanisation of the Urade Unions in the 1990s, Brussels: European Trade Union Institute. —— (2002) ‘European trade unions coping with globalization’, in Jürgen Hoffmann (ed.), The Solidarity Dilemma: Globalization, Europeanization and the Trade Unions, Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, pp. 83–118. Dølvik, Jan Erik and Visser, Jelle (2001) ‘A third turning point: ETUC and social partnership’, in Justin Greenwood and Hugh Compston (eds), Social Partnership in the European Union, London: Macmillan, pp. 72–100. Duchêne, François (1994) Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence, New York and London: W. W. Norton. Ebbinghaus, Bernhard and Visser, Jelle (1997) ‘European labor and transnational solidarity: challenges, pathways, and barriers’, in Jytte Klausen and Louise A. Tilly (eds), European Integration in Social and Historical Perspective: 1850 to the Present, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 195–221. Erne, Roland (2002) ‘Le syndicalisme, acteur de la démocratisation de l’Union européenne?’, in Tania Régin and Serge Wolikow (eds), Les syndicalismes en Europe, vol. 2, A l’épreuve de l’international, Paris: Syilepse, pp. 161–78. Formigoni, Guido (1995) ‘I sindacati italiani e il processo di integrazione europea (1947–60)’, in Andrea Ciampani (ed.), L’altra via per l’Europa – Forze sociali e organizzazione degli interessi nell’integrazione europea (1947–1957), Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 19–52. Gobin, Corinne (1996) ‘Consultation et concertation sociales à l’échelle de la Communauté Économique Européenne: Étude des positions et stratégies de la Confédération

128

Patrick Pasture

Européenne des Syndicats 1958–1991’, unpublished PhD thesis, Université Libre de Bruxelles. Gobin, Corinne (1998) ‘Syndicalisme européen et lobbies: une antinomie fondamentale’, in Paul-H. Claeys, Corinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets and Pascaline Winand (eds), Lobbyisme, pluralisme et intégration européenne/Lobbying, pluralism and European integration, Brussels: Presses interuniversitaires européennes, pp. 110–23. Greenwood, Justin (2003) Interest Representation in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Guasconi, Maria Eleonora (1995) ‘Il Labour Party, il Trade Union Congress e il processo di integrazione europea dal 1945 al 1957’, in Andrea Ciampani (ed.), L’altra via per l’Europa: Forze sociali e organizzazione degli interessi nell’integrazione europea (1947–1957), Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 112–26. —— (1998) ‘The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions’ policy towards the European integration process from 1950 to 1957’, in Eric Bussière and Michel Dumoulin (eds), Milieux économiques et intégration européenne en Europe occidentale au XX siècle, Arras: Artois Presses Université, pp. 358–70. Guichaoua, Elsa (1994) ‘Le Comité d’action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe’, in Gérard Bossuat and René Girault (eds), Europe brisée, Europe retrouvée: Nouvelles réflexions sur l’unité européenne au XXème siècle, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne. Guinand, Cédric (2001) ‘Les syndicates allemands et les institutions euopéennes’, in MarieThérèse Bitsch (ed.), Le couple France–Allemagne et les institutions européennes, Brussels: Bruylant, pp. 293–306. Haas, E. B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economical Forces 1950–1959, London: Stevens and Sons. Hoskyns, Catherine (1996) Integrating Gender: Women, Law and Politics in the European Union, London/New York: Verso. Kaiser, Josef (ed.) (1996) Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund 1949–1956, Cologne: Bund. Kaiser, Wolfram (1997) ‘Challenge to the community: the creation, crisis and consolidation of the European Free Trade Association, 1958–1972’, Journal of European Integration History, 3(1): 7–33. —— (1999) Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945–1963, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Lieber, Robert J. (1970) British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites and Pressure Groups, Berkeley, CA/Los Angeles, CA/London: University of California Press. MacShane, Denis (1992) International Labour and the Origins of the Cold War, Oxford: Clarendon. Maggiorani, Mauro (1998) L’Europa degli altri: Comunisti italiani e integrazione europea (1957–1969), Firenze: Carocci. Martin, Andrew and Ross, George (1999) ‘In the line of fire: the Europeanization of labor representation’, in Andrew Martin and George Ross (eds), The Brave New World of European Labor: European Trade Unions at the Millennium, New York and Oxford: Berghahn, pp. 312–37. Mechi, Lorenzo (1994–1995) ‘Una vocazione sociale? L’azione dell’Alta Autorità delle CECA a favore dei lavoratori sotto le presindenze di Jean Monnet e di René Mayer’, Storia delle relazioni internationale, (10–11): 147–83. —— (2000a) ‘L’action de la Haute Autorité de la CECA dans la construction de maisons ouvrières’, Journal of European Integration History, 6(1): 63–88. —— (2000b) ‘Il Comitato consultativo della CECA’, in Antonio Varsori (ed.), Il Comitato Economico e Sociale nella costruzione europea, Venice: Marsilio, pp. 34–46.

Trade unions as a transnational movement 129 Meynaud, Jean and Sidjanski, Dusan (1969) Les groupes de pression dans la Communauté européenne, Brussels: Éditions de l’Institut de sociologie de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2 vols. Middlemas, Keith (1995) Orchestrating Europe: The Informal Politics of the European Union 1973–95, London: Fontana Press. Mioche, Philippe (2001) ‘Bilan économique et social de la CECA: un passé qui a preparé l’avenir’, in Marie–Thérèse Bitsch (ed.), Le couple France–Allemagne et les institutions européennes, Brussels: Bruylant, pp. 63–79. Newman, Michael (1993) ‘The British Labour Party’, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.), Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s, Leiden/New York/Cologne: E. J. Brill, pp. 162–77. Pasture, Patrick (1995) ‘The fist of the dwarf: formation, organisation and development of the Christian trade unions as European pressure group 1947–58’, Journal of European Integration History, 1(2): 5–26. —— (1999) Histoire du syndicalisme chrétien international: La difficile recherche d’une troisième voie, Paris/Montréal: L’Harmattan. —— (2000) ‘In de buitenbaan: essay over internationale syndicale culturen en structuren bij de oprichting van de EGKS’, in Peter Van Kemseke (ed.), Diplomatieke cultuur, Leuven: Leuven University Press, pp. 223–41. —— (2001a) ‘The flight of the robins: European trade unions at the beginnings of the European integration process’, in Bart de Wilde (ed.), The Past and Future of International Trade Unionism, Gent: IALHI/Amsab, pp. 80–103. —— (2001b) ‘The interwar origins of international labour’s European commitment (1919–1934)’, Contemporary European History, 10(2): 221–37. —— (2002) ‘Has European integration led to Europeanization or rather to renationalization of the trade union movement?’, paper delivered at the International Workshop, Trade Unions in the Transnational Sphere, Florence: European University Institute, 25–26 October. —— (2004) ‘Window of opportunities or trompe l’œil? The myth of labour unity in Western Europe after 1944’, in Gerd-Rainer Horn and Padraic Kenney (eds), Transnational Moments of Change: European Society – 1945, 1968, 1989, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 27–49. Pasture, Patrick and Verberckmoes, Johan (eds) (1998) Working Class Internationalism and the Appeal of National Identity – Historical Dilemmas and Current Debates on Western Europe, Oxford/New York: Berg. Pernot, Jean-Marie (2001) ‘Dedans, dehors – La dimension internationale dans le syndicalisme français’, unpublished PhD thesis in Political Science, Université Paris X – Nanterre, 3 vols. Régin, Tania (2003) ‘Les relations intersyndicales françaises à la lumière des engagements internationaux 1948–1979’, unpublished PhD thesis in History, Université de Bourgogne, Dijon. Reinalda, Bob (2003) ‘The evolution of intergovernmental organisations since 1815: opportunities for transnational politico-social movements and effects on welfare state, civil society and democracy’, paper delivered at the ODIS-International Symposium ‘Intermediary Structures and Democracy – An Historical Approach’, Leuven – Brussels, 29 November 2003. Roussel, Hélène (2003) ‘Force ouvrière et l’Europe’, in Michel Dreyfus, Gérard Gautron and Jean-Louis Robert (eds), La naissance de Force ouvrière: Autour de Robert Bothereau, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, pp. 233–45.

130

Patrick Pasture

Strikwerda, Carl (1997) ‘Nationalism, ethnicity and social movements’, Brood & Rozen, 2(1): 11–23. Van der Linden, Marcel (2000) ‘Conclusions: the past and future of international trade unionism’, in Anthony Carew, Michel Dreyfus, Geert van Goethem, Rebecca GumbrellMcCormick and Marcel van der Linden (eds), The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Bern/New York: Peter Lang, pp. 519–40. Varsori, Antonio (1995) ‘Jean Monnet e il Comitato d’Azione per gli Stati Uniti d’Europa dalle origini ai Trattati di Roma (1955–1957)’, in Andrea Ciampani (ed.), L’altra via per l’Europa – Forze sociali e organizzazione degli interessi nell’integrazione europea (1947–1957), Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 139–70. Verbist, Sophie (2001) ‘Communisme versus Europese integratie: een onoverbrugbare tegenstelling? De positie van de West-Europese communisten tegenover de EEG vanuit Belgisch perspectief (1957–1969)’, unpublished Licentiate’s thesis (MA) in History, Belgium: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Visser, Jelle (1998) ‘Learning to play: the Europeanisation of trade unions’, in Patrick Pasture and Johan Verberckmoes (eds), Working Class Internationalism and the Appeal of National Identity – Historical Dilemmas and Current Debates on Western Europe, Oxford/ New York: Berg, pp. 231–57. Visser, Jelle and Ebbinghaus, Benhard (1992) ‘Making the most of diversity? European integration and transnational organisation of labour’, in Justin Greenwood, Judith Grote and Karsten Ronit (eds), Organised Interests and the European Community, London: Sage, pp. 206–37. Waterman, Peter (2001) Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, London: Continuum.

6

The alliance of European Christian Democracy and Conservatism Convergence through networking Karl Magnus Johansson

This chapter explores networks of European Christian Democratic and Conservative parties. Their networking activities have brought these two formerly more distinct party families closer together in European politics. Most studies of transnational party co-operation have researched party families in isolation from each other. In contrast, emphasis is placed here on convergence through networks of interaction across such groupings of political parties. The rapprochement between European Christian Democracy and Conservatism follows a certain path. The primary aim of this chapter is to trace this path and the road ahead along historicalinstitutional lines, illuminating persistence and path dependency (see e.g. Steinmo et al., 1992; Pierson, 1998). Some useful analytical concepts that are also relevant in this context are discussed in greater detail in other chapters in this book. They include the discussion of new institutionalism and socialization by Frank Schimmelfennig and of networks by Karen Heard-Lauréote. The chapter draws on a large number of interviews and on extensive documentation compiled through archival research. Various ancillary associations are also included and so are party foundations and federations, which also contribute to transnational socialization and convergence. Whereas the chapter is predominantly empirical in character, I also draw out implications for the development of theory that may be applied in future research on transnational exchanges of political parties and politicians.

Political parties in transnational politics and in the European Union Political parties are often referred to as an example of transnational actors (see e.g. Kaiser, 1969; Rosenau, 1990; Smith, 2001). This suggests they are non-state, societal actors operating across state borders. However, various types of transnational actors should be differentiated from each other. Do political parties qualify as such actors? Political parties are fundamentally different, for example, from private interest groups and firms. Political parties have distinctive characteristics. They are generally office-seeking. A political party may form a coalition in government or in parliament with another political party. This implies that political parties might be supportive of a regime and committed to the preservation of

132

Karl Magnus Johansson

state sovereignty, acting in defence of some national interests. This situation serves to restrain the freedom of action of political parties and their leaders. It is, therefore, not self-evident that political parties are ‘sovereignty-free’, as Rosenau (1990: 36) suggests they are. European democracies have party governments. The so-called ‘regime parties’ are integrated with the state and postwar Italy is an example of this (Partitocrazia). The Christian Democrats dominated the state there until the early 1990s. There are special public laws regulating political parties in several European countries. Modern political parties are in a number of ways semi-public organizations. Most of them are subject to some kind of public framework laws yet many of their activities remain voluntary and private in nature. Whereas the top echelon of political parties could fulfil functions in state institutions, the supporters and ideological foundations fit more closely with the civil society. Political parties are traditionally seen as voluntary associations rooted at the societal level. Historically, political parties emerged on the basis of social cleavages and political conflicts. In the present era, such conflicts are to an increasing extent played out in supranational arenas of policy-making. It is, therefore, logical that political parties also follow suit and organize themselves in the European political sphere. Political parties at the European level are emerging and are becoming actors in their own right. They take policy initiatives and bring together the networks of member parties and politicians. A regulation on funding and a statute of European political parties was adopted in 2003 in light of the revised ‘party article’ in the Treaty of Nice ( Johansson and Zervakis, 2002; Day and Shaw, 2003; Johansson and Raunio, 2004). In conjunction with broader institutional changes in the European Union, this regulation could have a major impact on the ways in which political parties conduct politics in the future. One could foresee more policy co-ordination on a transnational basis. Alterations in the EU institutional balance make the emergent European political parties more significant. I am especially thinking here of the general reinforcement of the links between the European Commission and the European Parliament (EP), whose importance has grown considerably as a result of treaty revisions. European party elites have been instrumental in this development. The European political parties are confronted with a number of challenges and in order to meet these they need to be strengthened as organizations and become more autonomous and integrated. The nature of transnational party interaction in the EC/EU has changed quite dramatically since the 1970s. This kind of interaction has three different stages: contact, co-operation and integration (Niedermayer, 1983). Co-operation has been sustained by the various organizations that were established in the 1970s (Pridham and Pridham, 1981; Pridham, 1982). The patterns of interactions are transforming themselves, and for the time being are somewhere in between co-operation and integration ( Johansson and Zervakis, 2002). Integration means that authoritative decisions, on the basis of some kind of majority voting, are taken at the European party level and that national political parties voluntarily comply with these decisions. All the European political parties allow for majority voting in internal bodies. The future

Christian Democracy and Conservatism

133

power balance in these organizations is hard to predict. The new regulation on a statute and funding of European political parties could result in centralization as far as the chain of command is concerned. Whereas Christian Democrats were pushing for this regulation, conservatives were far from enthusiastic. As for European party interaction, conservatives tend to be pragmatic and prefer contact and cooperation to integration. Conservatives want to maintain their independence and cannot accept being mere national components of a European political party. National political parties, generally keen on their identity and credibility, will strive to hold on to their power to nominate candidates for European elections and run the campaigns themselves within member-states.

European Christian Democracy and Conservatism: an ever closer union? Over the years, there have been numerous and durable contacts between Christian Democratic political parties in Europe. There is a substantial body of literature on the historical foundations of such contacts (see e.g. Irving, 1979; Gehler and Kaiser, 2004). Within the Christian democratic family, the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI) was founded in 1949. In 1965 the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) came into being. In view of the direct elections to the EP the European People’s Party (EPP) – Federation of Christian Democratic Parties of the EC was formed in 1976 ( Jansen, 1998). From the outset, the EPP was seen as an embryonic European political party. The EUCD and the EPP merged in 1998, primarily to avoid duplication of work and also in light of the inclusion of political parties from EU candidate countries. Throughout the postwar period there have been meetings of presidents and secretary-generals of Christian democratic parties. In addition, there have been contacts among parliamentarians and most notably in the Common Assembly/EP. The Christian Democratic Group was founded already in 1953. The Conservative Group only came into being in the context of the 1973 enlargement. In 1979, following the first direct elections to the EP, the name of the group was changed into the European Democratic Group (EDG). On 1 May 1992 this group dissolved as the British and Danish Conservatives became allied members of the EPP Group. This alliance was agreed to after very complicated discussions and negotiations (Hanley, 1994; Johansson, 1997; Jansen, 1998). The key personality was Helmut Kohl, then German Chancellor and leader of the ChristlichDemokratische Union (CDU), who put his weight behind this alliance. He was courted by John Major. As the new leader of the Conservative Party and as Prime Minister, Major, and the people around him, including his party chairman Chris Patten and Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, tried to enter into a coalition with Christian Democrats and to improve relations with other EC governments more generally. Major (1999: 265) wrote in his memoirs: ‘I was keen to rebuild shattered fences, to prevent Britain from being seen for ever as the odd man out to be excluded from private consultations that so often foreshadowed new policy in Europe.’ This suggests that motives of power politics contributed to the alliance.

134

Karl Magnus Johansson

The alliance formed in 1992 was a key event for the future development of European interactions among conservatives and Christian Democrats. As was noted earlier, the process of rapprochement between them follows a certain path and logic of its own. That the Christian democrat leaders finally gave a green light to the British Tories sent a clear signal that other conservatives were welcome to coalesce with Christian Democrats which has also happened. Conservative parties from Nordic countries have joined the EPP and its parliamentary group. So have the Portuguese Partido Social Democrata (PSD), Forza Italia and the French neoGaullist party (previously Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), now the leading force in the centre-right Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, UMP, founded in November 2002). Several political parties in the candidate countries became associate members or observers of the EPP. The EPP started early to prepare for this enlargement. As long as there is a joint Christian Democratic/Conservative Group, newcomers who identify themselves with any of these two, historically separate, ideological families are generally welcome there. The alternative of being nonaligned is far less attractive in terms of both material and non-material resources, which include budgetary means, a sense of recognition and perhaps also of belonging, that is, a shared identity. In terms of power it is a fact that important decisions in the EP often follow from deals made between the largest political groups. The alliance has been subject to review after European elections and has been, and remains, somewhat fragile. The EPP Group added ‘European Democrats’ to its name after the 1999 European elections and the full name became Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED). This was of symbolic importance since especially the British Conservatives wanted to signal a separate identity and their autonomy within the group. They renegotiated the arrangement of the allied membership in connection with the June 2004 elections to the EP (European Voice, 12–18 February 2004 and 1–14 April 2004). Following a constitutive meeting in July, the number of deputies in the ED part of the group were altogether 40, including 28 British Conservatives. Although described as a loveless marriage of convenience, there were still strong incentives for the British Tories to remain allied with Christian Democrats in one and the same political group in the EP. Nevertheless, some members preferred a departure from the Christian Democrats and the creation of a new group with free-market and Euro-sceptic, or ‘Euro-realist’, political parties from countries that joined the European Union in 2004, including the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Estonia (European Voice, 23–29 October 2003 and 12–18 February 2004). The choice rested with the leadership of the British Conservative Party, which remained in opposition to the Christian Democrats’ goal of a federal Europe and constitution. The British Conservative Party kept aloof from the EPP organization. However, the new party leader Michael Howard attended the summit of EPP centre-right leaders and prime ministers in Paris on 4 December 2003 (Financial Times, 4 December 2003). The French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin

Christian Democracy and Conservatism

135

hosted the meeting at his office, the Hôtel de Matignon. The main item of the agenda concerned the EU Intergovernmental Conference and the negotiations over the new treaty, or constitution as the federalists prefer to call it. There was considerable networking and co-ordination at the time of the European Convention (2002–3), which drafted the constitution. The EPP had its own Convention group and regularly arranged meetings and seminars. Parliamentarians and politicians from countries due to join the European Union were involved. Of the 13 members of the powerful Convention Praesidium, 7 came from the EPP including President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and VicePresident Jean-Luc Dehaene. A European constitution was a key priority of the Christian Democrats, but not of the British Conservatives. For the time being, there was not ‘an ever closer union’ and a meeting of minds between European Christian Democracy and British Conservatism. More broadly, however, we can conclude that conservatives and Christian Democrats have come much closer together in European politics. There is also policy co-ordination within the EPP, which is instrumental in weaving a web of networks of interaction among Christian Democrats and Conservatives in Europe. Whereas the alliance formed in 1992 was a key event, the real formative moments or critical juncture can be traced back at least to the 1970s. We must, therefore, return to that decade to be able to assemble evidence corroborating the argument of persistence and path dependency. We are dealing with a process that unfolds over time.

Onto the path: the Inter-Party Conference The Inter-Party Conference involved conservative parties and those parties on the Christian democratic side that could live with a conservative political party. The most regular participants at Inter-Party Conference meetings were those representing the British and Nordic Conservative parties and the German and Austrian Christian democratic parties. A series of meetings were held from 1972 in the cities of Oslo (1972), Luxembourg (1973), Helsinki (1974), Munich (1975), Copenhagen (1976) and Edinburgh (1977). Some meetings took place on the margins of the annual conference of the British Conservative Party (in Blackpool in 1975 and 1977 and in Brighton in 1976). There were also a number of party meetings in Salzburg and in Bonn, or near Bonn, at the Political Academy Eichholz of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. In 1974–6, party representatives got together to compare and discuss the programmes of the political parties with a view to a common political platform, or charter. The overarching aim of the Inter-Party Conference was to prepare the foundation of a common European party organization (Kohler and Myrzik, 1982). The youth and student sections put pressure on their parties. These sections took an initiative at a meeting they held in London in 1972 (Ashford, 1980: 121–2). The British Young Conservatives and Federation of Conservative Students lobbied their mother party. The 1975 party conference debated and passed a motion urging ‘the Conservative Party to work more closely with our

136

Karl Magnus Johansson

political allies in Europe towards the formation of a moderate centre-right alliance (a European Democrat Party (EDP))’ (quoted in Ashford, 1980: 120; see also Pridham and Pridham, 1981: 197; Lodge and Herman, 1982: 173). In Sweden there was a similar pressure from the youth and student sections on the party, notably in the context of its annual conference in October 1975.1 Youth and student associations then coordinated their efforts at the European level. Documentary evidence shows that they jointly proposed the formation, and a charter, of EDP on the basis of a report drawn up during 1974–5. The joint proposal was presented at the Inter-Party meeting in Munich in June 1975.2 According to this proposal, the alliance should be open to Christian Democratic, Conservative and like-minded political parties and ‘be the starting-point for the eventual creation of a trans-national European party, with the different national parties of the European countries as constituent members’. They also proposed a research and information office of those parties interested in facilitating the exchange of information between the different parties and in order to undertake joint research projects. It was also suggested that joint working groups be established at once in regard to the developments in Spain and Portugal. Another idea was to hold regular party leader meetings similar to those of the Socialist International. European unity was a priority: Only a close cooperation between our parties, with the creation of a joint party on the European level as its immediate and clearly declared objective, can ensure that the future of the United Europe we seek will not be dominated by the organized forces of socialism. As the parties responsible for the original creation of the European institutions, and as those which have been in the forefront of the struggle for European unification in the entire post-war period, it is our duty to take the lead also in the formation of European political parties. Only in this way can we show that our commitment to a democratically governed United Europe is real. [Italics added]3 There was a link, at least on an individual basis, to the European federalist movement including the Young European Federalists (YEF). In exploring the networks of interaction between European Christian democrats and conservatives special attention must be paid to the British Conservatives. They have played a central part in the forging of party links. In the 1960s, the British Conservatives cultivated transnational relations mainly with the Germans, whom they considered the closest of the continental Christian Democrats. Considering both the CDU and the Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) as their nearest allies, the Tories worked quite closely with them in the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe, the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There were also the Königswinter Conference meetings of the Anglo-German Association that involved parliamentarians. Politicians also came together in numerous meetings arranged by the German party foundations including the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and its London office. Such meetings contributed to an increased knowledge of the value

Christian Democracy and Conservatism

137

bases and political platforms of the political parties represented. The German Christian democratic conception of the social market economy (a salient feature of European Christian Democracy) was made known to British Conservatives. This concept would play a distinct role for policy-making in the British Conservative Party in the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, there were initiatives to establish cooperation between the political departments of the larger conservative and Christian democratic parties, notably the British Conservative Party and the CDU. As Director of the Conservative Research Department (CRD), Chris Patten was involved in such a cooperation. A Catholic by confession, he was in a position to build bridges to European Christian Democrats. He was also well versed in the thinking of that ideology, including Catholic social teachings. This was helpful when he later, in the early 1990s, as party chairman, was involved in the talks on an alliance in the EP. During the course of the 1970s, the British Conservatives became increasingly engaged in developing relationships with political parties in Europe. This is attested to by a schedule of the nature of the links that existed between ‘different branches of the Conservative Party and like-minded (and some other) parties in Europe’.4 This schedule served as a reference document which could be kept permanently up-to-date in case of ‘alterations in the nature of inter-party relations’. At an operational level the International Office of the British Conservative Party played an active role, primarily through Lady Elles, who was the head of the office in the 1970s. She stressed ‘the great importance’ of the formation of the would-be European Democrat Union for all the parties.5 They would be ‘willing to join in the formation of this union at the earliest possible moment and I think we must make this clear to our Christian Democrat friends’.6 Lady Elles called attention to the European Union of Women (EUW) of which she was chairman in the 1970s.7 Founded already in 1953 and composed of women members of conservative, Christian democratic and other like-minded parties, the EUW has contributed to closer party relations. It is noteworthy that the EUW also included Italian Christian Democrats as well as representatives of the Portuguese and Spanish centre-right parties. Within the EUW, relations have been close between the British and Nordic Conservatives and the German Christian Democrats. The same could be said of the associations assembling representatives of the student and youth sections of the conservative party and some Christian democratic parties. The Shadow Cabinet, under Margaret Thatcher, who was elected new party leader in February 1975, formulated a policy for a European anti-socialist, anti-collectivist alliance. There was a domestic–political motive to counter the international and much acclaimed contacts of the Labour Party. The Shadow Foreign Secretary, Reginald Maudling, was very concerned about relations with like-minded parties in Europe (Maudling, 1978: 221–3). So was Douglas Hurd, the opposition spokesman on European affairs outside the Shadow Cabinet. He was himself involved in the party contacts pursued by the party’s International Office, as were the deputy party leader William Whitelaw and Thatcher herself.

138

Karl Magnus Johansson

Thatcher made a series of visits abroad to argue the case for an anti-socialist alliance in Europe. Having met with CDU heavyweights, including Kohl, in Germany in June 1975, she went there again in May 1976 to address the CDU Congress in Hanover (Thatcher, 1995: 341, 344). This congress was very European, both with regard to policies and visitors (Kleinmann, 1993: 373).8 The Foreign Christian democratic politicians attending the CDU congress were Amintore Fanfani of the Italian Democrazia Cristiana (DC), Josef Taus from the Austrian Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP), Tindemans (then prime minister) of the Flemish Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP) from Belgium and Jean Lecanuet (then minister of justice) of the French Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (CDS). There were also leading party representatives from Norway, Portugal, Spain, Chile and Venezuela. The congress provided an opportunity for Thatcher to forge links. In her speech Thatcher said: ‘I am convinced that the Christian Democratic, Conservative and Centre Parties in Europe should now join together in an effective working alliance. I believe that this is a task of historic importance, and one in which we should invest all our energies’ (quoted in Ashford, 1980: 120–1). Reportedly, Thatcher received standing ovations which lasted for at least five minutes.9 Courting parties less enthusiastic about an alliance including the British Conservative Party, Thatcher went to the Hague and Rome for talks with leading Dutch and Italian Christian Democrats and called for their involvement in the preparations for a European organization (Thatcher, 1995: 345–6). These visits also served as a way to improve the rather sparse bilateral links the British Conservative Party had established with Christian democratic parties other than the German one. Thatcher was kept informed about the talks in the Inter-Party Conference, and was herself closely involved and described in interviews as being most interested and constructive. Other party leaders who involved themselves were Poul Schlüter of the Danish Conservative party, Kohl and Franz Josef Strauss of the Bavarian CSU and Taus of the Austrian ÖVP. Significantly, the leader of the Swedish conservative Moderata Samlingspartiet, Gösta Bohman (Minister of Economic Affairs 1976–8 and 1979–81), deliberately kept some distance because of the involvement of Strauss who received a very negative press in Sweden. The Swedish social democrats, themselves very active internationally, scored partypolitical points by publicly questioning this connection between the ‘Moderates’ and a party described in a derogatory way as ‘right-wing’. In fact, Strauss had established a close contact with General Pinochet of Chile. Thatcher and Strauss shared a similar anti-socialist and anti-communist rhetoric, which created problems for Christian Democrats in countries like Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands where they actually formed government coalitions with socialist parties. The leadership of the purely Christian democratic EUCD decided to find out more about the policies of Thatcher and the party of which she was the leader. On behalf of the EUCD, its Dutch Deputy SecretaryGeneral Karl Josef Hahn and the Head of the CDU International Office Heinrich Böx made an ‘information visit’ to London on 24–25 February 1975.10

Christian Democracy and Conservatism

139

The visit was agreed to by the President and the Secretary-General of the EUCD, Kai-Uwe von Hassel (German CDU) and Arnaldo Forlani (Italian DC). The Dutch ‘Equipe’ of EUCD was also behind the decision. Hahn and Böx met with Thatcher and other senior Tories. Lady Elles arranged the visit, the purpose of which was to get to know better the guiding ideas and political action of the British Conservative Party. Again, it was concluded that the name and image ‘conservative’ represented serious difficulties. Likewise, it was feared that common political activities between the conservatives and the Christian Democrats could give the impression that they wanted to create an anti-socialist Europe. For their part, the Tories were concerned that all the Christian democratic parties would unite around the position of the Belgians, the Dutch and the Italians, thereby leaving the conservatives in limbo. Despite this position and despite the formation of the EPP, in 1976, the Tories hoped that a majority of Christian democratic parties would wish to form the EDU. However, no decision was reached in 1976. One reason for this was the German federal election in early October that year. Kohl and Strauss were rivals in German politics. Both led parties in opposition to the governing social democrats. Kohl too argued that a common European organization of the Christian Democrats and conservatives could counter the tendency towards a socialist Europe. He visited Thatcher in London in July 1976 and said that he wanted closer contacts between the CDU and the British Conservative Party. As Thatcher (1995: 342) herself would put it, these two parties ‘were bound to be the two key elements’ in the nascent EDU. Its founding meeting was postponed more than once. Whereas the British and Nordic Conservative parties remained committed to the idea, the Austrian ÖVP and German CDU suffered from internal conflicts. The trade union faction and social wing, or faction of the CDU insisted that the party should stay away from conservatives and remain loyal to the cause and organization of European Christian Democracy. After all, European Christian democratic parties had a common background in the EUCD and its predecessor, the NEI, and they were now about to form the EPP in view of the first European elections. These were scheduled for 1978 but were delayed until 1979. Due to the vacillations within the CDU and the ÖVP, the CSU and its leader Strauss, tried to seize the initiative. The CSU invited party representatives to a meeting in Munich on 15 March 1977. The venue was the Hanns Seidel Foundation, one of the German party foundations. The CSU proposed Thatcher as EDU chairman. This was controversial in the light of sentiments within Christian democratic parties. Conservatives and Christian Democrats committed to the EDU became increasingly impatient. There were concerted efforts regarding its formation. The Shadow Foreign Secretary (1976–8) John Davies planned to see Tindemans in Brussels.11 Tindemans was Prime Minister of Belgium 1974–8 and in 1976 was elected the first EPP President. On 1 December 1977 Thatcher, Kohl and Taus, the ÖVP leader who by now was the designated candidate to become EDU chairman, met in Brussels with Tindemans.12 They decided to postpone the foundation of the EDU until a date after the EPP programme had been agreed in February 1978 and after the French parliamentary

140

Karl Magnus Johansson

elections had been held in March 1978. Although publicly outspoken against the formation of the EDU, it is suggested that Tindemans was not that critical in private. However, he was under pressure from his Flemish party and also had to give priority to the EPP. He even threatened to step down from his position as president of the EPP. The final deal involved the British Conservative Party, the German CDU and CSU, and the Austrian ÖVP.13 Taus held a private meeting with Kohl. On 20 March 1978 Taus hosted a meeting at his house in Kitzbühel. The persons attending this meeting were Lady Elles of the British Conservative Party and the Secretary-Generals of CSU and CDU, Gerold Tandler and Heiner Geißler. Thus, Nordic representatives were excluded from this meeting despite the fact that the Secretary-General of the Swedish Moderata Samlingspartiet, Lars F. Tobisson, had been 1 of 4 members of the Inter-Party working group originally established to prepare the EDU. The others decided to make programmatic and organizational changes. This caused considerable acrimony among the Swedes. In his internal report to the party leadership, Tobisson wrote that one option was for the party leader to not attend the inauguration and thus refrain from signing the declaration. Another option raised was that the Swedish party could become an observer instead of a full member, at least initially. The Finnish conservative Kansallinen Kokoomus party considered the same option because of its resistance to the goal of ‘European unity’, which was embraced in draft versions of the EDU charter.

