World Infopaedia: Iraq (Volume 14 of World Infopaedia)

WORLD infopaedia: IRAQ Pragun Publication WORLD infopaedia IRAQ Pragun Publication (D.K. Publishers Distributors En...

Author: M.H. Syed

36 downloads 1061 Views 22MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!

Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

WORLD infopaedia: IRAQ

Pragun Publication

WORLD infopaedia

IRAQ

Pragun Publication (D.K. Publishers Distributors Enterprise) 4224/1, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002 Ph: 91-11-41562573-77 Fax: 91-11-41562578 E-mail: [email protected] www.dkpd.com

Published by:

Pragun Publication 4224/1, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110002 Phones: +91-11-41562573-77, Fax: +91-11-41562578 Email: dkpd@de\3.vsnl.net.in visit us at: www.dkpd.com

Pragun Publication is an enterprise of OK Publishers Distributors, engaged in distribution and publishing for more than three decades. Its mission and objective is to make Indian publications widely available among the consumers both in India and abroad through its countrywide distribution outreach.

ISBN : 978-81-89645-73-1

First Published 2007 ISBN 81-89645-46-3 (Set) 81-89645-73-0

© Publishers

Published in India and Printed at: liP Printers, New Delhi-110015 Mobile: 9810271526

Publi sher Parmil Mittal

Edito rial Coord inato r M.H. Syed

Edito rs AK. Saxena AM. Bagulia AZ. Bukhari Arif Ali Khan Ashok Pachauri B.o. Usmani B.M. Lal Gian Chand Jagmo han Negi Kamlesh Gupta Kapil Dev MA Khan M.M. Sury Madhurendra Kumar Manohar Puri Muhammad I1yas Naseem Ahmed P.K. Joshi S.K. Chaturvedi S.K. Sharm a Seema Sharm a Sumit Sethi Sandee p Sury Usha Chaturvedi Usha Puri Vishal Sethi

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

Contents Preface

ix

Iraq at a Glance

xi

1. Introduction

1

History • People • Physical Features • Economy

2. Salient Features

5

Nuclear Capabilities • Country's Response

3. History

25

Early History • Victory of Islam • Umayyad Caliphate • Abbasid Caliphate • Mongol Invasion • Ottoman Period • World War I and British Mandate • Independent Monarchy • The Republic • Coups and Coup Attempts • Emergence of Saddam Hussein • Iran-Iraq Conflict • Anfal Campaign against Kurds • Road to Democracy • Strategy for Progress • Politi~ of Alliance • Political Opposition • Transition Period • Later Events

4. Geography

113

Settlement Patterns • Physical Features • Climate

5. Society Social System • The People • Rural Society • Urban Society • Agrarian Reforms • Lifestyle • Housing • Dressing • Eating Habits • Food and Drinks • Kurds

125

(vi)

• Other Minorities • Social Forces • Tribal Structure • Demography • Population • Healthcare • Human Development • Advancement of Women

6. Religion Sunni Muslims • Shia Muslims • Yazidis • Christians • Jews • Spiritual Centre

181

7. Heritage and Culture Cradle of Civilization • Cultural Heritage and Monuments • Customs and Rituals • Wedding Traditions

203

8. Art and Architecture Preservation of Art and Culture • Forgotten Era and Modern Art • Massacre of Mesopotamian Archaeology • Contemporary Architecture

225

9. Education Child Education • Higher Education • Administration and Finance • Educational Development and Planning • Destruction of Educational System • UNESCO's Role

243

10. Language and Literature History of the Arabic Language • Arabic, the Divine Language • Iraqi Arabic • Jewish Language • PreIslamic Literature • Arabic Literature • Modern Literature • Iraqi Literature • Arabic Writing • Folk Literature • Turkish Literature • Dictator as Novelist

265

11. Economy Economic Growth and Structure • Reconstructing the Economy • Socio-economic Development • PostWorld War II Period • Role of Government • Oil Sector • Industrialisation • Banking and Finance • Foreign Trade • Transportation • Agriculture

299

(vii )

12. Polity

349

Political System • Political Parties • The Constitution • Local Government • The Judiciary • Foreign Policy • Military Ties

13. Science and Technology

389

International Initiative • Scene in New Iraq • New Programmes • Acquisition of Technology • Situation Prior to Gulf War

14. Sports

399

Football • Wrestling

15. Tourism

405

Timeless Beauty • Journey to Iraq • Iraqi Museum • Baghdad • Babylone • Mosul • Najaf Bibliography

421

Index

431

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

Preface The world which we all live in came into existence some eighteen thousand million years ago. As for the birth of this universe, there are various theories. Of them, theory of the Big Bang is regarded to be the most authentic one. According to it, a big single explosion took place, which produced condensed material, and that has been expanding continuously. This material is called galaxy/galaxies. Precisely, these galaxies are the huge congregation of stars, which are held together by the gravitational force. Of these stars, our Sun is one and our Earth is one of its nine planets. For the purpose of ease, the earth has been divided into several parts-either dry or wet. The dry ones are known as continents. These are seven in number. All but one (Antarctica) are inhabited and have charming flora and fauna. A continent consists of different countries. For instance, India lies in Asia, Egypt in Africa, France in Europe and US in North America. Total number of countries, in the world, today is nearly 200. Similarly, the waters have been divided into five oceans. The 20th century world witnessed a score of events; and some major events in the last century were determining factors for a number of people to let themselves off the fetters of slavery of centuries long colonialism and enable themselves to declare their status as free nations of the world. Colonial forces were shown doors by their inferior subjects in the third world. In the running up process of imperialist expansion and exploitation, the nations such as Germany, Italy and Japan were left bereft of what they actually deserved and demanded. These disgruntled nations steered the world to the two world wars, which took toll of crores of lives and properties worth billions. Hiroshima and Nagasaki tasted the wrath of atom bombs ever dropped in the world history. After the wars, a new world order emerged. Britain's importance in this new world order almost ceased to exist. The cold war between US and USSR reigned over the world, till the beginning of 1990s, when the Soviet Union finally got disintegrated.

(x)

The collapse of Soviet Union as a nation resulted in the world coming under a unipolar world, with US ruling the roost. Earlier. wars were fought in South Asia, South East Asia and Middle Eastern Asia. United States proved to be a failure in its Vietnam ambitions. India and China are on the path to add up to other superpowers of the world. Most of the African countries remain to be in pathetic condition in respect of economic, political and social status. However, some Pacific and some Latin American countries are emerging as new economic powers. Today, the world has evolved a new economic and cultural order. The whole world has turned into a global village. Hence, ,every nation and every country has attained its own significance and importance. Each country has its own laws of governa!,ce and enjoys full autonomy. But, they have varying capacities in terms of economy, defence, education, etc. That's why conflicts over diverse issues keep surfacing day in and day out. Taking into consideration all these crucial points, some initiatives were taken in order to control any unjust and untoward situation on the basis of mutual cooperation. With this backdrop, a dire need for a comprehensive, authentic, research-based and informative work, covering the whole world, was seriously felt. This endeavour is meant to filnhis vacuum only. In this Encyclopaedia of a unique nature, all the important nations of the world are described about. The main themes characterising this Encyclopaedia are; general information and factual data. This Encyclopaedic work reflects the history, politics, and cultural affairs of all nations. All information is given in an interesting and intelligent manner. Every volume is devoted to one nation. This volume, an independent book, in itself, is on : Iraq. These introductory titbits apart, this vast World Infopaedia is a priceless gem in the series of its ilk. Comprehensively and exclusively tailored, this modest work would certainly prove to be a win-win venture. Certainly, this novel work can be made use of by scholars, students, teachers, journalists and general readers, barring all national boundaries. All genuine suggestions and enlightening remarks will be highly appreciated by the undersigned, who would solicit your sincere response and wise comments. -Editors

Iraq at a Glance Introduction • Background: Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq was occupied by Britain during the course of World War I; in 1920, it \Alas declared a League of Nations mandate under UK administration. In stages over the next dozen years, Iraq attained its independence as a kingdom in 1932. A republic was proclaimed in 1958, but in actuality a series of military strongmen ruled the country, the latest was Saddam Hussein. Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war (1980-88). In August 1990, Iraq seized Kuwait, but was expelled by US-led, UN coalition forces through the Gulf War of January-February 1991. Following Kuwait's liberation, the UN Security Council (UNSq required Iraq to scrap all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles and tq allow UN verification inspections. Continued Iraqi noncompliance with UNSC resolutions over a period of 12 years led to the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003.and the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime. <;:oalition forces remain in Iraq, helping to restore degraded infrastructure and facilitating the establishment of a freely elected government, while simultaneously dealing with a robust insurgency. The Coalition Provisional Authority, which temporarily administered Iraq after the invasion, transferred full governmental authority on 28 June 2004, to the Iraqi Interim Government (IG), which governed under the Transitional Administrative Law for Iraq (TAL). Under the TAL, elections for a 275-member Transitional National. Assembly (TNA) were held in Iraq on 30 January 2005. FOIlm.-Jing these elections, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) assumed office. The TNA was charged with drafting Iraq's permanent

(xii )

constitution, which was approved in a 15 October 2005 constitutional referendum. An election under the constitution for a 275-member Council of Representatives (CoR) was held on 15 December 2005. After an official certified ballot count is released, an Iraqi Government is expected to be formed by late spring or early summer 2006. (Updated till June-2006) Geography • Location: Middle East, bordering the Persian Gulf, between Iran and Kuwait • Geographic Coordinates: 33 00 N, 44 00 E • Map References: Middle East • Area: Total: 437,072 sq km land: 432,162 sq km water: 4,910 sq km • Land Boundaries: Total: 3,650 km border countries: Iran 1,458 km, Jordan 181 km, Kuwait 240 km, Saudi Arabia 814 km, Syria 605 km, Turkey 352 km • Coastline: 58 km • Maritime Claims: Territorial sea: 12 nm continental shelf: not specified • Climate: Mostly desert; mild to cool winters with dry, hot, cloudless summers; northern mountainous regions along Iranian find Tlirkish borders experience cold winters with occasionally heavy snows that melt in early spring, sometimes causing extensive flooding in central and southern Iraq • Terrain: Mostly broad plains; reedy marshes along Iranian border in soutb with large flooded areas; mountains along borders with Iran and Turkey • Elevation Extremes: Lowest point: Persian Gulf 0 m highest point: unnamed peak; 3,611 m; Note-this peak is not Gundah Zhur 3,607 m or Kuh-e Hajji-Ebrahim 3,595 m • . Natural Resources: Petroleum, natural gas, phosphates, sulphur • Land Use: Arable land: 13.12% Permanent crops: 0.61% Others: 86.27% (2005) • Irrigated Land: 35,250 sq km (2003) • Natural Hazards: Dust storms, sandstorms, floods

(xiii)

• Environment-current Issues: Government water control projects have drained most of the inhabited marsh areas east of An Nasiriyah by drying up or diverting the feeder streams and rivers; a once sizable population of Marsh Arabs, who inhabited these areas for thousands of years, has been displaced; furthermore, the destruction of the natural habitat poses serious threats to the area's wildlife populations; inadequate supplies of potable water; development of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers system contingent upon agreements with upstream riparian Turkey; air and water pollution; soil degradation (salination) and erosion; desertification • Environment-international Agreements: Party to: Law of the Sea signed, but not ratified: Environmental Modification • Geography-note: Strategic location on Shatt al Arab waterway and at the head of the Persian Gulf Demography

• Population: 26,783,383 (June 2006 est.) • Age Structure: 0-14 years: 39.7% (male 5,398,645/female 5,231,760) 15-64 years: 57.3% (male 7,776,257/female 7,576,726) 65 years and over: 3% (male 376,700/female 423,295) (2006 est.) • Median Age: Total: 19.7 years male: 19.6 years female: 19.8 years (2006 est.) • Population Growth Rate: 2.66% (2006 est.) • Birth Rate: 31.98 births/1,000 population (2006 est.) • Death Rate: 5.37 deaths/1,000 population (2006 est.) • Net Migration Rate: 0 migrant(s}/1,000 population (2006 est.) • Sex Ratio: At birth: 1.05 male(s}/female under 15 years: 1.03 male(s}/female 15-64 years: 1.03 male(s}/female 65 years and over: 0.89 male(s}/female total population: 1.02 male(s}/female (2006 est.) • Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 48.64 deaths/1,000 live births male: 54.39 deaths/1,000 live births female: 42.61 deaths/ 1,000 live births (2006 est.) • Life Expectancy. at Birth: Total population: 69.01 years male: 67.76 years female: 70.31 years (2006 est.)

(xiv)

• Total Fertility Rate: 4.18 children born/woman (2006 est.) • HIV/AIDS-Adult Prevalence Rate: Less than 0.1 % (2001 est.) • HIV/AIDS-People Living with HIV/AIDS: Less than 500 (2003 est.) • HIV/AIDS-Deaths: NA • Nationality: Noun: Iraqi(s) Adjedive: Iraqi • Ethnic Groups: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian and Others 5% • Religions: Muslims 97% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian and Others 3% • Languages: Arabic (Officiai), Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), Assyrian, Armenian • Literacy: Definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 40.4% male: 55.9% female: 24.4% (2003 est.) Government • Country Name: Conventional long form: Republic of Iraq Conventional short form: Iraq Local long form: AI Jumhuriyah al Iraqiyah Local short form: AI Iraq • Government Type: Transitional Democracy • Capital: Baghdad • Administrative Divisions: .18 governorates (muhafazat, singular-muhafazah); AI Anbar, AI Basrah, AI Muthanna, AI Qadisiyah, An Najaf, Arbil, As SUlaymaniyah, At Tamim, Babil, Baghdad, Dahuk, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Karbala', Maysan, Ninawa, $alah ad Din, Wasit • Independence: 3 October 1932 (from League of Nations mandate under British administration); Note-on 28 June 2004 the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government • National Holiday: Revolution Day, 17 July (1968); Note-this holiday was celebrated under the Saddam Hussein regime but the Iraqi Interim Government has yet to declare a new national holiday • Constitution: Ratified on 15 October 2005

(xv)

• Legal System: Based on European civil and Islamic law, under the framework outlined in the Iraqi Constitution • Suffrage: Formerly 18 years of age; universal • Executive Branch: Chief of State: Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) President Deputy Presidents Note-the President and Deputy Presidents comprise the Presidency Council) Head of Government: Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) Prime Minister; Deputy Prime Ministers Cabinet: 32 ministers appointed by the Presidency Council, plus Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers • Legislative Branch: Unicameral Council of Representatives or Mejlis-e-Watani (consisting of 275 members elected by a closed-list, proportional-representation system) Elections: held 15 December 2005 to elect a 275-member Council of Representatives to finalise a permanent constitution Election Results:· Council of Representatives-percent of vote by partyNA; number of seats by party-NA • Judicial Branch: Supreme Court appointed by the Prime Minister, confirmed by the Presidency Council • Political Parties and Leaders: Al-Sadr Movement [Muqtada Al-Sadr]; Assyrian Democratic Movement [Yunadim Kanna]; Conference of Iraqi People [Adnan al-Dulaymi]; Constitutional Monarchy Movement or CMM [Sharif AIi Bin al-Husaym]; Da'wa Party [Ibrahim al-Jafari]; Independent Iraqi Alliance or lIA [Falah al-Naqib]; Iraqi Communist Party [Hami? al-Musa]; Iraqi Hizballah [Karim Mahud al-Muhammadawi]; Iraqi Independent Democrats or lID [Adnan Pachachi, Mahdi alHafizJ; Iraqi Islamic Party or lIP [Muhsin Abd al-Hamid, Hajim al-Hassani]; Iraqi National Accord or INA [Ayad Allawi]; Iraqi National Congress or INC [Ahmad Chalabi]; Iraqi National Council for Dialogue or INCD [Khalaf Ulayan al-Khalifawi alDulaymi]; Iraqi National Unity Movement or INUM [Ahmad alKubaysi, chairman]; Islamic Action Organisation or IAO [Ayatollah Muhammad al-Mudarrisi]; Jama'at al Fadilah or JAF [Ayatollah Muhammad Ali al-Yaqubi]; Kurdistan Democratic Party or KOP [Masud Barzani]; Muslim Ulema Council or MUC [Harith Sulaiman al-Dari, secretary general]; National Iraqi Front [Salih al-MutlaqJ; National Reconciliation and Liberation

(xvi)

Party [Mishan al-Jabburi]; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan or PUK [Jalal Talabai]; Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq or SClRI [Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim] note: the Kurdistan Alliance, Iraqi National List, Iraqi Consensus Front, Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, and United Iraqi Alliance were only electoral slates consisting of the representatives from the various Iraqi political parties • Political Pressure Groups and Leaders: An insurgency against the Iraqi Transitional Government and Coalition forces is primarily concentrated in Baghdad and in areas west and north of the capital; the diverse, multigroup insurgency is led principally by Sunni Arabs whose only common denominator is a shared desire to oust the Coalition and end US influence in Iraq • International Organisation Participation: ABEDA, AFESD, AMF, CAEU, FAO, G-77, lAEA,IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, lOA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, 10C, ISO, !TU, LAS, NAM, OAPEC, OIC, OPEC, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTO (observer) • Flag Description: Three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with three green five-pointed stars in a horizontal line centred in the white band; the phrase Allahu Akbar (God is Great) in green Arabic script-Allahu to the right of the middle star and Akbar to the left of the middle star-was added in January 1991 during the Persian Gulf crisis; similar to the flag of Syria, which has two stars but no script, Yemen, which has a plain white band, and that of Egypt which has a gold Eagle of Saladin centred in the white band; design is based upon the Arab Liberation colours

Economic-overview • Iraq's economy is dominated by the oil sector, which has traditionally provided about 95% of foreign exchange earnings. Iraq's seizure of Kuwait in August 1990, subsequent international economic sanctions, and damage from military action by an international coalition beginning in January 1991 drastically reduced economic activity. Although government policies

(xvii)

• • • • • • •

supporting large military and internal security forces and allocatipg resources to key supporters-of the regime hurt the economy, implementation of the UN's oil-for-food programme, which began in December 1996, helped improve conditions for the average Iraqi citizen. Iraq was allowed to export limited amounts of oil in exchange for food, medicine, and some infrastructure spare parts. In December 1999, the UN Security Council authorised Iraq to export under the programme as much oil as required to meet humanitarian needs. Per capita food imports increased significantly, while medical supplies and health care services steadily improved. Per capita output and living standards were still well below the pre-1991 level, but any estimates have a wide range of error. The military victory of the US-led coalition in March-April 2003 resulted in the shutdown of much of the central economic administrative structure. A comparatively small amount of capital plant was damaged during the hostilities and looting. Insurgent attacks, and sabotage have undermined efforts to rebuild the economy, further. Attacks on key economic facilities-especially oil pipelines and infrastructure-have prevented Iraq from reaching projected export volumes, but total government revenues have been higher than anticipated due to high oil prices. Despite political uncertainty, Iraq has established the institutions needed to implement economic policy, has successfully concluded a three-stage debt reduction agreement with the Paris Club, and is working towards a Stand-by Arrangement with the IMF. The Stand-by Arrangement would clear the way for continued debt relief from the Paris Club. GDP (purchasing power parity): $94.1 billion (2005 est.) GDP (official exchange rate): $46.5 billion (2005 est.) GDP-Real Growth Rate: -3% (2005 est.) GDP-Per Capita (PPP): $3,400 (2005 est.) GDP-Composition by Sector: Agriculture: 7.3% industry: 66.6% services: 26.1% (2004 est.) Labour Force: 7.4 million (2004 est.) Labour Force-by Occupation: Agriculture: NA industry: NA services: NA

(xviii)

• Unemployment Rate: 25% to 30% (2005 est.) • Population below Poverty Line: NA • Household Income or Consumption by Percentage Share: Lowest 10%: NA highest 10%: NA • Inflation Rate (consumer prices): 40% (2005 est.) • Budget: Revenues: $19.3 billion expenditures: $24 billion; including capital expenditures of $5 billion (2005 budget) • Agriculture-products: Wheat, barley, rice, vegetables, dates, cotton; cattle, sheep, poultry • Industries: Petroleum, chemicals, textiles, leather, construction materials, food processing, fertilizer, metal fabrication/ processing • Industrial Production Growth Rate: NA • Electricity-production: 31.7 billion kWh (2005) • Electricity-consumption: 33.3 billion kWh (2005) • Electricity-exports: 0 kWh (2005) • Electricity-imports: 2.02 billion kWh (2005) • Oil-production: 2.093 million bbVday; note-prewar production (in 2002) was 2.03 million bbVday (2005 est.) • Oil-consumption: 351,500 bbVday (2005 est.) • Oil-exports: 1.42 million bbVday (2005 est.) • Oil-imports: Nill • Oil-proved Reserves: 112.5 billion bbl (2005 est.) • Natural Gas-production: 1.5 billion cu m (2003 est.) • Natural Gas-consumption: 1.5 billion cu m (2003 est.) • Natural Gas-exports: 0 cu m (2004 est.) • Natural Gas-imports: 0 cu m (2004 est.) • Natural Gas-proved Reserves: 3.115 trillion cu m (2005) • Current Account Balance: -$9.447 billion (2004 est.) • Exports: $17.78 billion f.o.b. (2004) • Exports-commodities: Crude oil (83.9%), crude materials excluding fuels (8.0%), food and live animals (5.0%) • Exports-partners: US 51.9%, Spain 7.3%, Japan 6.6%, Italy 5.7%, Canada 5.2% (2004)

(xix)

• Impor ts: $19.57 billion f.o.b. (2004) • Impor ts-com moditi es: Food, medicine, manufactures • Import s-partn ers: Syri923%, Turkey 19.5%, US 9.2%, Jordan 6.7%, Germa ny 4.9% (2004) • Reserv es of Foreign Excha nge and Gold: $8.4 billion (2005 est.) • Debt-e xterna l: $82.1 billion (2005 est.) • Econo mic Aid-re cipien t: More than $33 billion in foreign aid pledged for 2004-0 7 (2004) • Curren cy (code) : New Iraqi dinar (NID) as of 22 Januar y 2004 • Excha nge Rates: New Iraqi dinars per US dollar-1,475 (2005), 1,890 (second half, 2003), 0.3109 (2001) • Fiscal Year: Calendar year

Comm unica tions • Teleph ones-M ain Lines In Use: 1,034,2 00 (2004) • Teleph ones-M obile Cellular: 574,00 0 (2004) • Teleph one System : General Assessment: the 2003 war severely disrupt ed telecom munica tions throug hout Iraq includi ng international connections; USAID is overseeing the repair of switching capability and the construction of mobile and satellite communication facilities domestic: repairs to switches and lines destroyed during the 2003 war continue, but sabotag e remains a problem; additional switching capacity is improving access; cellular service is available and centred on three regional GSM networks, improving country-wide connectivity international: country code-964; satellite earth stations-2 !ntelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region), and 1 Arabsa t (inoperative); coaxia l cable and microwave radio relay to Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, and Turkey; despite a new satellite gateway, international caIls outside Baghdad remain problematic • Radio Broad cast Station s: After 17 months of unregulated media growth, there are approximately 80 radio stations on the air inside Iraq (2004) • Televis ion Broad cast Station s: 21 (2004)

(xx)

• Intern et Count ry Code: .iq • Intern et Hosts: 4 (2005) • Intern et Users: 36,000 (2005) Trans portat ion • Airpor ts: 111 (2005) • Airpor ts-with Paved Runways: Total: 78 over 3,047 m: 20 2,438 to 3,011-7 m: 37 1,524 to 2,437 m: 5 914 to 1,523 m: 7 under 914 m: 9 (2005) • Airpor ts-with Unpav ed Runways: Total: 33 over 3,047 m: 2 2,438 to 3,047 m: 4 1,524 to 2,437 m: 5 914 to 1,523 m: 12 under 914 m: 10 (2005) • Helipo rts: 8 (2005) • Pipelin es: Gas 1,739 km; oil 5,418 km; refined produc ts 1,343 km (2004) • Railwa ys: Total: 2,200 km standard gauge: 2,200 km 1.435-m gauge (2004) • Roadw ays: Total: 45,550 km paved: 38,399 km unpaved: 7,151 km (1999) • Waterw ays: 5,279 km note: Euphrates River (2,815 km), Tigris River (1,899 km), and Third River (565 km) are principal waterways (2004) • Merch ant Marine: Total: 13 ships (1000 GRT or over) 67,796 GRT/1 01,317 DWT by type: cargo 11, petrole um tanker 2 (2005) • Ports and Terminals: Al Basrah, Khawr az Zubayr, Umm Qasr Milita ry • Militar y Branc hes: Iraqi Armed Forces: Iraqi Regular Army (includes Iraqi Special Operat ions Force, Iraqi Intervention Force). Iraqi Navy (former Iraqi Coastal Defence Force), Iraqi Air Force (former Iraqi Army Air Corps) (2005) • Militar y Servic e Age and Obliga tion: 18 years of age; the Iraqi Interim Govern ment is creating a new professional Iraqi military force of men aged 18 to 40 to defend Iraq from external threats and the current insurgency (2004)

(xxi)

• Manpo wer Availa ble for Militar y Servic e: Males age 1849: 5,870,640 females age 1849: 5,642,073 (2005 est.) • Manpo wer Fit for Militar y Servic e: Males age 1849: 4,930,074 females age 1849: 4,771,105 (2005 est.) • Manpo wer Reach ing Military Servic e Age Annually: Males age 1849: 198,518 females age 1849: 289,879 (2005 est.) • Milita ry Expen diture s-Doll ar Figure : $1.34 billion (2005 est.) • Militar y Expen ditures -Perce nt of GDP: NA

Trans nation al Issues • Dispu tes-int ernati onal: Coalition forces assist Iraqis in

monitoring bounda ry security; Iraq's lack of a maritime bounda ry with Iran prompts jurisdiction disputes beyond the mouth of the Shatt al Arab in the Persian Gulf; Turkey has expressed concer n over the status of Kurds in Iraq • Refug ees and Intema lly Displa ced Person s: Refuge es (country of origin): 22,711 (Palestinian Territories) IDPs: 1 million (ongoing US-led war and Kurds' subseq uent return) (2005) • (Information Based on : International Fact Sheets)

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

1

Introduction For long, known to the world as Mesopotamia, Iraq is a Muslim country in the Middle East. It is situated at the northwest end of the Persian Gulf. Iraq, covering an area of 4,37,072 sq. km. is bordered on the north by Turkey, on the west by Syria and Jordan, and on the south by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iraq is a nation, rich in culture, with a long history of intellectual and scientific achievement. The country is known for its painters and sculptors, who are among the best in Arab world. It is prosperous by its oil and other minerals. Previously, Iraq was a one-party state, governed by Baath Party's leader Saddam Hussein. After ruling over the country for 24 years, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was ousted by US forces. Currently, he is in US custody and under trial. Baghdad is the commercial and political capital of Iraq. Basra and Mosul are the second -and third largest populated cities.

History Iraq's history goes back to the very origins of civilization. World's first urban and literate civilization sprang up in the very fertile valley of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Mesopotamia and Sumeria were born in the area that is now called Iraq. In 18th century BC, Hammurabi established the first empire of Babylonia. Babylonians under Hammurabi achieved fame for their legal code. Later Assyrians established a vast empire in 7th century BC. Cyrus the Great, set up the Achaemenid empire. He captured Babylon and Greek cities in Asia Minor. Mesopotamia became part of the Persian empire.

2

Iraq

Alexander, the Great subdued the Persians in 330 BC and tried to restore Babylon city. But Parthians overtook the Greek and Mesopotamia became a battleground between Parthians and the Romans. Arab Muslims invaded Mesopotamia in 7th century AD. Later, Baghdad became capital of the Abbasid Caliphate and the centre of Muslim world. In 1258, Mongols attacked Baghdad. In 16th century, the Ottomans conquered Iraq and held it till 1917. In 1920, the British occupied Iraq and set up an Arab Monarchy, but in 1932 Iraq became independent. In 1948, Iraq, as a member of the Arab League got involved in Arab-Israel war. A leftist revolution established a republic in 1958. The Kurds of north Iraq demanded autonomy. In 1968, Baath Party started a military coup, led by Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein became the President of Iraq in 1979, replacing the civilian government. An international crisis in Iraq occurred when Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait in 1990. US-led coalition forces defeated Iraq and compelled it to withdraw from Kuwait. Iraq made Kuwait free. After Kuwait's liberation, the UN Security Council (UNSC) wanted Iraq to destroy all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles and to allow UN verification inspections. Iraq did not accept the UNSC resolutions. It resulted in the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the ouster of the Saddam Hussein's regime. Coalition forces remained in Iraq to help restore disrupted infrastructure and facilitate the establishment of a democratically elected government. On 28 June, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred powers to the Interim Government in Iraq. The people of Iraq cast their votes on 30 January, 2005 to elect a 275-member Transitional National Assembly to draft a permanent constitution and pave the way for new national elections at the end of 2005. Now, an elected government is in power in Baghdad, though it has not fully consolidated itself and the resistance forces are still active and strong enough (updated till ·July-06).

People Most of the people of Iraq live along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and few people live in Iraq's western desert region. In the country, 76 per cent of the people are Arabs. Kurds, Turkmens, Assyrians, Armenians and other small groups also reside in the country. Islamic community is divided into two sects-Sunni and

Introduction

3

Shia. Iraqi Census shows that the number of Shias is 55 per cent. Arabic language is spoken all over the country. This language is the mother tongue of the Arab majority. In Iraq, 60 per cent of the people are uneducated. In Iraqi society, the family is the most important unit of social organisation. Iraqi families are patriarchal and provide protection, food, shelter, income, reputation and honour to all members of the family. Father is the most responsible member and enjoys complete authority over his family. Wives have to obey and serve their husbands. In Iraqi society, men are privileged and girls are married at an earlier age than boys. The custom of simple divorce prevails in Iraq. Kurds practise endogamy. It is considered ideal if a man marries his father's brother's daughter. In Iraq, women generally wear 'abayah'. It is a long black garment that covers her body from the shoulders down to her feet. But men wear a long sleeved onepiece dress that covers the whole body called 'dishdashah'. Dishdashah is usually made of white cotton to reflect sunlight. In winter, the dishdashah is made from heavier fabric such as wool and comes in dark colours. People eat their evening meal around 8:00 pm. Their food is rich and diverse, which is full of spices, such as saffron and mint.

Physical Features Iraq has three major physiographic regions-the southwestern desert, the Tigris-Euphrates basin, and the northeastern highlands. The highlands rise above 1524 metres. The southwestern desert occupies about 40 per cent of the country. It descends gradually from the more elevated western volcanic plateau of Syria and Jordan. It reaches sea level at the head of the Persian Gulf. The southwestern desert is sparsely inhabited by pastoral nomads. The Tigris-Euphrates basin separates the highlands from the southwestern desert. It accounts for 5 per cent of the land area. It extends from northwest to southwest and forms upper and lower basins. The lower basin has extensive marshlands. The Tigris and Euphrates, form their juncture at alQurnah, called the Shatt ai-Arab. Iraq has these two important rivers-Euphrates and Tigris. The Euphrates originates in Turkey and enters Iraq from the northwest. Here, only the wadis of the western desert feed it during the winter rains. The Tigris also rises in Turkey but several rivers feed it in Iraq such as the Khabur, the Great Zab, the Little Zab, and the Uzaym. All of these rivers join the Tigris above

4

Iraq

Baghdad. Though the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates are essential to the life of the country, but they sometimes also threaten it. Climate : The climate of Iraq is mainly arid. Summer season starts from June and ends in August. It is very hot and dry. In the summer. Average minimum temperature ranges from about 22.2°e to about 29°e. It rises to maximum, between roughly 37. 7°e and 43.3°e. In summer months, temperatures are more likely to go over 46°e and some places have records of over 48°e. Two types of wind blow in summer-southern and southeasterly. Further, there are dry, dusty winds which occur from April to early June. Winter season is very cold and starts from December and lasts till March. Ninety per cent of the annual rainfall occurs between November and April. In winter, minimum temperature decreases to near freezing point in the northern and northeastern foothills. The temperature of western desert is between 2°_3°e and 4°_5°e. Average annual temperature in Baghdad is lOoe (January) and 35°e (March).

Economy Iraq is the second largest producer of oil but the Gulf wars disrupted its oil production. Arable land in Iraq is about 13 per cent of the total land area. People are engaged in agricultural work in areas near Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The large crops harvested are wheat, watermelon, barley, tomatoes, grapes and dates. Nearly one-third of the land area is pasture. It supports sheep, cattle and goats. Most industries are concentrated around Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk. Iraq largely depends on imports. The major employment sectors apart from oil and agriculture are various services.

2 Salient Features Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq was occupied by Britain during the course of World War I; in 1920, it was declared a League of Nations mandate under UK administration. In stages over the next dozen years, Iraq attained its independence as a kingdom in 1932. A "republic" was proclaimed in 1958, but in actuality a series of military strongmen have ruled the country since then, the latest was Saddam Hussein. Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war (1980-88). In August 1990, Iraq seized Kuwait, but was expelled by US-led UN coalition forces during the Gulf War of January-February 1991. Following Kuwait's liberation, the UN Security Council (UNSC) required Iraq to scrap all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles and to allow UN verification inspections. Continued Iraqi non-compliance with UNSC resolutions over a period of 12 years resulted in the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime. Coalition forces remain in Iraq, helping to restore degraded infrastructure and facilitating the establishment of a freely elected government. The Coalition Provisional Authority transferred sovereignty to the Interim Government on 28 June, 2004. Iraqis voted on 30 January, 2005 to elect a 275 member Transitional National Assembly that will draft a permanent constitution and pave the way for new national elections at the end of 2005. The military action taken by the USA and its coalition partners in Iraq in March-April 2003, and its aftermath, dominated the security

6

Iraq

debate in 2003 and impinged on virtually every field of security policy. The--successful, low-cost occupation of a nation of 23 million people displayed the USA's unique strength: the aftermath showed more about its limitations and about the limited meaning of military power in general. The USA was able to win a war in Iraq but not to restore peaceful conditions, nor provide a convincing vision of the country's future. It overthrew an enemy, but the limited nature of its supporting coalition-and its inability to secure a United Nations mandate on the wished-for terms-betrayed its inability to coerce its friends. Indeed, the lessons drawn by others seem to be provoking a closing of ranks in many regional groupings which, if not exactly anti-US, do set limits to anyone-power 'hegemony'. The supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat from Iraq seemed the strongest foundation for the USA and its coalition partners to launch their attack, but it subsequently crumbled. Perhaps luckily, evidence of past and present WMD problems in, notably, Iran, Ubya and North Korea was strong enough to maintain the momentum of international cooperation against the proliferation menace-and many states were motivated to work for less violent solutions. A boost has been given to multi-functional, full-cycle arms and technology control strategies adapted to new globalised conditions. The Euro-Atlantic community was sorely divided by Iraq, but the heart-searching this prompted suggests that the Western 'family' is still 'family', no matter how dysfunctional. Determined efforts were made from mid-year onwards to restore a sense of unity and find new purpose in key institutions such as the United Nations (with a fundamental review of security challenges and principles commissioned by the Secretary General), NATO (with a new focus on global military operations, initially in Afghanistan), and the European Union (with new strategy documents, innovations in European defence cooperation, and proposed institutional changes for stronger leadership). 'Re-institutionalisation' has outweighed 'de-institutionalisation' in the balance up to now. Considered as a conflict, Iraq underlined that any interventioneven non-military-is a gamble for high stakes. Improvement of national and international performance on follow-through and peace building is long overdue. The impact on Iraq's region was limited in

Salient Features

7

terms of conflict escalation but lacking in positive results for 'Arab democracy'. New fronts and incentives for terrdr,ism outweighed any deterrent effect that might have been hoped for. The performance of new military equipment and tactics in Iraq will encourage imitators in some parts of the world and a search for new 'asymmetric' responses in others. The concomitant boost in US military expenditure has aggravated both the problems of budgetary and trade imbalance for the USA itself, and the uncertainties for the whole world economy. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003, was a reminder that the world is threatened by other dangersincluding, for example, climate change and environmental collapsefor which it has yet to find either united policies or adequate resources. More insidious damage was done in the year to human rights and freedoms, without which security policies designed to protect and spread Western-style values risk losing both credibility and effect. In the late 1980s, Iraq became a central actor in Middle Eastern affairs and a force to reckon with in the wider international community. Iraq's growing role resulted from the way in which it was adapting the principles of Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party socialism to meet the country's needs and from its somewhat unexpected success in compelling Iran in August 1988, to request a cease-fire in the eight-year-old Iran-Iraq War. Iraq's reassertion in the 1980s, of its role in the region and in the world community evoked its ancient history. At one time Mesopotamia ("the land between the rivers"), which encompassed much of present-day Iraq, formed the centre not only of the Middle East but also of the civilized world. The people of the Tigris and Euphrates basin, the ancient Sumerians, using the fertile land and the abunda~t water supply of the area, developed sophisticated irrigation systems and created what was probably the first cereal agriculture as well as the earliest writing, cuneiform. Their successors, the Akkadians, devised the most complete legal system of the period, the Code of Hammurabi. Located at a crossroads in the heart of the ancient Middle East, Mesopotamia was a plum sought by numerous foreign conquerors. Among theITL were the warlike Assyrians, from the tenth century through the seventh century BC, and the Chaldeans, who in the sixth century BC created

8

Iraq

the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World. In 539 BC, Semitic rule of the area ended with the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus the Great. The successors of Cyrus paid little attention to Mesopotamia, with the result that the infrastructure was allowed to fall into disrepair. Not until the Arab conquest and the coming of Islam did Mesopotamia begin to regain its glory, particularly when Baghdad was the seat of the Abbasid Caliphate between 750 and 1258. Iraq experienced various other foreign rulers, including the Mongols, the Ottoman Turks, and the British under a mandate established after World War I. The British placed Faisal, a Hashimite claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad, on the throne in 1921. Popular discontent with the monarchy, which was regarded as a Western imposition, led in 1958 to a military revolution that overthrew the king. Ultimately, the military regime installed a government ruled by the Baath's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and created the Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, that institutionalised the RCC's role. Within the Baath, power lay primarily in the hands of Baathists from the town of Tlkrit, the birthplace of Saddam Hussein, who played an increasingly prominent role in the government in the 1970s. (Tikrit was also the hometown of his predecessor, Ahmad Hasan-al-Bakr, who formally resigned the leadership in 1979). The Baathist government in 1~70, granted the Kurdish minority a degree of autonomy, but not the complete self-rule the Kurds desired, in the predominantly Kurdish regions of Dahuk, Irbil, and As Sulaymaniyah. In the early 1970s, Iraqi casualties from the renewed warfare with the Kurds were such as to induce Saddam Hussein to sign an agreement with the Shah of Iran in Algiers in March 1975, recognising the thalweg, or the midpoint of the Shatt ai-Arab, as the boundary between the two countries. The agreement ended the Shah's aid to the Kurds, thus eventually quelling the rebellion. Saddam Hussein then turned his attention to domestic matters, particularly to the ec.onomy and to an industrial modernisation prograr;nme. He had notable success in distributing land, in improving the standard of living, and in increasing health and educational opportunities. Rural society was transformed as a result of large

Salient Features

9

rural-to-urban migration and the decline of rural handicraft industries. Urban society witnessed the rise, particularly in the late 1970s and the 1980s, of a class of Baathist technocrats. Shia Muslims, who, although they constituted a majority, had been largely unrepresentative in significant areas of Iraqi society, in which the minority Sunni Muslims were the governing element, were integrated to a considerable degree into the government, into business, and into the professions. Buoyed by domestic success, Sad dam Hussein shifted his concentration to foreign affairs. Beginning in the late 1970s, Iraq sought to assume a more prominent regional role and to replace Egypt, which had been discredited from its position of Arab leadership because of signing the Camp David Accords in 1978. Iraq, therefore, gradually modified its somewhat hostile stance toward Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, seeking to win their support. Relations with the Soviet Union, Iraq's major source of weapons, cooled, following the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan that began in December 1979. In contrast, Iraqi ties with France improved considerably, and France became Iraq's second most important arms supplier. The overthrow of the monarchy in Iran and the coming to power in 1979 of Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini-whom Saddam Hussein had expelled from Iraq in 1978, reportedly at the Shah's request-revived the historic hostility between the two countries. Saddam Hussein feared the impact on Iraqi Shias of Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalism and resented Iran's attempted hegemony in the Persian Gulf region. Believing Iran's military forces to be unprepared as a result of the revolutionary purges, in September 1980, following a number of border skirmishes, Iraq invaded Iranian territory. Thus began a bitter, costly, eight-year-long war in which the strength and the revolutionary zeal of Iran were clearly demonstrated. From late 1980 to 1988, the war took precedence over other matters. The Baath high command succeeded in controlling Iraq's military institution to a degree that surprised foreign observers. One of the major instruments for accomplishing this control was the People's Army, which served as the Baath Party's militia. The Baath could do little, however, to counter Iran's superiority in manpower-and material. At times when Iraq considered its situation

10

Iraq

particularly desperate-for example, when Iranian forces appeared to be gaining control of substantial areas of Iraqi territory, such as Al-Faw Peninsula in the south and the northern mountainous Kurdish area-Iraq unleashed a barrage of missiles against Iranian cities. Further, reliable reports indicated that Iraq used chemical warfare against the enemy, possibly in the hope of bringing Iran to the negotiating table. To prevent domestic unrest as a result of the war, Saddam Hussein adopted a "guns and butter" economic policy, bringing in foreign labourers to replac~ those called to military service and striving to keep casualties low. After drawing down its own reserves, Iraq needed the financial support of its Gulf neighbours. Of the later, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates all provided Iraq with loans to help it proceed the war. Relations with Egypt also improved significantly after the war's outbreak. Meanwhile Iraqi hostility toward Syria, its fellow Baathist government but traditional rival, increased as a result of Syria's strong support of Iran. As part of his wartime economic policies, Saddam Hussein, in 1987, returned agricultural collectives to the private sector, and in 1988 he took measures to privatise more than forty state-run factories because of the inefficiency and unprofitability of agriculture and industry when under state control. These privatising steps reflected a desire for greater economic efficiency rather than a change in economic ideology. Government controls on the economy were decreased by cutting subsidies, by allowing partial foreign ownership, and by reducing bureaucratic regulation of enterprises, thus reducing labour costs. Despite the introduction of more liberal economic policies in Iraq in the late 1980s, few indications suggested that the political system was becoming less rigid to any significant degree. Ultimate decisions in both the economic and the political realms apparently remained in the hands of Saddam Hussein rather than in those of the constitutionally-designated RCC. According to a statement by Saddam Hussein to the Permanent Bureau of the Arab Jurists' Federation. in Baghdad in November 1988, the Baath two years previously had approved steps toward democratisation, but the Iran-Iraq War had delayed these. The measures included having a minimum of two candidates for each elective post, allowing non-Baathists to run for

Salient Features

11

political office, and permitting the establishment of other political parties._In Januar y 1989, following an RCC meeting chaired by Saddam Hussein, the formation of a special committee to draft a new constitution was reported; according to unconfirmed reports in November, the new constitution would abolish the RCC. Elections for the National Assembly were also announced, and this body was authorised to investigate government ministries and departments. The elections took place in early April and featured almost 1,000 candidates (among them 62 women, although none was elected) for the 250 seats; only 160 Baath Party members were elected. A numbe r of Baathist candidates also were defeated in the Septem ber Kurdish regional assembly elections. The results of both elections indicated a gradual downgrading of the prominence of the Baath. The RCC, moreover, directed the minister of information to permit the public to voice complaints about government programmes in the government-controlled press; and government officials were ordered to reply to such complaints. The role of Saddam Hussein's family in government affairs was somewhat muted as well. FollOWing the helicopter crash in a sandstorm on May 5 that killed Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law and cousin, Minister of Defence Adnan Khayr Allah Talfah, a technocrat who did not come from Tikrit, replaced Talfah. The internal security apparatus controlled by the Baath Party continued to keep a particularly close check on potential dissidents: these included Kurds, Communists, and members of Shia revival movements. These movements, such as AD Dawah al-Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), commonly referred to as Ad Dawah, sought to propagate fundamentalist Islamic principles and were out of sympathy with Baath socialism. Furthermore, in 1988 in the final stages of the war, both before and after the cease-fire, Iraq was thought to have engaged in chemical warfare against the Kurds. Conceivably, the regime saw an opportunity to instill such fear in the Kurds, a significant percentage of whom had cooperated with Iran during the war, that their dissidence would be discouraged. In the spring of 1989 the government announ ced it would depopulate a border strip thirty kilometres wide along the frontier with Turkey and Iran on the northeast, moving all inhabitants, mainly Kurds, from the area; it began this process in May.

12

Iraq

In December 1988, reports surfaced of dissidence within the army, in which Saddam Hussein lacked a power base. The projected annual Army Day celebrations on Januar y 6, 1989, were cancelled and allegedly a number of senior army officers and some civilian Baathists were executed. In February the regime announ ced that all units of the People's Army would be withdrawn from the front by late March; in July, a further announcement disbanded the threedivision strong 1st Special Army Corps, formed in June 1986, but apparently some time would elapse before soldiers actually returned to civilian status. Such measures were probably occasioned by the continued success of the cease-fire, initiated in August 1988. The cease-fire held, although a number of border incidents occurred, of which the most serious was the Iranian flooding of a sixty-four-kilometre frontier area north-e ast of Basra. Informed observers considered the flooding designed to put pressure on Iraq to return a strip of approximately 1,000 square kilometres of Iranian territory on the steppe beyond Baqubah. On October 27, Iran stoppe d flooding the area, probably as a prelude to a new United Nations (UN) and International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC) mediation effort. The peace talks under UN sponsorship, despite a score of faceto-face meetings, had made little progress as of mid-December. A few exchanges of prisoners of war (POWs), largely of those that were i11 or wounded, had taken place, but both Iraq and Iran sti11 held large numbers of each other's prisoners. Saddam Hussein, who had agreed on October 5, 1988, to the ICRC plan for prisoner repatriation, in March 1989 propos ed in a letter to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cue liar that the UN guarantee the return of the freed POWs to civilian life. Saddam Hussein made his proposal in the hope that this guarante~ would reassure Iran, which held approximately 70,000 Iraqi POWs -where as Iraq held about half that numbe r of Irania nsthat the balance of power would not be disturbed. Iran refused to exchange prisoners or to implement any of the ten points of UN Security Council Resolution 598 dealing with the dispute until Iraq returned all Iranian territory. A major source of disagreement in the peace negotiations was Iraq's insistence on sovereignty over the Shatt ai-Arab, as oppose d to the divided ownership created under the 1975 Algiers Agreement.

Salient Features

13

Failing such_a settlement, Iraq threatened to divert the waters of the Shatt ai-Arab above Basra so that it would rejoin the Gulf at Umm Qasr, a port that Iraq had announced it would deepen and widen. Iraq was eager to have Iran allow the UN to begin clearing sunken ships from the Shatt ai-Arab so as'to permit Iraqi access to the sea. Iraq, meanwhile, had launched a diplomatic campaign to improve its relations with other countries of the region, particularly with Jordan and Egypt. In the last half of 1988, beginning even before he accepted the cease-fire, Saddam Hussein met five times with King Hussain and three times with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak. These high-level meetings included symbolic elements, such as Saddam Hussein's accompanying Hussein on a visit in Baghdad to the graves of Faisal and Ghazi, the Hashimite kings of Iraq, an indication of a conSiderably more moderate Iraqi Baathist attitude toward monarchy than had been evident in the past. The meetings were designed to bolster political and economic support for Iraq (in December 1988 Iraq concluded a US $ 800 million trade agreement with Jordan for 1989), as well as to coordinate Arab policy toward the Palestine Liberation [email protected] and toward Israel, a revision of Iraq's previous rejection of any Arab-Israeli settlement. In addition, Saddam Hussein sought to reassure Saudi Arabia, from which Iraq had received substantial financial support during the IranIraq War, that Iraq had no intention of dominating or of overthrowing the Persian Gulf monarchies. In its relations with the Western world, Iraq also exhibited greater moderation than it had in the 1970s or early 1980s. For example, the United States Department of State indicated in late March 1989, that Iraq had agreed to pay US $ 27.3 million compensation to relatives of the thirty-seven American naval personnel killed in the 1987 Iraqi attack on the USA Stark. During the war with Iran, Iraq had borrowed extensively from France, Britain, Italy, and to a lesser extent from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Japan. These countries would doubtless play significant roles in Iraq's reconstruction and rearmament; in view of their commercial interest, Iraq has succeeded in having its loan repayments rescheduled. For example, Iraq signed an agreement with France in September 1989, allOWing it to repay its indebtedness, due in 1989, over a six-to

14

Iraq

nine-year period, and completing arrangements for Iraq's purchase of fifty Mirage 2000s. Since the cease-fire in August 1988, Iraq has undertaken an extensive rearmament programme involving foreign arms purchases and the intensified development of its domestic arms industry to generate export income as well as to meet domestic needs. The First Baghdad International Exhibition for Military Production took place from April 28 to May 2, 1989, featuring numerous types of Iraqi arms. Among weapons Iraq produced in 1989 were a T-74 tank, called the Lion of Baghdad, and an Iraqi version of the airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft, developed from the Soviet llyushin 11-76. Iraq named the plane the Adnan-1 after late Minister of Defence Adnan Khayr Allah Talfah. A military development that aroused considerable concern in Israel was Iraq's launching from its Al-Anbar space research centre in early December of a forty-eight ton, threestage rocket capable of putting a satellite into space orbit. The minister of industry and military industrialisation also announced that Iraq had developed two 2,000 kilometre range surface-to-surface missiles. Apart from the need to replace lost armaments, the war imposed a heavy reconstruction burden on Iraq. To rebuild the infrastructure and to prevent disaffection among the population of the south who had suffered particularly, the government gave a high priority to the rebuilding of Basra. On June 25, Iraq published the completion of the basic reconstruction of Basra at a cost of approximately US $ 6 billion, stating that work was then beginning on rebuilding AlFaw, which, prior to wartime evacuation, had about 50,000 inhabitants. The government has also announced programmes to create heavy industry, such as new iron and steel and aluminium works, to build another petrochemical complex, to upgrade fertiliser plants, and to reconstruct the offshore oil export terminals at Khor a1-Amaya and Mina al-Bakr. In June 1989, Iraq reported its readiness to accommodate very large crude oil carriers at a new terminal at Mina al-Bakr. Iraq took other economic measures to stimulate oil production and to control inflation. Since the cease-fire, Iraq has pumped nearly its full OPEC quota of 2.8 billion barrels of oil per day. Ir

Salient Features

15

Septem ber 1989, Iraq completed its second crude oil pipeline across Saudi Arabia,with a capacity of 1,650,000 barrels per day, terminating at the Red Sea just south of the Saudi port of Yanbu. These major economic ventures resulted inflation. To counter price rises, the regime has set weekly prices on fruit and vegetables and in late June instituted a price freeze for one year on stateproduced goods and services. Concurrently, it authorised an additional monthly salary of 25 Iraqi dinars (approximately US $ 80) for all civil servants and members of the police and military forces. The negative economic consequences of the war extended beyond the reconstruction of cities and war-damaged infrastructure to include postponed development projects. For example, the massive rural-tourban migration, particularly in southern Iraq, caused by the war had intensified a process begun before the war and had created an urgent need for housing, educational, and health facilities in urban areas. The war also had serious effects on Iraqi society, exacerbating the strained relations of Iraqi Arabs with the leading minority, the Kurds. The war, however, exerted a positive influence by promoting a greater sense of national unity, by diminishing differences between Shias and Sunnis, and by improving the role of women. The aftermath of the war permitted modification of traditional Baathist socialist doctrines so as to encourage greater privatisation of the economy, although the degree to which the government would maintain its reduced interference in the economic sphere remained to be seen. The end of the war left a number of unknown factors facing the Iraqi economy and society. One was the size of the post-war world petroleum deman d and whether Iraq could sell its potential increased output on the international market. An important unanswered social question was whether women who had found employment during the war would return to domestic pursuits and help increase the birth rate as the government hoped. Although women might remain in the work force, presumably, work permits of most foreign workers brought in during the war would be terminated. An immediate result of the war was an attempt by the government at political liberalisation in allowing multiple candidates for elected posts and by offering an amnesty for political, but not for military, offenders. A test of this liberalisation will be· wh~ther the reforms

16

Iraq

promised by the end of 1989-the new constitution, legalisation of political parties other than the Baath, and freedom of the pressoccur. Measures taken reflected only minimal lessening of the personal control of President Saddam Hussein over the decision-making process in all spheres of the country's life. The end of the war left many security issues unresolved. Although the regime had disbanded some armed forces units, would Iraq maintain a strong, well-trained army, posing a potential threat to its neighbours and to Israel? Also, what of the Iraqi POWs returning home after several years' indoctrination in POW camps ih Irancould the government of Saddam Hussein rely on their loyalty? Finally, Iraq faced the problem of its traditional Sunni-Shia dichotomy. The war had demonstrated the ability of Iraqi Shias to put nationalist commitment above sectarian differences, but the influence of fundamentalist Shia Islam in the area, represented by the Iranian regime, would continue to threaten that loyalty.

Nuclear Capabilities For the first time in the history of the safeguards system, a state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty-Iraq-was found to have violated its safeguards agreement with the IAEA by not declaring and submitting nuclear material activities to the Agency's inspection. IAEA teams have been investigating Iraq's nuclear capabilities since May 1991 and following the Gulf War under terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 directed at eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the means to produce and use them. The resolution-which deals with ballistic missiles, biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons--expressly requested the lAEA to inspect known or suspected nuclear sites in Iraq; to remove or otherwise take exclusive control of all material and equipment usable for nuclear weapons; and to develop a comprehensive plan for future monitoring and verification of Iraq's nuclear programme. lAEA teams working in cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq had completed ten on-site inspections as of February 1992. The IAEA Board of Governors declared Iraq in violation of its safeguards agreement at a special session on 18 July, 1991. It strongly condemned the Government of Iraq for not submitting nuclear material and facilities in its clandestine uranium enrichment programme to the

Salient Features

17

IAEA's inspection, and expressed its grave concern about "evident deception and obstruction of IAEA inspectors", who were denied access several times to sites they wished to inspect. In accordance with its Statute, the IAEA transmitted its conclusions to the United Nations Security Council. Iraq officially responded to the Board's action in a letter to the United Nations Secretary General on 23 July, 1991 from its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ahmad Hussain. Criticising the action as "unfair and unbalanced," he said the IAEA "had rushed to pass judgement" and that Iraq had "fully laid bare its nuclear programme." Results reported to the IAEA Board and to the United Nations show a detailed, though not yet complete, picture of Iraq's nuclear programme in the view of inspectors. Inspection teams have reported "conclusive evidence" that Iraq had a "complex, comprehensive nuclear weapons development programme" and had made "continued attempts to conceal the true extent" of that programme. Besides an ambitious and multifaceted uranium enrichment programme, the: picture emerging includes separation of small quantities of plutonium. Enrichment activities were found to be substantial, and included two industrial-scale facilities for producing highly enriched uranium at Tarmiya and Ash Sharkat, using the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) method and a broadlybased programme to produce enriched uranium with ultracentrifuges. Iraq's interest in separating plutonium at its main nuclear research centre at Tuwaitha, albeit on a very limited scale, is considered noteworthy, especially since the activities should have been but were not declared under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Inspections are continuing to uncover the full extent of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, concentrating on sites where sensitive nuclear material or equipment may be installed, used, or stored and on the industrial and technological infrastructure supporting the nuclear programme. Inspectors consider it probable that the full extent of Iraq's infrastructure to manufacture components for uranium enrichment method has yet to be completely revealed. In parallel with inspections, operations have begun to remove highly enriched uranium research reactor fuel assemblies from Iraq by Member States of the Agency. IAEA inspectors further have placed

18

Iraq

under Agency seals a considerable amount of nuclear material and equipment items related to the enrichment programme and other activities. More than 30 sites and hundreds of buildings throughout Iraq have been inspected. Additionally, inspectors have collected thousands of samples of nuclear and other materials for analysis by scientists at the IAEA's analytical laboratories at Seibersdorf near Vienna. Apart from raising questions about the true scope of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, the inspections have intensified discussion about the need to strengthen the existing IAEA safeguards system. At the February 1992 meeting of the IAEA Board, several measures to strengthen the safeguards system were discussed. Worldwide focus following Iraq's non-compliance has raised new questions about whether the system that has operated well for over two decades needs to be modified, expanded and enhanced. The very essence of non-proliferation commitments and their verification is that neighbours, regions and the world at large should be able to rely upon them with confidence and without risking surprises that could have disastrous security implications, Director General Blix told the Board members. Although it is not possible to reduce to zero the risk that undeclared and impermissible nuclear activities could take place without detection, he has proposed ways to considerably reduce the risk. Following the Director General's call to give more "teeth" to the safeguards system, the IAEA Board has reaffirmed the Agency's ability to conduct special inspections of undeclared facilities on which it has information in Member States with comprehensive safeguards agreements, when necessary and appropriate. It also agreed to expanded requirements on the timely provision and use of nuclear facility design information. The Board called on S~3tes to provide preliminary information as early as possible on programmes for new nuclear facilities and activities, as well as modifications to existing facilities as soon as the decision to construct, to authorise construction or to modify a facility has been taken. This information would be updated during project definition, preliminary deSign, construction and commiSSioning phases. The Board also addressed proposals on reporting and verification of the export, import and production of nuclear material, of sensitive

Salient Features

19

equipment and certain non-nuclear materials. The proposals included measures under which States would provide the IAEA with information to enable it to verify that reported inventories in a given State are consistent with the State's declared nuclear activities. The Board will review these proposals further at a later date. 'AEA Activities: Following adoption of Security Council resolutions charging the IAEA with the task of destroying, removing, or rendering harmless nuclear-related facilities, equipment and materials in Iraq, the IAEA developed a plan of action. The initial plan, approved by the Security Council, as well as the first inspections, focused on material and facilities known to exist at the time and were based on Iraqi declarations of 18 and 27 April, 1991. The plan emphasised that inspections should provide additional information and could reveal additional items to be reviewed in subsequent inspections. As time progressed, and with each new inspection, this assumption proved to be accurate as inspectors found evidence indicating that the Iraqi nuclear programme was far more extensive than revealed by Iraq at the time. In fact, Iraq consistently denied the existence of any work related to nuclear weapons development until mid-October, when in the course of the seventh inspection, Iraq acknowledged that research studies in weaponisation had been conducted atAl-Tuwaitha. Iraqi authorities later confirmed what inspection activities revealed to be extensive efforts to conceal or destroy evidence of such a programme. After repeated visits, nuclear weapons experts on the inspection team became convinced that it was the A1-Atheer site that was principally involved in nudear weapons design activities. Iraq maintained that it was a materials production centre until 21 October, when it admitted that the site had in fact been built also to service the weaponisation programme. Throughout the initial phase of implementation of the IAEA plan, Iraq persistently provided only limited acknowledgement of activities until they were exposed through inspections. Evidence of critical areas such as uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development were concealed. Iraqi authorities denied access to inspectors and confiscated documents. Such actions by Iraq created a rather difficult environment.

20

Iraq

IAEA -Plan of Action: The original and prime concern of Agency inspection efforts centred on the fate of the highly enriched uranium reactor fuel, which was known to be in Iraq. This information was based on twice yearly inspections of facilities at the A1-Tuwaitha nuclear research centre, which had been declared under the NPT agreement. Stocks of fresh un-irradiated fuel used for the Soviet IRT 5000 reactor were of vital concern. Efforts began to locate 68 fuel assemblies of 80 per cent enrichment with a U235 content of 10.97 kilograms and 10 assemblies of 36 per cent enrichment with U235 content of 1.27 kilograms. In addition, there was a set of fresh fuel plates for the French Tammuz-2 reactor with an enrichment of 93 per cent and a total UZ35 content of 372 grams. Other highly enriched material included 35.58 kilograms of UZ35, which had been irradiated but could not be readily used in weapons production. However, it was enriched to 93 per cent, which gave it high strategic value. The first IAEA inspection team found that the irradiated material was held at two storage locations: a fuel pond, which contained the reactor core and fuel storage racks; and an emergency storage where fuelled from the Tammuz-2 reactor core and associated pond had been transferred during the Gulf War. This emergency storage, designated "location B", consisted of pits in a farmland area a few miles from the A1-Tuwaitha Nuclear Centre. The irradiated fuel at location B was stored under normally unacceptable conditions and presented severe preparation problems for safe transport. Radiation levels were unusual and because of the lack of water treatment and suitable containers, corrosion problems could not be avoided. In addition, the pond at the IRT 5000 reactor site was filled with debris when the reactor was destroyed in the oombing. This required careful work to clear the pond to enable fuel still there to be verified without contaminating the work area. This work was completed and all the fresh fuelled for the IRT 5000 reactor was removed from Iraq in November 1991. Removal of the strategically most significant material marked an important stage in the implementation of the IAEA plan.

Salient Features

21

A total of some 6 grams of clandestinely produced plutonium was eventually declared by Iraq and was removed during the fifth IAEA inspection. Iraq declared some 400 tons of additional material including natural uranium in many forms ranging from yellowcake to processed chemicals. Much of the material was hidden; it had been moved to secret locations or buried in desert areas. Therefore, it took time to collect the material at a site where it could be identified and verified. This material is now under Agency seals. Negotiations continue with French and British companies to remove the remaining irradiated fuel under IAEA seals still in Iraq. Prior to the first inspection, the only known nuclear facilities in Iraq were those at the A1-Tuwaitha nuclear centre, where nuclear material was being safeguarded. No other facilities were declared in the initial Iraqi statements. As a result of the second inspecti9n, the Tarmiya industrial centre was revealed as a site for the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), a facility capable of producing nuclearweapons-usable material. This was a large site still in the installation stage, although some production units had begun operation and a small quantity of low enriched uranium had been produced. Iraq declared to the first team that the site was a plant for manufacturing transformers, an implausible claim. When its true nature was established, later inspections showed that extensive deception had taken place, including laying fresh concrete to hide evidence of the machinery that had been installed and walls which had been painted to hide the presence of uranium. In fact, Iraqi authorities eventually admitted that a facility at Ash Sharkat, which had initially been declared as a non-nuclear plastic coating plant, had been intended as a duplicate of the plant at Tarmiya. In addition to its EMIS and centrifuge programmes, Iraq conducted extensive deception to hide the true nature of the chemical plant at Mosul which produced the uranium oxide and tetrachloride material , used as feed material in the enrichment programme. The IAEA plan gave priority to identifying research, development, support and manufacturing facilities and materials used in irradiated fuel reprocessing and isotopic enrichment. Following each Agency inspection, the extent of facilities and equipment revealed has been reported.

22

Iraq

The major discovery has been that of the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) programme and its extent. Iraq took extensive measures to hide the existence of the process. Prior to the first inspection, most of the equipment for the EMIS process had been buried, excavated and moved between various sites by convoy to hide it from detection. The second inspection team located the equipment, but was refused access a number of times to the military camps in which it was housed. Photographs were taken as a convoy attempted to escape by a back entrance while inspectors were denied access at the front gate. In this incident, warning shots were fired by Iraqi personnel. The EMIS equipment has now been largely accounted for. Remaining parts have been collected at one site and destruction has proceeded steadily during recent inspections. Destruction activities have included cutting the magnet pole pieces, the vacuum chambers and associated equipment with special plasma torches. Equipment for a centrifuge programme has also been destroyed or removed. Particularly, some rotor and bearing parts have been removed for Agency analysis to determine the extent and the nature of the programme, while most of the centrifuge components have been crushed. Special machines used to produce the centrifuges have been destroyed or rendered useless by cutting off key parts. . The Al-Tuwaitha nuclear centre was extensively equipped with "hot cells" for dealing with radioactive material, although many were severely damaged during bombing. However, concern remained about possible reconstruction and future use of the undamaged cells. Therefore, during the seventh inspection, these cells were rendered harmless by cutting off the manipulator arms and control wires. Associated glove boxes were rendered useless by pouring cement into them. As a long-term measure, epoxy resin was used along with cement to render harmless the mixers-settlers. The seventh and eighth inspections revealed special equipment essential to the nuclear weaponisation programme for warhead development and assembly as distinct from nuclear material production. Two special video cameras ("streak cameras") were

Salient Features

23

removed from Iraq and other equipment has been sealed pending decisions on removal, destruction or monitoring. Country's Response

Inspections and declarations revealed in a rather piecemeal fashion that Iraq had processed material to chemical forms suitable for enrichment and for production of plutonium, material that Iraq was required to declare to the Agency in accordance with its safeguards agreement as well as by resolution 687. The existence of gram quantities of plutonium, which had been clandestinely separated from irradiated fuel at the AI-Tuwaitha nuclear centre, had been revealed. In addition, fuel assemblies had been fabricated from previously undeclared stocks of natural uranium oxide. Even after the Iraqi authorities gave detailed accounts of the EMIS programme, they denied any major progress in a centrifuge enrichment programme. As evidence accumulated, admissions were made of a small number of centrifuges and components as part of early stages of a research and development programme, and then of the intention to build a small (100 machine) cascade. Even when a facility deemed by experts as being capable of producing a few thousand machines a year was located, Iraq denied such intentions. The Iraqi authorities have lately shown more openness in discussions about the programme where some important inconsistencies remained from previous inspections and many issues were resolved including details as to the progress, objectives, and dimensions of the programme. In January 1992, an inspection team visited Iraq to discuss key components sufficient to produce a few thousand centrifuges, which had been imported. As a result of the meetings, which took place in the presence of technical experts from both sides, the Iraqi authorities acknowledged the procurement of these materials and components and explained that these supplies had been destroyed or "rendered harmless" by melting and crushing before the beginning of Agency inspections under resolution 687. The Iraqi authorities also acknowledged the procurement of 100 tons of special high tensile steel (maraging steel) sufficient to produce a few thousand-centrifuge rotors and rotor internal fittings

24

Iraq

as well as the procurement of several thousand aluminium forgings for the vacuum housing flanges. The Iraqi authorities said that these materials also had been destroyed or rendered harmless by melting before inspections began. Iraq's response to IAEA inspection work has largely followed a pattern of denial of clandestine activities until the evidence became overwhelming, followed by cooperation. As a consequence of this behaviour it is not yet possible to be confident that the full extent of prohibited nuclear activities in Iraq has in fact been disclosed. Therefore, Agency inspection and monitoring efforts in Iraq will continue to assure that no re-emergence of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme occurs.

3 History Iraq, a republic since the 1958 coup d'etat that ended the reign of King Faisal 11, became a sovereign, independent state in 1932. Althou~h the modern state, the Republic of Iraq, is quite young, the history of the land and its people dates back more than 5,000 years. Indeed, Iraq contains the world's richest known archaeological sites. Here, in ancient Mesopotamia (the land between the rivers), the first civilization-that of Summer-appeared in the Near East. Despite the millennium separating the two epochs, Iraqi history displays a continuity shaped by adaptation to the ebbings and flowings of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (in Arabic, the Dijlis and Furat, respectively). Allowed to flow unchecked, the rivers wrought destruction in terrible floods that inundated whole towns. When irrigation dikes and other waterworks controlled the rivers, the land became extremely fertile. The dual nature of the Tigris and the Euphrates-their potential to be destructive or productive-has resulted in two distinct legacies found throughout Iraqi history. On the one hand, Mesopotamia's plentiful water resources and lush river valleys allowed for the production of surplus food that served as the basis for the civilising trend begun at Summer and preserved by rulers such as Hammurabi (1792-1750 BC), Cyrus (550-530 BC), Darius (520-485 BC), Alexander (336-323 BC), and the Abbasids (750-1258 AD). The ancient cities of Summer, Babylon, and Assyria all were 'located in what is now Iraq. Surplus food production and joint irrigation and flood control efforts facilitated the growth of a powerful and expanding

26

Iraq

state. Mesopotamia could also be an extremely threatening environment, however, driving its peoples to seek security from the vicissitudes of nature. Throughout Iraqi history, various groups have formed autonomous, self-contained social units. Allegiance to ancient religiOUS deities at Ur and Eridu, membership in the Shia Ali (or party of Ali, the small group of followers that supported Ali ibn Abu Talib as . rightful leader of the Islamic community in the seventh century), residence in the asnaf (guilds) or the mahallat (city quarters) of Baghdad under the Ottoman Turks, membership in one of a multitude of tribes-such efforts to build autonomous security-providing structures have exerted a powerful centrifugal force on Iraqi culture. Two other factors that have inhibited political centralisation are the absence of stone and Iraq's geographic location as the eastern flank of the Arab world. For much of Iraqi history, the lack of stone has severely hindered the building of roads. As a result, many parts of the country have remained beyond government control. Also, because it borders non-Arab Turkey and Iran and because of the great agricultural potential of its river valley, Iraq has attracted waves of ethnically diverse migrations. Although this influx of people has enriched Iraqi culture, it also has disrupted the country's internal balance and has led to deep-seated schisms. Throughout Iraqi history, the conflict between political fragmentation and centralisation has been reflected in the struggles among tribes and cities for the food-producing flatlands of the river valleys. When a central power neglected to keep the waterworks in repair, land fell into disuse, and tribes attacked settled peoples for precious and scarce agricultural commodities. For nearly 600 years, between the collapse of the Abbasid Empire in the thirteenth century and the waning years of the Ottoman era in the late nineteenth century, government authority was tenuous and tribal Iraq was, in effect, autonomous. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Iraq's disconnected, and often antagonistic, ethnic, religious, and tribal social groups professed little or no allegiance to the central government. As a result, the all-consuming concern of contemporary Iraqi history has been the forging of a nation-state out of this diverse and conflictridden social structure and the concomitant transformation of parochial loyalties, both tribal and ethnic, into a national identity.

History

27

Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, the tanzimat reforms (an administrative and legal reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire), the emergence of private property, and the tying of Iraq to the world capitalist market severely altered Iraq's social structure. Tribal sheikhs traditionally had provided both spiritual leadership and tribal security. Land reform and increasing links with the West transformed many sheikhs into profit-seeking landlords, whose tribesmen became impoverished sharecroppers. Moreover, as Western economic penetration increased, machine-made British textiles displaced the products of Iraq's once-prosperous craftsmen. During the twentieth century, as the power of tribal Iraq waned, Baghdad benefited from the rise of a centralised governmental apparatus, a burgeoning bureaucracy, increased educational opportunities, and the growth of the oil industry. The transformation of the urban-tribal balance resulted in a massive rural-to-urban migration. The disruption of existing parochial loyalties and the rise of new class relations based on economics fuelled frequent tribal rebellions and urban uprisings during much of the twentieth century. Iraq's social fabric was in the throes of a de-stabilising transition in the first half of the twentieth century. At the same time, because of its foreign roots, the Iraqi political system suffered from a severe legitimacy crisis. Beginning with its League of Nations Mandate in 1920, the British government had laid out the institutional framework for Iraqi government and politics. Britain imposed a Hashimite monarchy, defined the territorial limits of Iraq with little correspondence to natural frontiers or traditional tribal and ethnic settlements, and influenced the writing of a constitution and the structure of parliament. The British also supported narrowly based groups-such as the tribal sheikhs--over the growing, urban-based nationalist movement, and resorted to military force when British interests were threatened, as in the 1941 Rashid AIi coup. Between 1918 and 1958, British policy in Iraq had far reaching effects. The majority of Iraqis were divorced from the political process, and the process itself failed to develop procedures for resolving internal conflicts other than rule by decree and the frequent use of repressive measures. Also, because the formative experiences of Iraq's post 1958 political leadership centred on clandestine opposition activity, decision-making and government activity in general have

28

Iraq

been veiled in secrecy. Furthermore, because the country lacks deeply rooted national political institutions, a small elite, the members of which are often bound by close family or tribal ties, frequently has monopolised political power. Between the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and the emergence of Saddam Hussein in the mid-1970s, Iraqi history was a chronicle of conspiracies, coups, countercoups, and fierce Kurdish uprisings. Beginning in 1975, however, with the signing of the Algiers Agreement-an agreement between Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran that effectively ended Iranian military support for the Kurds in Iraq-Saddam Hussein was able to bring Iraq an unprecedented period of stability. He effectively used rising oil revenues to fund large-scale development projects, to increase public sector employment, and significantly to improve education and health care. This tied increasing numbers of Iraqis to the ruling Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party. As a result, for the first time in contemporary Iraqi history, an Iraqi leader successfully forged a national identity out of Iraq's diverse social structure. Saddam Hussein's achievements and Iraq's general prosperity, however, did not survive long. In September 1980, Iraqi troops crossed the border into Iran, embroiling the country in a costly war. Contemporary Iraq occupies the territory that historians traditionally have considered the site of the earliest civilizations of the ancient Near East. Geographically, modern Iraq corresponds to the Mesopotamia of the Old Testament and of other, older, Near Eastern texts. In Western mythology and religious tradition, the land of Mesopotamia in the ancient period was a land of lush vegetation, abundant wildlife, and copious if unpredictable water resources. As such, at a very early date it attracted people from neighbouring, but less hospitable areas. By 6000 BC, Mesopotamia had been settled, chiefly by migrants from the Turkish and Iranian highlands. The civilized life that emerged at Summer was shaped by two conflicting factors: the unpredictability of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which at any time could unleash devastating floods that wiped out entire peoples, and the extreme fecundity of the river valleys, caused by centuries-old deposits of soil. Thus, while the river valleys of southern Mesopotamia attracted migrations of neighbouring peoples and made possible, for the first time in history, the growing of surplus

History

29

food, the volatility of the rivers necessitated a form of collective management to protect the marshy, low-lying land from flooding. As surplus production increased and as collective management became more advanced, a process of urbanisation evolved and Sumerian civilization took root.

Early History Summer is the ancient name for southern Mesopotamia. Historians are divided on when the Sumerians arrived in the area, but they agree that the population of Summer was a mixture of linguistic and ethnic groups that included the earlier inhabitants of the region. Sumerian culture mixed foreign and local elements. The Sumerians were highly innovative people who responded creatively to the challenges of the changeable Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Many of the great Sumerian legacies, such as writing, irrigation, the wheel, astronomy, and literature, can be seen as adaptive responses to the great rivers. The Sumerians were the first people known to have devised a scheme of written representation as a means of communication. From the earliest writings, which were pictograms (simplified pictures on clay tablets), the Sumerians gradually created cuneiform-a way of arranging impressions stamped on clay by the wedge-like section of a chopped-off reed. The use of combinations of the same basic wedge shape to stand for phonetic, and possibly for syllabic, elements provided more flexible communication than the pictogram. Through writing, the Sumerians were able to pass on complex agricultural techniques to successive generations; this led to marked improvements in agricultural production. Another important Sumerian legacy was the recording of literature. The most famous Sumerian epic and the one that has survived in the most nearly complete form is the epic of Gilgamesh. The story of Gilgamesh, who actually was king of the city-state of Uruk in approximately 2700 BC, is a moving story of the ruler's deep sorrow at the death of his friend and of his consequent search for immortality. Other central themes Qf the stOry are a devastating floo,d and the tenuous nature of man's existence. Laden with complex abstractions and emotional expressions, the epic of Gilgamesh reflects the intellectual sophistication of the Sumerians, and it has served as the prototype for all Near Eastern inundation stories.

30

Iraq

The precariousness of existence in southern Mesopotamia also led to a highly developed sense of religion. Cult centres such as Eridu, dating back to 5000 BC, served as important centres of pilgrimage and devotion even before the rise of Summer. Many of the most important Mesopotamian cities emerged in areas surrounding the pre-Sumerian cult centres, thus reinforcing the close relationship between religion and government. The Sumerians were pantheistic; their gods more or less personified local elements and natural forces. In exchange for sacrifice and adherence to an elaborate ritual, the gods of ancient Summer were to provide the individual with security and prosperity. A powerful priesthood emerged to oversee ritual practices and to intervene with the gods. Sumerian religious beliefs also had important political aspects. Decisions relating to land rentals, agricultural questions, trade, commercial relations, and war were determined by the priesthood, because all property belonged to the gods. The priests ruled from their temples, called ziggurats, which were essentially artificial mountains of sunbaked brick, built with outside staircases that tapered toward a shrine at the top. Because the well being of the community depended upon close observation of natural phenomena, scientific or protoscientific activities occupied much of the priests' time. For example, the Sumerians believed that a number represented each of the gods. The number sixty, sacred to the god An, was their basic unit of calculation. The minutes of an hour and the notational degrees of a circle were Sumerian concepts. The highly developed agricultural system and the refined irrigation and water-control systems that enabled Summer to achieve surplus production also led to the growth of large cities. The most important city-states were Uruk, Eridu, Kish, Lagash, Agade, Akshak, Larsa, and Ur (birthplace of the prophet Abraham). The emergence of urban life led to further technological advances. Lacking stone, the Sumerians made marked improvements in brick technology, making possible the construction of very large buildings such as the famous ziggurat of Ur. Summer also pioneered advances in warfare technology. By the middle of the third millennium BC, the Sumerians had developed the wheeled chariot. At approximately the same time, the Sumerians discovered that tin and copper when smelted together produced bronze-a new, more durable, and much

History

31

harder Tl:letal. The wheeled chariot and bronze weapon s became increasingly important as the Sumerians developed the institution of kingship and as individual city-states began to vie for supremacy. Historians generally divide Sumerian history into three stages. In the first stage, which extended roughly from 3360 BC, to 2400 BC, the most important political development was the emergence of kings who, unlike the first priestly rulers, exercised distinct political rather than religious authority. Another important feature of this period was the emergence of warring Sumerian city-states, which fought for control of the river valleys in lower Mesopotamia. During the second phase, which lasted from 2400 BC, to 2200 BC, Sargon I, king of the Semitic city of Akkad, conquered Summe r in approximately 2334 BC Sargon was the world's first empire-builder, sending his troops as far as Egypt and Ethiopia. He attempted to establish a unified empire and to end the hostilities among the city-states. Sargon's rule introdu ced a new level of political organis ation that was characterised by an even more clear-cut separation between religious authority and secular authority. To ensure his supremacy, Sargon created the first conscripted army, a development related to the need to mobilise large numbers of labourers for irrigation and flood-control works. Akkadian strength was boosted by the invention of the composite bow, a new weapon made of strips of wood and horn. Despite their military prowess, Akkadian hegemony over southern Mesopotamia lasted only 200 years. The Guti, a mountain people from the east, then overthrew Sargon's great grandson. The fall of the Akkadians and the subsequent re-emergence of Summe r under the king of Ur, who defeated the Guti, ushered in the third phase of Sumerian history. In this final phase, which was characterised by a synthesis of Sumerian and Akkadian cultures, the king of Ur establi shed hegem ony over much of Mesop otamia . Sumer ian supremacy, however, was on the wane. By 2000 BC, the combined attacks of the Amorites, a Semitic people from the west, and the Elamites, a Caucasian people from the east, had destroyed the Third Dynasty of Ur. The invaders nevertheless carried on the SumeroAkkadian cultural legacy. The Amorites established cities on the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers and made Babylon, a town to the north, their capital. During the time of their sixth ruler, King Hammurabi (1792- 1750 BC),

32

Iraq

Babylonian rule encompassed a huge area covering most of the Tigris-Euphrates river valley from Summe r and the Persian Gulf in the south to Assyria in the north. To rule over such a large area, Hammurabi devised an elaborate administrative structure. His greatest achievement, however, was the issuance of a law code designed "to cause justice to prevail in the country, to destroy the wicked and the evil, that the strong may not oppress the weak." The Code of Hammurabi, not the earliest to appear in the Near East but certainly the most complete, dealt with land tenure, rent, the position of women, marriage, divorce, inheritance, contracts, control of public order, administration of justice, wages, and labour conditions. In Hammurabi's legal code, the civilising trend begun at Summ er had evolved to a new level of complexity. The sophisticated legal principles contained in the code refled a highly advanc ed civilization in which social interaction extended far beyond the confines of kinship. The large number of laws pertaining to commerce reflects a diversified economic base and an extensive trading network. In politics, Hamm urabi's code is evidence of a more pronou nced separation between religious and secular authority than had existed in ancient Summer. In addition to Hammurabi's legal code, the Babylonians made other important contributions, notably to the science of astronomy, and they increased the flexibility of cuneiform by developing the pictogram script so that it stood for a syllable rather than an individual word. Beginning in approximately 1600 BC, Indo-European-speaking tribes invaded India; other tribes settled in Iran and in Europe,. One of these groups, the Hittites, allied itself with the Kassites, a people of unknown origins. Together, they conquered and destroyed Babylon. Hittite power subsequently waned, but, in the first half of the fourteenth century BC, the Hittites re-emerged, controlling an area that stretched from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. The military success of the Hittites has been attributed to their monopoly in iron production and to their use of the chariot. Nevertheless, in the twelfth century BC, the Hittites were destroy~d, and no great military power occupied Mesopotamia until the ninth century BC. One of the cities that flourished in the middle of the Tigris Valley during this period was that of Ashur, named after the sun-god of the Assyrians. The Assyrians were Semitic speakers who occupied Babylo~

History

33

for a brief period in the thirteenth century BC. Invasions of ironproducing peoples into the Near East and into the Aegean region in approximately 1200 BC, disrupted the indigenous empires of Mesopotamia, but eventually the Assyrians were able to capitalise on the new alignments of power in the region. Because of what has been called "the barbarous and unspeakable cruelty of the Assyrians," the names of such Assyrian kings as Ashurnasirpal (883-859 BC), TiglathPileser III (745-727 BC), Sennacherib (704-681 BC), and Ashurbanipal (669-626 BC) continue to evoke images of powerful, militarily brilliant, but brutally savage conquerors. The Assyrians began to expand to the west in the early part of the ninth century BC, by 859, they had reached the Mediterranean Sea, where they occupied Phoenician cities. Damascus and Babylon fell to the next generations of Assyrian rulers. During the eighth century BC, the Assyrians control over their empire appeared tenuous, but Tiglath-Pileser III seized the throne and rapidly subdued Assyria's neighbours, captured Syria, and crowned himself king of Babylon. He developed a highly proficient war machine by creating a permanent standing army under the administration of a well-organised bureaucracy. Sennacherib built a new capital, Nineveh, on the Tigris River, destroyed Babylon (where citizens had risen in revolt), and made Judah a vassal state. In 612 BC, revolts ~f subject peoples combined with the allied forces of two new kingdoms, those of the Medes and the Chaldeans (Neo-Babylonians), effectively extinguished Assyrian power. Nineveh was razed. The hatred that the Assyrians inspired, particularly for their policy of wholesale resettlement of subject peoples, was sufficiently great to ensure that few traces of Assyrian rule remained two years later. The Assyrians had used the visual arts to depict their many conquests, and Assyrian friezes, executed in minute detail, continue to be the best artifacts of Assyrian civilization. The Chaldeans became heir to Assyrian power in 612 BC, and they conquered formerly Assyrian-held lands in Syria and Palestine. King Nebuchadnezzar (605-562 BC) conquered the kingdom of Judah, and he destroyed Jerusalem in 586 BC Conscious of their ancient past, the Chaldeans sought to re-establish Babylon as the most magnificent city of the Near East. It was during the Chaldean period that the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, famed as one of the Seven

34

Iraq

Wonders of the Ancient World, were created. Because of an estrangement of the priesthood from the king, however, the monarchy was severely weakened, and it was unable to withstand the rising power of Achaemenid Iran. In 539 BC, Babylon fell to Cyrus the Great (550-530 BC). In addition to incorporating Babylon into the Iranian empire, Cyrus the Great released the Jews who had been held in captivity there.

Victory of Islam Iraq was conqured by Muslims in the reign of second Caliph Hazrat Umar. The most critical problem that faced the young Islamic community revolved around the rightful successor to the office of Caliph. Uthman, the third Caliph, had encountered opposition during and after his election to the Caliphate. Ali ibn Abu Talib, the Prophet Muhammad's (Pbuh) cousin and son-in-law (by virtue of his marrying the Prophet's (Pbuh) only surviving child, Fatima), had been the other contender. Ali's pietism was disquieting to certain vested-interest groups, who perceived the more conservative Uthman as more likely to continue the policies of the previous Caliph, Umar. Discontent increased, as did Ali's formal opposition to Uthman based on religious grounds. AIi claimed that innovations had been introduced that were not consonant with Quranic directives. Economics was the key factor for most of the members of the opposition, but this, too, acquired religious overtones. As a result of the rapid military expansion of the Islamic movement, financial troubles beset Uthman. Many beduins had offered themselves for military service in Iraq and in Egypt. Their abstemious and hard life contrasted with the leisured life of Arabs in the Hijaz (the western part of the Arabian Peninsula), who were enjoying the benefits of conquest. When these volunteer soldiers questioned the allocation of lands and the distribution of revenues and pensions, they found a ready spokesman in AIL Groups of malcontents eventually left Iraq and Egypt to seek redress at Medina in the Hijaz. Uthman promised reforms, but on their return journey the rebels interce;>ted a message to the governor of Egypt commanding that they must be punished. In response, the rebels besieged. Uthman in his home in Medina, eventually slaying

History

35

him. The Muslim world was shaken. AIi, who had not taken part in the siege, was chosen Caliph. Two opponents of Ali enlisted Aishah, a widow of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), to join them in accusing Ali and demanding retribution for Uthman's death. When the three went to Iraq to seek support for their cause, Ali's forces engaged theirs near Basra. Aishah's two companions were killed, and Ali was clearly victorious. Muawiyah, a kinsman of Uthman and the governor of Syria, then refused to recognise Ali, and he demanded the right to avenge his relative's death. In what was perhaps the most important battle fought between Muslims, Ali's forces met Muawiyah's at the Plain of Siffin near the largest b.end of the Euphrates River. Muawiyah's forces, seeing that they were losing, proposed arbitration. Accordingly, two arbitrators were chosen to decide whether Uthman's death had been deserved. Such a decision would give his slayer status as an executioner rather than as a murderer and would remove the claims of Uthman's relatives. When the arbitrators decided against Ali, he protested that the verdict was not in accordance with Shariah (Islamic law) and declared his intention to resume the battle. Ali's decision, however, came too late for the more extreme of his followers. Citing the Quranic injunction to fight rebels until they obey, these followers insisted that Ali was morally wrong to submit to arbitration. In doing so, they claimed, he bowed to the judgement of men-as opposed to the judgement of God that would have been revealed by the outcome of the battle. These dissenters, known as Kharajites (from the verb kharaja-to go out), withdrew from battle, an action that had far-reaching political effects on the Islamic community in the centuries ahead. Before resuming his dispute with Muawiyah, Ali appealed to the Kharajites; when they rejected the appeal, he massacred many of them. Furious at his treatment of pious Muslims, most of Ali's forces deserted him. He was forced to return to Al-Kufah-about 150 kilometres south of Baghdad-and to await developments within the Islamic community. A number of Islamic leaders met at Adruh in present-day Jordan, and the same two arbitrators from Siffin devised a solution to the succession problem. At last it was announced that neither Ali nor Muawiyah should be Caliph; Abd Allah, a son of Umar, was proposed. The meeting terminated in confusion, however, and no final decision

36

Iraq

was reached., Both AIi and Muawiyah bided their time in their separate governorships: Muawiyah, who had been declared Caliph by some of his supporters, in newly conquered Egypt, and Ali, in Iraq. Muawiyah fomented discontent among those only partially committed to AIL While praying in a mosque at AI-Kufah, AIi was murdered by a Kharajite in 661 AD. The ambitious Muawiyah induced AIi's eldest son, Hasan, to renounce his claim to the Caliphate. Hasan died shorHy thereafter, probably of consumption, but the Shias later claimed that he had been poisoned and dubbed him "Lord of All Martyrs." Ali's unnatural death ensured the future of the Shia movement-Ali's followers returned to his cause-and quickened its momentum. With the single exception of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), no man has had a greater impact on Islamic history. The Shia declaration of faith is: "There is no God but God; Muhammad (Pbuh) is his Prophet and Ali is the Saint of God."

