Uncertain Masculinities: Youth, Ethnicity and Class in Contemporary Britain

Uncertain Masculinities

In this era of rapid change, boys face more difficulties than ever before in establishing their self-image and status. In this original and challenging study Mike O’Donnell and Sue Sharpe explore how teenage boys from white, AfricanCaribbean and Asian backgrounds negotiate contemporary uncertainties to construct their gender identities. Drawing on theoretical insights about how class, race and ethnicity critically affect the formulation of masculinities, the authors examine: • • • •

the split between boys’ formal acceptance of politically correct ideas and their informal behaviour amongst the peer group boys’ leisure pursuits, including involvement in illegal activities and their selective identification with global youth culture the discrepancies between boys’ and girls’ attitudes and expectations the quality of communication and guidance between men and boys

Uncertain Masculinities is a fascinating account of the complexity of contemporary boys’ identities and will be of use to students of the sociology of youth and of gender studies. Mike O’Donnell is a Senior Lecturer in sociology at the University of Westminster. Sue Sharpe is Visiting Fellow at the Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, and the author of Just Like a Girl.

Uncertain Masculinities Youth, ethnicity and class in contemporary Britain

Mike O’Donnell and Sue Sharpe

London and New York

First published 2000 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. © 2000 Mike O’Donnell and Sue Sharpe All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data O’Donnell, Mike. Uncertain masculinities: youth, ethnicity and class in contemporary Britain Mike O’Donnell and Sue Sharpe Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Teenage boys—England—London—social conditions. 2. Minority teenagers—England—London—social conditions. 3. Masculinity—England—London. 4. Socialisation—England—London. 5. Ethnicity— England—London. 6. Social surveys—England—London. I. Sharpe, Sue, 1945– II. Title. HQ799.E52 L656 2000 305.235´09421–dc21 00–022263 ISBN 0-203-44283-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-75107-8 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-15346-8 (hbk) ISBN 0-415-15347-6 (pbk)

To our respective Dads now gone always remembered

Contents

Introduction 1

2

3

1

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group: the school and neighbourhood contexts

14

The social construction of youthful masculinities: peer group sub-cultures

38

Marriage, families and relationships: images and expectations

89

4

Work: changing structures, changing opportunities

125

5

Culture, leisure and crime

154

6

Conclusion: boys and men

191

Notes Bibliography Index

197 200 205

vii

Introduction

In 1999 Jack Straw, then Home Secretary, was prominently reported as saying that the main social issue of our time pertained to the behaviour and role of young men. He was doing no more than giving official recognition to a concern that had been repeatedly expressed throughout the 1980s and increasingly during the 1990s. On the face of it there certainly seems to be a ‘boys’ problem’. Boys are now under-performing compared to girls in nearly all subjects at GCSE; the less well qualified can be difficult to employ and as a result often struggle to construct stable and fulfilling lives; boys commit about three times as much crime as girls; and they are generally perceived as far more anti-social in their general conduct than girls. Much of the damage they do is to themselves. Boys are far more likely to attack each other than to attack girls, and the suicide rate for young men between the ages of 15 and 24 has almost doubled since 1976 and is far higher than the corresponding figure for young women. The image of young men is now so poor that they are often presented in the popular media as a dubious risk as partners for young women. How fair is this perception of boys as being not only more difficult than girls but as somehow also being in greater difficulty? We decided to explore these and related issues for ourselves. Talking with an ethnically diverse sample of boys has provided the information that drives this book. What they told us—sometimes intentionally and sometimes by implication—was by no means always predictable. Although our research confirms some widely held views of boys in contemporary society, their accounts testify to the complexity and difference in their situations. Class and ethnicity interplay with gender and generation to an extent that tends to undermine sweeping generalisations. At the core of this book are the boys themselves—their responses and accounts; but we have not fought shy of making our own interpretations. However, rather than overburden our account with theory we have only drawn on and constructed theory where it is helpful in making sense of our data. Uncertain Masculinities is based on research we carried out in four London schools, mainly in the mid-1990s. We conducted the survey through questionnaires and interviews. The questionnaires were completed by 262 boys, and we interviewed 44 of these. We also interviewed three senior staff from the schools. We sought to report the boys’ thoughts on a number of key 1

2

Introduction

areas of their lives. These areas are indicated in the chapter titles. The main focus of the book is on the way the boys’ attitudes are gendered, and, in particular, how they come to think and behave as ‘masculine’. A basis of gender comparison was already available from Sue Sharpe’s studies of girl students (Just Like a Girl, 1976 and 1994) at four Ealing schools, three of which were included in the present survey. We also included a school from Hackney in East London. All the boys in our research were in year eleven, and most were 15 or 16 years old. This was a year older than the girls in Sharpe’s studies. We wanted to allow for the tendency for boys to mature physically and mentally somewhat later than girls, and we found that, if anything, a year was an underestimate, although some of the boys’ relative immaturity was explicable in cultural rather than maturational terms. The inclusion of the Hackney school boosted the number of African-Caribbean boys in the survey and also increased the number of boys from smaller minority ethnic groups. By far the largest groups in the survey were white (a large majority born in England), AfricanCaribbean and Asian (mainly Indian and Pakistani). One of the Ealing schools had a large majority of Asian students (mainly Sikh and Muslim). The real names of boys or teachers quoted in the book have all been changed. The construction of gender in relation to class, ethnicity and age While gender relations and the construction of masculinities are the main themes of this book, ethnicity, class and age also loom large. Class and ethnicity are widely acknowledged as major influences on the formation of masculinities. Paul Willis’s classic Learning to Labour (1977) shows how a group of workingclass boys become men by imitating the toughness, solidarity and physicality which they associate with their fathers. It is resentment of and even resistance against ‘them’, against authority, that is the basis of their ‘macho’ character. Less studied than working-class masculinity are the masculinities of middleand upper-class men and boys. A still far-from-extinct example of the latter are the public school type, who, in contrast to working-class men and boys, typically internalise the belief that it is their peculiar right to exercise authority. Both working-class and upper-class men embody their distinctive masculinities in their differing demeanour, style and use of language. Both these types of masculinity embody expressions of gender inequality, in the form of real or implied dominance, in relation to women and girls. The class origins of the boys in our survey were varied enough for us to be able to comment on the relationship between masculinities and class. We used Goldthorpe’s class schema as the basis for categorising the boys according to class (Goldthorpe et al., 1987). We asked the boys to state the occupations of both parents but, with the exception of African-Caribbean boys, it was rare for the father to be in a lower-status occupation than the mother. The majority of the boys were working-class (56 per cent). However, this varied considerably between ethnic groups. Fifty-seven per cent of the white boys

Introduction

3

were middle-class—from service or, more usually, intermediate class backgrounds—and this possibly reflected the gentrification of previously ‘working-class’ areas of London such as Hackney. Seventy-five per cent of the African-Caribbean boys were working-class in background, mainly skilled or semi-skilled. However, class as measured by father’s occupation may have been less significant in their case, as far more of them were from mother-led single parent families than was the case with boys from other ethnic groups. Compared to other ethnic groups, a relatively high proportion of these African-Caribbean mothers were in full-time paid work, the majority being employed in lowergrade professions or in routine non-manual work. In contrast, the small number of boys of African origin in the survey tended to be middle-class (70 per cent), typically the sons of people in the higher-grade professions. Seventyfour per cent of the Asian boys were working-class but there were significant differences between the class origins of Indian boys on the one hand and Pakistani and Bangladeshi on the other. There were more self-employed people among the parents of the former, whereas the latter were most likely to be in unskilled work or unemployed. These trends were broadly in line with Modood and Berthoud’s findings on ethnicity and occupation (1997). The interplay of masculinity and ethnicity, particularly ethnic nationalism, has often been observed in relation to white British men and boys, and increasingly so in relation to African-Caribbeans. Tony Sewell’s Black Masculinities and Schooling: How Black Boys Survive Modern Schooling (1997) finds that some African-Caribbean boys express their disillusionment and opposition to school in terms of black ‘nationalist’ ideology—often articulated in music, dance and demeanour. According to Sewell, other African-Caribbean boys express their sense of the irrelevance of school by pursuing more purely hedonistic, apolitical lifestyles. Our research confirms that ethnic identification, sometimes of a nationalist or neo-nationalist intensity, plays a powerful part in the way youthful masculinities are articulated and expressed. This is scarcely less the case with Indian and Pakistani boys as with white English and African-Caribbean boys. In all these cases, national or ethnic heroes and rituals—typically sporting or musical—are constantly cited as reference points for desirable masculinity. Where heroes and style-icons are ‘borrowed’ from another ethnic group, it is usually because the borrowing group itself aspires to possess the qualities expressed by them. Thus, elements in the related styles of ‘black macho’ (being ‘hard’), ‘black flash’ (being at the cutting edge of fashion—‘sharp’) and ‘black cool’ (being ‘laid back’—in effortless control) have been adopted widely by other ethnic young. The motive for imitation is more appropriation than admiration or identification, though these do sometimes occur. To the extent that cultural borrowing breaks down exclusiveness, it can undermine narrow and intolerant forms of ethnic identity. There is a possibility that new and hybrid ‘ethnic’ or cultural forms will one day render racism redundant, but that time is still a long way off. Youth is both a biological and a social category. It is a period of physical and mental maturation and of learning about society and about what society expects

4

Introduction

of its individual members. In traditional societies, these processes take place relatively seamlessly and, apart from crucial rituals or rites of passage, informally in the family/community. In modern societies this period of development and learning is to a significant extent hived off to specialist, formally-run institutions— to schools. Modern schooling is characterised by considerable tension between many students and teachers, the latter sometimes supported by other agents of socialisation and social control. Even among the majority of students not directly involved in anti-school activity, some express considerable indifference to school. While we found that more students than was reported in research in the 1960s and 1970s, including those of working-class background, accepted the instrumental value of education, this did not necessarily mean that they worked hard or liked school. The ‘real world’ was often thought to lie elsewhere, either in leisure or, ultimately, in paid work. The growing popularity of vocationally oriented courses at all levels of ability may have made schools seem more relevant in the area of preparation for employment, but if schools also aspire to shape students into ‘good citizens’—a goal apparently strongly enjoined by the Blair government—then, on the basis of our evidence, their performance was no better than moderate. Other cultural influences, including immediate peer groups and wider youth culture, seemed to engage many boys more strongly and meaningfully. The gap between the aims and culture of schools and teachers and what is meaningful to some of their students recurs throughout this book, and has emerged as a major issue of interpretation during the course of our research. This gap sometimes results in conflict, but not always. Perhaps what is more the case is that teachers (and, to some extent, other authority figures) and students live in different, although overlapping, worlds. These ‘two worlds’ are, of course, socially constructed, and to that extent youth itself is a social construct. Youth in modernity, and perhaps even more so in late modernity, is positioned in very demanding and subordinate circumstances—albeit from what may be ‘the best intentions’. Although it does not have a prescribed age of entry and exit, youth in late modernity is sufficiently demarcated and defined to ensure that age is an important basis of social and cultural reference and identity. Yet the culture and identity that young people construct is often not at all what their mentors intend. Chapter by chapter Chapter 1 of Uncertain Masculinities examines issues of gender equality and ‘race’ in the schools under study, mainly from the perspectives of the boys. Despite recent national reforms, the schools we studied were not entirely devoid of gender inequality, in both the formal and informal curriculum. Perhaps the latter is now the more significant, at least for the age group we were considering, and can work against as well as for boys. Some of the boys certainly felt that they were sometimes unfairly assumed to be the likely source of ‘trouble’ even before they had actually done anything. The schools we researched shared what has now been recognised as a national issue—that boys are performing

Introduction

5

less well than girls in most subjects at age 16. However, whatever advantage this might give girls in the short term, so far it has not led to a substantial undermining of patriarchal dominance in the world of work—although there are signs that the academic achievements of girls and women are beginning to have some carryover effect in this area. This first chapter also examines the attitudes of the boys to ‘racial’/ethnic equality, with reference to the strongly stated anti-racist policies of all four schools. What emerged in our interviews with the boys was that in some cases there was a sharp discrepancy between their general acceptance of and often apparent respect for the anti-racist values and policies of the schools and their everyday relations with each other, which were frequently influenced by racism. This is not to say that the schools were entirely unsuccessful in trying to imbue anti-racism, but they were certainly less successful than they would have liked and perhaps than they imagined. Exploration of the chasm between what is formally asserted and assented to and what happens informally in respect to ‘race’/ethnic matters continues into Chapter 2. A similar gap exists in relation to the boys’ approach to gender issues where, again, what is formally assented to in the public domain seems to be held with less conviction in private than in practice. Chapters 3 and 4, in particular, explore this discrepancy and other aspects of the boys’ attitudes and behaviour in relation to gender, but the theme also recurs throughout the book. Chapter 2 is the key theoretical chapter of the book, and the only one that draws more from secondary sources than from our primary material. The chapter reviews the literature on the construction of youthful masculinities or, to use Mac an Ghaill’s pithier term, ‘the making of men’ (1994). Both class and ethnicity can play substantial roles in the shaping of masculinities, and which of the two is most salient depends on specific historical circumstances. In effect, taken together, several works primarily concerned with the educational underachievement of white working-class boys in the 1960s also incidentally described how the class culture of the boys helped to shape their masculine identity (Hargreaves, 1967; Lacey, 1970; Willis, 1977). Similarly, Ken Pryce’s Endless Pressure (1986) can be read partly as a study of African-Caribbean masculinity—moulded as it has been in response to slavery and to post-slavery white supremacism and racism. More recently, there have been several books which more directly address black masculinity, including Tony Sewell’s work referred to above. We found that ethnicity continued to be a powerful formative factor in the structuring of masculinities in the 1990s. Ethnicity articulates with masculinity in a way that tends to accentuate the competitive and even aggressive aspects of masculinities. In most societies men are the warriors or defenders of the ethnos or people, and this complements and consolidates their dominance in gender relations. In view of this, it is not surprising that many of the points of reference and identity made by the boys were expressive of their own internal group solidarity and projected aggression. Sometimes this was expressed symbolically in, for instance, collective use of macho slang, and sometimes for

6

Introduction

real in fighting or violence against property. Although nearly all the boys were British nationals, nationality in terms of citizenship by no means equated with their perceptions of cultural nationality and belonging. In the latter case, it was their ethnic culture, often mediated through youth culture or sport, which was the main focus of their sense of identity. Thus, white English boys identified with the England national football team and even local football teams to an extent that African-Caribbean boys rarely did. The African-Caribbean boys were much more likely to identify with individual black music or sports stars, or with American basketball in which there is a substantial black presence. For the Pakistani boys it was their internationally successful cricket team that was the favoured source of heroes. Indian boys were probably the most eclectic among the minority ethnic groups in the range of people and cultural practices and symbols with which they found some degree of expression and identity. Although ethnicity was used by the boys to express their sense of difference and separateness from others, there was a considerable amount of cultural exchange and sharing between them. If modernity is redolent of nation and post-modernity of the global, then it is possible to put a post-modern gloss on the cultural flux and hybridity that occurred alongside more culturally embedded and conservative behaviour. Paradoxically, both in terms of being resented and of being imitated, AfricanCaribbean boys were the focal group. It was largely what was perceived as their ‘macho’ behaviour that commanded the attention of boys from other ethnic groups. This quite complex cultural phenomenon is explored in some detail in Chapter 2, with reference to other research as well as our own. Crucially, as a matter of theoretical interpretation, and unlike some recent contributions, we do not consider that ‘black macho’ as a form of masculinity exists only or mainly as the result of black men and boys internalising the negative labels of a white racist society (Mac an Ghaill, 1988; Alexander, 1996; Sewell, 1997). Such labelling can, of course, play a significant role in stimulating and reinforcing this particular behaviour, just as it can in relation to other behaviours. However, to isolate this single aspect of cultural interaction so as to explain so widely observed a phenomenon is altogether too narrow an approach. In order to explain ‘black macho’, it was necessary to embark on quite a lengthy sociohistorical excursion in which it is argued that, while black macho behaviour is related to a more general culture of resistance to racial oppression (i.e., as partly reactive in origin), it is also seen as generationally reproduced and to that extent is as much a cultural trait as any other established attitude or behaviour might be. Certainly, many black and white boys alike saw ‘black macho’ as a form of behaviour ‘owned’ by some black boys for which they were responsible. Nevertheless, the macho style favoured by many African-Caribbean boys needs to be understood in the context of slavery and post-slavery. The macho style is associated with resistance to and rejection of oppression and humiliation, often sexual as well as racist. It is in part reactive and in part assertive and should be seen in the broadest context of cultural interaction rather than merely as the outcome of labelling particularly by—in recent times—school and other

Introduction

7

authorities. Schools are often confronted by black macho; they do not cause it. Black macho is a powerful theme throughout African-Caribbean and AfricanAmerican cultures, and unless these cultures as a whole are to be seen as the product of negative labelling by white racists, then black macho must be seen as an authentic part of them, generating creative as well as destructive behaviour. Black youth culture exists as a powerful frame of reference outside and, for some, in opposition to the school system. To significant numbers of AfricanCaribbean boys their sub-culture appears to have much more to offer than the education system and the white dominated society it services. African-Caribbean and African-American cultures, including the strong element of macho resistance within them, are cultures generated out of displacement, trauma and subjection, and it is with reference to this total context that they must be analysed. Chapters 3 and 4 explore gender in more directly relational and comparative terms. The core of gender inequality is in relationships enacted through the gendered division of labour: domestic and paid work. For the purposes of comparison, we used previous research by one of the authors (Sharpe, 1994) which was a similar study of girls at four London schools, three of these schools forming part of the present sample. (This research is often referred to as ‘the girls study’ in these chapters). Chapter 3 examines the boys’ attitudes to girlfriends, marriage, housework and family life and some related ideas about masculinity. Their views were wide ranging, through the patriarchal and plainly sexist to the egalitarian and democratic. As with matters relating to ‘race’, for some of the boys there tended to be a discrepancy between what they perceived as being the ‘correct’ response to our enquiries and what they ‘really’ thought and did. In the context of the schools’ anti-sexist and anti-racist policies, pupils usually know what is expected of them. Many of their responses about marriage and the family could be compared with those from the research on the girls attending the same schools a few years earlier. What emerged from this was striking evidence of a ‘cultural lag’ in boys’ attitudes and expectations, about marriage and family life in particular. This apparent mismatch has implications for their own future relationships and family lives. The boys’ often conservative attitudes and assumptions about marriage and the domestic division of labour highlighted this sense of a ‘time warp’ between them and the girls, within which they had not quite come to terms with the changing realities of gender relations and power structures. Some class differences were evident, in that egalitarian attitudes tended to be expressed more by boys from middle-class than working-class families. Boys from different ethnic groups gave various responses and, if anything, it was the African-Caribbean boys who professed to slightly more current or future intended sharing of domestic tasks. Among the Asian boys there were considerable differences in how they approached the challenge of building their own relationships and families against the background of their own ethnic cultural norms and the fast-changing practices of partnerships and marriages in late modernity. Chapter 4 asks the boys about their intentions in relation to further education and work, and their attitudes to possible unemployment. It highlights the shift in the economy from traditional jobs and working structures of a more industrial

8

Introduction

era, when life seemed to offer more security, to the relatively unstable and riskier occupational patterns of today. It also reflects a time when most young people of all backgrounds are recognising and accepting that, whatever their feelings about school, their only chance lies in continuing education beyond schoolleaving age. The chapter looks at boys’ job choices which encompass a wider range than did those of the girls in the 1991 study, but likewise, their choices were quite heavily gendered, that is they were predominantly in stereotypical ‘men’s work’. Relatively ‘new’ or expanding occupational areas such as the media, computer or information technology, sport and leisure offer the potential for gender equality, but to a considerable extent they are not delivering on this promise. Middle-class boys tended, as has usually been the case, to have higher educational and career aspirations, but these class differences were less marked than might have been expected. Some ethnic differences emerged, and, for instance, more white and African-Caribbean boys expected to work in skilled trades and also in the emerging sports industries, while new technology attracted Asian boys, who often aspired to careers in business or finance. We asked about the boys’ feelings towards unemployment. They were aware of the prospect but often preferred to be optimistic about their own futures. We also examined the boys’ attitudes to equality in the workplace and found them to be generally positive. Their ideas about the consequent sharing of family and domestic responsibilities were more mixed. They seemed to find it easy to acknowledge women’s right to having good jobs but harder to accept them having equal status in the family. Some of the boys were struggling with the implications of this and the possible prospect of their increased role in domestic work. Again it reflects some difference between accepting principles and coping with reality, and may be linked with the same cultural lag referred to above. Some boys are simply reluctant to adjust to changes that undermine their power, privilege and self-interest. Chapter 5 examines some aspects of the boys’ leisure activities. Some class differences are noted, but the most interesting and extensive data pertains to the links between ethnic identity and leisure pursuits. The sports favoured by the boys tended strongly to reflect their cultural nationalism—football for the white boys, cricket for the Pakistanis, and basketball for the AfricanCaribbeans. The Asian and African-Caribbean boys were also somewhat less likely to watch the main ‘British’ TV channels—BBC and ITV—being more likely to prefer the more globally oriented Sky from which they were more able to choose sports and other programmes that played to their ethnic interests. These observations do not contradict the frequent observation of post-modernists that youth culture is highly fluid and multi-cultural in terms of style and imagery. In particular, a great deal of borrowing from black youth culture by other youth occurs, especially around the themes of ‘cool’ and ‘macho’. Yet, ethnically rooted differences in youth culture persist, however much they may become blurred by borrowing and imitation and by the homogenising effect of the commercial youth consumer market. Within youth culture, ethnic difference may be addressed in different ways

Introduction

9

and for different motives—usually in order to celebrate it, but sometimes to minimise its divisive potential. The latter was the case in popular music styles such as Two-Tone and the Rasta-Punk sharing of rock and reggae. There is already a substantial literature on ethnicity and popular music, and partly for this reason we concentrated on other leisure areas, particularly sport which, admittedly, is partly organised around notions of different national identity and might therefore seem to accentuate them (see Jones, 1988 and Gilroy, 1993(a), for development of the ethnicity/music theme). Themes relating to globalisation and post-modernism surface most strongly in Chapter 5. The content of the media is now diverse enough for boys to select according to their own tastes. To a considerable extent, their preferences reflect their sense of ethnic identity, albeit as mediated through the youth and sports markets. At the same time, the ethnic minority boys need to relate to the dominant English culture. Some tend to reject it, but most relate to it in a fairly pragmatic way without wholly identifying themselves with it. Interpretive frameworks We did not begin our research with the intention of working within or seeking to confirm a clearly defined theoretical framework. However, we proceeded on the mutual assumption that we each approached matters from a radical left-of-centre vantage point. We took the view that society is structured along gendered lines as well as in other ways, and that there are various types or formations of masculinity— which are malleable—and that in different ways these are related to patriarchy. We will shortly return to the issue of the gender order—in the case of Britain, still a broadly patriarchal one. The approach to understanding masculinities as personal/social constructs was most authoritatively developed by R W Connell in Gender and Power (1987) and Masculinities (1995), and has also been used in Mairtin Mac an Ghaill’s influential The Making of Men: Masculinities, Sexualities and Schooling (1994). Although this approach is now widely accepted, it has not gone without criticism. In particular, John MacInnes argues in The End of Masculinity that Connell ‘smuggles in the assumption that it is only men who possess masculinity’ (1998:57–8). In fact, to accuse Connell of covert biologism is quite contrary to his clear view that gender formations are culturally produced and that both men and women are capable of expressing attitudes and behaviour currently labelled ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’. MacInnes is so keen to see gendered inequalities and related cultural differences disappear that he is somewhat unrealistically more concerned to establish how insubstantial they are rather than to trace the still-powerful formations of masculinity that continue to be the main cultural and personal expressions of patriarchy. It is the latter task that Connell has so impressively embarked upon. In Connell’s terms we were researching how 15- and 16-year-old boys come to see themselves in relation to the ‘gender order’ of society—that is, to the structure and culture of gender inequality at the macro level. To do this

10

Introduction

we asked the boys questions on a wide range of topics, including their views on school, work, family life and leisure. We also looked at the ‘gender regimes’—the balance of gender power at the smaller institutional level—in the four schools of our study and how these affected the boys’ notions of gender and masculinity. Links between gender at the micro and macro levels are routinely made throughout the book. Connell’s influence on this book is reflected in two general areas rather than in any sustained attempt to apply his theoretical framework or even to employ most of his key terms. First, Connell sees patriarchy—virtually the universal form of gender order—as highly permeable to other structural influences, particularly ‘race’ and class. Second, and somewhat similarly, he sees masculinities as highly variable and changeable in form. As he puts it, ‘in recognising different types of masculinity, then, we must not take them as fixed categories’ (1995:38). We have taken the later point and illustrated it quite substantially, without, however, greatly using his descriptive terminology of gender structures, much of which applies more precisely to adults and the work context rather than to mid-teenagers. We do not even have much cause to use the term ‘hegemonic masculinity’—the dominant type of masculinity in a given gender order—because, again, the subjects of our research are not yet securely positioned within the hierarchy of patriarchal power. Of course, to a greater or lesser extent, all the boys anticipate and prepare for a position within patriarchy, and charting this process is an important part of our research. In this respect, Mac an Ghaill’s work offers some helpful typologies of emerging masculinities based on his research in schools (1994). However, as well as using Mac an Ghaill we frequently refer to other forms of masculinity, some of which may appear as little more than stylistic posturing but which invariably reflect a deeper structural reality. To return to Connell’s first point—that class and ‘race’/ethnicity and other factors interact with gender and contribute to the shaping of masculinities. The way an age group is socialised and organised in society also affects gender expectations and identities. This is rather evidently the case in relation to young people, who are subject to a relatively high level of social control and socialisation, not least in gender and sexual matters. In our interpretation, as in Connell’s, class, ethnicity, age and gender do not interact in any formulaic or wholly predictable way. In practice, we found that these factors interacted in substantially different ways in relation to the masculinities of white and African-Caribbean youth—social class being more important in the former case and the ‘folk’ memory of slavery and present reality of racism being more significant in the latter. For us, the social construction of identity means that people make their own class, ethnic, gender and other identities, but that they do so in circumstances that constrain them and influence them in certain directions. To understand a changing gender order and the changing types of masculinities within it requires historical analysis, in the sense of the analysis of specific actions and circumstances. Only then can generalisations be ventured, and even then only with the proviso that the circumstances on which

Introduction

11

they are based are unlikely ever to be precisely repeated. That said, this book does not avoid comment and conclusions. It is worth reiterating that gender is relational, both in terms of how gendered structures relate and how people relate to each other. Although this book is largely about the way that boys construct their identities and aspirations, including their concepts of their own and others’ masculinity, the fact that gender is relational prompted us to make use of data from a comparable sample of girls (Sharpe, 1994). The gender order in Britain, like that in many other Western countries, is changing rapidly. In the process there has been an enormous amount of adjustment and, to risk an understatement, discomfort. Granted that, some women are feeling somewhat more liberated, while some men are feeling a great deal more confused. The point in adopting a relational perspective is precisely not to ‘weigh one side against the other’ but to get a sense of gender interaction, and particularly, in view of the age of our respondents, of the directions it might be developing in. Sometimes the media reporting of gender change has seemed to revel in the conflicts and frustrations that have accompanied it. In particular, there has sometimes been a triumphalist tone in the reporting of the relative decline and troubles of men and boys. In the space of a few days in October 1999, the following newspaper headlines appeared: ‘Don’t blame wimmin boys, blame your dad: Why the Frail Sex is Male’ (Guardian, 19.9.99: G8); ‘Girl pupils thrash boys as GCSE gap gets wider’ (Evening Standard, 14.10.99:11); ‘Ditch your man and be happy’ (Observer, 17.10.99:13); ‘It’s nothing personal, but we’d rather eat alone’ (Evening Standard, 18.10.99:22). In fact, the last headline refers to an apparent growing trend and perhaps preference among both sexes to eat alone—though admittedly this finding was from a survey by Geest, a company that specialises in the production of single portions of microwave food! However, the trend to living alone is a genuine one and the signs are that women are generally coping better than men. Sometimes we, too, note that the responses of men and boys to on-going change in gender relations can be ‘pathetic’ or ‘funny’, but fundamentally their struggle to come to terms with this is one of the most serious and far-reaching of our time. Some questions of terminology should be addressed. Perhaps more pages have been written on the meaning and correct usage of the terms ‘race’, ethnic group, nation and genetically derived terms than on any substantive aspect of the wide area they refer to. It is not part of our purpose to add to this voluminous discussion, but it is important that we adopt uses that clearly convey what we mean. The term ‘race’ is the one that has caused the most difficulty and confusion (for different views, see: Miles, 1993; Banton, 1987). We accept the nowpredominant sociological view that the term ‘race’ in popular usage is a social construct rather than a precise scientific description. Thus we observe the convention of putting the term in inverted commas. We are interested in ‘race’ and racism in so far as the boys constitute each other and themselves as particular ‘races’ and on that basis make positive or negative judgements. However, in practice, where boys made negative judgements of this kind, they seemed to be

12

Introduction

based as much on cultural as on biological criteria, although the precise basis was seldom made specific. To accommodate this, our use of the term ‘racism’ refers to cultural as well as to biological prejudice and discrimination. This wide usage of the term is functional to a major focus of our study which is on the interaction of ‘race’/ethnicity and gender rather than on minutely distinguishing the boys’ attitudes and actions in terms of ‘race’/ethnic categories. The alternative, of attempting to distinguish between racism and ‘ethnicism’ or ethnic friction/conflict, seemed redundant in the context of our study. The term ‘ethnic group’ is employed here in its established usage as referring to the way of life of a people with a common historical and cultural experience, and is axial to our analysis and interpretations. The two terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’ refer to somewhat similar phenomena, but they are not interchangeable. An ethnic group is not necessarily a nation. A nation is a legal-political entity, although its members often share a cultural identification with it. Narrowly defined, the members of a nation are those who are its nationals, i.e., those who possess citizenship of the relevant nation state (a situation complicated in Britain by the fact that different categories of citizenship exist with different rights). An ethnic group refers to people who believe they have shared a fundamentally defining cultural and historical experience and identity. Individuals who believe themselves to be members of the same ethnic group may not necessarily share the same nationality, as was, and still is, the case with Jews. On the other hand, as is now conspicuously the case in Britain, people who belong—by self-definition—to different ethnic groups may share the same nationality (see Modood and Berthoud, 1997: Chapter 9). The point of relevance here relates to the overlap or lack of overlap between ethnicity and nation. Members of a given ethnic group which is not a nation sometimes aspire to create a nation based on their ethnic identity or, sometimes in a less thought-through way, simply talk about and identify with their ethnic group as though it was their nation. The latter was the case with some of the boys in our survey, especially those of African-Caribbean origin. This occasional elision of ethnic and national identity occurs predominantly at the cultural level—it does not necessarily imply a practical intention of seeking a different national citizenship or creating a new nation. Much the same issue arises with the term ‘masculinity’. It will be clear from the discussion above that we do not regard the qualities traditionally associated with masculinity as the exclusive preserve of men and boys. Any characteristic, or feasible range of characteristics, may be associated with any human being or group of human beings. We use the term to indicate how men and boys have constructed—in particular historical circumstances—given cultural attitudes and behaviours in relation to gender. We have not put the term ‘masculine’ in inverted commas in every case, but have done so where it seems especially necessary to draw attention to the constructed nature of masculinities. We have not chosen to frame our theoretical approach in post-structuralist or post-modern terms, but have occasionally used insights from these theories. In particular, themes of globalisation and cultural diversity, hybridity and

Introduction

13

change, probably feature much more than they would have done had this book been published some years ago. We have also tried to achieve a fairly seamless analytical and interpretative weave between structural and cultural factors which, while it does not collapse the two spheres theoretically, seeks to convey a practical sense of flow and counterflow between them. As far as our theorising of youthful masculinities is concerned, we have certainly found a variety of discourses rather than a single, overwhelmingly dominant one—an indication, perhaps, that traditional patriarchy is fragmenting. If there was a predominant masculine ‘discourse’ among the boys in this survey it was probably a modified and somewhat modernised version of ‘macho’—or, rather, several different versions of being macho. But many boys were certainly aware that there are other ways of being masculine, and one or two of them that there is no particular need to be ‘masculine’ at all. Acknowledgements Many thanks are due to the boys whose thoughts and ideas contributed to this book, and to the teachers in their schools, who gave us their time and also accommodated us and our research so patiently. We would also like to thank Sonia Lane for transcribing all the interviews. Sue would like to express much appreciation to Anne Reid for reading the chapters and making helpful and encouraging comments, and to Peter O’Shea for his caring and constant support. Mike would like to thank his family—especially his children—and friends for the time ‘lost’ to them in writing this book. Sooner or later they will find something in it for them. He owes a thank-you to several students— especially to Alison Rowley, Junior Johnson and Vanessa Walker—for sharing their first-hand knowledge of youth and minority ethnic cultures.

1

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group The school and neighbourhood contexts

This chapter discusses the contribution of the education system and the peer group to the formation of boys’ masculinities. The boys’ sense of ethnic identity and, in some cases, their experience of racism—either as victims or perpetrators or both—also contribute to the way they think of themselves as masculine, and are discussed at length later in the chapter. To a considerable extent, the school authorities and the boys’ peer groups were pulling in different directions, with the schools trying to shape attitudes to gender and ‘race’ to reflect egalitarian values and with many of the boys expressing still quite sexist and racist attitudes. Although masculine identities are, of course, defined primarily in gender terms, other influences than gender relations help to construct them. Prominent among these are class, ethnicity/nationality, youth culture and the media. This chapter begins with a brief overview of some of the main factors influencing the formation of masculinities in British society, with particular reference to the immediate post-war period—our point of departure. Any analysis of youthful forms of masculinity must address gender relations in the parent culture. In capitalist societies, class plays a fundamental role in shaping gender relations and identities. Class-influenced patterns of behaviour are conveyed largely through the family and are sometimes inadvertently reinforced in school. Because of the interest in social inequality of many British sociologists writing in the early post-war decades, we know a great deal about gender relations among the working class, even though class rather than gender was the main focus of concern. Almost incidentally, therefore, one of the most fully researched forms of masculinity by British sociologists is workingclass ‘macho masculinity’, which historically was formed in the often oppressive conditions of industrial capitalist society. Macho masculinity was characterised by reciprocal loyalty and support among the in-group of ‘mates’ or ‘lads’, and frequently by suspicion and mockery of the ‘bosses’ and outsiders. This form of masculinity was practised prominently by working-class boys in secondarymodern schools and many comprehensives in the post-war years. If anything, macho behaviour was probably expressed in more raw and dramatic forms by those younger men, whose behaviour had not yet been tempered by the constraints of family and work. Working-class macho is not, however, the only form of working-class 14

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group

15

masculinity. Many working-class men and boys have achieved solid and productive relations with each other and with women, relations which it would be insulting to label as macho. A more neutral term for this form of masculinity might be ‘solidaristic’ working-class masculinity, and this term will be occasionally used here. If there was an egalitarian sense of shared experience and status among many men in traditional working-class culture, women tended to be seen as different, very much as ‘the other’, or even ‘the opposite’ (sex). Sharply distinct if not segregated conjugal roles were part of a generally, though not undiluted, patriarchal social structure and culture (Young and Willmott, 1957). Although many working-class boys and men were content to remain working-class, many others aspired to higher social status and this could erode identification with ‘the lads’. Such men and boys were likely to conform more closely to middleclass values, including notions of masculine career success and achievement. Radical shifts in the British economy and class structure have had an impact on established forms of masculinity to an extent which justifies references to a ‘crisis’ of masculinity. However, experiences of this generalised crisis can be very different for boys of different social backgrounds. Much of this book describes how the boys in our survey engaged with varying degrees of confidence and confusion, both with economic challenges and with problems of constructing their identities, particularly gender identities. Class was not the only factor forming the masculinities of British boys and men. In the 1950s and 1960s, people talked about the influence of America on British culture almost as much as they now talk about the globalisation of culture. These influences included notions and images of what it is to be a man or to be masculine. Globally, as well as in Britain, it was the American model of ‘cool, hard, and in control’ masculinity such as that portrayed with variations by Humphrey Bogart and Clint Eastwood, that became the best known and perhaps most influential form of contemporary masculinity. It is this form of masculinity that Bob Connell has referred to as ‘hegemonic’ and it has certainly had an influence in Britain and elsewhere (Connell, 1995). This form of masculinity does not have the collective class-based characteristics of macho working-class masculinity, and instead reflects much more strongly values of individual control, competition and survival. Its roots lie in the struggle of immigrants to America to succeed in often hostile conditions and, ludicrous as it seems, in a bloody and often racist cowboy culture. As Connell notes, in the contemporary period the largely American-inspired model of masculinity is particularly dominant in the world of work, especially among business leaders and those who aspire to emulate them. With reference, then, to a wider context, this chapter analyses the attitudes and opinions the boys expressed about gender and ‘race’. Further, it provides some empirical reference for the more theoretical discussion in the next chapter of the interplay of ethnicities and masculinities in relation to white, AfricanCaribbean and Asian boys. In the present chapter, the formal policies and practices of the schools in relation to both gender and ‘race’ are briefly examined, and their impact or lack of impact on the attitudes and behaviour

16

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group

of the boys in less formal contexts within and outside of school, including that of the peer group, is discussed. Official school policy on gender and ‘race’ equality is a significant factor in the attitude formation of many of the boys. However, although all the boys we questioned were aware of the policies of their schools on these matters, their responses to them varied considerably. It was apparent that in many cases the boys’ attitudes were formed primarily outside school. Each of the four schools in our study had in place strongly stated equal opportunity policies in relation to gender and ‘race’. It was clear from our interviews that the boys understood that, as far as the schools were concerned, anti-sexism and anti-racism were to be taken as correct. In practice, many of the boys did not always observe these principles, especially outside of the school environment. The schools: gender in the formal and informal curriculum The formal curriculum The Sex Discrimination Act, implemented in 1975, made discrimination on grounds of sex illegal in education as well as in other areas of public life. However, comprehensive gender equality in education was not quickly achieved and in some respects has still not been achieved, despite the impressive way in which the performance of girls and women at every level up to degree has caught up with and in most subjects now surpasses that of boys and men. A major factor preventing fuller achievement of gender equality has been early and often premature subject specialisation along sex/gender lines. Prior to the introduction of the national curriculum (via the Education Act of 1988), large numbers of girls would opt out of chemistry, physics and technology-based subjects, and even general science and maths, as early as 14 years of age, while many boys would seek to avoid studying foreign languages, biology and home economics. Overall, early subject specialisation produced an unbalanced pattern of educational attainment along sex lines.1 Undoubtedly this pattern of subject specialisation has benefited men at the expense of women, and has fed into and supported the structure of patriarchy. This is because the subjects boys tend to opt for still tend to lead to higher paying jobs. Thus, the maths, science and technology qualifications attained by proportionately more males tend to lead to better paying jobs than the social science and arts qualifications attained by proportionately more females. The introduction of a compulsory national curriculum to age 16 has reduced but by no means removed gendered subject specialisation which, however, tends now to occur most sharply at A level and degree level. There is a crucial class dimension to this pattern of gendered educational attainment. It is middle-class young men studying at post-compulsory education level that most benefit from the gendered pattern of subject specialisation and its consequences for career choice. Young men of workingclass origin are less likely than middle-class boys to remain in post-compulsory

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group

17

education and more likely than young women of all class origins to leave school with poor qualifications. Far from obtaining any relative benefit from education, these boys are now the main failures of the system. Their predicament is being seen as a major contemporary social issue and is a genuine ‘gender crisis’ (albeit one narrower in scope than the inequality experienced to a greater or lesser extent by all women and girls under patriarchy). Whereas women in general are the main exploited group under patriarchy, young working-class men are the most obvious casualties of a major structural shift developing in that system. This change in patriarchy stems from complementary developments in capitalism and technology. The advantage that their position in industrial labour gave working-class men over working-class women has been steadily eroded in the last thirty years or so. Working-class boys from certain ethnic minorities can be doubly disadvantaged because of racism. However, for those working-class boys who are academically successful, a gender advantage or—to use R W Connell’s term—a gender ‘dividend’, can still flow from opting to study subjects associated with hard, ‘masculine’ rationality such as the natural sciences, or from studying the new technological or higher status vocational subjects such as computer studies or business studies. Notwithstanding the continuing importance of gendered subject specialisation in reproducing patriarchy, it is the lower level of attainment, relative to girls, of boys at 16 years old which has emerged in the majority of subject areas that most captured public attention and concern during the 1990s. Undoubtedly it is the problem of social control generated by these difficult to employ and often disaffected youths that has driven this concern. This chapter deals only briefly with the issue, although it was a substantial one in the schools in our study. However, the issue of educational attainment recurs throughout this chapter as a factor relevant to youthful masculinities. The pattern of boys’ educational attainment and underattainment is deeply interwoven with masculine cultures as well as with class and ethnicity. Despite the fact that the national curriculum had been in place for several years, we found considerable evidence that gendered curriculum specialisation persisted in some subject areas studied by the year-11 students of our study. This occurred even within subjects which the schools required all students to take. The ‘mechanism’ by which this occurred was through the provision of option choices within subject areas prescribed by the national curriculum. Where a particular option was associated more strongly with one or other sex, boys and girls tended to ‘choose’ accordingly. This process occurred in relation both to some academic subjects and to physical education. Indeed, the reduction of the compulsory element in the national curriculum at 14 in 1998, while enhancing student choice, may have increased these opportunities. On the other hand, subject content across the curriculum now tends to be less blatantly gendered. For instance, Home Economics contains considerable material about the commercial and industrial aspects of food production and about health and nutrition and the bio-technological aspects of food, rather than merely teaching pupils ‘how to cook’.

18

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group

Nevertheless, a gender neutral curriculum has not become a reality for all pupils. Edward, a student at one of the Ealing schools, commented on his experience: Interviewer: Edward:

Do you think there are subjects thought more to be for boys than girls? I would think like Computing, Design and Technology. I don’t think there’s a girl doing that. Most of the subjects are quite evenly split—Maths and English, History, Business Studies, Media Studies, they’re all a mixture. Things like CDT are mostly boys. Probably because it’s a man’s job, women don’t do that sort of job.

Edward also commented that few boys studied Child Development, ‘probably because either they don’t do that kind of job…or because, if they did, their friends might think they’re a bit weird’. Other students confirmed Edward’s observation that, while most classes contained roughly the same number of each sex, classes in certain subjects often did not. Courtney, also attending an Ealing school, stated that ‘there’s not one female’ in Technology ‘whereas in Art there are a lot of females in the class’. The two explanations given above by Edward for the sex imbalance in certain subject areas were quite commonly offered by the boys we interviewed. In more sociological terms, Edward’s first point is that the gendering of subject ‘choice’ is conditioned by the gendering of the labour market—paid and domestic. The labour market is still highly differentiated by gender, and in Edward’s view students normally prepare themselves for this by making gendered curricular choices—where they deem it appropriate and where they still can. Second, Edward suggests that those who deviate significantly from the expected choices might trigger social censure—‘their friends might think they’re a bit weird’. This kind of traditional perception was especially common among some of the less academic boys, often of working-class background, and was also mirrored in the attitudes to unusual choices expressed by girls from these schools studied by Sharpe (1976, 1994). Sport and physical education are still sometimes assumed to be of lower status than academic subjects, yet it is in these areas that some of the most overt and unreformed gender socialisation takes place. Arguably, the embracing—to the point of obsession—of sport by many boys, and the rejection of it in favour of more ‘feminine’ pursuits by many girls, represents a watershed in their gendered development which is as formative for some as, say, opting to specialise in the humanities rather than the natural sciences. As is repeatedly illustrated throughout this book, sport is of central symbolic significance for many boys, shaping their notions of masculinity and identity perhaps more than anything else. Pattman et al. (1999) argue from their study of 11–14year-old boys that football is ‘understood by many boys not only as a masculine activity but as something which made boys masculine’, and which helps to

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group

19

emphasise gender differences. They see football as not simply a game, but as a ‘key cultural resource’ and a ‘major site for the construction of gendered identities’. The discourse of competitive sport is closely interwoven with the entrepreneurial capitalism which threatens to engulf it. Further, sport and leisure is a fast-expanding occupational area which is currently serviced mainly by men and thus represents a missed employment opportunity for women. No apology is offered for giving this issue substantial treatment here, although, of course, this does not represent an endorsement of the way sport is organised either commercially or in schools. In one Ealing school, several boys, like Paul, commented that in PE lessons girls tended to choose different activities from boys: In PE, there’s football and netball. Some of the boys do trampolining but most boys like football or play basketball. The girls do trampolining and netball… (Paul) One way of engaging more girls in sport and, at the same time, perhaps engendering more cooperative and less frenetically competitive values through it would be to have more mixed-sex sport in schools. Of course, equal opportunity in education does not require that all individuals—whether boys or girls—should study in all details precisely the same curriculum, but rather that all should have equal opportunity to develop their abilities and potential. PE and sport, in particular, are perhaps areas in which individual differences of ability and taste are likely to affect curricular preference and choice. Nevertheless, the possible consequences of young men and women carrying out most sporting and physical education activities largely on a separate basis need to be thought through. One outcome is that girls tend to get used to being in a passive ‘watching role’ in relation to popular sports such as soccer, rugby and, to a lesser extent, cricket. However, realistically and in the foreseeable future, mixed sport is likely only to make up a modest part of this area of the curriculum. It is not a substitute for a satisfactory sports and PE curriculum for girls. To achieve this, two lines of action seem necessary. One is to put more effort into ensuring that girls’ participation in the major established sports, such as soccer and cricket, has equal status with that of boys. The other is to recognise that many girls prefer certain sports and physical education activities which are less popular among boys and to make provisions for this. On the first point, girls’ and women’s soccer in Britain is far less developed in school and generally than in many other countries, including the Scandinavian countries, Germany, China and the United States. In the United States—the 1999 women’s soccer world cup winners—legislation ensures equal status to women’s sport in colleges. Already in the United States, women’s soccer is thriving and leading players attract lucrative sponsorship. It is significant that, in the United States, soccer does not have the ‘macho’ associations that it does in Britain. There, such

20

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group

associations belong to American football and, to a lessor extent, baseball and basketball. However, this does demonstrate that soccer does not necessarily have to carry heavily macho cultural meanings of a kind that many girls and women quite understandably reject. A second line of action to make sport and physical activities more attractive to girls would be to give more emphasis to those they do enjoy, such as aerobics and dance. Some of these appear to be marginalised by the popularity of the main competitively organised sports. Sue Jones, a senior lecturer in PE at Manchester Metropolitan University, has argued that the ‘restrictions of the national curriculum don’t fit in with what girls want’, and that even ‘if dance and aerobics are offered, the main meal is still competitive’ (Guardian Education, 23.3.99:6). It is the ‘main meal’ that seems to turn some girls off—at least as participants. Yet there is a cooperative as well as a competitive aspect to most sports, although more so in some than in others. It would not be difficult to structure some sport in schools to socialise pupils towards cooperation, including cooperation between the sexes, although this might require some reshaping of the PE and sporting curriculum. Whereas mixed-sex soccer and rugby teams can cause problems, mixed-sex tennis, swimming and athletics teams need not do so. There is relatively unexplored opportunity for development along these lines. Mixed-sex tennis doubles are familiar enough, but what about mixed-sex relay races? There is no need for sport in schools—which has an educational as well as a recreational purpose—to ape the intensely competitive and masculinised nature of commercialised professional sport, much of which has been reorganised in recent times to emphasise competition and the importance of winning. It may even be that if a more cooperative approach to sport were to develop between the sexes in schools, the relationship between commercial and school sport would shift, with the result that young people might seek a somewhat different range of experiences from commercial sport than those they currently get. Thus, if mixed-sex and more cooperative sports were encouraged in schools and less emphasis given to single-sex sport characterised by intensely individualistic values, young people might begin to demand more of the same in commercial, professionalised sport. Given the seemingly increasing importance of sport in gendering attitudes, such a shift in opinion could be quite influential in achieving a slightly less frenetic society. However, it would be unrealistic to suggest that even a minor change in this direction could be easily achieved, given the power of commercial and professional interests in shaping the culture of sport (which even extends to rewriting the rules of sport to stress the competitive, ‘winning is the only thing that matters’, approach). It must be conceded that, whatever its potential benefits, mixed-sex sport may not have great appeal to many girls, and the issue of mixed-sex education needs to be approached with as much if not more sensitivity in this area as in any other. Far from being keen to embark on mixed-sex sport, many girls find the prospect of any organised sport quite daunting. According to a study by the Girls in Sport Partnership, there is an association between low self-esteem

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group

21

and self-confidence and lack of motivation to play sport (Guardian Sport, op. cit.). However, as in other areas of school and leisure activity, many girls seek peer approval and acceptance less through excelling in individual competition and more through mutual support. Particularly at puberty, sport may not correspond well with developing self-conceptions of femininity and womanhood. However, as suggested above, a sensitively conceived PE and sports curriculum ought to be able to accommodate and even, when appropriate, challenge such perceptions. The government’s decision in 1999 to abolish compulsory games is to be welcomed as a liberal and democratic move, but if girls opt out on a much larger scale than boys, it may leave many important and often disregarded gender issues unaddressed. While there are still some areas in which the formal curriculum is stereotypically gendered, this needs to be balanced by the evidence that, in most subject areas, girls now seem to be getting as fair and as good an education as boys. To the extent that this is so, it is a battle won for feminism. Indeed, perhaps the outstanding development in education of recent years has been the steady improvement in the attainment of girls, generally achieved at a faster rate than boys. In 1998, 53 per cent of girls reached the benchmark of five GCSE passes at grade ‘C’ or above compared with 42.6 per cent of boys. Although this relative improvement is a real one, it is also the case that, in several subject areas, girls have been out-performing boys for decades. It is partly the publication of results that has made this situation more apparent. The fact that the educational success of girls is not entirely new should act as a dampener on those who proclaim this success as an indicator of the end of patriarchy. The core of patriarchy is the sexual division of labour, and this appears to be taking much longer to change (see Chapter 4). Worrying about the boys: class and attainment In the light of the trends discussed above, it is not surprising that areas of weakness in the educational performance of some boys now attracts widespread attention. The greater tendency of boys towards disruptive, delinquent and violent behaviour has also caused concern. These are the observations of a Head of Upper School and a Deputy Head, respectively, in two West London schools, in response to a question about the relative academic performance of girls and boys: Oh, no doubt about it. At GCSE level the girls are outstripping the boys by a long way…You could argue that it’s exceptional teachers but I don’t think that’s the case. It’s just the way it happens with performance. (Head of Upper School) But when we analyse who is doing well, it’s classic. It’s a disproportionate number of girls who are always in the top half of every group…We’ve got a large number of kids who are definitely on tabs [drugs] for far too long in

22

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group

the day and they tend to be boys. We’ve got a few cases of girls who behave like that…but it’s the boys who set the scene…The fact that we’re struggling to teach them well in a mixed ability situation is to do with a great long tail of not very able children, with quite complex special needs, and a lot of them are boys. (Deputy Head) In interviews, the boys themselves often stated that they were more inclined to be troublesome and that the girls worked harder. Barren was quite emphatic: Interviewer: Darren: Int: Darren:

Do boys and girls muck around the same? No, girls do their work and stuff. The boys muck around. There are some girls who muck around but not this level. Why do you think that is? To impress everyone. To be macho.

Darren goes on to argue that, to be popular, boys have either to be ‘really clever’, in which case they have ‘loads of friends which are clever’, or ‘you have to be a nutter, do this, do that, and people like you for doing it’. Although he expressed regret about it, he himself had taken the ‘nutter’ route. Until quite recently, the issue of the relatively low educational attainment among boys, particularly of working-class origins, has tended to be obscured by a number of factors. Most obviously, the matter could easily be ignored when most of the boys got jobs anyway. Apart from specific job skills which could be learnt at work or through apprenticeships, most of Britain’s industrial workforce of the first thirty post-war years required little more than basic skills in ‘the three Rs’. Their low attainment level tended to become submerged when they left school, although it remained an element in the mainstream of national culture in the form of a strong strain of anti-intellectualism in workingclass masculine culture. However, since about the mid-1970s, boys of this level of attainment could expect only low-paid work or none at all. Many of the boys were aware of the problem. This is how Asif from Hackney, an area of high unemployment, saw it: I reckon a lot more men are unemployed than women. At school girls take more care of their work. Boys all mess about, and at the end of the day they have to go on the dole looking for work. Girls have more of a chance of getting a job. (Asif) The plight of many working-class boys of low academic attainment vividly illustrates that substantial shifts in gender relations can be precipitated by factors occurring outside of the gender order—in this case the decline of industrial work. It is now a moot point as to whether these jobless or low-paid young men benefit much from patriarchy at all, or, to put it in Connell’s terms, whether

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group

23

they are in receipt of any significant ‘patriarchal dividend’. By most measures, the majority of them are far worse off than, for example, well-qualified and wellpaid young women, and hardly any better off than young women in a similar employment situation to themselves. As more and more women detach themselves from dependence on patriarchy, their self-achieved class status is likely to become relatively more significant for them. John MacInnes envisages the development of a fairly gender-neutral class system which—to the extent that it occurs—will render patriarchy redundant and irrelevant to an increasingly competitive capitalism which demands the best person for the job (MacInnes, 1998). Boys unable to adapt to this are at risk of finding themselves redundant, not only as employees but as prospective mates for women. Whether patriarchy is generally in retreat is open to debate, but it certainly seems weaker among the working class, both culturally and in the erosion of the material basis of patriarchy in the centrality of ‘men’s work’. It is hardly surprising that young women who have reasonable employment prospects are not attracted towards relationships with boys who do not (see Chapter 3). In contrast to the difficulties experienced by many working-class boys, those from more affluent backgrounds have tended to maintain a strong position educationally, and even more so in the employment market, right through to the end of the twentieth century. In the first thirty or so post-war years, the academic attainment levels of middle- and upper-class boys were generally high, and because of the class-gender bias of the educational system, these boys tended to emerge as the apparent ‘stars’ of the state system. In the period between the mid-1970s and the late 1990s it was the improvement in the attainment levels of girls, especially those of middle-class background, that was the main gender-driven change in education. This improvement occurred across the board, including in traditionally ‘male’ subject areas, particularly Maths and the natural sciences. However, the educational performance of middle- and upper-class boys has remained strong and, as young men, they still tend to dominate the elite universities. Meanwhile, until recently, the educational difficulties of many working-class boys have tended to be ignored or, at best, articulated in terms of the consequences of their ‘disruptive behaviour’ for school and for societal order and control. Reflecting the harsh economic realities of the 1980s and 1990s, boys of all class backgrounds in our survey generally showed an appreciation of the link between educational attainment and career achievement (see Chapter 4). However, in practice, attitudes of indifference and even antagonism to education persisted among some white working-class boys. These attitudes seemed part of a wider macho lifestyle, partly the residue of harsh industrial culture, although other types of masculine orientations had also emerged among working-class boys more reflective of the conditions of the 1990s. To understand workingclass macho requires an appreciation of its historical roots of the kind briefly attempted earlier. Similarly, in order to understand the masculinities of AfricanCaribbean and Asian boys, their particular histories and cultures must be considered. Most African-Caribbean boys share some class experiences similar

24

Gender, ‘race’ and the peer group

to those of white working-class boys, but this is mediated and intensified by the possibility or reality of racism. Ethnic culture, including forms of masculinity occurring within particular ethnic groups, cannot be effectively considered as a separate or mere ‘bolt-on’ factor to class. Youthful African-Caribbean masculinities, including African-Caribbean macho, were constructed in an historical context in which class and ethnic experience was more or less a seamless whole in which each changes the other—a point which will become clearer in the next chapter. Youthful Asian masculinities are somewhat different again, and for similarly specific and sometimes complex historical reasons. These remarks support the well established analysis that the cultural and social life of students outside of the educational context deeply affects their experience and success within it. A specific purpose of the next chapter is to examine how different types of masculinity interplay with the educational system, and particularly how these masculinities are formed within peer groups. The formal curriculum: conclusion To summarise, in the schools under study the national curriculum was not delivered in a completely gender-neutral way, although it offered a much fairer framework than that provided in many schools prior to its introduction. To the limited extent that boys and girls are still able to select different subject areas, boys appear to benefit more than girls, and such ‘choices’ certainly tend to reflect traditional notions of gender role formed in a patriarchal society. However, the poorer performance, particularly of working-class boys relative to girls of similar background, has focused a range of issues about boys and education which have previously been obscured. A central factor in this matter is how boys and young men of different ethnic and class backgrounds express their masculinities and in particular whether or not their masculinities hinder or further the educational process. The informal curriculum The informal curriculum includes everything learnt in schools outside of the formal academic curriculum. Two important ways in which school culture and practice can socialise pupils is through role-modelling and labelling. Both areas have been the subject of considerable research and professional debate in recent years.2 Many local education authorities have taken positive steps to appoint women teachers and teachers from ethnic minority at all levels, partly in order to provide appropriate role models. Similarly, a large body of educational research into the effects of labelling on students’ self-esteem and educational performance has had a substantial influence on teaching delivery, particularly among teachers consciously adopting anti-sexist and anti-racist approaches. As might be expected in the case of progressive London schools, each of the four schools we studied had adopted equal opportunity policies and practices in their appointment procedures. Part of the purpose behind these

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25

policies was to create an environment in which not only men but women and members of ethnic minorities as well were seen by pupils to be routinely occupying a range of responsible roles. One school in particular had almost made a crusade out of its equal opportunities procedures in relation to gender and ‘race’—and with some effect. The consistent message from our interviews with both the boys and the senior staff was that the authority of female staff was as accepted and respected as that of males. The very few exceptions concerned young female teachers. However, while the boys extended a rough equality of respect to teachers of both sexes, some also perceived a gendered difference of behaviour between them in the classroom (see page 26). Our interviews with the boys showed that many of them considered that classroom relations were partly shaped by gender. However, although references were made to ‘classroom troublemakers’, the boys’ comments did not confirm that anti-school sub-cultures of boys occurred to the extent found in schools in predominantly working-class areas by some earlier researchers (Hargreaves, 1967; Ball, 1981). These studies were intensely observational, and it is possible that our data simply failed to indicate an existing phenomenon. However, other explanations are plausible. The first is that ethnic differentiation between the boys provided an alternative basis of social organisation and behaviour to the class-based peer group. The multi-ethnic nature of the schools we examined diluted the class-gender effect which is an element in the production of such sub-cultures. Large and socially integrated groups of anti-school workingclass boys whose membership crossed ethnic lines were not reported. Classroom ‘trouble’ appeared to occur more on an individual or small group basis, and the membership of the small groups was as—or more—likely to reflect ethnicity as class. In highly ethnically mixed schools such as those in our study, such differential ethnic identification can be as significant as those divisions among students occurring along class lines. However, in ethnically diverse schools, ethnically-based peer groups are likely to be somewhat smaller and thus less dominant than the large, anti-school, working-class peer groups of the early post-war era, which at times virtually ‘went into battle’ with teachers in certain schools. This is not to underestimate the intensity of the tension and aggression that can occur between teachers and peer groups, particularly those of young African-Caribbeans (see Mac an Ghaill, 1988; Sewell, 1997). A second explanation for the apparently limited influence of social classbased anti-school sub-cultures within the classroom relates to the quality of the schools and teachers. While we cannot comment on matters of day-to-day competence, it was clear that the schools’ senior managements were well informed on issues of pedagogy and classroom processes. According to Hargreaves, Ball and others, an important contributory element in the formation of anti-school peer groups is negative labelling by teachers. Awareness and perhaps greater avoidance of such labelling in the schools we surveyed may have worked against the development of large anti-school peer groups. But while macho boys remained much in evidence, their frame of reference and action was based more on the ethnic rather than the class-based peer group.