Along the path: the European Democrat Union The EDU was at last inaugurated at a ceremony at the Kleßheim Castle near Salzburg on 24 April 1978. This occasion provided a photo opportunity not least for the hosts, the Austrian ÖVP and its leader Taus, who needed some publicity to strengthen his position and that of his party in Austrian politics. In attendance were the party leaders and future Heads of Government Thatcher, Kohl and Schlüter. Strauss was also present, which seems to have been the real reason why the leader of the Swedish Moderata Samlingspartiet Bohman stayed away even though the excuse given for the absence concerned duties related to his position as minister of economic affairs. It is beyond doubt that there was an element of domestic politics involved. The media and the Leader of the Social Democrats, Olof Palme, dubbed the EDU ‘The Black International’. All Nordic Conservative parties joined the EDU from the outset, with the exception of the one from Iceland. This party (Självständighetspartiet) was later convinced to join as an observer. It was no coincidence that the name of the new party organization did not contain the word conservative. This was an attempt to placate Christian Democrats. However, this was not sufficient to convince the Belgian, Dutch and Italian Christian Democrats to become founding members of the EDU. It is interesting to note that, on a personal basis, the Italian DC had been represented in the Inter-Party Conference. This party was represented at EDU meetings and

Christian Democracy and Conservatism

141

was adopted as an observer in 1981. Both the Italian DC and the Walloon Parti Social Chrétien (PSC) from Belgium were represented as observers at the EDU party leaders conference in Salzburg in July 1980. Still, however, the Italians remained nervous about a formal link to the British Conservative Party, in particular. So were the Belgian, notably the Flemish CVP, the Dutch Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA) and also the Irish Fine Gael. This party had been invited to the Inter-Party Conference, but sent an apology. Involved in transnational co-operation, Garret FitzGerald (1991: 343), the party leader, belonged to those who insisted that the German Christian democrats ‘had to be headed off from forming an alliance with, among others, the British Tories’. He defined Fine Gael as a party, within the Christian democratic movement, ‘on the left wing with the Benelux parties and with some of the French and Italians’ (ibid.). The Luxembourg Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (CSV), under pressure from the Germans, had been involved in the Inter-Party Conference and became a permanent observer of the EDU. The Austrian ÖVP took on a leadership role in the EDU. Alois Mock replaced Taus as chairman. Other parties from non-EC countries to link-up with the EDU either as full members or as observers were Svenska Folkpartiet in Finland, the Swiss CVP, the Greek Nea Demokratia (ND), the Portuguese Partido do Centro Démocratico Social (CDS), the Spanish Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), the Maltese Partit Nazzjonalista (PN), Democratic Rally of Cyprus (DR) and the Turkish Justice Party. As for Spain there was a certain rivalry. Manuel Fraga attempted to get into the EDU but this was controversial and postponed because of his record as a minister in Franco’s government. In 1983, however, Fraga’s Alianza Popular (AP) party (the present Partido Popular, PP) joined the EDU. Of the historic parties within European Christian Democracy, the French CDS would become indirectly affiliated to the EDU through the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF), which became an observer of the EDU. The more conservative Gaullist RPR was a founding member and, although absent from the inaugural meeting of the EDU, Jacques Chirac involved himself and hosted a number of EDU meetings over the years. The ancillary associations had observer status within the EDU and those associations were the EUW, the Democrat Youth Community of Europe (DEMYC), the European Democrat Students (EDS) and (from 1981) the European Medium and Small Business Union (EMSU). The associations were invited to attend meetings of the various EDU organs, including the working groups. Besides the party leaders’ conference, which met annually, the most important bodies of the EDU were the steering committee and the expert/working groups or committees. Initially, four working groups were established: European structure, Employment policy, Energy and environment and Euro-communism. The working group on Euro-communism later changed its name to the European Left. Carl Bildt was one of the participants from the outset. Another later Prime Minister, Alain Juppé, at the time economic advisor to Chirac, chaired the working group on employment policy. Other EDU working groups or committees have dealt with issues such as technology, consumer protection, the welfare state and education policy. There have also been a number of ad hoc working groups or

142

Karl Magnus Johansson

sub-committees, an example of which is a committee that dealt with family policy. Another committee concerned itself with economic policy and discussed the terminology and contents of the welfare society in relation to the welfare state. Subsequently, there was a committee on privatization. Like several other committees, this one worked on the basis of questionnaires on the achievements and plans in the various countries that led to a progress report. The discussions on economics touched upon topics such as supply-side economics, profit sharing, workers’ participation and youth unemployment. Academic works served as a basis for some of those discussions, for example, over profit sharing. There was also an academic side to the discussions on ideology and philosophy among representatives of EDU member parties. In 1987, the Austrian ÖVP and its political academy invited the members of a so-called ‘philosophers’ group’ to a seminar on neo-conservative thinking and challenges. There have also been workshops on other specific themes, such as local government. A much appreciated part of EDU’s work was the expert group on election management and campaign techniques, which was set up at an early stage and that dealt more broadly with political communication. The group was later reorganized into a permanent group of campaign managers within individual EDU member parties. These managers were given the task of following the evolution of ideas and practices in the field of campaign techniques and reporting this knowledge to their colleagues. One workshop was held annually. Such seminars also provided an opportunity to exchange views on opinion research in different countries. Other topics discussed at such workshops were canvassing and the use of TV and radio in campaigns. There was a special EDU committee entitled Satellite Broadcast. The EDU was seen as being helpful to member parties by pooling information and ideas in order to benefit from experiences acquired in different countries. The method of the working group encourages deliberation and personal acquaintances among people who get to know each other, which forms one of the main purposes of all these activities. A politician who has been involved in EDU committees over the years (including the initial employment policy committee) is Margaretha af Ugglas, Sweden’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in Carl Bildt’s 1991–4 government. She has also been active in the EUW and has served as chairman of its Swedish section. She argued that the EDU working groups and the social exchanges were ‘very important’.14 There were ‘lively discussions’ and relations which were ‘trustful’. The drafting of reports was the most essential method of EDU. She also narrates that they came into contact with ‘currents of ideas’. She believes that the EDU working groups also inspired the EPP (of which she was a Vice-President during 1996–2002). Just like the EPP, the EDU also organized ministerial meetings.15 As for meetings of ministers of finance and the economy, the EDU set an example. The EPP arranged its first meeting of finance ministers in 1998 (EPP/EUCD Yearbook ’98), whereas the first meeting of this kind under the auspices of the EDU was held in 1986. Only top politicians, including ministers and front-bench spokespersons of EDU member parties, got together. The first meeting took place in London on

Christian Democracy and Conservatism

143

21 April 1986. Nigel Lawson, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, and John MacGregor, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, attended the meeting.16 One item on the agenda concerned privatization and this theme was raised again at the second meeting of finance ministers held in Bonn on 27 May 1988 attended, among others, by Gerhard Stoltenberg, the German Minister of Finance, Peter Brooke (British Paymaster-General, non-cabinet) and Rodrigo Rato, the later Spanish Minister of Finance. One item on the agenda concerned reports on tax reforms in the various countries. The next meeting of the EDU finance ministers’ Conference convened in Helsinki on 19 May 1989. In the 1980s, initiatives were also taken to arrange meetings of chairmen of parliamentary groups as well as parliamentary conferences. One such conference took place in Berlin in 1986, another in Antalya, Turkey, in 1989. In the 1990s, there were joint EDU/EPP parliamentary conferences and meetings of chairmen of parliamentary groups. One catalyst was provided by the prospect of EU enlargement. Just like the EPP, the EDU tried to reach out to Central and East Europe and strengthen party links there. There were various fact-finding missions, both bilateral and multilateral with a clear revelation of a division of labour. The Swedish Moderata Samlingspartiet was, and still is, particularly active in the Baltic countries, most notably in Estonia. The CDU, for its part and with the assistance of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, seemingly gave priority to Poland but has been active almost everywhere, as Dorota Dakowska also demonstrates in her chapter in this book. Over the years, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation has brought together people at the attractive venue of Cadenabbia on Lake Como. The German party foundations are a role model for foundations elsewhere, for example, in Britain and the USA (Smith, 2001: 64–6; see also Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991; Bartsch, 1998; Gellner, 1998; Dakowska, 2002). In the years 1989–90, the EDU established a support programme for new political parties in Central and Eastern European countries. The EDU steering committee decided that there would be ‘no financial transfers’ but, instead, that ‘the help should be concentrated on seminars, visits, donations of technical equipment and know-how’.17 For the time being, they would concentrate on Hungary and Yugoslavia. For logistical and financial reasons it made sense to coordinate the activities of the EDU and the EPP, especially for the German member parties. They aimed at some kind of merger between the two organizations, of which they were the founding members. The rapprochement between the EDU and the EPP from the late 1990s was significant in the light of the uneasy relationship between European Christian Democracy and Conservatism (Metsola, 2000). The EDU Secretariat in Vienna closed in 2000 and these functions became integrated with the EPP Secretariat in Brussels. The EDU Executive Secretary became deputy secretary-general of the EPP. At the EPP congress in Berlin in January 2001 statutory changes were agreed, so that the EDU chairman could take part in meetings of EPP bodies. Another decision was to set up joint working groups, to be headed by senior politicians from both organizations. A pan-European forum and working groups dealing with European policy, foreign and security policy,

144

Karl Magnus Johansson

economic and social policy, campaign management and media, and, finally, enlargement, were established. A complete integration of the EDU and the EPP was not possible due to the Euro-sceptic positions of the British Conservative Party. At the same time, Christian Democrat leaders seemed to think that it was important not to isolate that party from the broader European debate and to provide a forum for ongoing discussions. That is the main reason for maintaining the meetings of leaders of the former EDU member–parties and also for inviting the leader of the British Conservative Party to EPP summit meetings. Nordic Conservative parties too had reservations about the EPP. The Swedes have appreciated the looser organization and the procedures of the EDU, which tended to have a pragmatic approach to transnational party cooperation whereas the EPP is seen as being more bureaucratic and overly centralized. The EPP is a broad church that has clear differences over ideology and policy. Such differences come to light when election manifestos as well as party and action programmes are prepared in the EPP, for instance with regard to employment and social policy. Some internal problems also concern clashes of personalities. One problem that took up much time and energy of the EPP concerned the Austrian government coalition, which the ÖVP, an EPP member party, formed with the radical right-wing FPÖ, the so-called ‘Freedom Party’, in early 2000 ( Johansson, 2002b). Operating within the EC/EU, the EPP was set to become more important politically than the EDU. From the outset the EPP was intended to be a real European political party. Whatever its prospects in this respect, the EPP has come to stay as the most important forum for networking among conservative and Christian democratic parties in Europe.

Avenues for future research The final discussion draws out some theoretical implications. This theory development is essential for further, theoretically grounded analyses of various aspects of transnational party networks. One aim of such analyses must be to assemble sustainable evidence of how and why such networks come about and also whether and how they affect policy-making in national and European arenas alike. One effect could be convergence or homogenization of policies and institutions between the countries in question, corroborating theoretical assumptions presented by the first generation of Europeanization theorists. In my view, the most promising area for future research is transnational socialization. This research agenda and the methodological issues involved are elegantly introduced and discussed by Frank Schimmelfennig (Chapter 3, this volume). I would like to emphasize the attention which neo-functionalist theory has paid to actor socialization, notably of elites within political parties and interest groups. This early theorizing should therefore be recognized. The transnational networks of interaction facilitate exchange of information and dissemination of ideas. Political party elites belong to European structures of

Christian Democracy and Conservatism

145

shared beliefs and understandings as well as of communicative action. Their role can be conceptualized within the context of a constructivist approach to European integration that emphasizes the role of ideas and norms. In an endogenous fashion, these elites can be socialized into inherited ideas and discourses, or frames of references and action. Interests might therefore be redefined rather than pre-given, or exogenous. Long-term and durable contacts are sealed in personal exchanges among political parties and their ancillary associations, including women, youth and students. They learn something from each other and imitation may occur on the basis of specific role models or templates and sources of inspiration. At the same time, transnational contacts provide a source of credibility and legitimacy for political parties and their leaders in domestic settings. When asked about influences emanating from their participation in transnational cooperation among political parties or ancillary associations, Swedish Conservatives tend to answer that they have learned and been affected, but they cannot say exactly how. One type of answer is that they are affected unconsciously or subconsciously. This might result in changed normative assumptions and attitudes to actors from other countries, for example. At the same time, politicians involved in it might first and foremost be reconfirmed in their beliefs and attitudes rather than acquainted with completely new ideas and proposals. There is an element of self-selection. Those who are active on a transnational basis tend to be those politicians who already embrace the European idea and internationalist values more generally. Although particular European party organizations such as the EPP could exert some influence in this respect, one cannot exclude that they could merely cause the already sympathetic individual politicians, the political parties or the party governments to submit proposals in line with existing preferences and policy positions. In any case, it is difficult to test hypotheses about the effects of socialization, including that of party elites in transnational networks. Networks of interaction among party elites, some of whom are ministers, could facilitate decision-making at various levels. At the top, heads of government meet prior to European Council summits ( Johansson, 2002a,c). Meetings such as these have become a way to cultivate personal trust, to exchange views, not least in order to prevent unpleasant surprises, to broaden the knowledge base of other countries and domestic political problems. Transnational linkages are established between political parties and leaders who meet as a collective identity, in this case the EPP, which brings together the network, coordinates policies and drafts political declarations. Networking of the kind explored in this chapter has a foreign policy dimension and provides important channels for access and influence for political parties and their leaders. Julie Smith points out that political parties play a significant role in global politics and that the transnational activities blur the distinction between the ‘governmental’ and the ‘non-governmental’: Governmental actors in liberal democracies are almost invariably representatives or members of a political party (French or Italian technocrats provide only a very partial exception to this) and such party-political considerations

146

Karl Magnus Johansson may play a part in their foreign policy decision-making. This is a fortiori the case with the German party foundations, which were intended to be an instrument of German foreign policy, yet one that is predicated on partypolitical links. (2001: 73)

National representatives and particularly those who are in government have to take national interests into consideration. This behaviour reflects a kind of ‘nation-state logic’, which is predominant in state-centric analytical approaches. Another approach suggests that foreign policy is formulated or shaped by the so-called ‘linkage actors’ (Mingst, 1995), instead of reflecting a kind of ‘transnational logic’. Smith too draws attention to the socialization effects that may follow from transnational party co-operation. She argues that such effects ‘might be expected to contribute to a stabilization of party politics and, hence, democratic practice in newly emerging democracies’ (Smith, 2001: 73). Research on transnational networks and socialization involving political parties could therefore contribute to knowledge of democratization and democratic consolidation, for example, in connection to contemporary political developments in Central and Eastern European countries similar to experiences from the Iberian Peninsula in the 1970s. The extension of party co-operation to disparate centre-right parties from the new member states can of course lead to greater internal fragmentation in the short term. On the other hand, it may well contribute to convergence through continuous networking and socialization of those parties into the mainstream EPP and EPP-ED structures, ideas and policies and thus strengthen the Europeanization of East-Central Europe in the course of EU enlargement and integration.

Notes 1 Ulf Adelsohn m fl, Stockholm, ang Europa-politiken och europeiska partisamarbetet, Motion (85), partistämman i Norrköping, 8–11 oktober 1975, Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Stockholm, Moderata Samlingspartiets arkiv II, Partistämmoprotokoll, A1: 8. 2 European Democrat Students, Conservative and Christian Democrat Youth Community (COCDYC), Joint Proposal, Inter-Party Meeting, München 1975 (the document The Charter of the European Democrat Party (EDP) is enclosed), Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Moderata Samlingspartiets arkiv II, F10A, Handlingar rörande internationella möten och rapporter, F10A: 1, 1973–7, München, 6–8 juni 1975. The same documents are available in the archive of the youth section of Moderata Samlingspartiet, Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Arninge, Moderata ungdomsförbundets arkiv, Vol. 446, Internationellt, COCDYC, 1973–6. And also in the personal archive of Per Unckel, Chairman of COCDYC/DEMYC 1974–6, Riksarkivet, Moderata ungdomsförbundets arkiv, Vol. 281. In 1975 COCDYC became DEMYC, which transformed itself into the Youth of EPP (YEPP) in 1997. 3 Ibid. 4 Conservative Party International Office, Conservative Party Links in Western Europe, May 1977, Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Stockholm, Moderata

Christian Democracy and Conservatism

5 6 7 8

9

10

11 12

13

14 15 16 17

147

Samlingspartiets arkiv II, F10A, Handlingar rörande internationella möten och rapporter, F10A: 1, 1973–7. Letter from Lady Elles to Jens Karoli (Secretary-General, Det Konservative Folkeparti), 4 May 1976, Archive of Det Konservative Folkeparti (the Danish Conservative Party), Copenhagen. Letter from Lady Elles to Jens Karoli (Secretary-General, Det Konservative Folkeparti), 6 August 1976, Archive of Det Konservative Folkeparti (the Danish Conservative Party), Copenhagen. Interview with author. Carl Bildt, 1976–05–28, Rapport från CDU-kongressen i Hannover, 23–26 maj 1976. Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Arninge, Moderata ungdomsförbundets arkiv, Vol. 306. Bildt argued in his report that this was the first time a non-socialist party exploited its European party contacts in order to strengthen its position in an approaching election campaign. Ibid. In Bildt’s view Thatcher’s speech on freedom was the highlight of the CDU congress. Interestingly enough, Bildt remarked that Tindemans called the speech a disaster and considered himself fooled to take part in some kind of Christian Democratic/ Conservative demonstration of solidarity whose political contents he definitely could not share. Union Européenne Démocrate Chrétienne, UEDC, 26.2.1975, confidentiel, K. J. Hahn, Bref rapport sur une visite au Parti Conservateur Britannique, à Londres, les 24 et 25 février 1975. Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Arninge, Moderata ungdomsförbundets arkiv, Vol. 446. Minutes of the Inter-Party meeting held at Blackpool on 13 October 1977, Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Stockholm, Moderata Samlingspartiets arkiv II, Handlingar rörande Europeiska demokratiska unionen (EDU) 1975–8, F10B: 1. Lars F. Tobisson, 1977–12–13, Rapport från EDU-överläggning i Wien 1977–12–12, Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Stockholm, Moderata Samlingspartiets arkiv II, Handlingar rörande Europeiska demokratiska unionen (EDU) 1975–8, F10B: 1. The data in this paragraph is based on memoranda drawn up by the Secretary-General of the Swedish Moderata Samlingspartiet, Lars F. Tobisson: PM ang EDU och mötet i Klesheim 1978–04–24 and Telefonsamtal med Lady Elles fredagen den 10 mars 1978, Riksarkivet (National Archives of Sweden), Stockholm, Moderata Samlingspartiets arkiv II, Handlingar rörande Europeiska demokratiska unionen (EDU) 1975–8, F10B: 1. Interview with author. This paragraph, and other information on EDU activities, draws on documentation kept at the archive of Moderata Samlingspartiet, Stockholm. John MacGregor was elected the first President of the COCDYC at its inaugural conference in Hamburg in 1964. EDU, Survey on the EDU support programme for new political parties in CEEC (reference to the meeting of the EDU steering committee, Munich, 6–7 December 1989), Archive of Moderata Samlingspartiet, Stockholm, EDU 26, Committee no. 1, European Structures, European Policy.

References Ashford, Nigel (1980) ‘The European economic community’, in Zig Layton-Henry (ed.), Conservative Party Politics, London: Macmillan, pp. 95–125. Bartsch, Sebastian (1998) ‘Politische Stiftungen: Grenzgänger zwischen Gesellschafts-und Staatenwelt’, in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (eds), Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik. Vol. 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen, Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, pp. 184–98.

148

Karl Magnus Johansson

Dakowska, Dorota (2002) ‘Beyond conditionality: EU enlargement, European party federations and the transnational activity of German political foundations’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 3(2): 271–96. Day, Stephen and Shaw, Jo (2003) ‘The evolution of Europe’s transnational political parties in the era of European citizenship’, in Tanja A. Börzel and Rachel A. Cichowski (eds), The State of the European Union: Volume 6, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149–69. European People’s Party (1999) EPP/EUCD Yearbook ’98, Brussels: EPP. European Voice (23–29 October 2003) ‘Thatcher plots with Tories to lead exodus from EPP’. —— (12–18 February 2004) ‘Tories stay in “marriage of convenience” with EPP’. —— (1–14 April 2004) ‘European People’s Party deal opens door to sceptics’. Financial Times (4 December 2003) ‘Tory leader aims to forge links in Europe’. FitzGerald, Garret (1991) All in a Life, London: Macmillan. Gehler, Michael and Kaiser, Wolfram (2004) Transnationale Parteienkooperation der europäischen Christdemokraten: Dokumente 1945–65, Munich: K. G. Saur. Gellner, Winand (1998) ‘Think tanks in Germany’, in Diane Stone, Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett (eds), Think Tanks Across Nations, Manchester, NH: Manchester University Press, pp. 82–106. Hanley, David (1994) ‘The European People’s Party: towards a new party form?’, in David Hanley (ed.), Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective, London and New York: Pinter Publishers, pp. 185–201. Irving, R. E. M. (1979) The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe, London: Allen & Unwin. Jansen, Thomas (1998) The European People’s Party: Origins and Development, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Johansson, Karl Magnus (1997) Transnational Party Alliances: Analysing the Hard-Won Alliance between Conservatives and Christian Democrats in the European Parliament, Lund: Lund University Press. —— (2002a) ‘Another road to Maastricht: the Christian democrat coalition and the quest for European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5): 871–93. —— (2002b) ‘European People’s Party’, in Karl Magnus Johansson and Peter A. Zervakis (eds), European Political Parties between Cooperation and Integration, Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 51–80. —— (2002c) ‘Party elites in multilevel Europe: the Christian Democrats and the Single European Act’, Party Politics, 8(4): 423–39. Johansson, Karl Magnus and Raunio, Tapio (2004) Politiska partier i den europeiska författningen, Stockholm: SNS Förlag. Johansson, Karl Magnus and Zervakis, Peter A. (eds) (2002) European Political Parties between Cooperation and Integration, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Kaiser, Karl (1969) ‘Transnationale politik’, in Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.), Die anachronistische Souveränität, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 80–109. Kleinmann, Hans-Otto (1993) Geschichte der CDU: 1945–1982, Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlags-Anstalt. Kohler, Beate and Myrzik, Barbara (1982) ‘Transnational party links’, in Roger Morgan and Stefano Silvestri (eds), Moderates and Conservatives in Western Europe: Political Parties, the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance, London: Heinemann, pp. 193–223. Lodge, Juliet and Herman, Valentine (1982) Direct Elections to the European Parliament: A Community Perspective, London: Macmillan. Major, John (1999) John Major: The Autobiography, London: HarperCollins. Maudling, Reginald (1978) Memoirs, London: Sidgwick & Jackson.

Christian Democracy and Conservatism

149

Metsola, Ukko Elias (2000) Towards the Majority: An Analysis of the Rapprochement between the European People’s Party and the European Democrat Union, unpublished thesis, University of Helsinki. Mingst, Karen (1995) ‘Uncovering the missing links: linkage actors and their strategies in foreign policy analysis’, in Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney (eds), Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 229–42. Niedermayer, Oskar (1983) Europäische Parteien? Zur grenzüberschreitenden Interaktionen politischer Parteien im Rahmen der EG, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. Pierson, Paul (1998) ‘The path to European integration: a historical-institutionalist analysis’, in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 27–58. Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael (1991) ‘Foreign political aid: the German political foundations and their US counterparts’, International Affairs, 67(1): 33–63. Pridham, Geoffrey (1982) ‘Christian democrats, conservatives and transnational party cooperation in the European Community: centre-forward or centre-right?’, in Zig Layton-Henry (ed.), Conservative Politics in Western Europe, London: Macmillan, pp. 318–46. Pridham, Geoffrey and Pridham, Pippa (1981) Transnational Party Co-operation and European Integration: The Process Towards Direct Elections, London: Allen & Unwin. Rosenau, James N. (1990) Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Smith, Julie (2001) ‘Political parties in a global age’, in Daphné Josselin and William Wallace (eds), Non-State Actors in World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 59–75. Steinmo, Sven, Thelen, Kathleen and Longstreth, Frank (eds) (1992) Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thatcher, Margaret (1995) The Path to Power, London: HarperCollins.

7

German political foundations Transnational party go-betweens in the EU enlargement process Dorota Dakowska

The German political foundations (Politische Stiftungen) have played an important role facilitating party cooperation in countries in transition from authoritarian rule and, more recently, in the context of the transformation of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). As party-related, publicly financed and largely autonomous organizations, these foundations are specific transnational actors. This chapter deals with both theoretical and empirical aspects of a transnationalist perspective in the study of the enlargement of the European Union (EU), focussing particularly on the party cooperation preceding the accession of new member states. The first section discusses the specificity of the research object and the normative bases of the institutional meshing between the foundations, the federal ministries and the political parties; it also provides evidence of the foundations’ involvement in democratization processes. Having sketched out a few of the analytical biases of government-centred research on EU enlargement, the case study of the foundations’ involvement in CEEC allows for the consideration of norm dynamics and legitimation through transnational networks in the study of EU enlargement. Finally, an analysis of the transnational cooperation between the European party federations and the political foundations in the years preceding the accession of new member states to the European Union in 2004, helps us to reconsider the questions of identity and transnational socialization in an enlargement context.

The German political foundations as transnational actors The political foundations are peculiar research objects in political science. Considered Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), they are nevertheless associated with German foreign policy through the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Foreign Ministry (AA). Created mainly in the postwar years, they were traditionally committed to run political education projects, to encourage civic involvement in political life and to promote pluralism in the postwar Federal Republic. Unlike most NGOs, they are financed by public funds and the amount each foundation receives depends on

German political foundations 151 the representation of each political party in the Bundestag. Nowadays, six foundations exist in Germany. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) created in 1925 and affiliated to the Social Democratic Party (SPD) is the oldest one. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) affiliated to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was officially set up in 1964 out of two other organizations, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNS) affiliated to the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) in 1958, and the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSS) allied to the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) in 1967. The Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBS) affiliated to the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) was created in 1997 out of three smaller foundations publicly financed since 1989. Finally, the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLS) allied to the post-communist Party of Democratic Socialism received its first public grants in 1999. The specificity of German political foundations raises the problem of the definition of non-state actors and of the use of their NGO status in the foreign policy. Insofar as they are financed mainly by public funds (95 per cent) and have close links with ministries and with the political parties, they do not fit the classic definition of NGOs. Most of them are not even foundations in the legal sense.1 However, they do fit the definition of transnational actors if we adopt the conceptual framework developed by Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie in their introduction to this book and operate the switch from a structural (formal autonomy) to a more functional definition, looking at the practices and repertoires of action rather than at the origin of their financial resources. Furthermore, I apply Thomas Risse’s definition of transnational relations as ‘regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organisation’ (Risse, 1995: 3). Transnational does not refer to a level, as Bastiaan van Apeldoorn reminds us in Chapter 4 in this volume, but rather to ‘social phenomena that link different levels’. As party-related organizations, the foundations pursue their own agendas, in the wake – or in the avant-garde – of party international cooperation. They build networks across the world, involving political parties and their organizations, trade unions, professional associations and NGOs. Thus they may be conceptualized as ‘go-betweens’ between these different groups (Bartsch, 1998). The foundations’ international activities may collude with German governmental policies. Still, the foundations cannot be regarded as governmental instruments though, as they represent all the political tendencies represented in the Bundestag. Another reason is that they act at the multilateral level of transnational party cooperation and thus go beyond the governmental framework of bilateral assistance towards democratization. It is to be noted that the foundations represent themselves as private organizations in their activities abroad. The construction and strategic use of this NGO image help us to perceive more clearly the relationship between German public and non-public actors and to see how public agencies take advantage of the transnational, non-state profile of the foundations. Furthermore, the support of the state may be a crucial element allowing norm entrepreneurs to pursue their agenda of norm socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). This corroborates

152

Dorota Dakowska

the conclusion of the growing irrelevance of the distinction between public and private actors, as both these ‘worlds’ (Rosenau, 1990) are closely interwoven. In the case of Germany, due to the federal and corporatist traditions and to the democratization of the Federal Republic under the auspices of the allies, transnationalism has been historically rooted, as a brief review of the institutional origins of the foundations’ entrenchment in German foreign policies will show.

Products of West Germany’s democratization and the Cold War The origins of the political foundations stem from the postwar context with allied control of the reconstruction of democratic institutions in West Germany. Because of the delay in the institutionalization of foreign policy, the first German representations abroad in the postwar years, parallel to but sometimes preceding the embassies, were non-state agencies (companies, church humanitarian organizations and private foundations) (Danckwort, 1990). Thus, the specificity of the political foundations is enmeshed in Germany’s character as a ‘semi-sovereign state’ (Katzenstein, 1978). Germany’s negative international image at that time is another factor explaining the tendency of German public agencies to delegate responsibilities – and funds – to private or semi-public organizations, which did not officially act on behalf of the state and could thus be better perceived and more easily accepted abroad. This tendency was reinforced by the onset of the Cold War in Europe, and the confrontation of two ideological blocks. While in some cases, it was difficult for German diplomats to engage officially in this confrontation abroad, the German Foreign ministry took advantage of the activity of the political foundations and welcomed their initiatives such as the organization of meetings and seminars for young scholars, trade unionists or politicians from developing countries trying to prevent ‘communist infiltration’ in these areas.2 Throughout the decades, the cooperation between the foundations and the state was characterized by a significant continuity of norms, which took shape with the institutionalization of German development policies. These norms encompass, to begin with, the notion of pluralism, as the foundations are committed in their overseas activities to reflect the diverse political tendencies co-existing within German society. The guiding idea is that you can teach pluralism only while practising it, through the transmission of a plurality of values, which may compete, complete and overlap each other (BMZ, 1995: 6). Second, an idea broadly shared by public policy officials concerns the role of the state. In fact, there is a consensus common to BMZ officials and to the foundations that the state alone is unable to fulfil all the tasks of development and foreign policies. Thus, compared with state-run programmes, foundations have the advantage of leading a direct social dialogue to ensure a continuous, long-term presence, independent of government changes in Germany. Finally, an important constitutive feature enables the use of NGO status to fulfil the objectives of state policies. Because of suggestions by the government, the foundations present themselves in their work abroad as NGOs according to the so-called

German political foundations 153 ‘limited publicity’ principle (BMZ, 1973: 59; BMZ, 1999: 15). This shows the importance accorded to Germany’s international image and also explains the difficulties for external observers in understanding the actual status of the foundations due to their flexible profile that allows them to appear as more or less state- or party-affiliated, according to circumstances (Bartsch, 1998). The relationship between foundations, ministries and political parties is based on their original exchange of resources. As political foundations are partyaffiliated organizations, each of them has close personal and ideological links with a political party. While the party support emanating from the Bundestag provides political foundations with the necessary financial resources from the public budget, the party affiliation guarantees them a considerable degree of independence from possible ministerial influence. Thus, foundations are among the organizations that enjoy the widest leeway in their relations with the BMZ (Glagow and Schimank, 1983). From a sociological perspective, the foundations may be considered as brokers between different institutional fields. An example of a situation when party resources are reinvested in strengthening the foundations’ position is the annual vote on the federal budget, which takes place in the Bundestag. The funds for foundations are divided between them according to a formula which is based on the numbers of votes obtained by each political party during the last two parliamentary elections.3 In fact, MPs from each party support their foundation in the Budgetary Committee. While this all-party coalition, which led to an increase of funds in the 1970s, used to be publicly criticized as ‘self-service’ (i.e. parties helping themselves to the public budget), it could not prevent some cuts due to the recent budgetary crises in Germany. An important part of the foundations’ activity was their support of the opposition in authoritarian countries. The German foreign ministry welcomed this, as long as it did not undermine the work of its embassies, which could thus preserve their neutral position in case of internal conflicts abroad. Owing to their mediating role and the informal support of opposition movements, the foundations played an important role during transitions from authoritarian rule in Latin America, Southern Europe and Africa. The KAS invested the most in Latin America, not least due to its links to the Christian democratic trade unions in the Central Latinoamerico de Trabajadores (CLAT) and the American Christian democratic party federation, the Organización Demócrata Cristiana de América (ODCA). It has been active in Chile and Venezuela since the the 1960s, and later also become involved in Guatemala, Argentina, El Salvador and Nicaragua. It has developed an impressive network of formally independent, but in practice often political, research organizations and training institutes (Wagner, 1994). In Chile, the KAS gave decisive support – parallel to the American involvement through the National Endowment for Democracy – to the plebiscite of 1988, which led to the overthrow of General Pinochet. The social democratic FES, while having a strong impact in Costa Rica, was more influential in Africa especially in support of local trade unions. The foundations’ activity in Southern Europe is relatively well known due to their support of the opposition to authoritarian regimes in Spain and Portugal in

154

Dorota Dakowska

the 1970s. The FES, in cooperation with the Socialist International (SI) and the German trade unions gave decisive support to Spanish political emigrants and helped them to reconstruct party structures after General Franco’s death in 1975. It also supported the very pro-European wing of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) around Felipe Gonzáles in the transition process in Spain (Ortuño Anaya, 2002). The Portuguese Socialist Party under the leadership of Mario Soares was effectively formed in Germany in 1973, in one of the FES education centres (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991, 1996). Since the 1970s to 1980s, political foundations have set up their offices also in industrialized countries, where they tend to reinforce political dialogue. The Brussels offices are important platforms facilitating access to European institutions. Also the Washington offices, aimed at strengthening transatlantic dialogue, are considered strategic centres. The activities in Central and Eastern Europe combine the characteristics of both approaches: assistance for democratization and political cooperation. Although Central European states were not considered to be developing countries according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) criteria, the liberalization of 1989 required a substantial transfer of know-how in the economic, political and judicial spheres. The political foundations supported the reform process, but at the same time they developed political dialogue with the clear objective of helping stabilize the party landscape in the target countries and finding potential partners for German political parties.

The transnational perspective of EU enlargement The study of transnationalism in the European Union and the larger European political space is a helpful and necessary tool for understanding European integration in the long term. As Wolfram Kaiser demonstrates in his chapter in this book, contemporary history can provide important empirical evidence to help overcome the conceptual limits of intergovernmentalism (with its focus on EU institutions and inter-state bargaining) and take into account the role of transnational agents and elite networks in exchanging ideas and influencing the political agendas. While the study of European integration as such and the recent studies of Europeanization of domestic policies have acknowledged the role of transnational actors as important channels of common norms, values and policy transfer, most enlargement studies still suffer from a strong intergovernmental bias. A brief outline of these biases leads on to the question how the study of transnational relations may help overcome this bias, and bring back the study of EU enlargement into a broader framework of European integration analysis. Most of the EU enlargement studies in the 1990s were embedded in the intergovernmental perspective, focussing on the macro level, inter-institutional bargains and treaties (see Sedelmeier, 2002). Thus, they seem to have adopted the arguments of the intergovernmental analysis, considering EU institutions as unitary bureaucracies reflecting the interests of the member states. Several factors

German political foundations 155 explain this perspective: while enlargement was initially conceived as a policy like any other, it quickly appeared that it was an undertaking without precedence due to the scope of change, the consecutive growth of heterogeneity within the European Union and the legal requirements to be met (Mayhew, 1998). Considering the alleged weakness of civil society and of political parties in the candidate states, some authors concluded that electoral stakes were marginal in the institutional change and in the adoption of European norms in Central Europe (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). In this way, the unquestionable asymmetry of the relationship between the European Union and the candidate states as well as the leadership role played by the Commission from the beginning of the process (Robert, 2001) has led to a sometimes oversimplified perception of the EU enlargement as a unidirectional, vertically oriented process, operated exclusively by bureaucratic agents. The bias of this analytical perspective concerns, for example, the variety of actors participating in the enlargement process, where the distinction is rarely made between the enlargement policies as such – conceived and set up at the level of institutions (especially the Commission and national governments) – and a more openly defined enlargement process. The latter involves undoubtedly a multiplicity of actors at different levels: governments and ministries, but also political parties, interest groups etc. The empirical demonstration of their pro-active role in the European agenda-setting has in some cases provided remarkable evidence of interest groups’ influence on specific policy sectors of the EU enlargement (Torreblanca, 1998; Sedelmeier, 2002; Saurugger, 2003). Moreover, rejecting the non-governmental channel because of the weakness of civil society in Central Europe may seem paradoxical if one keeps in mind the leverage effect transnational coalitions had on transformations in societies under authoritarian regimes (Grabendorff, 1996; Pridham, 1999). Another bias of the bureaucratic enlargement perspective is the illusion of a rational, unitary and intentional EU action. The somewhat mechanical vision of conditionality functioning according to the logic of cost/benefit calculation, punishments and rewards on the EU side, leading to a final rule adoption in CEE suffers from a teleological bias. It leaves little room to study the deviations and inconsistencies of EU policies, their fragmented character as well as different structural obstacles to the implementation of the acquis communautaire in the candidate states. Finally, while the importance of adapting to the pressures exerted by European institutions in the candidate states cannot be contested, the scope of resulting convergence is a matter for discussion. On the one hand, several factors such as the speed of adjustment and the receptivity of Central European elites allow the hypothesis of a more important convergence of the institutional structures in the candidate states resulting from accession than was the case during former enlargement stages (Grabbe, 2001). On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that coercive instruments cannot be widely applied. Due to the diversity of national models, the European Union is not able to propose a single model in some sectors such as public administration (Goetz, 2001). So this diffused character of EU influence (Grabbe, 2001) does not necessarily lead to increased convergence.

