Understanding Problems of Social Pathology
At the Interface
Series Editors Dr Robert Fisher Dr Margaret Sönser Breen
Advisory Board Professor Margaret Chatterjee Professor Michael Goodman Dr Jones Irwin Professor Asa Kasher Dr Owen Kelly Revd Stephen Morris
Professor John Parry Dr David Seth Preston Professor Peter L. Twohig Professor S Ram Vemuri Professor Bernie Warren Revd Dr Kenneth Wilson, O.B.E
Volume 33 A volume in the At the Interface project ‘Cultures of Violence’
Probing the Bounderies
Understanding Problems of Social Pathology
Edited by
Przemysław Piotrowski
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2006
The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence”. ISBN-10: 90-420-2025-3 ISBN-13: 978-90-420-2025-2 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2006 Printed in the Netherlands
Contents Introduction
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Przemysáaw Piotrowski PART 1
Norms and Pathology - Probing the Boundaries of Social Life On Constructive and Destructive Ways of Understanding Personal Freedom and Responsibility
1
Krzysztof MudyĔ The Social-Psychological Construction of Violent Political Discourses: Psychopathology in Political Life
19
Richard Jackson The Phenomenon of Prostitution in Poland: Around the Problem of Legalization
49
Emil W. Páywaczewski ‘Blind Date with Dirty Harry’: A Criminal Justice Dispute on the Polish-Language WWW
61
Andrzej R. ĝwiatáowski PART 2
Problems of Social Pathology: Symptoms and Mechanisms Iconic Violence: Description of the Phenomenon
83
Agnieszka Ogonowska Juvenile Delinquency in Poland: Psycho-Social Conditions Piotr Sáowik and Piotr Passowicz
97
Young People and Police Officers in French Poor Suburbs: The Social Construction of a Conflict
117
Christian Mouhanna Collective Behaviour: Psycho-Social Determinants
131
Przemysáaw Piotrowski Suicide of the Elderly
145
Barbara Pilecka Silent Bystanders to Violence: Social Influence or a Conflict of Identification
163
Dorota Kubacka-Jasiecka PART 3
Individual and Social-Scale Preventive Strategies Victims of Violence: Stereotypes and the Process of Helping
199
Maágorzata Wysocka-Pleczyk Prevalence of Psychoactive Substance Use among Adolescents in Poland in the Period of Political Transformation: Change Tendencies and Prevention Programmes
219
Krzysztof Zajączkowski Coping Behaviour of the Unemployed from the Perspective of Robert Merton’s Theory of Anomie
231
Urszula WoĨniak Notes on Contributors
243
Welcome to an At the Interface Project Understanding Problems of Social Pathology is a volume within the Cultures of Violence series of projects. These multi- and inter-disciplinary research projects aim to identify and understand the prevailing extent of violence in contemporary life. In the process, they will explore the representation of violence in media, art and literature. Violence has been part of societies purporting to unite people, e.g., totalitarian regimes. It has been no less part of societies that set great store on diversity. It remains a horrifying feature of today's world. Key themes considered in the project are; x
is violence part of human nature?
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war, civil war, terrorism and the metropolis
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religion, religious institutions, and their role in curtailing or propelling violence; religious fundamentalism and violence
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institutional life - including schools and hospitals
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ethnicity, nationalism, and sub-nationalisms; racism and violence
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violence in the private domain - abuse of women and children
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violence in the public domain - the legitimation of violence, law, concepts of punishment, capital punishment
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state violence - militarism and arms competition
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market economy and globalization; poverty and violence
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violence and modernity - the role of science and technology
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youth and violence - gang violence, children soldiers, hooliganism
Dr Robert Fisher Inter-Disciplinary.Net http://www.inter-disciplinary.net
Acknowledgements
This book was written in cooperation with the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Poland
The editor would also like to thank Izabella Murzyn-Borzemska for her linguistic consultation and proofreading skills
Introduction: Understanding Problems of Social Pathology Przemysáaw Piotrowski The world we live in is the arena of dramatic changes in almost every sphere of human life. In the span of last 15 years, we witnessed a whirl of events reflecting the power of human spirit and mind - suffice it to mention the fall of the Berlin Wall, integration of Europe, an unprecedented advancement in medicine and computer technologies. At the same time we are faced with a proliferation of facts that make us ponder over human destructiveness such as the armed conflicts in various parts of the globe, two wars in the Persian Gulf, the terrorist attack of 09.11, or the so-called “war on terror”. Never before had the world been so “small” and vulnerable, and never before had there been so many divisions and tensions. The progress in most spheres of life (science, economy, etc.) is the sign of our times no less than the prevalent inequality in the distribution of wealth and a serious underdevelopment of some of the world’s regions. The achievements of human mind that could serve the purpose of saving human life, or at least enhancing its quality are primarily implemented for the military purpose. The global phenomena, such as the easy flow of information, people or capital are not accompanied by creation of the global institutions of control and the implementation of universally accepted legal regulations. Also, as the antiglobalist demonstrations show, the consequences of globalisation do not meet with a widespread, enthusiastic reception. The changes of mentality are much slower than those ensuing from the multifarious process of globalisation. Zygmunt Bauman, a philosopher, uses the term of second separation to describe the era we live in and the anxieties we experience. On a large scale, we witness changes in deeply rooted lifestyles, management techniques, the loosening up of social bonds, diminished significance of the fundamental social institution - the family. Instability and insecurity are also observable in the sphere of morality. The heated debate over euthanasia or homosexual marriages reflects the chaos in this sphere of life. Global socio-political and economic changes lead to the emergence of crises and tensions in lives of individuals and of entire societies. In line with contemporary changes, politics should have a global character, whereas it is still arrested in the formula of interstate treaties, allegiances or disputes. According to Bauman, the situation evokes the period at the turn of the 18th century, where Europe witnessed the onset of the first separation - a separation of the workplace from the world of local community and households. Aside from technical revolution, urbanisation and emancipation there was human suffering and starvation of the masses,
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accompanied by strikes and terrorist attacks. Gradually, however, the emergence of the welfare state made it possible for the social groups at variance to reach an accord. Nowadays we are far from resolving the problems stemming from the characteristics of the period of the second separation. One may only hope that the direction of steps taken in order to stabilise global social reality will be closer to the ideals of preventive democracy as propounded by Benjamin R. Barber rather than the preventive war doctrine of George W. Bush administration. In an unstable and dynamically changing situation, various social problems come to surface, sometimes referred to by the umbrella term of social pathology problems. It is at the discretion of scientists representatives of social sciences - to provide explanation of the causes and mechanisms of the pathological phenomena in order to enable the implementation of appropriate prophylactic and preventive measures. In my understanding, the term social pathology embraces social problems that are present in common consciousness, and are perceived as detrimental and destructive to individuals, groups, or the entire society. I refer to thus formulated working definition as it is difficult, if not impossible, to construct a single, objective and universal definition of social pathology. This term (along with violence and deviation) falls within a social-political paradigm, which means that its definition lies at the discretion of social subjects who hold the power, and also relates to a particular time in history and to a given society. A social reality (including social pathology) is constinually being constructed anew in the process of confrontation of perspectives and definitions of individuals, institutions and social groups. Therefore what interests the authors of the book more than the disputes on the right definition, is the understanding of social pathology phenomena - their causes, mechanisms, and social costs. Complex and multidimensional as it is, social reality is best described from various perspectives. For that reason, a potentially interesting and fruitful interdisciplinary approach characterises the book. It contains mainly texts of psychologists who, as the editor of the articles does, work at the Institute of Applied Psychology at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. The articles of sociologists, lawyers, and one theoretician of education broaden the horizon and thus contribute new insights to the entirety of the book. Participation in scientific conferences: Cultures of Violence (Prague, 2002), Social Control and Violence – Breaking the Cycle (Cracow, 2002) and XIIIth World Congress of Criminology Reducing Crime and Promoting Justice: Challenges to Science, Policy and Practice (Rio de Janeiro, 2003) allowed me to get familiar with the studies of the authors and to embark on a cooperation. The body of articles predominantly relates to Polish reality, as well as stems from the experience of the Polish society in the period of political transformation. No less interesting are the articles on the psychopathology
Przemysáaw Piotrowski
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of political discourse, community-policing problems in France, and issues of social concern (victims of violence, problems of the elderly, and collective behaviour). 1.
Norms and pathology - probing the boundaries of social life.
The book is divided into three thematic parts. The first chapter is devoted to the reflections on the norms and pathology of social life. In the societies of the post-industrial era, it may be difficult to delineate the boundary between behaviour that is widely accepted, less readily tolerated, or disapproved altogether. The role and social impact of the social control agencies fluctuates. The exchange of information on a global scale makes various lifestyles, value systems, patterns of behaviour intertwine and thus aggravates the normative chaos. The symptoms of chaos are observable on the level of individual existence, in social institutions, and even in international politics. Examples of chaos proliferate. In a social reality created by the media, an enhanced value is ascribed to the individual’s “five minutes” in the media. Televised reality shows instil in the viewers a conviction that a mere fact of “being” in the media grants instant popularity, whereas social esteem and financial success are expected to follow naturally. This is a fundamental change, as in the not-so-distant past “being someone” was a prerequisite of success. It translated into having such personal traits, abilities, and talents that, if properly employed, would help in gradual achievement of life’s objectives. The cultural changes of the past decades also influenced the shape and operation of the important social institutions. According to Steven F. Messner and Richard Rosenfels, the authors of an institutionalanomie theory of the social distribution of crime, the Western societies are characterised by a strong domination of economy over other institutions of social life. A prevailing phenomenon, also in the countries of the former Eastern-Europe block, is the introduction of economic standards in those spheres of life that had not been previously regarded in the categories of “making a profit” (such as sport, fine arts, education). Consequently, a fact of competently assuming such life duties as helping others, childcare, or caring about a family life, does not meet with a social esteem and does not constitute a source of prestige. Dismissed as they are for being uneconomical in their nature the institutions such as child rearing, family, politics do play an extremely vital role of creating and delineating normative framework of society. The limits of norms and pathologies are additionally blurred by the incoherence of declarations and actions on the global political arena. To exemplify this point we may consider attitude of international society towards the countries that violate human rights. Too often are the ideas of
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freedom, dignity, and justice sacrificed for bilaterally lucrative trade contracts. The authors of the first chapter describe selected mechanisms of understanding, constructing and re-defining the norms of social life. They also focus on a public debate on the legal norms and social consequences thereof. The opening article by Krzysztof MudyĔ is an attempt to reconstruct hidden convictions connected with different ways of understanding the limits of personal freedom and responsibility. The author focuses on convictions that are conducive to destructive behaviour, such as e.g. the voluntaristic understanding of freedom: “To be free is, if first and foremost, to be able to do what one feels like doing at a given moment”, as well as other models that relate a sense of freedom to the use of power, advantage, or domination. The author also distinguishes four destructive convictions connected with a way of understanding personal responsibility, i.e. external observer pitfall, persecutor pitfall, victim pitfall and rescuer pitfall. In a similar vein, the reflections of Richard Jackson revolve around the complex origin of the convictions that legitimise violence. The analysis of the causes of the armed conflicts implies the discourse of violence that precedes such conflicts. According to Jackson, the central variable in explaining violent political conflict is the deliberate construction of a totalizing war discourse, a “vast cultural complex” that deconstructs existing non-violent discourses and destroys sites of opposition, and then replaces it with new narratives of hatred, fear, and the justified use of extreme violence. Such an approach brings back the notion of agency to civil war analysis, linking micro and macro levels of explanation - the intersection and interaction of the social and the psychological - and suggests that political entrepreneurs purposefully attempt to manipulate the thoughts and feelings of people to create conflict and motivate violence. The consecutive two articles raise the issue of conditions underlying creation and institutionalisation of legal norms in Poland, along with a public discourse that accompanies these processes. The article of Emil W. Páywaczewski brings up the issue of prostitution. According to the author, considering the current factual and legal status in Poland, with regard to prostitution what we are experiencing is legal hypocrisy. Brothels are illegal while at the same time can be set up under the guise of various escort agencies or massage parlours. A hypothetical project of legalizing prostitution is also debated. It is concluded that prostitution will always to some degree remain obscure, extending beyond the monitoring powers of official entities. It will still fall within social pathology, and lie in the circle of interest of organized crime. The scope of the latter, however, will be considerably lower as compared with the current legal
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system situation. The legalization of prostitution is not an ideal solution but rather the choice of the so-called “lesser evil”. It would solve many prostitution-related problems but is at the same time it would bring about new ones. A heated debate on legal issues is taking place in the internet. A particular character of such a discourse constitutes the subject of the article by Andrzej ĝwiatáowski. The author chose some realms of WWW-discussions in order to analyse their punitiveness level: e.g. legitimate self-defence, right to defence, and the presumption of innocence, criminal policy and the severity of the sentences passed, the death penalty, imprisonment and prison conditions. As a result, specific features of the internet discourse emerge, such as simplified generalisation, rhetoric of exclusion, and ignoring both subjective element of the crime and the causation. Thus obtained data support the stereotype of a high punitiveness. The “emotional punitiveness” seems to be typical rather than exceptional. 2.
Problems of social pathology: symptoms and mechanisms.
The second part of the book presents selected issues, causes, and mechanisms of social pathology. The articles in this chapter analyse the problems from two perspectives - by considering the psycho-social situation of the “actors” of deviant behaviour, as well as cultural context of their lives. Much attention is devoted to the problems of young people a social group that deserves consideration for several reasons. It was only 50 years ago that the youth gained and independent value as a separate “component of culture”, whereas formerly it was considered solely as a growing-up period of a human life. Nowadays, young people find themselves in a particular social situation - they have matured biologically and thus are no longer regarded as children. Although they do not yet enjoy legal rights of adult life, they are exempt from the responsibilities it imposes. The young age is best described with one word: a moratorium. As long as young people continue their education the responsibilities connected with self-financing, starting a family, childcare are adjourned until later. This psycho-social moratorium translates into a “protective season”. Namely, young people try out various types of activities but are not held accountable for their wrong decisions. Consequently, they may be tempted to embark on various, potentially attractive life opportunities, but simultaneously may experience insecurity in confrontation with serious existential problems. Owing to the characteristics of their age and to their potential, young people feature prominently in the category of consumers. The media, the industries of apparel, entertainment, or communication, among others, target their products at a young consumer, and also have play a role in moulding the tastes of young people and setting out the
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trends. The development of youth culture reflects a complex socioeconomic processes and civilisation changes. It is closely correlated with the characteristics of puberty age - a period of an increased need of autonomy, often marked by dysfunctions in social functioning, which in turn is an important consideration for our reflections. The first article in this chapter focuses on the significance of the media in the process of socialisation of young people. Agnieszka Ogonowska attempts to describe and interpret the phenomenon of iconic violence - a very specific construction of audiovisual texts (films, TV programmes, computer games, advertisements, virtual reality) which is the significant source of psychological impact. The efficiency of its working depends on viewers’ audiovisual competence level, which in turn may be developed by educational methods pertaining to media literacy. The article is based on the work of Pierre Bourdieu (the concept of symbolic violence, a description of the mechanism of the cultural reproduction), Michel Foucault (the knowledge/power theory), Jean Baudrillard (simulation) and Derrick de Kerchove (cultural determinism). In the article much attention is also devoted to the problem of popular culture, and its role in structuring the educational process and in developing cultural competence. The article of Piotr Sáowik and Piotr Passowicz also discusses the problem of negative impact of the media on the young people and the media being conducive to deviant-behaviour. The authors examine the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency in Poland, its relation with psychosocial factors, focusing on the political transformation and the ensuing social-cultural changes (leading to, amongst others, the changes in value system, feelings of alienation, or social anomie), connected with the loss of the sense of continuity and consistency among the young. The authors emphasise the role of adults, and parents in particular, in the developmental and educational process of the young generation. They posit that the older generation experiences alienation in contact with the younger generation, finding it difficult to maintain a trangenerational discourse, at the increasing prevalence of mercantile orientation of the young. The media play an important role in moulding young people’s personalities. Finally, the authors point at criminal justice system, accentuating its pathogenic incoherence and ineffectiveness in exerting punishment. In the recent years in Poland the attitudes of mistrust, if not hatred, towards police forces have been on the increase among the young people. Both parties of this conflict put forward arguments for the situation, while the fear of crime is mounting among the ordinary citizens. The article of Christian Mouhanna analyses the phenomenon in relation to the situation in France, where young people, especially the urban dwellers of ethnic minorities, are most likely to be perceived as a source of crises in the poverty-stricken suburbs of France. They appear to be the
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enemies of the public services, and especially of the police forces. The author’s goal is to take a closer look at both parties - young people and the police officers - in order to establish to what extent the conflicts are not only the result of psychological matters but a consequence of a social system in the local community. Instead of building trust, interactions between youngsters and public utilities staff produce a downward spiral of hatred and violence. Mouhanna propounds that social pathology is the outcome of individual psychology, as well as the result of a social system, in which not only the young people, but also certain institutions transgress rules. Tensions and group conflicts may incite violent behaviour of the desperate crowd. Racial disturbances, hooligan excesses of football fans, mob lynching and violent political demonstrations, which in social psychology fall under umbrella term of “collective behaviour”, may entail a sequence of changes to the psychological functioning of an individual, such as a temporary lapse of self-awareness, disappearance of one’s sense of identity, and an increased tendency to engage in deviant activities. The issues of psycho-social conditions of collective behaviour feature prominently in the article by Przemysáaw Piotrowski. In the first part of the article, the author briefly presents the classic works on collective behaviour, and subsequently focuses on the discussion of psychological mechanisms behind the crowd formation, and on the factors that favour deviant behaviour. The second part of the article encapsulates results of the author’s research on football hooligans’ subculture, with an emphasis on the sense of alienation - a variable that provides a new perspective for the reflections on collective behaviour. The notion of a sense of alienation spans the reflections on the problems of deviant behaviour of the young and the elderly. As Barbara Pilecka expounds in her article an old age is a particularly difficult stage in a life of a person - marked by multiple bereavements, the termination of one’s professional career, and a loss of material status. The latter is of particular pertinence in Poland, where many elderly persons live on insufficient pension, and often in poverty. On the other hand, old age poses new challenges, such as the undertaking of new roles, remaining active, accepting one’s life, and coming to terms with the thought of the inevitable. Old age, more than any other stage in one’s life, is in jeopardy of self-destructive tendencies. Suicide rates among the elderly are high. Suicide in the advanced age may often be regarded as a continuation of life-long problems. Self-destructive tendencies correlate with feelings of loneliness, a lowered self-esteem, depression and maltreatment received from others. The severity of adaptation problems may be alleviated if an individual, be it a young or an elderly person - is a part of social network and receives support from the social environment. Nevertheless, our
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everyday life shows that even overtly brutal acts of violence and crime may meet with social apathy instead of immediate succour. It is often the case when the victims are blamed for their distress. The article by Dorota Kubacka-Jasiecka attempts an explanation of psychological mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of indifference and passivity of the witnesses in situations of violence. The researchers of the subject as well as crisis intervention workers share a conviction that silence and passivity of bystanders to violence, denial of the victim’s distress, and a diffusion of responsibility, add to the experience of trauma; the so-called dialectics of trauma affects not only the victims, but also the witnesses to violence involved. This phenomenon impairs the recovery of health and balance of the victims. With a view of understanding social attitudes of indifference, the author discusses mechanisms of human behaviour, social influence, empathy, and defensive mechanisms of countertransference. Finally, she refers to the Ney’s transgenerational triangle of abuse that expounds bystanders’ indifference by the dysfunction of one’s identity, resulting from experienced violence. All the models discussed are interchangeable, and reflect different levels of human activity thus taking on different meanings, depending on a given situation. 3.
Individual and social-scale preventive strategies.
The articles in the third part of the book explore the issues of preventive strategies and countermeasures against social pathology, in individual life and in social scale. The authors discuss the problems that stir public debate in Poland - violence, drug abuse and unemployment. It suffices to cast an eye on statistical data to realise the severity of the phenomena. The data collected within International Crime Victim Survey show that robbery victimisation risk in Poland is definitely the greatest of all the European countries. The survey conducted in schools proved that over 90% of students aged 15 have already drunk alcohol, and 15% of boys drink alcohol on regular basis. According to GUS (Main Statistical Office) the unemployment rate was at 19.3% in July 2004. The article by Maágorzata Wysocka-Pleczyk explores the stereotypes in social perception of the victims of violence, and the role of stereotypes in the process of psychological assistance. The issues discussed in the article involve the most important mechanisms favouring the emergence and perpetuation of stereotypes of victims of violence, and some stereotypes of victims, with the example of the victims of sexual assault. The role of stereotypes in the secondary victimisation is visible in the reactions of victims, their families, assistance providers, and social environment. The article encapsulates three, most important models of prosocial behaviour: arousal cost-reward model, the empathy-altruism hypothesis, the decisional model of crisis intervention, as well as the
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attributional models of psychological assistance. The models served to demonstrate how stereotypes impede the process of helping the victims of violence. The article of Krzysztof Zajączkowski raises the issue of drug abuse among youngsters in Poland. The author focuses on the question of suitability of preventive programmes implemented in Polish schools in the light of changing social reality. The fist part of the article presents quantitative and qualitative changes in psychoactive substance use in Polish society. The second part provides a general characteristic of a selected group of programmes aimed at drug-use prevention. The selected programmes underwent reviews and gained considerable popularity with the practitioners. The assessment of the usefulness of the programmes in the prophylactic-educational functioning of schools was carried out through the review of the research data on the effectiveness of the programmes, and to their accuracy in addressing topical problems of young Poles. The analysis of the programmes led to the formulation of conclusions and generalisations, which in the nearest future should lay down directions for the implementation of contemporary preventive programmes in primary and secondary schools in Poland. The final paper of the chapter - by Urszula WoĨniak - is devoted to the problems of coping with the situation of unemployment. The author analyses adaptation mechanisms (drawing on the theory of Robert K. Merton), describes the unemployment as a situation of anomie, and presents five types of adaptation to such a situation - with a particular consideration of the innovation strategy. 4.
Conclusion. A need for understanding.
We present the readers with a book that discusses a host of problems considered detrimental to society or perceived as social pathology. The element linking the chapters of the book, which also enhances the value of its entirety, rests in the authors’ focus on multidimensional conditions of the socially negative phenomena, and on their mechanisms, which are not widely recognised. The key notion for the structure of the book rests in understanding. In the studies concerning social pathology, different meanings of the word are employed, namely comprehension, sympathy and agreement. Naturally, understanding is found on an ability to notice and comprehend the problems with their multifaceted and complex nature. For a successful resolution of a problem, or a reduction of its consequences, it is imperative to make a conscientious effort to comprehend the causes, mechanisms, and consequences of a given phenomenon; also, it may be necessary to analyse the arguments of the opposing parties. For example, the overall significance of a violent crime rests in a type of an act and a legal qualification thereof, as well as
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in various considerations pertaining to the life of the perpetrator and the victim, the functioning of various institutions of social control, the reaction of social audience, or the impact of the media. If both the dramatis personae and the researchers look at the problem from perspectives other than their own, they can adopt a more understanding approach based on sympathy. Naturally, where there is pain, humiliation, or a sense of distress, the people involved may refuse to or may simply be unable to understand the motives of the other party. The wounds inflicted by long-standing armed conflicts, domestic wars, or terrorist attacks do not heal easily. However, by overcoming the limitations of thinking through the prism of stereotypes, hatred and mutual accusations we pave a way for understanding and subsequent accord. The process may prove painstaking and long, owing to the fact that social reality favours immediate and spectacular solutions, even if they prove ineffective in the end. However, there are many examples of accord reached through understanding. That is how effective preventive programmes in local communities emerge, the peacebuilding process in the countries torn by domestic conflicts is built, the ideas of restorative justice are implemented, and how schools in many countries help overcome ethnic, racial, or religious stereotypes. Finding a common ground for agreement creates foundations for cooperation. Once the cooperation is established - based on understanding and goodwill of all the parties involved - the resolution of majority of social problems becomes possible. Przemysáaw Piotrowski, Cracow, Poland.
Part I Norms and Pathology - Probing the Boundaries of Social Life
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On Constructive and Destructive Ways of Understanding Personal Freedom and Responsibility Krzysztof MudyĔ Whether we decide to undertake some actions or not, and how we react to various situations result, to some extent, from unexpressed convictions that we hold, our “hidden concepts of reality”, some of which concern the idea of freedom and responsibility. The objective of this chapter is to articulate some of the convictions related to the ways of understanding the limits of personal freedom and responsibility. Destructive convictions are such that their consequences are detrimental either to an individual or to their relation with others, and thus contribute to social pathology in micro- and macroscale. It is assumed that the ideas of freedom and responsibility may be conceived in a variety of ways, which produces different forms of their realization, and consequently results in disparate behaviours, some of which seem less constructive than others and extract more social “costs”. Propensity for identifying personal freedom with all forms of power, domination or possession may exemplify such behaviour. Similarly, although for other reasons, identification of personal freedom with unfettered autonomy and independence of others (or with an absolute selfcontrol) may also bring about (self) destructive consequences. From a psychological perspective, it is a particularly crucial to consider that unvoiced opinions, and inner subconscious expectations, per se, may trigger conflicts, and the sense of enslavement and restriction. Indeed, such “private notions of freedom” have bearing on our interpretation of certain situations, and other people’s behaviour as a violation of our personal freedom, or a threat to our autonomy, and our subsequent response of defiance, passive resistance, revolt or other forms of counteraction, including acts of aggression. In a commonly held view being a free human being, or at least ascribing a certain margin of freedom, is a prerequisite of responsibility (for oneself, for others, and generally, for “something”). On the other hand, the lack of imagination and responsibility is detrimental to the foundations of freedom, be it individual or collective. One way or another, the ideas of freedom and responsibility are complementary and extensively interdependent. Therefore the second part of this chapter is devoted to the issue of responsibility, in an attempt to prove the thesis that destructive notions of responsibility do not come down to the stereotyped view (as of individualistic culture) that only the deficiency of responsibility brings about negative consequences, be it in individual, interpersonal or social aspect.
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On Constructive and Destructive Ways of Understanding
1.
Concepts of freedom versus experienced freedom.
For the sake of further considerations it seems adequate to distinguish the sense of freedom or experienced freedom (or the lack of it) from the manifested, and less or more prevalent, ideas of freedom, which are bound to be biased. The idea of freedom is carried over from the institution of slavery, nonetheless the passage of time has not served to elucidate it, if not to the contrary. In the “meantime” the idea of freedom has provided a focus for a host of ruminations - be it philosophical, theological, ethical, legal, economic, and last but not least, psychological. Aside from the complex, and, often contradictory, interpretations of freedom, one has to bear in mind that in the times of slavery “being free” translated into not being a slave, along with all ensuing consequences and possibilities. 1 The abiding character of the idea of freedom seems to be rooted in the universality of human experience of situations in which freedom of action is taken away (or restricted) such as coercion, violence, restraint, restriction, dependence, or attachment. We are led to think that the abstract idea of freedom has emerged as a generalised, polar opposite of physical enslavement, and a more generally conceived limitation of the freedom to act. 2 One has to agree with K. Obuchowski that in today’s world - or at least in our culture - striving for freedom has become a cultural norm, and thus a value that is more readily recognised rather than implemented. 3 Owing to its vagueness and capacity, the idea of freedom has taken on a form of a “wish box”, to be filled up with individual, and often contradictory, contents. The dual character of freedom is revealed, from the start, in the complementarity of the notions of “freedom from” and “freedom to”. Therefore, every model of freedom provides twofold information: about the values at risk, and the values to appreciate. From a methodological point of view, the above consideration may also have positive implications. Wealth of information on one’s idiosyncratic experience of freedom or their system of values may come out from the reconstruction of their subjective notion of freedom. For some people the idea of freedom and experience thereof come down to negative freedom, i.e. independence of various averse circumstances. 4 Others, still, perceive it as a possibility to achieve attractive goals positive freedom. Some people will associate freedom with spontaneity of reaction, self-expression, while others, just to the contrary, will see it as a power to exert a total control over circumstances, and their behaviour. Some people may conceive freedom as inextricably linked with the possibility of undertaking action (especially in a social context), while others would rather concentrate on the stoic ideal of interior freedom,
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bearing in mind the words of Voltaire: “You cannot impose a customs duty on thoughts”. 2.
Social implications of “private concepts of freedom”.
Psychology has for a long time provided us with arguments to corroborate the thesis that our sense of being, and our decisions to undertake some actions, and not others, rest largely on our subjective interpretation of a situation. Following this line of thinking, whether we experience freedom or its deficit also depends on the subjective interpretation of our situation, our rights and options. What’s more, the extent of our perceived freedom, or its deficit, as well as what behaviours of others we perceive as a threat to our freedom depend in large measure on our “private concepts of freedom”, on how we understand the “nature” of freedom. It is sufficient a reason for the issue of personal freedom to provide a focus for reflection, discussion, and dialogue. Besides, in the crowded “global village”, there is an ever-growing prevalence of situations in which the subjectively (and arbitrarily) defined boundaries of personal freedom may, and often do encroach the boundaries of freedom of others. One of the commonly implemented means of enhancing one’s sense of freedom is the aspiration to amass personal wealth, and to extend the limits of one’s property, be it material or symbolic. These are costly methods of enhancing the sense of personal freedom, both from a social and individual perspective. Another reason why the issue of freedom attracts attention may relate to its “educational-developmental” aspect. Namely, the notion of freedom evaluates with age, from the simplified and “wishful”, towards more complex, and more realistically defined. Preventive and educational measures may enhance and accelerate this process. It is also necessary to acknowledge the “diagnostic-therapeutic” reasons. The sense of enslavement often correlates with interior conflicts, and accompanies multiple psychological and psychosomatic disorders. 5 The sense of freedom or enslavement corresponds with, and is the consequence of “invasive” interpersonal contacts, often based on various forms of psychological violence. 6 It is conducive to a strictly antidemocratic model of interpersonal communication, pervasive in the contemporary culture of the West. 7 There is ample evidence - also from the author’s research - that children and adolescents assert their freedom by effectively counteracting external pressures, suggestions or orders. It squares with one of the “Statements of freedom”, which propounds that “We feel free when able to ‘overcome the resistance of reality’, when we effectively counteract external pressures and limitations”. 8 The results of B. Pasiut’s research on the attitudes to euthanasia, conducted among secondary school students in
4
On Constructive and Destructive Ways of Understanding
Cracow, showed that those adolescents who received persuasive information against euthanasia (with reference to authority of the Church or doctors) prior to completing the questionnaires, responded twice more often in favour of euthanasia than those who were not subject to such persuasion. 9 This spectacular result corresponds with classical concept of reactance of J. Brehm, which suggests that we are prone to protect the alternatives of choice which seem to be in jeopardy. 10 By the way, the behaviours that consist in counteracting something (orders, proposals or opinions) are attractive inasmuch as they allow a prompt and cheap (in a sense of invested energy) experience of our subjectivity. Also, the impact of our behaviour on others may be directly observed from their reactions. 3. To want, to be able to, and to have to - three components of experienced freedom. Irrespective of a vast array of notions and related experience, there is one common denominator of the experience of freedom. It combines a triangle of ideas of: ABILITY, OVERABILITY, and INABILITY. Individual types of the qualitatively disparate experience of freedom or enslavement are represented by the correlations and interactions of states or processes behind these notions. By way of comment, it should be expounded that: - ABILITY stands for the sense of influence, initiation, competition and control, together with all other opportunities to influence reality, both in external and internal sense, - OVERABILITY is connected with the sense of advantage (be it physical, psychological, military, political, economic, or any other) and its implementation, - INABILITY stands for the sense of helplessness when faced with an unacceptable situation. These three key concepts outline a horizontal plane of the experienced freedom. Aspiration for ability may be at least twofold. We may wish to improve our abilities (skills) either to be able to do more than before, or to excel others. In the former case, we, ourselves, constitute our point of reference, while in the latter we refer to others. The first kind of aspiration may be rooted in the developmental motivation, may stem from our aspiration for perfection or the ideal, while the second may be competition-related or result from feelings of anxiety, animosity or inferiority (compare: Adler’s concept of striving for power). Subjectively, all these aspirations may have freedom-related connotation for an individual, and be interpreted as attempts to strengthen one’s autonomy, and assert one’s freedom, individuality or subjectivity. The appeal of freedom rests in the fact that for the people who feel discriminated it translates into equal rights and possibilities, whereas the people who enjoy
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above-average options perceive freedom as their right to unlimited expansion and domination. Apart from the horizontal pane marked out by the synonyms of I CAN, and their semantic antonyms, in order to describe experiences related to freedom or enslavement, it is prerequisite to include key concepts of I WANT, and I HAVE TO, together with their antonyms. 11 It is necessary to acknowledge that all freedom-related experiences, and the views on the nature of freedom or enslavement may be described by (or come down to) the combination of the three concepts together with their negations, i.e.: I WANT (I don’t want to), I CAN (I cannot) and I HAVE TO (I don’t have to). And thus: - I WANT TO expresses the degree of commitment to one’s actions (planned or already in progress) ensuing from the attractiveness of the activity or the desired goal; - I CAN expresses the degree of subjective control over one’s actions, plans or external circumstances; - I HAVE TO expresses all emotionally unacceptable actions, events and circumstances that we consider inevitable, and indisputable. 12 Simply put, an equation for “the sense of freedom” may be represented by: S(F) = (I WANT ^ I CAN) > I HAVE TO It means that the feeling of freedom may be experienced once the combination of I WANT and I HAVE TO outweighs I HAVE TO. The more detailed rendition of the equation for the sense of freedom would be: S(F) = (I WANT ^ I CAN) or (~I WANT ^ ~I HAVE TO) > (~I WANT ^ I HAVE TO) or (I WANT ^ ~I CAN) It means that the sense of freedom appears when, within the subjective interpretation of a situation, and one’s potential “I want to and I can”, and “I don’t want to and I don’t have to” outweigh “I don’t want to and I have to”, and “I want to and I cannot”. Obviously, all three elements (feelings): I want to, I can, I have to, are subject to the workings of integration-defensive mechanisms, which affect their multilevel interactions. For example, a strong positive motivation would boost estimation of one’s potential, and consequently increase the chances of the realisation of one’s goals, according to the dictum: “when there is a will, there is a way”. Analogically, a low estimation of one’s potential results in a waning motivation, and the proverbial grapes taste bitter, and are not worth the trouble. 13 According to the proposed formula, the “increase” in one’s sense of freedom should take place in three, distinct contexts 1) when the directional motivation I WANT TO is on the increase, 2) when the feeling or conviction of one’s efficiency is on the increase, owing to the generalisation of the present moment “successes”, and the conviction I CAN becomes stronger (I have achieved this and that, it surely means I am
On Constructive and Destructive Ways of Understanding
6
capable of much more), 3) when, for any reason the pressure of I HAVE TO type (internal or external) is on the decrease. 14 4.
On less or more constructive understanding of freedom.
The research carried out by the author in 1992 made use of a questionnaire “Statements of freedom”, containing 30 statements on the nature of freedom and its stipulations, mostly quotes from the writers on the subject of freedom. 15 The respondents had to express their attitude (level of acceptance) towards each of the statements, and mark them on the scale of 11 points, where 0 stood for complete disapproval and 10 meant complete approval of a statement. There were 146 participants in the project, (72 women, and 74 men), aged between 16 and 73. They represented various educational, professional, and family backgrounds. Contrary to the expectations, it transpired that irrespective of their gender or age, the subjects were extensively unanimous in eliciting acceptable statements, which is indicative of the ways of understanding (interpreting) freedom. The most accepted statements with the points are presented in Table 1. Table 1: The statements most accepted by the whole group of subjects (N=146; no distinctive differences between genders or ages). Statement no.
11
Statement Freedom is, first and foremost, courage to do what one desires (or considers right), at the readiness to bear the consequences of one’s actions.
Degree of acceptability M 7.8
“Affirmative” model of freedom 29
6
We experience freedom mostly when our feelings, thoughts, and actions are in a perfect harmony. Freedom comes down to a spontaneous action of an entire, integrated personality. “Coherent” model of freedom Freedom is the ability to express one’s individual nature, and to fulfil one’s potential in an interpersonal sphere. “Expressive” model of freedom
7.6
7.4
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Interestingly, all of the most accepted statements share one common denominator. Namely, they all embrace so-called “positive freedom”, and none of the accepted statements refers to the idea of “internal freedom”. It is also worth mentioning that identical statements turned out to be most “popular” in a subsequent research project, carried out by the same method on a group of 100 students (67 girls and 33 boys) of secondary schools (liceums) in Cracow. As a result, the statement no.11 earned an average of 9.1 points, the statement no.6 earned 8.8 points, and statement no. 29 was the fourth in the ranking. 16 The statements that scored the lowest in the ranking - the least approved or the mostly rejected ones - are presented in Table 2. Table 2: The statements as least accepted by the whole group (N=146) Statement no.