Umayyad Caliphate Muawiyah was declared Caliph. Thus began the Umayyad Dynasty, which had its capital at Damascus. Yazid I, Muawiyah's son and his successor in 680 AD, was unable to contain the opposition that his strong father had vigorously quelled. Hussein, Ali's second son, refused to pay homage and fled to Mecca, where he was asked tl) lead the Shias-mostIy Iraqis-in a revolt against Yazid I. Ubaidullah, governor of AI-Kufah, discovered the plot and sent detachments to dissuade him. At Karbala, in Iraq, Hussein's band of 200 men and women refused to surrender and finally were cut down by a force of perhaps 4,000 Umayyad troops. Yazid I received Hussein's head, and Hussein's death on the tenth of Muharram (October 10, 680 AD) continues to be observed as a day of mourning for all Shias. Ali's burial place at AI-Najaf, about 130 kilometres south of Baghdad, and Hussein's at Karbala, about 80 kilometres south-west of Baghdad, are holy places of pilgrimage for Shias, many of whom feel that a pilgrimage to both sites is equal to a pilgrimage to Mecca. The importance of these events in the history of Islam cannot be overemphasised. They created the greatest of the Islamic schisms, between the party of Ali (the Shiat Ali, known in the West as Shias or Shias) and the upholders of Muawiyah (the Ahl-us-Sunna, the People of the Sunna-those who follow Muhammad's (Pbuh) custom and example) or the Sunnis. The Sunnis believe they are the followers

History

37

of orthodoxy. The ascendancy of the Umayyads and the events at Karbala, in contrast, led to a Shia Islam which, although similar to Sunni Islam in its basic tenets, maintains important doctrinal differences that have had pervasive effects on the Shia world view. Most notably, Shias have viewed themselves as the opposition in Islam, the opponents of privilege and power. They believe that after the death of Ali and the ascension of the "usurper" Umayyads to the Caliphate, Islam took the wrong path; therefore, obedience to existing temporal authority is not obligatory. Furthermore, in sacrificing his own life for a just cause, Hussein became the archetypal role model who inspired generations of Shias to fight for social equality and for economic justice. During his Caliphate, Ali had made Al-Kufah his capital. The transfer of power to Syria and to its capital at Damascus aroused envy among Iraqis. The desire to regain pre-eminence prompted numerous rebellions in Iraq against Umayyad rule. Consequently, only men of unusual ability were sent to be governors of Al-Basrah and Al-Kufah. One of the most able was Ziyad ibn Abi Abihi, who was initially governor of Al-Basrah and later also of Al-Kufah. Ziyad divided the residents of Al-Kufah into four groups (not based on tribal affiliation) and appointed a leader for each one. He also sent 50,000 beduins to Khorasan (in north-eastern Iran), the easternmost province of the empire, which was within the jurisdiction of Al-Basrah and Al-Kufah. The Iraqis once again became restive when rival claimants for the Umayyad Caliphate waged civil war between 687 AD, and 692 AD Ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi al-Hajjaj was sent as provincial governor to restore order in Iraq in 694 AD. He pacified Iraq and encouraged both agriculture and education.

Abbasid Caliphate Many unsuccessful Iraqi and Iranian insurrectionists had fled to Khorasan, in addition to the 50,000 beduins who had been sent there by Ziyad. There, at the city of Merv a faction that supported Abd al-Abbas (a descendant of the Prophet's (Pbuh) uncle), was able to organise the rebels under the battle cry, "the House of Hashim." Hashim, the Prophet Muhammad's (Pbuh) grandfather, was an ancestor of both the Shia line and the Abbas line, and the Shias, therefore, actively supported the Hashimite leader, Abu Muslim.

38

Iraq

In 747 AD, Abu Muslim's army attacked the Umayyads and occupied Iraq. In 750 AD, Abd al-Abbas (not a Shia) was established in Baghdad as the first Caliph of the Abbasid Dynasty. The Abbasids, whosl1line was called "the blessed dynasty" by it supporters, presented themselves to the people as divine-right rulers who would initiate a new era of justice and prosperity. Their political poliCies were, however, remarkably similar to those of the Umayyads. During the reign of its first seven caliphs, Baghdad became a centre of power where Arab and Iranian cultures mingled to produce a blaze of philosophical, scientific, and literary glory. This era is remembered throughout the Arab world, and by Iraqis in particular, as the pinnacle of the Islamic past. It was the second Abbasid Caliph, Al-Mansur (754-75 AD), who decided to build a new capital, surrounded by round walls, near the site of the Sassanid village of city of Baghdad. Within fifty years, the population outgrew the city walls as people thronged to the capital to become part of the Abbasids' enormous bureaucracy or to engage in trade. Baghdad became a vast emporium of trade linking Asia and the Mediterranean. By the reign of Mansur's grandson, Harun ar Rasheed (786-806 AD), Baghdad was second in size only to Constantinople. Baghdad was able to feed its enormous population and to export large quantities of grain because the political administration had realised the importance of controlling the flows of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers. The Abbasids reconstructed the city's canals, dikes, and reservoirs, and drained the swamps around Baghdad, freeing the city of malaria. Harun-ar-Rasheed, the Caliph of the Arabian Nights, actively supported intellectual pursuits, but the great flowering of Arabic culture that is credited to the Abbasids reached its apogee during the reign of his son, Al-Mamun (813-33 AD). After the death of Harun ar Rasheed, his sons, Amin and Al-Mamun, quarrelled over the succeSsion to the Caliphate. Their dispute soon erupted into civil war. Amin was backed by the Iraqis, while Al-Mamun had the support of the Iranians. Al-Mamun also had the support of the garrison at Khorasan and thus was able to take Baghdad in 813 AD. Although Sunni Muslims, the Abbasids had hoped that by astute and stern rule they would be able to contain Shia resentment at yet another Sunni dynasty. The Iranians, many of whom were Shias, had hoped that

History

39

AI-Mamun would make his capital in their own country, possibly at Merv. AI-Mamun, however, eventually realised that the Iraqi Shias would never countenance the loss of prestige and economic power if they no longer had the capital. He decided to enter his rule in Baghdad. Disappointed, the Iranians began to break away from Abbasid control. A series of local dynasties appeared: the Tahirids (821873 AD), the Suffarids (867-1495), and the Samanids (819-1005). The same process was repeated in the West: Spain broke away in 756 AD, Morocco in 788 AD, Tunisia in 800 AD, and Egypt in 868 AD. In Iraq, there was trouble in the south. In 869, Ali ibn Muhammad (Ali the Abominable) founded a state of black slaves known as Zanj. The Zanj brought a large part of southern Iraq and south-western Iran under their control and in the process enslaved many of their former masters. The Zanj Rebellion was finally put down in 883 AD, but not before it had caused great suffering. The Sunni-Shia split had weakened the effectiveness of Islam as a single unifying force and as a sanction for a single political authority. Although the intermingling of various linguistic and cultural groups contributed greatly to the enrichment of Islamic civilization, it also was a source of great tension and contributed to the decay of Abbasid power. In addition to the cleavages between Arabs and Iranians and between Sunnis and Shias, the growing prominence of Turks in military and in political affairs gave cause for discontent and rivalry at court. Nomadic, Turkic-speaking warriors had been moving out of Central Asia into Transoxiana (i.e., across the Oxus River) for more than a millennium. The Abbasid Caliphs began importing Turks as slave-warriors (Mamluks) early in the ninth century. The imperial palace guards of the Abbasids were Mamluks who were originally commanded by free Iraqi officers. By 833 AD, however, Mamluks themselves were officers and gradually, because of their greater military proficiency and dedication, they began to occupy high positions at court. The mother of Caliph Mutasim (who came to power in 833 AD) had been a Turkish slave, and her influence was substantial. By the tenth century, the Turkish commanders, no longer checked . by their Iranian and Arab rivals at court, were able to appoint and depose Caliphs. For the first time, the political power of the Caliphate

40

Iraq

was fully separat ed from its religious function. The Mamluks continued to permit Caliphs to come to power because of the importance of the office as a symbol for legitimising claims to authority. In 945 AD, after subjugating western Iran, a military family known as the Buwayhids occupied Baghdad. Shias from the Iranian province of Daylam south of the Caspian Sea, the Buwayhids continued to permit Sunni Abbasid Caliphs to ascend to the throne. The humiliation of the Caliphate at being manipulated by Shias, and by Iranian ones at that, was immense. The Buwayhids were ousted in 1055 by anothe r group of Turkic speakers, the Seljuks. The Seljuks were the ruling clan of the Kinik group of the Oghuz (or Ghuzz) Turks, who lived north of the Oxus River. Their leader, Tughril Beg, turned his warriors first against the local ruler in Khorasan. He moved south and then west, conquering but not destroying the cities in his path. In 1055, the Caliph in Baghd ad gave Tughril Beg robes, gifts, and the title, "King of the East." Because the Seljuks were Sunnis, their rule was welcomed in Baghdad. They treated the Caliphs with respect, but the latter continued to be only figureheads. There were several lines of Seljuks. The main line, ruling from Baghdad, controlled the area from the Bosporus to Chinese Turkestan until approximately 1155. The Seljuks continued to expand their territories, but they were content to let Iraqis and Iranians simply pay tribute while administering and ruling their own lands. One Seljuk, Malek Shah, extended Turkish rule to the countries of the eastern Mediterranean, Asia Minor, and to parts of Arabia. During his rule, Iraq and Iran enjoyed a cultural and scientific renaissance. This success is largely attributed to Malek Shah's brilliant Iranian vizier, Nizam al-Mulk, one of the most skilful administrators in history. An astronomical observatory was established in which Umar (Omar) Khayyam did much of his experimentation for a new calendar, and religious schools were built in all the major towns. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, one of the greatest Islamic theologians, and other eminen t scholars were brought to the Seljuk capital at Baghda d and were encour aged and suppor ted in their work. After the death of Malek Shah in 1092, Seljuk power disintegrated. Petty dynasties appear ed throughout Iraq and Iran, and rival claimants to Seljuk rule dispatched each other. Between 1118 and 1194, nine

History

41

Seljuk sultans ruled Baghdad; only one died a natural death. The atabegs, who initially had been majordomos for the Seljuks, began to assert themselves. Several founded local dynasties. An atabeg originated the Zangid Dynasty (1127-1222), with its seat at Mosul. The Zangids were instrumental in encouraging Muslims to oppose the invasions of the Christian Crusaders. Tughril (1177-1194), the last Seljuk sultan of Iraq, was killed by the leader of a Turkish dynasty, the Khwarizm shahs, who lived south of the Aral Sea. Before his successor could establish Khwarizm rule in Iraq, however, Baghdad was overrun by the Mongol horde.

Mongol Invasion In the early years of the thirteenth century, a powerful Mongol leader named Temujin brought together a majority of the Mongol tribes and led them on a devastating sweep tl-lrough China. At about this time, he changed his name to Chenghis (Genghis)man,meaning "World Conqueror." In 1219, he turned his force of 700,000 west and quickly devastated Bokhara, Samarkand, Balkh, Merv and Neyshabur (in present-day Iran), where he slaughtered every living thing. Before his death in 1227, Chenghis Khan, pillaging and burning cities along the way, had reached western Azarbaijan in Iran. After Chenghis's death, the area enjoyed a brief respite that ended with the arrival of Hulagu Khan (1217-1265), Chenghis's grandson. In 1258, he seized Baghdad and killed the last Abbasid Caliph. While in Baghdad, Hulagu made a pyramid of the skulls of Baghdad's scholars, religious leaders, and poets, and he deliberately destroyed what remained of Iraq's canal headworks. The material and artistic production of centuries was swept away. Iraq became a neglected frontier province ruled from the Mongol capital of Tabriz in Iran. After the death in 1335 of the last great Mongol khan, Abu Said (also known as Bahadur the Brave), a period of political confusion ensued in Iraq until a local petty dynasty, the Jalayirids, seized power. The Jalayirids ruled until the beginning of the fifteenth century. Jalayirid rule was abruptly checked by the rising power of a Mongol, Tamerlane (or Timur the Lame, 1336-1405), who had been atabeg of the reigning prince of Samarkand. In 1401, he sacked Baghdad and massacred many of its inhabitants. Tamerlane kille-9 thousands of Iraqis and devastated hundreds of towns. Like Hulagu, Tamerlane had a penchant for building pyramids of skulls. Despite his showy

42

Iraq

display of Sunni piety, Tamerlane's rule virtually extinguished Islamic scholarship and Islamic arts everywhere except in his capital, Samarkand. In Iraq, political chaos, severe economic depression, and social disintegration followed in the wake of the Mongol invasions. Baghdad, long a centre of trade, rapidly lost its commercial importance. Basra, which had been a key transit point for sea borne commerce, was circumvented after the Portuguese discovered a shorter route around the Cape of Good Hope. In agriculture, Iraq's once-extensive irrigation system fell into disrepair, creating swamps and marshes at the edge of the delta and dry, uncultivated steppes farther out. The rapid deterioration of settled agriculture led to the growth of tribally based pastoral nomqdism. By the end of the Mongol period, the focus of Iraqi history had shifted from the urban-based Abbasid culture to the tribes of the river valleys, where it would remain until well into the twentieth century.

Ottoman Period From the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, the course of Iraqi history was affected by the continuing conflicts between the Safavid Empire in Iran and the Ottoman Turks. The Safavids, who were the first to declare Shia Islam the official religion of Iran, sought to control Iraq both because of the Shia holy places at An Najaf and Karbala and because Baghdad, the seat of the old Abbasid Empire, had great symbolic value. The Ottomans, fearing that Shia Islam would spread to Anatolia (Asia Minor), sought to maintain Iraq as a Sunni-controlled buffer state. In 1509, the Safavids led by Ismail Shah (1502-1524), conquered Iraq, thereby initiating a series of protracted battles with the Ottomans. In 1514, Sultan Selim the Grim attacked Ismail's forces and in 1535, the Ottomans led by Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), conquered Baghdad from the Safavids. The Safavids re-conquered Baghdad in 1623 under the leadership of Shah Abbas (1587-1629), but they were expelled in 1638 after a series of brilliant military manoeuvres by the dynamic Ottoman sultan, Murad IV The major impact of the Safavid-Ottom~m conflict on Iraqi history was the deepening of the Shia-Sunni rift. Both the Ottomans and the Safavids used Sunni and Shia Islam respectively to mobilise domestic support. Thus, Iraq's Sunni population suffered

History

43

immeasurably (1623-1638). while during the br,'ef Safavid reign (1623-1638), ..... Iraq's Shias were excluded from power altogether dUring the longer perbd of Ottoman supremaLy (1638-1916). During the Ottoman period, the Sunnis gained th{;- administrative experience that would allow them to monopolise political power in the twentieth century. The Sunnis were able to ta1{e advantage of new.economic and {'dllcntiolll't I>olific~t {'dllcntiolll'1 opportunilles opportunllles whde the Shl.lS, Shl.lS. frozen Oll! of the I>olific~1 proce!'ts. remained politically Impotent and economicdlly depresseu. The Shia-Sunni rift continued as an Imprrtant element of Iraqi social In the till the cnd {,f Saddam Husseln. structure in By the seventeenth century, the frequent comlicts with the Safavlds had sapped the-strength of the Ottoman Empire and had weakened Its control over Its provincel. In Iraq, tribal' authority once again dominated, nh leteenth-century Iraq is a chronicle of dominated. the history of nil tdbal migrations and of con'lict. The nomadic population swelled with the influx of bedulns from Najd, In the Arabian Peninsula. Beduln Becluln raids on settled areas became impossible to curb. In the interior, interior. the large and powerf~l MlIntafiq tribal confederation took shape under the leadership of the Sunni Saadun family of Mecca. In 1he desert south-west. south-west, the Shammar-one of the biggest tribal cor,federations of the Arabian Penlnsula-entered the Syrian desert and c\asr.ed clasr.ed with the Anayzah confederation. conf!ilderatlon. On the lower Tigrls Tlgris near Al.Am~h, AI·Amarah, a new tribal confeder~tion. confederation, the Banl Lam. took root. In the norm, the Kurdlsh Baban Dynasty emerged and organised Kurdish resistance. The resistance made It Impossible for the 'Ottomaru to maintain even nominal suzerainty bv{;!r Iraqi Kurdlstan (land of the Kurds).- Between 1625 and 1668, 1668. and from 1694 to 1701, Incal sheikhs ruled AI·Basrah fine the shllikhs mershlands. mershlands, home of the Mac,an (Marsh Arabs). Th.e powerful shlllkhs basically Ignored the Ottoman governor of ~aghdad. . The cycle of tribal warfare- and of deteriorating urban life t.~at benan in the thirteenth century with the Mongol Invasions invasions waS temporarily reversed with the re-emergel1ce _of the Mamluks., In the early eighteenth century. century, the Mamluks began asserting authority mle fimt fin;t over Basra, the apart: from the Ottomans. Extending their ru-le Mamluks eventually control1(!d the Tigris Tlgris and Euphrat~s EuphratE;!s river vaUeys valleys , from the Pe~ian Gulf to the foothills of Kurdistan. For the most part, thE' Mamluks were able administrators, and their rule was'markea

44

Iraq

by pOlitical stability and by economic revival. The greatest of the Mamlu k leader s, Suleym an the 11 (1780- 1802), made great strides in imposing the rule of law. The last Mamluk leader, Daud Initiated import ant moder nisation progra mmes that (1816- 31), initiate Industries, training a 20,000 canal~, establishing industr . Included eleanlng canals, . man army, and starting a printing press. .MarTJJuk period ended in 1831, when a severe flood and ThE! Th~ .MatTJJu bild Baghdad, enabling the Ottoman sultan, Muhmud Il, plague devastatlild to re.assert Ottom an sovereisnty over Iraq. Ottoman rule was unstable; ten governors between 1831 Baghdad, for exampie, had more than ~en and 1869. In 1869, however, the Ottomans regained authority when Mldhat Pasha was appointed Slovernor of Baghdad. the refoml-minded Midhat 0) 1 the Western model. 011t to modernise Iraq 0) Immediately set Ollt Mldhat immed Midhat at, .' prlm~ry objectivc-s of Midhat's reforms called the tanzim The primpr . rcial were to reorganise th.a army, to create codes of criminal and comme law, to secularise the school system, and to Improve provincial administration. He created provincial representative assemblies to assist the governor, and he set up elected municipal councils In the major ~Ities. Staffed largely by Iraqi notables with no strong ties to . the masses, the neW OffiC'lS nonetheless helped a group of Iraqis gain adrrilnlstratlve experience. By establishing government agencies In the cities and by attempting tribes, Mldhat altered the tribal-urban balance of power, to settle the tribEW, In favour of the which since the thirteenth century had been. largely in . wnlch n ~bes, 1~he most important element of Midhat's plan to extend Ottoma TfJlU land law (named ., into the countryside was the 1858 Tfro authori~~l authori it), The new land issu'ng office ment govern the of Ini'lats after the Ini'ials tax farms with and ldings ldirlgs iandho of system reform replaced the feudal to induce both ed des:gn wa.o;: It rights. ty legally sanctioned proper political existing the n stake a them give sheikhss to settle and to tribal sheikh . order. trihal sheikhs to become In practice, the TAPU laws enabled. the tribal new law was an attempt the that fearing en, large landowners; tribesm to collect taxes more effectively or to impose conscription, registered community-owned tribal lands in their sheikhs' ~~mes or sold them outright to urban speculators: As a result, tribal' sheikhs gradually were transformed into profit-seeking landlords while their tribesmen were relegated to the role of impoverished sharecroppers.

/

History

45

Midhat also attempted to replace Iraq's clerically run Islamic school system with a more secular educational system. The new secular schools provided a channel of upward social mobility to children of all classes, and they led slowly to the growth of an Iraqi intelligentsia. They also introduced students for the first time to Western languages and disciplines. The introduction of Western disciplines in the schools accompanied a greater Western political and economic presence in Iraq. The British had established a consulate af Baghdad in 1802, and a French consulate followed shortly thereafter. European interest in modernising Iraq to facilitate Western commercial interests coincided with the Ottoman reforms. Steamboats appeared on the rivers in 1836, the telegraph was introduced in 1861, and the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, providing Iraq with greater access to European markets. The landowning tribal sheikhs began to export cash crops to the capitalist markets of the West. In 1908, a new ruling clique, the Young Turks, took power in Istanbul. The Young Turks aimed at making the Ottoman Empire a unified nation-state based on Western models. They stressed secular politics and patriotism over the pan-Islamic ideology preached by Sultan Abd al-Hamid. They reintroduced the 1876 constitution (this Ottoman constitution set forth the rights of the ruler and the ruled, but it derived from the ruler and has been called as at best an "attenuated autocracy,"), held elections throughout the empire, and reopened parliament. Although the Iraqi delegates represented only the well-established families of Baghdad, their parliamentary experience in Istanbul proved to be an important introduction to selfgovernment. Most important to the history of Iraq, the Young Turks aggressively pursued a "Turkification" policy that alienated the nascent Iraqi intelligentsia and set in motion a fledgling Arab nationalist movement. Encouraged by the Young Turks' Revolution of 1908, nationalists in Iraq stepped up their political activity. Iraqi nationalists met in Cairo with the Ottoman Decentralisation Party, and some Iraqis joined the Young Arab Society, which moved to Beirut in 1913. Because of its greater exposure to Westerners who encouraged the nationalists, Basra became the centre from which Iraqi nationalists began to demand a measure of autonomy. After nearly 400 years under

46

Iraq

Ottoman rule, Iraq was ill prepared to form a nation-state. The Ottomans had failed to control Iraq's rebellious tribal domains, and even in the cities their authority was tenuous. The Ottomans' inability to provide security led to the growth of autonomous, self-contained communities. As a result, Iraq entered the twentieth century beset by a complex web of social conflicts that seriously impeded the process of building a modern state. The oldest and most deeply ingrained conflict was the competition between the tribes and the cities for control over the food-producing flatlands of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers. The centralisation policies of the Sublime Porte (Ottoman government), especially in the nineteenth century, constituted a direct threat to the nomadic structure and the fierce fighting spirit of the tribes. In addition to tribalurban conflicts, the tribes fought among themselves, and there was a fairly rigid hierarchy between the most powerful tribes, the so-called "people of the camel," and the weaker tribes that included the "people of the sheep," marsh-dwellers, and peasants. The cities also were sharply divided, both according to occupation and along religious lines. The various guilds resided in distinct, autonomous areas, and Shia and Sunni Muslims rarely intermingled. The territory that eventually became the state of Iraq was beset, furthermore, by regional differences in orientation; Mosul in the north had historically looked to Syria and to Turkey, whereas Baghdad and the Shia holy cities had maintained close ties with Iran and with the people of the western and south-we~tern deserts. Although Ottoman weakness had allowed Iraq's self-contained communities to grow stronger, the modernisation initiated by the Sublime Porte tended to break down traditional autonomous groupings and to create a new social order. Beginning with the tanzimat reforms in 1869, Iraq's for the most part subsistence economy slowly was transformed into a market economy based on money and tied to the world capitalist market. Social status traditionally had been determined by noble lineage, by fighting prowess, and by knowledge of religion. With the advent of capitalism, social status increasingly was determrned by property ownership and by the accumulation of wealth. Most disruptive in this regard was the TAPU land refor~ of 1858. Concomitantly, Western social and economic penetration increased; for example, mass-produced British machine-made textiles gradually

History

47

displaced Iraq's traditional crafts and craftsmen. The final Ottoman legacy in [raq is related to the policies of the Young Turks and to the creation of a small but vocal Iraqi intelligentsia. Faced with the rapidly encroaching West, the Young Turks attempted to centralise the empire by imposing upon it the Turkish language and culture and by clamping down on newly won political freedoms. These Turkification policies alienated many of the Ottomantrained intelligentsia who had originally aligned themselves with the Young Turks in the hope of obtaining greater Arab autonomy. Despite its relatively small size, the nascent Iraqi intelligentsia formed several secret nationalist societies. The most important of these societies was Al-Ahd (the Covenant), whose membership was drawn almost entirely from Iraqi officers in the Ottoman army. Membership in AI-Ahd spread rapidly in Baghdad and in Mosul, growing to 4,000 by the outbreak of World War I. Despite the existence of AI-Ahd and of other, smaller, nationalist societies, Iraqi nationalism was still mainly the concern of educated Arabs from the upper and the middle dasses.

World War I and British Mandate By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman territories had become the focus of European power politics. During the previous century, enfeebled Ottoman rule had invited intense competition among European powers for commercial benefits and for spheres of influence. British interest in Iraq significantly increased when the Ottomans granted concessions to Germany to construct railroad lines from Konya in south-west Turkey to Baghdad in 1899 and from Baghdad to Basra in 1902. The British feared that a hostile German presence in the Fertile Crescent would threaten vital lines of communication to India via Iran and Afghanistan, menacing British oil interests in Iran and perhaps even India itself. In 1914, when the British discovered that Turkey was entering the war on the side of the Germans, British forces from India landed at Al-Faw on the Shatt ai-Arab and moved rapidly toward Basra. By the fall of 1915, when British forces were already well established in towns in the south, General Charles Townshend unsuccessfully attempted to take Baghdad. In retaliation, the Turks besieged the British garrison at AI-Kut for 140 days; in April 1916, the garrison was forced to surrender unconditionally. The British quickly re-grouped their forces, however, and resumed their advance under General

48

Iraq

Stanley Maude in December 1916. By March 1917, the British had captured Baghdad. Advancing northward in the spring of 1918, the British finally took Mosul in early November. As a result of the victory at Mosul, British authority was extended to all the Iraqi wilayat (sing, wilayah-province) with the exception of the Kurdish highlands bordering Turkey and Iran, the land alongside the Euphrates from Baghdad south to An Nasiriyah, and the Shia cities of Karbala and An Najaf. On capturing Baghdad, General Maude proclaimed that Britain intended to return to Iraq some control of its own affairs. He stressed that this step would pave the way for ending the alien rule that the Iraqis had experienced since the latter days of the Abbasid Caliphate. The proclamation was in accordance with the encouragement the British had given to Arab nationalists, such as Jafar al-Askari; his brother-in-law, Nuri as Said; and Jamil al-Midfai, who sought emancipation from Ottoman rule. The nationalists had supported the Allied powers in expectation of both the Ottoman defeat and the freedom many nationalists assumed would come with an Allied victory. During the war, events in Iraq were greatly influenced by the Hashimite family of Hussein ibn Aii, sharif of Mecca, who claimed descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh). Aspiring to become king of an independent Arab kingdom, Hussein had broken with the Ottomans, to whom he had been vassal, and had thrown in his lot with the British. Anxious for his support, the British gave Hussein reason to believe that he would have their endorsement when the war ended. Accordingly, Hussein and his sons led the June 1916, Arab Revolt, rr::lrching northward in conjunction with the British into Transjordan, Palestine, and Syria. Anticipating the fulfilment of Allied pledges, Hussein's son, Prince Faisal (who was later to become modern Iraq's first king), arrived in Paris in 1919, as the chief spokesman for the Arab cause. Much to his disappOintment, Faisal found that the Allied powers were less than enthusiastic about Arab independence. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, Iraq was formally made a Class a mandate entrusted to Britain. This award was completed on April 25, 1920, at the San Remo Conference in Italy. Palestine also was placed

History

49

under British mandate, and Syria was placed under French mandate. The French ejected Faisal, who had been proclaimed king of Syria by a Syrian national congress in Damascus in March 1920, in July of the .same year. The high commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, and his deputy, Colonel Arnold Talbot Wilson, headed the civil government of post-war Iraq originally. The British were confronted with Iraq's age-old problems, compounded by some new ones. Villagers demanded that the tribes be restrained, and tribes demanded that their titles to tribal territories be extended and confirmed. Merchants demanded more effective legal procedures, courts, and laws to protect their activities and interests. Municipal authorities appealed for defined powers and grants-in-aid in addition to the establishment of public health and education facilities. Landlords pressed for grants of land, for the building of canals and roads, and for the provision of tested seeds and livestock. The holy cities of An Najaf and Karbala and their satellite tribes were in a state of near anarchy. British reprisals after the murder of a British officer in An Najaf failed to restore order. The Anayzah, the Shammar, and the Jubur tribes of the western desert were beset by violent infighting. British administration had yet to be established in the mountains of Kurdistan. Meanwhile, from the Hakkari Mountains beyond Iraq's northern frontier and from the plains of Urmia in Iran, thousands of Assyrians began to pour into Iraqi territory seeking refuge from Turkish savagery. The most striking problem facing the British was the growing anger of the nationalists, who felt betrayed at being accorded mandate status. The nationalists soon came to view the mandate as a flimsy disguise for colonialism. The experienced Cox delegated governance of the country to Wilson while he served in Persia between April 1918 and October 1920. The younger man governed Iraq with the kind of paternalism that had characterised British rule in India. Impatient to establish an efficient administration, Wilson used experienced Indians to staff subordinate positions within his administration. The exclusion of Iraqis from administrative posts added humiliation to Iraqi discontent. Three important anti-colonial secret societies had been formed in Iraq during 1918, and 1919. At An Najaf, Jamiyat an Nahda alIslamiya (The League of the Islamic Awakening) was organised; its

50

Iraq

numerous and varied members included Ulema (religious leaders), journalists, landlords, and tribal leaders. Members of the Jamiyat assassinated a British officer in the hope that the killing would act as a catalyst for a general rebellion at Iraq's other holy city, Karbala. ,Al-Jamiya al-Wataniya al-Islamiya (The Muslim National League) was formed with the object of organising and mobilising the population for major resistance. In February 1919, in Baghdad, a coalition of Shia merchants, Sunni teachers and civil servants, Sunni and Shia ulama, and Iraqi officers formed the Haras al-Istiqlal (The Guardians of Independence). The Istiqlal had member groups in Karbala, An Najaf, AI-Kut, and AI-HiIlah. Local outbreaks against British rule had occurred even before the news reached Iraq that the country had been given only mandate status. Upon the death of an important Shia mUjtahid (religious scholar) in early May 1920, Sunni and Shia Ulema temporarily put aside their differences as the memorial services metamorphosed into political rallies. Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, began later in that month; once again, through nationalistic poetry and oratory, religious leaders exhorted the people to throw off the bonds of imperialism. Violent demonstrations and strikes followed the British arrest of several leaders. When the news of the mandate reached Iraq in late May, a group of Iraqi delegates met with Wilson and demanded independence. Wilson dismissed them as a "handful of ungrateful politicians." Nationalist political activity was stepped up, and the grand mujtahid of Karbala, Imam Shirazi, and his son, Mirza Muhammad Riza, began to organise the effort in earnest. Arab flags were made and distributed, and pamphlets were handed out urging the tribes to prepare for revolt. Muhammad Hiza acted as liaison among insurgents in An Najaf and in Karbala, and the tribal confederations. Shirazi then issued a fatwa (religious ruling), pointing out that it was against Islamic law for Muslims to countenance being ruled by non-Muslims, and he called for a jihad against the British. By July 1920, Mosul was in rebellion against British rule, and the insurrection moved south down the Euphrates River valley. The southern tribes, who cherished their long-held political autonomy, needed little inducement to join in the fray, They did not cooperate in an organised effort against the British, however, which

History

51

limited the effect of the revolt. The country was in a state of anarchy for three months; the British restored order only with great difficulty and with the assistance of Royal Air Force bombers. British forces were obliged to send for reinforcements from India and from Iran. Ath Thawra al-Iraqiyya al-Kubra, or The Great Iraqi Revolution (as the 1920 rebellion is called), was a watershed event in contemporary Iraqi history. For the first time, Sunnis and Shias, tribes and cities, were brought together in a common effort. In the opinion of Hanna Batatu, author of a seminal work on Iraq, the building of a nation-state in Iraq depended upon two major factors, the integration of Shias and Sunnis into the new body politic and the successful resolution of the age-old conflicts between the tribes and the riverain cities and among the tribes themselves over the food-producing flatlands of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The 1920 rebellion brought these groups together, if only briefly; this constituted an important first step in the long and arduous process of forging a nation-state out of Iraq's conflict-ridden social structure. The 1920 revolt had been very costly to the British in both manpower and money. Whitehall was under domestic pressure to devise a formula that would provide the maximum control over Iraq at the least cost to the British taxpayer. The British replaced the military regime with a provisional Arab government, assisted by British advisers and answerable to the supreme authority of the high commissioner for Iraq, Cox. The new administration provided a channel of communication between the British and the restive population, and it gave Iraqi leaders an opportunity to prepare for eventual self-government. The large number of trained Iraqi administrators who returned home when the French ejected Faisal from Syria aided the provisional government. Like earlier Iraqi governments, however, the provisional government was composed chiefly of Sunni Arabs; once again the Shias were under represented. At the Cairo Conference of 1921, the British set the parameters for Iraqi political life that were to continue until the 1958 revolution; they chose Faisal as Iraq's first King; they established an indigenous Iraqi army; and they proposed a new treaty. To confirm Faisal as Iraq's first monarch, a one-question plebiscite was carefully arranged that had a return of 96 per cent in his favour. The British saw in Faisal a leader who possessed sufficient nationalist and Islamic credentials

52

Iraq

to have broad appeal, but who also was vulnerable enough to remain dependent on their support. Faisal traced his descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), and his ancestors had held political authority in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina since the tenth century. The British believed that these credentials would satisfy traditional Arab standards of political legitimacy; moreover, the British thought that Faisal would be accepted by the growing Iraqi nationalist movement because of his role in the 1916 revolt against the Turks, his achievements as a leader of the Arab emancipation movement, and his general leadership qualities. As a counterforce to the nationalistic inclinations of the monarchy and as a means of insuring the king's dependence, the British cultivated the tribal sheikhs, whose power had been waning since the end of the nineteenth century. While the new king sought to create a national consciousness, to strengthen the institutions of the emerging state, and especially to create a national military, the tribal sheikhs supported a fragmented community and sought to weaken the coercive power of the state. A major goal of the British policy was to keep the monarchy stronger than anyone tribe but weaker than a coalition of tribes so that British power would ultimately be decisive in arbitrating disputes between the two. Ultimately, the British-created monarchy suffered from a chronic legitimacy crisis: the concept of a monarchy was alien to Iraq. Despite his Islamic and pan-Arab credentials, Faisal was not an Iraqi, and, no matter how effectively he ruled, Iraqis saw the monarchy as a British creation. The continuing inability of the government to gain the confidence of the people fuelled political instability well into the 1970s. The British decision at the Cairo Conference to establish an indigenous Iraqi army was significant. In Iraq, as in most of the developing world, the military establishment has been the bestorganised institution in an otherwise weak political system. Thus, 'vhile Iraq's body politic crumbled under immense political and economic pressure throughout the monarchic period, the military gained increasing power and influence; moreover, because the officers in the new army were by necessity Sunnis who had served under the Ottomans, while the lower ranks were predominantly filled by Shia tribal elements, Sunni dominance in the military was preserved.

History

53

The final major decision taken at the Cairo Conference related to the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Faisal was under pressure from the nationalists and the anti-British mujtahids of An Najaf and Karbala to limit both British influence in Iraq and the duration of the treaty. Recognising that the monarchy depended on British support-and wishing to avoid a repetition of his experience in Syria-Faisal maintained a moderate approach in dealing with Britain. The twenty-year treaty, which was ratified in October 1922, stated that the king would heed British advice on all matters affecting British interests and on fiscal policy as long as Iraq was in debt to Britain, and that British officials would be appointed to specified posts in eighteen departments to act as advisers and inspectors. A subsequent financial agreement, which significantly increased the financial burden on Iraq, required Iraq to pay half the cost of supporting British resident officials, among other expenses. British obligations under the new treaty included providing various kinds of aid, notably military assistance, and proposing Iraq for membership in the League of Nations at the earliest moment. In effect, the treaty ensured that Iraq would remain politically and economically dependent on Britain. While unable to prevent the treaty, Faisal clearly felt that the British had gone back on their promises to him. After the treaty had been signed, Iraq readied itself for the country-wide elections that had been provided for in the May 1922 Electoral Law. There were important changes in the government at this time. Cox resigned his position as high commissioner and was replaced by Sir Henry Dobbs; Iraq's aging Prime Minister, Abd ar Rahman al-Gailani, stepped down and was replaced by Abd alMuhsin as Saadun. In April 1923, Saadun signed a protocol that shortened the treaty period to four years. As a result of the elections, however, Jafar al-Askari, a veteran of the Arab Revolt and an early supporter of Faisal replaced Saadun. The elected Constituent Assembly met for the first time in March 1924, and it formally ratified the treaty despite strong (and sometimes physical) opposition on the part of many in the assembly. The assembly also accepted the Organic Law that declared Iraq to be a sovereign state with a representative system of government and a hereditary constitutional monarchy. The newly ratified constitutionwhich, along with the treaty, had been hotly debated-legislated an

54

Iraq

important British role in Iraqi affairs. The major issue at stake in the constitutional debate revolved around the powers of the monarchy. In the final draft, British interests prevailed, and the monarchy was granted wide-ranging powers that included the right to confirm all laws, to call for a general election, to prorogue parliament, and to issue ordinances for the fulfilment of treaty obligations without parliamentary sanctions. Like the treaty, the constitution provided the British with a means of indirect control in Iraq. After the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was ratified, the most pressing issue confronting the newly established constitutional monarchy was the question of boundaries, especially in the former Ottoman wilayah of Mosul, now known as Mosul Province. The status of Mosul Province was complicated by two factors, the British desire to gain oil concessions and the existence of a majority Kurdish population that was seeking independence apart from either Iraq or Turkey. According to the Treaty of Sevres, concluded in 1920 with the Ottoman Sultan, Mosul was to be part of an autonomous Kurdish state. The treaty was scrapped, however, when nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal (18811938-also known as Ataturk) came to power in Turkey and established control over the Kurdish areas in eastern Turkey. In 1923, after two failed British attempts to establish an autonomous Kurdish province, London decided to include the Kurds in the new Iraqi state with the proviso that Kurds would hold government positions in Kut'dish areas and that the Kurdish language would be preserved. The British decision to include Mosul in Iraq was based largely on their belief that the area contained large oil deposits. Before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British-controlled Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) had held concessionary rights to the Mosul wilayah. Under the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement-an agreement in 1916 between Britain and France that delineated future control of the Middle East-the area would have fallen under French influence. In 1919, however, the French relinquished their claims to Mosul under the terms of the Long-Berenger Agreement. The 1919 agreement granted the French a 25 per cent share in the TPC as compensation. Beginning in 1923, British and Iraqi negotiators held acrimonious discussions over the new oil concession. The major obstacle was Iraq's insistence on a 20 per cent equity participation in the company;

History

55

this figure had been included in the original TPC concession to the Turks and had been agreed upon at San Remo for the Iraqis. In the end, despite strong nationalist sentiments against the concession agreement, the Iraqi negotiators acquiesced to it. The League of Nations was soon to vote on the disposition of Mosul, and the Iraqis feared that, without British support, Iraq would lose the area to Turkey. In March 1925, an agreement was concluded that contained none of the Iraqi demands. The TPC, now renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPq, was granted a concession for a period of seventyfive years. In 1925, the League of Nations decided that Mosul Province would be considered a part of Iraq, but it also suggested that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty be extended from four to twenty-five years as a protection for the Kurdish minority, who intensely distrusted the Iraqi government. The Iraqis also were to give due regard to Kurdish sensibilities in matters of culture and of language. Although reluctant to do so, the Iraqi assembly ratified the treaty in January 1926. Turkey was eventually reconciled to the loss by being promised onetenth of any oil revenues that might accrue in the area, and a tripartite Anglo-Turco-Iraqi treaty was signed in July 1926. This settlement was to have important repercussions, both positive and negative, for the future of Iraq. Vast oil revenues would accrue from the Mosul Province, but the inclusion of a large number of well-armed and restless Kurds in Iraqi territory would continue to plague Iraqi governments. With the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and the settling of the Mosul question, Iraqi politiCS took on a new dynamic. The emerging class of Sunni and Shia landowning tribal sheikhs vied for positions of power with wealthy and prestigious urban-based Sunni families and with Ottoman-trained army officers and bureaucrats. Because Iraq's newly established political institutions were the creation of a foreign power, and because the concept of democratic government had no precedent in Iraqi history, the politicians in Baghdad lacked legitimacy and never developed deeply rooted constituencies. Thus, despite a constitution and an elected assembly, Iraqi politics was more a shifting alliance of important personalities and cliques than a democracy in the Western sense. The absence of broadly based political institutions inhibited the early nationalist movement's ability to make deep inroads into Iraq's diverse social structure. Thus,

56

Iraq

despite the widely felt resentment at Iraq's mandate status, the burgeoning nationalist movement was largely ineffective. Nonetheless, through the late 1920s, the nationalists persisted in opposing the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and in demanding independence. A treaty more favourable to the Iraqis was presented in December 1927. It remained unratified, however, because of nationalist demands for an unconditional promise of independence. This promise eventually was made by the new high commissioner, Sir Gilbert Clayton, in 1929, but the confusion occasioned by the sudden death of Clayton and by the suicide of Abdul Muhsin-as-Saadun, the most powerful Iraqi advocate of the treaty, delayed the writing of a new treaty. In June 1929, the nationalists received their first positive response from London when a newly elected Labour Party government announced its intention to support Iraq's admission to the League of Nations in 1932 and to negotiate a new treaty recognising Iraq's independence. Faisal's closest adviser (and soon-to-be Iraqi strongman), Nuri as Said, carried out the treaty negotiations. Despite widespread opposition, Nuri as Said was able to force the treaty through parliament. The new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed in June 1930. It provided for a "close alliance," for "full and frank consultations between the two countries in all matters of foreign policy," and for mutual assistance in case of war. Iraq granted the British the use of air bases near Basra and at AI-Habbaniyah and the right to move troops across the country. The treaty, of twenty-five years' duration, was to come into force upon Iraq's admission to the League of Nations. The terms of the treaty gained Nuri as Said favour in British eyes but discredited him in the eyes of the Iraqi nationalists, who vehemently opposed its lengthy duration and the leasing of air bases. The Kurds and the Assyrians also opposed the treaty because it offered no guarantees for their status in the new country.

Independent Monarchy On October 13, 1932, Iraq became a sovereign state, and it was admitted to the League of Nations. A complex web of social, economic, ethnic, religious, and ideological conflicts, all of which retarded the process of state formation, still beset Iraq. The declaration of statehood and the imposition of fixed boundaries triggered an intense competition for power in the new entity. Sunnis and Shias, cities and tribes, sheikhs and tribesmen, Assyrians and Kurds, pan-Arabists and Iraqi

History

57

nationalists-all fought vigorously for places in the emerging state structure. Ultimately, lacking legitimacy and unable to establish deep roots, the British-imposed political system was overwhelmed by these conflicting demands. The Sunni-Shia conflict, a problem since the beginning of domination by the Umayyad Caliphate in 661, continued to frustrate attempts to mould Iraq into a political community. The Shia tribes of the southern Euphrates, along with urban Shias, feared complete Sunni domination in the government. Their concern was well-founded; a disproportionate number of Sunnis occupied administrative positions. Favoured by the Ottomans, the Sunnis historically had gained much more administrative experience. The Shias' depressed economic situation further widened the Sunni-Shia split, and it intensified Shia efforts to obtain a greater share of the new state's budget. The arbitrary borders that divided Iraq and the other Arab lands of the old Ottoman Empire caused severe economic dislocations, frequent border disputes, and a debilitating ideological conflict. The cities of Mosul in the north and Basra in the south, separated from their traditional trading partners in Syria and in Iran, suffered severe commercial dislocations that led to economic depression. In the south, the British-created border (drawn through the desert on the understanding that the region was largely uninhabited) impeded migration patterns and led to great tribal unrest. Also in the south, uncertainty surrounding Iraq's new borders with Kuwait, with Saudi Arabia, and especially with Iran led to frequent border skirmishes. The new boundaries also contributed to the growth of competing nationalisms; Iraqi versus pan-Arab loyalties would severely strain Iraqi politics during the 1950s and the 1960s, when Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser held emotional sway over the Iraqi masses. Ethnic groups such as the Kurds and the Assyrians, who had hoped for their own autonomous states, rebelled against inclusion within the Iraqi state. The Kurds, the majority of whom lived in the area around Mosul, had long been noted for their fierce spirit of independence and separatism. During the 1922 to 1924 period, the Kurds had engaged in a series of revolts in response to British encroachment in areas of traditional Kurdish autonomy; moreover, the Kurds preferred Turkish to Arab rule. When the League of Nations awarded Mosul to Iraq in 1925, Kurdish hostility thus increased. The

58

Iraq

Iraqi government maintained an uneasy peace with the Kurds in the first year of independence, but Kurdish hostility would remain an intractable problem for future governments. From the start, the relationship of the Iraqi government with the Assyrians was openly hostile. Britain had resettled 20,000 Assyrians in northern Iraq around Zakhu and Dahuk after Turkey violently quelled a British-inspired Assyrian rebellion in 1918. As a result, approximately three-fourths of the Assyrians who had sided with the British during World War I now found themselves citizens of Iraq. The Assyrians found this situation both objectionable and dangerous. Thousands of Assyrians had been incorporated into the Iraqi Levies, a British-paid and British-officered force separate from the regular Iraqi army. They had been encouraged by the British to consider themselves superior to the majority of Arab Iraqis by virtue of their profeSSion of Christianity. The British also had used them for retaliatory operations against the Kurds, in whose lands most of the Assyrians had settled. Pro-British, they had been apprehensive of Iraqi independence. The Assyrians had hoped to form a nation-state in a region of their own. When no unoccupied area sufficiently large could be found, the Assyrians continued to insist that, at the very least, their patriarch, the Mar Shamun, be given some temporal authority. Both the British and the Iraqis flatly refused this demand. In response, the Assyrians, who had been permitted by the British to retain their weapons after the dissolution of the Iraq Levies, flaunted their strength and refused to recognise the government. In retaliation, the Iraqi authorities held the Mar Shamun under virtual house arrest in mid-1933, making his release contingent on his signing a document renouncing forever any claims to temporal authority. During July, about 800 armed Assyrians headed for the Syrian border. For reasons that have never been explained, the Syrians repelled them. During this time, King Faisal was outside the country for reasons of health. According to scholarly sources, Minister of Interior Hikmat Sulayman had adopted a policy aimed at the elimination of the Assyrians. This policy apparently was implemented by a Kurd, General Bakr Sidqi, who, after engaging in several clashes with the Assyrians, permitted his men to kill about 300 Assyrians, including women and children, at the Assyrian village of Simel (Sumayyil).

History

59

The Assyrian affair marked the military's entrance into Iraqi politics, setting a precedent that would be followed throughout the 1950s and the 1960s. It also paved the way for the passage of a conscription law that strengthened the army and, as increasing numbers of tribesmen were brought into military service, sapped strength from the tribal sheikhs. The Assyrian affair also set the stage for the increased prominence of Bakr Sidqi. At the time of independence, tribal Iraq was experiencing a de-stabilising realignment characterised by the waning role of the sheikhs in tribal society. The privatisation of property rights, begun with the tanzimat reforms in the late 1860s, intensified when the Britbll supported Lazmah land reform of 1932 dispossessed even greater numbers of tribesmen. While the British were augmenting the economic power of the sheikhs, however, the tribal-urban balance was rapidly shifting in favour of the cities. The accelerated pace of modernisation and the growth of a highly nationalistic intelligentsia, of a bureaucracy, and of a powerful military, all favoured the cities. Thus, while the economic position of the sheikhs had improved significantly, their role in tribal society and their status in relation to the rapidly emerging urban elite had seriously eroded. These contradictory trends in tribal structure and authority pushed tribal Iraq into a major social revolution that would last for the next thirty years. The ascendancy of the cities and the waning power of the tribes were most evident in the ease with which the military, led by Bakr Sidqi, put down tribal unrest. The tribal revolts themselves were set off by the government's decision in 1934 to allocate money for the new conscription plan rather than for a new dam, which would have improved agricultural productivity in the south. The monarchy's ability to deal with tribal unrest suffer.!d a major setback in September 1933, when King Faisal died while undergoing medical treatment in Switzerland. Faisal's death meant the loss of the main stabilising personality in Iraqi politics. He was the one figure with sufficient prestige to draw the politicians together around a concept of national interest. Faisal was succeeded by his twenty-oneyear-old son, Ghazi (1933-1939), an ardent but inexperienced Arab nationalist. Unlike his father, Ghazi was a product of Western education and had little experience with the complexities of Iraqi tribal life.

60

Iraq

Ghazi also was unable to balance nationalist and British pressures within the framework of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance; increasingly, the nationalist movem ent saw the monarchy as a British puppet . Iraqi politics during Ghazi's reign degene rated into a meanin gless competition among narrowly based tribal sheikhs and urban notables that further eroded the legitimacy of the state and its constitutional structures. In 1936, Iraq experienced its first military coup d'etat- the first coup d'etat in the modern Arab world. The agents of the coup, General Bakr Sidqi and two politicians (Hikmat Sulayman and Abu Timman, who were Turkoman and Shia respectively), represented a minority response to the pan-Arab Sunni govern ment of Yasin alHashimi. The eighteen-month Hashimi government was the most successful and the longest lived of the eight governments that came and went during the reign of King Ghazi. Hashimi's govern ment was nation alistic and pan-A rab, but many Iraqis resent ed its authoritarianism and its suppression of honest dissent. Sulayman, a reformer, sought to engineer an al1!ance of other reformers and minori ty elemen ts within the army. The reform ers includ ed communists, orthodox and unorthodox socialists, and persons with more modera te positions. Most of the more modera te reformers were associated with the leftist-leaning Al-Ahali newspaper, from which their group took its name. The Sidqi coup marked a major turning point in Iraqi history; it made a crucial breach in the constitution, and it opened the door to further military involvement in politics. It also temporarily displaced the elite that had ruled since the state was founded; the new govern ment contained few Arab Sunnis and not a single advocate of a pan-Arab cause. This configuration resulted in a foreign policy oriented toward Turkey and Iran instead of toward the Arab countries. The new government promptly signed an agreem ent with Iran, temporarily settling the question of bounda ry betwee n Iraq and Iran in the Shatt ai-Arab. Iran maintained that it had agreed under British pressure to the international bounda ry's being set at the low water mark on the Iranian side rather than the usual international practice of the midpoint or thalweg. After Bakr Sidqi moved against Baghdad, Sulayman formed an Ahali cabine t. Hashim i and Rashee d Ali were banish ed, and

\

History

6~

Nuri as Said fled to Egypt. In the ·course of the assault on Baghdad, Nuri as·Said's brother-in-law, Minister of Defence'Jafar Askari, was killed. . . Ghazi. sanctioned SUlayman's government even th.ough it had achieved power unconstitutionally; neverthele.;s, the coalition of forces that gained power in 1936 was beset by major contradictions. The Ahali group was Interested In scei,,1 reform V:·h~reas Sldqi and his supporters In the mHitar~l\lIere inte~ted In expar,lSion. Sidql, momover, alienated important sectors of the population; the natlohalis~ in the army resented him because of his l
1937.'

.

In April 1939, Ghazi was killed In an automobile accident and was succeeded by his infant son, Falsa!. n. Ghazl's first cousin, Amlr Abdullah, was made regent. The death of Ghazl and the rise of Prince Abdullah and Nuri as Said-the latter one of the Ottoman-trained officers who had fought with Sharif Hussaln of Mecca-dramatically changed both the goals and the role of the monarch~!. Whereas Falsal and Ghazl had been strong Arab nationalists and had. opposed the British-supported tribal sheikhs, Abdullah and Nuri as Said were Iraqi nationalists who relied Ort the tribal sheikhs. as a counterforce' against the growing urban nationalist movement. By the end of the 19305, pan-Arab ism had become a powerful Ideological force In the Iraqi military, especially amOl1g' younger officers who hailed from the. northern provinces and who had suffered ec.onomically from the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The B.itlsh role in que.tling· the Palestine revolt of 1931) to 1939 further intensified anti-Brrtlsh sentiments in the militar;t and led a group of disgn.mtkd officers to form the Free Officers' Movement. which aimed at overthrowing the monarchy. As World War 11 approached, Nazi Germany attempted to capitalise on the antl·Brltish sentiments in Iraq and to woo Baghc;lad to the Axis cause. In 1939, Iraq severed diplomatic relatfons with Germany-as it was obliged to do because of treatY. obligations with

Iraq

62

Britain. in 1940, however, the Iraqi.'nationaiist and ardent anglophobe Rashid Ali succee ded Nuri as Said.as Pime Minister. The new Prirne· Minister was reluctant to break completE Iy with the Axis powers, and he propos ed restrictions on British troop movements in Iraq. : Abdullah and Nuri as Said botr were propon ents of close 'cooperation with Britain. They opposl3d Rashjd AU's pcllcles Md pressed him to resign. In response. Rashid All and four generals led a military coup that ousted Nuri as'$aid and the regent, both of whom escape d to Transjordan. Shortly after saizing power in 1941, R~hid All appoin ted an ultranationalist civili:1O cabinet, which gave only conditional consent to British requests in April 1941 for troop land\ngs in ·Iraq.· The British quickly retaliated by landIng forces at Basra, justifytng this second occupation of Iraq by citing Rashid Ali's violation of the Anglo-Iraql Treaty of 1930. Many Iraqis regarded the move ·as an atten'lpt to restore British rule. They laUied to the support of the Iraqi army. which received a numbe r of aircraft from the Axis powers. The Germans. however. wern preoccupied with campaigns In Crete and with preparations for the' invasion of the Soviet Union, and they could spare little assistance to Iraq. As the British steadi1>' advanc ed. Rashld All end his gove.mrnent fled to Egypt. An armistice was signed on May 30. Abdullah reh.,mad as regent, and Rash~d AIi and the four generals were tried in absentia and were sentenc ed to death: The generals returned to Iraq and were subsequently exe( uted, but Rashid AI! remained in exile. The most Important C1Spect of n e Rashid AIi coup of 1941 was Britain's use of Transjordan's Arab Legion against the Iraqis and their reimposition by force of arms of Abdullah as regent. Nothing !=ontrlbute('\ more to nationalist sen ,iment in Iraq, especially in the military, than the British Invasion d 1941 and the reimposilion of the mon.archy. From then on, the m(lOarchy was completely di-lOrced from the powerful nationalist trend. Widely viewed as an Clnachl'Onism that lacked popula r legitimacy, the monarchy was perccivec', 10 be aligned with social forc'e'i that were retardi ng the cOlllllry's developm~nt.

111 Januar y 1943, under the terms of the 1930 treaty with Britain, Iraq declared war on the Axis powers. Iraq cooper ated completely with the British under the succesSive governments of Nuri as Said achi (1944-1946). Iraq bL!ci:l!ne a (1941·1944) and Hamdi aI-Pach .,

History

63

base for the rnilita~ occupation of Iran and of the Levant. In March 1945, Iraq became a founding member of th(~ British-supported League of Arab States (Arab League), which included Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Although the Arab League was ostensibly deSigned to foster Arab unity, many Arab natiol1allsts viewed it as a British-dominated alignment of pn)Western Arab states. In December 1945, Iraq joined the United Nations (UN). World War II exacerbated Iraq's social and economic problems, The spiralling prices and shortages brought on by the war increaseci the opportunitl; for exploitation and significantly widened the gap between rich and poor; thus, while wealthy landowners were enrichinf! themselves through corruption, the salaried midde class, includinn teachers, civil selVants, and army officers, saw their incomes depreciak daily. Even worse off were the peasants, who lived under the heGl~1 burden of the 1932 land reform that permitted their landlords (sheikhs) to make huge profits selling cash crops to the British occupying force. The worsening economic situation of the mass of haqis duri'ng th.l 1950s and the 1960s enabled the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) to establish ueep roots during this period. In addition to its festering socio-econorni~ problems. posl-World War 11 Iraq was beset by a leadership crisis. After the 1941 Rashid All coup, the pro-British Nurl as Said had dominated Iraqi politia-. The latter's British orientation and autocratic marmer increasingl; were at vftriance with the liberal, reformist philosophy of Iraq's new, nationalists. Even before the end of the war, nationalists hnci dmn( mde, I the restoration of politfcal activity, which hod been banncd durin:] the war ill th~ interest of national security. Not until the government of Tawflq Suwaidi (Febnlflry-Mflrch 1946), however, wem poiitiril! parties allowed to orgallise. Within a short period, six rmtics wme formed. The parties !;oon became so out»poken in their ctiticislll of the govcrn:nent that thp government closed or clIrtclileci the clci)viti('s of the more t,X'treme leftist parties, Accumulated grievances against Nur! as Said and the regellt climaxed h the 1948 Wath~ah (uprising). The Wathbah WilS (\ prote~t against the Portsmouth Treaty of January 1~48 and its provision th'lt Cl board of Iraqis and British be established to dec.ide on dC!fen. 'e matters of mutual interest. The treaty enragecllraqi natiol1C1lists, wf 10

Iraq

64

were still bitter over the Rashid Ali coup of 1941 and,the continued influence of the British in Iraqi affairs. The uprising also was fuelled by widespread popula r discontent over rising prices, by an acute bread shortagl>, and by, the regime's fallure to liberalise the political , system. The Wathbah had three important effec~ on Iraqi politics. First; and most directly, it led Nuri as Said and the regent to repudiate the Portsmouth Treaty.. Second, the succass of the uprising led the OPPOSItion tt'! Intensify Its ~paign to' discredit the regime. This activity not only weakened the monarchy b'.Jt also seriously eroded the legitimaCy of the political process. Finally, the uprising created a schism bP.tween Nuri as Said and Abdullah. The former wanted, tighten political control and to deal harshly with the opposition; response, the the regent edvoca ted a more tempered approach. and more more relied British Increasingly mistrusted the regent and ~uri' as Se.ld. ' Iraq bitterly objected to the 1947 UN decision to partition Palestine and scnt S 3veral hundred recruits to the Palestine front when hostilities broke out on May 15, 1948. Iraq sent an additional 8,000 to 10,000 troops of the regular army during the course of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War; theSe troops were withdrawn in, April 1949. The Iraqis had arrived at the Palestine front poorly equ! pped and undertrained because of the drastic reduction In'defence (!xpenditures imposed by NUr! as Said following the 1941 Rashld All coup. As a result, they even more f~red verY poorly In ,the fighting and returned to Iraq Impact on e negativ a had also war The alienated from the regime. available of cent per 40 d allocate ment govern the Iraqi economy. The s paid royaltie Oil s. refugee iian Palesth for funds for the army and 1948. In off cut was Halfa to e pipelin the to J.raq were halved when er, moreov led, sman busines Jewish a of g The war and the hangin nity; commu Jewish ous prosper Iraq's of most of to the departure about 120,00 0 Iraqi Jews immigrated to Israel between 1948 and 1952. In 1952, the depTes~ed economic si uation, which had been exacerbated, by a bad harvest and by the gcvernment's refusal to hold direct elections, triggered large-scale anti regime protests;' the protests , turned especially violent in Baghdad. In I esponse, the government declared martial law. banned (}\I political po rties, suspended a numbe r

to

on

In

History

65

of newspapers, and imposed a curfew. The immense size of the protests showed how widespread dissatisfaction with the regime had become. The middle class, whom had grown considerably as a result of the monarchy's expanded education system, had become increasingly alienated from the regime, in large part because they were unable to earn an income commensurate with their status. Nuri as Said's autocratic manner, his intolerance of dissent, and his heavyhanded treatment of the political opposition had further alienated the middle class, especially the army. Forced underground, the opposition had become more revolutionary. By the early 1950s, government revenues began to improve with the growth of the oil industry. New pipelines were built to Tripoli, Lebanon, in 1949 and to Baniyas, Syria, in 1952. A new oil agreement, concluded in 1952, netted the government 50 per cent of oil company profits before taxes. As a result, government oil revenues increased almost fourfold, from US $ 32 million in 1951 to US $ 112 million in 1952. The increased oil payments, however, did little for the masses. Corruption among high government officials increased; oil companies employed relatively few Iraqis; and the oil boom also had a severe inflationary effect on the economy. Inflation hurt in particular a growing number of urban poor and the salaried middle class. The increased economic power of the state further isolated Nuri as Said and the regent from Iraqi society and obscured from their view the tenuous nature of the monarchy's hold on power. In the mid-1950s, the monarchy was embroiled in a series of foreign policy blunders that ultimately contributed to its overthrow. Following a 1949 military coup in Syria that brought to power Adib Shishakli, a military strongman who opposed union with Iraq, a split developed between Abdullah, who had called for a Syrian-Iraqi union, and Nuri as Said, who opposed the union plan. Although Shishakli was overthrown with Iraqi help in 1954, the union plan never came to fruition. Instead, the schism between Nuri as Said and the regent widened. Sensing the regime's weakness, the opposition intensified its anti regime activity. The monarchy's major foreign policy mistake occurred in 1955, when Nuri as Said announced that Iraq was joining a British-supported mutual defence pact with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. The Baghdad Pact constituted a direct challenge to Egyptian President

66

Iraq

Gamal Abdul Nasser. In response, Nasser launched a vituperative media campaign that challenged the legitimacy of the Iraqi monarchy and called on the officer corps to overthrow it. The 1956 British-French-Israeli attack on Sinai further alienated Nuri as Said's regime from the growing ranks of the opposition. In 1958, King Hussain of Jordan and Abdullah proposed a union of Hashimite monarchies to counter the recently formed Egyptian-Syrian union. At this point, the monarchy found itself completely isolated. Nuri as Said was able to contain the rising discontent only by resorting to even greater oppression and to tighter control over the political process.

The Republic The Hashimite monarchy was overthrown on July 14, 1958, in a swift, predawn coup executed by officers of the Nineteenth Brigade under the leadership of Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd as Salaam Arif. The coup was triggered when King Hussain, fearing that an anti-Western revolt in Lebanon might spread to Jordan, requested Iraqi assistance. Instead of moving toward Jordan, however, Colonel Arif led a battalion into Baghdad and immediately proclaimed a new republic and the end of the old regime. The July 14 Revolution met virtually no opposition and proclamations of the revolution brought crowds of people into the streets of Baghdad cheering for the deaths of Iraq's two "strong men," Nuri as Said and Abdullah. King Faisal 11 and Abdullah were executed, as were many others in the royal family. Nuri as Said also was killed after attempting to escape disguised as a veiled woman. In the ensuing mob demonstrations against the old order, angry crowds severely damaged the British embassy. Put in its histo~cal context, the July 14 Revolution was the culmination of a series of uprisings and coup attempts that began with the 1936 Bakr Sidqi coup and included the 1941 Rashid Ali military movement, the 1948 Wathbah UpriSing, and the 1952 and 1956 protests. The revolution radically altered Iraq's social structure, destroying the power of the landed sheikhs and the absentee landlords while enhancing the position of the urban workers, the peasants, and the middle class. In altering the old power structure, however, the revolution revived long-suppressed sectarian, tribal, and ethnic conflicts.

History

67

The strongest of these conflicts were those between Kurds and Arabs and between Sunnis and Shias. Despite a shared military background, the group of Free Officers that carried out the July 14 Revolution was plagued by intern~J dissension. Its members lacked both a coherent ideology and an effective organisational structure. Many of the more senior officers resented having to take orders from Arif; they're junior in rank. A power struggle developed between Qasim and Arif over joining the Egyptian-Syrian union. The Baath Party supported Arif's pro-Nasserite sympathies, while Qasim found support for his anti-union position in the ranks of the communists. Qasim, the more experienced and higher ranking of the two, eventually emerged victorious. Arif was first dismissed, then brought to trial for treason and condemned to death in January 1959; he was subsequently pardoned in December 1962. Whereas he implemented many reforms that favoured the poor, Qasim was primarily a centrist in outlook, proposing to improve the lot of the poor while not dispossessing the wealthy. In part, his ambiguous policies were a product of his lack of a solid base of support, especially in the military. Unlike the bulk of military officers, Qasim did not come from the Arab Sunni north-western towns nor did he share their enthusiasm for pan-Arabism: he was of mixed Sunni-Shia parentage from south-eastern Iraq. Qasim's ability to remain in power depended, therefore, on a skilful balancing of the communists and the pan-Arabists. For most of his tenure, Qasim sought to counterbalance the growing pan-Arab trend in the military by supporting the communists who controlled the streets. He authorised the formation of a communist-controlled militia, the People's Resistance Force, and he freed all communist prisoners. Qasim's economic policies reflected his poor origins and his ties with the communists. He permitted trade unions, improved workers' conditions, and implemented land reform aimed at dismantling the old feudal structure of the countryside. Qasim also challenged the existing profit-sharing arrangements with the oil companies. On December 11, 1961, he passed Public Law 80, which dispossessed the IPe of 99.5 per cent of its concession area, leaving it to operate only in those areas currently in production. The new arrangement significantly increased oil revenues accruing to the government. Qasim

68

Iraq

also announced the establishment of an Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) to exploit the new territory. In March 1959, a group of disgruntled Free Officers, who came from conservative, well known, Arab Sunni families and who opposed Qasim's increasing links with the communists, attempted a coup. Aware of the planned coup, Qasim had his communist allies mobilise 250,000 of their supporters in Mosul. The ill-planned coup attempt never really materialised and, in its aftermath, the communists massacred nationalists and some well-to-do Mosul families, leaving deep scars that proved to be very slow to heal. Throughout 1959, the ranks of the ICP swelled as the party increased its presence in both the military and the government. In 1959, Qasim re-established diplomatic relations between Iraq and Moscow, an extensive Iraqi-Soviet economic agreement was signed, and arms deliveries began. With communist fortunes riding high, another large-scale show of force was planned in Kirkuk, where a significant number of Kurds (many of them either members of, or sympathetic to, the ICP) lived in neighbourhoods contiguous to a Turkoman upper class. In Kirkuk, however, communist rallies got out of hand. A bloody battle ensued, and the Kurds looted and killed many Turkomans. The communist-initiated violence at Kirkuk led Qasim to crack down on the organisation, by arresting some of the more unruly rank-and-file members and by temporarily suspending the People's Resistance Force. FollOWing the events at Mosul and at Kirkuk, the Baath and its leader, Fuad Rikabi, decided that the only way to dislodge the Qasim regime would be to kill Qasim. The future President, Saddam Hussein, carried out the attempted assassination, which injured Qasim but failed to kill him. Qasim reacted by softening his stance on the communists and by suppressing the activities of the Baath and other nationalist parties. The renewed communist-Qasim relationship did not last long, however. Throughout 1960 and 1961, sensing that the communists had become too strong, Qasim again moved against the party by eliminating members from sensitive government positions, by cracking down on trade unions and on peasant associations, and by shutting down the communist press. Qasim's divorce from the communists, his alienation from the nationalists, his aloof manner, and his monopoly of power-he was

History

69

frequently referred to as the "sole leader" -isolated him from a domestic power base. In 1961, his tenuous hold on power was further weakened when the Kurds again took up arms against the central government. The Kurds had ardently supported the 1958 revolution. Indeed, the new constitution put forth by Qasim and Anf had stipulated that the Kurds and the Arabs would be equal partners in the new state. Exiled Kurdish leaders, including Mullah Mustafa Barzani, were allowed to return. Mutual suspicions, however, soon soured the BarzaniQasim relationship; in September 1961, full-scale fighting broke out between Kurdish guerrillas and the Iraqi army. The army did not fare well against the seasoned Kurdish guerrillas, many of whom had deserted from the army. By the spring of 1962, Qasim's inability to contain the Kurdish insurrection had further eroded his base of power. The growing opposition was now in a position to plot his overthrow. Qasim's domestic problems were compounded by a number of foreign policy crises, the foremost of which was an escalating conflict with the shah of Iran. Although he had reined in the communists, Qasim's leftist sympathies aroused fears in the West and in neighbouring Gulf states of an imminent communist takeover ofIraq. In April 1959, Allen Dulles, the director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, described the situation in Iraq "as the most dangerous in the world." The pro-Western shah found Qasim's communist sympathies and his claims on Iranian Khuzestan (an area that stretched from Dezful to Ahvaz in Iran and that contained a majority of Iranians of Arab descent) to be anathema. In December 1959, Iraqi-Iranian relations rapidly deteriorated when Qasim, reacting to Iran's reopening of the Shatt ai-Arab dispute, nullified the 1937 agreement and claimed sovereignty over the anchorage area near Abadan. In July 1961, Qasim further alienated the West and proWestern regional states by laying claim to the newly independent state of Kuwait. When the Arab League unanimously accepted Kuwait's membership, Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with its Arab neighbours. Qasim was completely isolated. In February 1963, hemmed in by regional enemies and facing Kurdish insurrection in the north and a growing nationalist movement at home, Qasim was overthrown. Despite the long list of enemies

70

Iraq

who opposed him in his final days, Qasim was a hero to millions of urban poor and impoverished peasants, many of who rushed to his defence. The inability of the masses to stave off the nationalist onslaught attested to the near total divorce of the Iraqi people from the political process. From the days of the monarchy, the legitimacy of the political process had suffered repeated blows. The government's British legacy, Nuri as Said's authoritarianism, and the rapid encroachment of the miHtary (who paid only scant homage to the institutions of state) had eroded the people's faith in the government; furthermore, Qasim's inability to stem the increasing ethnic, sectarian, and claSS-inspired violence reflected an even deeper malaise. The unravelling of Iraq's traditional social structure upset a precarious balance of social forces. Centuries-old religious and sectarian hatreds now combined with more recent class antagonisms in a volatile mix.

Coups and Coup Attempts Two Syrian students, Michel Aflaq and Salah-ud-Din al-Bitar founded the Baath Party that orchestrated the overthrow of Qasim in the early 1940s. Its ideological goals of socialism, freedom, and unity reflected the deeply felt sentiments of many Iraqis who, during the monarchy, had suffered from the economic dislocation that followed the break-up of the old Ottoman domain, from an extremely skewed income distribution, and from the suppression of political freedoms. Beginning in 1952, under the leadership of Fuad Rikabi, the party grew rapidly, especially among the Iraqi intelligentsia. By 1958, the Baath had made some inroads into the military. The party went through a difficult period in 1959, however, after the Mosul and Kirkuk incidents, the failed attempt on Qasim's life, and disillusionment with Nasser. The Baath's major competitor throughout the Qasim period was the ICP; when Qasim was finally overthrown, strongly pitched battles between the two ensued. The Baath was able to consolidate it., bid for power only with the emergence of AIi Salih as Saadi as leader. Upon assuming power, the Baath established the National Council of Revolutionary Command (NCRC) as the highest policy-making body and appOinted Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, one of the Free Officers, as Prime Minister and Arif as President. The party leader, Saadi, however, held the real power. Despite the dominance of the newly

History

71

established NCRC, the Baath's hold on power was extremely tenuous. The organisation was small, with an active membership of fewer than 1.000, and it was not well represented in the officer corps or in the army at large. Its leadership was inexperienced, and its ideology was too vague to have any immediate relevance to the deep-seated problems besetting Iraq in the early 1960s. Its ambiguity of purpose had served the party well during the Qasim era, enabling it to attract a diverse membership sharing only a common aversion for "the sole leader." In the post-Qasim period, that ambiguity was tearing the party asunder. The party's lack of cohesion and lack of a coherent programme had two major effects on Baath policy. First, it led party strongman Saadi to establish a one-party state that showed little tolerance for opposing views. Second, in the absence of strong ideological ties, cliques from the same village, town, or tribe increasingly pervaded the Baath. This tendency became even more pronounced during the 1970s. Troubled by internal dissension and unable to suppress a new wave of Kurdish unrest in the north. the Baath held power for less than a year. Most damaging was the foundering of unity talks with Nasser and the new Baathist regime in Syria. When the unity plan collapsed, Nasser launched a vituperative campaign challenging the legitimacy of the Baath in Iraq and in Syria. Nasser's attacks seriously eroded the legitimacy of a regime that had continually espoused pan-Arabism. Another factor contributing to the party's demise was Saadi's reliance on the National Guard-a paramilitary force composed primarily of Baath sympathisers-to counter the Baath's lack of support in the regular army. By bolstering the guard, Saadi alienated the regular army. Finally, the Baath was sharply divided between doctrinaire hard-liners, such as Saadi, and a more pragmatic moderate wing. With its party ranks weakened, the Baath was overthrown by Arif and a coterie of military officers in a bloodless coup in November 1963. Upon assuming power, Arif immediately announced that the armed forces would manage the country. The governing core consisted of Arif; his brother, Abd ar Rahman Arif; and his trusted colleague, Colonel Said Slaibi. Arif was chairman of the NCRC, commander in chief of the armed forces, and President of the republic; his brother

72

Iraq

was acting chief of staff, and the colonel was commander of the Baghdad garrison. The Arif brothers, Slaibi, and the majority of Arif's Twentieth Brigade were united by a strong tribal bond as members of the Jumailah tribe. Other groups who participated in the 1963 coup included Nasserites-an informal group of military officers and civilians who looked to Nasser for leadership and who desired some kind of unity with Egypt-and Baathists in the military. By the spring of 1964, Arif had adroitly outmanoeuvred the military Baathists and had filled the top leadership posts with civilian Nasserites. Arif and the Nasserite officers took steps to integrate the military, economic, and political policies of Iraq with those of Egypt; this was expected to lead to the union of the two countries by 1966. (The United Arab Republic [UAR] , which Iraq expected to join, existed from 1958 to 1961 and consisted of Egypt and Syria. Arif proposed that Iraq joined partly as an anti-communist measure but this union never occurred.) In May 1964, the Joint Presidency Council was formed, and in December the Unified Political Command was established to expedite the ultimate constitutional union of the two countries. In July 1964, Arif announced that henceforth all political parties would coalesce to form the Iraqi Arab Socialist Union. Most important for the future, Arif adopted Nasser's socialist programme, calling for the nationalisation of insurance companies, banks, and such essential industries as steel, cement, and construction-along with the tobacco industry, tanneries, and flour mills. Arif's nationalisation programme proved to be one of the few legacies of the proposed Egyptian-Iraqi union. By 1965, Arif had lost his enthusiasm for the proposed union, which had received only lukewarm support from Nasser. Arif began ousting Nasserite officers from the government. As a result, the newly appointed Prime Minister, Brigadier Arif Abd ur Razzaq, who was also a leading Nasserite, made an unsuccessful coup attempt on September 12, 1965. In response, President Arif curtailed Nasserite activities and appointed fellow tribal members to positions of power. Colonel Abd ur Razzaq an Nayif, a fellow Jumailah, became head of military intelligence. Arif also attempted to bring more civilians into the government. He appointed the first civilian Prime Minister since the days of the monarchy, Abd ur Rahman Bazzaz. Bazzaz strongly advocated the rule of law and was determined to end the erratic,

History

73

military-dominated politics that had characterised Iraq since 1958. He also tried to implement the First Five-Year Economic Plan (1965-70) to streamline the bureaucracy and to encourage private and foreign investment. In April 1966, Arif was killed in a helicopter crash and his brother, Major General Abd ur Rahman Arif, was installed in office with the approval of the National Defence Council and the cabinet. Abd ur Rahman Arif lacked the forcefulness and the political acumen of his brother; moreover, he was dominated by the ambitious military officers who were responsible for his appointment. The government's weak hold on the country, thus became more apparent. The most pressing issue facing the new government was a renewed Kurdish rebellion. The 1964 cease-fire signed by Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani and Abd as Salaam Arif was short-lived; by April 1965, the two sides were again engaged in hostilities. This time military support provided by the shah of Iran helped the Kurds win important victories over the Iraqi army. Kurdish inroads in the north and escalating Iraqi-Iranian tensions prompted Iraq's Prime Minister Bazzaz to propose a more far-reaching settlement to the Kurdish problem. Some of the more salient points of Bazzaz's proposal included amnesty, use of the Kurdish language in Kurdish areas, Kurdish administration of their educational, health, and municipal institutions, and the promise of early elections by which the Kurds would gain proportional representation in national as well as in provincial assemblies. When Barzani indicated that he approved of these proposals, the Kurdish conflict appeared to have ended. The army, however, which had opposed having Bazzaz as a civilian head of the cabinet, feared that he would reduce their pay and privileges; consequently, it strongly denounced reconciliation with the Kurds. President Arif yielded to pressure and asked for Bazzaz's resignation. This ended the rapprochement with the Kurds and led to a collapse of civilian rule. The new Prime Minister was General Naji Talib, a pro-Nasserite who had been instrumental in the 1958 Revolution and who strongly opposed the Kurdish peace plan. Arif also sought to further the improved relations-- with Iran initiated by Bazzaz. This rapprochement was significant because it denied the Kurds access to their traditional place of asylum, which

74

Iraq

allowed recovery from Iraqi attacks. Arif visited Tehran in the spring of 1967; at the conclusion of his visit, it was announced that the countries would hold more meetings aimed at joint oil exploration in the Naft-e Shah and Naft Khaneh border regions. They also agreed to continue negotiations on toll collection and navigation rights on the Shatt ai-Arab and on the demarcation of the Persian Gulf's continental shelf. During the winter of 1966-67, Arif faced a crisis emanating from a new source, Syria. The IPC transported oil from its northern fields to Mediterranean ports via pipelines in Syria. In 1966, Damascus claimed that the IPC had been underpaying Syria, based on their 1955 agreement. Syria demanded back payments and immediately increased the transit fee it charged the IPC. When the IPC did not accede to Syrian demands, Syria cut off the flow of Iraqi oil to its Mediterranean ports. The loss of revenue threatened to cause a severe financial crisis. It also fuelled anti-Talib forces and increased public clamour for his resignation. In response, Talib resigned, and Arif briefly headed an extremely unsteady group of military officers. In the opinion of Phebe Marr, a leading authority on Iraq, on the eve of the June 1967 War between Israel and various Arab states, the Arif government had become little more than a collection of army officers balancing the special interests of various economic, political, ethnic, and sectarian groups. The non-intervention of Iraqi troops while Israel was overtaking the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies and was conquering large tracts of Arab territory discredited the Arif regime in the eyes of the masses. To stave off rising discontent, Arif reappointed strongman Tahir Yahya as Prime Minister (he had first been appointed by Arif in November 1963). Yahya's only accomplishment was to lessen Iraq's economic dependence on the Western-owned IPC: on August 6, his government turned overall exploitation rights in the oil-rich North Rumailah field to the statecontrolled INOC. The Arif government, however, had lost its base of power. Lacking a coherent political platform and facing increasing charges of corruption, the government was only hanging on. Ultimately two disaffected Arif supporters-Colonel Abd ur Razzaq an Nayif and Ibrahim ad Daud-were able to stage a successful coup against Arif, and the Baath quickly capitalised on the situation. Nayif and Daud had been part of a small group of young officers, called

History

75

the Arab Revolutionary Movement, which previously had been a major source of support for Arif. By July 1968, however, reP9rts of corruption and Arif's increased reliance on the Nasserites (whom both Nayif and Daud opposed) had alienated the two officers. Nayif and Daud acted independently from the Baath in carrying out the coup, but lacked the organisational backing or the grass-roots support necessary to remain in power. In only a few weeks, the Baath had outmanoeuvred Nayif and Daud, and, for the second time in five years, had taken over control of the government.

Emergence of Saddam Hussein The Baath of 1968 was more tightly organised and more determined to stay in power than the Baath of 1963. The demise of Nasserism following the June 1967 War and the emergence of a more parochially oriented Baath in Syria freed the Iraqi Baath from the debilitating aspects of pan-Arabism. In 1963, Nasser had been able to manipulate domestic Iraqi politics; by 1968, his ideological pull had waned, enabling the Iraqi Baath to focus on pressing domestic issues. The party also was aided by a 1967 reorganisation that created a militia and an intelligence apparatus and set up local branches that gave the Baath broader support. In addition, by 1968, close family and tribal ties bound the Baath's ruling clique. Most notable in this regard was the emergence of Tikritis-Sunni Arabs from the north-west town of Tikrit-related to Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. Three of the five members of the Baath's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) were Tikritis; two, Bakr and Hammad Shihab, were related to each other. The cabinet posts of President, Prime Minister, and defence minister went to Tikritis. Saddam Hussein, a key leader behind the scenes, also was a Tikriti and a relative of Bakr. Another distinguishing characteristic of the Baath in 1968 was that the top leadership consisted almost entirely of military men. Finally, Bakr was a much more seasoned politician in 1968 than he had been in 1963. Less than two months after the formation of the Bakr government, a coalition of pro-Nasser elements, Arif supporters, and conservatives from the military attempted another coup. This event provided the rationale for numerous purges directed by Bakr and Saddam Hussein. Between 1968 and 1973, through a series of sham trials, executions, assassinations, and intimidations, the party ruthlessly eliminated any group or person suspected of challenging Baath rule. The Baath also

76

Iraq

institutionalised its rule by formally issuing a Provisional Constitution in JUly 1970. This document was a modification of an earlier constitution that had been issued in September 1968. The Provisional Constitution, which with some modifications is still in effect, granted the party-dominated RCC extensive powers and declared that new RCC members must belong to the party's Regional Command-the top policy-making and executive body of the Baathist organisation. Two men, Saddam Hussein and Bakr, increasingly dominated the party. Bakr, who had been associated with Arab nationalist causes for more than a decade, brought the party popular legitimacy. Even more important, he brought support from the army both between Baathist and non-Baathist officers, with whom he had cultivated ties for years. Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, was a consummate party politician whose formative experiences were in organising clandestine opposition activity. He was adept at outmanoeuvringand at times ruthlessly eliminating-political opponents. Although Bakr was the older and more prestigious of the two, by 1969, Saddam Hussein clearly had become the moving force behind the party. He personally directed Baathist attempts to settle the Kurdish question and he organised the party's institutional structure. In July 1973, after an unsuccessful coup attempt by a civilian faction within the Baath led by Nazim Kazzar, the party set out to re-consolidate its hold on power. First, the RCC amended the Provisional Constitution to give the President greater power. Second, in early 1974, the Regional Command was officially designated as the body responsible for making policy. By September 1977, alI Regional Command leaders had been appOinted to the RCC. Third, the party created a more pervasive presence in Iraqi society by establishing a complex network of grass roots and intelligence-gathering organisations. FinalIy, the party established its own militia, which in 1978 was reported to number close to 50,000 men. Despite Baath attempts to institutionalise its rule, real power remained in the hands of a narrowly based elite, united by close family and tribal ties. By 1977, the most powerful men in the Baath, thus, were alI somehow related to the triumvirate of Saddam Hussein, Bakr, and General Adnan Khayr Allah Talfah, Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law who became minister of defence in 1978. All were members of the party, the RCC, and the cabinet, and all were

History

77

members of the Talfah family of Tikrit, headed by Khayr Allah Talfah. Khayr Allah Talfah was Saddam Hussein's uncle and guardian, Adnan Khayr Allah's father, and Bakr's cousin. Saddam Hussein was married to Adnan Khayr Allah's sister and Adnan Khayr Allah was married to Bakr's daughter. Increasingly, the most sensitive military posts were going to the Tikritis. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Bakr was beset by illness and by a series of family tragedies. He increasingly turned over power to Saddam Hussein. By 1977, the party bureaus, the intelligence mechanisms, and even ministers who, according to the Provisional Constitution, should have reported to Bakr, reported to Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein, meanwhile, was less inclined to share power, and he viewed the cabinet and the RCC as rubber stamps. On July 16, 1979, President Bakr resigned, and Saddam Hussein officially replaced him as President of the republic, secretary general of the Baath Party Regional Command, chairman of the RCC, and comma nder in chief of the armed forces. In foreign affairs, the Baath's pan-Arab and socialist leanings alienated both the pro-Western Arab Gulf states and the shah of Iran. The enmity between Iraq and Iran sharpened with the 1969 British announ cemen t of a planned withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971. In February 1969, Iran announced that Iraq had not fulfilled its obligations under the 1937 treaty and deman ded that the border in the Shatt ai-Arab waterway be set at the thalweg. Iraq's refusal to honour the Iranian deman d led the shah to abrogate the 1937 treaty and to send Iranian ships through the Shatt ai-Arab without paying dues to Iraq. In response, Iraq aided anti-shah dissidents, while the shah renewed suppor t for Kurdish rebels. Relations between the two countries soon deteriorated further. In November 1971, the shah occupied the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which previously had been under the sovereignty of Ras al-Khaymah and Sharjah, both membe r states of the United Arab Emirates. The Iraqi Baath also was involved in a confrontation with the conservative sheikhdoms of the Gulf over Iraq's suppor t for the leftist People's De~ratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and the PopUlar Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf. The major contention between Iraq and the conservative Gulf states, however, concerned the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah that

78

Iraq

domina te the estuary leading to the souther n Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. Beginning in the early 1970s, Iraq's desire to develop a deep-w ater port on the Gulf led to deman ds that the two islands be transferred or leased to Iraq. Kuwait refused, and in March 1973, Iraqi troops occupi ed As Samita h, a border post in the north-e ast corner of r Kuwait. Saudi Arabia immediately came to Kuwait's aid and, togethe with the Arab League , obtaine d Iraq's withdrawal. The most serious threat facing the Baath was a resurgence of a Kurdish unrest in the north. In March 1970, the RCC and Mustaf Barzani announ ced agreem ent to a fifteen-article peace plan. This plan was almost identical to the previous Bazzaz-Kurdish settlem ent that had never been implemented. The Kurds were immediately ed pacified by the settlement, particularly becaus e Barzani was permitt e becam then troops i's Barzan to retain his 15,000 Kurdish troops. "Those g meanin rga, an official Iraqi frontier force called the Peshme Who Face Death." The plan, however, was not completely satisfactory becaus e the legal status of the Kurdish territory remain ed unresolved. At the time y of the signing of the peace plan, Barzani's forces controlled territor already and ast from Zakhu in the north to Halabja h in the south-e had established de jacto Kurdish administration in most of the towns , of the area. Barzani's group, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KOP) was granted official recognition as the legitimate representative of the Kurdish people. The 1970 agreem ent unravelled through out the early 1970s. After the March 1974, Baath attemp t to assassinate Barzani and his son Idris, full-scale fighting broke out. In early 1974, it appear ed that the Baath had finally succee ded in isolating Barzani and the KDP by co-opting the ICP and by signing a treaty with the Soviet Union, both traditionally strong suppor ters of the KOP. Barzani, however, compe nsated for the loss of Soviet and ICP suppor t by obtaini ng military aid from the Shah of Iran and from the United States, both of which were alarme d by increasing Soviet influence in Iraq. When Iraqi forces reached Rawanduz, threatening to block the major Kurdish artery to Iran, the Shah increased the flow of military supplies to the Kurdish rebels. Using antitan k missiles and artillery obtaine d from Iran as well as military aid from Syria and Israel, the KOP inflicted heavy losses on the Iraqi forces. To avoid a costly stalema te like that

History

79

which had weakened his predecessors, Saddam Hussein sought an agreement with the shah. In Algiers on March 6, 1975, Saddam Hussein signed an agreement with the Shah that recognised the thalweg as the boundary in the Shatt ai-Arab, legalised the shah's abrogation of the 1937 treaty in 1969, and dropped all Iraqi cl;:;lims to Iranian Khuzestan and to the islands at the foot of the Gulf. In return, the Shah agreed to prevent subversive elements from crossing the border. This agreement meant an end to Iranian assistance to the Kurds, Almost immediately after the signing of the Algiers Agreement, Iraqi forces went on the offensive and defeated the Peshrrierga, which was unable to hold out without Iranian support. Under an amnesty plan, about 70 per cent of the Peshmerga surrendered to the Iraqis. Some remained in the hills of Kurdistan to continue the fight, and about 30,000 crossed the border to Iran to join the civilian refugees, then estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000. Even before the fighting broke out in March 1974, Saddam Hussein had offered the Kurds the most comprehensive autonomy plan ever proposed. The major provisions of the plan stated that Kurdistan would be an autonomous area governed by an elected legislative and an executive council, the President of which would be appointed by the Iraqi head of state. The Kurdish council would have control over local affairs except in the areas of defence and foreign relations, which would be controlled by the central government. The autonomous region did not include the oil-rich district of Kirkuk. To facilitate the autonomy plan, Saddam Hussein's administration helped form three pro-government Kurdish parties, allocated a special budget for development in Kurdish areas, and repatriated many Kurdish refugees then living in Iran. In addition to the conciliatory measures offered to the Kurds, Saddam Hussein attempted to weaken Kurdish resistance by forcibly relocating many Kurds from the Kurdish heartland in the north, by introducing increasing numbers of Arabs into mixed Kurdish provinces, and by razing all Kurdish villages along a 1,300 kilometre stretch of the border with Iran. Saddam Hussein's combination of conciliation and severity failed to appease the Kurds, and renewed guerrilla attacks occurred as early as March 1976. At the same time, the failure of the KDP to obtain significant concessions from the Iraqi government

80

Iraq

caused a serious split within the Kurdish resistance. In June 1975, Jalal Talabani formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUK was urban-based and more leftist than the tribally based KO? Following Barzani's death in 1975, Barzani's sons, Idris and Masud, took control of the KO? In October 1979, Masud officially was elected KOP chairman. He issued a new platform calling for continued armed struggle against the Baath through guerrilla warfare. The effectiveness of the KOp, however, was blunted by its violent intra-Kurdish struggle with the PUK throughout 1978 and 1979. Beginning in 1976, with the Baath firmly in power and after the Kurdish rebellion had been successfully quelled, Saddam Hussein set out to consolidate his position at home by strengthening the economy. He pursued a state-sponsored industrial modernisation programme that tied an increasing number of Iraqis to the Baath-controlled government. Saddam Hussein's economic policies were largely successful; they led to a wider distribution of wealth, to greater social mobility, to increased access to education and health care, and to the redistribution of land. The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and the subsequent oil price rises brought on by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran greatly enhanced the success of Saddam Hussein's programme. The more equitable distribution of income tied to the ruling party many Iraqis who had previously opposed the central government. For the first time in modern Iraqi history, a government-albeit at times a ruthless one, had, thus, achieved some success in forging a national community out of the country's disparate social elements. Success on the economic front spurred Saddam Hussein to pursue an ambitious foreign policy aimed at pushing Iraq to the forefront of the Arab world. Between 1975, and 1979, a major plank of Saddam Hussein's bid for power in the region rested on improved relations with Iran, with Saudi Arabia, and with the smaller Gulf sheikhdoms. In 1975, Iraq established diplomatic relations with Sultan Qaboos of Oman and extended several loans to him. In 1978, Iraq sharply reversed its support for the Marxist regime in South Yemen. The. biggest boost to Saddam Hussein's quest for regional power, however, resulted from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's signing the Camp David Accords in November 1978. Saddam Hussein viewed Egypt's isolation within the Arab world as an opportunity for Iraq to play a leading role in Arab affairs. He

History

81

was instrumental in convening an Arab summit in Baghdad that denounced'Sadat's reconciliation with Israel and imposed sanctions on Egypt. He also attempted to end his long-standing feud with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, and, in June 1979, Saddam Hussein became the first Iraqi head of state in twenty years to visit Jordan. In Amman, Saddam Hussein concluded a number of agreements with King Hussein, including one for the expansion of the port of Aqabah, regarded by Iraq as a potential replacement for ports in Lebanon and Syria.