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Two related perceptions about gender in the classroom were widely shared among the boys. One was that teachers of both sexes tended to treat girls slightly more favourably than boys, and the other—often cited by the boys as an explanation of the first—was that boys were seen often to be more troublesome than girls. It was suggested that occasionally certain male teachers colluded with, and even indulged, boisterous behaviour from boys. However, some boys saw such behaviour as largely their own responsibility. This mitigated the feelings of resentment some of the boys had about their perception of being less well treated than girls. This treatment was seen as often deserved rather than the outcome of unfair labelling. Although the boys generally saw themselves as likely to be rather more troublesome than girls, most were keen to distance themselves from those they perceived as ‘real troublemakers’ or ‘dossers’ who cropped up in some classes. Generally, they did not find much fault in the way teachers conducted their classes, nor did they suggest that a substantial amount of negative labelling of pupils by teachers was occurring. We did not seek to check the boys’ perceptions by observing classroom interaction as some studies have done (Hargreaves, 1967; Ball, 1981). Such accounts tend to suggest that ‘troublemaking’ occurs largely as a ‘self-fulfilling prophesy’ resulting from the labelling process. In the secondary-modern school he studied, Hargreaves argued that the key mechanism in the formation of anti-school peer groups was streaming, which locked ‘the lads’ into an oppositional relationship with the school authorities. Ball found that teacher labelling reflecting class prejudice could occur in mixed ability classrooms as well. Other factors besides the boys’ own perceptions support the view that negative labelling by teachers was probably not a major factor in alienating boys. The management in these schools appeared to be well informed about potentially negative classroom processes, and it is doubtful whether any teacher could have routinely discriminated against an individual student or group of students without being noticed and either counselled or disciplined. Despite the challenges they faced, these schools appeared to have achieved a reasonable level of fair and effective practice. Perhaps as a result, entrenched anti-school peer groups did not occur on the scale researchers have found in some schools in working-class neighbourhoods, although in some classrooms there were certainly boys perceived as ‘troublemakers’ by both teachers and other boys. While the boys showed little awareness or resentment of negative labelling of the kind indicated by some earlier research, they were very aware of the consequences of acquiring a reputation for being a troublemaker. Nathan, an African-Caribbean student, commented that ‘as long as you’re not like one of the pupils that is always on the hit list, you’re alright’. During the 1970s and 1980s sociological research tended to present boys’ attempted domination of the classroom as operating to their advantage and against that of girls (Spender, 1983). Such behaviour was seen as reinforcing boys’ control of talk and territory in relation to girls, and prepared them for similar patriarchal relations in work and family. The fact that neither boys nor

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girls were aware that these processes were occurring and tended to take them for granted made them all the more powerful in their effects. To what is possibly a large extent, these processes of patriarchal socialisation and reinforcement continue. However, since the early 1970s, many schools, including those we studied, have consciously attempted to counterbalance bias towards boys in education. Some boys perceived ‘girl-friendly education’ as favouritism towards girls, but, perhaps surprisingly, many expressed a rough understanding and acceptance of schools’ efforts in this area. One West London school attempted to provide a ‘sheltered’ leisure area for girls, in the form of a Chinese garden in which only girls were allowed. Luke, a student at the school, made the following comments: [T]he teachers built a Chinese garden in the school and then they wouldn’t allow any boys to go in there…it was just girls. I thought it would be nice just to sit there sometimes but we weren’t allowed. I suppose it was fair because the boys still dominated the whole playing area outside. Now there’s a common room—everybody shares that… (Luke) Separating young boys and girls in this way has the obvious advantage of providing greater immediate opportunity for freedom and control to the latter. Whether in the longer term it is an effective strategy for enabling girls to cope with the controlling behaviour of boys is more debatable. What is not in dispute is that, whatever the current balance of power between the sexes in terms of spatial and verbal dominance in the classroom and playground, in recent years girls have substantially improved their academic performance relative to boys. This relative improvement has not yet been as fully reflected in the sphere of paid work as might be expected and as is sometimes suggested (see Helen Wilkinson’s Genderquake (1994)3 for what is perhaps an overoptimistic assessment). The schools and gender: concluding comment So far this chapter has suggested a high degree of acceptance of the principle of gender equality in the four schools we studied. All the schools pursued equal opportunity policies. The introduction of the national curriculum has generally helped the cause of equal opportunity in relation to gender, but some gender stereotyping in the area of subject ‘choice’ appears to persist. Quite a high level of awareness of the informal processes which foster gender inequality was apparent in management policy and practice. If the boys were much less aware of the informal and often unconscious ways in which gender inequality is reproduced, it is clear that a majority of them at least acknowledged the importance of the principle. The continuing improvement in the levels of the educational attainment of girls has somewhat shifted the search for the key causal factor in generating gender

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equality away from the educational system towards paid and domestic work. Here, gender inequality remains rather more intransigent and, once in the occupational system, many boys in our survey would be likely to gain some advantage from its remaining gender bias—not necessarily by their own intent but simply because the structure of domestic and paid work still tends to advantage men and boys. However, patriarchy does not advantage all of them equally and some it does not advantage at all. Class, ethnic and even gender factors worked variously to the disadvantage of many boys in our survey, to the extent that Connell’s suggested ‘patriarchal dividend’—whereby all males gain some advantage however small— scarcely seemed to come into play at all. At worst, a minority of boys struggled at school and returned to unwelcoming, empty homes in which occasionally ‘mum’ might not even live, let alone wash their clothes. In such cases, the gender order, as well as the class system, works against them. Some would find a way out of disadvantage through education, but others would not. The extent to which the likely educational and career failures of such boys is affected by gender as well as other factors is discussed in later chapters. ‘Race’/ethnicity and masculinities Inside the schools Boys’ identities are not only formed in relation to the increasing challenge of ‘the other’ in the form of girls but they are also confronted by ethnic differences among themselves. Post-war immigration has put issues of ethnicity, ‘race’ and colour on the agenda in schools and in national life generally to an unprecedented degree. In some contexts and for some individuals, the ‘sameness’ of gender is strong enough to create a collective ‘masculine’ solidarity which overrides possible conflicts arising from ethnic differences. The boys’ attitudes to ‘race’/ethnicity deeply influence their perceptions of their own gender identities, and vice versa. Thus, macho defence of ‘territory’ or possessiveness of a girlfriend can acquire an added edge if the ‘aggressor’ is perceived as ‘belonging to another race’. In these cases, a gendered situation could be said to be ‘racialised’. On the other hand, a shared ‘masculine’ pride and identification in the achievements of a boy or man from ‘another race’, and perhaps a desire to imitate or emulate them, will also occur. This section attempts to chart some of the main shifts and flows of ‘race’/ethnic and ‘masculine’ identities and related behaviours expressed by the boys. The four schools in the study had adopted anti-racist policies which were clearly perceived as such by the boys. The following comments from one Ealing Head Teacher are perhaps unusually robust, but they are typical of the strength of commitment to anti-racism expressed by the senior staff we talked to in all the schools: We had very strong ways of dealing with racism. If there was a racist incident with a pupil swearing at another pupil, they were sent home immediately

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and their parents brought in to discuss it. It wasn’t just: ‘You said something, so you go home and don’t come back’. They were brought in and it was discussed within the context of the whole (anti-racist) philosophy. And that still applies. Somebody called somebody a Paki the other week. I sent him home. You’ve only got to talk to their parents for five minutes and you know why… (Head Teacher) As the Head Teacher’s concluding remark implies, he believed that anti-racism in the school context might be countered by racism at home, although we cannot confirm whether his judgement was accurate. Whatever views they may have been hearing at home, a majority—although by no means all—of the boys we interviewed appeared to be genuinely opposed to racism and to view their peers of whatever ethnic background in a broadly egalitarian way. Of course, it is perhaps the easy option to express the ‘correct’ opinion in the formal context of an interview. However, on other matters the boys generally seemed willing to express controversial or politically incorrect opinions if these were what they believed. Rather than push the boys to say what they felt was expected, the interview situation often encouraged the boys to be particularly thoughtful and self-interrogatory, with the result that some of their answers almost became a dialogue with themselves. The possibility of being involved in racism—either as victims or perpetrators—was part of the reality of the boys’ lives, but school was not the main site of racism. None of the boys we talked to saw themselves as having been victims of direct racism by teachers. On the contrary, teachers tended to be seen as advocates and enforcers of anti-racism and this role seemed to be accepted as fair by the boys. School, particularly within the classroom, offered some protection against racism, and to that extent was a relatively safe haven against it. When asked if he noticed whether pupils were treated differently ‘in terms of racial equality’, Zac, an African-Caribbean student, put the virtually universal view: ‘No, we are all treated the same’. George, an African-Caribbean student, came closest to suggesting that he might have been discriminated against by a teacher but he stopped well short of making a definite accusation. Nevertheless, his comments illuminate how racism can insidiously undermine a potential victim’s self-confidence and trust of others: Interviewer: George:

Have you encountered racial inequalities in school? I couldn’t say yes, but then again little things, but as you go along you don’t notice them, but when you look back you think about that thing, and you think it could have been, maybe but not sure. You don’t really follow up on them. You let them lie… Like not being chosen for things. I’m not sure. Like when we used to have group games, never being chosen to be in the best team. But then again, you think—was my ability right, was I good at that thing, or was it just that I was a different colour?

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Richard Sennett (Sennett and Cobb, 1972) referred to the hidden injuries of class—which often took the form of psychological damage. George’s doubt and uncertainty is perhaps evidence of a comparable hidden damage that racism can inflict. In a society in which a considerable amount of racism occurs, it can be the suspicion of racism as well as the reality of it that can damage relations between members of different groups. The black journalist Geoff Small put his finger precisely on this point in the television series ‘Black and White’. The series enquired into the extent of racial discrimination in Bristol in a number of areas, including housing, employment and access to leisure facilities. Small carried out the research with a white journalist, Tim Marshall. Their approach was for Small to apply for accommodation, a job or whatever, and for Marshall to make a similar application shortly afterwards. The rate of rejection experienced by Small compared to Marshall varied between 3 to 1 and 5 to 1, depending on the particular area. This rare opportunity to present racial discrimination and roughly quantify its extent prompted Small to observe that, in these kinds of everyday situation, black people are unlikely to know whether they have been rejected legitimately or as a result of discrimination. In a TV series which ran in 1999, Small and Marshall’s ‘experiment’ was repeated by another black man and white man, ‘Rob and Rob’. Significantly, black Rob again referred to the uncertainty about whether racism has taken place as being one of the most painful aspects of potentially discriminatory situations. In memorably graphic terms he referred to such situations as ‘like being pissed on from a great height, but from so far away it feels like rain’. It is this kind of uncertainty and potential indignity and unfairness that has affected George, and such feelings are likely to diminish only to the extent that racial discrimination and prejudice does. It is unlikely that conscious discrimination by teachers would occur in the schools we studied on anything like the scale of that experienced by Small in other areas of public life. These schools were each given vigorously anti-racist leads. Contrary to the impression sometimes given, the public education system is one of the more progressive areas of national life in matters of equal opportunity and treatment. Even so, in one of the schools a teacher had received a final warning for racist behaviour. In short, George’s worries were not mere paranoia. In any case, racism is perhaps conducive to paranoia. It is arguable that racism among individual teachers, as distinct from institutional racism characteristic of the educational system as a whole, has sometimes been exaggerated in the relevant sociological literature and perhaps in the teaching of sociology. The concepts of labelling and self-fulfilling prophesy are easily understood by students and can be rather glibly applied, apparently to ‘blame’ teachers for all kind of ills visited on various disadvantaged groups, including ethnic minorities. Both Mac an Ghaill’s Young, Gifted and Black (1988) and Sewell’s Black Masculinities and Schooling (1997) explain the poor relations between some teachers and African-Caribbean boys significantly because of intentional or, more usually, unintentional racism on the part of individual teachers. In fairness, what they find in some teachers is

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not quite so serious as intentional racism but instead represents stubborn and conservative attitudes and a lack of ‘racial awareness’. However, both Mac an Ghaill and especially Sewell also emphasise that the fundamental causes of the alienation from school of many African-Caribbean boys lie outside the educational system. What the boys—or a significant number of them—have done is build a sub-culture which provides a strong ‘alternative’ identity, at the heart of which is ‘black macho’ and a need for ‘respect’. This aspect is given even more emphasis here, and much less is given to the largely unproven hypothesis of teacher failure in relation to black pupils—amounting, in some cases, to racism. The boys in our survey saw schools and teachers as anti-racist rather than likely to be racist, and saw some of their peers as more likely to be racist than their teachers. Racism among the boys: the ‘only joking’ excuse According to the boys, it was only among the students themselves that racism occurred in an everyday, routine way within the schools. In general, however, they explained this away as ‘only joking’. In answer to a question about whether racism occurred at school, Fred, a white student from a West London school with a strong anti-racist approach, responded: No, only mucking about. Just like they would say to me ‘You honkey’ or something, I’d say ‘Shut up, stupid black’ or something. Just like a joke. Just friendly mucking about. (Fred) Abdul, an Indian student at the same school, observed that ‘everyone gets cussed in school’. He regarded ‘cussing’ as ‘childish stuff and considered that it was ‘part of life’. The widespread view among the boys, that racist banter was fairly harmless and anyway inevitable, raises important issues. It is a view which clashed with the schools’ official anti-racist policies. (This issue has some parallels with the sexist ‘joking’ and banter that some girls experience from boys, as described in Chapter 3.) The boys’ view is realistic in that physical and cultural difference will often provoke, among other things, humour or, in their own words, ‘pisstaking’. The rigorous, politically correct view that such matters should never be a subject for joking is likely to be frequently contravened in practice—and not only by boys, although this does not justify such joking. The danger of racist banter is that it can fairly easily turn into more serious insults and even pave the way to physical violence and lasting ill-feeling. It can be the thin end of a very nasty wedge. Once they were beyond the direct supervision of the teaching staff, a minority of boys did become involved in racism at a more serious level. Jake, a white boy, described the involvement in racism of some of the boys from a younger age-group:

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Interviewer: Jake: Int: Jake: Int: Jake: Int: Jake: Int: Jake:

Is there any racial conflict in the school that you hear of or get involved in? There is some but I don’t get involved in it. Who do you see as getting involved in it? The younger white kids. Black kids tend to wind them up at times. Do you mean African-Caribbeans or both? Both. You think they start it? Yes. You don’t get involved? Sometimes…

Given the frequency of racist joking among themselves, it is not surprising that our questionnaire data confirmed that most of the boys believed that schools are not wholly free of racism. Eighty-three per cent of African boys, 77 per cent of white boys, 74 per cent of African-Caribbeans and 71 per cent of Asians disagreed with or strongly disagreed with the statement that: There is no racism in school these days’. This is a high level of agreement among the ethnic groups that racism in schools persists. Racist banter occurred much less at the school with an Asian majority than at the other schools in our survey. This is rather obviously explained by the fact of the large majority of Asian pupils. This was the perception of one student, Gary: Interviewer: Gary: Int: Gary:

Have you experienced any racism in school? Do you notice any? Not really. In this school there isn’t much racism… You don’t think Asian guys get more aggro than most? Not in our school. Maybe somewhere where there are more blacks, they might get more. I don’t know.

However, Gary’s observations do not lead to the conclusion that there was no group tension and conflict in the school. Desai, an Indian student at the same school, confirmed Gary’s observation but commented that there was considerable friction among Asian students themselves: …Nothing you could really call racism—but Asians tend to fight other Asians. Hindus will say something about the Muslims and their religion— how fanatical they are—and how their babies have certain parts of their private parts taken off. Things like that. And the Muslims will say ‘Oh, you Hindus worship monkeys’. Silly things like that. I suppose that is racism. I haven’t seen any racism in this school between white people and black people, not really. (Desai) The problem of ethnic conflict between Asian groups pointed out by Desai has been a substantial one in Southall in recent years. In fact, the conflict has been

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mainly between Sikhs and Muslims rather than Hindus and Muslims. In 1997 tension flared into violence, and beatings and public confrontation occurred. Given the extent of religious-ethnic difference among South Asians in Southall it is likely that some conflict would have occurred among them even if they had been a much smaller proportion of the total population in the district. Along with other data in our survey, this conflict confirms that racism and ethnic tension is not exclusively a white-black issue in Britain (see pages 178–81). Outside the schools The opportunity to express racism depends on context. In general, the boys were more likely to experience and engage in more serious racism outside rather than inside the school. The progressive, liberal environment of the schools and their anti-racist cultures and controls lessened the severity of racism and reduced its extent in the schools. From their own accounts, it seems that some of the more racist-inclined boys felt freer to express their racism outside of school in the streets and neighbourhoods. Sometimes the journey to school, or even time spent in the playground, gave opportunity for racism. As is discussed in the next chapter, the peer group often played a role in the expression of racism. What we cannot establish from our data is the precise influence of the home background on the boys’ attitudes to ‘race’; all we can do is to observe that teachers frequently cite the home as a more potent source of influence than themselves on the attitudes and behaviour of their pupils. Typically, the boys stated that they had more friends at school from ethnic groups other than their own than they had in their own neighbourhoods. This is not surprising, given that most of them lived in neighbourhoods in which their own ethnic group was relatively highly concentrated. However, it is also likely that the multi-cultural environment of the school was more conducive to friendships across ethnic lines than the frequently more ethnocentric ethos of the boys’ homes and community networks. In Southall, the large Asian presence has the effect of diminishing the likelihood of white racism. In the other schools, according to some of the boys’ accounts, ethnically mixed peer groups were reported as less likely to become involved in ethnic or racist conflict than ethnically homogenous ones. Membership of an ethnically homogenous peer group was not necessarily always dictated by the make-up of the neighbourhood population. Some of the boys seemed to select such groups by preference, and sometimes this indicated attitudes that, if not overtly racist, were inclined to be intolerant and belligerent to boys seen as different from themselves. Historically, racism in Britain has been overwhelmingly caused by members of the white majority group and has occurred within white dominated institutions. However, this was not entirely how all the boys perceived or interpreted ‘racial’ and ethnic conflict. They tended to understand racism in terms of their own immediate experience rather than as part of the larger historical and contemporary picture. Unsurprisingly, those more closely involved in racial conflict often blamed

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the boys from the ethnic background with which they were in conflict. In practice, at the level of everyday interaction, responsibility for racist behaviour was shared across the ethnic groups—although it sometimes took different forms among these groups. Most of London’s 200 or so ethnic groups are represented in Hackney, and ethnically distinct young male peer groups commonly occur in that borough. Bruce, a white boy from the Hackney school, had a very polarised view of matters: The blacks will go mugging the whites. They won’t mug a black person, they’ll mug a white person or Asian person. Asians will go mug someone else, they won’t mug the Asians. The whites stick together, the blacks stick together, and the Asians stick together. That’s how it works…If I saw a load of black people walking along, I’d cross over. Because you know they’re going to come up to you and try to mug you. I’ve been mugged three times just outside school. (Bruce) In fact, Bruce’s view of ‘how it works’ is only partially accurate. There certainly is some peer conflict along racial lines in Hackney, but Bruce’s description is influenced by subjective experience, prejudice and exaggeration. Bruce was himself a member of a gang and it is possible that he was less the blameless victim in the three ‘muggings’ than he states. Nevertheless, if his account of three ‘muggings’ is to be taken as accurate, it would be unfair to minimise his comments and feelings. The comments of both Bruce and Jake (see pages 31–2) are clearly influenced by the ‘side’ they see themselves as being on. Their remarks seem partly motivated by self-justification. It is interesting that both tended to express rigid attitudes towards gender roles as well as towards ‘race’/ethnicity. Reactionary attitudes, like liberal ones, tend to occur in a related cluster, and theirs could perhaps be described as embryonically authoritarian (Hampden-Turner, 1971). Several of the boys made it clear that they were much more fearful about the possibility of racial victimisation when they travelled outside their own area than when they were inside it. Thus, an Asian youth from Ealing expressed the view that to be caught alone in Shepherd’s Bush could be risky. Similarly, an African-Caribbean boy from Hackney claimed that there was much more chance of harassment ‘up Tottenham’ than locally. The accuracy of these comments cannot be verified, but they are certainly understandable in terms of the psychology of territory and security. Like being at home, being in one’s own neighbourhood tends to be associated with safety and security. In fact, official statistics suggest that an individual is about as likely to suffer violence from a close relative or friend as from a stranger. Similarly, much of the actual violence experienced by the boys occurred around their own neighbourhood or not infrequently just outside their close neighbourhood, not untypically around the school. Nevertheless, it is not

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surprising that, when travelling alone or even in twos outside ‘their territory’ and without the protection of ‘their mates’, the boys often felt more vulnerable and were sometimes treated as such by the local boys. Gang violence across neighbourhood lines was sometimes sparked by threats or by violence to individuals. Although it is this kind of ritualistic, set-piece, larger-scale posturing and conflict that tends to capture media attention, everyday experience is generally on a smaller, less noticeable scale and usually goes unreported. Both the extent and the nature of the racism experienced by boys needs careful analysis. Only a minority had been involved in any violence motivated by racial or ethnic prejudice and, among these, one or two incidents were typical. In the interviews, most of the boys came across as racially tolerant and as accepting of the principle that people have a right to be culturally different. Even outside school, many had friends from different ethnic backgrounds than their own. Yet racist humour and chat was part of the background noise of the boys’ lives— even in school, once out of reach of official surveillance. Does this racist banter matter? On the one hand, it can be seen as the ‘thin end of the wedge’, the sure sign that, despite official policy, a racially tainted way of seeing the world persists. For some boys, racist joking is certainly part of deeper personal attitudes that could well develop into more serious racism. On the other hand, for some the joking may be genuinely superficial. The self-mockery in ‘racist’ terms of some black boys is particularly hard to read. To hear a black youth call another one a ‘nigger’ might jar on the ears of most white anti-racists who nevertheless may be in no position to know what nuances of meaning the youths might have invested in the term. In principle, anti-racism can admit of no exception. In practice, the degree of culpability of racist talk or behaviour will depend on intention and context as well as on the words used. Anti-racist policies which emphasise behaviour control at the expense of education and argument risk driving racism underground where it can fester (see the Burnage Report, Macdonald et al., 1989). It may even be that a crudely totalistic approach may produce a displacement effect, by which racism and racial discrimination are shifted from the public to the private sphere. Unfortunately it is not enough to ban racism and racial discrimination; it is necessary to enter into dialogue with it. While dialogue can and does occur in the classroom and through the school curriculum, this is not always the most meaningful and effective context in which to engage some of those students most in need of it. Gender and ‘race’: formal and informal regimes There is now a considerable body of legislation and, additionally, widely agreed practice which governs behaviour in relation to both gender and ‘race’/ ethnicity in schools. Further, the national curriculum seeks to provide equal educational opportunity to individuals regardless of sex or ethnic origin. While there is debate about whether the content and structure of the national curriculum fully achieves these goals, few now argue that the previously highly decentralised curricular system was generally more effective in this respect

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(despite the achievements of some local authorities). Schools are, of course, agencies of socialisation, and the schools in our survey appeared to have been fairly effective in impressing the importance of gender and racial equality in the minds and, to a significant extent, in the behaviour of their students.4 How deep this went varied greatly, even among the 44 boys we interviewed. Some were genuinely and maturely tolerant, while others were racist to varying degrees. A number of other variables, in addition to school, shaped the boys’ attitudes to gender and ‘race’/ethnicity. These include the family, peer group and individual character and, in given instances, any one of these might be more influential than the school. Even in the cases of individual boys, it is probably misleading to think of tolerance or racism as occurring in an entirely fixed and stable way, although in most cases their orientation was clear. Whether individual or group, ‘race’ and ethnic difference sometimes seemed to be a secondary aspect of peer conflict which would probably have occurred anyway. Thus, a theft by one boy from another could only be regarded as a racially motivated crime if the boys were seen as racially different. Yet ‘race’ or ethnic difference may or may not have played a part in the selection of the victim. ‘Race’ and ethnicity act as apparently stable reference points for the boys and are often implicated in conflicts in the way that any other significant factor of difference, such as religion, might be. Given the high visibility of ‘racial’ and cultural referents, this is particularly liable to be the case whatever the initial cause of conflict. As was described above, ‘race’/ethnicity is part of the background awareness and conversational murmur of the boys even in the absence of antagonistic intent. Undoubtedly an anti-racist and/or multicultural educational regime plays a part in the shaping of informal behaviour in this area, and, overall, the influence seems positive despite the possible displacement effect referred to above. The correctness of formal rules will never be precisely mimicked in the shifts and shades of everyday culture—nor would we wish them to be. Optimistically, though, what may happen is that people will gradually find matters of gender and ‘race’/ethnic difference less and less a cause for insecurity, irritation, hatred or barbed humour but rather a cause of stimulation and celebration. Indeed, particularly in the area of leisure culture, we found some signs that this is happening (see Chapter 5). In conclusion: sometimes it’s hard to be a boy Men and boys are responding variously to what now clearly seems to be a weakening in patriarchy and the slow liberation of those it has oppressed— girls and women. Some boys seemed genuinely egalitarian and democratic in their values and attitudes towards gender relations, even if not always in their practice. Others seemed threatened or ambiguous about the achievements of girls. However, there are still ways and means for boys to gain some gender advantage at school, mainly through subject choice and specialisation. By their own admission, the boys tended to be more ‘troublesome’ both in and

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out of school. This seems to be damaging them not only in terms of academic attainment but in their relationships and their own well-being and happiness. For a significant number, racism makes matters worse. Young men’s macho aggression and destructiveness in the public context is aimed much more against other young men than against young women and, sadly, the inability of some to cope with ethnic difference has accentuated this. Like the expression of sensible or ‘politically correct’ views on various other issues, the formal acceptance of anti-sexism and anti-racism by the majority of the boys is often not matched by what some of them ‘really’ think and do.

2

The social construction of youthful masculinities Peer group sub-cultures

To a large extent it is within the male peer group that boys construct their masculinities—imitating each other and evaluating themselves against each other. Peer group rivalry and conflict is sometimes sharpened by ethnic difference, which can intensify a youthful ‘masculine’ aggressiveness which seems to alienate rather than attract a growing number of girls. Schools engage in what is sometimes a losing battle to counterbalance the collective influence of the peer group, particularly the male peer group. The gap between what teachers are trying to achieve with 15- and 16-year-olds and what some of the boys would rather be doing can create an air of noncommunication and a sense of cross purpose in the classroom. Matters can deteriorate in all sorts of ways, sometimes into substantial disorder but more characteristically into student boredom and teacher frustration. Humour and parody is another reaction to such imperfect situations, and we found an example of this among a group of African-Caribbean students at one of the Ealing schools. These boys were aware that, as a group, they obtained poorer academic results than the white and Asian students. They were also aware of the liberal educational jargon routinely used by teachers in referring to this issue. Simultaneously deprecating both themselves and the educational system, they referred to themselves as ‘The Underachievers’. Research has established that a wide range of responses to the educational system—individual and group—occur among students other than simply ‘proschool’ or ‘anti-school’, and that peer group membership and identity is an important mediating factor in shaping response (Ball, 1981; Woods, 1983). Both as a basis of identity and as a unit of collective action, the peer group is an immensely powerful player in school dynamics. The peer group itself, as a specific reference point of generational belonging, can have substantial independent influence on the identities and actions of its members. It is also important as a mediator or conduit of other influences on them, such as class, ethnicity and wider youth culture (which is often the peer group’s own main point of subjective reference). For many of the boys, school was not the main, or even a major, factor in the formation of their general attitudes and behaviour, although of course even the most reluctant and disaffected among them tended to acquire some skills and knowledge. Far more important was what their 38

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friends were thinking and doing. As Paul Willis put it with reference to the anti-school ‘lads’ in Learning to Labour. ‘In some respects school is a blank between opportunities for excitement on the street or at a dance with your mates, or trying to “make it” with a girl’ (1977:38). The senior teachers we interviewed and many of the boys acknowledged— the former sometimes ruefully—the powerful influence of the peer group, especially on boys. Jane Green, the Deputy Head of a West London school with predominantly Asian pupils, put the point emphatically: The children at school only seem to flourish as groups. Any child who doesn’t operate within a group…is seen as isolated…The group seems a very powerful thing. And to be accepted. Peers seem to be much more important than the family or home in children’s eyes… Jane Green No doubt her comments reflect a teacher’s-eye view, but they were widely repeated not least by some of the boys themselves. Desai, an Indian boy, stated somewhat aphoristically: ‘you are who you hang around with’. This chapter, then, examines several of the main influences which help to shape youthful identities and particularly the formation of masculinities. The peer group is an important influence in itself and a mediator of other influences. Among the many influences on masculine identity formation, this chapter looks particularly at ethnicity. It is therefore the confluence of masculinities and ethnicities that is the central but not exclusive focus here. However, no assumption is made that ethnicity rather than, say, patriarchy, global youth culture, or class, is necessarily the main influence in shaping youthful masculinities. While theoretical analysis requires that their relative influence is weighed, in practice they work together and affect particular individuals and groups differently. Our concentration here on the interaction of ethnicity and masculinity is based on the view that the former is an important influence in the formation of masculinities which is in need of some reinterpretation.1 White boys and the social construction of masculinities: class and nation The title of this section does not imply that there is a fixed form or forms of masculinity specific to white males. Rather, what is being examined is the way in which ethnicity, youth culture and class, as well as other factors, generate flows of influence which contribute to how the boys perceive and construct their gender identities. The reality is one of flux and change around key values, beliefs and images which themselves shift over time. However, it is the case that membership of the dominant and overwhelmingly the most numerous ethnic group in Britain has had a significant effect on the formation of the masculinities of white boys and men over a long historical period. Membership of the white majority both gives some boys a feeling of power and focuses their sense of

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nationalism and territory. Of course, white ethnicity is a wide term, and one that meant somewhat different things to different boys. Most of the white boys had a sense of local belonging and identity as well. For the most part, the white boy we surveyed were born-and-bred Londoners—often with a strong sense o identification with the area of London in which they lived. A few of them came from the North of England and the Celtic countries, and one or two fron families of asylum seekers, and this was reflected in their senses of identity. Many of the non-white boys, of course, were the sons or grandsons o ‘immigrants’, and to varying extents shared similar cultural interests am identifications with white boys. However, ethnic identification was very strong among African-Caribbean and Asian boys. In this respect our research supports albeit more impressionistically, the evidence cited in the fourth PSI survey which reports that ethnicity is almost as common a self-descriptor as nationality among African-Caribbeans and the main Asian groups across the age range (Modood and Berthoud, 1997:292). Nationality is the basis of citizenship and as such, of those crucial rights that include permanent residence and access to work and social security; it is also an indicator of cultural identity that varies greatly between individuals. Quite reasonably, an immigrant (or an asylun seeker) may be far more interested in national membership for practical reason of access to rights, rather than cultural membership. Given this, it is quite probable that in cultural terms many members—if not a majority of the members of Britain’s minority ethnic groups—identify as much or more with their ethnic culture as they do with the British culture of which they are nevertheless a part. This is not to contradict the point made by Stuart Hall and many others that many minority ethnic Britains think of themselves as having dual, or ‘hyphenated’, or multiple identities, such as British-Pakistani or young black British (Hall, 1992). Nor is there any need systematically to orde identities in any hierarchy of subjective preference—people generally prefer living their identities rather than grading them. Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s a substantial body of work was: published which shared a broadly common purpose and methodology. It purpose was to establish why working-class boys achieved far less academic and career success than boys of middle-class origin (the performance of boys o upper-class origin did not receive comparable attention).2 This body of work will be used here for the different purpose of analysing the main characteristic; of youthful, white working-class masculinities, about which it contains and enormous amount of material. This, chapter, then, is the most discursive and is more dependent than the others on secondary sources. The aim is to use this body of work to build up flexible models of youthful masculinities which reflect the interaction o ethnicity, gender and other factors and—over the course of the book—to relate these models to our own findings. Most of the works discussed below examined school and classroom processes The methodologies used in the classroom research were predominantly qualitative with a strong emphasis on participant observation. The backbone

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of this impressive corpus is a trilogy of studies of the relative failure of workingclass students in three types of school—a secondary-modern, a grammar school and a comprehensive. The studies are David Hargreaves’s Social Relations in a Secondary School (1967), David Lacey’s Hightown Grammar (1970), and Stephen Ball’s Beachside Comprehensive: A Case-Study of Secondary Schooling (1981). The first two were studies of single-sex boys’ schools. By the time Ball embarked on his study, male sociologists had come to appreciate more fully the importance of researching girls as well as boys in the education system, and so he selected a mixed-sex school for his study. As well as recognising the potential role of the peer group in drawing pupils away from formal education, Ball also stressed the attractions of youth culture in general as an alternative to school work. Further, he observes that at the time he was carrying out his research in the late 1970s, many children of working-class background did not see school as particularly relevant to their goals in relation to their adult lives: Out of school, many of these adolescents had jobs, went to pubs and to dances, and were able to make their own decisions or to participate in the decision-making of the social group. They participated in or aspired to much of an adult ‘working-class culture’. (Ball, 1981:117) A central theoretical point of all three works is that schools, and particularly classroom teachers, play a significant part in the relative educational failure of working-class children through the labelling process. Specifically, the negative labelling of working-class children can lead to conflict with teachers, loss of confidence and alienation from school—with likely destructive consequences for the children’s educational and career success. It is not our intention to replicate these studies. On the matter of the relationship between class and labelling, our impression was that the progressive policy frameworks and managerial regimes in the schools that we researched probably resulted in less negative labelling of pupils on the basis of class—as well as gender and ‘race’— than was reported in these studies. However, this impression is based on interviews with the boys and some members of the school management, not on observation. An interesting research study would be systematically to explore whether the negative labelling in schools and classrooms remains as extensive and damaging as is sometimes assumed. The main relevance of the above trilogy of studies to our own work is the information they contain on youthful masculinities, and particularly on the relationship between class and masculinities. As their authors presented it, their data pertained mainly to class, labelling, the peer group and educational failure, but, cut slightly differently, the data provides a mine of information on young masculinities or, at least, young working-class masculinities. Hargreaves’s study is the earliest of the three, and presents a vivid picture of the often hard and bitter conflict between tough, working-class boys who were generally consigned

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to the lower streams and teachers variously determined to impose their authority on the boys, or being cowed and demoralised by them. The single-sex ‘sec mod’ where he carried out his study seems at times to have been more like a battleground than a school—a reinforcer of these macho and anti-educational attitudes that characterised much of a generation of working-class lads and which still linger today (see Riseborough’s evocatively titled ‘GBH: The Gobbo Barmy Harmy’, in Bates and Riseborough, 1993). Lacey’s research tells us less about the collective power of the workingclass boys’ peer group because the boys he researched were relatively isolated in a predominantly middle-class grammar school environment. However, the tendency of these boys to ‘stick together’—intensified by the labelling process— and to drift back to their own cultural roots, indicates that both the collective and solidaristic values of working-class culture survived the boys’ transition to grammar school. These values and associated behaviour played a part in the relative failure of working-class boys to settle or succeed in the grammar school compared to middle-class boys. Lacey’s study shows how difficult it could be for working-class boys to break from their class situation even when they clearly had the ability to achieve upward social mobility. Ball’s study had more to say about the complexities of interaction between class culture and labelling, especially with respect to middle-class pupils. The latter were more likely than working-class pupils to be pro-school in a way that was either supportive or manipulative of the formal school system. Working-class pupils were more likely to be anti-school in that they were passive towards or rejecting of the formal school system. Ball did not claim that his categories were exhaustive of pupils’ possible relationships to the school system, nor that they were entirely generated by the class background of the pupils. He effectively indicated that the variety of potential responses of pupils to the interplay of their own cultural background and the school context, including the way they constructed their masculinities, was considerable. Macho lads and ordinary kids: Paul Willis and Phil Brown As far as constructing a typology of white working-class masculinities is concerned, the most comprehensive source of material is Paul Willis’s classic, Learning to Labour (1977) and the book is used for this purpose later in this section. Here it is relevant to note the main argument of the book which is that it is primarily the culture of ‘the lads’ which caused their educational failure rather than negative labelling at school. In contrast to the conformist ‘ear’oles’ (or ‘swots’) who hoped to ‘better themselves’, the lads rejected school values in the confident belief they would get the kind of a job they wanted anyway. This analysis represented a significant change of emphasis from Hargreaves and Lacey, who stressed the role of teacher labelling in the ‘failure’ of working-class boys. However, Ball, perhaps reflecting Willis’s influence, saw labelling as reinforcing class and peer group influence in contributing to the underachievement of working-class children rather than as the main cause of it.

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From the point of view of this book, Willis’s description of the formation of an anti-school sub-culture is less relevant than his more incidental but equally well observed description of a dominant form of youthful workingclass masculinity of the time. The term widely adopted in the literature to describe this form of masculinity is ‘macho’ and the aptness of it will become obvious. Toughness and posturing are common characteristics of this form of masculinity which remains an influential model of youthful ‘laddishness’ as we enter a new millennium, even though it has frequently become wholly detached from the culture of industrial manual labour in which it developed. Given that identity is partly defined in terms of who one sees as ‘different’ and ‘other’, the lads avoided behaving in ways they might have seen to be weak or feminine, routinely talked of girls as sex objects and tried to treat most girls as such, and adopted aggressive and insulting attitudes to gays and to members of other ethnic groups. In short, they were what would be judged now, if not then, sexist and racist. Although such attitudes were by no means shared by all working-class people, they were strong enough in traditional workingclass culture to find expression in sex segregated gender roles and sometimes in discriminatory behaviour to people of other ‘races’/cultures. However, despite the negative streak of intolerance and exclusion in their culture, the lads were as clear about what they were as what they were not, i.e. they had a strong positive sense of their own identity. It is possible to abstract from Willis’s work a number of core values and related behaviours central to the lads’ type of youthful working-class masculinity. Figures in brackets are page references in Willis, 1977. • •

•

•

•

•

physicality/practicality ‘practice is more important than theory’ (56) toughness ‘The fight is the moment when you are fully tested in the alternative culture’ (35); ‘In a more general way, the ambience of violence with its connotations of masculinity spread through the whole culture’ (36) collectivism (centrality of the informal peer group/loyalty to ‘yer mates’) ‘The essence of being “one of the lads” lies within the group. It is impossible to form a distinctive culture by oneself (23). ‘Solidaristic masculinity’—a term used at the beginning of the previous chapter—is a major characteristic of what Willis calls the boys’ ‘collectivism’. territoriality/exclusion The following is a quote from Joey, one of the lads: ‘That’s it, we’ve developed certain ways of talking, certain ways of acting, and we developed disregards for Pakis, Jamaicans and all different… for all the scrubs and the fucking ear’oles and all that…’ (23) hedonism/‘having fun’ Another quote from Joey: ‘I think fuckin’ laffin’ is the most important thing in fuckin’ everything…it can get you out of a million things’ (29) opposition to authority This occurs partly because of the lads’ determination to have fun and to win enough freedom to do so: ‘The most basic, obvious and explicit dimension of counter school culture is entrenched general and personalised opposition to authority’; ‘In many

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respects the opposition…can be understood as a classic example of the opposition between the formal and the informal’ (22) (All the above quotations are from Willis’s own commentary except where otherwise stated.) A problem in attempting to analyse any form of masculinity is establishing with any precision what influences structure it. This issue will not be fully addressed at this point, but it is worth reiterating that class, generational, patriarchal and ethnic influences all contribute to the formation of masculinities, but not in any predictable or formulaic way. The macho masculinity of the lads reflects clear class and patriarchal influences and also the shared generational experience of school and impending work as well as a strong sense of white ethnic identity. One of our main purposes in writing this book is to tease out the effects of ethnicity on gender formation, and specifically on masculinities. In the case of the above studies, the focus is exclusively or primarily on white youth and, perhaps as a result of this, their ethnicity is taken for granted rather than explored, although it does surface in the form of racism among the lads in Willis’s study. In the case of the macho workingclass lads, class and ethnic factors seem to converge to reinforce their sense of collective identity and territoriality and their often narrow attitudes to others. While accepting Willis’s view that class culture is crucial in influencing attitudes to education, Phil Brown’s Schooling Ordinary Kids (1987) criticises the polarised picture of working-class youth he considers Willis presents. As the title of his book suggests, Brown finds that the ‘ordinary’, just-getting-by, type of behaviour is typical of the majority of the boys and girls in his survey, rather than the aggressive search for excitement of the lads. On the basis of his own research in a South Wales comprehensive school, Brown suggests ‘three different ways’ among working-class kids ‘of being in school and becoming adult’ …‘getting in’ (the ‘rems’—not all ‘rems’ were remedials but they tended to be low academic achievers); ‘getting out’ (the ‘swots’); or ‘getting on’ (‘ordinary kids’). Those who adopt the ‘getting in’ approach want to get into working-class culture and work proper—and out of school; those who adopt the ‘getting out’ approach aspire to a middle-class job and lifestyle; and those who adopt the ‘getting on’ approach are the majority of ‘ordinary working-class pupils’ who ‘neither simply accept nor reject school, but comply with it’ (Brown, 1987:31). From the point of view of how masculinities are constructed by workingclass boys, the relevant point from Brown’s study is that the majority of lads are not ‘extreme macho’. As was suggested in the previous chapter, historically, working-class men and boys may have benefited from gender inequality but they were not crudely macho. They expressed their masculinities in different ways which, within their own frame of cultural reference, were often supportive to their families as well as their mates. Like Ball, Brown emphasises that most working-class boys and girls, not just the ‘rems’ or rebels, take part in youth culture but, according to Brown, unlike the ‘rems’, most of them do not use it as a basis from which to reject school:

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The difference between the ordinary kids and the ‘rems’ is not that ordinary kids are not exposed to an increasing number of activities and ‘outside interests’ which may bring them into conflict with the school. It is not the case that ordinary kids will not engage in generational and class youth subcultures, but rather, that these rarely become full-blown, which would bring them into direct opposition to the school. (Brown, 1987:92) Brown’s analysis has some application to our own findings. First, as the extract shows, he does not see a huge gap between the experience of the ‘rems’ and the ordinary kids, although their different adaptations to school are likely to have future significant effects on career and lifestyles. It is a reasonable speculation that it is the rather more macho ‘rems’ who are more likely to be unemployed and to fall foul of authority after leaving school. Similarly, most of the boys in our survey were more or less engaged with youth culture— there was no sharp difference in this respect between the more and the less academically oriented, although a variety of differences occurred between the boys in terms of cultural practices. Second, Brown’s more differentiated account of adaptations to school and of school-work transitions is closer to our own findings (see Chapter 4). So, too, is the implication in Brown’s book that working-class boys construct a variety of masculine identities of which being macho is only one. In any case, our data was drawn from individual interviews and questionnaires rather than group observation, and, to that extent, was designed to reflect individual differences. A further point is that the boys in our survey, like Brown’s respondents, were faced with an employment market blighted by economic recession in which youth unemployment was even higher than the national average. It no longer made sense for them to adopt the cocksure attitude to job prospects of the lads of Willis’s study. Nevertheless, if Brown does not find a sharply polarised ‘lads and ear’oles’ situation, it is also the case that some of the ‘rems’ showed typical features of macho culture. Nationally, macho working-class masculinity began to take on a dislocated and even slightly desperate character as the infrastructure of traditional industrial working-class life began to collapse in 1980s Britain. Beyond macho, other forms of youthful masculinities: Mairtin Mac an Ghaill Mairtin Mac an Ghaill’s The Making of Men: Masculinities, Sexualities and Schooling (1994) was the first book to deal substantially and directly with the contribution of schooling to the construction of masculine gender and sexual identities. Previously he had examined aspects of schooling and ethnicity, particularly labelling, in Young, Gifted and Black (1988). Mac an Ghaill’s full consideration of gender and ethnic factors in the schooling process does not mean he downgrades the influence of class in the formation of identities. In fact he finds that types of masculinity are strongly influenced by class

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background and seems to see class as the main factor shaping masculinities. Thus, while in no way seeking to be exhaustive, he finds three ‘modes’ of masculinity among the working-class students in his study and one among the middle-class boys. He identifies the three groups of working-class boys as ‘The Macho Lads’, ‘The Academic Achievers’, and ‘The New Enterprisers’ (although this group appears not to be exclusively working-class); and the middle-class group as ‘The Real Englishmen’. Although sometimes referred to in other terms, the two types of masculinities described by the terms ‘Macho Lads’ and ‘Academic Achievers’ occur frequently in the works referred to above. The macho lads were simply called ‘the lads’ by Willis—the traditional term that friendship groups of working-class men of all ages use to refer to themselves. Macho laddish behaviour is still quite widely adopted by boys of working-class origin, even though the socio-economic context from which this type of masculinity emerged and flourished has largely disappeared. The decline of traditional manual work is the main underlying cause of what Mac an Ghaill refers to as a crisis of white working-class masculinity. The greatest degree of dislocation occurs among those working-class boys (and men) whose self-esteem and identity is based on their ability to perform heavy physical labour. The gendered division of labour which generated this type of masculinity has rapidly changed over the last quarter of a century. For those working-class students who did not want or could not find traditional working-class jobs, the options were increasingly to seek upward mobility into white collar work (Academic Achievers and New Enterprisers) or to face the prospect of low-paid, perhaps irregular employment or longer-term unemployment (Goldthorpe et al., 1987) (see Chapter 4, pages 126–30). The real possibility of not getting a job unnerved some of the boys in our survey, and the collective sense of security and confidence of the previous generation had gone. Although some of them were bored with school and wanted badly to move on, few expressed the contempt for education shown by some of the boys in Willis’s study. Until recently, the concerns of many sociologists with educational underachievement have led them to focus more on ‘the lads’ than the upwardly mobile working-class children (‘the lobes’) or the more routinely successful middle-class children. Mac an Ghaill’s categories of ‘Academic Achievers’ and ‘New Enterprisers’ incorporate more adequately both the changing educational and occupational realities of the 1980s and 1990s and the different aspirations of students. He specifically notes that the Academic Achievers contained a high proportion of Asian as well as white boys (Mac an Ghaill, 1994:59). Mac an Ghaill describes the New Enterprisers as working-class lads who saw an opportunity for upward social mobility in the newly vocationalised curriculum and ‘were negotiating a mode of school student masculinity with its values of rationality, instrumentalism, forward planning and careerism’ (1994:63). Although the boys in our survey were younger than those in Mac an Ghaill’s sample and had not developed their academic specialisms and career choices to the same extent, the differences he indicates in academic and career orientation among working-class boys were broadly apparent.

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Middle-class boys and masculinities: ‘The Real Englishman’ and ‘Techno-Man’ Mac an Ghaill’s fourth category, the middle-class ‘Real Englishmen’, was the least apparent in our survey, although there were boys of similar background and aspiration in our sample. However, Mac an Ghaill’s description of this grouping is quite specific: A central contradiction for the Real Englishmen was that unlike the Macho Lads’ overt rejection of formal school knowledge and the potential exchange value it has in the market place, the Real Englishmen had a more ambiguous relationship to it. They envisaged a future of higher education and a professional career…they defined themselves as the younger generation of the professional elite who like modern-day high priests positioned themselves as arbiters of culture. (Mac an Ghaill, 1994:65) Although Mac an Ghaill’s four categories of masculinities are conceived as class-gender categories, all the Real Englishmen were white, as might be expected from their collective label, and at the time at which the above quotation applies, were slightly older than the boys we surveyed. Although many of the middle-class boys in our study also ‘envisaged a future of higher education and a professional career’, we found little sign of the precise cultural pretensions noted by Mac an Ghaill. Perhaps the boys in our study were not yet mature and sophisticated enough to think in these terms. Further, there are more opportunities for sixth formers than fifth formers to develop a reflective sub-culture of this kind. However, one of Mac an Ghaill’s observations about the Real Englishmen does strike a chord of recognition. Mac an Ghaill comments that they were at pains to distance themselves from what they saw as the hypocritical liberalism of their well-heeled parents, in particular in their adoption of strongly nationalistic views. In contrast to the ‘Real Englishmen’ of Mac an Ghaill’s study, some of the white middle-class boys in our survey carried nationalism over into clear prejudice and expressed illiberal attitudes. As we have seen (page 34), one boy in our research, Bruce, expressed rather aggressive attitudes on ‘race’ in which he sees himself as a participant in a world of antagonistic racially-based male youth groups. Edward from Hackney was the son of a property surveyor and a nurse. He had stereotypical views about white and African-Caribbean boys as being ‘pretty tough’ and Asian boys as being weaker. However, his tendency to illiberalism more obviously leaked through in his comments on gender. On the sexual division of labour between himself and his future spouse, Edward stated that: ‘If she wanted to…I’d let her stay at home. But if she wanted to work, I’d let her do that as well’. It is Edward’s assumption of control that gives away the patriarchal and incipiently authoritarian attitudes behind his attempted gesture of liberality. Edward had expressed similar views on the issue of gender equality

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and the curriculum. He considered that other boys would consider it ‘weird’ if one of them opted to study Child Development, and his own attempt to avoid overtly agreeing with this attitude was mild and unconvincing. A more familiar manifestation of masculinity than that expressed in the attitudes of ‘the Real Englishmen’—though not incompatible with them—is the instrumental and hyper-rationality often associated with high- and middlelevel businessmen, bureaucrats and technocrats. Both Bob Connell (1995) and Vic Seidler (1997) have explored this cultural formation in men and see it as a major component in their dominating and controlling behaviour, particularly that of middle-class men. This kind of orientation, albeit in embryo, was certainly apparent among the boys in our survey. It was obvious among more ambitious middle-class boys but also among some less advantaged working-class and ethnic minority boys. If one was in the business of inventing labels for categories of masculinity, this one might be termed ‘technomasculinity’. However, the speed of social and cultural change is such that the cultural formations that such categories seek to describe transform very quickly. Too rigid categorisation can give a false sense of stability. Nevertheless, control of technology is likely to become even more important as a means of achieving power, influence and wealth. It is an area in which boys and men are already much more firmly established than girls and women. According to an EOC report, Gender Equality and the Careers Service (1999), 67 per cent of school leavers opting for apprenticeships in Information Technology are young men, and this gender inequality is even more marked in respect to higher qualifications. Although interest in the new technology was even more apparent among middle-class students in our survey, at least in the academic context, to some extent, command of the new technology has become a new benchmark of masculinity among boys regardless of class. Among working-class boys we found that a frequent use of computers was to play exciting and often violent games, and to that extent it may partly have replaced the celebration of physical labour and strength both as an expression of and a symbolic referent for macho. Middle-class boys were more likely to refer to the new technology in an academic and career context, and for them the dividend in masculinity seemed more to be in the hard-edged cleverness associated with this type of skill. However, an equally notable social factor in relation to the new technology was the large number of Asian, especially Indian boys, who expressed both an academic and a career interest in it. Their enthusiasm seemed to be for both the technology itself and the opportunities that mastery of it might offer them. Speculating, it may be that they also felt that the high demand for objective skills in this area would ensure that employers could not afford the luxury of racial discrimination. The perceived importance of technological mastery in contemporary masculine success can be viewed as a variation and extension of the long association of masculinity with rationality (see page 195). ‘Technoman’, then, would seem to be a sub-species of ‘rational man’—a mutant survivor!