16
12
20
Statement Freedom is a need of a considerably small class of people who are endowed with talents that others are lacking. Therefore, freedom may be restricted without any reservations. Equality, however, appeals to the common folk. “Elitist” model of freedom Freedom is a troublesome gift from nature. A human being wants to dispose of the gift by passing it on to anyone else, That is why, in the course of history, people have created gods. “Averse” model of freedom Freedom is an illusory idea that incites us to rebellion, contrariness, or negation whenever things do not go according to our plans.
Degree of acceptability M
3.0
3.3
3.5
“Illusory” model of freedom
A common denominator of the most disapproved statements is that they depreciate or undermine the role and significance of freedom. This might imply that in our culture the idea of freedom (albeit understood in a multitude of ways) is highly appreciated, if not overrated.
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On Constructive and Destructive Ways of Understanding
In reference to the above-mentioned results, it is worth mentioning that the perception of freedom among men changes with age (and the idea of freedom tends to become laden with more significance more statements were ascribed higher points). No such tendency was observed among women-subjects, which may imply that freedom is mainly a “male problem”. By the way, the statement that met with a proportionally increased acceptance among men as they progressed with age was that of no. 21: “Only those who want to be free may consider themselves to be human beings’” (r=36; p<0.001). The above-mentioned research did not focus on the question of destructive or constructive dimensions of the recognised models of freedom. Nevertheless, the quoted findings indicate that so-called “people in the street”, if adequately provoked to reflection, display a good taste, and opt for (surprisingly unanimously) sophisticated and constructive understanding of freedom, rather than one-sided, and simplistic definitions. However, this does not serve to prove that the accepted interpretations of freedom carry over to behaviour in specific life situations (particularly those that entail spontaneous and emotional response). The research also hinted at some developmental tendencies in the preferred approach to freedom. They serve to prove the hypothesis that in the process of development we first tend to embrace the voluntary and hedonistic approach to freedom (“To be free means to be able to do whatever I feel like doing this moment”). Later in life, we are more likely to appreciate the value of internal freedom (“Freedom is the art of acceptance of the inevitable, and the unavoidable”). Interior freedom, also known as “internal emigration” is extremely important, as it is a last bastion of our humanity, invaluable in times of difficulties. However, like any emigration, it also has its shortcomings. It should not be forgotten that internal freedom as described by stoic philosophers, was coined by slaves (i.e. Epictetus). Opportunities and hazards that ensue from the advancement of modern technology, especially its crowning achievement, the Internet, force us to redefine the idea of internal freedom. Does the so-called virtual space serve to radically enhance our personal freedom (freedom to act) or is it rather an extension of our internal freedom? This issue calls for a separate consideration. However, one opinion is worth quoting here. In his article Cyberspace as liberation, MoĪdĪyĔski looks at this problem very critically: Cyberspace has become yet another prison. Possibilities of manipulating and directing other people have been increasing dramatically. The Internet - an illusion of freedom - is yet another electronic bar in our window with the view of the external and the internal world. New
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illusion emerges as we, allegedly, enjoy this unrestricted access to the sea of knowledge and information. Remember though, you can drown in the sea. 17 5.
On stereotypical understanding of responsibility.
The fact that we all inhabit what is now a “global village” calls for a re-definition of many traditional ideas. The change of contexts entails the change of definitions. One of them relates to the idea of “responsibility”, which is still associated with the 19th century stability, solidity, and most readily ascribed only with positive meaning. Parents, for instance, tell their children to behave responsibly - whatever this means. If we want to rebuke someone we usually say they are irresponsible, rather than over-responsible. However, both extremes may be conducive to pathology. Contrary to popular stereotypes, an individual may be over-responsible or “ill-responsive” to the challenges of reality or the supposed expectations of others. Someone once said that idealists are dangerous because of their readiness to go to any lengths for the ideal they recognise as noble. Terrorists - a crossbreed of human hopelessness and the potential of technology - usually feel more responsible than others for the future of the world, humanity or animals, and are ready to consecrate their life, and the lives of others in the name of some value that had been elevated to the absolute, also called an “overvalued idea”. Simply put, we may distinguish between the pathology of irresponsibility, the pathology of “overresponsibility”, and that of “ill-conceived responsibility”. 6.
On systemic understanding of responsibility.
The problem of personal responsibility depends in large measure on, better or worse, delineated boundaries of one’s influence on the shape of reality, and the entailing (often unnoticed) consequences, or the socalled side effects. It is also connected with the decision not to undertake any action, and the resignation from the possibility of exercising influence on events and situations of which we are part. Also, it is a question of making the most of the opportunities or letting them slip. 18 Sometimes we feel responsible for not having influenced the course of events sufficiently. On other occasions, we absolve ourselves from any responsibility, in spite of the visibly negative consequences of our actions, assuming that we acted with “good intentions”, and according to our knowledge at the time - our action was purposeful and rational. 19 One may feel guilty about not being able to have shaped the course of events in the desired direction. Also, one may underestimate or be unaware of their actual influence. Simply put, some people readily shrug
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On Constructive and Destructive Ways of Understanding
off responsibility for the actual consequences of their actions, while others post factum apply the unrealistic criterion of potential influence and tend to assume too much responsibility, which may, in the course of time, transform into a feeling of guilt. The problem of understanding and experiencing our responsibility seems to stem from the fact that, on the one hand we have the reasons (or even duty) to consider ourselves as autonomous entities, and on the other hand we perceive ourselves as a separate system, as in the autopoiesis sense of H. Maturana. It is equally indisputable that every one of us constitutes a part of a larger whole - if not the Universe, then at least a “global village”, in the understanding of M. McLuhan. Unfortunately, the global village long ago ceased to be a close, small community, and has become synonymous with a planet populated by all mankind, where it is ever more difficult to establish the boundaries of one’s responsibility and to define “what we are still responsible for, and what we are no longer responsible for”. The systemic nature of reality may prompt an obvious conclusion that we are responsible for ourselves, but not only for ourselves. Depending on the embraces ontology, “not for myself” may mean that we are responsible “for the people we know” or once knew, “the mankind”, “the rest of the Universe”. As the Christian tradition has it, a sin may take a form of “a thought, a word or an action”. Therefore some of us, in compliance with the accepted ontology, may assume responsibility for their “actions”, rather than “acts of speech”, externalised and objectivised verbal reactions, and even less so for “thoughts and feelings”, which we prefer not to display. In line with the popular ontology, we feel more responsible for what is visible or has been externalised. However, a change in the adopted ontology may carry over to the responsibility, and favour what is invisible, not displayed – “thoughts” or “desires” - as synonymous with what is internal. In this respect, what is more difficult to define, grasp or measure objectively becomes laden with more significance. In consequence, it is difficult to “hold someone accountable”, in social and legal terms. This could imply that responsibility, at least in a moral sense, rests on the professed, accepted ontology, which is both a result, and an expression of our knowledge. As we are responsible for our knowledge, we are also responsible for our personal ontology of reality, for choosing particular vision of reality. Like freedom, responsibility does not have to be regarded as a value added to the fundamental properties of reality, but rather as an essential aspect of human existence. 20
Krzysztof MudyĔ
7.
11
“To be responsible for” and “to respond to”.
The systemic nature of reality, or more specifically our position in the systemic reality makes us responsible not only for what we do out of our own will or initiative, but also, to some extent, responsible for the “rest of the world”, for the events that unfold without our initiative, intention, but still concern us, and call for our “response”. If someone calls for help, we usually respond, even though we do not feel responsible for the cause of their affliction. We find it easier to take responsibility for the consequences of our own actions, words and decisions, and feel obliged to “repair damage that we have inflicted”. It gets more complicated when we are faced with institutional or collective responsibility, when a large number of people is involved in a decision-making process, i.e. boards of directors, supervising boards, commissions, committees. The sense of responsibility, or even awareness of a cause-andeffect relation or influence (in a broad sense), may also disappear when the negative consequences of our actions and decisions are postponed in time. It should be noted that the consequences of a faulty decision, be it personal or political may emerge as late as years after it was taken, which makes it even more difficult to relate the contents of the “bill of consequences” to the past actions, or the lack of action. Being responsible not only for ourselves but also for others may come from the fact that no-one is a “lonely island” or an absolutely autonomous entity, as we all make up a larger entity, and are part of reality. To a degree we are obliged to “respond to” the needs, calls and challenges of external reality, also when we are not directly involved in the events, and we have not “arranged with the reality” to be summoned to respond. Take for example a situation of an accident or a mugging. If we do not help the victims, irrespective of the fact that we are not accountable for the accident, we violate one or more moral rules (e.g. social solidarity rule). Different as it is from causative “responsibility for”, and more difficult to codify, this type of responsibility merits the term of moral responsibility. It seems that the postulate of “responding to” may also be considered in relation to the previously mentioned systemic nature of reality. The reversed Cartesian dictum: “I think, therefore I am” may be rendered into “I am, therefore I think”, and “I am accountable for the shape of my existence”. Remembering that an individual does not exist in isolation, we may conclude and postulate: “I am a part of reality therefore I respond to its calls”. To illustrate the point, let us imagine a telephone ringing. If we do not pick up the receiver, and do not respond to the signal we send out a false (thus morally deplorable) message that we are “not
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On Constructive and Destructive Ways of Understanding
there”. This does not imply, however, that we should react to every phone call with a “pronto”. 8.
Four pitfalls of personal responsibility.
The term pitfall encompasses these situations and circumstances in which it is particularly easy to misconstrue the scope of one’s responsibility by either limiting or stretching out its boundaries. A. External observer pitfall. External observer pitfall consists in fact that we feel more responsible for - what we think - is seen from the outside, from the stand of an external bystander rather than for what is disclosed only to an “internal observer”, hereby identified with the consciousness of the subject. The name of the pitfall suggests a tendency to feel more accountable for our overt actions (thus perceived by others) rather than for our thoughts or (undisclosed) emotions or judgements that we (quite erroneously) consider to be our private affair, or downgrade as trivial. From a genetic perspective, in philogenetic and ontogenetic sense, our consciousness is primarily focused on the external world rather than on itself or the signals from ‘its’ body. Similarly, the sources of social rewards or punishment are primarily located in the social world on the exterior. The process of “self-reinforcement”, in the meaning of selfgenerating rewards and punishment, is secondary, and takes place later. Similarly, the feelings of guilt or shame emerge in response to the evaluating reaction of social environment. Adults may feel guilty for two different reasons: 1) when they feel they have violated an internalised and self-accepted moral norm, 2) they have been punished, or expect to be punished and therefore conclude to be guilty. The same framework may be applied to the sense of responsibility. We feel more responsible for the problems that we expect to, or already have been made “accountable for” than for undisclosed matter. External observer pitfall may contribute to the evasion of responsibility for our thoughts, and emotions and subsequent unwillingness to control them. This may be manifested by incoherence, and inconsistency of one’s behaviour, a discrepancy between verbal and non-verbal acts of communication. Deficiency in responsibility for one’s experienced emotions and passed judgements may also stem from an inclination to attribute it to external causes. This brings us to another type of pitfall.
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B. Persecutor pitfall. Persecutor pitfall is characterised by the proneness to seek the causes of our negative emotions or wrongdoings beyond ourselves. At this point, one should bear in mind words of M. Rosenberg that “What others say and do may be the stimulus, but never the cause of our feeling”. 21 Assuming responsibility for our actions is not easy. Promulgation of semantic patterns such as “my boss got on my nerves” or “you make me feel guilty” adds to this tendency of finding fault for our mental state with others. M. Rosenberg listed as many as eight different situations in which we evade responsibility for our own actions. In principle, it occurs whenever we consider another person’s behaviour (or an act of speech) to be the cause of our behaviour or our negative emotions, at the same time, we shy away from responsibility for the state of our emotions and delegate it the external environment. Such pattern of interpretation and reaction is known to characterise people with weak emotional control. It is also believed that malefactors typically exonerate themselves from responsibility by finding fault with their victims - “because she put too much salt in the soup”, “ cause she was staring at me”, “because he wasn’t wearing a cap”. C. Victim pitfall. Victim pitfall consists in undermining one’s influence - potential or real, on the course of events, and adopting a completely passive attitude to the situation of which we are part. This pitfall is connected with the empirically proven fact that people are prone to consider the low probability a catastrophic event occurrence as almost null. In consequence, the possibility of its occurrence is ignored, and no steps are taken to reduce it. 22 It seems that the regularities demonstrated by the research on the subjective probability of the occurrence of events (desirable and not), also relate to subjective evaluation of personal influence on shaping the situation in which they are involved. The general dictum: “to change what may be changed and to accept what is unalterable” sounds rational but in some situations may provide a fallacious justification for the victim pitfall. Undoubtedly, it is rational a strategy to influence the evident and obvious situations, whereas it is not a very rational one to give up on the course of action when we deem our influence to be paltry, or very limited. It is worth noting that in the global world we inhabit, individual influence on many spheres of social life (including the parliamentary elections results) is infinitesimal. Nevertheless, an entailing conclusion that we have no influence on the shape of the world, and subsequent absolution from any responsibility for the world simply leads to the victim pitfall. It seems that many faces of social pathology in the modern world
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On Constructive and Destructive Ways of Understanding
relate to this pitfall. Paradoxically enough, everyone suffers the palpable or even dramatic consequences, but no-one feels enough responsibility for their causes or for taking any preventive measures. It should also be reiterated that the visibly observed passivity of an individual, or a group (micro- or macro-scale) unwittingly communicates a message to the social surroundings. However understood, the message is bound to provoke a reaction that is inherently associated with the observed passivity. It may come across as, e.g. symptom of indifference – “if they don’t care then…”. Violent malefactors or potential perpetrators may interpret it as dismissal, superiority or provocation (of a would-be victim). Moreover, the potential “saviours” and “assistants” may take it for a sign of helplessness, a call for taking over responsibility for other person’s situation, for making a decision for them, for providing assistance, in spite of the fact that the request for help has not voiced. D. Rescuer pitfall. Rescuer pitfall consists in an exaggerated sense of responsibility for the “wellbeing” of people that we relate to. Common morality calls this concern for others altruism, and recognises it as praiseworthy. The problem lies in the fact that by taking over (or sustaining) responsibility for another person we deprive them of (be it considerable or small) feedback information about the consequences of their actions, and obstruct their sense of responsibility for their own life. As it happens, family relations may showcase a specific constellation of roles - as the role of a rescuer complements those of a persecutor (attacker) and a victim. Such a destructive arrangement of interpersonal relations is known as a “dramatic triangle”. “Co-dependent” people - usually the closest relatives of a person dependent on alcohol, drugs, hazard, work, etc. - are particularly susceptible to fall in the saviour trap. They try hard, and usually to no avail, to take control over life of the close one who has given up or lost such control. Contrary to appearances, the role of a saviour is not as morally constructive and praiseworthy as it may first appear. In her book on co-dependence, M. Beattie observes that in most cases, violent acts and rescue are indicative of low self-esteem. We help others and get them out of troubles not only because we do not think highly of ourselves but also because we do not think well of them. We consider them - quite erroneously though - to be unable to be held accountable for their own actions. By way of conclusion we may paraphrase someone’s words and say that “the modern world has many problems and you are one of them”. Globalisation adds to the sense of individual helplessness and blurs the boundaries of personal responsibility. In consequence, we may be liable to
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two kinds of mistakes. We may either feel responsible for our individual “state of being” or we may assume responsibility for the future of the world and humanity, rather than our own actions, emotions and opinions.
Notes 1
Adler, 1962, 30-42; MudyĔ, 1998, 976-977. MudyĔ, 1992, 23. 3 Obuchowski, 1993, 228. 4 compare: Skinner, 1978, 32. 5 MudyĔ, 1992, 27. 6 Motyka, 1991, 32. 7 Rosenberg, 1999, 17; MudyĔ, 2000, 19; MudyĔ, 2002, 42. 8 One of 30 statements utilised by the author for the purpose of his research. I shall enlarge on this later. 9 Pasiut, 2002, 4. 10 Brehm, 1966,12. 11 MudyĔ, 1995, 44-45. 12 It should be acknowledged that I HAVE TO has a broad meaning in this context. It encompasses all kinds of inevitable external obligation, as well as internal compulsions. It also refers to “moral imperatives”, and to all internalised duties, and obligations. 13 compare: MudyĔ, 1995, 211. 14 This type of the sense of freedom is connected with “breaking free” from various averse circumstances, which produces a feeling of relief (and joy), as encapsulated in a sentence: “I’m glad I don’t have to do it anymore. Now, at last, I can…”. 15 MudyĔ, 2001, 5. 16 MudyĔ, 1999. 17 MoĪdĪyĔski, 2003. 18 see: Branden, 1999, 43. 19 see: Derbis, 1994, 53; Zimny, 1984, 788. In writing about responsible freedom, Romuald Derbis distinguishes between personal responsibility and task-based, political, and moral responsibility. The author’s understanding of personal freedom is particularly interesting. He posits that: “Personal responsibility, also known as internal responsibility, relates to our intention to comply with the laws of nature and culture”. This definition squares with the proposed by Zimny differentiation between objective responsibility (in a way connected with the consequences of transgressing the laws of nature), and social responsibility, connected with respecting or transgressing the laws of culture. 20 Branden, 1996, 18. 21 Rosenberg, 1999, 41. 2
16
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see: Tyszka, 1999, 203-213.
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intencjonalny.
Warszawa:
Pasiut, B. (2002), Wpáyw komunikatów perswazyjnych na stosunek máodzieĪy licealnej do eutanazji. Unpublished manuscript. Skinner, B. F. (1978), Poza wolnoĞcią i godnoĞcią. Warszawa: PIW. Rosenberg, M. (1999), Nonviolent Communication. A Language of Compassion. Del Mar: PuddleDancer Press. Tyszka, T. (1999), Psychologiczne puáapki oceniania i podejmowania decyzji. GdaĔsk: GdaĔskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne. Zimny, Z. (1984), ‘OdpowiedzialnoĞü obiektywna, subiektywna i spoáeczna’, Przegląd Psychologiczny, 4: 785-91.
Author Affiliation Krzysztof MudyĔ, a psychologist, is a lecturer at the Institute of Applied Psychology at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. At present, his areas of study focus on psychological determinants of individuallyheld onthologies of reality, psychological consequences of “virtualisation” of reality, private “models” of freedom, and correlation between an individually-held system of values and one’s subjective assessment of the reality of various “objects”. He is the author of numerous publications, e.g.: Zdarza siĊ, Īe myĞlimy... (‘We happen to think…’), O granicach poznania. Miedzy wiedzą, niewiedzą i antywiedzą (‘On limits of cognition. Knowledge. No-knowledge. Anti-knowledge’) and Problem granic poznania z hipersystemowego punktu widzenia (‘Limits of cognition. Hyper-systemic approach’).
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The Social-Psychological Construction of Violent Political Discourses: Psychopathology in Political Life 1 Richard Jackson 1.
Introduction.
The current “war on terror” has in many ways, brought the problem of political violence into the daily experience of almost everyone. In fact, political violence encompasses a vast array of phenomena. In the first instance, there are highly organized and large-scale forms of political violence, such as interstate wars, conventional civil wars, and revolutions. The United States-led attack against Iraq in the spring of 2003 is only the latest of more than one hundred interstate conflicts since World War II alone. In addition, there have been more than 150 civil wars and revolutions in that time. More commonly however, there are sub-state forms of political violence like coup d’etat, army mutinies, violent demonstrations, street riots, pogroms and inter-communal massacres, insurgencies, death squad violence, vigilante violence, and the breakdown of law and order in so-called “failed states.” Individuals may also engage in political violence, such as assassinations, suicide bombings, and other acts of terrorism. The campaign by al Qaeada since 1992 against the United States is only the latest example since the Middle Ages of small groups of individuals pressing their political claims against states through the use of violence. The purpose of this chapter is to examine a major form of contemporary political violence, namely civil war, and to suggest a theoretical framework for understanding its causes. Sustained forms of civil violence are widespread across many regions of the world, and have in fact, replaced conventional interstate wars as the predominant form of international violence. The importance of such an examination lies firstly, in the observation that conflict management at the international level is currently in crisis. It has proven to be largely ineffective in dealing with the “new wars” of the post-Cold War period. Numerous efforts at mediation, conciliation, sanctions, peacekeeping, and humanitarian intervention have failed to properly resolve civil wars in Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Kashmir, Israel-Palestine, Colombia, Myanmar, The Solomon Islands, and numerous other states. The primary reason for this crisis of international conflict management rests in the conceptual deficit evident in official discourses in terms of understanding the true nature of this kind of political violence, and the theoretical vacuum in regards to its causes. Because there is little understanding about the causal imperatives of civil wars, the remedies
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applied are often misplaced, blatantly mistaken, or poorly applied. It is therefore, an overriding imperative that we devote greater energies to uncovering the roots of contemporary political violence and develop relevant theories for their management and resolution. In addition, civil wars pose an array of interlinked security threats, such as the spill-over effects of illegal arms trades, the spread of transnational criminal enterprises, the flows of refugees and asylum seekers, and the rise of terrorism. In other words, greater understanding of the phenomenon of civil war will also facilitate the management of other related sources of insecurity. A related problem is that scholarly discourses are often hampered by outmoded assumptions and approaches. During the cold war, civil violence received only marginal attention in the scholarly literature on international conflict, as IR scholars were pre-occupied with the global conflict between the superpowers. 2 It was really only the end of that conflict and the rise in salience of civil violence in the former Soviet Bloc that re-directed their energies in a new direction. However, the predominance of IR scholars has meant that the field has tended to be dominated by a number of core - mainly neo-realist - assumptions which, by and large, are proving unhelpful in the search for a better understanding of the nature and causes of civil violence. For example, international conflict in general has been approached from a traditional Clausewitzean perspective, with its emphasis on professional military structures, “scientific” military strategy and tactics, military technology and capabilities, and traditional war aims. The application of such approaches to the deconstructed settings and post-modern character of much contemporary political violence (with its criminal aspects, human rights abuses, diverse armed groups, ethnic hatreds, ritualized violence, and external inter-connections) is extremely limited. 3 Further, there continues to be a tendency to portray contemporary civil wars as a form of political abnormality or a kind of social pathology; it is the breakdown of a particular system, or the retreat from normally peaceful political forms. 4 Such positivist views of civil war ignore the considerable objective (and subjective) rationality of deliberately employing political violence in certain contexts. In some circumstances, violence can perform a variety of functions in alternative systems of profit, power, and protection. In other words, civil wars are not necessarily “breakdowns” in normally peaceful political systems, or the aberrant suspension of non-violent domestic politics. 5 Rather, they are the direct result of a particular form of politics - a system of conflict -that is often rooted in the structures and processes of so-called “weak states”, and which has its own political logic. Therefore, contrary to much conventional wisdom,
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[…] if we wish to examine conflict we must begin by analysing what is normal. Or at least, those long-term and embedded social processes that define the conditions of everyday life. The purpose and reasons for conflict are located in these processes. From this perspective, political violence is not different, apart or irrational in relation to the way we live: it is an expression of its inner logic. 6 Along with positivist assumptions, the study of civil wars has tended to employ positivist methodologies in either historical-political case studies, or more recently in large-scale quantitative empirical analyses. For the most part, the study of political violence has tended to apply modernist rationalist assumptions about human motivations in situations of social conflict. It is suggested that ordinary people fight civil wars in the rational pursuit of economic gain, or for personal security in times of anarchy, or in pursuit of political goals defined by nationalist ideologies. For example, some situations of sustained political violence are argued to be the result of security dilemmas: ethnic groups in situations of “emergent anarchy” calculate that pre-emptive self-defense is necessary to ensure group survival, prompting escalatory preparations for violence. 7 In other words, civil war, it is argued, is usually the result of structurally determined or bounded rational decision-making that does not have violence as an end in itself or as a key objective in and of itself, but is rather a means to an end. Implicit is the assumption that people in war act in terms of rational calculation, and not, for example, out of hatred or irrational fears. In fact, there may be other more subjective social-psychological rationalities for employing violence in politically fragile, ethnically fractured, and economically weak states. 8 Violence may be intrinsically valuable in itself, or may be enacted out of hatred, fear, or chauvinistic beliefs. In any case, sustained political violence usually involves the creation of political discourses that “link passion and rationality in a manner which modernism - with its image of humankind as intellectively rational - is incapable of explaining.” 9 In other words, the conceptual challenge of explaining contemporary forms of political violence does not necessarily lie in excavating the reasons why communities within states take up arms against each other. The more important and more interesting question is how ordinary people in some societies are induced (or seduced) by national and local leaders into extreme forms of violence against other communities during times of civil conflict. Bowman, commenting on his experiences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia observes,
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The brutalities which have characterized ethnic interaction in the succeeding three years could not, I contend, have been foreseen by an observer of the patterns of coexistence which had characterized the postwar years; after the eruption of nationalist fervor, intermarriage, co-residence and economic cooperation were replaced by mutilations such as the gouging out of eyes and hacking off of genitals as well as the rape of women and children, the wholesale massacre of ethnic groups within towns and villages, the desecration and destruction of the properties and houses of those viewed by the perpetrators as ethnic ‘others’, and the collection of men, women and children in concentration camps where torture, murder, and genocidal deprivations of food and water were commonplace. […] The ethnic hatred which has erupted throughout the territories of Former Yugoslavia may have been instigated from above, but the popular response to that fomentation has been enthusiastic. 10 Similarly, Lemarchand poses the key question at the heart of Burundi’s continuing bestial inter-communal violence: By what extraordinary combination of circumstances could centuries of relatively peaceful commingling between Hutu and Tutsi, cemented by their shared loyalty to a common set of institutions [including the Kirundi language!], suddenly dissolve into fratricide? 11 As Kaufman points out, such inhumanity demonstrated by ordinary citizens cries out for explanation, and “no account of ethnic war is adequate which does not explain how such things can happen”. 12 Yet most academic accounts of civil war avoid such fraught emotional engagement with its central subject-matter. What we need is to explain political violence as human actions involving agency and intentionality, and not just as historical events or the result of certain structural features inherent to some societies. That is, moving beyond the structure-agency debate to a “post-dualist” approach, we need to integrate both a structural and agentic understanding of political violence in society. 13 In order to add agency-based explanations to existing structural accounts, we need to understand how internal war as a social continuity is both constructed and reproduced in the actions of individuals, communities, and states. Such an approach brings back the notion of agency to war analysis, linking micro
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and macro levels of explanation. It requires a framework which has its focus in the intersection of the social and the psychological. 2.
The Study of Contemporary Political Violence.
There are three main approaches discernible in the study of contemporary political violence: the initial “ancient hatreds” approach of the early 1990s, structuralist approaches, and bounded rationality approaches. First, a section of the current literature focuses on so-called ethnic conflicts in international politics. Typically, it is asserted that “tribally based warfare” erupts “where ethnic and other hatreds had long been officially suppressed but never extinguished in the hearts and minds of populations”. 14 Emphasizing the existence or re-emergence of “ancient hatreds” or a “primitive instinct for violence,” 15 there is also a stress on the element of irrationality, as if persisting political violence “is a perversion of reason that would otherwise lead men and women to adopt peaceable behavior”. 16 Quite apart from its ethnocentric baggage, 17 the ancient hatreds analysis is mono-causal, and risks ignoring the prosaic political and economic roots of political conflict. 18 In addition, while it may be true that identity politics depends on collective memory and tradition, it is also the case that these are often “reinvented” when other sources of political legitimacy - socialism, post-colonial forms of nationalism - fail or corrode. 19 Accompanying the “ethnic” explanation, there is usually a focus on mass-led dimensions, as if most contemporary political violence is an outburst of spontaneous and uncontrollable social forces. These approaches undervalue the role of the political elite in the social life of particular communities, and in the interaction between the various political communities constituting the international system. They also fail to consider the logic of perceived threats, constraints, and opportunities that lead elites to make the choices they do in situations of ongoing political crisis. 20 Second, structuralist approaches attempt to describe the broad social, political, and economic factors that are purported to drive sustained political violence. There are several different structural approaches. For example, there is a booming quantitative literature that seeks to identify the economic and political determinants of civil war. 21 Typically, these studies use large-n data sets and sophisticated statistical methods to try to find correlations between the onset of political violence and variables related to social divisions (ethno-linguistic division, religious diversity), national attributes (population size, previous war experience), levels of economic development (per capita real GDP, per capita energy consumption, primary export percentage, resource scarcity), type of political system (democracy versus autocracy, political and civil rights,
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democratic transitions), and international context (Cold War, geographic region, neighbors at war). 22 Another, and potentially fruitful, structuralist account lies in attempts to re-focus attention on state processes in contemporary political violence. Efforts to “bring the state back in” to the analysis have so far focused on the process of state-building in the developing world. It is argued that, in a general sense, conflict is the result of state-making - both in terms of territorial consolidation and institution-building. 23 The process of European state-building, apart from taking centuries, was often bloody and violent. 24 No less than the European experience, it is argued, the process of creating nation-states in developing regions of the world like Africa also involves war-making. 25 Furthermore, irrational colonial boundaries, chronic underdevelopment, external interference, and the attempt to compress the long process of creating a nation-state into a very short timeframe, have made the state-building project in these regions even more prone to violent civil conflict that was the case in Europe. 26 In extreme cases, the erosion of autonomy can lead to states collapsing or failing altogether. 27 During the European experience unviable states were absorbed by stronger states or reconfigured in new forms. However, the nature of the present international system, particularly its normative structures, makes this option virtually impossible. A final broad category of studies on political violence involves bounded rationality approaches. These studies suggest that given certain structural conditions - emergent anarchy, economic scarcity, weakening state structures due to globalization - elites and groups make rational decisions to pursue their aims by violent means. Within the bounded context of their decision-making parameters, going to war may be entirely rational. For example, it has been noted that many current civil wars involve substantial economic aspects as entrepreneurs make use of opportunities to profit from the uncertainties created by widespread conflict. 28 That is, ruling elites (and their rivals) may calculate great benefits in the creation and maintenance of “war economies,” and there is now an increasingly substantial body of research detailing the significant economic benefits of maintaining “complex emergencies” and the accompanying flow-on political capital that can accrue. 29 How are we to evaluate the research on large-scale, sustained political violence? The sad state of affairs is that research has so far produced few systematic models or cumulative results. Conducted almost exclusively from within positivist assumptions and employing positivist methodologies, studies have focused mainly on the structural characteristics of societies in conflict, or on the processes of bounded rational decision-making. As important as they are for highlighting the key background, or necessary but not sufficient, causes of civil wars, these explanations are limited. The main problem is that empirically they fail to
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explain why very similar societies that share the same structural features most commonly associated with conflict - poverty, salient ethnic or social divisions, minority grievances, failing government institutions, lack of national identity, low levels of state legitimacy - produce radically different conflict histories. And why civil wars erupt when they do, and not earlier or later. The answer to this puzzle lies in the pivotal role of “conflict discourses” as a key variable in generating sustained political violence. This is another level of explanation that brings agency back into the study of civil war. Contemporary forms of political violence are, after all, social constructions instigated by political entrepreneurs, but rooted in the social continuities of often weak state structures and processes, and reproduced through the violence itself. In other words, it is the rise and domination of certain kinds of conflict discourses (and not simply the presence of certain structural features or processes of political conflict) that turn certain kinds of states into societies at war. Research into the causes of sustained political violence needs to examine how conflict discourses arise, what distinguishes them from other non-violent discourses, the ways in which they “defeat” alternative (non-violent) discourses, and how they can be deconstructed and replaced with democratic and inclusive discourses. In this chapter, discourse signifies “a socially and historically specific system of assumptions, values and beliefs which materially affects social conduct and social structure”. 30 Violent discourses furthermore, are large-scale power-knowledge regimes akin to Foucault’s discourses of medicine, education, or humanism, and achieve hegemony at particular historical junctures which we call civil wars. The power of violent discourses rests in their ability to allow personal consciousness and political consciousness to coexist but not to confront each other. In other words, even if there is within an individual a questioning doubt about the war they are fighting, “there are no newspapers, no radio stations, no alternative language in which he can frame his doubts and discover that others have doubts just like him”. 31 The discourse has foreclosed certain kinds of thought, and with it, certain kinds of action. Of course, although language and text as being constitutive (and not merely representational) is crucial to the notion of discourse, society is not reducible to language and linguistic analysis. 32 Discourses are broader than language, being constituted not just in texts, but also in definite institutional and organizational practices; they are discursive practices. For example, a discourse of education includes not just the language and content of school texts, but also the physical arrangements of the classrooms, the shape of the tables, school songs and mottos, disciplinary practices, school uniforms and dress codes, and so on. A political discourse similarly involves not just speeches by politicians, or their pamphlets and writings, but also the symbols they appropriate (flags, colors, dress-codes), the
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myths and histories they refer to, the laws they pass, the organizational structures they create, the decision-making procedures they follow, the actions they undertake (marches, demonstrations, boycotts), and so on. In other words, discourses can be considered as an amalgam of material practices and forms of knowledge. 3.
The Construction of Violent Political Discourses.
It is not sufficient to explain political violence solely by reference to certain structural preconditions. What actually needs to be explained is how neighbors once ignorant of the very idea that they belonged to opposed civilizations begin to think - and hate - in these terms; how they vilify and demonize people they once called friends; how, in short, the seeds of mutual paranoia are sown, grain by grain, on the soil of a common life. 33 The key necessary variable in explaining sustained political violence, I believe, is the deliberate construction of a totalizing war discourse, a “vast cultural complex” that deconstructs existing anti-war discourses and destroys sites of opposition, and then replaces it with new discourses of hatred, fear, and the justified use of extreme violence. 34 This approach brings back the notion of agency to war analysis, and links micro and macro levels of explanation. It is the intersection and interaction of the social and the psychological, the individual and the group. It suggests that “conflict entrepreneurs” or “ethnic entrepreneurs” purposefully attempt to manipulate the thoughts and feelings of people to create conflict and motivate violence. Broadly, there are two main processes at work in the creation of a totalizing violent discourse. In the first process, conflict entrepreneurs attempt to deconstruct or discredit alternative discourses that oppose their own war aims - antiwar and anti-violence discourses. As Ignatieff puts it, “violence must be done to the self before it can be done to others”; the living tissue of connection and recognition that binds inter-ethnic communities together “must be cauterized before a neighbor is reinvented as an enemy”. 35 In her analysis of the Sudanese civil war, for example, Hutchinson concluded that military leaders in the South were “intent on undermining, if not destroying any mediating institutions standing between themselves and the loyalty of their recruits, including, if necessary, bonds of family, kinship, community and religiosity”. 36 At the political level, this often involves restructuring the political rules and taking over the key institutions to centralize power and limit the activities of opposition groups. Typically, laws are passed which
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restrict democratic participation or curtail opposition groups’ activities, while simultaneously establishing new governmental structures. Other laws may make it a crime to criticize the leadership or express dissent; at the same time, security organizations are usually given greater latitude and wider powers to harass, detain, or spy on citizens. New organizations are often created to discredit or replace existing organizations that are deemed disloyal. Parallel military, cultural, educational, or religious organizations, such as new churches or new paramilitary neighborhood defense units, may be formed by nationalists. In Zimbabwe, for example, the government introduced a “youth training scheme” run by war veterans to instill in young people an “unbiased history of Zimbabwe.” It was argued that school teachers and parents had failed in their patriotic duty because young people did not know “true Zimbabwean history and culture”. 37 Recruited from unemployed boys and girls in the townships, they were deployed all over the country during elections: They were given basic training in military drill and put under the command of war veterans. Wearing T-shirts marked ‘Chimurenga Three’, they were sent out to defend and to extend the revolution. They were used as electoral shock troops - to erect barriers on roads, to beat people who could not produce ZANU/PF cards, to attack MDC activists. 38 At the social-cultural and individual level, the rules and norms of ethical behavior regarding the killing of friends and neighbors, for example, must be deconstructed and replaced by the justified belief in selfdefensive pre-emptive violence. Or, as Bowman puts it, the moral scruples which had regulated social interaction previously have to be overwhelmed and replaced with a will to efface the presence of that “other” from the earth. 39 Hutchinson similarly describes more concretely how ethical restraints on intra and inter-ethnic warfare were systematically dismantled in Southern Sudan during the war: […] up until the 1991 splitting of the SPLA, Nuer and Dinka combatants did not target unarmed women, children or elderly persons in violent confrontations between themselves. Local ethical codes also condemned the burning of houses and the slashing of crops. Any breech of these ethical limits was considered a direct affront against God or Divinity (kuoth nhial), as the ultimate guardian of human morality. The expectation was that God would punish the transgressor (or someone closely related to him) through
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manifestations of sudden death, disease or some other misfortune. Acts of inter-Nuer homicide, moreover, were governed by an even stricter set of ethical norms, which required, among other things, that the slayer be ritually purified of the ‘embittered’ blood of his victim. 40 Convinced that these local prohibitions were impeding the war against the Sudanese government, SPLA commanders instigated a program of “violent coaching” among recruits to convince them that homicides in anti-government war were completely devoid of the social and spiritual risks normally associated with homicide, and there was no need to purify the slayer of his deed, no possibility of claiming blood wealth compensation, and no need to memorialize the slain. The results of this program were predictable: […] Nuer SPLA recruits came to accept this revolutionary pronouncement. And in the process, they jettisoned any lingering feelings of personal accountability for slayings carried out under military orders. Consequently, when Garang and Machar squared off in 1991, the one remaining pillar of local ethical codes - that prohibiting the purposeful killing of unarmed women and children of all ages - soon crumbled. Both military factions swung their guns around on each other’s entire civilian populations. God, it seems, was no longer watching. 41 The violence itself, furthermore, acts as a discursive practice, reproducing the norms and beliefs required for its continuance and spread. In the Sudanese case, the increasing replacement of spears with guns in regional patterns of warfare created a degree of “social distance” and “spiritual ambiguity” about the ethical and spiritual ramifications of homicide. This is because, unlike a spear, the source of a bullet lodged deep in someone’s body could not be traced with any accuracy, and soldiers could not know for certain whether or not they had killed someone. At the same time, conflict entrepreneurs work to overwhelm and submerge alternative oppositional spaces and voices. Academic institutions, schools, families, religious institutions, the media, popular culture, democratic and participatory political institutions, and even traditional cultural authority structures are all powerful discursive institutions that must be discredited if necessary, and then brought under control - by state coercion, if necessary. This is the Gramscian notion of hegemony, where consensus must be enforced for the nationalist cause.