Iran-Iraq Conflict In February 1979, Saddam Hussein's ambitious plans and the course of Iraqi history were drastically altered by the overthrow of the shah of Iran. Hussein viewed the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran as both a threat and an opportunity. The downfall of the Shah and the confusion prevailing in post-revolutionary Iran suited Saddam Hussein's regional ambitions. A weakened Iran seemed to offer an opportunity to project Iraqi power over the Gulf, to regain control over the Shatt ai-Arab waterway, and to augment Iraqi claims to leadership of the Arab world. More ominously, the activist Shia Islam preached by the leader of the revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, threatened to upset the delicate SunniShia balance in Iraq, and a hostile Iran would threaten Iraqi security in the Gulf. Furthermore, deep-seated personal animosities separated the two leaders. The two men held widely divergent ideologies, and in 1978 Hussein had expelled Khomeini from Iraq-reportedly at the request of the shah-after he had lived thirteen years in exile in An Najaf. For much of Iraqi history, the Shias have been both politically impotent .and economically depressed. Beginning in the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Sunnis favoured their Iraqi co-religionists in the matter of educational and employment opportunities, the Shias consistently have been denied political power. Thus, although the Shias constituted more then 50 per cent of the population, they occupied a relatively insignificant number of government posts. On the economic level, aside from a small number of wealthy landowners and merchants, the Shias historically were exploited as sharecropping peasants or menially employed slum dwellers. Even the prosperity brought by the oil boom of the 1970s, only trickled down slowly to

82

Iraq

the Shias; however, beginning in the latter half of the 1970s, Saddam' s populist economic policies had a favourable impact on them, enabling many to join the ranks of a new Shia middle class. Widespread Shia demonstrations took place in Iraq in February 1977, when the government, suspecting a bomb, closed Karbala to pilgrimage at the height of a religious ceremony. Violent clashes between police and Shia pilgrims spread from Karbala to An Najaf and lasted for several days before army troops were called in to quell the unrest. It was the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, however, that transformed Shia dissatisfaction with the Baath into an organised religiously based opposition. The Baath leadership feared that the success of Iran's Islamic Revolution would serve as an inspiration to Iraqi Shias. These fears escalated in July 1979, when riots broke out in An Najaf and in Karbala after the government had refused Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir as Sadr's request to lead a procession to Iran to congratulate Khomeini. Even more worrisome to the Baath was the discovery of a clandestine Shia group headed by religiOUS leaders having ties to Iran. Baqir as Sadr was the inspirational leader of the group, named Ad Dawah al-Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), commonly referred to as Ad Dawah. He espoused a programme similar to Khomeini's, which called for a return to Islamic precepts of government and for social justice. Despite the Iraqi government's concern, the eruption ofthe 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran did not immediately destroy the IraqiIranian rapprochement that had prevailed since the 1975 Algiers Agreement. As a sign of Iraq's desire to maintain good relations with the new government in Tehran, President Bakr sent a personal message to Khomeini offering "his best wishes for the friendly Iranian people on the occasion of the establishment of the Islamic Republic." In addition, as late as the end of August 1979, Iraqi authorities extended an invitation to Mehdi Bazargan, the first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to visit Iraq with the aim of improving bilateral relations. The fall of the moderate Bazargan government in late 1979, however, and the rise of Islamic militants preaching an expansionist foreign policy soured Iraqi-Iranian relations. The principal events that touched off the rapid deterioration in relations occurred during the spring of 1980. In April, the Iranian-

History

83

supported Ad Dawah attempted to assassinate Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. Shortly after the failed grenade attack on Tariq Aziz, Ad Dawah was suspected of attempting to assassinate another Iraqi leader, Minister of Culture and Information Latif Nayyif Jasim. In response, the Iraqis immediately rounded up members and supporters of Ad Dawah and deported to Iran thousands of Shias of Iranian origin. In the summer of 1980, Saddam Hussein ordered the executions of presumed Ad Dawah leader Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqr as Sadr and his sister. In September 1980, border skirmishes erupted in the central sector near Qasr-e Shirin, with an exchange of artillery fire by both sides. A few weeks later, Saddam Hussein officially abrogated the 1975 treaty between Iraq and Iran and announced that the Shatt alArab was returning to Iraqi sovereignty. Iran rejected this action and hostilities escalated as the two sides exchanged bombing raids deep into each other's territory. Finally, on September 23, Iraqi troops marched into Iranian territory, beginning what was to be.a protracted and extremely costly war. The Iran-Iraq War permanently altered the course of Iraqi history. It strained Iraqi political and social life, and led to severe economic dislocations. Viewed from a historical perspective, the outbreak of hostilities in 1980 was, in part, just another phase of the ancient Persian-Arab conflict that had been fuelled by twentieth-century border disputes. Many observers, however, believe that Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran was a personal miscalculation based on ambition and a sense of vulnerability. Saddam Hussein, despite having made significant strides in forging an Iraqi nation-state, feared that Iran's new revolutionary leadership would threaten Iraq's delicate Sunni-Shia balance and would exploit Iraq's geo-strategic vulnerabilities-Iraq's minimal access to the Persian Gulf, for example. In this respect, Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran has historical precedent; the ancient rulers of Mesopotamia, fearing internal strife and foreign conquest, also engaged in frequent battles with the peoples of the highlands.

Anfa) Campaign against Kurds This is a narrative account of a campaign of extermination against the Kurds of northern Iraq. It is the product of over a year and a half of research, during which a team of Middle East Watch

84

Iraq

researchers ~ve analysed several tons of captured Iraqi government documents and carried out field interviews with more than 350 witnesses, most of them survivors of the 1988 campaign known as Anfal. It concludes that in that year the Iraqi regime committed the crime of genocide. Anfal-"the Spoils"-is the name of the eighth sura of the Koran. It is also the name given by the Iraqis to a series of military actions, which lasted from February 23 until September 6, 1988. While it is impossible to understand the Anfal campaign without reference to the final phase of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Anfal was not merely a function of that war. Rather, the winding-up of the conflict on Iraq's terms was the immediate historical circumstance that gave Baghdad the opportunity to bring to a climax its long-standing efforts to bring the Kurds to heel. For, the Iraqi regime's anti-Kurdish drive dated back some fifteen years or more, well before the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq. Anfal was also the most vivid expression of the "special powers" granted to Ali Hasan al-Majid, a cousin of President Saddam Hussein and secretary general of the Northern Bureau of Iraq's Baath Arab Socialist Party. From March 29, 1987 until April 23, 1989, al-Majid was granted power that was equivalent, in Northern Iraq, tc? that of the President himself, with authority over all agencies of the state. Al-Majid, who is known to this day to Kurds as ''Ali Anfal" or ''Ali Chemical," was the overlord of the Kurdish genocide. Under his command, the central actors in Anfal were the Arst and Fifth Corps of the regular Iraqi Army, the General Security Directorate (Mudiriyat al-Amn al-Ameh) and Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat). The pro-government Kurdish militia known as the National Defence Battalions, or jahsh, assisted in important auxiliary tasks. But the integrated resources of the entire military, security and civilian apparatus of the Iraqi state were deployed, in al-Majid's words, "to solve the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs." The campaigns of 1987-1989 were characterised by the following gross violations of human rights: • mass summary executions and mass disappearance of many tens of thousands of non-combatants, including large numbers of women and children, and sometimes the entire population of villages;

History

85

• the widespread use of chemical weapons, including mustard gas and the nerve agent GB, or Sarin, against the town of Halabja as well as dozens of Kurdish villages, killing many thousands of people, mainly women and children; • the wholesale destruction of some 2,000 villages, which are described in government documents as having been "burned," "destroyed," "demolished" and "purified," as well as at least a dozen larger towns and administrative centres (nahyas and qadhas);

• the wholesale destruction of civilian objects by Army engineers, including all schools, mosques, wells and other non-residential structures in the targeted villages, and a number of electricity substations; • looting of civilian property and farm animals on a vast scale by army troops and pro-government militia; • arbitrary arrest of all villagers captured in designated "prohibited areas" (manateq al-mahdoureh), despite the fact that these were their own homes and lands; • arbitrary jailing and warehousing for months, in conditions of extreme deprivation, of tens of thousands of women, children and elderly people, without judicial order or any cause other than their presumed sympathies for the Kurdish opposition. Many hundreds of them were allowed to die of malnutrition and disease; • forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of villagers upon the demolition of their homes, their release from jail or return from exile; these civilians were trucked into areas of Kurdistan far from their homes and dumped there by the army with only minimal governmental compensation or none at all for their destroyed property, or any provision for relief, housing, clothing or food, and forbidden to return to their villages of origin on pain of death. In these conditions, many died within a year of their forced displacement; • destruction of the rural Kurdish economy and infrastructure. Like Nazi Germany, the Iraqi regime concealed its actions in euphemisms. Where Nazi officials spoke of "executive measures," "special actions" and "resettlement in the east," Baathist bureaucrats

86

Iraq

spoke of "collective measures," "return to the national ranks" and "resettlement in the south." But beneath the euphemisms, Iraq's crimes against the Kurds amount to genocide, the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. The campaigns of 1987-1989 are rooted deep in the history of the Iraqi Kurds. Since the earliest days of Iraqi independence, the country's Kurds-who today number more than four million-have fought either for independence or for meaningful autonomy. But they have never achieved the results they desired. In 1970, the Baath Party, anxious to secure its precarious hold on power, did offer the Kurds a considerable measure of self-rule, far greater than that allowed in neighbouring Syria, Iran or Turkey. But the regime defined the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in such a way as deliberately to exclude the vast oil wealth that lies beneath the fringes of the Kurdish lands. The Autonomous Region, rejected by the Kurds and imposed unilaterally by Baghdad in 1974, comprised the three northern govern orates of Erbil, Suleimaniyeh and Dohuk. Covering some 14,000 square miles-roughly the combined area of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island-this was only half the territory that the Kurds considered rightfully theirs. Even so, the Autonomous Region had real economic significance, since it accounted for fully half the agricultural output of a largely desert country that is sorely deficient in domestic food production. In the wake of the autonomy decree, the Baath Party embarked on the ''Arabisation'' of the oil-producing areas of Kirkuk and Khanaqin and other parts of the north, evicting Kurdish farmers and replacing them with poor Arab tribesmen from the south. Northern Iraq did not remain at peace for long. In 1974, the long-simmering Kurdish revolt flared up once more under the leadership of the legendary fighter Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who was supported this time by the governments of Iran, Israel, and the United States. But the revolt collapsed precipitately in 1975, when Iraq and Iran concluded a border agreement and the Shah withdrew his support from Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KOP). After the KOP fled into Iran, tens of thousands of villagers from the Barzani tribe were forcibly removed from their homes and relocated to barren sites in the desert south of Iraq. Here, without any form of assistance, they had to rebuild their lives from scratch.

History

87

In the mid and late 1970s, the regime again moved against the Kurds, forcibly evacuating at least a quarter of a million people from Iraq's borders with Iran and Turkey, destroying their villages to create a cordon sanitaire along these sensitive frontiers. Most of the displaced Kurds were relocated into mujammaat, crude new settlements located on the main highways in army-controlled areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. The word literally means "amalgamations" or "collectivities." In their propaganda, the Iraqis commonly refer to them as "modern villages"; in this report, they are generally described as "complexes." Until 1987, villagers relocated to the complexes were generally paid some nominal cash compensation, but were forbidden to move back to their homes. After 1980, and the beginning of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, many Iraqi garrisons in Kurdistan were abandoned or reduced in size, and their troops transferred to the front. In the vacuum that was left, the Kurdish peshmerga-"those who face death" -once more began to thrive. The KOp, now led by one of Barzani's sons, Masud, had revived its alliance with Teheran, and in 1983 KOP units aided Iranian troops in their capture of the border town of Haj Omran. Retribution was swift: in a lightning operation against the complexes that housed the relocated Barzanis, Iraqi troops abducted between five and eight thousand males aged twelve or over. None of them have ever been seen again, and it is believed that after being held prisoner for several months, they were all killed. In many respects, the 1983 Barzani operation foreshadowed the techniques that would be used on a much larger scale during the Anfal campaign. And the absence of any international outcry over this act of mass murder, despite Kurdish efforts to press the matter with the United Nations and Western governments, must have emboldened Baghdad to believe that it could get away with an even larger operation without any adverse reaction. In these calculations, the Baath Party was correct. Even more worrisome to Baghdad was the growing closeness between the Iranians and the KOP's major Kurdish rival, Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Baath regime had conducted more than a year of negotiations with the PUK between 1983-1985, but in the end these talks failed to bear fruit, and full-scale fighting resumed. In late 1986, Talabani's party concluded a formal political and military agreement with Teheran.

88

Iraq

By this time the Iraqi regime's authority over the North had dwindled to control of the cities, towns, complexes and main highways. Elsewhere, the peshmerga forces could rely on a deep-rooted base of local support. Seeking refuge from the army, thousands of Kurdish draft-dodgers and deserters found new homes in the countryside. Villagers learned to live with a harsh economic blockade and stringent food rationing, punctuated by artillery shelling, aerial bombardment and punitive forays by the Army and the paramilitary jahsh. In response, the rural Kurds built air-raid shelters in front of their homes and spent much of their time in hiding in the caves and ravines that honeycomb the northern Iraqi countryside. For all the grimness of this existence, by 1987 the mountainous interior of Iraqi Kurdistan was effectively liberated territory. This the Baath Party regarded as an intolerable situation. In the first three months after assuming his post as secretary general of the Baath Party's Northern Bureau, Ali Hasan al-Majid began the process of definition of the group that would be targeted by Anfal, and vastly expanded the range of repressive activities against all rural Kurds. He decreed that "saboteurs" would lose their property rights, suspended the legal rights of all the residents of prohibited villages, and began ordering the execution of first-degree relatives of "saboteurs" and of wounded civilians whose hostility to the regime had been determined by the intelligence services. In June 1987, al-Majid issued two successive sets of standing orders that were to govern the conduct of the security forces through the Anfal campaign and beyond. These orders were based on the simple axiom on which the regime now operated: in the "prohibited" rural areas, all resident Kurds were co-terminous with the peshmerga insurgents, and they would be dealt with accordingly. The first of al-Majid's directives bans all human existence in the prohibited areas, to be applied through a shoot-to-kill policy. The second, numbered SF/4008, dated June 20, 1987, modifies and expands upon these orders. It constitutes a bald incitement to mass murder, spelled out in the most chilling detail. In clause 4, army commanders are ordered "to carry out random bombardments, using artillery, helicopters and aircraft, at all times of the day or night, in order to kill the largest number of persons present in these prohibited zones." In clause 5, al-Majid orders that, ''All persons captured in

History

89

those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them, of which we should be duly notified." Even as this legal and bureaucratic structure was being set in place, the Iraqi regime became the first in history to attack its own civilian population with chemical weapons. On April 15, 1987, Iraqi aircraft dropped poison gas on the KDP headquarters at Zewa Shkan, close to the Turkish border in Dohuk governorate, and the PUK headquarters in the twin villages of Sergalou and Bergalou, in the governorate of Suleimaniyeh. The following afternoon, they dropped chemicals on the undefended civilian villages of Sheikh Wasan and Balisan, killing well over a hundred people, most of them women and children. Scores of other victims of the attack were abducted from their hospital beds in the city of Erbil, where they had been taken for treatment of their burns and blindness. They have never , been seen again. These incidents were the first of at least forty documented chemical attacks on Kurdish targets over the succeeding eighteen months. They were also the first sign of the regime's new readiness to kill large numbers of Kurdish women and children indiscriminately. Within a week of the mid-April chemical weapons attacks, Al-Majid's forces were ready to embark upon what he described as a three-stage programme of village clearances or collectivisation. The first ran from April 21 to May 20; the second from May 21 to June 20. More than 700 villages were burned and bulldozed, most of them along the main highways in government-controlled areas. The third phase of the operation, however, was suspended; with Iraqi forces still committed to the war front, the resources required for such a huge operation were not available. But the goals of the third stage would eventually be accomplished by Anfal. In terms of defining the target group for destruction, no single administrative step was more important to the Iraqi regime than the national census of October 17, 1987. Now that the springtime village clearances had created a virtual buffer strip between the government and the peshmerga-controlled zones, the Baath Party offered the inhabitants of the prohibited areas an ultimatum: either they could "return to the national ranks" -in other words, abandon their homes

90

Iraq

and livelihoods and accept compulsory relocation in a squalid camp under the eye of the security forces; or they could lose their Iraqi citizenship and be regarded as military deserters. The second option was tantamount to a death sentence, since the census legislation made those who refused to be counted subject to an August 1987 decree of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, imposing the death penalty on deserters. In the period leading up to the census, al-Majid refined the target group further. He ordered his intel1igence officials to prepare detailed case-by-case dossiers of "saboteurs'" families who were still living in the government-control1ed areas. When these dossiers were complete, countless women, children and elderly people were forcibly transferred to the rural areas to share the fate of their peshmerga relatives. This case-by-case, family-byfamily sifting of the population was to become a characteristic feature of the decisions made during the Anfal period about who should live and who should die. Last, but not without significance, the census gave those who registered only two alternatives when it came to declaring their nationality. One could either be Arab or Kurdish-a stipUlation that was to have the direst consequences for other minority groups, such as the Yezidis, Assyrians and Chaldean Christians who continued to live in the Kurdish areas. The Anfal campaign began four months after the census, with a massive military assault on the PUK headquarters at Sergalou-Bergalou on the night of February 23, 1988. Anfal·would have eight stages in al1, seven of them directed at areas under the control of the PUK. The KDP-control1ed areas in the north-west of Iraqi Kurdistan, which the regime regarded as a lesser threat, were the target of the Final Anfal operation in late August and early September, 1988. The Iraqi authorities did nothing to hide the campaign from public view. On the contrary, as each phase of the operation triumphed, its successes were trumpeted with the same propaganda fanfare that attended the victorious battles in the Iran-Iraq War. Even today, Anfal is celebrated in the official Iraqi media. The fifth anniversary in 1993 of the fall of Sergalou and Bergalou on March 19, 1988 was the subject of banner headlines. Iraqi troops tore through rural Kurdistan with the motion of a gigantic windshield wiper, sweeping first clockwise, then counter-clockwise, through one after another of the "prohibited

History

91

areas." The First Anfal, centred on the siege of the PUK headquarters, took more than three weeks. Subseq uent phases of the campai gn were generally shorter, with a brief pause between each as army units moved on to the next target. The Second Anfal, in the Qara Dagh region, lasted from March 22 to April 1, 1988; the Third, covering the hilly plain known as Germian, took from April 7 to April 20; the Fourth, in the valley of the Lesser Zab river, was the shortest of all, lasting only from May 3 to May 8. Only in the Fifth Anfal, which began on May 15 in the mountainous region northeast of Erbil, did the troops have any real difficulty in meeting their objectives. Encountering fierce resistance in difficult terrain from the last of the PUK peshmerga, the regime called a temporary halt to the offensive on June 7. On orders from the Office of the Presidency (indicating the person al supervisory role that Saddam Hussein himself played in Anfal), the operation was renewed twice in July and August, with these actions denom inated Anfal VI and Anfal VII. Eventually, on August 26, the last PUK-controlled area was declared, "Cleansed of saboteurs." By this time, Iran had accepted Iraq's terms for a cease-fire to end the war, freeing up large numbers of Iraqi troops to carry the Anfal operati on into the Badina n area of northern Iraqi Kurdistan. The Final Anfal began at first light on August 25, and was over in a matter of days. On Septem ber 6, 1988, the Iraqi regime made its de facto declaration of victory by announ cing a general amnest y for all Kurds. Each stage of Anfal followed roughly the same pattern. It characteristically began with chemical attacks from the air on both civilian and peshmerga targets, accompanied by a military blitz against PUK or KDP military bases and fortified positions. The deadly cocktail of mustard and nerve gases was much more lethal against civilians than against the peshmerga, some of whom had acquired gas masks and other rudimentary defences. In the village of Sayw Senan (Second Anfal), more than eighty civilians died; in Goktap a (Fourth Anfal), the death toll was more than 150; in Wara (Fifth Anfal) it was thirty seven. In the largest chemical attack of all, the March 16 bombin g of the Kurdish town of Halabja, between 3,200 and 5,000 residents died. As a city, Halabja was not technically part of Anfal- the raid was carried out in reprisal for its capture by peshme rga suppor ted by Iranian Revolutionary Guard s-but it was very much part of the Kurdish genocide.

92

Iraq

After the initial assault, ground troops and jahsh envelo ped the target area from all sides, destroying all human habitation in their path, looting househ old possessions and farm animals and setting fire to homes, before calling in demolition crews to finish the job. As the destru ction procee ded, so did Hilber g's phase of the "concentration" or "seizure" of the target group. Convoys of army trucks stood by to transport the vi11agers to nearby holding centres and transit camps, while the jahsh combe d the hi11sides to track down anyone who had escape d (Some members of the militia, an asset of dubious reliability to the regime, also saved thousan ds of lives by spiriting people away to safety or helping them across army lines.). Secret police combe d the towns, cities and complexes to hunt down Anfal fugitives, and in several cases lured them out of hiding with false offers of amnesty and a "return to the national ranks" -a promise that now concea led a more sinister meaning. To this point, Anfal had many of the characteristics of a counterinsurgency campaign, albeit an unusually savage one. And capture d Iraqi docum ents suggest that during the initial comba t phase, counterinsurgency goals were upperm ost in the minds of the troops and their comma nding officers. To be sure, Iraq-li ke any other soverei gn nation -had legitimate interests in comba ting insurgency. But the fact that Anfal was, by the narrowest definition, a counterinsurgency, does nothing to diminish the fact that it was also an act of genocide. There is nothing mutual\y exclusive about counterinsurgency and genocide. Indeed, one may be the instrument used to consum mate the other. Article I of the Genocide Convention affirms, "genocide, whethe r committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law." Summarily, executing non-co mbatan t or captured members of an ethnical-national group as such is not a legitimate wartime or counterinsurgency measure, regardless of the nature of the conflict. In addition to this argume nt of principle, many features of Anfal far transcend the realm of counterinsurgency. These include, first of all, the simple facts of what happen ed after the military goals of the operati on had been accomplished: • the mass murder and disappe arance of many tens of thousa nds of non-combatants-50,OOO by the most conservative estimate, and possibly twice that number;

History

93

• the use of chemical weapon s against non-combatants in dozens of locations, killing thousands and terrifying many more into abando ning their homes; • the near-total destruction of family and community assets and infrastructure, including the entire agricultural mainstay of the rural Kurdish economy; • the literal abando nment, in punishing conditions, of thousan ds of women, children an'd elderly people, resulting in the deaths of many hundreds. Those who survived did so largely due to the clandestine help of nearby Kurdish townspeople. Second , there is the matter of how Anfal was organised as a bureaucratic enterprise. Viewed as a counterinsurgency, each episode of Anfal had a distinct beginning and an end, and its conduc t was in the hands of the regular army and the jahsh militia. But these agencies were qUickly phased out of the picture, and the capture d civilians were transferred to an entirely separat e bureau cracy for processing and final disposal. Separa te institutions were involv edsuch as Amn, /stikhbarat, the Popular Army (a type of home guard) and the Baath Party itself. And the infrastructure of prison camps and death convoys was physically remote from the comba t theatre, lying well outside the Kurdistan Autonomous Region. Tellingly, the killings were not in any sense concurrent with the counterinsurgency: the detainees were murder ed several days or even weeks after the armed forces had secured their goals. Finally, there is the question of intent, which goes to the heart of the notion of genocide. Docum entary materials capture d from the Iraqi intelligence agencies demon strate with great clarity that the mass killings, disappe arances and forced re-locations associated with Anfal and the other anti-Kurdish campaigns of 1987-1 989 were planne d in coherent fashion. While power over these campaigns was highly centralised, their success depend ed on the orchestration of the efforts of a large numbe r of agencies and institutions at the local, regional and national level, from the Office of the Presidency of the Republic on down to the lowliest jahsh unit. The official at the centre of this great bureaucratic web, of course, was AIi Hasan al-Majid, and in him the question of intent is appare nt on a second , extremely important level. A numbe r of audio-t apes were made of meetings between al-Majid and his aides from 1987 to 1989. Four indepe ndent experts, to establish their authenticity and

94

Iraq

to confirm that the principal speake r was al-Majid, examin ed these tapes. Al-Majid was known to have a distinctive, high-pitched voice and the regional accent of his Tikrit district origins; those Iraqis consulted by Middle East Watch recognised both these features without hesitation. As a public figure who frequently appear s on radio and television in Iraq, his voice is well known to many Iraqis. One Iraqi consulted on this subject pointed out that the principal speake r on the many hours of recordings in Middle East Watch's possession spoke with authority and used obscene language. In contrast, he said: "Others in those meetings were courteous and respectful with fearful tones, especially when they addressed al-Majid himself." Al-Majid, two experts noted, was often referred to by his familiar nickname, ''l\bu Hasan. " The tapes contain evidence of a bitter racial animus against the Kurds on the part of the man who, above any other, plotted their destruction. "Why should I let them live there like donkeys who don't know anything?" Al-Majid asks in one meeting. "What did we ever get from them?" On anothe r occasion, speaking in the same vein: "I said probab ly we will find some good ones among [the Kurdsl ... but we didn't, never." And elsewhere, "I will smash their heads. These kind of dogs, we will crush their heads." And again, "Take good care of them? No, I will bury them with bulldozers." Loyalty to the regime offered no protection from al-Majid's campai gns. Nor did membe rship in the pro-go vernme nt jahsh. Al-Majid even boasted of threatening militia leaders with chemical weapon s if they refused to evacua te their villages. Ethnicity and physical location were all that mattered, and these factors becam e co-terminous when the mass killings took place in 1988. The 1987 village clearances were wholly directed at governmentcontrol led areas, and thus had nothing whatev er to do with counterinsurgency. If the former residents of these areas refused to accept government-assigned housing in a mujammaa, and took refuge instead in a peshmerga-controlled area-a s many did-th ey too were liable to be killed during Anfal. The same applied to other smaller minorities. In the October 1987 census, many Assyrian and Chalde an Christ ians-an Aramaic-speaking people of ancient origin- refused the govern ment's deman ds that they designate themselves either as Arabs or Kurds. Those who declined to be Arabs were automatically

History

95

treated as Kurds. And, during the Final Anfal in Dohuk governorate, where r1lQst Christians were concentrated, they were in fact dealt with by the regime even more severely than their Kurdish neighbours. Those few Turkomans, a Turkic-speaking minority, who fought with the Kurdish peshmerga were not spared, because they too were deemed to have become Kurds. Almost continuously for the previous two decades, the Baathled government had engaged in a campaign of Arabisation of Kurdish regions. The armed resistance this inspired was Kurdish in character and composition. In 1988, the rebels and all those deemed to be sympathisers were therefore treated as Kurds who had to be wiped out, once and for all. Whether they were combatants or not were immaterial; as far as the government was concerned they were all "bad Kurds" , who had not come over to the side of the government. To pursue Hilberg's paradigm a little further, once the concentration and seizure was complete, the annihilation could begin. The target group had already been defined with care. Now came the definition of the second, concentric circle within the group: those who were actually to be killed. At one level, this was a straightforward matter. Under the terms of Al-Majid's June 1987 directives, death was the automatic penalty for any male of an age to bear arms who was found in an Anfal area. At the same time, no one was supposed to go before an Anfal firing squad without first having his or her case individually examined. There is a great deal of documentary evidence to support this view, beginning with a presidential order of October 15, 1987-two days before the census-that "the names of persons who are to be subjected to a general!blanket judgment must not be listed collectively. Rather, refer to them or treat them in your correspondence on an individual basis." The effects of this order are reflected in the lists that the Army and Amn compiled of Kurds arrested during Anfal, which note each person's name, sex, age, place of residence and place of capture. The processing of the detainees took place in a network of camps and prisons. The first temporary holding centres were in operation, under the control of military intelligence as early as March 15, 1988; by about the end of that month, the mass disappearances had begun in earnest, peaking in mid-April and early May. Most of the detainees went to a place called Topzawa, a Popular Army camp on the

96

Iraq

outskirts of Kirkuk-the city where Ali Hasan al-Majid had his headquarters. Some went to the Popular Army barracks in Tikrit. Women and children were trucked on from Topzawa to a separate camp in the town of Dibs; between 6,000 and 8,000 elderly detainees were taken to the abandoned prison of Nugra Salman in the southern desert, where hundreds of them died of neglect, starvation and disease. Badinan prisoners from the Final Anfal went through a separate but parallel system, with most being detained in the huge army fort at Dohuk and the women and children being transferred later to a prison camp in Salamiyeh on the Tigris River close to Mosul. The majority of the women, children and elderly people were released from the camps after the September 6 amnesty. But none of the Anfal men were released. Middle East Watch's presumption, based on the testimony of a number of survivors from the Third and bloodiest Anfal, is that they went in large groups before firing squads and were interred secretly outside the Kurdish areas. During the Final Anfal in Badinan, in at least two cases military officers carrying out instructions from their commanders executed groups of men on the spot after capture. The locations of at least three mass gravesites have been pinpointed through the testimony of survivors. One is near the north bank of the Euphrates River, close to the town of Ramadi and adjacent to a complex housing Iranian Kurds forcibly displaced in the early stages of the Iran-Iraq War. Another is in the vicinity of the archaeological site of Al-Hadhar (Hatra), south of Mosul. A third is in the desert outside the town of Samawah. At least two other mass graves are believed to exist on Hamrin Mountain, one between Kirkuk and Tikrit and the other west of Tuz Khurmatu. While the camp system is evocative of one dimension of the Nazi genocide, the range of execution methods described by Kurdish survivors is uncannily reminiscent of another-the activities of the Einsatzkommandos, or mobile killing units, in the Nazi-occupied lands of Eastern Europe. Each of the standard operating techniques used by the Einsatzkommandos is documented in the Kurdish case. Some groups oi prisoners were lined up, shot from the front and dragged into pre-dug mass graves; others were shoved roughly into trenches and machinegunned where they stood; others were made to lie down in pairs, sardine-style, next to mounds of fresh corpses, before being killed; others were tied together, made to stand on the

History

97

lip of the pit, and shot in the back so that they would fall forward into it-~method that was presumably more efficient from the point of view of the killers. Bulldozers then pushed earth or sand loosely over the heaps of corpses. Some of the gravesites contained dozens of separate pits, and obviously contained the bodies of thousands of victims. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the executioners were uniformed members of the Baath Party, or perhaps of Iraq's General Security Directorate (Amn). By the most conservative estimates, 50,000 rural Kurds died during Anfal. While males from approximately fourteen to fifty were routinely killed en masse, a number of questions surround the selection criteria that were used to order the murder of younger children and entire families. Many thousands of women and children perished, but subject to extreme regional variations, with most being residents of two distinct "clusters" that were affected by the Third and Fourth Anfals. Abuses by zealous local field commanders may explain why women and children were rounded up, rather than being allowed to slip away. But they cannot adequately explain the later patterns of disappearance, since the detainees were promptly transferred alive out of army custody, segregated from their husbands and fathers in processing centres elsewhere, and then killed in cold blood after a period in detention. The place of surrender, more than place of residence, seems to have been one consideration in deciding who lived and who died. Amn documents indicate that another factor may have been whether the troops encountered armed resistance in a given area-which indeed was the case in most, but not all, of the areas marked by the killing of women and children. A third criterion may have been the perceived "political stance" of detainees, although it is hard to see how this could have been applied to children. Whatever the precise reasons, it is clear from captured Iraqi documents that the intelligence agencies scrutinised at least some cases individually, and even appealed to the highest authority if they were in doubt about the fate of a particular individual. This suggests that the annihilation process was governed, at least in principle, by rigid bureaucratic norms. But all the evidence suggests that the purpose of these norms was not to rule on a particular person's guilt or innocence of specific charges, but merely to establish whether an individual belonged to the target group that was to be ''Anfalised,''

98

Iraq

i. e., Kurds in areas outside government control. At the same time, survivor testimony repeatedly indicates that the rulebook was only adhered to casually in practice. The physical segregation of detainees from Anfal areas by age and sex, as well as the selection of those to be exterminated, was a crude affair, conducted without any meaningful prior process of interrogation or evaluation.

Although Anfal as a military campaign ended with the general amnesty of September 6, 1988, its logic did not. Those who were released from prisons such as Nugra Salman, Dibs and Salamiyeh, as well as those who returned from exile under the amnesty, were relocated to complexes with no compensation and no means of support. Civilians who tried to help them were hunted down by Amn. The mujammaat that awaited the survivors of the Final Anfal in Badinan were places of residence in name alone; the Anfalakan were merely dumped on the barren earth of the Erbil plain with no infrastructure other than a perimeter fence and military guard towers. Here, hundreds perished from disease, exposure, hunger or malnutrition, and the after-effects of exposure to chemical weapons. Several hundreds more-non-Muslim Yezidis, Assyrians and Chaldeans, including many women and children-were abducted from the camps and disappeared, collateral victims of the Kurdish genocide. Their particular crime was to have remained in the prohibited majority Kurdish areas after community leaders declined to accept the regime's classification of them as Arabs in the 1987 census. The regime had no intention of allowing the amnestied Kurds to exercise their full civil rights as Iraqi citizens. They were to be deprived of political rights and employment opportunities until Amn certified their loyalty to the regime. They were to sign written pledges that they would remain in the mujammaat to which they had been assigned-on pain of death. They were to understand that the prohibited areas remained off limits and were often sown with landmines to discourt:'ge resettlement; directive SF/4008, and in particular clause 5, with its order to kill all adult males, would remain in force and would be carried out to the latter. Arrests and executions continued, some of the latter even involving prisoners who were alive, in detention, at the time of the amnesty. Middle East Watch has documented three cases of mass executions in late 1988; in one of them, 180 people were put to death. Documents from one local

History

99

branch of Amn list another eighty-seven executions in the first eight months of 1989, one of them a man accused of "teaching the Kurdish language in Latin script." The few hundred Kurdish villages that had come through Anfal unscathed as a result of their pro-government sympathies had no guarantees of lasting survival, and dozens more were burned and bulldozed in late 1988 and 1989. Army engineers even destroyed the large Kurdish town of Qala Dizeh (population 70,000) and declared its environs a "prohibited area," removing the last significant population centre close to the Iranian border. Killing, torture and scorched-earth policies continued, in other words, to be a matter of daily routine in Iraqi Kurdistan, as they always had been under the rule of the Baath Arab Socialist Party. But the Kurdish problem, in Al-Majid's words, had been solved; the "saboteurs" had been slaughtered. Since 1975, some 4,000 Kurdish villages had been destroyed; at least 50,000 rural Kurds had died in Anfal alone, and very possibly twice that number; half of Iraq's productive farmland had been laid waste. All told, the total number of Kurds killed over the decade since the Barzani men were taken from their homes is well into six figures. By April 23, 1989, the Baath Party felt that it had accomplished its goals, for on that date it revoked the special powers that had been granted to AIi Hasan al-Majid two years earlier. At a ceremony to greet his successor, the supreme commander of Anfal made it clear that "the exceptional situation is over." To use the language of the Genocide Convention, the regime's aim had been to destroy the group (Iraqi Kurds) in part, and it had done so. Intent and act had been combined, resulting in the consummated crime of genocide. And with this, AIi Hasan al-Majid was free to move on to other tasks demanding his special talentsfirst as governor of occupied Kuwait and, then, in 1993, as Iraq's Minister of Defence.

Road to Democracy The Iraqi people have voted. Despite very real danger and threats, millions demonstrated their deep interest in deciding their own destiny and their fervent hope in Iraq's future. Despite inexperience and an ongoing violent insurgency, these were, without a doubt, the most free and transparent elections in Iraq's long history.

100

Iraq

Multinational Forces in Iraq and the US Embassy in Baghdad energetically supported the Iraqis, as did much of the international community, and we are proud of these efforts. Although American diplomats and soldiers worked together with Iraqis to assist in making this electoral process a success, this is ultimately and uniquely a triumph of the Iraqi people-of Iraqi policemen and soldiers, of election workers, of political activists and journalists, of the interim government, and of the millions of voters voting for the first time in an election where their opinions and cherished dreams counted for something. This was an Iraqi victory, after many decades of bitter suffering, in, which the entire world should rejoice and whose outcome all should respect. This election is not the end of the Iraqi democratic process but the beginning. Iraq's new leaders, chosen by the people, will now commence the nuts and bolts work of daily political life anywhere in the world: compromise, trade-offs, coalition-building, heated arguments, and long-winded debate. Iraqi political leaders will reach out to political opponents as they wrestle to fashion a new constitution, which must be supple enough to incorporate modern democratic values and also respect the hallowed and humane cultural and religious traditions of the Iraqi people. It must be a constitutional process, which has the whole-hearted participation and consultation of all of Iraq's communities. For the United States, the path in Iraq is equally clear: support the continuing development of Iraqi institutions-armed forces, police, civil society, courts, businesses. Help the Iraqi people come to their own decisions about their own future and to find Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems. Watch as this people of the Land Between the Two Rivers reclaim their greatness and take their rightful place as a respected member of the world community. Strategy for Progress

The war in Iraq is far from a mission accomplished. Today, Iraq faces a crisis with grave implications for its national security and the future of the Iraqi people. The Bush Administration's mismanagement of post-war Iraq has left the United States unprepared for the instability that continues to grow. America is standing virtually alone in confronting a counter-insurgency struggle with no clear end in sight. The United States can still succeed in Iraq and fulfil its commitments

History

101

to the Iraqi people, but it will require a plan-one that provides for new international arrangements to manage the political, security and economic aspects of Iraq's transition. The record is all too clear. The Bush Administration's intolerance of dissent has left America without enough allies to share the burden of funds and forces. The White House and the Pentagon wilfully ignored the recent history of post-conflict experience and the specific warnings of the State Department. The Administration invested authority in a group of exiles and gave American companies a monopoly on contracts to rebuild Iraq. And it has insisted on absolute control, leaving the United States unaided by the wisdom, insights and engagement of the Iraqi people and the international community. By fOCUSing almost exclusively on military force as the primary means of social transformation and on Baghdad as the geographical engine of political change, the United States failed to wage a parallel campaign to win the consent of the Iraqi people. The Bush Administration also failed to use America's economic and diplomatic resources to generate widespread popular support for and engagement in the process of moving Iraq from its autocratic past and towards a democratic future. The net result is that America is unable to guarantee security for the Iraqi people. Coalition forces have little control of major urban centres such as Fallujah and Najaf. Insurgents, terrorists and criminals have significantly slowed major elements of the reconstruction effort. Three years after the invasion, too many IraqiS have yet to see a material improvement in their lives. Getting out of the mess created by the Bush Administration will certainly prove more difficult than getting into it. We have four options. The first option is to maintain the current course, and essentially keep going it alone without a real strategy, continuing to ignore the facts on the ground. This inevitably means dispatching more American troops and further burdening American taxpayers-without an exit strategy. Absent either political credibility or a plan, the United States would be forced to rely increasingly on the military, alienating the now fractured "Coalition of the Willing." This is the option preferred by President Bush, who continues to see the current difficulties in Iraq as a speed bump on the road to democracy. The second option is to withdraw US troops following the June 30 hand over to a

102

Iraq

yet-to-be-named Iraqi institution. This course of action would ease the burden on the budget and our overstretched military. But it would likely bring about one of three unpalatable scenarios: the ascendance of a hard-line government hostile to the United States; the rise of sub-regional warlordism within Iraq; or the opening of Iraqi borders to the free movement of terrorists and criminals. It would also devastate America's reputation around the world as a nation that makes good on its commitments. A third option-and one that is gaining increasing currency in Washington-is to "internationalise" the Iraq operation by bringing in the United Nations, NATO and more troop-contributing nations. Clearly, it would be desirable to reduce the burden on the United States while at the same time showing an international face to an Iraqi populace grown wary of the American occupation. But there are several daunting obstacles. Current trends are running against internationalisation Spain, Honduras and the Dominican Republic have pulled out of the coalition and others have indicated they may depart shortly. The Administration having dismissed the concerns of other nations and excluded non-coalition members from the reconstruction effort has already drained its capital with the international community. The horrific pictures of abuse and humiliation at the Abu Ghraib prison have only made things worse. This leads to a fourth option, one that contains several items unfamiliar to or rejected by the current White House. This plan relies on a strategic vision, the strength to concede mistakes and make mid-course corrections, and an ability to recognise stark reality. This Strategy for Progress is based on providing the assurances us allies need about security and the overall management of Iraq's transition in order to overcome their reluctance to participate. At this stage of the game, it was not possible to layout a strategy that would guarantee a stable, secure, and prosperous Iraq, or even won and sustained the peace. The Bush Administration's gross mismanagement of post-war Iraq leaves it without the option of chOOSing good policies over bad, or safe options over calculated risks. The first choice is between handing over responsibility for security o:!Xclusively and entirely to the Iraqis or, alternatively, striking an arrangement that allows the international community to compensate for the fragility of Iraq's nascent security forces. We believe the latter

History

103

is the only and best option, not only to protect the Iraqi people but also to advance reconstruction. The second choice focuses on sovereignty. It was at best inaccurate and at worst disingenuous for the Bush Administration to suggest that Iraqis would control their destinies after June 30. The massive US and international troop presence in Iraq would continue to wield far greater power and authority than any interim caretaker government. There was no such thing as "partial sovereignty," however, and the most realistic option was to consider the period from July to elections next January as a transition from occupation to sovereignty-a concept already validated by UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi. While some elements in Iraq might perceive this as an attempt by international powers to meddle in their internal affairs, the Bush Administration's failure to develop a responsible alternative to spiralling political chaos left no other realistic choice. Third and last, the United States must make a fundamental choice between maintaining exclusive control over Iraq's future and bearing the entire resource, troop and political burden or opening up the challenge to the advice and support of the international community. We believe the only viable option is to cede America's exclusive monopoly on Iraq in exchange for the engagement of our allies, Iraq's neighbours, the United Nations, and NATO. Given the current context, there are few ideal policy options. With so much at stake, we have no option but to think creatively, understanding that at the end of the day what is possible is primarily a function of political will.

Politics of Alliance In 1988, Iraq was no nearer to the goal of democracy than it had been when the Baath came to power in 1968. The establishment of "popular democracy" as a national objective remained essentially unfulfilled. Political activities were restricted to those defined by the Baath regime. The party, however, recognised that not all citizens would become party members, and it sought to provide a controlled forum for non-Baathist political participation. It created the Progressive National Front (PNF) in 1974 to ally the Baath with other political parties that were considered to be progressive. As a basis for this cooperation, President Bakr had proclaimed the National Action Charter in 1971. In presenting the charter for public discussion, the

104

Iraq

Baath had invited "all national and progressive forces and elements" to work for the objective of a "democratic, revolutionary, and unitary" Iraq by participating in the "broadest coalition among all the national, patriotic, and progressive forces." The Iraqi Communist Party OCP) was one of the important political groups that the Baathists wanted involved in the PNE Discussions between the Baath and the ICP took place periodically over three years before the latter was induced to join the PNF in 1974. For Baath leaders, the PNF was a means of containing potential opposition to their policies on the part of the ICP. Although the ICP was too small to pose a serious armed challenge to the Baath, it was regarded as a major ideological rival. The ICP's roots were as deep as those of the Baath, because Iraqi Marxists had formed the former party in the 1930s. Like the Baath, the ICP was an elitist party that advocated socialist programmes to benefit the masses and that appealed primarily to intellectuals. Despite these similarities, there had been a long history of antagonism between the two parties. Baathists tended to suspect the Communists of ultimate loyalty to a foreign power, the Soviet Union, rather than to the Arab nation, even though the Baathists themselves regarded the Soviet Union as a friendly and progressive state after 1968. In return for participation in the PNF, the ICP was permitted to nominate its own members for some minor cabinet posts and to carry on political and propaganda activities openly. The ICP had to agree, however, not to recruit among the armed forces and to accept Baath domination of the RCC. The ICP also recognised the Baath Party's "privileged" or leading role in the PNF: of the sixteen-member High Council that was formed to direct the PNF, eight positions were reserved for the Baath, five for other progressive parties, and only three for the Communists. The ICP also agreed not to undertake any activities that would contravene the letter or spirit of the National Action Charter. The ICP might have hoped that the PNF would gradually evolve into a genuine power-sharing arrangement. If so, these expectations were not realised. The Baath members of the High Council dominated the PNF, while the party retained a firm grip over government decision-making. By 1975, friction had developed between the ICP and the Baath. During the next two years, at least twenty individual

History

105

ICP members were arrested, tried, and sentenced to prison for allegedly attempting to organise Communist cells within the army in contravention of the specific ban on such activities. The April 1978 Marxist coup d'etat in Afghanistan seemed to serve as a catalyst for a wholesale assault on the ICP. Convicted communists were retried, and twenty-one of them were executed; there were virulent attacks on the ICP in the Baathist press; and scores of party members and sympathisers were arrested. The ICP complained, to no apparent avail, that Communists were being purged from government jobs, arrested, and tortured in prisons. By April 1979, those principal ICP leaders who had not been arrested had either fled the country or had gone underground. In 1980, the ICP formally withdrew from the PNF and announced the formation of a new political front to oppose the Baath government. Then onwards, however, ICP activities against the Baathists were largely limited to a propaganda campaign. The various Kurdish political parties were the other main focus of Baath attention for PNF membership. Three seats on the PNF were reserved for the Kurds, and initially the Baath intended that nominees fill these from the Kurdish Democratic Party (KOP), the oldest and largest Kurdish party. By the time the PNF was established in 1974, however, the KOP was already involved in hostilities against the government. The KOp, which originally had been formed in 1946 in Iran where Mullah Mustafa Barzani and other party co-founders had fled following the collapse of a 1945 revolt, was suspicious of the Baath's ultimate intentions with respect to self-rule for the Kurdish region. Even though Barzani himself had negotiated the March 1970 Autonomy Agreement with Saddam Hussein, he rejected Baghdad's March 1974 terms for implementing autonomy. Subsequently, full-scale warfare erupted between central government forces and KOP-organised fighters, the latter receiving military supplies covertly from Iran and from the United States. The Kurdish rebellion collapsed in March 1975, after Iran reached a rapprochement with the Baath regime and withdrew all support from the Kurds. The KDP leaders and several thousand fighters sought and obtained refuge in Iran. Barzani eventually resettled in the United States, wh~re he died in 1979. Following Barzani's death, his son Masud became leader of the KOP; from his base in Iran he directed a campaign of guerrilla

106

Iraq

activities against Iraqi civilian and military personnel in the Kurdish region. After Iraq became involved in war with Iran, Masud Barzani generally cooperated with the Iranians in military offensives in Iraqi Kurdistan. Barzani's decision to fight Baghdad was not supported by all Kurdish leaders, and it led to a split within the KOP. Some of these Kurds, including Barzani's eldest son, Ubaydallah, believed that the Autonomy Agreement did provide a framework for achieving practical results, and he preferred to cooperate with the Baath. Other leaders were disturbed by Barzani's acceptance of aid from Iran. Israel, and the United States, and they refused to be associated with this policy. Consequently, during 1974, rival KDP factions, and even new parties such as the Kurdish Revolutionary Party and the Kurdish Progressive Group, emerged. Although none of these parties seemed to have as extensive a base of popular support as did the KOp, their participation in the PNF permitted the Baath to claim that its policies in the Autonomous Region had the backing of progressive Kurdish forces. The unanticipated and swift termination of KDP-central government hostilities in March 1975 resulted in more factional splits from the party. One breakaway group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under the leadership of Jalal Talabani, was committed to continuing the armed struggle for Kurdish autonomy. Until 1985, however, most of the PUK's skirmishes were with fellow Kurdish fighters of the KOp, and Talabani himself held intermittent negotiations with Baathist representatives about joining the PNF. Other KOP splinter groups agreed to cooperate with the central government. In order to accommodate them, and in recognition of the fact that no single political party represented the Kurds, two additional seats, bringing the total to eighteen, were created in the PNF. Thus, the number of Kurdish representatives increased from three to five. The composition of the PNF changed again in 1980, following the withdrawal of the three ICP members; the number of Kurds remained constant. In 1975, the Baath invited two independent progressive groups to nominate one representative each for the unreserved seats on the PNF. These seats went to the leaders of the Independent Democrats and the Progressive Nationalists. Neither of these groups was a

History

107

formally organised political party, but rather each was an informal association 'of non-Baathist politicians who had been active before 1968. These groups had demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Baath Party that their membe rs had renoun ced the former "reactionary" ideas of the various pre-revolutionary parties to which they had belonged. In 1988, the Baath Party continued to hold the position that the PNF was indispensable as long as the Arab revolutionary movem ent faced dangers in Iraq and in other parts of the Arab homeland. The Baath insisted that its policy of combining its "leading role" within the front and a cooperative relationship based on "mutua l respect and confidence" among itself and the front's members was correct and that, in fact, this was a major accomplishment of its rule. Nevertheless, the PNF was not an indepe ndent political institution. Although it served as a forum in which policy could be discussed, the Baath actually controlled the PNF by monopolising executive positions by holding half of the total seats, and by requiring that all PNF decisions must be by unanimous vote.

Politic al Oppos ition Although the Baath in 1988 permitted the existence of several non-Baathist political parties, it did not tolerate political opposition to its policies. An effective security police appara tus had forced underg round those groups oppose d to the Baath. Other opposition groups operate d in exile in Europe, Iran, and Syria. These included the ICp, the KDP, the PUK, a Baath splinter that suppor ted the Damas cus-bas ed National Comm and, and several Islamic parties. Although various opposition parties periodically succee ded in carrying out acts of violence against regime targets, especially in Kurdistan, for the most part their activities within Iraq did not seriously challenge the Baath regime. The opposition to the Baath historically was fragmented, and efforts to form allianc es-suc h as the ICP's November 1980 initiative to create a Democratic and Patriotic Front of Kurdish and Arab secular parties -found ered over ideological divisions. Personality clashes and feuds also prevented the various Kurdish and Arab secular parties from cooperating. In addition, many of the opposition parties seemed to have a weak internal base of popula r suppor t becaus e of the prevailing perception that they had ~ollaborated with

108

Iraq

enemies of Iraq at a time when the country was engaged in war with Iran. The religious opposition to the Baath was primarily concentrated among the devout Shia population. The most important opposition party was Ad Dawah al-Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), popularly known as Ad Dawah, which originally had been established by Shia clergy in the early 1960s. After the Baath came to power in 1968, Ad Dawah opposed the regime's secular policies, and consequently many prominent clergy associated with the party, as well as some who had no connections to Ad Dawah, were persecuted. In 1979, apparently to contain any radicalisation of the Iraqi Shia clergy like that which had occurred in Iran, the regime arrested and subsequently executed Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir as Sadr, the country's most respected Shia leader. Sadr's precise relationship to Ad Dawah was not established, but his death precipitated widespread, violent demonstrations and acts of sabotage. Ad Dawah was banned in 1980, and membership in the organisation was made a capital offence. After the war with Iran had begun, Ad Dawah and other Shia political groups reorganised in exile in Europe and in Iran. In late 1982, the Iranian authorities encouraged the Iraqi Shia parties to unite under one umbrella group known as the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI). Headquartered in Tehran, SAIRI was under the chairmanship of Muhammad Saqir al-Hakim, a prominent clergyman whose father had been the leading Ayatollah of Iraq in the 1960s. SAlRI's aim was to promote the cause of Islamic revolution in Iraq by overthrowing the Baathist regime. To further that objective, in 1983, SAlRI established a government-inexile. SAIRl's activities brought harsh reprisals against members of the extended Hakim family still living in Iraq but were generally ineffective in undermining the political controls of the Baath. Another opposition element included in SAlRI was the Organisation of Islamic Action, headed by Iraqi-born Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrissi.

Trans ition Period Iraq's transitional Administrative Law, was hailed by the US occupation regime as a major accomplishment. In truth, the law is a recipe for prompt and protracted wrangling, which ,~ould lead to civil strife, fragmentation of the country and disaster. First, dissent and haggling have been ensured by the fact that the

History

109

document does-not lay down clear steps for the creation of a body to assume "sovereignty" on June 30, when both the Coalition ProviSional Authority and the Governing Council am due to be dissolved. The section in the original text on the creation of an interim government has been excised and replaced by a vague formulation. Article 2, section Bl, says an "interim government" will be "constituted in accordance with a process of ex!ensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conduded by the Governing Council and the [occupation regime] and possibly in consultation with the United Nations". (The "possibly" demonstrates clearly that the US is not keen on UN participation in this process, denying it the legitimacy that the UN could bring to it.) Second, the lawfully titled the "Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period" is subject to amendment in coming months, opening the door to a flood of complaints from members of the 25 strong Governing Councils, fractured by communal contestation, influential personalities and the public. Iraq's most powerful figure, senior Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, reacted to the law by issuing a fatwa. or jUridical opinion. which was posted on his website. He stated that any law covering the transitional period "will not gain legitimacy" until it is "'endorsed by an elected national assembly". He also said: 'This law places obstacles in the path of reaching a permanent constitution for the country which maintains its unity and the rights of all ethnicities and sects." Sistani's comments were echoed by Abdel Aziz Hakim, head of the Tehran-backed Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SClRI). He stated: "Our main problem lies with the imposition of restrictions set by an unelected body [the US-appointed Governing Council] on an elected body [the proposed transitional National Assembly which win draw up Iraq's new constitutionl.The law, consisting of a preamble, nine chapters and 62 articles, lays down the US view on what sort of state Iraq should l,?ecome. Article 4 defines Iraq's polity as "republican, federal, democratic. and pluralistic". This provision excludes a return to the monarchy, favoured by a minority of Iraqis, and imposes a federation, opposed by a majority. A second influential religiOUS figure, Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Al-Mudarrissi, who is based in Karbala, warned that: federalism

110

Iraq

could lead to civil war. Well before invading and occupying Iraq, the Bush administration had promised the Kurds that the "autonomy" or quasi-independence they had enjoyed since 1991 would be preserved. In addition to laying down that Iraq's polity would be federal, the law gives the "Kurdlstan Region" (consisting of the provinces of Sulelmanlya, Dohuk and Erbil plus some areas in Kirkuk, Dyala aIld Ninevah) the right to amend federal legislation applied in this re~on (ArtIcle 54, section B). Article 60, section C gives twothirds of the voters In three provinces (presumably those in the Kurdistan Region) the right to veto the permanent constitution even If approved by a majority In the other 15 provinces. This could enable the Kurds to blackmail the qrafters of the permanent constitution on other issues. The Kurds (and the ethnic Turks or Turkofnen) secured ethnic recognition In ArtIcle 7, which declared Iraq to be a country of "many nationalities". Anally, Kurdish was recognised alongside Arabic as an official language. The two latter provisions were not new: Baathist constitutions recognised the Kurds as one of the two nationalities (along with Arabs) living in Iraq and decreed .that Kurdish would be an official language. The Kurds were not granted all their demands. They were not allowed to annex K1rkuk, a city of 800,000 divided equally between Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen. The Kurds did not secure the revenues from the Klrkuk 011 fields. The document says that earnings from oil should be controlled by the federal government and shared by ail Iraqis, with special allocations being made for underdeveloped areas. The Kurds also Insisted that their peshmerga militia be incorporated into a provincial national guard, but the law prohibits communal militias unless provision has been made for them in federal legislation. If this permits the transformation of the peshmerga into a provincial force, a "national guard", the Kurdish militia could survive; otherwise, it will have to disband-as will the militias of SCIRI and the Iraqi Natlopaf COn~.· Federalism .Is. not the only point of contention. A second major Issue could be found in Article 59, which says that during the transitional period, Iraq's armed forces will be a "principal partner In the multinational force operating in Iraq under [the] unified command [of the US)". This situation will end only after the permanent

History

111

constitutio.{l is ratified and an elected government is formed. This provision essentially denies Iraq the most basic attribute of sovereignty: control over its own territory. To make things quite clear, the Iraqi Interim Government, about to take office, was suggested to be empowered to conclude binding agreements regarding the presence and role of foreign forces in Iraq. This means that a temporary unelected body, rather than the elected government, will sign defence pacts with the US and its associates. While Sistani strongly objects to unelected bodies making any long-standing commitments on behalf of Iraq, the country's rulers will be under massive pressure to grant Washington whatever it wants on the military front. After a month of acrimonious debate, the Pentagon, rather than the State Department, was put in charge of reconstruction. This means that the military, rather than the civilian agencies of the US government, will be calling the shots when it comes to spending the $18 billion allocated by Congress for rebuilding and developing Iraq. A third issue, which has already prompted hot contestation, is the role of Islam. Article 7 states that "Islam is the official religion of the state" and "a source of legislation". It also says, "no law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the rights cited" in the law "may be enacted during the transitional period". Freedom of religious belief and practice is assured. This is simply a stopgap formulation, which was certain to be opposed by clerics and other conservatives both on the Governing Council and in Iraq's Shia and Sunni religious establishments. While Sistani, a moderate who rejected direct clerical rule, was expected to be prepared to accept the formulation, radicals like the firebrand Muqtada Al-Sadr and some members of the Shia Islamist Dawa party md SCIRI call for Iraq to become an Islamic state, ruled by clerics, Nith Sharia, Islamic canon law, being the law of the land. These forces were all set to press their case in order to pre-empt he drafting of the permanent constitution. If they had managed to mpose their will on Iraq, the pledges made by the Bush administration hat Iraqis would be a "free people governed by the rule of law" and hat Iraqi citizens would be accorded equal treatment, regardless of render, sect, nationality or religion, would have become no more

112

Iraq

than hollow promises. The conservative clerics likely to grab power were not expected to uphold these principles-as the case of Iran has most amply shown .. The law established a new timeframe and work plan for the "transition period".

Later Events Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war (1980-88). In August1990, Iraq seized Kuwait, but was expelled by US-led, UN coalition forces through the Gulf War of January-February 1991: Following Kuwait's liberation, the UN Security CouncU (UNSC) required Iraq to scrap all weapons of mass destruction and long-range mlssUes and to allow UN verification inspections. Continued Iraqi noncompliance with UNSC resolutions over a period of 12 years led to the US-led Invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime. Coalition forces remain in Iraq, helping to restore degraded infrastructure and facilitating the establishment of a freely elected government, while simultaneously dealing with a robust insurgency. The Coalition Provisional Authority, which temporarily administered Iraq after the invasion, transferred full governmental authority on 28 June 2004, to the Iraqi Interim Government (IG), which governed under the Transitional Administrative Law for Iraq (TAL). Under the TAL, elections for a 275-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA) were held in Iraq on 30 January 2005. Following these elections, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) assumed office. The TNA was charged with drafting Iraq's permanent constitution, which was approved in a 15 October 2005 constitutional referendum. An election under the constitution for a 275-member Council of Representatives (CoR) was held on . 15 December 2005. After an 'offlclal certified ballot count is released, an Iraqi Government Is expected to be formed by late spring or early summer 2006. (()pdated till June-2006)

\

4 Geography The border with Iran has been a continuing source of conflict and was partially responsible for the outbreak in 1980' s war. The terms of a treaty negotiated in 1937 under British auspices provided that in one area of the Shatt ai-Arab the boundary would be at the low water mark on the Iranian side. Iran subsequently insisted that "British imperialist pressures imposed the 1937 treaty on it" and that the proper boundary throughout the Shatt was the thalweg. The matter came to a head in 1969 when Iraq, in effect, told the Iranian government that the Shatt was an integral part of Iraqi territory and that the waterway might be closed to Iranian shipping. Through Algerian mediation, Iran and Iraq agreed in March 1975 to normalise their relations, and three months later they signed a treaty known as the Algiers Accord. The document defined the common border all along the Shatt estuary as the thalweg. To compensate Iraq for the loss of what formerly had been regarded as its territory, pockets of territory along the mountain border in the central sector of its common boundary with Iran were assigned to it. Nonetheless, in September 1980, Iraq went to war with Iran, citing among other complaints the fact that Iran had not turned over to it the land specified in the Algiers Accord. This problem has subsequently proved to be a stumbling block to a negotiated settlement of the ongoing conflict. In 1988, the boundary with Kuwait was another outstanding problem. It was fixed in a 1913 treaty between the Ottoman Empire

114

Iraq

and British officials acting on behalf of Kuwait's ruling family, which in 1899 had ceded control over foreign affairs to Britain. The boundary was accepted by Iraq when it became independent in 1932, but in the 1960s and again in the mid-1970s, the Iraqi government advanced a claim to parts of Kuwait. Kuwait made several representations to the Iraqis during the war to fix the border once and for all but Baghdad has repeatedly demurred, claiming that the issue is a potentially divisive one that could inflame nationalist sentiment inside Iraq. Hence in 1988 it was likely that a solution would have to wait until the war ended. In 1922, British officials concluded the Treaty of Mohammara with Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman al-Saud, who in 1932 formed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The treaty provided the basic agreement for the boundary between the eventually independent nations. Also in 1922, the two parties agreed to the creation of the diamondshaped Neutral Zone of approximately 7,500 square kilometres adjacent to the western tip of Kuwait in which neither Iraq nor Saudi Arabia would build permanent dwellings or installations. Beduins from either country could utilise the limited water and seasonal grazing resources of the zone. In April 1975, an agreement signed in Baghdad fixed the borders of the countries. Despite a rumoured agreement proViding for the formal division of the Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone, as of early 1988, such a document had not been published. Instead, Saudi Arabia was continuing to control oil wells in the offshore Neutral Zone and had been allocating proceeds from Neutral Zone oil sales to Iraq as a war payment. Most geographers, including those of the Iraqi government, discuss the country's geography in terms of four main zones or regions: the desert in the west and south-west; the rolling upland between the upper Tigris and Euphrates rivers (in Arabic the Dijlis and Furat, respectively); the highlands in the north and north-east; and the alluvial plain through which the Tigris and Euphrates flow. Iraq's official statistical reports give the total land area as 438,446 square kilometres, whereas a United States Department of State publication gives the area as 434,934 square kilometres. The desert zone, an area lying west and south-west of the Euphrates River, is a part of the Syrian Desert, which covers sections of Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The region, sparsely inhabited

Geography

115

by pastoral nomads, consists of a wide, stony plain interspersed with rare sandy stretches. A widely ramified pattern of wadis-watercourses that are dry most of the year-runs from the border to the Euphrates. Some Wadis are over 400 kilometres long and carry brief but torrential floods during the winter rains. The uplands region, between the Tigris north of Samara and the Euphrates north of Hit, is known as Al-Jazirah (the island) and is part of a larger area that extends westward into Syria between the two rivers and into Turkey. Water in the area flows in deeply cut valleys, and irrigation is much more difficult than it is in the lower plain. Much of this zone may be classified as desert. The north-eastern highlands begin just south of a line drawn from Mosul to Kirkuk and extend to the borders with Turkey and Iran. High ground, separated by broad, undulating steppes, gives way to mountains ranging from 1,000 to nearly 4,000 metres near the Iranian and Turkish borders. Except for a few valleys, the mountain area proper is suitable only for grazing in the foothills and steppes; adequate soil and rainfall, however, make cultivation possible. Here, too, are the great oil fields near Mosul and Kirkuk. The north-east is the homeland of most Iraqi Kurds. The alluvial plain begins north of Baghdad and extends to the Persian Gulf. Here the Tigris and Euphrates rivers lie above the level of the plain in many places, and the whole area is a delta interlaced by the channels of the two rivers and by irrigation canals. Intermittent lakes, fed by the rivers in flood, also characterise south-eastern Iraq. A fairly large area (15,000 square kilometres) just above the confluence of the two rivers at Al-Qurnah and extending east of the Tigris beyond the Iranian border is marshland, known as Hawr al-Hammar, the result of centuries of flooding and inadequate drainage. Much of it is permanent marsh, but some parts dry out in early winter, and other parts become marshland only in years of great flood. Because the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates above their confluence are heavily silt laden, irrigation and fairly frequent flooding deposit large quantities of silty loam in much of the delta area. Windborne silt contributes to the total deposit of sediments. It has been estimated that the delta plains are built up at the rate of nearly twenty centimetres in a century. In some areas, major floods lead to the deposit in temporary lakes of as much as thirty centimetres of

116

Iraq

mud. The Tigris and Euphrates also carry large quantities of salts. These, too, are spread on the land by sometimes excessive irrigation and flooding. A high water table and poor surface and subsurface drainage tend to concentrate the salts near the surface of the soil. In general, the salinity of the soil increases from Baghdad south to the Persian Gulf and severely limits productivity in the region south of AI-Amarah. The salinity is reflected in the large lake in central Iraq, south-west of Baghdad, known as Bahr al-Milh (Sea of Salt). There are two other major lakes in the country to the north of Bahr al-Milh: Buhayrat al-Tharthar and Buhayrat al-Habbaniyah. The Euphrates, originates in Turkey, is augmented by the Nahr (river) al-Khabur in Syria, and enters Iraq in the north-west. Here only the wadis of the western desert feed it during the winter rains. It then winds through a gorge, which varies from two to sixteen kilometres in width, until it flows out on the plain at Ar Ramadi. Beyond there the Euphrates continues to the Hindiyah Barrage, which was constructed in 1914 to divert the river into the Hindiyah Channel; the present-day Shatt al-Hillah had been the main channel of the Euphrates before 1914. Below AI-KW, the river follows two channels to As Samawah, where it reappears as a single channel to join the Tigris at AI-Qurnah. The Tigris also rises in Turkey but is significantly augmented by several rivers in Iraq, the most important of which are the Khabur, the Great Zab, the Uttle Zab, and the Uzaym, all of which join the Tigris above Baghdad, and the Diyala, which joins it about thirty-six kilometres below the city. At the Kut Barrage much of the water is diverted into the Shatt al-Gharraf, which was once the main channel of the Tigris. Water from the Tigris thus enters the Euphrates through the Shatt al-Gharraf well above the confluence of the two main channels at Al-Qurnah. Both the Tigris and the Euphrates break into a number of channels in the marshland area, and the flow of the rivers is substantially reduced by the time they come together at AI-Qurnah. Moreover, the swamps act as silt traps, and the Shatt ai-Arab is relatively silt free as it flows south. Below Basra, however, the Karun River enters the Shatt ai-Arab from Iran, carrying large quantities of silt that present a continuous dredging problem in maintaining a channel for oceangoing vessels to reach the port at Basra. This problem had been

Geography

117

superseded by a greater obstacle to river traffic, however, namely the presence of several sunken hulks that had been rusting in the Shatt ai-Arab since early in the war. The waters of the Tigris and Euphrates are essential to the life of the country, but they may also threaten it. The rivers are at their lowest level in September and October and at flood in March, April, and May when they may carry forty times as much water as at low mark. Moreover, one season's flood may be ten or more times as great as that in another year. In 1954, for example, Baghdad was seriously threatened, and dikes protecting it were nearly topped by the flooding Tigris. Since Syria built a dam on the Euphrates, the flow of water has been considerably diminished and flooding was no longer a problem in the mid-1980s. In 1988, Turkey was also constructing a dam on the Euphrates that would further restrict the water flow. Until the mid-twentieth century, most efforts to control the waters were primarily concerned with irrigation. Some attention was given to problems of flood control and drainage before the revolution of July 14, 1958, but development plans in the 1960s and 1970s were increasingly devoted to these matters, as well as to irrigation projects on the upper reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates and the tributaries of the Tigris in the north-east. During the war, government officials stressed to foreign visitors that, with the conclusion of a peace settlement, problems of irrigation and flooding would receive top priority from the government.

Settlement Patterns In the rural areas of the alluvial plain and in the lower Diyala region, settlement almost invariably clusters near the rivers, streams, and irrigation canals. Robert McCormick Adams, director of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, has summarised the bases of the relationship between watercourse and settlement. He notes that the levees lay down by streams and canals provide advantages for both settlement and agriculture. Surface water drains more easily on the levees' backslope, and the coarse soils of the levees are easier to cultivate and permit better subsurface drainage. The height of the levees gives some protection against floods and the frosts that often affect low-lying areas and may kill winter crops.

118

Iraq

AboveaIl, those living or cultivating on the crest of a levee have easy access to water for irrigation and household use in a dry, hot country. Although there are some isolated homesteads, most rural communities are nucleated settlements rather than dispersed farmsteads; that are, the farmer leaves his village to cultivate the fields outside it. The pattern holds for farming communities in the Kurdish highlands of the north-east as well as for those in the alluvial plain. The size of the settlement varies, generally with the volume of water available for household use and with the amount of land accessible to village dwellers. Sometimes, particularly in the lower Tigris and Euphrates valleys, soil salinity restricts the area of arable land and limits the size of the community dependent on it, and it also usually results in large unsettled and uncultivated stretches between the villages. Fragmentary information suggests that most farmers in the alluvial plain tend to live in villages of over 100 persons. For example, in the mid-1970s a substantial number of the residents of Baqubah, the administrative centre and major city of Diyala Governorate, were employed in agriculture. The Marsh Arabs (the Madan) of the south usually live in small clusters of two or three houses kept above water by rushes that are constantly being replenished. Such clusters often are close together, but access from one to another is possible only by small boat. Here and there a few natural islands permit slightly larger clusters. Some of these people are primarily water buffalo herders and lead a seminomadic life. In the winter, when the waters are at a low point, they build fairly large temporary villages. In the summer they move their herds out of the marshes to the riverbanks. The war has had its effect on the lives of these denizens of the marshes. With much of the fighting concentrated in their areas, they have either migrated to settled communities away from the marshes or have been forced by government decree to relocate within the marshes. Also, in early 1988, the marshes had become the refuge of deserters from the Iraqi army who attempted to maintain life in the fastness of the overgrown, desolate areas while hiding out from tl~e authorities. These deserters in many instances have formed into large gangs that raid the marsh communities; this also has induced many of the marsh dwellers to abandon their villages.

Geography

119

The war has also affected settlement patterns in the northern Kurdish areas. There, the persistence of a stubborn rebellion by Kurdish guerrillas has goaded the government into applying steadily escalating violence against the local communities. Starting in 1984, the government launched a scorched-earth campaign to drive a wedge between the villagers and the guerrillas in the remote areas of two provinces of Kurdistan in which Kurdish guerrillas were active. In the process, whole villages were tortured and subsequently bulldozed, which resulted in the Kurds flocking into the regional centres of Arbil and As Sulaymaniyah. Also as a military precaution, the government has cleared a broad strip of territory in the Kurdish region along the Iranian border of all its inhabitants, hoping in this way to interdict the movement of Kurdish guerrillas back and forth between Iran and Iraq. The majority of Kurdish villages, however, remained intact in early 1988. In the arid areas of Iraq to the west and south, cities and large towns are almost invariably situated on watercourses, usually on the major rivers or their larger tributaries. In the south this dependence has had its disadvantages. Until the recent development of flood control, Baghdad and other cities were subject to the threat of inundation. Moreover, the dikes needed for protection have effectively prevented the expansion of the urban areas in some directions. Dikes on its eastern edge, for example, restricted the growth of Baghdad. The diversion of water to the Milhat al-Tharthar and the construction of a canal transferring water from the Tigris north of Baghdad to the Diyala River have permitted the irrigation of land outside the limits of the dikes and the expansion of settlement.

Physical Features Location: Middle East, bordering the Persian Gulf, between Iran and Kuwait. Map References: Middle East Area: Total: 437,072 sq. kms; Water: 4,910 sq. kms; Land: 432,162 sq. kms Area Comparative: Slightly more than twice the size of Idaho Land Boundaries: Total: 3,650 km Border Countries: Iran 1,458 km, Jordan 181 km, Kuwait 240 km, Saudi Arabia 814 km, Syria 605 km, Turkey 352 km

120

Iraq

Coastline: 58 km Maritime Claims: Continental shelf: not specified, Territorial sea: 12 NM Climate: Mostly desert; mild to cool winters with dry, hot, cloudless summers; northern mountainous regions along Iranian and Turkish borders experience cold winters with occasionally heavy snows that melt in early spring, sometimes causing extensive flooding in central and southern Iraq. Terrain: Mostly broad plains; reedy marshes along Iranian border in south with large flooded areas; mountains along borders with Iran and Turkey. Elevation Extremes: Lowest point: Persian Gulf 0 m, highest point: Haji Ibrahim 3,600 m Natural Resources: Petroleum, natural gas, phosphates, sulphur Land Use: Arable Land: 11.89 per cent, Permanent Crops: 0.78 per cent, Other: 87.33 per cent (1998 est.) Irrigated Land: 35,250 sq. kms (1998 est.) Natural Hazards: Dust storms, sand storms, floods Environment Current Issues: Government water control projects have drained most of the inhabited marsh areas east of An Nasiriyah by drying up or diverting the feeder streams and rivers; a once sizable population of Marsh Arabs, who inhabited these areas for thousands of years, has been displaced; furthermore, the destruction of the natural habitat poses serious threats to the area's wildlife population; inadequate supplies of potable water; development of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers system contingent upon agreements with upstream riparian Turkey; air and water pollution; soil degradation (salination) and erosion; desertification. Environment-international Agreements: Party to: Law of the Sea, Nuclear Test Ban signed, but not ratified: Environmental Modification. Geography-note: Strategic location on Shatt ai-Arab waterway and at the head of the Persian Gulf.

Climate Roughly 90 per cent of the annual rainfall occurs between November and April, most of it in the winter months from December

Geography

121

through March. The remaining six months, particularly the hottest ones of June, July, and August, are dry. Except in the north and north east, mean annual rainfall ranges between ten and seventeen centimetres. Data available from stations in the foothills and steppes south and south west of the mountains suggest mean annual rainfall between thirty-two and fifty-seven centimetres for that area. Rainfall in the mountains is more abundant and may reach 100 centimetres a year in some places, but the terrain precludes extensive cultivation. Cultivation on non-irrigated land is limited essentially to the mountain valleys, foothills, and steppes, which have thirty or more centimetres of rainfall annually. Even in this zone, however, only one crop a year can be grown, and shortages of rain have often led to crop failures. Mean minimum temperatures in the winter range from near freezing Uust before dawn) in the northern and north-eastern foothills and the western desert to 2°_3°C and 4°-SoC in the alluvial plains of southern Iraq. They rise to a mean maximum of about lS.SoC in the western desert and the north east, and 16.6°C in the south. In the summer mean minimum temperatures range from about 22.2°C to about 29°C and rise to maximums between roughly 37. 7°C and 43.3°C. Temperatures sometimes fall below freezing and have fallen as low as -14.4°C at Ar Rutbah in the western desert. They are more likely, however, to go over 46°C in the summer months, and several stations have records of over 48°C. The summer months are marked by two kinds of wind phenomena. The southern and south-easterly sharqi, a dry, dusty wind with occasional gusts of eighty kilometres an hour, occurs from April to early June and again from late September through November. It may last for a day at the beginning and end of the season but for several days at other times. This wind is often accompanied by violent dust storms that may rise to heights of several thousand metres and close airports for brief periods. From mid-June to midSeptember the prevailing wind, called the shamal, is blown from the north and north-west. It is a steady wind, absent only occasionally during this period. The very dry air brought by this shamal permits intensive sun heating of the land surface, but the breeze has some cooling effect. The combination of rain shortage and extreme heat makes much of Iraq a desert. Because of very high rates of evaporation,

122

Iraq

soil and plants rapidly lose the little moisture obtained from the rain, and vegetation could not survive without extensive irrigation. Some areas, however, although arid, do have natural vegetation in contrast to the desert. For example, in the Zagros Mountains in north-eastern Iraq there is permanent vegetation, such as oak trees, and date palms are found in the south.

Geography as Impediments to Peace and Stability: Insurgents in Iraq have become a major headache for the Bush administration, and an impediment to the peace and democracy so dear to many Iraqis. Nonetheless, the true question is not what to do with insurgents but what to do with Iraq itself-with the demography and geography that have been Iraq's defects since its birth as a country. Geographically, its neighbouring countries including Syria, Iran and Turkey surround Iraq. Tyranny under the Baath party has ruled Syria for almost half a century, and the Syrian government has been notorious for sponsoring terrorists against Lebanon, Israel and now Iraq. For decades, the Syrian and Iraqi governments have not been friends but rather rivals. Muslim Shia fundamentalists have ruled Iran, for its part, since the ousting of the former Shah of Iran. Iran, like Syria, has been behind the Hezbollah in Lebanon and other extreme Muslim groups such as Jihad, and has been known for state-sponsored terrorism for decades. Like Syrians, Iranians are free only to cherish their leaders and glorify their rule. Turkey, on the other hand, is a weird and a shaky democracy with its government dominated by those who claim to be of a sectarian Muslim religious group, but the recent rise in anti-Semitic sentiments among Turks, and their refusal to aid coalition forces in the war against Saddam has proven otherwise. Furthermore, Turkish authorities have been practising barbaric ruling against the Kurds, who make up one-third of their population, for years, depriving them of the most basic human rights including speaking in their mother tongue. Notably, the human rights violations of all three of these neighbours of Iraq have been documented by respectable human rights organisation such as Amnesty International for having some of the dirtiest records for many years. The problem doesn't end with negative influence alone. Iran and Iraq have been quarrelling over their territorial integrity since the end of British colonialism in Iraq. During the 1980's, Iraq and Iran fought

Geography

123

one of the bloodiest wars in the history of the Middle East, and thus millions oftives were claimed on both sides. Since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, Turks have been looking to intrude into Iraq to satisfy their false and unrealistic territorial claims on northern Iraqi provinces near their border. Also, Turks oppose the fair share representation of Iraqi Kurds in the Iraqi government fearing that their counterparts in Turkey will demand the same. Common sense dictates that tyrants are interested in seeing their counterparts around as opposed to something different. These regimes realise their illegitimacy as they have been maintaining their power through force and torture rather than a democratic process where the people are responsible for electing their political officials. As one can imagine, a democratic Iraq will not be in the best interests of these regimes, and they well know that a democratic Iraq will entice their people to demand the same, shake off the yoke of their repression, and end their illegitimate power. Since in a sense a democratic Iraq with peace and prosperity will mark the end of these shaky governments, they are therefore maximising their efforts to entice more chaos and fuel instability in Iraq as they fear for their own fate more than the fate of the Iraqi people. Demographically, the threads that make up the fabric of the Iraqi population are a very powerful force working against unity in Iraq, making Iraq's territorial integrity questionable and unjustifiable. Iraq's population is made up mainly of Arabs and Kurds, two different nationalities each with their own distinct and unique national attributes. Iraq has been ruled by Arabs since its formation as a republic. Kurds as a distinct nation have fought their subjugation to the Arabs, and rightly demanded their statehood since the inception of Iraq. Kurds have been tortured and genocide has been committed against them by Iraqi Arabs, resulting in the Kurds' resentment of any forced union as a nation with the Arabs. Arabs themselves are divided; the majority in Iraq are Shias and they feel closer to their fellow Shias in Iran than the Sunni Arabs in Iraq. They too have suffered under Saddam and never had their fair share of political power. The Sunni Arabs have been dominant in Iraq, and now, as their last man, Saddam, has been ousted they are not willing to share power with the rest of the Iraqis. Therefore, they are behind the insurgencies and thus the progress of peace and stability in Iraq is

124

Iraq

not only barred by the differences of its people groups alone, but also by the outright actions of some of its own people to sabotage it. Iraq's own geography and demography are its fatal enemies. Geographically, the only way to deal with this paramount dilemma is to encourage regime changes in Iraq's neighbours from hostile anarchy to democratic regimes. However, given our gloomy success in winning peace in Iraq this endeavour could be suicidal and regrettable. As far as Iraq's demography is concerned, imposing a merger nation on Iraq's different ethnic and religious groups will blow up in the face of its organisers, prolonging the Iraqi people's suffering and bringing civil war closer with every minute that passes. So far, neither of these two problems has been dealt with effectively, therefore causing the Iraqi people to prepare themselves for more suffering, and America to consider staying even longer in Iraq, incurring greater war expenditures and casualties.