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White boys, class and ethnicity The body of work referred to and partly reinterpreted above is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of youthful white masculinities as they have developed in relation to the educational system. The majority of the authors referred to were not primarily concerned with masculinity, although all of them had to confront it, given its impact on formal education and the socialisation of youth. The picture of white youthful masculinities they collectively present is only partial. Mac an Ghaill’s The Making of Men is directly concerned with the construction of masculinities and offers by far the fullest account. Even so, he selects from observation just four groups of young males, each of which is characterised by a more or less identifiable ‘mode’ of masculinity. Again, it is worth stressing that his categorisation systematically prioritises class over ethnicity as an influence on the formation of gender identities, whereas a key argument of this chapter is that no particular influence should necessarily be privileged in this way. Nevertheless, Mac an Ghaill’s work does offer a coherent example of how masculinities can be analysed in relation to socio-economic context as well as developing a typology of youthful masculinities that is specific to his data but is clearly open to some generalisation. As far as working-class boys are concerned, he adds to the familiar categories of Macho Lads and Academic Achievers that of New Enterprisers. We came across many boys in our survey who could be included in this category, not only white but Asian and, though less so, African-Caribbean. It would be very surprising if a strong orientation of this kind to the new, higher-status vocational curriculum and related jobs had not developed. Although their competitive and instrumental attitudes are hardly novel among young men, the socioeconomic context in which they strive to assert themselves is very different from that of their fathers’ generation as is the anxiously keen timbre of their response. Although not seeking to be comprehensive, Mac an Ghaill describes only one middle-class grouping of young males, the Real Englishmen. While we found no clear evidence of such a form of white youthful masculinity, it is highly likely that it occurs more widely than just in the institutions which Mac an Ghaill researched. However, we did find that some white middle-class boys as well as some white working-class boys were sometimes uneasy in their attitudes to ethnic minorities, and that their sense of identity was sometimes strongly ethnocentric. Later sections in this chapter argue that in, certain circumstances, ethnicity can play as strong—or even stronger—a role in the construction of masculinities as class. This is specifically the case in relation to African-Caribbean boys and arguably so in relation to Asian boys, particularly those of Muslim background. Mac an Ghaill’s theoretical model seems to prioritise the class-gender axis of influence somewhat at the expense of that of ethnicity-gender. We have no a priori theoretical view of this kind and, in the cases just mentioned, the balance of empirical evidence seems to point away from Mac an Ghaill’s assumptions. Historically, the British class system has operated in a sharply divisive way, including within the education system, but it has always been open to

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ameliorating influences. We found some evidence that traditional class divisions may have influenced the boys in our survey rather less than was the case with previous generations of boys from roughly similar backgrounds. Even among white boys, who might have been expected to be most influenced by the British class system in their attitudes to education, we found a mix of middleand working-class boys with an interest in either or both academic areas and higher-status vocational courses. This seemed more likely to result in a reduction in class cultural differences between them, including the way they perceived themselves as masculine, than to accentuate differences. Even granted that attitudes associated with differential educational choice are likely to harden in the sixth form, there were few signs among the boys in our survey of the contempt that Mac an Ghaill reports the middle-class Real Englishmen had for the working-class Achievers (Mac an Ghaill, 1994:66–7). Mac an Ghaill’s concentration on class as apparently the key influence on the formation of ‘modes of masculinity’ results in an underemphasis on the influence of ethnicity. In particular he does not consider that the Indian boys who adopt the New Enterprisers approach to educational advancement and self-presentation do so because of pressure and support from their families and community, which is more reflective of ethnicity than class. Of course, there is no doubt that in the lived reality of everyday life, ethnic and class influences are inseparable, but it is still necessary to weigh their respective effects. For several reasons, then, the relationship between class and masculinities appears to be weakening. First, as is consistently argued here, post-war immigration has complicated the class-derived working-, middle- and upperclass-influenced modes of masculinity of pre-war Britain. Second, the British occupational and class structure has changed and become more differentiated. It is increasingly difficult to ‘read off boys’ or men’s class background from the way they present themselves as masculine. This is because the effect of class background on gender identities is weaker, while other influences on them are stronger. The education system reflects this greater complexity both in their gender styles and in that boys from different class backgrounds seem somewhat less differentiated by the types of courses they want to do. This is perhaps less a process of embourgeoisement and more one of increasing diversity and complexity. Third, educationalists themselves may well have contributed to the extent to which young people seem to be able to think and act outside of class boundaries. In particular, comprehensive reform sought in part to diminish the socio-cultural boundaries of Britain. Reformers may have achieved more in undermining the cultural than the material influence of class. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the media has also played a relatively independent role in generating new masculine or ‘masculinised’ images and styles. In the 1980s and 1990s, the most popular youthful masculine style was neither genuine working-class macho nor a youthful version of the often understated but confident and ‘rational’ masculinity of the managerial and professional middle class. What emerged quite pervasively was the ‘laddish’ style, the origins of which seem quite various. Often this new laddishness took

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the form of a purportedly classless yobbishness and collective male selfcelebration which nevertheless had an element of shaky self-reassurance about it. No doubt this style was partly motivated by a sense of threat from increasingly assertive females and as well as from the prospect of unemployment. The style was even adopted by many middle- and upper-class young males who, however, were generally much less willing to give up their wealth and privilege than they were the manners and accent that had been associated with them. Although ‘laddishness’ affects to be a classless cultural style, its main origin may lie with the achievement of money and status by upwardly mobile workingand lower-middle-class males in the 1980s and 1990s. In retaining their accents and abrasive attitudes and in rejecting total cultural assimilation to the wealthy, these young men perhaps showed a degree of integrity and undermined some of the pretensions and affectations for which the established British uppermiddle and upper class is notorious. Whether their own preferred style offered anything much better is debatable, although it probably generated more intentional humour. Perhaps because economic success and upward social mobility were most associated with London and the South East, the most widely adopted accent taken to portray the laddish style was a slightly flattened Cockney which became known as ‘Estuary English’. On some lips it came to seem even more forced and false than did received pronunciation. Like all widely adopted modern youth styles, the media played a significant role in purveying and popularising new laddishness (see Chapter 5). Like many youth styles, ‘laddishness’ as a media and market reference point was beginning to look in need of an injection of energy by the late 1990s. In an effort to provide this, the magazine ‘for lads’ ZN created the ‘whopper’, who turned out to be a new type of lad with all the old characteristics! Upper-class boys and masculinities Historically, upper-class youthful masculinity has been as distinctive as workingclass macho masculinity and, partly because it also served as a model for the professional middle classes, more influential than the working-class version. The traditional masculine demeanour and behaviour of upper-class men and boys is closely associated with the exercise of power, influence and authority. Acceptance of this authority runs deep in Britain’s common culture, but so does resistance to it, not least in the form of parody and mockery. A more complete account of the formation and types of masculinities than is required here would need to analyse upper-class masculinity at some length. However, the public schools which, from the mid-nineteenth century, have forged this type of masculinity are remote from the immediate experience and considerations of the boys in our survey, even though the national elites that public schools substantially produce disproportionately shape the conditions in which less advantaged boys live. The public schools continue to inculcate upper-class and patriarchal values among the offspring of the traditionally and newly rich. It would be a gross mistake to underestimate either how formidable

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the more successful products of public schools are or the extent of their power in national life. The notorious ‘public school type’ or ‘public school man’ was and is disciplined, tough, self-confident to the point of arrogance, accustomed to the notion of leadership, and elitist in the highest degree. These were the types of men who ran the British Empire, and the current generation remains powerfully positioned. To a large extent, grammar schools were modelled on the public school system. They usually adopted prefectorial and house systems and emphasised the character building potential of sporting activities—all of which aped public school practice. Successful grammar school pupils were likely to become members of local elites, with a minority gaining access to the national elite dominated by ex-public school pupils. The introduction of the comprehensive school system was intended to challenge the patent non-egalitarianism of the grammar/secondary-modern school system. It is still too early to say whether the comprehensives have improved the relative chances of upward social mobility of children of workingclass origin. However, it is now the case that there is a much greater variety and range of social background among Britain’s wealthy and powerful, and correspondingly the dominance of the traditional upper-class masculine style has diminished (see successive annual editions of ‘The Times Rich List’ for an illustration of the accelerated decline of traditional wealth). Whether matters of cultural style and self-presentation are of much importance against the reality of a rapidly increasing wealth gap between the rich and the poor and the continuing, if slightly decreasing, patriarchal control of wealth and power is open to debate. Whatever their contribution to a materially more equal society, the comprehensives can better enable more mixing and social exchange to occur between various socio-cultural groups than might otherwise take place. Further consequences of this exchange in relation to different ethnic groups will emerge as this chapter progresses. African-Caribbean boys and the social construction of masculinities Understanding African-Caribbean masculinities: the boys’ view African-Caribbean boys talking about themselves Perhaps reflecting the post-modern interest in difference and diversity, much recent literature on youthful identities has emphasised the influence of ethnicity. Although Mac an Ghaill’s theoretical perspective is predominantly a classgender one, in practice he gives considerable weight to the effect of ethnicity in the formulation of masculinities. Thus, in his earlier book Young, Gifted and Black (1988) he adopts as his own descriptors the ethnically-based selfdesignated names of two groups of boys—‘The Rasta-heads’ and ‘The Warriors’—and explains much of their respective behaviour in terms of their response to labelling. As discussed on page 46, the categories Mac an Ghaill

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uses to refer to various groups of boys in The Making of Men (1994) are not ethnically based. Even ‘The Real Englishmen’ are clearly indicated and interpreted as a middle-class group. Nevertheless, it is difficult—although not impossible—to envisage non-whites gaining ‘membership’ of this group. As its title suggests, Les Back’s New Ethnicities and Urban Culture emphasises the role of ethnic identity in the lives of the inner urban young people he researched (Back, 1996). However, Back sees ethnic culture among the young as fluid and porous, and as inter-playing with class and other factors such as neighbourhood identification and culture. For instance, he describes the admiration of some white boys for African-Caribbeans as sometime based on a selective and egocentric identification with the latters’ much vaunted macho characteristics. In general, Back’s stress on diversity is based on the extent and dynamism of cultural inter-change and is the antithesis of a rigidified multiculturalism. Like many other researchers, we found that the ‘macho’ image is a predominant style among African-Caribbean boys (see page 65). This was not only true in terms of many of the African-Caribbean boys’ self-perception, it was a view of them commonly taken by boys from other ethnic backgrounds. Before exploring the macho identification, however, it is necessary to introduce some qualifying comment. First, not all the African-Caribbean boys either saw themselves as ‘macho’ or aspired to be so. Second, even among some of the more obviously macho types, there were some hesitations and qualifications. These two points are illustrated in parts of the remainder of this section. Third, for understandable reasons, discussions of the macho style of masculinity often tend to be emotive and judgemental. Some see it as threatening and invasive. Here the emphasis will be on analysis and interpretation. Courtney, whose parents were from Grenada and who was big enough to wear the macho style with ease, rejected it—although he then expressed some attitudes towards housework which slightly smacked of macho. Courtney rejected the macho label not only in terms of himself but also in relation to most of his African-Caribbean peers: From what people think of me—‘He’s a nutter, he’s a hard one’—I’m not like that, no. Maybe the image is like that. I find that a lot of my West Indian friends, they are relatively sensitive, they see both points of view. I find that some of my friends who are not Afro-Caribbean are more closed up. They don’t reveal their sensitivity, so it looks as though they’re macho and everything, whereas possibly they aren’t. Me, I don’t try to confine it. (Courtney) Courtney is saying that, as far as he himself is concerned—and perhaps by implication his African-Caribbean friends—superficially they may seem macho but in fact they are more openly sensitive than his non-African-Caribbean friends. However, Courtney was quite clear that sensitivity did not involve

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egalitarian attitudes towards a partner. To a question on the ‘new man’, he replied: ‘Rubbish! It’s never going to be. You might get more sensitive, help a bit more, but you’re not going to be the “househusband”, it’s not going to get like that, no.’ Courtney came from a single parent family and his mother did secretarial work. In Mac an Ghaill’s terms, Courtney might be classified as a workingclass Achiever. He was keen to go on to do A-levels and get a professional job. His smart but conventional self-presentation reinforced this message. It may have been because of his serious academic and career ambitions that he rejected the macho identity, although, at a less instrumental, more personal level, he did give indications of practising the sensitivity he claimed. His father was dead and he clearly had an active concern for his mother and siblings. Further, despite his rubbishing of the house-husband concept, like many of the AfricanCaribbean boys we interviewed he considered it normal and fair that he should do ‘his share’ of the housework. One of the most interesting points he raised is that, behind the macho facade some of his African-Caribbean friends are prepared to be more emotionally open—suggesting that African-Caribbean macho may be less ‘closed off than white macho. Franklin’s parents were both born in Jamaica. He said that most of his friends were quite macho and tough and that ‘occasionally’ he was also. Yet Franklin did not give an unqualified endorsement to the macho style. Asked why some boys adopt a macho image, he replied: Franklin: Interviewer: Franklin:

I don’t know. To impress, to show off. I don’t know. Do you think it attracts girls? Not all the time. Most of them like a new man, sensitive approach.

Another African-Caribbean boy, Adam, also took the view that boys should be able to show sensitivity, but again this was not part of an overall ideology of gender equality. In fact, like Courtney, he combined his endorsement of sensitivity with quite a traditional and patriarchal view of gender roles: Adam:

Interviewer: Adam: Int: Adam: Int: Adam:

I think that a man should be strong, but on the other hand he should show his emotions. Some people say that if a man cries he’s a sissy, but why do you have tears—they’re meant to come out at some time or another. A man should be able to look after his children, look after his wife. And the wife should be able to look after the husband and children. So you could cry if you wanted? Yes. Do you think men are more violent? Most men, yes. Is it nature or do you think they’ve learnt to be that way? I think its nature.

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All three boys appreciate that masculine behaviour can have a sensitive side, but they are also attached to more traditional notions of masculinity (see also Chapter 3 in relation to masculine images). They are attracted by the idea of being able to show a range of emotions but not by an egalitarian sharing of power and labour. It is possible that, in an interview situation, face-to-face with an adult, the boys felt defensive about being seen as macho, and this may partly account for their slightly ambiguous responses on the subject. Still, there is no expectation that 16-year-olds should display ideological consistency! White boys talking about African-Caribbean boys Although some African-Caribbean boys themselves show some unease about the macho aspects of their own behaviour, the most negative constructions came from members of other ethnic groups. Given the negative image of young African-Caribbean boys still prevalent in much of the British press and the public perception, it is important to establish as precisely as possible how boys from other ethnic groups do see African-Caribbean boys. Some, such as Terry and Paul—white boys from two different Ealing schools—expressed mixed but predominantly negative opinions. Terry’s ambiguity on matters of ‘race’ can be gauged by his observation that, although he had ‘a few’ African-Caribbean friends, he would ‘probably not’ go out with an African-Caribbean girl because of ‘the stick’ he would get from his white friends. The following was his response to the question of whether he saw ‘any signs at all of racial tension in the school’: Terry: Int: Terry:

Int: Terry:

Yes there is. Groups of people. In the year below, there’s a group of coloured people, they go around hassling people. You say ‘coloured’—what group are you talking about? Afro-Caribbeans. Basically, they’re loud and they’ve no respect for anything. Some of them are fine. Just this particular group, and you get the odd person calling names. And people call them names. Who do you see as starting the aggro? Both parties really. You’ve got them asking for it. Some people should ignore it.

Terry makes an effort to be fair in apportioning blame for the ‘aggro’, but he clearly inclines to the view that it is mostly the African-Caribbean boys’ fault. Despite indicating that not all African-Caribbean boys get involved, there is a strong sense in which he is condemning African-Caribbean boys collectively as distinct from merely some individuals. Such perceptions and attitudes are characteristic of stereotyping and occur among adults as well as younger people. However, it is also possible that there is some empirical substance in the perception of Terry and others. The possibility that the macho style of some African-Caribbean boys is particularly confrontational—even by comparison with macho white working-class boys—is an issue which will be further discussed.

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Paul, a white boy, was himself almost classically stereotypical in his views of African-Caribbean boys: There’s quite a lot of racism in our school. Most of the kids are half-caste or coloured. The coloured kids try to be hard, better than the white people. The white people don’t like that, and call them names. Things like that. It ends up in a fight. I don’t get into that. I had a couple of fights last year which I got suspended for… (Paul) Paul expressed the quite common view among white boys that AfricanCaribbean boys went around threateningly in groups. He blamed ‘blacks, Jamaicans’, for going round ‘in gangs, groups of fives’ and claimed that they ‘come over and start all the fights’. Then in a sudden apparent about-turn, he said: ‘Most of my friends are Jamaican. I like playing football with them’. It is not unusual for white boys to sustain seemingly incompatible opinions and feelings about black boys. Les Back (1996) suggests that some white working-class boys tend to select aspects of macho masculinity from the AfricanCaribbean boys’ culture that fit well with their own macho aspirations and self-image.3 This seems likely and could well be the case with Paul. Sport is an area of conspicuous achievement for some African-Caribbeans, and we found other examples where it provided a positive meeting point for black and white boys. Back further suggests that the selective acceptance and adoption by some white boys of African-Caribbean macho culture may not dislodge the underlying racism and hostility which can flare at times of conflict, sometimes bringing friendships to an end. He also notes that white macho boys are unlikely to select Asian boys as friends on the basis of the latter’s perceived (non)macho qualities. We also found that, in the world of youth culture, the popular stereotype of Asians as passive and even as victims was widely accepted— although not by many Asian boys themselves. Several Asian boys had an interest in martial arts, but in the mid-1990s this did not seem to be providing a frequent basis for friendship with white boys. Of course, as Back himself recognises, the pattern of inter-ethnic friendship just indicated is simply one among many. As he illustrates, shared experience in leisure, work or in the neighbourhood can provide the foundation of much deeper and more lasting relationships for people of different ethnic backgrounds. James was another white boy we interviewed who regarded AfricanCaribbean boys as particularly aggressive and in the habit of going around in groups. James went to a West London school which has a large majority of Asian pupils. Therefore, in the context of this school, he was a member of a minority. It is interesting that what he perceived was consistent with Terry’s and Paul’s observations about which group ‘starts the trouble’. Contrary to what some others boys said, he claimed that there was ‘a lot’ of racial tension within the school:

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Interviewer: James: Int: James:

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Do you think one group more than another causes it [racial tension]? Sometimes. Usually West Indian people start it. They go around in groups. Being in a group doesn’t start a racial incident. No. They start it because they’re in a big group and they cause a fight.

The repeated perceptions of some white boys that black boys ‘go around in groups’ and are sometimes ‘loud’ and even threatening require some comments. First, some white boys behave in pretty much the same way, and which ethnic group does it the most may well be to a considerable extent in the eye of the beholder. Second, African-Caribbean boys are still disproportionately likely to be working-class compared to white and Asian boys, and working-class culture, including working-class youth culture, has historically tended to be social and even ‘street’ oriented. Third, and perhaps most convincingly, until recently African-Caribbean culture has been overwhelmingly public—in the sense of communal—and oral. Again, given the minimal education available to black people during and for long after slavery, it was allowed to be little else. Even the strong musical tradition of African-Americans and African-Caribbeans has a notable element of the poetic and rhetorical about it. The continuing dominance of rap in youth music in the late 1990s owed much to this powerful tradition of audience engagement. That much of white and, increasingly, Asian youth is also engaged is obvious, although this does not always lead to a wider mutual acceptance. Not all the white and Asian boys we interviewed saw society in an ethnically polarised way. Dick, the son of white parents, sustained a thought-through anti-racism from which he had not been dislodged even though he had once ‘been mugged by three black youths, Afro-Caribbeans’. Interviewer: Dick: Int: Dick:

Who do you think causes it [racism]? Probably the white youths. I suppose the media as well… So you haven’t been generally embittered against AfricanCaribbeans? No. There are some Afro-Caribbeans here who are quite bad and annoy you. I was walking up here and somebody just decided to swing the door, like that, just to give you a bit of a fright. No point. There are a lot of people who are a bit stupid like that. A lot of Afro-Caribbeans are nice and fine. I don’t see any reason why you should hate the whole race, just because of a couple of people…

Although, as one would expect, there was a range of opinion among white boys about the extent to which African-Caribbean boys ‘started trouble’, the view that they did so was a common one. As was suggested earlier in this

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chapter, some of this was little more than finger-pointing by white boys who were just as involved as the African-Caribbean boys. In particular, many of the white working-class boys with whom the African-Caribbean boys most came into direct conflict also cultivated a macho style. It is probably impossible to say with certainty which group is the more macho and confrontational. However that may be, the weight of evidence clearly shows that an element in the confrontational macho style of some African-Caribbean boys reflects ethnic rather than simply class experience. To the extent that this is the case, then the African-Caribbean boys’ macho style is a genuinely collective ethnic phenomenon rather than simply a matter of individual behaviour. In other words, as Ken Pryce effectively argued over twenty years ago (see Pryce, 1986), ‘black macho’ behaviour is culturally learnt and elaborated. A form of collective behaviour that is inter-generational and culturally embedded cannot sensibly be regarded as merely the product of negative labelling, however much the latter may occur. The contribution of racism to the formation of African-Caribbean masculinities This section will argue that for, African-Caribbean boys and men, racism, including the racist system of slavery, and their response to it, has been relatively more influential than class in forming their masculinities. The relationship of class, ethnicity and gender presents somewhat different issues in respect to young African-Caribbean males than is the case with young white males. The history and cultural experience of African-Caribbeans in relation to white people has deeply affected many aspects of African-Caribbean masculinities. The masculinities of young African-Caribbean boys cannot be understood without contextualisation in relation to white racism and patriarchy in both their contemporary and historical manifestations. Slavery and the plantation system oppressed and humiliated African-Caribbeans in every aspect of their lives. Of course, as is the case with any system of domination, members of the subordinate group were organised and controlled on the basis of different degrees of oppression and ‘privilege’, but overall, slavery is about as ‘total’ a system of social domination as it is possible to devise. Slavery was abolished in the British empire only about three lifetimes ago, and in the United States about two lifetimes, periods of time well within ‘folk’ or group memory. As far as black men are concerned, perhaps the symbolic image is that of ritual castration and burning carried out well into the twentieth century in some of the former slave states. As recently as 1998, three white racists tied a black man to the back of their truck and dragged him along for several miles. Later they painted his decapitated head black. No immediate motive for the murder appeared to exist other than that the man was black. This is an extreme example, but it does dramatise widely typical attitudes and behaviour. In any case, history and contemporary events suggest that it is not wise to understate the degree of hatred and brutality that focuses on ‘race’ and ethnicity.

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American examples of racism are relevant to the British context because, as Paul Gilroy and others have shown, the cultural consciousness of AfricanCaribbeans embraces the United States as well as, of course, Africa—the ‘black Atlantic’ as Gilroy evocatively refers to it (1993b). In any case, slavery operated at comparable levels of brutality in the former British West Indies (Thomas, 1997:221). However, it is not necessary to plumb history to illustrate white racism against people of African heritage. There is a mountain of evidence of both individual and institutional racism against African-Caribbeans in Britain since their large-scale immigration began in the early post-Second World War period. As it happens, on the day on which this section is being drafted, two national newspapers led with headlines indicative of evidence of racism in policing and schooling in Britain. The case of policing is the most clear-cut. The Guardian headline is ‘Stop and Search leaps by 20’ (8.3.99: data based on research published by Statewatch). The lead article then goes on to give the extraordinary statistics behind the headline: African-Caribbean people are 7.5 per cent more likely to be stopped and searched than white people and 4 times more likely than them to be arrested. Asians were just under three times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people. Overall, 10 per cent of those stopped and searched are arrested and no further proceedings are taken against one in five of these. To put it mildly, ‘stop and search’ seems to be widely operated in a way likely to inflame a sense of injustice among African-Caribbeans already made sensitive by a long history of discriminatory practices. As far as this study is concerned, it is particularly relevant to younger people, and especially young men, who are the ones most likely to be stopped and searched. The other headline relevant to the argument that African-Caribbean masculinities tend to be created in the context of struggle and adverse circumstances was ‘Schools Failing Black Pupils’, and occurred in the Daily Express (8.3.99). The headline complemented two articles in the same edition, one written by David Blunkett, Secretary of State for Education and Employment, and the other by a journalist, Dorothy Lepkowski. Quite fairly, accusations of racism were not bandied about in the coverage, but again the question of control and conflict was raised. Lepkowski noted the disproportionate rates of expulsion among children of African-Caribbean origin. Citing a 1997 report from the Commission for Racial Equality as her source, she went on to observe that these expulsions were usually not for the more obvious and clear-cut breaches of discipline: Two years ago the Commission for Racial Equality reported that exclusions had reached ‘crisis’ proportions, with youngsters in some ethnic groups being six times more likely to be expelled than their white class mates. Of these, three out of four were disciplined not for violence or bullying—the most common cause of expulsion—but for insolence or bad attitude. Many dropped out of education and failed to gain any qualifications… (Daily Express, 8.3.99)

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From the point of view of the argument being presented in this section, the significant phrase in this extract is ‘insolence or bad attitude’. To the extent that what is referred to as ‘insolence or bad attitude’ does occur among young African-Caribbean males, it reflects an understandable sensitivity to authority, particularly authority exercised by whites, and a demand for ‘respect’. As will be discussed later, the need for ‘respect’ is common among African-Caribbean boys and young men (Pryce, 1986; Sewell, 1997). (‘Respect’ is to some extent a quality in life also desired and mentioned by young people in general, in a variety of youth studies.) The educational system needs to cope with and positively accommodate this cultural phenomenon among young black males, and certainly not by directing them to predominantly sporting and musical activities. Of course, it is easy to write in critical terms about schools excluding black boys for what is perceived as ‘insolence and bad attitude’—it is much harder to deal with challenging and aggressive behaviour in practice. This book is not in the business of blaming teachers either individually or en masse for the problems under discussion. There is doubtless some individual racism among teachers, but perhaps rather less than in other occupational groupings. It is primarily at the cultural and institutional level that the educational system is failing to produce curricular and organisational frameworks that genuinely engage and tap the potential of African-Caribbean boys, just as the system significantly failed and still fails many working-class white boys. AfricanCaribbean boys are likely to be caught by a dual disadvantage—class inequality and racism—and now perhaps by a third—gender disadvantage—reflecting negative masculine stereotypes and the erosion of traditional ‘male’ work. Because of their sense of injustice due to racism and disadvantage, many black boys are suspicious of white authority and power. Because their group and sometimes individual experience is even more acutely disadvantaged than that of white working-class boys, their response is correspondingly even more intense. Implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, they sometimes reject its legitimacy. That is hardly surprising. However, when carried into the school context, the boys’ anti-authority attitudes—in combination with whatever individual or institutional racism might characterise a particular school—can contribute to conflict and discontent. Darcus Howe, the black British writer and broadcaster, gives an account of African-Caribbean boys’ alienation from school based on close observation—and it is interesting that he refers to processes and experiences outside rather than inside school in his explanation. The boys he refers to in the following passage include his sons: The boys begin that way [getting obediently down to work like their sisters] at primary school, but soon realise that there are other immediate issues: racial attacks by whites, the police, the local shopkeeper who thinks that every black boy is a shoplifter. Soon the boy is transformed because he has to face directly the weight of the society that surrounds him. He moves into a warrior stance, using language that transforms ordinary English into

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a series of confrontational metaphors and similes. By secondary school he is mature beyond his years. The school system tries to tame the instincts of survival and offers a smooth edge that bears no relation to reality. I have seen it unfold in my own house. Black Caribbean boys are a new and growing social force and they cannot be compared to OFSTED’s mould of who a child is and what he or she is required to learn. (Howe, 1999:23) The next section begins to examine how various modes of black masculinity are historically constructed and how they relate to African-Caribbean boys’ wider social experience, including education. The effects of slavery, both at the time and after, on black masculine identities The starting point for understanding African-Caribbean masculine identities is racism and the responses to it. This is then followed by class. It is against the harsh interface of imperial conquest and oppression that African-Caribbean men and boys have fought to shape their masculine identities. Prior to slavery, their gender identities were formed within indigenous African cultures, but within the modern epoch it was not until the mid-twentieth century that they achieved sufficient freedom to assert and develop relatively autonomous, as distinct from largely imposed, self and collective identities. It was virtually inevitable that when this opportunity came, black masculinities would develop often in angry reference to white oppression, particularly white racist patriarchal oppression. Slavery drove at the heart of black masculinity, separating men from their wives and children and abusing both. The exploitation and stereotyping of black women—as domestic ‘maids’ and objects for sexual use—took significantly different forms than for black men. As these brief examples show, the various forms of black gender identity, including ‘black macho’, widely recognised as a dominant form of contemporary black masculinity, cannot be properly understood without reference to historical context. The origin of contemporary black macho can be understood partly as an expression of cultural resistance, sometimes developing into more conscious political activism, including rebellion (although rebellion is not necessarily political in character). Both during and after slavery a wide range of identities and lifestyles were developed by men of African origin which embodied the adoption of different strategies for coping with the system to which they found themselves subject. A similar range of identities occur among black men and boys today, as they struggle in different ways to deal with a society that to a greater or lesser extent they still see as racist, although changed circumstances are reflected in a shift towards more overtly assertive strategies. Of course, their struggle for identity in the face of slaughter and abuse was not only, and probably not even mainly, a gender one. Because African slaves had been brutalised and humiliated as a ‘race’, their

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primary struggle was to reassert their ‘racial’/ethnic humanity, dignity, competence and achievement. This struggle occurred both at the individual and the general or collective level. There was a quantitative leap forward in this long and difficult process in the 1960s when positive black images began to be asserted, starting with ‘black power’. In the terminology of Miles and Solomos, African slaves had been negatively ‘racialised’, and it is scarcely surprising that one of their responses was to reassert ‘racial’/ethnic pride and worth (Miles, 1989; Solomos, 1989). How ethnic struggle for pride and identity related to the desire of individuals to achieve economic success and social mobility is an important question which is addressed on pages 77–8. Slavery, an extreme system, provoked a range of responses, some of them also extreme. The following typology of coping strategies is presented here not as definitive nor exhaustive but merely as indicative of a range of responses adopted to cope first with slavery and then with a freer but still highly racist society. It is not based on specific empirical research but reflects a broad range of historical and contemporary data. It is similar to Weber’s description of an ideal type model, in that it attempts to abstract the main possible types or formations of a phenomenon—in this case patterns or strategies of coping or survival negotiable by black men and boys. As the following account indicates, the balance of strategic options shifted as African-Caribbeans emerged from a context of severe oppression into relative freedom. A range of identities and lifestyles can be loosely associated with the various coping strategies—these are ways of acting and self-presentation which embody the intention behind the strategies. The style/identity column has been gendered to capture styles particularly associated with men and boys (although in principle there is no reason why they cannot be associated with women and girls—as in practice some, to a degree, are). In two cases, the strategies/identities can be said to harden into consciously-held political positions: rebellion-political activism, and separatism-nationalism. The strategies and related identities are: Coping Strategies

Related (Masculine) Identity/Style

Submission Conformity/accommodation Imitation Resistance/rebellion Retreatism Separatism

Uncle Tomism Low key ‘More English than the English’ Macho Culture/Political Activism Drug Dependency, Drop-out Rastafarianism, Black Muslim, Nationalist

A response to oppression which has become much despised within black culture was submission, the related cultural style of which is ‘Uncle Tomism’. In this case, the definitions of the oppressor are internalised and domination and power accepted. An acceptance by a black man of his own or his people’s inherent inferiority in relation to white people is a form of such submission. Others adopted a conformist approach to the demands of the slave system without

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necessarily accepting its legitimacy or succumbing to it psychologically. In Erving Goffman’s terms, some must have ‘played it cool’—secretly rejecting the slave system, if not actively planning to overthrow it (see Goffman, 1968). The term accommodation conveys a lesser degree of overt conformity to the system but still a willingness to ‘do business’ with it, if only for lack of an alternative. In our view the term robust or critical accommodation is a coping strategy more typically adopted by contemporary African-Caribbean girls and women than by boys and men. What underlies it in their case is the practical need to get educated and to get on with paid and domestic work (a higher proportion of AfricanCaribbean women than white women are in full-time work). Given the chasm in power and position between the ‘slave-owner’ and the slave, there must have been few meaningful opportunities for full-scale imitation other than in surreptitious ridicule. Nevertheless, the terrible dislocation and cultural trauma experienced by African slaves left them open to cultural impression by the dominant group. Contemporary British African-Caribbean culture reflects many aspects of the Western-Christian tradition as well as more specifically British and English cultural elements. During the early years of postwar immigration, the middle-class ideal, often with smart clothes and an accent to match, represented a model of imitation for some immigrants with aspirations to acceptance by indigenous Britains and perhaps with aspirations to upward social mobility. These tended to be from Asia and Africa rather than the predominantly rural and working-class African-Caribbeans. However, this approach does highlight the interesting issue of how a person from a minority ethnic group negotiates mobility in a class system still heavy with white cultural reference and symbolism (see pages 69–70). Unsurprisingly, resistance to ‘whitey’, both as cultural lifestyle and as an embryo political strategy, has attracted more kudos than more conformist orientations. Resistance has had tremendous appeal to young black people in both Britain and the United States since the 1960s. Resistance to white authority, such as is embodied in the educational and police systems, burst into rebellion in 1981, 1985 and again in 1995. The strength of contemporary black macho and the resistance of many young African-Caribbean boys to ‘white’ authority can be explained partly by the humiliation and repression of their forebears under slavery. Control was exercised over black men’s sexuality and over their children and partners to a degree that was almost bound to provoke an assertive, highly masculinised reaction—when the opportunity emerged. Overt resistance to white domination and abuse—individual or collective—under slavery was only possible to a limited degree. As is the case with the women’s movement, it is since the 1960s that the most sustained and powerful resistance has occurred. Retreatism and separatism both represent attempts to escape from white power and oppression rather than to negotiate with it in some way. Within sub-cultural theory, retreatism is usually associated with psychological breakdown, often as a result of inability to cope with social pressures. Cloward and Ohlin use the category to describe those criminals—the least effective—who are able to organise themselves

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neither in relation to the dominant society nor in relation to those who deviate from it (Cloward and Ohlin, 1961). Such a model of ‘normals and deviants’ is transparently inappropriate here, given that it is the majority or at least the oppressive majority culture that merits censure rather than the minority. However, it would be surprising if there were not significant numbers of black people who did give up either trying to prosper in a substantially racist society or trying to change it and retreat into marginal activities. What is perhaps more surprising is that resilience and resistance are much more characteristic of black youth culture than retreatism, although doubtless many individuals mix or move in and out of these cultural modes. The belief that only separating from white society will ensure equality has a long history among black people. Most recently it has been expressed by a group within the American Black Panther Party and by the Rastafarians. Although some have a literal belief in separatism, for many it can be taken as symbolic of their disillusionment and alienation from white society. This model of coping strategies and related identities spans a long historical period, and the practically available options changed greatly in relation to shifts in the wider socio-economic system. The economic and cultural options for black men changed somewhat after their transition from slaves to wagelabourers. Once they became more integrated into the capitalist system, the possibility of various class identities emerged. This occurred in the United States in the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, and in Britain after the immigration which followed the Second World War. However, white racism in both the United States and Britain meant that the cultural identities and conflicts initially generated within slavery remained relevant. To some extent, these established identities and conflicts were projected onto the capitalist class system. Thus, for a black person to become middle-class raised the spectre of a new form of ‘Uncle Tomism’. How could an ethnic/‘racial’ identity forged under oppression survive ‘success’ in the system of the oppressor? Some found the notion of being black and middle-class unproblematic, but others struggled with it. A so-called young black underclass developed, partly because of white racism and exclusion and partly as a cultural choice on the part of young black people. Arguably, it is this group that has been the dynamic and charismatic centre of black youth culture. Other young black people sought conventional success within the capitalist system but bought into ‘black flash’— a stream of extrovert and assertive cultural styles which reflect black rather than white identities. The typology of African-Caribbean masculinities is no more than a rough guide to the range of gender identities constructed or negotiated by black men and boys. The danger with such models is that they can be taken to imply that social reality and forms of identity are simpler and more clear-cut than they are. In practice, people’s identities may shift in one direction or another and they may hold contradictory identities simultaneously. A day-time conformist at work might be a night-time rebel. Broad typologies can indicate the direction and flow of collective identities, especially when such typologies adopt the labels of the social actors themselves.

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The pride in, and insistence on, self-autonomy of many black boys and men, and their resistance to white power and authority, can therefore partly be understood in terms of the group experience of slavery and subsequent exploitation. However, these qualities are also often found among AfricanCaribbean girls and women, and it is too simple to categorise them as exclusively gendered ‘masculine’ (Phoenix, 1987; Mirza, 1992). Further, the majority of African-Caribbean boys are working-class or the off-spring of parents who are irregularly employed. The masculinity of young African-Caribbean males is similar in some aspects to that of white working-class boys, and this is no doubt partly due to similarities in socio-economic experience and background. It is an arguable point whether class or ethnicity plays the greater part in the formation of youthful African-Caribbean masculinities, although the latter case is strongly maintained here. Making sense of macho A main argument so far suggested in this section and further developed below is that the macho style prominently adopted by some African-Caribbean boys and men is only in part the product of negative stereotyping; it is also generated by some African-Caribbeans in response to aspects of their historical and contemporary experience. Given what African-Caribbeans have had to ‘fight against’, this is an historically highly plausible argument and, further, there is no lack of evidence for it. However, perhaps because such an analysis may be—wrongly—taken as ‘blaming the victim’ it has tended not to be explored. Even recent work which fully explores and acknowledges the power and pervasiveness of the African-Caribbean macho style fights shy of fully recognising that it is now an embedded cultural characteristic which is generationally reproduced and not mainly a reaction to negative stereotyping. Thus both Clair Alexander (1996:137–8) and Tony Sewell (1997:126–7), especially the former, describe macho behaviour among black boys as substantially an internalisation of negative stereotypes which have been generated by the dominant culture. Here, we argue an alternative thesis without any sense either of censure or of liberal guilt, neither of which are appropriate or constructive to analysis. This is that black macho is now an established mode of masculinity which is generated and contested from within the African-Caribbean culture just as working-class macho was and to some extent still is in working-class culture. The parallel with working-class macho is an extremely fruitful one. There are many reasonably unbiased studies of macho style among white working-class males which locate this somewhat similar type of masculinity to black macho firmly within workingclass culture. Willis’s definitive work shows that, although the lads are positioned in subordination, their values and actions must be understood as reflective of their own culture rather than as merely reactive. In principle the same level of dispassionate analysis ought to be achievable with respect to the study of AfricanCaribbean culture, including black macho. Just as the conditions of industrial

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labour experienced by the working-class male provoked tough, sometimes embattled and uncompromising collective resistance, so the experience of slavery generated a culture of injured pride, anger and resistance among many black men. Macho may be regarded as an extreme, and in some expressions an unacceptable, form of resistance, but as an element in a tough and assertive strategy for coping with oppression and brutality it is comprehensible. Where macho is most pointlessly destructive is when it is expressed collectively in intragroup or gang rivalry, or individually as a form of domination of a partner. What is being offered here is not a celebration of macho but an interpretation of it as a constructed response rather than mainly as a label imposed by white society. Ultimately, interpretation of this issue is one of emphasis and, given that cultural orientations are the product of continuous interaction, black macho should not be regarded as static, however embedded it may currently be. Just as the decline of industrial culture has seen a decline of working-class macho and of the more widely shared solidaristic masculinity, so black macho could become a semi-redundant cultural mode should racism decline and the opportunity structure become more open to African-Caribbean boys. Predictably, some of the resistance of African-Caribbean boys and men to exploitation and racism has been categorised as deviant by the dominant society, just as working-class men routinely fell foul of the law and official censure. Partly because it was made even more difficult for black people than for the working class to organise and institutionalise their resistance to oppression, black resistance has tended to be predominantly individual and cultural rather than institutional and political. Resistance embodied in lifestyle is probably easier to characterise as deviant or even pathological than organised political dissent. ‘Resistance’ by another name in 1960s/70s Bristol: re-interpreting Ken Pryce Ken Pryce’s Endless Pressure (1986; first published 1979) is a classic study of African-Caribbean settlement in Britain and was among the first to deal in detail with post-war black youth culture in this country. Pryce carried out a participant observational survey of the mainly Jamaican-origin community in the St Paul’s area of Bristol between 1969 and 1974. Pryce’s study is controversial and inevitably in some respects dated, but it remains the most thoroughly empirically grounded study of by far the largest African-Caribbean group—Jamaicans—to settle in Britain. Pryce particularly concentrated on what has been referred to here as the macho culture of some African-Caribbean men and boys, and his study shows quite clearly that this culture was fuelled both by Jamaican experience and ‘rude boy’ prototypes and by the continuing experience of racism in Britain. It would be a simple matter to use other sources than Pryce to support our own evidence of a ‘hard’, macho culture among African-Caribbean boys, but Pryce is particularly authoritative and provides an important historical dimension, both because he amply refers to the influence of Jamaican culture and because his own data was gathered a generation ago.

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As Pryce himself states, he began his research with few preconceptions, but on the basis of his observations categorised the African-Caribbean community into two orientations which in turn are sub-divided into six main lifestyles. It needs to be said at the outset that some of Pryce’s terminology is ill-chosen and some now simply dated, but he provides a mass of well classified information on cultural differentiation within the African-Caribbean ethnic group and, in particular, on young African-Caribbean men. The two orientations suggested by Pryce are the stable law-abiding orientation and the expressive-disreputable orientation. The stable law-abiding orientation is subdivided into four lifestyles which are given here, along with Pryce’s own description of their ‘world views and political attitudes’ in brackets. They are: the Proletarian respectables (God-fearing, peaceful accommodation); the Saints (Pentecostalist, peaceful accommodation); the In-betweeners (black people, conscious and anti-integrationalist); and the Mainliners (pro-liberal and conservative moderate). The expressive-disreputable orientation is sub-divided into two lifestyles: Hustlers (first-generation refusers of ‘slave labour’ and ‘shit work’—hedonistic, criminalistic and indifferent to white society); and Teenyboppers (second-generation refusers of ‘slave labour’ and ‘shit work’— delinquency, Rastafarianism and other forms of black consciousness). In the second edition of Endless Pressure (1986), Pryce admitted that his close association of Rastafarianism with delinquency was offensive and misleading.4 It is unfortunate that Pryce stigmatised a significant social movement in this way. Less telling is the criticism made by Cashmore and Troyna (1982:26–7) that Pryce’s lifestyle categories were too stereotypical and failed to recognise that a single individual might move fluently between lifestyles. Of course, any categorisation of individuals involves the risk of oversimplification—that is perhaps inherent in generalisation—but Pryce’s schema seems to capture as much variety and detail as most other work on Britain’s African-Caribbean community. However, before discussing it in relation to youthful African-Caribbean masculinities, one further caveat needs to be issued. Pryce’s characterisation of the hustler and teenybopper lifestyles as expressive-disreputable is, in its use of the term ‘disreputable’, judgemental and moralistic. These groups may have been disreputable in the view of Pryce and some members of the British public, but others regarded them much more positively. It was a mistake for Pryce to incorporate a negative judgement within his basic typological framework. The result is that he falls into the trap of some more conservative thinkers of presenting African-Caribbean young men as ‘a problem’. These two groups will be referred to here simply as having an expressive orientation—a characterisation which has often been made about the lifestyles of some African-Caribbeans. What use, then, does Pryce’s research have in understanding the origin, cultural content and development of youthful African-Caribbean masculinities? Pryce explains the particular masculine style of hustlers and teenyboppers as the outcome of their experience in Jamaica—going back to the colonial period— and in contemporary Britain. He states that slavery, post-colonial oppression

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and, for immigrants into Britain, continuing oppression and discrimination, made it difficult for many to establish stable and committed family and work patterns. Pryce’s lifestyle model also fully recognises that many African— Caribbeans in Britain have adopted ‘stable, law-abiding’ lifestyles, and his bias in favour of this group is fairly clear throughout the book, although he is well aware of the attraction of the expressive lifestyle of the teenyboppers for some even of the more conventional and conformist. It has often been observed since Pryce published his book that youth culture is even more important as a means of relatively autonomous self-expression to African-Caribbean than to white youth, and that the former often take a creative lead and provide charismatic role models to other youth (Jones, 1988; Back, 1996). Pryce gives many examples of the hustler/teenybopper sensitivity to insult and offence on the part of ‘the cheeky white man’ boss in the work situation. It would be astonishing if such attitudes did not exist prominently among African—Caribbeans, given their historical and continuing exploitation by many white employers. It is perhaps unfortunate that the concept of black ‘cultural resistance’ was not adopted by Pryce because, in effect, that is what he is describing (see Hall et al., 1979; Hebdige, 1979). Cultural resistance refers to the rejection of oppression at the level of lifestyle and everyday activity, and, as such, is distinguished from political resistance which it may or may not accompany. In fact, Pryce comments that he came across ‘only a few’ politically committed teenyboppers during his research. However, he gives great emphasis to expressive activity, particularly music, within teenybopper culture, which he sees both as a career opportunity for some of them and as a source of pleasure. If anything, he may even slightly overstate the role of reggae and associated lifestyle activities in relation to other African-Caribbeans: Teenyboppers were identified with reggae in the first place mainly through their association in the expressive-disreputable orientation; this was the social opening through which the music gained entry into Britain. The production of music in the black community is and always has been the exclusive business of hustlers (and now teenyboppers): reggae was first played in Britain in black discos and blues dances, etc. What is more, for hustlers and teenyboppers the music business (whether as singer, dancer or businessman) is a way of earning a living. We have seen this to be the case with the rudies in Jamaica, we know it to be the case in the black ghettos of America, and it is very much the case now in Britain as well. (Pryce, 1979:159) There were many other styles of music, in addition to reggae, current among young African-Caribbean youth in the 1990s and into the new millennium. Nor is it now true—if, indeed it ever was—that the production of music in the black community is the ‘exclusive’ concern of hustlers. More contemporary styles are well described in Les Back’s New Ethnicities and Urban Culture (1996), and are briefly discussed later in this book (pages 169–71). It is still

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to some extent the case that, for young African-Caribbeans, careers in music and entertainment are seen as ‘alternative’ to mainstream and conventional careers. Such careers offer a more open and flexible opportunity structure and must often seem more attractive than the potentially discrimination-ridden path of a conventional career. This was certainly the case for Nathan, whose ambition to make a career in rap is discussed in later chapters (see pages 138 and 169–71). For African-Caribbean boys, careers in music and entertainment are still often associated with a certain ethos or style of masculinity. This is a macho style of conspicuous consumption, including sexual consumption, blatant hedonism and irreverence towards authority, particularly racist authority. While similar macho qualities are common among white rock stars, as Pryce explains, they have a particular resonance among black youth. Pryce gives a perceptive analysis of the lifestyle orientation he refers to as ‘In-betweeners’. In-betweeners seek to reconcile making a decent living with retaining an authentic black lifestyle and identity: In-betweeners want to make it in terms of all the conventional symbols of success—a home, a family, a career, a good salary, security and respectability. But the problem that exercises the mind of all in-betweeners, thereby differentiating them from all mainliners, is how to make it and still remain ‘black’, that is, how to be successful and still be authentic in terms of ‘black culture’, how to be middle class without deserting one’s roots…As proud blacks with drive and ambition, in-betweeners are galled at the realization that they must lose their identity…in order to achieve success in white society…In-betweeners have resolved their dilemma by an ideological and highly self-conscious manipulation of their life-attitudes. (Pryce, 1979:241–2) Much has changed since Pryce wrote Endless Pressure, but the book highlighted two related identity issues which remain of relevance to African-Caribbeans and which were apparent among some of the boys in our survey. First is the interesting issue of whether an African-Caribbean can become culturally middle-class and still remain ‘black’ (in the sense of retaining a full and authentic African-Caribbean lifestyle and identity). Second is the dilemma faced by many young African-Caribbeans of how to develop a sense of self which combines potentially conflicting elements—particularly, success in and conformity to an historically oppressive white society and participation in a culture formed in large part in resistance to that society. If anything, these issues confront young African-Caribbeans even more sharply today than they did in the early 1970s. This is because the shift of the British economy from the industrial to the service sector means that there are more white collar jobs of some sort and fewer jobs in heavy industry available to black (as well as white) people. As Pryce observes, it is white collar work and lifestyle which present the biggest challenge to black people in combining conventional material success with a commitment to their own cultural authenticity and integrity, which for many

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is partly based on rejecting the discriminatory ‘opportunity structure’ of white society. In the year 2000, scores of thousands of young African-Caribbeans are still faced with these issues. We would not today refer to these as ‘in-betweeners’ any more than we would refer to the minority who still comprehensively reject conformity to dominant norms as ‘teenyboppers’. As Les Back argues, many contemporary young people—not only African-Caribbeans—envisage and negotiate their identity development in complex, varied and flexible ways. This is partly because a greater variety of lifestyle models have emerged in the last quarter of a century, including the spectacular styles of the youth subcultures and the greater visibility and intermingling of various ethnic lifestyles. Of course, identities are seldom as consciously articulated and practised as clearly as they can be presented on the written page and, as Back makes clear, it is the fast flow and cross-fertilisation of cultural influence that has become a characteristic feature of youthful lifestyles and identity. A third issue of cultural identity for African-Caribbean youth is raised in Pryce’s book, and is well worth commenting on. This is the extent of the continuity between the ‘expressive-disreputable’ culture of the boy ‘teenyboppers’ and the older ‘hustlers’. As he describes it, the boys are virtually apprentice hustlers. Whereas most predominantly white youth sub-cultures—such as mods or punks—have no full-blown adult equivalent to aspire to, young black cultural resisters do—the hustlers. The fact that there is a long-term ‘alternative’ lifestyle available to young black boys unattracted to mainstream careers may well add to their sense of confidence and empowerment, but it could also lead to their ultimate marginalisation and alienation. Resistance, racism and the lack of opportunity The dilemma or, more positively, the challenge of both achieving economic success and maintaining cultural integrity has not diminished since Pryce carried out his research in the early 1970s. No doubt for most young AfricanCaribbeans the challenge of retaining a hold on their roots and of achieving at least adequate material reward in a white dominated society was worked out in a more or less unselfconscious way and in circumstances largely not of their own making. The experience of discrimination and frustration in the employment market which persisted through the 1970s and 1980s is one external factor that helped shape the culture of resistance that flourished among many second- and third-generation African-Caribbeans during these decades. A sense of grievance and the inclination to resist was intensified by poor relations with the police. For a significant minority, resistance flared into rebellion in the urban disorders of 1981 and 1985. African-Caribbean history and culture offer a rich stock to draw on in the expression of resistance, and this has been greatly added to by younger generations. For instance, whereas blues and gospel conveyed messages of pain and acceptance, reggae, rap and hip-hop can be angry, assertive and

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confidently—even arrogantly—celebratory of self and group identity. Existing literature and our own research indicates that resistance is gendered somewhat differently for boys and for girls. Although both may adopt a stance that has often been labelled as ‘attitude’, in terms of education African-Caribbean boys tend to be more openly confrontational of authority whereas the girls are more likely to set their own agenda of academic achievement but in a way that maintains their independence and distance from the white authority structure (see Mac an Ghaill, 1988, and Fuller, 1982). The term resistance is therefore more precisely applied to some of the boys’ behaviour whereas that of ‘critical accommodation’ might better apply to the strategies adopted by some of the girls. Although resistance is a simple concept—it means opposing oppression— it can be a complex process in practice.5 It is inevitable that sometimes the boys will ‘resist’ racism in what may be termed an anticipatory way, i.e. they may imagine that racism is going to occur or even that it is occurring when it is not and start ‘resisting’ in anticipation of its occurrence. In itself this is not paranoia or mere trouble-making, although it is compatible with both (and doubtless both occur). Rather, these boys routinely draw on the strategies and techniques of a culture of ‘survival’ and resistance in which a social environment dominated by white adults is regarded at best with suspicion and at worst with hostility. This generalisation applies to a particular prominent pattern of sub-cultural behaviour, but one which is not practised by all or necessarily the majority of African-Caribbean boys. Even so, in the fairly tough areas in which the schools in our research were located, individual AfricanCaribbean boys would find it difficult to avoid the pull of cultural resistance including the image of black macho which was its central cultural motif. As both Durkheim and Marx in their different ways emphasised, the power of the collective can have a coercive effect, and that is notoriously the case in relation to peer group conformity. While white and Asian boys often suggested that African-Caribbean boys ‘made trouble’, they were less likely to comment on the frustrations and provocations the latter experienced. The difficulties of the second and third generation of post-war AfricanCaribbeans were compounded by the series of recessions that affected Britain from the mid-1970s. The impact of hard economic times was made all the greater by the coincidental factor that the size of the generational cohorts of young African-Caribbeans during these years was relatively large compared to those of white youth. This was because a relatively large proportion of the first generation of post-war African-Caribbean immigrants were by that time young adults. Many of their children and even grandchildren became teenagers in the 1980s and 1990s. As the 1960s had demonstrated in relation to the post-war ‘babyboomers’, a large generation can be particularly influential. Public awareness of young African-Caribbeans was amplified by sometimes sensationalising and stereotyping media coverage. Arguably, negative media coverage of youth, particularly African-Caribbean youth, contributed to government exercising firmer social control of youth during the Thatcher-Major

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and Blair administrations. The boys we questioned and interviewed were living through a period of Thatcherite and post-Thatcherite reaction, although they were shielded from the full impact of Conservative education policy by the liberal environment of their schools. In any case, a resounding majority of boys from the three main ethnic backgrounds disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition we put to them that ‘What the country needs now is someone like Mrs Thatcher’. It is worth reiterating that it is being argued here that ‘school processes’ are not the only nor the main explanation for the often relatively unproductive and difficult school experiences of many African-Caribbean boys. Of the variables that account for this situation, it is the peer-based macho culture of resistance that appears to be the most decisive. This culture is not merely a function of labelling, although labelling can accentuate and fuel it. As was argued above, the origins of this culture lie centuries back in slavery, and it is renewed by continuing racism. Paul Willis made a similar observation about the antiauthoritarian culture of the white working-class lads of his famous study (Willis, 1977). Their anti-authoritarianism made it unlikely that they would engage constructively with the education system or other structures of power and conformity, and the same is true of many African-Caribbean boys. The schools in our survey were committed to anti-racism and were clearly perceived as such by the boys. It was among their own peers—among themselves—that the boys found racism, even if they often excused it as ‘a joke’. As far as institutional racism is concerned, their own or their friends’ and relatives’ experience told them what surveys have long shown, that it is in the employment market rather than in the educational system that they are most likely to be victims of the most seriously damaging and exclusionary form of discrimination. Statistics consistently show that people of African-Caribbean and Asian origin are at risk of racism in the street, neighbourhood and even in their own homes (see, for instance, ‘We Can’t All Be White’, Rowntree Foundation, 1999). Many African-Caribbean and, increasingly, Asian boys are ready to hit back. Class, ethnicity and racism in the making of African-Caribbean resistance Within the traditional Marxist paradigm, ethnicity is generally seen as a less significant form of identity than class. However, the recent writings of Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy have to some extent rendered ethnic identity, in its more positive and tolerant formulations, as respectable within radical theory and action. Initially, in the Thatcher period, Hall queried whether the political Right should be allowed to extol the virtues of the dominant white ethnic group while ethnic minorities adopted a low-key approach to their own cultural achievements—many of them wrought through resisting racism and discrimination (1992). However, while Hall acknowledges a legitimate basis for the celebration of ethnic identity, he is understandably chary in the extreme of ethnic chauvinism and intolerance. Nor does he consider that ethnic identity

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should be exclusionary or static. On the contrary, he considers that a dynamic identity is open to other influence and images and so is itself likely to be constantly shifting and changing—albeit usually on an axis of values and selfpresentations that have a degree of recognisable continuity. Further, Hall argues that individuals tend to have multiple identities—including, for instance, gender and sexual identities, and perhaps varieties of each, as well as ethnic. Paul Gilroy is equally emphatic that ethnic identity is subject to constant flux. Indeed, his study of black identity, The Black Atlantic (1993b), treats not only the huge variations within black identity but acknowledges the variety of influences on black experience from other cultural sources. A key question at issue here is the extent to which the macho style of many young African-Caribbean males is a product of their class experience or of their ethnic experience. In fact, although this matter is often posed in this slightly polarised way, to do so risks oversimplification. It is the interplay of these and other factors that contributes to the formation of African-Caribbean macho. It is a misleading assumption that, because macho behaviour occurs frequently among both white and black working-class males, African-Caribbean macho can be defined primarily in class cultural terms. Of course, in psycho-behavioural terms, all macho behaviour is fairly similar. It involves the assertion of power and control, or frustration at the lack of them. However, because these characteristics typify macho behaviour regardless of the social origins of the actors involved, they provide little clue about what is specific to African-Caribbean macho. A more precise understanding of what is distinctive about African-Caribbean culture, including African-Caribbean masculinities, is better achieved with reference to historical context rather than on the basis of theoretical assumption. The historical experience of African-Caribbeans prior to immigration to Britain was typically that of economic struggle and uncertainty—sharpened by recent recession in the countries from which immigration occurred; and most of the population other than the elites were very poor by comparison with Britain. While many immigrants to Britain were skilled workers, work was often insecure and wages low. As was the case in the United States, the abolition of slavery in Britain’s ex-colonies in the Caribbean had little effect on the extent to which society was stratified by ‘race’—for which colour was the most obvious signifier. The hierarchies of class and ‘race’ closely coincided. In more technical terms—and this is a crucial point of analysis—status, in the form of ‘race’ and ethnic identity, influenced class position as much and perhaps more than class influenced status. In this respect, matters proved little different for African-Caribbean immigrants to Britain, and the experience of ‘racial’ and ethnic prejudice no doubt partly explains the sense of injury and anger which characterises African-Caribbean macho masculinity. The second and third post-war generations of African-Caribbeans in Britain have been more prepared than the first to resist and confront rather than to accommodate to injustice and disadvantage. Whereas the white working-class boys who were the main subject of Resistance Through Rituals (Hall and Jefferson, 1975) were expressing a diffuse anger against authority or, at most,

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what they experienced as ‘the system’, young African-Caribbean men had a very specific focus of grievance—racism and racial discrimination. They increasingly resisted ‘racial’ oppression in all kinds of ways. Although the style and manner of the working-class boys’ resistance reflected their class situation, few of them specifically focused on members of the capitalist class or any other class as the clearly perceived object of their aggravation and ridicule. Individuals were objected to at a lifestyle and personal level rather than for ideological reasons. Thus, more middle-class people might be targeted because they were seen as ‘posh’ or because their apparent power was resented, but otherwise almost anybody different would do as a target—‘JAs, poofs or ‘ippies’—as long as they were not part of the immediate gang of lads. In contrast, for African-Caribbean boys it was the symbols and institutions of white, rather than class, domination that irked—and white, like black, is highly visible. Almost any institution in ‘white’ society could become a specific object of resentment because hard experience taught that racism could occur anywhere. What African-Caribbean youth was resisting was both more easily generalised about and more easily specified than what white working-class boys were resisting. African-Caribbean youth culture manifests a much greater awareness and resentment of racial than of class oppression, and to that extent is far more anti-racist than it is anti-capitalist. Indeed, there is a strong theme of conspicuous consumption in African-Caribbean youth culture which often resonates positively with capitalist consumption. The young black ‘underclass’ debate: the excluded The location in the system of stratification of African-Caribbeans in Britain and of African-Americans in the United States has been referred to by a number of commentators as that of an ‘underclass’, and the term has often been given a specific application to youth, and especially minority youth.6 However, perhaps because it is sometimes used in a stigmatising way, the term has become less often used. The Blair government prefers to use the term ‘excluded’ to apply to a wide range of people, of whatever ethnic background, who in one way or another struggle to achieve an adequate independent life. Although the term ‘underclass’ is best discarded, a review of the underclass debate does usefully set up some key issues in relation to the opportunity structure as it affects black people and, in particular, black youth. The term ‘black underclass’ effectively conveys the extent to which people of African descent have been socially and economically marginalised, mainly as a result of racial discrimination. The term implies that black people experience significant disadvantage not routinely experienced by white people, and that established class terminology, including the term ‘working-class’, is not in itself sufficient to describe their position in the system of stratification. The use of the term ‘black underclass’ also indicates, albeit ambiguously, that status differentiation, in this case perceived racial or cultural difference, can play a major role in the stratification of black people in white-dominated societies.