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For example, it is not uncommon to see in the early stages of a war discourse construction moves to take control of the media so that dissenting voices can be eliminated from the public arena. Similarly, critical academics may be dismissed from their posts, “unpatriotic” teachers replaced by more “patriotic” teachers, and religious groups may be ordered to “stay out of politics.” Lemarchand describes how the Tutsi minority in Burundi consolidated control over the government, the army, the educational system, and the media, and then exercised a form of social hegemony over the Hutu to perpetuate its rule. 42 In Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, the Hutu leadership used locally organized civil defense to give people the experience of conducting roadblocks, house searches, security meetings, night patrols, and to develop the shared vocabulary and techniques for identifying “enemies of the people” and their “accomplices”. 43 In Serbia in early 1991, there were still sites of struggle and protest. Thousands of students and members of the political opposition took to the streets in opposition to the emerging discourses of hate, singing “give peace a chance”, to which Milosevic responded by sending in tanks and soldiers. 44 In Zimbabwe, a nation wracked by ongoing political violence, the ZANU/PF government has made concerted efforts to destroy the universities as sites of alternative oppositional discourses by enlisting a few sympathetic academics to publicize studies confirming the government’s view of history (with the ZANU/PF “liberation from colonial oppression” at the center), and economic studies demonstrating the benefits of land re-distribution. 45 Having respected academics taking such diverging positions in support of both the government and the opposition MDC facilitates the discrediting of these institutions as authoritative discursive sites. The Church in Zimbabwe - once a powerful source of moral authority in Zimbabwe - has been similarly divided through deliberate government tactics. While the Jesuits, for example, have taken an active role in condemning state violence, other parts of the church have spoken out in support of the regime. The government has attempted to discredit the recalcitrant parts of the church by accusing them of supporting “terrorists” and of historically being part of the colonial enslavement process. Observing the recent elections, Ranger noted that At the same time that Mugabe attacked church critics he wooed other Christians. At a February prayer day in Harare he addressed an audience which included ‘hundreds of Madzibaba Nzira’s Apostolic sect members, holding and lifting placards inscribed with ZANU/PF political messages […] They sang a chimurenga song as they were toyi-toying’. The new Anglican Bishop of Harare, Kunonga, told Mugabe that
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he had put all Christians to shame by distributing land: ‘Actually, you have been more merciful than God Himself!’ Baba Nzira announced a prophecy that Mugabe was ‘divinely appointed King of Zimbabwe and no man should dare challenge his office’. 46 In other words, ZANU/PF has successfully neutralized two authoritative discursive sites, while at the same time retaining full control over the entire coercive capabilities of the state. The second process in the creation of a war discourse, once other discourses have been discredited or captured, involves the mobilization and coordination of multiple discursive sites - politics, media, popular culture, religion, education, the arts - in the pursuit of the conflict entrepreneurs’ designs. For example, churches and other religious actors will be used to give religious sanction to the conflict entrepreneurs’ message and values, schools will teach a particular version of history, historical myths will be appropriated into popular television programs, musicians will write and perform patriotic songs, academic studies will “prove” the authenticity of political statements or programs, and the media will sanitize or slant its reporting. Such a sustained and carefully choreographed assault on the collective psyche can create new collective norms, new or altered collective memories and histories. In this way, it is possible to control social opinion and action. In other words, this is an attempt to alter the social-psychological context which allows for the direction of individuals towards political violence. There are several discernible characteristics of war discourses that these sites are mobilized to promote, including: the construction of exclusive identities, or the designation of the Other; the stereotyping, dehumanization, and the designation of the Other as “enemy”; the creation of a sense of victim-hood and grievance; and inculcation of beliefs about the justification and sometimes the necessity of violence against the Other. First, there is the well-known, and well-researched notion of identity formation. The creation of “the Other” as a constitutive outside to the Self is a critical precondition to internal war. 47 As Drakulic states, “once the concept of ‘otherness’ takes root, the unimaginable becomes possible”. 48 It is a well-worn path how in the initial stages, this involves the (re)creation, usually by political elites, of group or ethnic identity based on shared language, religion, and historical mythology. In contrast to primordialist accounts, Kaufman has argued that in Eastern Europe at least, and it is certainly true in Africa as well, that Ethnic nationalism is a modern ideology which, for most of the eastern half of Europe, has been current for little over a century. Before that time, the peasants of the
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Balkans and the South Caucuses did not usually identify themselves as, say, ‘Croats’ or ‘Georgians’ or ‘Azerbaijanis’ at all: it is only in the twentieth century that they were convinced to adopt these identities on the basis of shared language, religion, and historical mythology. Before that, identities were typically much more local. 49 These separate identities form the initial bedrock of the “imagined differences” between groups that can then be exploited by “ethnic entrepreneurs”, usually through transforming ordinary feuds and “normal” political grievances into ethnic ones. The creation or re-creation of ethno-national identities is carried out most powerfully through the discourses of “symbolic politics”, and is vividly seen in the lead up to the war in former Yugoslavia. 50 Bowman describes the articulation of a Serbian discourse that was designed to reconstitute “Serbia” as a locus of identity and “Serbian interests” as a focus of concern: There was […] an official blessing and promotion of old traditions (frowned upon as ‘folklore’ during Tito’s regime) recounting the heroic struggle of the Serbian nation against the invading Ottoman armies. Vidovan, the annual celebration of the defeat of the armies of Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic by the Ottoman armies in the ‘Field of Blackbirds’ on 15 June 1389, became an official ceremony […] Prominent members of the Serbian government, including Milosevic, would listen to village minstrels lament the melancholy fate of the Christian heroes who died six hundred years earlier defending Serbia against foreign invasion […] On Vidovan 1989 […] the bones of Prince Lazar, which had rested in Serbia since his defeat six centuries before, were ceremonially paraded through the towns and monasteries of Serbia before being ‘returned’ with great fanfare to the Orthodox monastery of Graanica at the heart of Kosova. 51 Political symbolism is not the only means of constituting identity. Schools and education, along with family socialization, are also potent sites for the discursive formation of ethnicity. Neuffer’s account of a young girl’s education in Rwanda leading up to the 1994 genocide is revealing:
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[…] teachers stood at the front of the classroom and asked who was Tutsi and who was Hutu. As soon as JJ raised her hand to proclaim herself a Tutsi, she was forever teased and bullied by Hutu children. They would corral her in the schoolyard and repeat what their parents had told them about how ‘evil’ the Tutsi were. When the teacher was frustrated with the students, as they stumbled over their sums or grammar, he would simply blame the Tutsi in the class. ‘Oh, you Tutsi, wake up!’ the teacher claimed with exasperation. History classes were also awkward. There the teacher would talk about Rwanda’s history: the history of the Tutsi ‘oppressors’ and their injustices to the Hutu. 52 However, for sustained political violence to become possible, it is also necessary that groups stereotype, dehumanize, and scapegoat the Other. This is a social-psychological process, and is part of what Bowman calls the “discursive project of transforming neighbors into enemies”, or the “discourses of ethnic antagonism”. 53 Russian characterizations of Chechens as “criminals” and “terrorists”, and Chechen beliefs about Russian imperialism and chauvenism is a typical example of such processes. 54 In Zimbabwe, Mugabe has stated that “whites are evil”, and has attempted to brand MDC as “traitors”, “terrorists”, and “colonial stooges”. 55 In Rwanda, popular radio station Radio Mille Collines referred to Tutsi as “inyenzi”, or “cockroaches”, while the pictorial newspaper Kangura stated: A cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly. The history of Rwanda shows us clearly that a Tutsi stays always exactly the same, that he has never changed. The malice, the evil, are just as we knew them in the history of our country. 56 Such stereotypes can be used to justify certain harsh or disproportionate measures against the Other, such as the Russian contention that Chechnya needs to be ruled with an iron fist, as Chechens are naturally lawless and uncontrollable, and the use of overwhelming force is all that the Chechens respect or understand. Alternately, in extreme cases, the process of dehumanization can justify violence, as in the Hutu belief that the murder of Tutsi was simply a matter of “sweeping out the cockroaches.” An important consequence of such discourses is the creation of world divided between two camps in which there is no neutral place to stand, and those who don’t support the cause and its leaders are by definition supporters of the “enemy”.
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Another part of creating discourses of the enemy, typically also involves a sustained effort to characterize the Other as aliens or interlopers, such as the Hutu characterization of Tutsi as being Nilotic settlers from the North. This myth, widely perpetuated by the Hutu leadership in Rwanda leading up to the 1994 genocide was based on a Belgium anthropologist’s mistaken theory of Tutsi origins. 57 It had the effect of creating a Tutsi identity infused with “alien-ness”, and became the justification for “sweeping the cockroaches” out of the Rwandan house. In the former Yugoslavia, Muslims were identified with alien Ottoman invaders, despite that fact that they were predominantly converted Slavs. Once group identities have been established and made concrete, and stereotyping has helped to dehumanize the Other and identify them as the enemy, it is also possible to create a sense of victim-hood, based on real or perceived historical or contemporary grievances, which can then function as another precursor to civil war. This is the second strategy employed by conflict entrepreneurs; it is the story of how “communities of fear are created out of communities of interest”. 58 The role of the press is crucial in this process, as seen in the former Yugoslavia. In Serbia, the official press started to run stories about Albanian Muslims raping Serbian women, the expulsion of Serbian families by Albanian officials, and the desecration of orthodox monasteries in Kosova. In relation to Croatia, the Serb media revived memories of the Ustasha regime, which appeared to be reincarnated in the declarations and symbols of the new Croat government. Newspapers and bookshops filled with stories illustrating the history of the “Croatian” attempt to exterminate the “Serbs”. At the same time, in Croatia and Slovenia, the press published pictures of thousands of allegedly Slovene and Croat victims of partisan reprisals from the second world war: Photographs of caves full of stacked bones flooded the newspapers of both republics giving rise to campaign rhetorics in which these persons, previously referred to in non-national terms as ‘Nazis’ or ‘quislings’, became ‘Croatian victims’ or ‘Slovene victims’ of communist brutality. 59 In Zimbabwe, Mugabe has called his campaign of land redistribution and struggle against the MDC “The Third Chimurenga”. 60 This is a powerful myth revolving around African resistance to colonial invasion in the nineteenth century that was brutally suppressed. The second chimurenga was the liberation war against the oppressive white Salisbury government in the 1970s. Similarly, Armenian grievances surrounding the Turkish massacre of Armenians in the early part of the
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twentieth century, and Chechen memories of Stalin’s deportation, are other examples of a potent sense of victim-hood based on real, re-invented or re-interpreted historical grievances. In Rwanda, the Belgian authorities created a new sense of victim-hood in 1959 when they transferred power from Tutsi to Hutu, telling them that Hutu had been grievously mistreated and they were the country’s “suppressed masses”. 61 The anger and rage given to the immediacy of these grievances can then become the basis for and justification of violence directed towards self-defense or righteous revenge. A key part of violent discourses that can lead to war is the creation of new norms of violence, and the destruction of old norms of tolerance, ethical behavior and peaceful conflict management. The foundation for the discursive legitimation of the violence already exists in most societies through doctrines of just war, state monopoly of violence, the justified use of revolutionary violence, and defense of the family (Nation). 62 It is a relatively small step to convince people that warfare is legitimate if it is in defense of national identity, homes and families, a revolution against an oppressive and illegitimate regime, or to right an historical injustice - particularly if it is against stereotyped “evil” people or “cockroaches.” Typically, the threat posed by the Other is expressed in extreme and zero-sum terms. In Zimbabwe, for example, the conflict is defined as a struggle between “good” and “evil”, a mortal struggle between “patriots” and “traitors”. 63 During the recent election in Zimbabwe, Mugabe reminded the voters that one of the heroes of the first chimurenga, Chief Makoni, had his head cut off by the British in 1896; and now they wanted his head. 64 Often, leaders present a view that the very survival of the nation is at stake, especially if communities are geographically mixed: When the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ do not run along defensible territorial borders but through the middle of towns and villages and, all too often, through the middle of families, the desired ‘national entity’ can be discursively presented as penetrated and occupied by ‘enemies’ who must - at least - be disarmed by disenfranchisement and - at best - be neutralized by exile or extermination. 65 Once violence is under way, it can have several functions, including ritual initiation, the creation of collective guilt, and to polarize attitudes, heighten fear, and neutralize moderates. Often, violence will be deliberately employed to socialize fighters. In the Sudanese civil war, the SPLA used violent training methods, including starvation, abandonment, beatings, drownings, and firing squads for disobedient recruits, to create a
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“socially-isolated contingent of armed youth who were brutally trained not only to kill on command but, also, to torture whomever their military superiors designated”. 66 Many SPLA soldiers were forced to participate in disciplinary firing squads aimed at fellow recruits. In an increasing number of wars, including Sierra Leone and Uganda, violence is also used as a ritual to bind armed militias together, often by creating a sense of collective group guilt. 67 Ritual violence can also break down inhibitions against murder, torture, and human rights abuses. 4.
The Context of Violence Political Discourses.
With the exceptions of Northern Ireland and Spain, the vast majority of large-scale, sustained political violence takes place in the developing world, and in what we might call “weak states”. I would suggest that the weak state context provides all the necessary ingredients for political entrepreneurs to create and sustain a violent discourse. However, before we examine the ways in which the weak state context contributes to political violence, we need to define and conceptualise what we mean by the term “weak state.” There is no singular definition of the weak state, but it is possible to distinguish between strong and weak states using a matrix of social, political, and economic factors. Strong states, it is argued, involve the willingness and ability of a state to maintain social control, ensure societal compliance with official laws, act decisively, make effective policies, preserve stability and cohesion, encourage societal participation in state institutions, provide basic services, manage and control the national economy, and retain legitimacy. 68 Beyond the issue of state capacity, however, strong states also possess high levels of socio-political cohesion that is directly correlated with consolidated participatory democracies, strong national identities, and productive and highly developed economies. Perhaps most importantly, strong states exist as a “hegemonic idea”, accepted and naturalized in the minds of the population such that they “consider the state as natural as the landscape around them; they cannot imagine their lives without it”. 69 Weak states, on the other hand, are defined by an almost mirror opposite set of characteristics. They are characterized, first of all, by unconsolidated or non-existent democracies, and may face serious problems of legitimacy. Typically, the legitimacy crisis is expressed through very low political participation rates (and correspondingly high levels of disengagement or “exit” by significant sectors of the population
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such as peasants), a reliance on coercion to ensure compliance, unstable politics (e.g., governmental crises, coups, plots, riots, rebellions), severe social cleavages (ethnic, religious, or class), and the centralization of power in a ruling elite, usually focused on a single leader or political party. Second, weak states invariably lack cohesive national identities. Primary loyalties are often expressed in sub-national terms, and “exit” from the state - psychologically, socially, economically, and/or politically - is common. In essence, the “hegemonic idea” of statehood is missing or only weakly present, and relates to the conditions of their emergence into juridical statehood. Unlike European states, the colonial state was an alien intrusion forcibly imposed on an arbitrarily defined territorial unit. 70 Lacking very little in terms of substantial statehood - particularly, a national identity, legitimate sovereignty based on a social contract, internally created national institutions - de-colonization gave these territories formal sovereignty, or juridical independence, before a cohesive national identity was ready to emerge. Third, weak states are defined by varying levels of institutional weakness and a frequent inability by governments to implement their policies. 71 At the extreme end of the scale, the institutions of state are incapable of even a minimal level of operability and may even be in a terminal spiral of collapse. At the least, weak states possess underresourced and underdeveloped institutional capacity, and face enormous difficulties in mobilizing the population or regulating civil society. Even relatively straightforward governmental tasks such as tax collection or maintaining minimal levels of law and order can prove difficult for weak states. Institutional weakness, furthermore, is both cause and consequence of ongoing economic crisis. Weak states typically exhibit all the symptoms of economic underdevelopment and dependency - dualistic and poorly integrated mono-economies, heavy debt burdens, low or negative growth rates, high inflation and unemployment, low levels of investment, and massive social inequalities. Finally, weak states are characterized by an external vulnerability to international actors and forces which is the direct result of their internal fragility. As Ayoob puts it, “Fragile politics, by definition, are easily permeable. Therefore, internal issues in Third World societies [...] get transformed into interstate issues quite readily”. 72 Mujaju argues that because the political systems of weak states “are internally incoherent and because aspects of their internal form are projections of the external environment, they are easily manipulated from the outside”. 73 External vulnerability can be observed in the permeability of weak state borders to arms smuggling, transnational crime, terrorism, refugee movements, and general contagion effects that are manifest in areas like West or Central Africa.
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As was previously suggested, there is some empirical evidence to show that weak states - states exhibiting economic weakness, low levels of legitimacy, institutional weakness, ethnic divisions, external vulnerability - are statistically at far greater risk of experiencing internal war than strong states, and can be usefully used as predictors of conflict. Holsti suggests that the main source of war in the last fifty years has been internallyderived, and he argues that it is the characteristics of weak, strong, and failed states that explains the causes and incidence of contemporary war. 74 In reality, the regions populated by strong states have long been arenas of peace and stability, while regions of weak and failed states are continually zones of turmoil and political violence. Weak states create the necessary conditions for the creation of violent discourses in a number of ways. First, weak state elites have to engage in elite accommodation and therefore, cannot always control or eliminate ethnic or political entrepreneurs. The politics of weak states - the actions of elites in response to internal and external demands and opportunities - are conditioned by the underlying structural characteristics described already: institutional weakness, economic scarcity, problems of legitimacy, political instability, and external vulnerability. The structural characteristics of weak states place extraordinary pressures on decisionmakers, bounding their choices. In effect, they transform weak state politics into a continual process of crisis management, or what Migdal calls “the politics of survival”. 75 Political elites have to manage both internal and external pressures, usually through forms of “elite accommodation”, in order to sustain a meaningful semblance of sovereignty. 76 Internally, they have to continually secure hegemony and manage local “strongmen” - individuals or groups who exercise power in their own right, and who pose challenges to weak state rulers. 77 Second, the poverty, social divisions, and authoritarian forms of government create a ready-made set of grievances that can be harnessed for political ends. The saliency of such issues in weak states can be readily transformed into the kind of anger and hatred needed to convince people to employ violence, to a much greater extent than is possible in a strong state. Furthermore, weak state elites tend to employ strategies of coercion and authoritarianism a great deal, normalizing political violence as a mode of political discourse. By contrast, in strong states there tend to be multiple non-violent and political avenues by which minorities or individuals can express their grievances and seek representation - petitions, public inquiries, elections, peaceful demonstrations, strikes, education campaigns, pressure groups. Furthermore, the non-violent management of conflict is deeply embedded into the wider political culture, and political violence of any kind is stigmatised. This is not to say that outbreaks of political violence from aggrieved sections of the population never occur in
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strong states, only that the conditions for sustained political violence are not there to the same degree as in weak states. Third, state institutions and structures, as well as civil society are weak and cannot resist the kinds of totalizing discourses created by entrepreneurs. Media outlets can be more easily captured and monopolized; in many weak states, there are often only a few radio stations, newspapers, and other sources of political information. Similarly, schools, universities, churches, and other discursive sites are relatively few and institutionally weak, and can be controlled and intimidated into propagating the discourses of hate and exclusion. In strong states, there tend to be multiple sources of information, and multiple discursive sites where the discourses of hate and exclusion could be countered. It is unlikely - although not entirely impossible - that conflict entrepreneurs could fully capture enough of the media sources, schools, churches, unions, associations, and other sites necessary to create a totalising violent discourse in a strong state. It is, unfortunately, the case that it is highly possible in a weak state. Lastly, identities in many weak states are easily malleable and manipulated. This is because ethnic identities have their roots in the contradictions inherent in the exercise of state power by colonial powers seeking to establish hegemony. 78 Ethnic identity formation facilitated indirect rule, which in turn retarded emergent class consciousness. Following independence, many weak state elites used the appeal to ethnicity in their own attempt to establish hegemony, thereby “institutionalizing the divisions which exist by making ethnic identity the basis for political and (to a lesser extent) economic participation”. 79 As we have already alluded, the politics of identity can also serve as a source of political legitimacy when other sources - socialism, nationalism - fail or corrode. 80 By creating vertical links across class strata (e.g. through identity-based patron-client networks, political graft, and resource allocation), it helps to maintain a level of integration quite out of proportion to objective class differences, which in weak states are often severe. In contrast, strong states possess more powerful and binding national identities, as well as multiple overlapping social, political and cultural identities that prevent any single identity from taking precedence particularly to the point of becoming the basis for violence against former friends, neighbors and colleagues. For example, one’s identity as a Scotsman in Britain could be overlaid with other identities of being part of the aristocracy, Conservative-leaning, a lawyer by profession, Anglican, Celtic football club supporter, and European in outlook. These other identities would give pause to calls to attack non-Scottish people, especially if they shared identities in terms of religion, class, political outlook, and so on.
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In short, weak states provide the context in which violent discourses can be more easily created, normalized and sustained. Without such a context, political violence would express itself in sporadic incidents like race riots, murders, or occasional massacres. It would be short-lived outbreaks of violence, rather than the kinds of intractable warfare that became endemic during the 1990s. Sustaining violence over months and years requires a concerted campaign by a political entrepreneur that is sustained by a weak state context. In other words, political violence can only be sustained when it becomes a totalising discourse that takes over an entire society. This is much more easily possible in a weak state context than a strong state, where, as we have suggested, civil society is robust, institutions are strong, peaceful forms of political conflict are normalized, citizens have multiple overlapping identities, and there are multiple sites of alternative discourses - churches, unions, clubs, societies, associations, pressure groups, academic institutions - and alternative sources of information. As a final comment, it needs to be remembered that the creation of violent discourses is not simply a linear process whereby conflict entrepreneurs take control of discursive sites and then proceed to construct a new social reality. Rather, it is a positive feedback process where all the causes - structures, processes, and discourses - reinforce each other in an escalatory cycle. Weak state structures of poverty and social divisions, for example, lead to the “politics of survival” by elites, which can then provide fuel for conflict entrepreneurs. The discourses of victim-hood and identity-hatred, in turn reinforces those structures by intensifying social divisions, threatening law and order, and heightening fear and a sense of exclusion. The importance of this to understanding civil war is that “because all of the causes reinforce each other in an escalating spiral or positive feedback loop, events need not happen in any particular order. The causes are universal, but the paths to ethnic war are multiple”. 81 5.
Conclusion.
Several conclusions follow from this study. In the first instance, there needs to be a change to our dominant beliefs about political violence. Civil conflict and political violence is not necessarily abnormal or a “breakdown” of social systems or political compacts. In fact, in many societies violence is normalised and ingrained into daily life and political practice, and making sense of it involves understanding the way it is socially constructed and reproduced in discursive formations. In other words, the atrocious violence associated with civil wars is not always antisocial or necessarily anomalous behavior, but rather the expression of precisely the sort of society that has developed, or been constructed, in those cases. Rather than the breakdown of a social system, sustained
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political violence is the creation of a special kind of social system. The importance of this re-conceptualization is the logical implication that attempting to reform a broken down social system (as much international conflict management attempts to do) is unlikely to be successful if, in fact, we are not dealing with systemic breakdown. It implies that socially transformative strategies must be employed instead. Understanding political violence therefore, involves appreciating how it is a multi-level social construction involving both structures and processes. Civil wars cannot be explained solely by reference to the structures of weak states, or to the actions of conflict entrepreneurs. Both are required to create the conditions for the emergence of sustained political violence. In a strong state where democratic politics are the norm, conflict entrepreneurs are unlikely to be able to convince society to engage in large-scale violence, although some individuals may be convinced to engage in terrorist activity, for example. Similarly, many weak states do not fall into political violence because conflict entrepreneurs and accompanying war discourses have not yet been constructed; there are no ethnic entrepreneurs, or sections of civil society have been able to resist violent discourses. The implications of this conceptualization are important, particularly in terms of the dominant view that conflict is the result of certain structural features inherent to particular societies. It is also important that we do not overestimate the effectiveness of discourse as some kind of unidirectional all-powerful force that forecloses the possibility of resistance. Such a view actually implies a form of determinism and a return to structuralism, denying autonomy, ethics, or responsibility. 82 The framework presented here suggests that there is still room for human agency, as individuals can construct their own identities by drawing on certain discourses, including anti-war discourses. People construct political violence, which also means that they can also deconstruct it. In particular, there are a number of conclusions important for our understanding of conflict management. An initial implication is that the model has important applications for early warning and conflict prevention. To date, early warning systems (EWS) have focused on the measurement of structural factors (economic crises, famines, destabilizing political events), which usually have a threshold of concern, that once crossed will (theoretically) spur preventive diplomatic action. The model presented here suggests that a careful monitoring of the important discourses of an at-risk country is also necessary. Attention needs to be paid to the use of symbolic politics and hostile myths in political discourse, as well as identity manipulation, the creation of victimhood, stereotyping, and so on. When these features become apparent and start to gain social acceptance, the international community - the UN, NGOs, other states and organizations - need to intervene in appropriate
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ways. The work of the OSCE’s High Commissioner for Minorities falls into this category, and needs both greater priority and to be a model for other organizations. The model also suggests that in addition to third party intervention for securing ceasefires and the end of violence itself (peacemaking and peacekeeping), a multidimensional approach needs to be taken that targets both state reconstruction (eliminating the structures that cause conflict), and discourse transformation. This concept of peacebuilding involves a range of social transformation strategies, from economic development activities to institution building, local capacity building, human rights training, demobilization of soldiers, and local conflict management training. Many of these activities are presently considered peripheral to the main diplomatic activities of mediation, negotiation, or humanitarian intervention. However, they must become mainstreamed if international conflict management is to be more effective in contemporary civil wars. A critical new addition to the range of conflict management strategies must be activities aimed at de-constructing discourses of hate, intolerance, and violence. In fact, some organizations are involved in exactly this. Search for Common Ground, a conflict resolution NGO in 1982 in the United States, works in several conflict-ridden countries (including Burundi, Macedonia, and Angola) producing television programs, songs, radio programs, and publications aimed at countering stereotypes, encouraging cooperation, and building inter-communal understanding. This kind of discourse reconstruction is not yet taken as seriously as it needs to be, and the failure to dismantle war discourses is a direct precursor to the outbreak of further conflict. In a sense, perhaps the most important conclusion from this study is actually fairly optimistic: while sustained political violence is difficult to stop, it is also difficult to start. It takes a great deal to create totalizing violent discourses, or “self-affirming social realities capable of both sustaining and reproducing themselves”, and along the way it is possible to strengthen alternative discourses fighting for supremacy in different arenas. 83 There are multiple sources of moral and social authority where opposition can be organized and bolstered, and the process of constructing internal war actually involves profound and sometimes, prolonged struggle. Academics can speak out and de-bunk racist myths or incorrect economic data. Churches can urge their members to love their enemies and unite in the universal family of God. Women’s associations can build networks of solidarity across ethnic and political lines. School teachers can refuse to teach racist curricula. In fact, in many weak states wracked by economic crisis and torn apart by serious social divisions, this is exactly what has happened: there have been enough sites of opposition, and sufficiently strong voices countering the “conflict entrepreneurs” that
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violence has been averted. South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994 is an important example. Here, in spite of the actions of clandestine military elements and certain political elites to destabilize the country and cause a spiral into violence, the work of the Peace Committees and other civil society groups working together under the general Peace Accord averted an internal war.
Notes 1
An earlier version of this chapter was presented as a paper at the conference ‘Cultures of Violence’, 3rd Global Conference: Diversity within Unity, 12-16 August, 2002, Prague, Czech Republic. 2 Scherrer, 1999, 52; Licklider, 1993, 6-7. 3 see: Jackson, 2002; Kaldor, 1999; Duffield, 1998. 4 Duffield, 1998. 5 Jackson, 2001, 2002. 6 Duffield, 1998, 67. 7 see: Lake and Rothchild, 1998. 8 Herbst, 1996/7. 9 Bowman, 1994. 10 Bowman, 1994. 11 Lemarchand, 1994, 2. 12 Kaufman, 2001, 2. 13 Hodgson, 2000, 20-21. 14 Snow, 1996, 26; 38. 15 Kaplan, 1994. 16 Berdal and Keen, 1997, 797-798. 17 Howard, 1995/6, 28-29. 18 Keen, 1998, 10-11. 19 Kaldor, 1999, 7. 20 Job, 1992, 28. 21 Sambanis, 2001, 259. 22 see: Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Henderson and Singer, 2000; Maxwell and Rueveny, 2000. 23 See Ayoob, 1995, 1996. 24 Tilly, 1975, 1985. 25 Herbst, 1990. 26 Howard, 1995/6, 52. 27 see: Zartman, 1995. 28 see: Berdal and Keen, 1997; Keen, 1998. 29 see: Berdal and Keen, 1997; Reno, 1998; Duffield, 1998; Kaldor, 1999; Keen, 1998. 30 Hodgson, 2000, 59.
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Ignatieff, 1999, 37. Hodgson, 2000, 62. 33 Ignatieff, 1999, 36. 34 Roach, 1993, 8. 35 Ignatieff, 1999, 54. 36 Hutchinson, 2001. 37 Ranger, 2002, 15. 38 Ibid. 39 Bowman, 1994. 40 Hutchinson, 2001. 41 Hutchinson, 2001. 42 Lemarchand, 1994. 43 Wagner, 1999. 44 Neuffer, 2001, 23. 45 see: Ranger 2002, 10. 46 Ranger, 18. 47 Derrida in Hodgson, 2000, 71. 48 Drakulic quoted in Neuffer, 2001, 32. 49 Kaufman, 2001, 4-5. 50 Kaufman, 1994. 51 Bowman, 1994. 52 Neuffer, 2001, 92. 53 Bowman, 1994. 54 see: Bennett 2000. 55 see: Ranger, 2001, 9. 56 Quoted in Neuffer, 2001, 100. 57 see: Neuffer, 2001, 87-88. 58 Ignatieff, 1999, 39. 59 Bowman, 1994. 60 Ranger, 2002, 13. 61 Neuffer, 2001, 89. 62 see: Jabri, 1996. 63 Ranger, 2001, 14. 64 Ibid. 19. 65 Bowman, 1994. 66 Hutchinson, 2001. 67 see: DFID, 2000. 68 Dauvergne, 1998, 2. 69 Migdal, 1998, 12; see also Skinner, 1978. 70 Cornwell, 1999, 62. 71 Byman and van Evera, 1998, 37. 72 Ayoob, 1986, 14. 73 Mujaju, 1989, 260. 32
43
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74
Holsti, 1995, 319. Migdal, 1988, 227-229. 76 Reno, 1998, 2. 77 Reno, 1998. 78 Boone, 1994, 111. 79 Ake, 1976, 9. 80 Kaldor, 1999, 7. 81 Kaufman, 2001, 36. 82 see: Hodgson, 2000, 73. 83 Bowman, 1994. 75
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Rupesinghe, K. (1992), ‘The disappearing boundaries between internal and external conflicts’, in: Rupesinghe, K. (ed.) Internal conflict and governance. New York: St Martin’s Press. Sambanis, N. (2001), ‘Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry (part 1)’, Journal of conflict resolution, 45: 259-282. Scherrer, C. (1999), ‘Towards a comprehensive analysis of ethnicity and mass violence: types, dynamics, characteristics and trends’, in: Wiberg, H. and Scherrer, C. (eds.) Ethnicity and intra-state conflict: types, causes and peace strategies. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Skinner, Q. (1978), Foundations of modern political thought: volume two, the age of reformation. London: Cambridge University Press. Snow, D. (1996), Uncivil wars: international security and new internal conflicts. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Tilly, C. (1975), ‘Reflections on the history of European state-making’, in: Tilly, C. (ed.) The formation of national states in Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tilly, C. (1985), ‘War making and state making as organised crime’, in: Evans, P. Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (eds.) Bringing the state back in. Cambridge, UK: Crambridge University Press. Wagner, M. (1999), ‘All the Bourgmestre’s men: making sense of genocide in Rwanda’, Africa today, Jan-March, available on Expanded Academic ASAP. Zartman, I. W. (1995), ‘Introduction: posing the problem of state collapse’, in: Zartman, I.W. (ed.) Collapsed states: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Author Affiliation Richard Jackson is a Lecturer in International Security at the University of Manchester. His research focuses on the causes and resolution of political violence. His most recent book is Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester University Press).
The Phenomenon of Prostitution in Poland: Around the Problem of Legalization Emil W. Páywaczewski 1.
The scale and symptoms of prostitution in Poland. 1
Changes in Polish political, social, economic and cultural life, initiated in 1989, in connection with the opening of borders, resulted in an influx of various forms of the so-called sex industry. Escort agencies, erotic massage salons, porn movie theatres and sex shops appeared very soon. According to estimates, since the beginning of the 90’s, the number of women active in the prostitution industry was approximately 10,000. Exceptionally, in 1997 it increased to 13,500 women, of whom 2,500 were women of foreign citizenship. The largest group among foreigners were Bulgarians, whose number was estimated to be 1,100. Others were Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Romanians and, in small numbers, Moldavians. The prostitutes from foreign countries, especially from the countries of the CIS and Bulgaria, are followed by their pimps who remorselessly and often violently take over the profits from prostitution on the territory of Poland. To the largest extent it applies to trade in women and prostitution taking place along highways and transit roads of TIR trucks. At present activity of this type is becoming the purpose for visiting Poland. As a result of, among others, police activities and changes in economic trends, the number of prostitutes has systematically decreased. As demonstrated by data obtained from police field units for the year 2001, prostitution was conducted by approximately 7,400 women, to include a little above 1,000 foreigners, and the larges group among them were Ukrainians. According to the newest data, with the passing years the number of prostitutes who are active in Poland has grown again to nearly 10,000. Still, women of Polish citizenship are the largest part of this number. The fraction of women of foreign citizenship is estimated to be about 40-50%, of which the largest group are Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Belarussians. A very upsetting phenomenon is prostitution among minors, both girls and boys. As early as in the first half of the 90’s many regional Police headquarters reported the fact that 12-14 years old girls were active prostitutes, frequently motivated by economical reasons, as well as the fact of illegal employment of high school students in escort agencies and occasional sexual services provided by student girls from various types of schools. 2 In 1997 about 360 underage prostitutes were counted. One
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The Phenomenon of Prostitution in Poland
should notice that among them were as many as 30 girls below 15 years of age and 69 boys between 15 and 17 years of age. In 2001, about 172 underage persons who were active in prostitution were counted. The highest number of prostitutes was found in the region of Lower Silesia (46) and in Warsaw (29). The most frequent cause of prostitution by minors is the fact that they are the sole providers in their families or that it is their only source of money. Prostitution is most common among girls. 154 cases were found of girls who were prostitutes and 18 cases where boys were prostitutes. Even though prostitution is not subject to criminal penalties in Poland, the Police observe a number of crimes associated with this demeanor. Most of all it is profiting from other person’s prostitution, in the form of a tribute collected for the right to conduct prostitution in a given place, for instance in a hotel, in a street, highway, or for organizing and providing accommodation in escort agencies. The study of phenomena connected with prostitution and the forms of its exploitation, conducted by the criminal division of the Police, indicates that they undergo continuous transformation and in a quite flexible manner adjust to the political situation, social norms, legal provisions, and most of all to the demand in the area of the broadly understood “sex industry”. Hence, we can talk about a continuing stabilization in the sex industry market, and only occasionally there are conflicts that result from competition between pimps and the owners of escort agencies. The recognized forms of prostitution are: - Call Girls – young, educated women who know foreign languages, and who make contacts through the phone; - Women who work as prostitutes in hotels, night clubs, known only to the staff of these facilities; - Women who work as prostitutes in streets, squares – frequently abusing alcohol or drugs, in conflict with the laws because of disturbance of public order; - Women who act as prostitutes occasionally. In the last years new markets were created, such as highways, “go-go” type night clubs, escort agencies, massage parlors, or individual sponsoring by a rich client in exchange for sexual services. Still unstudied remains the problem of prostitution that takes advantage of telephone calls and press advertisements, as well as the so - called sex tourism conducted without intermediaries and pimps, mostly abroad during the vacation holiday season. The growth of the number of women who are active prostitutes is fostered by: - increasing unemployment and bad material situation of the family, - slacking of moral principles, - opening of borders and facilitations in international tourism,
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- appearance of camouflaged brothels, acting in the guise of various agencies. We need to underline, however, that perceiving prostitution solely as a problem of psychosocial deviation of women – as is often the case – simplifies and distorts the reality. Without the analysis of not just the supply, but also the demand, without knowing how common among men in a given society and in a given time is the use of prostitutes’ services, without answering the question of who are the customers, how large percentage among them are young men, married men, etc. - one cannot propose an accurate diagnosis. 2.