5 Society Iraqi society is composed of sizable and distinct social groups whose differences and divisions have been only slowly and fitfully challenged by the emergence of a strong, centralised political regime and state apparatus. Moreover, there are regional and environmental differences between the scattered mountain villages whose economic base is rain-fed grain crops and the more densely populated riverain communities to the south that are dependent on intricate irrigation and drainage systems for their livelihood. There are also linguistic and ethnic differences. The most important exception to the Arab character of Iraq is the large Kurdish minority, estimated at 15-20 per cent of the population. According to official government statistics, Turkomans and other Turkic-speaking peoples account for only 2 to 3 per cent of the population. There was previously a large Iranian population settled around the Shia holy cities of Karbala and An Najaf, and the southern port city of Basra; this element was largely expelled by government decree in 1971-72 and 1979-80. Divisions along religious lines are deep rooted. Although upward of 95 per cent of Iraq's population is Muslim, the community is split between Sunnis and Shias; the latter group, a minority in the Arab world as a whole, constitutes a majority in Iraq. Numerous observers believe that the Shias make up between 60 and 65 per cent of the inhabitants, although the data to support this figure are not firm. Of the non-Muslim communities, fragmented Christian sects cannot be

126

Iraq

more than 1 or 2 per cent, concentrated mainly in the governorates of Nineveh and Dahuk. A formerly extensive Jewish community is to all practical purposes defunct. The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the defeat of the Arab armies in 1948-49 rendered the situation of Iraqi Jews untenable and led to a mass exodus, both to Israel and to Iran in 1950. Just before the Iran-Iraq War, the sharp cleavage between the rural and urban communities that formerly characterised Iraqi society had begun to break down as a result of policies instituted by the government. The war has accelerated this process. Continuous fighting has devastated large areas of the rural south, which in turn has triggered a massive rural migration to the capita\. In the late 1980s, Iraqi and foreign observers agreed that for the nation's economic health this flight from the countryside would have to be reversed, and they anticipated that the government would undertake measures to accomplish this reversal once the war ended. Kinship groups are the fundamental social units, regulating many activities that in Westernised societies are the functions of political, economic, religious, or neighbourhood groups. Rights and obligations centre on the extended family and the lineage. The family remains the primary focus of loyalty; and it is in this context, rather than the broader one of corporate loyalties defined by sectarian, ethnic, or economic considerations, that the majority of Iraqis find the common denominators of their everyday lives. A mutually protective attitude among relatives is taken as a matter of course. Relatives tend to be preferred as business partners since they are believed to be more reliable than persons over whom one does not have the hold of kinship ties. On higher levels, deeply ingrained family loyalty manifests itself in business and public life. The characteristic form of family organisation involves a large group of kinsmen related to one another through descent and marriage, that is, an extended family usually consisting of three generations. Such an extended family may all live together, which is the more traditional pattern, or may reside separately like a nuclear family, but still share the values and functions of an extended family, such as depending upon one another and deferring to the older generation. As Iraqi society has become increasingly urbanised, however, the tendency towards nuclear family social organisation, as opposed

Society

127

merely to residence, has become more prevalent. The status of an individual is traditionally determined by the position of his or her family in society and the individual's position within that group. The family transmits values and standards of behaviour of the society to its members and holds them responsible for each other's conduct. It traditionally determines occupations and selects marriage partners. Kinsmen also cooperate in economic endeavours, such as farming or trade, and ownership in land and other assets frequently is vested in the group as a whole. The sharpest degree of divergence from these patterns occurs among educated urban Iraqis, an ever-increasing proportion of the society. Until 1959, family life was subject to regulation only according to religious law and tradition. All Muslims were brought under a single body of family law for the first time in 1959, with the enactment of a secular law on personal status, based on Shariah, statutes from other Islamic countries, and legal precedents established in Iraqi courts; a brief amendment was enacted in 1963. The law spells out provisions governing the right to contract marriage, the nature of the contract, economic rights of the partners, divorce and child custody, as well as bequests and inheritance. The basic structural unit of the family consists of a senior couple, their sons, the sons' wives and children, and unmarried daughters. Other dependent relatives may also be attached to the group. The senior male is the head of the family; he manages its properties and has the final voice in decisions. Kinsmen are organised into still larger groups. The next level of organisation is the lineage, composed of all persons, male and female, who trace their descent from a common ancestor. The number of generations by which this ancestor is removed from the oldest living one varies; a depth of four to six generations is usual. Individuals or whole families of other descent sometimes attach themselves to a particular lineage in an arrangement of mutual advantage, becoming recognised after several generations as full members of the lineage on equal terms with those born into it. In small villages everyone is likely to belong to the same lineage; in larger ones there may be two or more lineages in common but tempered by economic cooperation, intermarriage, and the authority of the village leadership or elders. Also among non-tribal Iraqis,

128

Iraq

kinship organisation and traditions of common descent do not go beyond the lineage. Awareness of distant ties is keen among recent migrants to the cities and among the rural population. In rural areas, new households are not usually set up until many years after the initial recognition of a marriage. In general, the wife moves in with her husband's parents, where the young couple remain for some time. Often this arrangement is maintained until the death of the father. Even when the father dies, the brothers sometimes stay together, forming joint family households that include themselves, their wives, and their children. The actual number of persons who make up the household is determined by the family's economic circumstances, pattern of living, and mode of habitation. In an agricultural setting, as long as ownership of land and other possessions is vested in the family as a whole, the possibilities for a young man to set up an independent household are limited. In urban centres, on the other hand, young men can avail themselves of wage-earning employment. Authority within the family is determined by seniority and sex. The father, in theory, has absolute authority over the activities of the members of the household, both within the confines of the house and outside. He decides what education his children will receive, what occupations his sons will enter, and, usually in consultation with his wife, whom his children will marry. These authority patterns also have been greatly weakened in the urban environment and by the shift of more and more responsibilities from the family to larger social institutions, such as the schools. An even greater change in the traditional pattern of male dominance has been brought about by the war. Because Iraq is numerically a much smaller nation than Iran, it has experienced considerable difficulty maintaining an adequate defence on the battlefront. To field a sufficient force, it has had to draw down the available labour pool on the home front, and to compensate, has mobilised women. In the mid-1980s, observers reported that in many ministries the overwhelming proportion of employees were women. Foreign contractors have encuuntered women supervisors on huge construction projects, women doctors in the hospitals, and even women performing law enforcement roles. This emancipationextraordinary for an Arab country-was sanctioned by the government,

Society

129

which expended a significant amount of propaganda publicising the role of women in helping to win the war. The government further maintained that after the war women would be encouraged to retain their new-found work roles; this was doubtful, however, because in the same breath the government declared its determination to increase the birth rate. The Muslim majority has traditionally regarded marriage as primarily a civil contract between two families, arranged by parents after negotiations, which may be prolonged and conducted by an intermediary. The arrangement of a marriage is a family matter in which the needs and position of the corporate kin group are primary considerations. Prospective partners are often known to each other, and they frequently come from the same village and the same kin group. Among educated urban dwellers, the traditional pattern of contracting marriage is giving way to a pattern in which the young persons make their own choices, but parents must still approve. With regard to marriage and divorce, the 1959 Law of Personal Status, amended in 1963, liberalised various provisions that affected the status of women; in practice, however, the Iraqi judiciary up to the Revolution tended to be conservative in applying the provisions of the law. Specifically, Iraqi law required that divorce proceedings be initiated in a court of law, but the husband still had the controlling role in dissolving the marriage. Moreover, a man who wanted to marry a second wife was required first to get approval from the court. Provision was also made for the custody of children to be based on consideration of the welfare of the child. Economic motivation and considerations of prestige and family strength all contribute to the high value placed on large families. The greater the number of children, especially sons, the greater the prestige of the father, and through him that of the family as a whole. Boys are especially welcome because they are the carriers of the family tradition, and because they're economic contribution in an agricultural society are greater than that of girls. Between the ages of three and six, children are given freedom to learn by imitating older siblings. Strong emphasis is then placed on conformity with elders' patterns and on loyalty and obedience. Family solidarity is stressed. The passage from adolescence to maturity

130

Iraq

is swift. Upon reaching puberty, there traditionally is a separation of sexes, and girls are excluded from male society except that of their close kin. Great emphasis is placed on premarital chastity, and this is one reason for early marriages. Boys have greater freedom during adol~scence than girls and begin to be drawn into the company of their fathers and the world of men.

Social System The impact of Western penetration on the indigenous social and demographic structure in the nineteenth century was profound. Western influence took the initial form of transportation and trading links and the switch from tribal-based subsistence agriculture to cash crop production-mostly dates-for export. As this process accelerated, the nomadic population decreased both relatively and in absolute numbers and the rural sedentary population increased substantially, particularly in the southern region. This was accompanied by a pronounced transformation of tenurial relations: the tribal, communal character of subsistence production was transformed on a large scale into a landlord-tenant relationship; tribal sheikhs, urban merchants, cnd government officials took title under the open-ended terms of the newly promulgated Ottoman land codes. incentives and pressures on this emerging landlord class to increase production (and, thus, exports and earnings) resulted in expanded cultivation, which brought more and more land under cultivation and simultaneously absorbed the "surplus" labour represented by the tribal, pastoral, and nomadic character of much of Iraqi society. This prolonged process of sedentarisation was disrupted by the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire during and after World War i, but it resumed with renewed intensity in the British Mandate period, when the politic;;>.! structure of independent Iraq was formed. This threefold transformation of rural society-pastoral to agricultural, subsistence to commercial, tribal-communal to landlordpeasant-was accompanied by important shifts in urban society as well. There was a general increase in the number and size of marketing towns and their population; but the destruction of handicraft industries, especially in Baghdad, by the import of cheap manufactured goods from the West, led to an absolute decline in the population of urban centres. It also indelibly stamped the subsequent urban growth with

Society

131

a mercantile and bureaucratic-administrative character that is still a strong feature of Iraqi society. Thus, the general outline and history of Iraqi population dynamics in the modern era can be divided into a period extending from the middle of the nineteenth century to World War H, characterised chiefly by urbanisation, with a steady and growing movement of people from the rural (especially southern) region to the urban (especially central) region. Furthermore, the basic trends of the 1980s are rooted in the particularly exploitive character of agricultural practices regarding both the land itself and the people who work on it. Declining productivity of the land, stemming from the failure to develop drainage along the irrigation facilities and the wretched condition of the producers, has resulted in a potentially harmful . demographic trajectory-the depopulation of the countryside-that in the late 1980s continued to bedevil government efforts to reverse the decades-long pattern of declining productivity in the agricultural sector. The accelerated urbanisation process since World War H is starkly illustrated in the shrinking proportion of the population living in rural areas: 61 per cent in 1947, followed by 56 per cent in 1965, then 36 per cent in 1977, and an estimated 32 per cent in 1987; concurrently between 1977 and 1987 the urban population rose from 7,646,054 to an estimated 11,078,000. The rural exodus has been most severe in Al-Basrah and Al-Qadisiyah governorates. The proportion of rural to urban population was lowest in the governorates of Al-Basrah (37 percent in 1965, and 1 percent in 1987) and Baghdad (48 per cent in 1965 and 19 per cent in 1987). It was highest in Dhi Qar Governorate where it averaged 50 per cent in 1987, followed closely by Al-Muthanna and Diyala governorates with rural population of 48 per cent. Between 1957 and 1967, the population of Baghdad and Al-Basrah governorates grew by 73 per cent and 41 per cent respectively. During the same years the city of Baghdad grew by 87 per cent and the city of Basra by 64 per cent. Because of the war, the growth of Al-Basrah Governorate has been reversed while that of Baghdad Governorate has accelerated alarmingly, with the 1987 census figure for urban Baghdad being 3,845,000. Iranian forces have mounted an offensive each year of the war since 1980, except for early 1988, seeking to capture Basra

132

Iraq

and the adjoining area and subjecting the city to regular bombardment. As a result, large numbers of the population fled northward from Basra and other southern areas, with many entering Baghdad, which was already experiencing overcrowding. The government has attempted to deal with this situation by moving war refugees out of the capital and resettling them in other smaller cities in the south, out of the range of the fighting.

The People Although the data are not absolutely reliable, the government estimates that 76 per cent of the people are Arab, 19 per cent are Kurds, while Turkomans, Assyrians, Armenians, and other relatively small groups make up the rest. All but a small percentage adhere to Islam. The Islamic component is split into two main sects, Sunni and Shia, with the Shias by far the majority. Officially, the government sets the number of Shias at 55 per cent. In the 1980s, knowledgeable observers began to question this figure, regarding it as low. Because the government does not encourage birth control and the Shias, the least affluent in society, have traditionally had the highest birth rate, a more reasonable estimate of their numbers would seem to be between 60 and 65 per cent. All but a few of the estimated 3,088,000 Kurds are Sunni, and thus the Sunni Arabs-who historically have been the dominant religious and ethnic group-constitute a decided minority vis-a-vis the Shia majority. Almost all Iraqis speak at least some Arabic, the mother tongue for the Arab majority. Arabic, one of the more widely spoken languages in the world, is the mother tongue claimed in 1988 by over 177 million people from Morocco to the Arabian Sea. One of the Semitic languages, it is related to Aramaic, Phoenician, Syriac, Hebrew, various Ethiopic languages, and the Akkadian of ancient Babylonia and Assyria. Throughout the Arab world the language exists in three forms: the Classical Arabic of the Quran, the literary language developed from the classical and referred to as Modern Standard Arabic, which has virtually the same structure wherever used, and the spoken language, which in Iraq is Iraqi Arabic. Educated Arabs tend to be bilingual-in Modern Standard Arabic and in their own dialect of spoken Arabic. Even uneducated Arabic speakers, who in Iraq are about 60 per cent of the population, can comprehend the meaning

Society

133

of something said in Modern Standard Arabic, although they are unable to speak it. Classical Arabic, apart from Quranic texts, is known chiefly to scholarly specialists. Most of the words of Arabic's rich and extensive vocabulary are variations of triconsonantal roots, each of which has a basic meaning. The sounds of Arabic are also rich and varied and include some made in the throat and back of the larynx which do not occur in the major Indo-European languages. Structurally there are important differences between Modern Standard Arabic and spoken Arabic, such as the behaviour of the verb: the voice and tense of the verb are indicated by different internal changes in the two forms. In general, the grammar of spoken Arabic is simpler than that of the Modern Standard Arabic, having dropped many noun declensions and different forms of the relative pronoun for the different genders. Some dialects of spoken Arabic do not use special feminine forms of plural verbs. Dialects of spoken Arabic vary greatly throughout the Arab world. Most Iraqis speak one common dialect to Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Jordan and-as is true of people speaking other dialectsthey proudly regard theirs as the best. Although they converse in Iraqi Arabic, there is general agreement that Modern Standard Arabic, the written language, is superior to the spoken form. Arabs generally believe that the speech of the bedouins resembles the pure classical form most closely and that the dialects used by the settled villagers and townspeople are unfortunate corruptions.

Rural Society Rural Iraq contains aspects of the largely tribal mode of social organisation that prevailed over the centuries and still survived in modern age-particularly in the more isolated rural areas, such as the rugged tableland of the north-west and the marshes in the south. The tribal mode probably originated in the unstable social conditions that resulted from the protracted decline of the Abbasid Caliphate and the subsequent cycles of invasion and devastation. In the absence of a strong central authority and the urban society of a great civilization, society developed into smaller units under conditions that placed increasing stress on prowess, decisiveness, and mobility. Under these conditions, the tribal sheikhs emerged as a

134

Iraq

warrior class, and this process facilitated the ascendancy of the fighter-nomad over the cultivator. The gradual sedentarisation that began in the mid-nineteenth century brought with it an erosion of sheikhly power and a disintegration of the tribal system. Under the British Mandate, and the monarchy that was its creation, a reversal took place. Despite the continued decline of the tribe as a viable and organic social entity, the enfeebled power of the sheikhs was restored and enhanced by the British. This was done to develop a local ruling class that could maintain security in the countryside and otherwise head off political challenges to British access to Iraq's mineral and agricultural resources and Britain's paramount role in the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. Through the specific implementation ofland registration, the traditional pattern of communal cultivation and pasturage-with mutual rights and duties between sheikhs and tribesmen-was superseded in some tribal areas by the institution of private property and the expropriation by the sheikhs of tribal lands as private estates. The status of the tribesmen was in many instances drastically reduced to that of sharecroppers and labourers. Tl;1e additional ascription of judicial and police powers to the sheikh and his retinue left the tribesmen-cum-peasants as virtual serfs, continuously in debt and in servitude to the sheikh turned landlord and master. The social basis for sheikhly power had been transformed from military valour and moral rectitude to an effective possession of wealth as embodied in vast landholdings and a claim to the greater share of the peasants' production. This was the social dimension of the transformation from subsistence, pastoral economy to an agricultural economy linked to the world market. It was, of course, an immensely complicated process, and conditions varied in different parts of the country. The main impact was in the southern half-the riverain economy-more than in the sparsely populated, rain-fed northern area. A more elaborate analysis of this process would have to look specifically at the differences between Kurdish and Arab sheikhs, between political and religious leadership functions, between Sunni and Shia sheikhs, and between nomadic and riverain sheikhs, all within their ecological settings. In general, the biggest estates developed in areas restored to rultivation through dam construction and pump irrigation after

Society

135

World War I. The most autocratic examples of sheikhly power were in the rice-growing region near Al-Amarah, where the need for organised and supervised labour and the rigorous requirements of rice cultivation generated the most oppressive conditions. The role of the tribe as the chief politico-military unit was already well eroded by the time the monarchy was overthrown in July 1958. The role of some tribal sheikhs had been abolished by the central government. The tribal system survived longest in the mid-Euphrates area, where many tribesmen had managed to register small plots in their names and had not become mere tenants of the sheikh. In such settings an interesting amalgam occurred of traditional tribal customs and the newer influences represented by the civil servants sent to rural regions by the central government, together with the expanded government educational system. For example, the government engineer responsible for the water distribution system, although technically not a major administrator, in practice became the leading figure in rural areas. He would set forth requirements for the cleaning and maintenance of the canals, and the tribal sheikh would see to it that the necessary manpower was provided. This service in the minds of tribesmen replaced the old customary obligation of military service that they owed the sheikh and was not unduly onerous. It could readily be combined with work on their own grazing or producing lands and benefited the tribe as a whole. The government administrators usually avoided becoming involved in legal disputes that might result from water rights, leaving the disputes to be settled by the sheikh in accordance with traditional tribal practices. Thus, despite occasional tensions in such relationships, the power of the central government gradually expanded into regions where Baghdad's influence had previously been slight or absent. Despite the erosion of the historic purposes of tribal organisation, the prolonged absence of alternative social links has helped to preserve the tribal character of individual and group relations. The complexity of these relations is impressive. Even in the southern, irrigated part of the country there are notable differences between the tribes along the Tigris, subject to Iranian influences, and those of the Euphrates, whose historic links are with the Arab bedouin tribes of the desert. The tribe represents a concentric social system linked to the classical nomadic structure but modified by the sedentary environment

136

Iraq

and limited territory characteristic of the modem era. The primary unit within the tribe is the named agnatic lineage several generations deep to which each member belongs. This kinship unit shares responsibilities in feuds and war, restricts and controls marriage within itself, and jointly occupies a specified share of tribal land. The requirements of mutual assistance preclude any significant economic differentiation, and authority is shared among the older men. The primary family unit rests within the clan, composed of two or more lineage groups related by descent or adoption. Nevertheless, a clan can switch its allegiance from its ancestral tribal unit to a stronger, ascendant tribe. The clans are units of solidarity in disputes with other clans in the tribe, although there may be intense feuding among the lineage groups within the clan. The clan also represents a shared territorial interest, as the land belonging to the component lineage groups customarily is adjacent. Several clans united under a single sheikh form a tribe (ashira). This traditionally has been the dominant politico-military unit although, because of unsettled conditions, tribes frequently band together in confederations under a paramount sheikh. The degree of hierarchy and centralisation operative in a given tribe seems to correlate with the length of time it has been sedentary: the Bani Isad, for example, which has been settled for several centuries, is much more centralised than the Ash Shabana, which has been sedentary only since the end of the nineteenth century. In the south, only solely tribesmen inhabit the small hamlets scattered throughout the cultivated area. The most widely spread social unit is the village, and most villages have resident tradesmen (ahl as suq-people of the market) and government employees. The lines between these village dwellers and the tribes-people, at least until just before the war, were quite distinct, although the degree varies from place to place. As the provision of education, health, and other social services to the generally impoverished rural areas increases, the number and the social influence of these non-tribal people increase. Representatives of the central government takeover roles previously filled by the' sheikh or his representatives. A government school competes with the religious school. The role of the merchants as middlemenbuyers of the peasants' produce and providers of seeds and implements

137

Society

as well as of food and clothing-has not yet been superseded in most areas by the government-sponsored cooperatives and extension agencies. Increasingly in the 1980s, government employees were of local or at least rural origin, whereas in the 1950s they usually were Baghdadis who had no kinship ties in the region, wore Western clothing, and took their assignments as exile and punishment. In part, the administrators provoked the mutual antagonism that flourished between them and the peasants, particularly as Sunni officials were often assigned to Shia villages. The merchants, however, were from the region-if not from the same village-and were usually the sons of merchants. Despite some commercial developments in rural areas, in the late 1980s the economic base was still agriculture and, to a lesser but increasing extent, animal husbandry. Failure to resolve the technical problem of irrigation drainage contributed to declining rural productivity, however, and accentuated the economic as well as the political role of the central government. The growth of villages into towns and whatever signs of recent prosperity there were should be viewed, therefore, more as the result of greater government presence than as locally developed economic viability. The increased number of government representatives and employees added to the market for local produce and, more important, promoted the diffusion of state revenues into impoverished rural areas through infrastructure and service projects. Much remained to be done to supply utilities to rural inhabitants; just before the war, the government announced a campaign to provide such essentials as electricity and clean water to the villages, most of which still lacked these. The government has followed through on several of these projects-particularly in the south-despite the hardships caused by the war. The regime apparently felt the need to reward the southerners, who had suffered inordinately in the struggle.

Urban Society Iraq's society just before the outbreak of the war was undergoing profound and rapid social change that had a definite urban focus. The city has historically played an important economic and political role in the life of Middle Eastern societies, and this was certainly true \

138

Iraq

in the territory that is present-day Iraq. Trade and commerce, handicrafts and small manufactures, and administrative and cultural activities have traditionally been central to the economy and the society, notwithstanding, the overwhelming rural character of most of the population. In the modern era, as the country witnessed a growing involvement with the world market and particularly the commercial and administrative sectors, the growth of a few urban centres, notably Baghdad and Basra, has been astounding. The war, however, has altered this pattern of growth remarkably-in the case of Baghdad accelerating it; in the case of Basra shrinking it considerably. Demographic estimates based on the 1987 census reflected an increase in the urban population from 5,452,000 in 1970 to 7,646,054 in 1977, and to 11,078,000 in 1987 or 68 per cent ofthe population. Census data show the remarkable growth of Baghdad in particular, from just over 500,000 in 1947 to 1,745,000 in 1965; and from 3,226,000 in 1977 to 3,845,000 in 1987. The port of Basra presents a more complex picture: accelerated growth up to the time the war erupted, then a sharp deceleration once the war started when the effects of the fighting around the city began to be felt. Between 1957 and 1965, Basra actually had a higher growth rate than Baghdad-90 per cent in Basra as compared with Baghdad's 65 per cent. But once the Iranians managed to sink several tankers in the Shatt ai-Arab, this effectively blocked the waterway and the economy of the port city began to deteriorate. By 1988, repeated attempts by Iran to capture Basra had further eroded the strength of the city's commercial sector, and the heavy bombardment had rendered some quarters of Basra virtually uninhabitable. Because of the war reliable statistics were unavailable, but the city's population in early 1988 was probably less than half that in 1977. In the extreme north, the picture was somewhat different. There, a number of middle-sized towns have experienced very rapid growthtriggered by the unsettled conditions in the region. Early in the war the government determined to fight Kurdish-guerrilla activity by targeting the communities that allegedly sustained the rebels. It, therefore, cleared whole tracts of the mountainous region of local inhabitants. The residents of the cleared areas fled to regional urban centres like Irbil, As Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk; by and large,

Society

139

they did not transfer to the major urban centres such as Mosul and Kirkuk. Statistical details of the impact of these population shifts on the physical and spatial character of the cities were generally lacking in the 1980s. According to accounts by on-the-spot observers, in Baghdad-and presumably in the other cities as well-there appeared to have been no systematic planning to cope with the growth of slum areas. Expansion in the capital until the mid-1970s had been quite haphazard. As a result, there were many open spaces between buildings and quarters. Thus, the squatter settlements that mushroomed in those years were not confined to the city's fringes. By the late 1950s, the sari/ahs (reed and mud huts) in Baghdad were estimated to number 44,000, or almost 45 per cent of the total number of houses in the capital. These slums became a special target of Qasim's government. Efforts were directed at improving the housing and living conditions of the sari/ah dwellers. Between 1961 and 1963, many of these settlements were eliminated and their inhabitants moved to two large housing projects on the edge of the city-Madinat ath Thawra and An Nur. Schools and markets were also built, and sanitary services were provided. In time, however, Ath Thawra and An Nur, too, became dilapidated, and just before the war Saddam Hussein ordered Ath Thawra re-built as Saddam City. This new area of low houses and wide streets has radically improved the lifestyles of the residents, the overwhelming majority of whom were Shias who had migrated from the south. Another striking feature of the initial waves of migration to Baghdad and other urban centres is that the migrants have tended to stay, bringing with them whole families. The majority of migrants were peasant cultivators, but shopkeepers, petty traders, and small craftsmen came as well. Contact with the point of rural origin was not totally severed, and return visits were fairly common, but reverse migration was extremely rare. At least initially, there was a pronounced tendency for migrants from the same village to relocate in clusters to ease the difficulties of transition and maintain traditional patterns of mutual assistance. Whether this pattern has continued into the war years was not known, but it seems likely. A number of observers have reported

140

Iraq

neighbourhoods in the capital formed on the basis of rural or even tribal origin. The urban social structure has evolved gradually over the years. In pre-revolutionary Iraq a well-defined ruling class, concentrated in Baghdad, dominated it. This was an internally cohesive group, distinguished from the rest of the population by its considerable wealth and political power. The economic base of this class was landed wealth, but during the decades of the British Mandate and the monarchy, as landlords acquired commercial interests and merchants and government officials acquired real estate, a considerable intertwining of families and interests occurred. The result was that the Iraqi ruling class could not be easily separated into constituent parts: the largest commercial trading houses were controlled by families owning vast estates; the landowners were mostly tribal sheikhs but included many urban notables, government ministers, and civil servants. Moreover, the landowning class controlled the parliament, which tended to function in the most narrowly conceived interest of these landlords. There was a small but growing middle class in the 1950s and 1960s that included a traditional core of merchants, shopkeepers, craftsmen, professionals, and government officials, their numbers augmented increasingly by graduates from the school system. The Ministry of Education had been the one area during the monarchy that was relatively independent of British advisers, and, thus, it was expanded as a conspicuous manifestation of government response to popular demand. It was completely oriented towards white-collar, middle-class occupations. Within this middle class, and closely connected to the commercial sector, was a small industrial bourgeoisie whose interests were not completely identical with those of the more traditional sector. Iraq's class structure at mid-century WCI~ characterised by great instabilit)..·. In addition to the profound changes occurring in the countryside, there was the economic and social disruption of shortages and spiralling inflation brought on by World War H. Fortunes were made by a few, but for most there was deprivation and, as a consequence, great social unrest. Longtime Western observers compared the situation of the urban masses unfavourably with conditions in the last years of Ottoman rule. An instance of the abrupt

Society

141

population shifts was the Iraqi Jews. The establishment of the state of Israel led to the mass exodus of this community in 1950, to be replaced by Shia merchants and traders, many of whom were descendants of Iranian immigrants from the heavily Shia populated areas of the south. The trend of urban growth, which had commenced in the days immediately preceding the revolution, took off in the mid-1970s, when the effects of the sharp increases in the world price of oil began to be felt. Oil revenues poured into the cities where they were invested in construction and real estate speculation. The dissatisfied peasantry then found even more cause to move to the cities because jobsmainly in construction-were available, and even part-time, unskilled labour was an improvement over conditions in the countryside. As for the elite, the oil boom of the 1970s brought greater diversification of wealth, with some going to those attached to the land, and some to those involved in the regime, commerce, and, increasingly, manufacturing. The working class grew but was largely fragmented. A relatively small number were employed in businesses of ten or more workers, whereas a much larger number were classified as wage-workers, including those in the service sector. Between the elite and the working masses was the lower middle class of petty bourgeoisie. This traditional component consisted of the thousands of small handicraft shops, which made up a huge part of the so-called manufacturing sector, and the even more numerous one-man stores. The newer and more rapidly expanding part of this class consisted of professionals and semi-professionals employed in services and the public sector, including the officer corps, and the thousands of students looking for jobs. This class became particularly significant in the 1980s because former members of it have become the nation's elite. Perhaps the most important aspect of the growth of the public sector was the expansion of educational facilities, with consequent pressures to find white-collar jobs for graduates in the non-commodity sectors.

Agrarian Reforms One of the most significant achievements of the fundamentally urban-based revolutionary regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958-63) was the proclamation and partial implementation of a radical agrarian reform programme. The scope of the programme and the drastic shortage of an administrative cadre to implement it, coupled with

142

Iraq

political struggles within the Qasim regime and its successors, limited the immediate impact of the programme to the expropriation stage. The largest estates were easily confiscated, but distribution lagged owing to administrative problems and the wasted, saline character of much of the land expropriated. Moreover, landlords could choose the best of the lands to keep for themselves. Outsiders, such as officials of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), can only surmise the impact of the reforms on the lives of the rural masses on the basis of uncertain official statistics and rare observations and reports. The development of cooperatives, especially in their capacity as marketing agents, was one of the most obvious failures of the programme, although isolated instances of success did emerge. In some of these instances, traditional elders were mobilised to serve as cooperative directors, and former sirkals, clan leaders who functioned as foremen for the sheikhs, could bring a working knowledge of local irrigation needs and practices to the cooperative. The continued impoverishment of the rural masses was evident, however, in the tremendous migration that continued through the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s from rural to urban areas. According to the Ministry of Planning, the average rate of internal migration from the countryside increased from 19,600 a year in the mid-1950s to 40,000 a year in the 1958 to 1962 period. A study of 110 villages in the Nineveh and Babylon governorates concluded that depressed rural conditions and other variables-rather than job opportunities in the modern sector-accounted for most of the migration. There was little doubt that this massive migration and the land reform reduced the number of landless peasants. The most recent comprehensive tenurial statistics available before the war broke outthe Agricultural Census of 1971-put the total farmland (probably meaning cultivable land, rather than land under cultivation) at over 5.7 million hectares, of which "civil persons" held more than 98.2 per cent. About 30 per cent of this had been distributed under the agrarian reform. The average size of the holdings was about 9.7 hectares; but 60 per cent of the holdings were smaller than 7.5 hectares, accounting for less than 14 per cent of the total area. At the other end of the scale, 0.2 per cent of the holdings were 250 hectares or larger, amounting to more than 14 per~cent of the

Society

143

total. Fifty-two per cent of the total was owner-operated, 41 per cent was farmed under rental agreements, squatters worked 4.8 per cent, and only 0.6 per cent was sharecropped. The status of the remaining 1.6 per cent was uncertain. On the basis of limited statistics released by the government in 1985, the amount of land distributed since the inception of the reform programme totalled 2,271,250 hectares. Political instability throughout the 1960s, hindered the implementation of the agrarian reform programme, but after seizing power in 1968, the Baath regime made a considerable effort to reactivate it. Law 117 (1970) further limited the maximum size of holdings, eliminated compensation to the landowner, and abolished payments by beneficiaries, thus acknowledging the extremity of peasant indebtedness and poverty. The reform created a large number of smallholdings. Given the experience of similar efforts in other countries, foreign observers surmised that a new stratification has emerged in the countryside, characterised by the rise of middle-level peasants who, directly or through their leadership in the cooperatives, control much of the agricultural machinery and its use. Membership in the ruling Baath Party is an additional means of securing access to and control over such resources. Prior to the war, the party seemed to have few roots in the countryside, but after the ascent of Saddam Hussein to the presidency in 1979, a determined effort was made to build bridges between the party cadre in the capital and the provinces. It is noteworthy that practically all party officials promoted to the second echelon of leadership at the 1982 party congress had distinguished themselves by mobilising party support in the provinces. Even before the war, migration posed a serious threat of labour shortages. In the 1980s, with the war driving whole communities to seek refuge in the capital, this shortage has been exacerbated and was particularly serious in areas intensively employing mechanised agricultural methods. The government has attempted to compensate for this shortage by importing turnkey projects with foreign professionals. But in the Kurdish areas of the north-and to a degree in the southern region infested by deserters-the safety of foreign personnel was difficult to guarantee; therefore, many projects have had to be temporarily abandoned. Another government strategy for coping with the labour shortage caused by the war has been to import

144

Iraq

Egyptian workers. It has been estimated that as many as 1.5 million Egyptians have found employment in Iraq since the war began.

Lifestyle The family is the most important unit of social organisation in contemporary Iraqi society. It also is a relatively cohesive institution at the centre of economic activities. The family provides protection, food, shelter, income, reputation, and honour. The present-day Iraqi family is not extended in the strict sense. It is rare for three or more generations to live together in the same household. However, relatives generally remain closely tied in a web of intimate relationships. They continue to live in the same neighbourhood, to intermarry, and to group together on a kinship basis. Although the family is losing ground where social change is occurring most rapidly (such as in cities), family loyalty still dominates all aspects of Iraqi life. Economic motivation and considerations of prestige and family strength all contribute to the high value Iraqis place on large families. Family members may be held responsible for the acts of every other member. Iraqi families are patriarchal and hierarchical (with respect to sex and age). The father possesses complete authority and responsibility. He expects respect and unquestioning compliance, and shows little tolerance of dissent. Fathers generally remain aloof from the task of raising children in their early years. The Iraqi Arab family is the society in miniature: the same patriarchal and hierarchical relations and values also prevail at work and in religious, political, and social associations. Iraqi society traditionally assigns women a subordinate status. The majority of women continue to occupy the private domain of the household. Wives are expected to obey and serve their husbands and to defer to them, especially in public. Supported by religious ideology and teachings, the prevailing standards of morality stress values and norms associated with traditional ideas of femininity, motherhood, and sexuality. At the heart of the role of women is the belief that a family's honour is tied to a woman's modesty and faithfulness. Men are privileged in Iraqi Arab society, wielding almost all authority. Important masculine values and virtues, dating from the

SOciety

145

nomadic past, include personal bravery, a willingness to bear hardships and to come to the aid of family and friends no matter what the circumstances, and fathering children (preferably sons). Traditionally, Iraqi Arab marriage has been seen as a family and communal affair more than an individual one. It has been a mechanism for the reinforcement of family ties and interests. Iraqi Arabs still practice arranged marriage and endogamy (marriage within the same lineage, village, or community). Most common is the parallel cousin marriage: marrying the child of one's father's brother. Traditionally, girls have married at a substantially earlier age than boys. Great emphasis is placed on premarital chastity. Polygamy in Iraq is conditional upon approval of a judge. It is relatively simple for a husband to divorce his wife, but very difficult for a wife to divorce her husband against his will. The traditional codes governing marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance differ in Iraq according to ethnicity and religious sect. Marriages are important events to Kurdish families. Traditionally, they are arranged. Kurds also practice endogamy. Ideally, a man will marry his father's brother's daughter, to whom he has "first rights." Marriage celebrations can range from one day to one week. Gifts are exchanged between the wedding families. The bride brings with her a dowry equal to the ceremonial bride-price and the agreed-upon alimony to be collected if the marriage ends in divorce. On the seventh day of the marriage, the couple visits close relatives, receiving more presents for their new lives. If the groom does not pay the agreed-upon bride-wealth or does not support and clothe his wife according to the standards of her own family, the bride has grounds for divorce. The only other way she may obtain divorce is by repayment in full of the bride-wealth, unless otherwise stipulated in the marriage settlement. A man may divorce his wife by renouncing her three times. The hierarchical structure of the Arab family requires children to obey their elders and meet their expectations. Sons are especially welcome in Arab families because they are the carriers of the family tradition, and because their economic contribution is greater than that of daughters. Sons are usually taught to be protectors of their sisters and to help the father with his duties inside and outside the house, while daughters are taught to defer to their brothers, and to

146

Iraq

help the mother to take care of household chores. Arab families also teach their children to attach tremendous importance to blood ties and bonds of loyalty. During adolescence, there, traditionally, is a separation of sexes.

Housing The availability of housing is one of the aspects of social security. Owning a house has implications on the social status of the individual and family, and is an investment for the future. It is an indication of the success and the ability to spend on the family and to guarantee its future. In Iraq, houses have taken various forms. It is either a detached dwelling unit, an apartment, or a small traditional unit similar to those in other countries in the Middle East. Dwelling units may also be annexes to larger houses. There are also dwellings such as tents and huts. Most Iraqis live in permanent dwellings in the form of houses, annexes, or flats. Some houses suffer from destruction due to war or age. The majority of families in Iraq own their dwelling units, and renting is only in the urban areas. The distribution of dwelling unit types is similar throughout Iraq. • Ten per cent of families in Iraq suffer from overcrowding, 8 per cent in the urban areas, and 16 per cent in the rural areas. • 95 per cent of units were constructed of permanent building material. • 28 per cent of families in it was Governorate, and 28 per cent of those in Misan live in non-permanent dwelling units. 14 per cent of families in Nineveh Governorate live in huts. 20 per cent of families nationwide live in simple non-traditional dwelling units, which indicates inadequate housing conditions. Ownership of property is a common form of social security in Iraq, which is more common to the Centre and South. However, in Baghdad and the North, tr...l rate of rented houses increases. The number of houses occupied without rent payment also increases in the North, especially in the Kurdistan Region, as a result of the special situation of this region in the recent past, particularly due to ownership restrictions and internal immigration. Overall it is found that: • 76 per cent of dwelling units are owned by the families living in them;

Society

147

• 15 per cent of the dwelling units are rented; • 7 per cent of dwellings have been squatted upon; • 2 per cent are occupied without paying rent. As a result to the numerous wars that took place inside Iraq, and others that took place with neighbouring countries dUring the last 25 years, many dwelling units were subject to destruction. Although the survey did not measure the costs of the destruction, the following was found: • 5 per cent of houses in the urban areas, and 3 per cent of those in the rural areas suffer from destruction; • 6 per cent of families in urban and rural areas live in dwelling units suffering from destruction; • 25 per cent of the family dwellings in the rural areas in the North have been destructed as a result of war.

Dressing The majority of Iraqi women dress conservatively. Some women dress in clothes that do not cover their faces or hair, while others cover them. For example, a very conservative woman might wear a long black garment called "abayah" that covers her body from the shoulders down to her feet. Under this cover she could be wearing a traditional Arabian dress in full body length with long sleeves or she could be wearing the latest style from an internationally known designer. In addition to the abayah, a very conservative woman would also wear a face and head cover while some others would not. The majority of men wear a long sleeved one-piece dress that covers the whole body, called a "dishdashah" or "thoub". During summer, the dishdashah is usually made of white cotton to reflect sunlight. In winter, the dishdashah is made from heavier fabric such as wool and comes in darker colours. With the dishdashah men also wear a 3-piece head cover. The bottom piece of this head covering is a white cap that is sometimes filled with holes. This cap, called "thagiyah", is used to hold the hair in place. On top of the thagiyah is a scarf-like head cover that comes in two types: a light, white head cover called "gutrah" which is worn in summer, and a heavy red and white checked head cover called "shumag" which is worn during winter.

148

Iraq

These head covers protect the head from direct sunlight and can be used to cover the mouth and the nose dUring sand storms or cold weather. On top of the thagiyah and the gutrah is the "ogal", which is a black band surrounding the top of the head to hold everything else in place. When male children reach puberty they are taught to wear the head covering as a sign for entering manhood.

Eating Habits The Iraqis like to spread their bread with olive oil, or with soft white cheese, or to dip it in the delicious oily purees which they make from chick peas, broiled eggplant or parsley flavoured with pungent sesame seed oil. Because the cooking habits of Iraqis were so strongly influenced by neighbouring Turkey and Iran, Iraq joins Israel as one of the only Middle-Eastern nations to lack a unique cuisine. Like the Turks, Iraqis love to stuff vegetables and eat a great deal of rice, lamb and yogurt. Like Iranians, they enjoy cooking fruits together with beef and poultry. While there may not be a distinct style to Iraqi cookery, there are several dishes that have their roots there, and all have become well beloved parts of Israeli dining: Masgooj is an outdoor barbecue of skewered whole river fish; Pacha is a slowly cooked combination of sheep's head, stomach, feet and a variety of other meats in broth; and turshi, a mixture of pickled vegetables, is a popular side dish. Historian Reay Tannehill reports that in the 18th. century, the most famous chefs of Baghdad were Jews who had travelled in Europe. Upon their return, they introduced French and Italian influences to the diet of upper-class Iraqi families. Even today, one of the most popular dishes in Baghdad is lahma hi ajeen. Composed of circles of yeast bread topped with ground lamb that has been cooked in herbed tomato sauce, the dish was devised by a Jewish chef after he had visited Italy. Many young Iraqis prefer to call the dish by its popular name-"pizza." . Iraqi food is rich and diverse, incorporating spices typical of Arabic cooking, such as saffron and mint. Extra food is usually cooked in case of surprise visitors, while expected guests are treated to many elaborate dishes. People eat their evening meal around 8:00 p.m. Most cooking is done on gas or paraffin-oil stoves, though

Society

149

in the cities, people often own microwave ovens to help shorten cooking time. The preferred meats in Iraq are lamb, beef, goat, mutton and poultry. Muslims do not eat pork or pork products. As in other Middle Eastern countries, Iraqi meat dishes often combine vegetables and rice. Iraqi cooking uses two varieties of rice: amber rice in the north, and neggaza in the south. Popular main courses include kebabs, which are skewered chunks of grilled meat; quzi, roasted and stuffed lamb; and kubba, which is minced meat with nuts, raisins and spices. Masgouf is a special dish made from fish that live in the Tigres River. Another popular dish is tripe, a dish made of cow's stomach; there are a number of tripe restaurants in the cities. Most meals are accompanied by flat rounds of bread (samoons). For dessert, people enjoy some of Iraq's local fruits, rice pudding, Turkish Delight, sesame cookies, or baklava, a pastry made with honey and pistachios layered between filo sheets. The most widely consumed drinks in Iraq are coffee and tea. Arabic coffee is famous for its strong flavour. In Iraq, people brew their coffee thick and bitter, and serve it black. Tea is usually served in small glasses and drunk sweetened, without milk. Fruit juices and soft drinks are also popular. Muslims are officially forbidden to consume alcohol. Unfortunately, economic sanctions have altered Iraqi eating habits, as food has been rationed since 1991. In the south and central Iraq, the government issues five food items: wheat flour, rice, sugar, tea and cooking oil. Those with children under one year old can also get milk powder, when available. Many foods are now too expensive for most people to buy, and in many places, people are receiving only about one-third of their daily caloric requirement. Various international programmes have been working in Iraq to distribute food.

Food and Drinks The Kurds are not heavy meat-eaters, but rely more on vegetables and grains. Uke other Muslims, they eat lamb and mutton, and sometimes beef, but mostly in conjunction with rice and vegetables, in pilafs and in dishes parallel to our stews. Staple grains are rice and bulghur (a kind of wheat kernel somewhat akin to Cream of

150

Iraq

Wheat) and a flat bread baked on the sides of a tandoor or circular oven. Tandoor-style Indian, Pakistani, and Afghan restaurants have cropped up in recent years in bigger cities in the United States, and bread like the Kurds make is often available there. Vegetables include summer squash, cucumbers, tomatoes, and parsley-like greens. Fruit is appreciated, with watermelon (eaten with knife and fork) a favourite. Salt, pepper, cumin, and garlic are common spices; hot peppers are used sparingly, and cooking oil is used with enthusiasm. Plain yogurt is another staple, along with cheese. Kurdish families are likely to want to make their own yogurt, a simple process that depends on a live yogurt culture, which is added to milk and causes it to ferment. Our whole milk is generally unacceptable for yogurtit is too rich in fat-but 1 per cent or 2 per cent milk is fine. Kurds drink tea-lots of it, heavily sweetened, occasionally by means of a sugar cube held under the tongue. In the Middle East, tea is drunk in small glasses (with a small spoon placed in the glass to keep it from breaking when hot tea is poured into it), which can sometimes be found in Middle Eastern grocery stores in the United States. It will be a great help to your Kurdish friends if you show them where they can buy rice and bulghur in bulk. Middle Eastern grocery stores are likely to carry varieties of both that are familiar to the Kurds. A source for yogurt or the wherewithal to make their own will be appreciated. Finding a substitute for the flat bread should not be a challenge: Afghan flat bread or pita is acceptable. Gl"€ens vary widely between here and the Middle East. Kurdish women might have to try a number of kinds before finding one they like. When the time comes, and if the Kurds can find a source of seeds, you might assist them in planting a herb garden. Other necessary staples include tomato paste, which is diluted and cooked with vegetables, and whatever cooking oil a particular cook prefers. Olive oil is the standard oil throughout the Middle East, but many Kurds have not been able to afford it and might have gotten used to using butter or other kinds of oil. Kurds

Kurds represent by far the largest non-Arab ethnic minority, accounting for about 19 per cent of the population, or around 4 million. They are the overwhelming majority in As Sulaymaniyah,

SOciety

151

Irbil, and Dahuk governorates. Although, the government hotly denies it, the Kurds are almost certainly also a majority in the region around Kirkuk, Iraq's richest oil-producing area. Kurds are settled as far south as Khanaqin. Ranging across northern Iraq, the Kurds are part of the larger Kurdish population (probably numbering close to 16 million) that inhabits the wide arc from eastern Turkey and the north-western part of Syria through Azarbaijan and Iraq to the north-west of the Zagros Mountains in Iran. Although, the largest numbers live in Turkey (variously estimated at between 3 and 10 million), it is in Iraq that they are most active politically. The Kurds inhabit the highlands and mountain valleys and have traditionally been organised on a tribal basis. In the past it was correct to distinguish the various communities of Kurds according to their tribal affiliation, and to a large extent this was still true in the 1980s; tribes like the Herkki, the Sorchi, and Zibari have maintained a powerful cohesion. But increasingly groups of Kurds organised along political lines have grown up alongside the tribal units. Hence, the most northern and extreme north-eastern areas of Iraq are heavily infiltrated by elements of the so-called Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). The area around Kirkuk and south to Khanaqin is the preserve of the Faili Kurds, who, unlike the majority of Kurds, are Shias. Many of the Faili Kurds belong to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The far north-western region of Iraq around Sinjar is spotted with enclaves claimed by the Iraqi Communist Party, the bulk of whose cadres are composed of Kurds. Once mainly nomadic or semi-nomadic, Kurdish society was characterised by a combination of urban centres, villages, and pastoral tribes since, at least, the Ottoman period. Historical sources indicate that from the eighteenth century onward Kurds in Iraq were mainly peasants engaged in agriculture and arboriculture. By the nineteenth century, about 20 per cent of Iraqi Kurds lived in historic Kurdish cities such as Kirkuk, As Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil. The migration to the cities, particularly of the young intelligentsia, helped develop Kurdish nationalism. Since the early 1960s, the urban Kurdish areas have grown rapidly. Kurdish migration-in addition to being part of the general trend of urban migration-was prompted by the escalating armed conflict with the central authorities in Baghdad, the destruction of

152

Iraq

villages and land by widespread bombing, and such natural disasters as a severe drought in the 1958-61 period. In addition to destroying traditional resources, the severe fighting has hindered the development of education, health, and other services. The historic enmity between the Kurds and the central Arab government has contributed to the tenacious survival of Kurdish culture. The Kurds' most distinguishing characteristic and the one that binds them to one another is their language. There are several Kurdish dialects, of which Kirmanji tends to be the standard written form. Kurdish is not a mere dialect of Farsi or Persian, as many Iranian nationalists maintain. And it is certainly not a variant of the Semitic or Turkic tongues. It is a separate language, part of the IndoEuropean family. The Kurds have been locked in an unremittingly violent struggle with the central government in Baghdad almost since the founding of the Iraqi republic in 1958. It appeared in the early 1970s that the dissident Kurds-under the generalship of the legendary leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani-might actually carve out an independent Kurdish area in northern Iraq. In 1975, however, the shah of Iran-the Kurds' principal patron-withdrew his support of the Kurds as part of the Algiers Accord between Tehran and Baghdad, leading to a sharp decline in the Kurdish movement. The signing of the Algiers Accord caused a breakaway faction to emerge from the Kurdish Democratic Party (KOP), led by Masud Barzani, the son of Mulla Mustafa Barzani. The faction that left the KDP in opposition to the accord formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani. The PUK continued to engage in low-level guerrilla activity against the central government in the period from 1975 to 1980. The war between Iraq and Iran that broke out in 1980 afforded the PUK and other Iraqi Kurdish groups the opportunity to intensify their opposition to the government.

Other Minorities The Yazidis are of Kurdish stock but are distinguished by their unique religious fusion of elements of paganism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam. They live in small and isolated groups, mostly in the Sinjar Mountains west of Mosul. They are impoverished cultivators and herdsmen who have a strictly graded religio-political

Society

153 hierarchy and tend to maintain a mor e closed community than othe r ethnic or religious groups. Historic ally, they have bee n subject to sha rp persecution owing to their here tical beliefs and practices. The Tu rkomans , who are believed to constitute som ewh at less than 2 per cent of the population, are village dwellers in the northeast living along the border between the Kurdish and Arab regions. A num ber of Turkomans live in the city of Irbil. The Turkomans, who spe ak a Turkish dialect, have pres erved their language but are no longer tribally organised. Most are Sunnis who were brought in by the Ottomans to repel tribal raids. These early Turkomans were settled at the entrances of the valleys that gave access to the Kurdish areas. This historic pacification role has led to strained relations with the Kurds. By 1986, the Turkomans numbered somewh ere arou nd 222 ,00 0 and were being rapidly assimilated into the general population. The Assyrians are considered to be the third largest ethnic minority in Iraq. Although, official Iraqi stati stics do not refer to them as an ethnic group, they are believed to represent abo ut 133 ,000 persons or less than 1 per cen t of the pop ulation. Descendants of ancient Mesopotamian peoples, they speak Ara maic. The Assyrians live mainly in the maj or cities and in the rural area s of north-eastern Iraq where they tend to be professionals and busi nessmen or independent farmers. They are Christians, belonging to one of four churches: the Cha ldea n (Uniate), Nestorian, Jacobite or Syri an Orthodox, and the Syrian Catholic.

Soc ial For ces McGeough's essay provides some dee per understanding of the complex make-up and structure of Iraq, in particular the relationship between the sheikhs, tribes and the governing powers in Iraq. The essay ope ns with a recounting of sheikh Malik's untimely dea th at the han ds of US forces. In the months preceding the invasion, Malik had mad e his vast resources availab le to the US military sources, providing information and assistan ce in preparation for the then imminent invasion. Malik undertook his activities at great personal risk. Yet in the early days of the inva sion US forces laun che d five missiles in to Malik's sprawling prop erty, where his extended family had gathered in what they thought was a safe area. Twenty-two

154

Iraq

and children. The reason for the civilians were killed, mostly women US forces by tribal enemies of bombing? Misinformation fed to the Malik. g tradition in Iraqi society to McGeough outlines the long-standin the family. Pride and sha me, seek revenge for sha me suffered by t importance to the tribes. With McGeough explains, are issues of grea on Iraqi society in the 199 0's, the UN imposed sanctions biting hard the sanctuary of the tribes, where a good num ber of Iraqis returned to dispensing justice and largesse, tribal sheikhs take responsibility for The sheikhs were, according to overseeing issues large and small. the early days of the occupation, McGeough, willing to assist the US in bee n entirely marginalised. for a price. They have, however, l leaders, and in the course While paying no hee d to the triba es have man age d to 'sha me and of the occupation, the occupying forc powerful sheikhs included, that dishonour' a good man y people, ght into Iraqi society, have bee n would, for the want of a little insi erstwhile allies. er of the sheikhs, and in McGeough makes a case for the pow that would be favourable to the particular their ability to play a role ds advised in the preparatory occupying forces. Wiser military hea tory relationship should be struck days of the invasion that a concilia tary powers ignored the advice. with the powerful sheikhs. US mili e the occupiers given to building Only after the Fallujah uprising hav in any serious way. McGeough relationships with some of the sheikhs certainly have the pow er to wind makes it clear that while the sheikhs ness to do so no longer exists. back the insurgency, the prepared a bedrock feudalist society In all, McGeough paints a picture of dam 's lengthy and brutal rule, that despite or perh aps because of Sad ds significant power in everyday the sheikhs pow er remains, and yiel life in Iraq. d deal of insight into the McGeough's essay provides a goo ety and exposes muc h of the underpinning structure of Iraqi soci inistration reflected in the daily arrogant brutality of the US adm y portents that there is a more operations of its arm ed forces. His essa goals in Iraq could be met with efficient way to occupy Iraq, that US que reveals, between the lines, an inclusive outlook. McGeough's criti alternative ruling caste in Iraq, that there is already in existence an control of religious extremists. and one that may well be bey ond the

Society

155

Quarterly Essay makes no claim to being a socialist publication, and to be sure, McGeough provides only a journalists analysis, reporting on the structure of Iraq while passing no comment on the misogynist and brutal future that awaits Iraqi society generally, if an Islamic republic is founded.

Tribal Structure At least three-quarters of the Iraqi people are members of one of the country's 150 tribes. Iraq's society is very feudalistic, with most of the population identifying him/herself with one or the other tribe. Tribes have become an increasingly important part of Iraqi society. Even those Iraqi citizens without a tribal background often turn to neighbourhood sheikhs for representation or assistance with the government. During the Ottoman period, nomadic tribes formed the bulk of Iraq's population. Throughout most of Iraq, direct Ottoman control was weak. Loose tribal confederations prevailed, with each tribe acting as a sort of mobile mini-state. In the absence of a strong central authority, the tribal framework fulfilled the primary functions of conflict and resource management. The most important tribal confederations in Iraq included: the Muntafiq, Anaza, Dulaim, Sham mar, Zubayd, Ubayd, Bani Lam and AI-bu Muhammad. Tribal origins varied, religious divisions were not always clear-cut, and there was often a fusion between the different groups. Despite the shared religion of Islam and a general feeling of Arabness, Iraqi tribes did not have a sense of common identity. During the Ottoman period, the Iraqi tribes earned their livelihood from herding animals, trade, raiding, and collecting tribute. A hierarchical system based on the mode of subsistence developed, with the camel-breeding tribes at the top, followed by the sheepbreeders, peasants, and the marsh-dwellers. Where sedentary agriculture prevailed, another hierarchy placed rice-growers on top, followed by vegetable growers, and manual workers. Tribesmen regularly visited towns, both to trade and to visit the holy shrines. Beginning the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire increased its control over Iraqi tribes through settlement policies and land reform measures. The result was an erosion of the sheikhs' traditional source of power and a disintegration of the traditional tribal system. Following World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British decided to unite the three Ottoman provinces of

156

Iraq

Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra into one nation-state called Iraq (a name borrowed from the medieval past of the region) despite the significant religious, lingUistic, ethnic, and tribal divisions running through Iraqi society. British policies restored power to the tribal sheikhs, thereby helping to preserve and reinforce Iraq's tribal structure. At the same time, the British colonial state gradually appropriated former tribal functions like control of land, water distribution, and law enforcement. Nomadic tribes continued to settle in village communities based on extended families or sub-clans. These communities often retained their tribal names, but they were linked to the agricultural market, rather than the subsistence economy. Iraqi tribes continued to lose power under both the modernising monarchy and the republican regime. The republican regime enacted and began to implement agrarian reform. At the same time, a new wave of emigration from countryside to city weakened the remaining tribal units and ties. Following the 1968 -Baathist coup, close family, clan, and tribal ties bound Iraq's ruling Sunni elite. Most notable in this regard was the emergence of Tikritis Sunni Arabs from the town of Tikrit northwest of Baghdad related to President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. Saddam Hussein, a key leader behind the scenes, was a Tikriti and a relative of al-Bakr. Since the mid-1970s, the Baathist regime's efforts to overcome Iraqi divisions and bring the various ethnic and religious communities under effective central control have included military campaigns against the Shia and Kurds, social and economic incentives, and the attempted creation of a unifying national ideology. Sunni-Shia tensions peaked following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). During this period, the regime also increased its control by relying on tribal loyalties among both Sunni and Shia Arabs. Sunni tribes that closely supported the regime included: the Dulaym, Jubbur, Ukaydat, Mulla, Saidat, and Shammar. A Shia tribe, al-Ahbab, from the Tikrit region also supports the regime. The regime's rationale for increasingly relying on the tribes during this period was twofold. First, tribal' Arabs, although they had become settled, were still considered Bedouin, and thus the most genuinely Arab, and the most trustworthy in a war against the Persians. Second, they were believed to have retained

Society

157

tribal values such as communal spirit, honour, and valour. For the impoverisheCl tribes, military and government service was a respectable and profitable livelihood as well as a vehicle for upward mobility. Saddam Hussein also rewarded the villages of loyal tribesmen by providing roads, electricity, and water systems. Cooperating tribal leaders could rely on the government to provide jobs and perks to their members. In contrast, punishment for uncooperative sheikhs ranged from the denial of jobs and perks to death. In the Kurdish regions, a policy of replacing uncooperative chiefs and splitting tribes was the key to the government's interaction with the rural Kurds during the 1980s. Tribal chiefs appointed by the regime mediated between the government and their communities, and fought against Kurdish nationalists represented by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Because of a weakened economy and the severely reduced ability of the state to provide social services, many Iraqis increasingly turned to their tribes for support. The renewed alliance between state and tribe created a new symbiosis: the state advanced the favoured tribes and the favoured tribes protected the state. In the late 1980s, this state-tribe alliance became official. The regime has continued to portray tribes as a symbol of patriotism, broadcasting popular forms of tribal war poetry and stressing tribal values. It has facilitated the re-establishment of tribal councils to supervise economic activities, resolve conflicts, and police the region. It also has armed the more loyal tribes throughout the country. The success of the regime's tribal policy was demonstrated when several Shia tribes remained on the sidelines or supported the regime during the 1991 uprising. Anyone who is a Tikriti was easily understood to be affiliated with the Baath regime and the state. Anyone who had a problem with a Tikriti would not have received proper protection from the state as he would have in any other country. Individuals in disagreement with a Tikriti in Iraq would certainly have faced severe re-tributions, and even death. Alternatively, if one is having a problem with the Barzani family in Northern Iraq or the Halabchei family heading the Islamic Movement, one will be persecuted, regardless of one's identity or political perspective. The Iraq government was a family enterprise. It's run by family members, tribal members, second cousins, their sons, their nephews.

158

Iraq

It is a tribal system that runs the country and family relations is the most sure to loyalty, in the system and a guarantor of having no coups, no assassinations from with.

Emphasising the tribal structures as a ruling aspect was quite important as the Iraqi security system was under the umbrella of the National Security Council. The Council was headed by the President and convened in the presidential palace. When Saddam Hussein was not there, his son-in-law AIi Hasan Majid took over this function. Later on the ruling family leaders, i.e., Saddam Hussein and his brothers and half-brothers, met and decided that his son Qusay should replace him in all meetings or ceremonies where he is not present due to illness or other reasons. This provision is another indication that the tribal life was firmly incorporated in the daily decision-making process in Iraq. The same applies to the KDP where it had already been decided who was going to replace Masud Barzani, should anything happen to him. They were working on this individual to promote him like a prince. In a passport one will usually find three names: the name of the person, the name of their father, the name of the grandfather. However, the actual surname, which is the indication of the tribe or region one belongs to, was not written in the passport. The Iraqi government came up with this deliberate policy in order to not identify the area or tribe a person comes from for security reasons. This practice was partly a protection for the individual. If somebody is, e.g. called a Tikriti, it is easy to know that they are part of the ruling family which may expose them to particular security risks. The tribal society brings along some other consequences: individuals are protected, yet at the same time limited by the tribe. This fact is very visible for women and children. Women belong to the family and do not have much right to choose about their own future. Deciding whether to work or not, choosing a profession, choosing their spouses is not in their hands. What is decisive is the family's approval. If one defects from the existing social structure, it means that one is immoral. Since immorality would ruin the honour of the family, the respective family member should be punished. In Sulaymaniyah, one woman's nose was cut in order to set an example. She was accused of having an immoral relationship which, however, was not proven.

Society

159

After 1990, there were quite a high number of honour crimes in Iraq, which according to Iraqi law were not punishable. If a woman transgressed a social norm, e.g., by being with a man without marriage or eloping from her husband without permission of the family, the tribal law prescribes capital punishment for this behaviour. This punishment is tolerable according to the Iraqi criminal code. It should give the families the right to instruct their children ethically with the methods they choose, be it punishment at home, be it not letting their children attend a specific school. The result is a circle of social relations at home, with the brothers having superiority to the sisters and the father having superiority to the rest of the family. This pattern is reflected at district as well as government level. After the Baath Party came to power in 1968, they were opposed to this tribal society and wanted not only to abolish the tribal names, reflecting the Ottoman style of naming people, but also to do away with these tribal structures altogether. However, the developments in the Middle East did not allow them to reach their aim. According to Judith Yaphe, "Baghdad through the 1990s encouraged the reconstruction of clans and tribal extended families where they existed. In other areas, the government allowed the manufacture of new "tribal" groups based on economic ties or greed. Where the initiative was weak, Baghdad apparently encouraged prominent citizens to take the initiative or permitted non-leading families to manufacture an entity in order to gain power and wealth .... This has cre-ated a new symbiosis: the state advances the favoured tribes and the favoured tribes protected the state. The state benefited from its absorption of the tribes and the tribes used the state to enrich themselves. In Northern Iraq, the tribal society helped the parties to maintain their power by assigning their own people to specific positions in the government and by using the benefits of this mechanism for themselves or their families. When the KDP took over the rule of Arbil, first they just kept everything in the same order in which they had received it. In time, however, they started to promote Bahdinani people (from the northern regions of Kurdistan) to be assigned to positions in Amil City, the supposed capital of Kurdistan. This caused some reaction from Arbili people, still they support the KDP position in the

160

Iraq

government and in Arbil City for reasons of security and further settlement in the administration and society. This phenomenon does not only occur with the KOP. The PUK is also including some tribes, assigning tribe members to specific apparatuses. The situation in the south is not different. The head of the Supreme Assembly of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which is the umbrella organisation for Shia opposition groups, is Muhammad Bakr alHakim. He comes from the al-Hakim families who for centuries have been scholars. His predecessor Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, his name deriving from his tribe, was a well-known scholar of Shia Islam, too. He was assassinated in Najaf in February 1999. These people are known because of the reputation of their tribe. The rise of an individual is quite rare in this kind of society. The routine chain of feudalistic relations continues to exist, making it difficult to ensure life, bread and security under these conditions Clans and Tribes: As a result at the Turks spaced and large settlement, the important and great existence of the Turks appeared in Iraq. The Turk's not achieving living in a settled order yet, served in Abbasi army as a Turkish colonv in the period of Abbasiler. These Turks coming to Iraq first are belonged to various clans and tribes. It can be identified easily from their names and nicknames that to which tribe they belong. For example, it's possible to understand that Ybni Kayyddyg is from Kayyoly; Kybcakhi, is from Kypcak; Khallukhi is from Karluk; Ybni Azgyp is from Azoypoolu and Ybni Yemak is from Yemakoolu. It's understood easily on condition that they are studied carefully that some of these are from Oohuz and the others are from Beni Tulun (Tolunooullary) as an example. Because many Turkish names, likely to be read in various styles according to Arabian spelling in old writing caused the thought of The Turks beings Iran or coming from another origins. Like this, the existence of many Turkish commanders, Afpyn, Sacaooullary, Karabuora and Buyuk Buora. It is seen that some Turkish tribes were represented in large r:~mbers in the army at Abbasi Caliphs service. The main tribes of these are AI-Ivaiye, that is Yyva tribe of Oghuz and the Khazor and Halac. The settlement of the Turks in a settled way to the area is actually about 11 century. North Iraw of today including Baodat started to become Turkish on a large scale especially from 1055; the date Tuorul Bey got into Baodat. The Turkish

Society

161

emigrations occurring continuously in later times reinforced the population settling in the ar'=!a before. Turkish clans and tribes emigrating until the Murad IV. Period formed Turkish group maintaining its existence today. The Turkish group maintained its culture, language, customs, and traditions in Iraq today because they lived in a settled way, tribes and clans were mixed generally each other and they became agitated. However, it is not possible to select because they have used the c!an and tribes names forming Turkish population so far. As a result of this agitation, such as tribe life style, sometimes surnames changed in the centres of developed city life like Musul, Erbil and Kerkuk. Compared to this, we can see that the names of clan and tribe have existed in a vivid way up to now in the centres of rural life. We are going to study in this section the clan, tribe and family names living in Turkish settlement areas and villages as a general apart from the clans and tribes leading role in forming Iraqi Turks of today, and the tribes living and maintaining their existence today in the course of history. Iraqi Tribes, Key Source of Loyalty, Rebellion: For a glimpse of one of Saddam Hussein's oldest weapons, look at a sign along the desolate highway that leads to this city: Territory of the Al-Dulaimi Tribe-Sword in the Hands of the Leader. Or look in a nearby suburb at a ranch house with an SUV out front, or across the border in Damascus, Syria, where plots are hatching against Saddam Hussein. These are all modern manifestations of the tribes of Iraq. When loyal, they refer to themselves as the leader's sword and provide a guide to how Saddam Hussein clings to power. When rebellious, the tribes suggest that his grip is slipping. They also are one possible lever that Western officials have largely ignored in their long campaign to unseat the Iraqi dictator.

Demography Iraq is a country of over 30 million. Baghdad is the commercial and political capital of Iraq with over 5 million in population. Basra and Mosul are the second and third largest in population. Most of Iraq's population lives along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and few Iraqis live in Iraq's West Desert region.

162

Iraq

Iraq is prosperous from its oil and other mineral wealth such as sulphur, phosphates, fertilisers, natural gas, and fertile land. Iraq has the second largest proven oil reserves in the world. For the time being, Iraq will solely depend on oil to breed export revenues. Other potential exports consist of urea, fertilisers, sulphur, phosphates and dates. In 1979, immediately upon coming to power, Saddam Hussein silenced all political opposition in Iraq and converted his one-party state into a cult of personality. Over the years since then, his regime has systematically executed, tortured, imprisoned, raped, terrorised and repressed Iraqi people. Iraq is a nation rich in culture with a long history of intellectual and scientific achievement. Yet Saddam Hussein has silenced its scholars and doctors, as well as its women and children. Iraqi dissidents were tortured, killed, or disappeared in order to deter other Iraqi citizens from speaking out against the government or demanding change. A system of collective punishment tortured entire families or ethnic groups for the acts of one dissident. Women were raped and often video-taped during rape to blackmail their families. Citizens were publicly beheaded, and their families were required to display the heads of the deceased as a warning to others who might question the politics of this regime. Saddam Hussein was also the first leader to use chemical weapons against his own population, silencing more than 60 villages and 30,000 citizens with poisonous gas. Saddam Hussein has tried to silence ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq as well. During the Anfal Campaign of 1987-88, Saddam Hussein's regime killed and tortured the Kurdish population. It eliminated many Kurdish villages, and forced surviving Kurds into zones where he could control them. His regime has suppressed the Shia religious community through killings and arrests and bans their Friday prayers and books in certain regions. He has also targeted the citizens of other nations in his region, killing and torturing Kuwaiti and Iranian citizens, among others. The Iraqi people are not allowed to vote to remove the government. Freedom of expression, association and movement did not exist in Iraq. The media was tightly controlledSaddam Hussein's son owned the daily Iraqi newspaper. Iraqi citizens could not assemble except in support of the government. Iraqi citizens

163

SOciety

could not freely leave Iraq. The international community, including the UN and internationally based non-governmental organisations, has documented and repeatedly condemned this regime's horrific record of abuse. Saddam Hussein simply ignores the will of the rest of the world. Saddam Hussein has given the Iraqi people a terrible choiceto remain silentor or face the consequences. But despite his regime's attempts to silence the Iraqi people, their voices were still being heard. Providing money, building materials and even schematic drawings, Kurdish political parties have repatriated thousands of Kurds into this tense northern oil city and its surrounding villages, operating outside the framework of Iraq's newly ratified constitution and sparking sporadic violence between Kurdish settlers and the Arabs who are a minority here, according to US military officials and Iraqi political leaders. The rapidly expanding settlements, composed of two-bedroom concrete houses whose dimensions are prescribed by the Kurdish parties, are effectively re-engineering the demography of northern Iraq, enabling the Kurds to add what ultimately may be hundreds of thousands of voters ahead of a planned 2007 referendum on the status of Kirkuk. The Kurds hope to make the city and its vast oil reserves part of an autonomous Kurdistan. Kurdish political leaders said the re-patriations are designed to correct the policies of ousted President Saddam Hussein, who replaced thousands of Kurds in the region with Arabs from the south. The Kurdish parties have seized control of the process, they said, because the Iraqi government has failed to implement an agreement to return Kurdish residents to their homes. But US military officials, Western diplomats and Arab political leaders have warned the parties that the campaign could work to undermine the nascent constitutional process and raise tensions as displaced Kurds settle onto private lands now held by Arabs. "If you have everyone participating, it'll be a clean affair and you can accomplish your goals," said Lt. Col. Anthony Wickham, the US military's liaison to the Kirkuk provincial government for the past year. "But don't go

164

Iraq behind people's backs, which they have a bad habit of doing," he said, referring to the Kurds. "Does that bring greater stability to Kirkuk? No. It brings pandemonium."

In late August, Arabs shot and killed a Kurdish official who was chalking out settlements in Qoshqayah, a disputed village 24 miles north of Kirkuk. An Iraqi soldier was also killed and six Arabs were wounded in skirmishes with Kurds before US and Iraqi troops restored order, arresting two dozen Arabs and cordoning off the village. Arab residents said it was the latest of several violent incidents between security forces in the area over the past two years. "Our patience is about to end," said Hussain Ali Hamdani, a 64 year old Sunni Arab tribal leader. "There are 137 houses in this village now and in each there are at least five" Kurds. "We will protect our land and not abandon it. It's our honour." "The Arabs will not give up Kirkuk," said Muhammad Khalil, the leader of an Arab bloc within the Kurdishdominated Kirkuk provincial council. "If America really wants to help Iraq, it will try to stop the Kurds from gaining control over Kirkuk, which would start a civil war." US military officials said they had sought unsuccessfully to persuade Kurdish political leaders to avoid repatriating Kurds onto private lands, a practice they said had inflamed tensions across the region. Kirkuk, a city of almost 1 million, is home to a combustible mix of multiple ethnicities, a contentious past and enormous potential wealth. Kirkuk's precise demographic make-up is a source of dispute, but Kurds are believed to represent 35 to 40 per cent of the population. The remainder is composed primarily of Arabs, ethnic Turkmens and a small percentage of Assyrian Christians. The Kurds, saying they have a historical claim, hope to anchor Kirkuk to Kurdistan, their semi-autonomous region. Kirkuk holds strategic as well as symbolic value: The ocean of oil beneath its surface could be used to drive the economy of an independent Kurdistan, the ultimate goal for many Kurds. "Kirkuk is part of Kurdistan as Washington D.C. is part of the. United States," said

Society

165

Rizgar Ali, President of the Kirkuk provincial council and a top official in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of the two main Kurdish political parties. With the Kurds firmly in control of the provincial government, Kirkuk already shows signs of a remarkable transition. The names of many streets, buildings, schools and villages have been changed from Arabic to Kurdish. Thousands of Kurds who flooded into Kirkuk after Hussein's fall are still living in a soccer stadium, a city jail and vacant lots. The landscape is replete with ubiquitous gray concrete blocks of the new Kurdish settlements. The city's fate has been one of the thorniest issues of Iraq's constitutional process. Under Article 136 of the document ratified by Iraqis on Oct. 15, a referendum on the status of Kirkuk will be held in the province no later than Dec. 31, 2007, but only after the Iraqi government takes measures to repatriate former Kurdish residents and resettle Arabs or compensate them. The constitution extended a March 2004 transitional law that assigned responsibility for the re-patriations to the federal government. But throughout Kirkuk and across hundreds of remote farming villages, the Kurdish political parties are doing the job themselves. In Alu Mahmud, 20 miles north of Kirkuk, dozens of concrete houses are under construction in three subdivisions plotted by Patriotic Union of Kurdistan engineers. Rashaad Sultan, the village leader supervising the project, said the party provides $ 5,000 to each repatriated family. To ensure that the houses are completed, the money is distributed in instalments: $ 500 to lay the foundation; $ 2,000 when the walls are erected; $ 2,500 upon completion. The self-imposed Kurdish leaders have been very successful in recording one failure after another since 1991 both in internal Kurdish politics and in negotiating with outsiders about their rights and freedoms. The Kurdish role in the new Iraq was no exception to this repetitive phenomenon, this as well marked yet another failure for those who have given themselves the right to speak on behalf of these people in south Kurdistan. The appointed Iraqi government not only dose not give the role of an equal partner to the Kurds in Iraq, it is a setback from what they were offered three decades ago under a chauvinistic Arab dictatorship. Further more, the old Baathie's who are still blowing up coalition forces in Iraq, received more respect and power in the

166

Iraq

new Iraqi gQvernment than the Kurds who harried to the front lines and suffered casualties to help US invade Iraq without bothering to ask US for a written contract about their role in the future Iraq. Instead of a definitive plan about their rights and their role in Iraq, the Kurdish leaders might occasionally mumble that what has been done is not what they asked for, but they are living with it for the sake of pleasing others, just like what Barzani and Talabani have done in their last letter to George W. Bush. In my opinion, even if the demand of the Kurdish leaders were respected and one of the two posts of presidency or Prime Minister's was granted to a Kurd, it would not have translated into much for south Kurdistan in terms of power because of the population demography in Iraq and because of the psychology of the majority of none Kurds in Iraq. Since Kurds have less then 30 per cent of Iraq's population, but a large portion of Iraq's resources, any form of government that is based on a strong centralised power or a simple majority rule will not be in their favour. Even if ignoring the economic disadvantages, the political issue is not only disadvantage for the Kurds, but it is a great danger to Kurdish security, since Arabs in Iraq have a tendency to be very violent and indifference to democracy and the rule of law. The biggest problem the Kurdish society now faces in the south is the fact that it lacks a national plan. The fate of the area is negotiated upon arbitrarily by a couple of none elected leaders who might be good for the political parties that they represent, but they might not necessarily have the best strategies when it comes to the fate of the whole nation in south Kurdistan. The fact that legally, historically, ethnically, south Kurdistan is not part of Iraq have not been accepted yet by the Kurdish leadership; they see these people as a little brother in a dysfunctional family called Iraq, and they have to do their best to make the family behave a little better and not abuse the little brother so much. As long as this notion is in the psyche of the Kurdish leadership the role of Kurd in Iraq will remain as a sidekick, and they will never have a show of their own. At this stage of history it is seen several economical, political, and cultural advantages to be partners with the rest of Iraq in a symbolic union, but this will not be possible unless the rest of

Society

167

Iraq will accept that south Kurdistan as separate and distinct from the rest of Iraq and it is part of the fundamental right of Kurdish people in this region to form their government without any relations whatsoever, with the rest of Iraq; then if the Arabs of Iraq see that they have mutual interest to have a union with south Kurdistan, they should negotiate on the mechanism and the details of that union, until then any talks or participation in an Iraqi government is counterproductive to their cause as a nation. This should have been the policy of Kurdish leadership from the start. As far as the union with Iraq concerned we have in previous, articles outlined that south Kurdistan militarily, economically, and politically must be independent and equal to the rest of Iraq. A federal government through an elected small parliament who would have equal number of members from each government should coordinate areas of interest such as defence, economics, and foreign affairs for both governments. This will benefits both nations and puts an end to the circle of violence that they have been trapped in for eighty years. Turkic people were already in Iraq under the Sasanians. In the early Islamic era, the Turks arrival in Iraq started with the settlement of about 4000 Bukharan Turks under the Umayyad governor of Basra Ubeydullah Ibn Ziyad in 673-674. For most of the time when the Abbasids ruled from Baghdad (744-1258) the Turkish soldiers were figureheads of the army under Turkish commanders. In the Samanid (819-999) army the Turkish militia was an important element. In the Buyid (932-1062) army, the Turkmen element was the main military force. With the Seljuks the Turkmen became the real sovereigns in Iraq.

The Turkmen, who were the second largest nationality in Iraq under the Buyids, had further increased in number during the Seljuk period. During the Atabeg era, a large gathering of Turkmen took place in Iraq. Other waves of Turkmen entered Iraq in the winter of 1231, when the Mongols defeated the Khawarazm Shah Jalal ai-Din, they spread in Al-Jazeerah cities: Sinjar, Khabur and Harran. The arrival of the Turkmen in Iraq reached its climax under the Mongols. Turkmen continued to arrive in Iraq at the time of the Qara Qoyunlu, the Aq Qoyunlu and the Ottomans. While the Shabaks--(Qizilbash or Alawi) were the Turkmen soldiers of Shah Ismail who came to Iraq under the Safavids.

168

Iraq

The Turkmen of Iraq live mainly in a region, which stretches from Talafar in the Northwest to Badra and al-Aziziyya in the al-Kut province in mid eastern Iraq. They are found in the following provinces: Kirkuk, Mosul, Erbil, Salah ai-Din, Diyala, Kut and Baghdad. The largest Turkmen population concentration is found in the city of Kirkuk whose linguistics, cultural and ethnic identity is distinctly coloured by their presence. Tavuk, Taza Khurmatu sub-districts and tens of villages in the Kirkuk province are Turkmen. The number of Turkmen in Erbil city is estimated to be no less than 250,000. Aitun Kopri which was detached from Kirkuk in 1976 and annexed to Erbil is a large Turkmen sub-district. The Turkmen of Mosul are living in the large Talafar district (Population is 227,000), sub-districts of Iyadhiyya (11,000) plus 10 villages and Muhallabiyya (8,500) plus 7 villages, the large villages of Qara Qoyunlu (11,000), Rashidiyya (25,000), Shirikhan, Sallamiyya and in the Sinjar (about 20,000) city. There are a large number of Turkmen in Mosul city (about 30,000), the city's largest area 'Prophet Jonah' is a Turkmen neighbourhood. Heavily inhabited Turkmen Bayat and Duz Khurmatu districts were annexed to Salah ai-Din Province in 1976. Bestamli, Amirli and Sulayman Pak are from the large sub-districts of the latter province. The biggest and heavily Kurdified and Arabified Turkmen cities are found in Diyala province: Kifri District, which was detached from Kirkuk province in 1976, Kara Tepe, Kizil Rabat, Shahraban, Mandali and Khanakin 11,12,13. The Turkmen speakers still constitute a considerable part of the population of Badra in al-Kut province. Those who forgot their mother language are still proud of their Turkmen origin as in al-Aziziyya. According to the Turkmen writers the Turkmen of Baghdad are estimated to be 50,000 families or 300,000 people. Distortion of the Demography: Arabification: The Arabification policies of Kirkuk City began as early as in the 1930s, when the cabinet of Yasin AI-Hashimi made 2 racist decisions: Termination of study in Turkmen language in 1932 and the huge al-Hawije project to cultivate the vast plain at the west of Kirkuk City to settle the Arab tribes of AI-Ubeyd and AI-Jubur. With the establishment of the Republic, appointment of Turkmen dropped off and the Turkmen were discharged from the important positions in

169

Society

the governmental offices. In the dictatorial Baath period, the assimilation and forced deportation of Turkmen from Kirkuk City started. The Turkmen were not allowed to buy immovable proprieties. After 1970s, Arabs have enjoyed special incentives and rights, which encouraged thousands of families to obey the order of the Baath Party and settle in the historically Turkmen area Kirkuk. In the 1970s, the names of tens of villages and districts in Kirkuk province were officially given Arabic names. Large numbers of Turkmen families were given deportation notification from Kerkuk at the end of November 1993 Kurdification. Arbil city was almost completely Turkmen at the turn of the 19th century. It is mainly Kurdified and now made the Capital of so-called Kurdistan. The main Turkmen city Kirkuk, which was almost completely populated by Turkmen, was exposed to the Kurdish emigration in the 1930s and 1940s. While the reason of Kurdification was economical and social at the beginning, with the set up of Kurdish uprising in the beginning of 1960, it took the form of political trend. McDowall describes the Kurdish policy toward Kirkuk city as follows: "For both Arabs and Kurds the value of Kirkuk city had been greatly enhanced by the nationalisation of the oil industry. At the beginning of 1974, oil revenue was expected to be ten times higher than in 1972. A huge resource was now at stake. Kirkuk accounted for 70 per cent of the state's total oil output and Mulla Mustafa felt bound to claim both the town itself and a proportion of its oil revenue". The most acute and heavy Kurdish movement into Kirkuk city started with the support of American authorities after the occupation of Iraq. Over a period of a few months about 200,000 Kurds entered Kirkuk. Thousands of the governmental buildings, were occupied by the Kurdish families and Kurdish Peshmargas. Several Shanty houses, which include hundreds of houses, started to be built around the city.

Population Although a census occurred in late 1987, only overall population totals and some estimates were available in early 1988. The latest

170

Iraq

detailed census information was that from the 1977 census. The total population increased from 12,029,000 in 1977 to 16,278,000 in 1987, an increase of 35.3 per cent. The population has fluctuated considerably over the region's long history. Between the eighth a.nd the twelfth centuries AD, Iraqparticularly Baghdad-was the flourishing centre of a burgeoning Arab civilization, and at the height of the region's prosperity it may have supported a population much larger than the present society. Some estimates range as high as 15 to 29 million. Decline came swiftly in the late thirteenth century, however, when Mongol conquerors massacred the populace, destroyed the cities, and ravaged the countryside. The elaborate irrigation system that had made possible agricultural production capable of supporting a large population was left in ruins. A pattern of alternating neglect and oppression characterised the Ottoman rule that began in the sixteenth century, and for hundreds of years the three vilayets of Baghdad, Al-Basrah, and Mosul-which the British joined to form Iraq in the aftermath of World War 1remained under-populated backward outposts of the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-1800s, the area had fewer than 1.3 million inhabitants. Upon independence in 1932, the departing British officials estimated the population at about 3.5 million. The first census was carried out in 1947, showing a population of about 4.8 million. The 1957 census gave a population of about 6.3 million, and the 1965 census returned a count of slightly above 8 million. The October 1977 census gave the annual rate of population growth as 3.2 per cent. According to the October 1987 census, the annual population growth rate was 3.1 per cent placing Iraq among the world's high population growth rate countries (2.8 to 3.5 per year). In common with many developing countries, Iraq's population was young approximately 57 per cent of the population was under the age of twenty. The government has never sought to implement a birth control programme, a policy reinforced by the war to offset losses in the fighting and mitigate the threat from Iran, whose population is roughly three times that of Iraq. In 1977, about 64 per cent of the population was listed as living in urban areas; this was a marked change from 1965, when only 44 per cent resided in urban centres. In the 1987, government

Society

171·

estimates, the urban population was given as 68 per cent, resulting in large measure from the migrations to the cities since the start of the war. The partial destruction of Basra by Iranian artillery barrages has had a particularly devastating effect; by 1988, according to some well informed accounts, almost half the residents of the city-its population formerly estimated at 800,000-had fled. At the same time, approximately 95,000 persons were identified in the 1977 census as nomadic or semi-nomadic beduins. The population remains unevenly distributed. In 1987, Baghdad Governorate had a population density of about 950 persons per square kilometre and the Babylon Governorate 202 persons per square kilometre, whereas Al-Muthanna Governorate possessed only 5.5 persons per square kilometre. In general the major cities are located on the nation's rivers, and the bulk of the rural population lives in the areas that are cultivated with water taken from the rivers. The Turkmen of Iraq are considered the third largest ethnic group in Iraq. Due to the undemocratic environment, their number has always been underestimated. It was fixed at 2 per cent of the total Iraqi population during the negotiations of the Mosul issue in the establishment of the Iraqi State after the World War I. According to McDowell the Turkmen outnumbered other nationalities in Kirkuk province as a whole in the 1950s. The population of Kirkuk province was 388,939 of 6,250,000 of the total Iraqi population. The population of Arabs and Christians did not exceed 20-30 thousand in Kirkuk province. There should have been at least 180,000 Turkmen in Kirkuk province alone making up 2.9 per cent of the total Iraqi population, not taking into account other Turkmen living in Arbil, Mosul, Diyala, etc. Despite missing Turkmen voters in Mosul (not less than half million Turkmen population), Diyala and Baghdad the number of the Turkmen in the present Iraqi National Council is 15, this makes 5.5 per cent of the total. Since the establishment of the Iraqi State in 1921, the Turkmen are living between the other ethnic groups who had developed high nationalist feelings. The Arabs possessed the power of governing and the Kurds received helps and supports (financial, moral and even weapons) from the international community, while the Turkmen remained helpless. Successive Iraqi governments violated their Human rights. Turkmen officials were reduced in the government offices.

172

Iraq

Study in Turkrnen language was terminated in 1932. They were exposed to displacement and deportation, deprived from cultural rights, not permitted to register themselves as Turkmen in censuses and they were enforced to change their nationality. Meanwhile the neighbouring countries and the international community were and are still unaware of/or indifferent to their lot. Unfortunately, the Turkmen tragedy, continued after the occupation of Iraq in 2003. Most probably because of the non-cooperative Turkish policy toward the occupation of Iraq, the occupation policy aims to marginalise the Turkrnen of Iraq as it happened when the Governing Council and the Temporary Government were constituted. The heavily populated Turkmen district of Talafar has been neglected for about a century: the majority of houses are still built of adobes, the schools and roads have not been renovated for several decades, it has repeatedly been deprived of electricity or water for several months. They had to use the unhealthy water of the small river for washing and drinking. At present piped water from the municipality is provided for only a few hours a week to the houses. Despite extremely sporadic attacks or insult were directed toward the occupying power in the district of Talafar, sub-district Iyadhiyya and recently the large village Rashidiyya are heavily and repeatedly exposed to the attacks of the American tanks and helicopters and of the National Guards, which are constituted mainly of Kurdish Peshmargas.

Healthcare The establishment of regular and professional healthcare is regarded by many as being the most pressing of all needs for postwar Iraq. The current healthcare system is currently in a state of ruin, suffering from a lack of equipment, depleted ranks of trained personnel-with many having fled the country-and an overall poor standard of care. The principal areas that require improvement are cardiovascular treatment capability, general hygiene products, dialysis and a lack of functional laboratories. The healthcare system supported by Saddam Hussein was riddled with corruption, healthcare quality varying according to ethnic region. Southern regions of Iraq, mainly populated by Shiite Muslims, had higher infant mortality rates than Baghdad, while health standards

SOciety

173

in the city of Kirkuk were manipulated. Companies wishing to sell pharmaceutical products to the Iraqi Ministry of Health were required to offer a 'service charge' of 10 per cent. There are approximately 240 hospitals operating in Iraq, with around 1,200 primary healthcare clinics also in the country. Since March 2003, 49 hospitals and clinics have been rehabilitated, with plans for a further 131 units to also be improved. Most of the equipment at the hospitals and clinics is either broken, outdated or inadequate, with the better services generally located around Baghdad and the country's northern regions. Iraq's Ministry of Health has a professional staff of around 100,000, over 80 per cent of which are female. A large percentage of Iraq's healthcare professionals are specialised in their respective fields, with a severe lack of primary healthcare workers. Additionally, there is a distinct lack of first-tier pharmaceuticals available. Following the conflict in Iraq and the overthrowing of the country's previous regime, it was only through quick action from the former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and a number of other international relief agencies that a public health crisis was averted. These parties have since been able to restore the Iraqi healthcare system to its pre-war levels. Over $ 40 million has been spent on 128 generators for healthcare sites, with over 13,000 tons of pharmaceutical supplies delivered since May 2003. Existing medical equipment has been surveyed and repaired where possible. A number of programmes have been undertaken by the Ministry of Health to foster international assistance, including the recent 'Adopt a Hospital' programme and the 'Monthly National Immunisation Day' programme, under which three million children have been vaccinated. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has been heavily involved in delivering vaccines, with 1.4 million doses of vaccinations delivered since July 2003. An additional 30 million doses have been procured with the aid of both UNICEF and USAID. Malnutrition is also a major issue in Iraq, particularly in the southern and central regions, where almost a third of children are sufferers. Many women in these regions suffer· from Anaemia. Child mortality rates are high, through a combination of low breastfeeding levels, low birth weights, diarrhoea and respiratory infections.

174

Iraq

The Iraqi healthcare system under the previous regime was highly centralised, tending to concentrate on curing illnesses as opposed to looking to prevent them. Decentralisation of the management system has been deemed a priority. Other targets include the establishment of a body to oversee healthcare standards and to license healthcare professionals that will adhere to those standards; the incorporation of definitive legislation, updating whatever regulations are already in place. Satisfactory training and education programmes also need to be put in place, along with the necessary infrastructure to enable healthcare management, planning and finance.