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John Rex argues that racial discrimination was the main cause of the development of a black underclass in Britain (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Rex, 1986). In the context of suggesting a much wider usage of the term, Ralf Dahrendorf correctly states that ‘the underclass is not a class’ but is comprised of a variety of people who for various reasons are excluded from the social mainstream (1992:57). For Rex, status disadvantage does not preclude class disadvantage—he considers that in Britain they have converged and reinforced each other. In the United States, Douglas Glasgow used the term ‘black underclass’ to apply specifically to black youth, particularly to young men. Like Rex, Glasgow considers racial discrimination to be the main factor underlying the emergence of a black underclass (Glasgow, 1981). Writing some 20 years ago, Glasgow noted with some prescience that, in the United States, the underclass was in danger of becoming inter-generational. He further observed that alienation and disillusionment, which had its roots in discrimination and exclusion from the opportunity structure, was in danger of being culturally internalised by young black people who were increasingly turning away from the dominant white society. The term ‘underclass’ has been adopted by some on the political Right as well as a number of non-Marxist, radicals and liberals, including those mentioned above. The best known of these is the American social policy advisor Charles Murray, who later turned his article ‘Underclass: A Disaster in the Making’ (1989) into an influential book. Murray directed his comments especially at African-American youth, particularly fingering the roles of young mothers and fathers. The direction of Murray’s analysis is perhaps apparent in his summary of what he sees as early indicators of the emergence of an underclass: There are many ways to identify an underclass. I will concentrate on three phenomena that have turned out to be early warning signs in the United States: illegitimacy, violent crime, and drop-out from the labour force. (C Murray, 1989) Murray went on to argue that the main cause of the development of the American underclass was ‘welfare dependency’. During his 1989 visit to Britain, Murray had some contact with leading members of the Conservative government—thus his concern with warning signs which he did indeed think were present in Britain. He noted that, in the British context, the issues he raised might apply on a wide scale to less educated and employable white young men as well as to young black men in the same position. There is nothing in Murray’s essay which gives much weight to the impact of discrimination, particularly in employment, in the formation of a black underclass. His solution to the so-called dependency culture is equally narrow in scope and imagination—withdraw welfare from single parents who cannot independently support their children and, where the latter cannot be supported by family, have them fostered or put into care.

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Murray misses entirely the historical and still relevant explanation for the exclusion of many black people in Britain and the United States. As a group, they are at a structural disadvantage in the first instance because of racial discrimination. The prime responsibility for this situation lies with individual and institutional white racism, not with black people or their culture. A large part of any solution must be in firm public opposition to and practical policies against racism. Despite inequality of opportunity, a sizeable African-American middle class has developed, and there are signs that one is also emerging in Britain—albeit as yet on a relatively smaller scale. Unless this process continues and accelerates, it is evident that a disproportionate number of young black men will continue to be in long-term unemployment. While some young black men do ‘give up’ on the system, research in Liverpool carried out by Michelle Connolly and her colleagues (1991) found that a large majority of them wanted settled work. Young black men’s negotiation of identity in a majority white society Clair Alexander’s The Art of Being Black (1996) includes a number of young, middle-class African-Caribbean and African-British males in her study of ‘the creation of black British youth identities’. The point of including a reference to her book here is that it deals with a rather older group of men than those in our survey. The two case studies discussed below can be regarded as examples of the sort of experiences that might subsequently happen to boys in our study, although they are not presented here as necessarily typical. Although not a macro-scale study of stratification issues, Alexander’s work offers many useful insights on how racial discrimination can affect opportunities for occupational mobility and class status. She also provides many illustrations of the varied and creative responses to discrimination and frustration of the young black men. Of the two groups that Alexander researched, it is the first—whom she referred to as ‘the boys’—that we will concentrate on here. The nine members of this more or less loosely knit group of friends were all between 22 and 24 years of age—young men as compared to the mid-teenagers we interviewed. Of the boys, four were of Jamaican origin, three of Nigerian origin, one from Ghana, and one, Satish, who was born in India and had lived in Britain since he was twelve. His girlfriend, Dion, was ‘not officially a member of the group’ but ‘had known all the boys for many years’ and was a rich source of information about them. Dion was of Jamaican origin and Satish himself would sometimes pretend he was from the Caribbean and generally presented himself as ‘black’. Clair Alexander is of Asian origin, and the twelve months she spent doing ethnographic research as ‘one of the boys’ were not without interesting incident! Alexander’s study shows that, as a result of being black, the young men of both Caribbean and African origins have to deal with a common issue—racial discrimination and often negative images of black males and masculinities. They responded in a variety of ways.

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Malcolm, of Jamaican origin, and Clive, of Nigerian origin, adopted lifestyles which reflected a degree of conformity or accommodation, but which were also quite assertive in their extravagant style and consumerism. Their experiences illustrate how many ambitious young black men feel that they must ‘look the part’ as well as also be competent to do a given job. Thus what is sometimes referred to as ‘black flash’ has become an established style among ambitious black males. Malcolm was self-employed in the family tropical foodstuffs retailing business. He regarded racial abuse as inevitable in his line of work but countered it by seeking to achieve an image of success and wealth within the work environment. He drove a new Audi car, wore handmade suits and a large quantity of gold jewellery, and not only owned two mobile phones but also a message pager! Malcolm explained that he was keen to avoid the stereotype of black failure, although in doing so he perhaps veered towards the stereotype of ‘black flash’. As Alexander sympathetically puts it, ‘(t)his external image, based upon the expression of material wealth, can perhaps be seen as an attempt to carve out a model for black achievement’ (Alexander, 1996:89). Thus she implies that ‘the manipulation’ of ‘class’ symbols can be an attempt to combat the stereotype of black economic failure. However, a relevant point to add here is that both economically successful and unsuccessful black males often adopt assertive forms of masculinity which involve conspicuous display, including display of clothes, jewellery and possessions. Those who have ‘made it’ can usually differentiate themselves through the scale and quality of their consumption, but are still connected in aspects of style and aspiration to their ‘black brothers’. White ‘polite middle-class’ disdain for ‘black flash’ is somewhat schizophrenic and ethnocentric and creates a potential catch-22 for black people. The image of black failure is riddled with stereotypes, but the black celebration of black success may be resented or somehow seen as ‘not quite right’. On the other hand, many young black people seem to ride these potentially complex tensions very effectively and, as Chapter 5 explores, they gain great kudos from their leadership in areas of youth culture. Clive, who was of Nigerian origin, was the most conventionally successful of the young men. He deliberately set out to avoid the fate of many of his friends who did ‘silly things: postmen, train-drivers, bus-drivers, or you see them loafing around the street’ (Alexander, 1996:77). Clive chose to side-step issues of racism and adopt a strategy of individual competition and conformity in order to achieve career success. He sought to render the issue of ‘race’ irrelevant in his working life, although his social life was overwhelmingly among black people. Alexander’s account acutely observes the interplay of class and ‘race’, and in particular Clive’s inability to neutralise ‘race’ in the eyes of others: He utilized all the external images to portray a facade of conformity; he wore designer suits to work, owned a new Alfa-Romeo, carried a message pager, and cultivated an appropriate accent…Although there is undoubtedly a ‘class’ element to Clive’s situation, the primary identity which was

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negotiated was signalled by phenotype…When Clive was ‘made redundant’ just after I left London, the reason given was that the Company felt that Clive would be unable to adapt to future developments in technology. Although no overt reference was made to ‘race’, it is interesting that the company used lack of intellectual capacity as a reason for dismissal. (Alexander, 1996:87) Conclusion: the construction of young African-Caribbean masculinities This section has not sought to establish which factor—class, ‘race’, ethnicity or age—is ‘dominant’ or, in lumbering Althusserian terms, ‘determinant in the final instance’ in the lives of young black males, including in the structuring of their masculinities. To postulate the relationship between these factors in this way is highly misleading. There is no absolute relationship between these powerfully formative forces, and their interplay will vary from individual to individual and, at a higher level of generality, from group to group. Young African-Caribbean and African-British males are aware of, and to various degrees affected by, the racism and racial discrimination that has hampered their parents and may hamper their own socio-economic opportunities. They have responded to oppression and to the challenge to achieve with energy and imagination. Ethnic culture, including particular images of masculinity, is a major resource drawn on by young black males in the development of their identities and in coping with problems and challenges. Asian boys and the construction of masculinities In the previous two sections it was argued that the masculinities of white boys are decisively structured by class, and those of African-Caribbean boys by racism and their ethnically mediated response to it. The Asian boys in our survey were the children or grandchildren of people who were born in traditional societies which were predominantly stratified by castes rather than by industrial classes. Their primary socialisation, therefore, occurred in the context of families and communities of a much more traditional (including religious) kind than most of the white boys. The Asian boys differed from the African-Caribbeans in that their forbears were not slaves and their culture had not been forged largely in response to that most extreme and repressive of social systems. Even so, subjection to imperialism and racism has ensured that a certain hardened defensiveness, already present in some traditional concepts of Asian masculinity, has developed further. Asian boys experience two main flows of cultural influence: the traditional ethnic and the modern British. It is too much of a cliché to say that the boys—or, for that matter, Asian girls—are ‘caught’ between two cultures. Some boys did experience conflicting cultural influences and pressures, but others seemed to adjust relatively easily and without undue stress to the

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complexities of their situation. The term ‘negotiation’ is a better and more neutral descriptor of the process by which individual boys worked out their cultural identities and relationships than one which implies constant angst and struggle. Here the focus is on how the boys negotiated their masculine identities in admittedly often demanding contexts. Cultural images and perceptions of Asian masculinities in the dominant culture The Asian boys themselves often had a positive, if sometimes traditionally patriarchal, notion of what becoming and being a man involved. Although the precise detail of the gendered division of labour varies across the wide range of Asian cultures, patriarchy, in the minimal sense of men having much more power than women, is universal or nearly so. Among Muslims, the power and authority of men, although not without qualification, is particularly strongly established in relation to women and children. The right to self-defence is well established both philosophically and practically in many Asian cultures and was quite often evoked by the boys in our survey. It would be a crude simplification to call the tradition of self-defence ‘macho’, although in the context of peer group interaction in Britain it sometimes takes on a macho aura. There are a number of perceptions or typings and related images of Asian men and boys in the dominant culture in Britain which are partly accurate and partly exaggerated and stereotypical. Stereotypes can lead to victimisation if they form the basis on which members of the stereotyped group are treated. Three perceptions will be referred to here—each of which occurred among the boys. Oversimplifying somewhat, these can be referred to as ‘the weakling’, ‘the warrior’ and ‘the patriarch’. First is the notion of Asian men and boys as ‘passive’ or even ‘weak’. The main reference here seems to be one of perceived physical weakness, including lack of aptitude for ‘tougher’ sports such as football and lack of robust athleticism in general. Edward, a white boy from a West London school, typifies this perception: Asian guys aren’t seen to be that strong and hard really. Probably because there aren’t many of them in our school…quite a lot…but they aren’t seen to be that strong. (Edward) In the world of macho, to be weak physically tends to be elided with weakness of character as expressed in such phrases as ‘bottling out’ and ‘lacking guts’, and the status and treatment of Asian boys can suffer accordingly. Sometimes the Asian boys were compared unfavourably to black boys, whose macho behaviour was more overtly combative. The apparent tendency of Asian boys to be physically smaller has fed this stereotype. However, perhaps a higher protein diet and fitness/weight training are already evening out this apparent physical difference between the ethnic groupings.

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A second typing of Asian males is in some contrast to the first, although it also has a complementary aspect. In this case, the perception is that some young Asian men possess a disciplined and trained capacity for violence, mainly in the cause of self-defence. Mastery of technique is perceived as compensating for an assumed lack of physical strength. This is an image which has become heavily loaded with stereotypes, but it has a real basis in the oriental tradition of martial arts and self-defence. Among the associations conveyed by this image are a certain latent exoticism and mystery—a power not fully understood by ‘Westerners’ but felt as potentially threatening to them. The high level of technical control and the complex and sometimes elaborate ritual involved in the advanced practice of martial arts and self-defence contrasts with the relatively simple framework of, for example, boxing and wrestling. The philosophical underpinnings of these practices adds to their mystique. Not surprisingly, practices associated with physical and technical control as well as with the exotic have had considerable appeal to some Asian British boys—not least, at one remove from reality, in films and computer games (see Chapter 5). A third image of Asian males, particularly Muslims, is that they exercise strong domestic and family control. This is part of a much wider understanding of Asian culture, again particularly Islam, as being patriarchal and traditional. In general, these perceptions are well founded, but they have sometimes led to dramatic and unsympathetic media presentations of conflict and male oppression of women and children within Asian families and communities— presentations which in turn have fed negative stereotypes of Asians within popular culture. Our research interest mainly focused on the effect on Asian boys of their own family and parental experience, which by no means always conformed to popular stereotype (see Chapter 3). Each of the above images of Asian masculinity is part of the stock of cultural ‘knowledge’ and reference in mainstream society which the Asian boys in our study were themselves able to draw on. Not surprisingly—given their ‘inside’ knowledge—the boys rarely drew on these referents in a way which crudely endorsed dominant stereotypes. Their own ideas about their masculinity were part of larger constructions of their identity, about which their ideas were often provisional and still in the course of development. One further aspect of Asian youth needs to be mentioned because it certainly played a significant part in the thinking of a relatively large number of the Asian boys in our study. This is the commitment of Asian schoolchildren to education and relatedly to career success. As we discuss in the next section, to some extent this enthusiasm for education is a class as well as an ethnic cultural characteristic, but in the case of the Asian boys in our survey it seemed to cross class lines. Education and ‘masculine’ career orientations The strong orientation towards educational and career success among many boys of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim ethnic background was often related to their sense of appropriate masculine achievement, as is described in Chapter 4.

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Answers to the question, ‘Have you got a career in mind’, were often along the lines of the following examples: I want to go into the financial side, hopefully into the Stock Exchange. Or Merchant banking. (Desai)

I’ll go to college to do B. Tech. in electronics. After the HND in electronics. (Wakar) Not all the Asian boys were prospective high flyers, but many did have clear ideas about vocational courses they wanted to take and careers they hoped to pursue. Some saw success in highly materialistic terms—Desai, again: …I admire those who achieve…You need to be good at practical life…I think without money you can’t do many things. That’s a fact. You can’t do anything. Friendship, love, relationships…But there’s always a price on it. (Desai) Mac an Ghaill’s term ‘New Enterprisers’, or simply ‘Enterprisers’, is an appropriate description of those Asian boys who had a strong interest in higherstatus vocational courses and careers in technology and/or business. Mac an Ghaill used this term to describe working-class boys of various ethnic backgrounds who had this orientation (Mac an Ghaill, 1994). However, a large proportion of the Asian boys in our survey for whom this term is appropriate came from backgrounds in which their father was self-employed rather than from the manual working class. Like a substantial number of children from the post-war white working class, these boys aspired to salaried middle-class occupations, although the route they were frequently adopting—the higherstatus vocational courses—reflected the impact of the Thatcher reforms on education. Labour Force Survey figures (as published annually in Social Trends) show that nationally there is already a sizeable Indian professional and managerial middle class and a smaller Pakistani one. Compared to the national picture, relatively few of the Asian boys in our survey came from backgrounds in which either parent was a member of the middle-class salariat. Proportionately far more were self-employed—a trend which reflects the national situation. For their sons to achieve salaried middle-class jobs in substantial numbers would be something of a breakthrough for Asian parents. So far the real basis of their economic success has been within their own community or as vendors of their own ethnic and other goods to the larger national community. Many of the Asian boys seemed ready to build further on this achievement and have their sights set on careers in technology, finance or the professions. If self-employment seemed to induce a certain inter-generational dynamism, this needs to be balanced by the fact that unemployment among the fathers of

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the Asian boys in our sample was proportionately much higher than among whites (a majority of whom were in service industries or intermediate occupational categories) and somewhat higher than among African-Caribbeans (who were still well represented in their traditional areas of employment—skilled and semi-skilled manual work). There was also a relatively high concentration of Asian fathers, particularly Pakistani and Bangladeshi, in unskilled work. Boys from these backgrounds must have been aware of the obstacles to upward mobility that their parents had faced, some of which they might face themselves. Although some of the boys from these backgrounds expressed little in the way of a clear sense of educational or career direction, others shared in what appeared to be a strong education/career orientation among Asians. What prompts the ambitions of these Asian boys and how are their masculinities formed by them? To a degree, career ambition requires little explanation, although the extent of it varies between social groups. Immigrant groups in particular are often especially concerned to improve their economic situation or at least to provide the means for their children to do so. As is illustrated below (see page 140), many of the Asian boys had hopes of ‘doing better’ than their parents, although such aspirations were usually negotiated in close reference to their parents’ wishes and feelings. Surprise at the aspirations to upward mobility of Asian boys is therefore inappropriate. What perhaps needs more explanation is the apparently limited ambition of many white working-class lads in the 1960s and after. As is indicated by Willis and other chroniclers of working-class male youth subcultures, the explanation appears to lie in their assumption that the ‘normal thing’ to do was to get a job doing manual work—just like dad and very probably like grandad had done before him. That assumption was exploded by the recessions of the 1980s and the development of widespread unemployment. In any case, the extent to which even ‘solid’ working-class children harboured ambitions to achieve at least lower middle-class status is perhaps understated in the literature. In fact, many millions did make just such a transition. By the mid1980s and 1990s, the realities of deindustrialisation were apparent to new generations of working-class youngsters. Mac an Ghaill’s well observed groupings of ‘achievers’ and ‘new enterprisers’ were working-class boys of white and Asian background. The masculine identities of these boys were interwoven with the success and status they aspired to, and if this sometimes had a modern technological gloss to it, it was not greatly different from the typical ambition of upwardly mobile working-class and middle-class boys throughout the post-war period. Macho—reaction Mac an Ghaill also observed that a macho working-class sub-culture persisted among some white boys. It became increasingly clear in the 1990s that a macho culture has developed among some Asian boys, particularly those of Bangladeshi origin. This is less a working-class youth sub-culture than it is

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one of social exclusion. It is difficult to attempt precise quantification, but compared to earlier decades there were far more cases of ‘Asian’ youth gangs reported in the 1990s than in earlier decades. There were also several cases of gang attacks by predominantly Asian boys, some of which resulted in the deaths of their victims. The latter were extreme cases, but they were indicative of a trend to aggressive and antisocial behaviour among some Asian boys. Other than in Southall we found little direct evidence of this phenomenon, but it is now widespread enough to require comment. These Asian boys have very different lifestyles and prospects than the more academically and career motivated Asian boys, although there are junctures in school and leisure life where the two ‘types’ might interact. The reasons why this macho subculture has developed among some Asian youth are not hard to find. Impoverished backgrounds, likely experience of racism, and in some cases difficulties in the use of the English language, would be expected to produce a sense of exclusion and possibly of victimisation. Individual and group frustration and aggression is only one, though perhaps the most predictable, of several possible patterns of reaction to such experience. Whereas working-class youthful macho is, as Miller (1962) and Willis (1977) have demonstrated, indigenous to the parent class culture, that of socially excluded Asian boys appears to be largely reactive. Of course, once a pattern of aggressive and posturing behaviour has been stimulated, it can easily turn from the defensive to the aggressive—particularly among inexperienced young males. In this respect there is some similarity between the behaviour of some second-generation Asian youth and that of some second-generation AfricanCaribbean youth a decade or so before them. Although some Asian youth do appear to be going through a period of poorly focused anger and even sociocultural disorientation, this does not mean they are wholly isolated from other streams of youth cultural influence (see Chapter 5). Nor does it appear that even the most delinquent of Asian youth are typically completely adrift from their families, although these may have significant gaps of knowledge about their sons’ activities. What emerged in one celebrated case involving murder and multiple acts of violence by several young Asian men was that their parents had no idea of their generally delinquent behaviour. A chasm of communication and information of this kind between the generations is often a sign of rapid and deep cultural change. In general, the Asian boys we interviewed, especially those of Indian origin, often referred to their parents’ and families’ influence. Parental influence often occurred in a negotiated rather than in an authoritarian way. The boys seemed motivated by respect for their parents and a concern not to hurt their feelings, rather than by anything resembling fear. These motives seem uppermost in the decision of Asif, a Bangladeshi student, not to pursue his own ambition to be an air-pilot: Asif:

They really wanted me to study medicine, so I’m going for it now. I hope everything goes well for me.

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Interviewer: Asif:

Do you really feel that you’re doing it for them? If they hadn’t felt like that about piloting? No, I think I’m doing it for myself, and for them in a way. It’s OK for me. My parents thought that being a pilot could be quite dangerous. Anything could happen in a plane. But being a doctor is more safe and more established.

Self-defence and low-key masculinity It may be that the influence of family and their traditional cultures had a moderating effect on how many Asian boys envisaged and presented their masculinity. Two boys of Muslim background, Wakar, a Pakistani, and Asif, the Bangladeshi just referred to, talked with insight and sophistication about how they presented their own gender style and how others reacted. Wakar was not impressed by macho peacockery, nor did he think that girls were, but neither was he naive about what gains respect from other boys: Wakar: Interviewer: Wakar:

Int: Wakar:

…I don’t approve of fighting in the first place, but I do train for self-defence to use as a last resort. Do you think that fighting is important to show you are macho? To girls? I don’t know. I think most girls tend to go for boys who have a good build. They talk about having good attitudes, or ‘I like talking to you because you’re fun’, or something like that…‘You’ve got a good sense of humour.’ Somebody said people respect you if you’re good at fighting. The way I get out of that…because I’ve got a lot of respect in my own year and other years, and the way I get out of that is by doing self-defence…

It is obvious that Wakar has thought through his approach to matters such as fighting and how to gain respect. It is impressive that he maintains his view about not approving of fighting even when presented with the opposite proposition—that fighting gains respect. It is true that this view is a basic principle of self-defence, but Wakar has integrated it into his own selfdevelopment. Asif, the Bangladeshi boy, rejects altogether the idea that the macho style has much charisma as far as girls are concerned. In answer to the question ‘Is it still important to give a macho image in school’, he replied: Not really, it doesn’t help much. Not like you’re ‘the tough boy’ and everybody respects you. Nowadays, they really respect the clever ones more than the macho big bully types. If you’re macho they’re not going to be with you or like you, but if you can prove it on paper, that’s OK really. (Asif)

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Although they are responding to general questions, both Wakar and Asif speak from personal experience. In Bob Connell’s terms, they are reflexively constructing their own gender identities (Connell, 1995), or in Giddens’s terms they are consciously developing their own ‘life history project’ (Giddens, 1991). No doubt people have always pieced together their own identities in this reflexive way, and in the context of the boys’ lives such concepts may sound inflated. However, both Connell and Giddens see an increased potential in late modernity for both greater subjective freedom and greater variety and difference in identities. Perhaps Wakar and Asif in their avoidance of gender stereotypes modestly illustrate this trend. Tariq, a boy of Indian Sikh origin, might be considered macho, but he also was hardly stereotypical. He presented himself as very much ‘his own man’ and street-wise, but was not anti-academic and intended to go on to study Alevels. He differentiated between boys like himself who mixed work and pleasure and a handful of ‘basic dossers’ in his class. However, he did comment that at times his social life took priority over his school work. Tariq had a girlfriend and most of his friends were a few years older than himself. He had been ‘caught’ by the police ‘for marijuana and also joy-riding’. He drank alcohol in pubs and occasionally got involved in fights—some of which had racist overtones. However, he said that racism was not a problem for him at school. Although prone to chauvinism, Tariq’s masculinity was understated and assured. He wore earrings and commented that ‘the only real difference’ in the way teachers treated boys and girls was ‘that girls get away with earrings and styles and stuff. When asked about his attitude to homosexuality, Tariq’s cool momentarily unfroze—‘Gays? They should be shot first.’ However, his more considered attitude was slightly less intolerant—‘If they want to do it that’s their problem.’ When asked what well-known person he admired, Tariq had no instant answer, but when pressed he came up with Linford Christie. Tariq was one of a number of Asian boys who stated their admiration for an individual of African origin—something which did not happen in reverse. However, his real hero was his uncle, a man who had lived a wild youth, spent some time in prison, but had emerged to become manager of a motor-servicing business, earning £35,000 a year and owning a BMW. An explanation for Tariq’s physical self-confidence became clear towards the end of the interview: Interviewer: Tariq: Int: Tariq:

Do you do any sports, leisure things? Yes, I’m British kick-boxing champion. So you can handle yourself? You could say that.

However, although Tariq enjoyed his ‘kicks’, the life of his uncle seems a better guide to his longer-term agenda. Tariq wanted to make money.

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Conclusion: the construction of Asian masculinities The various images of Asian males discussed at the beginning of this chapter are not wholly unreflective of aspects of Asian masculinities. However, as extreme stereotypes they rarely provide much insight into how individuals act and think, or how members of peer groups collectively behave. In fact, such stereotypes can do great damage. They function not as a basis of sympathetic understanding of others but as a means of objectifying others. Stereotypes define the other as different, often as ‘essentially’ different and—crucially—usually as inferior or threatening, or in some other way as unacceptable. Stereotypes such as ‘Asian males are weak’ or ‘Asian males are chauvinistic’ are not only racist (or ethnically prejudiced) in themselves, they tend to be part of wider patterns of racist thought and behaviour. The step from prejudice of this kind to active discrimination and, in some instances, violence is easily and frequently taken. Virtually all surveys into racist acts, including racial violence, report that Asians are more likely to be the victims of this kind of behaviour than African—Caribbeans. In general, young Asian men seem resourceful in using their own cultures and their experience of the dominant culture to build viable masculine identities. Given the racism and the provocation and discrimination that Asian boys routinely experience, it is perhaps a tribute to their traditions of restraint that self-defence and self-help, rather than revenge and resentment, seem to be their preferred patterns of response. Conclusion This chapter has explored some aspects of the interplay of school, ethnicity and the peer group in the formation of the masculinities of boys in year eleven in four London schools. Large as this frame of reference is, it has also been necessary to refer constantly to the role of other factors in forming the identities of the boys, including, of course, class and, to a lesser extent, locality. There is a significant difference between how the boys behaved under the authority of the school, particularly in the classroom, and their behaviour in the space and time between school and home. The break between the formal sphere of school and the informal but still normatively-structured sphere of play and peer group is not total, but it is substantial in the life of the boys. In school the boys learnt the values and behaviours associated with anti-sexism and anti-racism. Outside school, some of the boys sustained these values to varying degrees while others did not. There is a sense in which, outside of school, free from the constraint of teachers, the boys were able to express their ‘real’ values. Some of the boys were ethnically and racially tolerant both in and out of school, whereas others were ethnocentric and intolerant. Most boys tended to revert to more ethnically based peer groups and friendships outside school and ethnic/racial awareness in a non-politically correct sense was part of their everyday life. However, it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the possible positive effects of equal opportunities education and socialisation. The concept of equality—gender

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and ‘racial’—was implicitly present in our conversations, even with some of the more racist boys. Somehow the message had impressed itself that people should be treated as equal in their humanity and that racism was therefore wrong. Even the more overtly racist among our boys tended to be uncomfortable in their racism. It is perhaps on the basis of such apparently modest successes that the difference rests between achieving a liberal society or something much worse. Although social class-based anti-school subcultures were clearly not a main focus of our research, it is of some interest that these did not appear to have strongly developed in the schools in our survey. The boys referred to individual or small groups of troublemakers, but suggested nothing on the scale observed by Hargreaves in the 1960s and Willis in the 1970s. If this is the case, it is probably because the boys formed social groups partly if not primarily along ethnic lines, thus weakening potentially class-based sub-cultures. It is significant that the one apparently anti-school sub-culture that did come to our attention was the ethnically-based, self-styled ‘Underachieves’. It is also possible that social class-based anti-school sub-cultures are, in any case, generally less strong than previously. This would reflect the numerical and cultural decline of the working class and perhaps the highly controversial policy of excluding ‘troublesome’ pupils adopted in many schools. While a variety of masculine orientations occurred among the boys, the extent to which many young men still desire to dominate—either in reality or symbolically—was notable. There was a minority who viewed partner relationships democratically, and a minority of ‘male chauvinist pigs’. However, more common than ‘new man’ or ‘mcp’ was ‘mixed up man’—who had learned something from the gender equality agenda but still retained significantly patriarchal and sexist attitudes and patterns of behaviour. The situation in relation to ‘race’ was similarly mixed. Often, tendencies to tolerance and intolerance were present in the same person. The main explanations for this inconsistency and confusion probably do not lie within the education system itself. In respect of both patriarchy and class, schools alone cannot change society—at least not very much, especially in the short term. In this matter, teachers’ sense of helplessness against the influence upon children of the home, media and peer group is more realistic than that of more optimistic social engineers who would use the education system as a mechanism for fundamental change. The various models of masculinity learnt by the boys in our survey are generated mainly in the economic and occupational structure and reinforced in a culture that itself is increasingly driven by commercial considerations. To challenge these forces effectively would require much more centralised control of the education system even than has developed under the Thatcher/Blair governments, and probably more than is compatible with liberal values. Education can and does play a part in the cause of gender equality, but the latter will only be achieved if change occurs on a much wider front. The real axis on which patriarchy turns is the gendered division of labour. It is developments in families and relationships and in paid work that are at the heart of the re-shaping of the gender order currently underway. The

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growing confidence of girls and the uncertainties of many boys are both reflected in and largely caused by changes in these areas. The next two chapters present and analyse evidence of tension and fragmentation at the core of patriarchy, with clear signs that a different gender order is being constructed by younger people, particularly young women.

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Marriage, families and relationships Images and expectations

Sometimes feminism and women’s equality is a load of rubbish but mostly it’s just important for women. It’s their choice really, what they do with their lives. Men have got a little bit to do with it but not much. (Chris)

If there is a crisis or crises in masculinities, then patriarchy, too, must be under stress, and very likely severe stress. Particular forms of masculinity are part of the pattern of everyday patriarchy. Once men begin to lose belief in their masculinity, then, it is a sure sign that patriarchy itself is losing credibility. The faltering of the dominant discourse of masculinity, hegemonic masculinity, and of the system of patriarchy are complementary. What we are witnessing is perhaps the decline of one of the longest running fables of all—in Lyotard’s (1990) terms that of an over-arching meta-narrative—one carved out in Eden, the superiority of men over women. Some of the forms and expressions of masculinity discussed in the previous chapter have a distinctly defensive and insecure character. Others seem overreactive in their ‘macho-ness’. Perhaps ‘mixed-up man’ is now the most common ‘type’ of all. When a system of oppression, in this case patriarchy, begins to be undermined, its beneficiaries, in this case men and boys, are likely to show some confusion. Equally, those disadvantaged by oppression, women and girls in the case of patriarchy, are almost certain to grow in confidence, assertion and achievement as cracks in the system open up new opportunities for them. Ironically, it is as things get better that demands for greater liberty and equality tend to increase. Like black people in the United States after the Second World War, women since the 1960s and 1970s have had their appetites whetted by the taste of equality and freedom and want more. The signs are that they are getting it and that men and boys are having to suffer a re-adjustment. For some, this is proving painful and confusing. It is right that patriarchy should be theorised as a structure of oppression, but it is also a pattern of relations and relationships. Looked at as a pattern of relationships, it becomes particularly obvious that the gender order is in a dynamic state of change. This is what emerges through the voices of the boys and girls in this and the next chapter. As the balance of cultural ‘capital’ and institutional power begins to shift somewhat from men/boys to women/girls, it is increasingly 89

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clear that we are no longer in a system of ‘pure’ patriarchy at all. As many feminists and ex-feminists have observed, gender relations are more complex now. As more women and girls assert their autonomy and sense of equality, more men and boys suffer the pain of loss—a loss of power and a loss of ‘getting their own way’ and of ‘being spoiled’. However, the extent of change should not be overstated. To reach a period of ‘post-patriarchy’, the gender order would have to be characterised by broad equity between men and women, and we are some way from that yet. As far as the core institution of patriarchal power and oppression is concerned—the (patriarchal) family—many women and girls are clearly voting with their feet. Many either do not want to get married or, having done so, find they do not like it. The statistics on the decreasing popularity of (first) marriage and the extremely high rate of divorce are all too familiar. However, some more recent projections on emerging patterns of living and relationships are startling. In 1999, the Economic Research and Action Council published a study entitled ‘Britain Towards 2010: the Changing Business Environment’. It forecast that a staggering 40 per cent of households would be occupied by people living alone, that there would be still fewer married couples, and continued high divorce rates. The signs are that women are generally coping better than men with this trend to aloneness. In order to explore more thoroughly the often different and contrasting attitudes of boys and girls to marriage, family and relationships, we have drawn more substantially in this chapter on data from a previous study of 14–15year-old girls at four Eating schools carried out by one of the authors (Sharpe, 1994: Just Like a Girl), and three of these schools were included in the boys survey. This research took place in 1991 to update an earlier study in 1972 of girls’ attitudes and expectations about education, work and marriage, and for simplification is often referred to in this and the next chapter as ‘the girls study’. Sex/gender difference is, of course, not the only factor affecting attitudes to marriage, family and relationships. Class and ethnicity also require consideration here, but our research clearly shows that gender differences in relation to marriage, family and relationships transcend differences of class and ethnicity to a considerable extent. The erosion of the patriarchal family and conflicting gender expectations Recent social change, including the impact of feminism, has, then, radically altered the lives of girls and women and raised their expectations both inside and outside the home. Boys growing up at the end of the twentieth century might be expected to have adjusted their perceptions and expectations of girls and women accordingly, but such development, where it has occurred, has been rather uneven. Many of the expectations of boys and men seem to have remained relatively intact, despite changes in social and economic circumstances. Many questions have been raised about the traditional ideas of

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marriage and family life, and have been changed by many in practice, and unsurprisingly the instigators have been girls and women. But if the ideas of boys and men have not moved in the same direction, they could be more than a little out of step with the girls and women they assume may be their future partners. Young men, and more especially working-class young men, seem to be in something of a ‘time warp’ in this respect (Sharpe, 1995; Lees, 1999). For many years, we seem to have been hearing about or experiencing the apparent ‘crisis’ in, and ‘break-up’ of the family in Britain and the West. Over the last thirty years in England and Wales the number of marriages has fallen dramatically—between 1971 and 1996 the rate of first marriage more than halved—while the divorce rate more than doubled.1 Two in five marriages now end in divorce and at least one in five families is headed by a lone parent, usually a lone mother. The changes in the structure and the permanence of family life have affected women relatively more than men, and the attitudes of many girls reflect this trend. While they have not lost their desire for or sense of romance, they have become cynical about the meaning and commitment associated with marriage. The girls study, referred to above, revealed many changes. One striking difference was that, although girls showed continuing concern with relationships and future families, they had lowered their expectations and respect for marriage. They placed more emphasis on the importance of work and independence in women’s lives, a concern that had significantly increased over the intervening period since the first study in the early 1970s. Girls in the 1990s appeared well acquainted with the high level of marriage breakdown, and the hardship consequently faced by single mothers. In terms of their future family life, they strongly endorsed principles of equality and expected a shared relationship with a future husband or partner. In this sense, the girls were up to date with the changes going on in society, and were contributing to them at the same time. Less so the boys. Our research highlights the changing and sometimes contradictory attitudes about marriage and the family, gender roles and identity that have been taking place over recent decades. Again, it was clear that girls have changed a lot more than boys. Evidence of this male ‘cultural lag’ has been acknowledged for some time now. Changes in traditional attitudes, rituals, behaviour and family organisation in favour of more egalitarian lifestyles and beliefs appear in many ways to benefit girls and women more than boys and men.2 As a consequence, boys and men seem less interested and slow to recognise or accept such changes. While the general implication has been that women gain by achieving ‘equality’ in many areas of life, and through the breaking down of traditional patriarchal attitudes and behaviour, the complementary assumption, obviously made more by men than women, is that men lose in some way. To the extent that marriage and the family are patriarchal structures, boys’ simple endorsement of the decline in these structures might be as unlikely as turkeys voting for Christmas. The actual situation is, as usual, rather more complex than this, and both sexes can be seen to gain and lose in various respects.

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Underlying the reluctance of many men and boys to grasp what is happening to gender relations may be the harsh implication of their own ‘redundancy’. The ‘redundant male’ is the product not just of increased job rationalisation and the apparent demise of ‘a job for life’, but of women’s increasing control over their fertility and economic independence. Women have shown an increasing ability to exist without men, from actually conceiving children (e.g. through IVF treatment) and caring for them, to independently achieving a reasonable economic and social status. In the broader context, within the concept of today’s ‘risk society’ (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992; Wyn and Dwyer, 1999) very little seems secure and certain, a situation brought about through radical changes to the traditional ‘linear’ sequences that we used to assume applied to many aspects of life. There is no longer stability of family, education, work, industry and the state, and perhaps it is girls and women who are implicitly recognising and adapting to this in their day-to-day lives better than boys and men. This chapter looks at some of the boys’ attitudes and ideas about more personal aspects of their futures, such as girlfriends, marriage and divorce, having children and organising their future homes and families. One clear difference between boys and girls often noticed from much earlier on in their lives is girls’ absorbing interest in relationships compared with boys’ relative lack of interest (Lees, 1993; Sharpe, 1994). Girls are more concerned with things like who is friends with whom, who is dating whom, and how different people or families ‘fit’ together. Girls’ greater interest in and viewing of television ‘soaps’ reinforces this.3 At the age when they can answer questions in studies such as this, most girls have had a lot more practice in thinking and talking about their present and future relationships. This was reflected in the relative ease which those in the girls study could discuss their ideas and expectations in this area compared to the boys. The boys, meanwhile, were more interested in sex than relationships, at least the idea and representation of it if not the actual practice, and their conversations relating to girls were more involved with sexual performance and conquests than with love and relationships (see pages 161–2, and also Holland et al., 1998). These differently gendered attitudes seem to be more a recipe for tension and cross-purpose than a basis for successful relationships. Relationships, marriage and divorce Girlfriends: to pay or not to pay As a prelude to looking at attitudes about marriage, we asked the boys whether they had girlfriends, and if so, whether she was at school or at work. Girls’ concepts of relationships extend to more long-term thought about marriage or living with a partner, and having children at some time in the future, albeit in a rather hazy way. In contrast, boys’ mindset remains, in many cases, rooted in what has been appropriate for ‘patriarchal’ society this century. Contributing to this is boys’

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physical and psychological maturity, which tend to lag behind those of girls at this age, and relationship issues are not usually salient concerns. In keeping with this, fewer of these 15–16-year-old boys (two in five) said they had a girlfriend compared to the half of the 14–15-year-old girls in the girls study who said they had a boyfriend. Two-thirds of the African-Caribbean boys said they had a girlfriend, compared with a third of the white and Asian boys. The relatively high proportion of Asian boys with girlfriends in the context of the stricter expectations of their culture reflects the ways that many Asian boys are now engaging with ‘Western’ attitudes and practices and with the diverse influences of global youth culture. They have always had much more social freedom than their sisters, but they have not generally been encouraged by their families or the wider community to have girlfriends. Of all the boys who had a girlfriend, most said that these young women were still at school, often attending the same school as them. Relatively more African-Caribbean boys had girlfriends who were in paid work, which implies that these young women may have been older than themselves. In a patriarchal society, it is customary for the man to have more earning power than the woman, and to pay for her expenses. Today, women have more earning potential than ever before, and the idea of sharing has been taken on in various domestic and personal relationships, yet the boys still tended to express the old values and practices. When asked about sharing expenses in a relationship with a girlfriend, the tendency was for boys to say that they paid, and that they preferred to pay. This preference was apparent even in those cases where girlfriends were in paid work while the boys were still in school. Some said that they felt ‘awkward’, or that it was not right, if they could not or did not pay. This flies in the face of their endorsement of general statements about equality for women and men in other areas, and how girls should be able to do what they wanted. Yet at this age it seemed that the traditional need to be a ‘gentleman’ (as one boy put it) in financial terms made many feel bad if they did not pay for their girlfriend. Although some certainly did share expenses, and saw that as the right thing to do, there seemed to be a strong hangover of traditional attitudes where money was concerned. Some boys may also have felt that paying left them ‘in control’—and perhaps with ‘something owed’ should they seek ‘sexual favours’ later. Another explanation for this may have been in the boys’ and girls’ appreciation of the greater earning power of men, although this is less marked among younger people. At the time of our research in the mid-1990s, the average pay of women was 75 per cent of men’s, having risen from 63 per cent in 1980 (the year in which the Equal Pay Act was introduced). In 1998–99, according to the Office of National Statistics, this figure rose to an all-time high of 80.9 per cent, which supports our view that the material basis of gender inequality is gradually eroding, although it clearly still has some way to go. To be able—and to be seen to be able—to pay for a girlfriend was important and symbolised a power and status relationship that boys were keen to hang on to. It is a rehearsal for the male ‘breadwinner’ role, which in many households is now a redundant one, and, as well as reflecting some relationship

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between money and power in this respect, is another aspect of the male ‘cultural lag’ in recognising women’s (theoretical) financial equality. Many boys felt reasonably comfortable about splitting costs, but far less so about their girlfriend paying for them, as the following quotes demonstrate: It’s nice to pay for a girlfriend, but if you haven’t got much money then the girl could pay sometimes. (Dick: white) Usually just share it. Equal. Sometimes I pay for her, sometimes she pays for me. Depends who’s got the money! About the same. I do [feel that I should pay because I’m a boy]. But she works as well, so she’s got more coming in. I don’t work. I do feel badly not paying. (Steven: white) No. I won’t let her pay. She’s always saying—let me pay—but no. (Jake: white) Depends who’s getting more money. If she’s getting more money than I am, then there’s nothing wrong with her paying her share, I’ll pay for mine. If I have a lot of money, I’ll pay for both of us. If she’s earning more than me, she could pay for me, but I like to pay for myself, I don’t like people paying for me. (Gary: African-Caribbean) While young men did not much enjoy the reality of their girlfriends paying for them on a date, they did, however, go along much more with the idea of being asked out. There was general agreement (81 per cent) for an attitude statement that suggested that ‘With women’s equality, girls should be asking boys out as much as the other way around’, and more especially with the African-Caribbean boys. (About half of both the white boys and the African-Caribbean boys strongly agreed with this.) Only a few boys disagreed, and some, especially the Asian boys, were unsure. From a female perspective, many girls are somewhat fearful of asking boys out, because they think they may be seen as being too forward, or to be looking for a sexual relationship (Lees, 1986, 1993; Holland et al., 1998). Although when asked their opinion on whether ‘A girl who asks a boy out is asking for a sexual relationship’ nearly two-thirds of all the boys disagreed, girls’ fears could still be fuelled by the one in five boys who did agree with this. This latter group included slightly more Asian boys, which fits traditional culture and could reflect the equation of virtue with passivity and that of assertiveness on the part of women with being ‘loose’. Many girls still claim, with good reason, that if they take the initiative with a boy by asking him out, whether or not they are interested in a sexual relationship, they risk their reputation and will possibly be labelled as ‘easy’ or a slag. Therefore, although there is more awareness of equality issues in relationships between boys and girls, men and

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women, this is still strongly affected by a hangover of traditional assumptions and images of male dominance and female submission. Both sexes seem not fully to have worked out what gender equality means in relation to these ‘rituals’ of young relationships. Marriage I think that before you get married you should understand that you will be with your partner for the rest of your life. (Paul)

In 1998, the governing Labour Party produced a Green Paper (‘Supporting Families’) in which it outlined issues it wished to address within its family policy. One of the aims was to strengthen the institution of marriage to reduce the risk of family breakdown. There was a suggestion that making marriage harder to get into, and harder to get out of, would lower the divorce rate. The context for this were the marriage and divorce statistics which showed, for instance, that in 1996 there were 1.4 per cent fewer marriages than in 1995, and this was part of a trend. As we have observed, although marriage still appears to be quite popular in the United Kingdom according to the figures, this is partly to do with the high rate of remarriage. In the case of young women, Sharpe’s research (1994) showed clearly how marriage had lost much of its attraction for girls between the 1970s and the 1990s. In 1972, 82 per cent of the 14–15-year-old white girls in Sharpe’s first study wished to marry, compared to only 45 per cent of those researched in 1991. The views of young people to these issues are further illustrated in the extra survey of 15–16-year-old boys and girls carried out in one of the Ealing schools.4 Both sexes were similarly positive about the prospect of having children, but showed marked differences in their attitudes and expectations regarding marriage and divorce. The majority of boys from all ethnic groups expressed their wish to marry (85 per cent overall), although slightly fewer of the white boys (70 per cent) wanted to marry, compared with the Asian, African-Caribbean and African boys. There was some discrepancy in marriage expectations between boys and girls, and especially between white boys and girls. Only about two in five of the white girls wanted to marry, compared to nearly double that proportion of the white boys.5 In fact, nearly half the white girls said ‘No’ to marriage, together with some of the Asian girls. The Asian boys were also more enthusiastic about marriage than the Asian girls. The African-Caribbean and African girls and boys shared relatively similar expectations, which were comparatively pro-marriage. There are clear differences in history and culture around family and marriage expectations in these different ethnic groups. African-Caribbean families, for example, have traditionally been characterised by a female-led household in which women are both breadwinners and childcarers. (This was also reflected in the relatively high percentage of single mothers represented in this group in our research.)

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In Asian culture, marriage, very often in the form of arranged marriage, has had a particularly central role, especially for young women. But for these young people there was an important difference between the boys and girls, in that the former tended to endorse marriage as part of confirming and continuing the traditional (patriarchal) family while many girls did not. Harry, a white boy, is an example. He was born when his parents were very young, they all got on well as a family, and his parents wanted him to have the educational opportunities they had not. Harry endorsed marriage in the light of their relationship: I think actual marriage in like a church, I don’t think the actual ceremony is particularly important, but I think marriage is a good thing. I think the stability it provides in the home is quite a good thing. I see it through my parents, they’ve got a pretty good marriage, I think. So I think that’s good especially for kids at home. You see stability in your parents, and it rubs off and you get secure children. So I do think it is a good thing, yes. (Harry) Overall, boys seemed to have much more faith in marriage and in the stability of the family. Coupledom: marriage or living together? It is now commonplace for men and women to live together before their marriage, or without ever getting married.6 According to Giddens (1999), the couple, married or unmarried, is at the core of the family. Marriage as an economic contract has been replaced by the idea of romantic love as the basis for marriage. With the decline of the family as an economic unit, and the rise of coupledom or uncoupledom, many now no longer consider it necessary or desirable to seal a relationship by marrying. Girls are far more in line with this way of thinking than boys, and this was illustrated in our research by the boys’ assumptions, enthusiasm and commitment to the idea of marriage, and in how they saw their future ‘coupledom’. For example, almost all the girls in the smaller group of boys and girls within our study questioned specifically about marriage agreed that: ‘Marriage is just a piece of paper, so people may as well live together instead’, compared to less than half as many boys. Commensurate with the results of the girls study, this attitude was particularly endorsed by the white girls, only about one in ten of whom agreed that: ‘Marriage is an important way of committing yourself to another person’, compared to more than eight in ten of the boys. Proportionally more of the African, African-Caribbean and Asian girls were more committed to the institution of marriage. In the case of the Asian girls, this can be understood in terms of traditional cultural attitudes that ultimately ‘won out’ against ‘permissive’, modern ones. The attitudes of the African-Caribbean girls are more difficult to explain, particularly as they are more likely to come from

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single parent families. African-Caribbean girls are also noted for their ability to ‘cope’ (Phoenix, 1987). It may be that personal or observed experience of single parent families gives them a realistic awareness of the difficulties of single parenthood. Perhaps marriage still appeals as a practical (and in some cases religious) ideal. Asked what future arrangements regarding marriage or living together they might prefer, the majority of both boys and girls considered that they would like to live with and eventually marry their partner. For example, four-fifths of the white boys compared to only half the white girls said they would live with a partner, and eventually marry them. Tom was one of these: For myself I think marriage is pretty important and the father and mother have to be there for the child. I’d live with them and then I’d feel as you got older that marriage is the official statement of your love like, so I’d get married eventually. (Tom) For another white boy, Paul, eventually getting married was more about money than commitment: I wouldn’t get married straight away. I’d live with her for a few years, to see if it’s the right person. But then decide to get married. When you’re nice and comfortable with money. If you’ve not got enough money there’s no point in getting married really. (Paul) The remaining white girls said they would live with, but not marry, their partner, a choice made by relatively few of the white boys. There were also some class differences among the white boys in their attitudes towards marriage. For middle-class boys like Luke, who was hoping to go to university, issues like marriage were for the distant future: I’m just concentrating on finishing my education at the moment, giving myself the best possible chance to get a good job. I suppose I was brought up to be very open-minded with my parents, they consider themselves to be partners, they live together and take care of the family together like any married couple would do. They still argue, like a married couple. I’m not sure [if I’ll do the same]. I’m not thinking that far ahead. (Luke) Middle-class and working-class young people still have different trajectories into further education and work, with more of the middle class taking higher education, and this may contribute to different ways that they might experience and respond to a ‘crisis of masculinity’. For instance, it has been found (Banks et al., 1992) that young men going into further education have more egalitarian

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attitudes than those going straight into work, and this may lessen any potential conflict in expectations between them and the young women with whom they form relationships. Past research has suggested that, for some time, marriage among the middle class has tended to be more symmetrical (i.e. more democratic and involving more role sharing) than among the working class (see Young and Willmott, 1973). There were other ethnic group differences on marriage versus cohabitation. African-Caribbean and African boys and girls expressed relatively similar views to one another, in that most thought that they would eventually marry after they had lived together with a partner first. Asian young people were the most traditional, and it was not surprising to find that a greater proportion (about half) of both Asian boys and girls than from the other ethnic groups said they would marry without living together first. But significantly, half the Asian boys and over a third of the Asian girls said they would live together first and eventually marry. At one time it would have been expected that all (or almost all) Asian young men and women would not have anticipated cohabiting with a partner. This professed intention, considering the cultural pressures and expectations on them to marry without having any sexual contact or living together beforehand, at least challenges if not ultimately contravenes their parents’ wishes and would invoke disapproval from the community. Although their future reality may show a change of mind or they may not be allowed to make such a choice, this exemplifies how the influence of the dominant culture appears to be stronger than ethnic/religious culture. The example of their own parents and other people’s parents clearly has an effect on young peoples’ views on marriage. Girls’ lives are more concerned with all manner of relationships, both their own and others’, from which they may develop an acute awareness of the ways that marriages and relationships in general can easily break up. This has no doubt informed their relative cynicism about marriage. Lyn, a young woman participating in the girls study, observed: I’m not getting married, not after my mum and dad—no way! I’d quite like to live with someone when I’m older but I don’t know if I’ll get married to them. I don’t see the point in marriage, it’s just a piece of paper, isn’t it? I suppose it’s nice to have a commitment, depends on the type of people. I’ve seen it too much with my mum and dad, all the bad things. I suppose it’s got good things as well…If you could just live with someone and have a relationship that was really steady, it could just be like you were married. The thing is now it’s so complicated, my mum and dad are separated with the divorce and half the money for the house and this and that. It’s too much confusion, too much hassle. (Lyn) This was also reflected in the finding that most boys (nine out of ten) living with both natural parents were positive about wanting to marry, while

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proportionally less of those living in lone parent and step-parent families did so. About one in four of boys in lone parent families or with step parents expressed their rejection of marriage. Perhaps it is not surprising that boys are more committed to the idea of marriage, as marriage appears to be more beneficial to men. In Connell’s terms, marriage still delivers a significant ‘patriarchal dividend’ (1995). Men gain in structural terms from the relative power, resources and elements of service that are contained within the marriage contract. In a quality-of-life research project carried out in the 1970s it was found that married men expressed more satisfaction with life than unmarried men, and were also physically and mentally healthier, whereas the reverse was true for women. Other research on men’s health has shown that the presence of a female partner appears to have positive effects on men’s health, while unmarried/unpartnered women seem to be healthier than married/partnered women. Men tend to benefit by the health monitoring, advice and care given by partners, while women benefit more from their social support networks than from their male partners (Shumaker and Hill, 1991). If men are experiencing a ‘time’ and ‘cultural lag’ in their recognition of social and domestic changes, and difficulties in handling the consequent blurring of identities and roles, it is perhaps no wonder that boys optimistically assume they will marry and have a family in the fullness of time, while girls wonder whether it’s worth the trouble! The economic factors underlying and affecting this situation should not be overlooked. Carol Pateman (1988) has pointed out that the marriage contract has been like a type of labour contract, and was more acceptable when the wage labourer and the domestic labourer (the housewife) remained in separate spheres. The gendered division of labour reflected a patriarchal order. Once women move out of this ordering, to join the labour force, this will upset the balance of the ‘gender contract’, and they will not be satisfied with subordination and inequality in the home. Women have been increasingly demanding of equality, inside and outside the home, for many years, and many young women growing up in the 1990s tended (somewhat mistakenly) to see the battle for equality as all but won. It is easy to see how this can also translate into scepticism towards marriage, which now appears less attractive, especially since living together with a partner has become a socially acceptable alternative. This latter arrangement accommodates both the concept of romantic love and the bearing of children, to which young women are still strongly committed. With increasing unemployment, working-class men in particular are not the ‘necessary’ economic investment for working-class women that they once were. Arranged marriage Unsurprisingly, the ethnic group that differed most from the others in its attitudes to marriage was Asian. While coupledom and living together are becoming increasingly common, the arrangement of marriage still continues

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as an important part of Asian and other cultures. In the research for Just Like a Girl (Sharpe, 1994), it was clear that between the 1970s and the 1990s there had been some change in the feelings and attitudes of Asian girls to arranged marriage. Whereas in the 1970s many Asian girls felt very constrained by this and expressed resentful and rebellious attitudes towards those parents arranging their marriage, by the 1990s these had softened, and many girls said that they would not mind such a marriage as their parents would allow them to meet a number of ‘suitable’ men, and they would be given the power of veto if they did not like them. Others thought their parents would not expect them to have an arranged marriage at all. What is happening is not a simple absorption of the minority culture by the majority one, nor is it a separate survival of the minority culture; rather, the more complex development of plural and often hybrid cultural lifestyles. For many of the boys from Asian backgrounds in this research, the prospect of arranged marriage did not loom as a particular obstacle in their lives. Many said that they did not think their parents expected them to have one, and often added that they would in any case probably marry an Asian woman within the required faith (e.g. Muslim, Hindu, etc.), so there would be no problem. Some had been, or were at the time, going out with girls of a different ethnic background, but these were not to be their intended marriage partners. Although a significant number had declared they might live together before marriage, when questioned more closely on this the reality seemed less likely. Wakar said he could choose his own partner, but it was up to his parents to agree or disagree with his choice, and ‘you have to marry a Sikh in our religion, you can’t marry any other’. He thought his parents would not allow him to live with someone before marriage, even if he wanted to. Tariq also said his parents would want him to marry a Sikh woman, but it would not be arranged, and he even thought he would cohabit with her first. He expressed having more freedom, but had gained it through resistance: ‘The way I’ve got all my freedom is through rebellion, going against everything my parents say.’ (See page 85 for more on Tariq’s engagement with his ‘masculinity’.) Abdul, a Hindu from India, was also a mixture of convention and rebellion: Abdul:

Interviewer: Abdul:

[Marriage] is a good thing, because it’s commitment, you have to settle down sooner or later and marriage is good for settling down. I think I won’t get married until I’ve got myself established with education and started earning good money, then I’ll get married. Or look for someone to get married to. Would you live with them, or would that be seen as not good within your community? I don’t really care. If I wanted to, then I would. I wouldn’t listen to my community. It’s what I think that counts, not what they think. I think they’d understand sooner or later. I’d just do it. I don’t care about the community any more.

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His parents do not mind him having girlfriends outside his culture, but not a wife: Abdul:

They prefer her to be Indian. But they think I’ve got a good choice, so they’re not really worried. They prefer her to be Hindu. Well, they prefer me to marry a Hindu girl, but a girlfriend they know won’t be a very long-term relationship, so they don’t mind for a girlfriend. But for a wife they want an Indian girl. I think that’s OK. I agree with that as well.