Activities of escort agencies.
Since 1992 there has been a dynamic growth of escort agencies and massage parlors, which are operated on the basis of registration in registers of economic activity. As to the range of services provided, sexual services are not listed, even though it is commonly known that they are disguised brothels. Facilities of this type have become quite popular among prostitutes. The reason is that they give them a greater anonymity, assure personal hygiene and decrease the risk of contracting venereal diseases. Also the clients eagerly use this type of agencies, because they are provided a higher standard of services, higher security and a more intimate atmosphere. They can at the same time take advantage of a bar with an abundant supply of alcohol, and frequently also narcotics. 3 Owners of agencies defend themselves from criminal penalties for profiting from someone else’s prostitution by establishing “Rules of operation of the escort service agency” or by including in the employment contract the provision that the woman must not engage in sexual intercourse with clients, subject to immediate termination of the contract. The changes that take place in the forms of prostitution apply also to escort agencies and massage parlors. In 1996 there were 850 of them, in 1997 there over 1,000, and now there are approximately 800, with their level of employment amounting to some 4,300 prostitutes. The highest number of escort agencies is in large cities. 4 Owners of agencies establish associations and special funds which allow them to cover their losses that may occur due to a robbery, destruction caused by competition or to cover the cost of a legal counsel if they are sued in a court. Agencies that have been operating for a longer period of time turn into elite clubs protected by an internal network of cameras and a numerous group of guards. The creation of such standards allows for an undisturbed use of sexual services and for activities which are not always in compliance with the laws. In such places, most often Polish women are employed, but many of them employ women of foreign nationality.
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The problem with existence of escort agencies is not limited to the provision of sexual services. It is accompanied also by crimes of other categories, such as for example tax crimes or breaking the laws on economic activity. The conclusion of the studies that have been conducted to date is that in addition to the protection paid for by individual agencies, they are also “protected” by criminal groups which draw profits from it. Moreover, there have been cases of agencies and massage parlors which were bought by criminal groups that control the prostitution industry. This type of transactions is conducted with the purpose of obtaining financial gains, as well as identifying persons from the business world who often use the services of such agencies. Agencies often offer drugs as well as alcohol without excise takes and the required license. Often they are a refuge for persons who are sought for prosecution by law enforcement as well as minors who have run away from their homes or orphanages. There are also cases of prostitutes being forcefully kept there and forced to continue their behavior. Moreover, places of this type are a good place for recruiting women who are then sold for work in other agencies domestically or abroad. 3.
The problem of legalizing prostitution.
For a long time in discussions held in Poland the question is raised of whether brothels should be legalized. Among others, the question is considered of whether a prostitute should pay taxes and in exchange be guaranteed the same services as all taxpayers. Some participants in the discussion refer to Dutch and German arrangements where prostitution is treated as a profession. Women who practice it pay taxes and get protection from the state and the same services as all other citizens. There are organizations of persons who work in the erotic business and their trade unions, and the profession is not so strongly ostracized by the society. 5 One may add that in most countries of the “Western civilization”, in accordance with the spirit of abolition, prostitution is neither legal nor punishable. These countries include most European countries as well as, among others, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay and India. 6 According to Michaá Boni, former labor minister, a hypothetical project of legalizing prostitution would not require any changes in the labor code. But if prostitutes were really to be given a status that is equal to other professions, they would have the full right to use the social security system, and so with time they would start receiving disabilities benefits and pensions. Consequently, they could also take advantage of unemployment benefits in the case they lose their “jobs”. This would most likely bring about a protest of a large part of the society. Similarly it is difficult to visualize a situation where labor bureaus would present to
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young, uneducated women the offer of employment in brothels. The state would then play the role of a legal pimp. One may ask the question of whether the state today is not such a pimp, since it taxes brothels that exist under the guise of escort agencies. In the opinion of many persons, it is a regular symptom of a duplicitous morality. 7 The public character of the discussion on legalization of brothels in Poland, existing under the name of escort agencies, has become more prominent in 2001. Protests of inhabitants who complained about the difficulties associated with having escort agencies in the neighborhood have induced Professor Andrzej Zoll, the Ombudsman for Citizens’ Rights, to address the justice minister. Zoll thinks that legalizing brothels would make it easier for the neighbors of escort agencies to fight for their rights. At present the agencies are being set up in housing districts, in blocks of apartments, in the neighborhood of schools and churches, and indeed one cannot prevent it. The then justice minister Lech KaczyĔski proposed, in turn, such changes that would allow for a more effective fight against the illegal activities of escort agencies. The Ombudsman for Citizens’ Rights turned attention to the fact that supporting the fiction of fighting with prostitution causes the greatest damage to the inhabitants of houses in city centers. He also expressed the opinion that if brothels existed legally, it would be a good idea to try to move sex industry to the outskirts of cities and to designate special quarters for it. This arrangement would effectively prevent contacts with this phenomenon of children and people who do not desire them. 8 It is also worthwhile to quote the opinions of experts from the Police Headquarters who unanimously underline that it is time to consider legalizing prostitution because in the present situation there is no control over it. In the present legal system the Police is helpless in enforcing the provisions of criminal law concerning criminal acts that accompany prostitution. At best it can punish for breaking the public order, hindering road traffic, lack of residence registration, or causing public disgust. 9 In Poland the Dutch or German arrangement are not easy to introduce. The first problem that arises relates to the very legal system in Poland. For example in Holland there is a law that allows for profiting from other’s prostitution. Brothels are registered and consequently taxes are paid and there is right to holiday, medical care, etc. One has to agree with the opinion that considering the current factual and legal status in Poland, with respect to prostitution what we are experiencing is legal hypocrisy. Brothels are illegal while at the same time they can be set up under the guise of various escort agencies or massage parlors. Keeping brothels in the underground does not, alas, bring positive results, because they are an object of interest to criminal organizations. It is them who stay in control of this industry and reap the highest profits.
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The Phenomenon of Prostitution in Poland
Legalizing brothels would require modifying the penal code. In art. 204 of the penal code it would be necessary to remove the provision on penalization of profiting from prostitution and from its facilitation. However, most of all, the problem with legalizing the operation of brothels is caused by the fact that Poland ratified the 1952 UN convention on combating trafficking in people and exploitation of prostitution. In the convention Poland agreed to prosecute profiting from prostitution of other persons and to comply with the ban on operating legal brothels. The opponents of legalizing prostitution indicate that rejecting this convention by Poland could undermine our country’s credibility in the international system. Legalizing brothels would bring about the necessity to regulate the legal status of prostitutes, which would mean making changes in the labor law and granting them the right to holidays, disability benefits, pension, etc. Undoubtedly there would be advantages to legalizing brothels for potential clients of prostitutes. This would especially take place in cases of contracting a venereal disease from a prostitute, because they could claim damages from the owners of the brothel. Also the budget of the state would profit from it more than today. True, this would not fix the Polish economy, but on the other hand it would be appreciated by the society. The society would hence get the signal that prostitution is a phenomenon that is acceptable. This, in the opinion of Professor Marian Filar, is the most important thing that the opponents of legalization of prostitution are against. 10 The essential fact, however, would be the diminishing of criminal surroundings of prostitution. If this sphere of life and economy became legal, it would probably become less attractive to criminals than it is today. In the opinion of Professor Jan Winiecki, a possible legalization of brothels would bring a greater social that fiscal advantage. However, no economist presents financial models that demonstrate potential economic effects of such change. Hence we remain in the area of potential effects, which in addition are difficult to estimate. 11 The increased connection between the norms of law and the social reality may be considered the greatest benefit of legalizing prostitution. Moreover, and this is no less important, there would be a greater respect for law. Another equally important benefit would be the elimination or a radical reduction of the criminal surroundings of prostitution. This was the effect resulting from terminating prohibition, or legalization of trade in alcohol, in the USA. It is also evident that delegalization of narcotics has caused the emergence of a powerful criminal drug industry in the United States and throughout the world. Maybe this effect should be considered the most important. At the same time the economic argument plays a rather marginal role.
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Legalizing prostitution would solve many problems related to it, but it is true that at the same time it would bring about new ones. Legalizing prostitution would impose many new obligations on the society. A control system would have to be created, which would consist in checking if in a given brothel there are no persons who are forced to work there, who are sick, who are children or whether no minors use the brothel’s services. A prostitute would obtain many social rights. There would be a new problem of unemployment and related benefits. The state would gain some control over this socially difficult group, but in exchange it would have to take over some responsibility for the women and their clients. 12 We can imagine a hypothetical situation: a client contracts a venereal disease. The girl has a certificate from a public medical center which confirms that she is healthy. The client can claim damages not only from the direct perpetrator, but also from the health care system which guarantees his safety. Here we face the problem of whether it is possible to show such a certificate – venereal diseases have an incubation period of several months and the woman, or the client, may start infecting others earlier. This is an important problem, because health reasons are frequently referred to by supporters of legalization. 13 There would also be a very visible division within prostitution. On the one hand there would be licensed brothels with legal employees, on the other – women without the required documents. Most of all those would be illegal immigrants, but also women who for some reasons (age, health) could not count on being employed legally. They would be in an even more difficult situation than today. They would for instance have to lower prices to keep the clients from going to their legal competition. Probably illegal prostitution would be even more connected with organized, serious crime. 4.
An attempt to summarize.
As the above discussion indicates, legalization of prostitution is not, unlike it seems, an easy task. It is a very complex phenomenon that is connected with various areas of social life. Making a general summary of the discussion on legalizing prostitution, one could pay attention to the fact that currently there is a growing tendency to tolerate or even accept prostitution. The reason for it is the fact that this activity has ever been impossible not only to effectively eliminate, but even significantly limit. A more important role is probably played by the changes in value systems. In some social groups this phenomenon is no longer perceived as “a necessary evil”, but is rather interpreted as “a way of life” or even a profession. It is also seen in the groups opposed to prostitution who do not accept this phenomenon, even without the criminal surroundings, but at the same time consider it a part of social life. 14 It is worth mentioning that,
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according to a survey by Pentor conducted for the Wprost weekly magazine, 50.2% of Poles thought that brothels should be legalized, while 39.5% expressed the opposite opinion. 15 K. ImieliĔski is right in stating that the current activities of states undertaken towards the phenomenon of prostitution should aim at: - elaborating methods of preventing prostitution by persons who are forced to do it by circumstances (economic crises and others), - providing sanitary – hygienic care to prostitutes, because they both risk contracting sexually transmitted diseases and may themselves infect others, - assuring standards of living in the society to persons who want to stop being prostitutes. 16 To summarize, as of today the discussion in this area should be directed to the issue of how to limit prostitution to those persons who do it due to their choice and not to necessity, while at the same time dropping any unrealistic ideas to stop it. One should remember that the problem of prostitution contains a wide range of issues concerning both sexes, socioeconomic, psychological-medical and moral issues. At the same time all activities which exploit prostitutes (procurement, suteneurship, and coupling) and trade in persons would be heavily penalized, especially that they remain in the scope of organized crime. 17 One must not lose sight of the fact that the increase in prostitution is influenced by abuse of minors which must be prevented by firm and effective action. 18 The arguments for legalizing prostitution seem reasonable, because only such regulation of the problem would make it possible to seize it by the Police, medical and fiscal authorities. For a criminologist it seems quite evident that this demeanor will always to some degree remain outside all transparency and monitoring by official entities, and within social pathology, and most of all within the interest of organized crime. The range of this would, however, be incomparably less than within the current legal system. The legalization of prostitution is not, as highlighted above, an ideal solution, but rather the choice of the so-called “lesser evil”.
Notes 1
The numerical data quoted in this article come from unpublished papers of the Criminal Division of the Bureau of Criminal Service of the Police Headquarters in Warsaw. 2 This is indicated by Wiesáawa Sztylkowska, 1996, 211; see also: KurzĊpa, 2001. 3 see: Tomtaáa, 1997, 249-50.
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4
Unofficially, an estimated number of prostitutes in Poland may reach 300 to 500 thousands of persons. The number of escort agencies may reach as many as over ten thousand. 5 It is worth mentioning that the arrangement that were accepted in Holland was also caused by the dislike of illegal immigration. Prostitutes must have work permits, the owners of brothels find it disadvantageous to hire illegally working foreigners, because they may lose their licenses. See also Toszecka, 2003, 58-59; CywiĔski, 2001, 80-81. 6 see more in: Schweizer, 1997, 67 and next. 7 Gontarz, 2003, 7. 8 Ibid., 9. 9 The opinion of inspector Bogusáaw Tomtaáa from the PHQ, quoted in: Markiewicz, 2000, 8. 10 Ibid., 6. 11 Ibid., 7. 12 see Graczyk, 2001, 34. 13 More about the knowledge about HIV/AIDS among women who provide sexual services – see TNS OBOP, Sexual behavior and the knowledge about HIV/AIDS in the group of women who provide sexual services. Contact: [email protected] 14 This is indicated by Stanisáaw Podemski, 2001. Broad information on the prevention is contained in also in Antoniszyn and Marek, 1985, 119 and next. See also Kowalczyk - Jamnicka, 1998. 15 see Kudzia and Pawelczyk, 2002, 23. 16 ImieliĔski, 1990, 185 and next. 17 see Warylewski, 2000. 18 More on this issue: see CzyĪ, 1996, 59 and next.
Bibliography Antoniszyn, M. and Marek, A. (1985), Prostytucja w Ğwietle badaĔ kryminologicznych. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Prawnicze. CywiĔski, P. (2001), ‘Zawód: prostytutka’. Wprost, March 11th, 80-81. CzyĪ, E. (ed.) (1996), Children in prostitution and pornography: selected materials from world congress, Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights. Stockholm. Gontarz, J. (2003), ‘Cesarzowi co cesarskie’. Businessman Magazine, 23(149): 7-10.
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Graczyk, R. (2001), ‘WyjĊte spod prawa’. Gazeta Wyborcza, April 21st, 34. ImieliĔski, K. (1990), Manowce seksu: prostytucja. àódĨ: Res Polona. Kowalczyk-Jamnicka, M. (1998), Spoáeczno-kulturowe uwarunkowania prostytucji w Polsce. Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo WSP. KurzĊpa, J. (2001), MáodzieĪ pogranicza – ‘Ğwinki’ czyli o prostytucji nieletnich. Kraków: Impuls. Kudzia, P. and Pawelczyk, G. (2002), ‘Seks city’. Wprost, August 4th, 2224. Markiewicz W. (2000), ‘Kobiety przydroĪne’. Polityka, September 9th, 68. Podemski, S. (2001), ‘Sellers of the Spring’, Rzeczpospolita, January 16th. Schweizer, H.O. (1997), ‘Uregulowania prawne a seks w wybranych krajach’, Przegląd Policyjny, 3: 67-74. Sztylkowska, W. (1996), ‘PrzestĊpczoĞü zorganizowana związana z Īyciem nocnym’, in: W. Páywaczewski and J. ĝwierczewski (eds.) Policja polska wobec przestĊpczoĞci zorganizowanej. Szczytno: Wydawnictwo WyĪszej Szkoáy Policji. 206-220. Tomtaáa, B. (1997), ‘PrzestĊpczoĞü zorganizowana związana z Īyciem nocnym’, in: W. Páywaczewski and J. ĝwierczewski (eds.) Policja polska wobec przestĊpczoĞci zorganizowanej (2nd edition). Szczytno: Wydawnictwo WyĪszej Szkoáy Policji. 249-50. Toszecka, A. (2003), ‘Usáugi horyzontalne’. Polityka, June 21st, 58-59. Warylewski, J. (2000), ‘Penalization of dealing in people in the light of new penal code’, Palestra, 7-8: 43-57.
Author Affiliation Emil W. Plywaczewski is a Full Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology of the Faculty of Law at University of Bialystok, Director of the Chair of Criminal Law and Head of Department of Substantive Penal Law and Criminology, and Vice-dean of the Faculty of Law. His literary
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output comprises over 221 publications, printed in Poland and abroad (47), a dozen or so of them monographs. He was the first author in Poland to publish monographs on organized crime and on money laundering. He is an acknowledged expert on the organized crime problems. He is member of many organizations and scientific societies both Polish and international. Since 2001 he has been serving as a United Nations consultant for the implementation of its project “Assessement of Organized Crime in Central Asia”.
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‘Blind Date with Dirty Harry’: A Criminal Justice Dispute on the Polish-Language WWW Andrzej R. ĝwiatáowski As I helped Mabel out of the car at the polling station at Rosie’s school, it transpired that she was a supporter of Sir Arnold Tufton, and intended to vote Conservative. ‘He was very good when I was burgled,’ she said. Did he catch the burglar, or recover your stolen property?’ I asked in a faux-naif fashion, ‘No, but he told me, that if he was a Home Secretary he’d chop the thieves’ hands off,’ she said, benignly. Sue Townsend, Adrian Mole: The Cappucino Years, Penguin Books, London, 2000: 35.
1.
Introduction.
The public views on the methods of dealing with the criminals and criminality attract the interest of criminologists and victimologists. 1 It is often pointed out that the attitudes of the public become more and more punitive, with some exceptions. 2 The view that the state does not respond to the criminality with due strictness are prevailing. Very high level of the punitiveness of Polish society became a stereotype. 3 Recent research seems to put it in doubt, but we still may be sure, that this level is not low. 4 It is a well-known phenomenon that the public attitudes towards the criminality and criminal policy are in modern societies shaped mostly by the media. The media picture of criminality induces both fear of crime (very high in Poland), and the knowledge on criminal policy and criminal justice. 5 Well-known phenomenon is the paradox of the fear of crime. 6 The fear of crime is higher among the older people and women - the groups less endangered with victimisation. Taking in account the sociodemographic structure of the internet users we may assume, that their fear of crime is lower, comparing to the general population. The emergence of the WWW opened a new, very interesting and difficult research field. The discussion lists (earlier) and the discussion fora (today) enable the users to immediately publish, discuss and
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exchange the views and opinions. Anonymous nature of the discussion, absence of the selection mechanisms and immediacy of the publishing differ the WWW distinguish the WWW discussions from the press discussions. We can see more similarities to talk-radio, but still the differences are visible. We may say, that the WWW fora are the most easy and immediate way of discussion (except the face-to-face interaction). It does not mean, however, that the internet is a good place for social research. First, the internet society must not be confused with the general society. It is obvious, that the sociodemographic characteristics of the internet users are totally dissimilar to the general picture of the society. Secondly, the anonymous nature of the discussion lead to the overrepresentation of the extreme views. Put in other words: if you see a piece of news on the internet and you don't find it strange, shocking, obscure or unjust, you do not comment the news. If, however, your opinion is critical, you are certainly much willing to comment. There is a Polish proverb: Wie, Īe dzwonią, ale nie wie, w którym koĞciele. (He/she knows the bell is ringing somewhere, but he/she does not know, at which church tower). We use it to describe someone, who posses some general knowledge or awareness on particular issue, but this knowledge is grossly inaccurate and inadequate. This idiom is a very good description of the quality of the discussion conducted at present in the Polish sector of World Wide Web (Internet). The paper provides a general overview of discussion on the various criminal justice issues on three main Polish-language commercial portals (Interia.pl, WP.pl and Onet.pl), portal related to the biggest newspaper (Gazeta.pl) and legal service of another portal - Hoga.pl. (prawo.hoga.pl). Time scope is from late 2000 till early 2003. The choice of the material from the topics discussed on the Net is subjective and the author is fully aware of the methodological limitations of this approach. The characteristics of the research data (huge number of heterogeneous postings) provoke qualitative rather than quantitative approach. One of the findings of the conducted research is, that the legal awareness and legal knowledge of the participants of the WWW discussions is very low, probably much lower, than in Western Europe. We may provide various explanations for this phenomenon. Arguably, combination of factors should be taken into account. One of the advantages from reading the discussion fora on the net is getting to know what issues are really controversial for the public opinion. It may be the case that the public opinion finds some other issues to be particularly “hot” than we - the scholars - tend to do. The specific feature of interia.pl, wp.pl and onet.pl. is that all the views expressed by the users are comments to the news placed on the pages. The formula of gazeta.pl is open. In practice, most of the discussions on gazeta.pl also start with a comment to the particular news from Gazeta Wyborcza or other press news.
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It is a well-known phenomenon, than the proportion of the crimes reported by the press is not even similar to the actual structure of the criminality. Almost all the crimes reported are the violent crimes against the person (the crimes against the life and health, according to the Polish criminal code terminology). The WWW pages reader may also read much about the white-collar commercial crime. In a real life in Poland, reported crimes of this type are ca. 3% and 1% respectively. The biggest group is just like everywhere - the crimes against property - 2/3 of all the reported criminality. Needless to say this create a totally false picture in the public perception. 2.
Major topics and major misunderstandings.
A. The judicial independence. One of the most misunderstood issues is a judicial independence. Almost all the participants to the internet discussions understand the notion of the judicial independence as the independence from any control or supervision of the judicial activities. It is wrong, because the judge acts in two spheres: adjudication and sc. “administration”. There is no doubt that the independence exists in the sphere of adjudication. In the administrative sphere the judge is subject to the supervision of the president of the particular court. Indirectly - all the members of judiciary are subordinated to the Minister of Justice. There is no independence in the administrative sphere. The judicial decisions are perceived as “too lenient” almost everywhere in the world 7 . Such conviction is accompanied by the lack of knowledge of the details of the cases discussed. It is obvious, that the higher the knowledge of the particular cases is, the higher acceptance of the outcome. British CVS proves that such acceptance is much higher if someone knows the files of the case, comparing to the knowledge of the facts selected by the journalist or researcher. 8 Very often we can read the proposals of the change of the method of selection of the judges. Some participants (it is possible it was one person hidden behind different nicknames) voice the following proposal: the judge should be elected in the general election with the possibility of recall if the judge does not meet the expectations of the electorate. According to the arguments, the present system is wrong, because the judge is independent from the “ordinary people”. If the judge understands he or she may be easily recalled, the “lenient” or “unjust” judgements would not take place. Of course it is very easy to ridicule such proposals or such arguments. The critical approach suggests looking for the reasons that make people forward such unusual ideas. One of those reasons is certainly
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low level of “transparency” of the legal system. People not always understand why particular judgement was passed. Indeed, the attitudes like “let's dismiss these judges” are not rare. In general, the WWW portals are the places, where one can encounter a very strong criticism towards the verdicts of the courts. In fact, all the reported acquittals start the storm. B. The participation of the lay people in the administration of justice. The polarisation of the views can be seen in case of the issue of the lay participation in the administration of justice. The strong and numerous groups of America-enthusiasts are unable to accept any other model than the jury model. The lack of criticism is sometimes just ridiculous. One of the arguments is that thanks to the jury system the miscarriages of justice are very rare in America, contrary to the profoundly corrupt European systems. On the other hand, many people express the view, that the administration of justice must be professional and the lay-assessors system should be abolished altogether as soon as possible. The lay assessors are hardly defended! Honestly speaking, it is not strange. The present quality of the lay-assessors system is Poland is low. It is difficult to point the advantages of the participation of the lay assessors for the system. Quite recently one of the WWW users described the problem he encountered. He was a lay assessor and in on of the cases he failed to convince the judge and the other lay-assessor to his point of view. He was outvoted and he presented a dissenting opinion. Since that, he had not been called to any other case. The unfortunate lay-assessor received a very strong support from other visitors of the forum. The story was a pretext for a generalised criticism of the criminal justice, judges, law and society. The problem is, however, that the position of this lay assessor in the described case had not only been grossly unjust, but it was also in clear contradiction to the law. Put in other words, the lay assessor was obviously wrong in his opinion. Not surprisingly the judge and the other lay-assessor couldn't accept his perverse view. Not surprisingly he was probably found a troublemaker. C. The legitimate self-defence. The social perception of the legitimate self-defence (necessary defence) is dramatically different from the real meaning of this institution. The opinion, that Polish law does not provide for a possibility of proper self-defence seems to be overwhelming. Many participants state, that there should be no limits to the self-defence. They seem to forget that the legal institution of an exceptional nature must not exist without limits. According to the expressed views, the attacked person should have the
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right of using any method and means of the defence. Moreover, they formulate the “natural” right to kill the attacker and even the intruder. The self-defence is also used as an argument for the death penalty. From this point of view, the execution is an act of the self-defence of the society or enforced by the society on behalf of the victim, who failed to self-defend himself or herself. There is a number of another cliche related to the self defence in general and to the positive regulation of the necessary defence in Polish law. First of such cliche is: “One may use only the same weapon the attacker is using” and it is wrong. Obviously it would be wrong, should such odd limitation existed. It is not true, because neither the law in books nor law in action gives the reasons to such statement. It is no doubt, that the victim may use any weapon - the only limit is proportionality to the dangerousness of the attack rather that to abstract dangerousness of the attacker's weapons. Polish courts are usually sympathetic for the defendants who acted in self-defence. Same time, however, the public opinion seems to be sure, that the situation is entirely different. Why? Probably the reason is, that media never inform about the dozens of cases of “real” self-defence. Their attention is attracted by picturesque cases of the false or exaggerated self-defence. D. The use of guns by the Police. Another common opinion is the opinion, that the rights of use of the weapons by the Police are narrow and restrictive. The truth is that these rights are already broader than in the USA or west-European countries and still growing. After the policeman have been killed by the criminals near Warsaw the politicians started another discussion on “broadening” the right to use a gun. The proposal was warmly welcomed by the readers of the internet portals. The change was made in the law. Before the change, the policeman must have tried to avoid wounding or killing innocent third parties. Now there is no such duty. This was the only important change. Anyway, comments were very positive. Probably people are happy they can be accidentally killed much easier, than it was before. E. The grounds and policy of the provisional (pre-trial) detention. The attitudes towards the provisional detention may be seen as an indirect indicator of the punitiveness, because the provisional measures are not the punishment. They are used in order to prevent the collusion, escape or other illegal interference with the evidence or the course of the trial.
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One of the frequently discussed issues is the law and practice of use of the preventive measures within the criminal process. The level of understanding the nature and aims of provisional detention and other preventive measures is very low. Non-jurist usually perceive the anticipation of the punishment as the main or even only rationale of the provisional detention before the trial! It is expressed in the commonly used cliche: “policja áapie a sądy wypuszczają” (“the police captures, the judges let the criminals go free”). Again and again we can read the news on another caught criminal who was “let free” by the judge, who refused the application of the preventive measure. It is always commented with an outrage. Any attempt of clarification that the law provides for the restrictive grounds of application of preventive measures fails. In Polish law, it must be a high degree of probability, that it was the particular person who committed the particular crime. Moreover, the provisional detention may be ordered only in case of the real danger of collusion, escape or illegal interference with the investigation. The WWW users who try to point it are routinely labelled naive or stupid by the people, who apparently think, that all the persons arrested by the police should be automatically detained up to the trial. Exceptionally we can hear the voices that the present regulation of the provisional detention is far too broad, and that normally the detention should not be applied before the trial. F. The right to defence and the presumption of innocence. Both right to defence and the presumption of innocence are obscure notions very often. For example, the internauts often express the views, that the heinous murderers should not have the defence attorney (sic!). Similarly, the defence attorneys of the leaders of organised crime are attacked for being “immoral”. All the misunderstandings connected with the presumption of innocence are strange it we take in account, that the reference point is usually USA. In the USA both the presumption of innocence and the right to defence are also constitutional values. G. The duties of the witness. The issue of the role and rights of the witness in the criminal process is one of the least abstract issues. Everybody may become a witness in a criminal case. Due to some unclear reasons, the duties of the witness are grossly misunderstood. The echoes of this misunderstanding
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can be easily found on the net. First of all, there is an opinion, that standing as witness in the court is not a duty, but the matter of a free choice and courtesy of the called person. The news on compelling the witnesses with the means available in law (mainly small fine) is subject to criticism. An interesting example can be found on one of the forae. The famous professor of criminal procedure answered the question asked by the journalist and he explained that normally the witness must go the court if the judge decide so. He pointed that the witnesses’ discipline in Germany or in the USA is much higher, compared to Poland. It provoked very aggressive comments. The commentators, not the lawyers themselves, accused the professor of incompetence. H. Immunity witness and protected witness. Immunity witness is an often subject of the discussion. The awareness of the nature of this instrument is extremely low. The immunity witness (Ğwiadek koronny) is very often confused with anonymous (protected) witness. That is why we can find the comments like: “I think it may happen only in Poland that a criminal becomes an immunity witness” (sic!). It seems to be the case that many participants do not understand who the immunity witness is. First, any criticism of the existence of this instrument is strongly resented. Secondly, any doubts of credibility of the immunity witnesses in particular cases are rejected. I. Criminal policy. In the field of the general criminal policy we can find enormous number of cliches that are thoughtlessly repeated and used as the arguments. Most of them was initially used by the politicians for the purposes of the political marketing and propaganda. Today they live their own life. It would be impossible to list all such cliche. The most frequent are: 1. The change of the criminal law in Poland in 1997 (new legislation) started a “liberalisation” of the criminal policy, 2. The number of the types of prohibited criminal acts is constantly decreasing. 3. The most frequent group of crimes is the serious crimes against the person. 4. The murder rate in Poland is very high. 5. The probation may be used only in case of subminimal social dangerousness of the crime (sometimes: of the criminal),
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6. In case the criminal is sentenced for more than one crime, the penalty may not be higher, than the highest of the punishments applied. 7. It is necessary to make the punishment much harsher, in the interest of the victim. 8. Possession of small amount of drugs is not a crime at all. In the year 2000-2001 the extensive changes in Polish criminal law were prepared and voted by the parliament. The preparatory works were conducted by the “tough on crime” politicians in secrecy - without the discussion and consultation required by law. The proposals included growth of both upper and lower limits of penalties for particular crimes. Indirectly it meant marginalising of probation and community service. In fact, the imprisonment was to be a main means of criminal policy. The draft contained many unacceptable ideas. For example - the trial in absentia was to be a rule and the presence of the defendant - the exception (sic!). The list of other unconstitutional, contrary to European Convention of Human Rights or simply stupid solutions was very long. It was obvious, that the president must veto the Bill. Just before the deadline the decision should have been made he invited the most representative academics, judges, prosecutors, advocates and representatives of the law enforcement agencies and asked them for the opinion. The opinion was unanimous - no one defended the scandalous changes. It was not a surprise, that the president vetoed the Bill. However, the reader of the WWW portals might have been under the impression that the decision was not known till the last day. Possibly this was the reason for the massive attack to be seen on all the portals in the following days. The general disapproval of the president's decision (ca. 80%) was accompanied with the insults and suggestions, that president was bribed by the criminals, acted under the foreign pressure and so on. Similarly, the scholars who advised president were named traitors who do not know everyday life. The opinion, that the law professors do not know the law was also common. There were also the suggestions, that they “never seen a criminal” (!?) or accept money from abroad (this was the suggestion by L.KaczyĔski - the former Minister of Justice - the main sponsor of the vetoed changes). Many commentators called for the dismissal of all the professors and the judges who objected the changes. Probably the majority had no idea about the unacceptable mistakes in the re-codification. They thought the changes are simply making the penalties higher. If so, they could not understand the criticism of the lawyers. It is disputable, whether the complete information on the contents of the “KaczyĔski Bill” could have changed the attitudes of the majority of the veto critics. It may be argued, that the black-white perception of the world and lack of basic legal knowledge make them easy target for the cynical politicians.
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J. The severity of the sentences passed. General view is that the sentences passed in Poland are very lenient. Many commentators are deeply convinced, that Polish criminal justice is one of the most lenient in the world. Very often the information on the sentences passed abroad are used as an instrument. Usually the reference point is USA, however, once Norway was used as an example of very harsh justice system (sic!). Obviously, there are a lot of users (probably law students and legal professionals) who know the truth, but they do not participate in these discussions. I noticed that the freshmen tend to engage in the discussions and tend to clarify the incorrect information. Later the attitude of “not throwing the pearls before the swine” dominate. K. The death penalty. The attitudes towards the death penalty are usually seen as one of the measurers of the punitiveness. 9 The death penalty is one of the major discussion subjects. Another wave comes after the news of another murder comes. So as ca. 60% of Polish support the re-introduction of the death penalty, it is not a surprise, that the support for the death penalty on the net is overwhelming. There are three kinds of arguments used to support the view that the death penalty is necessary: 1) philosophical and ideological (retribution, just deserts thinking etc.) 2) pseudo-utilitarian 3) economical As regards the philosophical arguments, we may not agree with them, but it is possible and legitimate to discuss them. It is possible to find the elaborated and sensible exchanges of the arguments of that type. The death penalty is seen as a “natural” and “normal” state, the abolition of the penalty, the liberal “illness” of the society. The pseudo-utilitarian arguments deserve the prefix “pseudo” simply because they are not related to any empirical data nor common sense. If the argument is, that the death penalty stops the criminals from murdering other people, this argument may be found somehow grounded (not entirely nonsense). If, however, we read on the net, that the death penalty is necessary to stop the car-radio thieves of hooligans, we found the discussion rather difficult. The most shocking, is the finding, that neither ideological nor utilitarian arguments are the most often used. The most often used arguments are the economical ones. The cliche is: “He is to get the life
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imprisonment, the life imprisonment is very expensive, the tax-payers will have to pay. He should be executed, it is much cheaper”. Just like in case of other arguments, I will not discuss it. What I want to say is, that the arguments of this kind are surprisingly the most frequent. There is also fourth type of the argument: the death penalty must be good, because the Americans have it. L. America as the pattern. Generally speaking, many WWW users take the USA as the ideal solution of any possible problem. It is possible to find numerous examples of such approach, like: 1. death penalty 2. jury system 3. easy access to weapons 4. possibility of killing any trespasser under the legitimate selfdefence. One important issue is the correlation of the support of the death penalty and the accession to the European Union. Although it is just the impression, I am deeply convinced there is a negative correlation here. Very often the same persons strongly supported the death penalty and strongly opposed the accession. I mentioned before, that the discussions and comments on the death penalty might be found especially after the much commented murder cases. It is interesting, that many of the critics of death penalty tend to express the views like “Basically I am against, but not in this case”. We can say, that they fail the sc. “Tim McVeigh test”. M. The imprisonment and prison conditions. Frequently discussed issue is the prison. The discussion focused on the prison as such is not very often. Much more frequent is using the prison condition as the argument in the discussion on punishment, especially on the imprisonment. The general knowledge of Polish society on the prison conditions is, that the prisons in Poland are luxurious places, where the inmates enjoy watching TV and video (provided by the jail), bodybuilding and sex. Many of the inmates are not present at a given time, because the system of leaves is very extensive. When outside of prison, they usually commit another serious crimes. It sounds like a joke. Unfortunately, reading a WWW fora discussions shows that this is not a joke.
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Under these circumstances it is not a surprise, that even a longterm imprisonment sentences are routinely commented as too low. The general tendency is that as much as possible criminals should be imprisoned for the longest possible time. Of course this is by far not the only view to be found on the net discussions, but certainly the most frequent one. Many misunderstandings are connected to the labour of prisoners. Very often we can read, that there is plenty of motorways to be built and plenty of swamps to be dried, and that the inmates should do it. As to the swamps, the remote echo of the old-time propaganda can be heard here. We can remember the “social parasites” campaign (mostly early 80's) and the idea of cultivating the ĩuáawy depression. It was many years ago, the political system changed, but the echo can still be heard. 3.