-Human Development The turbulent history of Iraq over the past 30 years has had a devastating impact on the social, political, physical and human capital of the country. Rebuilding and investing in political and social capital is a major task faced by Iraqis with the support of the international community. Nonetheless, Iraq has the human, cultural and economic potential to forge ahead and Iraqis are eager to re-build their lives, communities and institutions. The Cluster aims to improve the human development situation in Iraq and promote good governance by strengthening institutional capacity, contributing to the creation of employment opportunities, and providing policy advice especially in the areas of local government, public-private partnership, pro-poor growth strategies civil society and human rights in line with Iraqi needs, objectives and priorities. Agencies within the Cluster programmed an estimated US $ 3.3 million in core funds and US $ 40.6 million in multi-bilateral funds for governance and human development activities. Accomplishments were as follows: UNICEF provided technical support to the National Mine Action Authority (NMM) in the area of mine risk education. Information materials in the form of posters and pamphlets were developed and distributed to schools and primary health centres. 1V spots were also broadcast, to alert children and families to the dangers of unexploded remnants of war. UNICEF staged eight coordination meetings with policy makers in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) to discuss child protection issues, and developed training

Society

175

modules about social work and children in need of special protection. An assessment and plan of action workshop on juvenile justice was conducted. UNICEF also supported the creation of several public centres, including centres for disabled persons and four drop-in centres for street children. Furthermore, UNICEF transferred to the government two transitional centres for children without primary caregivers, two "child friendly spaces" centres, and one open centre for children and youth. Finally 12 social worke1'5 from MoLSA received training in Syria, and 160 MoLSA social workers were trained in Iraq. UNIFEM carried out initial capacity building consultations with various Iraqi women's representatives of government institutions and civil society organisations. The results of the UNDP-sponsored Iraq Living Conditions Survey conducted in 2004, were launched in May 2005. They represent a valuable tool for policy formulation, better targeting and monitoring of interventions and initiation of work related to Millennium Development Goals (MDG). UNDP assisted the Iraqi Government's strategic planning and policy development by hosting meetings with the Ministry of Human Rights, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Women's Affairs, the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works, and the Ministry of Provincial Affairs. UNDP implemented activities to strengthen Iraqi civil society and media. 52 civil society organisations in Northern Iraq were provided with management training and small grants, and 30 trainers from Iraqi NGOs participated in management and good governance training. 70 Iraqi journalists were trained in basic principles of journalism and election coverage, and an Iraqi News Exchange was launched. In cooperation with. Human Rights Office/UNAMI, UNDP supported the process to establish a National Centre for Missing Persons, staging a Conference on Missing Persons in January 2005, and then follow up meetings of forensic, scientific and legal experts to determine the Centre's legislative framework, organisational structure, and training needs. With the design of suitable operating modalities, the Iraq Reconstruction and Employment Programme (IREP) proved

176

Iraq

to be an excellent instrument for job creation and poverty alleviation. While the majority of the activities were focused in Southern Iraq, this programme was significantly expanded to other parts of the country. An estimated 2.6 million working days were generated benefiting 43,500 unemployed people. IOM organised a ministerial workshop to identify the migration functions of various Iraqi government ministries. Furthermore, initial consultation on the Iraq border management system took place. Finally, IOM is establishing an English training programme for the Ministry of Interior. HROIUNAMI made considerable progress, in collaboration with the Iraqi Government, towards the establishment of a National Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture. A Memorandum of Understanding is under discussion between UNAMI, the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, and possibly an Iraqi Association. The aim of the Centre is to strengthen the capacity of Iraqi health and legal profeSSionals to deliver multi-disciplinary care for victims of torture and to set up a rehabilitation centre/training hub in Basrah. The UNODC project for strengthening judicial integrity will support enhanced transparency and accountability within the highest courts, the rule of law and the fight against corruption. Based on the Joint UN-Iraq Assistance Strategy, many of the current activities will continue into 2006 building upon the accomplishments made so far. Notwithstanding, the security considerations, which will continue to impact on UN work in Iraq, efforts will be sustained for closer and greater interaction with Iraqi authorities and institutions focusing on the following areas: • Support the constitutional process through building the human and institutional capacities of the Constitutional Committee and the implementation of advocacy and outreach activities to ensure participation and inclusiveness. • Support the Government's efforts to refine the National Development Strato.gy and formulate sound thematic and sectoral strategies and policy papers. • Assist in the elaboration of a framework for enhancing capacities of local authorities in the management of local affairs and

Society

•

•

•

•

•

177

promote the implementation of local pilot development initiatives. This will include compilation of relevant legislation and carrying out comparative research. Continue implementing interventions aimed at providing basic services. At the same time, help build the capacities of central agencies, key line ministries and local administrations to better deliver public services and respond to the needs of the communities they serve. Provide short term employment opportunities through small scale public works and improve living conditions ofTocarcorrtmunities and slum dwellers. Help public institutions address problems of corruption, money laundering and drug trade, and create a transparent public accountability system by raising awareness, and strengthening planning, coordination, budgetary and management capacity of key institutions. Promote economic initiatives, enterprise development, and modernise business support services through the chambers of commerce. Support the development of a free and independent media,; promote a culture of protection of human rights in key governmental and non-governmental institutions; facilitate judicial system reform; mainstream gender equality in national policies, and promote change within the Iraqi society in support of gender equality and women's rights; support the strengthening of Iraqi civil society. Advocate issues concerning youth and child protection needs, developing child rights-based systems and poliCies, expanding child protection mechanisms at Governorate level, implementing projects that promote Iraq's rising youth population, and providing policy advice to government and civil society.

Advancement of Women Throughout history, women in Iraq have enjoyed special care and consideration to ensure their role in society is strengthened, their honour safeguarded and their rights maintained. Ever since mankind created the first laws and legislation, Iraq has paid special attention to women's issues, and provided women with legal protection against anything, which might prejudice their rights or human dignity. This

178

Iraq

was demonstrated in Hammurabi's Code, in passages that confirm that a woman is considered a complete legal person. This Code included provisions to protect wives and guarantee their human and financial rights. It affirmed the rights of girl child to the estate of their parents, and a woman's right to bear financial responsibility independently of her husband. It affirmed women's right to own property, engage in trade, enter into contracts, dispose freely of their money and occupy high office. Islamic law conferred equal social rights on men and women and granted women the right of independent political participation, since God ordered his Prophet to receive the support of women independently. The Shariah also gave men and women equal rights in dissolving marriage and to education. It gave women complete independence in financial rights, property ownership in the widest sense and the disposal of their money. Women have made significant advances in modern Iraq, participating widely in all aspects of political and working life. The glorious revolution of 17-30 July paid special attention to women and affirmed the importance of their role in building an integrated society by increasing their opportunities for development and progress, guaranteeing their rights and responding to the demands of social, economic, cultural and political developments in a manner appropriate to the humanitarian values and concepts on which Iraqi society is based. Thanks to the consideration paid to women by Saddam Hussein, his belief in the importance of their role in society and his affirmation of the equal human value of men and women, women begun to occupy more important positions in all aspects-economic, social and political-of working life. The number of women in all institutions and facilities and in high offices has greatly increased. Every possible opportunity was open to women in Iraq to increase their educational, cultural and personal capacities in order to qualify for appointment to positions and guarantee them an effective role in Iraqi society. Working women were granted- one year's paid maternity leave, and it is easy for them to get leave to care for their children. There are plenty of child-care facilities and kindergartens in all residential and work areas, and health and special medical services and mother and child care are provided in even the remotest areas.

Society

179

The support of Saddam Hussein for women is embodied in his backing of the General Union of Iraqi Women as a national nongovernmental Organisation and an important source of advice on women's issues. The concern of the glorious revolution of 17-30 July with the promotion of women parallelled the outcome of international conferences on women since 1975, in which Iraqi women fully participated. Iraq has taken important international initiatives. We refer here in particular to the Conference of Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries on the Role of Women in Development, held in Baghdad from 6 to 13 May 1979, and which used as a basis the Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women held in Copenhagen in 1980 and the Baghdad Conference on the Human Rights of Women (1994). Iraq also participated in other relevant regional and international conferences. However, the numerous challenges faced by Iraq have severely affected the advancement of Iraqi women. Examples of these challenges are the eight-year Iranian aggression against Iraq (1980 to 1988) and the 3D-Power aggression of January 1991, when all sorts of weapons were used, including those internationally outlawed. In addition to the material damage and humanitarian suffering caused by military action, Iraqi women have been burdened and psychologically, physically and socially scarred by the continuation of the disastrous total embargo imposed on Iraq since 1990. This has severely circumscribed the role of women, reduced their participation in public life and destroyed their achievements and progress on educational, employment, social and economic levels. This conflicts with the specifications of resolutions adopted by international conferences on women, which have stressed the obligation of the international community to improve the situation of women and raise their educational, employment and social levels. The difficult economic circumstances that are widespread as a result of the total sanctions regime have forced many Iraqi women to abandon their education in order to be available for domestic work and attempt to alleviate the burdens of daily life which become ever more onerous, with a view to fulfilling the daily demands of the family and of children in particular.

180

Iraq

Furthermore, the sanctions imposed on Iraq have widespread negative effec~on women and their physical and mental well-being, as a result of the daily sufferings brought about by insufficient food and medicine, and the lack of basic humanitarian supplies for the family and for women in particular. At a press conference in Geneva in March 1996, the Assistant to the Regional Director for the Middle East of the World Health Organisation stated that the health situation in Iraq had been set back 50 years, as has been confirmed by the report of United Nations agencies and humanitarian organisations that have visited Iraq. The negative [illegible] resulting from the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq have drawn the attention of the international community to the dangers of such measures. The Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" (N50/60-S/1995/1) referred to the ethical and legal aspects of applying sanctions and their conflict with the purposes of the United Nations, and urged the need for measures to limit the inhumane effects of sanctions on vulnerable groups. The Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, also. called for measures to be taken in accordance with international law to alleviate such effects on women and children. The goals, procedures and mechanism for the implementation of the national strategy for the advancement of Iraqi women are based on the provisions of the Iraqi Constitution and the precepts of the merciful Islamic Shariah, the cultural heritage, the values of Arab and Islamic society and the principles of human rights. The role and status of women reflect the development of society. Support is required for the process of the advancement of women and their capacities in society, and the removal of any manifestations of discrimination against them.

6 Religion Although members of the former ruling Baath Party generally were ideologically committed to secularism, about 95 per cent of Iraqis are Muslim and Islam is the officially recognised state religion. Islam came to the region with the victory of the Muslim armies under Caliph Umar over the Sassanians in 637 AD at the battle of Al-Qadisiyah. The majority of inhabitants soon became Muslim, including the Kurds, although small communities of Christians and Jews remained intact in the area of present-day Iraq. Iraq has been the scene of many important events in the early history of Islam, including the schism over the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad. While a precise statistical breakdown is impossible to ascertain because of likely inaccuracies in the latest census (conducted in 1997), according to best estimates, 97 per cent of the population of 26 million persons are Muslim. Shia Muslims-predominantly Arab, but also including Turkomen, Faili Kurds, and other groups-constitute a 60 to 65 per cent majority. Sunni Muslims make up 32 to 37 per cent of the population (approximately 18 to 20 per cent are Sunni Kurds, 12 to 15 per cent Sunni Arabs, and the remainder Sunni Turkomen). The remaining approximately 3 per cent of the overall population consist of Christians (Assyrians, Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenians), Yazidis, Mandaeans, and a small number of Jews. The Sunni population of Iraq is predominately Hanafi, while the Shia population is predominantly Jafari. Kurdish Muslims are mostly

182

Iraq

of the Sunni branch, but mainly follow the Shafii school of Sunni Islam, which distinguishes them from the majority of the Iraqi Arab Sunni Muslim population, which is primarily of the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. There is also a strong Sufi mystic following among the Kurds. Sufism contributes to a less orthodox practice of Islam among much of the Kurdish population. Shia, although predominantly located in the south, also are a majority in Baghdad and have communities in most parts of the country. Sunnis form the majority in the centre of the country and in the north. Shia and Sunni Arabs are not ethnically distinct. From the mid-16th century to 1916, the Ottoman Empire ruled three disparate provinces-Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul-that comprise modern-day Iraq. To counter the influence of the Shia Safavid Empire in Iran, the Ottomans maintained Iraq as a Sunni-controlled state and largely, had excluded from power Iraq's Shia and Kurdish population. The Ottoman Empire organised society around the concept of the millet, or autonomous religious community. The non-Muslim "People of the Book" (Christians and Jews) owed taxes to the government; in return they were permitted to govern themselves according to their own religious law in matters that did not concern Muslims. The religious communities were, thus, able to preserve a large measure of identity and autonomy. The British and the British-backed Iraqi monarchy continued the Ottoman policy of supporting the ruling Sunni Arab minority from the towns, villages, and tribes of Iraq's central region. The Sunni leadership attempted to overcome Shia dissatisfaction by promoting a pan-Arab identity for Iraqis, arguing that Arab culture and the history of the Arabs transcended religiOUS and communal ties. Shia, wary of being outnumbered by Sunnis in an Arab confederation, regarded the Iraqi monarchy's pan-Arab ideology with suspicion. The Kurds, as nonArabs with their own nationalist aspirations, rejected the monarchy's pan-Arabism. The Iraqi monarchy tried to integrate the various fragments of Iraqi society through military conscription and national education. These integrationist policies achieved some modest success during the last two decades of the monarchy, but the Sunnis remained dominant. Shia penetration into the highest echelons of government and military was almost non-existent, and the vast majority of Iraq's

Religion

183

poor continued to be Shia. Kurdish representation in both the government and the military was proportionately more substantial than that of Shia. The decade of republican rule following the 1958 coup that toppled the monarchy brought mixed results for both the Shia and the Kurds. Economically, Shia fared better than they had under the monarchy. Religiously, relations between the secular ruling Sunni regimes and the Shia remained tense. The radically pan-Arab ideology of the regime excluded the Kurds. Following an initial improvement in relations, a pattern of negotiations over Kurdish autonomy followed by armed clashes developed. Shia Arabs have supported an independent Iraq alongside their Sunni brethren since the 1920 Revolt; many Shia joined the Baath Party and Shia formed the backbone' of the Iraqi Army in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Although Shia Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs traditionally have dominated economic and political life. Sunni Arabs are at a distinct advantage in all areas of secular life, be it civil, political, military, or economic. Saddam's Government for decades conducted a brutal campaign of killing, summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the religious leaders and followers of the majority Shia Muslim popUlation and has sought to undermine the identity of minority Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) and Yazidi groups. Sunni-Shia tensions peaked following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Tens of thousands of Shia were arrested and deported during this period. In the Kurdish region, the pattern of negotiation followed by fighting continued. During this period, the regime also tried to enhance its legitimacy and rally support for the war effort by promoting a specifically Iraqi (rather than Arab) identity. This effort included emphasising Iraq's ancient history and Mesopotamian cultural identity. Politically, the new trend took the form of increased representation in government for both Shia and Kurds. This strategy of combining repression with cooptation, along with the war effort, accelerated the integration of Iraqi society and produced a sense of common identity (excepting, for the most part, the Kurds). During the war with Shia Iran, Iraqi Shia did not revolt and mass defections to Iran did not materialise.

184

Iraq

Sunni Muslims In Iraq, only 35 per cent of the population is Sunni, although over 80 per cent of the global Muslim population is of the Sunni branch. In Iraq, Sunni Islam is found among both Arabs and Kurds. Sunni Arabs are approximately 15 per cent of Iraq's population; Sunni Kurds are approximately 20 per cent. Sunni Arabs are primarily of the Hanafi school, while Sunni Kurds are primarily of the Shafii school. The other two legal schools in Islam, the Maliki and the Hanbali, lack a significant number of adherents in Iraq. There is no strict or cohesive Sunni identity in Iraq. Sunnis subscribe to a broad spectrum of ideologies and affiliations, many of which have little to do with religion. For Sunnis in Iraq, ethnic identity is a more potent force for either social unity or social discord than religious identity. Iraq's Sunni Arabs inhabit the valleys of the Euphrates above Baghdad, and of the Tigris between Baghdad and Mosul. Sunni Arabs in Iraq comprise the country's ruling elite. A broad system of socio-economic enticements, patronage, and cliental relationships ties Sunni Arabs together. Sunni Islam is closely tied to Arab culture, both of which Originated in the Arabian peninsula and spread north into contemporary Iraq. Iraqi Sunnis tend to regard themselves as descendants of and heirs to the golden age of Arab Islamic civilization, much of which took place under the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad from the 8th to 13th centuries. Following the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate, nonArabs (Turks) assumed control of subsequent Islamic empires, to the shame of the Arabs. The Sunni Ottoman Empire, which governed Iraq from the mid-16th century through World Wcrr I, maintained Iraq as a Sunni-controlled state as a bulwark against ,the spread of Persian! Shia influence. As a result, Sunni Arabs gained the governing, military, and administrative experience that would enable them to monopolise political power in the 20th century. In Iraq, the Sunni-Shia division has been, on the whole, a political and socio-economic struggle over the allocation and distribution of wealth and political power. Since its founding as a state in 1921, Iraq has been largely secular. The government in Iraq has largely controlled religious teaching and institutions, while expressing an appreciation of)slam's cultural heritage and its contribution to Iraqi national identity. Individual

Religion

185

Sunnis in Iraq may follow Islamic rituals and live an Islamic lifestyle. For a decade following the 1968 Baathist coup, Islam remained the official state religion. However, overall, the ruling Sunni elite attempted to defuse Islam as a political and social force. In response to the 1979 Shia Iranian Revolution and subsequent Iran-Iraq War, Sunni Islam became, an important part of the Iraqi regime's identity. Radical Islamic movements in Iraq have been harshly persecuted and marginalised. Wahhabism from neighbouring Saudi Arabia has never established a foothold within Iraq. Kurdish society is marked by receptiveness to religious pluralism. Sunni Islam arrived among the Kurds somewhat later than among the rest of the Arab population. Islam gave key leaders in the Kurdish national movement an added authority that transcended the oftendivisive boundaries of tribal loyalty. At the same time, the contemporary Iraqi government's manipulation of religious symbols and values against the Kurdish nationalist movement caused many Kurds to develop an ambiguous view of the relationship between Sunni Islam and Kurdish identity. Many Iraqi Sunni Kurds belong to mystical Sufi orders, of which the Qadiri and Naqshbandi are the largest. Both orders have followers across the Middle East, Central, and South Asia. A Qadiri Sufi shrine in Baghdad attracts annual transnational pilgrimages. While Sufi Islam has broad acceptance in Iraqi society, Sufism has frequently been viewed by orthodox Sunni Muslim theologians with some degree of suspicion because of its strong mystical components. Shia Muslims tend to be hostile towards Sufism because they believe it is heretical. Sufi orders serve to both strengthen and divide Kurdish society. Kurds of the same order feel a common bond, regardless of tribe. There is, however, tension between rival orders. Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the President of the Republic, follows the Qadiri order. The Masud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KOP) , and the influential Barzani family are Naqshbandi Sufis.

Shia Muslims Islam, as it is practised in Iraq, is closely tied to Arab culture. Shiism in Iraq is heavily influenced by Arab identity and, thus, differs

186

Iraq

from the version followed in Persian Iran. Many of Iraq's tribes converted to Shiism in the 19th century, partly in response to Ottoman settlement policies that disrupted the tribal order. Shia rituals and law helped tribesmen cope with their more complex daily life. The rapid conversion of Iraq's tribes to Shiism did not permeate the former social and moral values of the tribesmen. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi Shia for the most part chose their Arab identity over their religious one. Historically, Iraq has been the heartland of the global Shia community. For the most part, Shia Arabs have made attempts to accommodate their religious identity to the framework of the Iraqi state. Although Shia resent the ruling Sunni minority's repeated questioning of their loyalty and Arab bona fides, the Shia community has never unified behind a Shia cause. A variety of views about politics and religion contradicts the image of a monolithic, radical, and pro-Iranian Shia community. Although there are strong cultural and familial links between Iraqi and Iranian Shia, Arab identity and national sentiment remain powerful influences within the community. A significant practice of Shia Islam is that of visiting the shrines of Imams both in Iraq and in Iran. These include the tomb of Imam Ali in An Najaf and that of his son Imam Hussain in Karbala since both are considered major Shia martyrs. Before the 1980 Iran-Iraq War, tens of thousands went each year. The Iranians made it a central aim of their war effort to wrest these holy cities from the Iraqis. Other principal pilgrimage sites in Iraq are the tombs of the Seventh and Ninth Imams at Kazimayn, near Baghdad, and in Iran, the tomb of the Eighth Imam in Mashhad and that of his sister in Qom. Such pilgrimages originated in part from the difficulty and expense in the early days of making the hajj to Mecca. Commemorating the martyrdom of Hussain, killed near Karbala in 680 AD during a battle with troops supporting the Ummayad Caliph, there are processions in the Shia towns and villages of southern Iraq on the tenth of Muharram (Ashura) , the anniversary of his death. Ritual mourning (taaziya) is performed by groups of men of five to twenty each. Contributions are solicited in the community to pay transportation for a local group to go to Karbala for taaziya celebrations forty days after Ashura. There is a great rivalry among groups from different places for the best performance of the passion

Religion

187

plays. In the villages, religious readings occur throughout Ramadan and Muhamim. The men may gather in the mudhif {tribal guesthouse}, the suq {market}, or a private house. Women meet in homes. The readings are led either by a mumin (a man trained in a religious school in An Najaf) or by a mullah who has apprenticed with an older specialist. It is considered the duty of sheikhs, elders, prosperous merchants, and the like to sponsor these readings, or qirayas. Under the monarchy these public manifestations were discouraged, as they emphasised grievances against the Sunnis. In 1722, Persian Shia clerics emigrated to southern Iraq under the protection of the Iranian government in an area of Iraq where Ottoman control was weak. The emigration shifted the centre of Shia scholarship from Iran to Iraq, increasing the importance of Iraq and its Shia Shrine cities among the larger Shia community. The Sunni Ottomans considered the Shia clerics to be a potential fifth column because of their ties with Iran. To counter this Shia influence, the Ottomans placed the Sunni Arabs in positions of government in Iraq, a practice that was continued by the British. The predominance of the Sunni in the government continued throughout the Baath period. In 1920, a tribal revolt began against the British in the south of Iraq, incited largely by the Shia clerics. Many of the Shia clerics were Persian and felt threatened by British policies that endangered their influence among the local population and resented the occupation of Iraq by Christian infidels. The revolt was put down by the British, who saw the ability of the Shia clerics to incite a far-reaching rebellion as a danger both to them and to the young Iraqi state. From the late 1940s to the mid-1950s, the Shia made up the majority of the membership of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). The Shia ulema later condemned the ICP as an atheist party, which caused Shia to withdraw support~ a factor in the successful coup against President Qasim in 1963. The Iraqi Shia later became supporters of the al-Dawa and al-Mujahideen parties. The al-Dawa party was guided by the philosophy of Iraqi Shia Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a leading figure in the Shia Islamist movement until his execution by the government in 1980. Ayatollah RuhoUah Khomeini, a Persian and the leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, had taught and preached in Najaf after being

188

Iraq

exiled from Iran by the Shah in 1964. Khomeini's presence in Iraq had an impact on the Shia political movement in Iraq, but his influence in that movement was overshadowed by that of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a native Iraqi and an Arab.

Shia Leadership A Marjah is the highest authority on religion and law in Shiism. Where a difference in opinion exist between the Marjah, Aalims (Religious Scholar) try to provide different opinions. Four senior Grand Ayatullahs [Ayat Allah] constitute the Religious Institution (al-Hawzah al-llmiyyah) in Najaf, the pre-eminent seminary centre for the training of Shiite clergymen. Taqlid means acting according to the opinion of the jurist (mujtahid) who has all the necessary qualification to be emulated. So you do what the mujtahid's expert opinion says you should do, and refrain from what his expert opinion says you should refrain from, without any research [in Islamic sources] on your part. It is as though you have placed the responsibility of your deeds squarely on his shoulders. Among the conditions which must be found in a jurist (mujtahid) who can be followed is that he must be the most learned (al-alam) jurist of his time and the most capable in deriving the religious laws from the appropriate sources. There are generally six ranks among Shia clerics. The highest, grand ayatollah means "great sign of God". In the past, there were usually no more than five grand ayatollahs in the Shia Islamic world. Today, however, it is suspected that there are at least seven and possibly more. Under grand ayatollah is ayatollah ("sign of God"). Below Ayatullah is the rank of hojat ai-Islam, whi~h is Arabic for "authority on Islam". Next is mubellegh al-risala or "carrier of the message". While mujtahid often refers to clerics in general, it is also a specific rank, which denotes one has graduated from a religious seminary. At the bottom of the ladder are religiOUS students, talib ilm. Besides the obvious factors such as graduation to be promoted to mUjtahid, promotion in the ranks is a rather subjective matter. Two important factors behind promotion are the size and quality of one's student following and authorship of scholarly works on Islam. As of late 2002, there were two generally acknowledged senior Shia clerics in Iraq. Prior to the American occupation,

Religion

189

Ayatollah al-Sayed Ali al-Seestani [Ali as-Sistanil had been forbidden to lead prayers and remained under virtual house arrest in Najaf as a result of attempts on his life. Grand Ayatollah Sayed Ali Seestani, the current Shia spiritual leader, was attacked in his home in Najaf in November 1996, resulting in the death of one of his employees. Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sayed al-Hakim, another of Iraq's most important Shia clerics, is the uncle of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, whose brother, Abdul Aziz, serves on the Interim Governing Council. But Said is not associated with SCIRI; he is much closer to Sistani. His cousin Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim had been the spiritual leader of the Shia world between 1955 and 1970 and served as mentor to the founder of Iran's Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The two other living grand ayatollahs, who along with al-Hakim and Sistani comprised the four most powerful clerics in Iraq, are Muhammad Ishaq Fayadh and Bashir Hussain al-Najafi. Both rarely speak on political issues. All are based in the Shia seminary-the 'Hawza'-in AI-Najaf, which is the highest religious authority of Iraq's majority Shia population. Their followers regard them as sources for religious emulation and their written opinions can carry the force of law. At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, President George Bush urged Iraqis to topple the Baath regime, but the US did not back the Shia uprising that ensued in southern Iraq, and the rebels were slaughtered. When the fighters of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), headed by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, poured over the border from Iran. Fears of Iranian influence over Iraqi Shiites through SCIRI was a decisive factor in the US decision not to support the uprising. Grand Ayatollah Abu Gharib al-Qasim al-Khoei sent his son Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei to contact the Americans. When he reached French lines he was told Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the allied forces, would meet him, but the meeting never took place. Afterwards, AI-Khoei went into exile. For more than half a century, the school of the late Grand Ayatollah Imam Abul Qasim al-Khoee was an undepletable spring that enriched Islamic thought and knowledge. From his school graduated dozens of jurists, clergymen, and dignitaries who took it upon themselves to continue on his ideological path which was full

190

Iraq

of achievements and sacrifices in the service of the faith, knowledge, and society. Among those are outstanding professors of parochial schools, especially Holy Najaf and Qom. Some of them have attained the level of 'ijtihad'-competence to deduce independent legal judgment enabling them to assume the office of supreme religious authority. Others reached lofty levels qualifying them for shouldering the responsibilities of teaching and education. Most distinguished among those figures is His Eminence Grand Ayatullah as-Sayyid Ali al-Hussaini as-Seestani. He ranks among the brightest, the most qualified and knowledgeable of Imam al-Khoee's former students. In 1991, Iraqi authorities arrested 108 Shia clerics and students, including 95-year-old Grand Ayatollah Abu Gharib al-Qasim al-Khoee, 10 of his family members, and 8 of his aides. Ayatollah al-Khoee subsequently was released; however, he was held under house arrest until his death in August 1992. Ayatollah Hussain Bahr al-Uloom, who was arrested in 1991, had reportedly died under questionable circumstances in June 2001. The late Grand Ayatollah Muhsin AI-Hakim was the spiritual leader for the Shia world in the period 1955-1970. Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qasim al-Khoee received the mantle of leadership after the death of Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, in 1970. Grand Ayatollah AIi al-Sistani, who succeeded Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qasim al-Khoee in 1992, is believed to favour, keeping the Iraqi Shiite clergy out of politics. Baath Governmental authorities were associated with a series of previous fatal accidents, apparently engineered, such as the well known case of Sayed Muhammad Taqi al-Khoee, son of the Grand Ayatollah al-Khoee, who died on 21 July, 1994 in a suspicious car accident while returning from his weekly visit to Karbala. He was accompanied by his brother-in-law, Amin Khalkhali, his six-year-old nephew and his driver, when they crashed into an unlit truck blocking the divided highway. Since January 1998, the killings of three internationally respected clerics and an attempt on the life of a fourth have been attributed widely to government agents by international human rights activists, other governments, and Shia clergy in Iran and Leban~on. Ayatollah Sheikh Murtada al-Burujerdi was shot dead in the evening of 21 April, 1998 while he WaS walking home with two

Religion

191

companions after he had led cor.gregational evening prayers at the shrine of Imam~Ali. Following the 1991 Shia uprising in southern Iraq, Ayatollah ol-Burujerdi, who at that time had been arrested for three days, begar. leading the daily prayers in the sacred enclosure of Imam Ali. As well as being a leader of the congregational prayers, Ayatollah al-Burujerdi was a serious candidate for the position of Marja. It was reported that Ayatollah al-Burujerdi had been asked by the Iraqi authorities to give up his post as leader of the prayers at the shrine of Imam Ali, but he refused. Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Mirza Ali al-Gharawi (68 years old) was assassinated on 18 June, 1998 in his car on the route between the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf. He was accompanied by his son-in-law, driver and another companion. According to information from persons claiming to have been witnesses, the car of Ayatollah al-Gharawi was stopped and all four passengers of the car were then shot dead on the spot. Ayatollah al-Gharawi was a well-respected religious scholar and was also a senior spiritual leader (or Marja) of Shia Muslims. Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir al-Hussaini escaped an attempt on his life in January, 1999. Grand Ayatollah Mohammad al-Sadr [aged 66], the leading Shia cleric in Iraq, was assassinated in Najaf while driving home on the evening of 19 February, 1999 along with his two sons and chief assistants, Mustafa and Muammal, and their driver. The government had recognised al-Sadr as grand ayatollah in 1992, but in the months preceding his death he had begun distancing himself from the government in Ftiday sermons and urging people, against government wishes, to attend mass prayer gatherings. Following the murder of Ayatollah al-Sadr there were widespread reports, of at least four days of heavy clashes between protesters and security forces in heavily Shia neighbourhoods of Baghdad such as Medinat al-Thawra and in majority Shia cities such as Karbala, Nasriyya, Najaf, and Basra in which scores were killed and hundreds arrested. According to Iraq's opposition groups, the latest killings unleashed a mini-insurrection. They claim the army besieged Najaf. United Nations observers, monitoring food distribution in Iraq, passed through Najaf on the day of the supposed siege and noticed nothing unusual. In mid-April 2003, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, who had lived in exile in Iran for 23 years, and Ayatollah Abdul

192

Iraq

Majid al-Kohei who had lived in exile in London for 12 years, both returned to the holy city of Najaf to organise their followers. The two men were leaders of the most important Shia families in Iraq. Each man's father had served as the supreme religious authority in the Shia world for more than 20 years. They had both been betrayed by America after the 1991 Gulf War. And by the end of August 2003 both had been assassinated. At the beginning of the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Baqir al-Hakim instructed SeIRI elements in Basra, Najaf, Karbala and other cities not to start an uprising 'or support the US-led coalition. To supporters, Baqir al-Hakim's arrival was the Khomeini-like return from exile of a man who is due-at the very least-a place among the Iraqis who will form the country's interim leadership. To his opponents Hakim had been away too long and is too close to Tehran, where he lived while his people fought a bloody eight-year war with Iran. Al-Hakim warned repeatedly that the US would face armed resistance if its forces stayed too long after ridding Iraq of Hussein's regime. Al-Hakim was far less accommodating to coalition interests than al-Khoee and said, "We refuse to put ourselves under the thumb of the Americans or any other country, because that is not in the Iraqis' interest." On 10 April, 2003 Ayatollah Abdul Majid Al-Kohee was assassinated by a knife attack in Najaf after arriving from London. Majid was the son of the late Grand Ayatollah al-Khoee, spiritual leader of Iraq's Shias at the time of the 1991 Gulf War. Al-Kohee was a moderate and his competition with Grand Ayatollah Al-Hakim (who also headed to Najaf from his base in Iran) would have helped the American occupation. Al-Khoee had a better relationship with the United States, and his quick return to Najaf-with American assistance-was part of the Bush administration's effort to draw support away from al-Hakim. Although al-Khoee was usually accompanied by coalition forces, the officers do not enter the mosque and so were unable to rescue him. Abdul Majid was stabbed to death at the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, one of the holiest shrines for Shia Muslims. The murder raised tensions among Iraq's majority Shia population. The perception of al-Khoee as a US puppet was strengthened by the subsequent admission by Washington that it had channelled $ 13 million dollars to him. On 24 August, 2003 a bomb

Religion

193

exploded outside the house of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said alHakim, killing 3 guards and injuring 10 other people. Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim was slightly wounded in the neck by flying glass when a bomb went off outside his offices in Najaf, shortly after he finished his prayers. Four men in a car dropped a canister of cooking gas near the wall of the house beside the room where the 9rand ayatollah and his son were resting. Bodyguards noticed a flame coming from the top of the canister before it exploded, killing two of the guards and another household employee. Ten of his aides were wounded. Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim is the uncle of Ayatollah Muhammad Bakir al-Hakim, the leader of the best-organised Shia party, the Supreme Council forthe Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI). Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim headed one of Iraq's most powerful clerical families. The family included his nephew Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, who led the best-organised Iraqi Shia group, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The group waged a long guerrilla campaign against deposed leader Saddam Hussein from exile in Iran until the US overthrew the Iraqi regime in April 2003 . Subsequently, SCIRI modified its traditional calls for an Islamic system in Iraq and now says it is ready to work towards that goal within a democratic framework. A representative of SCIRI is one of the 25 members of the US-appointed Governing Council in Baghdad. The bomb attack called new attention to the potentially violent political divides among Iraqi Shia organisations. While no one knows who was behind the attack, suspicion in AI-Najaf immediately fell upon political rivals of the al-Hakim family. And those enemiesthanks to the family's prominence-are numerous. On 29 August, 2003 a car bomb exploded during Friday prayers in AI-Najaf outside the Imam Ali Mosque, killing Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and many others. Over a hundred people were killed, and several times that many were reported to be injured at the mosque, which is the most holy shrine for Shia Muslims in Iraq. There had been considerable unrest among the religious factions in the holy city, 175 kilometres south-west of Baghdad. AI-Hakim was the brother of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who is a member of the Iraqi

194

Iraq

Governing Council. Baqir al-Hakim, who was 66 years old, returned to Iraq on 10 May after 23 years in exile in Iran. Shia-Sunni Relations Until the 1980s, the dominant view of contemporary political analysts held that Iraq was badly split along sectarian lines. The claim was that the Sunnis-although a minority-ran Iraq and subjected the majority Shias to systematic discrimination. According to the prevailing belief, the Shias would drive the Sunnis from power, if once afforded an opportunity to do so. There was some basis to this notion. For many years Iraq was ruled, by-and-Iarge, by Arab Sunnis who tended to come from a restricted area around Baghdad, Mosul, and Ar Rutbah-the so-called Golden Triangle. In the 1980s, not only was President Saddam Hussein a Sunni, but he was the vice chairman of the ruling Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection). One of the two Deputy Prime Ministers and the defence minister were also Sunnis. In addition, the top posts in the security services have usually been held by Sunnis, and most of the army's corps commanders have been Sunnis. It is also true that the most depressed region of the country is the south, where the bulk of the Shias reside. Nonetheless, the theory of sectarian strife was undercut by the behaviour of Iraq's Shia community during Iran's 1982 invasion and the fighting thereafter. Although about three-quarters of the lower ranks of the army were Shias, as of early 1988, no general insurrection of Iraqi Shias had occurred. Even in periods of major setback for the Iraqi army-such as the AI-Faw debacle in 1986-the Shias have continued staunchly to defend their nation and the Baath regime. They have done so despite intense propaganda barrages mounted by the Iranians, calling on them to join the Islamic revolution. It appeared that, however important sectarian affiliation may have been in the past, in the latter 1980s nationalism was the basic determiner of loyalty. In the case of Iraq's Shias, it should be noted that they are Arabs, n0~ Persians, and that they have been the traditional enemies of the Persians for centuries. The Iraqi government has skilfully exploited this age-old enmity in its propaganda, publicising the war as part of the ancient struggle between the Arab and Persian empires. For example, Baathist publicists regularly call the war a modern day "Qadisiyah." Qadisiyah was the battle in 637 AD in which the Arabs defeated the pagan hosts of Persia, enabling Islam

Religion

195

to spread to the East. The real tension in Iraq in the latter 1980s was between the majority of the population, Sunnis as well as Shias, for whom religious belief and practice were significant values, and the secular Baathists, rather than between Sunnis and Shias. Although the Shias had been under represented in government posts in the period of the monarchy, they made substantial progress in the educational, business, and legal fields. Their advancement in other areas, such as the opposition parties, was such that in the years from 1952 to 1963, before the Baath Party came to power, Shias held the majority of party leadership posts. Observers believed that in the late 1980s Shias were represented at all levels of the party roughly in proportion to government estimates of their numbers in the population. For example, of the eight top Iraqi leaders who in early 1988 sat with Hussein on the Revolutionary Command Council-Iraq's highest governing body-three were Arab Shias (of whom one had served as Minister of Interior), three were Arab Sunnis, one was an Arab Christian, and one a Kurd. On the Regional Command Councilthe ruling body of the party-Shias actually predominated. During the war, a number of highly competent Shia officers have been promoted to corps commanders. The general who turned back the initial Iranian invasions of Iraq in 1982 was a Shia. The Shias continued to make good progress in the economic field as well during the 1980s. Although the government does not publish statistics that give breakdowns by religious affiliations, qualified observers noted that many Shias migrated from rural areas, particularly in the south, to the cities, so that not only Basra but other cities including Baghdad acquired a Shia majority. Many of these Shias prospered in business and the professions as well as in industry and the service sector. Even those living in the poorer areas of the cities were generally better off than they had been in the countryside. In the rural areas as well, the educational level of Shias came to approximate that of their Sunni counterparts. Prior to the war with Iran, the Baath had taken steps towards integrating the Shias. The war placed inordinate demands on the regime for manpower, demands that could only be met by levying the Shia community-and this strengthened the regime's resolve to further the integration process. In early 1988, it seemed likely that when the war ends, the Shias would emerge as full citizens. This was not to be, however.

196

Iraq

Shla-Baath Relations The Iraq~ Baath Party was a proponent of secularism. This attitude was maintained despite the fact that the mass of Iraqis are deeply religious. At the same time, the Baathists did not hesitate to exploit religion as a mobilising agent; and from the first months of the war with Iran, prominent Baathists made a public show of attending religious observances. Iraq's President Saddam Hussein was depicted in prayer in posters displayed throughout the country. Moreover, the.-' Baath provided large sums of money to refurbish . important mo~q\fes; this has proved a useful tactic in encouraging support from the Shias. Since the 1980's, the Baath Government reportedly attempted to eliminate the senior Shia religious leadership (the Mirjaiyat) through killings, disappearances, and summary executions. Despite supposed legal protection of reiigious equality, the Baath regime repressed severely the Shia clergy and those who follow the Shia faith. Forces from the Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), General Security (Amn al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeen Saddam), and the Baath Party have killed senior Shia clerics, desecrated Shia mosques and holy sites (particularly in the aftermath of the 1991 civil uprising), arrested tens of thousands of Shia, interfered with Shia religious education, prevented Shia adherents from performing their religious rites, and fired upon or arrested Shia who sought to take part in their religious processions. Security agents reportedly are stationed at all the major Shia mosques and shrines, and search, harass, and arbitrarily arrest worshippers. Reports of military operations against Shia civilians also increased notably in the summer of 1998 after the killings of Ayatollahs Ali alGharawi and Sheikh al-Borojourdi. In numerous incidents during 1998, security forces injured and summarily executed Shia civilians, burned Shia homes, confiscated land belonging to Shia, and arbitrarily arrested and detained scores of Shia. In January 1999, according to a report from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), security officials reportedly arrested Sheikh Awas, Imam of the Nasiriyah city mosque. Shortly after the arrest of Sheikh Awas, hundreds of Shia congregation members reportedly marched on the security directorate to demand that Awas be released immediately. Security forces allegedly opened

Religion

197

fire on the unarmed crowd with automatic weapons and threw hand grenades. Five persons reportedly were killed, 11 wounded, and 300 arrested. The Human Rights Organisation in Iraq (HROI) reported that 1,093 Shia were arrested in June 1999 in Basrah alone. The Iraqi National Congress reported that tanks from the Hammourabi Republican Guard division attacked the towns of Rumaitha and Khudur in June 1999 after residents protested the systematic unequal distribution of food and medicine to the detriment of the Shia. Fourteen villagers were killed, over 100 persons were arrested, and 40 homes were destroyed. In June 1999, SCIRI reported that 160 homes in the Abul Khaseeb district near Basra were destroyed. Baath security forces also forced Shia inhabitants of the southern marshes to relocate to major southern cities and to areas along the Iranian border. Former Special Rapporteur van Der Stoel described this practice in his February 1999 report, adding that many other persons have been transferred to detention centres and prisons in central Iraq, primarily in Baghdad. The Government reportedly also continued to move forcibly Shia population from the south to the north to replace Kurds, Turkomen, and Assyrians who had been expelled forcibly from major cities. The military also continued its water-diversion and other projects in the south. The Government's claim that the drainage was part of a land reclamation plan to increase the acreage of arable land and spur agricultural production was given little credence. Hundreds of square miles have been burned in military operations. The former Special Rapporteur noted the devastating impact that draining the marshes has had on the culture of the Shia marsh Arabs. SCIRI claimed to have captured government documents that detailed the destructive intent of the water diversion programme and its connection to "strategic security operations," "economic blockade", and "withdrawal of food supply agencies." The Baath Government's diversion of supplies in the south limited the Shia population's access to food, medicine, drinking water, and transportation. According to the former Special Rapporteur and opposition sources, thousands of persons in Nasiriyah and Basra provinces were denied rations that should have been supplied under the UN oil-for-food programme. In these provinces and in Amarah province, access to food allegedly is used to reward regime supporters

198

Iraq

and silence opponents. Shia groups reported that, due to this policy, the humanitarian condition of Shia in the south continued to suffer despite a significant expansion of the oil-for-food programme. By the end of Saddam's regime, the following government restrictions on religious rights remained in effect: restrictions on communal Friday prayer by Shia; restrictions on Shia mosque libraries loaning books; a ban on the broadcast of Shia programmes on government-controlled radio or television; a ban on the publication of Shia books, including prayer books and guides; a ban on many funeral processions other than those organised by the Baath Government; a ban on other Shia funeral observances, such as gatherings for Quran reading; and the prohibition of certain processions and public meetings commemorating Shia holy days. The Baath Government required that speeches by Shia Imams in mosques be based upon government-provided material that attacked fundamentalist trends.

Yazidis Yazidis are a syncretistic religious group (or a set of several groups). Many Yazidis consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, although some would define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct from Muslim Kurds. However, the Baath Government, without any historical basis, defined the Yazidis as Arabs. Yazidis predominately reside in the north of the country. There is evidence that the Baath Government in the past compelled Yazidis to join in domestic military action against Muslim Kurds. Captured government documents included in a 1998 Human Rights Watch report describe special all-¥azidi military detachments formed dUring the 1988-89 Anfal campaign to "pursue and attack·' Muslim Kurds. The Baath Government also targeted the Yazidis in the past. For example, 33 members of the Yazidi community of Mosul, arrested in July 1996, still are unaccounted for.

Christians Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be distinct ethnic groups, as well as the descendants of some of the earliest Christian communities. The communities speak a distinct language (Syriac). Although they do not define themselves as Arabs, the Baath Government defines Assyrians and Chaldeans as such, evidently to

Religion

199

encourage them to identify with the Sunni-Arab dominated regime. Christians are concentrated in the north and in Baghdad. Most Assyrians live in the northern governorates, and the Baath Government often has suspected them of "collaborating" with Iraqi Kurds. In the north, Kurdish groups often refer to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. Military forces destroyed numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 Anfal Campaign and reportedly executed and tortured many Assyrians. Both major Kurdish political parties have indicated that the Baath Government occasionally targeted Assyrians as well as ethnic Kurds and Turkoman as a part of its Arabisation campaign of ethnic cleansing designed to harass and expel non-Arabs from government-controlled areas in the north. AsSyrians are a Syriac-speaking people of Christian faith and of mixed Semitic, Aramaean, Assyrian, Persian, and Kurdish descent. Contemporary Assyrians, influenced in the 19th century by Western nationalism, now identify themselves as a single ethnic group, united by the Syriac language, the Christian Church of the East, and a common cultural heritage of the ancient Assyrian civilization. There are about 200,000 Assyrians in Iraq who constitute approximately one-sixth of Iraqi Christians. Assyrians are located mostly in the large cities of Baghdad, Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, and Basra. Rural Assyrians are located primarily in towns on the Mosul plain in northern Iraq. Assyrians share the Syriac language and much of a common history with Chaldeans. The two groups were divided over the last 500 years by the Chaldeans' re-unification with the Roman Catholic Church in 1552. Both contemporary Assyrians and Chaldeans claim to be heirs of the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia, including the ancient Babylonian, Assyrian, and Chaldean empires. Contemporary Assyrians often refer to Assyrians and Chaldeans as belonging to the same ethno-national group, while Chaldeans often include AsSyrians in their ethnic group. Assyrians sometimes identify themselves interchangeably as ''Assyrian'' or "Chaldean." Assyrians resist attempts by the Iraqi government to deny them their language and culture by giving them labels such as "ancient Iraqis" and "Iraqi Christians." They also oppose government policies that attempt to force Arabic and Arab culture upon them. Likewise, Assyrians in northern Iraq resist attempts by Kurds to assimilate them into Kurdish culture, language, and political parties.

200

Iraq

Assyrians did not fare well under Saddam Hussein, who destroyed Assyrian churches. Saddam Hussein's emphasis on tribal identity alienated contemporary Assyrians, who are excluded from Arab tribes and tribal customs. Assyrians have been in close proximity to political power in a number of empires of which they have been a part, despite their small numbers. As leaders of the Church of the East traditionally emphasised learning, their political success was often due to their high degree of education. Although the Ottoman Empire, which ruled Iraq, was allied with Germany during World War I, the Assyrians sided with Britain and were later protected by the British during the British Mandate that ruled Iraq after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Assyrians joined the British imperial troops, known as Levies. The Levies were notoriously used as an instrument of internal security, particularly to suppress Kurdish revolts in northern Iraq. Considered haughty by other Iraqis, the Assyrians earned bitter resentment among Iraqi Kurds and Arabs during this period. In 1933, as several hundred Assyrians attempted to cross the Tigris River into the French mandate of Syria, fighting erupted with Iraqi border troops. Within a few days, thousands of unarmed Assyrians were summarily executed in their villages while the Iraqi government stood aside. The Assyrian patriarch fled to exile in Cyprus and Britain, eventually re-establishing his seat in Chicago in 1939 along with, approximately, 15,000 Assyrians. Christianity is an important facet of identity among contemporary Assyrians. Assyrians and Chaldeans both trace their religious identities to the beginning of the Christian era. Syriac is a language closely-related to the Aramaic spoken by ancient Mesopotamian peoples, including Jesus. These historical facts strengthen the Assyrian identification with the ancient Assyrian and Chaldean civilizations, and with the early Christian church. The Assyrians emerged as a distinct Christian group in 431 AD, when their religious leader, the Patriarch Nestorius of Constantinople, broke away from the Byzantine Orthodox Church during the Third Ecumenical Council when his teachings were declared heretical. The Assyrians became pejoratively known as followers of the Nestorian Church, although Assyrians traditionally referred to themselves as "Suraya," or as followers of the "Church of the East." Assyrians do

Religion

201

not believe that the teachings of Nestorius are in violation of Christian teachings.

Jews Although few Jews remain in the country, government officials frequently make anti-Semitic statements. For example, in 2001 a Baath Party official stated, "lowly Jews" were "descendants of monkeys and pigs and worshippers of the infidel tyrant."

Spiritual Centre One of the most interesting places to visit are the Islamic cities of Karbala, Najaf and Qufa. These cities played a vital role in the history of early Islam, particularly during the establishment of Shiism. At Karbala, huge gold domes on two massive turquoise-coloured mosques face each other. The mosques, named after Imam Hussain and his cousin Abbas, are sacred places of pilgrimage for the Shias. Pilgrims pay respect to their leaders who sacrificed their lives by not accepting to pay allegiance to the Caliph in Damascus. On any given day and time, one finds scores of people visiting Karbala and offering prayers, meditation, feeding the poor and even having family outings. There are more Shia sites in Iraq than in Iran, so there always has been a large influx of Iranians visiting Iraq as pilgrims. Though both these sites are holy to the Shias, they are open to non-Muslims as well, and tour members were free to walk around the courtyard, take photos and meet people. The inside portion is, however, open only to Muslims, be they Shias or Sunnis. The adjoining cities of Najaf and Qufa house many more Shia sites, including a large cemetery, several mosques and madrasas (religious schools). It is also here that the main school of Shia thought exists and where the Ayatollahs undergo their training. The magnificence of modern-day Iraq lies in the capital city of Baghdad. Baghdad-the name means "garden of God"-is a large and beautiful city. It was during the early days of the Abbasid period (750-969 AD) that Baghdad became the world centre of intellectual and aesthetic growth. It was also here that the stories of Arabian Nights were conceived, where science, especially medicine, astronomy, mathematics, algebra, etc., developed and flourished. Names such as al-Khawarismi, the discoverer of algebraic equations (his name was later Latinised to Algorismus), al-Kindi, the philosopher who

202

Iraq

applied reason to tradition, al-Razi, a physician who compiled a medical encyclopedia and al-Ghazzali, a scholar of religious law, were names still proudly referred to by tourist guides. Baghdad maintained its beauty and majesty. From the palaces of the Abbasids to the palaces of Saddam Hussein, medieval and modem schools, museums, mausoleums and gardens, the city certainly had an atmosphere reflecting its historical past. The pride of the Iraqis, the city had construction of aesthetically designed structures going on seemingly everywhere, all from locally manufactured materials. The famous al-Rasheed Hotel, which like all other hotels in the country, had a large underground hall deSignated as a bomb shelter for use in case of an air raid. Other "five-star" hotels in the city included the Palestine and the al-Mansuriya, both of which were very much in the news during the recent bombings.

7

Heritage and Culture Cradle of Civilization In ancient times, the land area now known as modern Iraq was almost equivalent to Mesopotamia, the land between the two rivers Tigris and Euphrates (in Arabic, the Dijla and Furat, respectively), the Mesopotamian plain was called the Fertile Crescent. This region is known as the Cradle of Civilization; was the birthplace of the varied civilizations that moved us from prehistory to history. An advanced civilization flourished in this region long before that of Egypt, Greece, and Rome, for it was here in about 4,000 BC, that the Sumerian culture flourished. The civilized life that emerged at Summer was shaped by two conflicting factors: the un-predictability of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which at any time could unleash devastating floods that wiped out entire peoples, and the extreme richness of the river valleys, caused by centuries-old deposits of soil. Thus, while the river valleys of southern Mesopotamia attracted migrations of neighbouring peoples and made possible, for the first time in history, the growing of surplus food, the volatility of the rivers necessitated a form of collective management to protect the marshy, low-lying land from flooding. As surplus production increased and as collective management became more advanced, a process of urbanisation evolved and Sumerian civilization took root. The people of the Tigris and the Euphrates basin, the ancient Sumerians, using the fertile land and

204

Iraq

the abundant water supply of the area, developed sophisticated irrigation systems and created what was probably the first cereal agriculture as well as the earliest writing, cuneiform-a way of arranging impressions stamped on clay by the wedge-like section of choppedoff reed stylus into wet clay. Through writing, the Sumerians were able to pass on complex agricultural techniques to successive generations; this led to marked improvements in agricultural production. Writing evolved to keep track of property. Clay envelopes marked with the owner's rolled seal· were used to hold tokens for goods, the tokens within recording a specific transaction. Later on, the envelope and tokens were discarded and symbols scratched into clay-recorded transactions such as 2 bunch of wheat or 7 cows. As writing evolved, pictures gave way to lines pressed into clay with a wedge tip; this allowed a scribe to make many different types of strokes without changing his grip. By 3,000 BC, the script evolved into a full syllabic alphabet. The commerce of the times is recorded in great depth. Double entry accounting practices were found to be a part of the records. This remarkable innovation has been used to this day, as a standard for record keeping. It was the custom for all to pay for what they needed at a fair price. Royalty was not exception. The king may have had an edge on getting a "better deal", but it wasn't the law as it was in Egypt where the Pharaoh was the "living god" and as such, owned all things. It seems that everyone had the right to bargain fairly for his or her goods. Unlike their Egyptian neighbours, these people were believers in private property, and the kings were very much answerable to the citizens. In Egypt, the Pharaoh owned all things, including the people and property. Sumerians invented the wheel and the first plow in 3700 BC. Sumerians developed a math system based on the numeral 60, which is the basis of time in the modern world. Sumerian society was "Matriarchal" and women had a highly respected place in society. Banking originated in Mesopotamia (Babylonia) out of the activities of temples and palaces, which provided safe places for the storage of valuables. Initially deposits of grain were accepted and later other goods including cattle, agricultural implements, and precious metals. Another important Sumerian legacy was the recording of literature.

Heritage and Culture

205

Poetry and epic literature were produced. The most famous Sumerian epic and the one that has survived in the most nearly complete form is the epic of Gilgamesh. The story of Gilgamesh, who actually was king of the city-state of Uruk in approximately 2700 BC, is a moving story of the ruler's deep sorrow at the death of his friend Enkidu, and of his consequent search for immortality. Other central themes of the story are a devastating flood and the tenuous nature of man's existence, and ended by meeting a wise and ancient man who had survived a great flood by bUilding an ark. Land was cultivated for the first time, early calendars were used and the first written alphabet was invented ·here. Its bountiful land, fresh waters, and varying climate contributed to the creation of deeprooted civilization that had fostered humanity from its affluent fountain since thousands of years. Sumerian states were believed to be under the rule of a local god or goddess, and a bureaucratic system of the priesthood arose to oversee the ritualistic and complex religion. High Priests represented the gods on earth, one of their jobs being to discern the divine will. A favourite method of divination was reading sheep or goat entrails. The priests ruled from their ziggurats, high rising temples of sunbaked brick with outside staircases leading to the shrine on top. The Sumerian gods personified local elements and natural forces. The Sumerians worshipped Anu, the supreme god of heaven, Enlil, god of water, and Ea, god of magic and creator of man. The Sumerians held the belief that a sacred ritual marriage between the ruler and Inanna, goddess of love and fertility brought rich harvests. Eventually, the Sumerians would have to battle another peoples, the Akkadians, who migrated up from the Arabian Peninsula. The Akkadians were a Semitic people, that is, they spoke a language drawn from a family of languages called Semitic languages; Semitic languages include Hebrew, Arabic, Assyrian, and Babylonian, the term "Semite" is a modern designation taken from the Hebrew Scriptures; Shem was a son of Noah and the nations descended from Shem are the Semites. When the two peoples clashed, the Sumerians gradually lost control over the city-states, they had so brilliantly created and fell under the hegemony of the Akkadian kingdom, which was based in Akkad (Sumerian Agade). This great capital of the largest empire

206

Iraq

humans had ever seen up until that point that was later to become Babylon, which was the commercial and cultural centre of the Middle East for almost two thousand years. In 2340 BC, the great Akkadian military leader, Sargon, conquered Summer and built an Akkadian empire stretching over most of the Sumerian city-states and extending as far away as Lebanon. Sargon based his empire in the city of Akkad, which became the basis of the name of his people. But Sargon's ambitious empire lasted for only a blink of an eye in the long time spans of Mesopotamian history. In 2125 BC, the Sumerian city of Ur in southern Mesopotamia rose up in revolt, and the Akkadian empire fell before a renewal of Sumerian city-states. Mesopotamia is the suspected spot known as the "Garden of Eden." Ur of the Chaldees, and that's where Abraham came from, (that's just north of the traditional site of the Garden of Eden, about twenty-five miles north-east of Eridu, at present Mughair), was a great and famous Sumerian city, dating from this time. Predating the Babylonian by about 2,000 years was Noah, who lived in Fara, 100 miles south-east of Babylon (from Bab-ili, meaning "Gate of God"). The early Assyrians, some of the earliest people there, were known to be warriors, so the first wars were fought there, and the land has been full of wars ever since. The Assyrians were in the northern part of Mesopotamia and the Babylonians more in the middle and southern part.

Cultural Heritage and Monuments Between April 12 and 15, 2003, the Iraq Museum in Baghdad was looted, and many of the most important objects in the collection were stolen. Among them were the famous monumental Uruk Vase of 3300 BC, that appears in every art survey textbook and is one of the earliest narrative works of art, and the beautifully carved marble female head, perhaps representing the great Sumerian goddess Inanna, also from the sacred precinct at Uruk in southern Iraq and of the same period. Thousands of works of Mesopotamian and Islamic art and artifacts were stolen from the Iraq Museum, but that is not all: in the days before and after, the majority of other museums and libraries in the country were also looted, burnt, and destroyed. For thinking people

Heritage and Culture

207

all over the world, this was a great tragedy. For the people of Iraq, however, it was more than that. It was the theft and destruction of their history, a history that forms the basis of their identity as the people of this very ancient land. In pre-war news reports on Iraq we could read or hear descriptions of this country as a desert, a place poor in culture, if rich in oil reserves. But Iraq is also the land that archaeologists refer to by the Greek name of Mesopotamia: the land between two rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, and the home of one of the world's oldest civilizations. Paradoxically, ancient Mesopotamia is taken to be the past of mankind and even as the place of origin of Western civilization. So, if we remember that Mesopotamia is in fact the name given to the place we now call Iraq, then we should consider this: the ancient history of Iraq has traditionally been claimed as the history of the West, since according to the nineteenth-century model of the progress of civilization, the torch was passed from Mesopotamia and Egypt to Greece and Rome, and subsequently to the Western world. Sites such as Abraham's city of Ur, the Garden of Eden, Babylon, and Nineveh are, thus, the cultural heritage of the world. Many of these sites are indeed of particular interest to the Western world, since it derived certain aspects of its own culture from ancient Iraq, but all are valued and well loved by the people of Iraq, regardless of their significance for the world. The Iraqi people, who live their entire lives surroun ded by monuments and ancient sites, identify their land through these familiar landmarks. This is an aspect of Iraqi cultural patrimony fhat is not often addressed. A destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq is, thus, not simply a misfortune for global cultural heritage, but also a tragic loss for the people of Iraq. The reason that international laws on cultural heritage (such as the Hague Convention) exist is precisely becaus e people's sense of communal identity is defined in relation to a shared culture and history. In Iraq, the ancient monuments and thousa nds of archaeological sites are such a major part of the terrain that, for an Iraqi, a conception of the land without them is simply impossible. Families go for day trips and picnics to sites like the Parthian city of Hatra, a wonderful and magical place that dates to the second century BC, a city where Mesopotamian gods were worshipped

208

Iraq

alongside Greeco-Roman deities and where the architecture is a fabulous mixture of Assyrian and Roman forms. The pre-Islamic capitals of Ctesiphon and Babylon are also popular tourist destinations for all. Young children are taken on school trips to these ancient cities and to the local museum collections: the medieval Islamic city of Baghdad, founded in 762 AD, was consciously modelled upon these earlier, legendary capitals. Some ancient sites are simply part of daily life. The walls of cities, such as the Nineveh of biblical fame, can be seen everyday by the local people as they go about their daily lives. Rock reliefs carved by the sculptors of the Assyrian kings mark the terrain across the northern Iraqi countryside. While ancient sites in Iraq are the local cultural patrimony, there are moments of Iraq's past that were certainly events of world-historical significance. The first of these is the Uruk phenomenon of the fourth millennium BC This phenom enon can be described as the first cultural revolution, comprising the development of the first cities, the first monumental architecture, and, perhaps most important, the invention of writing. The second significant world event in the history of Iraq is the period of the Islamic rule of the Abbasid dynasty, between the eighth and tenth centuries AD. This was when Baghdad became the centre of the development of the arts and sciences, the place in which the Greek texts of classical antiquity were preserved through translations and copies. It was in the universities of Baghdad, under the patronage of the Abbasid kings, that mathematics, astronomy, physics, and medicine developed. This period of scholarly achievement was at its height in the eighth to the tenth centuries, but Baghd ad continued as the centre of scholarship, at least until it fell to the Mongol invasion of Hulagu Khan in 1258 AD. Both the Uruk and the Abbasid periods are truly remarkable because the innovations that took place in Iraq at those times influenced the state of knowledge and views of reality well beyond the narrow geographical region of the Tigris-Euphrates river valleys. In both periods, intellectual innovations in this land had long-term effects on the development of scholarship and world views throughout what we now call the Middle East, North Africa, and a large part of Europe, as well as, to a certain extent, southern Asia. These moments are, thus, comparable to turning points in world history such as the Italian

Heritage and Culture

209

Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution, all of which had significance well beyond the local, all of which became part of world history. Yet, we should not forget that cultural heritage and monuments, despite their significance to the world, are a powerful basis of local histories and identities. Historical artifacts, works of art, and monuments are the agents of memory and even of a sense of self. Their loss is psychologically devastating well beyond the loss that is calculated at the market value of antiquities. All New Yorkers can understand this sense of loss, since many of them still mourn the missing World Trade Centre structures themselves. While their destruction was certainly an event of world significance and people everywhere saw it as a tragedy, New Yorkers felt it in a different way, not only because they lost friends and fellow citizens, but because the towers were part of the horizon of their daily lives, part of the identity of their city. It was exactly this power of monuments and their relationship to a sense of local identity that the Mesopotamians seem to have understood very well. Many works of sculpture exemplify this ancient Mesopotamian understanding of the importance of the place of memory and identity in works of art and monuments. During the second half of the third millennium BC, an unparalleled number of images of the human figure in the form of sculpture in the round were produced in southern Mesopotamia at places such as Lagash and Ur. These statues are generally images in two-dimensional narrative art, whether political or religious, and they are also unlike images of deities or super-natural beings known primarily from the glyptic arts. Above all, what sets these statues apart is not so much the medium of sculpture in the round as their function: they are images of real, historical people who lived in antiquity and were represented in an image. The fact that these are statues of individuals places them in a genre of sculpture that is categorised in art-historical terms as portraiture. But using this descriptive term "portrait" immediately brings up a number of concerns. In the standard Western division of genres, mimetic resemblance is the first criterion of portraiture. The images from Mesopotamia representing historical individuals are indeed portraits because they represent the person in an image, even if they do not mimetically imitate the features of the person.

210

Iraq

The Mesopotamian portrait is actually linked to the person represented in much closer ways than the later tradition of external resemblance or approximation with which we are most familiar. In terms of function, it has long been known that such statuary represented the individual as a worshipper and was to be placed in a temple. A number of these images, both male and female, have been discovered in Situ, in temples. Numerous others bear inscriptions that dedicate them to specific deities for the life of the patron, the patron's family, and sometimes also for the life of the ruler. The two statues here are fine examples of the type. A Sumerian inscription on the back of the basalt statue from the Iraq Museum tells us that it represents a man called Dudu, a high priest and scribe of Urnanshe, the ruler of Lagash about 2400 BC. The statue was placed in the Temple of Ningirsu at Girsu, Telloh, in order to represent Dudu continuously in front of the deity. Its compact, blocky style of carving seems to emphasise durability. Here is a work of art in which style and function are closely linked, since the statue represented Dudu for all time and thus needed to convey durability. Another statue (stolen from the Iraq Museum in April) is a diorite statue from Ur that represents Enmetena, the ruler of Lagash, Tell ai-Hi ba, about 2350 BC. The statue bears an inscription on the back and on the right shoulder dedicating the image of Enmetena to the god Enlil. The inscription tells us about Enmetena's lineage and how the gods favour his rule. It also tells us of his many accomplishments and pious acts, the many temples that he had build for the gods. The end of the inscription reads: "At that time, Enmetena fashioned his statue, named it 'Enmetena whom Enlilloves,' and set it up before Enlil in the temple. Enmetena who built the Eadda, may his personal god Shulutul forever pray to Enlil for the life of Enmetena." These portraits were thus substitutes of sorts. They stood in the place of the person represented and could function as a very real form of presence of that person. They were, therefore, linked to the person in ways much closer than our notion of portrait, since an essence of the person continupd to exist in the image, a fact demonstrated in numerous ancient texts through which we can see that for the Mesopotamians an image had agency and was therefore a powerful object.

Heritage and Culture

211

With the Akkadian period it becomes clearer that portraits, as well as large-scale monuments such as stelae, were imbued with agency. The famous copper head of an Akkadian ruler, perhaps Naramsin, who ruled the entirety of Mesopotamia in 2254-2218 BC, is a fine example of this type and fortunately has survived the looting. It is life-size and hollow-cast in the lost-wax method, a technique that would be used by the ancient Greeks almost two thousand years later. The head was part of an entire statue that was most likely made of various materials. It is sensitively modelled to portray the aquiline nose and almond-shaped eyes of the king. The long, braided hair and curling beard are depicted as decorative and orderly patterns of luxurious excess indicating his ideal beauty and virility. The eyes themselves were originally inlaid with another material, which has unfortunately been lost. The head was found in Nineveh in northern Iraq and seems to have suffered an attack. The eyes, ears, and bridge of the nose all seem to have been deliberately attacked in antiquity, most likely during some ancient battle, and done deliberately in order to annihilate the agency that was thought to inhere in the Akkadian king's image. Both the monuments and the images of kings suffered similar fates in wars throughout antiquity. This treatment of images occurred because the ancient Mesopotamians saw images and monuments as social agents, as an index linked to the real essence of the person represented. In this case it is the king, and therefore the image is linked to the land itself. Its loss would have dire consequences for all the land, just as it is recorded that the loss of cult statues during wars indicated defeat and destruction for the city from which they were taken. Many of the Mesopotamian works of art that now reside in museum collections took on a totemic power through the millennia, and their destruction or loss was considered to have terrible and negative consequences for the country. The loss of the objects from Iraqi museums and libraries today would have been understood by the ancients as a sign of destruction of local identity; in their own cultural and historical contexts, the artifacts would have been considered social agents of cultural memory. So it is perhaps not an irony, but rather a profound understanding of the relation of artifacts and memory, that so many aspects of what we in the third millennium AD, consider to be our own civilized lives

212

Iraq

and way~ of thinking, in fact, originated in the third millennium BC, in Mesopotamia. Although in Iraq to date UNESCO has acknowledged only one World Heritage Site (Hatra), this is perhaps because the whole country should be so designated. Iraq is often described as the cradle of civilization, and the country is thickly dotted with the remains of thousands of villages, towns and cities. In 1990, the hostilities affected a number of archaeological sites. Rocket or shellfire damaged the brickwork of the Ziggurat at Ur (constructed in 2100 BC and restored around 550 BC). American troops were probably also responsible for minor looting at the site of Ur itself. Cracks appeared in the arch at Ctesiphon (Taq Kisra, dating to the 4th century AD and until last century the largest single span vault in the world). Bombing destroyed traditional houses on the citadel at Kirkuk. In a ground confrontation the greatest danger to archaeological sites is posed by the fact that their mounds, which can be 30m high and extend over kilometres are often the only raised features on the southern alluvial plain, and therefore liable to be adopted by combatants for various purposes. With modern machinery an entire 6000-year-old village can be recycled into a defensive earthwork in a day or two, and even old-fashioned trenches, which were much used in the last hostilities, can do irreparable damage to sites of paramount interest. Since the foreign troops did not significantly penetrate the inhabited sector of the southern Iraqi plain, the only example known to us is at Tell al-Lahm south of Ur, where American bulldozers did extensive damage. Another example of what can happen is prOVided by the ancient city of Der, modern Tell Aqar, which was converted into a military emplacement by the Iraqi army during the Iraq-Iran war. The trenching cut through the 4500-year old main temple uncovering unique statues and completely destroying their architectural context. A further risk is that archaeological trenches may be mistaken from the air for military emplacements. We do not have documented instances of this happening in 1990, but again in the 1980's the excavated site of Godin Tepe in western Iran was attacked from the air causing considerable damage to the 5000-year-old excavated remains.

Heritage and Culture

213

However, the chief potential casualty from modern explosives is standing architecture. One of the surviving ancient churches of Mosul (10th century) was partly destroyed in 1990. There are others equally old and at risk, not to mention a number of monasteries in the district some of which date back to the 4th Century AD. The minarets of the medieval mosques of Mosul and other cities are structurally very vulnerable, but entire mosques are of course at risk. Quite apart from the architectural and historical value of such structures, in Iraq the destruction of places of worship has been viewed with particular abhorrence since at least 2400 BC, and should be avoided with the utmost care. Iraq's few surviving old bridges must be imperiled, as must the few medieval and earlier forts, being self-evidently military structures. Unlike Egypt, Iraq does not have many standing monuments in stone, the principal example being the Parthian city of Hatra, but several ancient capital cities have been excavated with their palaces and temples uncovered, in Assyria with sculptured relief's lining the walls (especially at Nineveh [KouyunjikJ and Nimrud). Last, but not least, there are the museums. In 1990, the portable contents of the Iraq Museum in Baghdad were transferred to another site, from where they have since been returned; we do not know if similar measures have been taken this time, although they have reportedly in Mosul. The destruction of the Iraq Museum would be an appalling loss to the world. The majority of all archaeological finds, made in the country since its foundation in 1920, are stored there. As well as individual items of stunning beauty and importance from successive civilizations (Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Islamic), it shelters huge archives of cuneiform documents, many still unpublished, excavated by Iraqi and foreign expeditions: these include the earliest written archives in the world from Uruk, Sumerian literary texts from the schools of ancient Mesopotamia from 2500 down to 1600 BC, and the 4th century BC temple library of Sippar. There are also museums in most.of the Governorates, stocked with representative but still extremely valuable exhibits selected from the central collections in Baghdad. In 1990-91, several of these were looted in the aftermath of the withdrawal from Kuwait. Chests of manuscripts were recovered scattered across a hillside near Kirkuk.

214

Iraq

Finds in the Dohuk Museum were ground underfoot, and extremely few of the 4000 lost pieces have been identified on the world's art markets. The contents of the Nasiriyyah Museum were rescued by the courageous action of its woman Director who defied looters at the front door while a lorry was loaded at the back. We cite these instances to illustrate the danger, which attends the breakdown of law and order, which can so easily result from military action. Since the spring of 2003, when front pages all over the world were filled with alarming images of the looting of the Iraq National Museum, in Baghdad, relatively little has been heard about the aftermath of that event, although a limited number of items have, in fact, been recovered, leaving some 10,000 to 14,000 objects missing. Even less has been heard about the fate of the more than 10,000 historic and archaeological sites in Iraq that remain vulnerable to the same threats of war, looting and neglect. Although conflict and political uncertainty still characterise daily life in Iraq, important measures are being taken within the country to rebuild many of the institutions that anchor a civil societyincluding those concerned with education, commerce and cultural heritage. Iraqis unquestionably, face formidable challenges on a daily basis, but some significant advances have been made in stemming further loss of their cultural heritage. Equally true, and also frustrating, is the fact that much that needs to be done cannot be done until stability is restored. In the wake of the looting of the museum, a number of countries (some through UNESCO) have helped to refurbish the building, install new security systems conservation laboratories, and train lab technicians and conservators. The challenges facing archaeological and other historic sites are even more complex, given their remote and dispersed locations. Most of these sites are not safe to visit and have no guardians. Looting, now often carried out by bands of armed professionals, has caused irreparable damage to many archaeological sites and has scattered objects not seen in centuries among smugglers and collectors around the world. The areas most at risk include the Dhi Qar, Qadisyah and al-Muthanna provinces, which are south of Baghdad, between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and are part of the "fertile crescent." This region, wh:ch lay at the heart of ancient Sumerian and Babylonian

Heritage and Culture

215

civilizations, has suffered greatly at the hands of looters. In Nippur, for example, which was one of the most important sites in ancient Mesopotamia, many cuneiform tablets-including a copy of the Gilgamesh epic-are missing. In the province of Dhi Qar, however, a police force of 204 officers has begun patrols, and looting in the region has sharply decreased. Unfortunately, the looters are moving on to other provinces that are not as heavily patrolled but are just as significant. Another 1,500 patrol officers are currently being deployed in those areas. We continue to work to expand the police force and are even encouraging graduates of archaeology programmes to join the effort. In addition, at sites where it is possible to have guards, we plan to provide them with communication equipment when the funds can be raised, so that they can, at the least, alert the police when they see looters coming. The conflict itself, and the military installations that go along with it, are also threatening cultural-heritage sites. In Najaf and Mosul, particularly, historic buildings have been damaged in combat, as has the Mosul Museum, home to important objects from such nearby sites as the World Heritage Site of Hatra (This museum was also subjected to looting. Among the objects stolen from it are 30 bronze panels from the ninth-century BC Assyrian city of Balawat.). An ammunition depot that was constructed under Saddam Hussein's regime in the region of Hatra is now subject to controlled explosions that are damaging important buildings of the Hellenistic, Roman and Arab civilizations. One of the most important developments to have taken place since the looting of the museums has been the establishment, in spring 2003, of two significant relationships between the SBAH and international institutions, in order to develop both short-and long-term strategies for the preservation and stewardship of Iraq's cultural-heritage sites. Long-term planning efforts for the protection of historic sites are being undertaken with private-sector support from the Getty Conservation Institute in Los Angeles and the World Monuments Fund in New York, through the GCI-WMF Iraq Cultural Heritage Initiative. This partnership was established with seed funding from the J.M. Kaplan Fund and with further support from the National

216

Iraq

Endowment for the Humanities and UNESCO. In addition to supplying a diversity of hands-on support, the initiative attempts to stem the tide of looting by raising public awareness of it. The Iraq Cultural Heritage Initiative provides equipment, technology and methodologies for assessing and inventorying cultural 'Sites. It includes the creation of a National Cultural Heritage Information System and Database that will allow us to collect and organise information about the condition of, and threats to, the sites and monuments in Iraq. This will be essential for planning any future activity at these sites, whether for conservation, protection or research. This system was modelled after one now being used in Jordan, and it will help the SBAH to better assess the risks that Iraqi sites face, set priorities for intervention, plan for preventive conservation strategies, coordinate reconstruction efforts with other agencies, avoid further damage to the sites and organise international support for on-site restoration and preservation projects. Sixteen of our employees have just completed a month-long training programme in the use of this database organised by the GCI and WMF. It included training in the use of the software and the technical equipment proVided by UNESCO, as well as in the methodology of site documentation and assessment. The initiative has completed an on-the-ground project in Nineveh: When Sennacherib's palace was looted, and the roof stolen, protective roofing was reinstalled thanks to a grant from the initiative. We will continue our work in the museums and our efforts to strengthen our ability to protect historic sites, including our cooperation with international institutions and colleagues. While on-site work cannot take place until security improves, the assessment of the situation at Babylon is, nonetheless, a priority. Unlike many Arab countries, in a particularly similar manner to Iran (Persia), Iraq's neighbouring country, it embraces and celebrates the achievements of its past in pre-Islamic times. One of the great achievements of Ancient Mesopotamia, is, what seems like an ancient battery. Some archaeologists recently discovered a pot that could produce a couple of watts of electricity. Modem science only reached that stage recently. In the 8th century and 9th century, the Islamic Abbasid Caliphs presided over what was then the world's leading civilization, rich in science, art and literature.

Heritage and Culture

217

In the most recent millennium, what is now Iraq has been made up of five cultural areas: Kurdish in the north centred on Arbil; Sunni Islamic Arabs in the centre around Baghdad; Shia Islamic Arabs in the south centred on Basra; the Assyrians, who are a Christian people, living in various cities in the North; and the Marsh Arabs, a nomadic peoples, who live on the marshlands of the central river.

Customs and Rituals Gilgamesh Epic, an important Middle Eastern literary work, written in cuneiform on 12 clay tablets about 2000 BC This heroic poem is named after its hero, Gilgamesh, a Babylonian king who ruled the city of Uruk, known in the Bible as Erech (now AI-Warka', Iraq). According to the myth, the gods respond to the prayers of the oppressed citizenry of Uruk and send a wild, brutish man, Enkidu, to challenge Gilgamesh to a wrestling match. When the contest ends with neither as a clear victor, Gilgamesh and Enkidu become close friends. They journey together and share many adventures. Accounts of their heroism and bravery in slaying dangerous beasts spread to many lands. When the two travellers return to Uruk, Ish tar (guardian deity of the city) proclaims her love for the heroic Gilgamesh. When he rejects her, she sends the Bull of Heaven to destroy the city. Gilgamesh and Enkidu kill the bull, and, as punishment for his participation, the gods doom Enkidu to die. After Enkidu's death, Gilgamesh seeks out the wise man Utnapishtim to learn the secret of immortality. The sage recounts to Gilgamesh a story of a great flood (the details of which are so remarkably similar to later biblical accounts of the flood that scholars have taken great interest in this story). After much hesitation, Utnapishtim reveals to Gilgamesh that a plant bestowing eternal youth is in the sea. Gilgamesh dives into the water and finds the plant but later loses it to a serpent and, disconsolate, returns to Uruk to end his days. This saga was widely studied and translated in ancient times. /< Biblical writers appear to have modelled their account of the friendship of David and Jonathan on the relationship between Gilgamesh and Enkidu. Numerous Greek writers also incorporated elements found

218

Iraq

in the Gilgamesh epic into their dragon-slaying epics and into stories concerning the close bond between Achilles and Patroclus. The longest Babylonian epic poems are the Creation Epic and the Gilgamesh Epic. The former, consisting of seven tablets, deals with the struggle between cosmic order and primeval chaos. The secular Gilgamesh Epic, written about 2000 BC on 12 cuneiform tablets, concerns the hero's fruitless search for immortality. Masterfully woven together from an older series of separate Sumerian tales, this epic poem had great popular appeal in antiquity. It is of interest to modem biblical scholars because of its reference to a Noah-Iike character who survived a great flood. The Epic of Zu tells of the theft of the Tablets of Destiny from the gods by the evil bird Zu and of their recovery by the warrior god Ninurta. The search for the "plant of birth" by the shepherd Etana, who ultimately founded the first dynasty after the deluge, is related in the Epic of Etana. Among other Babylonian epics and myths are The Descent of Ishtar to the Nether World; Atrahasis, which deals with human sin and its punishment through plagues and the deluge; and Nergal and Ereshkigal, concerning the marriage of the divinities who ruled the netherworld. Other important works are The Babylonian Theodicy, a poetic dialogue about a Job-like "righteous sufferer"; a satirical dialogue, The Master and His Obliging Servant; and a recently discovered folktale, The Poor Man of Nippur, which seems to be the ancestor of one of the stories in the Arabian Nights. Among significant historical romances in poetic form are, The Cuthaean Legend, concerning the defeat of King Naram-Sin (reigned about 2255-2218 BC) of Akkad; The King of Battle, dealing with a military expedition to Anatolia led by Sargon I (reigned about 2335-2279 BC) of Akkad; and The Epic of Tukulti-Ninurta, describing the defeat of the Babylonians by the Assyrians. Each of the important deities had, in one or more of the Babylonian cities, a large temple in which he or she was worshipped as the divine civic ruler and protector. The larger cities also contained many temples and chapels dedicated to one deity or another; Babylon, for example, possessed more than 50 temples in Chaldean times (8th to 6th century BC). Temple services were generally conducted in open courts containing fountains for ablution 'lnd altars for sacrifices.

Heritage and Culture

219

The cella, or inner part of the temple, in which the statue of the deity stood on a pedestal in a special niche, was the holy of holies, and only the high priest and other privileged members of the clergy and court were permitted to enter it. In the temple complexes of the larger cities, a ziggurat, or staged tower, was often built, crowned by a small sanctuary, which probably was reserved for the all-important sacredmarriage ceremony celebrated in connection with the new-year festival. The upkeep of the major Babylonian temples required large revenues, which were provided primarily by gifts and endow ments from the court and the wealthy. In the course of the centuries, some of the major Babylonian temples accumulated immense wealth and came into possession of large estates and factories employing large numbers of serfs and slaves. Primarily, however, the temple was the house of the god, in which all the needs of the deity were prOVided for in accord ance with ancien t rites and impressive ceremonies carried out by a vast institutionalised clergy. The latter comprised high priests, sacrifice priests, musicians, singers, magicians, soothsayers, diviners, dream interpreters, astrologers, female devotees, and hierodules (temple slaves). Sacrifices, which were offered daily, consisted of animal and vegetable foods, libations of water, wine, and beer, and the burning of incense. Numer ous annual and monthly festivals were held, including a feast to celebrate the new moon. The most import ant festival of all was the celebration of the New Year at the spring equinox; it was known as the Akitu festival because some of its more esoteric ritual was enacted in the Akitu, Marduk's shrine outside of Babylon. The festival lasted 11 days and included such rites as purification, sacrifice, propitiation, penanc e, and absolution, but it also involved colourful processions. The culmination was probab ly the sacred-marriage ceremony previously mentioned, which took place in the sanctua ry crowning the ziggurat. Babylonian docum ents indicate that the ethical and moral beliefs of the people stressed goodness and truth, law and order, justice and freedom, wisdom and learning, and courage and loyalty. Mercy and compassion were espoused, and special protection was accord ed widows, orphan s, refugees, the poor, and the oppressed. Immoral and unethical acts were considered transgressions against the gods

220

Iraq

and the divine order and were believed to be punished by the gods accordingly. No one was considered to be without sin, and therefore all suffering was held to be deserved. The proper course for Babylonians unhapp y with their condition in life was not to argue and complain but to plead and wail, to lament and confess their inevitable sins and failings before their personal god, who acted as their mediator in the assembly of the great gods. The religioSity of the Babylonians has come to be proverbial, and not unjustifiably so. Nevertheless, religious skepticism existed and may have been more prevalent than sources reveal. One extant literary document known as the Babylonian Theodicy, for example, consists of a debate between a skeptic and a believer in which the latter finds it necessary to conclude with the patent and somewhat unsatisfying argument that the will of the gods is inscrutable. In anothe r Babylonian essay, taking the form of a dialogue between a master and slave, the tone is similarly skeptical and the mood cynical; the relativist view is advanc ed that all human actions can be justified and are therefore fundamentally without meaning, particularly because death makes life itself insignificant. For the Babylonians, death was indeed the consuming dread and a source of great despair. The Babylonians generally believed that at death the disembodied spirit descends to the dark nether world, and that human existence beyond the grave is at best only a dismal, wretched reflection of life on earth. Any hope of an eternal reward for the righteous and deserving was absent; everyone was impartially consigned to the world below. It is not strange that the most popular, dramatic, and creative Babylonian literary work, the Gilgamesh Epic, centres on a vain and pathetic quest for eternal life. We ask all Iraqis to study the history, mythology, religions, and all life aspects of our ancestors and forefathers, The people of the land between the two rivers, since we all, in one way or another, belong and relate to the life and history of the peoples of ancient Iraq, and to understand the stages of development of the cultural, religious, life style, literature, government, habits of our "ancestors who lived and created the most interesting historical tales and civilization, great in the standards of the day, and really mystifying

Heritage and Culture

221

for present scholars and ordinary people alike, as well as it is important for us to understand our roots in the land of the two great rivers and all it's great cities and accomplishments in all fields of humanity... the good and the bad and those in between! Hope you enjoy reading this 5000 years poem!

Wedding Traditions In Mosul, they make the party in the fourth day after marriage. This is usually held in the groom parent's house and the guest are from women only; the invited women should bring gifts for the new couple. Only the bride attend this party while her husband usually awaits in another room of his family house waiting for everyone to leave the house. The bride usually wears a party dress and some time more than one, or she may enter the room with her white dress and then change it after a while. The guests starts to dance and celebrate the new marriage. Most of the marriages are arranged in the traditional way (i.e., not after a love story). When a man sees a woman and he likes her form the first sight he tells his mother about her and his family starts to ask about her family and start to work like a detective and if they match with the groom family socially and economically and in other things they agree about her. His mother goes to the bride house and asks for her hand on his behalf from her mother and gives her all the information about her son and the family, so the bride family will start to do the same thing that the groom's has done but this time, in opposite direction. And if they agree they call the groom's house and ask the groom to come with his mother. Some families let the bride sit with the future groom alone and let them get introduced to each other and talk alone about themselves, if they both agree about each other they will go to the next step and if one of them did not like the other very much they will separate. Also many still prefer the marriage between relatives, like cousins especially in small towns and villages. The first thing to do after the initial agreement is called 'Mashaiya' in which the groom's family bring the older person in their family with a number of relatives and friends all just men and go to the bride's father who also brings all his relatives and friends all men and sit together to get introduced to each other and in this party the older

222

Iraq

person in the groom's side make a speech asking for the bride's hand from her father, the father makes another speech saying yes, then juice and deserts are serviced at once and after they finish, everybody leaves home. This party is very short and almost lasts for an hour only. Then comes the engagement party, in which the bride and the groom exchanged rings, he buys the bride a ring and she buys his ring, the engagement party is made by the bride's family, and usually is attended by close relatives only from both sides, some times if the house is too small only women attend the party beside the groom of cout:Se. There is a limit in the relation between the man and woman in their engagement period. 50 there is another step and this is (tying the knut) this is the exact translation to the Iraqis language where the couple become legally married in court but they still don't get to live together. In this contract the man usually writes her some kind of money or gold which she will take if he divorce her or he dies. This is usually done in court and some families bring the judge to the house of the bride where more traditional ceremonies can take place. For 5unnis the bride wear a white dress or Jallabyia, a tradition Arabic cloth, and in front of her they put seven cups, containing different kinds of white things like sugar, yoghurt, cream, honey, etc. Also they put the holy Quran and a mirror. These are traditions only and the people like to observe them. Usually the judge asks the bride personally if she agrees to marry this man by saying a long traditional speech and he repeats it for thre2 times and then the bride says yes. And then returns to the groom but he asks him only once! For 5hias: the bride wears a white nightgown and they also put in front of her the seven whites besides a big plate with different kind of spices decorated in a very nice way, and they bring a 5hia cleric instead of the judge and while he asks her, two women stand holding a piece of white cloth above her head and a third woman start to sprinkle white sugar above her head to that piece of cloth, her feet are put in water with some dried flowers in it. Then after tying the nut, comes the 'Nishan' which is another party held by the bride family either in their house or a hotel if the house is very small. In this party the groom's family gives the bride

Heritage and Culture

223

jewellery from gold or diamond depending on their wealth and the groom starts to put it on her, while every one dance and sing. Before the wedding day in one night there is also a small party held in the house of the bride and the groom as well separately, he invites his friends (like the bachelor party but with no stripper! some of the men might bring traditional dancers.) and she invites her friends. After all both parties have 'Hinna' to be put on the guests hands. After that comes the wedding party. Some, they don't have a party just Zaffa as we call it, in which the groom's family goes to the bride family bringing with them a music band and start to dance for a bit and then the new couple go to their home or hotel. Some have a big party. There are many other traditions before the wedding and after it. Of course these traditions may differ a little bit according to the social and economic levels and according to beliefs as well but this is the basic thing. Some of the families started to shrink those parties into two or three depending on the security and economic conditions.