Desai, also a Hindu, has been brought up by his mother in a one parent family since his father died. He considered that there would be nothing wrong in his cohabiting with a partner for a year or two before marrying, although marriage was not on his agenda for a good while yet. His mother was not so committed to arranged marriages, and she had said it was his choice. He himself said he was against arranged marriage if it was in any way forced. Kali, who is from Bangladesh and a Muslim, thought that people should live together before marriage ‘to get to know the person’. But for him this was unlikely: ‘I don’t think I would. I wouldn’t be allowed to.’ Asian cultures are still interacting with the majority British culture. While each is changed in the process, it is not always easy to predict how. Thus, few perhaps expected that a small but significant number of white British women would have converted to Islam. While, in many ways, Asian communities have protected and defended themselves against adopting many of the more ‘liberal’ attitudes and behaviour of British culture, there has also been a gradual absorption of change in individual families. This includes some changes in family structure, and, for example, a number of the Asian boys in this research (and Asian girls in the girls study) lived with divorced parents. There is still substantial respect among young Asians for their traditional culture, and the various roles, customs and behaviour that this implies. But for many girls the increased opportunities for Asian women in jobs and careers, together with clear evidence of Asian girls’ ability to study and achieve in school, have changed their future landscapes, and at least postponed, if not removed, the inevitability of an arranged marriage. Asian girls are growing up with changed expectations from their own lives, and from their future husbands, compared with those held by their own mothers. Asian boys growing up here may not have such traditional expectations about marriage or the role of their wife as those held in the past, but they were still somewhat out of step with the more egalitarian expectations of many Asian girls. Divorce The divorce rate has remained high, and there was a large increase in the divorce rate of under-25s between 1971 and 1998 (Social Trends, 2000). The divorce rate appears to be levelling out somewhat now, but the UK divorce rate is one of the highest in the European Union. Although it is a speculative

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exercise to be asking teenage boys and girls whether they think that it is likely that they themselves will be divorced or separated in the future, we did so, and their answers give some indication of their perspectives on this. Although a predictably large proportion (about half) said that they did not know, for those who did express an opinion, girls were far more cynical than boys, complementing their equally sceptical attitudes to marriage. Twice as many girls as boys thought this was ‘likely’. The boys were much more optimistic, and over 40 per cent thought divorce or separation to be ‘unlikely’ outcomes for them, consistent with their more positive views towards marriage. Like views on marriage, anticipation of divorce or separation was differentiated more by gender than ethnicity. White girls were considerably more likely than white boys to anticipate the possibility of divorce or separation. African-Caribbean and African girls were equally pessimistic, despite their comparative endorsement of marriage compared to the white girls, and none of them thought divorce or separation was ‘unlikely’. Even in the Asian group, where the culture strongly disapproves of divorce, a few girls and boys (about 15 per cent) thought this was ‘likely’ to happen to them. More of the Asian boys tended to see this as ‘unlikely’, while the majority of Asian girls were unsure. If we look at the boys’ and girls’ own parental situation overall, we find that one in five of them came from families where their parents had divorced or separated, and nearly half of these thought that it was likely that they, too, would end up in this situation (three times as many as those whose parents were still together). These were mainly white and African-Caribbean or African young people, while almost all parents of the Asian boys were still married. In terms of marriage expectations, the boys’ and girls’ own family situations may have contributed to their views. Only half of those with divorced or separated parents said they wanted to marry, compared with over three-quarters of those with married parents; and more of the former said they would live with a partner but not marry them. Their responses to related attitude statements may also reflect their family situations. For instance, there was support from those with separated parents for statements relating to children being able to grow up equally well in a one parent family as in a two parent family, and strong disagreement from them that parents should stay together for the sake of the children. A third of those with separated parents agreed that ‘You can’t expect people to stay with the same partner for life’, which was slightly more than those with both natural parents. Nearly twice as many of the girls believed this as boys (40 and 25 per cent respectively). Some of the boys felt strongly enough about divorce to write comments on their questionnaires. Their views were often very anti-divorce, and several emphasised commitment: If a commitment is made then it should be kept unless it really is a bad situation. People should stay together for as long as possible and not just give up.

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Many boys felt that parents should stay together for the sake of their children, unlike the girls, almost all of whom disagreed with this sentiment. Boys expressed more concern with the effects of divorce on children: Couples that divorce should not have children because it can be damaging for them. Parents shouldn’t just leave and forget about their nippers. The girls tended to be less oriented towards keeping the family together than the boys, and more aware about how difficult this may be. This might be because they know that, although it’s not easy, many women have shown themselves very capable of bringing up a family on their own. Again, this was a significant gender difference in attitude and sentiment. There were some supporting comments about divorce from the girls, but none from the boys. At this stage in their lives at least, the boys tended optimistically, and perhaps naively, to assume that their lives will proceed towards a state of ‘happy families’. Several girls went back a step further and queried: ‘Why get married if you are going to get divorced?’ It is pertinent that the majority of divorces (about 70 per cent) are applied for by women, and, if women become even more economically independent, this may get even higher. (Currently the highest increase in people applying for divorce is coming from women in their forties or fifties, whose families are probably now grown up.) If marriage as an institution is still seen to be more advantageous to men than to women, women may be right in accepting that it is ‘coupledom’ rather then marriage they are seeking, and, if this does not work, they will opt to get ‘uncoupled’. Family responsibilities and housework Domestic lives Although family life became more fragmented in the last half of the twentieth century, this has only marginally affected young people’s desire to have children. It is true that the average size of the family has decreased in the West due, inter alia, to more efficient contraception, women’s movement into work, and their desire for an identity outside the domestic sphere. But young people still wish and expect to have children at some point in their lives. Over 90 per cent of the boys in our survey did, as did over 80 per cent of the girls in Sharpe’s research (1994), despite the girls’ relative cynicism about marriage and family life. There was little difference between the ethnic groups on this. More women than previously are choosing not to have children these days, but this remains a positive expectation in most people’s lives. Very few girls or boys wished to have their children before they were 21, and most saw 26–30 as the best age to do this. Sharpe noted in both her studies (carried out in 1972 and 1991) that the girls anticipated having jobs or careers as well as

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children, and many took for granted that their young children would be easily and happily looked after in a nursery or with a childminder. Real life is not quite so simple, but certainly this is what most still desire. But how does this fit with boys’ expectations, in so far as they have formed any, about how they might organise domestic responsibilities in this changing social epoch? Sharing responsibilities Although future childcare is not something that 15–16-year-old boys may have given much thought to, we asked the boys how they might organise future family life if they had children under five. Their most popular choice (two out of five), which fits well with many of the girls’ expectations, was for their partner to take a part time or full time job while the child(ren) went to a childminder or a nursery. This was more especially endorsed by the Asian boys. Of those who would prefer their wife or partner to stay at home and look after the children, relatively more were white and Asian boys than AfricanCaribbean and African boys. Although a minority choice, more of the black boys endorsed a situation in which both partners would work for part of the week while the childcare and housework would be shared equally. This is perhaps in keeping with Mirza (1992), who described African-Caribbean relationships as being relatively egalitarian in relation to domestic work. Staying at home while their partner went to work was not a very popular option, and very few boys considered this. Some had other suggestions, though, which at least implied that they might be more involved with sharing the childcare. The following comments came from two of the white boys: Being a comic artist I would work at home so that we could both work full-time and I could keep an eye on the kids. I would also have the children. Go to nursery for periods of time to give my wife and myself time to be together. Several, but mainly Asian, boys also mentioned the possibility of their parents looking after their children while they worked: I would secure myself financially with my spouse, then have children and use my parents as childminders. I would want to see as much of my children as possible. I would prefer to continue with my career and would like my spouse to do the same. My parents would look after them and my wife and myself will earn big money. This is one traditional form of childcare organisation which has become less accessible as more grandparents (particularly grandmothers), from desire or

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necessity, are still doing paid work themselves, or they feel they have had enough of childcare. There are perhaps an increasing number of early-retired men who could, in theory, be available for childcare responsibilities, but we can only speculate at their reactions to this proposal. The boys were further asked whether, if their wife or partner was able to earn more money than them, they would be prepared to do most of the childcare and housework. About two-thirds thought that they would, but often with reservations—as expressed, for example, by one white boy: It depends on our jobs, as, if one were more important, the mother would be needed more at home. I would be willing for it to be me, but I don’t like the idea of it. There is still, as we noted in Chapter 2, a patriarchal tone about the responses of some of the boys, who approve or propose to ‘let’ their partner go to work. The majority of those who rejected this option gave traditional sexist responses as their reasons, such as: Because the women should always stay at home with the kids. (white) It’s a woman’s job. (African-Caribbean) Because I wouldn’t be able to look after the children as well as she could. (African) Because it’s shameful. Call me old fashioned but I believe in traditional values. (Asian) Because I wouldn’t like to spoil my career. (Asian) Because a man is supposed to show he can support his family. (Arab) Others said they would not do it because it would be boring or unsatisfying, or they simply did not like doing housework. A minority, mainly of white boys, used ‘equality’ to justify why they would not do more than their partners, saying that both partners should share the housework and childcare: ‘It should be shared no matter who earns what’; ‘Just because one of us gets a larger payroll the other should not be confined to the house’. Although obviously the historical and social context is different, one cannot resist the comment that this is not the kind of logic that has been applied to women traditionally staying at home because of men’s greater earning power!

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In contrast to the boys, the girls study had shown that most girls strongly endorsed equality or equity in sharing the responsibilities for housework and childcare. Fiona was one of these: I would expect him [husband/partner] to do half of it with me. I think most men don’t mind now. They wouldn’t be really excited about doing it, but I think they’d do it if they had to now. We had this discussion in media studies, all the boys were saying ‘women’s place is in the home’, but they were joking. They were laughing, trying to get on our nerves. But you don’t know if they were really joking or not. (Fiona) The boys’ joking behaviour here may reflect an awkward awareness that these views are in conflict with the strongly anti-sexist ideology of the school. There may be some parallel here, too, with the racist ‘joking’ discussed in Chapter 1. Joking and teasing in this way may be done simply to annoy, but it is also a way of saying the unsayable in a less challengeable way (see also pages 31 and 187). Pattman et al. (1999) also note that joking and ‘cussing’ is a mode of expression that is part of boys’ developing ‘masculinity’. In the interview situation, boys expressed in more detail their sometimes contradictory views about domestic responsibilities. There were some representatives of the ‘new man’, but this paragon has probably had more exposure in the media than in family homes, despite much lip service given to principles of equality and sharing. Lawrence, however, was one young man who favoured sharing—a veritable ‘new man’: I think you should have an equal partnership and share children and all the chores around the house. Just because you’re a man doesn’t mean they have to go out and be the breadwinner. If the man feels better that he be at home he should discuss it with the wife, you can’t take it for granted that if he’s male then he’s going to want to do that and because she’s female she’s not going to mind doing it. (Lawrence) Few boys would disagree that husbands and wives who both worked full time should share the housework and childcare, but some were nevertheless rather unsure about it. Most of the boys thought men were capable of looking after a home and should be more involved with their children. But some presented a solid band of resistance, typified by Tony, a white boy living with his parents and four older brothers and sisters: I suppose you have to share it [at home], but I’d let the woman do most of the work because I can’t really see me doing ironing and hoovering up. I think it’s a woman’s job. I’d do like put shelves up, fix the car, fix the fridge, washing machine. It might have changed for some people but if you

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ask the boys around here they say, well let the woman do it. If you asked the girls, they’d probably say, I’d let them do half and let me do half, but I wouldn’t do that—I’d just say you do that and I’ll do something else. Women always used to stay at home and look after the kids and now it’s changed and a lot of men stay home and the women go to work which is a good change. But most men wouldn’t do it—I wouldn’t like to do it anyway, I’d be bored at home. (Tony) Bruce was another white boy cast in the mould of the ‘old man’ rather than the ‘new man’, who could not see himself in the sharing role in his future family home: If I’m at work, I can’t [look after the children]. But if she’s at work, and I’m unemployed, it’ll be me won’t it. Or get a nanny. I can’t do that stuff. Changing the nappies! Ugh. Makes me sick. Wiping their bums. I would do it, but not if I didn’t have to. Just get a professional, or a woman in to do it. Women are born with it, aren’t they? Most women can look after kids. But if a man tries, it don’t work. Women are naturally able to look after them. (Bruce) Bruce really wanted to help less in his family home. He would have liked to continue or restore the ‘old’ division of labour, but he was aware that things have changed and he may not be able to get away with this in the future: Women can’t do the decorating, gardening, mechanic work. I don’t know many women mechanics. Dirty work. They wouldn’t want to get their nails dirty. It’s changed in some ways. Nobody has that idea any more. All women are different now. All the girls I know, say ‘Shut up, you do it.’ Share the work. They’ll refuse to do it, won’t they. They say ‘Shut up, you do it.’ So I might as well compromise, share the work. (Bruce) Bruce illustrates the potential uncertainty and confusion about aspects of contemporary ‘masculinity’ through his growing awareness of girls’ changed expectations compared to those of boys and men. If, as Giddens (1999) suggests, contemporary marriage and partner relationships are becoming more democratic and are increasingly about mutual fulfilment, then men will find that the continuation of the partnership may be conditional on this being so. Fathering We asked the boys in our study to express the extent of their agreement with a range of attitudes relating to men as fathers, and their responsibility for their

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children. While endorsement of marriage may be a relatively contentious area between the sexes, this area of questioning produced a more even response, one more in keeping with the popular contemporary image of the more sensitive and caring (but still macho) man. Accordingly, the majority (approximately three-quarters) of boys from each ethnic group believed that: ‘Men should be more involved in bringing up their children.’ Similar proportions also agreed that: ‘Men are just as able to care for babies and young children as women are.’ While such popular attitudes supporting increased participation of fathers in their children’s lives are endorsed, as we have suggested this may not always extend to the ways that domestic responsibilities and childcare might actually be organised. This kind of contradiction occurs in other related attitudes (annual editions of the British Social Attitudes Survey regularly remark on this point). For example, a high proportion of all the boys were in agreement with the statement: ‘If both husband and wife have full time jobs, they should do equal amounts of housework at home.’ (The white boys, though, lagged behind in their agreement compared with the other ethnic groups.) Sharing the childcare aroused a less enthusiastic reaction, and despite boys’ positive views about being more involved in fatherly activities, about half the boys in each ethnic group endorsed the view that: ‘It’s still the main responsibility of a woman with a husband and children to care for them.’ So much for equality! This was an attitude statement with which the majority of girls in the girls study had heartily disagreed. Listening to the boys speak about ‘equality’ between men and women, it seems that they are thinking more about equal job opportunities and pay (the benefits of which they would also share in a partner relationship), than equality in other more personal and familial aspects of life. This is also the case to some extent for the girls, but many more of them were also anxious to promote equality at home and in personal relationships. These somewhat contradictory attitudes and expectations about sharing domestic life are a key source of gender inequality affecting men’s and women’s contemporary relationships. Attitudes, intentions and behaviour often fail to coincide, especially around personal issues. What is formally accepted is often informally disregarded or only perfunctorily observed. We find, as with attitudes and behaviour in relation to ‘race’ and to health, that the expression of more ‘politically correct’ or publicly approved attitudes is in conflict with what people do when faced with the nitty gritty realities of personal everyday life. Thus the media image of a sensitive, ‘macho’ man who can cuddle babies is attractive to both women and men, but they are not likely to be pictured cleaning their bottoms! The attitudes and behaviour encouraged by these representations, and by the schools, are not necessarily the same as what the boys believe, or what they will do if and when they are in such a situation. Women may be welcome to take their chances in the outside world of work, but in the minds of at least some boys ‘private patriarchy’ (Walby, 1990) within the home and family is still endorsed and quietly practised.

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Housework—a mixed picture It may be that the extent to which a boy ‘practises’ the skills of housework when he is growing up at home, and his willingness to share in these sorts of activities, helps to make sharing in these—and the equality that young women are beginning to demand—a matter of course in later domestic relationships. In this context, our study found that a significant proportion (78 per cent) of all the boys said that they did some kind of housework at home, and there were some interesting and significant ethnic differences. More of the African-Caribbean boys, and to a lesser extent the Asian boys, said that they did housework than the white boys. If this is a real indication of housework being carried out by the African-Caribbean boys, it also fits in with a general cultural pattern of egalitarianism documented in African-Caribbean families (Mirza, 1992). The division of labour in these families may reflect both a more traditional culture and one in which a relatively high level of unemployment and irregular employment allows more ‘domestic time’ for African-Caribbean men. This presents some interesting questions in relation to the generally ‘macho’ image of African-Caribbean boys and men. This macho image is also qualified by these boys’ greater endorsement of attitudes strongly supporting the ‘softer’ aspects of men and masculinity, which are described later in this chapter. It may be that African-Caribbean boys express their macho tendencies in relation to sexuality and in competition with other boys, but have a less rigidly gendered view of what is ‘man’s work’ than has typically developed through the industrialisation which occurred first in predominantly white societies. When asked what type of housework they did, the boys referred to a variety of tasks, but the most frequently cited ones were much as would be expected. Washing-up and wiping the dishes, or putting dishes in and out of the dishwasher, were the most common, closely followed by general cleaning and dusting, and hoovering (or ‘hovering’ as many boys wrote—their major housework activity was to ‘hover the house’!) Some said they just helped with anything that they were asked to do, or did some kind of outdoor or DIY chores such as decorating, gardening, dealing with pets, etc. A small proportion cleaned and tidied their own rooms. There was no correlation between the boys’ class origins and whether or not they said they did housework. There was some variation (though not significant) by family structure, in that more of those in single parent or reconstituted families (i.e. step families) said they did housework than boys living with both natural parents. (Over one in five boys in this study—about the national average—were living in single parent families, and a small number lived with step parents or with grandparents.) The pattern of housework was slightly different between single parent and two parent households. More boys with single mothers did the outdoor chores, such as cleaning windows, washing the car, decorating, gardening, taking rubbish out, etc., which could be seen more as ‘male’ domestic tasks. This fits in with young men in single mother households often taking on increased responsibility for the more physical or ‘masculine’ forms of house or garden activity that might traditionally be done by fathers.

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Although housework activities were not included directly in the questionnaire used in Sharpe’s research on girls, it was clear in the interviews that girls felt they were expected to (and did) do more housework than their brothers. This had also been found by other researchers in the 1980s and early 1990s (Kelly, 1982; Gaskell, 1991), but it would be interesting to see whether this inequality has changed as working mothers make more domestic demands upon all of their children, and from general shifts in ideology and expectations about domestic equality that may have filtered into family life. In our research, slightly more boys overall helped with housework if their mothers had a job compared with if they did not, but this difference was not a significant one. However, it is likely that this kind of experience is affecting family behaviour and boys’ expectations about their own roles. Several boys talked about their mothers working and their fathers both sharing the housework and cooking meals. One of these was Harry, a white boy whose father had increased his domestic activities since he had been out of work: My dad has to do a lot of the housework, and cooks. I suppose it’s not stereotypical, if you like, although the Nineties man—he fulfils some of it. He has to do that, because my mum wouldn’t want to do that when she comes back from work. There’s no problems about that. I do my bit. I’m not—I suppose I don’t do as much as I should…I don’t do very much, let’s put it that way! It’s my own laziness really. I suppose a lot of kids do more, I don’t know. But I don’t. When my mum wasn’t in work, she did more, and when she was [my dad] was doing it. They don’t make my sister do any of it while I don’t or anything like that, it’s not a female thing, there’s none of that. I’m not someone who believes a woman’s place is in the kitchen. I think if a situation requires a man to do the housework, then so be it, and if vice versa, then that too. (Harry) While Harry expresses ‘politically correct’ attitudes but does not do very much in the home, Bruce, another white boy, is required to do more in his home, but retains his sexist attitudes to housework. He lives with his mother, who works as a book-keeper, and his four brothers and sisters. His father had died the year before. In this single parent family there was pressure for all the children to help with the housework, but this had not affected Bruce’s promotion of the traditional division of roles, and he reverted back to ‘laddishness’ at times: I do the housework. Everyone has to do it. Everyone gets turns. One hoovers, one washes up. Specially on weekends. Wash up and clean the house. All shared round. I’m always trying to get the girls to do it. It’s sexist, but I think they should do it. Boys should go out and enjoy themselves. A bit sexist. I shouldn’t be. They make most of the mess anyway, cooking and all that rubbish. They should clear it up…It’s changed in

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some ways. Most people, all parents work now and all the kids do the housework. It’s changing. It’s getting there. But I’d like it to stay as it was. Less work for men. (Bruce) We were able to compare the boys’ and girls’ responses on certain attitudes relating to domestic work and childcare in both the present research on boys and the 1991 study of girls. These indicated some gender and ethnic group differences, in that, for example, more white girls than boys (40 compared to 27 per cent) agreed that: ‘Having children is not as important for a woman as it used to be’, reflecting some awareness that not all women wish to have children these days, and that those who do may not want them to take over their lives totally. More of the African-Caribbean and Asian boys than the white boys agreed with this statement (over 40 per cent of each), which perhaps also reflects these kinds of changes being experienced by women coming from more traditional cultures, often characterised by relatively large families. Some attitudes, quite acceptable thirty years ago or more, look quite anachronistic today. One of these is: ‘A husband and family of her own is the most satisfying thing in a woman’s life.’ It was reasonable to ask it of girls in Sharpe’s original research, but twenty years later, by 1991, it already sounded quite out of date and provoked minimal agreement (Sharpe, 1976, 1994). This change reflects women’s embrace of other wider interests, roles and responsibilities in their lives, and their rejection of that assumption about their lives. This may also reflect a reversion to ‘self, that is, to ‘individualisation’ (Giddens, 1991) if the (marital) relationship does not work, and indicates that, for some girls, being in such a partnership may be worse than being on their own. When a corresponding statement was put to the boys: ‘A wife and family of his own is the most satisfying thing that a man can have’, a different picture emerged. The majority of boys from all ethnic groups were in agreement. (Of the minority of boys expressing disagreement, most were white.) Perhaps within men’s greater assumption of marriage and children, they still perceive a wife and family as the traditional area of personal intimacy and satisfaction, somewhere to return to in the context of a demanding working life outside the home. Although it is a cosy image, it sits rather awkwardly but idealistically amidst the present insecurities of work and home. It could also be that the importance of having a wife and family is accentuated for boys and men, as a secure and stable working life is no longer a likelihood. Another attitude that could also be thought of as very old-fashioned and Victorian is: ‘The father is the most important person in the home.’ Nevertheless, a quarter of each of the white and the African-Caribbean boys, together with nearly half the Asian boys, still thought this was true, demonstrating the continuing strength of attitudes representing traditional patriarchy. This contrasts with the strong disagreement that this statement provoked in almost everyone in the girls study. It may be that boys and girls are approaching these kinds of questions from different historical positions,

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but while women may be looking more to the future and the possibilities offered by their broadened landscapes and horizons, boys are clinging to the past and a more traditional position in which they are still the main beneficiaries. Family life in the future Most of us can think of ways that we would like to change our home and family lives, especially compared with those we grew up in. In many respects the structure and organisation of the family during the last century has been constantly changing, with subsequent generations carving slightly different patterns, and it appears that the values and assumptions of patriarchy may be becoming eroded and shaped into a more democratic framework (Giddens, 1999). The boys were questioned on whether they thought they would make their own future home and family similar to their present home and family, or whether they would prefer it to be different. Although half the boys said that they thought they would like to make their home and family the same as their own home and family is now, almost all the rest would change it in some way. Their responses to how they would like it to be different were divided between those concerned with aspects of parenting and those related to the structure or organisation of the home. Overall, half their responses were linked to parenting, and a third to structural or organisational aspects. Their most frequently expressed wish was to have a family in which the parents talk to their children, and in which there is openness and respect (almost a third of boys mentioned this). This fits in with Giddens’s (1999) idea of the emerging ‘pure relationship’ and the trend towards openness and ‘democratisation’ of the family. The house will reflect my personality. And my children will be asked to develop their personality. I would talk to them and advise them and not make important choices for them (i.e. A-level choices). There would be hardly any arguments. I would be good to my children. There would be no hierarchy and more of a democratic household. My home and family will cooperate with each other and have respect for me. It will be more open to my children to give suggestions and say what they think. It will be more modern and I will make an effort to understand my kids. The next two most cited changes were in the size of their home and its location; and the desire to create a good family atmosphere at home (each of these was

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desired by about one in six of the boys). Other responses referred to aspects of the organisation of family life; material circumstances; the freedoms they would allow their own children; and differences in the number or gender of children they would prefer to have in a family of their own. I won’t be an alcoholic like my dad so my family will get holidays, cars, and various other luxuries. And I won’t get my family blacklisted. I would make sure my children have a father and mother. Bigger, richer and more independent. Fewer boys living in families containing both natural parents said that they wanted their own future families to be different than did boys in lone parent families, step families, or those living with grandparents, once again implying the influence of family structure. The ‘ideal’ family continues to be one that is more ‘intact’, more like the ‘nuclear’ family image; i.e. it has not been disrupted by the family breaking up and/or reconstituting itself, even though such ‘breakup’ may lead to greater happiness rather than the reverse. Over half of each of the white, African-Caribbean and African boys wanted their future homes and families to be different from their present ones. Asian boys, on the other hand, tended to be more content with how things were, and almost two-thirds wished for their future home and family to be the same as their present one. Contributing to this is perhaps the relative cohesiveness of their family lives within a community that strongly reinforces traditional cultural values giving men more freedom and control over their lives than women. When girls had been asked the same question in the girls study, a similar proportion of them wanted their families to be different, but they were even more concerned than the boys with changing aspects of parenting over and above family organisation. For both sexes, desires for greater freedom, less strictness and greater understanding were more salient for them than issues of family organisation and the size and physical structure of their homes. It seems that emotional and relationship values have the edge over material ones. A problem which was not perhaps apparent to them was that the freedom and fulfilment many seek may be difficult to achieve whatever the family structure. Images and constructions of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ A sure sign that boys and men are in a state of some identity confusion is the variety of images of masculinity that appear and sometimes quickly disappear. Some of these, such as ‘new man’ and ‘macho man’, tend to conflict, although not unusually we found a single individual would lay claim to both images— although how this apparent conflict translated into lifestyle practicalities was

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seldom made clear. Some masculine images seem to be mainly the creation of the media or soon become remodelled by the media for easy consumption, but even so they often relate to real issues and tensions in the lives of contemporary men. ‘New man’ may have become something of a media joke, but he doubtless exists in thousands of homes in real and challenging situations. The opening sentence in the following quote from Harry—‘I’m not sure how I see Nineties man’—is not a bad one-line summary of the more general experience of men and boys. I’m not too sure how I see Nineties man. I think the days of inequality have gone out the window. I suppose you get the impression that Nineties man is supposed to be more sensitive, more caring. I don’t know, I’m not too sure. I like to think that Nineties man is a good move forward—I hope so. (Harry) Some boys simply resolved matters by staying with the familiar ‘macho’ image: Everybody’s been in a fight…If you’re a good fighter everyone respects you. If you’re like a wimp, no one respects you. Be macho to be respected …by boys. If there’s a big man you respect him, if there’s a little one you say ‘Shut up, get out of the way’ and hit him. (Bruce) There have been some changes in the portrayal of men and masculinity over the last few decades, including an added softening of image which has been absorbed and reflected in the media. Images of men in film, television and advertising roles depict sensitive types holding babies, or expressing emotions other than anger, or engaged in other so-called ‘unmacho’ activities. Nineties man is seen as being more tender and caring than his predecessors, and fatherhood is important (see Chapter 6, pages 193–6). There was overwhelming support from the boys in our survey (more than three-quarters) for a statement that: ‘It is as important for men to be sensitive and caring as it is to be strong and tough’, and many ‘agreed strongly’ with this. Accordingly, few agreed that: ‘Real men don’t cry.’ While there seemed to be identification with this softer image for men, this did not mean that the boys denied a belief in men’s natural aggression. A significant proportion (38 per cent) of boys agreed that: ‘Men are naturally aggressive and violent.’ There were some ethnic differences which also reflected the varying constellation and combination of masculinities described in Chapter 2. The Asian boys were divided quite equally on this issue; proportionally more white boys disagreed than agreed; while more of the AfricanCaribbean boys agreed than disagreed. For the African-Caribbean boys in particular, there seemed to be a stronger endorsement and juxtaposing of men as being both soft/caring and violent/aggressive. However, the belief of the majority of African-Caribbean boys that men are ‘naturally’ more violent and aggressive than women fits in with their general macho assumptions.

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In other research, young people have acknowledged that their contemporaries—especially young men—who are aggressive and fight, often become leaders within their group of friends, but the ‘respect’ this generates is not highly regarded by others outside the group.7 These attitudes to some extent contradict many young men’s coexisting expectations that they need to prove themselves to one another as macho by success in fighting, sexual exploits or some physical sport. We were told that boys at school who are quiet, absorbed in study, and uninterested in physical pursuits are at risk of being called ‘poofs’. The images implied by acceptable masculinity generally involve a rejection of anything too ‘other’ or ‘feminine’. Studies such as Holland et al. (1998) have described how many young men feel the need to create an image of assertive masculinity often involving sexual performance and achievement, especially when they are with their male peers. Aware that young women are often attracted to softer, more sensitive men who may be sexy but not necessarily sexually driven, young men today clearly face contradictory pressures as they try to achieve what they see as acceptable masculinity. Which would you rather be, a boy or a girl? Constructions of the ‘other’ One area of the research on both the boys and the girls can be seen as a window onto the images that each has of the lives and characteristics of the other. This relates to a question included in both of Sharpe’s studies of girls in the 1970s and the 1990s (1976, 1994). The girls were asked whether, if they could have chosen for themselves, they would have preferred to have been born a boy or a girl. Their expressed preferences partly reflected the position of women at each time. In particular, the girls in the later survey saw boys as having more problems and being less advantaged than did those in the earlier study. By the 1990s, there were changes in the choices of both the white girls and the Asian girls in favour of being a girl, and a relative decrease in favour of being born a boy. Whereas 25 per cent of the white girls in 1972 would have preferred to be a boy, twenty years later this had dropped to 16 per cent. This movement to endorse being a girl matched the movement towards women’s equality, and a strong sense of girls’ increasing levels of self-confidence and desire for independence. For the Asian girls in each of the two studies, this preference (to be a boy) decreased over time from 80 to 56 per cent. Whereas girls from Asian communities had previously appeared very resentful about their lack of freedom and their impending arranged marriages, twenty years later this often seemed to have been tempered through an option of choosing their husband from a selection of candidates suggested by their parents (and having a power of veto). In some cases they were also being allowed more freedom to meet friends and go out. In the intervening two decades there had clearly been change and movement in the situation, status and attitude towards girls (and women), a change that made being a girl a more attractive prospect. The African-Caribbean girls showed little change in the distribution of their

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choice; i.e. they were equally divided in their preference at both points in time. What many of the girls endorsed about being female was their ability to have children, which they saw as a lack in men’s lives. Although some did not like having periods, and did not relish the pain of childbirth, many thought it was worth it for the sake of being a mother. Girls also saw other advantages in being a girl, such as being able to do things that both boys and girls do, being able to wear boys’ clothes, and generally be themselves, and not having to worry so much about being judged and criticised by their peers. They were aware that boys get policed by their male peers into an endorsement of ‘macho’ stances and a negation of the feminine, and have to take on a particular persona to protect themselves. Several of the girls, such as Kim and Catherine, made these observations: Boys always have to put up a front. If something happens they can’t cry because that’s too sissy for them. They’ve got to be strong and macho. I couldn’t do that. But it’s a difficult question—we have our downs and they have their downs. If you asked boys the same question they’d want to be a boy. If any of them said ‘girl’, it would only be one or two out of the whole school. They enjoy being macho, they’re big and strong, and bringing in the money. (Kim) Many thought that girls have the best of both worlds: People expect boys to be tough. And if you didn’t play football or be tough with the boys, you would look like a poof or something. With a girl it doesn’t matter what you do. It doesn’t make you more feminine or more masculine, so you can do anything you want. (Catherine) However, overall the girls did consider that boys tend to have an easier life than they do, with more opportunities. As Kim predicted, when the boys were asked the same question, all but three said they preferred to be boys. The majority’s reasons for this were divided between expressing the disadvantages of being a girl (a third), the advantages of being a boy (another third), and about one in four who simply said that they had no experience of being a girl and just liked being the way they were. Those who emphasised the disadvantages of being a girl quoted sexual harassment and rape; getting pregnant and giving birth; having periods; and being subject to name-calling (reputation), as features of girls’ lives to be avoided. The other main disadvantage they saw for girls was in terms of sex discrimination in jobs and other opportunities, and sexism in general. Boys, on the other hand, had it better. They, like the girls, thought boys have an easier life: more fun; more freedom (this was especially emphasised by the

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Asian boys); parents worry less about boys than girls; boys are better at sports; they are the dominant sex (being the ‘man of the house’, etc.); and have better opportunities. A few gave the fact that they fancy girls, and not boys, as reason enough. Fatherhood did not appear on their list of advantages. Unlike the girls, for whom motherhood was a positive reason for being female, no boy thought to mention the attractions of being a father. The white and African-Caribbean boys tended to emphasise the disadvantages of being a girl (followed by the advantages of being a boy), whereas the Asian boys (as well as boys in other minority groups such as Turkish and Greek Cypriot, Arab, Afghan and Serbian), stressed the advantages of boys, which may reflect the way these cultures still tend to endorse the dominance of men over women in many areas of life. Overall, the preference for a boy’s life is predicated both on what boys perceive as the disadvantages of the ‘female role’ and ‘femininity’, and on the perceived advantages of a boy’s or man’s ‘role’ in life. What an increasing number of girls perceive and many boys struggle to accept is the extent to which young women are rejecting traditional and rigidly defined ‘gender roles’ and are constructing potentially more autonomous and fulfilling lives in which men are pencilled in for a smaller part than in the past, and, even then, only subject to their good behaviour! Yet, as the following quotes show, boys from various ethnic backgrounds saw girls in fairly unreconstructed terms, and either exaggerated the consequences of biological difference or saw male dominance as ‘natural’: We are still in the situation where girls would be passed off as second best in many cases. Then probably I would choose a boy as it’s the one I can identify with the most. (white) Because you don’t have periods every month or get pregnant and you can urinate up trees. (white) I know it’s sexist but bosses are usually men and how many secretaries are men. (white) Even with a disability I get less prejudice than a female. (white) Boys are the dominating sex. (African-Caribbean) Because men have more of a say in Britain’s economy. We don’t have to go through the abuse they do or have babies. (African-Caribbean)

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Maybe because I would be too young to consider whether the choice is a good one. And because girls who have fun would be called ‘slags’ and ‘bitches’ and I don’t think I could handle that prejudgement. (Asian) This is a very hard question to answer since I don’t know what it would be like to be a girl. Everything a girl has to do though, puts me off the idea. Such things like having a baby, all the pain, emotions and their problems. (ethnicity unknown) Asking boys and girls what sex they would have preferred to be born is a very hypothetical question, yet only a few of the girls in the girls study had been unable to give a reason; or they said that they just liked things the way they were, or that they could not choose because they did not know what it was like to be the opposite sex. By contrast, a quarter of the boys made this type of response: for example: ‘I couldn’t say I wanted to be a girl unless I knew what it was like to be a girl.’ Fewer boys than girls appeared to have the interest or imagination to express a reason for their preference. Perhaps girls were just more interested in this kind of projection; they certainly seemed more open to considering and exploring a ‘change of sex’ as a possible situation. This is not a criticism of boys, but an observation that girls’ greater willingness to explore imaginary situations perhaps reflects the greater extent to which they are able, or have been encouraged, to develop ‘emotional literacy’. It was no surprise that very few boys—three out of 262—said that they would prefer to have been born as a girl. Interestingly, two of the three boys who stated a preference for being a girl did so partly because they saw girls as more emotionally open than boys: Boys are meant to have a ‘macho’ image and be hard. If you don’t fit into this people think you’re stupid. Girls also get on better and can talk openly about their feelings or problems without being insulted or teased. (white) Girls are more mature and can handle situations better than boys sometimes. Also girls can show their emotions easier than boys can. (Cypriot) Because if I was a girl you would be able to get more respect from people if you could get a good job with a lot of power. (ethnicity unknown) In the girls studies, the fact that girls express their emotions and talk about problems with their friends was often mentioned as an advantage of their sex. Although hardly any of the boys we interviewed admitted that there can be disadvantages to being male, Harry was one who was happy to voice his

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agreement with some of the points the girls were making earlier about the pressures boys feel about being seen to be ‘manly’: I’m not sure [what I’d change about being male]. Sometimes there are situations where you can’t show your emotions, sometimes it’s harder to let yourself go a bit. To say what you mean, to do what you want. So sometimes you’re forced into being a man, if you know what I mean, to hide things rather than letting them go, which I think is a bad thing, one disadvantage. (Harry) It is possible that the public context in which the boys answered the questionnaire may have slightly inhibited one or two in responding more honestly or thoughtfully to the question of what sex they would prefer to be, given the choice. Even if more boys had thought that they might prefer to have a girl’s life, it might have been risking ridicule to have been seen to make this preference in such a relatively public situation, as there was the possibility that classmates could look over and see that they had put a tick against ‘girl’. Inasmuch as femininity is constructed as the ‘other’, boys will endorse their masculinity in opposition to it. Under their protective shell, boys’ masculinities can feel very fragile, and especially threatened by fears about being seen as ‘soft’ or in any way feminine, despite their apparent endorsement of softer, sensitive images for men. The pressure of the peer group fuels this apparent paradox, and boys may find that the only ‘safe’ areas that they can express feelings, doubts and anxieties about, for instance, relationships, looks and health, sexuality, and work is with female friends or girlfriends, possibly their mothers, and perhaps even with an adult interviewer (Pattman et al., 1998). Perhaps boys want the best of both worlds; i.e., the advantages of being macho, plus those of being a softer and more caring ‘new’ man. Currently, though, this blend lacks conviction, not least to many young women. Homophobia: the unrecognised ‘other’ Connell (1995) has theorised homosexuality as ‘subordinate masculinity’, on the grounds that it is a form of masculinity that attracts widespread disapproval and even persecution. If the boys construct ‘femininity’ as the often despised but desirable ‘other’, ‘femininity’ in a boy or a man—which is how homosexuality is often stereotyped—is for many boys the unacceptable ‘enemy’ within masculine identity itself, the ‘other’ which dare not speak its name. Homophobia is a well documented feature of school life, and Epstein (1996, 1997) has described how boys who did not behave in an ‘appropriately’ macho way were often victims of this form of sexism, expressed in terms of their supposed similarities to girls. In their study of homophobia, Nayak and Kehily (1996, 1997) found this to be a prevalent part of male student life and an activity that many young men constantly performed. In our research, Tony

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observed how the loud, sports-playing personalities tended to be seen as the ‘popular’ group, while quieter, non-sporty, studious boys could be the targets of homophobia: [If somebody was gay in school] I think they’d just keep quiet about it. I don’t know what would happen if somebody called them it or not. I don’t know what they would do. You get the quieter ones that go round with their friends. There’s two sets of people in this school, there’s the ones that are quite popular, all hang round with each other, and then you get the others that you don’t really know because they don’t speak out, and they go round in a group just the same. But these others are more popular because they’re always shouting out or playing cricket and football and that, so you know. But they get called gay, the quieter ones that go round. And more of the intelligent ones as well. They get called it. (Tony) One boy (whose sex preference on the questionnaire was to be a boy) wrote: ‘I may appear to be deviant if I wished to be something I’m not.’ However, it is unlikely that a significantly different response would have been obtained by conducting a secret ballot on such a question. The overt and strong endorsement of heterosexuality within schools is bound to have had some effect on boys’ responses. Views against homosexuality were expressed by several boys, such as Naseen, a young Asian: I don’t approve of it. But that’s me. It’s probably the way I think. I can’t explain it. I don’t find it natural, really. There’s a reason for men and women to get together, and that’s to reproduce. And homosexuality doesn’t do that. There’s no reason for it. (Naseen) While a few young men may express more liberal views in private, they all agree that it would be foolish to seem sympathetic to homosexuality when they were among ‘the boys’, because of all the barracking they would get. Life would not be worth living. They thought that an openly gay young man would be given such a bad time that he would have to leave school. These negative reactions towards homosexuality were reinforced by boys’ responses to related attitude statements, whereby over half agreed that: ‘Whatever people say, it is not natural for a man to be a homosexual’, and most ‘agreed strongly’ with this view. General disagreement with the suggestion that: ‘These days it should be acceptable for a young man to be gay (homosexual)’ provided further endorsement, and nearly half of the boys ‘disagreed strongly’. All ethnic groups showed high levels of homophobia, especially the African and Asian boys. Although these schools strongly endorsed anti-sexist policies, the negative attitudes and treatment within school of anyone thought to be homosexual, or the use of homosexual labels as terms of abuse, were not actively addressed.

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One white boy, who came from a liberal-minded family background, sums up his own thoughts about it: I think homosexuality is less of a taboo because of TV and the media, not that it’s been accepted more but it’s been shown more. I know ‘Brookside’ have had something on lesbianism and stuff. I think it’s being forced to become less of a taboo, but I think people still are pretty discriminative and narrow-minded about it. I don’t think that, but I think we’ve come a long way in the last decade or whatever, people being able to talk about what people didn’t accept. Some of it is good, but I still don’t think that we are as open-minded as we could be…We still get a lot of kids that are antihomosexuality. There’s a lot of intolerance [in school] as well, even with friends that I know who say it’s disgusting, and—‘They should be shot’— I’ve heard that. And yet on the other hand they’re happy to say racism is disgusting and should be stamped out, yet they won’t appreciate it’s the same sort of subject, along the same lines. Some of it’s good, but a lot of it’s bad still. (Harry) As the above statements suggest, there has been some liberalisation of attitudes to homosexuality among boys, reflecting the growth of identity politics over recent decades. Such growth has enabled challenges to conventional identities in terms of gender, sexuality and ethnicity, and made it possible for people to explore and push out the boundaries of different identities, but it has also increased the instability and fragility of masculinities. A loosening of traditional masculinity means a threat to its power and privilege, and some boys may feel the need to define and assert their masculine identities even more strongly. Conclusion The apparent ‘crisis’ in marriage and the traditional family has contributed to the ‘crisis of masculinity’ charted in the previous chapter, and will require more adjustment from boys than from girls. As we have seen, the boys taking part in these research studies were much more enthusiastic about getting married than the girls, and made more positive assumptions about it. Although girls are generally keen to have a relationship, for many of them marriage is now not a must. This contrasts with past decades when marriage was seen as attractive and/or inevitable by young women (Sharpe, 1976, 1994; Lees, 1986; Griffin, 1985). Old cameos in which women’s financial security was shown as being dependent on finding a husband, and where women were portrayed as trying to lure men into marriage, no longer apply. Men can no longer make financial promises to their potential wife/partner. Nowadays, although there are still pay differentials in certain areas of work, women can earn incomes comparable to those of men, and in some localities they may

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have a better chance of getting jobs. At one time, men led a powerful cast in which they could enjoy playing the ‘free’ bachelor, while also looking forward to playing the patriarch within the sanctuary and psychological security of ‘marriage’ where they would be cared for at home by wives who would do the housework and childcare. Both of these roles have lost much of their validity in recent years. Now it is perhaps women who are being given the better parts. Thus, marriage has lost much of its financial logic and appeal to women, especially marriage to working-class men. Even though marriage may eventually benefit them financially through certain tax concessions and pensions, this is no longer a strong incentive nor a secure prospect. The contemporary generation of young people, especially young women, have learnt to be cautious about marriage and even about having children and forming a family. Children are growing up amid visible evidence of couple and family rearrangement, as a consequence of which they may have to choose between parents. Therefore many children’s associations with marriage today may be contradictory. While marriage is still held up as a norm, children and young people—especially girls—identify more with the mother’s situation, as they can see how hard life can be in a single parent family. They may have experienced at first hand the anger and unhappiness that may be involved, at least initially, although many young people are more resilient than they are given credit for and can appreciate the possible benefits as well as the stresses that we assume characterise family break-up. There are other reasons behind many people’s apparent ‘rejection’ of marriage. The commonplace acceptability of cohabitation makes it increasingly apparent that relationships that do not involve marriage can be as deep and strong as those with institutional marriage ties. They can be equally romantic, but without the legal trappings, and without (in some, although not all, cases) the messiness often characterising divorce proceedings. The waning of the importance and influence of religion (e.g. Christianity and Catholicism) has contributed to this. The expense of getting married should also not be overlooked. A formal marriage can be an extremely expensive occasion, even in a registry office, and even if it is paid for by the bride’s family; and couples can find plenty of more practical uses for such money, such as for a deposit on a flat or house. Apart from aspects like the sentimental attraction of a white wedding in church, many people, especially young people, see little point in getting married. While marriage has lost much of the status it used to have, divorce no longer has the stigma it had in the past. Instead of being cast out by the family, or being seen as the ‘black sheep’, people now tend just to shake their heads knowingly, or with resignation, and accept divorce and separation as part of contemporary family life. It perhaps reflects the ‘disposable’ society we live in, where we can throw most things away and get a new replacement, whether it be a car, TV, washing machine, or even spouse/partner. This is the less appealing side of what Giddens (1992) refers to as the free and democratic ‘pure relationship’— perhaps it is the selfish side of individualism.

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The apparent decrease in the popularity of marriage, and the ‘break up of the family’, are seen by many as a linear trend that needs to be halted, even by some kind of restraining legislation or financial (fiscal) incentives or deterrents. It is projected that an even smaller proportion of people will get married in, say, twenty years time. But few things are linear, and it is possible that we are part of a ‘marriage cycle’, and we have been witnessing a reaction against marriage that may to some extent be reversed in years to come. Post-war generations have reacted against the rigidity of pre-war social institutions and embraced a society that now believes as much or more in the individual and the power of the market than it does in old-fashioned notions like religion, marriage, and the family. Unlike these generations, young people today have been growing up with parents (and other adults) who do not put the sort of pressures on them to marry, or stay married, as did their predecessors. It is therefore possible that they or future generations may show some movement towards ‘commitment’ by reviving the ‘old-fashioned’ institution of marriage, albeit in a slightly different form, one influenced in different ways by, for example, economics, sentiment or religion. As in clothing, fashionable styles may come round again, but never exactly the same, and this may also apply to relationships and marriage which may return modified by changes in the myths and structure of interests supporting them. Making another contribution to men’s insecurities in various areas of life are the changing popular images of men and ‘masculinity’. While the concept of the ‘new man’ is still treated somewhat as a joke, and derided as nonmacho, it is clear that some men, and perhaps more middle-class men, have nevertheless adopted a more sharing approach to relationships and family life. But progress towards egalitarianism is very slow, and is complicated by the uneasy coexistence of ideas, beliefs and images of the ideal man being both strong and macho (and heterosexual), as well as sensitive and caring. For example, many men find it hard to ‘soften’, or to share what may have been ‘feminine’ tasks, as this in some sense implies relinquishing aspects of personality and behaviour that still validate ‘masculinity’. Whereas women may acceptably talk about their health, personal life, family concerns and so on, men who do so may be dismissed (or dismiss themselves) as ‘whingeing’ or ‘wimpish’. It would benefit men perhaps to improve their ‘emotional literacy’ and better recognise what they and others are feeling, and use it positively to evaluate and enhance their thinking. The juxtaposition of such opposing ideas and images of masculinity also contributes to the politically correct attitudes that boys may voice in formal settings, while their present or future behaviour may be quite different. Men face a variety of contradictions stemming from the continuing power and the increasing fragility of masculinity. The apparent mismatch revealed between the ideas and assumptions expressed by the boys and the girls in these studies seems to be mirrored in other parts of society, and among older people. It is generally boys and men who are more positive about marriage than girls and women, and within institutions such as government and the church, it also seems to be

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predominantly male representatives who are defending or supporting marriage as essential for a ‘proper’ family life. But it is undeniable that things have changed, and whereas girls and women have embraced and often promoted these changes, there is clearly a ‘cultural lag’ or time warp embedded in the attitudes of boys and men to marriage and other changes in social and family structures and relationships. Whichever way you look at it, one aspect of the ‘crisis in masculinity’ (or mascu linities) is that, as women have become more self confident and potentially more economically independent, what men represented or presented to women is no longer quite such an attractive prospect. Girls are currently achieving a high level of educational success, and indeed it seems they have for years outperformed boys up to age 16; it is just that, until relatively recently, they have been more preoccupied with marriage and motherhood. With girls’ rising expectations and aspirations in many areas of their lives, it is becoming increasingly important for young men to confront the contradictions in the way they construct and live out their various ‘masculinities’, and to resolve the growing discrepancies between their own ideas and expectations about relationships and family life, and those of the young women they assume will be their future wives.

4

Work Changing structures, changing opportunities

In addition to the patriarchal family, the other institutional area on which the gendered division of labour rests is paid work. These two ‘structures’, as Sylvia Walby (1990) refers to them, are, of course, closely related. Changes in one of them are often linked to and even dependent upon changes in the other. The lives of both men and women and their interrelationships are affected by these. For example, the gradual development of more egalitarian relationships within families has been made possible by the opening up of opportunities for women in paid work. One of the main reasons why women and girls have increasingly been able to achieve more equality and democracy in families and relationships is that they believe that ‘if it all goes wrong, at least I can get a job’. That was much less the case in the nineteenth century, when women were much more economically dependent on men and spent much longer in domestic work and childcare. Further, their wages from paid work were relatively much less than they are now; their access to many occupations was legally barred; and there was virtually no welfare state. Now there is an escape from the ‘gender trap’, even if for some the route proves more of an illusion than a reality. However, the story of women in relation to paid work is not one of consistent progress. It is highly arguable that patriarchal power and control has conceded less ground in the workplace than in personal and familial relationships. One reason for this is that women have a more immediate power to opt out of personal relationships—including even marriage—if they find them oppressive, whereas it is less easy to use the threat of quitting a decent job as a bargaining counter at work. Despite the increasing numbers of women in paid work, the higher echelons of management and business remain emphatically, if somewhat decreasingly, in the hands of men, and are still a powerhouse from which the culture of hegemonic masculinity is generated. Nevertheless, the restructuring of the economy and of the organisation of work seem to be favouring the development of gender equality.

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The restructuring of work and careers I want to go to college straight away. I’d make my kids go to college straight away. There’s not many jobs around. You need good qualifications to get good jobs. I hope that I’ll get that. (Franklin)

Work prospects for men and women of all ages changed significantly in the last decades of the twentieth century. With the decline of manufacturing industries, and the relative rise in service industries and the media, men have had to make a radical readjustment in their jobs and careers, and indeed in their aspirations to regular employment. Women have increasingly entered the labour force—although mainly in traditional areas of ‘female employment’. No longer is there any simple and clear-cut division of labour whereby men go out to work while women are either at home caring for the home and family or have access to only a limited number of heavily gendered, relatively low-status and low-paying jobs. Patterns have changed, and few assumptions about working futures can now be taken for granted. There have been many attempts to theorise and explain the developments in the occupational and class/gender structures of the post-war period, but these are often quickly outdated by the seemingly ever-faster flow of change. Ironically, it is one of the earlier explanations that still seems as convincing as most. The late Daniel Bell’s The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (1973) presciently highlighted the new information technology as the dynamic and disruptive factor in the restructuring of Western society (and also, as we can now see, global society). Bell pointed to five related social structural changes which ‘in the next thirty to forty years…will see the emergence of…postindustrial society’ (1973: Preface, page x). These were, and still are: 1 2 3 4 5

Economic sector: the change from a goods-producing to a service economy; Occupational distribution: the pre-eminence of the professional and the technical class; Axial principle (of post-industrial society): the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and policy for the society; Future orientation: the control of technology and technological achievement; Decision-making: the creation of a new ‘intellectual technology’.

Bell later preferred the term ‘information society’ to ‘post-industrial society’ and, as we move into a new millennium in which it is ‘chips with everything’, we can see why. Bell was better at spotting the consequences of information technology for the occupational structure than for the structure of the gender order. In fact, the two areas are intimately related. The impact of the information age on both

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the occupational/class system and on gender is very largely a single socioeconomic process, and ultimately a cultural one. In the shift from an industrial to a service character, the occupational/class system is being radically regendered. Among the factors that have caused this are the new technology, the use capitalists and managers have made of it, and the thrust of liberal feminism for equality of opportunity and treatment now embodied in a raft of legislation. What this chapter mainly focuses on are the different—and sometimes similar—ways boys and girls have responded to this rapidly changing scenario. The overall context is one in which the advantage has been slipping from males—although importantly more slowly at the very top of the occupational hierarchy than at lower levels—and opportunities and possibilities are being opened up to females. The responses have been varied, and in some cases complex, sometimes involving inconsistent and hybrid attitudes reflecting both the past and the fast-moving present. Chapter 2 described how the boys’ selfconceptions of their ‘masculinity’ shift, partly in response to the rapid technological, economic and cultural changes they experience: some responding defensively or in a reactionary way, others more progressively and some with uncertainty and confusion. The present chapter examines their responses to actual and anticipated changes in employment, and in relation to the attitudes and expectations of the girls in a previous study by one of the authors (Sharpe, 1994—sometimes referred to in this book as ‘the girls study’). The emphasis here is on gender in relational terms. The structure of work for the first half and well into the second half of the twentieth century was characterised by a gendered division of labour that was clear and highly non-egalitarian. That division of labour was largely responsible for producing a gendering of the class system which was discussed in terms of the gender identities—the ‘masculinities’—of men and boys in Chapter 2. The purpose now is not to rehearse the points made there, but to sketch out in more detail the changes in the opportunity structure for boys and girls in preparation for the discussion of their responses which takes up most of the rest of this chapter. We are acutely aware that the gender order is basically a pattern of relationships, one that—whatever the scale of structural change— requires to be understood at that level, which is the human level. The occupational and class systems in Britain during the first half of the twentieth century had an appearance of solidity and even permanence that sharply contrasts with the situation in ‘late modernity’. As many saw it, there was a working class, a middle class and an upper class. Similarly, allowing for significant differences for class, men and women generally ‘knew’ their different ‘places’ in this society. Working-class culture and institutions were collective and communal in a way that is fast becoming a distant memory. This was especially so of the occupational communities built up around factories, mines and docks. If anything, the leisure and working life of the working class was more sharply gendered than that of the middle class. Even the trade union movement was overwhelmingly male in membership and run by men. The decline and changes in union membership of the last quarter of a century illustrate both the decline

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of the industrial working class and of men within it. Union membership is now little more than about 50 per cent of what it was in the 1970s, although it rose slightly in 1998 for the first time for many years. Tellingly, however, it is among women that union recruitment has recently most rapidly increased. The majority of union members are now from white-collar occupations for whom union membership is not the indicator of a socialist inclination that it was for many industrial workers. Unions are still important and influential, and their stock may well revive, but they are not the bastion of working-class ‘masculine’ power they used to be. This point was driven home to us by our own findings in what were two traditionally working-class areas. For both authors, who grew up with the political activism of the Sixties and Seventies, it was quite shocking to find that when we were administering our questionnaires in school classrooms some of the boys were asking us what a trade union was. We suspected there may have been others who were too polite, embarrassed, or not interested enough to ask this question. The query related to a question asking if the boys thought they would join a trade union when they were working. In response, 60 per cent of these predominantly working-class boys said that they would join a union, most of the rest said no, and a few were not sure. There were no particular ethnic differences in this response. The precise responsibility for the restructuring of work—including the way it has been re-gendered—in the later part of the twentieth century is a matter of some debate. The post-Fordist thesis is that the new technology has made a more flexible and efficient organisation of production possible. Post-Fordist production involves a separation of the labour force into a ‘core’ of highly skilled employees and a ‘periphery’ of generally less skilled, part-time, temporary, contract or trainee employees. There is an element of both technological and economic determinism about this thesis in that it appears to imply that capital and management had no real alternative but to reorganise in this fashion if they wanted to ‘compete effectively’. Some versions of post-Fordism also emphasise the ‘new managerialism’—the deft and skilled way in which a new breed of managers (sometimes) manipulate the new technology and the workforce to maximum productive effect (see, for example, R Murray, 1989). Marxist and other radical critics of the post-Fordist thesis tend to accept that the work process has, to some extent, been reorganised in this way, but see it as the responsibility of capitalists/managers whose main motive is to make as much profit as possible by increasing technological and worker productivity. Further, as Anna Pollert (1988) argues, in many parts of the world a Fordist or neo-Fordist assembly line type of production persists. This is usually in areas where labour is cheap (and often female), such as mainland China. A main difference between these two versions of the reorganisation of work in contemporary global society is one of interpretation. The radical versions hold capital responsible and argue that, in principle, work can still be organised in a more democratic and egalitarian way. The post-Fordist versions, on the other hand, are inclined to ‘go with the flow’. However, nobody imagines that changing ‘the flow’ of global capitalism in these ways will be easy!