156

Dorota Dakowska

Agents of change: foundation strategies in CEEC Transnational actors deployed their activities in the context of democratization marked by the prospect of EU accession. According to Thomas Risse, the success or failure of transnational coalitions in influencing policy outcomes depends on two main factors: the differences in the domestic structure and the degree of international institutionalization, that is, the extent to which specific policy areas, are regulated by bilateral agreements and international organizations (Risse, 1995: 6). In an overview of democratization processes in Europe, Laurence Whitehead described the European Union as an important pole of attraction, which has led economic elites in transition countries to an economic and political convergence with liberal standards (Whitehead, 1996). The European institutions offer a strong normative context, which constitutes agents’ identity and provides value and meaning to their action (Katzenstein, 1997). This normative context has been progressively extended to the candidate states in the enlargement period, which has increased their demand for foreign advice. If we apply the analytical framework developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink to EU enlargement, 1989 could be considered as the turning point, which led to an international norm cascade described by the metaphor of ‘contagion’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). As in some previous cases of democratization, most CEE states adopted liberal norms even without a clear perspective of EC integration. The domestic pressure for change by internationally backed opposition movements started in the 1970s and 1980s (Chilton, 1995), which could be qualified as a norm emergence period. International socialization is the dominant mechanism of the norm cascade stage (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The motivation of state elites engaged in the process of socialization cannot be separated from their identity and aspiration to be recognized as members of international society. While the acceleration of political change following 1989 may be considered as part of a norm cascade process, it seems difficult in practice to separate both stages as well as the mechanisms characterizing each of them, that is, persuasion and socialization.4 While socialization and the related imitation were the dominant logics of normative change in the 1990s, persuasion intervened as part of a more or less direct conditionality. The expectation of EU enlargement shaped the strategies of German political foundations (Dakowska, 2002). The empirical evidence from this process throws new light on EU enlargement. While focussing strongly on the constraint dimension of the processes, most existing analysis has failed to sufficiently take into account the resource dimension, and the way in which actors on both sides use the European pressures to promote their particular interests. Regarding EU enlargement, the question may be asked to what extent the constraint of compliance to the acquis communautaire by the candidate states was a resource for foreign non-state actors, that is, to what extent German foundations used the structure of opportunities offered by enlargement to enlist the financial and symbolic resources. I argue that the prospect of EU enlargement gave an important lever to

German political foundations 157 transnational actors (such as political foundations) for the transfer of both political ideas and transnational legitimacy and provided them with huge resources in terms of receptivity and prestige. Thus, foundations can be considered as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Börzel and Risse, 2000), promoting different political values within a common hard core of liberal norms, and support for European integration and individualism. The activities of political foundations reflect the orientations of German foreign policy enhanced by the specific preferences of each political party. An informal agreement is made between the foundations about their activities abroad, which completes their traditional division of labour linked to their political profile. Thus, the FES has a traditionally close cooperation with the German trade unions;5 the KAS puts stress on local government and decentralization in accordance with the idea of subsidiarity, and promotes the social market economy. The liberal FNS stresses economic and human rights problems, the HBS concentrates on ecological and gender issues, while the conservative HSS specializes in professional training, administration and security questions. Besides these axes, the official strategy of all foundations aims at the promotion of economic stability and market economy, the strengthening of democratic institutions, the rule of law and party pluralism. All these objectives are part of their broader aims like the deepening of dialogue at a bilateral level and helping with the preparations to join the European Union. All the foundations sent representatives to virtually all CEEC to build a network with the representatives of political parties, but also with the so-called ‘independent research institutes’ (in practice often party-affiliated), pro-European NGOs, professional associations, universities etc. Due to its traditional preference for financing the partners’ structures, the KAS in Poland supported several European education centres at different universities, the pro-European Polish Robert Schuman Foundation (with close links to the Union of Freedom party), the Liberal Market Economy Research Centre, and the Centre for International Relations (CSM) specialized in strategic questions. This kind of investment brings benefits to both sides: strengthening of liberal expertise provides the KAS with access to economic and social data and to experts, who may take political responsibility once their party wins the elections. Several ex-ministers ( Janusz Lewandowski, Janusz Onyszkiewcz) and an ex-ambassador to Germany, Janusz Reiter (director of CSM) employed in these internationally financed research centres are often invited to Germany and become natural interlocutors in Poland for German delegations invited by the KAS. The structure and functioning of these transnational networks is limited by existing legislation. Political parties in CEEC are usually not allowed to receive grants from a foreign organization. Foundations also do not have the right to participate directly or indirectly in electoral campaigns. However, they can help develop the professional skills of social and political actors in providing media training or public relations courses. An important part of the foundations’ involvement is in the pre-political field. In practice, they have generously supported youth associations related to political parties or party-related organizations

158

Dorota Dakowska

such as, for example, Young Conservatives or Young Democrats in the case of the KAS or the Young Social Democrats in the case of the FES in Poland. This provides them with access to the younger political elite, potentially more receptive to ideas on European integration. The aim has been to strengthen the expertise network of political parties, to promote support for European integration and to encourage exchange between German and Polish party elites. The foundations organized numerous seminars – often with the participation of prominent politicians or experts – on bilateral, economic, but also strategic and foreign policy issues and above all EU enlargement. Different transfers of experience and know-how may be studied in this context, such as judicial advice for local administration or constitutional reform, especially at the beginning of the transformation process, but also more exclusively party-oriented topics like training on the functioning of political parties or the organization of electoral campaigns. To give an example, the KAS and FES organized visits to Germany for Viktor Orban from Hungary in 1998 and for Leszek Miller from Poland in 2001 before their election as prime ministers of their countries, to provide them with information about the functioning of the German chancellery and the coordination of governmental work. In some cases, the foundations’ activity may be compared to a ‘second track diplomacy’ (Nebenaußenpolitik) (Nuscheler, 1993: 231). The regular and continuous dialogue carried out by the foundations allows German representatives to access the local political stage, of which they often have a much better knowledge than professional diplomats. When a new German ambassador is appointed to a CEE country, he usually meets the representative of a foundation to get his or her perception of the situation. Compared with the classical aims of diplomacy, some common features to state diplomacy and party diplomacy include the following. First, the foundations partly share the representation function with the embassies, although in a much more informal way. They may invite German party officials on their visit abroad. However, the informality is an advantage of such meetings. Second, like diplomats, they provide information about the political situation in the target country and send it to the ministries and politicians in Germany concerned with the foreign policy issues. But there are also many differences: foundations are not bound by protocol; they are not subject to an agreement between governments, so their contacts remain largely informal. Finally, the selection of foreign representatives of the foundations is different from the selection of professional diplomats. Their duty is limited in time and they may leave the foundation after several years spent abroad. A key point in understanding the logic of foundations’ networking is to study their dynamics insofar as their engagement in CEEC is also a resource for German political parties. The strategy consists of cooperating with potential elites – not only current governments, but also the governments of tomorrow. This means that as far as this cooperation encompasses practically the whole political spectrum of a partner country, there are strong chances that one of the German foundations will have close links to the governing party. For German MPs, foundations are important platforms facilitating access to virtually the whole

German political foundations 159 political scene of the partner country. In the foundations’ international activity, two kinds of resources serve the party directly: information and the capital of trust. First, staying in constant touch with the foundation representatives abroad allows direct information to flow to the parliament. Foundation offices provide a great deal of expert knowledge on foreign and domestic policy issues, especially those which are too specialized or long-term to be elaborated by the usual party political advisors. Second, the foundations’ activities strengthen political links at different levels while guaranteeing the necessary attention to the sensitivity of some questions. The advantage of foundations – as compared with state assistance programmes – is their direct access to key decision-makers in host countries. Thus, foundations could advise their partners in decisions concerning a new reform project or even encourage coalition building, initiatives that could be judged unacceptable if coming from the German government.

Transfer of norms and ideas in a social learning process In recent years, authors dealing with the role of norms in policy change have provided evidence of a profound connection between rationality and norms. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink speak of ‘a “strategic social construction”, in which actors strategise rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities or social context’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 888). The periods of critical juncture, such as the end of the Cold War, provide opportunities to question existing ideas about political order (Marcussen et al., 1999). In the process of socialization, actors acquire new preferences and internalize norms and rules through the interaction with a broader institutional context (Braud, 2000; Checkel, 2001). The likelihood of social learning grows when individuals of a group share common professional backgrounds, interact regularly, face a context of crisis but remain insulated from direct political pressure (Checkel, 1999) and also ‘when the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs or wants to belong’ (Checkel, 2001: 563). This was the case for the foundations’ representatives in CEEC, who due to their political profile were able to penetrate deeply into the local political spheres through frequent and informal interaction and who were perceived as representing German or European party networks. A first problem with studying socialization of CEE political elites into liberal or European norms is related to the number of participants and the complexity of pressures. It is impossible to make precise statements about the amount of change induced by an organization when one knows that different foreign donors gave joint support to the most promising parties or institutes. Also, the distinction to be made between the pressures of globalization, of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or of EU institutions is not always easy. The second problem is the highly complex, heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory identity of Central European political parties. Thus, their socialization within a transnational network may imply choice among these different components rather than switching from one – supposedly homogenous – identity to another.

160

Dorota Dakowska

An example of a party, which benefited from significant international support but did not manage to establish a clear identity, is the Polish Union of Freedom – Unia Wolnos´ci (UW). Due to the intellectual and democratic profile of its founding personalities, who played a leading role during the negotiated transition, the party had very diversified foreign contacts. Thus, its leaders cooperated with Christian democratic, liberal and even social democratic foundations. Being the most pro-European Polish party, the UW was divided into a Christian-democrat and a social-liberal wing. After initial efforts to preserve its ideological diversity, UW finally went for the Christian-democratic option, convinced among others by the KAS, and joined the European People’s Party (EPP) in 1998. However, after a split and subsequent defeat in the parliamentary elections in 2001, the UW leaders decided to switch to the European Liberals. So the important investment of the KAS in party-related organizations and milieus close to the UW did not bring the expected stability. As soon as the UW decided to join the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR), the FNS, which already financed its party-related educational organization (the Civic Club), offered its organizational and material (indirect) support.6 A more conclusive example was the assistance provided by the FES with the social-democratization of the Polish post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). While the FES transferred a lot of political knowledge and know-how (like the social democratic party programme, information about political marketing and electoral campaigning or some specific policy aspects), this evolution was undoubtedly facilitated by the pragmatic attitude of post-communist leaders, who from the beginning sought international legitimation in the social democratic family. As gaining the social democratic label was an essential stake for postcommunist parties (De Waele, 2003), the difficulty for the FES was less about persuading the SLD to adopt the social democratic programme and discourse and more about convincing other international partners that the SLD could effectively be considered a (social) democratic party. Foreign transnational support may help the existing political or social forces wishing to strengthen their structures. Thus the Green HBS provided material and ideational support to feminist groups in Poland and tried to bring them closer together with ecological movements. While the HBS initially preferred a more societal than political approach, the formation of the Red-Green coalition in Germany in 1998 provided an important incentive to establish an office in Warsaw and give assistance to the possible emergence of a Polish Green party. Finally, the decision to set up a Polish Green Party, the Partia Zielonych, supported by the HBS was realized after the EU referendum campaign in 2003, to which the European Federation of Green Parties contributed.

Transnational party cooperation preceding EU accession of new member states The European Union’s Eastern enlargement may be analysed through the prism of European party cooperation. Authors investigating the transnational circulation of norms have underlined the relationship between domestic and international

German political foundations 161 socialization after a regime change: ‘International socialization is important insofar as it reflects back on a government’s domestic basis of legitimation and consent and thus ultimately on its ability to stay in power’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 903). Focussing on this transnational networking, which makes up an important part of the foundations’ activities, facilitates the forging of a link between the bilateral dialogue and the multilateral, European level. The international legitimization of political parties by the admission of a new party to a party International or a European party federation interferes with the bilateral dialogue as it is the threshold from which political cooperation can start. This means that a German foundation may engage in a friendly dialogue with a Central European political partner, but a deeper cooperation does not occur before the association of that party to a European party federation or a party International. This kind of association is considered as integration into the family and provides the new member party with sufficient political legitimacy, allowing it to be accepted as an equal partner by German political parties. The cooperation between the German SPD and the Polish SLD during the 1990s is quite typical of this. The 1993 electoral victory of the post-communist SLD and the Peasant Party (PSL) in Poland was a significant incident in the legitimization process of Central European post-communist parties. Yet, a close cooperation with the FES did not take place until the admission of the SLD to the SI in 1996. Later, the FES briefed the SLD about the functioning of transnational party cooperation and introduced its leaders to the Party of European Socialists (PES) congresses. Since that time, the SPD and the SLD have remained in a close relationship, embodied in a bilateral parliamentary group organized with the help of the FES in Warsaw, which enables communication and coordination of their positions. One of the most spectacular cases of international legitimation was KAS support to the anti-Mecˇiar opposition in Slovakia. The KAS advised the democratic forces, encouraged the formation of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and promoted Mikuláˇs Dzurinda as the potential leader of the movement, guaranteeing his integrity abroad, providing him with contacts and advice before and following his electoral victory. This activity also involved mechanisms (mentioned by Wolfram Kaiser, Chapter 1, this volume) to exclude leaders, who did not respect acceptable ideas and behavioural patterns. Thus, the KAS marginalized Ján Cˇ arnogursky´, one of the leaders of the Slovak Christian democratic movement, because of his nationalist views and his negative attitude towards the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. A direct influence of the EU policy – which has to be confirmed, though – was the attempt by the KAS to influence positively the regular report of the European Commission following the election of Dzurinda in 1998 in order to support the transition.7 The KAS representative in Prague and Bratislava arranged several meetings with high-ranking German politicians for Dzurinda. He invited leaders of the EPP to the region to provide the anti-Meliar opposition with international backing. The German political foundations have been traditional partners of transnational party internationals. As Grabendorff has emphasized: In the case of large German political parties, the question is not so much about reciprocal influence, but about the overlapping identity of party and international. The SPD as well as the CDU dominate their respective

162

Dorota Dakowska transnational party organisation to such an extent that abroad the latter has often been identified with either one or the other West German party or their respective foundation. (1996: 213)

While the relative weight of German parties has evolved in the EU integration context, they have remained among the most important members within the European party federations. During the enlargement process, the foundations were intermediaries between Central European parties and EU party networks. The European party federations consider the German foundations as their embassies in CEEC.8 Owing to their continuous presence in CEEC and their personal contacts in European institutions, the foundation field representatives could influence decisions in an informal way. They helped Western European parties to identify their partners, observing (sometimes also supporting) their political evolution, finally assessing their readiness to be admitted as observer or associate member to a transnational party federation. By diffusing information through party networks they participated in the process of legitimization of CEEC parties. German political foundations were an important source of information for both sides. On the one hand, they could advise their partners in Central Europe on the formulation of their party statutes and programmes and on the conditions that had to be fulfilled in order to open the association process. On the other hand, they informed the EU party leaders about the composition and ideological setting of their CEEC political parties and also about the quality of contacts maintained with them. This was the case of Hungarian, Czech, Polish, but also Slovak, Estonian, Latvian and Bulgarian parties. The Czech Union for Freedom (US) was recommended by the KAS to the EPP, for example, a few days after its formal application.9 The fact that the German Klaus Welle, who closely collaborated with KAS offices in CEEC, was EPP Secretary-General during the first applications from the region, undoubtedly facilitated the process. While participating in the enlargement of European party federations through the association of political parties from the candidate countries, the foundation representatives helped their partners to adapt to the changing opportunity structure of the European Union. Making use of the EU institutional structure and providing political opportunities to domestic actors is an essential component of Europeanization (Goetz and Hix, 2000). By their activity, the foundation representatives helped the CEEC political leaders to perceive Brussels as an arena of negotiations and of potential political support. In Poland, the FES supported the strengthening of social democratic expertise on European affairs, structural funds management etc. The FES financed a series of reports on Poland’s progress in fulfilling the enlargement criteria. The official presentation of these EU-monitoring reports in Brussels increased the prominence of the FES and at the same time it opened influential channels for Polish experts to present their views to a wider public. Some of them like Jerzy Hausner became ministers and counsellors to the social democratic government in Poland in 2001. When in 2000 Leszek Miller,

German political foundations 163 the leader of the (then in opposition) SLD was invited to Brussels with the help of the FES, it enabled the Commission officials to get in touch with the future prime minister.10 At the same time, this visit had important domestic repercussions for Polish public opinion, as it triggered a political debate in the media whether opposition leaders should present their views about the ongoing accession negotiations in Brussels. Finally, this incident gave the SLD an opportunity to forge its image as a pro-European party, which was well accepted by European decision-makers at a time when accession negotiations entered a decisive phase. The informality characterizing the foundations’ activities proved an important resource for European party federations, especially during periods when the evolution of political parties in the CEEC and the future of EU enlargement faced a high degree of uncertainty. The fact that the foundations did not act officially on behalf of the party federations helped to overcome some internal dissent. Thus, foundations could be considered as agents for reduction of uncertainty and divergence. The structure of the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity (EFDS), linked simultaneously to the SI and the PES, is a good example of the use of party foundations by more formal transnational political organizations at the European level. Created officially in 1993, as a result of a wish expressed by Willy Brandt, the President of the SI, before his death and of his successor Pierre Mauroy, the leader of the French Socialists, the EFDS was charged with cooperation with CEE socialist parties. The creation of the forum reflects a moment when Western European political parties were profoundly divided regarding the strategy to adopt towards Central European post-communist parties. The fact that the activities of the EFDS were entrusted entirely to European political foundations11 was a key element, which helped to promote cooperation without engaging the PES officially. When a representative of the Forum travelled to a CEE country, he could meet a wider spectrum of political representatives than he would be able to do when delegated officially by the PES.12 The seminars organized by foundations in candidate countries dealt with issues of current reform implemented in the region such as minorities’ rights and gender issues. The EFDS could thus be perceived as an international catalyst of ideas and contacts, helping political parties, which remained outside the European party structures, to remain in close contact and to focus their priorities on a progressive rapprochement with the European Union. One of the aims was to encourage the domestic cooperation of post-communist and other social democratic parties, a strategy that partially succeeded in Poland and Bulgaria. Since the start of enlargement negotiations, the EFDS reoriented its activities into non-EU candidate states. It thus appears as a structure aimed at preserving ties between the European Union and in the wider Europe. This transnational party mobilization shows the EU enlargement as a twosided process, affecting both new member states political parties and the party federations at the EU level. Political leaders from the candidate countries tend to be recognized by their European partners and to benefit from their material, but above all, nonmaterial resources (such as legitimacy or contacts). Party leaders in the European Parliament (EP) perceive their interlocutors from Central and

164

Dorota Dakowska

Eastern Europe as future partners and allies, which could help them to overcome certain internal crises. The process of new members’ affiliation to transnational party associations is closely related to the consolidation of European party federation identity (Devin, 1993).

Bridging the gap between rationality and norms Studying the mechanisms of these transnational contacts in an institutionalist perspective enables us to take into account the logic of expected consequences – based on exogenous preferences and interest calculations – and also the logic of appropriateness – based on endogenous identity, cognitive dimensions and rules (March and Olsen, 1998).13 By the mid-1990s, the European party federations had to face the failure of their initial aims, which comprised the association of historical social democratic parties from CEEC or the Christian democratic parties based on the Western model. After a few years of cooperation, they realized that most social democratic parties of some importance in the region were of post-communist origin while the parties on the Right of the political stage could hardly fit into the Western definition of Christian Democracy. The European party federations had to overcome the gap between the aims of associating stronger partners who were able to increase the weight of federations and the expectation of a basic agreement on common norms and values. In other words, they had to find a balance between their aim of increasing their stability and power on the one hand and preserving a common identity on the other. The rational objective meant associating as many strong parties as possible, in order to enforce the federations’ bargaining power and resources after their accession. Thus, the domestic weight of Central European parties was the prevailing factor influencing dialogue. Contacts with some conservative parties were pursued notwithstanding the objective criticisms that could be made regarding their structure (the dominant role of trade unions in the case of Polish Social Movement Solidarity, RS AWS) or their ideational engagement (like the lack of conviction in regard to federalism). The power calculation may have prevailed in the case of the Hungarian Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), which was initially a member of the Liberal International (LI), before applying to the EPP. FIDESZ was pursued actively by EPP representatives and it was regarded favourably by the EPP Political bureau, while its statutes still placed the FIDESZ in the LI, of which Victor Orban held the vice-presidency. Thus, the FIDESZ became an EPP associated party at the end of the year 2000 and a full member after Hungary’s EU accession and the following EP elections in June 2004. The KAS office in Budapest was very active during this process. It organized visits and meetings for FIDESZ leaders and tried to convince them of the benefits of joining the EPP. It is also true, however, that European party federations carried out an in-depth survey of their partners’ effective norm commitment. The programme, statutes and policy profile of each potential partner were screened. The party federations sent observers to the CEEC party congresses. These parties, whose strong

German political foundations 165 commitment to European integration and federalism were not in doubt, were literally pursued by the European party federations. When a potential member party respected all the normative criteria, the formal, technical barriers could be lowered. In the case of the Polish UW accession to the EPP, the observer–member stage was bypassed for the first time. Once the UW broke its links with the EPP, the European Liberals made strong efforts to convince the party to cross over to the ELDR. They invited UW leaders (especially Bronisdaw Geremek and Leszek Balcerowicz) to their meetings. As usual, material support of the foundations was requested. In practice, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, the FNS President, was asked by Pat Cox to back the liberal efforts and to strengthen its financial involvement in Poland.14 The strong support of European Liberals for the UW has proved a successful strategy. Resulting from the mobilization of Polish pro-European voters during the European elections on 13 June 2004, the UW managed to send four representatives to the EP, including its historical leader Geremek who unsuccessfully stood in the elections for EP President in July 2004. It might be useful to distinguish between different stages of socialization. The meetings and congresses, to which politicians from the CEEC were invited prior to their association, were the first arena of socialization. Formal association with a party federation requires organizational and political adaptation and fully exposes the new party to internal socialization forums. Foundations intervened at both stages, providing organizational assistance and proposing training sessions on relevant topics. However, to be effective, exploring social learning mechanisms has to be based on an analysis of interactions (Checkel, 2001). As a result of this transnational socialization process, a transfer of discourse and perceptions seems indeed to have affected both sides. While politicians from candidate countries affiliated to the EPP have increasingly stressed their attachment to the principles of the social market economy and subsidiarity, EPP leaders have supported some of their priorities in their declarations such as when the EPP President Wilfried Martens supported the FIDESZ position with regard to the Hungarian Status Law (concerning Hungarian minorities abroad) and criticized the Hungarian socialists’ arguments advanced during their electoral campaign (EPP News, 2002).

Conclusion Research on German political foundations as transnational actors has several heuristic advantages. First, it allows an empirical refinement of the conceptual models of transnational networks’ activities, showing that relations with governmental agencies may be decisive for their impact. In fact, whereas German ministries are key resource providers for the foundations, the symbolic support of ministers who also play an important role in their parties is also an important legitimizing factor for foundations. Second, this research furthers the linking of the bilateral and the multilateral level through the dynamics of international party legitimation. Finally, it refines our reflection on the EU enlargement process and elite socialization mechanisms. Observing the enlargement of European

166

Dorota Dakowska

party federations through the association of new members provides empirical evidence of the entangled nature of the logic of consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness. Both the relative and potential numeric weight of CEEC political parties and the prestige expected from associating political leaders from the region, who were well known for their commitment to defending democratic ideas and for their pro-European convictions, were decisive factors influencing the mobilization of external actors. As far as the analysis of the foundations’ activities is concerned, the political and chronological re-contextualizing provides a frame for any conclusive statements. Facilitating their partners’ access to European arenas was critical at the early stage of partner identification and until the beginning of accession negotiations. At that time, due to the scarcity of information sources, the German foundations played a particularly important role. Since the first associations in the second half of the 1990s, the net of contacts of all kinds between CEEC political leaders and their European interlocutors has grown and the political foundations have no longer been considered as unique or vital information sources. However, this transnational communication channel has continued to function in both ways. Between the end of accession negotiations and the accession referenda and the European elections including the new member states in June 2004, the foundations sent political delegations for training in Brussels and supported those, who were still in process of political identification, looking for an appropriate political family to join. In CEEC, they helped their partners to assuage the painful process of persuading public opinion in the new member states to accept the social consequences of the transformation and accession as a necessary stage of the enlargement process. The results of the first European elections including these new member states have shown that domestic factors and veto players remain essential variables influencing political outcomes, which party leaders have to take into account if they wish to strengthen the democratic dimension of the enlarged European Union. The German political foundations remain useful observers and advisors of the ongoing developments in the new member states. Although the EU accession of ten new member states in 2004 is a turning point in the relations between both parts of Europe, the special relationship between the German parties and foundations and their CEEC partners will have to be reconsidered as it may develop and change, though not disappear entirely. Finally, this chapter contributes to reflecting on the role of the EP in the EU integration process. Usually considered as a backwater of Europeanization, the EP may also appear as a socialization arena worthy of further study and analysis. As far as the actors are concerned, focusing on bureaucratic or governmental institutions characteristic of some enlargement studies provides only a partial insight into the impact of EU governance outside of it, especially insofar as the normative pressures and social learning are concerned. Generating compliance with EU norms may be a matter for socializing institutions such as party political transnational networks including the foundations.

German political foundations 167

Notes 1 Only the liberal Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung is legally a foundation, the others have the status of a registered association (eingetragener Verein). 2 For a more thorough analysis of the foundations’ origins, see the results of my research in different public and private archives in my PhD research project, Les fondations politiques allemandes dans la politique étrangère: de la genèse institutionnelle à leur engagement dans le processus d’élargissement de l’UE, prepared at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris. 3 In 2001 the percentage was: KAS, FES: 3.25 per cent each; FNS, HSS, HBS: 11.66 per cent each; 0.5 per cent for the RLS. 4 For a typology of mechanisms of transnational socialization, see the contribution of Frank Schimmelfennig in Chapter 3 of this volume. 5 In Poland, the FES supported the Solidarnos´c´ trade union and tried to work with the post-communist OPZZ trade union, which was hampered by the disagreement between these two strongly politicized organizations. 6 Interview with a member of the UW board, Warsaw, 13 February 2004. 7 Interview with a former KAS representative, Berlin, 19 July 2000. 8 Interview with an EPP leader, Brussels, 21 February 2003. 9 EPP archives, Fax of the KAS Prague office director, Reinhard Stuht to the EPP General Secretary Klaus Welle, 26 October 1998. 10 The internal SLD journal published a photo of its delegation together with Romano Prodi; Tadeusz Iwin´ski ‘SLD w Brukseli. Marzenia a rzeczywistos´c´’, Wspódpraca mi˛edzynarodowa, 1(1), July 2000, p. 5. 11 While the FES had the most important material resources, it cooperated with other foundations within this transnational network, such as the Dutch Alfred Mozer Stichting, the Swedish Olof Palme International Center, the Austrian Karl Renner Institut, the British Westminster Foundation, as well as the French Fondation Jean Jaurès. 12 Interview with a PES adviser, Brussels, 25 February 2003. 13 For a discussion of this relationship in party cooperation preceding the EU enlargement, see Dakowska (2002). 14 FNS archives, Letter of Pat Cox, President of the ELDR to Count Otto Lambsdorff, Chairman of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Brussels, 15 November 2000.

References Bartsch, Sebastian (1998) ‘Politische Stiftungen: Grenzgänger zwischen Staaten-und Gesellschaftswelt’, in Deutschlands Neue Außenpolitik, Munich: DGAP/Oldenbourg Verlag, pp. 185–98. Börzel, Tanja and Risse, Thomas (2000) ‘When Europe hits home: Europeanization and domestic change’, European Integration Online Papers, 4(15) www.eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/ 2000-015a.htm Braud, Philippe (2000) Sociologie politique, Paris: LGDJ. Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) (1973) 2. Bericht des BMZ für den AwZ. 4. Grundsätze für die entwicklungspolitische Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Bundesregierung und den politischen Stiftungen, unpublished ministerial report, Bonn, August 1973. —— (1995) Die Tätigkeit der politischen Stiftungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa sowie der ehemaligen Sowjetunion (MOE/NUS), unpublished ministerial report, Bonn. —— (1999) Die entwicklungspolitische Arbeit der politischen Stiftungen. Informationsvermerk für den Bundestagsausschuss für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, unpublished ministerial report, Bonn.

168

Dorota Dakowska

Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999) ‘Social construction and integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4): 545–60. —— (2001) ‘Why comply? Social learning and European identity change’, International Organization, 55(3): 553–88. Chilton, Patricia (1995) ‘Mechanics of change: social movements, transnational coalitions and the transformation process in Eastern Europe’, in Thomas Risse (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 189–226. Dakowska, Dorota (2002) ‘Beyond conditionality: EU enlargement, European party federations and the transnational activity of German political foundations’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 3(2): 271–96. Danckwort, Dieter (1990) ‘Die Anfänge der Entwicklungspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den fünfziger Jahren und die Weichenstellungen für die folgenden Jahrzehnte – Ursachen und Wirkung’, in Manfred Glagow (ed.), Deutsche und internationale Entwicklungspolitik: Zur Rolle staatlicher, supranationaler und nicht-regierungsabhängiger Organisationen im Entwicklungsprozess der Dritten Welt, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 13–17. Devin, Guillaume (1993) ‘L’internationale socialiste en Europe centre-orientale: définition et rôle des « amis politiques »’, in Pascal Delwit and Jean-Michel De Waele (eds), La gauche face aux mutations en Europe, Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, pp. 189–200. De Waele, Jean-Michel (2003) ‘Les relations entre les partis politiques des Pays d’Europe centrale et orientale et les fédérations européennes de partis’, in Antoine Roger (ed.), Des parties pour quoi faire? La représentation politique en Europe centrale et orientale, Brussels: Bruylant, pp. 159–70. EPP News, Socialists Playing with Fire, 8 January 2002, www.eppe.org/news/ n01a_wm_hung_012.asp, consulted 8 March 2002 (no longer accessible). Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998) ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, International Organization, 52(4): 887–917. Glagow, Manfred and Schimanck, Uwe (1983) ‘Korporatistische Verwaltung: das Beispiel Entwicklungspolitik’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 24(3): 253–74. Goetz, Klaus H. (2001) ‘Making sense of post-communist central administration: modernization, Europeanization or Latinization?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 8(6): 1032–51. Goetz, Klaus H. and Hix, Simon (2000) ‘Europeanised politics? European integration and national political systems’, West European Politics, 23(4): 1–26. Grabbe, Heather (2001) ‘How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity’, Journal of European Public Policy, 8(6): 1013–31. Grabendorff, Wolf (1996) ‘International support for democracy in contemporary Latin America: the role of the party internationals’, in Laurence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimension of Democratization. Europe and the Americas, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 201–26. Katzenstein, Peter (1978) Policy and Politics in West Germany. The growth of a Semi-Sovereign State, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. —— (1997) Tamed Power. Germany in Europe, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. (1998) ‘The institutional dynamics of international political order’, International Organization, 52(4): 943–69. Marcussen, Martin, Risse, Thomas, Engelmann-Martin, Daniela, Knopf, Hans Joachim and Roscher, Klaus (1999) ‘Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation state identities’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4): 615–33. Mayhew, Alan (1998) Recreating Europe. The European Union’s Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

German political foundations 169 Nuscheler, Franz (1993) ‘Denkfabriken und diplomatische Hilfstruppen: Die Politischen Stiftungen der Parteien und ihre Auslandsarbeit’, in Dieter Weirich (ed.), Auftrag Deutschland, Nach der Einheit: Unser Land der Welt vermitteln, Mainz: Hase & Koehler, pp. 223–40. Ortuño Anaya, Pilar (2002) European Socialists and Spain: The Transition to Democracy, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael (1991) ‘Foreign political aid: the German political foundations and their US counterparts’, International Affairs, 67: 33–63. —— (1996) ‘International political finance: the Konrad Adenauer foundation and Latin America’, in Laurence Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimension of Democratization: Europe and the Americas, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 227–55. Pridham, Geoffrey (1999) ‘Complying with the European Union’s democratic conditionality: transnational party linkages and regime change in Slovakia, 1993–1998’, Europe-Asia Studies, 51(7): 1221–44. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.) (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Robert, Cécile (2001) ‘La Commission européenne face à l’élargissement de l’Union à l’Est: la construction d’un leadership’, Politique européenne, 1(3): 38–60. Rosenau, James N. (1990) Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Saurugger, Sabine S. (2003) Européaniser les intérêts? Les groupes d’intérêt économiques et l’élargissement de l’Union européenne, Paris: L’Harmattan. Schimmelfennig, Frank, Engert, Stefan and Knobel, Heiko (2003) ‘Cost, commitment and compliance: the impact of EU democratic conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(3): 495–518. Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2002) ‘Sectoral dynamics of EU enlargement: advocacy, access and alliances in a composite policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(4): 627–49. Torreblanca, Jose I. (1998) ‘Overlapping games and cross-cutting coalitions in the European Union’, West European Politics, 21(2): 134–53. Wagner, Christoph (1994) ‘Die offiziöse Außen-und Entwicklungspolitik der deutschen politischen Stiftungen in Lateinamerika’, in Manfred Mols and Christoph Wagner (eds), Deutschland – Lateinamerika: Geschichte, Gegenwart und Perspektiven, Frankfurt am Main: Verwuert Verlag, pp. 167–228. Whitehead, Laurence (ed.) (1996) The International Dimension of Democratization: Europe and the Americas, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

8

Transnational actors in the European Higher Education Area European opportunities and institutional embeddedness Eric Beerkens

Introduction In their academic and intellectual orientations, universities historically have been international institutions. Communicating in Latin, scholars would wander from one place of learning to another. Nobody asked for their papers or bothered them with bureaucratic restrictions or academic qualifications. It was a spontaneous movement and not the result of planning. Although it is clear that the contemporary wandering scholar may be less footloose than in medieval times, international academic exchange and mobility have remained important aspects of university enquiry and teaching. In contradiction to its intellectual orientation, the universities’ institutional environment has become very national, especially through the establishments of welfare states in the decades following the Second World War and the subsequent massification of higher education. The ties between national authority and university were already intensified in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however (Neave, 2000). Universities became instruments of states, they were regulated by them and governments provided much of their funding. Yet, increasing and diversifying demands for higher education have pushed countries to find new modes of governance for their higher education sector. In general these new modes of governance stress efficiency, effectiveness and accountability and leave more leeway for universities to make their own choices. This increased autonomy, together with expanding opportunities for international exchange and communication, has made the international dimension of the university an important topic again, both in the missions of universities as well as in research on higher education policies. In Europe, the nostalgic idea of the wandering scholar pursuing knowledge has over time transformed into the policy idea of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). In this EHEA, several actors have emerged that can be considered transnational. Examples of such actors are higher education consortia, which are groupings of universities that cooperate and exchange across borders. International higher education consortia can be defined as multi-point groupings of universities from three or more countries. They have a limited amount of members and membership is restricted to particular universities that are allowed by the other partners to enter the arrangement.