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

8 Art and Architecture Iraq is where the Mesopotamia Civilization, that went on to influence the European and Asian civilizations, grew. So as far as culture is concerned, Iraq has a rich heritage. The country is known for its poets and its painters and sculptors are among the best in the Arab world, some of them being world-class. Besides this, Iraq is also known for producing fine handicrafts, including rugs and carpets. The architecture of Iraq is best seen in the sprawling metropolis of Baghdad, where the construction is almost entirely new, with some islands of exquisite old buildings and compounds. More than 4,000 years ago, the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers began to teem with life-first the Sumerian, then the Babylonian, Assyrian, Chaldean, and Persian empires. Here, too, excavations have unearthed evidence of great skill and artistry. From Sumeria have come examples of fine works in marble, diorite, hammered gold, and lapis lazuli. Of the many portraits produced in this area, some of the best are those of Gudea, ruler of Lagash. Some of the portraits are in marble, others, and such as the one in the Louvre in Paris, are cut in gray-black diorite. Dating from about 2400 BC, they have the smooth perfection and idealised features of the classical period in Sumerian art. Sumerian art and architecture was ornate and complex. Clay was the Sumerians' most abundant material. Stone, wood, and metal had to be imported. Art was primarily used for religious purposes. Painting and sculpture was the main median used. The famous votive stone/marble sculptures from

226

Iraq

Tell Asmar represent tall, bearded figures with huge, staring eyes and long, pleated skirts. The tallest figure is about 30 inches in height. He represents the god of vegetation. The next tallest represents a mother goddessmother goddesses were common in many ancient cultures. They were worshipped in the hope that they would bring fertility to women and to crops. (Another connection to African culture.) The next largest figures are priests. The smallest figures are worshippers-a definite hierarchy of size. This is an example of artistic iconography. We learn to read picture symbols-bodies are cylindrical and scarcely differentiated by gender, with their uplifted heads and hands clasped. This is a pose of supplication wanting or waiting for something. Ur yielded much outstanding Sumerian work, e.g., a wooden harp with the head of a bull on top, showing mythological scenes in gold and mosaic inlay on the sound box (c.2650 BC, Univ. of Penn., Philadelphia) . Sumerian techniques and motifs were widely available because of the invention of cuneiform writing before 3,000 BC. This system of writing developed before the last centuries of the 4th millennium BC, in the lower Tigris and Euphrates valley, most likely by the Sumerians. The characters consist of arrangements of wedge-like strokes, generally on clay tablets. The history of the script is strikingly like that of the Egyptian hieroglyphic. Among other Sumerian arts forms were the clay cylinder seals used to mark documents or property. They were highly sophisticated. A detailed drawing was made from tracing a photograph of the temple vase found at Uruk/Warka, dating from approximately 3100 BC. It is over one metre (nearly 4 feet) tall. On the upper tier is a figure of a nude man that may possibly represent the sacrificial king. He approaches the robed queen Inanna. Inanna wears a horned headdress. The Queen of Heaven stands in front of two looped temple poles or "asherah," phallic posts, sacred to the goddess. A group of nude priests bring gifts of baskets of gifts, including, fruits to pay her homage on the lower tier. This vase is now at the Iraq Museum in Baghdad. "The Warka Vase, is the oldest ritual vase in carved stone discovered in ancient Summer and can be dated to round about 3000 BC, or probably 4th-3rd millennium BC. It shows men entering the presence of his

Art and Architecture

227

gods, specifically a cult goddess Innin (Inanna), represented by two bundles of reeds placed side-by-side symbolising the entranc e to a temple. Male statues stand or sit with hands clasped in an attitude of prayer. They are often naked above the waist and wear a woollen skirt curiously woven in a pattern that suggests overlapping petals (commonly described by the Greek word kaunakes, meanin g "thick cloak"). A toga-like garment sometimes covers one shoulder. Men generally wear long hair and a heavy beard, both often trimmed in corrugations and painted black. The eyes and eyebrows are emphasised with coloured inlay. The female coiffure varies considerably but predominantly consists of a heavy coil arrange d vertically from ear to ear and a chignon behind. A headdress of folded linen sometimes conceals the hair. Ritual nakedness is confined to priests. It has been thought that the rarity of stone in Mesopotamia contributed to the primary stylistic distinction between Sumerian and Egyptian sculpture. The Egyptians quarried their own stone in prismatic blocks, and one can see that, even in their freestanding statues, strength of design is attained by the retention of geometric unity. By contrast, in Summer, stone must have been imported from remote sources, often in the form of miscellaneous boulders, the amorph ous character of which seems to have been retained by the statues into which they were transformed. Beyond this general characteristic of Sumerian sculpture, two successive styles have been distinguished in the middle and late subdivisions of the Early Dynastic period. One t very notable group of figures, from Tall al-Asmar, Iraq (ancien Eshnunna), dating from the first of these phases, shows a geometric simplification of forms that, to modern taste, is ingenious and aesthetically acceptable. Statues, characteristic of the second phase on the other hand, though technically more competently carved, show aspirations to naturalism that are sometimes overly ambitious. In this second style, some scholars see evidence of occasional attempts at portraiture. Yet, in spite of minor variations, all these figures adhere to the single formula of presenting the conventional characteristics of Sumerian physiognomy. Their provenance is not confined to the Sumerian cities in the south. An important group of statues is derived

228

Iraq

from the ancient capital of Mari, on the middle Euphrates, where the population is known to have been racially different from the Sumerians. In the Mari statues there also appears to have been no deviation from the sculptural formula; they are distinguished only by technical peculiarities in the carving. Deprived of stone, Sumerian sculptors exploited alternative materials. Fine examples of metal casting have been found, some of them suggesting knowledge of the cire perdue (lost-wax) process, and copper statues more than half life-size are known to have existed. In metalwork, however, the ingenuity of Sumerian artists is perhap s best judged from their contrivance of composite figures. The earliest and one of the finest examples of such figures -and of Sumerian sculpture as a whole- -comes from a Protoliterate level of excavation at Tall al-Warka'. It is the limestone face of a life-size statue (Iraqi Museum, Baghdad), the remainder of which must have been compo sed of other materials; the method of attachment is visible on the surviving face. Devices of this sort were brought to perfection by craftsmen of the Early Dynastic period, the finest examples of whose work are to be seen among the treasures from the royal tombs at Ur: a bull's head decorating a harp, composed of wood or bitumen covered with gold and wearing a lapis lazuli beard (British Museum); A rampan t he-goat in gold and lapis, supported by a golden tree. The composite headdresses of court ladies (British Museum, Iraqi Museum, and University Museum); or, more simply, the miniature figure of a wild ass, cast in electrum (a natural yellow alloy of gold and silver) and mounte d on a bronze rein ring (British Museum). The inlay and enrichment of wooden objects reaches its peak in this period, as may be seen in the so-called standar d or doublesided panel from Ur (British Museum), on which elaborate scenes of peace and war are depicted in a delicate inlay of shell and semi-precious stones. The refinement of craftsmanship in metal is also appare nt in the famous wig-helmet of gold (Iraqi Museum), belonging to a Sumerian prince, and in weapons, implements, and utensils. Relief carving in stone was a medium of expression popula r with the Sumerians and first appears in a rather crude form in Protoliterate times. In the final phase of the Early Dynastic period, its style becam e

Art and Architecture

229

conventional. The most commo n form of relief sculpture was that of stone plaques, 1 foot (30 centimetres) or more square, pierced in the centre for attachment to the walls of a temple, with scenes depicted in several registers (horizontal rows). The subjects usually seem to be commemorative of specific events, such as feasts or building activities, but representation is highly standardised, so that almost identical plaques have been found at sites as much as 500 miles (800 kilometres) apart. Fragments of more ambitious commemorative stele have also been recovered; the Stele of Vultures (Louvre Museum) from Telloh, Iraq (ancient Lagash), is one example. Although it commemorates a military victory, it has a religiOUS content. The most important figure is that of a patron deity, emphasised by its size, rather than that of the king. The formal massing of figures suggests the beginnings of mastery in design, and a formula has been devised for multiplying identical figures, such as chariot horses. In a somew hat different category are the cylinder seals so widely utilised at this time. Used for the same purposes as the more familiar stamp seal and likewise engraved in negative (intaglio), the cylindershaped seal was rolled over wet clay on which it left an impression in relief. Delicately carved with miniature designs on a variety of stones or shell, cylinder seals rank as one of the higher forms of Sumerian art. Prominent among their subjects is the complicated imagery of Sumerian mythology and religious ritual. Still only partially understood, their skilful adapta tion to linear designs can at least be easily appreciated. Some of the finest cylinder seals date from the Protoliterate period. After a slight deterioration in the first Early Dynastic period, when brocade patterns or files of running animals were pre{erred, mythical scenes returned. Conflicts are depicted between wild beasts and protecting demigods or hybrid figures, associated by some scholars with the Sumerian epic of Gilgamesh. The monotony of animat ed motifs is occasionally relieved by the introduction of an inscription The beginnings of monumental architecture in Mesopotamia are usually considered to have been contemporary with the founding of the Sumerian cities and the invention of writing, in about 3100 BC. Conscious attempts at architectural design during this so-called Protoliterate period (c. 3400-c. 2900 BC) are recognisable in the

230

Iraq

construction of religious buildings. There is, however, one temple, at Abu Shahra yn (ancient Eridu) , that is no more than a final rebuilding of a shrine, the original foundation of which dates back to the beginning of the 4th millennium; the continuity of design has been thought by some to confirm the presence of the Sumerians throughout the temple's history. Already, in the Ubaid period (c. 5200-c .3500 BC), this temple anticipated most of the architectural characteristics of the typical Protoliterate Sumerian platform temple. It is built of mud brick on a raised plinth (platform base) of the same material, and its walls are orname nted on their outside surfaces with alternating buttresses (supports) and recesses. Tripartite in form, its long central sanctuary is flanked on two sides by subsidiary chambers, provided with an altar at one end and a freestanding offering table at the other. Typical temples of the Protoliterate period -both the platform type and the type built at ground level-a re, however, much more elaborate both in planning and ornament. Interior wall orname nt often consists of a patterned mosaic of Terra-cotta cones sunk into the wall, their exposed ends dipped in bright colours or sheathe d in bronze. An open hall at the Sumerian city of Uruk (biblical Erech; modern Tall al-Warka, Iraq) contains freestanding and attache d brick columns that have been brilliantly decora ted in this way. Alternatively, the internal-wall faces of a platform temple could be orname nted with mural paintings depicting mythical scenes, such as at Uqair. The two forms of temple -the platform variety and that built at ground level-p ersiste d throughout the early dynasties of Sumerian history (c. 2900-c. 2400 BC). It is known that two of the platform temples originally stood within walled enclosures, oval in shape and containing, in addition to the temple, accommodation for priests. But, the raised shrines themselves are lost, and their appear ance can be judged only from facade ornaments discovered at Tall al-Ubayd. These devices, which were intended to relieve the monoto ny of sun-dried brick or mud plaster, include a huge copper-sheathed lintel, with animal figures modelled partly in the round; woode n columns sheathe d in a patterned mosaic of coloured stone or shell; and bands of copper-sheathed bulls and lions, modelled in relief but with projecting heads. The planning of ground-level temples continued to elaborate

Art and Architecture

231

on a single theme: a rectangular sanctuary, entered on the cross axis, with altar, offering table, and pedestals for votive statuary (statues used for vicarious worship or intercession). Considerably less is known about palaces or other secular buildings at this time. Circular brick columns and austerely simplified facades have been found at Kish (modem Tall al-Uhaimer, Iraq). Flat roofs, supported on palm trunks, must be assumed, although some knowledge of corbelled vaulting (a technique of spanning an opening like an arch by having successive cones of masonry project farther inward as they rise on each side off the gap )-and even of dome construction-is suggested by tombs at Ur, where a little stone was available. The Sumerian temple was a small brick house that the god was supposed to visit periodically. The earliest Sumerians in the valley ornamented it so as to recall the reed houses built. This house, however, was set on a brick platform, which became larger and taller as time progressed until the platform at Ur (built around 2100 BC) was 150 by 200 feet (45 by 60 metres) and 75 feet (23 metres) high. These Mesopotamian temple platforms are called ziggurats, a word derived from the Assyrian ziqquratu, meaning "high". They were symbols in themselves; the ziggurat at Ur was planted with trees to make it represent a mountain. There the god visited Earth, and the priests climbed to its top to worship. Most cities were simple in structure; the ziggurat was one of the world's first great architectural structures.

Preservation of Art and Culture Members of Historians of Islamic Art, an international association of scholars professionally engaged with the art, architecture and history of the Islamic world have written and expressed their outrage and profound concern about the destruction of Iraq's cultural patrimony, art and institutions following the occupation of the country by coalition forces. Much attention has been focused on the extraordinary loss of Sumerian, Akkadian and Assyrian art and antiquities. As scholars who study and research the art and culture of Islamic societies, they would also like to draw attention to the loss and reported destruction of numerous collections of unique documents relating to the cultural

Iraq

232

history of Iraq from the eighth to the twentieth century. In addition to those artifacts lost during the sack of the museums in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, the burning of the National Library and Archives, the Ministry of Religious Endowments, and the looting of major university libraries have led to the destruction and dispersal of unique (and often poorly documented) works of art and manuscript collections. The scale and nature of the loss may never be known for certain. While these losses are now thought to be smaller than Originally estimated, the destroyed collections included early Qurans, historical works, Ottoman archival documents, and unique collections of early printed works and popular literature. Such museum collections and libraries constituted repositories of a knowledge that was both the patrimony of the Iraqi people, and the heritage of all humankind. The eradication of Iraq's cultural infrastructure in a matter of days following the fall of the Baathist regime is a grave and tragic calamity. The events that led to the catastrophe in Iraq constitute a gross dereliction of the duties of an occupying power under the Hague Convention. Moreover, this destruction was not only preventable, it was also predicted. Meetings between American archaeologists and the State Department made it clear that Iraq's cultural patrimony would require protection in the aftermath of a military victory. The effective protection afforded the Ministries of Oil and of the Interior show what might have been achieved had the administration shown the will to act upon such advice. In the light of the universal opprobrium that these events have attracted, the conflicting reports and counter-reports surrounding them, and the recent suggestion of international criminal involvement, members of Historians of Islamic Art called on the House and Senate in the US, and the British Parliament in the UK, to launch a comprehensive investigation into the events of April 2003. In addition to apportioning blame where it is due, such an investigation should also liaise with their Iraqi colleagues with the aim of making practical suggestions as to how to ameliorate this disastrous situation. They further requested that both governments ensure the availability of financial assistance and professional expertise to Iraqi cultural institutions upon request, as they began the process of reconstructing what remained of their patrimony. I

Art and Architecture

233

In the interim, they called on the coalition forces to extend full protection to the shattered remnants of Iraq's cultural institutions, and to ensure that none of the looted material (including books and manuscripts stolen from Iraqi archives and libraries) leaves the country. They called on the American and British administrations to publicly affirm that any institution or individual in Europe or the Unites States buying material shown to have been looted from Iraqi cultural institutions will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, and the material returned to Iraqi custody. While these measures cannot undo completely the damage already done to an ancient cultural heritage, they do amount to a belated assumption of the responsibilities that the US and UK administrations have repeatedly shirked, with such catastrophic consequences for the national patrimony of Iraq. These administrations must demonstrate their commitment to Iraq's restoration by making the preservation of Iraqi art and culture a top priority. The meeting that took place at the British Museum among European, American and Iraqi museum professionals was a positive step toward establishing cooperation and liaisons. The United States and Great Britain should support these important efforts, and provide funds and personnel to Iraqi museum and university colleagues to assist them in recovering and rebuilding their lives and their culture. It is simply not possible to think of the rebuilding of the country of Iraq without the restoration of its artistic and cultural heritage.

Forgotten Era and Modern Art News about the destruction of Iraq's cultural heritage often takes a back seat to reports on political and military issues and information about the wanton destruction, lack of protection, and severe neglect of Iraq's archaeological sites and museum collections. But the destruction of the modern cultural heritage that was a pioneering force in worldwide modernism is a tragedy that should not go unnoticed. Many seem to forget that the cradle of civilization is also the land of a contemporary country with a thriving culture. Since the mid-twentieth century, Iraq hosted important regional and international cultural events, which exhibited many works of art that entered the permanent collection of the Iraqi Museum of Modern Art, formally known as the Saddam Centre for the Arts. Iraqi artists

234

Iraq

once led tha Arab world in successfully forging a modern national style and provided a model for other artists in the region. In addition to Iraqi and other important regional works, the museum also owned works by Pablo Picasso, Joan Miro, and other modern European masters. In the wake of the US-led invasion in 2003, nearly all of the museum's collection was destroyed, looted, or lost. The modern art museum was one of many buildings severely damaged during the US bombing raids over Baghdad. The collection of over seven thousand works of art was viciously looted as the Baath regime collapsed, and as the occupying power failed to provide security to protect Iraq's important cultural institutions. A number of the works were smuggled out of the country, while others are still available on the black market in Baghdad. Many have petitioned the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the US State Department for help in stopping the pillaging of the museums and the recovery of the stolen works of art, but the official position has been to insist on the voluntary return of the stolen works; thus, nothing has been done. Only recently did the new Iraqi government authorise the repossession of works by force with the aid of the recently formed Iraqi police. About 1,300 works have been recovered and are in the custody of the Ministry of Culture. Most of these are severely damaged and are in desperate need of restoration. It is not certain the extent to which the Iraqi government will actively retrieve other stolen works. Luckily, a number of successful inc:lividual efforts were undertaken by concerned Iraqi citizens and are helping to locate, acquire, and protect missing art-works. It is presumed that most of them are still in Iraq; thus, it is possible that with concerted and coordinated efforts most can be recovered. Almost immediately after the looting of museums, some works were purchased personally by Iraqi gallery owners with the publicly stated intention of preserving them until they could be returned to a new Iraqi museum. The renowned Iraqi sculptor Muhammad Ghani has organised a wider and more efficient effort. Returning to Baghdad weeks after the collapse of the former regime, Ghani found the Iraqi Museum of Modern Art in ruins, with mounds of shattered sculptures and broken or empty frames whose canvases had been hastily cut out.

Art and Architecture

235

With the help- of his colleagues and students, he initiated and funded a campaign to buy back some of the stolen works in the neighbourhood near the museum. Ghani contacted the CPA, pleading for financial support and help to continue his endeavour. Failing to secure any aid, he solicited funds from friends, personal acquaintances, and other concerned individuals within the Iraqi community. His plan was simple: his eager students were to locate and purchase the stolen works through word of mouth. The individuals who donated the funds for the effort signed an agreement, retained by Ghani, establishing them as the temporary custodians of the specific works purchased until the museum is re-constituted. In return, these individuals will be publicly acknowledged as donors. He has been able to retrieve a considerable number of works in various conditions, which are currently stored in private Iraqi houses. Ghani's efforts persist, but, unfortunately, the price of stolen works continues to rise while his limited funds are being depleted, making his task slower and much harder to complete. Time is critical: most of the missing works will vanish into private collections, and the history of modern Iraqi art will be lost forever. Many have either been damaged beyond recovery or face the risk of severe damage, due to the lack of a safe, controlled environment. Iraq's infrastructure has been destroyed, and resources are in short supply. During the hot temperatures of summer, most households, businesses, and establishments only had electricity for few hours every day. Recently, Abbas Jawar was appointed the director for the planned new modern art museum. He is operating under the administration of the Institute of National Heritage, but no funds have been allocated to retrieve, restore, or document the works previously held at the museum, or those recovered so far by the government or by individuals. Furthermore, while the museum is a government institution, administered since its inception by the Ministry of Information and Culture, there is talk of converting it into a self-sufficient private institute, eliminating much-needed government funding altogether. There are controversial reasons for the government's abandonment of Iraq's modern art. Art of the last twenty years may be perceived by authorities as problematic because of concern about

236

Iraq

the political identity or patronage of the artist. In other words, the fear is that a policy of "de-Baathification" might determine the value and worth of a work of art.

Massacre of Mesopotamian Archaeology In the southern Iraq desert, the standing structures of ancient archaeological cities dot the horizon-majestic monuments to times long gone. Untouched for thousands of years, historic temples, palaces, tombs and entire dead cities are the sole witness of the passing of time. Properly excavated, these cities could reveal valuable knowledge on the development of the human race and resolve the big mysteries of history. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen. The Sumerian cities have been destroyed, ravaged by the incessant looting that started with the American invasion of Iraq. Once considered historical treasures, today crater-filled landscapes compete for space with hills of shredded pottery and broken bricks. Looters-mainly farmers or jobless Iraqis of all ages-have destroyed the monuments of their own ancestors, erasing their own history in their tireless search for artifacts. They leave their homes and villages seeking financial rewards. Poverty, ignorance and greed force them to change their lives and become tomb raiders and they actually live on the sites, they are robbing for months at a time. A cylinder seal, a sculpture or a cuneiform tablet can bring in desperately sought hard cash. They work all day long hoping to find an artifact that they can sell to the dealer for a mere few dollars. It is tough, dangerous work for bad pay. "A cylinder seal or a cuneiform tablet brings in under $ 50 on the site for the looter from the dealer. The dealer then sells it at ten times the price," explains the archaeologist responsible for the district of Nasiriya, Abdul Amir Hamadani. "More than 100 Sumerian cities haye been destroyed by the looters since the beginning of the war," says Hamadani, who was appointed at the war's end by the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage in Iraq. "It's a disaster that all we are keeping watch on but about which we can do little. We are incapable of stopping the looting. We are five archaeologists, some hundred guards, and, occasionally, a couple of policemen and they are a million armed looters, backed by their tribes and the dealers.

Art and Architecture

237

"We are in danger every time we go on a tour to an archaeological site. A couple of weeks ago, while on site, six vehicles surrounded our cars and we were shot at. After that, we were assured that the next time, we would be killed."

If the looters are just simple peasants, the dealers in stolen antiquities are far more sophisticated. Professional smugglers, they are connected to the shadowy ring that is the international antiquities mafia and black market collectors. There's never a shortage of funds since demand for Mesopotamian artifacts is constantly high-private collectors all around the world adore Sumerian artifacts because they go back to the beginning of civilization and in order to possess such items, they are ready to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars, all of which intensifies the looting. To cover their backs, local dealers buy the protection of the big clans in the nearby city of AI-Fajr who send their own people to plunder the sites. "The tribes are powerful, they are well armed and above all, they abide by their own laws," explains Donny Georges, the Director of the Iraq's museums and an Iraqi archaeologist of Assyrian origin appOinted by the Americans a few months after the looting of the museum. "No one can stop them. Although the Coalition forces are well aware of what is going on, no real effort is being made to stop the looting. The Italian Carabinieri (soldiers) are the only force that worked on this issue for a few months. Their efforts were fruitful in some parts of the Nasiriya district because the tribal leaders there are never interested in confronting the military." Every military force in Iraq has it's own programme of working in the city that they are controlling. Depending on their internal organisation some of them work on humanitarian levels, others on protection and others like the Carabinieri on archaeology. The Carabinieri unit in charge of heritage protection, known as Viper 5, used military backup on the sites to stop the looting at the beginning of this year. With the help of helicopter flyovers and foot patrol raids on the archaeological sites once or twice a week, they were able to capture and imprison many looters, but in doing so also

Iraq

238

terrorised the local population. The illegal digging stopped as a result, but only for a few months. The military conflict between the A1-Mahdi army, the local Shia militia loyal to firebrand cleric Moqtada A1-Sadr, and the Coalition Forces hit this protection scheme hard. "On one hand, it forced the Viper 5 team to reduce their excursions to the archaeological sites to occasional trips, and on the other, it pushed the looters to join the A1-Mahdi army," assures Hamadani. It's no longer a question of looters versus protectors; this is a war with heavy political dimensions. The turn of events caused the Carabinieri to withdraw from a protection assignment. ''At the time, it was like a pleasant dream sequence in a long nightmare," says Hamadani, "The looters did not join the A1-Mahdi army because they believe in fighting the Occupation, it's more about personal vendetta. Now they were able to intensify their activities. There were no Italian forces at the Nasiriya Museum when the library was set ablaze. The smugglers are now controlling life in this district and nothing is stopping them from looting." "These people have no respect for anything, not even their own religion," claims Georges. "They stole the treasures of the Imam A1i in Najaf. No one really knows what was there but it is widely believed that those were the treasures of the Islamic Sultans. People have been donating their most precious objects to the Mausoleum since the birth of Islam. All that is vanished today." According to sources inside and outside Iraq close to the smugglers, the local ringleaders are members of the old regime and are known to archaeologists, police, Interpol, private collectors and antiquities dealers. They work out of Baghdad and other big cities in Iraq; they secure the cash flow to the looters, and are capable of smuggling anything outside the country. There seems to be no end in sight to this horrific scenario. The coalition military forces are now causing irreparable damage themselves: they have transformed the historical city of Babylon in southern Iraq into a military base, despite promises from former US overseer of Iraq Paul Bremer in late June to dismantle the base. "They have levelled archaeological grounds in parts of the

Art and Architecture

239

site to build a landing zone for helicopters," says Zainab Bahrani, professor of Ancient Near Eastern art history and archaeology at Columbia University, who recently returned to New York City from a six-month observer mission in Iraq having been appointed by the Coalition Forces Senior Advisor for Culture. "The continuous movements of helicopters have caused the destruction of a wall at the temple of Nabu, and the roof of the Temple of Ninmah. Both date back to the sixth century BC." Bahrani says. The military base at Babylon has still not been removed. According to an archaeologist working with the Americans at the World Heritage Site of Hatra, Northern Iraq, who did not want to be named, the danger is no less there than in Babylon. The US Army programme to destroy military leftovers from the old regime and the war is harming the ancient site-a Parthian city with a blend of Hellenistic, Roman and Arab styles. Twice a day, the army conducts controlled explosions of recovered munitions and mines at the nearby military base. The constant seismic activity is damaging the stone arches in the main temple and the outer wall of the city and this may cause the collapse of parts of this site, listed as a World Heritage monument.

Contemporary Architecture The regaining of tradition is as crucial in Iraq as it is in Egypt; both are important centres in the Arab world and cradles of Western civilization. The contemporary situation of architecture in Iraq is as significant as the architecture in Egypt, and many parts of the Arab world have been influenced by leading Iraqi architects such as Muhammad Saleh Makiya, Rifat Chadirji, Basil al-Bayati, and Maath al-Alousi. Iraq has been unique in its revitalisation of one of the oldest traditions in architecture into a contemporary form. In a book about his father's work, Kanan Makiya quotes T. S. Eliot on the meaning of tradition: "Tradition cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. It involves, in the first place, the historical sense, which we may call nearly indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth year; and the historical

240

Iraq

sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence." For its architectural quality and its revival of tradition, the work of Muhammad Saleh Makiya stands as a prototype for Iraq and for new developments in the third world in general. Like Hasan Fathy in Egypt, Makiya analysed Iraq's past in his architectural work, in his role as an influential teacher, and in his scholarly publications. His ideas can be found in his writings: The Arab Village, sponsored by UNESCO and published in Cairo in 1951, and The Architecture of Baghdad, published in 1969 with the assistance of the Gulbenkian Foundation. In both books the fundamental insights that he established led to a reappraisal of the Iraqi architectural past. In contrast to the concepts of the international style, the style of modern Western architecture, Makiya proposed a new beginning for architecture in harmony with the spiritual and cultural identity of the Iraqi people and their unique tradition. The elements of the past are not seen as mere forms or ornaments but rather as elements and functions of space and the local climate conditions. The Kuwait State Mosque (1977-1981) is a step further in the consolidation of a building type from the past for contemporary use. At a cost of 13 million Kuwaiti dinars, 130 times the cost of the Khulafa Mosque, in Baghdad, this very large building accommodates 7000 people. Makiya designed several additional mosques for Islamabad (1970), Bahrein (1973), and Muscat (1997), but his most important work in this category is the 1983 design for the Baghdad State Mosque. The design was part of a competition that included invited architects such as Robert Venturi, Ricardo Bofill, Rasem Badran, and Maath al-Alousi. This very ambitious project was to accommodate 30,000 worshippers and included a school, a library, guest houses and residences. Makiya's proposal created a grandiose complex in a rectangular space with a monumental minaret and a dome that was supposed to be the dominant element of the neighbourhood. It was to be located in the central area of the round city of Al-Mansour. It was, for Makiya, a synthesis of earlier elements now orchestrated into a monumental ensemble. As his son Kanan Makiya interpreted the design, its "monumentality is deeply rooted in the architecture, not attached to it from the outside as a consequence of the brief, the type of client

Art and Architecture

241

or througn'simple-minded bigness." He legitimately compares the unbuilt design for the Baghdad State Mosque with the great examples of the mosques of the region, specifically the mosques at Samara and Ibn Tulun in Cairo, the culmination of the old tradition. The fact that a contemporary project can stand such a comparison is unique as it demonstrates the very different and yet unrecognised status of a non-Western architecture of high quality.

As was stated before, the ability of an architect is manifested not by a few singular buildings but in the many problems that await contemporary solutions. Makiya is in line with a few modern architects who are engaged in a wide variety of difficult tasks. Besides his religious buildings, Makiya has designed a number of educational structures. In 1965, he worked out a plan for Baghdad University; in 1966, he designed the Theology College in Baghdad, in close proximity to the existing buildings of Baghdad University; and in the 1967 plan for Al-Kufa University, he envisioned a new campus for 20,000 students in a shape that harmonises with the old Iraqi tradition. In 1981, Makiya designed the complex of Rasheed University in Iraq in collaboration with the German firm of Heinle, Wischer & Partners. And in a recent project for Al-Ain University of the United Arab Emirates, Makiya further developed his scheme, replicating and adapting the old plan of the city of Arbil for contemporary academic purposes. Since 1966, Makiya's activities have expanded beyond the borders of his country, where he executed a large number of commercial and residential buildings that include bank buildings in Basra and Mosul (both 1966) and Karbala and Al-Kufa (both in 1968). In open reference to old Iraqi historic building elements, these banks apply motif!) that relate to tradition, such as window setbacks in the Rafidain branch in Al-Kufa and the blue tile exterior walls on the Rafidain branch in Karbala. The Al-Kufa building was heavily damaged in the Gulf War, and the one in Karbala was completely demolished. In expanding his work to Bahrain and Oman, Makiya was able to realise a large number of buildings; among them are the Sheikh Mubarek Building in Bahrein (1973), the Entrance Arch and the Centre for the Handicapped of Isa Town in Bahrain (1973), the International Hilton

242

Iraq

Hotel, a garage and houses in Dubai (1974), the Al-Andalous housing complex in Doha, Qatar (1983), and the Police Officers Club interior design in Abu Dhabi (1982-1986). Among his most important projects in recent years are the headquarters of the League of Arab States in Tunis (1983), the headquarters for the Regional Arab Organisations in Kuwait (1982-1987), and the ceremonial grounds in Tikrit (1984), all three significant for the emerging symbolism of Arab architecture in different manifestations. The headquarters building in Kuwait searched for forms in which the unity of Arab states could be visualised. In the headquarters of the Arab League, this language is further developed and successfully articulated. Originally planned for Baghdad and later for Tunis, it calls for a contemporary structure in which both official political management and the imagery of Arab identity was expressed. In the ceremonial parade grounds in Tikrit, the birthplace of Saddam Hussein, a political involvement of a different kind was expected. For this questionable task, Makiya proposed a monumental open area in which the architectural details recall comparable traditional structures. Even though Kanan Makiya was intensely at odds with the political regime of Saddam Hussein, he could not help being impressed by the "breathtakingly beautiful and virtually timeless architecture, an architecture that is rooted in Mesopotamian traditions going back at least 4,000 years and yet has somehow become modern, even post-modern in feeling.

9 Education The impact of government policies on the class structure and stratification patterns can be imputed from available statistics on education and training as well as employment and wage structures. Owing to the historic emphasis on the expansion of educational facilities, the leaders of the Baath Party and, indeed, much of Iraq's urban middle class were able to move from rural or urban lower-class origins to middle and even top positions in the state apparatus, the public sector, and the society at large. This social history is confirmed in the efforts of the government to generalise opportunities for basic education throughout the country. Between 1976 and 1986, the number of primary-school students increased 30 per cent; female students increased 45 per cent, from 35 to 44 per cent of the total. The number of primary school teachers increased 40 per cent over this period. At the secondary level, the number of students increased by 46 per cent, and the number of female students increased by 55 per cent, from 29 to 36 per cent of the total. Baghdad, which had about 29 per cent of the population, had 26 per cent of the primary students, 27 per cent of the female primary students, and 32 per cent of the secondary students. The government through a centrally organised school system provided education. In the early 1980s, the system included a six-year primary (or elementary) level known as the first level. The second level, also of six years, consisted of an intermediate-secondary and an intermediate-preparatory, each of three years. Graduates of

244

Iraq

these schooHi could enrol in a vocational school, one of the teacher training schools or institutes, or one of the various colleges, universities, or technical institutes. The number of students enrolled in primary and secondary schools was highest in the central region and lowest in the north, although the enrolment of the northern schools was only slightly lower than that of the south. Before the war, the government had made considerable gains in lessening the extreme concentration of primary and secondary educational facilities in the main cities, notably Baghdad. Vocational education, which had been notoriously inadequate in Iraq, received considerable official attention in the 1980s. The number of students in technical fields has increased threefold since 1977, to over 120,090 in 1986. The Baath regime also seemed to have made progress since the late 1960s in redUcing regional disparities, although they were far from eliminated and no doubt were more severe than statistics would suggest. Baghdad, for example, was the home of most educational facilities above the secondary level, since it was the site not only of Baghdad University, which in the academic year 1983-84 (the most recent year for which statistics were available in early 1988) had 34,555 students, but also of the Foundation of Technical Institutes with 34,277 students, Mustansiriya University with 11,686 students, and the University ofTechnologywith 7,384 students. The universities in Basra, Mosul, and Arbil, taken together, enrolled 26 per cent of all students in higher education in the academic year 1983-84. The number of students seeking to pursue higher education in the 1980s increased dramatically. Accordingly, in the mid-1980s the government made plans to expand Salah ad Din University in Arbil in the north and to establish Ar Rasheed University outside Baghdad. Both were designed ultimately to accommodate 50,000 students. In addition, at the end of December 1987, the government announced plans to create four more universities: one in Tikrit in the central area, one each at AI-Kufah and AI-Qadisiyah in the south, and one at AI-Anbar in the west. Details of these universities were not known. With the outbreak of the war, the government faced a difficult dilemma regarding education. Despite the shortage of wartime manpower, the regime was unwilling to tap the pool of available university students, arguing that these young people were Iraq's hope

Education

245

for the future. As of early 1988, therefore, the government routinely exempted students from military service until graduation, a policy it has adhered to rigorously. This policy, however, has likely caused resentment among the poorer classes and those forced to serve multiple tours at the front because of continuing manpower shortages. The education system in Iraq was highly regarded and high performing, and in 1980 had achieved nearly universal primary enrolment. In the early 1980s, public funds began to be Siphoned off for military expenditures and other priorities of the ruling regime. Combined with the politicisation of the education system, which influenced everything from curriculum, teaching, staff, and admission policies, the system went into a steady decline. The looting that followed liberation compounded thirty years of neglect. There are 15,000 school buildings in Iraq and 10,000 of them need repair. Despite the problems of the previous regime, the education system in Iraq has improved since liberation. Most schools were open very soon after liberation and the highly valued national exams were given in June (had they not been given, Iraqi students would have lost an entire academic year). Attendance in academic year 2003-2004 was as high or higher than pre-conflict days. The CPA and a multitude of civilian agencies, military units, and international agencies have coordinated work with the Ministry of Education to train more than 33,000 secondary teachers in modern classroom management and instructional delivery and rehabilitate over 2,000 schools. The Ministry has been reorganised and re-staffed and teachers have received substantial pay raises. Iraq's education system, considered one of the best in the region in the 1980s, has declined dramatically in the last 20 years. An estimated 60 per cent of Iraq's population is now illiterate, and at least 25 per cent of primary school-age children do not go to school, according to World Bank statistics. It is estimated that half of children do not go on to secondary school. In rural areas the numbers are even higher. Up to half of girls never attend school, according to the Ministry of Education (MoE). UNICEF suggests that only 55 per cent of men and only 23 per cent of women can read. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in recent months the number of children being kept at home by their parents has risen dramatically as insecurity and violence plague parts of the country. The MoE

246

Iraq

recently unveiled a policy of freedom of thought and expression, tolerance and national unity in schools after gathering opinions from religious and political leaders from around Iraq. But the ministry still faces pressure from religious conservatives to teach more religion and morals in schools, following the fall of Saddam Hussein. Ministry officials last year removed decades of political teaching and indoctrination required by the former Baath party regime. Officials replaced it with a moderate curriculum that focuses on basic, universally practised religious teachings. According to MoE statistics, there are 14,924 schools in Iraq and 80 per cent of them (11,939) need some sort of repair following the looting when the former regime fell. Some 40 per cent (5,970) need major rehabilitation and 9 per cent (1,343) are in need of demolition or rebuilding. However, the country's schools were never in good condition-in 2002 the UN estimated that half of all school toilet facilities did not meet basic hygienic standards. There are plans for the MoE to build 4,500 schools in the next four years. The ministry asked for US $ 3.2 billion in repair and investment costs at an international donor's conference in Madrid in November 2003. The World Bank has pledged $ 100 million to rewrite and reprint all school textbooks containing references to Saddam Hussein. In addition, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) edited all primary and secondary school maths and science textbooks and distributed 8,759,260 million textbooks in 16 governorates across the country. Some 70 per cent were printed in Iraq and 30 per cent in Jordan. Central Region: In Baghdad, about 1,560 of approximately 1,700 schools have received $ 750 grants for repairs and supplies of their choice from the Baghdad School Teacher/Parent Programme. The money was part of the $ 35 million that USAID allocated in Central Iraq between May 2003 and March 2004. Baghdad University received a multi-million dollar grant from the US-Iraqi higher education and development programme for archaeology and environmental health. It also received a grant for legal education reform. Baghdad's Technology University and al-Anbar University in western Iraq got a chunk of the money to deal with higher education initiatives.

Education

247

Southern Region: USAID invested up to $ 29 million in education-related issues, such as the accelerated learning programme, which involved students from Nasiriyah and Karbala. The US-Iraqi higher education and development programme pledged a $ 20.7 million grant to fund higher education reforms. The University of Babil, the University of Salah ad-Din and Basra University were the beneficiaries of this initiative. Basra University used part of its grant for archaeology and environmental health and for legal education reforms. Northern Region: Students in ad-Diwaniyah and Arbil were involved in the USAID accelerated learning programme. In total, the USAID allocated more than $ 8 million for education projects in the five governorates of the region during the last year. Mosul University received a grant from a US-Iraqi higher education and development programme for archaeology and environmental health. The University of Mosul Hamam al-Alil and the University of Dahuk received a grant for academic, research and extension programmes. Those two universities also received a grant, along with the Nursing Ir.stitute in Dahuk, for public health and sanitation. The University of Sulaymaniyah received money for legal education reform. In general, the USAID funded 5.5 million examinations immediately after the conflict. It awarded 627 grants worth more than $ 6 million to repair schools. More than 2,300 schools were repaired for the 2003/4 school year. In addition, USAID distributed nearly 1.5 million secondary school kits with basic school supplies like pens, pencils and paper. It bought and installed 159,005 student desks, 61,500 chalkboards and 58,100 teacher kits. It also distributed 808,000 primary student kits and 81,735 primary teacher kits. USAID also awarded 25 Fulbright scholarships to students to study in the United States.

Child Education These declarations accompany the first comprehensive study on the condition of schools in post-conflict Iraq conducted by the Ministry of Education with the help of UNICEF. The survey has confirmed that thousands of school facilities lack the basics necessary to provide children with a decent education. Roger Wright added: "Iraq used to have one of the finest school systems in the Middle East. Now we have clear evidence of how far

248

Iraq

the system has deteriorated. Today millions of children in Iraq are attending schools that lack even basic water or sanitation facilities, have crumbling walls, broken windows and leaking roofs. The system is overwhelmed." He commented that the decay is the result of over a decade of neglect and under-funding during the sanctions era, as well as the impact of three wars, starting with the Iran-Iraq war. The survey collected data on students, teachers, and the condition of buildings for every kindergarten, primary, secondary, Yafieen (Alternative), and vocational schools and higher education institutes in the country. In all, the survey covered over 20,000 schools and institutes. The survey reveals that, in this last year, school enrolment surged but also that the facilities available are not near to adequate. There are not enough desks, chairs, or classrooms. Many schools have had to double up, with a quarter of all primary schools in Iraq running two or three shifts per day-meaning reduced classroom time for each shift of students. It also revealed that enrolment of girls was lower than boys in every grade. Overcrowding, insecurity and the lack of water and sanitation facilities in schools are the three main causes of lower enrolment of girls. On a daily basis, teachers, children and their families in Baghdad, and other flash points of conflict and criminality, have to overcome the feai" of bombings, explosions and kidnapping.

Rehabilitation works carried out since March 2003 has only partially reduced these difficulties and, the worsening security situation has now slowed down work on improving education facilities. Wright observed that: "The problem is not just delays in improving school buildings, more importantly, poor security is also holding back improvements in the quality of teaching and learning that is going on inside the classroom." He added that despite difficulties inside Iraq, UNICEF, the Ministry of Education, and many other partners continue to work to rehabilitate schools and conduct trainings to help ensure Iraqi children get the quality education they deserve.

Higher Education While Iraq enjoyed a long and proud tradition of distinguished universities, a sequence of wars and sanctions in recent years have

Education

249

severely damaged the system. After the recent invasion of Iraq by the coalition forces, 84 per cent of the infrastructure in Iraqi higher education institutions has been burnt, looted or severely destroyed in some form; 48 academics have been assassinated and many are under daily threat. Modern universities in Iraq were established in the second half of the last century, beginning with the University of Baghdad in 1957 uniting several constituent colleges in the process. During the 1960s five more universities were established-the University of Technology and the Al-Mustansirya University in Baghdad as well as universities in Basra, Mosul and Sulaymaniah. The further development of higher education in Iraq was characterised by establishment of technical institutes reflecting the considerable demand for qualified technicians created by the flourishing oil industry. During the last 20 years the policy of establishing a university in each governorate responded to both the demands of equity and the growing demand for higher education. Thus, 14 new universities were founded. Iraq's current higher education system comprises 20 universities and 47 technical institutes under the management of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MHESR). This includes 200 colleges, 800 departments, 28 research centres. The Commission for Computers and Informatics offers specialised course for post-graduates. There are, in, addition 10 private colleges offering programmes in computer sciences, business administration, economics and management. The UNESCO survey, 2004 found a total student enrolment of 251175, 42 per cent of whom are women. Almost 50 per cent of the students are enrolled at the 5 universities in Baghdad. Two universities have less than 2000 students while Baghdad University enrols two-thirds of all students. Thus, there is wide range in the size of universities as well as a lack of geographic equity in their distribution across the country. The major fields of study offered by the universities are: education, arts, law, social sciences, administration, economics, natural sciences, engineering and technology, medical sciences, veterinary medicine and agriculture. In the area of education there are 24 colleges preparing teachers for secondary schools, 7 colleges for primary and ki~dergarten school teachers and 7 for physical education. The University of Technology has a specialised college for technical education, training

250

Iraq

teachers for vocational schools and technical institutes. During the period of economic sanctions, the importation of computers was restricted and, therefore, computer related disciplines were offered in a limited number of institutions. Technical Education in Iraq comprises 37 Technical Institutes (58540) and 9 Technical Colleges (7368) with 66 000 students, 22 per cent of whom are female with 2837 teaching staff. There is, at least, one institute in each of the 18 govenorates. Iraqi higher education has a strong orientation towards technical education through the technical institutes which had significant growth after their inception in 1969. This expansion was triggered by the oil boom, which created the need for large numbers of technical workers. Technical Institutes award a Degree while Technical Colleges award a Diploma. These qualifications cover over 60 fields of specialisation in engineering, administration, medical subjects, agriculture and applied arts. The Technical Institutes resort with the Commission for Technical Education under the direction of the MHESR. Of the 19112 academic university teaching staff, 56 per cent are male and 44 per cent female; 43 per cent of the teaching force is concentrated in Baghdad. The average staff student teaching ratio is 1:13 being much more favourable than neighbouring countries such as Jordan (1:30) and Saudi Arabia (1:20). There are, however, extreme variations among Iraqi universities from 1:43 to 1:4. In Iraq, the minimum educational qualification for a teaching post in higher education is a master's degree. However, one-third of the teaching staff lack a masters degree; 28 per cent of the staff has doctorates, 39 per cent masters and 33 per cent bachelors degrees. While in pre-war days, Iraqi scientists were publishing widely in international and regional journals, very few articles were published in the last decade. The larger universities like Basra, Baghdad and Mosul have between 5 and 8 specialised research centres. In addition, there are other specialised research centres-the Polymer Research Centre, Date Palm Research and the Marine Research Centre. The Commission for Computers and Informatics (CCI) and the Commission for Medical Specialisation played an important role in training of research staff and promoting research activities. Socio-political research was conducted at the Gulf Study Centre at Basra University, International Study Centre at Mustansiriya University, Iranian Studies

Education

251

Centre in Basrah and Turkish Studies Centre in Mosul. Archeological research was undertaken in the Iraqi National Museum in Baghdad. The House of Wisdom-Beit Al-Hikma and the Iraqi Academy of Sciences-Majma AI-Hmi ai-Iraqi, two famous institutions focus on the history and academic tradition of the country and region. The teaching overload of academic staff was a serious obstacle to the development of high quality research. There was also limited international cooperation in research. The Iraqi Academy of Sciences, founded in 1948 was a centre for fellows from various disciplines including modern and ancient Middle Eastern languages, history, social and physical sciences. Its main goal was to promote the Arabic language and heritage. Its digital and traditional library was partially looted during the war. Iraqi academics are of the view that the Academy can re-establish itself as one of the leading research centres of the country but urgent interventions are required to rebuild its infrastructure for which a modest $ 825000 is estimated.

Administration and Finance Education in Iraq is state-controlled and highly centralised. The responsibility for deCision-making and supervision of the Iraqi education system is controlled by three authorities: local government educational authorities, which are responsible for kindergarten and primary education; Ministry of Education, which is responsible for secondary education (general, vocational, and teacher training), including curriculum development; and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, which is responsible for the administration of universities and the Foundation of Technical Institutes. Iraq is divided into 15 educational regions, each under a Director General of Education, for the administration of primary and secondary education. Each university and higher education institute has a council, and they are autonomous in a range of professional matters. However, they are financed directly by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, which makes most decisions concerning facilities, admission requirements and the appointment and assignment of staff. The State fully finances all aspects of public education. There are two types of finance: funding from the Ministry of Higher Education

252

Iraq

and Scientific Research and funding which covers private undergraduate education, which is provided by professional and private organisations and associations. The government is responsible for supplying books, teaching aids and free student residences for all public institutions. Arabic is the primary language of instruction at all institutions, with Kurdish also taught in Kurdish areas.

Size: There are approximately 12,950 educational institutions of all levels and types in Iraq. Of this total, 10 are state universities; three private colleges, and a state Technical Institutes Commission, which is comprised of 28 institutions. The total enrolment of students at all levels of education is approximately 4,319,368. Structure: Pre-school education in Iraq is of two-year duration and is open to children 4 years old. Primary education is six years in duration and is compulsory through age 11. Secondary education is six years in duration and completed in two stages: Intermediate and Preparatory. Intermediate education lasts three years for students aged 12 to 14 years. Preparatory education also lasts for three years and is designed to prepare students for the labour market or university study. It is divided into two branches (scientific and literary) beginning with the second year of preparatory education, during which students pursue academic studies in the sciences or humanities. In addition, there is also a six or three-year (depending on the point of entry) vocational preparatory stream of education, which covers industrial, agricultural and commercial branches. Vocational preparatory education is designed to prepare students for work in the professions or for university study. Tertiary education is open to students who satisfactOrily complete secondary education. Programmes at the undergraduate level are from three to six years in duration. Additionally, there are 28 two-year post-secondary institutes, which train students for various technical professions. Programmes leading to post-graduate degrees are also available. Teacher Education: Kindergarten and primary teachers are trained in five-year post-intermediate or two-year post-preparatory courses taught at Teacher Training Institutes. The qualification obtained is the Diploma in Primary Education. Teacher training for secondary-level teachers is available at the colleges of education in various universities. The Bachelor of Arts or Science for secondary

Education

253

teachers canbe completed in four years and includes a small number of professional education units. Graduates from non-education degree programmes can complete a one-year Higher Diploma of Education at the University of Baghdad, or a six-month course offered by the Ministry of Education. Training for teachers of vocational education is provided through the University of Technology, and Colleges of Agriculture, Administration, and Commerce within special teacher preparation departments. Funding for the Transformation: The International Fund for Higher Education in Iraq was initiated by the First Lady of Qatar through a donation of $ 15 million in 2003 and has enabled UNESCO to address the most urgent needs of higher education in Iraq. To this has been added smaller donations from the Qatar National Bank, South Korea and Doha National Bank. It is vital that the international community in order for the reconstruction and rejuvenation of the Iraqi higher education system to proceed un impeded augments these funds substantially. Compelling international evidence indicates that countries cannot generate sustainable socio-economic development without investment in human development. At the heart of such development is the production of critical intellectual capabilities and well-trained graduates with a range of competencies and skills. Douglas (2000) captures this necessity succinctly and aptly: "As the global economy becomes more competitive, those states and nations that invest the most time and energy in expanding and nurturing their higher education systems, will likely be the big winners of tomorrow." Without adequate higher education and research institutions providing a critical mass of skilled and educated people, no country can ensure endogenous and sustainable development and in particular, developing countries and least developed countries cannot reduce the gap separating them from the industrially developed ones. Sharing knowledge, international cooperation and new technologies can offer new opportunities to reduce this gap (World Declaration of Higher Education for the 21st Century, 1998). This is the vision that should be the driving force of the MHESR in constructing a modern higher education system for Iraq. The view on the reconstruction of higher education expressed by the Deputy Minister of Higher Education of Iraq at the Paris Round table is

254

Iraq

indeed encouraging: "To ensure quality higher education marked by gender parity, the separation of state and religion, mindful of the values of democracy and human rights". It is clear from the recent UNESCO Round table, the International Community stands ready to assist in whatever way required by the Iraqi people.

Educational Development and Planning Prior to 1991, the education system in Iraq was one of the best in the region, with over 100 per cent gross enrolment rate for primary schooling and high levels of literacy, both for men and women. Iraq's higher education, particularly in scientific and technological fields, was of an international standard and staffed by high quality personnel. As Iraq finds itself once again an active member of the international community, the renewal of the education system needs to reflect the universal norms and standards which will enable its children to fully understand democratic principles and processes while at the same time retaining their rich and multifaceted cultural identity. There are approximately 19,000 schools in Iraq, with around six million school pupils in total. Unfortunately, there are only 14,000 available buildings to host thEm, a shortage of around 5,000. As a result, schools are forced to work on double and triple shift systems with high pupil density. The Ministry of Education is embarking on c. plan to build 1,000 schools per year, though with growth in enrolment amounting to 3-4 per cent per year, it is expected that it will take longer than five years to overcome the shortage. Another problem for the education sector is the provision of textbooks and other school requirements such as desks and blackboards. The ministry is still in the process of devising a suitable plan to ensure the delivery of textbooks to pupils. Short-term activities will include the pevelopment of baseline indicators to measure educational progress, procuring and distributing essential school materials and providing equipment and supplies. Teacher training is also badly needed; many teachers have not received any sort of training for over two decades. Particular emphasis will be placed on emergency teachers or those who have been newly appointed or re-appointed. The ministry has deemed this as one of its core objectives.

Education

255

Cross-cultural awareness is crucial to Iraq's business growth potential. In order to allow the cultural community to have its voice heard in the reconstruction planning process, foundations and institutions have been invited to recommend strategies for collaborating with the people of Iraq. These include the preservation of cultural heritage, protecting the environment, socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, education and diplomacy, along with multi-cultural industrial design, marketing, healthcare and safety practices.

Destruction of Educational System Iraq's educational system was the target of US-British military action, because education is the backbone of any society. Without an efficient education system, no society can function. Schools and universities were bombed and destroyed. The Al-Mustansiriyah University, one of the oldest schools in the world with a history that goes back at least 1000 years was bombed and partially destroyed. It was here in 1980 that Iranian agents tried to assassinate Prime Minister Tariq Aziz-a terrorist act that helped precipitate the Iran-Iraq War. Afterthe 1991 war, UNSCOM inspectors, led by Australian Richard Butler, burned all chemistry books of the University Library. All other universities in Iraq have their science books burned by UNSCOM. Furthermore, the sanctions and US wars forced many Iraqi professionals to leave the country in what is called, Iraqi 'brain drain' . An estimated 30-40 per cent of Iraq's best-trained educators left to other countries. Under the sanctions, Iraq's contact with the rest of the world was also restricted and contributed to the deterioration of Iraq's educational system. To complete Iraq's isolation and inflict more harm, the UScontrolled sanctions committee banned all educational materials (including pencils, which allegedly could be converted to "weapons of mass destruction" by Iraqi children, papers and textbooks) from entering Iraq. A newly released study by the UN University (UNU) International Leadership Institute in Jordan revealed that: "The devastation of the Iraqi system of higher education has been overlooked amid other cataclysmic war results but represents an important consequence of the conflicts, economic sanctions, and ongoing turmoil in Iraq caused by US militaristic policy."

256

Iraq

Furthermore, "some 84 per cent of Iraq's institutions of higher education have been burnt, looted, or destroyed. Some 2,000 laboratories need to be re-equipped and 30,000 computers need to be procured and installed nationwide, said Jairam Reddy, director of UNU. "The Iraqi Academy of Sciences, founded in 1948 to promote the Arabic language and heritage, saw its digital and traditional library partially looted during the war and it alone needs almost one million dollars in infrastructure repairs to re-establish itself as a leading research centre", the study revealed. There was no shortage of bombs to destroy Iraq, but "there weren't enough desks, chairs, or classrooms and most schools lacked even basic water or sanitation facilities", added the report. According to the UN children's fund, UNICEF, Iraq's primary and secondary educational systems were further ruined by the war and almost 1 in 4 children has no access to education under US Occupation. The current Iraq's school curriculum is a US-crafted curriculum to brainwash Iraqi children. The US Occupation Authority or the (CPA) removed any content considered anti-American, including the 1991 Gulf War, the Iran-Iraq war, and all references to Israel policy in Palestine, and U.S support for Israel. "Entire swaths of 20th-century history have been deleted", said Bill Evers, a US Defence Department employee, and one of three American "advisers" to the Ministry of Education. It should be noted that these US "advisers" are US-handpicked proxies who make the major decisions in the Iraqi ministries, (i.e. it is not the USappointed quislings, which occupy cabinet pOSitions which make the decisions). "We considered anything anti-American to be propaganda and we took it out, and in some cases, we had to remove entire chapters", said Fuad Hussain, an Iraqi expatriate in the Ministry of Education. In other words, Mr. Hussain made the decision to remove "propaganda" and enforce a "free" curriculum. Before the staged "handover of sovereignty" in June 2003, Paul Bremer, th~ former US Proconsul in Baghdad, issued a series of "edicts" that "take away virtually all of the powers once held by several ministries", reported The Wall Street Journal on 13 May, 2004. In addition, Bremer enacted the "Bremer's Orders", a set of colonial "laws" widely known as the "100 Orders".

Education

257

"The Bremer orders control every aspect of Iraqi life-from the use of car horns to the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. For example, "Order No. 39 alone does no less than 'transition [Iraq] from a ... centrally planned economy to a market economy' virtually overnight and by US fiat", wrote Antonia Juhasz, a scholar at the International Forum on Globalisation in San Francisco. Order 37 will lower Iraq's corporate tax rate from about 40 per cent to a flat rate of 15 per cent. The accurate description of Iraq's economy is a "Capitalism dream" economy. The Virginia-based Corporation, Bearing Point Inc., received 250 million contracts to facilitate the looting. On May 22, Bush signed Executive Order 13303 granting blanket immunity to any US corporation dealing with Iraqi oil through 2007. The order "unilaterally declares Iraqi oil to be the unassailable province of US corporations .... In other words, if Exxon Mobil or Chevron Texaco touches Iraqi oil, it will be immune from legal proceedings in the United States", said Jim Vallette, research director for the Sustainable Energy and Economy Network. It makes the new "sovereignty" more like a US colonial dictatorship with no "democracy" and no national independence. That is why the January 2003 elections were a US-made trap to legitimise the US Occupation of Iraq. Nonetheless, these US-crafted "Orders" and economic therapies are illegal and in violation of the Geneva Conventions and The Hague Regulations, which stipulate that the occupiers 'must abide by the country's existing laws unless prevented'. Under international law, the occupiers are 'prohibited from selling of state-own assets' of the occupied country. Further, these "Orders" are illegal because they were enacted without tacit approval of legitimate Iraqi government, but under the threat of US military force. To make things worse for Iraq's education, Iraq's reconstruction has become the "biggest corruption scandal in history". In April 2003, USAID awarded a one-year, $ 62 million contract to Creative Associates International Inc. (CAU), and $ 1.8 billion to Bechtel Corporation to build Iraq's infrastructure, including schools and higher education institutions, without a public tender, a by-invitation-only deal awarded in a secret process. "For this initial round of contracts alone, Bechtel was also guaranteed another $ 80 million for company profits", wrote Jeffrey st. Claire, author of Grand Theft Pentagon. "While the situation continued to deteriorate

258

Iraq

for the US military forces in Iraq ... Last year Bechtel earned more than $ 17 billion for the first time", added St. Clair. Bechtel record of dodgy business does not bode well for the Iraqi people. Its record in Bolivia and India left poor communities without affordable drinking water. US officials often have highlighted their renovation of schools as a success story of Iraq under the occupation. However, despite the size of contracts, little has been done to rebuild or repair Iraq's schools and universities. "Schools listed as fully rebuilt are, in fact, flooded with sewage and lack desks, but are often freshly painted", wrote Christian Parenti of The Nation. Indeed, schools were only painted to remove the old regime slogans from the wall and replace them with George Bush's own lies of "democracy" and "liberation" rhetoric. A propaganda cliche designed to manipulate public opinions in the West (the US in particular), and enhance US imperial agenda of militaristic domination of the world. In a recent report Antonia Juhasz noted that; "The constant complaints from the Iraqi Ministry of Education officials and principals of schools that Bechtel has worked on, is that the work is either non-existent and shoddy, often putting students' health and safety at risk". There is "no improvement to the infrastructure, and no new equipment has been bought" , Muzhir AI-Dulaymi, spokesman for the League for the Defente of Iraqi People's Rights, told Aljazeera on 28 May, 2004. Bechtel waves off complaints with: "No matter what we do, the Iraqis will never be on the losing end", reported Corp Watch, a U.S-based anti-corruption organisation. The billion of dollars approved by Congress for the "reconstruction" of Iraq, was simply a "gift" from US taxpayers to US private corporations, not for the Iraqi people. In other word, US citizens are subSidising Bechtel, Halliburton and other US corporations. In October 2004, the CPA paid $ 12 billion to the contractors out of the Development Fund of Iraq (DFI) , instead of using the money earmarked by Congress for the "reconstruction" of Iraq. In other words, the CPA used Iraq's oil revenues to payoff the US contractors money that before the war was said (by Secretary of State Powell, among others) to be the "Iraqi people's" money. According to an independent audit conducted by KPMG for the multilateral International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq (IAMB)

Education

259

(established under UN Security Council Resolution 1483 as an audit oversight board), nearly $ 1.5 billion was extracted from the OFI to pay Halliburton. While Iraqi children are dropping out of school and dying of malnutrition, Iraqi money nourishes Halliburton executives and friends, including US Vice President Dick Cheney. The IAMB and auditors working for the United Nation's Iraq Advisory as well as the CPA's own Inspector General have since blasted the occupation authorities for sloppy handling and faulty accounting of the more than $ 9 billion in seized assets (including Iraqi oil revenues) known as the OFI. The $ 9 billion simply vanished. They discovered a wide range of irregularities, including the lack of competitive bidding for large contracts, missing contracts information, payments for contracts that had not been supervised, and, in some cases, outright theft. "The billions of dollars of oil money that has already been transferred to the US-controlled CPA has effectively disappeared into financial black hole", reported Christian Aid, a British humanitarian organisation. Protected by the presence of more than 200,000 US-British troops and mercenaries, Iraq is the biggest imperial lootocracy in the history of Western colonialism, and a "capitalism dream" economy. Iraq's education system has also fallen victim to the Occupationinstigated violence. School dropouts are very high, particularly among females as a result of violence and kidnappings. Many schools in Iraqi cities and towns have been closed, preventing hundreds of children from receiving basic education. ''Approximately 50 per cent of children are not going to school because their parents are too scared to send them, having heard these stories about children being kidnapped and held for ransom", a spokesman for Save the Children UK, Paul Hetherington, told IRIN. Moreover, malnutrition amongst Iraqi children has almost doubled from 4 per cent in 2002 to roughly 8 per cent since the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. The ongoing occupation and associated violence is wreaking havoc on Iraqi children and Iraq's long-term future. Although the UNU report noted briefly that only "four dozens academics have been assassinated", the real number is much higher. In a callous and murderous policy termed "Oe-Baathification", thousands of academics, scientists and prominent Iraqi politicians have been murdered. Together with the C.I.A., and Israel's Mossad

260

Iraq

agents; criminal elements and militia groups including, the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Iranian-trained Badr Brigade, the INA of Iyad Allawi and the INC of Ahmad Chalabi, have terrorised an entire nation and murdered its entire intellectual community. Two years of continuing occupation and violence have killed thousands of innocent men, women and children. The November 2004 scientific report by the reputable British medical journal, the Lancet, shows that from March 2003 to October 2004, US forces have killed more than 100,000 Iraqi civilians. The Lancet authors acknowledge that most of the victims were innocent women and children killed by US bombing of population centres. The number of Iraqis killed is increasing daily. Instead of condemning and exposing the crimes of this illegal occupation, Western liberal elites and the "anti-war" organisers close ranks with their own governments and have deliberately shifted the blame on the Iraqi Resistance with increasing sophistication. This known falsehood is intended to discredit the Iraqi Resistance and to deny the Iraqi people a'legitimate Resistance movement against an illegal foreign occupation. After all, the US and its collaborators have the most to gain from a divided Iraq embroiled in sectarian violence. How can the liberal elites and the "anti-war" organisers blame the Iraqi Resistance for the violence? Who committed the Fallujah atrocity, where more than 6000 innocent men, women and children were slaughtered with napalm and chemical weapons? Where were the liberal elites and the "anti-war" organisers when Iraq's cultural heritage which stands at the heart of human civilization, was destroyed and looted? Very few people in the West heard the scream of Fallujah's victims. The atrocity was sold as a 'necessary step' to enforce Western "democracy". On many occasions, the Iraqi Resistance has rejected violence against civilians, and has called on foreign journalists to stay in Iraq and report honestly. By contrast, US troops have detained and killed journalists who cover the Iraqi Resistance view of the war. Indeed US troops in Iraq have killed more than 13 journalists there. You do not need to do lots of research to find out why US troops targeting independent journalists. Today, more Iraqi cities and towns are under the same siege as Fallujah. People are not allowed to leave their homes and have no food and medicine.

Education

261

The cities of Ramadi and Qaim in western Iraq, just to mention two, had been under siege by US forces for many days. Hospitals have been destroyed to erase the number of civilians killed by US troops in hospital data banks. Schools, universities and government offices are closed. Random arrests of men, women and children, have resulted in the imprisonment of many young men, women and children. Tens of thousands of Iraqis are now imprisoned and tortured in hundreds of US-run prisons throughout Iraq. Had it not been for the Iraqi Resistance, Iraq would have been sold on the cheap to private US corporations, and Syria and Iran would have been attacked by now in pursuit of US hegemony. As a result of potent Iraqi Resistance, US Army recruitment is at its lowest level, and the war becoming very unpopular among the citizens of the imperial power(s). And the so-called "coalition of the willing" is fleeing and is losing its will. Even US Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Richard Myers acknowledged the presence of an effective Iraqi Resistance against US forces, although the US maybe using the presence of the Resistance as pretext to justify the ongoing occupation. The liberal elites and the "anti-war" organisers have yet to have an impact on their own government's policy. Meanwhile, hundreds of Iraqi children are dropping out of school and experienced Iraqi professionals, who were once called the 'German of the Middle East' for their technical prowess, are unemployed. Unemployment rate in Iraq is as high as 70 per cent today. Iraqis are watching their country and their society destroyed and looted by an armed imperial power and its private corporations. They can only be praised for their courage to stay and continue the struggle against the odds. "The bravery and dedication of educators [and other profeSSionals] who remain in a shattered Iraq should inspire the swift, meaningful and practical support of the international academic community," says UN Under Secretary-General Hans van Ginkel, Rector of the Tokyo-based UNU. The most urgent actions needed in Iraq today are the end of US violence and the revitalisation of Iraq's education and health systems. "Repairing Iraq's higher education system is in many ways a prerequisite to the long term repair of the country as a whole", said Jairam Reddy of UNU.

262

Iraq

Worldwide academics and educators should campaign for the end of the occupation and use the recommendation provided by the authors of the Iraqi Observatory report as a benchmark to assist the Iraqi people in rebuilding their education system. It stated rightly that, ''American Universities should refrain from competing for USAID Higher Education grants until the military occupation of Iraq ends and an independent and sovereign government exists in Iraq. That said institutions should make an effort to build contacts and offer expertise to the Iraqi academic community on an informal basis in preparation for that moment". The deliberate US strategy targeting anything other than "strictly military targets", including Iraq's educational system, constitutes a major war crime. In addition, legal evidence has shown that the war on Iraq amounted to a 'crime of aggression'. Clearly, US wars against Iraq violated the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare (Article 22) and the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (Article 3). A major reason the Nuremberg Tribunal was convened was because Germany had failed to prosecute its own war criminals after World War I. The setting up of an international war crimes tribunal, like the Nuremberg Tribunal, to investigate and prosecute those who committed these crimes against the Iraqi people should be the aim of the world community.

UNESCO's Role A recent Round table was convened by UNESCO to enable Iraqi academics and representatives from the MHESR to discuss with representatives of the international community the current status of the higher education system in Iraq and to explore ways of both its immediate and long term reconstruction and transformation. In all, 120 delegates participated in the discussions over a two day period. The main issues, needs and priorities that emerged from the Round table were the following: • The widespread destruction of the infrastructure of the higher education system and now lacking a reliable source of electricity and potable water; • The unstable and dangerous environment for normal academic activity-48 academics have been assassinated since 2003 and

Education

263

many are under daily threat. This has served to demotivate academics and many have left the country; • The quality of higher education has been steadily deteriorating since the imposition of authoritarian rule in Iraq. This has been exacerbated by a sequence of wars first with Iran, the Gulf war and now the invasion of 2003 with sanctions compounding the problems; it is estimated that 30-40 per cent of the best trained professors have emigrated since 1990; its research centres have suffered from isolation by the international academic community; • Only about one-third of the academic staff hold doctoral degrees; this together with long periods of isolation make the retraining of staff to international standards an urgent priority; • There is a need to equip more than 2000 scientific laboratories and for 30000 computers; libraries are in a poor condition and are in urgent need of restocking with new books and journals in both Arabic and English; journals in electronic format are required; • The student population has been rapidly increasing both due to a high birthrate and admissions policy that allows all students who have completed secondary school to enter higher education. At the conclusion of the conference, The Director General of UNESCO, Matsura stated: "The meeting provided us with valuable information and gave us an opportunity to appreciate the determination of Iraq's academics and Ministry of Education to bring higher education back to its former level of excellence". Despite the formidable problems encountered by the Iraqi higher education system, progress and improvements have been made. The subjects of democracy, human rights and anti-terrorist have been included in the curricula. There is no dedicated budget for higher education but an ad hoc amount has been allocated. This has increased from $ 40 million in 2003 to nearly $ 70 million in 2005. This has enabled salaries for teachers to be increased from $ 1000 a month to $ 1500 a month. Teacher upgrading has been supported by UNESCO and the World Bank; 4300 new jobs have been created in the universities; 40 per cent of the reconstruction of destroyed buildings have been achieved through the existing budget. A$tudent's union has been formed in each college and a new law governs student election based on freedom and democratic principles.

264

Iraq

In his concluding remarks at the Round table, the director of Higher Education, Georges Haddad, UNESCO outlined the following measures in support of the Iraqi Higher Education System: • Establish a database of the Iraqi academic Diaspora; • Connect the Iraqi higher education system to international networks; • Iraqi academics partiCipated in the next international quality assurance network held in Wellington, New Zealand; • Iraqi academics attended the next meeting of the International Association of University Presidents held in Bangkok; • A workshop was held in Amman to discuss student life in Iraqi universities; • There should be capacity building for university governance and management of Iraqi universities; • UNESCO/UNITWIN Chairs should be established for Iraqi universities in a number of disciplines-engineering, medicine, teacher training, distance education; • Establish a Conference of Rectors /University Presidents.

10

Language and Literature Kurdish is the language of more than twenty million Kurds living in a vast unbroken territory. Kurdish belongs to the family of IndoEuropean languages and to the Irano-Aryan group of this family. The Iranophone tribes and peoples of Central Asia and of the bordering territories began moving towards the Iranian plateau and the littorai steppes of the Black sea at the turning point of the second and first millennium BC. As these tribes and peoples invade the area, they assimilate and gave their language and their name to other IranoAryan peoples already present on the land. Some refuse total assimilation. Even today, there are fairly large pockets of nonKurdophone Kurds living in Kurdistan of Turkey, of Iran of and of Iraq. Kurdish, the language of the Kurds, which belongs to the northwestern group of Irano-Aryan languages, has never had the opportunity to become unified and its dialects are generally separated into three groups with distinct similarities between them. The biggest group, as regards the number of people who speak it, is the northern Kurdish, commonly called "Kurmanji", spoken by the Kurds living in Turkey, Syria, the USSR and by some of the Kurd's living in Iran and Iraq. 200,000 Kurdophones settled around Kabul, in Afghanistan, also speak this language. This group gave birth to a literary language. The central group includes the Kurdish spoken in the north-east of Iraq, where it's called "Sorani" and the dialects of the neighbouring areas, beyond the Zagros, in Kurdistan. of Iran. This group also gave birth to a literary language.

266

Iraq

There has always been an intellectual elite amongst the Kurds who, for centuries, expressed themselves in the conqueror's language. Numerous Kurdish intellectuals wrote just as easily in Arabic and in Persian as in Turkish. This is shown in the 13th century by the Kurdish historian and biographer, Ibn al-Asir, who wrote in Arabic, whilst Idris Bitlisi, a high Ottoman dignitary, of Kurdish Origin, wrote the Hesht Behesht (The Eight Paradises) in 1501, which recounts the first story of the eight first Ottoman sultans, in Persian. The Prince Sharaf Khan, sovereign of the Kurdish principality of Bitlis, also wrote his "History of the Kurdish Nation", at the end of the 16th century, a brilliant medieval source on the history of the Kurds, in Persian. It's difficult to date the origin of Kurdish literature. Nothing is known about the pre-Islamic culture of the Kurds. Moreover, only some of the texts have been published and it's not known how many disappeared in the torment of endless conflicts, which have been occurring on Kurdish territory for several centuries. The first well-known Kurdish poet is Ell Herirl, who was born in 1425 in the Hakkari region and who died around 1495. His favourite subjects are already those, which his compatriots will treat most often: love of the fatherland, its natural beauties and the charm of its girls. Kurdistan, in the 16th century was a battlefield between the Persians and the Turks. The Ottoman and Persian Empires were permanently formed and, at the beginning of the second half of the century, stabilised their borders, in other words they shared the territory of the Kurds, Kurdistan. The most famous poet from the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century is the Sheikh Ahmadi Nishani, known as Melaye Jeziri. He was born in Jezire Bohtan, and like many well read people of the time, he knew Arabic, Persian, and Turkish well. He was also influenced by Arabo-Persian literary culture. His poetic work of more than 2,000 verses has remained popular and is still republished regularly. He travelled a lot and made numerous disciples, who tried to imitate their master by adopting his language, which from then on became the literary language. Gradually the feeling of belonging to the same entity develops amongst the Kurds. This epoch will see the birth of the poet Ahmadi Khani, native of the Bayazid, who defines in his Mern-o-Zin, a long

Language and Literature

267

poem of more than 2,650 distiches, the elements of Kurdish independence. In the 19th century, following the general expansion of national liberation movements at the heart of the Ottoman Empire, and although strongly tinged with tribalism, a Kurdish national movement will slowly develop. A new literature blossoms with a certain delay due to distance and isolation. The authors who had received a classical education during their youth, given at a high level in the Madrasa, the religious schools, know Arabic and Persian well. The themes and images of their poetry is inspired, to a large extent, by the Persian tradition, but the poets display great imagination in the renewal of symbols and the musicality of verse. This poetry has, firstly, a religious tonality,-this is the epoch of the blossoming of mystic brotherhoods-but it is the patriotic and lyrical poets who have the most success. Mela Khidri Ahmadi Sh?weysi Mikhayill, better known as Nali is the first great poet to write his poetry mainly in central Kurdistan. The birth of the press accompanies the progress of the Kurdish national movement and the first review, with the significant name "Kurdistan" appears in Cairo, in Egypt, in 1898. In the 20th century, despite being the object of prosecutions, the Kurdish national movement doesn't stop developing. The outbreak of the First World War and its consequences radically change the situation of the Kurds. The Kurds had lived up until then in multi-cultural and multilingual societies. At the end of this war, the Kurds find themselves divided between four states: Turkey, Persia, Iraq and Syria, legally sovereigns but politically subordinated to the world game of superpowers. These states very quickly found themselves confronted with the problems of the diversity of languages. The literary production of the Kurds and the development of the language will from now on be dependent on the freedom they acquire in each of the states, which share their territory. Iraq, under British mandate, recognises a minimum of cultural rights to its Kurdish minority. Although the latter only comprises 18 per cent of the total Kurdish population, the centre of the Kurdish cultural life is transported to Iraq, where production develops from the second half of the 1920s. The Kurds come out of isolation and contact with the West-translation of Pushkin, Schiller, Byron and

268

Iraq

particularly Lamartine-completely changed the basic ideas in the poetic field. The beginning of modernity distances poetry from its traditional paths and if, in the first stage, the poems keep their classical form, innovation lies in their content, the Kurdish population lost their freedom and production dries up. They are forced to publish their works abroad or to go into exile. In Turkey, after the military success of Mustafa Kemal against Greece, a new treaty signed at Lausanne in 1923, confirmed Turkish sovereignty over a large part of the Kurdish territory and over more than 52 per cent of the total Kurdish population. This treaty guaranteed "non-Turks" the use of their language. A few months later, in the name of State unity, Mustafa Kemal violated this clause by banning the teaching of Kurdish and its public use. He deported most of the intellectuals. The Kurds became the "mountain Turks", living in "Eastern Anatolia" or in the "East". All the traditions, even the dress, all the groups, even the song and dance were abolished in 1932. After the Second World War, the Turkish regime between 1950 and 1971 gave itself a tinge of bourgeois democracy and use of the Kurdish language was authorised again. A new Kurdish intelligentsia formed. The military coup d'etat of 1971 and 1980 restored the policy of repression and massive deportations towardJ the west of Turkey. Their teaching of Kurdish and publications in this language are strictly forbidden today. In Iran, where more than a quarter of the Kurdish population live, the authorities conduct a harsh policy of assimilation of their Kurdish minority. All Kurdish publications and teaching of the language are absolutely forbidden. The great period of Kurdish literature in this area is that of the Republic of Kurdistan, which only !ast eleven months at the end of the Second World War. Despite its brevity, it provokes a remarkable development in Kurdish literature. Numerous poets emerge, such as the poets Hejar and Hemin. The repression, which follows the fall of the Republic, forces the intellectuals to go into exile, mostly in Iraq. In February 1979, a revolution of the people expels the monarchical regime but the Islamic government, which replaces it, is also unwilling to accord national rights to its Kurdish minority.

Language and Literature

269

Under- pressure from Kurdish revolutionaries gathered around the much missed Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, whose memory is engraved in the depths of every Kurdish heart, who demand incessantly the recognition of their language and their culture, the Iranian authorities are forced to tolerate the publication of various Kurdish works. If all literary creation remains forbidden, censorship authorises the publication of monuments from the Kurdish literature of the 19th century, some of which will be translated into Persian. Manuscripts depicting the history of Kurdish dynasties are finally published and dictionaries, grammar books and encyclopaedias by Kurdish personalities who marked their epoch, religious or not, appear in Kurdish and Persian. The Kurdish literary life in Iraq suffered the repercussions of the failure of the long Kurdish insurrection and the pitiless war between Iran and the Iraq. The Kurdish intellectuals choose the path of exile and take refuge in most of the Western countries and, remarkably, they will be at the. source of a real renaissance of the "Kurmariji" literature, strictly forbidden in Turkey and Syria. Supported by several hundred th
270

Iraq

West. Six years later, more than three hundred Kur.dish intellectuals, living in various European countries, and in America and Australia, have joined the Institute to help carry out its action of safeguarding and renewing their language and their culture. The Institute publishes reviews in Kurdish, Arabic; Persian, Turkish, and French. A "Bulletin de liaison et de-information" (Monthly Bulletin of Contact and Information) publishes a press review about the Kurdish issue and gives information about the activities and projects of the Institute. It's to the credit of the Institute that they were the first to encourage the development of the "Zaza!Dimla" dialect, spoken by about three million Kurds in Turkey. Finally, the Institute gathers together Kurdish writers, lingUists, and journalists from the diaspora, twice a year to study together the problems of modem terminology. This new blossoming of Kurdish intellectuals, poets and writers illustrates, in a most striking way, the parallelism between cultural freedom and development.

History of the Arabic Language Arabic, which is the native tongue of more than 200 million people worldwide, ranks 6th among the major languages of the world. Arabic is the official language of Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Western Sahara, and Yemen as well as one of the six official languages of the United Nations. In addition, it is widely spoken in countries such as Somalia and is the language of the holy writings of Muslims throughout the world. Modern Standard Arabic belongs to the Semitic language family. Semitic languages have a recorded history going back thousands of years--one of the most extensive continuous archives of documents belonging to any human language group. While the origins of the Semitic language family are currently in dispute among scholars, there is agreement that they flourished in the Mediterranean Basin area, especially in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin and in the coastal areas of the Levant. The Semitic language family is a descendant of "proto-Semitic"an ancient language that was exclusively spoken and has no written

Language and Literature

271

record. Aside from Arabic, the Semitic language family includes Hebrew, Aramaic, Maltese, Amharic, Tigrinya, Tigre, Gurage, Geez, Syrica, Akkadian, Phonoecian, Punic, Ugaritic, Nabatean, Amorite and Moabite. While a majority of these are now considered "dead" languages, either entirely obsolete or used only in religious practice, Arabic has flourished. The reason for this is inextricably linked with the rise of Islam and, more specifically, Islam's holy book, the Quran. While the first documented record of written Arabic dates from the early 4th century AD, its use in the early 7th century as the language of the Quran led Arabic to become the major world language that it is today. As Islam spread throughout the world, its chosen language did as well. Coupled with the rise of Islam, Arabic became the language of government as well as religion. Within 100 years after the introduction of the Quran, Arabic became the official language of a world empire whose boundaries stretched from the Oxus River in Central Asia to the Atlantic Ocean, and even northward into the Iberian Peninsula of Europe. As Islam continued to spread through the world, Arabic inherently followed.

Arabic, the Divine Language Arabic Literature: Uterary works written in the Arabic language. The great body of Arabic literature includes works by Arabic speaking Turks, Persians, Syrians, Egyptians, Indians, Jews, and other Africans and Asians, as well as the Arabs themselves. Arabic is the largest member of the Semitic branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family (classification: South Central Semitic) and is closely-related to Hebrew and Aramaic. It is spoken throughout the Arab world and is widely studied and known throughout the Islamic world. Arabic has been a literary language since, at least, the 6th century and is the liturgical language of Islam. The first Significant Arabic literature was produced during the medieval golden age of lyric poetry, from the 4th to the 7th century. The poems are strongly personal qasida, or odes, often very short, while some longer than 100 lines. They treat the life of the tribe and themes of love, fighting, courage, and the chase. The poet speaks directly, not romantically, of nature and the-t>ower of God. The qasida survive only through collections, chiefly the Muallaqat, Hamasa, Mufaddaliyat, and Kitab al-Aghani. The most esteemed of these poets

272

Iraq

are Amru al-Qais, Antara, and Zuhalr. With the advent of Islam, the Quran became the central work of study and recitation. Extra-Quranic poetry underwent a decline from which it recovered in a far different form. The Quran supplanted poetry by becoming the chief object of study of the Muslim world. Poetry regained some prestige under the Umayyads, when al-Akhtal {c.640-c.710} and al-Farazdaq {c.640732} wrote their lyric works. Under the Abbasids {750-1258}, Hellenic, Syrian, Pahlavi, and Sanskrit works became available in translation, and the Arabic language further developed as a vehicle of science and philosophy. Among the pioneers of Arabic prose were Ibn al-Muqaffa, the translator of the Indian fables of Kalila wa Dimna, and al-Jahiz {d. 868}, an influential figure in the establishment of the belles-letters compendia {adab} as a dominant literary theme. The next great period of Arabic literature was a result of the rise of the new Arabic-Persian culture of Baghdad, the new capital of the Abbasids, in the 8th and 9th centuries. Philosophy, mathematics, law, Quranic interpretation and criticism, history, and science were cultivated, and the collections of early Arabic poetry were compiled during this period. At the end of the 8th century in Baghdad, a group of young poets arose who established new court poetry. A prominent court poet was Abu Nuwas. Asceticism, not yet developed into Sufism, evolved into a poetic genre with Abu al-Atahiya. Among the most popular of Arabic poets, Mutanabbi {915-65} wrote some of the most complex, and most eloquent Arabic poems. The poet Hariri sought to combine refinement with dignity of style, and brilliancies with jewels of eloquence. Abu aI-Ala al-Maarri was an outstanding Syrian poet of great originality. The greatest mystic poet of the age was Umar Ibn al-Faridh {1181-1235}. The influence of India and Persia is seen in Arabic prose romance, which became the principal literary form. The greatest collection is the Thousand and One Nights. The major writers of historical and geographical works in Arabic include Bukhari, Tabari, Masudi, Ibn Khaldun, Ibn al-Athir {d. 1234}, and Ibn Batuta. The foremost Arab theologian was al-Ghazzali; Avicenna, the great physician, wrote on medicine. The central Asian scholar al-Farabi, wrote fundamental works on philosophical and musical theory. In the field

Language and Literature

273

of belles-letters, essays and epistles of great wit and erudition, known as risalas;were composed on subjects as diverse as science, mysticism, and politics. Chief practitioners of the genre include Ibn al-Muqaffa (d. 757), the unsurpassed al-Jahiz, and Ibn Qutayba (d. 889). The Western centre of Arab culture was Spain, especially Cordova under the Umayyads. The Spanish Arabs produced fine poets and scholars, but they are less important than the great Spanish philosophers-Avempace, Averroes, and Ibn Tufail. Their works became known in Europe chiefly through the Latin translations of Jewish scholars. Since 1200 in Spain and 1300 in the East, there has been little Arabic literature of wide interest. During the 19th cent., printing in Arabic began in earnest, centred in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus. Newspapers, encyclopedias, and books were published in which Arab writers tried to express, in Arabic, their sense of themselves and their place in the modern world. Simultaneously with a reaction against Western models in Arabic literature, the novel and the drama, forms never before used, developed. Notable 20th-century writers in Arabic include the novelist Naguib Mahfooz, winner of the 1988 Nobel Prize in Uterature, the playwrights Ahmad Shawqi and Tawfiq al-Hakim, the poets Hafiz Ibrahim, Badr Shakir as-Sayyab, Nazik al-Malaikah, Abdul Wahab al-Bayati, Mahmud Darwish, and Adonis, and the short-story writer Mahmud Tymur. There are many Arabic dialects. Classical Arabic-the language of the Quran-was originally the dialect of Mecca in what is now Saudi Arabia. An adapted form of this, known as Modern Standard Arabic, is used in books, newspapers, on television and radio, in the mosques, and in conversation between educated Arabs from different countries (for example at international conferences). Learning Arabic certainly takes time and practice, but there are not many irregularities in the grammar. It's much less complicated than Latin, and probably simpler than German, too. If you speak a European language, the root system of Arabic is an unfamiliar concept. Arabic words are constructed from three-letter "roots" which convey a basic idea. For example, k-t-b conveys the idea of writing. Addition of other letters before, between and after the root letters produces many associated words: not only "write" but also "book", "office", "library", and "author".

274

Iraq

Learning vocabulary may cause problems at first. In most European languages, there are many words, which resemble those in English. Arabic has very few, but it becomes easier once you have memorised a few roots. Arabic has many regional dialects, and if you want to master one of these the only really effective way is to spend a few years in the place of your choice. For general purposes-such as reading or listening to radio-it's best to concentrate on Modern Standard Arabic (numerous courses and textbooks are available). This would also be useful if you're interested in Islam, though you would need some additional religious vocabulary. There are 28 consonants and three vowels-a, i, u-which can be short or long. Some of the sounds are unique to Arabic and difficult for foreigners to pronounce exactly, though you should be able to make yourself understood. The normal word order of a sentence is verb/subject/object. The function of nouns in a sentence can also be distinguished by case-endings (marks above the last letter of a word) but these are usually found only in the Quran or school textbooks. Feminine nouns add the suffix .. .aat to form the plural but masculine nouns generally have a "broken" plural which involves changing vowels in the middle of the word: kitaab ("book"); kl,.ltub ("books"). Arabic has very few irregular verbs and does not use "is" or "are" at all in the present tense: "the king good" means "the king is good". Subtle alterations in the basic meaning of a verb are made by adding to the root. These changes follow regular rules, giving ten possible "verb forms" (though in practice only three or four exist for most verbs. The root k-s-r produces: • form I kasara, "he broke" • form 11 kasara, "he smashed to bits" • form VII in kasara, "it was broken up" The Arabic language takes many forms and can be divided into three main categories: Quranlc or Classical Arable: This is the Arabic ofIslam's holy book, the Quran. It is archaic, which means that it is very old, dating from the late 600's when the Quran was written down. It is used in the Quran and in the holy books of Islam. No one speaks Classical Arabic as a native, nor is it used for conversation. It is learned primarily for reciting and reading the Quran.