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Whichever version of the restructuring of work in contemporary capitalism is accepted, the gender implications are more or less the same and are highly significant. As a result of the restructuring of work in the last third of the twentieth century, women have entered the labour force in greater numbers than ever before. Thus, while between 1984 and 1997 the number of male fulltime employees decreased slightly, the number of female full-time employees increased by just over one million. This is a sizeable figure, and it is part of a longer-term trend. In the same period, the number of female part-time employees increased by about the same figure whereas the figure for men was less than three-quarters of a million. It is true that part of the motive for employing female workers is that their wages are relatively less and—because they are usually on less favourable contracts—they are easier to dismiss than male workers. It is also the case that in Britain the proportion of male to female full-time workers is still as high as 2:1 while for part-time workers the proportion of women is much higher than men at 4:1. Women are also more likely to be on temporary contracts. So, although paid employment has been crucial to the improvement in the material well-being and power of many women relative to men, the increase in female employment has generally not been on very favourable terms for them. Indeed, it is largely because women were seen as less organised and more easily exploitable that they were sometimes preferred as employees to men. Nevertheless, the pay and work situation of women relative to men has been steadily improving in the past quarter century. The minimum-wage legislation of 1998 is probably the main reason why in 1998–99 women’s wages as a percentage of men’s wages reached an all-time high (80.9 per cent). It is also the case that women have been getting a larger percentage of higher-status jobs, although progress at this level has been uneven and much more marked in the public than the private sector. In addition, women have tended to reach top positions in the greatest numbers in stereotypically ‘female’ areas of employment. However, stereotypical or not, a well-paying and influential job is precisely that. In 1998, 57 per cent of primary school heads in England and Wales were women. In 1992, 22 per cent of secondary headships were held by women and this had risen to 27 per cent by 1998. Even more indicative of the trend towards gender equality in this area is that current appointments are running in favour of women. Thus, in the primary school sector during the 1980s, just over a third of headships went to men, whereas between 1996 and 1998 the figure was less than 12 per cent (‘Times Educational Supplement’, 15.10.1999). A case could be made here against ‘reverse gender bias’. While there are few professional and even fewer business areas that can show quite such a marked closing of the gender gap as education, most show some trend in this direction. If the gender gap continues to be closed, it is bound to be the case that increasing numbers of men will feel—rightly or wrongly—that they have been the victims of gender bias if not outright discrimination. There is good reason for men in most occupations to feel less comfortable and secure than they used to. Pressure comes from several directions: increased

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competition from women, but also the various exercises in workforce cutting that hide behind such euphemisms as ‘downsizing’ or ‘re-structuring’ but are perhaps better described as replacing human physical or mental labour with technology. The attempts of the Thatcher and successive governments to encourage small-scale entrepreneurship led people into a notoriously risky if potentially rewarding area of work. Insecurity in work is an aspect of what has been termed the ‘risk society’ (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992; Beck et al., 1994). Such is the rate of change that ‘a job for life’ looks as though it will in future be the preserve of a very few. The less well qualified, the long-term unemployed, and older men and women seeking work, all face having to take whatever work they can get, often on a temporary or part-time basis. Nor are the middle classes spared insecurity. Apart from the ever-present spectre of being made redundant, the related emphases on performance-related pay and shorterterm contracts increase the possibility of employees being dismissed. While more rewards and credit are now given to individual occupational mobility and enterprise, the negative side of this may be seen in employers’ and society’s willingness to see the ‘less competitive and flexible’ as disposable or almost as waste—‘human resources’ that are not quite resourceful enough. Individuals often have to struggle hard to make an adequate living in this climate. It is significant that the increase in the number of people with two jobs between 1995 and 1999 was 1.3 million. Due in part to a stream of legislation passed under the Thatcher government which reduced the power of the unions, much of the energy that was once invested in collective and solidaristic activity has been diverted towards individual competition and achievement. The re-positioning of youth It is worth briefly recapping the changes in the class and gender structure characteristic of the society in which the boys and girls contributing to our research studies were fairly soon going to seek employment. It was—and is— a society in which the prospects of both upward and downward social mobility seem greater than ever—in that sense, a ‘risk society’. Many ‘ordinary people’ seemed to ‘make it’ at least into middle-class comfort and affluence, but the increase in street begging from the Thatcher period serves as a warning of the price of failure. This was also a period of conspicuous consumption in which style, impression and ‘surface’ seemed to count for much. If things are much different under Labour’s Prime Minister Blair, it has yet to become obvious. There are enough young people in the so-called ‘underclass’ for the term ‘youth underclass’ to have been used, and enough black youth in it for the term ‘young black underclass’ also to have been used (Chapter 2 contains a fuller discussion of this point). In gender terms, women had increased access to, and opportunity in, employment, but were particularly vulnerable to exploitation even though in some professional areas there was an outside chance of reaping a ‘gender dividend’ of their own. As has been described, boys reacted variously to these developments, but overall showed an awareness that the

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gap between ‘success and failure’ had widened. Minority ethnic youth was generally as keen to succeed as others. However, both young Asians and young African-Caribbeans knew that they might have to succeed or even simply survive through use of their own cultural resources against the grain of a still significantly prejudiced and discriminatory society. Young people have been as deeply affected as any by the coming of postindustrial society and the information age. There is no shortage of relevant literature in this area. Kenneth Roberts’s Youth Employment in Modern Britain (1995) provides a very useful overall outline of the changed structure of employment and opportunity for the age group as a whole, and it will be used here as a basis of discussion. Roberts refers to three types of education-to-work transitions which can be used for comparing the situation of youth in relation to employment in the industrial to the post-industrial periods. These types of transitions are: extended; short; and careerless. Each transition is defined in terms of the time elapsing between entering a career and reaching top earnings and the related power and status. In the first, extended careers, the point between entry and highest salary is the longest of the three types. Far more young people of both sexes, but especially girls, now pursue extended careers than was the case in the 1950s and 1960s. This is because of the expansion of professional and managerial work and, more recently, of jobs in ‘high tech’. In the latter area something of a reshaping of masculine aspiration and culture has occurred around proficiency in ‘high tech’, which both restates and may help to maintain masculine hegemony and advantage (see pages 17–18). Entry into extended careers has traditionally been via the academic route of A-levels and university, but the higher-status vocational routes such as those via business, design, media and information technology (IT) offer an alternative in some career areas. Again, there are signs that boys are beginning to dominate the latter areas (see pages 18 and 48). Another change from the earlier period is that even those who pursue extended careers can no longer expect to do so by means of ‘a job for life’, for instance in one firm or in the public sector. Work and skills are changing too quickly for that expectation to be realistic. Accordingly there is a tendency in some occupational areas for younger people to try to maximise their earnings very quickly, rather than gradually over the years. This is clearly the case in certain areas of finance, notably in the City of London where ‘burnout’ can occur before the age of forty. The ‘high risk, big rewards’ society is at its most intense in business and finance, and increasing numbers of business school graduates are finding work in Internet and venture capital firms rather than in large, established companies (The Times, 24.10.1999). ‘Short’ careers lead to earlier maximisation of earnings than extended ones, but not immediate maximisation. The traditional apprenticeships led to this type of career structure, which was considered to be the basis of a solid, working-class living. It is precisely this transition that has been severely cut back. During the first Thatcher recession in the early 1980s, the Manpower Services Commission was set up to replace as far as possible trade union-run apprenticeships by employer- and government-led training. This complemented

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the cut-back of the industrial and mining sectors of this period. A clear aim of these related policies was to reduce the power of organised labour. A large part of the purpose of the ‘training schemes’ was to achieve some control over those hundreds of thousands of young people unable to find work as a result of the high unemployment of the Thatcher years. It is during this period that ‘the youth underclass’ emerged on a serious scale, and it remains like a shadow lurking in the background for contemporary youth despite the efforts of the Blair government to produce policies to reduce and eventually to abolish it. Now only a minority of young people leave school at 16, and it is government policy that all 16-year-olds should go on to some kind of further education or training. Again, however, once they complete this, young people will not be entering a world in which they can fairly quickly achieve and expect to maintain their maximum salary. Such jobs do exist, but in today’s culture of short-term contracts and constant organisational change, few are allowed to sit comfortably in such positions. ‘Careerless’ transitions from school to work are characterised by immediate or very early maximisation of pay and status. Here we are talking about unskilled and semi-skilled work. In the industrial age there were many millions of manual jobs of this kind. These were the type of jobs ‘the lads’ would get if they could not make it into skilled work. Now, most unskilled or semi-skilled work is not in heavy industry but in areas of the service industries such as cleaning, catering, retail and security maintenance. Young people who do this kind of work often move in and out of employment and sometimes into the amorphous ‘underclass’. It was the latter prospect that had clearly concentrated the minds of many of the boys in our survey, some of whom, nevertheless, would likely find themselves in this situation. Overall, Roberts finds current education-to-work transitions to be longer, more fragmented (for instance, by alternate spells of work and education), often more expensive, and sometimes characterised by stress and insecurity. In such a context, the boys in this study, like the girls in Sharpe’s research (1994), were well aware that it is better to go on from school to a sixth form college or further education college, if not into some form of higher education, rather than leaving school to go directly into a job. The prospect of youth training did not have a lot of appeal; most saw this as a second-best training opportunity. This recognition and commitment to getting more education or qualifications was accepted by both middle-class and working-class boys, and is quite a different situation from that in the 1970s when working-class boys and girls left school with a good chance of a job or an apprenticeship. The changes in occupational opportunities described above are more or less apparent in the various studies of schooling referred to in the previous chapter. Many of the working-class girls contributing to the first edition of Just Like a Girl (Sharpe, 1976) were happy to leave school at 15 or 16 in the knowledge that there were job opportunities available for them. They did not always reject school, but it did not seem particularly relevant to their future lives. Writing about the same time, Paul Willis’s classic study of working-class

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boys (1977) describes their sense of the irrelevance of school and their near contempt for school and teachers. In contrast to the would-be upwardly mobile conformist ‘ear’oles’ (or ‘swots’) these ‘lads’ rejected school values in the confident belief that they would get the kind of job they wanted anyway. This kind of traditional industrial work, where jobs were generally ‘men’s work’ embodying ‘masculine characteristics’, was characterised by low upward mobility but a fairly high level of security. In any case, if they lost one job, they had little doubt that they could find another. It was part of the post-war ‘solidaristic’ working-class masculinity which, as described in Chapter 1, fuelled this assumption. Few boys in our study would show the contempt for education exhibited by those in Willis’s research. Phil Brown’s Schooling Ordinary Kids (1987) reports a less polarised situation among working-class pupils than the lads/lobes description presented by Willis. In Brown’s study there were far more pupils simply trying to get on with life. On the basis of his own research in a South Wales comprehensive school, Brown suggests three different modes among working-class kids of ‘being in school and becoming adult’. These are ‘getting in’ (rems—remedials), which involves a wish to get into working culture and work proper, in and out of school; ‘getting out’ (swots), which refers to those who aspire to a middle-class job and lifestyle; and ‘getting on’ (ordinary kids), which represents the approach of the majority of ‘ordinary working-class pupils’ who ‘neither simply accept or reject school but comply with it’, and seek ‘decent’ working-class jobs. Brown offered his typology in part as a corrective to Willis’s narrow focus on working-class boys’ opposition to school. He argued that the majority of working-class pupils (i.e. the ‘getting on’ group) ‘get on’ as best they can at school with the intention of making it as successful a transition from school to work as possible. Brown clearly regards his own analysis as better balanced than Willis’s, in the sense that it provides a more accurate presentation of the range of working-class pupils’ adaptation to school, and in that his account is more applicable both to the time he wrote and to when Willis wrote. Brown seems to want to reestablish the solid sensibleness and survival orientation of working-class culture. Even so, it is surprising that he does not more fully consider the historical dimension and discuss the possibility that his analysis differs from Willis’s partly because of factors relative to the periods when they each did their respective research. Specifically, the lads in Willis’s study were at school at a time in the early 1970s when virtually full employment still prevailed, whereas the pupils of Brown’s study faced an employment market in the early 1980s ravaged by recession and had to cope with the burgeoning complexities and failures of the new vocationalism and job training schemes. It is quite possible that, in the first half of the 1970s, it was easier and even more rational for more boys to be antischool. By the time Mac an Ghaill published The Making of Men in 1994, the socioeconomic change and fragmentation noted by Roberts had stimulated newer responses and articulations of masculinity among boys. The boys were also responding to a much more vocationalised and technological curriculum. He characterised two groups of boys by the terms ‘macho lads’ and ‘academic

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achievers’, groups which appear under one name or another quite frequently in the literature. The prototype ‘macho lads’ are the most memorably described by Willis, but their typical mode of behaviour is still quite widely adopted today by boys of working-class origin, even though the material conditions in which this type of masculinity flourished and had a rough relevance have largely disappeared. Many boys in our study showed residual signs of macho masculinity, and some a good deal more than that. The decline of traditional manual work is the main underlying cause of what Mac an Ghaill refers to as a crisis of workingclass masculinity, but which more precisely might be referred to as a crisis of macho working-class masculinity. In addition to the working-class ‘achievers’, Mac an Ghaill indicates another emerging type, the ‘new enterprisers’ who plan to make their way to career success via the higher-status vocational courses in ‘new’ work areas such as business, design, media and information technology. In colonising this newer area of the curriculum, these boys showed their determination to survive and prosper while simultaneously re-articulating their ‘masculinity’—two not unconnected processes. Although perhaps less obvious than in parts of the North of Great Britain, the de-industrialisation of East and West London has been substantial, and traditional jobs in manufacturing, dockwork, and even construction are scarce. Some boys in our survey had little precise idea of what careers they might pursue but, with few exceptions and regardless of social origin, most of them understood the basic realities of the job market. They recognised the lurking possibility of unemployment and, in this respect, did not share the sense of security and confidence of the previous generation. This was no less true of macho working-class lads who, although sometimes bored with or indifferent to school, were rarely contemptuous of formal learning in quite the comprehensive way that Willis’s lads had been. Like Harry, in our study, they know that it is no longer easy to get good jobs without some qualifications: I think there will be competition for jobs, even if you have a degree, or four A-levels. I think it will be hard no matter what qualifications you’ve got. A lot of my friends have said they can’t wait to finish school to get out in the big wide world, but people I know say they have to go and do A-levels, there’s no point otherwise. No real future. I suppose it’s less glamorous, less romantic leaving school these days than it was in an easier situation. (Harry) Young people from a variety of backgrounds are trying to achieve qualifications of different kinds in a period in which work is no longer guaranteed. Even in the ‘booming’ South-East, their real work prospects have failed to show a corresponding rate of expansion (although the expansion of the service sector has provided more opportunities for young women than for young men, partly because of the way certain types of work are stereotyped as ‘female’—for example, in offices, catering and the caring professions). In a fast-moving economy, many businesses and even public sector projects start out and then fold, or they expand

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and contract at a rate that can undermine the sense of economic stability and security of those individuals caught up in such events. In those career areas which have expanded, such as media-related work, successful entry may depend as much on who you know as on skills and qualifications. Class and ethnic background are factors that still exert a significant effect, and socio-economic variation continues to affect social mobility, generally favouring white people from middle- and upper-class backgrounds. There has been some gender levelling and women have made up ground in some occupational fields, even though wide pay differentials between men and women persist. The intersection of gender and ‘race’ has produced some interesting and unpredicted situations. For example, in some schools, Asian girls are shown to be more committed to and successful at educational achievements than Asian boys, and also better than many girls of other ethnicities. The hopes and fears for the future expressed by young people in a recent study of 11–16-year-olds showed the girls as being more involved with ideas about future relationships, families and other personal issues, while boys tended to be more concerned with jobs and money.1 The 15–16-year-old boys in our research were similarly expressing some concerns about their possible jobs or careers. A significant number assumed that they would go on to pursue a course at college for a couple of years, or at university for even longer, which put off any serious or clear thoughts about work for a good few years. For others, and especially those who expected to train in some kind of skill or trade, the ‘real’ world of work was getting closer, with the related concerns about future employment, or unemployment. It is working-class boys leaving school without qualifications who have become the main ‘failures’ of the system. Less than one in five of these boys expected to leave as early as 16 or 17, and most of these, like those in Roberts’s concept of ‘careerless transition’ (1995), were planning to take up some skilled or unskilled manual occupation. Overall, very few boys expected to leave school or college before the age of 18, whatever their work or career expectations. Although this chapter is mainly about the transition from education to work, it is useful to conclude this section with a brief look at youth transitions in a wider context. Recently the ‘journey’ from youth to adulthood has been described as a series of status transitions (Banks et al., 1992; Jones and Wallace, 1992). Bob Coles (1995) defines three main transitions: from school to work; from family of origin to family of destination (the domestic transition); and from living with to living apart from parents or carers (the residence transition). Coles examines the implications of what sequence of status transitions a young person moves through, and how each step can influence future steps and be vital for shaping their future lives to the extent of opening up or closing down future opportunities. In this context, the school-to-work transition is particularly important, and the decisions made (by the young person, their parents or carers, the education authorities, or a combination of these) about leaving school, gaining qualifications, continuing at college and so on, have far-reaching implications. They also affect other transitions in that, for instance,

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those who enter the labour market before the age of 20 are more likely to marry earlier than those who continue into higher education; and those who go into higher education may have the opportunity to move away from home and thus begin the residence transition. This broader glance at youth transitions confirms two important points. First, as most of the boys more or less realised, their educational qualifications to a large extent ‘set up’ the rest of their lives. The consequences of outright failure were more starkly visible to this than the previous generation, and this perhaps accounts for its notorious ‘realism’. Second, it is obvious that making the above transitions could be hard and problematic for any individual. As Roberts notes in relation to the education/work transition, all the transitions are longer and more fragmented than in the past. ‘Life’, as they say, ‘seemed simpler then’. For boys, these transitions seem that bit harder, more competitive and more open to failure than in the recent past. It is not wholly clear yet whether the Blair-Brown ‘New Deal’ will help or hinder them. All young people ‘in need’ of it are given a guided choice of education, work or training. Comfortable ‘failure’ is not an option. Jobs and careers: ‘real’ expectations and ideal aspirations Expectations I’ll take GCSEs, and then do a BTec course. It’s the same as A-levels these days. It’s practical instead of sitting behind a desk. I will be doing a course in engineering. I don’t like being behind a desk, I prefer to be out doing something, practical work. I sent off for a couple of them—you do an actual job…and college one day. I was interested in that because they did work and college: the one at the garage is two-and-a-half years, British Airways is three-and-a-half. Quite a long time. (Steven)

Boys were asked, both in the questionnaire and in interviews, what sort of job or work they expected to go into following their education in school or college. We were trying here to get some indication of their ‘real’ or more grounded job choices, as distinct from their job ideals (which were asked for in a subsequent question, and discussed later in this chapter). Their job or career expectations covered a wide range, from factory work, through various manual skills and types of engineering, to professional occupations like lawyer, journalist, stockbroker and marine biologist. The most popular choices expressed by these boys, from schools in Ealing and Hackney, were jobs from the traditional occupational structure in the skilled trades. These included being an electrician, engineer (at non-degree level), car mechanic and various skilled building trades, and they accounted for nearly one in five of their choices. Some of their choices also reflected the developments in occupational patterns and opportunities discussed above. A significant number of boys chose to pursue jobs and careers from the set of ‘new’ occupational opportunities

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that have arisen with the development of different, less secure patterns of work. For example, working in the media, computer technology and in business attracted similar proportions of boys of various backgrounds. They were fuelled by the wide range of vocational courses offered by colleges. These included courses related to various aspects of the media, performing arts, design, sport and leisure, computer and information technology, and business studies. About one in ten of the boys wanted to pursue careers in computer technology, and a similar proportion intended to work in a leisure- or sports-linked occupation. These expanding areas offer vocational training to young people, some of whom are not academically minded. Paul, for example, was a bit of a ‘lad’. He played around with the answers to his questionnaire, but was happy to be interviewed. He is white, his father works as a painter and decorator and he is the youngest of five children. He was hoping that the leisure industry would provide him with an appropriate job training opportunity: I’m going to Richmond College to do Sport and Leisure. I take that for one year, but then there’s another one for two years, and hopefully I’d like to be a PE teacher or work in a leisure centre. I’ll see how I do. My [GCSE] grades aren’t that good. I do a lot of sport. Football, tennis, hockey, basketball. My main sport is football. I play for the school football team. I like football…keeps me fit and healthy. [Interviewer: Is there any other reason for being a PE teacher?] It keeps you healthy, and I’m interested. Some subjects are boring. Being a PE teacher, you’re doing something every time, you help some kids, in the lunchtime, football after school, things like that. My parents said it’s totally up to me. My dad used to play football professionally for Oxford. He said ‘You can do sport and leisure if you want to’. It’s my career. (Paul) Reflecting the immense changes in occupational areas, it is interesting to note that there are now over 50,000 jobs in sports or sports-related industries, compared to only 12,000 in mining. Many students were obviously attracted by the related areas of information technology and communications, and a range of work involving computers. For Zac, for example, from an African-Caribbean family, it was the experience of playing computer games at home that prompted him to think about pursuing training in this area. I thought I would go into something to do with computers. I’m interested in the games, so I’d like to make something. I do a lot of games at home. I’m going to college, and work on computers at college. (Zac) The increasing place of the media in modern life was also apparent in the occupational expectations expressed by the boys. As described in Chapter 2,

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more young people are entering the media and helping to create their own images and styles, which the media in turn may appropriate and return to young people and the public in general. About one in seven boys expressed intentions to follow careers in journalism, music, and in more specific artistic pursuits such as cartoonist or comic-strip writer. Abdul is one example. He comes from an Indian family, his father is a mechanic, and his mother looks after his two younger brothers. He plans to take A-levels in communication studies, English language and literature and psychology, followed by a degree in media studies. He had already scripted, cast and directed a Christmas concert at school, and written a piece of drama. He had high ambitions: I want to direct a film. That’s what I’d love to do, direct a film. [Interviewer: So you’ll go on to do film studies and that sort of thing?] Yes. I’m looking forward to it, meeting new people and getting on with people, and being on sets. The most important thing about it will be having new people round me. I think people reflect on how well I work, because in school with dossers around me I’m not going to work. But if there’s everyone around me working, then I work. People affect that. (Abdul) Boys from other backgrounds also expressed ambitions in the fields of art or music, even though they realised that success can be elusive. Nathan, for instance (whose situation and aspirations are also featured in Chapter 5), was a young African-Caribbean who had been doing a lot of rapping for many years and saw this as his dream occupation. He was also aware that something else—in his case, training in sound engineering—would probably be necessary to supplement this, but this was proving difficult and he was also anticipating unemployment as part of his general life pattern: Really you can’t go to college for rapping or anything like that, and that’s really what I want to do. So I’ve really got to find myself something to do while I’m doing the rapping as well…I wanted to do sound engineering but I don’t think that will happen any more, because there’s not many courses that do it in London. One college I found for it, but there won’t be one this year, they said next year…I reckon yes, I will be unemployed. I don’t know how long. I will be unemployed some part of my life. (Nathan) Careers in fields such as sport and music combine what for most people used to be spare time leisure activities. But for young people with little or no academic inclination but with the relevant skills, the relative openness to new talent of the music- and sports-related industries is very appealing. George, also an African-Caribbean, whose family comes from St Lucia, expected to be either a car mechanic or a professional footballer, and was training in both. Football has his clear preference. Enthusiasm for sporting careers has a media glamour

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attraction, as well as the strong and prominent part in ‘masculinity’ and male identity played by sport (for more on George, see pages 169–71). Interest in pursuing sport to a career level is something that differentiated the boys’ expectations and aspirations from those of the girls. For although the girls sometimes talked about enjoying certain sports, and about setting up girls’ football teams in school, they rarely saw sport as a career path. Although some, like the boys, were interested in entering the leisure industry, they were more attracted to travel and tourism than working in sports and leisure centres. But for one in ten of the boys, especially African-Caribbean and white boys, a sporting career seemed a tangible and extremely attractive proposition. Despite the widespread rhetoric of equal opportunity, occupational opportunities open to young men and women of different class and ethnic backgrounds are still far from equal. This was reflected in the different work expectations and educational qualifications of the boys in our study. More of the middle-class boys were planning to enter professional careers, or taking up science or engineering at degree level, while proportionally more of the workingclass boys saw themselves taking up some kind of trade, mainly skilled but a few also in the unskilled trades. In terms of the different ethnic groups, the greatest diversity of occupations was shown by the white boys, closely followed by the Asian boys. Slightly more than a fifth of the white boys chose work in a trade— mainly skilled but also some unskilled manual trades. (This is considerably less than the employment figures given for a wider population in a survey by Modood and Berthoud, 1997, in which half of the white male population were employed in some category of manual work.) Some aspects of the distribution of the boys’ choices were clearly related to living in London, where a wide variety of work is available; for instance, one in six of the white boys wanted to work in a medialinked occupation. But there remained about one in six boys who were still quite unsure about what they would eventually like to do. For the AfricanCaribbean boys, the focus was even more on trade occupations, and a third of them specified this kind of work. This comes slightly closer to Modood and Berthoud’s (1997) figures, which show an even higher level—two-thirds—of African-Caribbean men to be working in skilled manual occupations, including self-employed. Perhaps the main explanation of the differences in figures here is that, whereas we were reporting expectation, Modood and Berthoud were recording fact. An element of ‘rose-tinted spectacles’ may have coloured the boys’ responses, even though they were asked to give expectations. Small proportions of the African-Caribbean boys were attracted to work related to the media, sport, computers or, though in fewer numbers than white and Asian boys, in the professions. Relatively more of this ethnic group (about a quarter) compared to the others had little idea what kind of work or career they might pursue. This lack of direction about future careers may be conducive to some of them eventually drifting into ‘the underclass’ (see pages 74–6). The career expectations of the African-Caribbean boys also tended to resonate strongly with their masculinity self-concepts (see pages 2–3), but most of these expectations do not imply the potential ‘problem’, described in Chapter 2, of

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how to reconcile middle-class careers with remaining with and endorsing black identity. The small number of African boys in the survey made up a distinctly different group, in that almost all either wanted to take up a professional occupation, or to work in design or the media. The Asian boys were somewhat different again. Fewer of them wanted to work in a trade (half as many as the African-Caribbean boys), even though this is where a high proportion of men from certain Asian communities are employed (Modood and Berthoud, 1997). A much greater proportion of Asian boys (nearly a quarter) than the other ethnic groups were keen to enter some kind of financial career, such as accountancy, banking, stockbroking, or wished to go into business management. This reflects the general involvement of the Asian community in running small businesses, post offices and so on. They had a similar interest in media careers and in professional, computer and science occupations as the white boys, but little interest in sport or sportrelated careers. The Asian boys (like the Asian girls in Sharpe’s 1994 study) had relatively high job expectations and, considering the nature of their fathers’ occupations (which were often low-level, self employed or unemployed), achieving these ambitions would represent significant success for both their families and the Asian community. Amongst the professional careers, vocations such as teaching and social work were not particularly popular with anyone. The teaching profession has been particularly demoralised in recent years, and very few of the boys (and relatively few in the girls study) wanted to go into it. And despite the professionalisation of social work, it is still a more popular choice for girls than for boys. Predictably, class and gender play a large part in the expectations of the boys and, given the tendency of the boys ‘not to expect’ to have to do manual work, would probably play an even bigger part in reality. Ethnic tradition and culture also clearly play a part in the directions of Asian and African-Caribbean boys’ expectations. In the latter case, there is some indication that certain career choices such as sport are heavily gendered in terms of what is regarded as appropriately ‘masculine’. In general, however, the tendency to use ethnic resources to boost or express self-images of masculinity was much more apparent in the area of leisure than work (see pages 164–7). A tendency for boys to colonise careers involving ‘high tech’ was apparent across the ethnic groups. Ideal jobs: the ones other people get As well as being asked about their job expectations, the boys were asked what job or career they would choose if they could do anything in the world that they wanted. A quarter of them (in common with a similar proportion in the girls study), expressed a preference for a specific ‘career’ involving skills, training and qualifications, which sometimes was the same as their actual job expectation. For the boys this meant being, for instance, an engineer, or a designer, but often

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it was for a less-cited career, such as being a pilot or a lawyer. The media proved to be the most popular area for job aspirations (chosen by about one in four boys), and these were mainly jobs with a far more glamorous status than their ‘real’ expectations, and consisted of occupations like musician, actor, film director, journalist and writer. The media plays a huge part in today’s social and industrial world, occupying people’s everyday life, and their general awareness. It appears to be open to all kinds of people, working at a variety of levels. Some areas are particularly glamorous and lucrative, and if you have talent, then—as the saying goes—‘it could be you!’ Such is the emphasis on individualism today that everyone is given the incentive to believe that with the appropriate skills or luck they can make it for themselves. Sport has reached unprecedented levels of popularity, and heavy media coverage of sports ‘stars’ and revelations of their high incomes has made this a key area of glamour and desire. An even higher proportion of aspirations than expectations revealed in our survey were sport-linked. About one in six of the boys aspired to success within sport or the sports industry, mainly as football stars, together with a few ace cricketers and basketball players. Some looked more towards football management, within which the remuneration can be as good or better than that of the players, linked as it is as much with big business as with the sport itself. Business in general, and the entrepreneurial spirit that fuels it, is reaching a higher profile than ever before. This was also emerging as a significant aspiration in the girls study, but for the boys it was even more prominent. Correspondingly, 20 per cent of the boys aspired to success in the world of business: owning or running their own businesses, and being very wealthy and successful in consequence. The main difference between the boys’ and the girls’ aspirations lay in the boys’ involvement with sport. By contrast, many of the girls aspired to a ‘glamorous’ career in the media, such as actress, film star, model, as well as journalist or writer. Clearly images associated with what Connell refers to as ‘emphasised femininity’ (1995) still have a hold on many girls, but it is also the case that for many glamour jobs, money, status and the power of sexual attraction are ‘part of the territory’. Only a few boys aspired to be anything or anyone with altruistic motives. For those who did, it was more often related to helping people within what was also their job expectation, such as within the fields of law or therapy. In comparing the boys and the girls on these kinds of job aspiration ideals, there was a sense in which the boys indulged in a higher level of fantasy than the girls, but the fantasy was largely an extension of their own ‘masculine’ concerns and egos. When it came to exercising their imaginations about what it might be like to be a girl, they were far less interested (see pages 118–19). Parental aspirations: aim high Regardless of their own employment status, parents often have high expectations and aspirations for their children, and education is often seen as the key to future success, whatever their actual abilities. Many parents want

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more opportunities for their children than they feel that they have had for themselves. Accordingly, asked whether their parents wanted them to go to university, over two-thirds said ‘yes’, nearly a quarter said ‘no’, and one in ten said their parents just left it up to them, although often with the advice at least to go on to college. My parents sat down and spoke to me about it when they were guiding me about college. They don’t really care what I do really. It’s down to me. That’s all they said really. About staying on. Not any jobs. (Tony) The parents of the Asian and African boys appeared to be the most enthusiastic about further or higher education according to their sons (each over 80 per cent), followed by the African-Caribbeans (69 per cent) and lastly the white boys, only just over half of whom wished this for their sons. This was also mirrored in the age to which parents wanted their sons to continue in education. Only a few boys (and proportionally more of these were white) said that their parents were happy for them to leave education early, aged 16 or 17. Nearly a third of each of the white and African-Caribbean boys’ parents wished them to stay until the age of 18, while the majority—about 60 per cent—reported that their fathers and mothers alike wanted them to stay in education until they were over the age of 18. With respect to parental hopes for their sons to go to university, the ethnic response pattern, as before, was for Asian parents to be the largest group wanting this education for their sons, followed by African, then African-Caribbean; and lastly, less than half of the white boys reported that their parents wished them to continue education to this level. To a limited extent this reflected the boys’ own level of educational and career expectations, but ascribed parental aspirations, if true, seemed unrealistic in many cases. They do not tally, for example, with the significant numbers of African-Caribbean boys who expressed expectations to take up a skilled trade. The high, sometimes overly-high, educational aspirations of parents of all backgrounds for their children have been described before. In the girls study (1994), many girls, and black and Asian girls in particular, described the emphasis their parents placed on education. Parental encouragement can be very important, and Mirza (1992) has argued that parental dispositions towards education are significant factors in educational success for young AfricanCaribbean women. However, again, class-related factors can be crucial in practice. Having the space and privacy, access to books, computers, and so on at home can encourage and facilitate young people to work efficiently towards such aspirations. In practice it is generally the middle-class and better-off families who can more effectively provide these. While it is positive that parents try to inspire their children to achieve well by expressing their job, career, or university expectations for them, for some children this may also serve to create excess pressure and anxiety.

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Gendered occupations In Britain, many occupational areas and jobs have been associated with either a masculine or feminine gender identity. Older, established jobs in trade and industry such as engineering, and skilled trades such as carpentry, bricklaying and electrical work, were—and largely still are—gendered as ‘masculine’, whereas teaching, nursing, secretarial work etc. are gendered ‘feminine’. It may be hoped that some of the new areas of work that are opening up stand some chance of remaining more ‘gender neutral’. Media and business studies attract both boys and girls, as do the leisure industry and design. The latter areas, however, already tend to divide the genders, in that boys choose sport and work in leisure centres while girls prefer travel and tourism; and more boys do industrial design while girls choose textile and interior design. Over the last three decades, social research into young people has mapped ways in which the gender identities, and the definitions of masculinity, have changed. These are illustrated in some of the academic literature, where, for example, hardworking boys of working-class origins have been rather unkindly characterised by the labels given them by macho lads, such as ‘swots’ and ‘ear’oles’ (Willis, 1977). Later, reflecting the changing economy and educational curriculum of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Mac an Ghaill (1994) differentiates this broad grouping of more diligent working-class boys into ‘academic achievers’ and the ‘new enterprisers’. He specifically notes that the ‘academic achievers’ contained a high proportion of Asian as well as white boys. Mac an Ghaill describes the new enterprisers as working-class lads who saw an opportunity for upward social mobility in the newly vocationalised curriculum and ‘were negotiating a mode of school student masculinity with its values of rationality, instrumentalism, forward planning and careerism’. The boys we surveyed were younger than Mac an Ghaill’s sample, and had not developed their academic specialisms and career choices to the same extent. However, the difference in emphasis he indicates was just distinguishable, although interest in the new technology was even more apparent among middleclass than among working-class students. To some extent, command of the new technology has become a benchmark of masculinity regardless of class. Among working-class boys we found that the frequent use of computers was in playing exciting and often violent games, and to this extent it may partly have replaced the celebration of physical labour and strength as a symbolic reference for machoness. Middle-class boys were more likely to refer to the new technology in an academic and career context, and for them the dividend in masculinity seemed to be more in the sharp-edged cleverness associated with this type of skill. However, perhaps the most notable social factor in relation to the new technology was the relatively larger number of Asian (especially Indian) boys who expressed an academic and career interest in it. The gendering of occupations is often constructed around the stereotyping of particular skills and characteristics as ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’, so making a given occupation seem more appropriate for either men or women. This stereotyping still strongly influences young people’s choices in relation to

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more traditional jobs. The girls in Sharpe’s research (1994) had made choices within a range of about thirty occupations, and these were mainly in the realms of ‘women’s work’, including working with or caring for children, caring for animals, air hostess, beautician, radiographer, and banking and insurance work; as well as some ‘new’ careers linked with psychology, design and the media. The boys in this research quoted between forty and fifty jobs or careers (some of which were related to one another), and many of these were correspondingly in areas which have traditionally been constructed as ‘men’s work’, such as mechanic, engineer, stockbroker. This was despite more boys taking courses in subjects like food technology and child development, and more girls doing business studies and CDT (craft, design and technology), as described in Chapter 2 of this book. In one school, very few girls had taken CDT, possibly deterred from participating in this subject by the notion that ‘technology’ is not really an appropriate subject for girls. Where boys took options in ‘girls” subjects like child development, it seemed that this was because it was seen as an easy option, rather than because they intended to do anything with it as a job or career. As Edward observed in Chapter 1 (page 18), boys and girls still go down conventional subject routes in school, and the boys seemed to find it even harder to move out of these areas than girls: ‘…if a girl did a job like that—something to do with CDT—I think the girls’ friends would think “Good for them”. But for a boy [looking after children], the boys would think, why is he doing this, it’s a bit weird.’ The girls study had revealed some girls who seriously wanted to take up occupations that were still classified as ‘men’s work’, such as car mechanic, engineer or firefighter, but very few boys wished to do work that could in any way be categorised as ‘women’s work’. This could also be seen as parallel with their general reluctance to take on so-called areas of ‘women’s work’ in the home, as illustrated in Chapter 3. Some areas of work are seen to be appropriate for both sexes, such as jobs in the computer industry, although computing skills are probably still seen as more the preserve of boys, evidenced by the greater amount of time that boys (compared to girls) spend playing computer games.2 In this respect, too, men seem to be making the running in higherlevel computer-based careers (EOC, 1999). There are, however, areas of movement and overlap within various job fields, and the media was clearly one of these, attracting boys and girls alike to journalism and other writing or media-related design courses, illustration, music, acting, and other artistic pursuits. Certain of the professions, although still male-dominated, appear to be more open to both sexes, and girls and boys alike—but not in any great number in these schools—aspired to careers in areas such as medicine, law, pharmacy, architecture and psychotherapy, amongst others. In the 1970s, a large proportion (about 40 per cent) of the girls taking part in the research documented in the first edition of Just Like A Girl (Sharpe, 1976) wanted to do some kind of officework. This was seen as ‘a nice job for a girl’ and could accommodate a wide range of class backgrounds, working at different levels of qualifications and with differing levels of responsibility. By

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the early 1990s this had changed considerably, and working in an office or being a secretary was no longer so widely considered by girls to be such a positive and appropriate aspiration. This was in many ways due to the expansion of jobs in other fields for women, a decrease in the kind of ‘glamour’ associated with certain levels of secretarial and officework, and a reskilling and renaming of this kind of work through the development of word processors, computers and other aspects of new technology. Nevertheless, a significant number of women do office or secretarial work, and being a secretary still represents a stereotypical vision of women’s work. For instance, being a secretary seemed to be a fall-back stereotype for many of the boys when they were asked what job they might choose if they were a girl and not a boy. When the girls in both of Sharpe’s studies (1976, 1994) had been asked the equivalent question (i.e., what job they would choose if they were a boy), they in turn specified male stereotypical skills like mechanic and engineer. Both boys and girls rejected actually doing these kinds of work themselves since they were inappropriate for their own sex. The gendered identities of certain such occupations, which are predominantly working-class areas of work, are still well intact. The predominant reasons for choosing a job or career given by the girls in Sharpe’s later study (1994) lay in their interest in aspects of the work itself, or in their concern to be with, or help, other people, and they were less concerned with earning lots of money. Such ‘people-involvement’ took up a large proportion of the reasons for girls’ occupational choices in both her studies (over a third of the reasons in the later one). This reflects the character of many jobs categorised as ‘women’s work’, and also the greater importance of people and caring for people in traditionally constructed ‘femininity’. Although there was some increase in responses about earning money by the 1990s, this was still far less than the concern expressed with interest, enjoyment, and the people involved in the work chosen. By comparison, while reasons for the career choices of the boys in our study also lay mainly in their interest in the work and the skills involved, money was a very important factor. Although a few were concerned with helping people, especially if this was an intrinsic characteristic of their chosen work, such as medicine, they did not express as much interest in meeting or working with people as had the girls. In this respect, the social and caring (the ‘feminine’) characteristics that have traditionally been assigned to various sorts of ‘women’s work’ still provide a motive for why girls continue to choose this type of work. The boys were asked if they considered there were any other important things about a job or career for a man, apart from earning money, pursuing a career, and meeting people; and those who thought there were mainly cited the achievement of job satisfaction and enjoyment of the work. Others were understandably concerned with attaining job security, providing for the family, having a pleasant working environment, achieving personal success, becoming independent and responsible, and a variety of other more individual aspects or desires such as ‘earning respect’, ‘making my family proud of me’, and ‘fulfilling your life to your dreams’. Asked the equivalent question—whether there were any other important aspects

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of a job or career for a woman—the girls study had produced a rather different response. Girls were more concerned with their potential independence through employment for the purpose of ‘standing on their own feet’ economically, and in the event that they might have a broken marriage. These concerns reflected their awareness of the changes that have been happening in women’s position at home and at work over the years, even since before the original 1970s study. The boys’ and girls’ considerations of this question come from differing positions: for the girls, paid work—something they have been increasingly involved in over the years, and in which they now represent half the workforce; their ascent of various career ladders; and a general increase in female confidence and self esteem. For the boys, there was no equivalent reflection of social and personal changes, even though such changes have been making work less and less secure for men over this period. It seems that boys have real difficulty in prioritising emotional and personal values over instrumental and career/monetary ones. Yet it is precisely in the former area that many girls and women are requiring more of men. Unless men can respond more fully, it is likely that the trend towards problems and fragmentation in gender relations will continue (see Chapter 3, pages 104–8, for more discussion of this issue). The boys were also asked several questions about their impressions of school work and careers ‘if you were a girl…?’ These concerned whether they thought that, if they were girls, they might work less hard, leave school or college earlier, or be less concerned to get a good job or career. Overall, there was a large majority who endorsed that a change of sex would not indicate any change in behaviour on these issues. At least four out of five of each ethnic group’s boys denied that they would work less hard if they were girls; the same proportion denied that they would leave school or college earlier; and more than two thirds denied that they would be less concerned to get a good job or career. It was the Asian boys whose attitudes appeared slightly more egalitarian than those of the others. While this may seem surprising, it is the case that in both Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan, girls and women, especially from better-off backgrounds, have extensive access to secondary and tertiary education, and these boys’ positive attitudes to girls’ education and work is not necessarily simply a recent adjustment to Western achievement-oriented values. It must also be clear from the application of Asian girls in these schools to their studies, and their exam results, that they are working as hard—if not harder than—the boys, and have equally high job aspirations. It may have been possible that the relatively high percentage of non-sexist replies to these questions is due to boys making what they felt were the ‘correct’ responses. With this in mind we looked at their responses to another question in which we asked whether they agreed that ‘boys don’t like girls to be more clever at schoolwork than they are’. Over a third of all boys agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, with little difference between ethnic groups. That this question had elicited a higher level of gender division than the other questions may lie in the personal dynamics of classroom competition, involving an immediate status recognition which had a greater reality than the more

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abstract issues of academic and career equality. And although almost threequarters of the boys agreed that ‘men are not expected to be better qualified than women these days’, it is quite significant that as many as a quarter still thought men should be better qualified than women. The varied pattern of response across these questions suggests some inconsistency in the boys’ attitudes to gender equality, as well as a range of differences between them. In the boys’ attitudes to equality in work, there was overall agreement that top jobs should be given to women as much as men. However, there was still a significant minority who endorsed a traditionally gendered division of labour advantaging boys over girls. These included views that parents expect boys to do better at schoolwork than girls (nowadays confounded by the underachievement reported for boys); and that it was more important for boys to get good jobs than girls. Relatively more Asian boys than the white or African-Caribbean boys endorsed such views, reflecting a stronger cultural endorsement of a dominant role for men in the family, work, and in the community. These statements had unsurprisingly obtained very little support from the girls in Sharpe’s research (1976, 1994). It would perhaps be naive to expect the boys to be as strong and consistent in their support for gender equality at work as the girls (although not all of the latter expressed wholly egalitarian attitudes). Most of the boys responded to the questions on gender equality by endorsing them. However, their intentions and their fantasies often tell a different story. What many of the boys accept in principle they often struggle to observe in practice—the level at which the real adjustment must take place. Thoughts and feelings about unemployment My mum and dad say it’s not what you want it’s what you can get. It’s a bit worrying. The unemployment. You have to just get good results and that. If you have no qualifications and that, it’s going to be hard. (Tony)

Because of changes in the structure of work, a guarantee of regular employment can no longer be taken for granted, and unemployment rates and the rate of job changes have been high. Many people of both sexes may expect to experience periods when they are not working, either because they cannot obtain work, or because they are self-employed and work comes in irregularly or not at all. Unemployment rates amongst young people are high3 and opportunities at certain levels of education may be better for girls, who in many subject areas have gained higher levels of qualifications than boys. (In 1998–99, for example, 53 per cent of girls obtained five A-C passes at GCSE, compared to 42.6 per cent of boys.) This advantage for girls decreases from GCSE to A-level, and disappears by degree level. As described in Chapter 1, the differentiation of subject choice at school already puts boys and girls on

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the road to a future differentiation in job or career status and pay, as evidenced in the starting pay for graduates which is significantly higher for the type of careers typically entered by young men. Success in exam passes also varies by class, and middleclass boys are likely to do better than working-class boys, while concern has been expressed about the particularly low achievements of working-class white and black boys. Opportunities for young people are thus critically affected by the social structural factors of gender, class and ‘race’, which are themselves affected by changes in the job market and the economy. In the 1980s, working-class youth were more at risk from unemployment than middle-class youth, who were benefiting from an expansion in professional and management jobs (Roberts, 1995) and this situation continued into the 1990s. National figures show that unemployment among the AfricanCaribbeans and even more so among the Pakistani-Bangladeshis is substantially higher than among whites,4 and this pattern was broadly reflected for the boys’ parents in our survey. In both cases, especially the former, unemployment is higher among men than women. In general, it is the working class and the ethnic minority groups that are at greater risk of unemployment (these patterns, as published in the Labour Force Survey, have been consistent for over ten years). Notwithstanding differences in educational qualifications achieved, there is no doubt that racism and discrimination continue to operate in the occupational sector, compounded by class and gender. Regardless of the insecurities of the ‘real’ world, most people, especially young people starting out in life, hope that they will be able to get some sort of work, and hope that this will reflect their interests, training and qualifications. Youth studies on transitions to adulthood carried out recently, such as that by Rudd and Evans (1998), have pointed out the almost paradoxically high levels of optimism reported by young people about their job prospects when seen in the light of a depressed labour market. Researchers offer four possible explanations for this: that the young people have been socialised to believe in individual choice and effort; that there is a time lag between aspiration and outcome; that it is part of the psychological make-up of the young people at this stage in their lives; or that it is a function of locality, and living in a urban environment. In our research, we asked the boys if they thought that they would be able to get regular employment after leaving school or college, and almost three-quarters of them answered in the affirmative, probably for a combination of all four explanations. There was no significant difference by ethnic group, although slightly more of the white boys were more positive in their anticipations. There was also no difference by social class background. However, as far as our sample of boys is concerned, the positive desire and expectation of employment expressed by the majority generally went along with a sharp and sobering awareness of the lurking possibility of unemployment with its undoubted disadvantages and miseries. Asked for their reaction if they did not gain regular employment, it was not surprising to find that the majority said that they would feel pretty bad. Many, like Edward, said that they would feel ‘gutted’, depressed, or disappointed:

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I’d still look for a job. I’d be pretty gutted I think, if I didn’t have a job. If I didn’t have a job, I’d find ways of making a job, set up my own business or something. I think it’s fairly important for men to have jobs. It’s that it seems to have been like that for a long time. (Edward) It is still, as Edward suggests, an important part of male identity to have a job, and for him unemployment would involve a determination to find some way of creating a working status, such as setting up a business. The Conservative government’s enterprise grants to establish people in small businesses resulted in a proliferation of these. Together with the increasing number of self-employed people at all levels of work, it appears fairly commonplace for anyone to be able to try and ‘make a job’, as Edward hoped he would. In reality, the competition can make this a hazardous and insecure way of life for any individual. Some boys said they would feel angry and fed up that they had wasted their time, their talents, and done years at school or studying in some form of education, only to find it was all for nothing. Joe was one who felt strongly this way: I understand there’s not a lot of jobs. That’s why everyone really needs to go to college to study to make sure they can get a job. If I didn’t get a job—I would feel gutted. Wasted all that time at school and college and then you’re unemployed. Waste of time. Might as well have gone out and tried to get a job straight away. I don’t know what I’d do about it then. Have to keep trying to get a job I suppose. Or just work in Safeways or something. (Joe) Some boys made more specific comments, such as: ‘it will lower my level of confidence’; ‘there will be nothing to keep me going’; ‘I’ll feel downgraded and let down by society’; ‘I’d feel like a nobody’; and ‘…a loser and a total idiot’. They spoke of the guilt and shame they would feel without a job. Many of these also expressed the need for perseverance, and their intention that, despite feeling bad, they would keep trying to get a job. A few simply thought they would feel bored, interpreting the question to mean their reaction to the time they would have on their hands if they did not have a job. Many of these boys could not or would not envisage unemployment as a possible part of their futures, but others had given it some thought and were a bit more aware of the changes that have been taking place in men’s role and identity in relation to women. Edward was one of these, but his professed denial of the importance of work was countered by his desire to work: Men have got the jobs, but not as much now—fifty years ago, it was. I think it is fairly important, yes, but not as important as it was. It wouldn’t matter if your wife worked and you didn’t work. It seems like having a job is an important part of a man’s masculinity, but I don’t feel that way. If I

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didn’t have a job, it wouldn’t affect my masculinity, I wouldn’t feel threatened by a woman working and not me. But I would want to work. It’s satisfying to bring money in. (Edward) Those boys with higher career aspirations tended to regard unemployment as quite a remote prospect and qualified their replies by saying that they would go to university and see what happened after that. The effect of early experiences of unemployment takes its toll, as evidenced by the demoralisation of the young long-term unemployed who have never actually experienced having a job. For some of them, it may also be that their own fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, are also unemployed. Our information about those boys’ own fathers’ work status was incomplete, due to the fact that in some cases they were not living with their father and did not know what he was doing. Of those in two-parent families, about one in five had fathers who were not in work. The main ethnic difference was that rather more (just over a quarter) of the Asian boys had non-working fathers who were unemployed, retired, or disabled, but within this figure there were relatively more Pakistani/Bangladeshis than Indians. A third of the boys’ mothers were not in paid work. It was predominantly mothers of the white and black boys who were in employment, while over half of the Asian boys said that their mothers were not in paid work. Despite the efforts of successive governments, unemployment is something that people have come to see as a familiar aspect of contemporary society, but a prospect that most young people not surprisingly wished to avoid. For a proportion of the many who have continued in education of some sort after the age of 16 with the advice and knowledge that little awaits those with no qualifications, it will come as even more of a bitter blow to have done the courses and still fail to get work. Conclusion At the beginning of the twenty-first century there is no assurance of job opportunities for boys coming out of school, unlike several decades ago. Even with qualifications it can be an uncertain process, and for those without them, there is little chance of a job with good pay or prospects unless they have special contacts or particular talents or skills in, for example, sport or music. Staying on at school in the sixth form, or transferring to a sixth form college, further education college or a youth training scheme are the other main alternatives. These may involve simply taking (or retaking) GCSEs, doing Alevels, taking various vocational courses to obtain NVQs or GNVQs, or doing a BTec course. At 15 or 16, many of the boys in this study were not at all sure exactly what to do, but most of them were aware of the need and demand for qualifications and wanted to stay on in education in some capacity. In this respect the boys were very similar to the girls researched by Sharpe (1994).

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Many who assumed that they would go to university were not thinking further ahead than that, and were not concerned at this stage about possible problems of unemployment. They were aware of this as a potential hazard, but preferred to be optimistic about their own futures. In terms of job expectations, the boys’ choices were mainly in occupational areas that have traditionally been considered as ‘men’s work’, paralleling the girls’ still predominant choice of ‘women’s work’. The boys were perhaps more entrenched in gendered job or career expectations than the girls, and, bearing in mind the concern many expressed at crossing gender boundaries, this was not altogether surprising, while somewhat disappointing. Given the workingclass background of the majority of these boys, it is not surprising that many expected to work in a skilled trade but others who might have expected to do so in the past were now looking for opportunities in the new growth areas of employment. These included new technology and computing, business studies, the leisure industry—sport, travel and tourism, design—in its many forms, and various aspects of the media and communication. As we have noted, there has been a shift in what was regarded more as ‘men’s work’, from heavy industry towards high-tech occupations, and occupational ‘masculinity’ has been reconstructed accordingly to embrace these kinds of career paths. Although gender stereotyping persists in traditional areas of work, it would be encouraging to find more signs of gender equality in these ‘new’ work fields. However, the picture is mixed. Some newer occupations are already taking on something of a gendered pattern, in which, for example, men are tending to predominate in higher levels of information technology and computing (EOC, 1999). Some boys are constructing new expressions and images of masculine identity around the new technology—a kind of ‘techno-masculinity’. More boys also expressed an expectation of working in the sports industry, and in the burgeoning gyms and leisure centres, while girls tended to prefer tourism, and were attracted to being a tour representative in the hope of meeting people and travelling. Design work, too, can attract both sexes, but girls often express concern about—and are deterred (for no logical reason) by—the technological aspects involved. The minority of young people in the current study and the girls study who expected to take up professional careers brought some progress towards levelling the gender ratios, as may those entering some of the relatively ‘new’ professions linked to subjects such as psychology and photography. While the work choices of boys from different ethnic groups were relatively similar, there were significant differences. Asian boys tended to go significantly more for careers in business or finance (three times as many as the white or African-Caribbean boys). The white and African-Caribbean boys were more likely to choose skilled trades, and a small but significant proportion (about 10 per cent) favoured sporting careers. Jobs linked to the media were quite popular (slightly more so with the white and Asian boys than those from African-Caribbean families); and similar but low proportions (nearly 10 per cent) of each group were interested in pursuing a professional career. Of course, it is worth bearing in mind that expectation is no guarantee of outcome, and

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the probability is that many of the boys in our survey erred on the side of optimism. Our research findings were consistent with most of the relevant educational research, which confirms that middle-class boys tend to have higher educational and career aspirations and an edge in self-confidence in relation to these matters. However, the differences between middle-class and working-class boys in these respects seemed somewhat less than is usually reported. There are several possible reasons for this. First, the new vocational curriculum had an appeal that crossed class lines, even though class differentiation may occur in terms of who studies high- or low-status vocational educational packages. The popularity of BTec courses and NVQs and GNVQs in certain popular fields to do with, for instance, leisure, design and the media, tends to cut across some class lines. Second, the educational and career aspirations of Asian students, and particularly those from India, seemed in any case less related to class than has been routinely reported for white students. The Asian students were especially attracted to careers involving high-level use of new technology, and those in finance. Third, the comprehensive schools in which we carried out our survey were seriously committed to the principles of equal opportunity. They do appear to have raised the level of expectation among some students who, a generation ago, would have settled for a working-class job. Such increased expectations may have been stimulated by the changing occupational structure and related pattern of social mobility apparent from the early Thatcher period. The collapse of traditional working-class jobs has meant that boys and men of working-class origin have been forced to contemplate the alternatives of descent into the so-called ‘underclass’, or competing with those from the middle-class for a wide and growing range of white-collar jobs. (London offers relatively more of the latter kind of opportunities than elsewhere.) A less kind and understanding welfare state has also perhaps enhanced the threat of ‘failure’ and the risk of young people falling into this ‘underclass’. Therefore, although the established link between class and educational aspiration was apparent in the four schools, the pattern was somewhat blurred by a variety of new and, taken together, quite complex developments.5 In Brown’s (1987) terms there were more pupils planning to ‘get out’ of the working class, and rather fewer likely to ‘get in’ to what was left of the traditional working class. There was general agreement, especially among the white and AfricanCaribbean boys, with a statement that: ‘life is harder for young men nowadays than it has been for their fathers’. In many ways they are right, and, for young people, life certainly seems to have become more complex in many ways. The certainties and predictability that characterised the industrial era are under threat, and the world can be perceived as a dangerous place with a new set of risks and hazards to be confronted. Entry to the labour market has become more difficult in recent decades, and unemployment is now a common part of young people’s lives, even at graduate level. Subjective feelings of risk have become a significant feature of young people’s lives, with consequent

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implications for their experiences and lifestyles. At the same time, an increasing diversity within school, and an increasing variety of occupational options, appear to offer young people a wider choice. Everything is presented as a possibility, with an emphasis on individual agency and achievement. Social structures such as class, although still exerting significant effects, tend to become increasingly obscured with the weakening of collectivist traditions and an intensification of individualist values. Furlong and Cartmel (1997) observe that: ‘Processes of diversification within the school and the labour market may obscure underlying class relationships and may provide the impression of greater equality and individualization without actually providing anything of substance.’ Although much has changed in almost every social sphere, there is more underlying continuity than may be apparent. Established social inequalities of class, gender and ‘race’ remain central to the life trajectories of young people growing up at the beginning of the twenty-first century, even though many of them may be unaware of them. For many young people, like the boys contributing to this book, there is unlikely to be a smooth or secure transition into the workforce.