Transnational actors in the EHEA 171 Cooperation and exchange take place in multiple disciplines and/or themes. The arrangements exceed loose cooperation, since an additional administrative layer is created above the participating organizations (Beerkens, 2002). In this chapter, we will look at higher education consortia as transnational actors and we will make an attempt to relate the behaviour of such consortia to theories of European integration. We will approach transnational actors as vehicles for transnational transaction and exchange, but at the same time acknowledge that transnational actors are composed of their constituent elements (in our case universities), which have developed in national institutional contexts. In other words, we will take a look inside transnational actors. Higher education consortia as transnational actors contain an inherent tension. On the one hand, they face new opportunities due to ongoing European integration and on the other, they might be restricted in their behaviour since they have historically emerged and still operate largely in a very national context. The question of how transnational actors deal with the tension between the new opportunities that arise due to further European integration and the national embeddedness of their constituent elements is addressed in this chapter. In order to provide the background for the study, we will first shortly address the emergence of the idea of the EHEA. After this, we will introduce our theoretical starting points for looking at transnational actors. Here, we draw mainly on theories of political integration on the one hand and sociological-economic theories of embeddedness on the other. On the basis of three cases, we will attempt to arrive at more general conclusions on the way in which transnational actors operate and how they deal with the tension between European opportunities and institutional embeddedness.

Policy background: the idea of the European Higher Education Area The Action Programme in the field of education, which was approved by the European Council in 1976, marked the start of a formal European educational policy. In this programme a number of broad policy objectives were addressed among which were the promotion of closer relations between educational systems and cooperation in the field of education. Although resources linked to this programme were very limited, the activities did influence the design of later programmes and stimulated the development of many cooperative networks that would emerge after the adoption of this programme (Ceri Jones, 1991). In that same year, the first Joint Study Programmes were established, which are now seen as the predecessors of the ERASMUS programme that started in 1987. During the latter half of the 1980s, further initiatives also emerged in the European domain. Examples include COMETT (to promote cooperation between higher education and industry), LINGUA (improvement of foreign language competence) and TEMPUS (focussed on the development of higher education systems in Central and Eastern Europe). ERASMUS, however, can be seen as the flagship activity in the field of higher education (van der Wende and Huisman, 2004). This programme was aimed at and succeeded in boosting student and staff

172

Eric Beerkens

mobility and inter-organizational cooperation within the EC (and later also included the countries from the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and from Central and Eastern Europe). In the second half of the 1990s, the ERASMUS programme became part of the broader SOCRATES Programme. Although the core policy remained unchanged, some important shifts could be observed (Wächter et al., 1999). More priority was given to the internationalization and Europeanization of curricula which was thought to foster cooperation and strengthen the European dimension in higher education. One of the instruments used to aid this was the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS). Another main shift was of a geographical nature. Under the new programme, the number of eligible countries was significantly increased, mainly through the inclusion of countries from Central and Eastern Europe. In spite of these changes, cooperation remained hampered by the diversity in systems, qualifications and educational regulations of the member states. The subsidiarity principle prevents the European Commission from intervening in issues such as educational content and quality. Moreover, European intervention in such national issues was politically very sensitive (van der Wende, 2000). Another issue that hindered the path to a more comparable structure of national systems was the emphasis placed on the preservation of diversity. Especially in the period where the resistance against globalization emerged on a global scale, standardization, homogenization and uniformity obtained a negative undertone, while diversity and variety received more positive connotations. This set the stage for a more bottom-up approach, with the initiative shifting from the European to the national level. The ultimate product in this balancing act was the Bologna Declaration of 1999. According to the Confederation of EU Rectors’ Conferences (CERC) and the Association of European Universities (CRE) this declaration ‘is a key document which marks a turning point in the development of European higher education’ (CERC/CRE, 1999: 3). Instead of being imposed by the European Union, the declaration was signed by 29 European countries as a commitment freely taken to reform their own higher education system or systems in order to create overall convergence at the European level. Its aim is to establish a EHEA and to promote the European system of higher education in the world. It proposes the adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees, the establishment of a system of credits, and the elimination of all remaining obstacles standing in the way of free mobility. Both the EU initiatives in higher education and research and the ongoing Bologna process have changed the institutional landscape of European higher education, adding several transnational associations, bilateral partnerships and multilateral groupings to the existing national landscapes. The wide and dense network of linkages that emerged through cooperation and exchange has provided European universities with the need for coordination and communication and for external positioning. The increasing entanglement of universities, faculties and departments or institutes and also of individual teaching and research staff, managers, policy makers and students has made transnational, inter-organizational arrangements in Europe at least more visible, if not more significant. The way in

Transnational actors in the EHEA 173 which they operate, and especially the way they deal with balancing the ‘Europeanness’ of the collective and the national institutional backgrounds of their constituent elements, will be investigated further in this chapter.

Transactions, exchange and European integration In studying integration processes in the European Union, a distinction can be made between schools of thought based on realist and functionalist assumptions. These assumptions focus on the ways of understanding the motivations, paths and outcomes of integration processes. The central question here is whether regional integration is the concerted pluralist articulation of national interests, or whether it is developing the characteristics of a supranational state, in which a new level of governance covers the region as a whole, not as individual nationstates. In the course of further European integration and the study of this process, the theoretical debate has centred around the intergovernmental-supranational dichotomy. Intergovernmental institutionalism stresses the role of states, and their pursuit of power and national interests. Supranationalism on the other hand, denotes a framework in which supranational factors possess a significant impact on the member states. Actors and institutions operating above the nation-states acquire a degree of autonomy and become independent actors. The European political institutions are the most evident examples of such actors. As explained in Bastiaan van Apeldoorn’s chapter (Chapter 4, this volume), the transaction-based theory represents a return to the neo-functionalist legacy of Ernst B. Haas (1958, 1961). It also incorporates the refinements of neo-functional theory by Joseph S. Nye (1970) as well as the transaction-based theory of Karl Deutsch (1957). The basic starting point of the approach is that the relative intensity of transnational activity causes shifts in the level of supranational governance. With this premise, the approach also allows for different speeds of transformation in different policy sectors. Different policy sectors may find themselves on different positions in the intergovernmental-supranational continuum. On this continuum, EU rules achieve higher degrees of clarity and formalization, EU institutions gain more autonomy and transnational actors become more present and more influential. In intergovernmental politics, it is the national governments that mediate between societal actors and supranational organizations and rules. In supranational politics, ‘transnational actors have a choice of fora in which to exert their influence. They may target national governmental structures [. . .] as well as supranational bodies and they may play one level of against the other’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 10). They can thus intentionally act upon national governments and supranational institutions, but they can also unintentionally provoke further integration through an increase and/or intensification of transnational exchange. The need or the desire for more transnational exchange does not emerge in order to – intentionally – bring about further supranational regulation (need or desire can emerge out of sheer curiosity, pressures for efficiency, market imperfections, but also through – material or symbolic – stimuli from national governments or supranational institutions), but it will trigger

174

Eric Beerkens

supranational regulation if it is substantial enough. The expansion of transnational society thus pushes for supranational governance, which is exercised to facilitate and regulate that society. The approach shares with neo-functionalists like Haas (1958) the logic of institutionalization at the supranational level which implies that when supranational rules, supranational organizations and transnational society have emerged, these rules, organizations and transnational actors become active driving forces for further integration. The legacy of Deutsch is mainly situated in the emphasis that is placed on the role of exchange and transactions. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) agree with Deutsch that exchange across borders drives integration processes. If the transaction-based approach claims that transactions and exchange push for a higher level of political integration, and higher education consortia (and other transnational organizations) can be perceived as vehicles for transaction and exchange, it can be assumed that such transnational actors play a significant role in the integration process. The emergence of the idea of the EHEA confirms this. The mobility of students and staff, the exchange of ideas, expertise and knowledge and the transaction of credits and financial means between universities, have pushed forward the recognition that regulations, structures and policies in the field of higher education need to be fine-tuned. The focus on transactions and exchange legitimates a more economical approach to integration. Following economic–sociological and neo-institutional theories, however, we also need to acknowledge that exchange takes place in a social environment. Although transnational exchange is put forward as one of the core elements of the transaction-based approach, the nature and the role of transnational actors remains rather unclear. Applying perspectives from economic sociology enables us to understand better how transaction and exchange takes place and therefore provides us with a middle range theory on the operation of transnational actors and their role in European integration.

The embeddedness of transaction and exchange Transactions, exchange, communications or flows, do not take place in a vacuum, but in a particular context. The transaction-based approach locates the development of European integration on a continuum. For the case of higher education, which has historically developed in a national context and is therefore very much embedded in national institutions, the national context continues to play a significant role. However, as we have seen in the previous sections, an increasing level of exchange of people, practices and ideas can be observed within the European Union and has led to the (idea of the) EHEA. It is claimed here that this causes a tension in the operations of transnational actors. Although such actors are transnational as a collective actor, their constituent elements, be they organizations or individuals, still have their national background in which they emerged and that has shaped their thinking and behaviour. Transaction-based theories on European integration thus see transactions and exchange as the main driving force for further integration, and economic

Transnational actors in the EHEA 175 sociological theories argue that exchange takes place in a social context. Therefore, looking at the constituent elements of transnational actors brings the process of integration back to the level of real actions of real actors and therefore can be considered a microcosm for studying the impact of Europeanization on universities (and other organizations). Since contemporary universities have developed in an environment dominated by national regulations, cultures, norms and organizational rules, the way this context has impacted on them cannot be ignored when they engage in international collaboration and exchange. The basic idea behind this line of thinking is related to the term ‘embeddedness’. The notion of embeddedness was coined by Polanyi (1944, 1957) and has more recently been extended into what is now termed the ‘new economic sociology’ (Swedberg, 1991). Granovetter (1985) argued for economists and sociologists to theorize economic action in ways that acknowledge its strong linkages to social structure. He argued that the economy is structurally embedded in social networks that affect its functioning. The concept of embeddedness is typically treated as synonymous with the notion that organizations and the economy are part of a larger institutional structure (Baum and Dutton, 1996). Granovetter (1985) uses the term in a more specific way to mean that economic action takes place within the networks of social relations that make up the social structure. In criticism of this narrow conception, DiMaggio (1990, 1994) has argued that economic action is embedded not only in the social structure but also in culture. Zukin and DiMaggio (1990: 14–22) make further distinctions between different kinds of embeddedness, including cognitive (i.e. structured regularities of mental processes), cultural (i.e. the role of shared collective understandings), political (i.e. the role of social, political, and other non-market institutions), as well as structural (i.e. contextualization of exchange in patterns of ongoing interpersonal relationships) embeddedness. Perceiving transnational actors as vehicles for transnational exchange between national organizations or individuals uncovers the tensions that exist in such transnational arrangements. Our premise is that transnational actors as composite arrangements of national elements need to balance their operations. They need to exploit the opportunities that they face due to European integration and at the same time acknowledge that their constituent elements are restricted in their behaviour. In the case of higher education consortia this would mean that the constituent universities can exploit each others’ strengths and they can create economies of scale and scope. Through membership, universities can gain access to research facilities, to student markets, to local knowledge, to scientific knowledge, to financial resources, etc. In order for a consortium to gain synergy from this exchange there must exist a situation where universities have something to offer to each other. In other words, there needs to be complementarity between the constituent parts of the consortium. However, since we have acknowledged that exchange (of knowledge and resources) takes place in a social context, the constituent parts also need to share similarities in order to cooperate. Institutional contexts of the constituent parts can be so different or incompatible leading to clashes in cooperation, which would leave the higher education consortium

176

Eric Beerkens

useless, since exchange cannot take place. The other side of the coin thus demands the constituent elements of a transnational actor to be compatible with each other. For transnational actors this means that they need to be organized and managed in such a way that they find the correct balance between difference and similarity, between complementarity and compatibility. The resources to be exchanged in higher education consortia are expressed in the portfolio of activities and projects agreed upon by a consortium. If in the implementation of projects, partner characteristics appear to be incompatible, the consortium needs to apply institutional coping mechanisms in order to reduce, avoid or solve problems due to dissimilarities, after which the endeavour to perform can proceed.

Operationalization and design Following our theoretical approaches, universities as constituent elements of transnational actors such as consortia are trapped in a paradox. On the one hand, they face new opportunities due to collaboration and exchange with other universities and therewith push forward the wider processes of integration. On the other hand, they are very much embedded in their national and organizational context. They operate mainly under national legislation and they are shaped by national culture. Furthermore, they have created their own organizational rules, norms and habits. We will examine this issue by first taking a closer look at three consortia and the way in which they balance the exploitation of new European opportunities and the national embeddedness of their members. A comparison of the three cases enables us to make more general statements on such higher education consortia. These considerations lead to the hypothesis that higher education consortia will perform better if their constituent elements have similar institutional backgrounds, at least in those cases where different institutional backgrounds have a negative effect on collaboration and exchange. In other words, the constituent elements need to show a considerable level of institutional fit in order to achieve their objectives. The empirical findings on these consortia are presented below and are based on a detailed analysis of a broader study of consortia in Europe and Southeast Asia which highlights the tension between global opportunities and institutional embeddedness (Beerkens, 2004). This analysis was based on interviews with persons that held central positions in these consortia and on questionnaires that were sent to all persons that were involved in activities of the consortia. The questions that were asked related to performance (expressed by the importance and the attainment of objectives) and the institutional fit between the participating universities (expressed by the impact and the presence of institutional differences). The hypothesized relation between institutional fit and performance was tested through a questionnaire and further explored through interviews and document analyses. Performance was measured on the basis of an assessment of the perceived attainment (5 point scale from (1) not successful to (5) very successful) of the formal objectives of the consortia weighed by the perceived importance of those objectives (5 point scale from (0.2) not important to (1.0) very important). For each of the individual objectives this results in an

Transnational actors in the EHEA 177 assessment in the range of 0.2 and 5. Institutional fit was measured on the bases of the assessment of perceived differences in six types of institutional forms between the partners in a consortium (on a 5 point scale from (1) homogeneous to (5) heterogeneous). These differences were weighed by the perceived impact of such differences (on a 5 point scale ranging from (1) negative impact to (0) no impact to (1) positive impact). The six types of institutional forms are based on a classification of institutions developed by Ingram and Clay (2000) and extended by Ingram and Silverman (2002). Ingram and Clay claim that in neo-institutional thinking one can distinguish three classes of actors: individuals (or groups of individuals), organizations and states. Ingram and Silverman added civil society as a fourth class. While institutions are typically categorized as formal or informal (North, 1990; Nee and Ingram, 1998), Ingram and Clay (2000) use a more fine-grained categorization based on two dimensions: who makes the rules (public or private entities) and how are they made and enforced (in centralized or decentralized fashion). On the basis of these two dimensions, they identify three types of institutions (excluding the possibility of public decentralized institutions). Ingram and Silverman have recently extended these types by including the latter. On the basis of these two dimensions, they arrive at four types of institutions: (i) decentralized/private: norms, with social groups as chief actor; (ii) decentralized/public: culture, with civil society as the chief actor; (iii) centralized/private: rules, with organizations as chief actors; and (iv) centralized/public: law, with states as chief actor. This typology makes evident that several sources of incompatibility can emerge. For the domain of norms, we will look at the conception of academic work and the character of the university (exemplified by its size, scope and age, which we regard as a source of diversity in university operations). For rules, we will look at two factors: the division of authority within the university and the formal organizational procedures. Culture as an archetypical type of institution is accounted for through the issue of national culture and law as a type of institution by the issue of national legislation and the organization of the national higher education system.

Three case studies We have looked at three higher education consortia: the ALMA network, the Coimbra Group of Universities and the European Consortium of Innovative Universities (ECIU). After an introduction to the cases, the general findings on performance and institutional fit will be compared. After this, we will look in more depth at the various mechanisms for managing the institutional diversity in consortia. ALMA Network ALMA is a cooperative network of four universities in the Meuse-Rhine Euregion. This region forms the intersection between the most southern part of the Netherlands, the eastern part of Belgium and the western part of one of the German Länder, Northrhine-Westphalia. The network was

178

Eric Beerkens

launched in 1990, and at that time consisted of the University of Maastricht, the Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule in Aachen (Aachen University of Technology) and the University of Liege in French-speaking Belgium. A year later, the Limburgs Universitair Centrum from Dutch-speaking Belgium joined the network. ALMA emerged in the euphoria of the early 1990s, a phenomenon that – through the Maastricht Treaty – especially was seized as an opportunity by the University of Maastricht. At the start, many projects focused more on collaboration in research than in education. A reason for the orientation on research was the dependency on Interreg subsidies (the EU programme for funding inter-regional cooperation). Projects eligible for Interreg needed to have a socio-economic impact on the region and collaboration in research seemed to be more successful in this respect than programmes focussing on mobility. Through the Dutch Programme on cross-border cooperation in 1997, the network received a financial boost to develop projects outside the Interreg framework. Some of the major achievements of the cooperation between the ALMA universities have further developed outside the direct authority of the network. Examples of this are EURON, a European graduate school in neurosciences, and the Transnational University Limburg, a joint venture between the University of Maastricht and the Limburgs Universitair Centrum. The ALMA network was established on the basis of complementarity between the participating universities. To exploit this complementarity, ALMA has never envisaged close integration of activities, but has functioned as a coordinator and facilitator for local initiatives. The network, however, has changed strategies, structures and objectives to cope with insufficient exploitation of complementary resources and with sources of incompatibility. ALMA’s core business in the beginning was the promotion of mobility, but this has developed somewhat disappointingly due to a lack of interest on the side of the students. This disinterest was partly due to financial support regulations, but also to the fact that many students prefer more remote places. In general, we can observe a somewhat low appreciation of ALMA by the respondents, which can be best explained by a lack of perceived institutional fit. The lack of fit is mainly caused by a perceived negative effect of several institutional factors, especially the centralized institutional types like legislation, organizational procedures and the division of authority in universities. Complementarity between the partners is sufficiently present but does not lead to higher performance. The reason for this could be that complementarity is not exploited sufficiently or that there might be a case of over-complementarity in the case of ALMA. This supports the idea that there exists a paradox between compatibility and complementarity, where an excessively high level of complementarity is accompanied by an excessively low level of compatibility. Coimbra Group of Universities The origins of the Coimbra Group lie in a meeting held in 1985 at the Catholic University of Louvain where 12 universities from the old European university towns gathered to discuss the possibility of establishing strong cultural links. The participants in this meeting realized that, along with cultural links, common activities in the field of student and staff mobility might be particularly fruitful. This belief was strengthened by the subsequent creation

Transnational actors in the EHEA 179 of the ERASMUS programme by the European Commission. The Coimbra Group Charter was drawn up and signed by 19 participating universities in September 1987 during a general meeting at the University of Pavia. By 2003, the number of members has increased to 39 universities, now also including universities from Central and Eastern Europe. The Charter lays down the criteria for membership along with the general aims and purposes of the Group. In its existence of over 15 years, the Coimbra Group has strongly held on to its identity of a traditional, comprehensive academic community and has stuck to its objectives of facilitating and promoting intra-European mobility of students and staff. In its early years, its policies were very much geared to the upcoming and ambitious European schemes. The Group has played an important role in this pioneering stage of European integration in the field of higher education. Of our three case studies, the Coimbra Group displays the highest level of performance and the highest level of institutional fit. Membership of the Coimbra Group is based on the old, traditional and comprehensive nature of its members. Correspondingly, the data from the respondents show that the differences in the nature of the participating universities are rather small. It also becomes clear, however, that the universities come from very different traditions, and that these differences sometimes slightly negatively impact on cooperation. This is most evident for the legal national contexts in which the universities operate. The differences in organizational procedures and in the division of authority are also great in the consortium. The diversity in national cultures is also assessed as high, although many see those differences as positive. The Coimbra Group’s activities focus on removing obstacles for cooperation, for instance, through mutual recognition and mutual exemption from student fees, but also through lobbying on the European level and through provision of information on differences between the systems, qualifications, methods, etc. used at its member universities. Furthermore, the Group tries to improve cooperation through the stimulation of the use of new technologies. For these activities, it has set up an organizational structure which has remained relatively stable in the history of Coimbra, and which has recently been simplified. Many of the task forces, working parties and committees that emerged in the early years of Coimbra have continued to exist. The cooperation in the task forces, with their relative endurance in composition is valued very positively by its members. European Consortium of Innovative Universities At a meeting of the CRE in 1996, the rector of the University of Twente at that time took the initiative to assemble a group of ‘like-minded’ universities to establish a consortium. This consortium should give the member universities an opportunity to position themselves strategically vis-à-vis their European and international environment. After consecutive meetings in Twente in September 1996 and in Warwick in April 1997, this ultimately led to the signing of a charter in Dortmund in November 1997, where ten universities decided to commit themselves to the ECIU and the members are all from Western European countries. Roughly, the development of ECIU from 1996 until 2003 can be divided in three phases. The start-up phase, running from 1996 until 1999, was mainly marked by the preparation of ECIU and the search

180

Eric Beerkens

for suitable and eager partners. The core of ECIU at that time displayed a high level of trust between the leaders and managers. In this phase, the main areas for strategic cooperation were identified. The foremost reason for cooperation for the participating universities was the establishment of a strategic position vis-à-vis their external environment and was less based on internal exchange of staff and students. In the strategic plan for 2000–2 that was developed in 1999, the total collection of activities was brought back to manageable proportions and several priority activities were selected. Also, there was a shift from highly ambitious to more realistic objectives. Another change that took place was the shift from external strategic positioning to a mix of external and internal activities. In this second phase in the development of ECIU, from 1999 until 2002, many of the planned activities were realized. In the operational phases however, the consortium became exposed to problems due to different legislation in different countries and due to different and shifting levels of commitment. More recently, from 2002 onwards, a third phase has commenced. In this phase, the new ‘ECIU Graduate School’, improvement of student and staff mobility and university–industry interaction will become the future focus points of ECIU. In ECIU, the employment of institutional coping mechanisms in order to solve obstacles or bridge differences has not been applied on the overall ECIU level. An explanation for this could be that partners were considered to be ‘like-minded’ from the start and that incompatibility would not be an issue. In general, it has not focussed much on changing the institutional fit between partners, but more on the complementarity of the partners. A final aspect should be noted here in relation to the below average performance of ECIU. This can to a certain extent be explained by the high ambitions of many of its objectives. The level of integration envisaged by the ECIU objectives (e.g. joint doctorates, joint research schools, joint accreditation) is higher than for the other consortia. But also in regular internationalization activities such as student mobility, ECIU goes beyond the traditional objectives (e.g. by integrating mobility with international internships). Putting the stakes too high, however, can also lead to a disinterest or distrust of people on the work floor or of other partners. On the other hand, focussing only on mainstream activities would probably not result in the exposure of the opportunities in the consortium. More risky, entrepreneurial activities do result in the possibility that real sources of complementarity become manifest, even though this is likely to proceed in a process of trial and error, due to considerable institutional differences.

Comparing the three case studies Comparing the three case studies, institutional fit and performance only show a significant correlation in the case of ALMA. The results indicate that a minimum level of compatibility is a precondition for successful collaboration in consortia. This claim is based on the results of the questionnaire (Table 8.1) and the interviews that were conducted with persons that represented the consortia.

Transnational actors in the EHEA 181 Table 8.1 Performance, institutional fit and the correlation between them

Performance Institutional fit Correlation (performance–institutional fit)

ALMA

Coimbra

ECIU

1.85 0.63 0.424*

2.65 0.03 0.042

1.91 0.27 0.047

Note * Pearson R  significant for p  0.05.

If we look in more detail at the different types of institutional forms, we arrive at the results of Table 8.2. A statistically significant difference in institutional fit can be observed between ALMA on the one hand and Coimbra on the other. The table shows that the differences between ALMA and Coimbra can be largely explained by the relatively strong negative impact that ALMA respondents perceive as coming from legal differences and differences in the division of authority at the partners. Furthermore, ALMA respondents on average see cultural differences as impacting on cooperation in a negative way, while the other consortia see this as positive. The moderate level of institutional fit in ECIU can chiefly be explained by the perceived negative impact of differences in centralized institutional forms and the diversity of these forms in the consortium. Overall, it is the centralized types of institutions (national laws, organizational procedures and the formal division of authority) that constitute the main source of incompatibility. We have claimed, however, that the performance and institutional fit of these consortia are not static, but need to be managed, like in any other organization.

Consortium management and institutional diversity As we have stated before, the level of institutional fit is not necessarily fixed. The consortia apply mechanisms in order to deal with sources of incompatibility and institutional mismatch. They adapt their measures in accordance with the institutional forms that are the cause of incompatibility. Furthermore, they deal in different ways with legal differences than with cultural differences and differently with cultural differences than with procedural differences. Where national legal differences and the differences in higher education systems present obstacles in cooperation, the consortia seem to be relatively powerless, since they are not in a position to change such laws or systems. A closer look reveals, however, that some of the consortia have been active in handling such obstacles. This has been most apparent in the case of Coimbra. This consortium (sometimes in cooperation with other European consortia) is active in lobbying on the European level. In broad European developments, such as the Bologna process, the consortium is actively involved or active in influencing (national) opinions through their personal contacts and the publishing of statements and recommendations. In ALMA this has also been the case, although more on a bilateral level. National legal frameworks were adjusted and a bilateral treaty was concluded to enable the

0.15 0.41 0.15 1.04 0.78 2.19 0.63 0.03 0.14 0.31 0.02 0.08 0.28

3.67 3.87 3.50 3.68 3.86 4.21

0.04 0.07 0.02 0.24 0.17 0.48 2.74 2.58 3.84 3.56 3.46 3.67

0.11 0.36 1.25 0.01 0.43 1.19 0.03

IF c

0.01 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.44

Ia

3.27 2.93 3.69 3.47 3.67 4.00

Hb

ECIU (N  42)

0.09 0.23 0.44 0.42 0.50 1.70 0.27

IF c

Notes a I  Impact; 1  negative impact on cooperation; 1  positive impact on cooperation. b H  Heterogeneity; 1  homogeneous; 5  heterogeneous. c IF  Institutional fit  Impact  Heterogeneity, where a higher score means a better fit. Note that in this table ‘Institutional fit’ does not exactly equal ‘Impact’  ‘Heterogeneity’. ‘Impact’ and ‘Heterogeneity’ are multiplied for each respondent separately. The mean in this column thus is not the product of the means of ‘Impact’ and ‘Heterogeneity’ but the mean of all individual products of ‘Impact’ and ‘Heterogeneity’.

Differences in conceptions of academic work Differences in the character of universities Differences in national culture Differences in the division of authority Differences in organizational procedures Differences in legislation Overall institutional fit

Hb

Ia

Hb

Ia

IF c

Coimbra (N  64)

ALMA (N  27)

Table 8.2 Institutional fit for the different institutional forms

Transnational actors in the EHEA 183 establishment of a transnational university (although the two individual institutions played a more substantial role in this than ALMA as a whole). In a more indirect manner, the frequency of cooperation and exchange in Coimbra (mainly in the framework of ERASMUS and SOCRATES) has made European authorities aware of obstacles that arise due to incompatibility of national regulations and thereby contributed to the process of European integration in higher education. This, of course, is a consequence of European cooperation and exchange in general and not just of Coimbra, although Coimbra is large enough to have had a substantial influence on this process. ALMA uses similar tactics, although they rarely act at the pan-European level but more on a multilateral and Euregional level. ALMA is fairly embedded in Euregional society and politics through their relationships with local business and local/provincial governments. However, the authority of such actors on national regulations is limited. ECIU is relatively inactive in exerting influence at a European level. National regulations often do not so much obstruct exchange and cooperation as to raise additional barriers that require extra administrative tasks and knowledge about other systems. Such tasks (e.g. recognition of study periods) increase transaction costs in cooperation. The consortia can be a way to institutionalize cooperation between a particular group of universities and in that way can create structures that minimize transaction costs. Frequent cooperation within the framework of a consortium avoids the need to perform specific tasks or gain specific knowledge over and over again. The Coimbra Group has set up such structures through its Task Forces and through the informal relations that have grown between international relations offices. The most obvious example for this is the exemption of tuition fees for intra-consortium mobility of students (although this is now regulated on a European level). This is also a feature of ECIU’s Student Exchange Programme. However, tuition fees cannot be regarded as part of national regulations in all countries since in some universities or countries they can also be determined by universities themselves, and therefore need to be classified under the centralized private institutions or organizational rules. Differences in such organizational rules and procedures also provide obstacles to cooperation. With regards to exchange of staff and students as well as cooperation, specific organizational rules can frustrate activities in a consortium either through ignorance or lack of information, or also because specific organizational procedures do not match. The former issue is often coped with through the provision of information and facilitating opportunities for staff to get to know one another’s universities. Especially, in cases where terminology used at the different member universities creates confusion, the provision of information, as happened in Coimbra, can be a simple way to create clarity. From the respondents from Coimbra, it became also apparent that the regular meetings and the relatively stable composition of the Task Forces created a very positive stance on these groups. The fact that Coimbra is more structured and that its structure has remained stable, has created networks of personal relationships within the consortium. Such networks seem to be beneficial for the exchange of information, but also for the commitment of persons to consortium activities. Obvious examples

184

Eric Beerkens

of organizational differences that create obstacles for exchange are academic calendars and credit systems. A first step in dealing with such obstacles is acquiring knowledge about each others’ calendars or systems. The ECIU has dealt with this through the provision of ‘fact sheets’ with (references to) the required information for students. Obstacles due to the differences in credit systems have also been acknowledged by the consortia. In the case of Europe, a collective solution to this problem was found in the ECTS. The latter mechanisms constitute a level of cooperation that already is a step further than information exchange. When knowledge about each others organization does not sufficiently alleviate the obstacles, member universities need to mutually adjust to each other. What becomes clear in the case studies is that, when cooperation enters this level, many universities back away. This is partly related to the fear or unwillingness to lose autonomy mentioned earlier. What can also be observed is that member universities might not be willing to come to mutual adjustment because they would see this as a decline of the quality of their own organizational procedures. A statement of one of the respondents illustrates this: ‘the culture of “we are the best” certainly hinders true academic communication and progress’. Steps towards mutual adjustment have been taken by some consortia, but have proven to be difficult to realize. In the case of ECIU, the ECIU Quality Review System can also be seen as a step to mutual adjustment. Although this has been successfully set up in the first years of the ECIU, until now it has failed to be implemented on an ECIU-wide basis, and therefore has had little impact on the actual operations in its member universities. In general, we can conclude that mutual adjustment is used as a mechanism to cope with organizational differences, but that it frequently fails in the implementation phase. If mutual adjustment is taken one step further, this results in the possibility of the creation of separate organizations or joint ventures. Such new organizations incorporate the organizational differences and this will in time (optimistically) lead to assimilation of sources of diversity. Considering the problems that are being faced with mutual adjustment, it does not come as a surprise that these mechanisms are not frequently used. In ALMA, it has however taken place on a bilateral basis with the establishment of the Transnational University of Limburg. This organization is set up in a way that national differences and organizational differences are incorporated in one organization, so that the partners in cooperation fall under a bilateral regime and, in legal terms, under one organizational regime. This university has an autonomous legal status, although it is clearly entangled with the two parent organizations, both in terms of governance and the location of facilities. A similar structure has been applied by the ECIU Graduate School. Unlike the Transnational University of Limburg however, this school is not a legal entity. ECIU, however, does consider the possibility of creating separate private organizations in those cases where national or organizational differences with regard to educational regulations or fees constitute obstacles. Joint Masters Programmes are now for instance offered by the Graduate School, but the establishment of a separate private organization to offer these Joint Masters is not ruled out for the future. Such joint ventures would demand

Transnational actors in the EHEA 185 substantial commitment from the partners, a characteristic that was not highly assessed in ECIU. Coimbra has never displayed any real aspirations in setting up joint ventures. The case studies have shown that the centralized institutional forms (e.g. national law, organizational rules and procedures) present the most difficulties and are the main causes for a lack of institutional fit between the members in the consortia. It is therefore not surprising that the consortia mainly employed coping mechanisms to tackle problems due to national and organizational procedures and regulations. In some cases, it is difficult to distinguish between public/ national institutional differences and private/organizational institutional differences. This is related to the fact that some universities are more tightly controlled by national governments than others. In some cases, for instance, the issue of tuition fees is related to national regulations, while in other cases universities are free to set these tuition fees. In general, we can observe that the employment of coping mechanisms becomes more complex in the cases where a higher level of integration of activities is envisaged. On the other hand, these are the areas where concrete coping mechanisms such as measures for mutual adjustment or the establishment of separate organizational structures are most needed. Problems caused by differences in decentralized institutional forms like culture, norms and beliefs were perceived as less crucial. In many cases, differences in national, organizational and professional cultures are even perceived as positive or at least as a positive challenge. This observation is rather contradictory to much of the international management literature on international consortia and international strategic alliances. This could be a specific characteristic of inter-university cooperation compared to general inter-organizational cooperation. Universities in general (at least in Europe) also see themselves as carriers of national cultures and therefore cultural diversity might be valued higher than in the business sector. Learning about each others’ cultures can in this respect be seen as a core academic value and in turn, cultural diversity may become a source of complementarity in a consortium. An additional explanation might come from the coping mechanisms that are used in the consortia. In the case of the more intangible institutional forms like culture, norms and beliefs however, mechanisms are not aimed at mutual adjustment or integration but mainly at the process of becoming acquainted with different cultures and habits and the recognition of those differences. This does not so much take place in the form of (acculturation) courses or written information but seems to be more successful in a process of ‘learning by (frequent) doing’. Support for this claim is provided by activities in the Coimbra Group. Because of the consistent and stable nature of their substructures (Steering Committee, Task Forces) there is a high level of interaction between the persons involved, both face-to-face and through new technologies. Through frequent interaction, persons get better acquainted with each other and with each other’s norms and habits. Coimbra has also established a task force for cultural diversity. The benefits of frequent interaction in order to get to know each others’ (university) cultures have also frequently been mentioned by respondents to the questionnaires. If we include language as an expression of culture

186

Eric Beerkens

and thereby as a part of the public context, we can detect some more concrete coping mechanisms. In general, coping with problems due to linguistic differences has led to one solution that has been applied everywhere – the use of the English language. In all consortia this has officially become the working language, even though other languages are used sometimes in smaller settings. This measure has proved successful in most cases in all consortia. Universities also offer courses in other foreign languages for students or staff members who want to spend time abroad. What becomes apparent from the case studies is that the personal and organizational relationships play a decisive role in cooperation. Even if there is an institutional fit between the members, this was not always a guarantee for success. It has mainly been in the cases where individuals were satisfied with the relational themes where the consortium objectives were seen as relatively successful. This implies that these relational issues should also be of concern to the consortium management. The question then becomes: what have consortia done to improve the relationships between individuals and organizations? In general, three broad methods can be distinguished on the basis of the case studies: sufficient communication, a clear organizational structure and the stimulation of commitment among the members. The improvement of communication at the consortium level can be rather straightforward, for example, through regular newsletters and updates on activities. On the project level, this can take place through mailing lists for instance, but also through providing the opportunities for more frequent face-to-face meetings. These measures are especially apparent for Coimbra. This consortium has issued newsletters on a regular basis and has facilitated regular meetings of its sub-units. Furthermore, coordination can also be supported through a clear organizational structure, where the tasks and responsibilities of the various sub-units are clear and known by the persons involved in consortium activities. Coimbra provides the best support for the argument that a clear organizational structure is necessary. The stability and the transparency in the organizational structure have led to a high assessment of the coordination of Coimbra as a whole. Most of the Task Forces in Coimbra have existed for a long time and in many cases the composition of these groups has remained rather stable. This creates a situation where people know each other and know what they can expect from each other. Several respondents of Coimbra pointed to the high commitment and effectiveness of the work that is being done in the task forces. In the case of ALMA, activities are based more on content and of a temporary nature. Accordingly, bodies set up for those activities are also of a temporary nature and, after projects are initiated, operate rather independently from ALMA. The ECIU on the other hand has set up a structure that entails both project related groups and more generic permanent bodies. The latter are the Thematic Working Groups of ECIU, but in these groups there seems to be a lack of consistency and commitment in comparison to the Coimbra Task Forces. The fact that these Coimbra Group Task Forces have existed substantially longer than the ECIU working groups, can (partly) explain these differences. This takes us to the final relational issue: how to stimulate commitment between individuals. Commitment between individuals arises from trust and

Transnational actors in the EHEA 187 familiarity between the people involved. The qualitative data point to the existence of processes of socialization among members in specific bodies within the consortia. Socialization is generally defined as the process of inducting actors into the norms, rules and ways of behaviour of a given community (Checkel, 2003; see also Frank Schimmelfennig, Chapter 3, this volume) and can be seen as a condition for commitment to materialize. When frequent meetings take place, where there is sufficient communication and where there is a relative stability in the people involved, a process of socialization can emerge. What seems to be the case is that such processes flourish better in small groups. Commitment between the member organizations thus becomes more likely if this arises in a bottom-up way. It starts in smaller groups and then reflects on other levels in the consortium. Also cooperation between a limited number of members, instead of all members, can increase the commitment, since members that are not committed to a specific type of activity are not ‘forced’ to take part.