Some of the specific features of the internet discourse.
A. Easy generalisation. Very important issue is a tendency of generalisation of particular cases. It is very easy to encounter the views like “The courts use to do this or that” based on the single news! If the news is, that some particularly lenient sentence was passed for particular crime, for example: arson, the views like “the courts are always very lenient in the arson cases”. It is a well-known phenomenon, that the attention of the press is attracted by the extraordinary cases, what leads to the deformation of the picture of the reality. 10 B. Critics always more active, than the supporters. It seems to be the case that the critics of the particular decision etc. tend to be more active in commenting the decision, than the ones, who support particular decision etc. It is not the surprise. A very good example of this phenomenon is a story of a Warsaw policeman, who killed two people in the street. He was on his road to work, while he noticed a street robbery. Trying to arrest the robbers, he used a gun. Some people in the nearby pub overheard the gunfire, left the pub and tried to corner a policeman, who was plain clothed. He supposedly warned them he was a policeman and then fired for several times wounding three attackers. Two of them died. After a lengthy and complicated trial he was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. The court correctly found the use of weapon excessive and unjustified. The court took in account the specific situation of the defendant, who initially acted in the public interest, then feared the group of aggressive people and mitigated the penalty. The appellate court decided on further mitigation - from 7 to 5 years imprisonment.
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Both 1st instance and the 2nd instance verdicts were very radically criticised on all the WWW forae. The views were expressed, that the policeman acted in the exercise of his duty (true), that it was selfdefence (wrong), and that the behaviour of the victims was obviously wrong. Indeed, if a group of beer-drinkers hear the gunfire in the street, attacking the gunman is not a best idea. In most general terms, the view that the policeman should be acquitted was almost common. The criticism towards the judges who “dare” to convict such a brave man was sometimes outside the acceptable limits. However, when the President exercised his right to pardon the convict, another discussion started. This time the views revolved by 180 degrees. The president was subject to very radical criticism. The tragic policeman was called a cold-blooded murderer. At a first sight such a change was amazing. If we take in account the phenomenon, that the criticism is always louder than the support, it is not strange anymore. In first two waves of the discussion, the crime control supporters dominated. For them, policeman is always right and the people who attack him must always take in account the worst consequences. In the second discussion, the contrary view prevailed. C. Relativity. An interesting phenomenon might have been observed in the Polish Hancock and Shankland case - the young guy, who drop a stone from a bridge onto a passing car. The defendant - young and mentally disfunctional man threw a stone, destroying a windscreen and wounding the passenger's leg. The court found him guilty and sentenced to 12 years in prison. It was clear, that the sentence is too severe, especially, that mental handicap placed the perpetrator almost on the borderline of the insanity. It was not the surprise, that the appellate court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. That time the court found him guilty again, but the penalty was 3 and a half years in prison. Two portals made it the front-page news. However, one of the portals simply informed, that the defendant was punished with three and a half years imprisonment, whilst other one stressed, that in an original trial the sentence was 12 years. The comments to both versions of the news differed sharply. On the first portal, the news and the sentence were generally welcomed. Some of the users expressed the view that the penalty might have been harsher, but the general opinion was in favour of the court and its decision. Entirely different situation was to be seen on the other portal. The commentators started a competition in insulting the judge and the legal system as a whole. The opinions, that the judge should be immediately dismissed were among the mildest ones (sic!). Other
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comments were a typical hate-speech, also with a strong sexist element, so as the judge was a woman. A similar example is provided by the case of the street musician, substance addict, who performed in the centre of the historical city of Kraków. So as he did not possess a required permit, he was charged with the misdemeanour for seven times. On the eight occasions the misdemeanours’ court sentenced him to seven days jail. One of the portals described case unfairly as the story of the young, gifted musician maliciously persecuted by the city authorities and police. The comments in favour of the defendant were prevailing and the criticism of the court decision was overwhelming. Other portal reported the case in a balanced manner. There the comments were much more balanced too, especially, that the noisy and unpredicted activity of the musician was subject to numerous complaints of the local inhabitants. D. Ethical discourse domination over the legal one. Many participants tend to discuss the legal aspects of particular problem without referring to the law itself. The attempts of diverting the discussion onto more legal tracks are labelled as “tricks” or “collusion”. It is easy to notice that this phenomenon happens especially if the issue is ethically relevant. A very good example was the fiery discussion after the paper “Skórki” (“The skins”) was published in Gazeta Wyborcza (the paper is owned by the same company that own “Gazeta.pl”). The authors revealed two suspicious practices. One of them was providing the families of the deceased emergency ambulance patients with the addresses of particular funeral home. It even happened, that the car of the funeral home was arriving at the scene immediately after the patient died, without any activity of the family. It was obvious, that the paramedics were paid by the funeral business. However, in order to call it a bribe, one important requirement must have been met. The paramedics, drivers or doctors must have been the “public officers” in order to be criminally bribed. The discussion about the bribery and recommended penalties was conducted without the reference to this basic legal requirement. The attempts of drawing the attention to this issue were rejected. Other good example of dejuridisation of the discussion is the issue of euthanasia. E. Democracy, exclusion and dehumanisation. Commonly used argument is the argument of “democratic choice”. The argument itself is correct. However, a primitive understanding of the democracy prevails: “the majority is always right”, vox populi vox dei. That is why the enthusiasts of the death penalty call for
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immediate reintroduction of this penalty. Similarly, any criticism of the changes in the criminal law was responded with the argument, that 99 % of the society calls for being “tough on crime”. This rhetoric is closely associated with the rhetoric of exclusion. The criminals are “bad guys” and we - the “moral majority” - are the “good guys”. The criminals are different from the non-criminals. We - the “good guys” are entitled to “fight” the criminality and indeed the criminals with any means we find appropriate. Basically there are no limits to the methods we use. Of course the criminals were human, but they gave up their humanity. By the act of killing the murderer gave up his humanity and agreed to be killed (sic!). A very good example of the rhetoric of exclusion is a manner of using the word bandit to name all the defendants or all the prison convicts (sic!). This way the word is used to describe a thief, reckless driver or even someone who committed a tax evasion. It is obviously contrary to the meaning of this word in a natural language. In Polish language we reserve this word for the description of someone who commits the serious violent crimes. I do not feel competent enough to further this analysis. What I want to say is, that this is the rhetoric we can find on the internet. The newspaper discussions are always polished, the most extreme views are to be found outside of the mainstream press. There is no such limitation on the internet - any view can be presented and discussed, any argument can be employed. F. Ignoring the subjective (mental) element of the crime and the causation: call for the absolute liability. Very often the basic requirements of the attribution (przypisanie, Zurechnung) of guilt are ignored. For example: in one of the discussions the view was expressed, that all the drunken drivers should be charged with attempted murder. The attempt of clarification the issue of the mental element of the attempt (it must be directly oriented towards the commission of the particular crime) were ineffective. Similarly, the obvious difference between murder and unintentional causing someone's death is obscure to the average internet user. Any news on sentencing anyone with aggravated assault (pobicie ze skutkiem Ğmiertelnym) - i.e. the assault that resulted with death is usually resented as unfairly lenient. It seems to be the case, that part (perhaps majority) of a public opinion is not aware of the subjective requirements of the crime. From this point of view the result of the criminal action would be the sole determinant of the responsibility. The individual, who caused the death of other human being is always a murderer, even if he/she didn't intend to kill!
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Next interesting example is the crime of taking the vehicle without authorisation. In Polish law, theft is taking other's property without authorisation and with intent to steal. This is more or less the same as in England or in Germany and the common-sense definition is the same. The obvious element of theft is a specific intent (dolus coloratus) of appropriation (przywáaszczenie). Using other's property without authorisation (and without the intent to steal) is a contravention (misdemeanour). The only exception is traditionally the short time using of other's car without the authorisation. The criminal code (just like previous and many foreign criminal codes) contains a crime of taking the vehicle without authorisation. The rationale of this exception is obvious to any criminologist and criminal lawyer. In case of taking the vehicle it is not easy to prove the intent. The car thieves would easily escape the criminal responsibility by claiming they were joy riders. The only reaction available would be small fine for the contravention (misdemeanour). It would be good in case of real joy riders, but not in case of gangs of car thieves. However, the very existence of this crime was in the late 90's under a heavy fire. The view was presented, that the existence of art. 289 c.c. enables the car thieves to avoid (sic!) the liability. Many WWW readers called for elimination of this article from the criminal code. They believed that in absence of art. 289 c.c. the people found in other's car would be simply punished as thieves. Needless to say, the truth is that in case the intent to steal was not proven, they would not be punished for the crime altogether. Just like in case of aggravated assault, this example proves the lack of understanding of the role of mental (subjective) element. Similarly, the issue of causation seems to be very difficult to be understood. For example, the recent news on a single mother who killed a newly born child was widely commented. Some of the commentators stated that the unknown father of the child should be traced down and charged with murder. G. Naive legal positivism. Another feature is the naive positivism - the belief, that any social problem can be solved by simply passing a new piece of legislation. The lesson was learned from the politicians. The political discourse is based on the assumption, that the society works as a “black-box”. If anything wrong happens, we simply need to pass another law e.g. to criminalise another human conduct and the problem should disappear. If the problem does not disappear, it is to mean that this method was a mistake. What should we do then? We should pass another law. Criminal law should then be used in
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combating the delays in wages payment, poverty or unemployment (!). Such ideas are not new; it had already been subject to discussion. 11 It would by dishonest not to mention that such oversimplified view is definitely not common. It dominates, but is very often objected. The major role in prevention of the social problems is attributed to criminal law. The level understanding of the ultima ratio nature of the criminal law is low. Criminal liability is perceived as the only real liability. The interest of the victim is associated with the penalty as severe as possible, not with the compensation or restitution. The possibility of influencing the social reality with the methods of criminal law is limited. The participants to the discussions do not seem to understand this. The black-box attitude seems to be prevailing. 4.
Conclusions.
We may formulate and forward some conclusions. These conclusions, however, are not the hard conclusions but rather the hypothesae. In order to substantiate these hypothesae we would need a thorough research. Such a research may be of some value for our knowledge on the general society. This usefulness must not be overestimated. 1. The legal knowledge in the area of criminal justice, substantive and procedural law of the WWW users is higher, than the average knowledge in the general society. So as the said level is very low, the legal knowledge of the general society is dramatically low. 2. The attitudes in the criminal justice dispute on the web are neither homogenous nor conformised. Usually the contrasting views are expressed. 3. The specificity of the WWW discussion makes the generalisation much easier, than in “ordinary” discussion. It is very often, that generalisation are built even on a single news. 4. The anonymous character of the net discussion enables both the verbal abuse of the opponent and use of false information or false inferences. 5. The critics of particular judgement etc. reported on the internet are usually more ready to comment, than the ones, who support particular decision. The critics are always “louder” than the supporters are. 6. If we see the above mentioned discussion in terms of due process - crime control tension, the crime control approach is certainly more visible. 7. American IP addresses are overrepresented among the whole. The American-based participants of the discussions usually perceive the American criminal policy as the ideal. Very often the discussions are
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placed against the American background and the American solutions are used as the reference point. 8. Ready made cliches provided by the politicians are very often used, especially in the area of criminal policy. 9. The majority of the WWW users support the death penalty. The most frequent arguments are the economic ones (sic!). 10: On the one hand, many WWW users view the imprisonment as the only “real” punishment. On the other hand, the group of WWW users who realistically perceive the issues of penalty is also big. 11. The people who possess a legal background usually avoid the participation in the “odd” discussions. The probable reason is a realistic understanding of the chances of convincing the TV-educated opponents, fear of being labelled as “stupid” or “naive”, as well as the “don't throw pearls before the swine” attitude. 12. The discussions on the WWW discussion fora prove that the general legal awareness of the non-lawyers in Poland is low. The nature of the misunderstandings as to the law certainly slows down the creation of the civic society and the social modernisation. That is why I think that the paramount issue is the education of the society in basic concepts and functions of law. This educational effort should initially be focused on the high school students and the university students other than law students. The data obtained from the WWW fora supports the stereotype of a very high punitiveness of Polish society. If we are going to estimate the punitiveness, crime victimisation surveys are not enough. Level of punitiveness is a result of many factors, one the most important is the media information about the crime and criminality. Such information provokes emotions, usually strong, usually not in favour of the perpetrators. ICVS seem to operate on the level of emotion plus analysis. Many people seem to remain on the level of pure (but verbalised) emotion. It may be seen among the participants of the fora discussions. The language is emotional, the level of aggression seems to be high, the views are often extreme. From the methodological point of view easy generalisation would be a mistake, on the other hand, it is highly improbable, that the views expressed in the internet are entirely alien to the “mainstream” society. We may say, that the “emotional punitiveness” is typical rather than exceptional in the general society.
Notes 1
Krajewski, 2002, 173. Kury, 2002, 107. 3 Wojciechowska, 1994, 32; Krajewski and Kury, 1998, 87. 4 Krajewski: 173-192. 2
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5
Czapska, 1997, 21. Kury and Obergfell-Fuchs, 1998, 425. 7 Krajewski and Kury, 87-120. 8 Kury 2002, 135. 9 Krajewski and Kury, 1998. 10 Báachut, 1997, 78. 11 Gardocki, 1990. 6
Bibliography Báachut, J. (1997), ‘Doniesienia kryminalne w polskiej prasie codziennej’, in: D. Doelling, K. Goessel and S. WaltoĞ (eds.) Relacje o przestĊpstwach i procesach karnych w prasie codziennej w Niemczech i w Polsce. Kraków: Katedra PostĊpowania Karnego UJ. 78-110. Czapska, J. (1997), ‘Poczucie spoáecznego zagroĪenia przestĊpczoĞcią’, in: J. Báachut, J. Czapska and J. Widacki (eds.) ZagroĪenie przestĊpczoĞcią: Raport Instytutu Spraw Publicznych. Warszawa-Kraków: IPS. 21-28. Gardocki, L. (1990), Zagadnienia teorii kryminalizacji. Warszawa: PWN. Krajewski, K. (2002), ‘Punitiveness of the Polish Society’, in: J. Czapska and H. Kury (eds.) The Myth of Repression or: The Importance of Crime Prevention. Kraków: Zakamycze. 173-197. Krajewski, K. and Kury, H. (1998), ‘PunitywnoĞü spoáecznych postaw wobec przestĊpczoĞci: Przegląd wyników badaĔ’, Czasopismo Prawa Karnego i Nauk Penalnych, 1-2: 87. Kury, H. (2002), ‘Punitive Attitudes and their Significance’, in: J. Czapska and H. Kury (eds.). The Myth of Repression or: The Importance of Crime Prevention. Kraków: Zakamycze. 107-171. Kury, H. and Obergfell-Fuchs, J. (1998), ‘Fear of crime in East and West after the political change’, in: J. Widacki and J. Czapska (eds.) Safe citizen - safe state. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL. 425-445. Townsend, S. (2000), Adrian Mole: The Cappucino Years. London: Penguin Books.
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Wojciechowska, J. (1994), ‘Wzrost przestĊpczoĞci jako Ĩródáo obaw i niepokojów mieszkaĔców Warszawy’, Przegląd Prawa Karnego, Vol. 10: 32.
Author Affiliation Andrzej R. ĝwiatáowski works in the Faculty of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian University as an assistant professor. He teaches criminal procedure, petty offences’ law and financial criminal law. He published extensively on criminal law, procedure and practice. Co-author of the handbook of criminal procedure and of the Financial Criminal Code Commentary.
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Part II Problems of Social Pathology: Symptoms and Mechanisms
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Iconic Violence: Description of the Phenomenon Agnieszka Ogonowska The main issue of iconic violence is a very specific construction of audiovisual texts. In accordance with their author’s intentions, they are the significant source of impact. The mechanism of iconic violence is connected with a film signification. A film text does not need to show violence per se; its creator uses very often quite neutral images. Iconic violence has both a psychological and a process-related character: it acts during the interaction between texts and its user who is not aware of such an impact. The efficiency of it depends on viewer’s audiovisual competence level. Without the competence, treated as a very important factor in all communication process, the user is at a disadvantage. 1 The images of violence work quite to the contrary, because of having one-for-ever-made-form, closed structures and above all, they show many different forms of violence on iconic level, so they could be seen by a viewer directly. The viewer has always a chance to take full responsibility of his or her choice. He chooses to watch violence in the media, so he follows his decision and bears the consequences. When taking into consideration iconic violence, the mechanism of its working is quite different. Iconic level of the text denotes relation with a part of social reality (a level of reference) and connotes many senses, which are not present there directly, but they could be recalled by viewer. He uses his knowledge about semantic, structural and logical relations with elements, which build text and evoke such associations. Both mechanisms of signification - denotation and connotation - could provoke violence. In the first subprocess: denotation is based on likeness or likelihood with the realm, but it can create only illusion of being such a relation. The communication process is successful when those three significant elements, namely: an author, a user and a text belong to the same socio-cultural sphere; thereupon they share the same universum of meaning. The user recognizes those elements, which are according to him significant for the meaning of the text and then he creates further association. They are more or less consistent with a dominant direction of reading, supposed by its author (a virtual reader/viewer category). The viewer decodes very often the text automatically, without a deeper reflection; so he follows the suggested meanings that do not activate any defensive mechanisms. He does not feel such a need, because the iconic level of the text is quite neutral. There are not any scenes of violence. Iconic violence is hidden in mechanism of text and in the process of text decoding.
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User reads text, which read him/her. He/she is being read by the media texts. Derrick de Kreckhove concludes: When we read, we scan the books, we are in control. But when we watch TV, it is the TV scanner that ‘reads’ us. Our retinas are the direct object of the electron beam. [...] In front of the television set, our defences are down; we are vulnerable and susceptible to multi-sensory seduction. 2 Text prefers very specific model of reader, who is receptive to influences of media; who accepts all “preferring” meanings and value systems from texts. To corrupting the audiovisual discourses, professional communicators use modern film techniques. They could succeed by such operations like: cheating, mistification and semantical moving. They use also cultural habits of the viewer and psychological knowledge to construct the text and to anticipate the potential direction of its reading. Cheating resolves itself to specific type of presentation of reality: not objectively, but by using the perspective of some groups of interests. Mystification is connected with hiding real motivation, opinions, facts by special construction of media images, which serves such a misinformation and divert viewer’s attention from real truth. The third technique semantic moving - is being used when all problematic and upset information, which could shake public opinion are being neutralized. Those three above mentioned techniques serve also as the special strategies used by the government and its elites who try to convince the society to the particular forms of behaviour by using media and audiovisual communication. Images of social life and social events are constructed by communicators to serve society as a true and an ideologically neutral representation of reality. The mechanism of constraining is being described in the classical model of viewer-voyeur, who has unrestricted comfort of watching while taking part in a cinema performance. The scopofilistic need is fulfilled here in the institutional context created by the system of cinematography, which in fact belongs to dominant form of culture. An institution can be treated as an instrument of social control, which makes it possible for viewers to gratify their needs, and to repress some undesirable forms of behaviours. While watching at cinema the sublimation of the viewer’s needs and drives connected with scopofilism is started, because in the institutional context he transforms himself from a voyeur into a film-fan. The same situation is taking place in the media world: Internet or television. They create themselves as the domestic media capable to foresee and realise all user’s demands. The truth is, they create a quite new psychological trap for him, because media text create those needs, the
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viewer adopts them as his own, and then media pretends that it can gratify them. The mechanism of producing this illusion is cyclical, connected with Freudian compulsion of repetition. Media violence is much broader term than the iconic violence. It does not direct attention to the mechanism of producing the meanings and values in the text treated as the media products, but it takes into consideration some ideological determinants of this kind of the product. Ideologies of media text are the consequences of socio-political determination of media institutions. In the last case the analysis should be started from those media institutions and value systems connected with them, to the analysis concrete media products, which reflect them and enter to the social system. Media violence works on the social level as a result of two significant directions of impact: from media institution on other social institution and vice versa or from media institution on its products. Media comes under law regulations, which determine the standards and rules of its working. And even in the situation when media are formally organised independently of the government, they are never quite independent of those regulations. It is a matter of a common knowledge, that it is quite impossible to separate media from business and political spheres, especially on the plane of informal contacts. The fact is that those relations determine the media production and existing regulation cannot counteract the media, and iconic violence effectively. No one can forbid the text’s author to select and choose information, which he considers important, or to prioritise, which reflects the significance of such information (agenda- setting). Institutionalisation of mass-communication is connected with yet another controversial issue. The main question arises: who is the real author in the process of the communication? Is he a creator of media text or maybe all members of an editorial staff? It could also be the owner of the media organisation. The next question is: what kind of relations take place between them? The main significant problem is also to assign quantity, quality, and the structure of all media organisations and their formal and informal relations with other social institutions and the groups of interest. The institutional analysis should be studied more thoroughly by adding economic source of its working and some socio-political factors which determine the forms and the contents of media products. Umberto Eco states that socio-political determinants never take on one form: one does not have to be paid by some guy to write texts [create - A.O] in accordance with his ideology. It suffices to write [to create - A.O.] texts in a state of a complete spiritual independence, and, quite instinctively,
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to obey the system of distribution, and easily find the economic context. Thus the determinants forced by the market (seemingly independent from the more complex ownership relations) generate text structures that need to be filled with ideological content. 3 Media violence is based on three different mechanisms: production, distribution and selling media texts and their users, created by them. Text produces its reader, who is being sold further, because of his serving on media market as the very precious goods. The institution of ad works in the same way. 4 The ad producers create advertisements to seduce the viewer – a potential product-buyer. The main task of their working is to transfer a text-user from one particular social role and a specific, complex of behaviour (viewer: reception and interpretation) to another role (consumer, and consumer behaviour). The similar mechanism of working is used by the authors of infoprogrammes. They do not give information on a social reality, but they construct its image to be representative for the interest of one social group (connected with media system or government). In fact, those texts do not produce a competent citizen, but a voter who approves of a social order. He does not make his political decision consciously, but very often under the pressure of media images, which determine his socio-political choices. Thereby media change citizen’s duties, and law into the illusion of democracy. Iconic violence has a broader strength of impact. More people become victims of this phenomenon than counts the number of images of violence fans. It should be emphasized once more - this is a significant difference. The basic attribute of that kind of image is presenting violence directly. Therefore, the viewer is conscious of what he wants to watch and what kind of emotional effects he can achieve. It is very interesting that finally such preferences have achieved approval inside of the film genres, like for example: gore, thriller or horror. [...] a presence (violence in a new horror - A.O.) should not only shock a viewer and give him emotional effects, which the earlier products were not capable to offer. Out of question is the problem of transgression, braking the rules of genres or the system, which produced them. A contemporary way of presenting violence allows viewer build a quite new receptive situation, in which he must obey both the iconic violence and the violence of presenting images. He has to watch very brutal scenes on the screen and he is subordinated to their specific visibility. 5
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Reception of images of violence is more ethical than violence of images. In the first case the viewer knows what he has decided to watch; in the second case, he is not aware of it. 1. Social reality and media images of reality: the mechanism of creating illusion. All media texts may be considered as an alternative form of reality images. They always give some interpretation of the realm, which they never reflect directly. Applying such a rule is a consequence of political and economic factors which determine all cultural production. On the cultural market there are only such products which express value systems connected with a (dominant) social group, for example: elites, depositors of knowledge, businessmen, minorities). This issue is related with a correspondence between reality and its media images and can be expressed in a question, whether the media or its products reflect the reality? If the answer is positive, someone can formulate another question: Whose realm do these images represent? 6 Texts, representing particular culture, show common beliefs, interests, and values, and they contribute to the approval of the specific social order and thereby to its stabilisation. It is very difficult to reveal this ideology in the text, to identify the social group whose interests are thus represented. The situation seems to be easier when we examine this kind of audiovisual texts, which serve to well known and recognizable goals, for example: ad. Unfortunately, it is only the illusion, because the higher consciousness of the author’s intention recognized by the viewer does not correspond with a relative more critical its decoding. It is true, that technology obeys, besides tool/mechanical order, which it extracts from itself, to social implications and to antropological consequences connected with many different techniques of visibility, so it makes particular ideological effects. 7 Technology can be used to discover many different aspects of the world; on the other hand, it connects particular forms of visibility (a regime of visibility) with particular power relations (technologies of power described by Michel Foucault). A mechanical reproduction enables not only the process of repetition of realm by creating infinite number of its copies, but also to product many forms of this realm, which creates the illusion of reality based on likeness or likelihood. The omnipresent copy serves not only as the external sign of the text, but at the same time it creates new ways of
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seeing and categorisation of the world. Copies made by using film camera represent the whole world for the viewer. Whereas in a social system there are many texts to show the same part of the realm, they begin to be the only way of seeing world. This process is even more dangerous, because we have new media, and they are able to create completely original world, so the media images replace reality and they create a perfect illusion. The process of reproduction connected with traditional film-apparatus was repressed by synthetic images, which are the products of high technology (the machine of visibility described by Paul Virilio). 8 Those processes modify both: the ontology of a film text and the epistemological function of cinema, which create quite new alternative worlds instead of register the reality. The mechanical reproduction which is symbolized by film camera was replaced by the cybernetic systems, symbolized by a computer. Images produced by computers repressed reproduction and transcription by conversion of data. On the same place, when earlier had appeared images of the world, now there are world images or the forms created by adding parts of copies and simulation of reality. 9 Thereby in a social system there exist many audiovisual texts that have different ontological status. User can not distinguish those differences and therefore ascribes the texts with equal importance. Contrary to the analogue images, the computer images suggest only being and existing, and they are self centred. The problem of reference between a text and reality is solved, because simulations produced by a computer give images, which are not dependent from any form of reality nor any external elements. Viewer identifies and equalizes images of reality with its computer simulation and audiovisual texts with realm. It seems to be very problematic and give serious consequences for organisation of political and social life. Those negative effects exceed problem of some new visibilities or changing inside of modern film art. Film text is an instrument of social impact or a product of the particular, historically determined political, economic and cultural factors. Equating mediated and real life is neither rare nor unreasonable. It is very common, it is easy to foster, it does not depend on fancy media equipment, and thinking will not make it go away. The media equation media equal real life - applies to everyone, it applies often, and it is highly consequential. And this is surprising. 10 Let’s think about it for a while. How we can clarify that phenomenon? How people can make such (mis)identification independently from their ages, qualification and culture? It seems that the key to solve that riddle lies in the analysis of the modern culture, which is
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dependent on the new electronic technologies. The next important process, which we should take into consideration, is the process of an aesthetisation of reality and an onthologisation of art. The significant consequence of those processes, is blurring the border between art and the sphere of everyday life, the realm and its copies, and its simulations. 11 Jean Baudrillard describes this phenomenon: “art entered into infinite reproduction, with everything that doubles itself, even the banal reality of the everyday, falling by the same token under the sign of art and becoming aesthetic”. 12 The third factor includes some psychological and antropological effects caused by new technologies and their products inside the social activity. The process of the mediatisation of the social life produced such consequences like: - people build their knowledge about world by using only media texts, which are the basic source of information for them; - they treat this information as the neutral report about social reality; - in process of communication they change their knowledge by recalling the media text to confirm the truth; - media texts circulate in a social and a cultural system and by the process of the social communication and then they are the subjects of the objectivisation. The process of circulation of media texts is closed in the cultural system; with time media texts become the only accessible true about world; - they make order in the social way of thinking about reality; - they offer compact and well-ordered images of world which replace the chaos of a real world; - a contemporary viewer acts more as the consumer of prepared meanings included in media texts, than as an active producer of his own senses. He feels very rare a need to verify information he gets from mass media. To recapitulate all problem we can suppose, that our information society goes to the direction described by Paul Virilio in his Machine of visibility. Film camera modified by modern technologies can not only reproduce the external reality, but also provide its interpretation. Audiovisual texts based on film texts become the most reliable and attractive form of the communication. Such things often occur because of their specific attributes. Medium is treated not only in theoretical and informational way - as the medium for transferring information – but rather as a form of cultural production connected with particular technology, which is obeyed by the social institution serves as compass in events of everyday life, as a form of an aparatus of visibility. 13
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Audiovisual text use images, sounds and move to create for the viewer an illusion of his direct participation in those events. They serve to build an alternative form of reality and to modify it by images of the real one. It is possible by media users nad their audiovisual activity. Media gives them patterns of behaviour, value systems, a cognitive representation of the world which were transferred in the real life. Audiovisual texts (films, advertisements, video clips, computer games) become very significant factor of the socialization. Form becomes the most important aspect in cultural production, because a serial production ensures commercial success and clearness (classical film genres) or it can also activate the cognitive processes of the viewer by intentional redundancy of information (info programmes), or by admitting self-reference of many audiovisual texts (film auto-thematic, aesthetics of repeating, used by authors of ad and video clips). The form is also the basic attribute of post-modernism, in which: “a good looking and an external style are the most important things”, “images dominate narration”, “we consume the images and the signs and ignore their usefulness and values”, “such characteristics like: artistic value, dignity, uprightness, authenticity, realism, intellectual depth and colourful narration are impaired”, and “virtual reality made by computer enables people to experience many different forms of realm came from second hand”. 14 The form is also the distinctive element of serial and standardisation strategy used in producing seemingly various cultural products, which create an illusion of lack such a likeness and relations. Reproduction of culture caused on the one hand, vanishing aura related earlier with work of art; on the other hand glorify the ideology of producers of those seemingly different forms. The contents of media text lose its significance for the user. He is attracted by forms, thereby his reception of the media texts works automatically. The attractive forms related with process “repeating the same” completely repressed such attributes of media texts, like: truth, objectiveness, reliability and its relation to the reality. Tomasz Goban-Klas concludes: a genre of the text in common sense means its type and relates with its distinctive kinds of products. In film theory, from where it comes, is a very controversial term, because there is a conflict between an individual originality represented by film and its attachment to the genre. Caring for complying with genres rules removes the value of text from the sphere of art, which emphasizes modern forms to tradition. With reference to media problem of genres is less controversial than in art, because the main standard in the media production is
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The media contribute to the spread of texts culture, and the use of genres form to better communicate with the media user. The viewer reacts in a way that could be anticipated by communicator with a relatively high probability. The main role of genre is to make a contact with the emotional and cognitive spheres of human being and thereby influenced them. Recognizing rules of genre by viewer automatizes the process of communication. The next issue, which is involved in the phenomenon of iconic violence is characteristic of postmodernism. The distinctive traits of contemporary culture are: decentralization, plurality, fragmentation. It is not divided in high and popular spheres, but seems to be heterogenous and functions as the conglomerate of many different parts, which can not be reference to one centre. The cultural text does not represent a single level of culture, but has a hybrid form evocative of the constructions on the border-line. In that last case, the process of transgression doesn’t take a “crossing-a-border-form”, but consists in creating palimpsests, which have a processual character. The reception of a once-made-structure is replaced by a polygamic strategy of the text reading, which make together a sphere of the intertextuality. Those texts and relations between them become the domain strategy of reading of post-modern genres. They begin to mean something only in a process of a never-ending discovery of their cultural contexts. What will happen, when the user is not prepared to take such an activity? How do the technological changes determine the requirements for their users? 2. From a text consumption to production of meaning. User as a performer. Translocation and transgression led to the modification and shift in the relation of the elements that form post-modern culture. The user adopts a role of a cultural nomad, changing his place perpetually. Human being moves inside a different world and in the transit spheres. The cultural products correspond with one other, according to the expectations of their users, who become more often active producers of cultural meanings (performers). The process of producing the sense and interactive forms of communications repressed reception based on the passive consumption. Audiovisual text demands an active and competent reader. A cultural competence enables one to make symmetrical communications, which take place in a context created by the author and on several levels at the same time (a poligamic production). Contemplation was replaced by such strategies of interaction like: navigation and playing. The linear forms of
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text were repressed by hipertextuality. The process of art reception and discovering the author’s intention hidden in the text is nowadays modified by the process of communication and user activation. The very concept of a text, whether unique or one of myriad copies, for example, underpins almost all discussion of cultural forms including film, photography, and their analogue in an age of electronic communication, television (where the idea of ‘flow’ becomes an important amendment). But in cybernetic systems, the concept of ‘text’ itself undergoes substantial slippage. Although a textual element can still be isolated, computer-based systems are primarily interactive rather than one-way, open-ended rather than fixed. 16 Technology becomes not only a subsystem of culture, but a very important element of all forms of the contemporary audiovisual works and the biosphere. After that conclusion we can put some questions about relation between body and art; culture and nature. Human body ceased from being the border between biological and social world. It makes an art space (body art), it becomes art itself. Body is disciplined by the system of culture and its products (Freud, Foucault) and on the other hand, the same body can be treated as a ballast, which makes impossible for user to full enter in virtual reality. It is quite possible to create some forms of identity without body (BLOG, IRC, MUD, MOO), and thereby some new forms of the social communication. That is the audiovisual communication, which is the main component of modern forms of interaction with the audiovisual texts (interactive cinema, computer games, virtual reality). At the same time, when developing the film art and audiovisual culture we can observe many changes inside of the cinema institution, which try to fulfil the viewer’s expectations by modernizing techniques of film production and projection and by functioning within the pale of a consumer society and its products reflecting the capitalistic ideology. The process of consumption material and cultural goods undergoes spatial and temporal consolidation. Thereby the viewer consumes films like he consumes goods or impressions walking on “temples of consumption”. While watching film he can consume double, because he can also eat popcorn and drink coca-cola bought in cinema city. Those changes correspond with a modern marketing strategy, for which good product should have two or even three various attributes under the banner of multiplication, synthetization, modernization. The main traits of them are some prefixes, like: POLI-, MULTI-, MEGA-, TRANS- and a combination of heterogenic elements (collages) which create ever richer net of intertextuality. The aesthetics of overabundance is used in television
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production, where the information is connected with its interpretation, the info-genres become to the fun-genres. The viewer can not recognise precisely what he watches and what kind of adequate strategy of decoding to adopt. The contemporary social-cultural reality seems to be a great show, which spreads systematically. New communication technologies accelerate the process of intentional confusion of their user by producing the modern and attractive products, which very often overgrow his competence and become the dangerous source of violence.
Notes 1
Ogonowska, 2003, 23. de Kerckhove, 1995, 14. 3 Eco, 1990, 29-30: “[...] le determinazioni socio-economiche non assumono mai un aspetto solo: non è necessario essere pagati da un tale per scrivere in accordo con la sua ideologia. Basta scrivere in assoluta libertà di spirito ma facendosi condizionare meccanicamente da un circuito di distribuzione del testo che è solidale alla serie economica senza per questo esserlo in modo transparente. Così che le modalità del mercato (apparentemente disconnesse da più profondi rapporti di proprietà) generano strutture testuali e queste richiedono, come loro ‘riempimento’ più proprio, strutture ideologiche”. 4 Ogonowska, 2001, 140-152. 5 Pitrus, 2001, 98. 6 Goban-Klas, 1999, 204. 7 GwóĨdĨ, 2001, 10. 8 Virilio, 2001, 39-62. 9 see: Heidegger, 1977. 10 Reeves and Nass, 1998, 5. 11 Goáaszewska, 2001, 155-158. 12 Baudrillard, 1995, 75. 13 GwóĨdĨ, 2001, 8. 14 Strinati, 1998, 180. 15 Goban-Klas, 1999, 198. 16 Nichols, 1988, 30. 2
Bibliography Baudrillard, J. (1995), Symbolic Exchange and Death. London: Sage Publications.
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Baudry, J.L. (1975), ‘Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus’, in: Ph. Rosen (ed.) Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology. New York: Columbia University Press. 286-298. Eco, U. (1990), Il superuomo di massa. Retorica e ideologia nel romanzo popolare. Milano: Tascabili Bompiani. Goban-Klas, T. (1999), Media i komunikowanie masowe: teorie i analizy prasy, radia, telewizji i internetu. Warszawa-Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. Goáaszewska, M. Wydawnictwo UJ.
(2001),
Estetyka
wspóáczesnoĞci.
Kraków:
GwóĨdĨ, A. (2001), ‘Przez okno technologii. Wprowadzenie’, in: A. GwóĨdĨ (ed.) Widzieü, myĞleü, byü: technologie mediów. Kraków: Universitas. 7-18. Foucault, M. (1999), Narodziny kliniki. Warszawa: KR. Heidegger, M. (1977), Budowaü, mieszkaü, myĞleü. Eseje wybrane. Warszawa: PIW. Kerckhove, de D. (1995), The Skin of Culture. Investigating the New Electronic Reality. Toronto: Somerville House Publishing. Nichols, B. (1988), ‘The Work of Culture in the Age of Cybernetic Systems’. Screen, 21(1): 22-46. Nycz, R. (1995), Tekstowy Ğwiat: poststrukturalizm a wiedza o literaturze. Warszawa: IBL. Ogonowska, A. (2001), ‘Przemoc w reklamie. Rzecz o represyjnym charakterze reklamy’, in: E. Wilk (ed.) Przemoc ikoniczna czy ‘nowa widzialnoĞü’? Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu ĝląskiego. 140-152. Ogonowska, A. (2003), Edukacja medialna: klucz do rozumienia spoáecznej rzeczywistoĞci. Kraków: Societas Vistulana. Pitrus, A. (2001), ‘Obrazy przemocy czy przemoc obrazów?’, in: E. Wilk (ed.) Przemoc ikoniczna czy ‘nowa widzialnoĞü’? Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu ĝląskiego. 97-104.