Language and Literature

275

Formal or Modem Standard Arabic (MSA): This is an updated version of Classical Arabic which is taugbt in the schools of Arab countries. It is the language of the news, modern literature and education. No one speaks it as a native language but it is used as a common language for people who speak very different varieties of Arabic or by second-language speakers. Spoken or Colloquial Arabic: There are many local varieties of Arabic, many languages in their own right. The most widely spoken and understood of these is Egyptian Arabic. Other distinct varieties are Iraqi, Levantine (Lebanese/Syrian/Jordanian/Palestinian) and Moroccan Arabic. Iraqi Arabic Tactical Iraqi is a computer-based, self-paced, learning programme that, in about 80 hours, teaches English-speaking people totally unfamiliar with Iraqi Arabic how to speak enough to accomplish tasks and missions in Arabic. Tactical Iraqi is ideal for military and civilian personnel who must rapidly train to accomplish missions that involve interacting with Iraqis but who are not linguists, don't already speak Arabic and don't have time to take immersive language training courses. Tactical Iraqi is a fundamentally new approach for teaching language. It works for virtually everyone, from high-aptitude learners to those who think they aren't good at learning languages. Tactical Iraqi quickly teaches how to communicate effectively with Iraqis in daily situations by prOViding sufficient knowledge and confidence in both spoken Iraqi Arabic and cultural nuances like gestures that are vital aspects of building trust in communication. It minimises learners' anxiety, embarrassment and confusion by letting them learn and practice at the computer at their own pace. Its gamelike design keeps learners interested and motivated even after hours of intensive practice. Tactical Iraqi consists of a breakthrough combination of advanced technologies-including artificial intelligence, interactive-animation simulations based on computer games, and speech recognition-and advanced educational and human factors methodologies. Tactical Iraqi provides a practical alternative for people who do not take resident courses, or who find conventional classroom language instruction to be boring and ineffective. These instructor-led and self-

276

Iraq

paced methods are usually reserved for active duty personnel with a high aptitud e for language becaus e they require substantial commitments of time. Tactical Iraqi is the second language in the Tactical Language and Culture Training Systems series produced by Tactical Langua ge Training LLC in collaboration with the University of Southe rn California. The first language, Tactical Levantine, is currently under evaluation at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Tactical Iraqi is currently in use at Camp Pendleton, at the Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School, and at other military installations in the United States and in Iraq. Other languages, including Tactical Pashto, are currently under development. Litera ry and Modem Standa rd Arabic : The term 'i\rabic" may refer either to literary Arabic or Modern Standa rd Arabic or to the many localised varieties of Arabic commonly called "colloquial Arabic." Arabs consider literary Arabic as the standar d language and tend to view everything else as mere dialects. Literary Arabic, al-lughatu-l-arabiyyatu-l-full (Literally: "the most eloque nt Arabic language" -refer s both to the language of present-day media across North Africa and the Middle East and to the more articulate language of the Quran. (The expression media here includes most television and radio, and all written matter, including all books, newspapers, magazines, documents of every kind, and reading primers for small children.) "Colloquial" or "dialectal" Arabic refers to the many national or regional varieties derived from Classical Arabic, spoken daily across North Africa and the Middle East, which constitute the everyday spoken language. These sometimes differ enough to be mutually incomprehensible. These dialects are not typically written, although a certain amoun t of literature (particularly plays and poetry) exists in many of them. They are often used to varying degrees in informal spoken media, such as soap operas and talk shows. Literary Arabic or classical Arabic is the official language of all Arab countries and is the only form of Arabic taught in schools at all stages. The sociolinguistic situation of Arabic in modern times provides a prime example of the linguistic phenom enon of diglossia-the normal use of two separat e varieties of the same language, usually in different

Language and Literature

277

social situations. In the case of Arabic, educated Arabs of any nationality can be assumed to speak both their local dialect and their schooltaught literary Arabic (to an equal or lesser degree). This diglossic situation facilitates code switching in which a speaker switches back and forth unaware between the two varieties of the language, sometimes even within the same sentence. In instances in which Arabs of different nationalities engage in conversation only to find their dialects mutually unintelligible (e.g. a Moroccan speaking with a Lebanese), both should be able to code switch into Literary Arabic for the sake of communication. Since the written Arabic of today differs from the written Arabic of the Quranic era, it has become customary in western scholarship and among non-Arab scholars of Arabic to refer to the language of the Quran as Classical Arabic and the modern language of the media and of formal speech as Modern Standard Arabic. Arabs, on the other hand, often use the term full to refer to both forms, thus placing greater emphasis on the similarities between the two. The difference between Arabic of the Quranic era and today's Classical Arabic is only in the degree of eloquence. The vocabulary and syntactic and grammatical rules are the same.

Jewish Language Judeo-Arabic can be divided into five periods: Pre-Islamic JudeoArabic (pre-eighth century), Early Judeo-Arabic (eighth/ninth to tenth centuries), Classical Judeo-Arabic (tenth to fifteenth centuries), Later Judeo-Arabic (fifteenth to nineteenth centuries), and Modern JudeoArabic (twentieth century). Much of what we know about Classical Judeo-Arabic comes from documents found in the Cairo Geniza. It is almost impossible to determine a precise date for the origin of Judeo-Arabic. There is some evidence that the Jews in the Arabian Peninsula used some sort of Arabic Jewish dialect even before the Islamic conquests (600s C.E.). Referred to as al-Yahudiyya (Newby 1971; 1988:21-23; Gil1984:206), this dialect was similar to the dominant Arabic dialect but included some Hebrew and Aramaic vocabulary, especially in the religious and cultural domains. Some of these loan words passed into the speech and writings of the Arabs, thus accounting for the Hebrew and Aramaic origins of certain Quranic words.

278

Iraq

There IS no evidence that Pre-Islamic Judeo-Arabic produced any literature, especially if we examine the language of the Jewish poet as-Samawal bnu 'Adiya', which did not differ from that of his Arab contemporaries. His poetry is part of the canon of Arabic literature-not Jewish literature. In fact, if Arab sources had not reported that he was Jewish, we never would have known. On the other hand, there may have been some al-Yahudiyya writings in Hebrew characters in the pre-Islamic period (Newby 1971:220). After the great conquests of early Islam, the Jews in the newly conquered lands adopted the language of the conquerors and began to incorporate Arabic into their writings, slowly developing, at times, their own spoken dialect. In the following centuries, Jewish-varieties of Arabic came to exist all around the Arabic-speaking world, from Iraq and Yemen in the East to Spain and Morocco in the West. In the late fifteenth century, Judeo-Arabic underwent a dramatic change, as many Jews, especially in North Africa, began to associate less with Arabs and the Arabic language and culture (this was less the case in Yemen, where strong contact persisted for some time afterward. This indicates that Judeo-Arabic did not develop along exactly the same lines everywhere.). This .cultural development was reflected both in the linguistic structure and in the literature. Written Judeo-Arabic at that time incorporated more dialectal elements, and more and more works appeared in Hebrew. This change was crucial in the division of Judeo-Arabic into Medieval and Late periods. The dramatic change in Judeo-Arabic that occurred around the fifteenth century resulted in a shift in the nature of the continuuglossia. Like most other Jewish languages, written Judeo-Arabic consistently uses Hebrew characters. Very frequently Jews adopted the spelling conventions of Talmudic orthography, employing the final forms of Hebrew letters and sometimes adapting existing consonants and/or symbols as vowel signs. Thus, the Hebrew script symbolises the Jewish nature of the ethnolect community. It was not uncommon to use script as a religious identification for a language, as with the Arabic script of Persian and Urdu, for example, which symbolise the Muslim nature of the language communities. The same way, the Cyrillic script of Serbian symbolises the centrality of the Eastern Orthodox Church's presence in that language, whereas Croatian, which for the most part (until recent political

Language and Literature

279

developments) was the same language, uses the Latin alphabet, indicating the Roman Catholic background of its users. Judeo-Arabic uses various traditions of orthography to transmit different political, cultural, and religious messages (Hary 1992: 112113), as can be seen in other Jewish languages. For example, Late Judeo-Arabic was written in a Hebraized orthography (Hary 1996b), helping to convey Jewish identity. Jewish speakers have usually considered their varieties to be separate from the local languages, giving them special names such as illuga dyalna 'our language.' In Morocco, Jews call Moroccan Judeo-Arabic i1arabiyya dyalna 'our Arabic' and general Moroccan Arabic i1arabiyya dilmsilmin 'Arabic of the Muslims.' Indeed, spoken Judeo-Arabic is sometimes unintelligible to people outside the community (it is obvious that Jewish languages written in Hebrew script are unintelligible to most non-Jews). As discussed above, it contains elements of Classical Arabic, dialectal components, pseudo-corrections, and standardisation of some features, as well as influences from Hebrew and Aramaic. Some Jewish dialects of Arabic have features in common with dialects from other Arab regions that cannot be found in the local non-Jewish varieties of Arabic. For example, in Cairene Judeo-Arabic one may find the phenomenon of niktib/niktibu for 1st person sg./ 1st person pI. imperfect, which is typical to western Arabic dialects (Fischer and Jastrow 1980:63). This phenomenon is not usually expected in Egypt, but, probably due to Jewish migration from Morocco to Cairo, it is found in the speech of Cairene Jews. This phenomenon of migrated or displaced dialectalism is also apparent in other Jewish languages, such as Judeo-Italian. Local varieties around the country include dialect features of other regions, such as the Central Italian system of seven vowels and the Southern Italian form Ii donni 'the women' (while the standard is le donne). The combination of these two regional phenomena can only be found in Judeo-Italian, suggesting a synthesis of regional features due to Jewish migrations within Italy. Jews have written Judeo-Arabic for Jewish readership usually on Jewish topics. However, there have also been translations of nonJewish literature into Judeo-Arabic, often incorporating Jewishimagery.

280

Iraq

This can also be seen, for example, in Yiddish and Judeo-Spanish. Jewish ethnolects around the world share an important literary genre: the verbatim translation of sacred and liturgical Hebrew/Aramaic texts. The translations included the Bible, the Siddur (prayer book), the Passover Haggadah, Pirke Avot (Ethics of the Fathers), and more. The sarh tradition involves word-for-word translation into the Arabic lexicon, maintaining the syntax of the original Hebrew/Aramaic text. Literary Judeo-Arabic contains, among other elements, many colloquial features from the right end of the Arabic continuum (Dialectal Spoken Judeo-Arabic). The other extreme of the Arabic continuum (standard Arabic) is not found in full in Literary Judeo-Arabic, but it is a resource for style shifting, as many authors attempted to use it with mixed success. In other words, Judeo-Arabic authors only approached Standard Arabic. If they wrote too much in Standard Arabic, they would lose solidarity and such texts would not be considered Judeo-Arabic. On the other hand, Standard Arabic is still the anchor for the left side of the Judeo-Arabic continuum, as it is in constant contact with the ethnolect and influences its structure and development. An example of this influence can be seen in the pseudo-corrections of some Judeo-Arabic authors attempting to write in the more prestigious variety of Standard Arabic. Several Judeo-Arabic authors mastered Standard Arabic and wrote in it. When they did, their writings in Standard Arabic were not considered Judeo-Arabic. Maimonides (1135-1204) serves as a good example in the period of Classical Judeo-Arabic. He was certainly capable of writing in Standard Arabic, and indeed did so, but he was able to switch between that and the different varieties of Judeo-Arabic, thus adapting to his readership. As a result, some of his works, such as his medical writings, which were aimed at non-Jewish readers, are in Standard Arabic and cannot be considered part of Classical Judeo-Arabic. In other works, such as his letters to his co-religionists, he used varieties of JudeoArabic, and therefore, they are in Literary Written Classical JudeoArabic. Today, the ethnolect is approaching extinction, mostly due to the large emigration of Arab Jews, or Jews of Arab lands, in the late forties and fifties of the last century. Most of these Jews moved to

Language and Literature

281

Israel, where the Zionist Israeli pressure to drop Judeo-Arabic and adopt Hebrew was immense. Others immigrated to France, North America, and elsewhere; where they tended to assimilate to the local languages. Today, there is still a sizeable Jewish community in Morocco but most of the Jewish speech community there uses French rather than Moroccan Judeo-Arabic. There are still speakers of JudeoArabic in Israel (and elsewhere) and a show in Moroccan JudeoArabic is broadcast on Israeli radio. However, the population of its users is aging, and its use as a native ethnolect will probably disappear in the near future.

Pre-Islamic Literature The structure of the Arabic language is well-suited to harmonious word-patterns, with elaborate rhymes and rhythms. The earliest known literature emerged in northern Arabia around 500 AD and took the form of poetry, which was recited aloud, memorised and handed down from one generation to another. It began to be written down towards the end of the seventh century. The most celebrated poems of the pre-Islamic period were known as the muallaqat ("the suspended"), reputedly because they were considered sufficiently outstanding to be hung on the walls of the Kaaba in Mecca. The typical poem of this period is the qasidah (ode), which normally consists of 70-80 pairs of half-lines. Traditionally, they describe the nomadic life, opening with a lament at an abandoned camp for a lost love. The second part praises the poet's horse or camel and describes a journey, with the hardships it entails. The third section contains the main theme of the poem, often extolling the poet's tribe and vilifying its enemies. The period before the writing of the Quran and the rise of Islam is known to Muslims as Jahiliya or period of ignorance. Whilst this ignorance refers mainly to religious ignorance, there is little written literature before this time, although a significant oral tradition is postulated. The final decades of the late 6th century though begins to show the flowering of a lively written tradition. This tradition was captured over two centuries late with two important compilations of these poets: the Muallaqat and the Mufaddaliyat. These collections probably give us a biased picture of the writings of the time as only those poems regarded amongst the best are preserved and some of the poems may represent only the best part of a long poem.

282

Iraq

Classical Prose The birth of Arabic prose as a literary form is attributed to the Persian secretarial class who served under the Abbasid Caliphs (750-1256) in Baghdad. Ibn al-Muqaffa (died 757) was a convert to Islam who translated classical Persian works into Arabic. He became famous as the translator of Kalila and Dimna, a series of ancient India didactic fables in which two jackals offer moral and practical advice. AI-Jahiz (776-869) developed Arabic prose into a literary vehicle of precision and elegance. Born in Basra, he was noted for his wit and became one of Baghdad's leading intellectuals during the early Abbasid period. The most famous of his 200 works were: • Kitab al-Hayawan ("The Book of Animals"), an anthology of animal anecdotes. • Kitab al-Bayan wa al-TabYin ("The Book of Elucidation and Exposition"), ostensibly about rhetoric but also covering history and science. • Kitab al-Bukhala' ("The Book of Misers"), amusing but perceptive observations on psychology. Abu-al-Faraj al-Isfahani (c 897-967), from AIeppo, wrote Kitab al-Aghani ("The Book of Songs"), in 24 volumes. A model of simplicity and clarity in its writing, the book gives a comprehensive picture of Arab culture and society, including songs and poems which were popular in Baghdad under the Caliph Harun al-Rasheed. A vizir (government minister) of the time is said to have taken 30 camelloads of books whenever he travelled-until he received a copy of the Book of Songs. He then felt able to dispense with all the other books.

AI-Hamadhani (died 1008) is credited with inventing the genre known as maqamat ("assemblies")-dramatic anecdotes narrated by a witty but unscrupulous rogue which poke fun at all levels of society. Elaborately written in rhyming prose, they exploit the unique capabilities of the Arabic language to the full. Out of 400 Original maqamat, 52 survived. The trend towards linguistic virtuosity led, ultimately, to a triumph of form over content. Al-Hariri (c 1054-1122) took the maqamah to new heights (or extremes) in order to demonstrate his prowess with

Language and Literature

283

word-pla~

and his seemingly inexhaustible vocabulary. In one work, he used only those letters of the alphabet, which have no dots or do not join to the following letter in a word. Even so, for more than seven centuries, al-Hariri's maqamat were regarded as the greatest literary treasure of Arabic, after the Quran. According to some readers, wholesome moral values and subtle criticisms of the existing social order underlie al-Hariri's decorative language.

Poetry A large proportion of Arabic literature before the 20th century is in the form of poetry, and even that which is either filled with snippets of poetry or is in the form of saj or rhymed prose. The themes of the poetry range from high-flown hymns of praise to bitter personal attacks and from religious and mystical ideas to poems on sex and wine. An important feature of the poetry which would be applied to all of the literature was the idea that it must be pleasing to the ear. The poetry and much of the prose was written with the design that it would be spoken aloud and great care was taken to make all writing as mellifluous as possible. Indeed saj originally meant the cooing of a dove. Arabic poetry is based largely on harmonies of sound and striking turns of phrasing. Hence, most of the poems are brief; and a poet's fame depended upon a few brilliant couplets rather than on any sustained melody or long-continued flight of noble thought. One distinguished philosophical poem of some length is the well-known "Lament of the Vizier Abu Ismail." This, we give in full at the conclusion of this section; but mainly we must illustrate the finest flowering of Arabic verse by selecting specimens of characteristic brevity. Many of the Arab Caliphs inclined to the gaieties of life rather than to their religious dutie..>, and kept many poets around them. Indeed, some of the Caliphs themselves were poets: The Caliph Walid composed music as well as verse; and was hailed by his immediate companions as a great artist. His neglect of religion, however, was so reckless as to rouse the resentment of his people, and he lost his throne and life. Most noted of all the Arab poets was Mutanabbi (90S-96S). His fantastic imagery and extravagant refinements of language were held by his admirers to be the very perfection of literature. More than forty

284

Iraq

commentaries were written to explain the subtleties of his verse. Such, indeed, was the intensity of Mutanabbi's poetic ecstasy that he fancied himself a prophet and began to preach a new religion, until a term in plison persuaded him to cling to the accepted form of Islam. In one well-known passage, ridiculed by the great French critic, Huart, Mutanabbi says of an advancing army that it was so vast "The warriors marched hidden in their dust, They saw only with their ears." The commentators explain, perhaps unnecessarily, that this means that the warriors' senses were confused by all the tumult, so that while they thought they saw, in reality they only heard the clamour of the marchers around them. In translation, Mutanabbi's verses lose all value. Deprived of their Arabic melody they seem mere bombast and absurdity. This, in fact, is the general charge, which must be made against the later Arabic poetry. It too often degenerated into empty sound. No people in the world manifest such enthusiastic admiration for literary expression and are so moved by the word, spoken or written, as the Arabs. Modern audiences in Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo can be stirred to the highest degree by the recital of poems, only vaguely comprehended, and by the delivery of orations in the classical tongue, though it be only partially understood. The rhythm, the rhyme, the music, produce on them the effect of what they call "lawful magic" (sihr halal).

Arabic Literature Arabic literature is the writing produced, both prose and poetry, by speakers of the Arabic language. It does not usually include works written using the Arabic alphabet but not in the Arabic language such as Persian literature and Urdu literature. The Arabic word used for literature is adab which is derived from a word meaning "to invite someone for a meal" and implies politeness, culture and enrichment. Arabic literature emerged in the 6th century with only fragments of the written language appearing before then. It was the Quran in the 7th century which would have the greatest lasting effect on Arabic culture and its literature. Non-fiction Literature: In the late 9th century Ibn al-Nadim, a Baghdadi bookseller, compiled a crucial work in the study of Arabic

Language and Literature

285

literature. Kitab a/-Fihrist is a catalogue of all books available for sale in Baghdad and it gives a fascinating overview of the state of the literature at that time. One of the most common forms of literature during the Abbasid period was the compilation. These were collections of facts, ideas, instructive stories and poems on a single topic and covers subjects as diverse as house and garden, women, gate-crashers, blind people, envy, animals and misers. These last three compilations were written by al-Jahiz-the acknowledged master of the form. These collections were important for any nadim, a companion to a ruler or noble whose role was often involved regaling the ruler with stories and information to entertain or advise. A type of work closely allied to the collection was the manual in which writers like ibn Qutaibah offered instruction in subjects like etiquette, how to rule, how to be a bureaucrat and even how to write. Ibn Qutaibah also wrote one of the earliest histories of the Arabs, drawing together biblical stories, Arabic folk tales and more historical events. The subject of sex was frequently investigated in Arabic literature. The ghazal or love poem had a long history being at times tender and chaste and at other times rather explicit. In the Sufi tradition, the love poem would take on a wider, mystical and religious importance. Sex manuals were also written such as The Perfumed Garden, Tawq a/-hamamah or The Dove's Neckring by ibn Hazm and Nuzhat a/-albab fi-ma la yujad fi kitab or Delight of Hearts Concerning What will Never Be Found in a Book by Ahmad al-Tifashi. Countering such works are one like Rawdat a/-muhibbin wa-nuzhat a/-mushtaqin or Meadow of Lovers and Diversion of the Infatuated by ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah who advises on how to separate love and lust and avoid sin. Fiction Literature: There is comparatively little fictional prose in Arabic literature, although many non-fiction works contained short stories a large proportion of which were probably made up or embellished. The lack of wholly fictional works is in part due to a distinction between a-fusha or quality language and a/-ammiyyah or the language of the common people. Few writers would bother to write works in this a/-ammiyyah or common language and -it was felt that literature had to be improving,

286

Iraq

educational and with purpose rather the just entertainment. This did not stop the common role of the hakawati or story-teller who would retell the entertaining parts of more educational works or one of the many Arabic fables or folk-tales which were not usually written down. The one significant exception to the lack of fiction is the Thousand and One Nights, easily the best known of all Arabic literature and which still effects many of the ideas non-Arabs have about Arabic culture. Although regarded as primarily Arabic, it was in fact developed from a Persian work and the stories, in turn, may have their roots in India. A good example of the lack of popular Arabic prose fiction is that the stories of 'Aladdin' and 'Ali Baba', usually regarded as part of the Tales from One Thousand and One Nights, were not actually part of the Tales. They were first included in French translation of the Tales by Antoine Gallant who heard them being told by a traditional story-teller and only existed in incomplete Arabic manuscripts before that. The other great character from Arabic literatUre 'Sindbad' is from the Tales. The Thousand and One Nights is usually placed in the genre of Arabic epic literature along with several other works. They are usually, like the Tales, collections of short stories or episodes strung together into a long tale. The extant versions are mostly written down relatively late, after the 14th century, although many are undoubtedly collected earlier and many of the original stories are probably pre-Islamic. Types of stories in these collections included animal fables, proverbs, stories of Jihad or propagation of the faith, humorous tales, moral tales, tales about the witty countryman AIi Zaybaq and tales about the prankster Juha. Modern Literature

A revival took place in Arabic literature during the 19th century along with much of Arabic culture and it is referred to in Arabic as al-Nahda, or Renaissance. This resurgence of writing in Arabic was confined mainly to Egypt until the 20th century when it spread to other countries in the region. This Renaissance was not only felt within the Arab world but also beyond with a great interest in the translating of Arabic works into European languages. Although the use of the Arabic language was revived, many of the tropes of the

Language and Literature

287

previous literature which served to make it so ornate and complicated were .dropped. Also the western forms of the short story and the novel were preferred over the traditional Arabic forms. Just as in the 8th century when a movement to translate ancient Greek and other literature helped vitalise Arabic literature, another translation movement would offer new ideas and material for Arabic. An early popular success was The Count of Monte Cristo which spurred a host of historical novels on Arabic subjects. Two important translators were Rifaah al-Tahtawi and Jabra Ibrahim Jabra. Major political change in the region during the mid-20th century has caused problems for writers. Many have suffered censorship and some such as Sunallah Ibrahim and Abdul Rahman Munif have been imprisoned. At the same time, others who have written works supporting 01: praiseworthy of governments have been promoted to positions of authority within cultural bodies. Non-fiction writers and academics have also produced political polemics and criticism~ aiming to reshape Arabic politics. Some of the best-known are Taha Hussain's The Future of Culture in Egypt which was an important work of Egyptian nationalism and the works of Nawal al-Saadawi who campaigns for women's rights. Modem Arabic Novels: Characteristic of the nahda period of revival were two distinct trends. The Neo-Classical movement sought to rediscover the literary traditions of the past, and was influenced by traditional literary genres such as the maqama and the Thousand and One Nights. In contrast, the Modernist movement began by translating Western works, primarily novels, into Arabic. Individual authors in Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt created original works by imitating the classical maqama. The most prominent of these was al-Muwaylihi, whose book, The Hadith of Issa ibn Hisham, critiqued Egyptian society in the period of Ismail. This work constitutes the first stage in the development of the modern Arabic novel. This trend was furthered by Georgy Zeidan, a Lebanese Christian writer who immigrated with his family to Egypt following the Damascus riots of 1860. In the early twentieth century, Zeidan serialised his historical novels in the Egyptian newspaper al-Hilal. These novels were extremely popular because of their clarity of language, simple structure, and the author's vivid imagination. Two other important writers from this

288

Iraq

period were Khalil Gibran and Mikhail Naima, both of whom incorporated philosophical musings into their works. Nevertheless, literary critics do not consider the works of these four authors to be true novels, but rather indications of the form that the modern novel would assume. Many of these critics point to Zainab, a novc::l by Muhammad Hussain Haikal as the first true Arabic-language novel, while others point to Adraa Denshawi by Muhammad Tahir Haqqi as the first true novel. A common theme in the modern Arabic novel is studies of family life with obvious resonances with the wider family of the Arabic world. Naguib Mahfuz on the other hand depicts life inside a modern Arabic city, in this case Cairo, and his works won him a Nobel prize for literature in 1988. Many of the novels have been unable to avoid the politiCS and conflicts of the region with war often acting as background to small scale family dramas. Plays: Theatre and drama has only been a visible part of Arabic literature in the modern era. There may have been a much longer theatrical tradition but it was probably not regarded as legitimate literature and mostly went unrecorded. There is an ancient tradition of public performance amongst Shia Muslims of a play depicting the life and death of al-Hussain at the battle of Karbala in 680 CE. There are also several plays composed by Shams ai-din Muhammad ibn Daniyal in the 13th century when he mentions that older plays are getting stale and offers his new works as fresh material. Drama began to be written in the 19th century chiefly in Egypt and mainly influenced and in imitation of French works. It was not until the 20th century that it began to develop a distinctly Arab flavour and be seen elsewhere. The most important Arab playwright was Tawfiq al-Hakim whose first play was a retelling of the Quranic story of the Seven sleepers and the second an epilogue for the Thousand and One Nights. Other important dramatists of the region include Yusuf ai-Ani of Iraq and Sadallah Wannus of Syria.

Iraqi Literature Modern Iraq is an important cultural powerhouse of the Arab world. Iraqi poets have been in the forefront of contemporary Arabic culture. In the 1920s and 1930s Maruf al-Rusafi, Jamil Sidqi alZahawi. and Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri became prominent among

Language and Literature

289

the poets of the Arab world. All three wrote in the neoclassical style, with beautiful rhymes and strict rules of metre and verse. Rusafi wrote poems about the suffering of the Iraqi people and their struggle toward independence. Jawahiri drew close to the Communist Party in the 1940s and expressed strong anti-colonialist sentiment in his poetry. The early 1950s saw an explosion of poetic and other literary creativity in Iraq. Most prominent among the new generation of Iraqi poets, who engaged in blank or free verse poetry as opposed to the neoclassical style, were Badr Shakir al-Sayyab and Abd al-Wahhab al-Bayati. Both dedicated much of their poetry to Iraq, its societY, and its politics, and both engaged in symbolic-mystical writing, borrowing mythological themes from their country's ancient preIslamic history. A prominent female poet of the same generation is Nazik al-Malaika. The quality of Iraqi poetry seems to have deteriorated since the 1970s, when government control of culture became near absolute. Poets who chose to remain in Iraq were forced to write verses in praise of Iraqi dictator Hussein. However, many Iraqi poets also compose poetry in colloquial Arabic that many people enjoy. Their poetry is easily understood, even by people who cannot read, as it is only recited, never written. It fills radio and television broadcasts and has enthusiastic listeners. The most famous novelist in Iraq during the first half of the 20th century was Dhu ai-Nun Ayub,. whose stories evolved mostly around social issues. Iraq has produced a number of good playwrights, such as Khalid al-Shawaf, who wrote in the 1940s and 1950s, and Adil Kazim, who wrote in the 1960s and 1970s. From the late 1930s to the late 1960s most of Iraq's greatest writers were inclined toward the political left, some of them close to the Communist Party.

Arabic Writing The most outstanding Arabic writer of the 20th century is Naguib Mahfooz, a prolific Egyptian novelist, playwright, and screen-writer who won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1988. Other prominent writers from Egypt-which has long been the intellectual centre of the Arab world-include Taha Hussain and Tawfiq al-Hakim. Censorship and the lack of an educated readership have restricted literary activity in many countries. Although banned in Saudi Arabia

290

Iraq

and little known in the west, Cities of Salt by Abd ur-Rahman Munif is considered by many to be one of the greatest modern novels. It deals with the discovery of oil in a remote oasis, and the impact of American business and corrupt Arab rulers on the lives of the poor local community. Lebanon has produced an outstanding poet, Khalil Gibran, whose mystical poetry is widely read. Among women writers, Nawal alSaadawi is probably the best-known. A number. of modern writers have also emerged in the Meghrib (north Africa), though many of them write in French rather than Arabic.

Folk Literature Classical written Arabic was inaccessible to the illiterate masses and largely incomprehensible-even if read aloud-to those who knew only local dialects. This led to the development of oral folk literature in which professional story-tellers recounted popular talesoften adding new anecdotes and individual touches in the hope of collecting more money from their audience. Even today, story-tellers can be found in some parts of the Arab world-the Jama-al-Fna in Marrakesh is perhaps the best-known example. It is probably a dying tradition but some attempts are being made to revive it. Typically, these stories recount the adventures of tribal or national heroes. A recurrent theme is the struggle of an underdog against adversity and his eventual triumph. One genre is known as the sirah ("life" or "biography") and is often based on historical characters.

Turkish Literature Turkish belongs to the Altay branch of the Uralo-Altay linguistic family. Through the span of history, Turks have spread over a wide geographical area, taking thpir language with them. Turkish speaking people have lived in a wide area stretching from today's Mongolia to the north coast of the Black Sea, the Balkans, East Europe, Anatolia, Iraq and a wide area of northern Africa. Due to the distances involved, various dialects and accents have emerged. The history of the language is divided into three main groups, old Turkish (from the 7th to the 13th centuries), mid-Turkish (from the 13th to the 20th) and new Turkish from the 20th century onwards.

Language and Literature

291

During the Ottoman Empire period, Arabic and Persian words invaded the Turkish language and it consequently became mixed with three different languages. During the Ottoman period, which spanned five centuries, the natural development of Turkish was severely hampered. Then there was the "new language" movement. In 1928, five years after the proclamation of the Republic, the Latin one, which in turn speeded up the movement to rid the language of foreign words, replaced the Arabic alphabet. The Turkish Language Institute was established in 1932 to carry out linguistic research and contribute to the natural development of the language. As a consequence of these efforts, modern Turkish is a literary and cultural language developing naturally and free of foreign influences. The history of Turkish Literature may be divided into three periods, reflecting the history of Turkish civilization, as follows: the period up to the adoption of Islam, the Islamic period and the period under western influence. Turkish literature was the joint product of the Turkish clans and was mostly oral. The oldest known examples of Turkish writings are on obelisks dating from the late 7th and early 8th centuries. The Orhun monumental inscriptions written in 720 for Tonyukuk, in 732 for Kultigin and in 735 for Bilge Kagan are masterpieces of Turkish literature with their subject matter and perfect style. Turkish epics dating from those times include the Yaratilis, Saka, Oguz-Kagan, Gokturk, Uygur and Manas. The "Book of Dede Korkut", put down in writing in the 14th century, is an extremely valuable work that preserves the memory of that epic era in beautiful language. Following Turkish migrations into Anatolia in the wake of the Malazgirt victory in 1071, the establishment of various Beyliks in Anatolia and the eventual founding of the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires set the scene for Turkish literature to develop along two distinct lines, with "divan" or classical literature drawing its inspiration from the Arabic and Persian languages and Turkish folk literature still remaining deeply rooted in Central Asian traditions. Divan poets did not have independent philosophies; they were content to express the same ideas in different ways. The magnificence of the poet came from his artistry in finding original and beautiful forms of expression. The most famous of the Divan poets were Baki, Fuzuli, Nedim and Nefi. Initially based on two foreign literary traditions, Arab and Persian, literature gradually stopped being merely imitative

292

Iraq

and took on Ottoman national characteristics. To a certain extent, the TurkiSR folk literature, which has survived till our day, reflects the influence of Islam and the new lifestyle and form of the traditional literature of Central Asia after the adoption of Islam. Turkish folk literature comprised anonymous works of bard poems and Tekke (mystical religious retreats) literature. Yunus Emre who lived in the second half of the 13th and early 14th centuries was an epoch making poet and sufi (mystical philosopher) expert in all three areas of folk literature as well as divan poetry. Important figures of poetic literature were Karacaoglan, Atik Omer, Erzurumlu Emrah and Kayserili Seyrani. The Western Literature influenced Turkish Literature. Changes in social, economic and political life were reflected in the literature of the time and the quest for change continued till the proclamation of the Republic. The distinguishing characteristic of the era in literature was the concern with intellectual content rather than a esthetic values or perfection of style. The latest period in literature, which is known as the Turkish Literature of the Republican period, came to be influenced by the following literary schools after Divan literary styles had been abandoned: Tanzimat (reforms), Servet-e-Funun (scientific wealth), Fecr-e-Ati (dawn of the new age) and Ulusal Edebiyat (national literature). Leading figures in the first period (1860-1880) in Tanzimat literature were Sinasi, Ziya Pasa, Namik Kemal, and Ahmet Mithat Efendi. Leading figures dUring the second period (1880-1896) were Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem, Abdulhak Hamit, Sami Pasazade Sezai, and Nabizade Nazim. Tevfik Fikret, Cenap Sahabettin, Suleyman Nazif, Halit Ziya Usakligil, Mehmet Rauf, Hussain Cahit Yalcin and Ahmet Hikmet Muftuoglu are the important representatives of this trend. Others who adopted the western approach, but who were outside the group, were Ahmet Rasim and Hussain Rahmi Gurpinar who supported the new Turkish literature. The most interesting Fecr-e-Ati poet was Ahmet Hasim. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu and Refik Halit Karay who initially were in the Fecr-i-Ati at the start of their careers, attained their true literary identities later in the National Literature Movement. Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Yahya Kemal Beyatli initially followed independent courses and later joined the National Literature movement. The Tanzimat, Servet-e-Funun and Fecr-e-Ati groups who

Language and Literature

293

came together to create a modern Turkish literature made great strides towards this aim, but their works stopped short of being a national literature with distinctive characteristics. In spirit, it was French-oriented. in language and style it was traditional and Ottoman. National Literature was created between the years 1911 and 1923. The leading literary figures of the period were Ziya Gokalp, Omer Seyfettin, Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, Yusuf Ziya Ortac, Faruk Nafiz Camlibel, Enis Behic Koryurek, Kemalletin Kamu, Aka Gunduz, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, Halide Edip Adivar, Halit Karay, Resat Nuri Guntekin, Ahmet Hikmet Muftuoglu, Necip Fazil Kisakurek, Halide Nusret Zorlutuna, Sukufe Nihal, Peyami Safa, and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar. The Republic later encompassed practically all national literary figures in the fields of culture, ideology and literature. The first decade of the Republic bore the stamp of the National Literature movement, wherein the simple clear language, poetic forms and syllabic metre of folk literature and topics from Turkey were favoured. The topics, written in simple language, were taken from real life and mirrored the conditions of the country. A unity was created in which all artists: Islamic, Ottoman, traditionalist and individualist could be a part, because the issue was not the concept of the trend of national literature, but the period itself of national literature. Yahya Kemal Beyatli made his debut in 1912 and won fame during the War of Independence. Until the day he died he did not tire in his quest for pure poetry. Mehmet Akif Ersoy, often considered an Islamic poet, made a great impact on both intellectuals and the masses with his book of poetry "Safahat" (stages) in which he treats the poverty and underdevelopment of various cities (primarily Istanbul) and countries and the alien aims of the intellectuals. The first poets of the Republic used simple language and the syllabic metre. The advocates of the syllabic metre who won fame during the Truce Years were Orhan Seyfi Orhon, Yusuf Ziya Ortac, Faruk Nafiz Camlibel and Kemalettin Kamu, all poets who stressed themes from Anatolia and the lives of ordinary people in their poems. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar wrote intensely profound poems full of hidden meaning, adapting Paul Valery's poetic notions to the Turkish

294

Iraq

language. Ahmet Kutsi Tecer was inspired in his work by folk sources, while Necip Fazil Kisakurek expresse~ the mystic tendencies of the Anatolian people in his poems and plays, using the Turkish language skilfully in an original and modem style reflecting his colourful character. Nazim Hikmet Ran, who went to Russia when he was young and returned with Marxist-materialist convictions, wrote revolutionary poems using the aesthetic qualities of Turkish in a new way which bore the influence of Myakovsky. These poems were the beginning of a socialist trend which became common in Turkish literature in the 1960's. By contrast, Ahmet Muhip Dranas' poems reflected aesthetic considerations only. Arif Nihat Asya was original in the richness of spirit and style of his poems. Omer Seyfetlin, the founder and most successful representative of the short story tradition in Turkish literature became the most widely read author in the country when the 144th edition of his books was published. The writings of Sait Faik Abasiyanik and Sabahatlin Ali started two widely different trends. Sait Faik Abasiyanik picked on happenings in Istanbul with intense poetical feeling based on his own experiences. Sabahatlin Ali, on the other hand, had a materialistic philosophy and specialised in objective description of simple events. With these two writers, daily life and events, opinions and expectations began to be reflected in literature, a trend that was to intensify in the 1960's. Orhan Veli Kanik published his poems in a book entitled "Garip" in 1941, and two others who shared his style, Melih Cevdet Anday and Oktay Rifat, created a new poetic movement called "Garipciler", based on the elimination of such formal restrictions as metre, rhyme and analogy hitherto considered to be essential in poetry. They wanted poetry to become a simple expression of feelings. Orhan Veli's successful poems in free verse greatly influenced those who came after him. Cahit Sitki Taranci achieved the same simplicity through the use of metre and rhyme. Free verse spread rapidly. Asaf Halet Celebi, Fazil Husnu Daglarca and Behcet Necatigil were some of the successful representatives of this style. The most well-known and widely-read writers of the 1950-1990 period can be listed as follows: Tarik Dursun K., Atilla lhan, Yasar Kemcl, Orhan Kemal, Kemal Tahir, Tarik Bugra, Aziz Nesin, Mustafa Necati Sepetcioglu, Firuzan, Adalet Agaoglu, Sevgi Soysal, Tomris Uyar, Selim Ileri, Cevat Sakir (Halikarnas Balikcisi), Necati Cumali,

Language and Literature

295

Haldun Taner. Prominent poets in this period are: Behcet Kemal Caglar, Necati Cumali, Oktay Rifat, Melih Cevdet Anday, Cemal Sureya, Edip Cansever, Ozdemir Ince, Ataol Behramoglu, Ismet Ozel, Ece Ayhan, Turgut Uyar, Sezai Karakoc, Bahaettin Karakoc, Umit Yasar Oguzcan, Orhan Pamuk.

Dictator as Novelist According to news reports, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has just published his first novel, entitled "Zubayba wa al-Malak" (Zubayba and the King). The Iraqi President becomes the second Arab leader to join the realm of novelists and fiction writers, preceded only by Libyan Moamar al-Qaddafi, who published a collection of stories several years ago. The news item distributed by the French News Agency makes only a brief mention of the 160-page novel by Hussein. The novel, a tale from Arab heritage, calls for adhering to "national values," and refers to its author in the third person, with the cover proclaiming the work: "Riwayya Likatibiha" (A Novel for its Author). This statement reinforces the conviction that the author, referring to himself with a possessive pronoun, is none other than the Iraqi President! While reading how the President introduced the author of his novel, speaking about an Iraq "drawing out his sword to say: Oh, I am Iraq alone on the earth," I asked myself, why Presidents bother to write literature? Isn't the leader-Zaim (strongman}-feared? Isn't he content with his name, pictures, statues, and the loud cheers, which punish people's ears? Isn't he content with being immortalised through a mass of followers? Why does he approach death drawing out the pen and entering the maze of composition? Saddam Hussein had already recruited Iraqi novelists to write his life story. Poet Abd al-Amir ai-Mala won a prize for his portrayal of the President, and the biographical novel, "The Long Days," was published in two parts and subsequently made into a film directed by one of the most celebrated Egyptian directors, Toufic Salih. Salih coincidentally also directed the masterpiece, "AI-Makhdoun" (The Deceived). Even though an author had written his story and a director made it into a film, the President could not help but write about himself. He became convinced that another could not write what he wrote, so he sought immortality for himself as an author.

296

Iraq

Now, why should Iraqi literature go through the ordeal of swallowing a novel unlike any other literary work. Why do Arab leaders believe that literature is a source of immortality, and that they need to consummate their leadership with a novel? Wasn't the Iraqi President satisfied with forcing the director of "his" film to re-shoot some of the scenes to eliminate pain showing on the herds face? Reportedly, director Toufic Salih was forced, under orders from the Iraqi President, to re-shoot the scene of extracting a bullet from the hero-president's foot because the actor had made the mistake of showing a little human pain during the surgery, which was performed without anaesthesia. When the President saw the scene, he summoned the director and made him listen to the doctor who had treated him after his attempt to assassinate Colonel Abd al-Karim Qasim. The doctor vouched that Hussein's expressions did not indicate pain. This leader feels no pain, yet he wants to write: how does one write when he feels no pain? How does he write when he sees his country only as a mirror of himself? The leader does write. Today he appears on television, introducing his novel, and tomorrow an entourage of poets, authors, and critics come to shower him with praise for this unique literary work. Perhaps some genius will even suggest putting music to this novel. Why this penchant for writing literature among military coup leaders? We may find an explanation in the roots of coup movements, which began with authors or individuals interested in literature: Zaki al-Arsuzi, a co-founder of the Baath Party was a lingUist; Michel Aflaq, another co-founder of the same party was a story writer; and Antoun Saadeh, founder of the Syrian Nationalist Party, was a literary critic. However, the founders' generation retreated before a new generation of military officers who made the army their means to power. Despite the illogical progression, literature became somehow a field associated with the coup and dictatorship, perhaps because all writing in these regimes is like writing intelligence reports. We find a strange mixture between the writer and the intelligence analyst: these regimes had different stages in which creative writers first become intelligence report writers and then become authors. These two types of writing became interconnected in a strange way, and by the 1980s in Iraq, it reached the level of producing a Baathist theory of aesthetics.

Language and Literature

297

The literary world suffered in a terrifying way thanks to this strange combination: Egyptian authors were imprisoned; Iraqi writers lived between exile, prison, and assassination; literature in Syria knew a great decline; and in the Gulf regimes, monarchies, emirates, and sheikhdoms the censor is almost the sole author. This suffering resulted from military officers' illusion that they are a part of society's cultural sphere. Secondary school teachers who founded nationalist political parties found the officers to be outstanding students, while officers considered their teachers a mere rite in the passage to power. When the military seized power, it wanted literature to serve its goalbut what can literature do when the goals disappear, shrink, or even die? What can literature do about regimes that came to power to liberate Palestine and emancipate society, but in the end transformed their military defeats into a means to perpetuate the domination of society, destroying all social structures and changing the state into empty departments surrounding the only leader? When the leader finds himself surrounded by emptiness, bent heads, and false praise, he is forced to write himself. Small writers who belittle themselves and diminish their writing cannot narrate his thirst for power and glory. Thus, the leader narrates the story of himself by himself, inventing the words, composing books, and giving ideas to poets! In his solitude, the dictator sees his own pictures surrounding him; he has destroyed all other pictures. Imagine the scene: a man living in the midst of thousands of pictures, and all are the image he wants to portray of himself. The man lives in a forest of mirrors, doing as he wishes, hearing only his own voice. The whole country is a valley, sending bdck the echo of his voice. Imagine this man who feels like a god, able to do whatever he wishes; his words, which are at once on the tip of thousands of tongues, and finds his pictures everywhere. Then he seeks the moon and becomes mad, just as the Roman emperor Caligula did, or he will burn the world, just as Hitler did, or he will write literature as Arab leaders do! Perhaps the dictator is "forced" to write books, for the Arab novel has not come close to accurately portraying the surrealistic slave state that prevails in the Arab world. The novel remains outside of this terrifying maze. Excluding two attempts, Abd al-Rahman Munif's "City of Salts" and "Land of Darkness," the world of the mad state remains closed to writing.

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

11 Economy Following the 1968 Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party revolution, Iraq's government pursued a socialist economic policy. For more than a decade, the economy prospered, primarily because of massive infusions of cash from oil exports. Despite a quadrupling of imports between 1978 and 1980, Iraq continued to accrue current account surpluses in excess of US $ 10 billion per year. In 1980, on the eve of the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq held reserves estimated at US $ 35 billion. When Iraq launched the war against Iran in 1980, the Iraqis incorrectly calculated that they could force a quick Iranian capitulation and could annex Iranian territory at little cost in either men or money. Using a number of means, Iraq opted to keep the human costs of the war as low as possible, both on the battlefield and on the home front. In battle, Iraq attempted to keep casualties low by expending and by losing vast amounts of material. Behind the lines, Iraq attempted to insulate citizens from the effects of the war and to head off public protest in two ways. First, the government proVided a benefits package worth tens of thousands of dollars to the surviving relatives of each soldier killed in action. The government also compensated property owners for the full value of property destroyed in the war. Second, the government adopted a "guns and butter" strategy. Along with the war, the government launched an economic development campaign of national scope, employing immigrant labourers to replace Iraqi fighting men.

300

Iraq

In 1981, foreign expenditures not directly related to the war effort peaked at an all-time high of US $ 23.6 billion, as Iraq continued to import goods and services for the development effort, and construction continued unabated. Additionally, Iraq was paying an estimated US $ 25 million per day to wage the war. Although the Persian Gulf states contributed US $ 5 billion toward the war effort from 1980 to 1981, Iraq raised most of the money needed for war purposes by drawing down its reserves over several years. Iraq could not replenish its reserves because most of its oil terminals were destroyed by Iran in the opening days of the war. Iraqi exports dropped by 60 per cent in 1981, and they were cut further in 1982 when Syria, acting in accord with Iran, closed the vital Iraqi oil export pipeline running through Syrian territory. The total cost of the war to Iraq's economy was difficult to measure. A 1987 study by the Japanese Institute of Middle Eastern Economies estimated total Iraqi war losses from 1980 to 1985 at US $ 226 billion. This figure was disaggregated into US $ 120.8 billion in gross domestic product lost in the oil sector, US $ 64 billion GDP lost in the non-oil sector, US $ 33 billion lost in destroyed material, and US $ 8.2 billion lost in damage to non-oil sector fixed capital investment. Included in the lost GDP were US $ 65.5 in lost oil revenues and US $ 43.4 billion in unrealised fixed capital investment. As the 1980s progressed, ;the Iran-Iraq conflict evolved into a protracted war of attrition, in which Iran threatened to overwhelm Iraq by sheer economic weight and manpower. Although Iraq implemented some cost-cutting measures, the government feared that an austerity plan would threaten its stability, so it turned to outside sources to finance the war. Iraq's Persian Gulf neighbours assumed a larger share of the economic burden of the war, but as the price of oil skidded in the mid-1980s, this regional support of Iraq diminished. For the first time, Iraq turned to Western creditors to finance its deficit spending. Iraq's leadership calculated correctly that foreign lenders, both government and private, would be willing to provide loans and trade credit to preserve their access to the Iraqi economy, which would emerge as a major market and an oil supplier after the war. But the sustained slump in oil prices made foreign creditors more skeptical of Iraq's long-term economic prospects, and some lenders apparently concluded that providing more loans to Iraq

Economy

301

amounted to throwing good money after bad. Some creditors were also wary of Iraq's post-war prospects because of Iranian demands for tens of billions of dollars in reparations as the price for any peace settlement. Although Iraq would probably pay only a fraction of the reparations demanded (and that, most likely, with the help of other Persian Gulf countries), a large settlement would nonetheless delay Iraq's post-war economic recovery. In 1988, as the war entered its eighth year and Iraq's debt topped US $ 50 billion, the government was implementing comprehensive economic reforms it had announced in 1987. Iraq's new economic policy was designed to reverse twenty years of socialism by relinquishing considerable state control over the economy to the private sector. It was not immediately clear if this move would result in a fundamental and enduring restructuring of Iraq's economy, or if it was merely a stopgap measure to boost productivity, to cut costs, to tap private sector savings, and to reassure Western creditors. To establish even a marginally functioning economy out of the wreckage of Iraq would have been a daunting task. Despite decades of a heavily controlled, state-run economy; the deterioration caused by a succession of wars; a decade of international sanctions; and the looting and sabotage that followed the 2003 war, the US government set its sights high after toppling Saddam Hussein: to create a liberal, market-based Iraqi economy, a key piece of its broader goal to bring democracy to Iraq. Immediately afterSaddam's ouster, Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs John B. Taylor noted that the United States hoped to turn Iraq into a "well functioning market economy that is growing, creating jobs, and is promising a future" for the Iraqi people. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer Ill, the US civilian administrator of Iraq, added in May 2003 that "Iraq is open for business." Establishing a functioning market economy in Iraq was a cornerstone of the Bush administration's goals of bringing lasting prosperity to Iraq and creating a model that could lead to the spread of free markets throughout the Middle East. In addition, the United States hoped that a free-market Iraq would be a bonanza for US companies, providing a wide-open market for US investment. The challenge of remaking Iraq's economy was twofold: to transform a centralised economy into a market economy and to reconstruct a

302

Iraq

war-torn economy. In post-conflict countries, the task of rebuilding the economy is one of the central challenges intimately connected with security, governance, and justice, as Iraq showed all too clearly in the first year of the occupation. Reconstruction projects were delayed and, in some instances, halted because of Iraq's dire security situation: civilian workers were under attack and often could not travel outside heavily fortified compClunds; security and insurance costs ate away at the money available for programmes; and sabotage of key infrastructure often destroyed ongoing projects. Foreign investors refrained from investing, citing the lack of a legitimate Iraqi government and an unclear legal situation. Yet, the problem is cyclical: a lack of economic opportunity only fuels social and political instability. Prior to the US transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government on June 28, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) implemented some major regulatory and legal reforms that could lay the foundation for a transition to a market economy and present a welcome climate for business in Iraq within the next several years. Yet, the long-term impact of those reforms remained uncertain for three reasons. First, security problems and political instability in Iraq would continue to hamper economic reconstruction efforts, delaying rebuilding efforts and discouraging foreign investment. Second, because the CPA was an occupying power, the status of its legal reforms after June 28 was uncertain. Third-and related io the second-the CPA pursued its economic programme with minimal Iraqi input, calling into question whether an Iraqi government, particularly a representative one, would continue to pursue the CPA's goals and policies. Moreover, even if an Iraqi government respected the CPA's laws on paper, Iraq's institutions and enforcement mechanisms might not be stror.:J enough to ensure their survival in practice in a country and region traditionally hostile to some of the changes the CPA imposed, such as allowing foreign ownership of Iraqi assets. Ultimately, it would not be the CPA's legal and regulatory reforms but rather what Iraq's new interim government and the transitional government do to usher in a market economy in the coming years that would be the real determinant of the future of Iraq's economy. Transforming Iraq into a market economy is particularly challenging because the features that made Iraq function as a command

Economy

303

economy are precisely the opposite of those needed for a market economy. Iraq as a command economy lacked any of the legal, regulatory, political, and economic institutions that form the basis of market economies. Saddam's command economy had its relatively successful moments: Before 1990, Iraq was one of the most prosperous and economically advanced countries in the Arab world, boasting a sizeable middle class; technical capacity; and, compared to other Middle Eastern countries, relatively high standards of education and health care, as well as high numbers of women educated and contributing to the economy. Iraq's fortunes began to change, however, in the 1990s, particularly after the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, which followed closely on the heels of the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. The wars, compounded by the crippling international sanctions regime imposed by the United Nations after the Gulf War, seriously damaged Iraq's infrastructure and closed off Iraq's economy from the rest of the world. Since the early 1980s, Iraq's economic indicators had tended severely downward. Iraq's annual per capita income in the early 1980s was an estimated $ 3,600; by 2001, it had dropped to $ 770-1,000. since 1980, Iraq had suffered absolute declines in its gross domestic product, chronic inflation, a depreciated currency, and a lack of foreign investment. Further, it had accumulated a crippling international debt burden. When the United States entered Iraq with grandiose plans to remake the economy in 2003, it had expected to find decent infrastructure; but the international community, including international financial institutions, had been largely absent from Iraq since the early 1990s, meaning there was little reliable data available about Iraq's economy. The Bush administration's unreasonably high expectations about the state of Iraq's infrastructure were but one example of its failure to plan and prepare adequately for the postwar phase in Iraq. In reality, the United States found an economy that essentially needed to be re-built from scratch, crushed by decades of wars, sanctions, and atrophy due to Saddam's neglect of the population's needs. Because the United States seriously underestimated the state of Iraq's economy, it did not plan adequately for key tasks such as restarting the power, supplying water, and creating jobs. Delays in addressing these needs, in turn, complicated US efforts to win over Iraqis' hearts and minds, thus contributing to the violence that increased as the occupation wore on.

304

Iraq

Economic Growth and Structure In the 1960s, investment in industry accounted for almost one-quarter of the development budget, about twice the amount spent under the monarchy in the 1950s. After the 1968 Baath revolution, the share allocated to industrial development grew to about 30 per cent of development spending. With the advent of the Iran-Iraq War, however, this share decreased to about 18 per cent. Development expenditure on agriculture fell from about 40 per cent under the pre-revolutionary regime to about 20 per cent under the Baath regime in the early 1970s. By 1982, investment in agriculture was down to 10 per cent of the development budget. Total Iraqi GDp, as well as sectoral contribution to GDp, could only be estimated in the 1980s. On the eve of the Iran-Iraq War, the petroleum sector dominated the economy, accounting for two-thirds of GDP. The outbreak of war curtailed oil production, and by 1983 petroleum contributed only one-third of GDP. The non-petroleum sector of the economy also shrank, and, as a consequence, total real GDP dropped about 15 per cent per year from 1981 to 1983. To a lesser extent, nominal GDP also shrank, from about US $ 20 billion to US $ 18 billion, an indication of high wartime inflation. The decline in GDP was reversed between 1984 and 1986, when oil production grew at about 24 per cent per year as the government secured outlets and resumed exports. But over the same period, the non-petroleum sector of the economy continued to contract by about 6 per cent per year, offsetting gains from increased oil production. In 1986, the petroleum sector revived to the extent that it contributed about 33.5 per cent of GDp, while the non-petroleum sector, including services, manufacturing and agriculture accounted for the remainder. Business services, the largest component of non-petroleum GDp, amounted to about 23 per cent of GDP. Agriculture accounted for p.bout 7.5 per cent of GDp, mining and manufacturing for slightly less than 7 per cent, construction for almost 12 per cent, transportation and communications for about 4.5 per cent, and utilities for between 1 and 2 per cent. The total estimated GDP for 1986 was equivalent to US $ 35 billion. Projections based on economic trends indicated that total GDP would grow about 6 per cent annually over the five-year period from 1987 to 1991. In fact, however, 1987 GDP was estimated at a

Economy

305

1.7 per cent real growth rate. The petroleum sector would continue to grow, although at a slower rate of about 8 per cent per year, and it would account for more than half of GOP. The non-petroleum sector was expected to resume modest growth in 1987. Construction would be the fastest growing sector, at about 7 per cent per year. Agriculture would grow only marginally, and therefore its share of overall GOP would decline from 1986 levels. Other non-petroleum sectors would grow at a rate of between 3 and 4 per cent per year and, because these projected growth rates were smaller than the overall GOP growth rate, would likewise decline as a percentage of total GOP. In early 1988, Iraq's total external liabilities were difficult to determine accurately because the Iraqi government did not publish official information on its debt. Moreover, Iraqi debt was divided into a number of overlapping categories according to the type of lender, the terms of disbursement or servicing, and the disposition of the funds. For example, some loans were combined with aid grants in mixed credits, and some loans were authorised but never disbursed. And, in a process of constant negotiation with its creditors, Iraq had deferred payment by rescheduling loans. Finally, some loans were partially repaid with oil in counter-trade and barter agreements. Nevertheless, experts estimated that Iraqi debt in 1986 totalled between US $ 50 billion and US $ 80 billion. Of this total, Iraq owed about US $ 30 billion to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf states. Most of this amount was derived from crude oil sales on Iraq's behalf. Iraq promised to provide reimbursement in oil after the war, but the Gulf states were expected to waive repayment. A second important category of debt was that owed to official export credit agencies. The authoritative Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates estimated in 1986 that Iraqi debt guaranteed by export credit agencies totalled US $ 9.3 billion, of which US $ 1.6 billion was short-term debt and US $ 7.7 billion was medium-term debt. In the category of private sector debts, Iraq owed up to US $ 7 billion to private companies that had not secured the trade credit they extended to Iraq with their government export credit agencies. The firms that were owed the most were based in Turkey, in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and in India, which lacked access to official

306

Iraq

export credit guarantees. European companies were also owed large amounts. By the late 1980s, Iraq had placed a priority on settling these private sector debts. In addition, Iraq owed an estimated US $ 6.8 billion to commercial banks as of mid-1986, although much of this sum was guaranteed by government export credit agencies. In the realm of government debts, Iraq had accrued considerable debts to Western governments for its purchases of military material. Iraq owed France more than US $ 1.35 billion for weapons, which it was repaying by permitting Elf-Aquitaine and Compagnie Fransaise des Petroles-Total (CFP)-two oil companies affiliated with the French government-to lift 80,000 barrels of oil per day from the Dortyol terminal near Iskenderun, Turkey. Finally, Iraq owed money to the Soviet Union and to East European nations. Iraq's debt to the Soviet Union was estimated at US $ 5 billion in 1987.

Reconstructing the Economy Amid political instability and violence, Iraq's economic problems have been viewed as secondary and unrelated. Economic hardship and violence (political and criminal) feed on each other: heightened popular dis-satisfaction and unemployment swell insurgent ranks and the growing insurgency further hampers development. Without genuine reconstruction and a sustained recovery plan, any political success will be short-lived. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) performance fell far short of expectations and needs and offers a fragile, dysfunctional legacy on which to build. The Interim Iraqi Government, its still-tocome elected successor, and the international community can ill afford to repeat its mistakes. Lack of security has been important and will continue to hinder economic activity. Kidnappings, assassinations and travel restrictions discouraged reconstruction and investment and led many non-Iraqis to withdraw. Attacks on oil facilities further disrupted the economy. Assessments of what went wrong also must recognise the difficulties of rebuilding an economy ravaged by Baathist misrule, war, and sanctions. But obstacles have not been of a security nature alone or wholly due to the Baathist legacy. The CPA made a hard jOD harder. For the most part, the occupation forces came without a plan. What strategy they had benefited from little if any Iraqi input, was heavily

Economy

307

shaped by ideology and repeatedly subject to Washington's political deadlines. ePA plans for complete economic overhaul quickly encountered stiff opposition by Iraqis intent on their own long-term strategy; shifting course, the ePA took ad hoc decisions, leaving unresolved crucial policy questions for fear of triggering even greater discontent. Thus, it was originally fixated on large-scale privatisation but, facing Iraqi hostility, neither privatised nor relinquished the objective. As a result, it failed to devise an alternative approach that might have revived ailing state companies so they could be used to find temporary jobs for the unemployed. The 15 November, 2003, turnaround accelerating the transfer of sovereignty led officials to re-adjust plans abruptly and emphasise projects they could complete, without regard to how they fitted an overall reconstruction strategy or whether they addressed Iraqis' immediate needs. US bureaucratic infighting and high staff turnover and inexperience added to the obstacles. Inadequate transparency and accountability in the contracting process combined with real or alleged corruption has fed distrust of both occupation authorities and Iraqi institutions. The point of listing failings is to learn from them. A sovereign Interim Government and eventually an elected one may be better positioned to correct m is-steps; more legitimate institutions may be better able to address everyday needs. But even if the process is smooth and viewed as credible by Iraqis-a considerable "if" -this will be a partial answer. Many issues that vexed the ePA remain. The Interim Government, for example, will be reluctant to make broad economic changes lest it be accused of usurping an elected government's prerogatives. As Lebanon's precedent shows, allocating power and positions along ethnic/sectarian lines risks encouraging a parallel apportionment of public jobs and resources, with corruption and malfeasance as by-products. Nor have the occupation authorities truly disappeared: the US remains powerful and, importantly, controls most reconstruction funds. The Interim Government's fundamental challenge is to devise a coherent reconstruction strategy that focuses on immediate material improvement and sets the stage for longerterm sound rebuilding while avoiding a socio-economic crisis and its attendant political

308

Iraq

implications. This means protecting and creating jobs; far greater involvement by Iraqis-including civil society, local councils, trade unions and associations-at the local level; and structural steps (such as decentralisation, and a strengthened, independent media and judiciary) to curtail corruption. The international community's full and swift help is needed. Increased assistance will not suffice; aid institutions, particularly those carrying out reconstruction projects on behalf of the US government, should reconsider their approach. Project-driven, externally designed aid is not the answer. Instead, the international community should work with Iraqi institutions to design a comprehensive economic development plan that seeks citizen input, emphasises decentralisation, job creation and alleviation of socio-economic distress, and includes a powerful transparency and anti-corruption component. Giving Iraq a real chance to recover also requires a clean break with the financial legacy of the Baathist regime-not full and total repudiation, but a significant write-off of debt and war reparations obligations through a smart combination of moratoriums, debt reduction, and preferential treatment of creditors in reconstruction projects.

Socio-economic Development The modern -Iraqi economy has been largely dependent on oil exports, as well as on extensive imports of machinery and other inputs for economic growth. The dependence on imports has of course increased over the past decade, given that funds made available through the Oil for Food Programme have been restricted to imports since 1997. Imported equipment and supplies have become especially visible over the past few years: shiny new garbage trucks, highprotein biscuits, air-conditioners. In 1989, the oil sector comprised 61 per cent of GDP, services came second with 22 per cent of GDp, then industry with 12 per cent, and agriculture with 5 per cent. It is difficult to form a clear quantitative picture of the Iraqi economy today. Clearly, oil is even more of an economic mainstay than in the past, given sanctions-related restrictions on trade, since it is the major source of foreign exchange and government revenue. However, analysts point out that the oil sector does not have strong horizontal and vertical linkages with the rest

Economy

309

of the economy, and that the scale of oil production does not exert significant direct influence on other sectors. Other sources of Government revenue include organised "religious tourism" with Iran, which reportedly brings in around $ 2.7 million in hard currency each month, and oil-for-goods and services barter trade with Turkey and Jordan. In addition, the Government has recently introduced service fees to cover costs. For example, hospitals are now supposed to cover half their budget from fees, and to pay for maintenance and new construction themselves. Government continues to be responsible for providing equipment and supplies. A separate fee structure applies to low-income groups. In recent months, the Government has reportedly distributed 300,000 plots of land to citizens, which are now being registered. Construction of homes on this land would help to jump-start the economy, given that this is a sector that uses local materials and skills. In 1989, GNP was about 14 billion Iraqi dinars at constant 1980 prices. This then declined at a rate of approximately 23 per cent until it reached 2.9 billion dinars in 1995. After fluctuating, GNP rose to 4.3 billion in 1996, in the wake of a redirection of economic policy, including reduction of non-essential spending, and inflation was brought under control. A worrying issue for the population's future well-being is that Iraq's pre-Gulf War debts are now said, according to various estimates, to total between $ 130 and $ 180 billion, which will burden the economy even in the absence of sanctions unless the debts are renegotiated and rescheduled. Moreover, no figure has been set on the ultimate amount of reparations Iraq' is expected to pay; since the MOU was signed, 30 per cent of the oil revenue was set aside for reparations, however, in SCR 1330 this was reduced to 25 per cent. Unemployment is 1987 was estimated at 4.49 per cent, with female unemployment of 7.28 per cent higher than male unemployment of 4.13 per cent. By 1997, female unemployment was reported to have doubled, reaching 17.6 per cent; reasons included the drop in GNP and the pressing need for more family income, which led to an increase in the number of women looking for work. In any case, even those who are employecl- seek second and third jobs. Teachers, whose :;alaries are as low as $ 3 a month, doctors, and civil servants seek income where they can find it, driving

310

Iraq

taxis, givtng special lessons, or opening private practice. Children are also being forced into the workforce due to family need. The last data on children's work dates to 1987, when 442,349 children aged 7 -19 were estimated to be in the workforce, of whom the majority389,429-were in the 15-19 age range. Even though figures are hard to come by today, there is a visible rise in the number of children selling goods on the streets, and in the number of child beggars, a recent phenomenon. For most Iraqis, household food security has been dependent on the rations they receive from Government, a system put in place after the Gulf crises. Prior to the MOU and after sanctions were put in place, the Government provided rations of some 1,093 calories per person, approximately 40 per cent of daily requirements. After the MOU, rations were increased to 2,030 calories in Phase I, and further improved to 2,472 calories in Phase VIII. However, the proportion of income spent on food is still around 72 per cent of the average household income, because monthly food rations only last two thirds of the month according to an FAOIWFP mission in April 2000 and because of low personal incomes. Average salaries only range between $ 3 and $ 6 a month. Sectors critical to the population's well-being-electricity, water and sanitation, health, and education-have yet to recover from the damage of two wars both in terms of physical plant and human capacity. Roads are still of high quality, and bridges and many Government buildings have been repaired. There is some new construction of schools, mosques and other facilities. However, the overall trends are of steep decline. It is important to keep in mid that the sanctions were imposed on a country that had just had its infrastructure seriously damaged in a devastating war in 1991. It was only after 1996, five years later, that some mitigation of the effects of sanctions took place. Efforts to alleviate the effect of sanctions concentrated on the humanitarian needs of the population, and did not address the massive investment necessary to overhaul the country's infrastructure. The evidence points to the impact of sanctions on the population's well-being and on the national economy. By all accounts, even during the 8 years of war with Iran, the country's overall development was not dramatically affected, and the Government continued to

Economy

311

invest heavily in social services. By 1990, primary health care reached about 97 per cent of the urban population and 78 per cent of the rural population; primary school attendance reached about 83 percent. Even after the war with Iran, Iraq was ranked 50th out of 130 countries on the 1990 UNP Human Development Index, which measures national achievements in health, education, and per capita GDP. It was close to the top of the "medium human development" category, a reflection of the Government's continued investment in basic social services. By 1995, Iraq had slipped to 106th out of 174 countries, and by 2000 it had plummeted to 126th, behind Bolivia, Mongolia, Egypt, and Gabon, close to the bottom of the medium human development category. According to the HDI, an Iraqi born in 1987, could expect to live 65 years. But whereas citizens in neighbouring Jordan saw their life expectancy improve from 67 years in 1987 to 70.4 years in 1998, life expect~ncy in Iraq dropped to 63.8. Whereas Jordan saw its literacy rate rise from 75 per cent in 1985 to 88.6 per cent in 1998, Iraq's dropped from 89 per cent to 73.5 per cent. In the 1990 HDI, Iraq ranked three places above Jordan. By 2000, it ranked 34 places below. Medical specialists note that a country, which had infant mortality in the range of 40 to 60 per 1,000 live births, as Iraq did in 1990, should by now have an infant mortality rate of between 20 and 30 per 1,000 live births. However, infant mortality in South/Centre Iraq rose to 107 per 1,000 live births between 1995-99. It compares the situation regarding infant mortality in Iraq to that of other countries over the past decade. As there has been no major change in government in Iraq since 1978, one can only conclude that if the Government had had the resources, it would have invested in social services, as in the past. This erosion of human development-which one can effectively term "de-development"-therefore appears attributable to the lasting effects of the crises of 1990/91 including the resulting sanctions regime, inspite of the attempts by the Security Council to alleviate the impact on the population. De-development on such a scale is unprecedented, and it will require decades of investment for the people of Iraq to reach the point at which they were in 1989.

312

Iraq

Post-World War 11 Period With the end of World War II, IPC and its affiliates underto ok repair and development of facilities in Iraq as rapidly as financing and materials became available. Exploration and drilling were pressed, particularly in the Basra and the Mosul areas, to meet concession terms. Although considered a priority, the elimination of transport constraints was a setback when a larger second, nearly completed pipeline to Haifa was abando ned in 1948 as a result of the first Arab-Israeli war. Use of the existing Haifa line was also discontinued. In 1951, however, commercial exports by the BPC of good quality crude began via a new pipeline to Al-Faw, on the Persian Gulf. Exports were boosted further with the completion in 1952 of a thirty-inch pipeline linking the Kirkuk fields to the Syrian port of Baniyas, which had a throughput capacity of 13 million tons per year. In that year, production from Basra and Mosul approa ched 2.5 million tons while the Kirkuk fields increased production to more than 15 million tons. In the span of a year (1951-52), total Iraqi oil production had doubled to almost 20 million tons. Iraqi officials still harboured ambitions, dating back to the 1920 San Hemo Conference, to take control of their nation's oil resources. The elimination of transportation bottlenecks and the subseq uent rapid growth of exports encouraged Iraqi assertiveness. IPC's costly, irretrievable investments in Iraq's oil infrastructure gave the government even greater leverage. One particularly sore point among the Iraqis concer ned IPC's contractual obligation to meet Iraq's domestic requirements for gasoline and other petroleum products. An IPC subsidiary operate d a small refinery and distribution compa ny based near Kirkuk that supplied two-thirds of Iraq's needs. But IPC imported the remaining third from a large refinery in Abadan, Iran. Iraq considered this arrange ment politically imprudent, a judgment that was vindicated when, in the early 1950s, Iranian production was cut during that country's oil industry nationalisation crisis. In 1951, the Iraqi govern ment took over, with compensation, the small Kirkuk refinery and hired a United States contractor to build a refinery near Baghdad. This represented Iraq's first concrete step toward taking control of the oil industry. In 1952, Iraq followed the examples of Venezuela and of Saudi Arabia by deman ding and receiving a 50 per cent tax on all oil

Economy

313

company profits made in the country. The tax more than doubled Iraqi profits per ton on exported oil. The 1958 Iraqi revolution had little effect at first on the government's attitude toward IPC. The government needed the oil revenues generated by IPC; moreover, Iran's experience when it nationalised its oil industry was a vivid reminder to the Iraqis of the power the oil companies still wielded. In 1959 and in 1960, surpluses led the international oil companies to reduce the posted price for Middle Eastern oil unilaterally, which reduced government revenues significantly. IPC's policy of exploiting and developing only 0.5 per cent of the total concessions it held in Iraq, and of holding the remainder in reserve also reduced Iraqi revenues. Perhaps in response to the general situation, Iraq convened a meeting in Baghdad of the major oil-producing nations, which resulted in the September 1960 formation of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In December 1961, the Iraqi government enacted Law No. 80, which resulted in the expropriation of all of the IPC group's concession area that was not in production. The expropriation iocked the government and the oil companies in a controversy that was not resolved for more than a decade. The companies had two paramount objectives in seeking to mitigate the law's effect. One was to regain control of the concession to the North Rumaylah field in southern Iraq, which was expected to be a major source of oil. In particular, the companies did not want competitors to gain access to it. The companies' second major objective was to limit the impact of Iraq's actions on IPC concession agreements in other oil-exporting nations. In February 1964, the government established the state-owned Iraq National Oil Company (lNOC) to develop the concession areas taken over from IPC. INOC was eventually granted exclusive rights by law to develop Iraq's oil reserves; granting concessions to other oil companies was forbidden, although INOC could permit IPC and other foreign companies to participate in the further development of existing concessions. Nevertheless, IPC continued to lift the bulk of Iraqi oil from the Kirkuk field that it had retained, and, more important, to export and to market it. IPC therefore remained the arbiter of existing, if not potential, Iraqi oil production. Iraq's disillusionment with newly formed OPEC began just after the enactment of Law 80. Iraq applied pressure on OPEC to adopt

314

Iraq

a unified negotiating stance vis-a-vis the oil companies. Instead, OPEC members negotiated separately. This allowed the oil companies to extract concessions that permitted them to switch production away from Iraq and therefore to pressure Iraq with the prospect of lower oil revenues. Iraq's relationship with IPC was further aggravated in 1966, when Syria raised transit fees on the pipeline that carried twothirds of Iraqi oil to port and demanded retroactive payments from IPC. When IPC refused to pay, Syria closed the pipeline for several months, an action that cost the Iraqi government much revenue. The eight-year shutdown of the Suez Canal that followed the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War increased the importance of Mediterranean oil producers because of their proximity to European markets. In 1970, Libya took advantage of this situation to win higher prices for its oil. Iraq, which was in the unusual position of exporting oil through both the Gulf and the Mediterranean, demanded that it be paid for its oil at the Libyan price. IPC countered that Iraqi oil, because of its higher sulphur content, was inferior to Libyan oil. Meanwhile, exports of Iraqi oil via the Mediterranean began to decline, which IPC attributed to falling tanker rates that made Gulf oil more competitive. Iraq, however, interpreted the declining exports as pressure from the oil companies. In general, Iraq believed that IPC was intentionally undercharging customers for oil it sold on behalf of Iraq and was cutting back Iraqi production to force Iraq to restore the nationalised concession areas. In response, Iraq attempted to make INOC a viable substitute for IPC. The INOC chairman of the board was given cabinet rank and greater authority, but INOe's activities were hampered by lack of experience and expertise. Iraq, therefore, sought assistance from countries considered immune to potential IPC sanctions and to retaliation. In 1967, INOC concluded a service agreement with Entreprise des Recherches et des Activites Petrolieres (ERAP)-a company owned by the French government--covering exploration and development of a large segment of southern Iraq, including offshore areas. Some foreign observers doubted that the terms of the arrangement were more favourable than IPC's terms, but more important from Iraq's point of view, the ERAP agreement left control in Iraqi hands. By 1976, ERAP started pumping the oil it had discovered, at which point INOC took over operation of the fields

Economy

315

and began delivering the oil to ERAP. In 1967, INOe tapped the Soviet Union for assistance in developing the North Rumaylah field. The Soviet Union provided more than US $ 500 million worth of tied aid for drilling rigs, pumps, pipelines, a deep-water port on the Persian Gulf, tankers, and a large contingent of technicians. In 1972, the North Rumaylah field started production and produced nearly 4 million tons of crude. In the same period, Iraq obtained aid from French, italian, Japanese, Indian, and Brazilian oil companies under service contracts modelled on the 1967 ERAP agreement. The service contracts, which Iraq did not regard as concessions, allowed the foreign oil companies to explore and to develop areas in exchange for bearing the full costs and the risks of development. If oil were discovered, the companies would turn their operations over to INOe, which would sell them the oil at a discounted rate. Iraq's increasing ability to manage its petroleum resources finally induced IPe to negotiate. In 1972, IPe promised to increase its production in Iraq and to raise the price it paid for Iraqi oil to the Libyan level. In return, IPe sought compensation for its lost concession areas. Iraq rejected this offer and, on June 1, 1972, nationalised IPC's remaining holdings in Iraq, the original Kirkuk fields. A stateowned company, the Iraqi Company for Oil Operations (IeOO), was established to take over IPe facilities. BPe was allowed to continue its operations. In February 1973, Iraq and IPe settled their claims and counterclaims. IPe acknowledged Iraq's right to nationalise and agreed to pay the equivalent of nearly US $ 350 million to Iraq as compensation for revenue lost to Iraq over the years when IPe was selling Iraqi oil. In return, the government agreed to provide to IPe, free of charge, 15 million tons of Kirkuk crude, valued at the time at over US $ 300 million, in final settlement of IPe claims. Some observers believed that IPe had received a liberal settlement. The October 1973, Arab-Israeli War impelled the Iraqis to take complete control of their oil resources, and Iraq became one of the strongest proponents of an Arab oil boycott of Israel's supporters. Although Iraq was subsequently criticised by other Arab countries for not adhering to the agreed-upon production cutbacks, Iraq nationalised United States and Dutch interests in BPe. By 1975, all remaining

316

Iraq

foreign interests were nationalised. Rfty-three years after the humiliating San Remo agreement, Iraq had finally gained complete sovereignty over its most valuable natural resource. Throughout the mid-to late-1970s, increases in the price of oil caused Iraqi oil revenues to skyrocket even as production fluctuated. Iraq funnelled much of this revenue into expanding the oil industry infrastructure. Refinery capacity was doubled, and in 1977 a key pipeline was completed from the Kirkuk fields across Turkey to a Mediterranean terminal at Dortyol. In 1976, the structure of the Iraqi oil industry was revamped. A new Ministry of Oil was established to direct planning and construction in the petroleum sector and to be responsible for oil refining, gas processing, and internal marketing of gas products through several subsidi ary organis ations. INOC would be responsible for the production, transport, and sale of crude oil and gas. Some of its operations were contracted out to Foreign Service companies. The State Organisation for Northern Oil (SONO), subordinate to INOC, replaced ICOO as the operating company in the northern fields. In subseq uent reorganisations, SONO was rename d the Northe rn Petroleum Organisation (NPO), and a Central Petroleum Organisation (CPO), as well as a Southern Petroleum Organisation (SPO) were also established. The State Organisation of Oil Projects (SOOP) took over responsibility for infrastructure from INOC, and the State Organisation for Marketing Oil (SOMO) assumed responsibility for oil sales, leaving INOC free to oversee oil production.

Role of Gover nment FollOWing the Baath Party's accession to power in 1968, the government began using central planning to manag e the national economy. The governmenl separated its expenditures into three categories: an annual expenditure budget for government operations, an annual investment budget to achieve the goals of the five-year plans, and an annual import budget. Economic plannin g was regard ed as a state prerog ative, and thus econom ic plans were considered state secrets. The government rarely pubJished budget or planning information, although information on specific projects, on total investment goals, and on productivity was occasionally released.

Economy

317

Extremely high revenues from oil exports in the 1970s made budgeting and development planning almost irrelevant in Iraq. The responsibility of the state was not so much to allocate scarce resources as to distribute the wealth, and economic planning was concerned more with social welfare and subsidisation than with economic efficiency. One consistent and very costly development goal was to reduce the economy's dependence on a single extractive commodityoil-and, in particular, to foster heavy industry. Despite this objective, in 1978, the government began an attempt to rationalise the nonoil sector. The process of cost-cutting and streamlining entailed putting a ceiling on subsidisation by making state-run industries and commercial operations semi-autonomous. The expenditures of such public entities were not aggregated into the governmental expenditure budget. Instead, state-run companies were given their own budgets in an attempt to make them more efficient. Because Iraqi economic development planning was predicated on massive expenditure, the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 brought central planning to an impasse. Despite an effort to maintain the momentum of its earlier development spending, the government was forced to revert to ad hoc planning as it adjusted to limited resources and to deficit spending. Economic planning became not just a perceived national security issue, but a real one, as the government devoted its attention and managerial resources to obtaining credits. The Fourth Five~ear Plan (1981-85) was suspended, and as of early 1988, the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1986-90) had not been formulated. In early 1987, President Saddam Hussein abruptly reversed the course of Iraq's economic policy, deviating sharply from the socialist economic ideology that the government had propounded since the 1968 Baath revolution. Saddam Hussein advocated a more open, if not free. market, and he launched a programme of extensive reform. Because the liberalisation was aimed primarily at dealing with the nation's mounting and increasingly unmanageable war debt, Saddam Hussein's motivation was more strategic than economic. He had four related goals-to conserve money by cutting the costs of direct and of indirect government subsidies, t6 tap private sector savings and to stem capital outflow by offering credible investment opportunities to Iraqi citizens, to reduce the balance of payments

318

Iraq

deficit by fostering import substitution and by promoting exports, and to use the reforms to convince Western commercial creditors to continue making loans to Iraq. The reform process began with Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Decree Number 652, which in May 1987 abolished Iraq's labour law. This law had institutionalised the differences among white collar, blue collar, and peasant workers. Under the law, every adult had been guaranteed lifetime employment, but workers had almost no freedom to choose or to change their jobs or places of employment, and they had little upward mobility. One result was that labour costs in Iraq accounted for 20 per cent to 40 per cent of output, compared to about 10 per cent in similar industries in non-socialist economies. Nonproductive administrative staff accounted for up to half the personnel in state-run enterprises, a much higher proportion than in private sector companies in other countries. The government immediately laid off thousands of white-collar workers, most of whom were foreign nationals. Thousands of other white-collar civil servants were given factory jobs. Previously, all state blue collar-workers had belonged to government-sponsored trade unions, while unions for private sector employees were prohibited. After the labour law was abolished, the situation was reversed. Government workers could no longer be union members, whereas private sector employees were authorised to establish and to join their own unions. To compensate state blue collar-workers for their lost job security, Saddam Hussein established an incentive plan that permitted state-enterprise managers to award up to 30 per cent of the value of any increase in productiwity to workers. Decree Number 652 aroused resentment and controversy among government bureaucrats, many of whom were stalwart Baath Party members, not only because it contradicted party ideology, but also because it imperilled their jobs. Feeling compelled to justify his new economic thinking and to reconcile it to Baathist ideology, Saddam Hussein wrote a long article in Ath Thawrah, the major governmentrun newspaper, criticising the labour law for perpetuating a caste and class system that prevented people from being rewarded according to merit and from using their capacities fully. Perhaps writing with intentional irony, Saddam Hussein stated that unless people were rewarded for producing more, some might start to regard the capitalist

Economy

319

system as superior because it permitted the growth of wealth and the improvement of workers' lives. In June 1987, Saddam Hussein went further in attacking the bureaucratic red tape that entangled the nation's economy. In a speech to provincial governors, he said, "From now on the state should not embark on uneconomic activity. Any activity, in allY field, which is suppos ed to have an economic return and does not make such a return, must be ignored. All officials must pay as much attention to economic affairs as political ideology." To implement this policy, Saddam Hussein announ ced a move toward privatisation of govern ment-o wned enterprises. Severa l mechanisms were devised to turn state enterprises over to the private sector. Some state companies were leased on long terms, others were sold outright to investors, and others went public with stock offerings. Among the state enterprises sold to the public were bus companies serving the provinces, about 95 per cent of the nation's network of gas stations, thousa nds of agricultural and animal husban dry enterprises, state department stores, and factories. In many instances, to improve productivity the government turned stock over to company employees. The most significant instance of privatisation occurred in August 1987, when Saddam Hussein announ ced a decree to abolish the State Enterprise for Iraqi Airways by early 1988. Two new ventures were to be established instead: the Iraqi Aviation Company, to operate commercially as the national airline, and the National Compa ny for Aviation Services, to provide aircraft and airport services. Stock was to be sold to the public, and the government was to retain a minority share of the new companies through the General Federation of Iraqi Chambers of Commerce and Industry. In a further move consistent with the trend toward privatisation, the RCC announ ced in November 1987 that the government would offer new inducements for foreign companies to operate in Iraq by loosening direct investment restrictions. Details of the new proposal were not specified, but it was expected to entail modification of Resolution Number 1646 of the RCC, enacted in November 1980, which forbade foreign capital participation in private sector companies. Changes in the long-standing government policy of preventing foreign ownership of state institutions might also occur. According to the new

320

Iraq

regulations, all foreign firms engaged in development projects would also be exempt from paying taxes and duties, and foreign nationals who were employees of these companies would pay no income tax. At the same time, Saddam Hussein announced that development projects would no longer be paid for on credit. The new legislation indicated that Iraq was encountering difficulty paying for or obtaining credits for turnkey projects and was therefore, willing to permit foreign companies to retain partial ownership of the installations that they built. Previously, Iraq had rejected exchanging debt for equity in this manner as an infringement on its sovereignty.

Oil Sector Natural seepage aroused an early interest in Iraq's oil potential. After the discovery of oil at Baku in the 1870s, foreign groups began seeking concessions for exploration in Iran and in the area of the Ottoman Empire that became Iraq after World War I. The AngloPersian Oil Company (later renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and still later British Petroleum) was granted a concession in Iran and discovered oil in 1908. Shortly before World War I, the British government purchased majority ownership of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The discovery of oil in Iran stimulated greater interest in potential Iraqi oil resources, and financial groups from several major nations engaged in protracted negotiations and in considerable intrigue with the Ottoman Empire in order to obtain concessions to explore for oil in. Mosul and in Kirkuk, two locations in what later was northcentral Iraq. Although a few concessions were granted prior to World War I, little surveying or exploration was done. Oil in the 1980s: In 1987, petroleum continued to dominate the Iraqi economy, accounting for more than one-third of nominal gross national product (GNP) and 99 per cent of merchandise exports. Prior to the war, Iraq's oil production had reached 3.5 million bpd, and its exports had stood at 3.2 million bpd. In the opening weeks of the Iran-Iraq War, however, Iraq's two main offshore export terminals in the Persian Gulf, Mina al-Bakr and Khawr al-Amayah, were severely damaged by Iranian attacks, and in 1988, they rem':'l.ined closed. Oil exports were further restrained in April 1982, when Syria closed the pipeline running from Iraq to the Mediterranean. In response, Iraq

Economy

321

launched a major effort to establish alternative channels for its oil exports. As an emergency measure, Iraq started to transport oil by tanker-truck caravans across Jordan and Turkey. In 1988, Iraq continued to export nearly 250,000 bpd by this method. In mid1984, the expansion of the existing pipeline through Turkey was accomplished by looping the line and by adding pumping stations. The expansion raised the line's throughput capacity to about 1 million bpd. In November 1985, Iraq started work on an additional expansion of this outlet by building a parallel pipeline between Kirkuk and Dortyol that used the existing line's pumping stations. Work was completed in July 1987. The result was an increase in exports through Turkey of 500,000 bpd. In September 1985, construction of a spur line from Az Zubayr in southern Iraq to Saudi Arabia was completed; the spur linked up with an existing pipeline running across Saudi Arabii;l to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The spur line had a carrying capacity of 500,000 bpd. Phase two of this project was begun in late 1987 by a JapaneseSouth Korean-Italian-French consortium. Phase two was to be an independent pipeline, parallel to the existing pipeline, which would run 1,000 kilometres from Az Zubayr to Yanbu and its own loading terminal. The parallel pipeline was expected to add 1.15 million bpd to Iraq's export capacity when completed in late 1989. Iraq negotiated with the contractors to pay its bill entirely in oil at the rate of 110,000 bpd. According to Minister of Petroleum Isam Abd ar Rahim al-Jalabi, Iraq negotiated special legal arrangements with Saudi Arabia guaranteeing Iraqi ownership of the pipeline. Iraq also considered construction of a 1-million bpd pipeline through Jordan to the Gulf of Aqaba, but in 1988 this project was shelved. The expansion of export capacity induced Iraq to try to boost its oil production, which in 1987 averaged 2.8 million bpd of which 1.8 million bpd were exported. The remainder was retained for domestic use. In addition, Iraq continued to receive oil donations of between 200,000 and 300,000 bpd from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia pumped out of the Neutral Zone on the east end of Iraq's southern border with Saudi Arabia. By the end of 1989, Iraq's goal was to have the capacity to produce oil for export at the pre-war level of 3.5 million bpd without having to depend on any exports by ship through the Persian Gulf; however, at a posted price of approximately

322

Iraq

us $ 18 per barrel, and with spot prices at less than US $ 13 per barrel, oil was worth less than half as much in 1988 as it was when the IranIraq War started. Iraq's oil revenue in 1987 was estimated at US $ 11.3 billion, up about 60 per cent from the 1986 level of US $ 6.8 billion. The expanded export capacity, theoretically, gave Iraq greater leverage in negotiating an increase in its OPEC quota. For the first several years of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq attempted to stay within its OPEC quota in order to bring OPEC pressure to bear on Iran to curtail its production. In early 1988, this issue was moot, however, because Iraq had announced in 1986 that it would not recognise its 1.54 million bpd quota and would produce whatever amou.nt best served Iraqi national interests. In 1987, however, Iraqi oil minister Jalabi reasserted Iraq's willingness to hold its oil production to the 1.54 million bpd OPEC quota if Iran adhered to an identical quota level. This would represent a decrease of about 40 per cent from the 2.61 million bpd that Iran was authorised by OPEC to produce. When Jalabi was appointed Iraq's oil minister in March 1987, he instituted a new round of reorganisations in the petroleum sector. The Ministry of Oil assimilated INOC, thus consolidating management of Iraq's oil production and distribution. The NPO absorbed the CPO. This Organisation, along with SOOP, was to be granted corporate status in an effort to make it more efficient. Jalabi was also concerned about the proper handling of Iraq's large hydrocarbon reserves. Although estimates of Iraqi hydrocarbon reserves in the late 1980s varied considerably, by all accounts they were immense. In 1984, Iraq claimed proven reserves of 65 billion barrels plus 49 billion barrels of "semi-proven" reserves. In November 1987, Iraq's stat€>owned Oil Exploration Company calculated official reserves at 72 billion barrels, but the company's director, Hashim al-Kharasan, stated that this figure would be revised upward to 100 billion barrels in the near future. In late 1987, oil minister Jalabi said that Iraqi reserves were "100 billion barrels definite, and 40 billion barrels probable," which would constitute 140 years of production at the 1987 rate. Western petroleum geologists, although somewhat more conservative in their estimates, generally concurred with Iraq's assessment; some said that Iraq has the greatest potential for new discoveries of all Middle Eastern Countries.