Conclusions: transnational actors as organizations In conclusion, we argue that the management of transnational actors or organizations is a combination of employing mechanisms for increasing institutional fit in combination with ‘relationship management’, that is the facilitation of the rise of commitment through communication and organization. Obviously, the more complex mechanisms have a more substantial influence on cooperation, but also require higher levels of trust and commitment between members. The lack of willingness or ability to be involved in close and intense cooperation is related to the institutional contexts in which the universities operate and have developed. We have used this institutional perspective to support the notion that members in a consortium also have to share some similarities in order to cooperate. This proposition was based on the assumption that universities are, much more than firms for instance, embedded in their (nationally and organizationally moulded) institutional contexts. The study has shown that this assumption does not have to be rejected. The impact on cooperation is, however, less straightforward than we expected. We have seen that different institutional forms influence cooperation in different ways. In all consortia that we have studied, the impact of centralized institutional forms such as national laws and organizational rules were perceived to have a negative impact on cooperation. This was much less the case for decentralized institutional forms like culture, norms and beliefs. The latter were seen by many as one of the interesting factors involved in cooperation. Academic and cultural diversity therefore can – with the right attitude – be a main source of complementarity instead of incompatibility. We have also observed (see Beerkens, 2004) that non-academics seem to place more emphasis on the institutional differences in their assessment of the performance of the consortia (while academics seem to place more emphasis on complementarity factors). This would mean that the institutional embeddedness of the university is more apparent in the eyes of

188

Eric Beerkens

non-academics than academics. This could be explained by the reasoning that the activities on which academics cooperate are of a more universal nature than is the case for non-academics. In general, we have seen that there is not a strong relationship between performance and compatibility. Only in cases where institutional fit between the universities is perceived as low, has this hampered cooperation. This leads to the conclusion that a minimum level of institutional fit is required, but the universities and their staff are very well capable of handling obstacles that arise due to incompatibility. On the other hand, we have also observed that most consortia do not pursue very close cooperation and tight integration. It is likely that if the intensity of cooperation increases, the discrepancies in institutional contexts will become more apparent and obstructive to cooperation. In this regard, it is useful to remain focussed on compatibility factors in cooperation, especially in cases where tight integration is foreseen, such as (private) joint ventures set up by universities from different countries and (future) mergers between higher education institutions from different countries. The results do not necessarily point to a convergence of the institutional contexts of universities. On the contrary, the differences in national institutional contexts are still widely apparent and substantially influence the activities of universities in the eyes of the respondents in this study. What can be observed, however, is that universities also become embedded in regional contexts (i.e. the European context). Naturally, this regional institutional context is likely to become a bigger influence in the case where regional institutions are stronger. Even though the national context is evidently predominant, for European universities the regional European context has an increasing influence on a university’s behaviour. The consortia that were very much connected to regional (political) institutions and that had adapted their activities to the programmes and policies (and the available funding) of these institutions (e.g. the European programmes for mobility and cooperation) seem to be more successful. Therefore, as in organizational studies, where adaptation to the external environment of organizations is seen as an important determinant in an organization’s performance, this argument can be extended to the consortia as well: European higher education consortia that adapt to their European environment are more successful. Internally, higher education consortia can also be approached from an organizational point of view. If we look at higher education consortia as a specific type of organization, we can detect characteristics that are also typical for universities. Van Vught (1989: 52–4) in this respect points to the authority of professional experts, the knowledge areas as the basic foci of attention and the related organizational fragmentation, and the extreme diffusion of decision-making power. These characteristics are also apparent in higher education consortia. The leadership-driven character of these consortia can then partly explain the dissatisfaction found by academics within them. Activities that correspond with values in ‘academia’ (e.g. cross-cultural exchange, exchange of knowledge) therefore seem to be more successful than activities that emerge out of pressures for efficiency and effectiveness.

Transnational actors in the EHEA 189

References Baum, Joel A. C. and Dutton, Jane E. (1996) ‘Introduction: the embeddedness of strategy’, Advances in Strategic Management, 13: 1–15. Beerkens, Eric (2002) ‘International inter-organisational arrangements in higher education: towards a typology’, TEAM Tertiary Education and Management, 8: 297–314. —— (2004) Global Opportunities and Institutional Embeddedness, Higher Education Consortia in Europe and Southeast Asia. Enschede: CHEPS. Ceri Jones, Hywel (1991) ‘Promoting higher education’s contribution to the developing European Community’, Prospects, 21(3): 443–54. Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2003) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework, Oslo: ARENA. Available http://www.arena.uio.no/events/papers/ Checkelpaper.pdf (accessed 20 June 2004). Confederation of EU Rectors’ Conferences (CERC)/Association of European universities (CRE) (1999) The Bologna Declaration on the European Space for Higher Education: En Explanation, Geneva: CERC/CRE. Deutsch, Karl W. et al. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the light of Historical Experience, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. DiMaggio, Paul (1990) ‘Cultural aspects of economic organization’, in Roger Friedland and A. F. Robertson (eds), Beyond the Marketplace: Rethinking Economy and Society, New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 113–36. —— (1994) ‘Culture and Economy’, in Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg (eds), The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 27–57. Granovetter, Mark (1985) ‘Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology, 91(1): 480–510. Haas, Ernst B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe, Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957, London: Stevens and Sons. —— (1961) ‘International integration: the European and the universal process’, International Organization, 15: 366–92. Ingram, Paul and Clay, Karen (2000) ‘The choice-within-constraints new institutionalism and implications for sociology’, Annual Review of Sociology, 26: 525–46. Ingram, Paul and Silverman, Brian S. (2002) ‘Introduction: the new institutionalism in strategic management’, Advances in Strategic Management, 19: 1–30. Neave, Guy (2000) The Universities’ Responsibilities to Society: International Perspectives, Amsterdam: Pergamon. Nee, Victor and Ingram, Paul (1998) ‘Embeddedness and beyond: institutions, exchange and social structure’, in Mary Brinton and Victor Nee (eds), The New Institutionalism in Sociology, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 19–45. North, Douglass C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nye, Joseph (1970) ‘Comparing common markets: a revised neo-functionalist model’, International Organization, 24: 796–835. Polanyi, Karl (1944) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, New York: Rinehart. —— (1957) ‘The economy as instituted process’, in Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson (eds), Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory, New York: Free Press. Stone Sweet, Alec and Sandholtz, Wayne (1998) ‘Integration, supranational governance, and the institutionalization of the European Polity’, in Wayne Sandholtz and

190

Eric Beerkens

Alec Stone Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–26. Swedberg, Richard (1991) ‘Major traditions of economic sociology’, Annual Review of Sociology, 17: 251–76. Vught, Frans van (1989) Governmental Strategies and Innovation in Higher Education, London: Kingsley. Wächter, Bernd, Ollikainen, Aaro and Hasewend, Brigitte (1999) ‘Internationalisation of higher education’, in Bernd Wächter (ed.), Internationalisation of Higher Education: A Paper and Seven Essays on International Co-operation in the Tertiary Sector, Bonn: Lemmens, pp. 11–76. Wende, Marijk C. van der (2000) ‘The Bologna Declaration: enhancing the transparency and competitiveness of European higher education’, Higher Education in Europe, 25: 305–10. Wende, Marijk C. van der and Huisman, Jeroen (2004) ‘Europe’, in Wende, Marijk C. van der and Jeroen Huisman (eds), On Co-operation and Competition: National and European Policies for the Internationalisation of Higher Education, Bonn: Lemmens, pp. 17–50. Zukin, Sharon and DiMaggio, Paul (1990) Structures of Capital: The Social Organization of the Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

9

Copweb Europe Venues, virtues and vexations of transnational policing Monica den Boer

Introduction This chapter discusses the emergence of transnational policing patterns in the European Union (EU). General processes such as Europeanization and globalization have provided incentives for the evolution of transnational governance, as the editors also demonstrate in the introduction to this book. In turn, this is beginning to have a pervasive effect on the criminal justice arena, especially since terrorism has been framed as a transnational and networked threat that is in need of a global response. Transnational policing in the European Union has had the possibility to mature because member states compensate their resistance against the creation of supranational law enforcement agencies by being tolerant about other forms of cross-borderization which are less detrimental to national sovereignty. There are, however, continuous frictions between the call for more centralized coordination at national level and the pragmatic need to develop flexible cooperation practices at the decentralized level. In this chapter, we will first undertake a theoretical analysis of the pendulum between the maintenance of national sovereignty and the development of transnational cooperation practices in the EU criminal justice arena. In the second section, a number of transnational policing practices that are currently unfolding within the Europen Union are discussed. Salient practices of transnational policing include, on top of the creation of official bodies such as the EU Police Office (Europol), the exchange of liaison officers between national authorities, transnational private policing, the exchange and imposition of best practices, the transnationalization of public order policing and police participation in international humanitarian peace missions. The third section looks at two research projects that have analysed the development of transnational policing practices. The first concerns Europeanization tendencies in the national law enforcement organizations of the EU member states. In particular, it looks at the convergence hypothesis, which starts from the assumption that EU legislation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs ( JHA) cooperation demands a certain level of approximation between working practices and organizational structures, which could eventually mean that organizations begin to adopt similar features. The second theme is the development of mostly informal practices of cross-border policing in

192

Monica den Boer

European border regions: here, transnationalism is pragmatically developed on the basis of common needs (Spoormans et al., 1999). One of the interesting dimensions concerns the interaction between those border practices and the institutions that carry a formal mandate to take part in international mutual legal assistance. The chapter concludes by raising a number of critical questions concerning the emergence of transnational policing practices, which includes the observation that within and between transnational police networks, the coordination of activities and the harmonization of professional standards is hard to achieve. Moreover, the proliferation of transnational police networks may be ill at ease with good governance requirements, such as the need for transparency and accountability.

How to define transnational policing? In order to describe what transnational policing is and how it should be considered, it is necessary to introduce a few more general concepts which are related to transnationalism, governance and the state, which is the political-administrative context in which the police organization traditionally operates. At the same time, the analysis of changes in policing can tell us more about fundamental changes in styles of governance, as policing is one of the core functions of government and governance, in general. In the field of European police cooperation, two styles of governance have intermingled: on the one hand, there is still a strong presence of informal bilateral or multilateral policy-making, and on the other hand there is an emphasis on formal policy-making through the creation of legal-regulatory frameworks. The former style could be characterized as transnational police governance, whilst the latter tends to be more associated with intergovernmental police governance, which is often subject of institutionalization such as Interpol and Europol. These two styles of police governance, which are regarded as ‘horizontal’ versus ‘vertical’ policing are not juxtaposed, but tend to be complementary. At the same time however, as we will see later, they may operate on and across contested borderlines (den Boer and Spapens, 2002: 17). Horizontal police cooperation – even if based on formal legal frameworks that for instance authorize operational actions across the national border (such as the Schengen Implementing Agreement) – tends to be more ad hoc and focussed on specific cases, and a much closer link seems to exist with local and regional issues. Within the European Union, there are various examples of long-established informal cross-border networks of officials from customs and diverse police forces, and of the regionalization of bilateral security regimes (Nogala, 2001b: 137), such as the Cross Channel Intelligence Conference (Sheptycki, 1998). These networks are generally constructed on the basis of personal acquaintance and personal trust, and are primarily used to exchange information (Nogala, 2001b: 137; den Boer and Spapens, 2002). Trust and reciprocity tend to be key ingredients for the establishment of a successful transnational (law enforcement) network (Anderson, 2002: 37).

Copweb Europe 193 Vertical police cooperation on the other hand, seems to be much more a product of elite bureaucracies, which are traditional, formal and hierarchical in nature. Seen from the perspective of a multi-level governance model, the layers of cross-border (horizontal) police cooperation can be found beneath (or alongside) ‘the level of high politics and head offices’ (Nogala, 2001a: 97). In between the vertical and horizontal levels of police governance, powerful policy networks (e.g. on organized crime) arise out of frustration with the slow EU bureaucracy. These concern themselves with coordinating an effective response to serious and organized crime at the global level, working through international organizations at the policy and operational level (Norman, 1999: 104). Examples of these are the EU Multidisciplinary Group on Organized Crime, the G8 Senior Experts Group on Organized Crime (known as the Lyon Group), and the Council of Europe’s Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption, which are all contributing to inter-organizational governance in the field of organized crime (ibid.: 115). Without much conscious steering or management, police organizations have had a long tradition of exploring and developing professional ties across the national border, partly out of need, partly because of the fun. Some sociologists even maintain that there may be something like a global ‘cop culture’, in which professional police agents tend to recognize each other’s discourse and behaviour. According to Reiner (2000: 87) however, despite the commonalities brought about by socialization and the transmission of stories, myths, jokes and the exploration of models of good and bad conduct, the culture of the police is neither monolithic, universal nor unchanging. But as Hebenton and Thomas (1995: 195) observe, all police officers are knowledge workers, ‘spending increasing amounts of time producing and communicating knowledge for their own systems of risk management and security provision’. The increased need for knowledge production and distribution have thus facilitated transnational pioneering practices and the establishment of professional epistemic communities, which are also discussed by Karen Heard-Lauréote (Chapter 2, this volume). In many ways, this has had the result that police organizations have a significant advance compared to other agents in the criminal justice chain, such as judges and public prosecutors. Moreover, the establishment of international epistemic communities, which is driven by the need to share knowledge and information, has been parallelled by the transnational law enforcement discourse concerning the ‘war against drugs’ (Sheptycki, 2000a: 201). In addition, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the terrorist train bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004, have fuelled the ‘war against terrorism’. Other potent discourses concern organized crime, compensatory measures against the security deficit resulting from the abolition of internal border controls, and immigration control (Aden, 2001: 105; Sheptycki, 2001: 145). In parallel with the development of new forms of governance, the gradual ‘hollowing out’ of the state (Rhodes, 1997) is also affected by processes of transnationalization. The move away from interstate politics may erode the sovereign power of the nation-state (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999: 4), and as a side effect, the police organization traditionally so deeply embedded within the nation-state

194

Monica den Boer

becomes a plural agent in a looser, less hierarchical administrative context. Typical features of this development are a growth of organizational autonomy and more interlinkage with other societal organizations. However, it should be acknowledged that, especially when it comes to questions related to internal and external security, states are still the important institutions in global politics (Sheptycki, 2000b: 6). In conceptualizing transnational policing, we also need to understand the role and influence of sub-state actors and even of non-state actors. Globalization has created enhanced opportunities for non-state actors to develop cross-border activities. As such, a multi-level governance model of policing is also beginning to emerge in several West-European states, as will be demonstrated further in the analysis of Euregional policing. Traditionally, policing is principally defined as the exercise of coercive power and the monopoly of violence in the maintenance of the internal social order of the state’s territory (Sheptycki, 2000b: 9). More widely, however, policing is concerned with the management of security in the important sense of guaranteeing that communities and territories are secured. A range of agents, including the state police, private citizens and commercial companies ( Johnston, 2000b: 210) may thus take part in ‘policing’. The subject of policing may include both territory and population, and it may be either public or private in nature (Sheptycki, 2000b: 11). Also, the subject of policing itself has become more transnational. Security concerns have been considerably redefined as a consequence of globalization. States have had to recognize that ‘internal security’ can no longer be dealt with nationally (Alain, 2001): In particular it has become increasingly difficult for individual states to exercise monopoly power over who resides on their territory, or over the movement of persons (migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers) across state borders, or over unlawful cross-border movements of, for example, criminals. International migration and cross-border crime, both major societal issues, have become the subjects of transnational regime-building. (Wallace, 2000: 49) Hence, newer targets of policing are transnational organized crime, the war on drugs and counter-terrorism. Moreover, law enforcement agencies are confronted with the effect of globalization in the communities policed by them: these communities are increasingly less homogeneous or even fragmented. An added feature is that increased individualization leads to more anonimity (especially in urban areas); the consequence of these developments is that the police no longer seem to ‘know’ their community. In the post-modern era, police and security organizations are confronted with a society that is changing fundamentally, which is characterized above all by increasing fragmentation and pluralism (Reiner, 2000: 216). Further, in line with the upsurge of neo-liberal politics, the state tends to recline and actively unfolds strategies of distanciation in the form of privatization ( Johnston, 2000a) and ‘responsibilization’ (Garland, 2001: 124f.). Policing

Copweb Europe 195 thus represents an ‘extended policing family’, by entrusting private security guards and neighbourhood wardens with the monitoring of security (Crawford and Lister, 2004). Against the background of a far more diffused array of policing processes (Sheptycki, 2000b) the police organization no longer reflects or symbolizes a cohesive social order which no longer exists (Reiner, 2000: 217). Even though new communities frequently concentrate around the theme of security (Boutellier, 2002: 90ff.), their stability and homogeneity seem rather feeble, which constitutes a real test-case for ‘policing by consent’. The international demand to tackle organized and serious crime, together with the re-scaling of policing activities at an increasingly central level, could therefore better be approached as a set of interlinked discourses. These discourses, which are closely related to political influence, massage law enforcement services into the direction of the transnational stage, which may imply a gradual move away from the local community (Bigo, 2000: 84). The subject of policing is largely determined by transnational crime control agendas: international connections between crimes and crime categories are continuously under construction. International law enforcement efforts – including implementation of international legal agreements – contribute to the common denomination of crime and disorder (Gregory, 2000: 117). Recent examples within the European Union are the EU arrest warrant which facilitates the extradition of suspects of 32 different criminal offences and the Mutual Legal Assistance Convention. Vehicles for the transportation of this transnational – sometimes nearuniversal – crime discourse are organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union, who announce their joint strategies by means of joint action plans against organized crime, terrorism, corruption or trafficking in human beings. Transnational policing is thus shaped by three factors: a fragmented legal frame and the consequent weak purview of legal norms; a priority of desperation (especially coming from geopolitically dominant states) that asserts that state sovereign power must be preserved; and a moral logic which provides the justification for the extra-territorial extension of formerly nationally bound police institutions into the transnational realm. This is a potent mix and there is seemingly no democratic mechanism to guide the process. (Sheptycki, 2000b: 168)

Forms of transnational policing The practice of international police cooperation tends to be rather incrementalist, both in policy-making terms as well as in operational terms (den Boer and Wallace, 2000: 518; Walker, 2000). There are various examples of transnational policing that have come into being, such as the exchange of liaison officers, the operationalization of joint investigation teams, the growth of transnational private policing and the dissemination of police knowledge. Liaison officers are seen as the ‘human interface between various national police forces’ (Bigo, 2000: 74) even to the extent that they have become the

196

Monica den Boer

human interface for data interconnection in order to avoid misuse of data files. Zagaris (2002: 156) writes that there has been a trend to expand the use of specialized liaison officers by the USA and other countries in areas like drug trafficking, customs, immigration, tax and counterfeiting. The most important tasks are the management of data flows and acting as the cultural-linguistic broker between different law enforcement practices. Also, as Zagaris (ibid.) maintains, liaison officers are crucial ‘to the success of selecting and conducting transborder criminal investigations and helping to prosecute transnational criminals’. Bigo (2000: 67) argues that the principles of free trade and free movement have made the liaison officer role crucial for policing in Europe, because it is they who manage the flow of information between their respective agencies: ‘Indeed, police, customs and immigration agencies have all sought to develop specialist liaison officers and the development of various bilateral and multilateral agreements have more or less codified these emergent networks.’ Liaison officers thus reinforce the interconnection between these agencies (ibid.). What characterizes (police) liaison officers is often their multilingual capacity, their past successful endeavours and their professional perspective as knowledge workers (Bigo, 2000: 73). Moreover, they tend to belong to an elitist world which is at the margins of the police world (ibid.). Examples of police liaison officers are officials seconded by foreign law enforcement organizations to diplomatic services, international police organizations such as Interpol and Europol, and bilaterally between all EU countries, for example in the Schengen framework. In the wake of the attacks on 11 September 2001, two liaison officers from each EU member state, one from the police service and one from the intelligence service, were seconded to Europol (den Boer, 2003: 199). Moreover, counterterrorism liaison officers and magistrates were exchanged between the USA and Europol and Eurojust respectively (ibid.: 201). Well documented is the stationing of liaison officers in Europe by the American law enforcement agencies: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (Nadelmann, 1993; Zagaris, 2002: 156) a practice which has grown since the Second World War. The DEA had 77 offices in 56 countries, whose mission includes the conduct of bilateral investigative activities, the coordination of intelligence gathering, the engagement in foreign liaison, the coordination of training programmes for host country policy agencies and the assistance in the development of host countries counternarcotics law enforcement institutions (Zagaris, 2002: 157). Activities by liaison officers do not go unnoticed by host authorities but are allegedly not always easy to control: undercover and surveillance are methods frequently used by liaison officers, and it is difficult to check whether and to what extent they hand over information required by them to their host country counterparts. One of the most significant problems – seen from an accountability perspective – is that most foreign liaison officers enjoy diplomatic or consular immunity (ibid.: 168); this has also been the case in relation to liaison officers stationed at Europol, but this may be subject to change.

Copweb Europe 197 The inception of joint investigation teams illustrates a new development that is currently taking place in the European criminal justice arena (den Boer and Spapens, 2002: 18). A legal basis for the creation of joint investigation teams within the European Union forms the Convention of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, which was adopted by the JHA Council in May 2000. Joint investigation teams may be established on the basis of a prior agreement between the competent authorities of EU member states. Furthermore, they are created for a specific purpose and for a certain amount of time. Different agencies can be represented within a joint team: police officers, customs officials, members from prosecution agencies, but also members from EU organizations, such as officials from the Office de la Lutte Anti-Fraude (OLAF ), Europol and Eurojust, and officials from non-EU countries as well as other international organizations like Interpol. Interestingly here, we may observe an intermeshing between vertical and horizontal international policing arrangements. OLAF is an agency of the European Commission primarily charged with investigating fraud against the European Union. Europol was established by virtue of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union which entered into force in 1993 and became operational in July 1999. The objective of this agency, which is based on an intergovernmental footing, is to gather and synthesize intelligence from the EU member states on serious and organized international crime, such as drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Its future supportive role in the joint investigation teams will lend it semi-operational power. Eurojust, meanwhile, was established in the aftermath of the Tampere Summit on JHA cooperation in the European Union in October 1999. Its objective is to act as the judicial counterpart of Europol and to coordinate criminal investigations into serious and organized international crime via the nationally responsible prosecution authorities (House of Lords, 2004). As well-established EU organizations, they will gradually be vested with further powers and become increasingly integrated in the formal EU governance structures. The new EU Constitutional Treaty contains the intention to establish a European Prosecution Office from Eurojust (den Boer, 2004). Returning now to the issue of the EU joint investigation teams, the territorial link is that such a team is stationed where it has been established – this will be in the EU member state where the most substantial part of the investigation takes place. A joint investigation team will be supervised by an official from that particular country. When the team is no longer active within a member state, the team leadership may change. The team is required to respect the law of the country in which it operates. This development illustrates the increasingly inter-territorial character of law enforcement cooperation, which implies that accountability will become a complex issue as it is divided between different agencies with diverse mandates and competencies. Joint investigation teams are a combination of interconnections between different levels of regimes (Aden, 2001), which can be seen as one of the principal characteristics of multi-level governance.

198

Monica den Boer

Transnational private policing takes place by or within multinational companies, for example, private security guards employed by multinational firms, corporate security specialists (e.g. industrial espionage but also cybermonitoring of employees). Johnston (2000b: 22) mentions the fact that the commercial security market is dominated by a small number of transnational companies: ‘These multifunctional organisations form complex transnational security networks by virtue of the interaction of their parent companies and branch plants with other commercial and non-commercial security providers.’ The market which covers these activities – including manned guarding, cash-in-transit, electronic systems, Circuit Camera Television (CCTV) and access control – transcends and penetrates the state, and is undergoing significant growth (ibid.: 24). Risks have become big business (Boutellier, 2002: 40). In his research, Johnston (2000b: 31) noted that there are several interstices between commercial security, government and the military through the personal curriculum vitae of private consultants, which obviously has a bearing on accountability questions (see further). The previously mentioned erosion of the sovereign nationstate may well contribute to the freeing of control of bureaucracies from legal limits imposed by frontiers, and the scope for private actors may be enlarged to build remote social control policies (Bigo, 2000: 95). Another form of transnational policing is the dissemination of police knowledge. In some cases it can be demonstrably argued that the convergence of police knowledge, policing practices and policing models is directly linked to international cooperation. Investigation strategies are a very telling example. Undercover investigation has been repeatedly promoted by international cooperation agencies. Avant-garde countries for undercover policing, especially the USA ( . . . ) and to a lesser degree Germany, have used international circles and organizations to promote or even to impose their concepts for policing. Common operations, for example in cases of international drugs trafficking, have led to standards for the steering of investigations by undercover means. Police cooperation circles not only diffuse the knowledge about undercover policing, but they also play a coordinating role. (Aden, 2001: 101) Hence, the promotion of intelligence models through transnational policing practices implies a sharing of police knowledge (see Sheptycki, 1998; quoted in Manning, 2000: 181; Sheptycki, 2001: 148; Schimmelfennig, Chapter 3 in this volume). The emergence of a transnational law enforcement bureaucracy revolves around certain synergies, which are apparent from the creation of compatibility in computerization, models for intelligence-gathering and the employment of police techniques (fingerprint searches, DNA, firearms) (Anderson, 2002: 38). In this regard, the evolution of international police education and police research plays an essential role in the transmission of knowledge and experience. The stepwise creation of CEPOL – the European Police College established by virtue

Copweb Europe 199 of the Tampere European Council in October 1999 – proves that at the national level, reflection has seriously begun on taking part in the construction of international curricula. Once this comes off the ground in a more wholesome fashion, police officers throughout Europe will enjoy the possibility of internationaling their professional knowledge of police systems, police techniques and criminal law. Courses and seminars will offer a perfect environment for further transnational socialization, a concept discussed in much greater detail by Frank Schimmelfennig in this volume, and for the development of transnational law enforcement networks, as has already been practice through other international policing arenas (e.g. the International Police Association).

Convergence: towards a transnational law enforcement bureaucracy? Despite the diversity between police organizations in West-European societies, there is also convergence of the structures and functions of police organizations. In turn, this growing convergence could be regarded as the emergence of a transnational law enforcement bureaucracy. In part, this development results from the fact that national law enforcement bureaucracies have similar historical roots, but also from an exposure to similar functions and expectations (Aden, 2001: 100). A more recent development is the influence which national law enforcement bureaucracies experience from the European Union, in particular through the approximation of legislation and the standardization of working practices. An illustration of this development is the demand from the European Union that all EU member states create specialized units for criminal investigation and national anti-drugs units. This demand also percolates down into the national law enforcement bureaucracies through the global prohibition discourse against drugs (Castells, 1997). As a consequence, the apparatus of drug enforcement has become an integral feature in all the national policing systems of the European Union (Anderson et al., 1995: 161–4). The fight against drugs, but also against organized crime, terrorism and illegal immigration has infused the creation of national coordination facilities. Anderson (2002: 38) illustrates this by writing that ‘a centralising effect is evident in decentralised systems so that the contrast between forms of police organisation in the member states is not quite as marked as it was two decades ago. The setting up of the National Criminal Intelligence Service in Britain and the refusal to allow direct contact between the police forces of the German Länder (they must proceed via the (federal level) Bundeskriminalamt) are two examples’. Centralization tendencies do however not stand alone. Johnston (2000a: 26ff.) argues that globalization ‘gives rise to inconsistent and sometimes contradictory patterns’. On the one hand, the role of national ministries and home affairs has been reinforced as the steering agent of coordinated cooperation across borders; and on the other hand, these same agents are faced with a diminishing capacity to manage their internal security affairs independently. Paradoxically, therefore, centralization can be parallelled (as we will see in the next section) by regionalization

200

Monica den Boer

and localization. ‘The result of globalization is not uniformity but an unstable combination of tendencies: centralisation and decentralisation; internationalisation and nationalism; homogeneity and diversity; fragmentation and consolidation’ (ibid.: 29). In our research project we sought to analyse the extent to which the focus on international organized crime provided a catalyst in the Europeanization of national police and prosecution agencies (den Boer and Doelle, 2002). The surging awareness of the security challenge posed by organized crime has forced EU member states to acknowledge that only a joint approach in the control of international organized crime can be successful. At the EU summit in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999, the European Council approved the report on the finalization and evaluation of the High Level Action Group on Organized Crime, which had been adopted during the Dutch EU Presidency in 1997. The first recommendation of that Action Plan asked the member states to ‘. . . examine whether it would be appropriate . . . to designate a body at national level which would have an overall responsibility for the coordination of the fight against organised crime’. Several member states had already created such a coordination body before this recommendation came out, such as the national Anti-Mafia Directorate in Italy, which was created back in 1991 (ibid.: 14). The Helsinki report makes a mention of the fact that the implementation of the Action Plan suffered difficulties and delays. This prepared the ground for a follow-up to the Action Plan, which led to the adoption of a new programme, entitled ‘The Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: A European Union Strategy for the beginning of the new Millennium’. This programme covers the period until 30 June 2005, and contains 39 recommendations which enlarge and deepen many of the recommendations of the 1997 EU Action Plan. Only a few of those recommendations are expected to have some impact on the organizational structures and procedures of national law enforcement bureaucracies. One of those is Recommendation 10, which may have a noticeable impact on the standardization of working procedures in the field of illegal immigration networks: ‘Member States shall undertake, in close cooperation with Europol, the Commission and the European Judicial Network, to ensure that clear rules on the coordination of investigations into such networks are laid down at both the law enforcement and the judicial level’ (ibid.: 20). The step towards an increased compatibility between professional law enforcement working practices and the move towards structural convergence may however be hindered by various factors. One of those may be the existence of prejudices against foreign police systems. Anderson (2002: 39) even maintains that ‘mistrust or suspicion of the foreigner has been built into the foundations of modern police systems’. This may be a particularly sensitive issue in relation to intelligence-exchange (den Boer, 2002: 152). Another factor may be the tremendous variation between politico-administrative systems, in particular the reasons, the objectives, the reform trajectories and the methods of implementation can differ widely (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). Moves towards convergence between law enforcement organizations may however go unnoticed: organizational

Copweb Europe 201 changes towards central coordination and centralization may be an almost internal process which is hardly noticeable to the wider public. Specialization, coordination, centralization and the enlargement of scale are all reform trajectories which potentially contribute to the approximation between national law enforcement bureaucracies, but they are rarely homogeneous in nature. On the surface, reforms which are expected to contribute to a more efficient and effective international cooperation may even be contradictory. Some member states have simultaneously implemented a mixture of organizational schemes, varying from the creation of single-purpose units (e.g. units for the investigation of synthetic drugs or the hormone mafia), to the creation of (horizontal) coordination units that should guarantee the coherence of policy and services (den Boer and Doelle, 2002: 23). All these observations lead us to the conclusion that for the moment, the EU regulation has not yet significantly contributed to the convergence between national law enforcement bureaucracies (ibid.: 41), let alone to the establishment of a transnational law enforcement bureaucracy. A wider conclusion may be that the European Union may have the power to facilitate, but not to impose, the emergence of transnational policing. The European Union does however, with all the platforms it provides (such as the EU Crime Prevention Network, the JHA Council Working Groups, the meetings between the Heads of the National Intelligence Services, Europol, Eurojust, CEPOL and the Task Force of Chiefs of Police), significantly contribute to the growth of transnational law enforcement networks. As already observed by Heard-Lauréote in (Chapter 2, this volume), transnational networks can take various forms and shapes. For the moment, professional law enforcement networks that move at the EU level tend to be pragmatic and issue-related, and also generally elitist to the extent that mainly national officials who represent the higher echelons of the national law enforcement bureaucracies take actively part in those networks. We should, however, keep in mind that these professional networks are actors who are either governmental or who are mandated by their governments, and that they tend to be relatively influential on EU policy-making in the area of internal security (Norman, 1999). Within this context, formal representatives of government who take part in transnational police networks can be seen as mediators who transfer opinions, values and perspectives about police and security matters. Hence, although these networks are sites of strategic action, these are explicitly not the kind of networks that bypass national and intergovernmental channels. In contrast, in the next section, we will discuss the formation of professional networks in European border regions, between governmental actors (police officials) who primarily interrelate in an informal capacity.