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Reeves, B. and Nass, C. (1998), The media equation: how people treat computers, television, and new media like real people and places. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Virilio, P. (2001), ‘Maszyna widzenia’, in: A. GwóĨdĨ (ed.) Widzieü, myĞleü, byü. Technologie mediów. Kraków: Universitas. 39-62. Wilk, E. (2001), Przemoc ikoniczna czyli ‘nowa widzialnoĞü’? Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu ĝląskiego. Woodward, G.C. and Denton, R.E. (1990), Political Communication in America. NY-West Point-Connecticut-London.
Author Affiliation Agnieszka Ogonowska, a psychologist, and cinematologist. She works as an assistant professor at the Institute of Applied Psychology at the Jagiellonian University. Her interests include psychology of the media, theory of the television, education through the media, and advertising. She has written the books: Edukacja medialna. Klucz do rozumienia spoáecznej rzeczywistoĞci (‘Education through the media. A key to understand social reality’), Tekst filmowy we wspólczesnym pejzaĪu kulturowym (‘Film text in the contemporary cultural landscape’), Przemoc ikoniczna (‘Iconic violence’) and Galaktyka po Gutenbergu. ReportaĪ z podróĪy kulturowej (‘Post-Gutenberg galaxy. Notes from the cultural journey’).
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Juvenile Delinquency in Poland: Psycho-Social Conditions Piotr Sáowik and Piotr Passowicz 1.
Introduction.
The decade of the 1990s in Poland was marked by anxiety related to the sense of threat from crime. It appears that the conviction of increasing prevalence of crime was making an ever-wider circle in the Polish society in the period of social-political-cultural transformations after 1989. It may be supposed that the phenomenon was similar to the series of changes that had previously swept through North America and many Western European countries. The analysis presented in this chapter is an attempt at comparison of the present day experience of the problem in Poland with the crime issues in other countries. Particularly interesting is the influence of the transformation period in Poland on the observable increase in threat from crime as juxtaposed with the situation of the countries with a stable social-political situation. It is worthwhile if the reader reflects on the similarities and differences observed in this respect between Poland (before its accession to the EU) and the United States and the European Union countries. Let us have a closer look at the situation in Poland. According to CBOS (Public Opinion Research Centre) survey carried out in 1997, what the Poles feared most was the loss of health, followed closely by the anxiety pertaining to the broadly defined crime. These fears were corroborated by the police statistics indicative of the increasing prevalence of crime as compared to the previous years, especially in relation to so-called “serious” crime, placing health or life at risk. 1 The statistics of the State Police Headquarters are illustrative of the differences in numbers of the committed crimes. Thus the total number of homicides in Poland in 1990 was at 730, whilst in 2002 it was at 1,118. Similarly, the number of car thefts was on the rise - from 5,056 in 1990, to 53,674 in 2002. There were 1,840 rapes reported in 1990, while in 2002 the respective figures were at 2,345. In the year 1990 there were 3 bank robberies, while in 2002 the respective figures were at 88. Particularly distressing was the increased prevalence, and the drastic nature of crime among juveniles. As the statistics of the State Police Headquarters show, the number of crimes committed by under-18s in selected categories was on the rise. 2 By way of illustration, in year 1992 there were 457 reported cases of physical assaults or tussles, whilst the respective figures for the year 2000 were at 1,782, and for 2001 at 1,727. Turning to thefts and robberies, the figures in the year 1992 were at 3,100, only to increase by four times to 12,900 in 2000. The number of crimes resulting in victim’s injuries was decidedly mounting, as in 1992 there
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were 1,306 cases reported, in 2000 there were 3,256, and in 2002 the respective figures were at 2,877 (the past two years saw a slight drop in these figures, yet still they considerably exceed the respective rates of the early 1990s). When it comes to the number of homicides and sexual assaults committed by under-18s in the years of 2001 and 2002, the figures were comparable with those of 1992; and the most marked increase in homicides was observed in the years 1996-1997, and in rapes in 1887. The above-mentioned data refers to under-18s, persons under the age of consent. It should be acknowledged, however, that the term “young people” also encompasses age groups over 18 (in statistical collations crimes committed by persons over 18, fall under the adult category). The increasing prevalence of crime among young people was also observed by Chymuk, who notes that, according to statistical data “(…) delinquency among juveniles (under-18s) and young people (under 24 years of age) is on the steady increase”. 3 Although the analysis of the above data points at the slight decrease in the crime rates among juveniles in the period of 2000-2002, it should be emphasised that the data is paltry, and inadequate for the longterm analysis of the phenomenon, especially if we consider the continuous influence of the psycho-sociological determiners fostering the upward tendencies. In the analysis of the increasing prevalence of crime among young people in Poland (from the psychological perspective) one should remember that it is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. The most salient factors behind the increased prevalence of crime among young people in Poland may be briefly summarised as follows: 1) The processes of social-cultural transformations ensuing from the political changes that prompted such phenomena as implied in changes in value systems, alienation, social anomy, etc. 2) Influence of adults, especially parents, on the developmental process of the young generation. 3) Influence of mass media, which role is particularly significant in the process of personality formation. 4) Criminal justice system (especially its incoherence and inconsistence). 5) Controversies pertaining to the reforms of educational system. 4 The objective of this analysis is to suggest possible psychological influences and solutions of problems that contribute to the increasing prevalence of juvenile delinquency. Also, the chapter will attempt to expound the psycho-sociological conditions of mounting crime rates among young people. Let us now enlarge on the above-mentioned factors.
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2. Identity of young people in the last decade - hazards and challenges. It seems worthwhile to commence the analysis with a discussion of the social and cultural factors of the political transition in Poland after 1989, especially in the context of the formation of young people’s identity and the dynamics thereof. For the present day generation of teenagers and young people in their twenties, the cultural and social context of the 1990s played a formative, and at times a negative, role. We posit that it was the real, and acute crisis of value system that found reverberation in the younger generation. It goes without saying that a collective mind employs certain statements, sentences, pictures, feelings that help us define our identity. These are all the descriptive elements of our generalised experience - characterised by a certain constancy, repetitiveness - that were similar yesterday and today, and that we expect to characterise us in the future. They outline our collective sense of continuity and coherence. 5 The loss of continuity may have been connected with the attempts, as made on a symbolic level, of coming to terms with the past, reviewing the evaluations and the radical changes in the judgmental opinions on the period of 1945-1989. The sense of coherence could have been disturbed by the emotionally flared- up disputes reflecting the deep contention over what was good, and what was bad in the past, what criteria to adopt and where to draw the demarcation line between what was good and what was bad in the past. These processes were further reinforced by the factors connected with the objective cultural transitions, which may be described through three models of culture, as put forward by Margaret Mead. Two considerations seem particularly interesting, namely the reflections on prefigurative and cofigurative cultures. The experience of the young, who have suitably adjusted to the newly arisen social, economic, and cultural conditions, gradually becomes a prevalent experience in the cofigurative culture, where it is at the same time a peer group experience.(…). Cofigurative culture somehow forces one to live in the present moment, detaches the emerging generations from the past as well as from the future, which looks vague and uncertain (…). Prefigurative cultures are such where the
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generation gap appears on the global scale, and at an ever-increasing rate, leading not only to the differences in opinions but to the overt rebellion of the young generation. In both prefigurative and cofigurative cultures people who embody different traditions and cultures converge (which adds to the feeling of the culture being a mixed, not a homogenous, entity). ‘Emigrants in time’, upholding former versions of culture, make their appearance. At the same time, the workings of popular culture homogenise attitudes, comportment, and outlook on the world. The entity of the cultural reality is incoherent, and the ensuing reaction is either the sense of threat and postfigurative zealousness or postfigurative adherence of adults to their own values and the values of the older generations. 6 This entails serious consequences affecting the formation of identity of the young people who, according to CBOS (1998), see themselves as the first generation growing up amidst the chaos of muddled ideas, squabbles (not only ideological), blurred divisions between the right and the wrong. We were not ready for this as there was nobody to prepare us for this. We got lost in this tangle that carries over from the days we only know from the stories of older people. 7 Individual and collective identity alike require delineation on the time scale, with the reference to the past, here and now, and future. The data gathered by CBOS (1998) forms a picture that alarmingly hints at serious deformations. It turned out that on the group level there is no emotional identification with any past-defining narration. The past is subject to denial and thus practically eliminated. The here and now is not agreeable altogether, most likely because of the prevailing sense of threat stemming from the fact that it is imperative now to define self-esteem in relation to one’s success in the competitive and ever fluctuating market, rather than on the basis of stable, and relatively permanent, personality traits, or the reference to absolute values. The most commonly observed phenomenon is one of projections, be it of future, mythical past, or the alternative here and now. Despite its potentially pro-developmental effects, the behaviour of incorporating fantasy into life, i.e. Role Playing Games (entering the world of virtual reality and assuming a role), is an alarming sign of a defensive tendency to escape the exigencies of reality rather than constructively respond to life’s challenges. This form of
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behaviour, in combination with social and cultural factors may lead to dissociation: - on the level of emotional identification; when one remains in their favourite world of fiction, which helps to anesthetise the constant anxiety of failure; - on the cognitive level, which helps to “stay cool”, live carefree and without any commitments, ignore the traditional hierarchies, be one’s own god, create one’s own principles, entertain a sense of not wanting anything and not aspiring to anything. It has to be acknowledged at this point that the above mechanism may be conducive to serious personality disorders, and the consolidation of personality traits such as: - lack of emotional empathy in relations with other people, - instrumental, objective treatment of other people, - temporarily blurred line between reality and fantasy. Moreover, discernible changes in the appreciation of culture may be observed. Notably, young people less frequently attend theatre, philharmonic concerts, museums. Also, literature has lost its appeal to young people. These forms of culture have become supplanted by computer games, which in turn contribute to blurring the line between real life and “virtual reality”. In effect, reality is likely to be perceived as an illusion - not “a real thing”. This situation may be exacerbated by the fact that a preponderance of youngsters live vicariously through the internet and, although closer to the world by getting factual information, they depart from the real experience of real people in real life. 3.
Adults and young people – two cultural worlds.
Further considerations will focus on the role of adults - authority figures - in the formation of a child’s personality. It has to be borne in mind that young people from so-called “pathological families” have always displayed propensity for crime. Currently, however, a new flock of juvenile delinquents has emerged. They come from so-called good (well-off) families; their parents are often engaged in career or money-making and provide their offspring with a high material comfort, while neglecting their emotional needs. Additionally, with the increasing material comfort of many families, children are not stimulated to physical exercise or expected to carry out chores, which gives them more free time, and leaves them with no sensible options of leisure-time activities. In her description of parent-child relationship from the perspective of culture, Barbara Fatyga observes that: the sense of alienation, that has so much afflicted the elderly, with regard to the young generation, stems also
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from the fact that they are not capable any more of engendering their moral imperatives in young people, even in the light of the present day cultural conditions, or sustaining the discourse between the generations. 8 The author rightly contends that “the tendency of young people to decide themselves about their free time and entertainment, without any interference or control of adults, may (and does) favour the emergence of aggressive behaviour”. 9 In other words, free time, together with the natural energy resources at the disposal of a young person may create propitious conditions for crime, e.g. “just for the kicks”. Moreover, sport activities or generally understood recreational pursuits are not “en vogue” among young people. The situation is further aggravated by insufficient promotion of active lifestyle, topped by poor recreational infrastructure. What appears most alarming is the most widespread tendency (…) understood as the diminishing societal control over the young generation at the shrinking sense of societal responsibility for them. This is overtly visible in the reactions of adults to the unacceptable and objectively harmful behaviour of youngsters. Who today will reprimand a primary school pupil smoking a cigarette near school? Or, who will stand up to the bunch of youngsters ‘brawling’ on a public bus?. 10 It is not uncommon for young people from so-called good homes to enter into a role without any inhibitions, and act out a pathological character, e.g. a prostitute or a gangster, only to re-enter the role of a good daughter or son upon returning home. This phenomenon has been corroborated by the research findings - “a substantial body of research and observation shows no discernible differences between ‘the poor’ and ‘the rich’ juveniles who behave aggressively”. 11 In the case of unforeseen difficulties in the real world, damaging the narcissistic sense of strength, causality, and inviolability, a young person may respond with incomprehensible and drastically aggressive behaviour carried over from the world of fantasy, but entailing real victims, possibly even fatalities. This danger is further reinforced by specific relations with authority figures, and the functioning models of career together with the underpinning type of personality, referred to by Erich Fromm as mercantile orientation.
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With regard to authority figures, the findings of CBOS (1998) survey demonstrate that the majority of Polish students in the final classes of secondary schools consider their parents to be good to them, but unwilling to pal around with them. They also wish they had grandparents, as paradoxically enough, the grandparents are considered to be attractive partners for dialogue and the exchange of experience. 12 There is an overtly apparent need for someone who would not only offer support (as according to young people the parents carry out this role quite well) but by their role in the relationship, would constitute a model facilitating the formation and assimilation of a clear, internal hierarchy of values. Without this process - indispensable for the formation of a mature personality - the feeling of loss and insecurity is only aggravated. The frequent occurrence of this has been confirmed by the observations and research by Barbara Skarga: Parents - in the full truism of the statement - fail to devote enough time or attention to their children. As the research findings show, the presently prevailing style of child rearing in families is all too often based on the misconstrued partnership (success at school) and the unwise, and indiscriminate permissiveness. 13 The cause of the diminished position of the older generation may carry over from polarised cultural patterns in which the generations grew up: In my opinion – notes Skarga - it was the propaganda of success that proved detrimental to the confidence of the older generation in relation to the younger one; a success may be the domain of the ‘young, attractive and creative’, while the older, burdened with the legacy of the People’s Republic of Poland, have no right to it. Too frequently, however the success is fuelled by amphetamine, based on moral relativism or even a transgression of law. (..) In effect, two social worlds emerge: the grown-ups and the young. Doomed to a compulsory cohabitation in a shared space, they, nonetheless, differ in their outlook on the world, lifestyles, leisure activities and the forms of ludicity preferred by the young. 14
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Analysing the patterns of young people’s careers, presently functioning in Poland, it seems worthwhile to relate them to the previously mentioned mercantile orientation, as the two characteristics complement each other in an alarming fashion. This orientation - tied with the mechanisms of the contemporary market of impersonal demand translates a value into a trade exchangeable idea. This holds true for a person who subsequently considers himself or herself as a mercantile good set for a sale - of an exchangeable value, rather than a transcendental entity above all social order. 15 It is imperative in such a context to be a man of success, to plan a career from early childhood in the spirit of “being cool”. The focus on achieving a maximum of pleasure in life is de rigueur. However, this is not a kind of pleasure that can be drawn from self-realisation, but rather a game: taking on a role of a stroller in the street full of supermarkets, rigorously sculpting one’s body in accordance with the prevailing cannon of beauty only to make it into a machine capable of absorbing and consuming the highest possible portions of pleasure. Concurrently, the spiritual role models are perceived as unappealing. Perfecting one’s personality appears practically futile, as it leads to a real individuality that is not compatible with the mercantile logic. In consequence, the specific status quo of the period elicited new attitude to money, widely adopted by the whole generation of the transformation time. It was reflected in marginalisation of all so-called “ethos groups”, be it Catholic youth movements or punk communes. In line with this logic, knowledge is regarded as a ticket to financial gain. What emerges is a character of the so-called market player. Who is this player in the game of market success? It is a person with the disturbed sense of self-identity, with no awareness of his or her authentic power, or deepest individual desires. This person dismisses personal self-realisation but puts a stake on a success in the game of purchase and sale of what is in demand at a given moment. “I am what sells best in me” - such a person could say and thus encapsulate the neglect of the real inner “Self”. The truth, arrived at by a thorough study of phenomena, seems pointless as the mercantile ends require only a shallow understanding that would allow an effective manipulation of the objects of cognition. 4.
The influence and the role of media.
Another important consideration relates to the ever-increasing influence of mass media on young people, as corroborated by a vast body of research. The studies on the influence of media violence led to the emergence of psychological theories of the impact of violence on behaviour, knowledge, emotions, attitudes, and the value system of the viewers. These theories break down into three or four groups. The first one comprises theories premised on the classic conditioning of Ivan Pavlov,
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e.g. theories of desensitisation. The second group includes the social theories of learning, drawing on the modelling and emulation processes. The third category encompasses cognitive theories, which refer to, among others, the notion of identification. In the case of the last two theories, we may talk about stimulation. There are also theories of catharsis. The theories of desensitisation posit that watching violent scenes on TV, especially in the atmosphere of relaxation, desensitises the viewer to the violence. In other words, the repeated exposition to the scenes of violence in mass media makes the viewers accustomed to this kind of stimuli, subsequently diminishing the accompanying feeling of psychological discomfort. The theories of modelling imply that the viewer - symbolically or literally - copies behaviour of a model, emulates the behaviour previously seen on the TV screen. The research of Turner and Berkowitz make it clear that observing other people behaving aggressively can increase the likelihood of aggressive behaviour of the viewer. 16 Last, but not least, the theories of catharsis hold that watching the scenes of sexual assault and violence has a purgative effect on the viewers, reducing their aggressive tendencies as observation of the externalised behaviour serves to weaken their own impulses. Generally speaking, the overall majority of academics subscribe to the view that the content of the media affects young people negatively. 17 Films featuring scenes of terror and violence incite young people to aggressive behaviour. According to Kenrick et al. the analysis of the research findings in the realm of aggression in the media leads to the conclusion that the pictures of violence in the media incite aggressive behaviour of children and adolescents in their contacts with strangers and acquaintances. 18 In a similar vein, the research of Braun-Gaákowska and Ulfik bears out the view that children are prone to aggression if exposed to scenes of violence on TV. 19 “By presenting a myriad of different aggressive behaviours, the television influences all aspects of attitudes towards others - their cognitive, emotional, and behavioural elements”. 20 It has to be acknowledged, though, that the influence of media correlates with multiple factors. Let us concentrate on some research findings in question. Many of the studies were carried out many years ago - which only serves to better illustrate the processes we experience today. They provide a much wider perspective for the processes of changes that we witness today as well as help us avoid making the same mistakes. A. Research review. It has been proved - Danecki elaborates on this point - that children were observant of aggression even when the film actually led to the conclusion that aggression does not pay. 21 Danecki also notes that the more frequently were the children exposed to televised aggression, the
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more willing they were to watch television, which in turn proved detrimental to their general intellectual development. On other hand when watching the programmes of violent content, older children and teenagers are attentive of characters’ motivation and the outcome of the observed scenes, as well as participate in the action, and pass judgements on the characters’ demeanour. It may imply that the more scenes of aggression the older children and teenagers watch, the more likely they are to adopt an aggressive attitude towards their environment. It has also been proved - Werwicki elaborates on this point - that certain reactions and attitudes of viewers remain vibrant even after the termination of the viewing. 22 It was also observed that young viewers tend to adopt the televised patterns, which affect their appearance and comportment as well as permeate fashion, and the content of entertainment for children and adolescents. 23 The more significant and appealing is the model the more apparent its adoption. The acquisition of aggressive behaviour was analysed by Bandura and Walters, who concluded that the children involved in their study internalised not only the observed behaviour but also the norm relating to this form of reaction. 24 “Consolidation of behaviour acquired through emulation may lead to the future inclination to respond with similar behaviour to various social contexts”. 25 This is consistent with the evidence put forward with Putkowska. 26 It is worthwhile to mention the interesting research of Kenny and Neale who found that there is a correlation between viewing programmes imbued with violence by 9-year old boys and their aggressive behaviour at the age of 19. 27 Other researchers of the problem posit that it is connected with the formation of the habit of aggression, and note further that aggression of 19-year olds may be more accurately predicted on the basis of a number of violent and terrifying scenes viewed by them on television than by other variables. This theory was also substantiated by the longitudinal research of Eron, implying a high correlation between the inclination to watch violence on television at the age of 8 years and subsequent aggression at the age of 18. 28 According to Eron, aggressionprone children viewing television programmes of proportionally low aggression content turn out to be less aggressive in 10 years time than the children who did not use to be as aggressive as the first group but who were exposed to violence-packed programmes on television for the period of 10 years. 29 Interesting findings ensued from the study of D.P. Philips. 30 Namely, the violence shown in mass media is conducive to actual aggression in the real world in equal measure as in the previous laboratory research (research on aggression had hitherto been carried out mainly in laboratory conditions). The author presents a first systematic vindication of the fact that violence in mass media directly contributes to the short-
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term, albeit staggering increase in the number of murders committed in the USA. He presents analysis of the research findings, which clearly indicates that further to the live media coverage of heavyweight boxing championships, the murder rate would increase from 12% to 46%. The increase in homicides was proportional to the publicity surrounding the fights. 31 And finally, it should be noted that television may affect a young viewer in other ways. Banaszkiewicz distinguishes two kinds of such influence: cognitive and emotional. 32 The former, helps young people to broaden their horizons, absorb information, norms, patterns of behaviour but only in scanty measure helps them to define and understand reality. The extent of mass media influence depends largely on such factors as life experience of the viewers, their knowledge, mood or contacts with societal environment. Research findings show that those children who already know a lot are more likely to find television programmes educational. Provoking aggression is one of the many types of emotional impact of watching the scenes of violence and terror on television. In effect, it may also be conducive to making the viewers (children and adolescents) accustomed to aggression and therefore more tolerant of its existence. Rounding up a vast body of research, A. Gaákowska notes that viewing violent scenes on television translates into an increase in aggressive behaviour in interpersonal contacts of younger children, and an increase in cruelty among older children. 33 It also transpired that “TV violence” counts among factors behind antisocial and crime-related behaviour among young people. Moreover, young people who are systematically exposed to violence on television, are at risk of developing a fallacious and harmful vision of the world and people. As research evidence demonstrates, they perceive the world to be more precarious a place than it actually is, and violence comes across as the most common and justified method of coping with disputatious and difficult situations. 34 Also observed was the increasing tolerance of violence in real life situations, and the acceptance of aggressive behaviour in everyday interpersonal contacts. Wojciszke asserts that:
The review of several dozen research projects (...) conducted in many countries (also in Poland) indicates that, in principle, the amount of time spent watching
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violence on television correlates with various indicators of violence shown in behaviour. 35 He points, however at the lack of finite evidence that the increase of violence is lasting. Indubitably, even a short-term increase in aggressive behaviour may be conducive to various manifestations of dangerous, criminal behaviour. Wojciszke further notes that relatively feeble (albeit reliable) correlations that came to light in the research could have stemmed from the fact that violence shown hitherto in films was either penalised or proved ineffective in reaching the objectives set out by the perpetrator. 36 Recent years, however, have seen an increase in films featuring violence in the context of obtaining specific profits by the perpetrator who is always immune from punishment. According to Wojciszke, we are on the verge of a real threat from the widespread increase of violence as a result of this cultural change - violence on television begets violence in real life. 37 The role of media (and television in particular) in providing alternative models of behaviour and norms to young people is considerable. In making his or her choices, the viewer may be affected by certain patterns, norms, or attitudes promoted by media. What is particularly consequential is the fact that too often is the viewer unaccompanied when he or she has to make such a choice. In view of the above considerations, it is no surprise that irrespective of their declared individualism, young people - as researched by H. ĝwida-ZiĊba - tend to follow the crowd, parrot other peoples’ opinions (mostly imported from television), do not ask questions, challenge, or doubt.This phenomenon is on the rise. 38 5.
The role of legislative and criminal justice system.
The legislative and criminal justice system in Poland, incoherent, and inconsistently implemented, deserves some consideration in this analysis. Much as the need of its reform is being discussed, the system is thought to be incomplete, excessively liberal, and particularly ineffective in exerting punishment. We do not intend to embark on legal ruminations but would like to point at certain psychological implications of the ineffectual system. It is highly demoralising a situation for a young person in which there is no clear-cut relation between the committed crime and the inevitability of punishment, the lack of it (as it is often the case), or its inadequacy. This situation may be illustrated by an example of football fans (or rather pseudo-fans, if not hooligans or offenders) who systematically incite hooligan excesses and remain practically unpunished. From a psychological point of view, such a situation reinforces (or
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stimulates) criminal behaviour. By attracting attention in this way, young people (and mostly self-conscious adolescents) experience gratification, the sense of self-importance but do not punished in any way. This is only one example of a plethora of, often drastic, unpunished crime. In a similar vein, A. Siemaszko emphasises that in recent years in Poland there has been a colossal increase of the suspended sentence, which practically means that many perpetrators go unpunished and “the lack of expected punishment functions as a reward”. 39 The author notes that Poland has one of the most “lenient penal policies in Europe”. Worse still, the low detectability of crime, or inefficient prevention addressed to young people aged 11-12 (prevention is belated if addressed to older adolescents) only contribute to the increasing prevalence of juvenile delinquency. 6.
Controversies pertaining to the educational reforms.
The analysis of the mounting juvenile delinquency should also include a reflection on the changes in the educational system in Poland. As the issue is vast and complex, we will concentrate only on certain aspects thereof. The social-cultural changes in Poland entailed reforms in the educational system, which was considered to be outdated. First and foremost, the students were subject to too much stress induced by intense competition, overloaded curricula, interpersonal conflicts (also with teachers). 40 This situation gave rise to, among others, postulates of creating schools that would promote “stress-free” teaching style, to “loosen up” discipline, and to abridge hitherto “overloaded” curricula. Some schools would even adopt “no-grades” policy. The proposals regarded mainly so-called social schools, nonetheless a certain “liberalisation” in the teaching styles carried over to state-owned schools. The loosening of discipline and reduction of stress were intended to enhance students’ central role in the education process, to stimulate their imagination and emotional sensitivity - a basis for autonomous, moral attitudes. However, this cannot take place at the expense of diminished level of education. Does not the so-called “stress-free” education actually cover up the teachers’ feeling at a loss, their helplessness, and resignation of responsibility for engendering in students the values and principles, which cannot be propagated single-handedly anymore? In other words, teachers sometimes give up on the process of moulding students’ systems of values and principles out of a certain expediency and instant gratification in the form of a misconstrued “laid back” manner. Notorious is the negligence of the need to engender in students certain rules of “good behaviour”, personal culture, or to develop their emotional intelligence. Teachers turn a blind eye to cases of youthful
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indiscretion (e.g. relating to behaviour in and out of school, culture of language, dress code, etc.). With the view of the above considerations, one would ask if the “stress-free” education actually has a positive effect on students, and whether relieving them of the burden of too much stress would step up their motivation to learn and develop themselves? Research and experience provide evidence to the contrary. The findings of the study conducted further to educational reforms among the students of schools in the USA, demonstrate that the students are complacent and devoid of selfcriticism. 41 Additionally, juvenile delinquency in the U.S.A. is on the rise. By way of comparison, it may be observed that 50 years ago the most serious transgressions of students in the U.S.A. would be speaking without being called on, boisterous behaviour, throwing litter. Nowadays the respective problems would include taking drugs or alcohol, teenaged pregnancy, homicide, rape, mugging, robbery. As D. Goleman observes, the year 1990 (as compared with the period of 20 years earlier) saw a dramatic increase in juvenile arrests for the most serious of crimes (the rates of murders had increased four times, and rapes twofold). 42 There is even talk of so-called “emotional illiteracy” pervading the society of today - more and more young people cannot control their emotions. One should also point at the detrimental effects of educational tendencies. Students are left to their own devices, without appropriate support, which in consequence may lead to more serious suffering than that experienced with the use of old, “repressive” methods of schooling. These tendencies in education are very alarming . 43 The context of these changes is certainly more complex, and carries over to the alterations in the traits of intellectual-cultural formations, pertaining, among others to relative understanding of truth not as a theoretical statement but as a certain moral postulate, whilst the philosophy-based openness is perceived as relativism. 44 What emerges is a dramatic limitation of a wider perspective and splitting it into a myriad of separate, individually perceived perspectives, at the atrophy of vertical dimension, which paves the way for sense and values. 45 It is worth noting that psychological research reveals that a certain level of stimulation, also involving stress, is prerequisite for a proper functioning of a person, and for the better completion of tasks (compare well known Yerkes-Dodson rules). The point is not for the school to engender too much stress in students, though a certain amount of stress is indispensable. It appears also that certain elements of competition are indispensable. On the one hand they serve to boost group dynamics, and on the other hand prepare students for the confrontation with their “adult” life. 46 For the prevention of criminal behaviour to be effective, it must be our primary concern to devote attention to appropriate emotional
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development of students, and to engender systems of values and moral principles in young people. 7.
Conclusions.
This analysis was an attempt to diagnose the causes behind the increasing prevalence of juvenile delinquency in Poland. What emerges is a picture of a serious crisis of identity of young people, pertaining to their social and cultural background, with a clearly marked political context. The manifold factors of the crisis comprise: - Culture-driven feelings of being lost, of lacking roots, hamper formation of mature and balanced personality. This is reinforced by the prevailing propensity for placing emotional needs in the world of fiction, and by the instrumental approach to one’s intellectual resources - a sole prerequisite for successful functioning in the world of fierce, economic competition. - A strong need for authority figures, at the simultaneous lack of appropriate examples to follow. - Potential authority figures belong to other cultures. - Influence of the media on the formation of aggressive-behaviour. Media often overtly promote violence, and foster attitudes of passivity, mindlessness, thus dulling the imagination of young people. - Incoherence and inconsistence of criminal justice system promotes the sense of impunity, and indirectly reinforces aggressive behaviour. - “Not-well-thought-out” reforms of the educational system that does not recognise the necessity of engendering values and moral principles in young people, and often fails to mould their emotional development. All the above-mentioned determinants are mutually reinforcing and do not bode well for the future. We think that in the nearest future, long-term steps will have to be taken in order to address the problems ensuing from the existing crisis as well as to tackle the approaching crisis. We have only briefly discussed some issues of the complex, and multifaceted phenomenon that requires further research. It is our intention to carry on with the research. This social problem is of paramount importance, and calls for cooperation of specialists in various fields. It is imperative that the research evidence pertaining to criminality (along with its specific recommendations) receive attention of decision-makers, and find practical application.
Notes 1 2
GruszczyĔska, 1998, 23; Janicki and Wáadyka, 2003. see: www.kgp.gov.pl/statys/przest.htm.
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Chymuk, 1998, 222. see also: Sáowik and Passowicz, 1998. 5 Grzegoáowska-Klarkowska, 1991, 264-265. 6 Fatyga, 1998, 2. 7 Meller and Flankowska, 1998, 5-6. 8 Fatyga, 1998, 2. 9 Ibid. 3. 10 Ibid. 4. 11 Ibid. 4. 12 Meller and Flankowska, 1998, 5-6. 13 Fatyga, 1998, 2. 14 Ibid. 4. 15 Fromm, 1947, 38-96. 16 see: Turner and Berkowitz, 1972. 17 see: Huesmann, 1982; Turner et al., 1986; Eron et al., 1996. 18 Kenrick, Neuberg, and Cialdini, 2002, 511. 19 Braun-Gaákowska and Ulfik, 2000, 72-74. 20 Ibid. 72. 21 Danecki, 1975, 158. 22 Werwicki, 1976, 91-102. 23 ĩebrowska, 1986, 647-652. 24 see: Bandura and Walters, 1963. 25 Werwicki, 1976, 100. 26 Putkowska, 1980, 196. 27 Kenny, 1972, Neale, 1972; see also: Koblewska, 1977, 128-132. 28 see: Eron, 1982; Warchoá, 1982, 40-49. 29 Warchoá, 1982, 46. 30 Philips, 1983, 560-568. 31 Ibid. 32 Banaszkiewicz, 1981, 162. 33 Gaákowska, 2000, 52. 34 Ibid. 35 Wojciszke, 2002, 362. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Meller and Flankowska, 1998, 5-6. 39 Siemaszko, 2003, 18-19. 40 Meller, 2003. 41 Petry-Mroczkowska, 1993, Szkudlarek, 1992, 21-41; Szkudlarek, 1995, 73-89. 42 Goleman, 1996, 231-232. 43 Sáowik, Passowicz and Wysocka-Pleczyk,1997, 216. 44 Petry-Mroczkowska, 1993. 4
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Passowicz and Sáowik, 1997, 316. Sáowik, Passowicz and Wysocka-Pleczyk, 216.
Bibliography Banaszkiewicz, A. (1981), ‘Z badaĔ szwedzkich nad oddziaáywaniem telewizji na dzieci’. Przekazy i opinie, 3: 161-165. Bandura, A. and Walters, R.H. (1963), Social Learning and Personality Development. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Braun-Gaákowska, M. and Ulfik I. (2000), Zabawa w zabijanie. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krupski i S-ka. Chymuk, M. (1998), ‘PrzestĊpczoĞü i patologie spoáeczne wĞród máodzieĪy’, in: J. KuĨma and Z. Szarota (eds.), Agresja i przemoc we wspóáczesnym Ğwiecie. Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza TexT. 217-229. Danecki, J. (1975), ‘Badania nad wpáywem scen przemocy w telewizji na psychikĊ dzieci’. Przekazy i opinie , 1 , 157-160. Eron, L.D. (1982), ‘Parent-child interaction, television violence, and aggression of children’. American Psychologist, 37, 197-211. Eron, L.D., Huesmann, L.R., Lefkowitz, M.M. and Walder, L.O. (1996), ‘Does television violence cause aggression?’, in: D.F. Greenberg (ed.) Criminal careers. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited. 311-321. Fatyga, B. (1998), Ekspertyza. Zapobieganie i Przeciwdziaáanie Przemocy RówieĞniczej w szkoáach i Ğrodowiskach lokalnych. Rozwiązania modelowe. (7.12.1998). Fromm, E. (1947), Man for Himself. New York: Rinehart and Co. Gaákowska, A. (2000), ‘Oddziaáywanie telewizyjnych obrazów przemocy w Ğwietle literatury’, in: M. Braun-Gaákowska and I. Ulfik (eds.) Zabawa w zabijanie. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krupski i S-ka. 32-53. Goleman, D. (1996), Emotional Intelligence. Bloomsbury: London.
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GruszczyĔska, B. (1998), ‘PrzestĊpczoĞü w Polsce w okresie transformacji w Ğwietle danych statystycznych’, in: J. Widacki and J. Czapska (eds.) Bezpieczny obywatel - bezpieczne paĔstwo. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL. 23-32. Grzegoáowska-Klarkowska, H. (1991), ‘Samoobrona przez samooszukiwanie siĊ’, in: M. Kofta and T. Szustrowa, (eds.), Záudzenia, które pozwalają Īyü. Warszawa: PWN. 257-289. Huesmann, L.R. (1982), ‘Television violence and aggressive behavior’, in: D. Pearly, L. Bouthilet and J. Lazar (eds.) Television and behavior: Vol. 2. Technical Reviews. Washington, DC: National Institute of Mental Health. 220-256. Janicki, H., and Wáadyka, W. (2003), ‘Strachy na lachy’. Polityka, June 7th, 1-16. Kenny, D. A. (1972), ‘Threats to the internal validity of cross-lagged panel inference, as related to “Television violence and child aggression: A follow up study”’, in: G. A. Comstock and E. A. Rubinstein (eds.), Television and Social Behavior. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 136-140. Kenrick, D.T., Neuberg, S.L. and Cialdini, R.B. (2002), Psychologia spoáeczna. Rozwikáane tajemnice. GdaĔsk: GWP. Koblewska, J. (1977), ‘Wpáyw aspoáecznych modeli zachowania ukazywanych w TV na zachowania odbiorców’. Przekazy i opinie, 3: 128132. Meller, M., and Flankowska, J. (1998), ‘Pokolenie Frugo’. Polityka, April 4th, 5-6. Meller, M. (2003), ‘Kres bezstresu’. Polityka, June 7th, 51-55. Neale, J.M. (1972), ‘Comment on “Television Violence and Child Aggression: A Followup Study”’ in: G. A. Comstock and E. A. Rubinstein (eds.), Television and Social Behavior. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 141-148. Passowicz, P. and Sáowik, P. (1997), ‘ZagroĪenia i moĪliwoĞci nowych systemów ksztaácenia dzieci i máodzieĪy - refleksje i propozycje’, in: W.
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Petry-Mroczkowska, J. (1993), pedagogiczne’. Znak, 9: 54- 63.