5

Culture, leisure and crime

There is much about the adult world—or perhaps it is adults themselves—that many boys wish to avoid. The first two chapters discussed how, in matters of ‘race’ and gender, many boys disregarded what they were being taught in school and behaved in a more macho and confrontational way than was officially approved. This chapter follows the boys into their own zone of (relative) freedom, ‘their own time’. The discussion of their television and reading habits shows them constructing a world of action, heroes and archetypes which owes more to commercial entertainment and sport than to education. Most of the remainder of the chapter deals in separate sections with the more ethnically distinctive leisure pursuits of white, African-Caribbean and Asian boys, as well as with some shared pursuits. An interesting feature is how the boys sometimes use the global media to select events, often sports or entertainment, which reflect their particular ethnic culture. At the same time in the highly visible and fluid world of youth culture, cultural pluralism transforms into cultural hybridity as groups and individuals of various ethnic origins borrow from, and imitate, each other. There is no predictable pattern in all this. In some cases a particular cultural preference stays with one ethnic group—for instance, basketball with British African-Caribbeans—and in others it spreads like wildfire across youth culture, such as the popularity of rap. The fluid and porous quality of contemporary youth culture distinguishes it from the more distinct conceptualisation of ethnic cultures of the multicultural model. It is probably in the coming together and hybridity that the best hope for a tolerant, vital and vibrant culture lies. A section on crime is included in this chapter, as many of the boys who admitted in interview to criminal acts explained that they did them as a form of self-entertainment to combat boredom. The conclusion to the chapter is a wideranging discussion of how the boys’ cultural and leisure activities express and shape their identities, including their masculinities, and also raises the issue of fathering and role-modelling in relation to masculine socialisation. Leisure as freedom from authority Unsurprisingly, young people in modern society often tend to turn away from the constraints of home and school when seeking freedom and fun. Darren, 154

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born in Iran, and a student from one of the Ealing schools, puts the issue succinctly: ‘Out of school it’s our rules’. In discussing fighting, he implies that ‘grassing on people’ to teachers transgresses these rules, and involves a loss of control as well as self-respect: Out of school it’s our rules. Right now I wouldn’t go out straight away and hit someone. I’d get in trouble. But outside school there’s nothing anyone can do. If someone gets on your nerves, you get them there and then. In school you can’t do that. I don’t like grassing on people, it’s silly. Teachers say: ‘Come on and tell me’. But if you do that, you can’t stand up for yourself. (Darren) It is not too romantic to see much of the leisure activity of modern youth in part as an attempt to establish a degree of autonomy in the face of powerful external forces of direction and control. Leisure can provide an opportunity to escape from parental constraint and from the more formally controlling forces of school into apparently greater ‘freedom’. Of course, leisure is also ‘escape time’ for adults, but few are as comprehensively subject to the authority of others as are young people. For most mid-teenagers, leisure is predominantly spent among peers: those of similar age and circumstances. Modern youth is socially organised to meet the needs of an industrial, capitalist society which both requires an appropriately socialised, skilled and educated workforce and generates the wealth to fund its education and training. The state rather than the private sector has provided the educational infrastructure for mass and some elite education, although the upper class has generally had its offspring educated privately and separately. Education policy, particularly the implementation of universal and compulsory education, has shaped the experience and identity of most youth in modern society and is continuing to do so to an increasing extent. The schoolleaving age was raised to 16 in 1973, and in the 1980s and 1990s a steady stream of measures have established state intervention in the education-work transition as the norm up to the age of 17 or 18. Leisure—so-called ‘free time’—occurs for mid-teenagers predominantly outside the immediate scope of parental and teacher authority. As young people seek experience and independence, the last thing most of them want to deal with is constantly lurking adults—be they parents, teachers or other agents of social control. Highly differentiated as many aspects of youth culture are, one safe generalisation is that participants in it are mainly young (even if the term ‘youth’ is occasionally stretched to include the odd hanger-on of 40 or more). As Bo Reimer observed in his study of Swedish youth, ‘the most important’ factor influencing participants in youth culture is not class or gender but ‘is actually age’ (1995:135). Socially constructed as age-grades certainly are, there is also an irreducible biological reality to them. The global dimensions of youth culture have greatly increased in late modernity. The home, and the state in its many guises, have ceded some ground

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to global influences on youth despite efforts to reassert the authority and control of the former in the final quarter of the twentieth century. To a large extent, global youth culture is driven by capitalism. Youth culture is substantially structured by the capitalist system of production and marketing, and by the media which itself is now predominantly capitalist-owned and exists primarily to make a profit rather than to provide a public service. Global companies exercise substantial control over youth market products and the artists they have under contract—although this is not total and is sometimes contested. The youth consumer products advertised or displayed through the media include music CDs, tapes and videos; computer games and hardware; clothes and footwear—particularly of the designer variety; drink; magazines; and a vast array of branded sports goods. Sixteen—the age of most of the boys in our survey—is towards the younger end of this market, but every item mentioned here was widely consumed by the boys we questioned. All the items produced for the youth market mentioned above are substantially, though in no case exclusively, produced by international corporations. Coca-Cola and Pepsi, Nike and Adidas sports and leisure wear, Puff Daddy and the Spice Girls, are all marketed globally. In turn, this produces a global youth culture. Satellite and cable have increased the potential for the development of a commercially driven global youth culture. At the same time, these same developments allow for the niche marketing of more differentiated products—providing these make sufficient profit. Despite the strength of globalised consumer trends generated by the capitalist media, there is now virtually a consensus in British sociology that young people are not simply ‘cultural dupes’ of capitalism and the commercial media but engage with various degrees of creativity in the construction of youth culture. This view was strongly expressed in Paul Willis’s Common Culture (1990), in which he argues that it is more accurate to think of young people as producer-consumers rather than just as consumers. He argues that creativity occurs not only among the elite of popular music and fashion but, on a day-to-day basis, among ‘ordinary’ youth as they play around with and sometimes make music and clothes. It would be a mistake to regard the creativity of youth, particularly early youth, as always or even often a conscious statement against capitalism. The boys in our survey were far more likely to voice criticism of school and parental authority than they were to criticise consumerist values, still less the capitalist system itself. On the contrary, much of what they regard as exciting and pleasurable is wrapped up in (and by!) capitalism. For all that, many did have a raw capacity to think and act for themselves, even if they seldom attempted much theorisation. Participating in, or, more likely, having a loose identification with, a global social movement or movements would be something that might come later for some of them. Some of the boys already showed an awareness of environmental problems and of global poverty. One of the factors which mitigates against the tendencies to conformity and homogenisation generated by globalisation is the ethnic cultural variety of the

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young. Ethnic identity can act as a brake on the drift to sameness that global cultural images and products may encourage. Often young people seek expression of ethnic identity in their selection of music and fashion items, and in the kind of sporting activities they watch and participate in. Logically it would seem plausible that ethnically-specific aspects of youth culture would be eroded by globalisation, but we found many examples to the contrary. To the extent that this was the case, it will again be helpful to examine the three main ethnic groups separately as was done in Chapter 2, while bearing in mind that much in youth culture is passed on and shared, and changed in the process. Ample evidence is provided in the following pages both of the creativity of modern youth and of the powerful domestic, state and commercial forces structuring their lives and influencing their minds. There were some collective patterns in the leisure activities of different groups of boys, and some individual ‘performances’ which seemed quite original. Giving an adequate account of both the general and the specific is not easy. In respect of their views of the world around them, some of the boys expressed an idealistic social morality which perhaps implied criticism of the ‘adult’ world, but, not unexpectedly, few of them expressed developed radical political views. The only groups that could be described as significantly ‘resisting’ social control and authority were some of the macho working-class boys and, more particularly, some of the African-Caribbean boys—the two groups to which Stuart Hall and his colleagues (1979) mainly applied the term in the mid-1970s. However, whereas white macho working-class boys were likely to challenge authority because they found it got in the way of some of their more exciting and diverting activities, for some African-Caribbean boys the conflict ran deeper. Some of the latter appeared implicitly to question the legitimacy of ‘white’ authority and, without necessarily being conscious of it, still shouldered the burden of historic racial oppression. While their anger and resistance had the potential to become political, on a routine day-to-day basis it was cultural and personal. Young people in modern society are positioned in a way which makes conflict with authority quite likely, and, as some commentators have pointed out, this can include youth from wealthier as well as less advantaged backgrounds (see Aggleton, 1987). Whereas in many traditional societies the transition between age grades is rapid and clearly marked by a rite of passage, in modern societies the youth-to-adulthood transition is extended and ambiguous. The prime reason is that the period of formal preparation for adulthood in terms of education and training has been steadily extended. This in turn reflects the complex demands of modern society which require the young to undergo a long period of socialisation and learning in order to function effectively. Such complexity is further reflected in the gradual way that young people acquire rights and responsibilities in Britain as in other modern societies. Thus the right to vote, and to hold a full driving licence, occur at different ages although there is a slowly emerging pattern by which rights and responsibilities are acceded to between 16 and 18 years of age. The extended and staggered construction of youth in modern society has several important consequences

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for the experience and status of young people. Tension and conflict are known to be produced by a long period of subordination in educational bureaucracies. Extended education and/or training also tends to lengthen the period of young peoples’ dependency on their parents or guardians, potentially increasing the period of ‘unfreedom’ they experience. Some young people may choose to remain at home well into adulthood, but for those who are trapped, the possibility of friction with their parents is considerable. The realistic possibility of leaving home was not available to the boys in our survey, but some of them were beginning to chafe against dependency. Modern society is littered with barriers and controls on youthful assertiveness, particularly that of young men. Some of these controls represent the conscious attempts of adults to direct the young, but the overall framework seems relatively arbitrary and not fully thought through. A particular disjunctive occurs because the freedoms available to the young in leisure often seem at variance to, and even disruptive of, the discipline and restraint required by formal agencies of socialisation. That there should be a difference between the culture of school and that of leisure is hardly surprising, but the potential for conflict is exacerbated by the relentless message of instant gratification of the youth consumer market which contrasts with the education-work ethic. Some boys—predominantly middle-class in background—were prepared to forgo immediate pleasure for future rewards, but for others school suffered by comparison with what was available ‘in the real world’ outside school. This world offers its own ‘lessons’ in values, behaviour and meaning. The boys mostly liked to be together. They expressed themselves, and to an extent ‘discovered’ themselves, in friendship and peer relations. ‘Going out with friends’ is mentioned more often than any other as a favourite activity. Few had paired off with a sexual partner to the extent of significantly cutting back on peer relations. It is a paradox of modern society that the apparently autonomous sphere of youth leisure and culture has expanded in parallel with the extension of their formal socialisation and control within the modern welfare state. Although leisure provided fewer opportunities for genuine autonomy than many of the boys imagined, they often achieved far more autonomy and expression than adults—parents, teachers, other state officials, and business people—might be aware of, or would feel comfortable with. For a minority, leisure time did more than merely compensate for and balance the demands of school. For them, the values and experiences of ‘free time’ led them to reject or marginalise formal education and to seek an alternative, freer lifestyle. The media Heroes and villains and mixing them up Two media-based activities enjoyed by the boys are examined here—watching television, and reading comics and magazines. These areas are considered in combination with a range of questions on their heroes and fantasies designed

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to explore aspects of their masculinities. In order to get further information on the role models favoured by the boys, we also asked each boy which individual he most admired and why. The reading habits of boys, especially in the case of magazines, is a relatively unanalysed area compared to their musical tastes (extensive discussions of music in youth culture have been made by Jones, 1988; Back, 1996; and Sewell, 1997). Although watching television was mentioned as the second favourite activity of the boys after spending time with friends, their reading habits perhaps showed more dramatically the extent to which many of their attitudes were highly gendered. Their responses gave some insight into their values and attitudes to masculinity, sexuality and ethnicity. Our approach to exploring the role of television in their lives was quite general and, although this meant we got relatively little detailed data on viewing habits, the broader information acquired was nevertheless revealing. Television: Sky’s the limit Cultural life within families is often segmented to some extent on the basis of gender and age. Marie Gillespie’s Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change (1995) has described how even in Asian families—which are generally most committed to a shared family and community culture—teenage family members tend to be drawn towards what she refers to as a ‘global youth culture’ of music, film and fashion. In some households she observed that adults, some of whom spoke little English, mainly tuned into ethnic language radio or television, whereas their teenage children accessed a global youth culture through the main terrestrial and satellite/cable channels. Such a difference in cultural orientation did not usually or necessarily result in conflict, but self-evidently it meant that some parents were limited in the amount of control they could exercise over the development of their children’s tastes—and potentially over their lifestyles. Gillespie’s and our own research support common observation in demonstrating that many young Asians are now influenced by global youth culture—although seldom to the point of wanting wholly to surrender their ethnic identity. Increasingly, Asian youth makes its own distinctive contribution to wider youth culture but, until quite recently, those young Asians participating in it did so mainly by imitation of Western youth cultural models (including AfricanCaribbean). As far as television is concerned, our information suggested that although the boys generally sought access to global youth culture, their ethnic identities remained important in the way they used and enjoyed television. The pattern of ownership of satellite and cable TV confirmed that access to more global media also enabled better access to ethnic culture, in so far as this occurs in and, in the case of African-Caribbean and Asian groups, has its origin in other parts of the world than Britain. Ironically, the global media sometimes reinforced the ethnically familiar and what for some had been ethnically local prior to their own or, more usually, their parents’ immigration. We found that white households were less likely to have satellite or cable television (33 per cent) than either Asian (37 per cent), African-Caribbean (51 per cent) or African

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(54 per cent) households. Over two-thirds of the small number of Turks, Greeks and Arabs in our sample had satellite or cable TV. The percentage difference between white and Asian households is small, but overall, minority households are clearly more likely to have satellite or cable TV than white households. Explanations reflecting both ethnicity and class can be suggested for this. First, the content of satellite and cable TV tends to be more international or, in the case of some cable channels, more oriented to local minority groups than that of the five main terrestrial channels. Whereas the BBC and ITV have had to make conscious efforts to achieve multicultural policies, CNN and much of Sky News are targeted primarily at an international audience. Of course, as far as films, music and other entertainment programmes are concerned, ‘international’ in fact means predominantly American. Such programmes provide the staple menu on satellite TV, and the fact that they can often be understood fairly easily at a visual level may appeal particularly to those for whom English is a second language. Cable TV is also more likely to carry programmes targeted at specific ethnic-language groups, and some local channels are wholly devoted to their needs and interests. In contrast to this mix of internationally and locally oriented programming, ITV and even more so BBC strongly reflect the established tastes of the white majority and, despite some obvious efforts to the contrary, perhaps still operate on an assumption of national culture which reflects white interests. A second explanation for the above pattern of ownership reflects the class composition of the main ethnic groups in our survey. The observation that satellite TV is ‘council house television’ is a bit patronising, and probably less the case than it used to be, but interpreted as indicating a trend it receives some support from our survey. A higher proportion of the white boys in our survey were middle-class than was the case for Asian and African-Caribbean boys, and it was the latter groups that were most likely to live in houses owning satellite or cable TV. Although a sizeable number of the Asian boys, particularly those of Indian origins, were from small-scale entrepreneurial family backgrounds, the majority of Asian boys came from families that could be classified as semi-skilled or unskilled working-class or, depending on precise definition, ‘underclass’ in origin. On the same basis, a majority of the AfricanCaribbean boys were from traditional skilled or semi-skilled working-class backgrounds. Working-class culture is associated with a hedonistic and entertainment orientation, and this seems to fit the picture here. However, ownership of satellite and cable TV was so much greater among the AfricanCaribbean than the white households in our survey that an additional explanation to that of class difference seems to be required. Arguably, the strong orientation to entertainment and certain sports among AfricanCaribbean youth, some of which are more fully covered on satellite and cable TV, partly explains the pattern of ownership under discussion. The particular channels favoured by boys from the main ethnic groups are consistent with the patterns of ownership and the interpretation given above. In presenting the viewing preferences of the boys, it needs to be borne in mind that overall only a minority of the boys’ households—albeit a surprisingly

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large minority—had satellite or cable TV. White boys preferred channels 1, 3 and satellite in that order; African-Caribbeans 3, satellite and—a poor joint third, 1 and 4; Asians preferred 3, 1 and satellite. The white boys’ preference for BBC 1 may reflect both ethnic and class factors, in that the BBC still has a lingering white middle-class aura despite accusations of ‘dumbing down’. Asian boys preferred the somewhat more populist ITV ahead of BBC 1, followed by satellite—to which most had limited access. It is notable that satellite was the second favourite television channel of the African-Caribbean boys, particularly given that almost half of African-Caribbean households did not own satellite or cable TV. This further supports the analysis that African-Caribbeans have a strong entertainment orientation which is significantly fed by international material. Comics and magazines: heroes and fantasies Although shifts of youth cultural taste and style often have an original twist to them, some themes recur which have a certain archetypal quality. In order to access some of the more fundamental as well as more transient aspects of youth culture, we asked the boys about the comics and magazines they read, and posed some more general questions about people they admired and the reasons why, which gave scope to some of their fantasies. We did not specifically seek information on their sexual fantasies, although a few offered this unsolicited, in some cases in sexist, macho language. In the questionnaire, we asked the boys what comics and magazines they read; and which comic character they liked best and why; which sportsperson they most admired and why; and their most admired person. We also asked respondents, both in the questionnaire and the interview, what they would most like to do if they had as much free time and money as they wanted. The responses of many of the boys to the above kinds of questions were extremely stereotypical. Frequent reference was made to macho activities and achievement, sometimes shading into violence and, predictably, into sexual peacockery. The humour enjoyed by many boys often had an aggressive and anti-authority edge—Dennis the Menace from the ever popular Beano being much cited as a favourite character. Another character mentioned had a name which suggested pure macho—Iron Man. Sid the Sexist from Viz magazine was also a popular character. A minority of the boys informally took the opportunity to use the questionnaire itself as a medium for expressing macho rudeness, much of which focused on their desire to ‘shag’ prominent female models or film stars. Fortunately, such responses provided data that was perhaps even more valid than that generated by the formal questions and confirmed that juvenile macho rudeness, especially of a sexual kind, remains a favoured form of humour among mid-teenage boys. Some boys mature out of these attitudes but others do not appear to. That is a large part of the current crisis of gender relations. Men behaving like boys seem to appeal less and less to women—at least not as the basis of a longer-term relationship.

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It is not easy to devise effective ways to confront such attitudes. Further legal constraint and censorship of the sexual content of boys’ literature might produce the opposite response from that intended, and, in any case, the Internet offers vast alternative possibilities far more difficult to control. In this largely private area, discussion and persuasion are probably the only feasible approach. It is not hard to envisage an approach to sex and sexuality which puts more emphasis on sensitivity and communication than that expressed by the likes of Sid the Sexist, and the acres of flesh and suggestiveness of the popular magazines for young men. Even granted that the sex drive is more or less universally insistent at puberty, not every culture presents sex in such a way that ‘nudgenudge, heh-heh’ is seen as a normal response. While criticising the violent and sexist content of some comic and magazine fantasy, it is worth remembering that excess is inherent to fantasy. Fantasy ‘occurs’ when—in the phrase of the sixties—‘the lid is off the id’ and the reality principle takes a long trip. The fascination and fun of fantasy is partly that it allows the unusual or the otherwise unthinkable ‘to happen’. Everyday life is subverted and subterranean values are given expression. In allowing demons and jokers free play in fantasy, it is possible that they are exorcised and so the need to evoke them in real life is reduced or removed. This is simply to suggest in slightly less familiar terms that the media can purge the behaviour it portrays as well as stimulate it. Of course, such an analysis assumes that boys can distinguish between reality and fantasy. Those, presumably few, that cannot effectively make such a distinction are likely to constitute a danger to themselves or others. Another problem is one of balance. Granted that all experience, including the indulgence of fantasy, has some effect in forming character and habit, how much freedom/licence should comics and magazines have to present and sell the kind of images and messages indicated above? Sports magazines were popular reading matter among the boys, and sports personalities were frequently mentioned as admired individuals as well as being chosen in response to the specific question on favourite sportspeople. Nearly all the sportspeople mentioned by the boys were males. An exceptional response from one boy mentioned the Jamaican champion sprinter Merlene Ottey. However this proved not to be a stand for gender equality, the reason given being that she ‘has nice legs’. The only woman sports star admired for nonsexist reasons was the tennis player, Monica Seles. Blatant macho display was not the only expression of masculinity in the reading matter favoured by the boys. Across the four schools, computer magazines were mentioned by the boys almost as often as comics and sports magazines. What appealed here was partly the power, speed and control associated with computer technology. Depending on the precise framework of the game, the technology was usually harnessed in the cause of achieving a high score under pressure or in defeating—in fact, often ‘destroying’ or ‘zapping’—the enemy. This type of behaviour could be termed ‘technomasculinity’ or ‘techno-macho’, as it is clearly a sub-genre of macho masculinity (see pages 42–5).

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Having initially been associated with an extension of the stereotypical female secretarial role, the use of computer technology and software has more latterly been colonised by males. It seems quite likely that the development of computer games stressing competition, conflict and destruction has helped to promote the gendering of youthful computer activity in this way. Skills in handling computer technology and software in youth can have substantial pay-offs in adult life. Knowledge and command of either or both computer hardware or software can convey status as well as being a help—if not a requirement—in many occupations. Predictably, it was mainly in the context of playing computer games rather than as a tool of learning or work that most boys mentioned the new technology. Nevertheless, the computer skills and confidence acquired and refined through playing these often ‘win or bust’ games, and the honing of their ‘competitive instincts’, would be likely to work to their advantage in the tough modern world of work. Despite some significant differences in leisure habits reflecting ethnicity which are discussed below, these remarks applied generally to the boys in our survey. However, in addition to minor variations within the general pattern, there were some boys who were quite distinctive and idiosyncratic in their tastes and in the people they admired. Not all African-Caribbean boys chose sports stars as people they admired or as role models. One picked out Martin Luther King as the person he himself would most like to have been, given the choice. In response to the same question, a white English boy surprisingly jumped two generations in choosing Keith Richards, ageing lead guitarist of the Rolling Stones. This choice fitted the boy’s overall lifestyle and aspirations. His special interest was playing the guitar and he said that, given the time and money, he would spend them on guitars, raves, drink and drugs! The macho ideals and sexual fantasies of the boys—often expressed in crude and chauvinistic humour—featured across all the ethnic groups, although matters concerning relationships and sexuality tended to be dealt with less blatantly and sometimes more sensitively by some Asian boys. The youth leisure industry readily caters for and fosters these macho and sexual perspectives and tastes at the global national/ethnic and even local levels of cultural reference. Globally, it is still American-made films, now available through video in offthe-shelf form, which are the main conveyors of hegemonic macho and techno masculinity. When linked to national or ethnic identity and loyalty, aggressive masculinity is often reinforced and the sports industry has cashed in massively on these intense sentiments. Speed and technology are other factors that sports advertisers like to associate themselves with. For instance, at times it is not easy to decide whether it is more (or less!) interesting to watch Formula One drivers and cars in a race or to settle for reading about their kit! At the local level, sport also generates the production of sports kits and equipment carrying the local favours as well as the sponsor’s brand name and advertising logos. In the case of the more successful teams, the local can become national, and in the case of a few, even global.

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Youthful masculinities, ethnicity and leisure Ethnicity played a significant role in the leisure activities of the boys, and therefore in their personal and cultural identities, although it was not in all cases the main influence. Such matters are impossible to quantify precisely but, as Marie Gillespie suggests in the extract below, global cultural/commercial trends are now arguably the most powerful influence on youth culture. Young people are not passive in the face of these forces but, to varying degrees, have the ability to negotiate, select and initiate cultural style and meaning. The interplay of youthful creativity and inspiration with the organisational and profit imperatives of the commercial leisure industry is a central theme of the post-war study of youth culture. From the formidable social statements and challenges of Bob Marley or John Lennon to the skill and status displays of kids playing video games, youth culture is generated from below as well as shaped from above by capitalist managers. The most recent example of a music trend that had its origin in the street, or, more precisely, the ghetto, is rap, previously known as hip hop. Some more successful rap singers have formed their own music-producing and publishing companies and have become rich businessmen themselves. Invariably they claim to be still in touch with their roots… Ethnic culture is simply one highly significant factor among many in the constantly changing flow of youth culture. Allowing for some differences of emphasis, our research leads us to agree with Gillespie’s succinct summary of these factors in relation to the Indian youth of Southall: …Youth cultures are increasingly transnational cultures of consumption which apparently transcend ethnic and other divisions. However, the hierarchies of taste and style which are endorsed among the youth of Southall are marked not only by ethnic, gender and generational differences but also by material and other cultural differences. In their…talk young people discuss these differences; they clarify distinctions between American, British and Indian consumer lifestyles and aspirations… (Gillespie, 1995:176) White boys and leisure: ‘Macho of the Day’ This section mainly explores the relationship between white ethnicity, masculinities and sport, especially football, although other aspects of the white boys’ leisure activities are also briefly touched on here, as well as referred to in other sections of this chapter. The reason for this selective emphasis is that nationalism/‘ethnicism’ comes through as a strong, perhaps surprisingly strong, theme in the boys’ leisure culture. Of all leisure activities this theme is most obvious in football. An important underlying question is whether their enthusiasm for football fuels intolerance of others such as ethnic minorities, or rather that the game channels aggression and competitiveness and opens up opportunity for tolerant and positive relationships. As might be expected in the case of the dominant ethnic group, the identification

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with ‘the national game’ is stronger than among ethnic minorities who have other cultural frames of reference and resources to draw on. However, it is particularly relevant to consider how white boys are responding to multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan trends in football and other sports. Two of the West London schools had a majority of white boys on roll. In general, the leisure activities, heroes and fantasies of these boys conformed to the pattern referred to above, although some of their interests reflected their more middle-class culture. This was apparent in their reading habits, and the inclusion among their favourite magazines of Exchange and Mart, Angling Times and a variety of science fiction and media publications, as well as the very popular computer magazines. White boys were likely to mention non-white athletes— particularly Linford Christie—among the sports stars they admired more than black boys were likely to mention non-black sports stars. None of the white boys mentioned a non-white as the person they would most like to be. Crossing the racial/ethnic boundary in this respect was a change of identity apparently too radical for them to envisage, yet they were able to admire and desire particular qualities they found in black people. Film and sports stars were the most popular choices in the category of the person the boys would most like to be, but also included were the inevitable Richard Branson, as well as Donald Trump and Ben Elton. One boy, a steam-train buff, selected George Stevenson, which was relatively original though still predictably ‘boyish’. Football was the most distinct indicator of national and local cultural identification among white boys, including those from more middle-class backgrounds. Many declared their support for the England football team and for a club team which was usually a big club near-by. There was a tendency for Ealing boys to mention Chelsea as a favoured team, and an even stronger one for the Hackney boys to mention Arsenal or, less often, Tottenham. At this time, the Arsenal captain Tony Adams was a much admired figure, as was the club’s black striker of the time, Ian Wright, whose appeal was almost as great among white boys as among African-Caribbeans. As will be more fully illustrated later in this chapter, football and other sports were sometimes the focus of national/ethnic identification and of potential rivalry and conflict between ethnic groups. Given the amount of racial abuse that has been aimed at black players in the past quarter of a century, it is not surprising that attendance at league games by young African-Caribbeans has tended to be thin. Attendance by young African-Caribbeans at football matches has greatly lagged behind the extent of their participation as players in Premiership football, when at the time of the study, the mid-1990s, they made up about 20 per cent of all players—a figure now probably slightly reduced by the influx of overseas players—many of whom are white—in the second half of the 1990s. African-Caribbean youth must also have been discouraged from attending football matches by the organised hooliganism—often with an explicit racist element—that developed among some white youth on the terraces of some football grounds. Despite these occurrences, support and participation for national and league sides sometimes transcends ethnic ‘lines’. The large number

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of foreign players in British football may have helped to break down some of its chauvinism and parochialism. At the time of our research the French-born player Eric Cantona was at the height of his fame and popularity in England. Although he played for a Northern team, Manchester United, he was mentioned positively by a number of the boys. One referred to him as ‘a brilliant player and a good man’. The latter part of that description might puzzle some referees, but it indicates the extent to which sports stars can act as significant role models to the young. Although none of the boys in our survey expressed awareness of the connection, among a significant minority of sports supporters and participants, nationalism and ethnocentrism articulates strongly with macho posturing. These sentiments sometimes boil over into xenophobia, racism and violence. The ugly culture of racism that has infected the margins of football should not be understated. However, few, if any, condemn popular music as a whole because it contains a quasi-fascist fringe, and the same should be true of sport. While the nationalism and chauvinism fostered by commercialised sport risks reactionary and dangerous outcomes, it is also arguable that, for most people, sport channels competitive feelings in a relatively controlled and safe way. At the same time, national and international sport provides many opportunities for positive interaction between people of different backgrounds. In Britain, the organisation, policing and surveillance of sports audiences has greatly improved in recent years. What sports organisers and educators must also do is seek to minimise the negative sentiments and behaviour associated with some sports while enhancing the positive. For the majority of people, affection for locality and country does not lead to antisocial behaviour; indeed, the contrary is probably more the case. Given some of the tragedies and violence associated with football, it is not surprising that some of the media coverage about it has been negative. Less publicised are the many positive relationships that develop among sports participants and doubtless among supporters as well. This was not an area we probed deeply but there were some indications that boys of different ethnic origin resolved, as well as exacerbated, problems of communication and other issues through playing together and through supporting the same team. As has been previously mentioned, some white boys who expressed racist views were positive about their shared experience with African-Caribbean boys in a sporting context (see page 56). It may well be that organised social contact with others is one of the more effective ways of constructively resolving ambiguous feelings about ‘race’ or, at least, subjecting them to a test against experience. While some white boys use sport as a means of expressing racism, others seemed to combine their nationalism and localism with a seemingly relaxed acceptance of the multi-ethnic and international make-up of much of British sport, especially football. Several explanations suggest themselves for this. First, as members of the ethnic majority, white boys may not feel threatened by the appearance of a minority of non-whites in various sports. If so, the process of acceptance may well be partial and complex. It may be that only certain qualities of athleticism and assertiveness are embraced, and only within certain contexts.

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Black athleticism is a familiar and relatively easily managed stereotype in that the recognition of prowess is narrowly defined. Recognition of athletic achievement is quite compatible with wholly or partially with-holding wider social acceptance. Les Back makes a similar point in relation to friendships between black and white boys when he suggests that the attraction may sometimes be flimsily based on admiration of the perceived ‘machismo’ of black boys which white boys may covet for themselves (Back, 1996). Another aspect of the psychology of partial acceptance is that it may amount to little more than sponsorship for the sake of practical advantage, perhaps inspired by stereotyping— ‘black guys are good at football, so we better have one in the team’. Global and American influences A second reason for the seemingly easy acceptance by white boys of the cosmopolitan nature of much of British sport applies equally to overseas white as well as black players. As far as the boys were concerned, the cosmopolitanisation of British sport was more or less taken for granted and added to the excitement and spectacle of the game. It is part of a wider process of the globalisation of the media and of media-sport which finances the geographical mobility of better players as well as providing sporting entertainment from every part of the world. Given the age of the boys in our survey, it is not surprising that they were taking these developments in their stride—they had known nothing else. Although American influences were generally quite apparent in the leisure life of white boys, especially music and leisure, this was less so in the case of sport. In contrast to African-Caribbean boys, basketball was scarcely mentioned by white boys, although some made references to American boxers. However, there is always the exception! One white boy seemed entirely Americanised in his leisure preferences, including the kind of sports he liked. He read Touchdown and First Down, magazines which covered American football; chose Emmitt Smith, an American sportsman, as his favourite sportsperson, and—in an ideal world—aspired to own an American football team. For good measure, he mentioned ‘Idaho Joe’, a fictional cartoon figure, as his favourite comic character—because of his ‘funny sarcasm’. In terms of favourite comic characters, more often mentioned by other white boys were the anarchic American schoolboys Beavis and Butthead, whose laid-back cynicism and cool contempt for authority mixed in with disaster-prone youthful gaucheness seemed to be a basis of hilarity and perhaps identification. Precisely how globalisation affects the boys’ sentiments in relation to their national and local football teams is a moot point. Experience shows that a multiethnic England team and largely overseas Arsenal and Chelsea sides can continue to draw on their traditional sources of support as well as attracting greater middle-class support than in the past. It does not follow that, because a symbol of local identity—in this case a football team—becomes differently constituted, the feelings focused upon it will therefore be withdrawn. Just as

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the meanings attached to referents can change, so a changing referent can continue to attract much the same meanings. Even so, it would be surprising if there was not some change, however gradual, in the way white English supporters of football perceived and felt about it. While globalisation, nationalism and localism do not interact predictably, in this context globalisation seems to have the potential to undermine nationalism and localism. In the longer term, even the less sophisticated might see the inconsistency, not to put it any stronger, of using ‘their’ team as a vehicle for their prejudice against black people or foreigners when it is quite likely to contain both. Such modest insight should not undermine enjoyment of football, although it may slightly shift the focus of pleasure from tribalistic competition to an appreciation of skills and character. In so far as the globalisation of football is about the mobility and display of elite talent of any ethnic background, this process should be enhanced. There were certainly many boys in our survey who expressed more interest in the skill and character aspects of sport rather than in its macho and chauvinistic associations. African-Caribbean boys and leisure The multicultural nature of the Hackney school ensured that we had a sizeable representation of African-Caribbean boys in our overall sample. This school was the most ethnically diverse of the four schools we surveyed. There were also smaller but significant minorities of African-Caribbean students at the West London schools. In addition, there were a number of boys with one or both parents born in Africa. These shared some attitudes and experience with AfricanCaribbean students but also tended to differ from them in certain respects. Unsurprisingly, the African students were less likely to refer to or identify with distinctly African-Caribbean reference points or individuals, such as hip hop or Linford Christie. They referred relatively more often to white sports stars, including the Olympic champion hurdler, Sally Gunnell, and the then English international soccer player, Nigel Clough. One student, both of whose parents were born in Ghana, supported the German football team because ‘they are the best’. A student whose parents were born in Nigeria mentioned Michael Heseltine as the person he himself would most like to have been but did not elaborate why. This last example notwithstanding, there was a slight suggestion that some African boys wanted to avoid strongly identifying with either the majority British or the African-Caribbean culture. Their distancing from the majority British culture is perhaps less surprising than that from African-Caribbean, but a degree of rivalry and competitive edge between black West Africans and AfricanCaribbeans is not unusual. Even so, there was substantial overlap in the sporting, musical and other cultural tastes of British-African and African-Caribbean boys. Probably no group in Britain has been more subject to stereotyping than African-Caribbeans. Much of the stereotyping of men and boys involves a particular construction of their masculinity and sexuality. They have frequently been presented in the dominant culture as highly physical and sexual, and as

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unacademic and unintellectual, if not unintelligent. These stereotypes have affected the leisure as well as the school and working lives of young AfricanCaribbeans. However, although the more general purpose of stereotyping— consciously or unconsciously intended—is to put the victim in an inferior position in terms of power and advantage, it is possible for victims not only to negotiate and mitigate the effects of stereotyping, but even to turn the stereotype to positive effect. It helps, of course, that even some mainly negative stereotypes may contain some positive message—to be considered physical and sexual may bring perceived advantages. Furthermore, many stereotypes reflect aspects of social reality—albeit often in exaggerated and offensive form. Thus, the vaunted ‘musical ability of black people’ can be stated in a patronising manner, but it may actually exist and be explainable in historical and cultural terms rather than as something ‘natural and innate’. Under slavery, black people were frequently deprived of access to literature and other means of cultural expression but one thing they often could do was to create music. The achievements of black singers in folk and popular music—gospel, blues, jazz as well as more recent varieties— is unique and perhaps unequalled. Like their forebears, African-Caribbean boys in our survey were living in circumstances not entirely of their own choosing, but what some of them made of those circumstances expressed considerable intelligence and sensitivity. The case has already been made that the emergence of ‘black macho’ in the United States and Britain can also be partly understood as a reaction against white patriarchy and racism as well as partly an internalisation of white stereotypes (see pages 61–6). While any type of macho tends to be destructive to self and others, black macho has also partly functioned as a defensive/aggressive protection mechanism. Three case studies of African-Caribbean boys: leisure pursuits as possible careers There was no shortage of interest in music and sport among the AfricanCaribbean boys in our sample although there were some exceptions. Two African-Caribbean boys had serious ambitions in music and football respectively. Nathan wanted to perform and record rap music, and George wanted to be a footballer. Neither of them were naive enough to take success for granted, and both of them had alternative careers in mind. Perhaps reflecting the skilled craft tradition of East London, reinforced by the immigration of skilled workers from the Caribbean, both considered engineering as a possible fall-back career—for Nathan, the choice was sound engineering; for George, motor mechanics. Nathan saw a job in sound engineering as secondary to his rapping ambitions: I just feel a bit unsure. The thing is, I do rapping, have done since the first year, and I’ve come across a lot of record companies into rap…So I’ve got to find myself something to do while I’m doing rapping as well. That’s why I wanted to do sound engineering but…I can’t take that course [it was

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not available]…I reckon, yes, I will be unemployed for some part of my life. But that time will be spent in the studio working on my own material. In general, Nathan’s attitudes to gender might be described as moderately macho. Living only with his father and brother, he had become accustomed to caring for himself and had egalitarian attitudes towards domestic work (see page 138). At school he wanted to balance work and fun, with perhaps the balance being tilted towards fun: But in a way I think it’s kind of cool to mess around a little, as long as at the end of the day you’re getting what education you want…You can live a little, get in trouble a few times, but as long as you’re not like one of the pupils that is always on the hit list, you’re alright. (Nathan) Given his prioritisation of his musical ambitions over doing paid work, by now, several years on, Nathan might well be living on benefits. He would not be the first young musician to make that choice. For him unemployment is essentially a part of a high-risk career strategy that could end in hard times but which also offers the possibility of considerable fulfilment and reward. This is a pattern of risk-taking that appears somewhat more common among young black than among young white males and contributes to the fact that proportionately more young black males achieve success in the music industry but more also become unemployed. Following Tony Sewell’s classification, Nathan might be described as a ‘hedonist’ rather than a nationalist, as his indifference to formal school processes was motivated by a wish to enjoy himself rather than by any ideological opposition to school (see Introduction, page 3). However, his was a hedonism which was calculated in terms of money as well as pleasure. George’s parents were born in St Lucia in the West Indies. George was more prepared than Nathan to compromise over his career ambitions. Asked what he might do when he left school, he replied: ‘Be an engineer. Or a professional footballer. One or the other. I’m working on both at the moment. I’ll have to choose in the end.’ Despite George’s caution, his hopes of becoming a professional footballer were no mere pipe-dream. He was in training with Queens Park Rangers, who were at the time a Premiership club, and he had a realistic prospect of getting a Youth Training Scheme place with them. But George had no doubt which career he preferred, and why: ‘The glamour, the glamour of football. I’ll be earning money but for something I enjoy doing. It’s not like I won’t enjoy mechanics but playing football is different to working on cars.’ Like Nathan, George wanted to move into an occupational area in which African-Caribbean males are substantially over-represented. In part, this overrepresentation is due to discrimination against them in other areas of employment, the relative openness of soccer and the music industry to transparent talent, and the internalisation of the ‘good at sport and music’

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stereotypes by young African-Caribbeans. Given that only a small minority can make a living out of sport or music, these factors contribute to the unemployment and stunted career opportunities of many young AfricanCaribbean males. But this is not how Nathan and George saw it. For them, rap and football respectively were compelling choices and ones at which observation of their peers convinced them that they had a reasonable chance of success. Viewed optimistically, but not that optimistically, these two young men may have been standing on the edge of interesting and rewarding careers— albeit perhaps short-lived ones. Although sport and music bring fame and fortune only to a few, they are growing areas of employment in an affluent, leisure-oriented society. The shift towards a leisure society is likely to be of some overall benefit to AfricanCaribbeans, of whom a relatively large number work in the leisure and entertainment area. The expansion of leisure industries in the post-industrial epoch may offset the decline in manual work which historically has been the main area of employment for African-Caribbean males. But to put matters in perspective, such developments will at best do no more than make a contribution to the emergence of a modest-sized and rather youthful African-Caribbean elite. This leaves unsolved the more bread-and-butter problem of the continuing unequal access of young African-Caribbean men to solid working- and middleclass jobs. This goal—broadly one of racial and economic equity—must be a main focus of government policy. However, given the huge contribution the leisure and entertainment industry now makes to Britain’s GDP and to its exports, it may to some extent be possible to achieve economic equity by drawing on the creative and expressive talents of many young African—Caribbeans. These talents are deeply embedded in black history and culture, and it is unlikely that any welfare to work or other policy could seriously undermine them; nor should it. The African-Caribbean boys we interviewed were as individually diverse as those from any other ethnic group. One of them—Winston, from a West London school—was very different indeed, at least as perceived in terms of our own categories and assumptions. Winston was obviously of ‘mixed race’, apparently of African and European stock. This turned out to be the case. However, it emerged that Winston had only one fairly distant relative of African origin. As far as Winston was concerned, he was neither ‘black’ nor ‘mixed-race’ but ‘white’. He seemed to see his white identity partly in biological and partly in cultural terms—all but one of his relatives were white and he spent most of his time with white people. Given the thought and passion Winston put into explaining his own perception of his identity, it seemed pointless to insist on trying to place him within a more ‘objective’ framework of definition. A more sympathetic response is to appreciate the dilemmas and irritation felt by those included by others in categories in which they do not include themselves. Winston was also relatively unusual in his leisure activities, in that he emphasised that he preferred to socialise and make friends with older people rather than his peers. He even made one of his favoured activities—‘drinking’— sound like an indicator of his maturity rather than of mid-teen pretensions.

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Speculating, it may also have been that Winston liked pubs because drinking in pubs is a traditional habit of white men and is less popular with young black people—whom he seemed to wish to avoid. Remarkable though Winston undoubtedly considered himself to be (he indicated that a glittering future in a profession was there for the taking), he was not entirely his own creation. He was an only child whose parents appeared to share his attitudes, and this may account for premature adulthood and disdain for the lifestyles of his contemporaries. Global influences on the leisure activities of African-Caribbean boys Other African-Caribbean boys at the West London schools conformed somewhat more closely than Winston to expectation. They were more likely to choose black men than any others as sports or other personalities they admired, but they also showed some cosmopolitanism in their choices. Even the sports stars they mentioned tended to be figures of European or even global stature. The most frequently mentioned were: the footballer, later to be Chelsea manager, Ruud Gullit; the American Olympic champion sprinter, Michael Johnson; and the legendary American basketball player, Michael Jordan. The African-Caribbean boys showed a strong tendency to choose American sports stars as idols and, in this context as in others, globalisation in effect largely means Americanisation—in this case with a transatlantic black twist! The popularity of black American basketball players partly reflects the niche and occasionally prime-time coverage of the sport on satellite and cable TV, to which African-Caribbean boys had relatively greater access. There is also some coverage of basketball on the main terrestrial channels. The African-Caribbean boys mentioned relatively few black film stars among the people they admired or wished to be like. This is probably because in the mid-1990s there were relatively few internationally famous black film stars (the likely explanation for this is that the mainly American financiers of wouldbe ‘blockbuster’ films, the regular appearance of which the industry depends on, regard minority stars as high-risk in terms of their ability to deliver mass audiences—unless, perhaps those minority stars are white British). In contrast, most sports, with the partial exception of tennis and the more comprehensive exception of golf, have been substantially penetrated by black athletes. In basketball they appear to dominate. Perhaps because of the relative paucity of leading black film stars, the African-Caribbean boys chose more non-blacks among film than among sports stars in the relevant categories. These included the ultra-macho Bruce Lee and Arnold Schwarzenegger as individuals they would most like to be. One African-Caribbean boy chose the first man on the moon, Neil Armstrong, in the latter category. These choices reinforce the view that there is a often strong macho component to youthful AfricanCaribbean masculinity but indicate that it is not tied exclusively to black role models.

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Interpreting the leisure activities of African-Caribbean boys The African-Caribbean cultural commentator, Paul Gilroy, has observed that ‘black expressive cultures affirm while they protest’ (quoted in Alexander, 1996:17). Much of the information about the boys discussed above is individually specific and as such is not easily generalisable, but it suggests that most were positive and life-affirming in their approach to leisure. The youth of the boys partly explains their strong desire to ‘have fun’, although most of them balanced this with an appreciation of the realities of work and money. There were some signs of what might be termed ‘resistance’ by some African-Caribbean boys in the school context and in their relations with authority generally, but this could also be said of the macho white working-class boys. Such limited resistance among white boys reflects the relatively impotent structural position of youth rather than any developed political or social radicalism. However, the position of young African-Caribbeans differs from young working-class whites in the crucial area of racism. Awareness of racism is massively present in black youth culture, particularly in the lyrics of songs and poetry. It is more than likely that Nathan’s creative work would deal with this and other black cultural issues. In his research into a group of AfricanCaribbean boys of similar age to those in our survey, Tony Sewell (1997) found some who had developed an outlook which was sufficiently politically focused for him to designate it as ‘nationalist’. These were boys who felt primary allegiance to a distinct and even separate black identity rather than a shared trans-ethnic British identity. A nationalist point of view would be compatible with the behaviour and attitudes of some of the African-Caribbean boys we interviewed, although rather more appeared to better fit a second category indicated by Sewell—‘hedonists’. These boys were not politically minded, and their anti-school posture was incidental to the more important goal of ‘having fun’. Interpretation of African-Caribbean culture in Britain has been deeply influenced by the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, particularly when under the directorship of Stuart Hall for the decade between the early 1970s and early 1980s. The concept of cultural resistance as applied to AfricanCaribbean youth remains relevant as a description of one mode of response to authority and racism. However, as a mode of response it is best understood as just one which individuals and groups might adopt to a greater or lessor extent, and more so in some contexts than others. Thus Nathan could be described as resisting the conventional routines of school and work by virtue of his neglect of, and indifference to, them. But to see him as acting primarily in negative terms is to miss the main point. In Gilroy’s terms, Nathan was much more into affirmation than protest, although his own music doubtless expressed both. In contrast, George was more cautiously staying in touch with or accommodating ‘the system’, while a wish to escape into ‘the glamour’ of football, whether stereotypically or otherwise, was not his greatest concern. Winston by his own definition should not have appeared in this section, but where else should we put him? Some might classify him as adopting a strategy of assimilation, but this hardly does justice to the complexities of his attempts to develop a strong and

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confident identity. Ultimately, sociology has to accept that individuals do not quite fit general categories and that some virtually defy them altogether. It is not surprising that African-Caribbean youth sets the pace for much of youth culture generally. The visibility and success of a relatively large number of African-Caribbean boys in popular and high-status activities within youth culture such as music and sport attracts admiration, imitation and some envy. So does their confidence, macho swagger and lack of deference to authority. Yet several of the African-Caribbean boys expressed ambiguous attitudes towards black macho, implying that it was as much a shell protecting their own vulnerabilities and sensitivities as a weapon against a hard and sometimes unfair world. Asian boys and leisure The culture of Asian boys in relation to white and African-Caribbean boys is in certain respects still distinct and likely to remain so, but in other respects is clearly moving in the direction of the wider youth culture. In this confluence both cultures change. It is a characteristic of traditional cultures that youth as an age grade is much more tightly tied into the general structures and values of a given society. The leisure ‘space’ and conspicuous consumption that characterises modern youth culture is not available in traditional societies, although the scope allowed to young people for play and sexual exploration in such societies, both ritualised and ‘free’, can vary. As it happens, traditionally Hindu, Sikh and Muslim cultures tend to exercise a relatively high degree of control over the young. Compared to Western norms, parental and communal control is particularly strong in the areas of sexuality and choice of marriage partner, and often extends to leisure and career matters. This contrasts with the situation that has developed in most modern Western societies, particularly Britain and America, where a high degree of freedom in sexual and leisure matters has developed, especially in the post-war era and even more so since the 1960s. Whether a traditional or late modern context provides a ‘better’ environment for youth to grow up in is a matter of judgement, reflecting values and taste. What is obvious, however, is that young Asians are, in varying degrees, aware of these cultural differences and respond in various and sometimes complex ways. To assume that all or most young Asians are ‘caught between two cultures’ or ‘in cultural conflict’ is to distort the subtlety of the cultural processes and responses at work. The Indian boys in our survey used a wider range of cultural reference in describing their interests and in indicating their identity than did the Pakistani boys. Chief among these were their own ethnic cultures, the dominant English national culture and global youth culture. Although different reference points conveyed more or less different meanings, they frequently blended and overlapped. When the Indian boys wanted to make statements about masculinity, they sometimes referred to global and the dominant English culture as well as their own ethnic culture. Thus to some extent their masculine

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identifications drew them away from exclusively ethnic references. This is unsurprising, because the language and symbolism of masculinity and patriarchy is virtually universal, while ethnic identity tends to be defined as exclusive. This is best illustrated by discussing what some of the boys themselves said. Asian boys in two West London schools in which they were a numerical minority Not surprisingly, it was at schools in which Asian boys were in a minority that the tendency to draw on wider cultural references most noticeably occurred, rather than at the third West London school where they were in a large majority. At the former schools, even cricket, which is hugely popular in both India and Pakistan, was referred to only infrequently. Two Indian boys at one Ealing school in which Asian boys were in a minority had cultural tastes that were particularly Westernised and globalised. One mentioned Batman and Spawn as favoured comic characters and offered an impressive mini-portrait of a sportsman he admired. This was the African-Caribbean footballer Paul Ince, who was admired because he ‘didn’t respond when bananas were thrown at him’ during a game. The second Indian boy also expressed admiration for a sportsman—the then England cricket captain Michael Atherton—whom he saw as ‘clever, perseveres, level-headed’. The tone of this boy’s response dropped a few notches in answer to the question ‘what would you do given the time and money?’: his answer was ‘shag women’. If such references to leading sportsmen illustrate a pervasive youthful macho, in these cases it is perhaps the more acceptable side of macho. It is possible that the qualities of resilience and survival that these boys admire were of particular relevance in their own lives as members of minorities, even though the men who expressed them were not of their own ethnic group.1 At the other West London school in which Asian boys were in a minority— albeit a sizeable one—it was again Indian rather than Pakistani boys who were the most likely to mention people and influences from outside their own ethnic group. One Indian student read comics and Hip Hop magazines. He also expressed an interest in martial arts, particularly admiring the film star JeanClaude Van Damme, a martial arts specialist.2 One reason why the Indian boys in these schools referred to so many non-Asian British or international stars may be that, as a minority in a particular school, they were influenced by the tastes of the majority of the boys. To participate adequately in everyday conversation with their non-Asian peers required that they shared a common basis of knowledge and interest. To a greater or lesser extent, they may also have felt a pull towards peer conformity common among this age group. However, perhaps the main reason why Indian boys so frequently admired sports stars from other ethnic groups is that there are so few Indians in many of the major sports played in the West. This is most notably the case in soccer and athletics. Those Indian boys who did take an interest in these sports were very likely to be drawn to the non-Asians who played them. Ironically, this

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meant that a comparatively culturally endogamous group was also the most eclectic in its range of cultural reference. It would be a mistake to confuse this eclecticism of necessity with a deeplyrooted cosmopolitanism. Rather, the Indian boys were approaching Western culture to some extent from the outside, at least in the sense that their parents were often more reserved about it than they were, and seldom provided models of achievement and aspiration in highly Westernised cultural areas. A partial exception to this is the entrepreneurial success of a relatively large number of Indians, but even this is significantly based on internal ethnic communal production and consumption. While such achievement might well provide a long-term model for imitation for some Indian boys, it is hardly an area from which the folk-heroes of youth culture are likely to be drawn. Whereas the African-Caribbean boys witnessed the most prominent of their ‘older generation’ make pop music and star in national and international sports, and consequently felt an immediate identification with them and their achievements, the Indian boys tended to admire stars from ethnic groups other than their own in relation to more Westernised areas of cultural achievement. Nevertheless, at the time of our research in the mid-1990s and even more so since, Asian youth, and especially Indian youth, had begun to cross the line between watching and participating in a number of cultural areas, particularly dance and music. The bhangra style of music, combining reggae with Indian musical forms, heralded the growing participation of Asian youth in the popular cultural scene. In this case a symbolic figure and cultural catalyst has been the hybrid music of Apache Indian. What often happens in these cultural confluences is not the assimilation of a minority by a majority group but the changing—however slight—of a cultural form or even the making of a new one. From cultural pluralism, hybrid and new cultural forms can emerge. Asian boys in a majority Asian West London school In one Ealing school, well over three-quarters of the students were Asian in origin. A large number were Sikhs from the Punjab, which lies partly in India and partly in Pakistan. There were also a large number of Muslim boys at the school with roots in Pakistan. Probably because of the predominantly Asian setting of the school, the students tended to emphasise their own ethnic culture more than was the case in those schools in which Asian boys were a minority. One means of flagging up their ethnic identification was in their respective support of the Pakistani and Indian cricket teams. As was the case with some white and African-Caribbean boys, ethnic and male chauvinism often converged and reinforced each other. There was especially strong support among the Pakistani boys at the school for the Pakistani cricket team. Many mentioned Imran Khan, the charismatic all-rounder, and Wasim Akram, the fast bowler, as sports stars whom they admired. In stark contrast, none of the Pakistani boys made mention of a British soccer star. Imran and Wasim are legendary macho figures and both

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wear their machismo in swashbuckling style. Their example would not be likely to mitigate any chauvinistic and patriarchal tendencies the boys might have. The support of the Pakistani boys for the Pakistani cricket team would ensure that they failed Norman Tebbit’s famous cricket test of ‘Englishness’. Tebbit’s test was that to be truly English one had to support the English national team. It was Tebbit’s intention in posing such an anachronistic test to assert an antiquated mono-culturalism, and to undermine multi-culturalism and, in particular, the view that the development of British post-war society inevitably meant the emergence of more varied and complex identities among British nationals. Such ‘hyphenated identities’ as black-British or British-Asian, some of which are incorporated in government documentation, indicate a simple acceptance and accommodation to this situation which is apparently beyond the capacity of Mr Tebbit to accept—just as it was beyond that of Enoch Powell before him. As is discussed elsewhere, in practice the complexity of many contemporary identities needs more subtle description and theorisation than is encompassed in the term ‘hyphenated identities’—often a hyphen is not nearly enough to encompass the varied and hybrid nature of many individual and group identities! Paul Gilroy’s magnificent image of ‘the black Atlantic’—although applying particularly to the ‘African diaspora’, better captures the scope of the issue. What the image suggests is the constant ebb and flow and counter-flow of cultural interactions over vast distances, constantly creating and re-creating identities (Gilroy, 1993b). As in the other schools, Indian boys expressed a much wider range of cultural reference than did the Pakistani boys. Even so, relatively few Indian and no Pakistani boys chose a well-known white-British or American person as someone they would most like to be. As was the case with white and AfricanCaribbean boys, no ‘ideal’ identity was envisaged that involved a change of racial/ethnic identity. This demonstrates—if further demonstration is needed— that ‘race’/ethnicity is regarded as a bedrock identity which few would wish to change. Several Asian boys left unanswered the question about who they might ideally like to be, and others responded with reference to general categories. The latter included ‘a millionaire’ and ‘a brave soldier’. One Indian boy chose his grandfather as the someone he would ideally like to be, and a boy of mixed Indian and Pakistani parents chose Einstein. Again, it was Indian rather than Pakistani boys who were more likely to select Western sports and film stars as people they admired. One referred to Arnold Schwarzenegger and to Mike Tyson—the latter in black patois: ‘he bad’. Adopting black patois is common among young people not of African origin and is highly significant in two respects. First, it illustrates the flux of argot, style and image in youth culture which often crosses ethnic lines. Second, it illustrates the strong influence if not the hegemony of youth of African roots within youth culture. Another Indian boy chose John Barnes, the black former Liverpool and England player, as his favourite footballer. Barnes, a highly skilled player and astute commentator on the game, is nobody’s idea of raw, narrow-minded macho. There is enough variety in the above replies to

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show that it is not only macho characteristics that are admired by Indian boys. Like boys from other ethnic groups, some of them look for intelligence and sensitivity in their idols and role models. One of the main ways Asian boys were able to access Asian cultures was through ethnic radio and videos. The Indian boys typically expressed mixed views about doing so. One student from the majority Asian school was an Indian film buff and strongly identified with Indian culture (albeit in its more Westernised manifestations!). His fantasy was to go to Bombay (Bollywood) and meet film stars. He also supported India at cricket and read ‘Asian magazines and English books’. Other Indian boys showed varying degrees of interest in Indian culture, although the majority expressed more enthusiasm for Western popular culture, including sport. One student veered towards a rejection of his parents’ culture—‘I don’t watch any Indian things’—and seemed frustrated by his parents’ preference for speaking in their own language. Marie Gillespie has commented acutely on the generational aspects of Asian culture in Southall in her ethnographic study Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change. She refers to ‘a dual concern voiced by many of Southall’s youth in particular: to achieve equality and recognition in British society without affronting their parental values’ (Gillespie, 1995:5). It is probably accurate to describe most of the Indian and Pakistani boys as seeking to accommodate parental expectations while participating in and enjoying a world foreign to many of their parents. However, different families and individuals did negotiate this complex challenge in different ways and with different degrees of harmony and conflict. Some clearly intended as adults to adopt different lifestyles and values than their parents. Because of the relative strictness of their parents’ moral and cultural views, some Pakistani boys seemed to feel it necessary to define their own—sometime different—vision more sharply. Distancing themselves from parents’ views was not confined to leisure matters. Significantly, in terms of implications for cultural change, some boys were not wholly at ease with their parents’ attitudes on sex and marriage, an issue also discussed in Chapter 3. For example, Kalbander, a Pakistani Muslim, made a deliberately uncompromising statement in relation to marriage: ‘I’ll marry for love’; while another Muslim boy was somewhat more circumspect when speaking of the question of living together with a partner before marriage: ‘it would be very difficult’ he said, referring to his parents’ almost certain opposition. Global currents: local conflicts The previous pages have illustrated that Asian boys in Britain interact with a wide variety of cultural influences. The source of some of these influences is global, although the boys sometimes selected cultural events and images that catered for their ethnic identities. Cultural influences seldom remain separate but are like swirls of differently coloured ink in a stream—some of them holding their distinctive shade for longer than others, but eventually intermingling in the creation of some new hybrid flow.