Analysing transnational policing in European border regions In an empirical research project which looked at the complementarity between centralized and decentralized criminal investigations into (international) organized

202

Monica den Boer

crime, we learned that informal contacts across the border, networks and ‘horizontal’ patterns of information-exchange are crucial levers for cross-border law enforcement cooperation (den Boer and Spapens, 2002: 3). The leading assumption throughout the research was that cross-border law enforcement networking finds a fruitful basis in European border regions, which are often characterized by a common cultural background, linguistic code and common problems with criminality. The pre-judicial investigation of cross-border (organized) crime, which in most continental criminal justice systems is a priority of the police, can be facilitated by previously existing contacts between law enforcement officials across the national borders. Taking account of subsidiarity (distribution of responsibility between law enforcement agencies) and confidentiality (intelligence) requirements, we argued that even larger-scale cross-border investigations into organized crime tend not be dealt with at the supra-regional level even if, as in the example of Belgium, the authorization of a national magistrate is required for the execution of cross-border operations (such as a controlled delivery or a surveillance). Throughout the research, we established that cross-border law enforcement cooperation in European border regions can certainly be found, and in some areas it is even thriving, such as in the Euregion Rhine-Maas (Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany) and in the Channel (UK, Belgium, France and the Netherlands; Gallagher, 1998). But a preference for formal cooperation through the national channels may imply that investments are minimized and that there are misgivings about the more pragmatically driven direct cross-border cooperation: these may vary from concerns about the lack of coordination to concerns about a failing compliance with data protection requirements. Transnational criminal cases which are dealt with by regional law enforcement agencies are not investigated beyond the control of national authorities, but the interconnection between (Eu-)regionally investigated cases and (inter-)nationally investigated cases may sometimes be rather thin. In fact, with the exception of the occasional request for mutual legal assistance, there seems to be little interaction between formal procedures that are handled through (inter)national authorities (e.g. a Ministry of Justice, or Europol) and the execution of cross-border investigation competences. Network contacts in border regions also allow the relevant actors to be creative within the confines of the law, and to be pragmatically opportunistic. Within the Euroregion Maas-Rhine, for instance, five partner regions are involved in cooperation (South-Limburg, five municipalities in Middle-Limburg, Belgian Limburg, the German-speaking community in Belgium, the province Liège in Belgium and the Aachen region in Germany). In many respects, the police and judicial systems of the Netherlands and Germany are similar, to the extent that the sub-national level of police governance tends to be prominent and the involvement of central-national authorities in criminal investigation is limited. At the border between Germany and the Netherlands, there are hardly any linguistic problems, because most Dutch people who live in this region are capable of understanding, reading and speaking the German language; increasingly

Copweb Europe 203 also, German public officials who work at the border speak Dutch. Furthermore, people who live near the border master the same dialect. For the same linguisticcultural reason, cooperation between the Netherlands and the Flemish-speaking parts of Belgium tends to be no problem at all. Formal as well as informal contacts are upheld by both the Belgian and the Dutch police. Relations between the Dutch police and Belgian authorities are occasionally thwarted as the Dutch are apparently less inclined to pay attention to protocol. Like in Germany and the Netherlands, authorities at the sub-national level are also important in the investigation of organized crime, but national authorities are explicitly responsible for authorization matters and the deployment of technical equipment or surveillance units (Spapens, 2002: 55f.). One of the best-known forms of law enforcement cooperation in this area concerns the longstanding NEBEDEACPOL, which is a forum for Dutch– Belgian–German chief police officers. There are several other examples of crossborder law enforcement cooperation in this area, including the creation of liaison bureaux on either side of the Dutch and the German border; the joint training of Belgian, Dutch and German arrest teams; a joint Belgo-Dutch initiative to clean up the Maastricht ‘junky-park’; a joint agreement between Belgium and the Netherlands in 1994 which allows the Belgian police to exercise certain competences on the Dutch side of the river Maas and vice versa; the facilitation of direct Internet communication between notification rooms, joint patrols, and a joint training module for Dutch, German and Belgian operational police officers and their direct supervisors (van Twuyver and Soeters, 1999: 153). Regional network contact points have been established along the whole Dutch–Belgian–German border. In the Netherlands, these are called ICC (Informatie en Coordinatie Centrum); in Germany, they are called Verbindungsstellen, and in Belgium, they are called OIPGs (Operationeel Invalspunt Aan de grens). The ICC in Limburg-South was the first Dutch contact centre and was established on 29 March 1995, just after the entry into force of Schengen. Except informationexchange, the ICC functions as a help-desk, and provides support to all forms of operational cooperation and management. In particular, the informationexchange seems to be a thriving function of the ICC. The South-Limburg ICC cooperates directly with the OIPG in Genk and Eupen in Belgium, and with the Verbindungsstelle in Aachen for the German forces Aachen and Heinsberg. The so-called ‘European Multi Media Information’ (EMMI) project – which started in January 1996 with the financial support of the European Union (Verbeek et al., 1999: 26) and which also involves the Euroregion Rhine-Maas-North – has even helped to accelerate information-exchange across the border. The project involves direct cooperation between 4 different universities (Aachen, Liège, Maastricht and Diepenbeek) and 5 police forces (Mönchengladbach, Aachen, Genk, Limburg-North and Limburg-South) in the three countries involved. The four EMMI-products are: PALMA (an electronic form for requests to another country, e.g. about the antecedents of a suspect); a Euroregional kiosk (Euroregional translation of Digital representation system); video-conferencing which allows direct visual contact between police forces by means of video- and document

204

Monica den Boer

cameras; and e-mail, which allows direct electronic information-exchange within a closed network. Within the Netherlands, the EMMI network has been linked with the national police computer network (Police Data Computer System – PODACS). A transnational criminal investigation often starts with the discovery of a criminal fact, which then leads on to the investigation of a diversity of other criminal activities. In the ‘Alphabet’ case, for instance, which was initiated in 1998 by criminal investigation authorities in the Region Meuse-Rhine, a severely maimed body of a murdered person was discovered floating in the River Meuse. Evidence pointed to possible suspects in the Netherlands and Belgium and a request for mutual legal assistance was submitted to the Belgian authorities for the interception of telecommunications related to those suspects. As the case evolved, it became clear that the suspects were active both on Belgian and Dutch territory, which provided legitimate grounds for a close cooperation between the police and judicial authorities of those two countries. The criminal investigation gradually focussed on the production and smuggling of synthetic drugs. As it transpired, the suspects involved also maintained contacts with persons suspected of firearms trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering and the use of violence in conflict settlement, including murder. The criminal investigation concentrated both on the smuggling activities to Austria and Slovenia and on the shipment of chemicals via the Netherlands resulting in the manufacturing of the drug Ecstasy in a Belgian town. In both sub-cases, the cooperation amounted to a number of arrests and seizures, for instance of a courier in Germany (Spapens, 2002: 58–62). The case illustrates the sizeable number of actors involved in the transnational investigation of cross-border crime, and the span of control and coordination which it requires. Without a high level of interpersonal communication, this would not have worked. In the Euroregion Meuse-Rhein, the network of detectives tends to be tight, is based on personal relations, mutual trust and frequent contacts, propelled by the almost inherently international nature of most serious criminal offences in this region. The trust and reciprocity factors are crucial ingredients in this delicate context. Cooperation tends to be swift and adequate, because in the first instance, the requests for mutual assistance are handled in an informal manner. If there are many questions, detectives may visit their counterparts at the other side of the border, to discuss information or even to have a direct look at the files or reports. When certain information appears useful, a formal request for mutual assistance is submitted, which paves the path for a formal and legitimate handling of the evidence by a court at a later stage. The formal way is normally only used when no personal contacts are available, or when the political situation in the relevant country is unstable to the extent that the integrity of police and judicial officials cannot be guaranteed. In the latter situations, contact tends to be established through Interpol or Dutch liaison officers. Interestingly, during the Alphabet case discussed earlier, Europol was merely used to establish initial contacts with the authorities in Slovenia, Bosnia, France, Switzerland, Hungary, Austria and Spain. Transnational cooperation between police and judicial authorities in different countries may also give rise to semiformal procedures, such as the mutual signing of a ‘framework contract’

Copweb Europe 205 (convenant) allowing for the exchange of certain data, the exchange of team members, and the employment of special investigation methods for the duration of a certain criminal investigation (ibid.: 62–5). The case also demonstrates that the internationalization of criminal activity demands an open-minded police professional who is willing to open and maintain contacts with his or her colleagues abroad. Although it appears that the capacity of local or regional criminal investigation agencies does not match the vast action radius of international criminal networks, their operational knowledge and logistic means of operation cannot and will never be matched by officials who work for supranational law enforcement agencies such as Europol. Hence, the informal networking contacts between police officers across national borders still have undeniable advantages, such as the relative absence of bureaucracy and mutual trust. The development of decentralized and regional governance is seen as a way to bring the European Union closer to its citizens, which is the reason why the European Commission plays a pivotal role in mobilizing regional interests across the European Union. The European Commission’s White Paper on Governance, published in 2001, emphasizes the role of local and regional government (Hoetjes, 2002: 84). For the purpose of our research project, we interviewed several key actors who have experience with cross-border police cooperation. They expressed differing views and opinions about the need to decentralize and regionalize law enforcement cooperation across national borders. In line with this observation, it is not necessarily the case that local or regional elites seek to expand decentralized responsibility for issues with global ramifications, such as international terrorism and large-scale organized crime (see also de Vries, 2000: 219). Theoretical perspectives on transnational cooperation at the decentral level thus tend to accentuate the interdependency between law enforcement officials who are active at a decentral level and those who are active at the level of national coordination. The management of internal security is becoming such a complex, multidimensional governance arena that officials who perform cross-border investigations are exposed to several new challenges. They have to operate within an increasingly complex network of competent actors, both nationally and abroad; at different levels and domains of governance; within an extended chain of implementation; within a mixed and unstable environment of (strategic) partnerships and competition; and within a pluriform accountability environment (den Boer and Spapens, 2002: 18). In sum, this means that it becomes increasingly hard to draw a clear line between decentralized and centralized practices of cross-border policing. The networked professional is capable of maintaining working contacts at various levels at the same time. His or her cobweb becomes metaphorical for the transnational law enforcement arena within which he/she operates.

Conclusion: critical issues concerning transnational policing in Europe Transnational policing embodies a continuous tension between formal police cooperation agreements at the intergovernmental level (notably at the level of the

206

Monica den Boer

EU polity) and informal arrangements for police cooperation at the internal borders between EU countries. The question is to what extent transnational policing may be regarded as complementary with international police cooperation, which is more driven by the coordination between central/national law enforcement services? Transnational policing is based on an evolving international consensus and a growing international discourse, and it may thus expected to be more effective than the imposition of international policing through newly created institutions such as Europol. The failing contribution of member states to Europol (e.g. lack of transfer of intelligence) could well be read as resistance offered by national police organizations to the sharing of competence with international agencies. Rivalries, frictions, territorial struggles can all be interpreted as symptoms of a newly emerging governance, which will be far more complex than the former international law enforcement practices, and which will thus be far more demanding on the national coordination capacities. Another tension exists between transnational policing and good governance. Indeed, to what extent does the proliferation of transnational policing practices affect accountability? Transnational public policy processes are embedded in political institutions that are less clearly defined, and much less authoritative, than those of the traditional state – and this creates an imbalance of participation and access between public actors, but also infuses asymmetry and aggravates the lack of transparancy. Furthermore, the complex arena of international security management demonstrates that there is a lack of a unified legal framework (Sheptycki, 1998: 235). As a consequence of the proliferation of initiatives, culminating in a crowded policy space (Hebenton and Thomas, 1995: 38) internationally operating police officers may be Alices-in-Wonderland when it comes to applying the right instrument and the right code in unique and challenging situations. But despite Sheptycki’s scepticism (1998: 235) about the potential of supranational policing agencies such as Europol to homogenize police communications and police knowledge, police officials may not simply fall prey to a post-modernist fragmented governance. Indeed, several avenues towards legal harmonization and the standardization have been opened up by the European Union. In this regard, the common Schengen rules concerning the employment of cross-border police competencies at the internal border are a good illustration. This is not to argue that transnational policing will ever be fixed and settled in a neat administrative pattern. Rather, like policing itself, transnational policing will experience the continuous motion of a changing world society, which is increasingly global and networked in character. This chapter has also highlighted that more empirical research is required on a range of issues. First: who exactly are the agents who take part in transnational police networks? What is their mandate, their motivation, their influence on policy-making and operational practices? Are transnational police networks flexible and open, or rather stable and closed? Second: more reliable research is required on the interaction between formal and informal transnational police networks; do they compete or is there an increasing flow of information between

Copweb Europe 207 those channels? Third: what are the disadvantages of a crowded transnational policing arena? Are concerns about the lack of transparency justified or are they used as arguments against the exploration of non-intergovernmental cooperation initiatives? And finally: to what extent are transnational police networks similar to other transnational policy networks? Can we find evidence to support the assumption that police officers are the best-networked professionals in the European Union?

References Aden, Hartmut (2001) ‘Convergence of policing policies and transnational policing in Europe’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 9(2): 99–112. Alain, Marc (2001) ‘Transnational police cooperation in Europe and in North America: revisiting the traditional border between internal and external security matters, or how policing is being globalized’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 9(2): 113–29. Anderson, Malcolm (2002) ‘Trust and police co-operation’, in Malcolm Anderson and Joanna Apap (eds), Police and Justice Co-operation and the New European Borders, The Hague: Kluwer, pp. 35–46. Anderson, Malcolm, den Boer, Monica, Cullen, Peter, Gilmore, William C., Raab, Charles D. and Walker, Neil (1995) Policing the European Union, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bigo, Didier (2000) ‘Liaison officers in Europe: new officers in the European security field’, in J. W. E. Sheptycki (ed.), Issues in Transnational Policing, London: Routledge, pp. 67–99. Boutellier, Hans (2002) De Veiligheidsutopie, Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers. Castells, Manuel (1997) The Power of Identity, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Crawford, Adam and Lister, Stuart (2004) The Extended Policing Family: Visible Patrols in Residential Areas, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Den Boer, Monica (2002) ‘Intelligence exchange and the control of organised crime: from Europeanisation via centralisation to dehydration?’, in Malcolm Anderson and Joanna Apap (eds), Police and Justice Co-operation and the New European Borders, The Hague: Kluwer, pp. 151–63. —— (2003) ‘The EU counter-terrorism wave: window of opportunity or profound policy transformation?’, in Marianne van Leeuwen (ed.), Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 185–206. —— (2004) ‘Crime and the constitution: brief chronology of choices and circumventions’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 11(2): 143–58. Den Boer, Monica and Doelle, Patrick (2002) ‘Converge or not to converge . . . that’s the question: a comparative analysis of Europeanisation trends in criminal justice organisations’, in Monica den Boer (ed.), Organised Crime: A Catalyst in the Europeanisation of National Police and Prosecution Agencies?, Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, pp. 1–62. Den Boer, Monica and Spapens, Toine (2002) Investigating Organised Crime in European Border Regions, Tilburg: IVA/Universiteit van Tilburg. Den Boer, Monica and Wallace, William (2000) ‘Justice and home affairs: integration through incrementalism?’, in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 493–518.

208

Monica den Boer

De Vries, Michiel S. (2000) ‘The rise and fall of decentralisation: a comparative analysis of arguments and practices in European countries’, European Journal of Political Research, 38(6): 193–224. Eising, Rainer and Kohler-Koch, Beate (1999) ‘Introduction: network governance in the European Union’, in Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising (eds), The Transformation of Governance in the European Union, London: Routledge, pp. 3–13. Gallagher, Derek Frank (1998) European Police Co-operation: Its Development and Impact between 1967–1997 in an Anglo-French Trans-Frontier Setting, PhD, Hampshire: University of Southampton, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Politics. Garland, David (2001) The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gregory, Frank (2000) ‘Private criminality as a matter of international concern’, in J. W. E. Sheptycki (ed.), Issues in Transnational Policing, London: Routledge, pp. 100–34. Hebenton, Bill and Thomas, Terry (1995) Policing Europe: Co-operation, Conflict and Control, New York: St. Martin’s Press. Hoetjes, B. J. S. (2002) ‘Het decentraal bestuur en Europa: theorie, wens en realiteit’, Bestuurskunde, 11(2): 79–86. House of Lords, European Union Committee (2004) Judicial Co-operation in the EU: The Role of Eurojust, 23rd Report of Session 2003–2004, HL Paper 138, London: The Stationery Office Limited. Johnston, Les (2000a) Policing Britain: Risk, Security and Governance, London: Longman. —— (2000b) ‘Transnational private policing: the impact of global commercial security’, in J. W. E. Sheptycki (ed.), Issues in Transnational Policing, London: Routledge, pp. 21–42. Manning, Peter K. (2000) ‘Policing new social spaces’, in J. W. E. Sheptycki (ed.), Issues in Transnational Policing, London: Routledge, pp. 177–200. Nadelmann, Ethan (1993) Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of US Law Enforcement, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Nogala, Detlef (2001a) ‘Editorial’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 9(2): 97–8. —— (2001b) ‘Policing across a dimorphous border: challenge and innovation at the FrenchGerman Border’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 9(2): 130–43. Norman, Paul (1999) ‘European Union police policy-making and co-operation’, in Fergus Carr and Andrew Massey (eds), Public Policy in the New Europe: Eurogovernance in Theory and Practice, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 103–21. Pollitt, Chris, and Bouckaert, Geert (2000) Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reiner, Robert (2000) The Politics of the Police, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn. Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability, Buckingham and Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press. Sheptycki, J. W. E. (1998) ‘Police co-operation in the English Channel region 1968–1996’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 6(3): 216–35. —— (2000a) ‘The “drug war”: learning from the paradigm example of transnational policing’, in J. W. E. Sheptycki (ed.), Issues in Transnational Policing, London: Routledge, pp. 201–28. —— (ed.) (2000b) Issues in Transnational Policing, London: Routledge. —— (2000c) ‘Policing the virtual laundrette: money laundering and global governance’, in J. W. E. Sheptycki (ed.), Issues in Transnational Policing, London: Routledge, pp. 135–76. —— (2001) ‘Patrolling the New European (in)security field: organisational dilemmas and operational solutions for policing the internal borders of Europe’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 9(2): 144–60.

Copweb Europe 209 Spapens, Toine C. (2002) ‘Case report on the Euroregion Meuse-Rhein’, in Monica den Boer and Toine Spapens (eds), Investigating Organised Crime in European Border Regions, Tilburg: IVA/Universiteit van Tilburg, pp. 51–71. Spoormans, C. G., Reichenbach, E. A., and Korsten, A. F. A. (eds) (1999) Grenzen over: Aspecten van grensoverschrijdende samenwerking, Bussum: Coutinho. Van Twuyver, M. and Soeters, J. M. L. M. (1999) ‘Internationalisering bij de politie – politiesamenwerking binnen de Euregio Maas-Rijn’, in C. G. Spoormans, E. A. Reichenbach, and A. F. A. Korsten (eds), Grenzen over: Aspecten van grensoverschrijdende samenwerking, Bussum: Coutinho, pp. 145–55. Verbeek, Joop, van den Herik, Jaap, Plugge, Leo and de Roos, Theo (1999) Politie en Intranet: Normering van netwerkkoppeling en grensoverschrijdend gebruik van multimediale databases op een internationaal politieel intranet, Kluwer: Deventer. Walker, Neil (2000) Policing in a Changing Constitutional Order, London: Sweet & Maxwell. Wallace, Helen (2000), ‘The policy process: a moving pendulum’, in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39–64. Zagaris, Bruce (2002) ‘US practice in cross-border operations against transnational crime’, in Brice de Ruyver, Gert Vermeulen and Tom Vander Beken (eds), Combating Transnational Organised Crime, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn: Maklu, pp. 155–87.

10 Transnational consensus building in EMU economic governance Elite interaction and national preference formation Daniela Schwarzer Introduction Economic governance in the European Monetary Union (EMU) is based on a complex set of rules and procedures. While monetary policy is centralized with the European Central Bank (ECB), the member states retain autonomy in other important fields of economic policy-making. In order to avoid negative spill overs in the interdependent economies of the EMU and European Union (EU), various procedures and processes to coordinate national policies have been devised. These are the Stability and Growth Pact and the Excessive Deficit Procedure of the Maastricht Treaty which limit national fiscal discretion. In addition, various processes relying on soft coordination and voluntary policy alignment, such as the European Employment Strategy, the Cardiff Process on structural reform, the Macro-Economic Dialogue or the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment have been set up. The annual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) bring together the different approaches and economic policy objectives in a single framework.1 Whereas critical evaluations of the formal mechanisms of economic governance in the Eurozone and the efficiency of outcomes flourish (see e.g. von Hagen and Mundschenk, 2001; Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2001; Collignon, 2003), most studies neglect the informal transnational structures in which the coordination processes are embedded (but see Pütter, 2003; Schwarzer, 2003). This chapter contributes to filling this gap.2 It first explains why the application of a transnational lens to economic policy coordination can yield insights into the mechanisms of coordination that many other approaches to European integration would ignore for ontological and epistemological reasons. The chapter then turns to the Eurogroup. This informal meeting of the Economic and Finance Ministers, together with the committees preparing its work, fulfil important consensus-building functions among policy-makers in the Eurozone. However, this consensus is only the consensus of a small number of governmental and administrative decisions-makers. It is disconnected from national preference formation processes. Yet, a transmission of the elite consensus into broad public (national or transnational) debates is crucial for the Eurogroup, and for all processes of soft coordination to gain political salience – especially if they touch on sensitive policy

EMU economic governance

211

decisions. This leads to the question of how far a Eurozone-wide public space has emerged. In its last section, the chapter brings together the observations on elite consensus-building and transnational public debates in a simple model of decisionmaking concluding with hypotheses on the conditions under which these processes of transnational interaction reach political relevance in domestic and European policy-making.

A transnational lens on economic policy coordination in EMU The Eurogroup is at the core of economic governance in the Eurozone. It gathers the Economic and Finance Ministers and one State Secretary per member state together with the representatives of the European Commission and the ECB. The member states and their supranational agents, that is, the actors who are assigned the key roles in intergovernmental and supranational bargaining processes in the European Union, are usually studied with the widespread analytical approaches in the intergovernmentalist tradition. Given the actors studied, it may be surprising to cast a transnational view on the European Union, especially as transnational relations have been defined as regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a government or an intergovernmental organization (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 3). As the editors explain in greater detail in the introduction of this book, this volume is based on a broader concept of transnationalism than suggested in the course of the first and second debate on transnationalism, which developed among political scientists in the second half of the twentieth century. The first, dating back to the mid-1970s (see e.g. Keohane and Nye, 1977), attacked the statecentric bias of neo-liberal and realist theory, but did not conceptualize the actions and steering mechanisms independent from the nation-states and their international organizations in detail. In 1990s, in the light of the increasing activity of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) in a globalized world, the second debate triggered by Risse-Kappen (1995) circled around the question to which degree and how transnational organizations were autonomous actors in processes of global governance – in opposition to the traditional structures of sovereign states and the international organizations that states have constructed (see Rittberger et al., 1999 for an overview). Hence, a seeming dichotomy between state and non-state actors was constructed, leading many researchers to de facto treat transnational relations as occurring in a distinct sphere beyond the nation-states. Of course, ministers and civil servants are, by definition, job-wise representatives of national governments or international organizations. However, they can also act in a transnational manner. In the Eurogroup, the Economic and Finance Ministers are not involved in bargaining processes among fixed national positions, as would be the case in intergovernmental or supranational policy-making. As in the case of party cooperation (see Karl Magnus Johansson, Chapter 6, this volume) or transnational police cooperation (see Monica den Boer, Chapter 9, this volume), there are extremely close inter-relationships between these transnational

212

Daniela Schwarzer

informal networks, and the ‘official’ intergovernmental sphere. This volume hence treats the functional role of actors (rather than their formal status) as decisive for policy outcomes. This allows one to include state representatives who interact in networks or fora beyond the formally established institutions of intergovernmental consultations or supranational policy-making in the European Union. This is an asset as the transnational lens has much to offer to the investigation of policy areas. Approaches with an intergovernmental or supranational focus cannot satisfyingly explain the functioning and impact of this informal meeting of ministers. There is, in fact, no reason for liberal intergovernmentalists to assume that transnational interaction makes any difference for the economic governance of the Eurozone, given the rationalist preference model and the failure to provide analytical space for the idea that social interaction can have an impact on preferences. This is a weakness, because empirical evidence suggests that the Eurogroup has a crucial role at the core of the economic governance mechanisms in the Eurozone. It is not the institution where intergovernmental deals are struck, but it is the forum in which important consensus-building processes take place and shared evaluative backgrounds for the assessment of policy options are established. The Eurogroup is a forum in which the social reality of EMU is constructed. Research on transnational relations in International Relations and in EU studies, together with the increasing application of the constructivist approach, has provided tools to investigate this grey zone of interaction in the European Union. Transnationalism shifts the focus to developments beyond intergovernmental bargains, and analyses social interaction beyond the EU institutions. Policy transfer and learning, consensus-building and the impact of ideas are core concepts which transnational approaches to the study of integration build on. Bringing these insights together with the empirical case of EMU allows filling the research gap persisting to date.

A forum for transnational consensus-building and identity formation Despite assembling members of national governments, the Eurogroup is an informal forum. It is so far not mentioned in the EU Treaties, and has no formal decisionmaking power. The Eurogroup gets together on the night before the monthly meetings of the Ecofin Council to discuss developments in the Eurozone. Debates in the Eurogroup do not have to reach a formal compromise or joint conclusions. The course of debates and their results usually remain confidential. Press briefings do not follow a standardized pattern and no outcome is published in the official journal. Despite this lack of a formal status, of decision-making power and of formalized communication, participants in the Eurogroup and close observers emphasize its importance for economic governance in the Eurozone. A former Minister of Finance of an EMU member state revealed that ‘The Eurogroup was crucial from the start of EMU. When we came together first, we did not know what to do about economic governance in euroland. We started to debate, and we learned about it together’ (interview with the author).

EMU economic governance

213

Empirical evidence drawn from interviews suggests that the Eurogroup serves as a forum for controversial discussions. Interview partners have mentioned the following aspects in which learning processes and consensus-building occur and mutual understanding has increased. First, all actors have had to learn about the new environment in which fiscal and broader economic policy decisions are embedded since the start of EMU. They have had to understand the implications of a single monetary policy for national economic performance and policymaking. Going through this learning process together had the advantage of developing shared standards for the assessment of the Eurozone economy and of the impact of certain policy strategies. Norms, such as fundamental policy concepts play an important role in the assessment of adequate policy responses. For soft coordination to work, some kind of minimum consensus has to exist – if not, there is no common frame of reference. In EMU, the starting position was the institutionalization of a neo-liberal consensus through the Maastricht Treaty. However, the practical management of the Eurozone has led to a modification of this consensus towards acknowledging the stabilizing function of fiscal policies (for details see Hancké, 2003; Schwarzer, 2003). Second, a working relationship with the relevant partners was constructed, especially among the national governments and the ECB. The ECB emerged as a new player with the start of EMU in 1999 and patterns of interaction first had to be established among the monetary and the national fiscal authorities. According to Eurogroup observers, the possibility of an informal exchange of analysis and interpretation of economic developments in the Eurozone has enabled the Finance Ministers to better understand the ECB’s reasoning and allows them to better anticipate its manoeuvres or interpret its official communication – and vice versa. In its monthly bulletin of October 2000, the ECB for the first time positively appraised the existence of the Eurogroup. At the start of EMU, the ECB had been dismissive of this informal forum and did not participate on a regular basis until autumn 2000 (see Klau et al., 2000). Then, the attitude towards the meeting of the first ECB President, Wim Duisenberg, apparently changed. He judged the Eurogroup as follows: Well, if anything has changed, maybe it is the experience of working together with the Eurogroup, that is the 11 – now already 12 – Ministers of Finance, of engaging in a very constructive dialogue about all our policies, both monetary as well as economic and financial policies, once a month. It has developed, and still is developing, in the direction of a truly constructive dialogue. So, although in the beginning I may have been a bit skeptical about the significance of such a dialogue, I must say I increasingly appreciate it as a golden opportunity both to hear and to tell our, may I call them our political counterparts, what we think of them and what they think of us. (Duisenberg, 2 November 2000, ECB Press Conference) Third, the exchange within the peer group enables Finance Ministers to evaluate their policy choices against the background of developments in other member

214

Daniela Schwarzer

countries. This not only involves a comparison of the best practices. Given strong economic interdependencies in the Eurozone, member states became aware of the potential repercussions that economic policies in other member countries could potentially have on their economic performance. This increased their interest in the developments in other member states. Fourth, in case of conflicting interpretations and resulting policy strategies, the open exchange in the Eurogroup has allowed Finance Ministers to better understand the (political, institutional or economic) constraints of a partner who seemingly ignores the European interest with national policy choices. An example of this is the German and Austrian reluctance to support European legislation on the withholding of tax, which they felt undermined national legislation and traditions of bank secrecy. In fact, there are cases in which conflicts have been overcome through deliberation in the Eurogroup. The instances are probably the most valuable examples for the argument that the Eurogroup does make a difference, despite the absence of formal decision-making power. On several occasions, the Eurogroup has de facto pre-agreed Ecofin decisions, after being able to resolve points of contention on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. This was the case in 2002, when France wanted the EU balanced budget objective to be given up. It was also the case when Germany did not comply with the EU budgetary targets in 2002. The Eurogroup, involving the European Commission, reached a consensus that Germany had to correct its budgetary plans. Germany agreed and the informal accord in the Eurogroup prevented an application of the formal warning mechanisms and sanctions (see also Pütter, 2003).3 These incidents suggest that interaction in the Eurogroup makes a difference. However, little has been said on why it does, and where the limits are. Participants and observers identify four aspects that distinguish the Eurogroup from Council meetings. First, the group is considerably smaller, with about 25 participants, compared to 200 in the Council after the EU enlargement in 2004. Membership is restricted to two representatives per country. As a rule, the Commission and the ECB are ‘invited’ to participate, and the President or VicePresident of the ECB and the Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs and his Director-General usually do so. Second, the atmosphere is collegial and confidential, which enables members to table national concerns, to test ideas in their peer group, and to understand better what considerations drive the other member governments. Third, interview partners pointed to the fact that there is ample time for in-depth debate. As there is no hard deadline to end discussions, they often extend over dinner and late at night before the next morning’s Ecofin meeting. Fourth, the preparation provided for the discussion by the European Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) differ from the input into Council meetings prepared by the diplomats of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). In particular the Commission’s input and the comments that follow from the ECB President or his representative emphasize a Eurozone logic as a background against which the participants have to position themselves. Consensus-oriented behaviour is triggered by the fact that the member states have learned that they face truly common challenges given the strong

EMU economic governance

215

interdependencies in the Eurozone, and their immense uncertainty as to how to govern the Eurozone effectively. National interdependencies and the existence of public goods in EMU require joint decisions – but formal governing structures are non-existent. Informal processes of transnational elite consensus building have hence become an important part of economic governance in the EMU. However, problems of efficiency, democratic accountability and transparency remain unresolved. All five aspects (small group, confidentiality, time for exchange, Eurozoneoriented input into discussions, perceived need to act together) encourage deliberative processes that allow the members to establish common interpretations of the developments in the Eurozone. The confidential atmosphere encourages debates and allows actors to test positions and policies, and the small number of participants guarantees interactivity and arguing and persuasion processes which are a prerequisite for consensus-building. The Eurozone ministers can have a unique forum for an exchange of ideas, including those issues which will be tabled the next morning in the Ecofin in a much more formal manner and under the pressure of finding binding agreements. Social interaction has allowed for socialization processes and contributes to a slowly emerging Eurozone identity. ‘We were not thinking “European” when we first came together. We were thinking in national terms and especially in terms of national economies. We had to learn that the Eurozone is one economy with one currency.’4 In this volume, Frank Schimmelfennig defines international socialization as a process of inducting actors into adopting the constitutive schemata and rules of the EC. International socialization is not a process solely reserved for non-state actors though. It can apply to government representatives if the necessary space for social interaction is provided for. In the Eurogroup, these processes go even further than adopting schemata and rules. To an important degree, the rules and patterns of interaction first had to be created at the start of EMU. When the Eurogroup took up its work, treaties and legislation relevant to the economic governance of the Eurozone already existed. But these formal institutions left many questions unanswered which were relevant for the practical governance of the Eurozone. The making of a monetary union is a project, which is finished with the bargaining rounds establishing the Treaties. Creating a new monetary order involves intense social processes – on the elite level and in the broad public – enabling the construction of an EMU social reality.5 Empirical evidence suggests that the Eurogroup played an important role in the creation of informal rules and identities among the political elite. Interview partners involved in the Eurogroup or working very closely with its members have pointed to the importance of discussions in the Eurogroup to understand the implications of EMU membership, to learn to refer to the Eurozone as one European economy and to identify as members of the Eurozone. The socialization processes are not restricted to the Economic and Finance Ministers and their State Secretaries. The processes also apply to the members of the EFC and through them spill back into the national ministries. The Eurogroup includes top-level representatives from the ECB and the European Commission who can participate in the deliberative processes. Given the formal independence

216

Daniela Schwarzer

of the ECB and the lack of a European economic government facing it (as would be the case in a nation-state setting), the Eurogroup hence offers important dialogue structures. The ECB insists on its legal and political independence, but is very interested not to lose touch with the member states.6 Schimmelfennig’s socialization concept is particularly useful for analytically grasping the impact of the Eurogroup as it emphasizes some degree of rule adoption, that is, a process internal to the actor with the potential to ensure compliance. It is a fundamental characteristic of the Eurogroup that it does not dispose of coercive mechanisms to ensure that its members comply with decisions. The minimum requirement for Eurogroup decisions to make any difference is that the members have made these as their rules and comply with them despite the absence of external sanctions. These social learning processes rely on argumentative action, in which actors engage in discourses seeking to convince their peers with the help of a better argument. Other participants can be persuaded by the legitimacy of the validity claims involved. Also, a second of the four possible mechanisms of socialization, which Schimmelfennig identifies, can be observed in the Eurogroup. Given the closeness and regularity of interaction and the degree of trust involved, there is an important potential for social influence based on social incentives and disincentives to adapt behaviour. Many interview partners have pointed to the importance of peer pressure. Although peer pressure and processes of persuasion through arguing are closely interrelated, they are still two distinguishable forms of social interaction. In the Eurogroup, processes of persuasion are more important than peer pressure, as one important condition for peer pressure to work among politicians with an interest in re-election is absent – the publicity of naming and shaming.