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Phillips, D.P. (1983), ‘The impact of mass media violence on US homicides’. American Sociological Review, 48: 560-568. Pilecka and W. Czajkowski (eds.) Prace Psychologiczne, Rocznik Naukowo-Dydaktyczny. Kraków: Wydawnictwo WSP. 315-320. Putkowska, J. (1980), ‘Sceny przemocy w telewizji a agresywnoĞü odbiorców’. Przekazy i opinie, 2: 193-197. Siemaszko, A. (2003), ‘My nie zgáaszamy, oni nie Ğcigają’. Gazeta Wyborcza, June 27th, 18-19. Sáowik, P., Passowicz, P. and Wysocka-Pleczyk, M. (1997), ‘Nowe systemy edukacyjne w Polsce - nadzieje czy obawy’, in: W. Pilecka and M. KliĞ. (eds.) Funkcje psychologii w dobie przemian spoáecznokulturowych w Polsce. Kraków: Wydawnictwo WSP. 215-220. Sáowik, P. and Passowicz, P. (1998), ‘Psychospoáeczne uwarunkowania wzrostu przestĊpczoĞci wĞród máodzieĪy w Polsce’, in: J. KuĨma and Z. Szarota. (eds.) Agresja i przemoc we wspóáczesnym Ğwiecie. Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza TexT. 238-248. Szkudlarek, T. (1992), ‘Postmodernistyczna pedagogia: amerykaĔska edukacja wobec wyzwaĔ kulturowego przeáomu’, in: B. ĝliwerski (ed.) Edukacja Alternatywna. Dylematy teorii i praktyki. Kraków: Impuls. 2141. Szkudlarek, T. (ed.) (1995), RóĪnica, toĪsamoĞü, edukacja: szkice z pogranicza. Kraków: Impuls. Turner, C.W. and Berkowitz, L. (1972), ‘Identification with Film Aggressor (Covert Role Taking) and Reactions to Film Violence’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21: 256-264. Turner, C.W., Hesse, B.W. and Peterson-Lewis, S. (1986), ‘Naturalistic studies of the long-term effects of television violence’. Journal of Social Issues, 42(3): 51-74. Warchoá, K. (1982), ‘Przemoc w Ğrodkach komunikowania masowego oddziaáywanie i metody badania’. Przekazy i opinie, 1: 40-49.
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Werwicki, M. (1976), ‘Wpáyw filmowych scen okrucieĔstwa i grozy na niektóre sfery osobowoĞci odbiorców’. Przekazy i opinie, 1: 91-102. Wojciszke, B. (2002), Czáowiek wĞród ludzi. Zarys psychologii spoáecznej. Warszawa: Scholar. ĩebrowska, M. (ed.) (1986), Psychologia rozwojowa dzieci i máodzieĪy. Warszawa: PWN.
Author’s Affiliation Dr Piotr Sáowik works at the Institute of Applied Psychology at the Jagiellonian University. He specialises in clinical psychology, psychology of health, individual and social psychopathology. He has published 27 academic articles, and has given over 40 academic speeches at conferences in Poland, and abroad. He is affiliated to several academic societies. Dr Piotr Passowicz works as a research assistant at the Institute of Applied Psychology at the Jagiellonian University. His areas of study focus on social-clinical psychology, crisis intervention, and education on an academic level, with the use of drama in particular. His main publications include: WieloznacznoĞü postrzegania ofiar przemocy wyzwaniem dla interwenta (‘Victims of violence. Social perception as a challenge for crisis intervention worker’), Psychospoáeczne uwarunkowania wzrostu przestĊpczoĞci máodzieĪy w Polsce (‘Psychological-social conditions of the increase in juvenile delinquency in Poland’) and Rola dramy w ksztaátowaniu modelowej postawy wobec ofiar gwaátu (‘Role of drama in shaping constructive attitudes towards victims of violence’).
Young People and Police Officers in French Poor Suburbs: The Social Construction of a Conflict 1 Christian Mouhanna The figure of young people, especially young urban men belonging to ethnic minorities, is often seen as a source of easy explanation for the crisis of the French poor suburbs. 2 Therefore, these young people are the main target of all policies trying to face the crisis, whether they emphasize repression or prevention. Both local disorders and urban riots are associated with this image of juvenile delinquency. The presence of young people in the streets is often enough to bring up fear -be justified or not - among the inhabitants of these suburbs. All the institutions that have to work in this type of area dominated by these young people cannot work properly. The legitimacy of their interventions is often disputed and the civil servants belonging to these institutions are regarded as unwelcome outsiders. 3 One of the most criticized institutions is the Police. Instead of being considered as a source of conflict resolution, the Police are often regarded as part of the conflict. For the young people who live in these areas, police officers are a “gang” among others gangs, disputing their territories. In their day-to-day life, they face stress, insults or stone throws. Besides, other public utilities now have to face the same problems. Bus drivers, power companies, or even fire brigades are afraid of interactions with these young people. The employees of these institutions are deeply affected by the situation. They think they provide public welfare in areas where there is a lack of access to employment or to market economy. For example, people there need public transportation because they don’t have cars. But at the same time, instead of being welcomed, these employees feel rejected. And among all people, the teenagers are those who seem to have the most dangerous attitude. They are “the problem”. If these fears are not ill-founded, and if their demand for more safety is legitimate, one question remains: the way these employees are using the argument of the youth as an explanation to all their problem undoubtedly is a fine matter for social sciences, even if these people, most of them civil servants, deny the right for an observer to investigate this question from a neutral point of view. For them, most of the young people who live in the poor suburbs are enemies. Therefore there is no need to try to understand them. Yet the trouble is that, interviewing these young people, one will find the same kind of opinions about the civil servants working in these areas, who are described as enemies. They are said to be taking advantage
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of their discretionary power, in order to deny these young people access to public utilities, or to be provoking them. The cross examination of the discourse from both sides shows an increasing use of a vocabulary martial and full of hatred. Public institutions are speaking of “pacification”, “offensive”, “reconquest”. It looks as though they did not have customers in these areas any longer, but only enemies. Similarly, these institutions now systematically register all complaints from their employees, whether they deal with serious incidents or with insults, graffiti or alleged disorders. Even the smallest incident is recorded, increasing the global level of fear among their employees. Our goal is to take a closer look to both sides, on the one hand young people, and on the other these employees - especially police officers - in order to examine to what extend the conflicts are not only the result of psychological matters, but also the result of a local social system. Instead of building trust, interactions between youngsters and public utilities staff produce a downard spiral of hatred and violence. 1.
Relationships between Police and youth: gang versus gang?
It is obvious that the Police are the most criticized and hated institutions in these areas. One could explain this phenomenon through the need to restore authority, which is incumbent upon the police and that the youth are supposed to refuse. But observations and interviews show the reasons that account for the conflict are both more complex and simpler. They are more complex, insofar as there are several causes to explain this conflict, and because this conflict is a result of an increasing crisis. There are also simpler, because simple facts often trigger these crises. A. The police officers: living with fear. Concerning the police officers, the first element to notice is the fear police officer feel when they enter poor and violent areas. They are very reluctant to speak about this point, which undermine the brand image of the cop. But in fact, they have to face severe blows to their integrity everyday. In some districts, police officer in uniforms are insulted, they are victims of spittle, or even of stone throws. They feel people there don’t respect them at all. Thus they respond using the same kind of contempt. And what is worst, they feel they can’t get anything under control. The result of this fear is that police officers have one priority: protecting themselves. Driving cars, they close the windows; they avoid stopping more than a few minutes at the same place. They often refuse to do foot patrols, and when they are to do so, they try to keep off the most dangerous areas. Besides, they are far from being ready to speak with anyone, especially young people. These remarks could be taken as
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anecdotal, but they are a first explanation for the lack of “normal” interactions between police officers and other people. A second kind of fear must be related to the consequences of an “incident” due to police misconduct, which could occur anytime in such a tense environment. A lot of police officers prefer avoiding loading their guns, because of the risk of killing someone in a panic. Apart from ethic or moral reasons, this kind of problem could have at least two negative consequences for the police officer. On the one hand, he will have to intervene later in the same district: regarded as a criminal, he will have to face the threat of retaliation. On the other hand, he will have to justify his conduct in front of his chiefs and in front of the justice. On these accounts, police officers try to avoid contacts with people who might represent a risk of conflict. The third kind of fear is less known, but it is clearly claimed by police officers themselves: this fear comes from inside their own organization. As they work in a hierarchical organization, they are expected to obey the orders they get from their chiefs. In fact, they have to apply the law. But at the same time, they have to avoid crisis due to their operations. Police misconduct, but also excessive use of control or inappropriate behaviour could cause local riots involving hundreds of teenagers. These events are likely to disturb the hierarchy. In this case, police officers could be blamed for having been too inflexible and not comprehensive enough. On other occasions the same chiefs could reproach their police officers working in the streets with being too flexible and too liberal regarding the rules they have to apply. Especially when they are in favour of a zero tolerance policy, these authorities imagine all offences should be recorded. They refuse to understand how strong the social pressure is in these areas, or they are not able to do so because of their lack of street level experience. Therefore, police officers are in a very ambiguous position in their relationships with their chiefs, because they have to conciliate these contradictory prescriptions: being lenient with young people in order to avoid riots, and yet being tough enough to deter them from committing offences. Without clear guidelines in their everyday work, the police officer feels extremely insecure from a formal point of view. All these three sources of fear are likely to be more pronounced in France, because of the organization of police services. In the French case, the police are not a local force, but a national one. That means police officers are recruited on a national basis. Most of them come from small cities with no second - generation immigrants out any immigrant or from middle class with a law immigration rate. The consequences of this situation are manifold. First, these police officers are not used to living in poor areas with urban culture which is a mix of various influences: the
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popular culture of poor districts, cultures from different countries the parents or the grand parents came from as well as the influence of American ghettos. They often are not able to understand the behaviour or the language of these young people they have to face. Secondly, these police officers don’t have any desire to spend their entire career in these districts with such a high level of risks. After one or two years there or less if possible, they ask for a new place to work in. So they are not really involved in the life of the district, and they don’t spent enough time there to really get to know the people’s needs or demands. Thirdly, because of this system, one will find only very young and very inexperienced police officers in these places where police work is the hardest and the more complex. Finally, they cannot understand why, although police is a public service aimed at protecting people, they are rejected by the population. Therefore, the first demand of a new officer arriving in such districts is to leave for another place. As a result of these individual choices, there are no experienced police officers working in these districts. 4 Regarding all the contradictions inside the police institution, the problem is that the police officer in the street is in a very uncomfortable position. He cannot be too aggressive, because it could be dangerous for himself and for his career. And he cannot be too lenient, because of the hierarchy and because, at any rate, it won’t prevent him from being injured. Among all police officers, the ones who feel the best are those who are in special riot units. They are not involved in prevention, they are not considered as responsible for misconduct, because they are the task force of repression. Therefore, although these units are said to be the most dangerous, they attract a lot of police officers. As a result of this structure, one could observe that police officers don’t know anybody in these poor districts, apart from the most visible criminals. They are not able to know exactly who is a “bad guy” and who is in favour of the police. They are not able to get any “unofficial” information from the inhabitants. They don’t even understand them, what they want and why they act in such a way. Confronted to these unattractive conditions, their only goal is to leave the place for a quieter place. And during their time in this district, they have to endure a lot of frustrations, leading them to be aggressive on occasions, insulting and sometimes violent. They act as if they were another gang in the district, when they should be the symbol of law and order. B. The Police actions viewed by the public. Our goal is now to identify the opinions that people express on the police. Among the inhabitants, they are several positions on this subject, but a lot of them feel that the police are not present enough and at
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the same time, that they are also too present. 5 Any observations and interviews can explain this paradox. The first point is the lack of police in these poor districts. All the inhabitants agree that police officers are rarely on duty when they are needed. When there is an emergency call, they have to wait a long time before a police patrol arrives. And in several cases, it never got there. Looking at the police organization, it is an easy task to explain why there are not enough answers to these demands. We have already discussed the policemen’s fears. Before protecting the population, their first priority is to protect themselves. When there is a call asking for an intervention in this kind of place, most police officers are reluctant to go there with no guarantee. Therefore, they ask the police station operator to check on the caller’s identity, in order to make sure that the call is not a trap or a joke. Then, even when the caller is identified, they wait until two or three car patrols are available to come along with them. All these operations take a lot of time, which is intolerable; especially in case of an emergency. That is why the police always appear to be too late and inefficient. Another cause of this lack of responsiveness lies in the fact that a lot of police officers despise this kind of population. They are not involved in their problems of neighbourhood conflicts or family crises, which are considered by the police as normal in such an environment. These people, and especially the young ones, are said to be the source of delinquency. From a police officer’s point of view, it’s hard to imagine these people as victims, even if they are in fact the most victimized people among all types of populations. 6 Police officers generally hold that these people are not cooperative because they hate the principle of policing or because they are afraid of retaliation if they give away drug dealers or others criminals. This opinion is far from being wrong, but it hides another reason; a lot of people would rather not cooperate because they don’t trust the police. They are reluctant to lodge a complaint at the Police station, as they believe they would rather be regarded as suspects than as victims. The inhabitants also feel the lack of presence when the Police patrols are in the district. We have already described the reasons that lead police officers to protect themselves. The consequence of this priority -self protection- is that they are not approachable. They cross the poor districts too quickly to be called by anybody. They mistrust the people approaching their cars. A lot of people talk about police officers “shut up in their cars”. The second part of the paradox refers to police interventions, and explains the gap between police actions and people’s demands to the police. To make it simple, there are two kinds of policing in these districts, during quiet times and in time of crisis. First, when the district is peaceful, the police patrols that are called to answer an emergency call get there after a while. Most of emergency calls are not blood crimes; they have to
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do with family violence, neighbourhood conflicts or noise pollution. In the mind of police officers, these kinds of problems are not important, because they don’t refer to “big crimes”, or to the struggle against the evil. These problems are more complex, and the police officer has no tools to solve them. The only thing he can do is to order the people to be quiet and to threaten them to arrest them if they refuse. That is why, in many cases, people in conflict turn together against the police officer. But the worst of it all for people are repeated police interventions with no solution. There are a lot of cases of men beating their wife or children, or of young people disturbing the life of a entire building, and no real answer by the police. Police officers seem to be waiting for the husband to kill his wife, or for young people to become out of control. That is to say that the police are only able to act when the things have become severe, which often means too late. The second kind of intervention takes place in time of crisis, i.e. urban riots, assault on police cars, or violent crimes. After such events, the chiefs send in the place a unit specialized in riots, with a high number of cars and officers wearing defense suits. On such occasions, the police can be seen everywhere, on every street corner. Anyone entering the area is inspected, even ten times in a single day. At that time the feeling among the population is that there are too many police officers in their district. They think they can’t live a “normal life”. Furthermore, these operations look inefficient, because they only take place in a short-term period, and because they don’t solve any of the problems there. Looking for the long - term efficiency of the police forces, the inhabitants don’t understand the logic of their action. They don’t really seem to have an efficient strategy. Periods of high level of control and periods of police withdrawal alternate which are not related to the citizens’ level of fear. Both the population and the police feel they live in a place where violence and conflict between both sides could appear anytime. One could notice that all these mechanisms lead to a catch 22 situation: the less the population trusts the police, the less the police can get information and contacts from this population, and the less the police understand the population and feel secure themselves. Therefore the police has less and fewer relationships with the population, who has lost trust in the police. In order to act in such places, police officers prefer to define their own goals. And the young inhabitant of this area has become the target for this kind of local strategy, at least for three reasons. First, the image of the young urban man living in these poor districts squares to the police officers’ view of a delinquent. He is young, which makes him “naturally” reluctant to follow the rules. He comes from a poor area; therefore he is likely to commit crimes in order to get money. He was born in a foreign culture, with different rules, so he has to be confronted to “our” laws. Our
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aim is not to say whether they are wrong or not. But it is obvious that police officers themselves prefer to avoid these kinds of questions. Second, these people do not benefit from a social network which could help them in case of problems with the police forces. Most “normal” citizen can appeal to someone in the city council or a friend working inside the police forces in order to make an arrangement with the police. This can’t be the case for the young people with no social relationship and with a bad image. We don’t want to imply that the police systematically arrest innocent young people, or that the police are responsible for juvenile delinquency, which has many other causes. But what is sure in any case, is the fact that the police are involved in the social construction of the image of young people as criminals, in a process of “stigmatization”. As far as the bad image of the police is concerned, one last explanation leads to the policy of policing. For the police chiefs, and for local or national governments, the most important priority is not always the satisfaction of the population in these poor districts, but the results they can present to the media. They lay the stress on good figures in terms of criminality rates or clearance rates. Police officers are expected to provide quick and important results from that point of view. In some places, they refuse to take complaints into account, in order to maintain a low rate of crime. Regarding repression, they prefer to arrest a lot of small drug dealers or consumers rather than a big dealer after several months of investigations, because it provides them with a good clearance rate. In the eyes of the young people confronted to such policies, that means it is better to be a big dealer or a burglar rather than a noisy band of young men standing in the streets or in buildings entrances. Considered as inefficient, racist, violent, unfair, the police is not welcomed in these areas. As we have shown in the previous paragraphs, the police officers’ fear and incomprehension is one part of the mechanism. We can now understand how the other side - the young people - acts and reacts. They are also afraid of the police’s reactions, which can be very violent, insofar as police officers themselves are victims of fear. The interviews of both police officers and young men show troublesome similar attitudes. Each party tries to protect itself in being aggressive and in refusing to understand the other party’s situation. Mistrust, imagination and hatred are the common way of exchanging between the both sides. For a lot of people, the police are only one gang among others. 2.
The failure of other kinds of policing.
This gap between the Police and the population, especially in these poor areas, was identified in France a while ago. 7 National
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governments and some police chiefs have tried to give an answer to this “state of war” by promoting different ways of policing. For twenty years, several programs have tried to change the nature of the relationships. These decisions were hard to apply, mostly because the police officers refused to follow the prescriptions, and partly because of the lack of clear guidelines from the authorities. The most important idea to be noticed is the reluctance of the whole organization to accept policies that try to build a police that would be more open to the citizens. During the 1980’s and the 1990’s, after several urban riots, the French governments enacted several reforms in order to reduce the tensions between the police and young people from poor districts. Police officers were invited to favour news priorities, to walk in the streets and to discuss with the population, to take part in prevention, to be involved in local meetings with the inhabitants. They were asked to change the image of the police. Fear and force should have been replaced by discussion and trust. A. A lack of commitment. But this resolution often didn’t lead on to concrete actions. A lot of police officers were too skeptical, because they thought the people living there were not able to act as normal people. They were also afraid of being on foot patrols in dangerous areas, where they could be injured. A lot of police chiefs reported they had changed their strategies by improving prevention, but in fact the so-called “new” police officers were not sent to the meetings, or were still judged on the rates of people arrested. Most of them were still doing the same things the same way. If the main problem is the culture of the police officers, one must say that the structure in which they work is still not ready to encourage them to change: why? First, we have to consider that we are in a very hierarchical organization. But that doesn’t mean that the chiefs can control their officers. 8 Most of the time, police officers are alone, or only with a colleague, in the streets. He is far from his chief’s eyes. 9 Therefore he can use his discretionary latitude to choose his own strategy. In order to try to have a better control on her troops, the answer of the hierarchy is to force them to produce “good statistics”, i.e. a minimum number of arrests or of parking tickets. But no one is able to produce figures concerning prevention. Second, if the priority is to provide a better service to the population and to answer her demands, the chiefs no longer are the only source of power. Police officers could argue that the chief’s orders are not relevant regarding the public demand. It’s not a surprise to notice that the chiefs were not very enthusiastic to open their service to the public. In the
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French national police system, the chief’s legitimacy does not come from the citizens, but from the ministry for Home affairs. In spite of all these problems, a minority of police officers have tried to overcome the conflicts and to establish new kinds of relationship with young people. Some of them were involved in sports; others attended various meetings with young and older people, explaining the rules and police actions. But these officers were not able to create a better climate between the police and the population. If they succeeded in establishing new ties between them and some people, they have become marginals in their own institution. Instead of using these improved relations to produce a new form of policing, other police officers considered them as traitors, especially when they were able to establish long-term contacts with the teenagers from these poor districts. Walking in the streets, the police officers involved in their district aren’t so much afraid of the population. Among the inhabitants, they can make a difference between dangerous people and the others who are in favour of the police. Even with the juvenile delinquents, they are less aggressive on the one hand, because they know they have to stay a long time in the same district. On the other hand they are not as scared, because they are able to identify the young man who is likely to insult them or throw them stones. In that sense, the young people are less protected by the anonymity that they used to know with other police officers. One could even notice that in some cases, the “new” police officer can negotiate with groups of young people ready to provoke a riot. But doing so - speaking or playing football with these young people - the “new” police officers arouse hostility from their peers. The former show the formers that another kind of policing is possible, with less fear, and more discussion. Facing these changes, the old style police officers are not ready to accept such obvious facts and to change their attitude. They are in a situation of cognitive dissonance. 10 Although the discourse of the police corpse is based on a logic of war, and not on negotiation, some police officers show the feasibility of another strategy. But, in order to reach this goal of a new perception of the police, they have to reduce their autonomy and to accept a new control upon their work: the control of the inhabitants. Therefore, the more conservative police officers will make everything to prove the inefficiency of these new strategies. 11 Whenever the more open police officers try to develop new relations with young people, or with inhabitants unions, the other reinforce police checks and repressive measures. Even if the police chief officers do not support such reactions, they let old police officers act that way, because they are not able to stop them, and because they don’t want to do so.
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B. The denial of accountability. There are two attitudes among the police officers. A minority is aware of the weaknesses of their institution, and tries to improve this situation in using the chances that the reforms provide them with. But a majority, including the police chiefs until the highest level, prefer not to follow this movement, or even try to check any evolution. The main point to emphasize is the lack of accountability that characterizes the French police. Although police officers are civil servants, and although they belong to a public service, they refuse any criticism or even any comment on their actions. The defense of the corpse prevails, and those who don’t accept this rule become marginal in the organization. In the richest districts, this weakness is counterbalanced by a greater leniency and by the inhabitants ability to find a solution through their social network. They are also able to appeal to lawyers in order to denounce police misconduct. But in the poorest ones, there is no obvious way of protesting against the police behaviour or of expressing the demands. The only thing people can do to claim their rights is to refuse their cooperation with the police, or in the worth case, to insult police officers, to throw stones at them or to organize riots. Our purpose is not to ascribe the causes of marginalization and delinquency to the Police. Such an explanation for a complex phenomenon would be too simple and too biased. Our goal rather is to understand whether the police are actually helping to appease tensions in these districts in crisis, or if it is an element of stigmatization and social exclusion. The lack of dialogue and the logic of control are likely to be linked to the perception of an unfair and unavailable police force, which seems to be acting for itself, and not for the public who needs it. Instead of being a tool of justice, the police are considered as a source of disorder. Even if it is not the only possible way to claim a demand, for young people without any other means to express what they feel, violence is also an answer to what appears to be a denial of justice and efficiency. One could quickly misinterpret our worlds, which are certainly not a condemnation of repression and legal punishment. To preach only prevention would lead to nonsense. The repressive action of the police is undoubtedly indispensable. It is also claimed by the people who live in these poor districts. But the inhabitants ask for a repression with precise targets, and not global and blind action which rather seems to reflect a lack of a real policy than an elaborate strategy. The problem is that if the police want to choose surgical strikes instead of a global policy of control and suspicion, police officers have to be involved in community life and to accept to play a social part. But most of them are not prepared to do so, because it is hard and hazardous work, and because they face fear and mistrust. What we have tried to explain is
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that social pathology is not only the result of individual psychology, but also the result of a social system in which not only young people but also institutions do not always follow the rules.
Notes 1
This article is based on several field works we have made on this subject. See bibliography. 2 Lazerges and Balduyck, 1998, 17-22. 3 Mouhanna, 2000, 95-110. 4 Monjardet, 1996. 5 Ibid. 6 Bidermann, 1967; Skogan, 1987, 135-154. 7 Peyrefitte, 1977. 8 Crozier and Friedberg, 1977. 9 Lipsky, 1980. 10 Festinger, 1957. 11 Merton, 1945, 193-210.
Bibliography Bidermann, A. D. (1967), Report on a Pilot Study in the District of Columbia on Victimization and Attitudes towards Law Enfrocement, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office. Crozier, M. and Friedberg E. (1977), L'acteur et le système. Paris: Le Seuil. Faivre, J-L. (1993), ‘Ce que fait la police: le travail des policiers en tenue dans un commissariat central parisien’, in: W. Ackermann (ed.) Police, Justice, Prison, trois études de cas. Paris: L'Harmattan. Festinger, L. (1957), Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston: Rox Peterson. Gleizal, J-J. (1985), Le désordre policier. Paris: PUF. Goldstein, H. (1990), Problem oriented policing. New York: McGrawHill.
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Kelling, G. L., and Coles C. M., (1996), Fixing broken windows. New York: The Free Press. Lazerges, C. and Balduyck, J-P. (1998), Mission interministérielle sur la prévention et le traitement de la délinquance des mineurs, Réponses à la délinquance des mineurs, rapport au premier ministre. Paris: La documentation française. Lipsky, M. (1980), Street-level bureaucracy: dilemmas of the individual in public services. New York: Basic Books. Merton, R. K. (1945), ‘Self fulfilling prophecy’. Antioch Review, 8: 193210. Monjardet, D. (1994), ‘La culture professionnelle des policiers’. Revue Française de Sociologie, 35(3): 393-411. Monjardet, D. (1996), Ce que fait la Police, sociologie de la force publique. Paris: La Découverte. Mouhanna, C. (1991), Étude sur l'expérience d'îlotage à Roubaix. Paris: CSO-IHESI. Mouhanna, C. (1997), Quelles évolutions pour la police de proximité: Montfermeil 1991-96. Paris: CSO-IHESI. Mouhanna, C. (2000), ‘ Les services publics et la question jeune: de la crainte au rejet’, in: F. Bailleau and C. Gorgeon (eds.) Prévention et sécurité, vers un nouvel ordre social? Paris: les éditions de la DIV. 95110. Peyrefitte, A. (1977), Réponses à la violence, rapport du comité d’étude sur la violence, la criminalité et la délinquance. Paris: La documentation française. Skogan, W. G. (1990), Disorder and decline, crime and the spiral of decay in american neighborhood. New York: The Free Press. Skogan, W. G. and Hartnett, S. (1997), Community policing. Chicago style. New York: Oxford University Press. Skogan, W. G. (1987), ‘The Impact of Victimization on Fear ‘, Crime and Delinquency, 33 (1): 135-154.
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Skolnick, J. H. (1966), Justice without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society. New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc.
Author Affiliation Christian Mouhanna is a researcher in Sociology at the Centre de Sociologie des Organisations (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris). His research interests include the Police organization and practices, the relationship between the Police and the population, the criminal justice system and his effects among the population. His most recent books are Peurs sur les villes : vers un populisme punitif à la française? (2004) and Polices judiciaires et magistrats : une affaire de confiance (2001). He is also the author of reports and articles examinig the reforms of the police and the justice in France.
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Collective Behaviour: Psycho-Social Determinants Przemysáaw Piotrowski Racial disturbances, hooligan excesses of football fans, mob lynching, political demonstrations that lead to acts of vandalism. What do these violent events have in common? In social psychology they fall under umbrella term of “collective behaviour”. Groups of people participating in such events “are relatively unorganized yet [...] hold a sense of unity and may work toward similar goals”. 1 Moreover, the above-mentioned situations have another common denominator: they may entail a sequence of changes to the psychological functioning of an individual, such as, among others, a temporary lapse of self-awareness, disappearance of one’s sense of identity, and an increased tendency to engage in deviant activities. Collective behaviour and their consequences are most conspicuous during all kinds of mass-events and political demonstrations. According to the estimates of the State Police Headquarters pertaining to safety levels during mass events in Poland, there were 813 cases of reported collective disturbance of public order in the period of 1998-2002, of which 719 occurred during sport events. 2 Over 800 people sustained injuries as a result (of which 531 were football fans). Also in this period, out of approximately 300,000 policemen commissioned each year to guarantee safety during mass events, 727 sustained injuries (653 during sport events). As for demonstration figures, the police statistics encompass only the period of 2000-2002, in which 1442 public demonstrations (pickets, rallies, etc.) were reported to have taken place in Poland, along with 288 reported cases of collective protest (mainly road blockades), and 86 incidents involving occupation of premises. 1.
Psychological determinants of collective behaviour.
Research on the psychology of collective behaviour has a longstanding tradition. In 1841 Charles MacKay published the book entitled Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, in which he described many examples of group panic and “madness of crowds”. In so doing, the author pointed at the contagious character of irrational attitudes and behaviour that may swiftly permeate society as they tend to be emulated by others. Gustav Le Bon was among the first scholars in Europe to pursue psychology of collective behaviour as an academic subject. His observations and generalisations were expounded in Psychologie des foules. The basic assumption propounded by Le Bon was that there is
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more to a crowd than just a collection of individuals who make it. According to Le Bon the main features of a crowd were as follows: - so-called “automaton”, or turning […] feelings and ideas in an identical direction, - changeability (vulnerability to external influence), - lack of perseverance in seeking objectives, - exaggerated, extreme emotions, - impulsive behaviour, which may be conducive to destructive acts, - lack of tolerance for opinions of out-group , - intellectual level of the crowd is inferior to that of its constituent individuals, - thinking in pictures and ideas, and binding them by simple associations, - suggestibility and proneness to “collective hallucination”. At the same time an individual immersed in crowd was characterised by: a) loss of his or her identity and individuality, disappearance of individual consciousness, b) feeling of impunity and invincibility, c) proneness to suggestion, rather than rational thinking, d) prevalence of unconscious processes over conscious ones, e) compelling urge to fulfil an idea that permeates a crowd. 3 The main psychological mechanism which underpins crowd functioning, according to Le Bon (and also to MacKay), is the contagion, whereby ideas, opinions or emotions may spread to the members of a crowd. Contagion also reflects a crowd’s susceptibility to suggestion and subsequent proneness of individuals to emulate behaviour of others. Turner and Killian, in their classic work Collective behavior expanded on the concept of Le Bon by pointing to the processes behind crowd formation. 4 And thus, for a spontaneous crowd to be formed there are two determinants in the external situation: abruptness and uncertainty. When passers-by form a gathering, prompted by, for example a car accident, the event is exceptional in a sense that it disturbs their daily routine. Under such circumstances the individuals in the crowd are not informed about the causes of the accident and do not know how to respond. Uncertainty and the need for information on the event foster contacts between bystanders. However, communication processes are not unique to spontaneously formed crowds. Startling and confusing situations may also arise at sport competitions. Spectators change their seats in the stand, discuss the chances of winning, comment on the performance or the referee’s decisions. Turner and Killian describe such interaction among the crowd members as milling. By the same token anxiety and excitement that permeate the crowd before a game, precipitated by uncertainty about its result, contribute to individuals’ susceptibility to rumour put in circulation by other spectators. Studies concerned with circulation of
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rumour (as insufficiently justified, unconfirmed information) point at several principles in this respect: - first, along with its circulation a rumour becomes contracted and contains fewer words, - second, along with its circulation a rumour gains on a dramatic expression, even though it contains fewer details, - third, content of a rumour undergoes transformation to match the expectations of the spectators, - fourth, initially conditional information is converted into a statement of certainty. 5 Spreading rumours may precipitate disruption of order during sport games (e.g. rumour that the game has been prearranged), or demonstrations (e.g. corruption allegations) while a person who disseminates such sensational news wins recognition of a crowd and even stands the chance of becoming its leader. Another process inherent in crowd formation is that of symbolisation. It consists in ascribing a certain object with a specific meaning that prompts a particular emotion, be it positive or negative. A positive symbol for fanatic football fans would be that of a team they identify with, whilst a negative one would be associated with a rival team, its supporters, or a referee. In certain cases the process of symbolisation may be long-term and precede the formation of a crowd. Such a “prior symbolisation” may characterise groups of aggressive football supporters and relates to the individual combination of attitudes, which has bearing on the processes of reception and selection of information. Stimuli that do not comply with individual’s attitudes are subsequently blocked and thus a fanatic supporter does not notice fouls by members of “his” team, believes that the rivals have won unfairly, favoured by a referee, etc. As research on spectators’ comportment demonstrates, in certain situations - when a game is particularly dramatic - intragroup dynamics takes on a form of so-called consolidation or emotional amok, as characterised by enhanced concentration of all spectators on the unfolding event, a heightened level of their involvement, emotional arousal, and at a considerable uniformity in reaction mode. 6 In effect, spectators of an exciting match become integrated, and shed the barriers that divide them (e.g. related to age, intellectual or cultivation level). Reduction of interpersonal distance prompts a phenomenon of temporary affiliation. Overcome by strong emotions, an individual is prone to adhere to the group. Joining in with other people “in the same boat” may also help reduce the level of negative emotions (such as fear), while the experience of positive emotions (contentment, eruption of joy) triggers openness and willingness to relate to others. What ensues is the need to assert and justify the intensity of one’s emotions. Consolidation of spectators may be either positive or negative (combined negative feelings of anger, hatred, etc.).