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Cricket provides an excellent example of the way cultural symbolism and activity changes its meaning in time and context. Earlier, it was described how the Pakistani cricket team is a focal point of ethnic identity for young BritishPakistanis in our survey. A visit of the Pakistani team to Britain provides the occasion for communal interest and, especially if it wins, celebration. At matches there is much singing and chanting and waving of flags. And yet, cricket of all games is quintessentially the traditional English game, exported to the then colonies with the rest of the trappings of Empire. Historically, cricket is much more the sport of the Imperial upper and upper middle classes—one reason, ironically, why it was introduced to colonial subjects rather than the more popular game of football. In Pakistan and India cricket has become the people’s game, and beating England at it is one way of getting back at the colonial ex-masters. Such victories can be seen as symbolically reversing the old order of power and status. Imran Khan, the former captain of the Pakistani cricket team, stated that his greatest ambition in cricket was to defeat England in a test series— significantly—in England. The conquered return as the conquerors (usually)! However, cricket, like many other popular sports, has become a tool of commerce and the media, and this has affected the way it functions as a vehicle for ethnic and national rivalry. For ‘grassroots’ supporters, national teams remain a focus of traditional loyalties, but for the media moguls who televise the games, the sponsors who help finance them, and to some extent even the now much-better-rewarded players, cricket is a business. For the very best players an international career can be a route to substantial wealth. Whether some are most motivated by the honour of representing their country or of making money is perhaps not entirely a fair speculation. More to the point here is to note the intensification of national rivalry and competition involved in selling modern cricket and other commercialised sports. Advertising of sport increasingly dramatises and hypes personal and team competition and conflict in order to build up interest and ticket sales. Of course, competition and conflict have always been part of cricket and other sports, but the combination of the thorough commercialisation and ‘media-isation’ of major professional sports has pushed these aspects to a new level of intensity. Cricket has perhaps been somewhat less affected by these trends than more genuinely globalised sports such as professional boxing and soccer, where the hype seems to grow in proportion to the investment in events. Even so, the days when cricket could be seen as a game played by gentlemen in a gentlemanly way are long gone. Sportsmanship has often been replaced by gamesmanship and ‘sledging’—a change in role-modelling that can hardly have any positive effect. In the absence of any conclusive research on media effects, it is possible only to surmise how boys are influenced by media-sport. It is odd that so much research on media effects has concentrated on fictional violence when it seems more likely that people would be influenced by real events, including sporting ones. Boys from all the larger ethnic groups in our survey, including the Pakistani and Indian boys, made frequent mention of their admiration of various sports stars. It seems likely that the hyped machismo and

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competitiveness surrounding much high-profile sport at the least reinforces other pressures in the boys lives for them to perform in a similar way. However, it was not the case that the boys only selected the crasser elements of macho behaviour to admire—and presumably to imitate; they valued mental strength as well as physical. Nearly all the boys tended to see their hero in highly individualised terms—as a man for himself—and seldom in terms of his contribution to the team or reference group. Yet, in a wider sense, the boys often did have a group frame of reference in mind when selecting figures they admired or identified with. Some boys mentioned particular stars because they were seen as ethnic folk heroes—often because of their conspicuous success and ‘masculine’ demeanour. Ethnic rivalry among Asian boys and communities Ethnic rivalry between Indians, mainly Sikhs, and Pakistani Muslims has done much to ensure that macho behaviour continues to flourish in Southall. As a majority among young people in much of Southall, Asian youth feels less threatened by young people from other ethnic groups. What is more to the fore is ethnic and religious conflict among Asians themselves. Some of the more aggressive conflict occurs among Asian boys and young men. As Desai, a student at the majority Asian school, put it, ‘in Southall Asians tend to fight other Asians’. In her discussion of ‘style types’ among the young Sikhs of Southall in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Marie Gillespie refers to the ‘hard’ style, one of several styles she noted among Asian youth (1995:187–8). The ‘hard’ style is signalled by the wearing of certain clothes and jewellery, such as leather jackets and Indian gold earrings—the sort of bricolage typical of contemporary youth cultures. According to Gillespie, ‘the “hard” style announces a claim to territorial power both on the streets of Southall and in the Punjab’ (1995:187). As befits its communal purpose, the style is a collective rather than an individualistic one, in that ‘hard’ types tended to go around in gangs of about six. The ethnic tension between Sikhs and Muslims in Southall involves a high degree of macho behaviour and merits further examination. Throughout the 1990s, a steady stream of incidents involving conflict between Sikh and Muslim youth have occurred, including two in 1997 involving fatalities. In the more serious of these confrontations, gangs were armed with ceremonial swords, baseball bats and axes—a frightening and bizarre global mix of weapons of potential destruction. The journalist Vivek Chaudhary describes how Manjit, a young Sikh participant in one of the 1997 incidents, explains his regalia: ‘Orange is the colour of Sikhism and that’s why I wear the bandanna. It’s to show people who I am.’ Manjit then produced a small ceremonial sword known as a ‘Kirpan’, which was draped diagonally across his torso, remarking: ‘That’s in case I meet any Pakis’ (Guardian, 3.5.97:6). Chaudhary quotes the opinion of Dalawar Chaudry, a local restaurateur, on the gangs of Sikh and Muslim youth. The latter sees them as a disturbing cultural hybrid: ‘Most of those involved have probably never even visited a

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temple or a mosque but they are giving all of us a bad name. These youngsters have no religion—they are a cross between British hooligans and ethnic community “heavies”. They have incorporated the worst of both cultures’ (ibid.). Vivek Chaudhary himself believes that the boys religious motivation is serious: For many of the youngsters, however, fervent religious loyalty has become a new form of identity which they boast about with the panache which you would expect of youths bragging about their latest designer label clothes. (ibid.) Whether the boys take their religions seriously or not, religion clearly functions as a symbolic and unifying aspect of collective ethnic identity. Their different religious identity feeds their defensive-aggressive posture towards each other. Although tension between the Sikh and Muslim communities is scarcely new, the situation in the 1990s contrasts with that of the 1970s and 1980s when Asian youth in Southall was more united in its opposition to racism, including its skinhead and quasi-fascist manifestations. Ironically, some Asian youth are manifesting a kind of ethnic chauvinism and even violence similar to that experienced by their own community. Ethnic intolerance is so commonplace, not only in Britain but worldwide, that any celebration of ethnic difference and diversity needs to be laced with caution and modified by openness and tolerance to others. Reified ethnicity is as dangerous as any other form of rigid and excluding ideology. Interpreting the leisure of Asian Boys Through youth culture, as well as through education, young Asians are in touch with a wider range of influences than many of their parents. This is certain to result in some cultural change between the generations, much of it probably substantial. It appears that Indian boys more readily shift their cultural focus to include dominant English national and global cultural referents than do Pakistani boys, but the limited nature of our data on the latter mean that any generalisations about them must be tentative. It is generally the case that a higher proportion of Indian immigrants into Britain were economically better off and were more familiar with the English language than was the case with Pakistani immigrants. To that extent, second- and third-generation Indian boys in England were better positioned than Pakistani boys to access dominant English national culture and also global culture. Further, the Hindu and Sikh religions tend to be less culturally enclosing and controlling than Islam. It is not surprising, therefore, that we found that Indian boys tended to be participating more fully in global youth culture than Pakistani boys. However, there was some adoption of Western values and norms among the latter, and this seems likely to increase. Unsurprisingly, it is in the major Indian and Pakistani settlement in Southall that traditional tension between Sikhs and Muslims most occurs. Young people

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have been at the heart of this tension and religion is a main aspect of the ethnic conflict. It appears that among some young Asians, a revival of religion and the adopting of traditional regalia, including weaponry, has been stimulated by the conflict. Culture is always in some degree of flux and this can include a reclaiming and, for that matter, a re-invention of tradition, as well as a participation in the new. Southall is the largest settlement of Indian people outside of the subcontinent, and it contains too a large Pakistani Muslim settlement. Ethnic tension there can occur on a larger scale than in other areas of Asian settlement. Nothing can be taken for granted in the sensitive area of ethnic relations, but many of the Asian boys in our survey seemed capable of coping with the cultural cross-currents through which they forge their identities. Ethnicity and colour can still be a matter for discrimination and stereotyping among young people, but youth culture typically sustains great diversity and difference, including the differences that young Asians bring to it. Breaking the rules Delinquency and truancy It may seem odd to include delinquency and truancy in a chapter which is mainly about the leisure activities of the boys. However, this perspective perhaps offers more insight into the place of such activities in the lives and outlooks of the boys than a narrowly defined criminological one would. It is, after all, mainly in leisure time or in time ‘stolen’ when truanting that most crime committed by young men and boys occurs. The word ‘crime’ is used here to include not only actions for which the boys were cautioned, or (rarely) tried, but self-reported illegal activity for which they were not ‘caught’. On the basis of the fact that far more boys stated that they had broken the law than were cautioned for doing so, it is clear that many took part to a greater or lesser extent in what was usually minor illegal activity. To treat delinquent activity as behaviour that many young boys ‘drift into’ or ‘try out’ is not at all new. The American sociologist David Matza (1964) saw youthful delinquency in this way, and many British studies of ‘gangs of lads’ present their usually minor illegal activities as part of an on-going search for ‘fun’ and ‘excitement’, a well-established form of which is baiting adult authority and mocking its status. Why this is so is discussed later in this chapter. In their responses to the anonymised questionnaire, a large majority of the boys (over 60 per cent) stated that they had broken the law at least once. It is quite possible and even likely that many of the 36 per cent of the boys who claimed never to have broken the law had in fact done so, but either weren’t aware of the fact or did not acknowledge it. Of the total number of 156 out of the sample of 262 boys who said they had committed a crime, 79 said they had done so five or more times. What is relevant here is not the precise figures but the relatively large minority of boys who were at least

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fairly regularly involved in breaking the law. These findings are very much in line with official statistics and other research (see, for instance, the ‘Crime and Justice’ section of any edition of Social Trends). Seventy-one of the boys said they had been cautioned, but these may not have been the regular lawbreakers. There were some differences in the pattern of law-breaking associated with ethnicity but these were less than impressionistic stereotyping might suggest. The higher incidence of boys who said they had broken the law was for the white and African-Caribbean boys (73 and 78 per cent respectively), followed by Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi (46, 40 and 38 per cent respectively). One explanation for the higher figure for whites and African-Caribbeans is that boys who belong to these two groups are in fact more likely to break the law than Asian boys and that this is a consequence of their relatively macho, anti-authoritarian cultural and leisure style—an argument consistent with the general line of analysis taken in this book. There were relatively more middle-class white than African-Caribbean boys in our main sample, and it is likely that the actual number of offences committed by white and African-Caribbean working-class boys is even closer than the figure reported above. The boys’ responses to the question of whether or not they had ever been cautioned showed a significant difference between the African-Caribbean boys and other groups. Forty-eight per cent of AfricanCaribbean boys who said they had broken the law had also been cautioned. The figure for the white boys was 32 per cent, and for Indian and Pakistani boys 22 and 20 per cent respectively. This substantial difference lends some support to the view that the relatively very large number of young AfricanCaribbeans involved in the criminal justice system is, at least in part, due to labelling or biased selection by the agencies of enforcement, however that process might occur. Of the 156 boys who said they had broken the law, 113 did so with friends, 27 did so alone and 16 said they had done so both alone and with friends. Thus, for the boys, law-breaking was overwhelmingly a collective, peer group activity. Again, these findings support existing research that the activities of this age group tend to be highly peer-based, a view which coincides with popular observation. The extent to which the boys explained their law-breaking activities as ‘fun’ is striking—even though this is again consistent with much sociological comment on why boys tend to ‘get into trouble’. Undoubtedly many of the boys regarded occasionally breaking the law as an aspect of their leisure activities. The particular attractions to the young of breaking the law are that the risk of being caught provides excitement and risk as well as the opportunity to tweak adult authority and assert their own freedom. Perhaps because the boys seldom see their law-breaking activities as ‘real’ crime, they tend to minimise their significance. Again and again they described their illegal activities with such terms as ‘little’, ‘silly’ and as ‘just for a laugh’. Tom and Harry from West London comment very typically. First, Tom:

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Tom:

Interviewer: Tom:

In school, it’s little things, like on the field trip we got caught going to the pub. Other things have happened in school. Outside school, I got cautioned by the police, for vandalism against cars. Joy-riding or just… No. Just breaking aerials. Car signs, stuff like that.

Tom and his friends were mainly middle-class, and in the past their activities might have been thought of as ‘high spirits’—albeit with unpleasant consequences for the owners of the vandalised cars. Harry was especially keen to downplay the seriousness of his and his friends law-breaking activities, implying that they were mainly a tilt against authority: Harry:

Interviewer: Harry:

I think kids will always do silly things, nothing major. Never stolen cars or anything like that. But you always get into places where you’re supposed to be 18 and you’re not. Trivial things but not major. Mainly the age thing, under-age? Under-age drinking? Yes. That’s always stuff that goes on. You want to be able to do stuff that you’re not allowed to do. If you have to lie, or have to break the law, then you do that. But nothing ridiculous.

Joe’s emphasis was less on challenging adult authority and more on the general entertainment value of getting into trouble: Interviewer: Joe: Int: Joe:

Is it tempting to get into trouble? Not really. Sometimes you do something naughty just for a laugh or something. What do you do for a laugh? Just—I don’t know—just get drunk, start being stupid, make a noise in the streets.

Abdul, an Indian student, was quite detailed about the activities he and some of his friends engaged in their leisure time. His remarks included some interesting references to drug-taking: Abdul:

Interviewer: Abdul:

Drinking, getting drunk. Smoking. Drugs. In my class there’s only one person who doesn’t smoke or drink. Out of 25, 26. This year’s probably one of the worst for smoking and drinking. It’s part of life now, I suppose. Everyone even in school. Drugs are illegal but no one believes it. In the toilets drugs get sold and stuff, still. What range of drugs? Nothing worse than weed. That’s it. Anything else is outside school…

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Abdul’s comments about the extent of soft drug-taking among this age-group are supported by academic research. Howard Parker et al. (1996) found that 45 per cent of the 16-year-olds they surveyed in the Northwest had taken cannabis, although the figure dropped to 5 per cent for ecstasy and 1 per cent for heroin. Parker argues that drug-taking has become part of the consumer lifestyle of young people and this interpretation would seem to fit our findings. The consistency and similarity of many of the boys’ references to their delinquent activities suggests some common and fundamental causal factor or factors. The ‘problematic’ behaviour of modern youth is partly explainable by the way youth is socially structured in modern society. The core dynamic at work is the dialectic of conflict generated by young people’s efforts both to enjoy themselves and to achieve peer status and, on the other hand, the structure of control and guidance established and enforced by adult authority. The ‘fun’ motive in the boys’ delinquent activities was discussed earlier in this section. The transition to adult status has become a particularly fraught issue following the collapse of nearfull youth employment from the late 1970s. In any case, given that the transition to adulthood in modern societies is long and complex, some conflict between the generations is to be expected. In particular, young people only achieve the rights and power of adulthood in a gradual and staggered fashion. While a phased transition is probably best suited to absorbing the requirements and complexities of modern adulthood, it can create tensions. Quite simply, young people often grow impatient to achieve what is eventually to be theirs anyway. For most boys, adult status is seen as involving the acquisition of further ‘masculine’ qualities. Growing up ‘to be a man’ is seen as acquiring tough, macho and risk-taking qualities, and this exacerbates conflict with authority even further. It is clear from the comments of the boys quoted above that ‘going to the pub’ and smoking have great symbolic value as assertions of adult status. That has not changed much for the best part of a century. As adults, most will find legitimate outlet for their ‘masculine’ aspirations in physical work if they are working-class, or in business, bureaucracy or technological toil and competition if they are middle-class. However, for a minority, the main outlet for their ‘masculinity’ will be in criminal or leisure pursuits. As was described on page 130, the Thatcher years saw a concerted effort by government to discipline what were seen as the dangerously rebellious and deviant tendencies of youth. The main means used for this were the education and training systems, and other legislative and institutional constraints such as a number of Criminal Justice Acts and the expansion of prisons. The first years of the Blair government saw these policies reinforced. It is interesting that most of the boys we interviewed considered that their schools operated reasonably effective and fair regimes of control, and to that extent government and the education inspectorate might feel reassured. However, no society can feel comfortable when it is controlling its youth by increasing the means of coercion rather than through argument and persuasion. As Abdul indicated, more rebellious and illegal activities tended to occur outside school, although he also commented in respect of some students selling

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drugs in the school toilet and keeping drinks in their lockers that ‘teachers are a bit dozy, they don’t know what’s going on’. Darren’s assertion at the beginning of this chapter that ‘outside school it’s our rules’ is perhaps the extreme statement of an attitude more or less shared by numerous boys. ‘Hanging around’ in the streets, perhaps feeling bored, prompts some boys to make their own entertainment and excitement. Joe, the white working-class boy quoted above, said what he did was ‘just get drunk, start being stupid, make a noise in the streets’. Several boys mentioned breaking off car radio aerials as one of their activities. Joe did not think that such behaviour was confined to a delinquent few: Interviewer: Joe:

Do you think it’s cer tain sor ts of people who are [troublemakers]? No, not really. When you go out, things sometimes—you can see how easy it is to get into trouble, when you’ve nothing to do.

Joe then proceeded to make it clear that he himself never took such opportunities! Making noises in the street and breaking aerials cannot, of course, be interpreted as attempts to gain adult status. Obviously different motives and impulses pertain to different activities. These and similar activities seem to be stimulated more by a resentment of authority and a wish to bait it, motives which are highly compatible with the desire to acquire power and authority for oneself. One of Freud’s insights, reiterated by post-modernism, is that the psyche is capable of simultaneously holding two apparently contradictory and opposite motives in relation to the same object. At a more obvious level, the aggressive actions of some of the boys can be interpreted as time-fillers and attempts to create a bit of excitement—an interesting happening. Part of the fun can be observing the irritated reactions of adults. Official figures indicate that much of the total incidence of petty theft and violence is carried out by boys and young men on the streets, including in shopping areas. (Thus the borough of Westminster, one of London’s major shopping areas, is notorious for its high level of these kinds of crime.) A significant amount of such crime seems to be carried out by truants during school time. Almost half (47 per cent) of the boys in our survey reported that they had truanted at least once. However, it is persistent truants that the police consider to commit a hugely disproportionate amount of crime. Of our respondents, 11 per cent said that they had truanted ten times or more. Doubtless it is partly for this reason that the Blair government added school truancy league tables to school educational performance tables. Thus the delinquent activities of a large minority of the boys in our survey give some support to Darren’s boast that ‘outside school it’s our rules’. No postSecond World War government has so far managed significantly to stem the tide of this type of ‘boyish’ activity. This is not the place to discuss the range of strategies for controlling and reducing the criminal and antisocial behaviour of quite

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substantial numbers of young men. In so far as this behaviour is sometimes seen by boys as demonstrating toughness and risk-taking, it relates to the construction of a kind of masculinity. In this perspective, the argument must be that, like other damaging and coercive behaviours associated with traditional masculinity, the excitement and fun are not worth the pain and distress caused. Conclusion: some general considerations Feminism and the more generally assertive attitudes of women and girls have affected boys of all ethnic groups. Surveying the cultural and leisure pursuits of young men, it is difficult not to be as struck by what does not change, or changes mainly in presentation, as much as by what is new and different. In the 1990s, most young British men, of whatever ethnic origin, still assumed that their ‘masculinity’ is a vitally important reference point for their aspirations, development and identity. Some of the images they use and the behaviour they adopt to express themselves are crude, in part reflecting the crassness and vulgarity of much commercially-driven youth culture. Quite clearly, aggression, sometimes violent, and sex, sometimes presented in a way that objectifies and humiliates women, are still commonplace aspects in the culture of young men. In the wider society, aggressive and violent macho images and behaviour and offensive sexual references underpin the more oppressive forms of patriarchal domination. Such images were quite commonplace in the cultural life of many of the boys in our survey. Behaviour that is constantly reinforced in the visual media and, to some extent on the sports field, generates both emotional attachment and the desire to imitate, and—by the very fact of its repetition and acceptability—is legitimised. Some of the machismo and aggression of the boys can be explained in class terms—for example, working-class ‘hardness’—or in terms of ethnic chauvinism, but a substantial part seems to be genuinely patriarchal in nature, overworked though that term has begun to seem. Most of the masculinised forms of behaviour adopted by the boys reflected a desire to dominate in some way, and through domination to gain advantage. The fact that certain types of masculine behaviour, particularly the cruder and more threatening types, are now no longer advantageous to their perpetrators has not yet stopped them occurring. There is also the issue of what consequences the strongly sexist and macho themes in the boys’ culture have. Many of the boys themselves regarded their sexism as a ‘joke’, in much the same way that they explained away their racist banter as a ‘joke’. It is quite likely that many of them would not, in practice, behave with the degree of sexism displayed in some of their favourite literature and in their remarks among themselves. Quite a few of the boys were perceptive enough to realise that some girls were put off by macho behaviour and were more impressed by cleverness and sensitivity. Nevertheless, many of the boys were only just beginning to deal with the idea of real relationships with girls, and they maintained negative or depersonalised stereotypes of women partly to protect their own insecurities and uncertainties. Same-sex peer group leisure

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activity among boys reinforces masculine solidarity and a frequent—though not inevitable—aspect of this is the expression of a sense of being opposite to, and even in opposition to, girls who, even so, are fast emerging for many boys as the object of desire. This serves to reinforce the emphasised or macho form of masculinity which is still a dominant model in Western culture. Puberty is a crucial period of identity development, and it is possible that in Western culture many young boys feel a strong pressure and need to define themselves as ‘not feminine’, i.e., as masculine, and therefore seek to establish how different they are from women. However, we have cited evidence from other areas of their lives, including their attitudes to domestic and paid work, indicating that a significant number of boys seem to be moving away from traditional and rigid patriarchal attitudes. Nevertheless, if there is a distinction between joking and serious behaviour, there is also a connection. Humour can mock and humiliate and help place the victim in an inferior power position. In Foucault’s terms, oppressive humour can be viewed as part of a larger regime of power-knowledge of gender oppression. There is now a considerable body of literature which has examined this process in relation to gender relations (see particularly Lees, 1993). Encouragingly, some girls’ magazines have shifted away from presenting females in passive and romantic mode to include more independent, assertive and achievement-oriented themes (McRobbie, 1994). There are fewer signs of a comparable shift in the content of boys’ and young men’s magazines, although in the late 1990s the high-tech magazines tended to improve their circulation at the expense of the ‘girlie’ ones. This may have simply been due to the fact that the latter had temporarily overplayed their limited format (albeit one that has a perennial appeal). In any case, given an adequate framework of regulation, changes in leisure culture are probably more likely to be long-term if they occur voluntarily rather than through legislation. Admittedly, as far as the sexism in the culture of young men is concerned, there is still a long way to go. Few boys had perhaps quite grasped the dimensions of the gender changes that have happened in the last forty years, or the scale of the adjustment that might be required of them. The consequences of gender equality in a society in which women increasingly do paid work and in which men do a larger share of domestic work—though this is perhaps emerging more slowly—may not be a complete disappearance of gendered emotional and character differences, but there is likely to be a substantial blurring of what has previously been polarised as ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ behaviour. Gay people have already contributed substantially to challenging expectations about ‘appropriate’ gender behaviour. Among heterosexuals, there are also some signs that the traditional typing of the ‘two sexes’ as ‘opposite’, which was functional for patriarchal society, is imploding under the reality of emerging female power and confidence. Many commentators have suggested that a crisis of masculinity has been precipitated in the wake of the feminist and gay movements (see Weeks, 1995). Given the extent to which men still control the commanding heights of Western capitalism, crisis may yet be too strong a word, but at the least a large crack seems to have developed in the edifice of Western patriarchy.

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Further, particular class or ethnic locations have been the sites of tensions and crises in patriarchy. Thus, economic change has undermined the material basis of working class patriarchy and masculinity and, for example, a whole series of historical occurrences have pushed African-Caribbean women towards relative independence from African-Caribbean men, although some of the latter have contested this. Men’s and boys’ cultural responses to feminism and the rise of more women to positions of relative wealth and power have certainly varied, but many have had a distinct air of unease and defensiveness. Again, responses need to be differentiated by class and ethnicity. One of the most generalised cultural responses among young men has been a reassertion of modified machismo in the form of ‘laddishness’. Among middle-class young men this sometimes takes the form of a slightly self-mocking revelling in football, beer and sex, the latter perhaps as much at the level of talk as of action. An underlying air of self-embarrassment and self-conscious naughtiness in 1990s laddishness was perhaps a realisation that it was more a petulantly defensive gesture than a serious counter-movement against feminism. The model for 1990s laddishness seems to have been the 1960s working-class ‘gang of lads’, but in the process of cultural diffusion much of the authentic aggression and anger of the earlier subcultures has disappeared. The media leads for this renaissance and gentling of laddishness are programmes such as Men Behaving Badly (but they know it—naughty boys!), and They Think it’s All Over (in which sportsmen-turnedTV-personalities David Gower and Gary Lineker reveal themselves to be no less laddish than the ‘cruder’ types). These programmes certainly narrow the image gap between the upper-class bounder and the working-class lad, and probably reach a wider audience as a result. In its triumph of style over substance, new laddishness travels easily. The extent to which aspects of the boys’ lives remain macho and sexist is perhaps surprising given the efforts of the feminist movement and the policies of sex equality pursued in most schools, including the ones which we studied. On the other hand, entertainment based on sex and machismo sells extremely well to men, not least to younger ones, and provides a major source of profit. It is difficult to envisage much restraint emerging from either consumer or producer in this area. However, enacting an authoritarian framework of law to ensure ‘politically correct’ behaviour in these areas would be likely to generate a bureaucracy of surveillance, inhibit legitimate freedom of expression, and promote evasion, including a black market. Despite the frequency with which new laddish images appeared in the media, this style did not homogenise ‘harder’ forms of machismo among boys out of existence. As was discussed in Chapter 2, it was the dislocated and excluded ‘non’-working-class lads who caused most public concern and political comment in the 1980s and 1990s. Alienated and sometimes aggressive young people begging on the streets and occasional flashes of collective urban (and even suburban) violence by the young stirred an uncomfortable mixture of conscience and insecurity among the wealthier majority. Bea Campbell’s

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Goliath: Britain’s Dangerous Places (1993) describes the fear and havoc some of these young men wrought up and down Britain in the early 1990s. Not infrequently, the victims of their anger and violence were members of racial minorities. In the case of many boys, sexism was part of an overall macho attitude. But many others had a more complex attitude to masculinity, not all of which can be attributed to a softening of crude macho by feminism. When boys pick out qualities of physical and mental endurance and resilience, they are espousing traditional qualities, but ones which will easily survive their often narrow association with a particular type of masculinity. These qualities were not merely associated with winning. On the contrary, various boys referred to the AfricanCaribbean defender Paul Ince’s dignity in the face of racial abuse; the Arsenal player Tony Adams’s refusal to be broken by physical mockery in the earlier part of his great career; and England cricketer Michael Atherton’s tough and intelligent response to mixed fortunes. These are decent human qualities worthy of admiration in whoever they occur. One boy—admittedly far from typical—broke out of masculine tunnel-vision in realising this. He chose Monica Seles, who courageously returned to tennis after being stabbed by a ‘fan’ of rival player Steffi Graf, as the sportsperson he most admired. The fact that there was only one such ‘cross-gender’ response to this question does tend to confirm that the boys see certain qualities as ‘naturally’ masculine. If so, they are in this respect poorly prepared for a society in which women frequently and, it would seem, increasingly display qualities of assertiveness, single-mindedness and resilience. Many of the boys in our survey accepted the principle of sex/gender equality without having quite having worked through the emotional, behavioural and relational consequences of this principle. In fairness, they are not alone in that.

6

Conclusion Boys and men

It is part of the purpose of this book that the boys should speak for themselves. This they did, often clearly and emphatically, and sometimes with ambiguity and uncertainty. Here are some reminders: Desai on the peer group: ‘You are who you hang around with’; Joe on ‘getting into trouble’: ‘When you go out… you can see how easy it is to get into trouble, when you’ve nothing to do’; George on what he really wanted to do: ‘The glamour, the glamour of football. I’ll be earning big money for something I enjoy doing’; these, and many others, had their say and their thoughts and experiences underpin the content of this book. However, it would be disingenuous to deny that much of this book reflects our own interests and interpretations. Prominent among the latter were the ways that boys constructed their masculinities; the influence of various factors including class, ethnicity and nationalism on the construction of masculinities; and the ultimate imperative of analysing gender issues in a relational context. Several issues also emerged which we had not fully anticipated, including the different ways the boys related to their formal and informal ‘worlds’. Perhaps less surprising, given the multi-ethnic nature of our sample, the issues of how ethnic culture and ‘racism’ articulate with patriarchy and constructions of masculinity also emerged large in our considerations. It is not a major aim of this book to make policy suggestions. We will be satisfied if we have thrown some light on the way boys think and act, particularly in response to how the education system deals with gender and racial/ ethnic issues. However, an enquiry of this kind inevitably prompts some reflections on how things might be different and perhaps better. In this respect, we would hesitate to be party to suggesting even more legislation and regulation of schools, although clearly the schools system must continuously respond to developments in the wider society where the rate of change continues to be unrelenting. One of the most striking findings of this book is that the often-observed divide between formal schooling and informal peer activity has persisted and even intensified in relation to the way the boys think and act about gender and ‘race’/ethnicity. Taking their cue in part from the anti-racist and antisexist regimes of their schools, the boys generally—if sometimes grudgingly— 191

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acknowledged that sexism and racism are unfair and cannot be justified. Outside school, and even in and around school when unsupervised, some of the boys were much more likely to be sexist and racist. The strong and worrying suspicion must be that it is the ‘outside school’ behaviour that is the more ‘real’ and likely to be the basis of their adult attitudes and conduct. The boys’ inconsistencies and uncertainties in relation to gender and ‘race’ do not imply a general criticism of existing anti-sexist and anti-racist legislation and practice within the education system, or of the multicultural teaching that has been built up over the last quarter of a century. We support the principles of anti-sexist education, and anti-racist and multicultural education, without pretending they are easily and effectively combined. Manifestly, girls seem to have benefited from sex discrimination legislation and ‘girl-friendly’ schooling in relation both to academic performance and increased understanding of their life choices and opportunities, and as we have seen, girls’ ideas of their futures appear to have adjusted significantly more than boys’ to the social changes in work, domestic life, and relationships. Efforts to achieve a curriculum that deals in an effective and balanced way with multiculturalism and racism have not yet been quite as effective. In this respect, Tony Sewell has sketched out a curriculum which is comprehensively antiracist and multicultural, and his and other suggestions merit serious consideration (Sewell, 1997: Chapter 9). Nor should schools retreat from the efforts being made to address the institutionalised imbalance relating to the representation of minority ethnic teachers in senior positions or in formulating adequately anti-racist and multicultural curricula. On the contrary, the government’s OFSTED report (1999) urging greater efforts in these directions is surely right in principle. Further, as we have discussed, some boys are developing genuinely egalitarian, democratic and tolerant attitudes in respect of gender and ‘race’, and this doubtless owes something to the efforts of their schools. The news is not all bad! Yet there is reason to worry about the boys. Not about all of them, perhaps, but about many. Far too many of them carry more than a residue of patriarchal and sexist attitudes and behaviour, and racism seems to be part of their everyday discourse. Reactionary attitudes in the areas of sex and gender now seem to be damaging many boys rather then working to their advantage, and it is difficult to see how racism is of much long-term benefit to anybody. So, what is to be done? It may be that the boys’ informal attitudes and behaviour could be most effectively addressed in the mode in which they occur—i.e. informally, or at least less formally than in an exclusively ‘politically correct’ mode of approach. Formal regulations and proselytising aimed at improving boys in these respects may simply turn them off. In the 1980s, young people were the object of a series of measures aimed at bringing them more under the control and direction of the state, and this approach has been revitalised under the first Blair administration. While there are arguments for and against greater regulation of youth in late modernity, one likely effect of increasing the regulation of a group of people in one area of their life—arguably to the point

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of over-regulation—is that they will seek autonomy and self-expression in another. A feature of youth culture in the late 1980s and 1990s was that young people compensated for the more exacting and precise demands of education and work by escaping into a world of pleasure and often excess in leisure. They constructed a separate leisure world about which most adults were thoroughly ignorant. In their illuminating study of drug-taking among young teenagers, Howard Parker and his colleagues observed how often parents simply did not suspect the drug-taking habits of their children (Parker et al., 1996). Similarly, communicating successfully with young people on matters of sexism and racism appears sometimes to be as difficult as communicating with them about drugs. It may be that the message of equality and tolerance should be conveyed in informal as well as formal contexts. This does not mean that teachers should start invading the leisure haunts of their students in order to proselytise them (although there is probably as strong an argument for ‘detached youth work’ as there ever was). Arguably, the new personal and social education and citizenship education which become compulsory in schools in the year 2000 should be as student-centred and informal as possible. To grade and publicise performance would seriously risk alienating many students. Regardless of these new initiatives, it may be that it is in the relatively few ‘spaces inbetween’ the classroom and the common room—the gyms and sports area, snack and dining areas, even corridors perhaps—that the most meaningful conversations about these matters can take place. It is sometimes when students—individually or as a group—‘hang around’ for a few minutes after class that the sign is out that they want advice or a ‘real’ conversation. But there is little point in forcing a topic onto the conversational agenda— that, again, is likely to be a turn-off. Realistically, what is being suggested here is more a question of attitude and orientation than anything so staged and contrived as seeking opportunities to win ‘converts’—however important the cause. Few people enjoy being cornered by an ideologue. Given that those who genuinely hold egalitarian attitudes to gender and ‘race’/ethnicity can at least try to shape their own behaviour accordingly, then we are into the area of teaching through interaction and by example. The need for boys and young men to have positive role models is self-evident in a society in which the media relentlessly and often aggressively reinforces values of consumption and selfgratification. Parents aside, teachers are as well positioned as any group of adults to influence the young by example and, despite criticisms from some sociologists that they are prone to label their students negatively, they are probably reasonably well motivated and equipped for this. However, as teachers themselves often point out, without the positive input of parents, including fathers, their educational and socialising work is likely to be of limited effectiveness. Two texts published in the 1990s sought to offer commentary and advice to men, particularly those in the father-son relationship, on the matter of masculinity. These were Robert Bly’s Iron John (1990), and Vic Seidler’s Man Enough (1997), which is largely framed

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as a reply to Bly. In their very different ways, both these texts sought to evoke worthwhile ways of being a man. Both Bly and Seidler bracket off the problem of whether masculinity in its various forms is to some degree innate, or entirely the outcome of socialisation. This is because they wish to concentrate on the more immediate and pressing issues facing men in the period following the feminist challenge. Both consider that the doubts and uncertainties surrounding the behaviour of contemporary males constitute a general crisis of ‘masculinity’. Bly begins with an extremely brief outline of ‘two sorts of males’, one ‘the fifties male’, and the second, ‘another sort of man’ who ‘appeared’ in the 1960s. The first, living in pre-second-wave feminist times, had a clear if uncomplicated vision of what a man was, and the second had been gentled by feminism and had learnt to show his ‘feminine’ side. Bly goes on to state that, in the 1970s, he ‘began to see all over the country a phenomenon that we might call the “soft male” ’. Thus, within the space of less than a page, Bly states what he sees as the contemporary problem for males. The old type of dominant masculinity had been fatally undermined, but what is replacing it is in some sense inadequate—for women as well as for men. Bly’s suggestion that young men, with the help of older, wiser ones, seek to find ‘the wild man’ within themselves and within nature, is as easily ridiculed as it is misunderstood. The basic proposition that men can find some pleasure and expression in their animal selves is unobjectionable as long as there is no implication that women cannot do the same, or that this necessarily makes them better men. It does not help precise understanding of his message that Bly writes mainly in the style of poetic myth, but it is clear that wildness is only one element in a mature and balanced masculinity and seemingly partly a transitional one: We have become used to seeing the Wild Man as wet, moist, foresty, ignorant, leafy, and all at once he is related to holy intellect and sun radiance—he is a King. (Bly, 1990:232) To be a king is, of course, a tough challenge, and surely too hard for everyman. Bly is rather given to the hyperbole of the mythologist. What he seems to be saying in more ordinary prose is that, along with quite a complex range of qualities, boys and men need to recover a well-grounded sense of self-worth and dignity. Such qualities are the bedrock of self-confident and creative character and, in part, they can be built up through constructive work and meaningful relationships. Above all, and admittedly somewhat obscurely, what Bly seems to want to express is that fathers should help to bring up their sons and that they might have something specific to offer in doing so. Vic Seidler strongly endorses Bly’s view that fathers should parent their children. He also agrees that ‘recovering the feminine is not enough’ and that in the West many men have lost the ‘sense of what it is to be a man’. In Seidler’s view the way for males to re-establish their identities is not in seeking

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to distance or differentiate themselves from women. On the contrary, he urges men to listen more closely to women and to seek more reciprocal and fairer relations with them. In a moment of ‘post-modern’ self-revelation, he tells how his own partnership almost broke down when his wife told him that she was getting too little out of it because he was putting too little into it. Drawing closer to women in this way—implicitly narrowing the gap between the ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’—is not all Seidler suggests to contemporary man. Consistent with much of his previous writings, he argues that men have too eagerly allowed themselves to be dominated by the work ethic and by instrumental rationality. Although he does not use the term ‘emasculate’, this seems to be what he considers has happened to men’s larger potential. This has been at great cost to themselves: ‘with modernity men have learnt to deny their emotional lives’ (Seidler, 1997:67) and yet ‘men are no less emotional than women’ (ibid.: 127). He argues that in pursuing work-obsessed lives, many men are not living their own lives with much autonomy but are living the lives others have prepared for them. They themselves, as well as their partners and children, are victims of this pattern of existence. Renegotiating this framework is where the struggle for a fuller manhood and humanity lies. What is the application of Bly and Seidler’s work to the boys in our study and boys like them? Both of them strongly believe that boys need the guidance of older men, and for Seidler the provision of such guidance is also a matter of fairness to women and part of the wider and more equitable sexual division of labour which he advocates. Bly’s emphasis on myth speaks to the need of the boys to find men to imitate and admire. Of course, for most of the boys we surveyed, their heroes were from the worlds of professional sport and the media. It was obvious from the tenor of some of the boys’ remarks that they took their heroes seriously as role models. It seems relevant then to ask the ‘reverse’ question: do today’s heroes take their position in relation to their youthful admirers seriously? The point here is to raise the question rather than answer it. If, in late modern culture, sporting and media figures have replaced saints and perhaps others among the great and good as figures of worship and influence, have they and the rest of us quite come to terms with what this means? Both Bly and Seidler see the father and, by extension, all responsible men as key figures in the mediation of these matters with their sons and other boys, local ‘bread-and-butter’ heroes who in traditional hero style might claim to be doing no more than their job. Finally, Seidler’s challenge that men should be ‘man enough’ not to allow themselves to be obsessed with paid work, nor to let themselves be controlled ‘by the lives others have prepared’ for them, suggests an agenda sufficiently demanding to satisfy the most ‘masculine’ of aspirations, although its real purpose is more broadly humanistic. The radical democratisation and humanisation of paid and domestic work implied by such a shift in men’s cultural attitude requires a commitment to change and struggle beyond that achievable by comic and television heroes. It also implies a commitment by work-driven men to spend more time in leisure and not least with their sons.

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The missing ‘heroes’ in many boys’ lives are the men they should know but don’t. Post-war youth culture has been constructed—although by no means intentionally—as distinct and informally segregated from adults. It is time to build bridges.

Notes

Chapter 1 1

2 3 4

The evidence for this is overwhelming and uncontested, and can be most easily accessed in successive editions of Social Trends. More recent editions tell the story of a progressive and quite rapid improvement of attainment by girls and women in those subjects in which they had historically done badly. M Arnot and G Weiner (eds), Gender and the politics of schooling (Hutchinson, 1987), provides an excellent coverage of feminist initiatives in schooling. H Wilkinson, No turning back: generations and gender quake (Demos, 1994). Admittedly, the optimism of this analysis is based partly on future projection. This is not the impression one would get from reading most of the vast literature on equality of opportunity in education in relation to class, gender and ‘race’/ ethnicity. It is perhaps time the hypothesis was tested that, compared to most other areas of national life, the education system is relatively liberal and even radical—both institutionally and in terms of many individuals within it. Certainly Margaret Thatcher thought so!

Chapter 2 1 2

3

4 5

6

In addition to Mac an Ghaill’s and Back’s work, frequently cited here, see Tony Sewell’s Black masculinities and schooling: how black boys survive modern schooling (1997). The most authoritative empirical account of the relationship between class and educational attainment is probably still A H Halsey, A F Heath and J M Ridge (1980) Origins and destinations: family, class and education in modern Britain, Clarendon Press. The literature cited in the main text, like our own research, is intended to illuminate the processes of cultural reproduction rather than establish statistical associations. Like Paul Gilroy and Vic Seidler, Les Back was until recently based at Goldsmith’s College in London, which achieved a quality of work in cultural studies in the 1990s comparable to that achieved at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham in the 1970s. See especially Chapters 9–15 inclusive in K Pryce’s Endless pressure, 2nd edition (1986). Although ‘resistance’ theory was widely adopted as an explanation of youth— including black youth—sub-cultural activity, theoretical expositions of the approach are hard to find. Dick Hebdige’s classic Subculture: the meaning of style (1979) offers perhaps the most extended exposition and application of the approach. For a useful discussion of the pros and cons of the term ‘underclass’, particularly in relation to youth, see K Roberts, Youth employment in modern Britain (1995:98– 104).

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Notes

Chapter 3 1

2

3

4

5 6

7

To some extent, the figures for marriage have been bolstered by the relatively high rate of remarriage in Britain, which is even more likely to end in separation or divorce. Remarriages accounted for slightly over two-fifths of marriages in 1997 (Social Trends, 2000), more than double the figures for 1971. In 1996, nine per cent of divorces in the UK were of marriages that had lasted less than three years, compared with two per cent in 1981 (Social Trends, 1999). Some evidence of benefits and progress in women’s lives, and some increase in empowerment and self-confidence, have been suggested, for example by Sharpe (1994) and Walby (1997), whereas Germaine Greer (1999) suggests that women today are worse off, having for example both to work and do all the childcare, since more are single mothers. Results of an ESRC-funded study of 1800 young people aged 11–16, carried out by a research team based at the SSRC, South Bank University, entitled ‘Youth values: identity, diversity and change’, showed that 62 per cent of 11–16-year-old girls said that their favourite television programmes were ‘soaps’, compared with 23 per cent of boys. To look in even more detail at gender in relational terms, we carried out a small additional piece of research with 15–16-year-old boys and girls in one of the Ealing schools. These young people included a mixture of ethnic groups, but mainly consisted of young people from white, African-Caribbean and Asian family backgrounds. For this smaller study, 72 boys and 60 girls filled in a short questionnaire specifically tailored to tap their attitudes and expectations about marriage, divorce and future family life. Similar gender differences were also found when we compared the professed marriage intentions of boys in our main study with those of girls in the girls study (Sharpe, 1994); i.e. boys are much more positive about marriage than the girls. Figures show that the proportion of women aged 18–49 cohabiting in Great Britain has more than doubled, from 11 per cent in 1979 to 29 per cent in 1998–99 (Social Trends, 2000). In 1995–97, about a quarter of all men and women going into a first marriage had cohabited first (Social Trends, 1998). Views expressed by young people participating in interviews and focus groups for an ESRC-funded project, ‘Youth values: identity, diversity and change’, carried out at South Bank University within the Social Science Research Centre.

Chapter 4 1 2

3

4

This was a finding from a study of 1800 young people aged 11–16, carried out by a research team based at the SSRC, South Bank University, entitled ‘Youth values: identity, diversity and change’, and described in McGrellis et al. (1998). In the study cited above (McGrellis et al., 1998), 31 per cent of the boys said they ‘regularly’ spent their leisure time playing computer games, compared to 10 per cent of the girls (and only 27 per cent of the boys said they ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ did this, compared to 61 per cent of the girls). In 1998, the rate of unemployment for 18–24-year-olds of both sexes was almost double that of the overall rate of unemployment, although it includes some in fulltime education. That for 16–17-year-olds was even higher, but this includes about a third in full-time education. The overall unemployment rate for those without qualifications was four times higher than those with a higher education qualification (Social Trends, 1999). For young people aged 16–24 in 1997–98, African-Caribbean young people had the highest unemployment rate at 39 per cent, compared with 18 per cent Indian and 29 per cent Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, while the rate for white young people was 13 per cent (Social Trends, 1999).

Notes

5

199

The jury is still out on the success of the ‘New Deal’, introduced by the Labour government in 1998–99 to remove young people from unemployment, which to some extent is meant to have addressed these issues for young people in recent years.

Chapter 5 1

2

The admiration of boys for British sportsmen from other ethnic groups was further exemplified by a boy of mixed Chinese and Singaporean origin. He admired the Arsenal and England player Tony Adams, who had been baited with the nickname ‘donkey’ as a somewhat ungainly young player but seemed to have gradually found his way to maturity. An Iranian student at the same school who described himself as a refugee also displayed a wide range of popular cultural reference. He referred to a variety of international stars—he found the fictional Mr Bean ‘funny’; admired the football manager Kenny Dalglish; and stated that his favourite basketball team was the US Dream Team.

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Index

Adams, Tony 165, 190, 199 Aggleton, P 157, 200 aggression: aggressive behaviour 5–6, 37, 56–7, 60, 83, 114, 164, 180–1, 187, 189;see also violence Alexander, C 6, 65, 76–8, 173, 200 American Black Panthers 64 anti-racism 7, 16, 28–30, 33, 36, 37, 72, 74, 86, 192 anti-school peer groups 25–6, 38–9, 87 anti-sexism 16, 37, 86, 106, 120, 192 anti-sexist ideology 7, 106, 120 apprenticeships 22, 48, 131 Arnot, M 197 arranged marriage see under marriage Atherton, Michael 175 Back, L 53, 56, 68, 70, 159, 167, 200 Ball, S 25, 26, 38, 41–2, 44, 200 Banks, M 97, 135, 200 Banton, M 11, 200 basketball 6, 8, 154, 167, 172 Bates, I 42, 200 Beano 161 Beck, U 92, 130, 200 Bell, D 126, 200 Berthoud, R 3, 12, 40, 139, 140, 202 bhangra 176 ‘black macho’ see under macho Blair, Tony 130 Blair-Brown ‘New Deal’ see under ‘New Deal’ Blair government 4, 71, 74, 87, 132, 185, 192 Blunkett, D 59 Bly, R 193–6, 200 Bogart, Humphrey 15 British Social Attitudes Survey 108

Brown, P 44–5, 133, 152, 200 Burnage Report 35 business, business studies 134, 137, 140, 141, 143, 151 Campbell, Bea 189, 200 Cantona, Eric 166 Cartmel, F 153, 201 Cashmore, E 67, 200 Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 173 Chaudhary, Vivek 180–1 childcare 104–7, 108 children: having children 95, 103, 116 Christie, Linford 85, 165, 168 class origins of the boys 3–4; and educational attainment 16–17, 22–4; and ethnicity 3, 10, 24, 45–6, 72–4; and nation 3 Cloward, B A 63, 64, 200 Cobb, J 30, 203 cohabitation 96–9, 122, 198 Coles, R 135, 200 comics 158, 161–3, 167, 175; see also magazines Commission for Racial Equality 59 computer games 48, 143, 144, 162–3 computer industry 144 computer magazines 165 computer technology 137, 151 Connell, R W 9–10, 15, 17, 22, 28, 48, 85, 99, 119, 141, 200, 201 consumption 122, 130, 156 cricket 6, 8, 19, 175, 176–7, 179 crime 182–7 ‘cultural lag’, ‘time lag’ 7, 91, 94, 99, 124 curriculum: formal 16–24, 43, 44, 191;

205

206

Index

informal 24–7, 43–4, 191; national 17, 27, 35 Dahrendorf, R 75, 200 delinquency 182–7 discrimination see anti-racism; antisexism; racism; sexism division of labour see gendered division of labour; labour, division of divorce (and separation) 90–2, 95, 101– 3, 122, 198 drinking 184 drugs 184–5, 186 Durkheim, E 71 Dwyer, P 92, 204 Eastwood, Clint 15 Economic Research and Action Council 90 Education Act 1988 16 educational attainment: and gender 16– 17, 21–4, 27–8, 36–7, 60–1, 124, 144 emotional literacy 118, 123 EOC 48, 144, 151, 201 Epstein, D 119, 201 equal opportunity policies 24–7, 30, 86 Equal Pay Act 93 equality, egalitarianism 8, 86–7, 93, 94–5, 99, 106, 108, 110, 125, 147, 188, 190 essentialism 86 ethnic group: usage of term 12 Evans, K 148, 203 family, family life 90–2, 112–13; see also childcare; children fatherhood, fathering 107–8, 117, 154 feminine, femininity 9, 21, 113–19, 123, 141, 143–5, 188, 194, 195 feminism 21, 89, 90, 127, 187, 189, 190, 194 football 6, 8, 19–20, 56, 164–8, 169– 71, 175 Fordism see post-Fordist thesis Foucault, M 188 Freud, S 186 Fuller, M 71, 201 Furlong, A 153, 201 Gaskell, J 110, 201 gay see homosexuality gender order 9–10, 11, 28, 89–90, 126 gendered division of labour 87–8, 104– 7, 125, 127, 128–30

gendered occupations 143–7 gendered subject specialisation 16–21, 24 Giddens, A 85, 92, 96, 107, 111, 112, 122, 130, 201 Gillespie, M 159, 164, 178, 180, 201 Gilroy, P 9, 59, 72, 73, 173, 177, 201 girl-friendly education 27, 192 girlfriends 28, 92–5 Glasgow, D 75, 201 globalisation 13, 128; and youth culture 155–7, 159, 164, 167–8, 178, 179, 181 Goffman, E 63, 201 Goldthorpe, J H 2, 46, 201 grammar schools 52 Greer, G 198, 201 Griffin, C 121, 201 Hall, S 40, 68, 72–3, 157, 173, 201 Halsey, A H 197 Hampden-Turner, M 34, 201 Hargreaves, D 5, 25, 26, 41–2, 87, 201 Hebdige,R 68, 197, 202 ‘high tech’ 131, 140 Hill, D 99, 204 Hindus 32–3, 80, 100–1, 174 hip hop see rap Holland, J 92, 94, 115, 202 homophobia 85, 119–20 homosexuality 85, 119–20, 188 housework 54, 109–12 Howe, Darcus 60–1, 202 images of masculinity and femininity 113–19, 123 ‘individualisation’ 111, 153 individualism 122, 141, 153 information technology 48, 126, 134, 137, 151; see also ‘high tech’; new technology Internet 131, 162 jobs: expectations 136–40, 151–2; ideal 140–1 joking behaviour: racist 31–2, 35, 72, 187–8; sexist 106 Jones, G 135, 202 Jones, S 9, 68, 159, 202 Kehily, M J 119, 203 Kelly, A 110, 202 King, Martin Luther 163

Index

labelling 6–7, 26, 30, 41–2, 45, 58, 183; and stereotypes of AfricanCaribbean boys 72, 168–9; and stereotypes of Asian boys 79, 86; see also stereotypes labour, division of 127 labour force 126, 129 Labour government 95, 199 Lacey, D 5, 41–2, 202 law-breaking see crime Lees, S 91, 92, 94, 121, 188, 202 leisure industry 137, 139, 143, 151, 193; and African-Caribbean boys 168–74; and Asian boys 174–82; and white boys 164–8 Lennon, John 164 Lepkowski, D 59 living together see cohabitation localism 165, 167–8 lone parents see single parents, single mothers Lyotard, J F 89, 202 Mac an Ghaill, M 5, 6, 9, 10, 25, 30–1, 45–7, 49–50, 52–3, 54, 71, 81, 82, 133, 143, 202 Macdonald, I 35, 202 macho: Asian 82–5; ‘black’ 6–7, 31, 53– 8, 61, 63, 65–6, 71, 73, 169, 174; working-class 15–16, 43–6, 50, 65– 6, 82, 83 MacInnes, J 9, 23, 202 magazines 158–9, 161–3, 165, 188; see also comics Manpower Services Commission 131 Marley, Bob 164 marriage 90–2, 95–9 121–4, 198; arranged 99–101; remarriage 95, 198 marriage contract 99 Marshall, Tim 30 martial arts 56, 80, 84, 86, 175 Marx, K 71 masculinities: African-Caribbean 52–78; Asian 78–86; and class 2, 23–4, 42– 52; construction of 5, 9–11, 12, 14, 113–15; and ethnicity 5–7, 58–66; types of 10, 14–15, 42–52, 58–66, 89–90; usage of the term 12; white 39–5; working-class 42–51; upperclass 51–2; see also solidaristic masculinity; ‘techno masculinity’ Matza, D 182, 202 McGrellis, S 198, 202

207

McRobbie, A 188, 202 media 9, 50, 71, 114, 134, 135, 137–8, 141, 143, 144, 151, 154, 156–63, 166, 167, 172, 178, 179 Miles, R 11, 62, 202 Miller, W B 83, 202 minimum wage legislation 129 Mirza, H S 65, 104, 109, 142, 202 modernity, post-modernity 4, 6, 9, 12, 127, 195 Modood, T 3, 12, 40, 139, 140, 202 multicultural education 36 Murray, C 75–6, 202 music 6, 9, 57, 68–9, 70–1, 138, 169– 71, 174; see also rap, hip hop; reggae Muslims 32–3, 80, 100, 174, 176, 180– 2 nationalism 165, 167–8, 179 nationality 12, 39–40 Nayak, A 119, 203 ‘New Deal’ 136, 199; Blair-Brown ‘New Deal’ 136 new technology 48, 127, 128, 143 new vocationalism 133, 137, 144, 152 Office of National Statistics 93 officework 144–5 OFSTED 61, 192, 203 Ohlin, L E 63, 64, 200 parental aspirations 141–2 parental situation 102 parents’ unemployment see under unemployment Parker, H 185, 193, 203 Pateman, C 99, 203 patois 177 patriarchy 10, 16–17, 21, 23, 36, 79, 87–8, 89–90, 92–3, 99, 105, 108, 111, 112, 125, 187–9, 192 Pattman, R 18, 106, 119, 203 peer group 14, 38–9, 42, 86, 158 Phoenix, A 65, 97, 203 Pollert, A 128, 203 post-Fordist thesis 128 post-modernity see modernity Pryce, K 5, 58, 60, 66–70, 197, 203 public schools 51–2 ‘race’, usage of term 11–12 racialisation 28 racism 28–37, 58–66, 71, 72–4, 76, 78,

208

Index

86–7, 166, 173; institutional 30–1, 72, 76; see also anti-racism rap, hip hop 138, 154, 164, 169–70, 175; see also music Rastafarianism 64, 67 rationality 195 redundancy in male role 92, 93 reggae 68; see also music Reimer, B 155, 203 religion 122, 123, 182; see also Hindus; Muslims; Sikhs remarriage see under marriage resistance, cultural 62–3, 66–72, 157–8 ‘resistance’ theory 197 Rex, J 75, 203 Richards, Keith 163 Riseborough, G 42, 200 ‘risk society’ 92, 130 Roberts, Kenneth 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 148, 197, 203 Rowntree Foundation 72, 203 Rudd, P 148, 203 Schwarzenegger, Arnold 172, 177 Seidler, V 48, 193–6, 203 Seles, Monica 162, 190 self-defence see martial arts Sennett, R 30, 203 separation see divorce Sewell, T 3, 5, 6, 25, 30–1, 60, 65, 159, 173, 192, 197, 203 Sex Discrimination Act 16 sexism 187–8, 189, 190, 192 sexuality, sexual performance 92, 94, 109, 115 Sharpe, S 2, 7, 11, 18, 90, 91, 92, 95, 100, 103, 110, 111, 115, 121, 127, 132, 140, 144, 145, 147, 150, 198, 203, 204 Shumaker, S A 99, 204 Sikhs 33, 80, 174, 176, 180–2 single parents, single mothers 91, 95, 96–7, 99, 102, 109, 122 slavery 6, 10, 58–65, 72, 73 soccer see football Social Trends 81, 101, 183, 197, 198, 204 solidaristic masculinity 15, 43, 66 Solomos, J 62, 204 Spender, D 26, 204 sport 6, 8, 18–21, 56, 85, 137, 138–9, 140, 141, 143, 151, 154, 163, 164–

71, 172, 174; and gender 18–21; see also basketball; cricket; football stereotypes 79–80, 145, 167, 168–9, 183; see also labelling Straw, Jack 1 streaming 26 Tebbit, N 177 technology see ‘high tech’; information technology; new technology ‘techno-masculinity’ 151 television 8, 92, 154, 158–61 territoriality 26–7, 34, 43, 180 Thatcher, M 72, 197 Thatcher government 71–2, 81, 87, 130, 131, 152, 185 Thomas, H 59, 204 ‘time lag’ see ‘cultural lag’ Tomlinson, S 75, 203 trade unions 127–8, 130, 131–2 training schemes 132, 133, 150 Troyna, B 67, 200 truancy 182, 186 ‘underclass’ 74–5, 130, 132, 139, 152, 197; young black 64, 74–6, 130 unemployment 8, 22, 45, 81–2, 99, 134, 135, 138, 147–50, 151, 170, 198, 199; parents’ 150 unions see trade unions Van Damme, Jean-Claude 175 violence 34–5; see also aggression Viz 161 Walby, S 108, 125, 198, 204 Wallace, M 135, 204 Weiner, G 197 Wilkinson, H 27, 197, 204 Willis, P 2, 5, 39, 41, 42, 46, 65, 72, 82, 83, 87, 132–3, 134, 143, 156, 204 Willmott, P 15, 98, 204 Woods, P 38, 204 work: women’s movement into 125; see also gendered occupations; jobs, expectations; labour, division of Wyn, J 92, 204 Young, M 15, 98, 204 youth training see training schemes