The relevance of transnational elite interaction Looking at the conditions for Eurogroup members to establish a consensus among each other is without doubt important to understand the functioning of the Eurogroup: ‘The political impact of informal circles of ministers in the EU depends on their ability to trigger consensus formation among the involved actors . . . . [The] informal co-ordination structures only work effectively if the participants enact the group consensus elsewhere’ (Pütter, 2003). Undoubtedly, this point is correct. But the analysis should not stop here, as it tells us nothing about the conditions under which agreements among an informal group of Finance Ministers reach political salience for the formal decisions within the community structures or at the domestic level. Consensus-building failed on several occasions: either because deliberation did not bring about a consensual view of issues at stake, or because although the Finance Ministers agreed, the member states still behaved differently. Against this background, rationalist approaches to the study of economic governance in the EMU seem to have strong arguments to call into doubt the importance of the deliberative processes. Liberal intergovernmentalism argues that member states strategically interact only according to domestically defined national preferences, not because of some transnational elite

EMU economic governance

217

consensus. The most prominent example is the clash among the member states and with the European Commission over the question of whether the Stability and Growth Pact should be applied to Germany and France in November 2003. Both countries had failed to push their deficits below the prescribed ceiling of 3 per cent of GDP, and this for 3 years in a row. The Commission requested Ecofin to impose budgetary measures on the two countries and to threaten them with fiduciary sanctions in case of non-compliance. Neither the Eurogroup, nor the Ecofin reached a common position on this issue. Despite repeated and long sequences of deliberation, the Eurogroup was unable to build a consensus on how to deal with this issue. Interview partners indicated that a consensus existed on the idea that Germany and France should reduce budget deficits to the margin prescribed by the Treaty, and that this should at best happen quickly. There was a disagreement over the question of whether this process would be successfully sped up by applying the rules in a strict way, however. Whether or not the member states had a preference to sanction Germany and France depended on the individual countries’ expectation to be coerced themselves. The more likely that this could happen, the less likely they are to demand hard implementation of the rules. In addition, controversial understandings persisted on the issue of which scope of interpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact could be used without completely undermining this institution. Here, especially smaller countries such as the Netherlands or Austria insisted on sticking to the word of the Pact without using any scope of interpretation, in order not to bend the rules to accommodate large countries’ interests. The Ecofin did not adopt the Commission proposal (which would have required a qualified majority vote) and put the deficit procedure against Germany and France on hold. The decision left not only the Eurogroup and the Ecofin deeply divided, but also increased tensions between the Commission and those member countries which opposed its proposal. The dispute was settled legally by the European Court of Justice on 13 July 2004. The Court acknowledged the right of the Council to vote down a recommendation by the Commission, but at the same time annulled its decision to suspend the disciplinary procedure against France and Germany for repeatedly breaking the euro rules (see Hulverscheidt et al., 2004). While the Court ruling brought procedural clarification and strengthened the role of the Commission in the process of budgetary surveillance, it did not solve the underlying problem of preference formation processes and the limits of consensus building. Two further, though qualitatively different, empirical examples seem also to support the intergovernmentalist scepticism. In September 2000, the Eurogroup agreed not to lower taxes as a means to compensate for high oil prices, although pressure from interest groups, such as the trucker lobby, had mounted on several governments. Although the Finance Ministers of these countries were under considerable pressure to react, their peers in the Eurogroup convinced them that unilateral tax rebates would lead to unfair competition in the Eurozone and put pressure on other governments to engage in this race to the bottom. Agreeing to the fellow Finance Ministers in the Eurogroup meant privileging the Eurozone logic over immediate national consideration. However, a little later France, the

218

Daniela Schwarzer

Netherlands and Belgium decided otherwise, and granted tax rebates to their lorry drivers. Also in 2000, the Eurogroup ministers agreed to use unexpected tax revenues to reduce budget deficits, in line with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, which postulated that governments should attempt to reach a budgetary stance of close to balance or in surplus. This objective is part of the non-binding policy co-ordination in EMU and hence based on voluntary commitment by the member states. Accordingly, the decision by the Eurogroup on measures in line with this objective was likewise only based on voluntary commitment. The Eurogroup – including the French Minister of Finance and the Economy – reached a consensus on this issue. Nevertheless, France only months later defected from this objective. Finance Minister Christian Sautter, who tried to defend the consolidation promise domestically, was eventually ousted from his position. One explanation, which liberal intergovernmentalists would probably put forward, is to qualify the agreement in the Eurogroup as ‘cheap talk’. This view denies that any substantial consensusbuilding within the Eurogroup occurs. An alternative interpretation, for which empirical evidence was found in the course of this study, is the following: the Eurogroup functions successfully as a forum for consensus-building – but it involves the wrong people in the right place. The short history of the Eurogroup shows that whenever agreements were broken by the EMU member states, this involved domestic disputes within the government which opposed the Finance Minister (i.e. the participant in the Eurogroup) to the Head of State or Government. The Heads of State and Government are more strongly driven by domestic policy considerations, while the Finance Ministers through the Eurogroup tend to be more involved with questions related to the governance of the Eurozone that are less easily linked to domestic interest groups. The considerations by the Heads of State and Government (who are often also leaders of their political parties) are natural given the nature of domestic political systems. It is rational for government leaders to maximize their utility by behaving in a way which they think increases their chance of re-election (or their parties’ chances of winning regional or even local elections). And if their behaviour reflects the median voter’s preference – although it may violate the Eurogroup consensus and be economically inefficient – it is democratically legitimate. Of course, the Heads of State and Government are also involved in transnational networks such as European party organizations etc. These, however, are much less specialized than the Eurogroup, whose meetings take place more often, are more intense and more focused on a continuous debate on economic governance of the Eurozone. Hence, transnational networks, in which the Heads of State are involved, are likely to provide for less consensus-building processes than the Eurogroup.7 A transnationally constructed consensus among Finance Ministers which contradicts previously formulated national preferences will only influence member state behaviour if one of the following two conditions is met. Either, the decisionmakers involved in the consensus-building process have the power (and the preference) to impose this norm domestically – against the median voter’s preference.

EMU economic governance

219

This is unlikely in economic policy-making. Budgetary decisions, especially, are not only the responsibility of the Economic and Finance Ministers, but strongly influenced by the Heads of States and Government, the Parliament, regional entities, national budgetary rules, etc. Or, alternatively, the consensus receives public backing, which reduces the political costs of enacting this consensus. This case, however, is unlikely as transnational structures for consensus-building beyond the political elite are only emerging. If deliberation in the Eurogroup leads to a modification of the preference articulated by the Finance Minister present in the Eurogroup, peer pressure and learning processes have worked at the individual cognitive level of this specific national representative. The consensus may spread into national ministries, not only through the initiative of the minister, but also through the civil servants involved with the Eurogroup and through the EFC. But the path for this consensus to reach domestic political salience is long. Given the secrecy of interaction in the Eurogroup and the technicality of macro-economic policy-making, the transnational elite consensus-building processes are disconnected from public debates in the member states. As far as budgetary decisions are concerned, the Eurozone aggregate budgetary stance is economically relevant, that is, the question of how the overall aggregate budgetary balance suits the monetary policy stance of the ECB. Second, the national budgetary stance is relevant with regard to potential output and the development of the domestic price level. However, these abstract economic figures are not what elections are fought on. Here, individual measures such as income tax decisions, expenditure programmes and short-term growth and employment effects matter. These, of course, affect the macro-economic policy mix. But these effects are positive or negative in the mid- and long-term and not usually a matter of public debate. This dichotomy between long-term considerations of economic governance and immediate political considerations is a key to explain the limits to the political salience of a consensus in the Eurogroup. National Finance Ministers gathering in this informal forum may undergo an individual preference change as the result of deliberation. The reason can be the provision of new Eurozone data and forecasts by the European Commission, arguing with peers which may allow for an increased understanding of domestic policy processes in other member countries, a transfer of information regarding the other players in the coordination game (the ECB and the social partners involved in national wage setting) etc. This can change the evaluative background against which the actors judge domestic policy options. However, it cannot be assumed that the same information and the same arguments are accessible to the voters in domestic debates. But national preferences are still defined domestically in a bottom-up process taking into account the national interest groups, the median voter etc. This can disconnect the Finance Minister’s preference from the preference articulated by other members of the cabinet, and especially by the Head of State or Government. In the worst case, the Finance Minister defends a policy solution agreed upon in the Eurogroup, which may be economically efficient for the Eurozone, but democratically illegitimate and of course, nonbinding. This policy solution is then overruled by a national policy decision,

220

Daniela Schwarzer

which may be legitimate, binding – but economically inefficient given the new conditions of economic policy-making in the Eurozone. This has been illustrated by the two examples of tax rebates in view of the high oil price, and the case of the French ‘cagnotte’. For the Eurogroup, the same is true as for all other processes of soft policy coordination in EMU: structured and intensified social interaction and exchange of information does not guarantee domestic policy adaptation. Whether soft coordination contributes to policy change depends on its impact on the domestic preference formation process. Three phases of the political process can be distinguished: agenda setting, the definition of policy options and the formation of a preference for one of the policy options. For each phase, there are specific conditions under which, and channels through which, the behaviour of national policy-makers can be influenced. Phase 1 – Agenda setting The interaction with EU partners and the European Commission can modify the actors’ cognitive perception of problems to solve through new information, a modified understanding of causalities, shifts in dominant normative frames etc. However, the choice to put an issue (high) on the political agenda depends on the likeliness of the issue to gain interest and support in the domestic public. This, in turn, depends on the media interest in the issue, and the existence of counter-interests etc. Thus, soft coordination will modify the actors’ agenda setting, if the costs of not acting rise. Rising costs can result from the mediatization of positions other than the government’s, for example, through peer pressure or activities by the European Commission who can raise these issues for example, in the draft of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. An example of this channel of influence can be the increasing awareness of the German working population about the differences in public childcare provision and subsidies in other EU countries. Comparisons of the highly criticized German system with the Scandinavian or even the French model in leading newspapers and television programmes have raised the awareness about the need for reform. Phase 2 – Definition of policy options New knowledge or a new assessment of old knowledge may lead civil servants in national ministries and political leaders to enlarge or re-define the scope of policy options to tackle old or new problems. Peer review can have an impact on the cognitive level of the individual as an ‘incentive providing mechanism focusing on improving policy performance through de-politicized administrative learning and scientific arguing’ (Meyer, 2003: 10). Studies and reports issued by the European Commission can further enhance transparency on measures and their impact. The benchmarking process may also give trans-national networks of non-state actors such as interest groups, research institutes, epistemic communities and their respective policy suggestions, greater weight in public debates. Phase 3 – Preference formation The choice of a policy option is determined by its likeliness to win votes for democratically elected governments. As outlined above, policy choices consequently depend on support among interest groups, public support reflected in opinion polls, media attention etc. It thus becomes crucial how the attempts to influence national policy formulation from the EU-level are

EMU economic governance

221

decoded in national media. EU-coordination processes can have an influence if governments can exploit the pressure from the EU-level to justify policy decisions that the government may have put aside earlier given domestic opposition. Or, domestic opposition parties can exploit the pressure put on a national government and can hence incite the government to adopt different policies. Soft policy coordination as happens in the Eurogroup and the Committee assembling national civil servants can hence gradually introduce new issues and solutions, it can (re-)structure debates and help policy-makers gather support. Analytically, there are two dimensions in which soft coordination can influence the policy process. First, it can happen on the individual cognitive level of policymakers through exposure to new information and arguments. Such learning processes are more likely to occur on the level of administrative staff gathered in the committees etc. than on the ministerial level or among the Heads of State and Government in the European Council. An exception is the Eurogroup due to its small size and its confidentiality. The European Council receives too strong a public attention, which makes it more difficult for the Heads of State and Government to revise judgements. Civil servants have more time to exchange information in committees, interact more regularly and informally, and they have the task to search for solutions, while the Heads of State and Government are guided by considerations of day-to-day politics. Second, soft coordination can interact with and induce public discourses within and across national boundaries, increasing the awareness of the issues at stake. Public recommendations are a soft stick for translating peer pressure into action. Soft coordination is a governance mechanism, which relies on the imposition of reputational costs to ensure compliance, or on the learning effect induced by social interaction. In the first case, it assumes that electoral success can be influenced by what is discussed in public. For two reasons, this mechanism is likely to work on the level of political leaders, that is, the ministers gathering in the Council of Ministers or the Heads of State and Government in the European Council. First, the elected leaders are more likely to be concerned by public discourse as it directly relates to the probability of future electoral success. Second, benchmarking and recommendation processes on the highest political level are not only public per se, but are also likely to raise the attention of the mass media given that prominent persons are involved. Policy or institutional change can be brought about through public credibility crises, which may or may not be linked to a real change in material circumstances.8 In differentiated modern societies, political leaders cannot shift political ideas on their own. They need public support from civil society actors such as interest groups or academic experts. Even more importantly, they need the mass media to reach a broader audience who not only act as an interface, but also as gatekeepers, agenda-setters and opinionentrepreneurs. Whether the soft rules are followed or ignored depends not only on whether the media make the process and the actors visible but also the extent to which they are considered as legitimate matters. The media not only act as transmitters, but also as decoders and thus actors themselves. If a recommendation is

222

Daniela Schwarzer

decoded as legitimate, policy-makers can more easily exploit the situation to push for policy change in line with the recommendation. If the EU advice is deemed an illegitimate meddling in domestic affairs, policy-makers will have little incentive to adopt the recommendation. Public discourse is increasingly discussed as an intervening variable to explain domestic adaptation of policies, institutions and ideas as a result of European integration. It is not only used to explain socialization or learning processes. Broad public mediatized discourse influences rational interest calculation, and thus decision-makers’ behaviour, even if their personal conviction has not changed. There is no automatic link connecting soft coordination and policy change. In the policy process, there are two periods during which barriers can make soft coordination ineffective: during the agenda-setting and the preference formation phase. As soon as political actors evaluate policy change as too costly, soft co-ordination will have no impact. The basis for this evaluation is the way in which the soft pressure from the EU level is decoded on the national level. Here, the media and other actors involved in public opinion formation have their role to play.

A Eurozone public space Since the start of the EMU on 1 January 1999, public debates on economic governance in the Eurozone have developed in intensity, quality and scope. Two strands of the debate can be distinguished: first, the transnational exchange of information and opinions on an expert level, and second, a broad public debate in the national media is developing as interest in the governance of the Eurozone is increasing. The two, of course, overlap. On an expert level, a growing number of researchers and analysts, mostly economists, study the developments in the Eurozone. This has started in the runup to EMU after the Maastricht Treaty was signed and by now has brought about a whole range of fora, which institutionalize the exchange among experts on a regular basis. Various transnational networks or internationally staffed research institutes which contribute to the academic debate on EMU exist, for instance the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in Brussels or the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in London, German–French working groups assembled by organizations such as the German–French Institute in Ludwigsburg or the German Institute for International Security (SWP). Likewise on a German– French initiative, a new institute for economic research with a strong focus on EMU takes up its work in Brussels in the second half of 2004. This European Center for the International Economy, the creation of which the German and the French government decided on 22 January 2003 on the fifteenth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, will be opened to participation from other member states after the starting phase and will hence be another transnational research institution. The Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) has set up a so-called ‘EMU monitor’.9 Twice a year, economists from several EMU countries publish a judgement of developments and adequate political responses for the Eurozone. While the German ZEI is the official publisher of this EMU monitor, the participants

EMU economic governance

223

come from various (and changing) renowned national research institutions, which ensures the transnational view on developments in the monetary union. The European Commission’s Fifth and Sixth Framework Programmes have made cross-border cooperation a prerequisite for EU funding, and has catalyzed projects such as Ezone Plus bringing together several research institutes from the European Union and accession countries in a transnational network on the Eurozone’s Eastern enlargement (www.ezoneplus.org). The Commission also financed the European Political Economy Infrastructure Consortium, a network and conference series for PhD candidates from throughout the European Union (www.epic.ac.uk). The European University Institute in Florence is a prime example of a European research institute gathering junior and senior scholars for an intensive exchange. Data from the Commission and its studies and policy papers on the Eurozone (for instance the Europaper series), represent a common reference for researchers against which they form their judgements. Annual Commission reports such as ‘Public Finances in EMU’ are widely quoted in the academic debate. Publications by national institutions in EMU member countries, which were previously mainly concerned with the national economy, now mostly include chapters on EMU developments. This was no automatic switch with the start of EMU on 1 January 1999. For instance, the Banca d’Italia, the Italian Central Bank, only introduced a detailed chapter on the analysis and economic outlook of EMU with its economic bulletin of March 2000 (Banca d’Italia, 1999, 2000). An important development is that economists increasingly work with harmonized data, which is provided by the European Commission or the ECB. Experts working on the Eurozone (as is usually the case in international economics) use English as a common language, and it can be said that the exchange among experts of the Eurozone is to a very large degree transnationalized. These transnational expert debates feed into Commission study groups. The national institutions also draw on international expertise and bring together academics in internationally staffed working groups, as done for instance by the Banca d’Italia. These examples show that the academic sphere is not only transnationalizing, but that boundaries to the policy-making sphere are increasingly blurred. For instance, several well-known economic and financial leaders including former and current CEOs, Central Bank Presidents, Finance Ministers, leading academics and others have created the ‘Euro 50 group’ with members from all EU countries. Among other initiatives, the group organizes semi-annual round tables on European economic policies in order to ‘identify major issues, alert institutions and inform public opinion’ (www.euro50.org) with academic assistance provided by the Center for Economic Policy Research in London. A second example of the close link-up between the academic and the policy-making spheres is an annual conference set up by the Centre for Financial Studies (CFS) in Frankfurt. ‘The ECB and its watchers’ conference brings together senior ECB representatives with the most prominent European economists from academic and financial institutions for a day-long dialogue every year since 1998. These events receive media coverage, which shows that the expert sphere is not isolated from the public sphere. Many research institutions in fact explicitly

224

Daniela Schwarzer

look for public exposure and increasingly professionalize the marketing of their publications and statements to international journalists. Private sector institutions, for example, economists from banks and other financial institutions, regularly issue statements and reports on the Eurozone. Think tanks widely distribute Eurozone-oriented policy proposals, which are often quoted by the national media. A good example is the ‘EMU monitor’ of the ZEI, which primarily consists of media information (press conference, press statement and background material). Individual researchers seek media exposure for individual publicity or because they expect more weight for their point vis-à-vis decision-makers by writing articles in the international press. These offers meet with a demand from journalists who themselves request Eurozone information. Their interest in the economic performance of the Eurozone as a whole grows, and Eurozone experts are used to provide judgements for their analysis. Some media even trigger larger processes to generate Eurozone information. Euroframe, a group of top research institutes from several member countries, calculates a Eurozone indicator at the request of three European newspapers within the Pearson Group, the Financial Times, Financial Times Deutschland and the Spanish Expansión (www.euroframe.org). Also, the European institutions contribute to the exposure of the expert knowledge on the Eurozone by publicly hearing Eurozone experts, and seeing to the distribution of this information. The European Parliament (EP) regularly sets up public euro-briefings and the Commission organizes expert workshops, the contributions to which are subsequently published. The EU institutions largely draw on the above mentioned research institutes and transnational networks. Every year, the Commission also stages a large annual conference on economic governance in the Eurozone when the spring forecasts are out. This event not only brings together international experts for two days of debates, it also involves political leaders, which encourages news coverage in the national media. It can hence be observed that the transnational processes of elite consensusbuilding (policy-makers and administrative staff) are embedded in a transnationalized expert sphere, which closely interacts with the policy-making sphere. The media pay increasing attention to these developments. What matters here is not that the debate is necessarily transnational in the sense that precisely the same article is made available to different national publics, but rather that the national media increasingly transport and decode what happens in the Eurozone. This concerns particularly the Stability and Growth Pact whose implementation has received ample news coverage. As argued above, this is important for peer pressure to work: naming and shaming hurts most when it is public, as, for instance, the example of the German Finance Minister Hans Eichel and the blame for unsound German fiscal policies by the Council in 2004, or the reprimand to Ireland in February 2001 have shown (see Schwarzer, 2003 for further examples). The media are also an important source of information for policy-makers, and shape the conscience of leaders for instance by bringing information on the Eurozone to their attention. If decision-makers have internalized the Eurozone logic through debates in the Eurogroup, and find this reflected in the media, they will more readily share these insights publicly. It is crucial for societal consensus-building processes that

EMU economic governance

225

people fuel this process who command respect in public debates.10 There is a strong chance that the creation of a stable Eurogroup presidency for a period of two years as of 1 January 2005 and the naming of Jean-Claude Juncker, the Luxembourg Prime Minister and Finance Minister, as its first President will increase the visibility of the Eurozone in the European Union itself and on an international scale. This has the potential to spread the Eurozone logic in public debates.

Conclusions: transnational interaction and domestic preference formation

Traditional national sphere

Figure 10.1 brings together these observations on elite and broad public consensusbuilding processes in a model of EU policy-making. On the top level, the figure depicts traditional processes of preference formation. Societal groups form preferences with regard to the structural conditions and the material concerns which they evaluate against some kind of ideational background. These groups then compete in the domestic policy process and against the background of national public debates. The government formulates a national preference, which it defends in the process of EU policy-making. Given the economic interdependencies, the cross-border interaction of interest groups, and of policy-makers, transnational interaction can influence all stages of this preference-formation process. The transnational in this case is not a distinct spatial level, nor does it involve a group of distinct actors, but it consists of domestic and EU policy-makers, experts, journalists etc. which interact in a transnational context beyond the formal EU institutions. It is a multi-level phenomenon with a potential to subtly influence the preference formation of social groups and the choice of governments when they formulate their national positions for EU state1...n

Structural conditions

Material concerns

Preferences of social groups SG1

SGn ...

Domestic intermediation involving public debate

National preferences NP1

NPn

EU policy-making

...

Ideational content

Transnational interaction (economic interdependencies, social interaction etc.)

Figure 10.1 National preference formation and transnational interaction.

226

Daniela Schwarzer

policy-making. As argued above, the media have a crucial role to play. They can transport information to the broad public and hence influence these domestic choice processes. As long as this link to the broad public is not strong enough, all informal processes of transnational elite consensus building are likely to be irrelevant in a democracy, if the consensus is in opposition to domestic policy interests. Whenever the Eurogroup has produced a consensus, which did not reach political salience, an important reason was the missing link to the domestic preference formation process. This raises the problem of economic efficiency and democratic accountability in the EMU – and sketches the avenues of necessary future reform of the institutional setting.

Notes 1 For a complete overview over the processes including the role of the member states and the EU institutions see European Commission (2002). 2 The empirical observations in this chapter are based on more than 20 expert interviews conducted for a research project on macro-economic policy coordination in EMU, which is in press. More information can be obtained from the author at [email protected] 3 The fact that both countries, Germany and France, actually provoked the deepest crisis in EMU since its creation in November 2003 is discussed below in following sections. 4 Former Eurogroup participant in an interview with the author. 5 Based on Searle (1995) and his understanding of the social construction of reality, these processes have been described for the private sector in Collignon and Schwarzer (2003). 6 Interview with an ECB official. 7 This observation, however, remains to be proven empirically which points to the importance of including the transnational perspective in the analysis of domestic and EU policy-making. 8 The German discussion of the OECD PISA-Study on school education is a prime example of how benchmarking process and comparative ranking of countries can translate into vivid domestic debates, which lead to policy change. 9 www.zei.de/zei_english/aktuell/presse_emu_download.htm (downloaded on 24 July 2004). 10 See Collignon and Schwarzer, 2003 for a model of a societal consensus building process.

References Banca d’Italia (1999) Bollettino Economico, No. 32, February 1999. —— (2000) Bollettino Economico, No. 34, March 2000. Collignon, Stefan (2003) The European Republic: Reflections on the Political Economy of a Future Constitution, London: Federal Trust for Education and Research. Collignon, Stefan and Schwarzer, Daniela (2003) Private Sector Involvement in the Euro: The Power of Ideas, London: Routledge. Duisenberg, W. (2000) ‘ECB Press Conference: Introductory Statement’, 2 November 2000, www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2000/html/iso01102.en.html European Commission (2002) ‘Co-ordination of economic policies in the EU: a presentation of key features of the main procedures’, Euro Papers (45).

EMU economic governance

227

Hancké, Bob (2003) ‘The political economy of fiscal policy in EMU’, European Political Economy Review, 1(1): 5–14. Hulverscheidt, Claus, Hönighaus, Reinhard and Koch, Rainer (2004) ‘EU-Richter beenden Defizitstreit’, Financial Times Deutschland, 14: 1. Jacquet, Pierre and Pisani-Ferry, Jean (2001) Economic Policy Co-ordination in the Euro-zone, Centre for European Reform Essays, London: Centre for European Reform. Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (1977) Power and Independence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, MA: Little Brown. Klau, Thomas, Knust, Cornelia and Wiesmann, Gerrit (2000) ‘EU-Finanzminister erweisen Euro schlechten Dienst’, Financial Times Deutschland, 11: 9. Meyer, Christoph O. (2003) The Soft Side of Hard Policy Co-ordination in EMU: Peer Review and Publicised Opinion in Germany and Ireland, paper presented at the NYU-London/UACES conference ‘Building EU-economic government: revising the rules?’, 25–26 April 2003, London: Senate House. Pütter, Uwe (2003) Governing informally: The Role of the Eurogroup in Shaping the Stability and Growth Pact as a Framework for Economic Governance in EMU, Paper presented at the NYULondon/UACES conference ‘Building EU-economic government: revising the rules?’, 25/26 April 2003, London: Senate House. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1995) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rittberger, Volker, Schrade, Christina and Schwarzer, Daniela (1999) ‘Transnational civil society actors and the quest for security’, in Muthia Alagappa and Takashi Inoguchi (eds), International Security Management and the United Nations, Tokyo, New York and Paris: United Nations University Press, pp. 109–38. Schwarzer, Daniela (2003) Fiscal Deficit Control in EMU: A Preference-centred Explanation of Institutional Dynamics, paper presented at the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence Research Seminar, 10 October 2003, Freie Universität Berlin. Searle, John (1995) The Construction of Social Reality, London: Allen Lane. Von Hagen, Jürgen and Mundschenk, Susanne (2001) ‘The functioning of economic policy co-ordination’, ZEI Working Paper (B 08).

Index

Note: Page numbers in italics indicate tables. AA (Foreign Ministry) 150 ABVV/FGTB (Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond/Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique) 121 ‘acculturation’ 18 ACF (Advocacy Coalition Framework) 41–2, 47 acquis communautaire 156 Action Committee for a United States of Europe, Monnet Committee 24, 115 Action Programme in field of education (1976) 171 ‘actor socialization’ 62 actors, transnational: actor-centredness 86; ‘domestic’/‘international’ nexus between 91; transnational business as ‘actor’ 84–5 ACUE (American Committee for a United Europe) 25 Aden, Hartmut 198 Adenauer, Konrad 27; Foundation 8, 9, 135, 143 adoption costs, socialization 68–9 advocacy coalitions, networks 7, 41; Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 41–2, 47; Single Market 49 AFL (American Federation of Labor) 110, 111 Africa, FES, impact in 153 agencies: law enforcement 196; socialization 63–4 agency: levels of 97; modern history and 19 agenda setting, political process phases 220 Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond/Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique (ABVV/FGTB) 121 Alianza Popular (AP) 141 allegiance to Europe 24 ALMA network, case study 177–8, 180, 181, 183, 186

‘Alphabet’ case 204 Amato, Giuliano (Vice-President, European Convention) 51 American Committee for a United Europe (ACUE) 25 American Federation of Labor (AFL) 110, 111 Amsterdam IPE project 93 Anglo-German Association, Königswinter Conference meetings 136 AP (Alianza Popular) 141 appropriateness, logic of 64 ‘argumentative persuasion’, meaning 24 arrest warrant, extradition 195 Association of European Universities (CRE) 172, 179 Austria, Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) 138, 139, 140, 141, 142 authority, socialization 67 Auto Oil Directive, advocacy coalition approach 49 Banca d’Italia (Italian Central Bank) 223 bargaining, socialization, transnational 65, 66 Beerkens, Eric 9, 170–90 Belgium: Algemeen Belgisch Vakverbond/Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique (ABVV/FGTB) 121; Liege, University of 178; Limburgs Universitair Centrum 178; Walloon Parti Social Chrétien (PSC) 141 ‘benchmarking’, concept of 98 BEPG (Broad Economic Policy Guidelines) 210, 218 BEUC (European Consumers’ Organization) 48 Bevir, Mark 39 Bidault, Georges 23–4, 26 Bildt, Carl 141, 142

Index Blair, Tony 51 BMZ (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) 150, 152, 153 BNFF (Bureau of Nordic Family Forestry) 49 Bohman, Gösta 138, 140 BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development) 54–5 border regions, transnational policing in 201–5 Bothereau, Robert (FO Secretary-General) 115, 120 Böx, Heinrich 138, 139 Bretton Woods system, expansion of world economy under 99 British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) 54–5 British Young Conservatives 135 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) 210, 218 Brooke, Peter 143 Brugmans, Hendrik 26 Buiter, Harm G. 113, 120 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) 150, 153 Bureau of Nordic Family Forestry (BNFF) 49 business, transnational 83–106; interest group pluralism 90–3; International Relations discourse 86–7; meta-theory 96; methodological issues 96–8; neo-functionalism 7, 87–90; neo-Gramscian transnationalism 7, 20, 93–6; research examples 98–100; theoretical perspectives 84–6 Cameron, David R. 5, 31 CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) 20, 45 Capitalist class formation 83–106 Caporaso, James 89 Cardiff process on structural reform 210 case studies: ALMA network 177–8, 180, 181, 183, 186; Coimbra Group of Universities 178–9, 180, 183, 185, 186; comparison 180–1, 181, 182; empirical 5–10; European Consortium of Innovative Universities 179–80 Catholic Church, and ideas, values and norms 27 CCTV (Circuit Camera Television) 198 CDA (Christen Democratisch Appèl) 141 CDS (Centre des Démocrates Sociaux) (France) 138, 141 CDS (Partido do Centro Démocratico Social) (Portugal) 141

229

CDU (Christian Democratic Union) (Germany) 8, 133, 136, 137, 139, 140, 143; Congress (1976) 138; Konrad Adenauer Foundation affiliated to 151 CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries): communist past 51; electorates, concerns of 76; EU impact on 75; foundation strategies 156–9; political foundations as embassies in 162; socialization of 52, 53; transformation 150 CEMR (Council of European Municipalities and Regions) 25, 36 Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) 222–3 Central and Eastern European Countries see CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 25, 196 Central Latinamerico de Trabajodores (CLAT) 153 Centre des Démocrates Sociaux (CDS) (France) 138, 141 Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 222, 223 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 222 Centre for Financial Studies (CFS) 223 Centre for International Relations (CSM) 157 CEPF (Confederation of European Forest Owners) 49 CEPOL (European Police College) 198–9, 201 CEPR (Centre for Economic Policy Research) 222, 223 CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies) 222 CERC (Confederation of EU Rector’s Conference) 172 CFS (Centre for Financial Studies) 223 CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) 52 CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail) (France) 110 Checkel, Jeffrey T. 24, 65–6 Chirac, Jacques 141 Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (CSV) (Luxembourg) 141 Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP) (Flemish) 138, 141 Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA) 141 Christian Democracy 8, 131–49; EDU 140–4; Inter-Party Conference 135–40; political parties, in transnational politics 21–2, 131–3, 145 Christian Social Union (CSU) (Bavaria/Germany) see CSU (Christian Social Union) (Bavaria/Germany)

230 Index Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) (Germany) see CDU (Christian Democratic Union) (Germany) Christliche Volkspartei (CVP) (Switzerland) 141 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 25, 196 Circuit Camera Television (CCTV) 198 CISC (International Federation of Christian Trade Unions) 110–11 CISL (Confederazione italiana dei sindacati lavoratori) (Italy) 110, 121 CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation) 55 ‘Civility’ (research program), network analysis 54 Civil Society Development Programme (EU) 53 class, transnational 83–106 CLAT (Central Latinamerico de Trabajodores) 153 Clay, Karen 177 COCDYC (Conservative and Christian Democrat Youth Community) 146, 147 co-decision procedure, introduction of (1992–93) 22 co-determination model, promotion by DGB 121 COGECA (General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union) 45, 48 Coimbra Group of Universities, case study 178–9, 180, 183, 185, 186 College of Europe, Brugmans as Rector of 26 COMETT 171 Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 74, 214 Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations in the European Union 45 ‘Committee of the 21’ 111, 112, 113, 114 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 20, 45 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 52 community formation, transactionalist approach to 2 CONCORD (Confederation for Cooperation of Relief and Development) 55 Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) (France) 110 Confédération Générale du Travail – Force Ouvrière (FO) see FO (Confédération Générale du Travail – Force Ouvrière) Confederation of EU Rector’s Conference (CERC) 172 Confederation of European Forest Owners (CEPF) 49