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The effect of sport spectators’ consolidation is determined, among others, by: a wish for a specific game score, sympathy or antipathy towards a particular player or team, performance against the rules, appearance of “stars”, drama, or a superior level of the game. 7 Another term used in relation to collective behaviour is that of deindividuation - a subjective state of a loss of self-awareness. According to Aronson, Wilson and Akert deindividuation: is the loosening of normal constraints on behavior when people are in a crowd, leading to an increase in impulsive and deviant acts. In other words, getting lost in a crowd can lead to an unleashing of behaviors that we would never dream of doing by ourselves. 8 The presence of other members of a crowd causes an individual to acknowledge less personal responsibility for his or her actions, at the diminished fear of the negative consequences of such actions. 9 The analysis by B. Mullen of press coverage of 60 cases of mob lynchings that took place in the USA in the period of 1899-1946, led him to contend that the larger a lynching crowd is, the more cruel the behaviour of the perpetrators. 10 The common in everyday life endeavour to receive positive evaluation from the social environment is temporarily subdued. There are two mainstream models of the psychological mechanism of deindividuation. The first of them attributes this state to the lowered self-awareness when the separateness of an individual is lost in the surge of the crowd and the unfolding events. It is difficult to concentrate on the external world and one’s internal world in equal measure. Additionally, the level of self-awareness of individuals immersed in a crowd diminishes, and the values and norms of conduct respected by the individual in his or her isolated condition become blurred. In consequence, the individual is likely to engage in antisocial or violent behaviour. 11 Another model holds that the deindividuation is a result of enhanced identification of an individual with a group, and his or her subsequent conformity with the group norms. 12 Irrespective of whether the first or the second model better reflects the truth (these models focus on different aspects of the phenomenon), the deindividuation hampers functioning of psychological inhibitors that prevent antisocial behaviour. Researchers of the phenomenon point to its link with anonymity, diffusion of responsibility and the so-called social facilitation. Anonymity of action does away with the apprehension of punishment or retaliation for the individual’s actions and breaks the person loose from external restraint. To ensure their anonymity in a crowd that indulges in destructive behaviour, individuals may choose to wear identical or masking outfits. For example, Ku Klux Klan members used to wear white, hooded coats, whereas
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prominent groups of aggressive-prone football fans of the early 1990s would wear sport flyers jackets. 13 Results of a classic experiment by Zimbardo showed that people whose identity was hidden would apply twice as many electrical shocks as those who could have been identified by their victims. 14 Also, the shocks administered by anonymous persons were of much longer duration. The study conducted in German schools by Rehm, Steinleitner, and Lilli showed that basketball players who wore identical outfits were much more aggressive than their plain-clothes counterparts (thereby easier to identify). 15 Individuals who constitute an anonymous crowd are less likely to consider themselves as offenders, and therefore do not assume personal responsibility for negative outcome of the actions they embark on. The diffusion of responsibility entails serious legal consequences. According to the Polish criminal law, the criminal responsibility is a “personal responsibility pertaining to individual fault”. 16 This means that every individual taking part in an event should be made accountable for his or her own actions. In practice, however, it is very difficult to ascribe accountability to individuals in a crowd, or to prove their culpability. In reference to a host of violations of the law, we may talk of multiple causality, or complicity, as it is impossible to establish who is principally accountable. In this way, the crowd protects an individual from the consequences of violating the law, which in turn strengthens the feeling of impunity. An individual in a crowd may notice other crowd members transgressing social norms. This may facilitate overcoming individual’ own moral restraints and incite engagement in a deviant activity. Another interesting aspect of crowd behaviour is that of groupthink. The phenomenon characterises groups which are highly cohesive and isolated from outside influence, and more likely than other groups to make wrong decisions that entail dramatic consequences. According to Janis, the primary symptoms of groupthink are: illusion of invulnerability, and thinking that failure happens only to others, which leads to over-optimism and risk taking, collective efforts to rationalise, unquestioned belief in the moral correctness of the group which leads to dismissing possible consequences of actions, stereotyped views of the outgroup, (“they” are evil, weak or stupid), a pressure to conform, a shared illusion of unanimity, tendency to dismiss the importance of one’s doubts, and protecting the group from contrary viewpoints, by self-appointed “mindguards”. 17 The interesting method of analysing social phenomena, including collective behaviour, arises from the assumptions of environmental psychology, i.e. „the discipline that examines the interrelationships between the physical and social environment and their impact on behavior”. 18 This approach embraces: various causes and effects of phenomena (instead of distinguishing independent variables and
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dependent variables), inter-related and interdependent components of a system (instead of one-way influence), and systems, conceived as organic entities (rather than groups of separately functioning individuals). The properties of the environment in which the crowd gathers, may be considered in the categories of “a system of behaviour” - a physical-social environment influencing an individual completely at a given moment. Being in such a system, to a large extent defines content of psychological experience, and behavioural mode of an individual. Many studies focus on the impact of density – the number of people per spatial unit. 19 In some cases over-density is perceived as crowding (psychological reflection of a multiperson situation) and negatively affects the people involved; it may cause exasperation, mental tension, tiredness, anxiety, fear. Also, the sensory system of an individual becomes overloaded, which impairs the ability to analyse the incoming information. The presence of others may be treated as any sort of excessive stimulation (e.g. heat or noise). Evans and Lepore contends that one of the factors that leads people to experience high density as crowding is loss of control: the feeling of reduced freedom, inability to move about unhampered, and dependence on other individuals in a crowd. 20 High density affects psychological functioning of individuals by intensifying their reactions. Thus the most discomfortprone individuals are characterised by enmity, raised anxiety, insecurity etc. Social psychologists concerned with proximics have proven the significance of respected personal space in relation to individual’s wellbeing. Trespassing the “intimate distance”, assumed to be at 18 inches or less in the middle-class American and European culture, is perceived as a violation of the protective zone of “Self”. Also, this very close physical contact amongst people in a crowd enhances sensuous reception; the scents, the body temperature, a wheezy breath. Discomfort and exasperation may exacerbate discontentment or even spark acts of aggression. Studies involving the analysis of photographs have shown that when collectively assembled, individuals are spatially organised. A crowd has a distinguished core and boundaries. The former is characterised by the highest density and concentration of individuals around the leader or object of worship, while the latter is composed of individuals loosely connected with the idea that cements the group (e.g. newcomers or leavers). By way of illustration, the stands of football stadiums are usually most densely crowded in the sectors occupied by fanatic supporters. The core (so called mill) is made up of the most experienced, and “fighttested” fans. It is where the most significant club insignia are located (e.g. the biggest flag). The mill occupied sector is revered as special, or almost a sacred place, a cult symbol on equal footing with club colours and emblems. This is the part of the stadium most ardently defended during the clashes with opposite team supporters or police. 21
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The factors that affect the behaviour of individuals in a crowd comprise such elements of the surroundings as light, temperature, or noise. And thus, low-frequency light may, among others, decrease heart rate and increase muscle tension, leading to the feeling of tiredness. Additionally, the fluorescent light may contribute to the feeling of discomfort. Changes in temperature also have bearing on individuals. Deviation from the optimal (18-22°C) temperature first affects subjective reactions (initial agitation that evolves into irritability, impatience, or apathy), and subsequently disturbs psychological-physical powers. Any sound harmful to health or undesirable in a given circumstances, and thus irritating, disturbing, or nagging could be regarded as a noise. Boisterous behaviour of supporters or participants of political manifestations (e.g. shouts, chants, songs) may contribute to emotional arousal of individuals, and at times is a direct stimulus of aggressive behaviour. 2. Collective behaviours of sport supporters versus sense of alienation. The abovementioned factors are most commonly incorporated in the psychological analysis of individual comportment in a crowd. The author’s own studies, conducted in Cracow hint at causes underlying involvement in deviant collective behaviour. 22 A sense of alienation is a key concept here. 23 The area of research covered the Cracow housing estate Azory, where since the late 1970s a strong group of young supporters of T.S. Wisáa football club has been active and alive. The group has been widely known for participating in hooligan disturbances both inside and outside the stadium. The estate is relatively small, with a population of a few thousand, and isolated from the body of Cracow, which gave rise to the development of a specific local community. The research has been carried out in a close cooperation with the Psychological and Educational Assistance Centre for Children, Youth and Parents located at the estate. The research was divided into three stages. In the first stage boys aged 11 to 13 attending two local schools were diagnosed and selected according to the criteria of belonging to the high risk group. Ninety four boys displaying several variables of disadvantageous character were selected. The manifested sorts of deviant behaviour included committing minor crimes, smoking cigarettes and staying in the company of people of low morality. In addition, the boys displayed a high level of aggression, low self-esteem, external locus of control, disturbed capability to adapt to a scholarly environment, and their progress in learning was slow. They often came from dysfunctional families due to parental criminal offences, addictions and improper educational attitudes. That stage was closed with
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the completion of a preventive programme adapted to the needs and capabilities of the studied group. At the second stage the elaborated prevention programme was introduced as an experimental factor and was put into practice in the local community from which the boys originated. The programme aimed at helping the children and youngsters by means of therapeutic work. It was also family- and school-oriented towards help at solving family crises, psycho-educational interaction, and re-shaping the academic environment, respectively. At school the help covered compensating didactic negligence, assistance to teachers as well as support in settling difficult educational issues. Participation in the preventive programme was voluntary. A group of 30 boys took the opportunity of participating in the programme (experimental group E). Among the other boys a set of 32 intensely involved in the estate football hooligan group and actively participating in the violent sport event-related hooligan disturbances was selected (group H). After 3 years of executing the programme the third stage of the research was initiated. Then, some personality variables and the level of sense of alienation were measured to determine the efficiency of the preventive programme. The results proved the programme to be highly effective. In boys belonging to the high-risk group, who took part in the programme, the level of physical aggression was lowered; it was accompanied by higher self-esteem and enhanced internal locus of control. In all the E group boys, in comparison to the members of the football hooligan group, a significantly lower level of sense of alienation has developed. 24 In the course of the studies, many obtained results verified positively the idea about deviant behaviours which are manifested in groups of sport supporters, being just a way of coping with the sense of alienation, expressed in a destructive manner. In the process of socialising the boys have been exposed to a configured set of disadvantageous factors. The failures they experienced in environments most vital to proper development, such as family, school, and peer group favoured a low level of social support as the major factor of their psychological condition. Perceptible deficit of social support facilitated the formation of a high level of sense of alienation. The greater the number of disadvantageous variables and their configurations the individual was exposed to, the more often such a formation occurred. Since the sense of alienation produces negative emotions, the alienated individuals tried to cope with the situation in question. For boys in high-risk groups the most dominant way of overcoming such a state is to form an informal group of a destructive character, combined from all the sort of individuals experiencing similar difficulties. In other words, if a tradition of aggressive supporting of a sport club originating from the local area happens to be an important
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element of the culture of a local community, the road to forming football hooligan groups remains wide open. The sense of belonging to such a group becomes the essential source of support and the base for shaping identity at the same time. Accepting the pattern of “aggressive masculinity” helps to build selfesteem on the one hand, and provides a satisfying position in the group on the other. 25 Fights with the rival fan groups or clashes with the police serve the goal of confirming or enhancing the status of both separate individuals and the entire group in the hierarchy of the ‘‘hooligans’ league’’. The values commonly accepted and exercised within the group strengthen the outbursts of aggressive behaviour. The first and foremost value for fanatic supporters is their favourite club, the team they feel represented by. It is the duty of each group member to protect the club reputation and unblemished name from any real or imaginary threat or insult. Therefore, the most appreciated values must be courage, ability to fight and perpetual alertness to take battle, loyalty to the group, readiness to incur renunciation for the ‘‘club colours’’. Also valued are such qualities as cleverness, great capacity to absorb alcohol (so called ‘‘strong head’’) as well as demonstrating an over-dominant, masculine behaviour towards women. The group values and standards are perceived as an alternative to the principles inculcated at school and by the mass media, which are regarded as unclear and ineffective in satisfying the needs. The sense of being rooted into the local community and identification with a group of football fans is accompanied by a sense of increasing alienation and inability to function in the wider social context. 3.
Conclusions.
Mutual relations: individual - crowd, constitute one of the most interesting, albeit most difficult to analyse, study focuses of social psychology. The article points at several factors that modify the formation and process of collective behaviour. Usually, they occur in a crowd that has assembled as a result of a situation of crisis, or a situation that is potentially dangerous, unexpected, or ambiguous. An impelling urge to define the situation fosters communication of the members of the assembly; rumours spread instantly; the emotional state of the members of the group undergoes dramatic changes. The interaction leads to the emergence of group norms and a common aim. The crowd becomes unified whereas the likelihood of deviant behaviour is increased. It is often that acts of violence committed in crowds are a result of anonymity of crowd constituents, and of psychological processes such as deindividuation and the diffusion of responsibility. According to the author, one should note the inherent causes, preceding the formation of the crowd. An important denominator of the
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psychological situation of persons involved in aggressive crowd behaviour (such as violent political manifestations, various forms of social protest, hooligan excesses on stadiums) seems to correspond with the high sense of alienation. In the case of discussed football hooligans, particularly characteristic was the level of normlessness, indicating that aggressive football supporters consider rules of social order to be unclear and externally imposed. Moreover, they believe that compliance with these rules will not facilitate the fulfilment of their needs. Consequently, they attempt to achieve prestige and position in a group by alternative means, e.g. street fights with police or clashes with rival fan groups. 26 In the case of protests of the unemployed or farmers, their sense of alienation will be of a different nature, as they feel threatened by a difficult social situation (and experience feelings of powerlessness and meaninglessness). Nevertheless, in the case of all the above-mentioned groups the sense of alienation and aggravation is a potentially deviant factor that may be at work in a crowd. These considerations indicate that our knowledge of collective behaviour could be implemented by security guards, rescue workers, architects of sports facilities, politicians, and religious leaders. For a humanist-oriented research worker, this area of interest is, first and foremost, a source of reflection on the human nature. In the face of the events in which one participates as part of a group, usually orderly and rational, human behaviour becomes unpredictable and diverges from previous experience. Knowledge of the psychological mechanisms underlying crowd behaviour sheds a new light on the ideas of freedom, independence, and responsibility - complex issues of the limits of humanity.
Notes 1
Feldman, 2001, 478. see: http://www.kgp.gov.pl/statys/imprezy.htm 3 Le Bon, 1895/1992. 4 Turner and Killian, 1957. 5 Matusewicz, 1990, 51-52. 6 Ibid. 34. 7 Ibid. 35-36. 8 Aronson et al., 1999, 337. 9 Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1989. 10 Mullen, 1986. 11 see: Bovasso, 1997; Postmes and Spears, 1998. 12 Aguirre et al., 1988. 2
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13
Piotrowski, 2000, 55. Zimbardo, 1969, 237-307. 15 Rehm et al., 1987, 359-360. 16 Filar, 1995, 108. 17 Janis, 1978, 165-166. 18 Feldman, 2001, 510. 19 Edwards et al., 1994, 150. 20 Evans and Lepore, 1992, 169. 21 Piotrowski, 2000, 57. 22 Piotrowski, 2000. 23 The term sense of alienation is used throughout the text in its basic meaning attributed by Melvin Seeman. The author recognised 5 dimensions of that psychological construct: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, self-estrangement and loneliness. 24 Piotrowski, 2000, 130. 25 see: Murphy, Williams and Dunning, 1992, 11-19. 26 Piotrowski, 2000, 128. 14
Bibliography Aguirre, B.E., Quarantelli, E.L. and Mendoza, J.L. (1988), ‘The collective behavior of fads: The characteristics, effects and career of streaking’. American Sociological Review, 53: 569-584. Aronson, E., Wilson, T.D. and Akert, R.M. (1999), Social Psychology. New York: Addison Wesley Longman Inc. Bovasso, G. (1997), ‘The interaction of depersonalization and deindividuation’. Journal of Social Distress & Homeless, 6(3): 213-228. Edwards, J.N., Fuller, T.D., Sermsri, S. and Vorakitphokatorn, S. (1994), ‘Why people feel crowded: An examination of objective and subjective crowding’. Population & Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 16: 149-173. Evans, G.W. and Lepore, S.J. (1992), ‘Conceptual and analytic issues in crowding research’. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 12: 163-173. Feldman, R.S. (2001), Social Psychology. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Filar, M. (1995), ‘OdpowiedzialnoĞü karna za naruszenia porządku towarzyszące imprezom sportowym’, in: A.J. Szwarc (ed.) Naruszenia
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porządku towarzyszące imprezom sportowym. PoznaĔ: Wydawnictwo PoznaĔskie. 101-124. Janis, I. (1978), ‘Generalizations About Groupthink’, in: R.T. Golembiewski (ed.) The Small Group in Political Science. The Last Two Decades of Development. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 162-174. Le Bon, G. (1895/1992), Psychologie des foules. Paris: PUF. MacKay, C. (1841/1932), Popular delusions and the madness of crowds. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Matusewicz, C. (1990), Widowisko sportowe. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo AWF. Mullen, B. (1986), ‘Atrocity as a function of lynch mob composition: A self-attention perspective’. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12: 187-197. Murphy, P., J. Williams and Dunning, E. (1992), Football on trial. Spectator violence and development in the football world (2nd edition). London - New York: Routledge. Piotrowski, P. (2000), Szalikowcy. O zachowaniach dewiacyjnych kibiców sportowych. ToruĔ: Wydawnictwo A. Marszaáek. Postmes, T. and Spears, R. (1998), ‘Deindividuation and antinormative behavior: A meta-analysis’. Psychological Bulletin, 123(3): 238-259. Prentice-Dunn, S. and Rogers, R.W. (1989), ‘Deindividuation and the selfregulation of behavior’, in: P.B. Paulus (ed.) Psychology of group influence (2-nd edition). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 87-109. Rehm, J., Steinleitner, M. and Lilli, W. (1987), ‘Wearing uniforms and aggression: A field experiment’. European Journal of Social Psychology, 17: 357-360. Seeman, M. (1959), ‘On the meaning of alienation’. American Sociological Review, 24: 783–791. Turner R. H. and Killian, L.M.(1957), Collective behavior. New York: Prentice Hall.
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Zimbardo, P.G. (1969), ‘The human choice: Individuation, reason, and order versus deindividuation, impulse, and chaos’, in: W.J. Arnold, D.Levine (eds.) Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 237-307.
Author Affiliation Dr Przemysáaw Piotrowski is an assistant professor at the Institute of Applied Psychology at the Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland. He is the author of Szalikowcy. O zachowaniach dewiacyjnych kibiców sportowych (‘Footbal hooligans: On sport fans’ deviant behaviour’), Subkultury máodzieĪowe. Aspekty psychospoáeczne (‘Youth subcultures: Psycho-social aspects’) and editor of Przemoc i marginalizacja. Patologie spoáecznego dyskursu (‘Violence and marginalisation. Pathology of social discourse’). He has published articles on the psychology of adolescence, the conditioning of collective behaviour, the psycho-social roots of violence, and health promotion.
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Suicide of the Elderly Barbara Pilecka 1.
Characteristics of old-age.
Old age is a difficult stage in a person’s life, marked by many losses, of which the most painful is the suffering of multiple bereavements. A person usually makes friends and acquaintances with people of the same age. Slowly but surely one has to bid farewell to active professional life, the image of an active person, part with friends, acquaintances, or siblings (usually of similar age) or, worse still, a spouse. Of all the changes that mark our lives it is the loss of a close relative that brings about most negative consequences. The losses afflicted by old age may evoke distressing memories of past partings and farewells. Irrespective of suffering that marks old age, one is confronted with various challenges. 1 Upon turning 50, a person has to take on new roles and come up with creative ways of organising leisure time after retirement. Situation of the elderly is further aggravated by the fact that society places a stigma on the elderly, and equates them with the disabled. 2 The sick role relieves a person of normal responsibilities, but carries other obligations with it. The sick person is expected to… regard his or her condition as undesirable… One interesting correlation is that ablebodied people are often offended by disabled people who appear satisfied or happy with their condition. A mood of regret and sadness are socially expected. 3 The perception of the elderly is often clouded by stereotypes. In effect, the elderly are treated on equal basis with the disabled, and are expected to present a picture of unhappiness. Old age is considered as synonymous with low spirits - a fallacious conviction that may lead to overlooking the symptoms of depression in the elderly. In spite of stress and burdens afflicted by their age, some elderly persons lead active lives. The imminence of death may galvanise the elderly into active life and make them get joy from small things. As Jung observed, old age does not have to translate into unhappiness, even in a culture that promotes youth. It should be borne in mind that we live in a culture that glorifies young and able-bodied people. However, we should avoid perceiving the elderly through stereotypes, and remember that for many people old age is a hopeless predicament marked by multiple losses. Many of the elderly
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cannot come to terms with these losses. The tasks that emerge are as follows: A. To focus energy towards new roles and activities. The parental roles are usually “a thing of the past” in old age, and become subsequently replaced by those of grandparents, which call for refreshment of forgotten skills. At the workplace an individual, who by then is one of the most senior, assumes the role of a mentor and often looks after, and trains new workers. Retirement poses a new challenge: free time. Some people may find the thought of retirement joyous and welcome it as a chance for unhampered pursuit of interests, while others may experience anxiety or depression when their career is about to be terminated. Such people find it more difficult to channel their energies into new tasks and to redirect their lives. Retirement may be particularly painful and difficult for those whose self-esteem is based on personal achievements and productive work. 4 A third group of people renounce retirement and continue to work creatively till the last moments of their life (Picasso exemplifies this group). The attitudes accompanying retirement are deeply rooted in culture. For many people in our country being retired translates into grappling with humbling material problems, as often the pension is insufficient to cover everyday, basic needs. Under such circumstances it is difficult or virtually impossible to follow one’s creative pursuits and everyday life transforms into a battle to survive and to avoid eviction from their flats, which may ensue from unpaid bills. B. To accept one’s life. In the later stages of life a person is faced with the evidence of personal successes and failures in three important spheres of life: marital life, child rearing, and professional career. Observation of the lives of their grown-up children may serve to measure the extent of their success as parents, whether the offspring are resourceful and go by moral principles in the questions of intimate life, work or child rearing. Elderly persons have to accept their own past and the discrepancy in their plans and achievements, their dreams and the realisation thereof. This should be followed by a process of incorporation of one’s failures and disappointments into “Self”. An individual should be proud of their achievements, even if they do not come up to their expectations. Some people are overwhelmed by their own losses, failures, and disasters. Others are overtly self-confident and may consider their lives as shining
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examples to be followed, at the same time rejecting any doubts in the evaluation of their lives. Both strategies clamp down on potential changes. What seems optimal is an honest assessment of one’s failures or crises, and an adoption of a more balanced perspective of personal achievements. In effect, the person is proud of himself or herself and personal achievements, whilst doing away with narcissism-like fascination with oneself. C. To cope with the thoughts of death. With the increasing prevalence of deaths among relatives, thoughts of one’s own death and the deaths of loved ones become more frequent, often causing anxiety. It is no longer possible to escape from questions about the inevitable. Typically, during a lifetime the thoughts of one’s own death are subject to repression. A person denies their own death and in their heart of hearts a person doesn’t believe in it. 5 Many young people never think of death, as it represents a very distant prospect. Although constantly present in the media, we tend to assume that death does not concern us; on television, people die in what seem exceptional circumstances, which we hope never to encounter. “Only very few of us will die in a plane crash, an earthquake or a terrorist attack”. 6 People convert the idea of death into an incidental experience in order inoculate themselves against anxiety. An elderly person, however, is less prone to treat death as an accident that happens to other people. Now one’s own death seems imminent. Typically, the entrance into old age follows the mid-life crisis, which accounts for the change in the value system, when religious and philosophical values take precedence over material, and career-related ones. The process of development continues. 7 The awareness of one’s own death carries with it an interest in God or philosophy. In this respect, the mid-life crisis is prerequisite for harmonious existence in old age. 8 Brewi and Brennan compiled a synthesis of views propounded by outstanding therapists and theorists of personality, pertaining to the meaning of old age from the perspective of the entire life: 1) Life is a journey. Development starts at birth and ceases at death. We continuously undergo development - a process that never ends. 2) Individual development falls within a specific, universal sequence, related to tasks characteristic for each stage of life. 3) Everyone follows a similar path of development. At the same time, everyone acts according to a unique formula. There are no two identical people. 4) Our development depends on personal choices and decisions.
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5) It is essential to be able to assert the “self” from the early childhood; what Rollo May called “the courage of existence”. 6) Crisis is a creative aspect in personal development. Crises stimulate us to confront new challenges of development. 7) Creative tensions and conflicts are essential to personal development. 8) Life should be lived fully to the end and youth should not be idealised, as all the life-stages are indispensable. 9) The journey through life heightens our awareness. 10) Every passage to a new stage of life is unique and of crucial importance. 11) Mid-life and old age are not blind alleys but avenues where the true personality flourishes. 12) In our early life, we have a primary relationship with our environment. Society can also imprison our “selves”. In later life, we develop a changing relationship with the world, we ourselves become the “gatekeeper”. 9 The above considerations place old age in the perspective of personality development. It has to be borne in mind, though, that this stage of life, more than any other is at risk of self-destructive tendencies. 2.
Frequency of the suicide rates of the elderly.
It is difficult to establish with precision the suicide rates of the elderly. Frequently, suicides in the elderly population are regarded as an accident or as a result of an illness. 10 World Heath Organisation (WHO) statistics reveal that suicides are more common among the elderly than the young, and that suicides among people over age 75 are three times more frequent than among the population under 25. 11 In large measure, a suicide is culture-related and its rates differ from country to country. Interestingly enough, the suicide rates among people between 15 and 24 years are high for New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the U.S.A., whilst the Latin countries, such as Spain, Italy, or Portugal have lower rates of suicide among the young and higher ones among the elderly, in particular among the male population over 75. 12 The only country that did not display this upward suicidal tendency of males over 75 was Poland in the period of 1988-1991, when the highest rate of male suicides was observed in the group aged between 45 and 54. 13 One may digress and hypothesise that the augmentation of suicides in this age group is linked indirectly with the still prevalent socioeconomic difficulties. At this time of life, men undergo mid-life crisis, arrive at the appraisal of their past. If socio-economic conditions deterred their life success, as measured by material position, and they cannot sustain their families, which downgrades their esteem in the eyes of their children, then their life balance turns out negative. This may provoke
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anxiety, depression, and self-destructive tendencies. Nonetheless, this is only a hypothesis that requires further research. As mentioned before, the highest suicide rates of the elderly are recorded in Latin countries such as Portugal, where the elderly commit suicide ten times more often than people under 45 years. In Italy and Spain, the respective figures show rates of suicide among the elderly to be seven times higher than among the young. 14 In the Anglo-Saxon countries the figures of old-age suicide are considerably lower, which may be the result of the improved psychiatric and social care system. For example, the rates of old-age suicide in Italy have been on the increase since 1990, while the respective rates for England and Wales have been on the decrease. 15 According to the World Health Organisation estimates, the period of 1950-1995 saw a 60% increase in the number the suicides among young people (under 45). Paradoxically though, various preventive programmes are addressed to young people and it is their lives that are cared for, while old-age suicide is becoming ever more acceptable. At the same time, the quality of life of the elderly in some countries contributes to the decrease of suicides among the elderly. 3.
Personality and social correlations of suicide of the elderly.
A. Suicide among the elderly as a continuation of former problems. Suicide of an elderly person is a result of problems carried over from the previous periods of life, as early as childhood. The biographies of elderly suicides hint at self-destructive tendencies in earlier stages of their life, repressed by defence mechanisms only to be revealed at a later age . 16 Old-age suicide is deeply rooted in one’s biography. Unsolved problems going back as far as childhood - that lasted throughout life may be at the base of the suicide in elderly age. Suicide of an elderly person is a logical consequence of their life, and those who displayed serious problems with interpersonal contacts are more likely to take their own life as their inadequacy in interpersonal relations may only intensify with old age. 17 In old age the former life problems may aggravate, and even suppress the taste for life. Suicides among women in Nigeria clearly illustrate this. 18 Having children is very important to people in Africa and therefore a barren woman typically suffers from anxiety and depression. Her self-destructive tendencies may only be warded off by her attentive family. In later stages of life, however, the hope for motherhood withers altogether and being abandoned by a partner, on top of other circumstances, triggers anxiety, stress, depression, and consequently suicide. Such women typically harbour thoughts of suicide in the general
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feeling of hopelessness for some time before carrying out the act. They usually have a history of attempted suicides. The prevention of suicides also requires a change in social attitudes towards the problem. It is particularly striking that although they may be soon faced with the problems of old age professionals are reluctant to address the problems of the elderly. 19 This tendency may also be observed in Poland. Senior citizens who display self-destructive tendencies shatter the ideal model of old age, and are detrimental to self-image of therapists who, first and foremost, want to be effective. Suicides of the elderly meet with a different social reaction than suicides of the young, who have a whole life before them. To illustrate the point let us consider the suicide of Karl Marks’ son-in-law, who wrote in his suicide letter: I am killing myself before pitiless old age, which gradually deprives me of the pleasures and joys of existence, saps my physical and intellectual will, paralyses my energy, breaks my will power, and turns me into a burden to myself and others. A long ago I promised myself not to live beyond the age of seventy. I have fixed the moment for my departure from life and I have prepared the method of executing my project; a hypodermic injection of hydrocyanid. 20 This suicide was committed in the 18th century France. Some authors, e.g. Choron consider it as illustrative of a rational suicide justified by age. 21 A spectacular example of an elderly suicide is that committed on 13 March 1990 by Bruno Bettelheim, a famous therapist. According to Odile Odoul: he may have committed suicide precisely because, with the onset of old age and physical diminution, that faculty of thinking freely has declined in him … It was less an act of despair than one of courage to follow his life principles to their logical conclusion. 22 This encapsulates the ever-topical discussion that goes back to the times of Renaissance on whether suicide can be ascribed with a noble meaning. Recognising the suicide of an elderly person as a noble resolution of life problems stops us from undertaking all preventive measures or from embarking on helping the elderly.
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B. Feeling of loneliness. Very often old-age suicide is connected with the feeling of loneliness. Elderly people have suffered multiple bereavements, and still may see the circle of their friends and relatives shrinking. The feelings of loneliness are further modified by attitudes of people related to the elderly. It is essential that they evince interest in the elderly to help alleviate their feeling of loneliness. The most serious problem in the context of loneliness seems to be the experience of mourning in the past, as inadequate closure of past mourning may provoke antagonistic attitudes towards other people. An elderly person may live in the circle of relatives and yet feel lonely because he or she denies their importance. Alternatively, such a person may be so absorbed in their own affairs that all conversations revolve around his or her person, which may be uninteresting or encumbering for others. 23 At times, physical indispositions impose limitations on social life. Many people sever relations with colleagues or subordinates at the moment of retirement. Renouncing favourite pastimes, company of other people or material goods may be conducive to listlessness and inertia . 24 It should be emphasised that loneliness is a crucial factor behind the act of suicide. Interpersonal conflicts, and suffering inflicted by others should also be considered. Pöldinger proved the veracity of Paul Valery’s claim that “suicide is the absence of others”. 25 In a similar vein, we may repeat after Jean-Paul Sartre that “Hell is others”. It may also be assumed that a person who receives negative treatment from the close relatives may feel lonely in spite of numerous bonds of blood. Physical presence of others does not deter feeling of loneliness when they show indifference towards the needs of the elderly person, or even aggression. Another feeling that accompanies loneliness is that of alienation. Many elderly people, also in Poland, do not keep up with the development of technology. They do not use mobile phones or the internet, even if they can afford them. They feel lonely and isolated as they find it difficult to fit in to a changing society . 26 On the other hand, many elderly people watch TV soaps, living vicariously the lives of the characters. The schedule for the day is arranged around the TV listings, and no visitors, however dear or close, are welcome during the broadcast of the favourite series. In this way TV soaps become a way of existence for many seniors. There is also a percentage of elderly people who travel extensively and enjoy contact with new cultures. Given the close contact with religion that is a source of comfort, it should be emphasised that many senior citizens in Poland manage not to succumb to depression.
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C. Faltering self-esteem. Faltering self-esteem, closely linked with the tendency of delving back into the past, may pose serious problems in old age. 27 Memories may play a positive role in strengthening feelings of youthfulness, competition, attractiveness, or closeness to others. On the other hand, others may concentrate on the negative experiences of the past so much that they become overwhelmed by them. Reminiscing about personal failures, disasters and disappointments may lower self-esteem. Negative life experiences should only serve as a lesson to learn from and guidance for the future. Lowered self-esteem impairs formation of interpersonal relations and leads to a sense of emptiness and uselessness. What emerges is a so-called “empty depression”, leading to the devastation of expectations towards oneself . 28 D. Depression. The diagnosis of old-age depression along with its treatment differs from those in other age groups. “Depression in elderly people is a terminal illness” as they are at risk of suicide. 29 The problem of being depression-prone in old age may be approached from the perspective of cognitive psychology, and thus considered to be a result of the incorrect evaluation of one’s life, as well as inadequate coping with life’s burdens, be it in private, material or social spheres. 30 Depression also accompanies various old-age-related illnesses (e.g. Parkinson’s disease) or may be triggered by medicines taken in treatment for other diseases. It is the elderly rather than the young who usually seek psychological or psychiatric assistance. Negative life experiences play an important role in depression of old age. 31 Those who have suffered multiple bereavements, who have experienced physical illnesses or stumbled over problems in personal relationships, are more inclined to depression, which is particularly dangerous in old age and results in suicide. However, the lasting emotional relations forged during one’s lifetime may guard against oldage depression. The bonds of attachment may be formed at various stages of life. The primary attachment of childhood relates to parents. Parker distinguishes two dimensions that lie at the foundations of parent-child relationship. 32 It is care, control, affection, and warmth in contrast with emotional aloofness and rejection. Attachment has a positive influence on mental wellbeing and helps during periods of difficulties. Kraaij and Garnefski examined 194 seniors aged 65 - 94. 33 Most of the Dutch-born subjects did not rely on families for their support and expressed belief in God. The research bears out that control exerted on the
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subjects by their parents (in distant past) or life partners causes depression in old-age. This control would embrace: domination, interference with private affairs, repeated criticism, and authoritative attitudes. The more control imposed on the life of subjects in the past - by parents or partners the higher the risk of old-age depression. Alternatively, low levels of control exerted by parents protected one from negative life experiences. Optimal bonds between a child and parents foster positive attitudes to life in its final stage. Domination and interference with the most private matters, inclination towards criticism as well as authoritarian behaviour, should be subject to psychological intervention at the earliest stages of life. Indubitably, formation of close relationships, based on getting acquainted with another person, has a positive impact on the psychological wellbeing of an elderly person. It transpires that old-age suicide may be prevented from the earliest childhood of an individual. E. Depression as a result of loss. One of the vital elements of the effective therapy of the elderly is the process of mourning following the death of a spouse. Meanwhile, many people over 60 years experience bereavement after their parents passed away at the age of 80 or more. 34 The death of parents is likely to have a devastating effect on children also because the parents are considered to act as a buffer against death. With them gone the children are there “on the front line”, especially when they turned 60. Suicides - committed or attempted - constitute reactions to the situation of a loss and abandonment and as such are pertinent to both genders. 35 Men commit suicide further to loss of power and control connected with professional life. In effect, retirement may unleash selfdestructive tendencies in men. Women are more inclined than men to commit suicide when they suffer a bereavement. The thought of a loss - present or past - looms in an elderly person’s mind. This burden makes people in this stage of life highly susceptible to the risk of suicide. Other afflictions of this stage of life include impaired physical functioning or the loss of physical attractiveness. The latter is acutely experienced by women. However, some women do not experience the diminution of past attractiveness in terms of a loss, as they finally feel free from advances of men and may appreciate a life of friendships. The context of suicides also comprises the problem of maltreatment of the elderly.
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F. Maltreatment. Maltreatment of the elderly may be conducive to suicide. According to the American Medical Association approximately 2 million people aged over 60 fall victim to violence, neglect, and various kinds of abuse. 36 Violence may lead to death but also indirectly contributes to the onset of mental diseases. It also provokes self-destructive behaviour. 37 Typically, the culprits count among the family members or minders. Although there are no adequate statistics available on this problem in Poland, it may be assumed that many people in our country are victimized in this way. Maltreatment may often be exercised psychologically and take a form of such behaviour as: treating the person as an object, evincing disregard for their opinions and beliefs, and callousness towards their needs. Many cases of maltreatment of the elderly remain unnoticed. It is estimated that in the U.S.A., for example, only one case in 14 of senior maltreatment is reported. 38 The victims are reluctant to report their cases as they fear being reprimanded, or are kept in isolation, unaware of their rights. Although no statistical data are available on the level of crime in Poland, it is known to be above the average, whereas the reporting of crime is very low. Barely 40% of victims report crime in Poland, whereas in other countries more than half of crimes are reported. 39 Only 30% of muggings are reported in Poland. In this line if thinking it may be assumed that few victims of domestic violence report maltreatment. Much as it is due to feeling of shame and reluctance to accuse the close relatives, the lack of trust towards police also plays a role. The functioning of police in Poland meets with societal negativity; only 46 % Poles consider police to be effective, as compared with almost 90% Americans, Canadians and over 70% Australians. 40 It is therefore difficult to establish the extent of domestic violence towards the elderly. Moreover, press reports point at occurrences of violent acts in nursing homes. Apprehension, depression and suicidal thoughts count among reactions to violence in all age groups. G. Suicidal thoughts and plans for suicide. Suicidal thoughts and undertakings are only the first steps on the way to self-destruction. The elderly are more likely than the young to actually commit suicide. Nonetheless, suicidal thoughts are not a frequent attribute of the later stages of life. The research conducted by was to find out if the desire for death was widespread among the senior population. 41 The subjects of the research were 516 Berlin-based men and women, aged 70 -105, who constituted a representative sample of the elderly population in Berlin. Every person participated in 15 sessions evaluated by a psychiatrist, as well as completed psychological tests. It transpired that
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20% of participants aged 70 and over displayed suicidal tendencies or wished for death, whilst 80% of participants did not display any thoughts of suicide. It was concluded that the wish for death is rather infrequent, even at an advanced age. The analysis of regression suggested that depression is a vital factor in foreseeing potential suicide. Typical symptoms of depression would include a sense of hopelessness, limited perception, helplessness, rigidity of perception processes, all of which make suicide seem to be the only solution to the problem and the only escape from the situation. 4. Similarities and differences in suicides among the young and the elderly. Suicidal letters are invaluable sources of information on the character of the phenomenon of old-age suicide as the age per se does not hold the key to the problem. The elderly and the young alike who take their lives evince long-term problems. The elderly admit that the unbearable psychological pain, and despair were preceded by a long period of suffering. 42 Misplaced aggression is less evident in the suicidal letters by the elderly, who seem to be more aware of the processes that led up to their suicide. The wish for death is more distinct in the elderly. A similar observation was made by Farberow and Shneidman upon the analysis of the suicide letters. 43 The authors referred to Menninger’s model of a threecomponent motive for suicidal death: - the wish to kill; - the wish to be killed; - the wish to die. The strict criterion for these three elements rests with the conscious hatred and conscious feeling of guilt with a concomitant hopelessness. The desire to kill is accompanied by aggression, blaming and condemning others, a wish to take revenge, and humiliation. The desire to be killed co-exists with masochism, finding blame with oneself, and self-condemnation. The wish to be dead embraces feelings of hopelessness, anxiety, tiredness and despair. Farewell letters of the elderly suicides are dominated by the features typical for the desire to be dead: feelings of hopelessness, anxiety, tiredness, and despair. Men aged 20-35, more than their elderly counterparts display motives “to kill” or “to be killed” and voice feelings of anger, hostility, disappointment, selfcondemnation, and guilt. The elderly suicide is tired of life and finds psychological or physical pain too much to bear. The suicide letter analysis shows that anger and hostility remain relatively long - through the end of the fifth decade of life. Feelings of guilt and finding fault with oneself are subdued with age, particularly after
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39 years of age. Similar tendencies may be observed in women. Elderly women display less guilt, self-blame and rebuke, and more feelings of despair, depression, and the sense of being a burden. The feeling of guilt is considerably less intensive after 60 years of age. 44 Nonetheless, every single suicide has to be approached individually, considering the unique conditions of personality and history of one’s private life. Irrespective of age, however, suicide may be considered as an irrevocable method of terminating unbearable pain and suffering. In spite of the apparent differences in the suicides of the elderly and the young, several common traits may be distinguished. 45 1) The common aim of su