Confederazione italiana dei sindacati lavoratori (CISL) (Italy) 110, 121 Conference of European Churches 52 consensus building (EMU economic governance) 9–10, 210–27; economic policy coordination 211–12; elite interaction 216–22; Eurozone public space see Eurozone; forum for 212–16; political process phases 220–1; transnational interaction and domestic preference formation 225–6 consequentiality, logic of 64, 67 Conservative and Christian Democrat Youth Community (COCDYC) 146, 147 Conservative Party (British) 134, 135, 136, 139, 140; Euro-sceptic positions of 144; International Office 137 Conservative Research Department (CRD) 137 consortium management, and institutional diversity 181–7 constitutionalization, European 1 Constitutional Treaty, intention to establish a European Prosecution Office 197 constructivist turn 62 Convention of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2000) 197 conversion concept, transnational communities 23 ‘core Europe’, integration theory 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 45 COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives) 74, 214 corporatism, policy networks 38 costs: adoption 68–9; transaction 68, 73 Council of Europe: British Conservatives and 136; Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption 193; trade unions 111, 112, 115, 116 Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) 25, 36 Council of Ministers 3, 120 Court of Justice, European 3 Cowles, Maria 97, 98, 99 Cox, Robert 102 CPE (European Farmers Coordination) 36 CRD (Conservative Research Department) 137 CRE (Association of European Universities) 172, 179 Crime Prevention Network (EU) 201 Cross Channel Intelligence Conference 192 CSM (Centre for International Relations) 157 CSU (Christian Social Union) (Bavaria/Germany) 8, 136, 139, 140; Hanns Seidel Foundation allied to 151

Index CSV (Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei) (Luxembourg) 141 CVP (Christelijke Volkspartij) (Flemish) 138, 141 CVP (Christliche Volkspartei) (Switzerland) 141 Cyprus, Democratic Rally (DR) 141 Czech Union for Freedom (US) 162 Dakowska, Dorota 8, 53, 75, 143, 150–69 Daugbjerg, Carsten 49 Davies, John 139 DC (Democrazia Cristiana) 138, 140–1 DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) 196 De Bruijn, Johan A. 40 de Gaulle, Charles 52–3, 116, 119–20, 121 Dehaene, Jean-Luc (Vice-President, European Convention) 135 Delors, Jacques 50, 123; Delors Committee 50 Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) (Poland) 160, 161, 163 Democratic Rally (DR) 141 Democrat Youth Community of Europe (DEMYC) 141 Democrazia Cristiana (DC) 138, 140–1 DEMYC (Democrat Youth Community of Europe) 141 den Boer, Monica 9, 191–208 Deutsch, Karl W. 2, 23, 61, 89, 173 DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) 111, 115, 116, 119, 121, 122 Di Maggio, Paul 175 Directorate General for Agriculture 45 Directorate General for Environment 45, 49 Directorate General of Social Affairs 116 ‘domestication’, socialization 73 ‘domestic conditionality’, dominant socialization strategy of EU 75 domestic resonance, socialization 68 Dowding, Keith 29, 44, 45 DR (Democratic Rally) 141 Drahos, Michaela 22, 52 Drinking Water Directive, advocacy coalition approach 49 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 196 drugs, war on 194 Duchêne, François 115 Duisenberg, Wim 213 Dulles, Allen 25 Dumoulin, Michel 25 Dutch Programme on cross-border co-operation (1997) 178 Dutrieue, Anne-Myriam 25 Dzurinda, Mikulásˇ 9, 161

231

ECB (European Central Bank) 213, 215, 216, 219 ECIU (European Consortium of Innovative Universities) 177, 179–80; Graduate School 180, 184; Quality Review System 184; Student Exchange Programme 183; Thematic Working Groups 186 ECJ (European Court of Justice) 3 Ecofin 217; Council 212 École Nationale d’Administration, College of Europe as 26 Economic and Finance Ministers 210, 211, 215 Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) 214, 219 Economic and Social Committee 119 Economic Committee for Europe in UN 111 ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) 20, 22, 26; Consultative Committee 112, 114; High Authority 30, 114, 116, 121; trade unions and 109, 111, 113, 114–15, 122, 123 ECTS (European Credit Transfer System) 172, 184 ED (European Democrats) 51 Eder, Klaus 72 EDG (European Democratic Group) 133 EDP (European Democrat Party) 136 EDS (European Democrat Students) 141 EDU (European Democrat Union) 8, 139, 140–4; Executive Secretary 143; as ‘The Black International’ 140 EEB (European Environmental Bureau) 48 EEC (European Economic Community) 6; British membership 20; creation 112, 115, 122; crisis of 1960s 121 EFC (Economic and Financial Committee) 214, 219 EFDS (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity) 163 EFR (European Financial Services Roundtable) 36, 50, 100 EFTA (European Free Trade Association) 28, 172; trade unions and 8, 113, 114, 115, 117–19, 121, 122 Egeberg, Morten 74 EHEA (European Higher Education Area) 170–90 Eichel, Hans 224 Eising, Rainer 74 ELDR (European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party) 160, 165 ELEC (European League for Economic Cooperation) 25 elite networks, transnational, role 6 Elles, Lady 137, 139, 140 embeddedness concept 175

232 Index EMMI (European Multi Media Information) 203, 204 ‘empty chair’ policy (1965) 109, 121 EMSU (European Medium and Small Business Union) 141 EMU (European Monetary Union): economic governance, consensus building 9–10, 210–27; economic policy coordination 211–12; elite interaction 216–22; Eurozone public space see Eurozone; forum for consensus building/identity formation 212–16; network analysis 49–50; political process phases 220–1; transnational interaction and domestic preference formation 225–6 entitativity, concept of 71–2, 77 EP (European Parliament) 3, 163–4, 224; Christian democratic membership 28; Commission and 132; elections to 72, 116; European Ideas Network and 51; influence of 22 EPC (European Political Co-operation) 52 epistemic communities (networks) 7, 41, 52 EPP (European People’s Party) 51, 133, 134, 135, 139–40, 142, 160; Berlin congress (2001) 143; EDU and 144; political bureau 164; UW accession to 165 EPP-ED (Group of the European People’s Party and European Democrats) 134 ERASMUS programme 171–2, 179, 183 Erhard, Ludwig 26 ERO (European Regional Organization) 8, 111, 113, 114, 115, 117–18; Joint ICFTU-ERO Committee on European Social Integration 112, 115 ERP (European Recovery Programme) 110 ERT (European Round Table of Industrialists) 3, 11, 89, 95, 100 ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) 8, 114, 121, 123–4 ETUS (European Trade Union Secretariat) 113, 114, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121 EU (European Union): accession of new Member States, party cooperation preceding 160–4; CEECs, impact on 75; Civil Society Development Programme 53; Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations in 45; complexity 51; Constitutional Treaty, intention to establish a European Prosecution Office 197; Crime Prevention Network 201; dayto-day politics 4; ‘domestic conditionality’, as dominant socialization strategy of 75; enlargement, transnational perspective 154–5, 165; government systems 51; Multidisciplinary Group on Organized

Crime 193; as ‘multi-venue system’ 73; neo-Gramscian transnationalism 94–5; policy-making process 21, 50–1; postMaastricht 22; as transnational space 1–14 EUCD (European Union of Christian Democrats) 133, 138, 139 Euratom 112, 122 Euregion Rhine-Maas 177; cross-border law enforcement 202, 203 Euro-12 group 5 Euro-50 group 223 ‘Euro-Communists’ 22 Euroframe (group of research institutes) 224 Eurogroup 10, 210, 214, 215, 218, 219, 220; Economic and Finance Ministers 211 Eurojust 197 EURON (European graduate school in neurosciences) 178 European Central Bank (ECB) 213, 215, 216, 219 European Coal and Steel Community see ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) European Commission: Directorate General for Agriculture 45; Directorate General for Environment 45, 49; European Parliament and 132; Fifth and Sixth Framework Programmes 223; on interest group representation 73; network research 53; role 3; subsidiarity principle 172 European Confederation of Free Trade Unions in the EC 114; see also ETUS (European Trade Union Secretariat) European Consortium of Innovative Universities see ECIU (European Consortium of Innovative Universities) European Consumers’ Organization (BEUC) 48 European Convention (2002–3) 135 European Council: Action Programme in education approved by (1976) 171; summits 145 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 3 European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) 172, 184 European Defence Community 111 European Democratic Group (EDG) 133 European Democrat Union see EDU (European Democrat Union) European Democrat Party (EDP) 136 European Democrats (ED) 51 European Democrat Students (EDS) 141 European Economic Community see EEC (European Economic Community) European Employment Strategy 210

Index European Environmental Bureau (EEB) 48 European Farmers Coordination (CPE) 36, 54 European Financial Services Roundtable (EFR) 36, 50, 100 European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity (EFDS) 163 European Free Trade Association see EFTA (European Free Trade Association) European Higher Education Area see EHEA (European Higher Education Area) European Ideas Network 51, 56 European Judicial Network 200 European League for Economic Co-operation (ELEC) 25 European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) 160, 165 European Medium and Small Business Union (EMSU) 141 European Monetary Union see EMU (European Monetary Union) European Multi Media Information (EMMI) 203, 204 European Parliament see EP (European Parliament) European People’s Party see EPP (European People’s Party) European Police College (CEPOL) 198–9, 201 European Political Cooperation (EPC) 52 European Political Economy Infrastructure Consortium 223 European Productivity Agency 117 European Recovery Programme (ERP) 110 European Regional Organization see ERO (European Regional Organization) European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) 3, 11, 89, 95, 100 European Social and Economic Council: and Council of Europe 115; DGB withdrawal of support for 116 European Social Charter 115, 116 European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 8, 114, 121, 123–4 European Trade Union Secretariat (ETUS) 113, 114, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121 European Union see EU (European Union) European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) 133, 138, 139 European Union of Women (EUW) 137, 141, 142 European University Institute (Florence) 223 European Youth Campaign (1951–8) 25 Europeiska democraktiska unionen 147

233

Europol (EU Police Office) 192, 196, 201; Maastricht Treaty 197 Euroregional kiosk (EMMI products) 203 Euro-sceptics 134, 144 Eurozone 210, 212, 215, 217, 218, 219, 222–5 EUW (European Union of Women) 137, 141, 142 FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 196 FDP (Free Democratic Party) (Germany) 151 Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique (FGTB) 121 Federation of Conservative Students (UK) 135 FERN (Forests and the European Union Resource Network) 49 FES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) (Germany) 8–9, 151, 153, 154, 157, 158, 162, 163 FGTB (Fédération Générale du Travail de Belgique) 121 FIDESZ (Hungarian Alliance of Young Democrats) 164 Fine Gael, Ireland 141 Finland: Kansallinen Kokoomus party 140; Svenska Folkpartiet 141 Finnemore, Martha 156, 159 FitzGerald, Garret 141 FNS (Friedrich Naumann Stiftung) (Germany) 151, 157, 160 FO (Confédération Générale du Travail – Force Ouvrière) 110, 120, 121, 122; R. Bothereau as Secretary-General 115, 120 Ford Foundation 25 Foreign Ministry (AA) 150 Foreign Policy Centre, as European think tank 54 Forests and the European Union Resource Network (FERN) 49 Forlani, Arnaldo 139 Fouchet Plan (1961) 120 FPÖ (Freedom Party) (Austria) 144 Fraga, Manuel 141 France: Christian Democratic/Conservative groups 134, 138, 141; ECSC, origins 26; Franco-German Treaty of Friendship (1963) 120 Franco, General Francisco 154 Free Democratic Party (FDP) (Germany) 151 Freedom Party (FPÖ) (Austria) 144 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) (Germany) 8–9, 151, 153, 154, 157, 158, 163 Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS) (Germany) 151, 157, 160

234 Index G8 Senior Experts Group on Organized Crime (Lyon Group) 193 Gaspari, Oscar 25 Geddes, Charles J. 112 Geißler, Heiner 140 General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union (COGECA) 45, 48 Geneva Circle 23; Christian democratic parties and 25, 30; meetings (1948–51) 11 German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) 150, 152, 153 German Institute for International Security (SWP) 222 Germany: Anglo-German Association 136; Bundestag 153; CEEC, foundation strategies 156–9; Cold War 152; democratization (West Germany) 152–4; EU enlargement, transnational perspective 154–5; Konrad Adenauer Foundation see KAS (Konrad Adenauer Foundation) (Germany); norms, transfer of 159–60; party cooperation, preceding accession of new Member States 160–4; political foundations see political foundations; as ‘semi-sovereign state’ 152; see also CDU (Christian Democratic Union) (Germany); CSU (Christian Social Union) (Bavaria/Germany); FES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) (Germany); FNS (Friedrich Naumann Stiftung) (Germany); SWP (German Institute for International Security) Gill, Stephen 102 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry (President, European Convention) 135 globalization 1; and sovereignty 36 Gonzáles, Felipe 53, 154 governance concept: interest group pluralism 90–3; multi-governance approach 90, 91; network analysis 39 Grabendorff, Wolf 161–2 Granovetter, Mark 175 Greece: military regime in 51; Nea Demokratia (ND) 141 Green Pool 111 Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) 151 Greenwood, Justin 74 Group of the European People’s Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED) 134 Haas, Ernst B. 2, 88, 89, 173 Haas, Peter M. 22, 41 Hahn, Karl Josef 138, 139 Hallstein, Walter (EEC Commission President) 28; Hallstein Plan 116, 118

Hanns Seidel Stiftung (HSS) (Germany) 139, 151 Hay, Colin 44, 46 HBS (Heinrich Böll Stiftung) (Germany) 151, 157, 160 Heard-Lauréote, Karen 6–7, 21, 36–60, 131, 193, 201 Hebenton, Bill 193 Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS) (Germany) 151, 157, 160 Helsinki Summit (1999), High Level Action Group on Organized Crime 200 High Level Action Group on Organized Crime, Helsinki Summit (1999) 200 historical materialism, transnational 93 historiographical tradition 17 history: as ‘historical social science’ 19; modern 19; Western Europe, transnational (post-1945) 6, 17–18, 19–28 Hix, Simon 4 Hoffman, Paul G. 25 Hoffmann, Stanley 3, 19 ‘hollowing-out’ of state 6, 39, 193 HSS (Hanns Seidel Stiftung) (Germany) 139, 151 Hungarian Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) 164 Hungary, EU accession 164 Hurd, Douglas 133, 137 ICC (Informatie en Coordinatie Centrum) 203 ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) 8, 110, 111, 114, 120; European Regional Organization 111; Executive Board 111; Joint ICFTU-ERO Committee on European Social Integration 112, 115 ICFTU-ECSC (Metalworkers’ and Miners’ Inter-Trade Committee) 113, 121 identification, socialization 67–8 ideology, neo-functionalism 88 ILO (International Labour Organization) 111, 112, 115, 116 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 159 Imig, Doug 72, 73 imitation, socialization, transnational 64–5 Informatie en Coordinatie Centrum (ICC) 203 Ingram, Paul 177 ‘institutionalisms’ 7 integration theory: ‘classical’ (neo-functionalist legacy) 87–90; ‘core Europe’ 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 45; definition of ‘integration’ 61; neo-functionalism 2, 3, 87–90; political society formation, integration

Index as 17–35; ‘politicization’ hypothesis of integration 70 ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ 5 interdependency notion, network analysis 40 interest groups 73; neo-functionalism 88, 92, 96; pluralism 90–3; political economy of 20 intergovernmentalism 3, 4; institutionalism 173; socialization and 62; supranationalism and 90, 91 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions see ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (CISC) 110–11 International Labour Organization (ILO) 111, 112, 115, 116 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 159 International Police Association 199 International Political Economy (IPE) 84, 85, 93 International Relations: business, transnational 86–7; ‘institutionalisms’ in 76; obsolete nature of approaches 4; socialization 62; transnational business 84, 85 International Trade Secretariats (ITS) 111, 112–13 Inter-Party Conference 131–49 Interpol 192 Interreg subsidies (EU programme for funding inter-regional cooperation) 178 interventionism 10 ‘intra-EC exchanges’ 90 IPE (International Political Economy) 84, 85, 93 Ireland, Fine Gael 141 Italy: Banca d’Italia (Italian Central Bank) 223; CISL (Confederazione italiana dei sindacati lavoratori) 110, 121; Democrazia Cristiana (DC) 138, 140–1; European University Institute (Florence) 223; UIL (Unione italiana del lavoro) 121 ITS (International Trade Secretariats) 111, 112–13 Jenkins-Smith, Hank 47 JHA ( Justice and Home Affairs) 191 JHA Council 197; Working Groups 201 Johansson, Karl Magnus 4, 8, 21, 131–49 John, Peter 50 Johnston, Alistair I. 65–6 Joint ICFTU-ERO Committee on European Social Integration 112, 115 Joint Masters Programme, ECIU Graduate School 184 Joint Study Programme 171

235

Journal of European Integration (Alan S. Milward) 19 Journal of European Public Policy 62 Journal of Theoretical Politics 50 Juncker, Jean-Claude 225 Juppé, Alain 141 Justice and Home Affairs ( JHA) 191 Kaiser, Jakob 27 Kaiser, Karl 2 Kaiser, Wolfram 1–14, 17–35, 45, 89, 151, 154, 161 Kansallinen Kokoomus party, Finland 140 KAS (Konrad Adenauer Foundation) (Germany) 8, 9, 143, 153; CDU, affiliated to 151; in Poland 157; Political Academy Eichholz 135 Keck, Margaret 42 Keohane, Robert O. 2, 86 Kohl, Helmut 133, 138, 139 Kohler-Koch, Beate 74 Königswinter Conference meetings, Anglo-German Association 136 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) (Germany) see KAS (Konrad Adenauer Foundation) (Germany) Koutzine, Victor 30 Kubiceck, Paul 53 Lambsdorff, Otto Graf (FNS President) 165 law enforcement, transnational policing 199–201 Lawson, Nigel 143 Le Galès, Patrick 39 legitimacy, socialization 67 Lewandowski, Janusz 157 Lewis, Jeffrey 74 LI (Liberal International) 164 Liberal International (LI) 164 Liberal Market Economy Research Centre 157 Liege, University of 178 Limburgs Universitair Centrum (Belgium) 178 ‘limited publicity’ principle 152–3 Lindberg, Leon N. 62 LINGUA 171 Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment 210 ‘little Europe’ 112, 113, 115, 118, 120, 122 London Progressive Governance Conference (2003) 51 London Underground map, network analysis 43 Luxembourg, Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (CSV) 141

236 Index Lyon Group (G8 Senior Experts Group on Organized Crime) 193 Maastricht Treaty (1992): agenda 4; Europol and 197; Excessive Deficit Procedure 210; institutionalization of a neo-liberal consensus through 213; negotiations 11, 21 Maastricht, University of 178 MacGregor, John 143 Macro-Economic Dialogue 210 Major, John 133 Malta, Partit Nazzjonalista (PN) 141 March, James G. 64 Marsh, David 26–7, 40, 41, 45–6 Marshall Plan 109, 110, 111, 122 Martens, Wilfried (EPP President) 165 Maudling, Reginald 137 Max-Planck School, policy networks 38 Mayer, René 123 Mazey, Sonia 73 Messina Conference (1955) 112 Metalworkers’ and Miners’ Inter-Trade Committee (ICFTU-ECSC) 113, 121 meta-theory, business 96 Miller, Leszek 158, 162–3 Milward, Alan S. 19, 23, 24 Mitbestimmung (co-determination model) 121 Mock, Alois 141 ‘Modeling Policy Networks’ ( Journal of Theoretical Politics) 50 Moderata Samlingspartiet 138, 140, 143 Monnet, Jean 122, 123; Action Committee for a United States of Europe 24, 115 Moravcsik, Andrew 3, 19, 24, 87, 89, 90 Mouvement Républicain Populaire 26 Muller, Pierre 39 Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption, Council of Europe 193 Multidisciplinary Group on Organized Crime (EU) 193 multi-level governance 4, 194 Mutual Legal Assistance Convention 195 National Criminal Intelligence Service (UK) 199 National Endowment for Democracy 153 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 111, 136 Natura 2000 network, forest owner associations 49 ND (Nea Demokratia) 141 NEBEDEACPOL (forum for Dutch–Belgian–German chief police officers) 203

Nebenaußenpolitik (second track diplomacy) 158 NEI (Nouvelles Equipes Internationales) 26, 133, 139 neo-functionalism: business, transnational 2, 3, 7, 87–90; governance analysis 91, 92; institutionalization and 174; interest groups and 88, 92, 96; ‘politicization’ hypothesis of integration 70; spill-over see ‘spill-over’, concept of; transnational ideology 88; transnational society 90 neo-Gramscian transnationalism 7, 20, 93–6, 101–2; historical materialism 93; Marxism and 94 Netherlands, Dutch Programme on cross-border co-operation (1997) 178 Network for Progressive Governance 36, 51 networks, transnational 36–60; advocacy coalitions see advocacy coalitions, networks; criticism of network analysis 26–7; epistemic communities 7; ‘graph theory’ branch of mathematics 50; interdependency notion 40; methodological issues 43–7; ‘network paradigm’ 39; policy networks see policy networks; research example 47–55; theory 37–43 ‘new economic sociology’ 175 NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations): advocacy coalitions 42; EMU, economic policy coordination and 211; environmental 49; ‘limited publicity’ principle 152–3; networks 48, 49; non-state actors 151; political foundations as 150; principled 87; role in global politics 5; see also British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) Nice Treaty (2001) 132 Non-governmental Organizations see NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations) Nordens Faglige Samorganisasjon 119 norms: rationality and 164–5; transfer of 159–60 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 111, 136 Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI) 26, 133, 139 Nye, Joseph S. 2, 86, 173 ODCA (Organización Demócrata Cristiana de América) 153 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 154 OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) 109, 111, 112, 115, 116, 122

Index OEEC Trade Union Advisory Committee (OEEC-TUAC) 112 OEEC-TUAC (OEEC Trade Union Advisory Committee) 112 Office de la Lutte Anti-Fraude (OLAF) 197 OIPGs (Operationeel Invalspunt Aan de grens) 203 OLAF (Office de la Lutte Anti-Fraude) 197 Olivetti, Adriano 25 Olsen, Johan P. 64 Onyszkiewcz, Janusz 157 Operationeel Invalspunt Aan de grens (OIPGs) 203 Orban, Viktor 158, 164 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 109, 111, 112, 115, 116, 122 organized crime, transnational 194 Organización Demócrata Cristiana de América (ODCA) 153 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 154 Ortuño Anaya, Pilar 53, 154 Osterhammel, Jürgen 18 ÖVP (Österreichische Volkspartei) 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144 PALMA (EMMI products) 203 Palme, Olof 140 Parrish, Richard 49 Parsons, Craig 26, 29 Partido do Centro Démocratico Social (CDS) (Portugal) 141 Partido Popular (PP) 141 Partido Social Democrata (PSD) (Portugal) 134 Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) 53, 154 Partit Nazzjonalista (PN) (Malta) 141 Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany) 151 Party of European Socialists (PES) 161, 163 Pasture, Patrick 8, 21, 28, 109–30 Patten, Chris 133, 137 Peasant Party (PSL) (Poland) 161 Persson, Göran 51 PES (Party of European Socialists) 161, 163 Peterson, John C. 48 Pinochet, General 138 pluralism: interest groups 90–3; policy networks 38; see also policy networks; political foundations and; Western Europe (post-1945) PN (Partit Nazzjonalista) (Malta) 141 PODACS (Police Data Computer System) 204 Poland: Green Party 160; Konrad Adenauer Foundation in 157; Robert Schuman

237

Foundation 157; Union of Freedom (UW) 160, 165 Police Data Computer System (PODACS) 204 policing, transnational 9, 191–209; bilateral/multilateral policy-making 192; border regions, analysing policing in 201–5; critical issues 205–7; definitions 192–5; forms 195–9; ‘horizontal’/‘vertical’ 192; law enforcement agencies 196; law enforcement bureaucracy 199–201; legal-regulatory frameworks, creation 192; liaison officers 195; police cooperation, international 192, 194, 195 ‘policy community’, origins of term 43 Policy Network (think tank) 51 policy networks 6–7, 37–8; terminology 43, 44 policy options, definition, political process phases 220 Polish Social Movement Solidarity (RS AWS) 164 political foundations: as embassies 162; as NGOs 150; pluralism and 152; as transnational actors 150–2; see also Germany political parties: cooperation, preceding accession of new Member States 160–4; ‘regime parties’ 132; in transnational politics 21–2, 131–3, 145; see also Christian Democracy political process phases (elite interaction): agenda setting 220; policy options 220; preference formation 220–1 Politische Stiftungen see political foundations Portugal: Partido do Centro Démocratico Social (CDS) 141; PSD (Partido Social Democrata) 134; Socialist Party 154 PP (Partido Popular) 141 preference formation, political process phases 220–1 ‘Prevention and Control of Organized Crime’ 200 Pridham, Geoffrey 76 ‘privileged transnational business civilization’, concept of 102 Progressive Governance 7 Progressive Governance Conference, London (2003) 51 Progressive Governance Network 56 Progressive Governance Summits (New York, Florence and Berlin) 51 PSC (Walloon Parti Social Chrétien) 141 PSD (Partido Social Democrata) (Portugal) 134

238 Index PSL (Peasant Party) (Poland) 161 PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) 53, 154 Radaelli, Claudio M. 49–50 Raffarin, Jean-Pierre (French Prime Minister) 134–5 Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) (France) 134, 141 rationality, norms and 164–5 Rato, Rodrigo 143 Red-Green Coalition (Germany) 160 Régin, Tania 123 Reiner, Robert 193 Reiter, Janusz 157 Renard, André 112, 114 research examples: business 98–100; networks 47–55; socialization 70–6 Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule (Aachen) 178 Rhodes, Rod 39, 40, 41, 45–6 Richards, David 44, 46 Richardson, Jeremy 73 Risse[-Kappen] Thomas 4, 71, 86–7, 151, 156, 211 RLS (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung) (Germany) 151 Robert Schuman Foundation, Poland 157 Rome Treaties see Treaties of Rome (1957) Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (RLS) (Germany) 151 Rosenberg, Ludwig 118 RPR (Rassemblement pour la République) (France) 134, 141 RS AWS (Polish Social Movement Solidarity) 164 rule adoption, socialization 63, 65 Sabatier, Paul 42, 47 Sandholtz, Wayne 3, 89 Satellite Broadcast, EDU committee 142 Sautter, Christian 218 Scheingold, Stuart A. 62 Schengen Implementing Agreement 192 Schevenels, Walter 111, 112, 115 Schimmelfennig, Frank 7, 22–3, 27, 52, 61–82, 88, 131, 144, 215, 216 Schlüter, Poul 138 Schröder, Gerhard 51 Schumacher, Kurt 29 Schuman, Robert 26 Schuman Plan 122 Schwarz, Hans-Peter 17–18 Schwarzer, Daniela 9–10, 210–27 SDK (Slovak Democratic Coalition) 161 Serrarens, P. J. S. (Dutch Secretary General of Christian trade union movement) 26

Sheptycki, J. W. E. 195 SI (Socialist International) 154, 163 Sikkink, Kathryn 42, 156, 159 Single European Act 91 Single Market coalition 49 Single Market Programme 3, 11, 89 Självständighetspartiet (Iceland) 140 Slaughter, Anne-Marie 5 SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) (Poland) 160, 161, 163 Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) 161 Slovakia, anti-Mecˇiar opposition 9 Smith, Julie 145 Smith, Martin 44 Smith, Michael 52 Soares, Mario 154 Social Charter, European 115, 116 social constructivism 62 Social Democratic Party (SPD) (Germany) 151, 161 social influence, socialization 65, 66 socialization, transnational 7, 22–3, 61–82; ‘acculturation’, and 18; ‘actor socialization’ 62; adoption costs 68–9; ‘anticipatory socialization’ 76; authority, and legitimacy 67; bargaining 65, 66; definition of ‘socialization’ 63; deliberation/setting 68; domestic resonance 68; ‘failed socialization’ 69; ‘heuristic claims’ 29; identification 67–8; imitation 64–5; mechanisms 64; methodological issues 69–70; national and 77; networks and 52; other socialization processes distinguished 63–4; primary political 77; research examples 70–6; rule adoption 63, 65; social influence 65, 66; social learning 65–6; structural compatibility/opportunities 68; theory 63–9; time horizon, socialization research 27; transaction costs 68 Socialist International (SI) 154, 163 Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe 115 social learning, socialization 65–6 SOCRATES Programme 172, 183 Soros Foundation 75 Spaak, Paul-Henri/Spaak Report (1956), integration theory 22 Spaak Committee 122, 123 Spain: Alianza Popular (AP) 141; Partido Popular (PP) 141; Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) 141 SPD (Social Democratic Party) (Germany) 151, 161 ‘spill-over’, concept of 3, 7, 61; ‘political’/ ‘cultivated’ spill-over 71, 73, 76 Stability and Growth Pact 210, 214, 217, 218, 224

Index Starie, Peter 1–14, 151 state-centrism 4 Stockholm Convention, and EFTA 118 Stoltenberg, Gerhard 143 Stone Sweet, Alec 89 Strauss, Franz Josef 138, 139 Streeck, Wolfgang 98 structural compatibility and opportunities, socialization, transnational 68 subsidiarity principle 172 supranationalism 5, 173; intergovernmentalism and 90, 91; neo-functionalism and 88; socialization and 62 Svenska Folkpartiet, Finland 141 Sweden: free trade association with EC, seeking 20; Moderata Samlingspartiet 138, 140, 143 Switzerland, free trade association with EC, seeking 20 SWP (German Institute for International Security) 222 Tampere European Council 197, 199 Tandler, Gerold 140 Tarrow, Sidney 72, 73 Taus, Josef 138, 139, 140, 141 TEMPUS 171 ten Heuvelhof, Ernst F. 40 Thatcher, Margaret 137, 139 Thatcher, Mark 39 theory: business 84–6; networks 37–43; Western Europe, transnational (post-1945) 19–28 Thomas, Terry 193 Tindemans, Leo 138, 139, 140 TNCs (Transnational Corporations) 86, 92, 94, 100 TOBB (Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Commerce and Commodity Exchanges) 53 Tobisson, Lars F. 140 Trades Union Congress (TUC) (Britain) 110, 111, 112, 115, 118, 120, 123 Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) 111 trade unions: Christian 110; Council of Europe and 111, 112, 115, 116; ECSC and 109, 111, 113, 114–15, 122, 123; EFTA and 8, 113, 114, 115, 117–19, 121, 123; European involvement 109–10; German 154; integration and 3, 21, 114–17; international organization 110–14; ‘outer seven’ 117; Rome Treaties 118, 123; as transnational movement 109–30; ‘two Europes’, in 119–21

239

transactionalism, theory of 23 transaction costs, socialization 68, 73 transactions, European Higher Education Area 173–4 Transatlantic Business Dialogue 100 transgovernmental relations, International Relations 64 transnational actors: definition 5; functional roles 11; as organizations 187–8 transnational business see business, transnational Transnational Corporations (TNCs) 86, 92, 94, 100 transnationalization: conceptualizing 23; empirical evidence 24; integration and 83; neo-Gramscian transnationalism 94; post-war Europe 31; process of 1, 2; studies 12 transnationalism, defined 36, 84 transnational networks see networks, transnational transnational policing see policing, transnational transnational relations, defined 151 transnational socialization see socialization, transnational transnational society, neo-functionalism 90 transnational space, EU as 1–14 Transnational University, Limburg 178, 184 transnational Western Europe see Western Europe, transnational Treaties of Rome (1957): EU environmental action, omission in 45; integration theory 24; trade unions and 118, 123 Trenz, Hans Jörg 72 Trondal, Jarle 74 ‘trust’, concept of 24 TUAC (Trade Union Advisory Committee) 111 TUC (Trades Union Congress) (Britain) 110, 111, 112, 115, 118, 120, 123 Turkey: Ankara, EC Delegation in 53; Justice Party 141 Turkish Chamber Development Programme 53 Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) 53 Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Commerce and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) 53 TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association) 53 UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático) (Spain) 141 UDF (Union pour la Démocratie Française) 141

240 Index Ugglas, Margaretha af 142 UIL (Unione italiana del lavoro) (Italy) 121 UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) (France) 134 UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe) 100 Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) (Spain) 141 Unione italiana del lavoro (UIL) (Italy) 121 Union of Freedom (UW) 157, 160, 165 Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) 100 Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) 141 Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) (France) 134 United Kingdom: Anglo-German Association 136; British Young Conservatives 135; Conservative Party 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 144; Federation of Conservative Students 135; National Criminal Intelligence Service 199 United Nations, Economic Committee for Europe in 111 United States of Europe: Action Committee 24, 115; ideal of 122; Socialist Movement 115 Unit Pricing Directive, advocacy coalition approach 49 US (Czech Union for Freedom) 162 UW (Union of Freedom) 157, 160, 165 Vachudova, Milada 76 van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan 7–8, 83–106, 151, 173 van der Pijl, Kees 94, 99 van Vught, Frans 188 van Waarden, Frans 22, 38, 52 Veldkamp, Gerard 120–1 Verbindungsstellen (regional network contact points) 203 Via Compesina (global network) 54

video-conferencing (EMMI products) 203 Visser, Jelle 123 von Hassel, Kai-Uwe 139 Wallace, Helen 5, 194 Walloon Parti Social Chrétien (PSC) 141 Warleigh, Alex 49 Watt, Robert 46 Welle, Klaus 162 Western Europe, transnational (post-1945) 6, 17–35; ‘Americanization’ of 25; historiographical tradition 17, 18; history and theory 23–8; methodology 28–31; theory and history 19–23 West Germany, democratization 152–4 WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) 110, 111 Whitehead, Laurence 156 Whitelaw, William 137 World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS) 55 World Federation of Trade Unions ( WFTU) 110, 111 Worldwide Fund for Nature ( WWF) 48 WWF (Worldwide Fund for Nature) 48 YEF (Young European Federalists) 136 YEPP (Youth of EPP) 146 Young Conservatives 158 Young Democrats 158 Young European Federalists (YEF) 136 Young Social Democrats 158 Youngs, Richard 54 Youth of EPP (YEPP) 146 Zagaris, Bruce 196 ZEI (Center for European Integration Studies) 222–3 Zielonych, Partia 160 Zito, Anthony R. 41–2 Zukin, Sharon 175 Zysman, John 3, 89