Economy

323

Besides petroleum, Iraq had estimated natural gas reserves of nearly 850 billion cubic metres, almost all of which was associated with oil. For this reason, most natural gas was flared off at oil wells. Of the estimated 7 million cubic metres of natural gas produced in 1987, an estimated 5 million cubic metres were flared. Iraq's Fifth Five-Year Plan of 1986-90 included projects to exploit this heretofore wasted asset. The war did not impede Iraqi investment in the oil sector. On the contrary, it spurred rapid development. The government announced in 1987 that, during the previous 10 years, 67 oil-related infrastructure projects costing US $ 2.85 billion had been completed and that another 19 projects costing US $ 2.75 billion were under way. One Iraqi priority was to exploit natural gas reserves. Because natural gas is more difficult to process and to market than petroleum, the Ministry of Oil in late 1987, called for the substitution of natural gas for oil in domestic consumption, a move that could free more oil for export. Therefore, it became a key goal to convey natural gas from oil fields to industrial areas, where the gas could then be used. In 1987, the Soviet Union's Tsevetmetpromexport (TSMPE) was constructing a main artery for such a system, the strategic trans-Iraq dry gas pipeline running northward from An Nasiriyah. In 1986, work was started on liquefaction facilities and on a pipeline to transport 11.3 billion cubic metres per day of natural gas from Iraq's North Rumaylah oil field to Kuwait. Another focus of Iraqi investment was the maintenance and augmentation of the oil industry's refining capacity. Before the war, Iraq had a refining capacity of 320,000 bpd, 140,000 barrels of which were produced by the southern refinery at Basra and 80,000 of which were produced by the Durah refinery, near Baghdad. In the opening days of the Iran-Iraq War, the Basra refinery was damaged severely, and as of early 1988 it remained closed. The Durah refinery, however, remained in operation, and new installations, including the 70,000 bpd Salah-ud-Din I refinery and the 150,000 bpd northern Baiji refinery, boosted Iraq's capacity past 400,000 bpd. About 300,000 bpd were consumed domestically, much of which was used to sustain the war effort. A second thrust of Iraqi oil policy in the late 1980s was the development, with Soviet assistance, of a major new oil field. In September 1987, during the eighteenth session of the Iraqi-Soviet

324

Iraq

Joint Commi~ion on Economic and Technical Cooperation, held in Baghdad, Iraq's SOOP signed an agreement with the Soviet Union's Techno-Export to develop the West Al-Qurnah oilfield. This oilfield was regarded as one of Iraq's most promising, with an eventual potential yield of 600,000 bpd. Techno-Export planned to start by constructing the degaussing, pumping, storage, and transportation facilities at West Al-Qurnah's Mishrif reservoir, expected to produce 200,000 bpd.

Industrialisation The non-petroleum industrial sector of the Iraqi economy grew tremendously after Iraq gained independence in 1932. Although growth in absolute terms was significant, high annual growth rates can also be attributed to the very low level from which industrialisation started. Under Ottoman rule, manufacture consisted almost entirely of handicrafts and the products of artisan shops. The availability of electricity and lines of communication and transportation after World War I led to the establishment of the first large-scale industries, but industrial development remained slow in the first years' after independence. The private sector, which controlled most of the nation's capital, hesitated to invest in manufacturing because the domestic market was small, disposable income was low, and infrastructure was primitive; moreover, investment in agricultural land yielded a higher rate of return than did investment in capital stock. World War 11 fuelled demand for manufactured goods, and large public sector investments after 1951, made possible by the jump in state oil revenues, stimulated industrial growth. Manufacturing output increased 10 per cent annually in the 1950s. Industrial development slowed after the overthrow of the monarchy during the 1958 revolution. The socialist rhetoric and the land reform measures frightened private investors, and capital began leaving the country. Although the regime led by Abd al-Karim Qasim excepted industry from the nationalisation imposed on the agricultural and the petroleum sectors, in July 1964 a new government decreed nationalisation of the twenty-seven largest privately owned industrial firms. The government reorganised other large companies, put a low limit on individual share holdings, allocated 25 per cent of corporate profits to workers, and instituted worker participation in management. A series of decrees relegated the private sector to a minor role and

Econom y

325

provok ed an exodus of managers and administrators, accomp anied by capital flight. The government was incapable of filling the vacuum it had created, either in terms of money or of trained manpower, and industrial develo pment slowed to about 6 per cent per year in the 1960s. After the 1968 Baath revolution, the govern ment gave a higher priority to industrial development. By 1978, the govern ment had revamp ed the public industrial sector by organising ten semiindepe ndent state organisations for major industry sub-sectors, such as spinnin g and weaving, chemicals, and engineering. Factory manag ers were given some autonomy, and an effort was made to hold them responsible for meeting goals. Despite Iraq's attemp t to rationalise and reorganise the public sector, state organisations remain ed overstaffed becaus e social legislation made it nearly impossible to layoff or to transfer workers and bureaucratisation made the organisations top-heavy with unproductive manag ement. The govern ment acknowledged that unused capacity, overstocking of inventories, and lost production time, becaus e of shortages or disruptions of supply, continued to plague the industrial sector. The govern ment attemp ted to strengthen public sector industry by pouring money into it. According to official figures, annual investment in the non-petroleum industrial sector rose from 1039.5 million in 1968 to 10752. 5 million in 1985. As a conseq uence, industrial output rose; the govern ment put the total value of Iraq's industrial output in 1984 at almost 10 2 billion, up from about 10300 million in 1968 and up more than 50 per cent from the start of the Iran-Iraq War. The total value of industrial input in 1984 was 10981 million, so value added was in excess of 100 per cent. Productivity relative to investment, however, remained low. Becaus e of revenues from oil exports, the govern ment believed it could afford to pursue an ambitious and expensive policy of import substitution industrialisation that would move the econom y away from depend ence on oil exports to obtain foreign exchange. In the early 1970s, Iraq made capital investments in large-scale industrial facilities such as steel plants. Many of the facilities were purcha sed from foreign contractors and builders on a turnkey basis. But Iraq neglected develo pment of the next stage in the industrial process, the transformation of processed raw materials into intermediate products,

326

Iraq such as construction. girders, iron pipes, and steel parts. The se bottlenecks in turn ham pere d the dev elopment of more sophisticated industries, such as machinery man ufacture. Plant construction also outp ace d infrastructure developmen t. Many plants, for example, were inadequately linked by road or rail to outlets. Excess capacity remained a problem, as the large industria l plants continued to strain the economy's ability to absorb new goo ds. In an atte mpt to overcome these problems, Iraq imported the finished products and materials it requ ired , def eati ng the pur pos e of its imp ort sub stit utio n industrialisation strategy and making the large extractive industries som ewh at redundant. Imports of vari ous basic commodities, such as plastics and chemicals, doubled and tripled in the 1970s. Most imports were consumed rather than used as intermediate components in industry; when imports were used as industrial inputs, value add ed tend ed to be low. Concurrently, tarif fs and other trade barriers erected to protect domestic infant industry from foreign competition imp ede d the importation of certain vital materia ls, particularly spare parts and machinery. The growth of small-scale industries in the private sector and the rise in the standard of livin g in general were inhibited by such restrictions. Subsidised by oil revenues, the industrialisation strategy yielded growth, but only at great cost. In the late 1980s, the cumulative fiscal effects of the war with Iran forced Iraq to reverse priorities and to focus on the export side of the trade equation. Although the government preViously had attempted to diversify the economy in order to minimise dep end enc e on natural resources, it was now forc ed to concentrate on generating export income from extractive industry , in which it had a comparative advantage, rather than on producing more sophisticated manufactured goods. At the sam e time, in conjunction with its gradual move toward privatisation, the government ceded greater responsibility to the private sector for the manufacture of light con sumer items as import substitutes. In 1983, legislation exempted the priv ate sector from customs duties and from excise taxes on importe d spare parts and on machinery nee ded to build factories. The private sector was also given tax exemptions for capital investment and for research and dev elopment spending. Finally, the replacement of sole proprietorships by joint stock companies was

Economy

327

encouraged as a means of tapping more private investment. In a 1987 reorganisation, the Ministry of Light Industries was renamed the Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of Industry and Minerals was renamed the Ministry of Heavy Industry. New ministers were appointed and were charged with improving both the quality and quantity of industrial output; large parts of the state bureaucracy that had controlled industry were abolished. According to official Iraqi figures, the total industrial labour force in 1984 consisted of about 170,000 workers. State-operated factories employed slightly more than 80 per cent of these workers, while 13 per cent worked in the private sector. The remaining 7 per cent worked in the mixed economy, which consisted of factories operated jointly by the state-which held a major share of the common stockand the private sector. Men constituted 87 per cent of the industrial work force. According to the Iraqi government, in 1984 there were 782 industrial establishments, ranging in size from small workshops employing 30 workers to large factories with more than 1,000 employees. Of these, 67 per cent were privately owned. The private sector owned two-thirds of the factories, but employed only 13 per cent of the industrial labour force. Privately owned industrial establishments were, therefore, relatively numerous, but they were also relatively small and more capital-intensive. Only three privately owned factories employed more than 250 workers; the great majority employed fewer than 100 people each. Private-sector plant ownership tended to be dispersed throughout industry and was not concentrated in any special trade, with the exception of the production of metal items such as tools and utensils. Although the private sector accounted for 40 per cent of production in this area, the metal items sector itself constituted no more than a cottage industry. Figures published by the Iraqi Federation of Industries claimed that the private sector dominated the construction industry if measurement were based not on the number of employees or on the value of output, but on the amount of capital investment. In 1981, such private-sector capital investment in the construction industry was 57 per cent of total investment. By this alternative measurement, private sector involvement in the textile and the food processing industries was above average. In contrast, about fourty-six stateowned factories employed more than 1,000 workers apiece, and

328

Iraq

several industrial sectors, such as mining and steel production, were entirely state domina ted. In 1984, Iraq's top industry, as measur ed by the numbe r of employees, was the nonmetallic mineral industry, which employ ed 18 per cent of industrial workers and accoun ted for 14 per cent of the value of total industrial output. The nonmetallic mineral industry was basf!d primarily on extracting and processing sulphu r and phosph ate rock, although manufacturing of construction materials, such as glass and brick, was also included in this category. Production of sulphu r and of sulphuric acid was a priority becaus e much of the output was exported; phosph ates were likewise import ant becaus e they were used in fertiliser production. Mining of sulphu r began at Mishraq, near Mosul, in 1972; production capacity was 1.25 million tons per year by 1988. With the help of Japan, Iraq in the late 1980s was augmen ting the Mishraq sulphu r works with the intent of boosting sulphur exports 30 per cent from their 1987 level of 500,00 0 tons per year and of increasing exports of sulphuric acid by 10,000 tons annually. Iraq was also attempting to increase the rate of sulphur recovery from oil from its 1987 level of 90 per cent. Phosph ate rock reserves were located mainly in the Akashat area northwest of Baghda d and were estimated in 1987 at 5.5 billion tons-e nough to meet local needs for centuries. A fertiliser plant at AI-Qaim, linked by rail to the Akashat mine, started production in 1984; it was soon converting 3.4 million tons of phosph ate per year into fertiliser. As the AI-Qaim operation came onstream, Iraq becam e self-sufficient in fertiliser, and three-quarters of the plant's output was exported. Iranian attacks on Iraqi fertiliser plants in the Basra area, however, cut Iraq's surplus. In 1986, Iraq obtaine d a US $ 10 million loan from the Islamic Development Bank to import urea fertiliser, and in 1987 Iraq continued to import fertiliser as an emerge ncy measure. Meanwhile, additional fertiliser plants were under construction in 1987 at Shuwairah, near Mosul, and at Baiji. Their completion would bring to five the numbe r of Iraqi fertiliser plants and would increase exports considerably. Anothe r import ant compo nent of the mineral sector was cement production. Iraq's 1987 cement production capacity was 12 million tons, and the govern ment planne d a near doubling of production.

Economy

329

Domestic consumption in 1986 was 7.5 million tons, and the surplus was exported, 1 million tons to Egypt alone. In addition to the nonmetallic minerals industry, several other industries employ ed significant percentages of the work force. The chemical and petrochemical industry, concentrated at Khawr az Zubayr, was the second largest industrial employer, providing work for 17 per cent of the industrial work force. Chemicals and petrochemicals accoun ted for a relatively high 30 per cent of the total value of industrial output becaus e of the high value of raw material inputs and the higher value added -more than 150 per cent. The labourintensive textile industry employ ed 15 per cent of industrial workers but accoun ted for only 7 per cent of the value of total industrial output. A major state-owned textile factory in Mosul produc ed calico from locally grown cotton. The foodstuffs processing and packaging industry, which employ ed 14 per cent of the total industrial labour force, accoun ted for 20 per cent of total output, but the value added was less than 50 per cent. Light manufacturing industries based on natural resources, such as paper, cigarettes, and leather and shoe production, together accoun ted for 10 per cent of the value of total industrial output. By the mid-1980s, efforts to upgrade industrial capacity from the extracting and processing of natural resources to heavy industry, to the manufactUring of higher technology and to the production of consum er items were still not fully successful. An iron and steel works built in 1978 by the French company, Creusot-Loire, at Khawr az Zubayr, was expected to attain an annual production level of 1.2 million tons of smelted iron ore and 400,00 0 tons of steel. Other smelters, foundries, and form works were under construction in 1988. (In 1984 this sector of the econom y accounted for less than 2 per cent of total output ). Manuf acture of machin ery and transpo rt equipm ent accoun ted for only 6 per cent of output value, and value added was fairly low, suggesting that Iraq was assembling imported intermediate compo nents to make finished products. A single factory established in the 1980s with Soviet assistance and located at Al-Musayyib, produc ed tractors. In 1981, Iraq contracted with a compa ny from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) to develop the domestic capability to produc e motor vehicles. Plans called for production of 120,00 0 passen ger cars and 25,000 trucks per year, but the project's

330

Iraq

us $ 5 billion cost led to indefinite delays.

By the late 1980s, Iraq had had some success in establishing light industries to produc e items such as spark plugs, batteries, locks, and household appliances. The electronics industry, concentrated in Baghdad, had grown to accoun t for about 6 per cent of output with the help of Thompson-CSF (that is, Compagnie sans fil) of France and the Soviet Union. Other more advanc ed industries just starting to develop in Iraq in the late 1980s were pharmaceuticals and plastics.

Banki ng and Finan ce When Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire, a numbe r of European curren cies circula ted alongs ide the Turkish pound . With the establishment of the British manda te after World War I, Iraq was incorporated into the Indian monetary system, which was operate d by the British, and the rupee became the principal currency in circulation. In 1931, the Iraq Currency Board was established in London for note issue and maintenance of reserves for the new Iraqi dinar. The currency board pursued a conservative moneta ry policy, maintaining very high reserves behind the dinar. The dinar was further strengthened by its link to the British pound. In 1947, the government-owned National Bank of Iraq was founded, and in 1949 the London-based currency board was abolished as the new bank assume d responsibility for the issuing of notes and the mainte nance of reserves. The National Bank of Iraq continu ed the currency board's conservative moneta ry policy, maintaining 100 per cent reserves behind outstanding domestic currency. Initiated during the last years of Ottoman rule, commercial banking became a significant factor in foreign trade during the British manda te. British banks predominated, but traditional money dealers continu ed to extend some domestic credit and to offer limited banking services. The expansion of banking services was hampe red by the limited use 0: money, the small size of the economy, and the small amoun t of savings; banks provided services for foreign trade almost exclusively. In the mid-1930s, the Iraqi government decided to establish banks in order to make credit available to other sectors of the economy. In 1936, the government formed the Agricultural and Industrial Bank. In 1940, this bank was divided into the Agricultural Bank and the Industrial Bank, each with substantially increased capital provided by the government.

Economy

331

The government established the Rafidayn Bank in 1941, as both the primary commercial bank and the central bank, but the National Bank of Iraq became the government's banker in 1947. The Real Estate Bank was established in 1948, primarily to finance the purchase of houses by individuals. The Mortgage Bank was established in 1951, and the Cooperative Bank in 1956. In addition to these government-owned institutions, branches of foreign banks and private Iraqi banks were opened as the economy expanded. In 1956, the National Bank of Iraq became the Central Bank of Iraq. Its responsibilities included the issuing and the management of currency, control over foreign exchange transactions, and the regulation and supervision of the banking system. It kept accounts for the government, and it handled government loans. Over the years, legislation has considerably enlarged the Central Bank's authority. On July 14, 1964, all banks and insurance companies were nationalised, and, during the next decade, banking was consolidated. By 1987, the banking system consisted of the Central Bank, the Rafidayn Bank, and the Agricultural, Industrial, and Real Estate banks. In the 1980s, the Rafidayn Bank was in the contradictory position of trying to maintain its reputation as a viable commercial bank while acting on behalf of the government as an intermediary in securing loans from private foreign banks. With deposits of more than US $ 17 billion in 1983, the Rafidayn was reportedly the largest commercial bank in the Arab world.

It managed to maintain a relatively sound commercial reputation for the five years of the war, and in 1985 its total assets stood at about 1010.4 billion and its total deposits, at more than 109.5 billion-both figures having tripled since the Iran-Iraq War began in 1980. This huge increase in deposits was attributed to increased saving by the public because of the scarcity of consumer products. Profits of 10290 million in 1985 represented an increase of nearly 50 per cent over 1980 levels. By 1985 the Rafidayn had established 215 branches in Iraq, 104 of which were in Baghdad; according to the Iraqi government, it also had seven branches abroad. In 1986, however, the bank started to delay payment of letters of credit owed to foreign exporters, and its failure to make instalment payments on a syndicated loan of 500 million Eurodollars, forced rescheduling of the debt payments.

332

Iraq

In 1987, with the exception of the Baghdad office of a Yugoslav bank, the Rafidayn was Iraq's only commercial bank. In this same year, the government ordered the Rafidayn Bank to double its capital to 10100 million. This increase was to enable the bank to improve and to extend its commercial services, so that it could tap the public for the increased deposits that would enable the bank to offer more loans. To the extent that new loans could bolster the emerging private sector, the move appeared consistent with other government efforts to make state-run operations more fiscally efficient. The other three banks in Iraq were so-called special banks that provided short-to long-term credit in their respective markets. Since its establishmenl in 1936, the Agricultural Bank had grown to forty-five branches, of which four were in Baghdad. In 1981, its capital stood at 10150 million and its loans totalled 10175 million. The Agricultural Bank had also started a project whose objective was to encourage rural citizens to establish savings accounts. Meanwhile, the Industrial Bank had grown to nine branches and offered loans both to private and to public sector industrial and manufacturing companies. The Real Estate Bank was composed of twenty-five branches and provided loans for construction of housing and tourist facilities. The Iraq Ufe Insurance Company, the Iraq Reinsurance Company, and the National Ufe Insurance Company conducted the nation's insurance business. Post offices maintained savings accounts for smc.!1 depositors.

Foreign Trade Primarily the Iran-Iraq War, its resulting deficit and debt problems, and developments in the petroleum sector shaped the pattern of Iraqi foreign trade in the 1980s. Iranian attacks on petroleum industry infrastructure reduced oil exports sharply and Iraq incurred a trade deficit of more than US $ 10 billion in 1981. The pattern continued in 1982 as the value of Iraqi imports peaked at approximately US $ 23.5 billion, while exports reached a nadir of US $ 11.6 billion, leading to a record trade deficit. Rgures for Iraq's imports and exports from 1984 onward vary widely and cannot be considered authoritative. Despite the partial recovery of Iraqi oil exports in 1986, exports were valued at only about US $ 7.5 billion because of the plunge in world

Economy

333

oil prices. In 1987, imports were expected to rise to about US $ 10 billion. Export revenues were also expected to rise, as Iraq compensated for low oil prices with a higher volume of oil exports. Iraq had counted heavily on solving its twin debt and deficit problems by re-establishing and eventually by augmenting its oil export capacity. But increases in volume were insufficient to offset lower prices, and because demand remained low, expanded oil exports served only to glut the market and further drive down the price of oil. The depressed price of oil and the low prices of other raw materials that Iraq exported, coupled with higher prices for the goods it imported, trapped the nation in the classic dilemma of declining terms of trade. Although Iraq was cutting the volume of its imports and was increasing the volume of its exports, the relative values of imports and exports had shifted fundamentally. More than 95 per cent of Iraq's exports were raw materials, primarily petroleum. Foodstuffs accounted for most additional exports. Conversely, nearly half of Iraq's imports were capital goods and consumer durables. According to Iraqi statistics, 34.4 per cent of 1984 imports were capital goods, 30 per cent were raw materials, 22.4 per cent were foodstuffs, and 12.5 per cent were consumer items. Iraq's declining imports resulted not so much from belt-tightening or from import substitution, as from the increasing reluctance of trading partners to extend credit. Despite its socialist orientation, Iraq had long traded most heavily with Western Europe. Initially, Iraq's debt accumulation worked in its favour by creating a hostage effect. Western creditors, both governments and private companies, continued to supply Iraq in an effort to sustain the country until it could repay them. Additionally, the debt helped to secure outlets for Iraqi petroleum in a tight international market through barter agreements in which oil was exchanged for a reduction in debt. In 1987, however, as some West European companies prepared to cut their losses and to withdraw from the Iraqi market, and as others curtailed sales by limiting credits, other countries were poised to fill the vacuum by offering goods and services on concessional terms. Companies from Brazil, South Korea, India, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, backed by their governments' export credit guarantees, were winning an increasing share of the Iraqi market. In 1987, the Soviet Union and East European nations were also offering goods and services on highly concessional terms.

334

Iraq

Eventually, Iraq's exports might also be diverted from the West toward its new trading partners. Iraq continued to seek Western imports when it could afford them. In 1987, Iraq was forced to ration imports for which payment was due in cash, although nonessential imports were purchased if the seller offered credit. Imports contributing to the war effort had top priority. Imports of spare parts and of management services for the maintenance of large industrial projects were also deemed vital, as Iraq sought to stave off the extremely high costs it would incur if facilities were shutdown, mothballed, and then reopened in the future. Consumer goods were given lowest priority. In 1985, Iraq purchased 14.4 per cent of its total imports from Japan. Iraq bought an array of Japanese products, ranging from transport equipment, machinery, and electrical appliances to basic materials such as iron and steel, textiles, and rubber goods. In 1987, as Iraqi debt to Japan mounted to US $ 3 billion, the government of Japan curtailed the export insurance it had offered Japanese companies doing business with Iraq; nevertheless, Japanese companies continued to trade with Iraq. Iraq bought 9.2 per cent of its imports from West Germany. Neighbouring Turkey provided the third largest source of Iraqi imports, accounting for 8.2 per cent of the total. Italy and France each accounted for about 7.5 per cent, followed by Brazil with 7 per cent and Britain with 6.3 per cent. Kuwait was Iraq's most important Arab trading partner, contributing 4.2 per cent of Iraq's imports. In 1985, Brazil was the main destination of Iraqi exports, accounting for 17.7 per cent of the total. France was second with 13 per cent, followed by Italy with 11 per cent, Spain with 10.7 per cent, Turkey and Yugoslavia with about 8 per cent each, Japan with abl.>ut 6 per cent, and the United States with 4.7 per cent. In April 1987, the government attempted to streamline the trade bureaucracy by eliminating five state trading companies that dealt in various commodities. Although the state trading companies had been established in the 1970s to foster increased domestic production, they had evolved into importing organisations. In view of this orientation, their operations were incorporated into the Ministry of Trade. Three Ministry of Trade departments, which had aaministered trade with socialist, with African, and with Arab nations, were abolished.

Economy

335

The responsibilities of these disbanded organisations were centralised in a new Ministry of Trade department named the General Establishment for Import and Export. The Ministry of Trade implemented a national import policy by allocating portions of a total budget among imports according to priority. The import budget varied from year to year, depending on export earnings and on the amount in loans that had been secured from foreign creditors. The government's underlying intention was gradually to replace imported manufactured products with domestic manufactured products and then to increase export sales. In the mid-1980s, however, the government recognised that increased domestic production required the import of intermediate goods. In 1987, state companies were permitted for the first time to use private agents or middlemen to facilitate limited imports of necessary goods. The private sector, which had long been accorded a quota of total imports, was also de-regulated to a limited extent. In 1985 the quota was increased to 7.5 per cent of total imports, and the government gave consideration to increasing that percentage further. All imports by the private sector had previously been subject to government licensing. In 1985, Law No. 60 for Major Development Projects exempted the private sector from the obligation to obtain licenses to import basic construction materials that would be used in major development projects. In an attempt to increase remittances from Iraqis abroad, the government also gave special import licenses to non-resident Iraqis. if the value of the imports was invested in Iraq and was not transferred outside the country. In 1987, the rules concerning private sector imports were liberalised further when private sector manufacturers were granted special licenses that permitted them to import raw materials, spare parts, packaging, machinery, and equipment necessary for plant modernisation and for expansion. In some cases no ceiling was placed on such imports, while in other cases imports were limited to 50 per cent of the value of the export earnings that the manufacturer generated. Such imports were not subject to quotas or to foreign exchange restrictions. Moreover, the government announced that it would make no inquiry into the companies' sources of financing. In a remarkably candid statement in a June 1987 speech, Saddam Hussein promised that citizens would not be asked where they had

336

Iraq

acquired their money, and he admitted that the private sector had not imported any goods because of its fear of prosecution by the security services for foreign exchange violations. While the government permitted more imports by the private sector, it, nevertheless, continued to promote exports at the same time. Starting in 1969, it maintained an Export SubSidy Fund, which underwrote the cost of eligible non-petroleum exports by up to 25 per cent. The Export Subsidy Fund was financed with a tax of 0.5 per cent levied on imports of capital goods and. 75 per cent levied on imports of consumer goods. Most imports were also charged both duty and a customs surcharge that varied from item to item. Export licenses were granted freely both to public and to private sector firms with only a few exceptions. The Board of Regulation of Trade had the authority to prohibit the export of any commodity when domestic supplies fell short of demand, and the control over export of certain items was reserved for the General Organisation of Exports. The degree to which government economic policies would be liberalised in the late 1980s remained to be seen. The government had taken several steps in that direction but state controls continued to play a major role in the economy in 1988. Both primary and secondary source information on the Iraqi economy tends to be both scant and dated. The government of Iraq has regarded data on national economic performance as a state secret, particularly since the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980.

Transportation Transportation was one of the Iraqi economy's most active sectors in the late 1980s; it was allocated a large share of the domestic development budget because it was important to the government for several reasons. Logistics became a crucial factor in Iraq's conduct of the Iran-Iraq War. The government also recognised that transportation bottlenecks limited industrial dewllopment more than any other factor. Anally, the government believed that an expanded transportation system played an important political role by promoting regional integration and by heightening the central government's presence in the more remote provinces. For these reasons, the government embarked on an ambitious plan to upgrade and to extend road, rail, air, and river transport simultaneously. Iraq's main

Economy

337

transportation axis ran roughly northwest to south-east from Mosul via Kirkuk to Baghdad, and then south to Basra and the Gulf. In the 1980s, efforts were underway to link Baghdad more closely with the Euphrates River basin to the west. The total length of Iraq's network of paved roads almost doubled between 1979 and 1985, to 22,397 kilometres, augme nted by an additional 7,800 kilometres of unpaved secondary and feeder roads. In 1987 Iraq's major road project was a 1,000-kilometre long segment of a six-lane international express highway that would eventually link the Persian Gulf states with the Mediterranean. In Iraq, the road would stretch from the Jordan ian border through Ar Rutbah to Tulayah near An Najaf, then to the southern Iraqi town of Ash Shaykh ash Shuyukh, and finally to the Kuwaiti border at Safwan. Construction was underway in the late 1980s. Plans were also being made for anothe r highway, which would link Baghd ad with the Turkish border via Kirkuk and Mosul. There was progress as well on a programme to build 10,000 kilometres of rural roads. Iraq possessed two separate railroads at independence, one standar d gauge and one-metre gauge. The standar d gauge line ran north from Baghd ad through Mosul to the Syrian border and to an eventual connection with the Turkish railroad system, and the metre gauge line ran south from Baghdad to Basra. Because the two systems were incompatible, until the 1960s cargo had to be trans loaded at Baghdad to be transported between the two halves of the country. The Soviet Union helped extend the standard gauge system to Basra, and by 1977 fully 1,129 kilometres of Iraq's 1,589 kilometres of railroad were standard gauge. By 1985 the total length of railroad lines had been extended to 2,029 kilometres, of which 1,496 kilometres were standar d gauge. In 1985, 440 standard-gauge locomotives that moved 1.25 bi11ion tons of freight per kilometre were travelling the railroads. A 252-kilometre line linking Kirkuk and Al-Hadithah was completed by contractors from the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1987 after five years of work. Built at a cost of US $ 855 million, the line was designed to carry more than 1 million passengers and more than 3 million tons of freight annualfy. The system included maintenance and control centres and more than thirty bridges crossing the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

338

Iraq

A 550-kilometre line built by a Brazilian company and extending from Baghdad to Qusaybah on the Syrian border, was also opened in the same year. In 1987, Indian contractors were finishing work on a line between AI-Musayyib and Samara. Iraqi plans also called for replacing the entire stretch of railroad between Mosul and Basra with modern, high-speed track, feeding all lines entering Baghdad into a 112-kilometre loop around the city, and improving bridges, freight terminals, and passenger stations. In addition, Iraq has conducted intermittent negotiations over the years with Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia concerning the establishment of rail links to complete a continuous Europe-Persian Gulf railroad route. At independence, Iraq had little port capacity, a fact that reflected the low level of foreign trade and the country's traditional overland orientation toward Syria and Turkey rather than toward the Gulf. Since then, the Gulf port of Basra has been expanded many times, and a newer port was built at Umm Qasr to relieve pressure on Basra. Oil terminals were located at Khawr al-Amayah, and Mina al-Bakr, Al-Faw, and a port was built in tandem with an industrial centre at Khawr az Zubayr. Because Iraq's access to the Gulf was an Iranian target in the Iran-Iraq War, port activities were curtailed severely in the 19805. Before shipping can be resumed after the war, the Shatt ai-Arab will have to be cleared of explosives and wreckage, which will take years. Despite long-standing government interest in developing the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers into major arteries for inland transport, little had been accomplished by the late 1980s, primarily because of the massive scale of such a project. Dredging and the establishment of navigation channels had been completed on several stretches of the Tigris south of Baghdad, and in 1987 a river freight route using barges was opened between Baghdad and AI-Amarah. Iraq investigated the possibility of opening the entire Tigris River between Mosul and Baghdad, as well as the feasibility of opening a stretch of the Euphrates between AI-Hadithah and Al-Qurnah, but lack of funds precluded further action.

Agricultu;:e Since the beginning of recorded time, agriculture has been the primary economic activity of the people of Iraq. In 1976, agriculture contributed about 8 per cent of Iraq's total GDp, and it employed

Economy

339

more than half the total labour force. In 1986, despite a ten-year Iraqi investment in agricultural development that totalled more than US $ 4 billion, the sector still accounted for only 7.5 per cent of total GDp, a figure that was predicted to decline. In 1986, agriculture continued to employ a significant portion-about 30 per cent-of Iraq's total labour force. Part of the reason the agricultural share of GDP remained small was that the sector was overwhelmed by expansion of the oil sector, which boosted total GDP. Large year-to-year fluctuations in Iraqi harvests, caused by variability in the amount of rainfall, made estimates of average production problematic, but statistics indicated that the production levels for key grain crops remained approximately stable from the 1960s through the 1980s, with yield increasing while total cultivated area declined. Increasing Iraqi food imports were indicative of agricultural stagnation. In the late 1950s, Iraq was self-sufficient in agricultural production, but in the 1960s it imported about 15 per cent of its food supplies, and by the 1970s it imported about 33 per cent of its food. By the early 1980s, food imports accounted for about 15 per cent of total imports, and in 1984, according to Iraqi statistics, food imports comprised about 22 per cent of total imports. Many experts expressed the opinion that Iraq had the potential for substantial agricultural growth, but restrictions on water supplies, caused by Syrian and Turkish dam building on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, might limit this expansion. Iraq has more water than most Middle Eastern nations, which led to the establishment of one of the world's earliest and most advanced civilizations. Strong, centralised governments-a phenomenon known as "hydraulic despotism"-emerged because of the need for organisation and for technology in order to exploit the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Archaeologists believe that the high point in the development of the irrigation system occurred about 500 AD, when a network of irrigation canals permitted widespread cultivation that made the river basin into a regional granary. Having been poorly maintained, the irrigation and drainage canals had deteriorated badly by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the Mongols destroyed what remained of the system. About one-fifth of Iraq's territory consists of farmland. About half of this total cultivated area is in the north-eastern plains and mountain

340

Iraq

valleys, where sufficient rain falls to sustain agriculture. The remainder of the cultivated land is in the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which receive scant rainfall and rely instead on water from the rivers. Both rivers are fed by snow pack and rainfall in eastern Turkey and in north-west Iran. The rivers' discharge peaks in March and in May, too late for winter crops and too early for summer crops. The flow of the rivers varies considerably every year. Destructive flooding, particularly of the Tigris, is not uncommon, and some scholars have placed numerous great flood legends, including the biblical story of Noah and the ark, in this area. Conversely, .years of low flow make irrigation and agriculture difficult. Not until the twentieth century did Iraq make a concerted effort to restore its irrigation and drainage network and to control seasonal flooding. Various regimes constructed several large dams and river control projects, rehabilitated old canals, and built new irrigation systems. Barrages were constructed on both the Tigris and the Euphrates to channel water into natural depressions so that floods could be controlled. It was also hoped that the water could be used for irrigation after the rivers peaked in the spring, but the combination of high evaporation from the reservoirs and the absorption of salt residues in the depressions made some of the water too brackish for agricultural use. Some dams that created large reservoirs were built in the valleys of tributaries of the Tigris, a measure that diminished spring flooding and evened out the supply of water over the cropping season. When the Euphrates was flowing at an exceptionally low level in 1984, the government was able to release water stored in reservoirs to sustain farmers. In 1988, barrages or dam reservoirs existed at Samara, Dukan, Darband, and Khan on the Tigris and Habbaniyah on the Euphrates. Two new dams on the Tigris at Mosul and AI-Hadithah, named respectively the Saddam and AI-Qadisiyah, were on the verge of completion in 1988. Furthermore, a Chinese-Brazilian joint venture was constructing a US $ 2 billion dam on the Great Zab River, a Tigris tributary in north-eastern Iraq. Additional dams were planned for Badush and Fathah, both on the Tigris. In Hindiyah on the Euphrates and in Ash Shinafiyah on the Euphrates, Chinese contractors were building a series of barrages. Geographic factors contributed to Iraq's water problems. Like all rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates carry

Economy

341

. This silt is deposited in river large amo unts of silt downstream d plains. In Iraq, the soil has a channels, in canals, and on the floo table rises through flooding or high saline content. As the water topsoil, rendering agricultural through irrigation, salt rises into the silt is highly saline. Drainage thus land sterile. In addition, the alluvial 's terrain is very flat. Baghdad, becomes very important; however, Iraq res from the Persian Gulf, is only for example, although 550 kilomet slight gradient makes the plains 34 metres above sea level. This h it facilitates irrigation, it also susceptible to flooding and, althoug also provides relatively few sites hampers drainage. The flat terrain downstream from both Syria and for dams. Most important, Iraq lies downstream from Turkey on the Turkey on the Euphrates River and Syria and Turkey completed Tigris River. In the early 1970s, both d vast reservoirs. Iraqi officials large dam s on the Euphrates and fille river's flow, claiming that irrigated protested the sha rp decrease in the dro ppe d from 136 ,000 hectares areas along the Euphrates in Iraq 1975. to 10,0 00 hectares from 197 4 to Iraq and Turkey in the late Despite cordial relations between on continued to cause friction 1980s, the issue of water allocati 1986, Turkey completed tunnels between the two governments. In water from the Euphrates into to divert an estimated one-fifth of the ish government reassured Iraq the Ataturk Dam reservoir. The Turk s would revert to normal. Iraqi that in the long run downstream flow not yet exploit Euphrates River protests were muted, because Iraq did ent did not wish to complicate water fully for irrigation, and the governm midst of the Iran-Iraq War. its relationship with Turkey in the inefficient gov ern men t Iraq 's syst em of land tenu re and tributed to the low productivity implementation of land reform con the agricultural sector. Lan d rights of farmers and the slow growth of rporating laws of man y cultures had evolved over many centuries, inco d Code of 1858, attempted to and countries. The Ottoman Lan gories of land and by requiring impose order by establishing cate holdings. By World War I, only surveys and the registration of land mplished and land titles were limited registration had bee n acco em of tribal tenure through which insecure, particularly und er the syst land although tribes used it. the state retained ownership of the ers bec ame more interested By the early 1930s, large landown of agricultural expansion was in securing titles because a period

342

Iraq underway. In the north, urban mer chants were investing in land development, and in the south tribe s were installing pum ps and were otherwise improving land. In respons e, the government promulgated n law in 193 2 empowering it to settl e title to land and to spe ed up the registration of titles. Under the law, a num ber of tribal leaders and village hea dme n were granted title to the land that had bee n worked by their communities. The effect, perhaps unintended, was to replace the semi-communal syst em with a system of ownership that increased the number of sharecro ppers and tenants dramatically. A 1933 law provided that a sharecr opper could not leave if he were indebted to the landowner. Because landowners were usually the sole source of credit and almost no sha recropper was free of debt, the law effectively bou nd man y tenants to the land. The land tenure system und er the Ottomans, and as modified by subsequent Iraqi gov ernm ents , provided little ince ntive to improve productivity. Sharecroppers and tenants who rece ived only a por tion -oft en only a small pro por tion -of the crop con ducted most farming. Any increase in production favoured owners disp roportionately, which served as a disincentive to farmers to produc e at more than subsistence level. For their part, absentee owners pref erred to spe nd their mon ey in acquiring more land, rather than to invest in improving the land they had already accumulated. On the eve of the 195 8 revolution, mor e than two-thirds of Iraq's cultivated land was concentrated in 2 per cent of the holdings, while at the oth er extreme, 86 per cent of the holdings covered less than 10 per cent of the cultivated land. The pre-revolutionary government was aware of the inequalities in the countryside and of the poo r condition of most tenant farmers, but landlords constituted a strong political force during the monarch ical era, and they were able to frustrate remedial legislation. Because the promise of land reform kindled part of the pop ular enthusiasm for the 1958 revolution and because the powerful landlords pos ed a potential threat to the new regime, agrarian reform was high on the age nda of the new governm ent, which started the process of land reform within three months of taking power. The 195 8 law, modelled after Egypt's law, limited the maximum amo unt of land an individual own er could retain to 1,00 0 dunums (100 hectares) of irrigated land or twice that amo unt of rain-fed land. The government

Economy

343

expropriated holdings above the maximum. Compensation was to be paid in state bonds, but in 1969 the government absolved itself of all responsibility to recompense owners. The law provided for the expropriation of 75 per cent of all privately owned arable land. The expropriated land, in parcels of between seven and fifteen hectares of irrigated land or double that amoun t of rain fed land, was to be distributed to individuals. The recipient was to repay the government over a twenty-year period, and he was required to join a cooperative. The law also had temporary provisions maintaining the sharecropping system in the interim between expropriation and redistribution of the land. Landlords were required to continue the manag ement of the land and to supply customary inputs to maintain production, but their share of the crop was reduced conSiderably. This provision grew in importance as land becam e expropriated much more rapidly than it was being distributed. By 1968, 10 years after agrarian reform was instituted, 1.7 million hectares had been expropriated, but fewer than 440,00 0 hectares of sequestered land had been distributed. A total of 645,00 0 hectares had been allocated to nearly 55,000 families, however, because several hundred thousan d hectares of government land were included in the distribution. The situation in the countryside became chaotic becaus e the govern ment lacked the personnel, funds, and expertise to supply credit, seed, pumps, and marketing service s-funct ions that had preViously been performed by landlords. Landlords tended to cut their production, and even the best-intentioned landlords found it difficult to act as they had before the land reform because of hostility on all sides. Moreover, the farmers had little interest in cooperatives and joined them slowly and unwillingly. Rural-to-urban migration increased as agricultural production stagnated, and a prolonged drought coincided with these upheavals. Agricultural production fell steeply in the 1960s and never recovered fully. In the 1970s, agrarian reform was carried further. Legislation in 1970 reduced the maximum size of holdings to betwee n 10 and 150 hectares of irrigated land (depending on the type of land and crop) and to between 250 and 500 hectares of non-irrigated land. Holdings above the maximum were expropriated with compensation only for actual improvements such as buildings, pumps , and trees. The govern ment also reserved the right of eminent domain in regard to

344

Iraq

lowering the holding ceiling and to dispossessing new or old landholders for a variety of reasons. In 1975, an additional reform law was enacted to break up the large estates of Kurdish tribal landowners. Additional expropriations such as these exacerbated the government's land manag ement problems. Although Iraq claimed to have distributed nearly 2 million hectares by the late 1970s, independent observers regarded this figure as greatly exaggerated. The government continued to hold a large proportion of arable land, which, because it was not distributed, often lay fallow. Rural flight increased, and by the late 1970s, farm labour shortages had become so acute that Egyptian farmers were being invited into the country. The original purpose of the land reform had been to break up the large estates and to establish many small owner-operated farms, but fragmentation of the farms made extensive mechanisation and economies of scale difficult to achieve, despite the expansion of the cooperative system. Therefore, in the 1970s, the government turned to collectivisation as a solution. By 1981, Iraq had established twentyeight collective state farms that employed 1,346 people and cultivated about 180,00 0 hectares. In the 1980s, however, the government expressed disappointment at the slow pace of agricultural development, conceding that collectivised state farms were not profitable. In 1983, the government enacted a new law encouraging both local and foreign Arab companies or individuals to lease larger plots of land from the government. By 1984, more than 1,000 leases had been granted. As a further incentive to productivity, the government instituted a profit-sharing plan at state collective farms. By 1987, the wheel appear ed to have turned full circle when the government announ ced plans to re-privatise agriculture by leasing or selling state farms to the private sector. Most farming in Iraq entails planting and harvesting a single crop per year. In the rain-fed areas the winter crop, primarily grain, is planted in the fall and harvested in the spring. In the irrigated areas of central and southern Iraq, summer crops predominate. A little multiple cropping, usually of vegetables, exists where irrigation water is available over more than a single season. Even with some double or triple cropping, the intensity of cultivation is usually on the order of 50 per cent because of the

Economy

345

practice of leaving about half the arable land fallow each year. In the rain-fed region, land is left fallow so that it can accumulate moisture. Plowing under weeds and other plant material that grqw during the fallow period also increases the fertility of fallow land. On irrigated land, fallow periods also contribute some humus to the soil. Grain, primarily wheat and barley, was Iraq's most important crop. Cereal production increased almost 80 per cent between 1975 and 1985, notwithstanding wide variations in the harvest from year to year as the amoun t and the timing of rainfall strongly affected both the area planted and the harvest. Between 1980 and 1985, the area under wheat cultivation increased steadily for a cumulative growth of 30 per cent, to about 1,566,500 hectares. In 1985, Iraq harvested a bumpe r crop of 1.4 million tons of wheat. In 1984, a drought year, Iraq harvested less than half the planted area for a yield of between 250,00 0 and 471,00 0 tons, according to foreign and Iraqi sources respectively. The north and central rain-fed areas were the principal wheat producers. Barley requires less water than wheat does, and it is more tolerant of salinity in the soil. For these reasons, Iraq started to substitute barley production for wheat production in the 1970s, particularly in southern regions troubled by soil salinity. Between 1980 and 1985, the total area under barley cultivation grew 44 per cent, and by 1985 barley and wheat production were virtually equal in terms both of area cultivated and of total yield. Rice, grown in paddies, was Iraq's third most important crop as measured by cultivated area, which in 1985 amounted to 24,500 hectares. The area under cultivation, however, did not grow appreciably between 1980 and 1985; 1985 production totalled almost 150,00 0 tons. Iraq also produced maize, millet, and oil seeds in smaller quantities. A number of other crops were grown, but acreage and production were limited. With the exception of tobacco, of which Iraq produced 17,000 tons on 16,500 hectares in 1985, cash crop production declined steeply in the 1980s. Probably becaus e of domestic competition from synthetic imports and a declining export market, production of cotion was only 7,200 tons in 1985, compared with 26,000 tons in 1977. Production of sugar beets was halted completely in 1983, and sugar-cane production declined by more than half between 1980 and 1985.

346

Iraq

Iraq may have cut hack on production of sugar beets and sugarcane becaus e of an intention to produce sugar from dates. Dates, of which Iraq produces eight distinct varieties, have long been a staple of the local diet. The most abunda nt date groves were found along the Shatt aI-Arab. In the early 1960s, more than 30 million date palms existed. In the mid-1970s, the Iraqi government estimated that the numbe r of date palms had declined to about 22 million, at which time production of dates amoun ted to 578,00 0 tons. The devastation of the Shatt aI-Arab area during the Iran-Iraq War hastened the destruction of date palm groves, and in 1985 the government estimated the number of date palms at fewer than 13 million. Date production in 1987 droppe d to 220,00 0 tons. The governmentmanag ed Iraqi Date Administration, however, planne d to increase production in an attempt to boost export revenue. In 1987, about 150,00 0 tons, or 68 per cent of the harvest, was exported, primarily to Western Europe, Japan, India, and other Arab countries. The Iraqi Date Administration also devised plans to construct large facilities to extract sugar, alcohol, vinegar, and concentrated protein meal from dates. Iraq produced a variety of other fruits as well, including melons, grapes, apples, apricots, and citrus. Production of such fruits increased almost 30 per cent between 1975 and 1985. Vegetable production also increased, particularly near urban centres, where a comparatively sophisticated marketing system had been developed. Vegetable gardening usually employed relatively modern techniques, including the use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides. Tomatoes were the most important crop, with production amounting to more than 600,00 0 tons in 1985. Other vegetables produc ed in Significant quantit y were beans, eggpla nt, okra, cucumbers, and onions. Overall vegetable production increased almost 90 per cent between 1975 and 1985, even though the production of legumes droppe d about 25 per cent over the same period. Crop production accounted for about two-thirds of value added in the agricultural sector in the late 1980s, and the raising of livestock contributed about one-third. In the past, a substantial part of the rural population had been nomadic, moving animals between seasonal grazing areas. Sheep and goats were the most important livestock, supplying meat, wool, milk, skins, and hair. A 1978 government survey, which represented the most recent official data available as

Economy

347

of early 1988, estimated the sheep population at 9.7 million and the goat population at 2.1 million. Primarily nomadic and semi-nomadic groups tended sheep and goats. The 1978 survey estimated the number of cattle at 1. 7 million, the number of water buffalo at 170,000, the number of horses at 53,000, and the number of camels at 70,000. In the 1970s, the government started to emphasise livestock and fish production, in an effort to add protein to the national diet. But 1985's red meat production (about 93,000 tons) and milk production (375,000 tons) were, respectively, about 24 and 23 per cent less than the in 1975 totals, although other figures indicated that total livestock production remained stable between 1976 and 1985. In the mid-1980s, however, British, West German, and Hungarian companies were given contracts to establish poultry farms. At the same time, the government expanded aquaculture and deep-sea fishing. Total production of processed chicken and fish almost doubled, to about 20,000 tons apiece, from 1981 to 1985, while egg production increased substantially, to more than 1 billion per year. The government planned to construct a US $ 160 million deep-sea fishing facility in Basra and predicted that, within 10 years, freshwater fishing would supply up to 100,000 tons of fish. Iraq nevertheless continued to import substantial quantities of frozen poultry, meat, and fish to meet local needs for protein.

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

12 Poli ty The political system in 1988 was in what was officially characterised as a "transitional" phase. This description meant that the current method of rule by decree, which had been in effect since 1968, would continue until the goal of a socialist, democratic republic with Islam as the state religion was attained. The end of the transition period was to be marked by the formal enactment of a perman ent constitution. The timing and the specific circumstances that would terminate the transitional stage had not been specified as of early 1988. The country remained under the regime of the Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party, which had seized power through a coup d'etat in July 1968. The legality of government institutions and actions was based on the Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, which embod ied the basic principles of the Baath Party- Arab unity, freedom, and socialism. These principles were, in turn, rooted in the pan-Arab aspirations of the party, aspirations sanctified through identification with the historic right and destiny of all Arabs to unite under the single leadership of "the Arab Nation." The most powerful decision-making body in Iraq, the ten members Revolutionary Comm and Council (RCq, which functioned as the top executive and legislative organ of the state was, for all practical purposes, an arm of the Baath Party. All members of the RCC were also members of the party's Regional Command, or state apparatus. President Saddam Hussein was both the chairman of the RCC and

350

Iraq

the secretary general of the Baath's Regional Command. He was generally recognised as the most powerful political figure in the country. From its earliest days, the Baath Party was beset by personality clashes and factional infighting. These problems were a primary cause of the failure of the first Baath attempt to govern Iraq in 1963. After the Baath returned to power in 1968, intra-party fissures were generally held in check, albeit not eliminated, by President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. When Saddam Hussein succeeded to the presidency in 1979, he also comma nded the loyalty of the major elements of the Baath. Saddam Hussein and other Baath leaders have always regarded the ability to balance endemic intra-party tension s-such as those between military and civilian elements and among personalities across boundaries of special isation -as the key to success in Baghdad. Above all, they perceived harmony in the military-civilian coalition as pivotaL Although the Baath had begun recruiting within the Iraqi military as early as 1958, and within ten years military members constituted the backbone of the party's power, civilian Baath leaders maintained overall control of the party. Iraqi politics under the Baath regime were generally geared toward mobilising support for the regime. Loyal opposition had no place, and it was not recognised as legitimate. The party leaders believed competitive politics ill-suited to Iraq, at least during the indefinite transitional period. They condem ned partisan political activity, which they insisted had had damaging consequences on national unity and integration. The Baath also invoked Iraq's unhapp y legacy of ethnic and regional cledvages as justification for harsh curbs on political rights. In 1988, twenty years after the Baath had come to power, it still was not possible to assess popular attitudes toward Saddam Hussein, toward the Baath Patty, toward political institutions, or toward political issues, becaus e there had been insufficient field research in the country. Even though elections for a National Assembly were held in 1980, and again in 1984, these had been carefully controlled by the government, and genUinely free elections have not been held for more than thirty years. Politicians or groups oppose d to the principles of the 1968 Baath Revolution of July 17 to 30 were not permitted

Polity

351

to operate~penly. Those who aspired to be politically active had few choices: they could join the highly selective Baath Party, remain dormant, go underground or into exile, or join the Baath-sponsored Progressive National Front (PNF). The PNF, which came into existence in 1974, was based on a national action charter that called for collaboration between the Baath and each of the other parties considered to be both progressive and nationalist. The PNF served as the only risk-free, non-Baath forum for political participation, although even this channel was denied to those whose loyalties to the regime were suspect. The Baath Party's objectives in establishing the front were to provide the semblance of broad popular support for the government as well as to provide the facade of alliance between the Baath and other parties. The Baath, however, held a dominant position within the front and therefore assumed sole responsibility for carrying out the decisions of the front's executive commission, which was composed of the Baath's most important members and sympathisers. In early 1988, the war with Iran continued to preoccupy Saddam Hussein and his associates. Approximately 75,000 Iraqis were killed in the war, and about 250,000 were wounded; more than 50,000 Iraqis were being held as prisoners of war in Iran. Property damage was estimated in the tens of billions of dollars; destruction was especially severe in the southern part of the country.

Political System In 1988, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) continued to be the top decision-making body of the state. The RCC was first formed in July 1968, and since then it has exercised both executive and legislative powers. The chairman of the RCC is the president of the republic. The number of RCC members has varied over time. According to the Constitution, the RCC is the supreme organ of the state, charged with the mission of carrying out the popular will by removing from power the reactionary, the dictatorial, and the corrupt elements of society and by returning power to the people. The RCC elects its chairman, who serves concurrently as President of the republic, by a two-thirds majority vote. In case of the chairman's official absence or incapacitation, his constitutional powers are to be exercised by the vice chairman, who also is elected by the RCC from

352

Iraq

among its members. Thus the vice chairman is first in line of succession. The members of the RCC, including both the chairman and the vice chairman, are answerable only to the RCC itself, which may dismiss any of its members by a two-thirds majority vote and may also charge and send to trial for wrongdoing any member of the council, any deputy to the President, or any cabinet minister. Since 1977, the Baath Party has regarded all members of the Baath Party Regional Command as members of the RCC. The inter-locking leadership structure of the RCC and the Regional Command has served to emphasise the party's dominance in governmental affairs. The RCC's constitutional powers are wide-ranging. It may perform legislative functions, both in collaboration with, and independently of, the National Assembly; approve government recommendations concerning national defence and internal security; declare war, order general mobilisation, conclude peace, and ratify treaties and international agreements; approve the state's general budget; lay down the rules for impeachment of its members and set up the special court to try those impeached; authorise the chairman or the vice chairman to exercise some of the council's powers except for legislative ones; and provide the internal regulations and working procedures of the council. The chairman is specifically empowered to preside over the council's closed sessions, to sign all laws and decrees issued by the council, and to supervise the work of cabinet ministers and the operation of the institutions of the state. Although the 1970 constitution provides for a parliament called the National Assembly, this body was not instituted until 1980. The RCC first circulated a draft law creating the assembly in December 1979; after some changes this was promulgated as law in the following March. According to the law, the National Assembly consists of 250 members elected by secret ballot every four years. All Iraqi citizens over eighteen are eligible to vote for assembly candidates. The country is divided into 250 electoral districts, each with an approximate population of 250,000. One representative is elected to the assembly from each of these constituencies. The National Assembly law also stipulates, however, that there is to be a single electoral list. Furthermore, the qualifications of all candidates for the assembly must be reviewed and be approved by a government-appointed election commission. In practice, these provisions have enabled the

Polity

353

Baath Party to control the National Assembly. To qualify as a candidate for National Assembly elections, individuals need to meet certain conditions. For example, prospective candidates must be at least twenty-five years of age, must be Iraqi by birth, must not be married to foreigners, and must have Iraqi fathers. Having a non-Iraqi mother is grounds for disqualification except in those cases where the mother is of Arab origin and from another Arab country. In addition, persons who were subject to property expropriation under the land reform or nationalisation laws are not eligible candidates. Furthermore, all aspiring candidates are required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the election commission that they believe in the principles of the 1968 Baath Revolution, that is, in the Baath Party's objectives. The first parliamentary elections, since Iraq becam e a republic in 1958, were held in June 1980, and the First National Assembly convened at the end of that month. Baath Party candidates won 75 per cent, or 187 seats, of the 250 seats. The remaining 25 per cent were won by parties allied with the Baath and by independent parties. Elections for the Second National Assembly were held in October 1984. Approximately 7,171,000 votes were cast in that election, and the Baath won 73 per cent (183) of the seats. Thirtythree women were elected to the assembly. Saadun Hammadi was elected chairman of the assembly, and two years later he was made a membe r of the RCC. Since 1980, the National Assembly generally has held two sessions per year in accordance with Article 48 of the Constitution. The first session is held in April and May, and the second session in November and December. During the few weeks each year that the National Assembly is in session, it carries out its legislative duties in tandem with the RCC. The assembly's primary function is to ratify or reject draft legislation proposed by the RCC. In addition, it has limited authority to enact laws proposed by a minimum of one-fourth of its membership, to ratify the government's budget and international treaties, and to debate domestic and international policy. It also has authority to supervise state agencies and to question cabinet ministers. Although the assembly has served as a forum for limited public discussion of issues, its actual powers were restricted and ultimate decision-making authority pertaining to legislation continued to reside with the RCC.

354

Iraq

The President is the chief executive authority of the country. He may exercise authority directly or through the Council of Ministers, the cabinet. He must be a native-born Iraqi. The Constitution does not stipulate the President's term of office, nor does it provide for his successor. President Bakr served for eleven years before retiring for health reasons in 1979. Saddam Hussein, the former vice chairman of the RCC, who continued to hold the office of President till 2003. The position of vice-chairman, rather than the office of Vice President, appear ed to be the second-most powerful political one. The Vice Presidency appear ed to be a largely ceremonial post, and the Vice President seemed to be appointed or dismissed solely at the discretion of the President. In 1988 the Vice President was Taha Muhy ad Din Maruf, who was first appointed by Bakr in 1974, and was subsequently kept in office by Saddam Hussein. The vice-chairman of the RCC, who would presumably succeed Saddam Hussein, was Izzat Ibrahim. The Council of Ministers is the presidential executive arm. Presidential policies are discussed and translated into specific programmes through the council. The council's activities are closely monitored by the diwan, or secretariat of the presidency. The head of the diwan is a cabinet-rank official, and his assistants and suppor t staff are special appointees. The members of the diwan are not subject to the regulations of the Public Service Council, the body that supervises all civil service matters. Cabinet sessions are convened and presided over by the President. Some senior members of the RCC are represented on the cabinet. By convention, about one-third of the cabinet positions may be reserved for members of the Baath Party. Ministerial portfolios included those for agriculture and agrarian reform, communications, culture and arts, defence, education, finance, foreign affairs, health, higher education and scientific research, industry and minerals, information, interior, irrigation, justice, labour and social affairs, oil, planning, public works and housing, religious trusts, trade, and transport. Additionally, there were seven ministers of state and seven presidential advisers with ministerial status. Of the cabinet members, the President and the minister of defence, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of interior, and the minister of trade were also members of the powerful RCC.

Polity

355

Politic al Partie s The Baath Party: The Baath Party continued to stress parallelism

focused on "regional" (qutri) and "national" (qawmi) goals, following the Baath doctrine that the territorially and politically divided Arab countries were merely "regions" of a collective entity called "The Arab Nation." Hence the Baath movem ent in one country was considered merely an aspect of, or a phase leading to, "a unified democratic socialist Arab nation." That nation, when it materialised, would be under a single, unified Arab national leadership. Theoretically, therefore, success or failure at the regional level would have a corresponding effect on the movem ent toward that Arab nation. Moreover, the critical test of legitimacy for any Baath regime would necessarily be whethe r or not the regime's policies and actions were compatible with the basic aims of the revolu tion-ai ms epitomised in the principles of "unity, freedom, and socialism." The Baath Party in Iraq, like its counterparts in other Arab regions (states), derived from the official foundin g congress in Damas cus in 1947. This conclave of pan-Arab intellectuals was inspired by the ideas of two Syrians, Michel Aflaq and Salah ad Din al-Bitar, who are generally regarded as the fathers of the Baath movem ent. Several Iraqis, including Abd ar Rahma n ad Damin and Abd al-Khaliq al-Khudayri, attende d this congress and becam e membe rs of the party. Upon their return to Baghda d, they formed the Iraqi branch of the Baath. Damin became the first secretary general of the Iraqi Baath. From its early years, the Iraqi Baath recruited converts from a small numbe r of college and high school students, intellectuals, and profeSSionals-virtually all of whom were urban Sunni Arabs. A numbe r of Baath high school members entered the Military College, where they influenced several classmates to join the party. Important military officers who became Baath members in the early 1950s included Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Salih Mahdi Ammash, and Abd Allah Sultan, all of whom figured prominently in Iraqi political affairs in later years. During the 1950s, the Baath was a clandestine party, and its membe rs were subject to arrest if their identities were discovered. The Baath Party joined with other opposi tion parties to form the underg round United National Front and participated in the activities

356

Iraq

that led tothe 1958 revolution. The Baathists hoped that the new, republican government would favour pan-Arab causes, especially a union with Egypt, but instead non-Baathist military officers who did not support Arab unity or other Baath principles dominated the regime. Some younger members of the party, including Saddam Hussein, became convinced that Iraqi leader Abd al-Karim Qasim had to be removed, and they plotted his assassination. The October 1959 attempt on Qasim's life, however, was bungled; Saddam Hussein fled Iraq, while other party members were arrested and tried for treason. The Baath was forced underground again, and it experienced a period of internal dissension as members debated over which tactics were appropriate to achieve their political objectives. The party's second attempt to overthrow Qasim, in February 1963, was successful, and it resulted in the formation of the country's first Baath government. The party, however, was more divided than ever between ideologues and more pragmatic members. Because of this lack of unity, the Baath's coup partners were able to outmanoeuvre it and, within nine months, to expel all Baathists from the government. It was not until 1965 that the Baath overcame the debilitating effects of ideological and of personal rivalries. The party then reorganised under the direction of General Bakr as secretary general with Saddam Hussein as his deputy. Both men were determined to return the Baath to power. In July 1968, the Baath finally staged a successful coup. After the Baath takeover, Bakr became President of the regime, and he initiated programmes aimed at the establishment of a "socialist, unionist, and democratic" Iraq. This was done, according to the National Action Charter, with scrupulous care for balancing the revolutionary requirements of Iraq on the one hand and the needs of the "Arab nation" on the other. According to a Baath Party pronouncement in January 1974, "Putting the regional above the national may lead to statism, and placing the national over the regional may lead to rash and childish action." This protestation notwithstanding, the government's primary concerns since 1968 have been domestic issues rather than pan-Arab ones. In 1968, the Baath regime confronted a wide range of problems, such as ethnic and sectarian tensions, the stagnant condition of agriculture, commerce, and industry, the inefficiency and the corruption

Polity

357

of government, and the lack of political consensus among the three main socio-political groups-the Shia Arabs, the Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds. The difficulties of consensus-building were compounded by the pervasive apathy and mistrust at the grass-roots levels of all sects, by the shortage of qualified party cadres to serve as the standard-bearers of the Baath regime, and by the Kurdish-armed insurgency. Rivalry with Syria and with Egypt for influence within the Arab world and the frontier dispute with Iran also complicated the regime's efforts to build th~ nation. From 1968 onwards, the Baath attempted to create a strong and unified Iraq, through formal government channels and through political campaigns designed to eradicate what it called "harmful prerevolutionary values and practices," such as exploitation, social inequities, sectarian loyalties, apathy, and lack of civil spirit. Official statements called for abandonment of traditional ways in favour of a new lifestyle fashioned on the principles of patriotism, national loyalty, collectivism, participation, selflessness, love of labour, and civic responsibility. These "socialist principles and practices" would be instilled by the party's own example, through the state educational system, and through youth and other popular organisations. The Baath particularly emphasised "military training" for youth; such training was considered essential for creating "new men in the new society" and for defending the republic from the hostile forces of Zionism, imperialism, anti-Arab chauvinism (e.g., from Iran), rightists, opportunists, and reactionaries. The Baath's major goal since 1968 was to socialise the economy. By the late 1980s, the party had succeeded in socialising a significant part of the national economy, including agriculture, commerce, industry, and oil. Programmes to collectivise agriculture were reversed in 1981, but government investment in industrial production remained important in the late 1980s. Large-scale industries such as iron, steel, and petrochemicals were fully owned and managed by the government, as were many medium-sized factories that manufactured textiles, processed food, and turned-out construction materials. The Baath's efforts to create a unified Arab nation were more problematic. The party didn't abandon its goal of Arab unity. This goal, however, proved to be a long-term ideal rather than a shortterm objective. President Saddam Hussein proclaimed the new view

358

Iraq

in 1982 by stating that Baathists now "believe that Arab unity must not take place through the elimination of the local and national characteristics of any Arab country.... but must be achieved through common fraternal opinion." In practice this meant that the Iraqi Baath Party had accepted unity of purpose among Arab leaders, rather than unification of Arab countries as more important for the present. As of early 1988, the Baath Party claimed about 10 per cent of the population, a total of 1.5 million supporters and sympathisers; of this total, full party members or cadres were estimated at only 30,000, or 0.2 per cent. The cadres were the nucleus of party organisation, and they functioned as leaders, motivators, teachers, administrators, and watchdogs. Generally, party recruitment procedures emphasised selectivity rather than quantity, and those who desired to join the party had to pass successfully through several apprentice-like stages before being accepted into full membership. The Baath's elitist approach derived from the principle that the party's effectiveness could only be measured by its demonstrable ability to mobilise and to lead the people, and not by "size, number, or form." Participation in the party was virtually a requisite for social mobility. The basic organisational unit of the Baath was the party cell or circle (halaqah). Composed of between three and seven members, cells functioned at the neighbourhood or the village level, where members met to discuss and to carry out party directives. A minimum of two and a maximum of seven cells formed a party division (firqah). Divisions operated in urban quarters, larger villages, offices, factories, schools, and other organisations. Division units were spread throughout the bureaucracy and the military, where they functioned as the ears and eyes of the party. Two to five divisions formed a section (shabah). A section operated at the level of a large city quarter, a town, or a rural district. Above the section was the branch (jira) , which was composed of at least two sections and which operated at the provincial level. There were twenty-one Baath Party branches in Iraq, one in each of the eighteen provinces and three in Baghdad. The union of all the branches formed the party's congress, which elected the Regional Command.

Polity

359

The Regional Comm and was both the core of party leadership and the top decision-making body. It had nine members, who were elected for five-year terms at regional congresses of the party. Its secretary general (also called the regional secretary) was the party's leader, and its deputy secretary general was second in rank and in power within the party hierarchy. The members of the comma nd theoretically were responsible to the Regional Congress that, as a rule, was to convene annually to debate and to approve the party's policies and programmes; actually, the members were chosen by Saddam Hussein and other senior party leaders to be "elected" by the Regional Congress, a formality seen as essential to the legitimation of party leadership. Above the Regional Comm and was the National Comm and of the Baath Party, the highest policy-making and coordinating council for the Baath movement throughout the Arab world. The National Comm and consisted of representatives from all regional comma nds and was responsible to the National Congress, which conven ed periodically. It was vested with broad powers to guide, to coordinate, and to supervise the general direction of the movement, especially with respect to relationships among the regional Baath parties and with the outside world. These powers were to be exercised through a national secretariat that would direct policy-formulating bureaus. In reality, the National Comm and did not oversee the Baath movem ent as a whole, because there continued to be no single comma nd. In 1966, a major schism within the Baath movem ent had resulted in the creation of two rival National Commands, one based in Damascus and the other in Baghdad. Both comma nds claimed to be the legitimate authority for the Baath, but 1966 onwards, they were mutually antagonistic. Michel Aflaq, one of the original cofounders of the Baath Party, was the secretary general of the Baghdadbased National Command, and Saddam Hussein was the vicechairman. In practice, the Syrian Regional Command, under Hafiz al-Asad, controlled the Damascus-based National Comm and of the Baath Party, while the Iraqi Regional Comm and controlled the Baghdad-based National Command. Theoretically, the Iraqi Regional Comm and made decisions about Baath Party policy based on consensus. In practice, the party's secretary general, Saddam Hussein, who since 1979, had also been

360

Iraq

chairman of the RCC and President of the republic, made all decisions. He worked closely with a small group of supporters, especially members of the Talfah family from the town of Tikrit; he also dealt ruthlessly with suspected opposition to his rule from within the party. In 1979, several high-ranking Baathists were tried and were executed for allegedly planning a coup; other prominent party members were forcibly retired in 1982. Saddam Hussein's detractors accused him of monopolising power and of promoting a cult of personality. The Const itution The Provisional Constitution of July 16,197 0, upon which Iraq's governmental system was based in 1988, proclaims Iraq to be "a sovereign people's democratic republic" dedicated to the ultimate realisation of a single Arab state and to the establishment of a socialist system. Islam is declared to be the state religion, but freedom of religion and of religious practices is guaranteed. Iraq is said to be formed of two principal nationalities, Arab and Kurd. A March 1974 amend ment to the Constitution provides for autono my for the Kurds in the region where they constitute a majority of the population. In this Autonomous Region both Arabic and Kurdish are designated as official languages for administrative and educational purposes. The Constitution also prescribes, however, that the "national rights" of the Kurds as well as the "legitimate rights" of all minorities are to be exercised only within the framework of Iraqi Unity, and the docum ent stipulates that no part of Iraq can be relinquished. The Constitution sets forth two basic aims, the establishment of a socialist system based on "scientific and revolutionary principles," and pan-Arab economic unity. The state is given an active role in "planning, directing, and guiding" the economy. National resources and the principal means of production are defined as "the property of the people" to be exploited by the state "directly in accordance with the requirements of the general planning of the national economy." The Constitution describes public properties and the properties of the public sector as inviolable. The Constitution classifies the ownership of property as "a social function that shall be exercised within the limits of society's aims and the state's programmes in accordance with the provisions of the law"; nevertheless, the Constitution also guarantees private ownership and individual economic freedom "within the limits of the law, provided

Polity

361

that individual ownership will not contradict or be detrimental to general economic planning." The Constitution stipulates that private property may not be expropriated except for the public interest and then only with just compensation. The size of private agricultural land holdings is to be defined by law, and the excess is to be regarded as the property of the people. The Constitution also bars foreign ownership of real estate, although individuals may be granted a legal exemption from this prohibition. Articles 19 through 36 of the Constitution spell out fundamental rights and duties in detail. The right to fair trial through due process, the inviolability of person and of residence, the privacy of correspondence, and the freedom to travel are guaranteed to all citizens. The Constitution also assures citizens of their right to religious freedom; to the freedom of speech, of publication, and of assembly; and to the freedom to form political parties, trade unions, and profeSSional societies. The Constitution directs the state to eliminate illiteracy and to ensure the right of citizens to free education from elementary school through the university level. According to Article 28, the aims of education include instilling opposition to "the doctrines of capitalism, exploitation, reaction, Zionism, and colonialism" in order to ensure the achievement of the Baathist goals of Arab unity, freedom, and socialism. The Constitution also requires the state to provide every citizen with employment and with free medical care. The Constitution defines the powers and the functions of the different government institutions. These include the RCC, the National Assembly, the presidency, the Council of Ministers, or cabinet, and the judiciary. According to Article 37, the RCC "is the supreme body in the State." Article 43 assigns to the RCC, by a vote of two-thirds of its members, authority to promulgate laws and regulations, to deal with national security, to declare war and conclude peace, and to approve the government's budget. Article 38 stipulates that all newlyelected members of the RCC must be members of the Baath Party Regional Command. The Constitution also provides for an appointed Council of Ministers that has responsibility for carrying out the executive decisions of the RCC. The chief executive of the RCC is the President, who serves as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and as the head of both the government and the state. The powers of the President, according

362

Iraq

to the Constitution, include appointing, promoting, and dismissing personnel of the judiciary, civil service, and military. The President also has responsibility for preparing and approving the budget. The first President, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, was in office from 1968 to 1979, when he resigned and was succeeded by Saddam Hussein. Articles 47 through 56 of the Constitution provide for an elected National Assembly, but its powers are to be defined by the RCC. Elections for the Assembly took place for the first time in June 1980. Subsequent National assembly elections were held in October 1984. The Constitution can be amended only by a two-thirds majority vote of the RCC. Although the 1970 Constitution is officially designated as provisional, it is to remain in force until a permanent constitution is promulgated. The current constitution of Iraq was approved by an October 15, 2005 ratification vote. The proposed constitution was drafted in 2005 by members of the Interim Iraqi Government to replace the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, which had been put in force by the Coalition Provisional Authority after the Iraq War and occupation of Iraq by the United States and Coalition forces. Under a compromise brokered before the referendum, it was agreed that the first government elected under the new constitution would consider amendments to the constitution in the first four months. Any amendments agreed would have to be ratified by a similar referendum to the one that originally approved it. Following this compromise the Sunni-majority Iraqi Islamic Party agreed to back a Yes vote. Electoral Commission officials told a news conference that 78 per cent of voters backed the charter and 21 per cent opposed it. Of 18 provinces, only two recorded "No" votes greater than two thirds, one province short of a veto. A two-thirds rejection vote in three of the country's 18 provinces (of which four are thought to include Sunni majorities) would have required the dissolution of the Assembly, fresh elections, and the recommencement of the entire drafting process. Turnout in the October 15 referendum was 63 per cent, commission officials had said previously. The drafting and adoption of the new Constitution was not without controversy, however, as sectarian tensions in Iraq figured heavily in the process.

Polity

363

The deadline for the conclusion of drafting was extended on four occasions because of the lack of consensus on religious language. In the end, only three of the 15 Sunni members of the drafting committee attended the signing ceremony, and none of them signed it. Sunni leaders were generally urging the electorate to reject the constitution in the 15 October referendum, but were overwhelmingly rejected by the voters. The text of the proposed constitution was read to the National Assembly on Sunday, 28 August, 2005. It describes the state as a "democratic, federal, representative republic" (art. 1) (however, the division of powers is to be deferred until the first parliament convenes), and a "multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-sect country." In addition to creating new law, the Council of Representatives is responsible for certifying treaties and international agreements; approving high-level judicial, military, and ambassadorial appointments; and approving the budget and final accounting presented by the Cabinet. The Council also elects the President of the RepUblic and can remove him for violating oath, constitution, or treason; it may also remove the Prime Minister in a no-confidence vote. The Council of Representatives may declare war with a twothirds vote and requests by both the President and Prime Minister. The Council of Representatives may be dissolved by a one-third vote of the Council or on requests of both the Prime Minister and the President. The Council of Union is only tasked to examine bills related to regions and provinces. Its creation, powers, and dissolution are to be determined by law. The articles detail the requirements for a presidential candidate and the two-thirds vote in the Council of Representatives necessary to appoint a President of the Republic. This section specifies the President's term, appointments, military leadership, and legislative approval powers. Described as the "symbol of the nation's unity", the President is not directly elected by the people and his powers are mostly ceremonial or protocolorary in nature, or require that he act with the approval of the Prime Minister or the Council of Representatives. Presidential succession goes first to the Deputy of the President of the Republic then to the President of the Council of Representatives.

364

Iraq

According to Article 148 of the Transitional Guidelines, until the Council of Representatives enters its second period of sessions, the President of the Republic shall be replaced by a three-member Presidential Council, comprising a President and two Deputy Presidents, appointed in the fashion described above. The decisions of this Presidential Council are to be adopted by unanimity. One of the President's functions is to appoint the leader of the majority party in the Council of Representatives to serve as Prime Minister. The Prime Minister then selects the members of his Cabinet, and these ministerial appointments are subject to a confirmation vote in the Council. If the Prime Minister fails to garner support for his Cabinet within 15 days, the President selects another candidate to try and form a government. Cabinet has the power to plan and implement the general policy of the state, propose laws and budgets, negotiate treaties, and oversee the national intelligence service and the security apparatus. The Prime Minister has direct executive responsibility for the general policy of the nation, is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and presides over the Cabinet. The Supreme Judiciary Council administers the judicial branch, nominates members of the courts and departments, and presents the judicial budget to the legislature. The Supreme Federal Court is the highest court in Iraq, which oversees election results, and also rules in case of accusations against the President or Prime Minister. Private courts are banned and it is forbidden to create any law that protects an administrative action or decision from being challenged in court. Powers are shared with regional authorities: regional customs, electrical power, environmental policy, public planning, health and education. Article 111 defines the breakdown of authority between the regions and the federal government: anything not written in the exclusive powers of the federal authorities is in the authority of the regions and, in the event of a dispute, priority will be given to the region's law. Oil is defined as the property of all Iraqi people (Art. 109) and is to be managed by the federal government in conjunction with regional and provincial governments, Article 110 attempts to define how oil revenue is to be distributed among the country's regions and provinces; however, beyond stating that it be done "fairly", the

Polity

365

constitutiqn does not go into specifics. It also could be read as referring solely to "current" oil fields, not ones opened up in the future. The country's future regions are to be established from its current 18 governorates (or provinces). Any single province, or group of provinces, is entitled to request that it be recognised as a region, with such a request being made by either two-thirds of the members of the provincial councils in the provinces involved or by one-tenth of the registered voters in the province(s) in question. Art. 117 paragraph 3 is of relevance to the contentious issue of oil revenues, stating that "Regions and provinces shall be allocated an equitable share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge their responsibilities and duties, but having regard to their resources, needs and the percentage of their population." Provinces that are unwilling or unable to join a region still enjoy enough autonomy and resources to enable them to manage their own internal affairs according to the prinCipal of administrative decentralisation. With the two parties' approval, federal government responsibilities may be delegated to the provinces, or vice versa. These decentralised provinces are headed by Provincial Governors, elected by Provincial Councils. The administrative levels within a province are defined, in descending order, as districts, counties and villages. Article 120 states that Baghdad is the Capital of the Republic within the boundaries of Baghdad Governorate. The constitution makes no specific reference to the status of the capital and its surrounding governorate within the federal structure, stating merely that its status is to be regulated by law. Consisting solely of Article 121, Part Four simply states that the constitution guarantees the administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights of the country's various ethnic groups (Turkmens, Chaldeans, Assyrians, etc.), and that legislation will be adopted to regulate those rights. On September 18, 2005, several changes to the text of the constitution were approved by Iraq's parliament, and will be included in the version published for ratification by the public. Also, a new compromise was made which caused many Sunni groups to support the constitution. Many of the links to the Constitution use the August 24, 2005, AP wire translation; however, the American Chronicle uses a

366

Iraq

slightly different translation dated October 12, 2005. The Constitution was adopted on 15 October, 2005, in a referendum of the people. The constitutional process culminating in a referendum made is not a sign of Iraqi sovereignty and democracy taking hold, but rather a consolidation of US influence and control. Whether Iraq's draft constitution was approved or rejected, the decision was expeeted to make the current situation worse. The ratification process reflects US, not Iraqi urgency, and is resulting in a vote in which most Iraqis did not even see the draft, and amendments were being reopened and negotiated by political parties and elites in Baghdad as late as four days before the planned referendum. The proposed constitution was apprehended to be stripped of Iraqis of control over their nation's oil wealth by opening all new oil exploration and production to foreign oil companies. The imposition of federalism as defined in the draft constitution undermines Iraqi national consciousness and sets the stage for a potential division of Iraq largely along ethnic and religious lines, with financial, military, and political power devolving from the central government to the regional authorities. All groups risksectoral as well as national interests. Human rights, including women's rights, individual, political and civil rights, economic and social rights, religious rights, minority rights, all remain at risk. Instead of balancing the interests of Iraq's diverse population by referencing its long-dominant secular approaches, the draft constitution reflects, privileges and makes permanent the current occupation-fuelled turn towards Islamic identity.

The Bottom Line: Constitutions can play a crucial role in founding and unifying new or renewing states; Iraq is no exception, and in the future drafting a constitution could play a key part in reunifying and strengthening national consciousness of the country. But this process has been imposed from outside, it is not an indigenous Iraqi process, and the draft constitution finalised is not a legitimate Iraqi product. Iraqis are still suffering under conditions of severe deprivation, violence, lack of basic necessities including clean water, electricity, jobs-crafting a new constitution never appeared high on their agenda. The process of ratifying the new constitution was far more important to the Bush administration than it was to the majority of people of Iraq. Whether the ratified constitution, it was a process and

Polity

367

a text largely crafted and imposed by US occupation authorities and their Iraqi'dependents, and thus lacking in legal or political legitimacy. The most important reality is that the draft does not even mention the US occupation, and neither ratification nor rejection of it was expected result in moving towards an end to occupation. None of the broad human rights asserted in the draft include any call to abrogate the existing laws first imposed by Paul Bremer, the US proconsul, and still in effect. Whether it was accepted or rejected, it was likely to worsen the insecurity and violence facing Iraqis living under the US occupation, and to increase the likelihood of a serious division of the country. As it was passed, over significant Sunni (and other) opposition, the constitution is widely viewed as an attack on Sunni and secular interests and will institutionalise powerful regional economic and military control at the expense of a weakened central government. Its extreme federalism was feared to transform the violent political conflict into full-blown civil war between ethnic and religiOUS communities. If it had failed, because Sunnis backed by significant secular forces, would have been able to mobilise enough "no" votes, the result could have been a collapse of the assembly's already weak legitimacy and capacity, and cancellation of the planned December elections. In either event, it was expected that resistance attacks will increase, not decrease. And certainly the greater violence of the US military occupation was to continue. From the vantage point of the Bush administration, a "yes" vote, however slim the margin and however dubious the legitimacy, validates the claim that the occupation is setting the stage for "democratisation" in Iraq; this explains the huge investment of money, political clout, and the personal involvement/interference of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad in the drafting process. If the White House was looking for a fig leaf to cover troop withdrawals, this would be it. But there was no indication there was any such interest in beginning to bring the troops home, particularly since the referendum is unlikely to lead to any diminution of violence. From the vantage point of the peace movement, the key issue, like that during the elections, remains that of Iraq's sovereignty and selfdetermination. Whatever one may think of this ratified draft constitution, it has been essentially imposed on the Iraqi people by US occupation

368

Iraq

authorities, and as such it is not legitimate. We may like parts of this draft, we may disagree with some future Iraqi-led constitutional process-but our obligation must be to call for Iraqis to control their own country and their own destiny. Once the US occupation is over, and Iraqis reclaim their own nation, we will continue to build the kind of internationalist ties with women's, labour and other civil society organisations fighting for human rights in Iraq, as we have with partners in so many other countries. But while the US occupation is in control, our first obligation is to work to end it.

The Referendum on the Draft Constitution: The referendum marked a key stage in the process of implementing the US-designed, US-imposed political process designed to give a "sovereign" gloss the continuing US occupation. The process was set in place and pushed to completion by each successive US-backed occupation authority in Iraq. Initial US reluctance to hold early elections was overcome by pressure from Shia leader Ayatollah al-Sistani; while his support ensured widespread Shia backing for the political process, it also guaranteed even greater opposition from Sunni and some secular forces. The Bush administration had invested a huge amount of political capital in ensuring the "success" of the constitution process, sacrificing for the actual content of the draft document to ensure that something, almost anything, that could be called a constitution would be endorsed by a majority of Iraqis. The US ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, had played an active and coercive role in pushing Iraqi political forces to participate and make concessions, and in the actual drafting of the document. The US goal was to justify the claim that Iraq was "moving towa ..ds democracy" and that the post-invasion, occupied reality of Iraq in 2005 was somehow equivalent to the experience of the United States at the time of the drafting of the US constitution. While numerous politicians, pundits and mainstream journalists routinely referred to the constitution's approval as the "necessary step towards ending the US occupation once and for all," it actually did nothing of the sort. Despite asserting the rhetorical claim of "sovereignty" and "independence" for Iraq, the constitution as drafted makes no mention of the US occupation. Even the "transition" section, while ensuring the continuation of the "de-Baathification" process, support for former political prisoners

Polity

369

and victims of terrorist attacks, and other contemporary concerns, there is no mention of the presence of the 150,000 or so US and coalition troops occupying the country, and certainly no call for them to go home. The US-controlled political process violates the Geneva Convention's prohibitions on an occupying power imposing political or economic changes on the occupied country. At the end of the draft constitution debate, the constitution left the US occupation intact and unchallenged. The Voting Process: There was large-scale opposition to the draft constitution, particularly from key elements of the Sunni population. In a US-prodded effort to "get the Sunnis on board," changes were negotiated between one Sunni party and the constitutional committee. Just three days before the vote, on October 12, they agreed to two changes-allowing the constitution to be amended by the new parliament scheduled to be elected in December, and limiting the "de-Baathification" process to those former members of the Baath party accused of committing crimes. The announcement was likely to persuade some additional Sunnis to vote, rather than boycott, or even to support rather than reject the constitution. But the Iraq Islamic Party is only one, and by far not the most influential, of the many Sunni-dominated political forces in Iraq, and it is unclear how influential they are or how significant the changes will be. Ukely Results: If the voting resembled something close to an accurate referendum, ("free" and "fair" are not even possibilities, given the dominance of US control of the drafting and conducting a vote under military occupation) the current draft constitution would have been likely, though not certain, to be approved by a small majority of Iraqi voters. It remained unclear, even with the new changes, whether the majority of the Sunni population would participate and likely vote "nd' on the draft, or would boycott the referendum altogether. It also was uncertain how many secular Iraqis of all religions and ethnicities may reject the constitution. There were clear indications that most Iraqis belie.ved the constitution had been drafted in a process from which they are largely excluded; international news outlets report that most had still not seen the text only days before the referendum.

370

Iraq

Control of Iraqi Oil: The major debates between Iraq's ethnic and religious communities, as well as between secular and Islamic C'?proaches, sidelined any debate over crucial economic, especially oil, policy decisions in the constitution. The draft asserted that "Oil and gas is the property of all the Iraqi people in all the regions and provinces," and that the federal government will administer the oil and gas from "current fields" with the revenues to be "distributed fairly in a matter compatible with the demographic distribution all over the country." But that guarantee refers only to oil fields already in use, leaving future explOitation of almost 2/3 of Iraq's known reserves (17 of 80 known fields, 40 billion of its 115 billion barrels of known reserves), for foreign companies-because the next section of the constitution demands "the most modem techniques of market principles and encouraging investment." Further, Article 11 states explicitly '~II that is not written in the exclusive powers of the federal authorities is in the authority of the regions." That means that future exploration and exploitation of Iraq's oil wealth will remain under the control of the regional authorities where the oil lies-the Kurdish-controlled North and the Shia-dominated South, insuring a future of impoverishment for the Sunni, secular and inter-mixed populations of Baghdad and Iraq's centre, and sets the stage for a future of ethnic and religious strife. While the specifics of oil privatisation are not written into the text of the draft constitution, they are consistent with the proposed Iraqi laws announced in August 2004 by the US-appointed interim Prime Minister Iyad A1lawi. He called for private companies, including foreign oil corporations, to have exclusive rights to develop new oil fields, rather than the Iraqi National Oil Company, as well as at least partial privatisation of the INOC itself, thus essentially selling off Iraq's national treasure to the highest foreign corporate bidder. Federalism: The division of Iraq into three major ethnically-or religiously-defined regions or cantons remains a long-standing fear of many Iraqis and many people and governments across the region and around the world, and the most important basis for opposition to the draft constitution. In historically secular Iraq, the shift in primary identity from "Iraqi" to "Sunni" or "Shia" (although Iraqi Kurdish identity was always stronger) happened largely in response to the US invasion and occupation; it does not reflect historical

371 Polity

tion pro mot es not just federalism cultural realities. The draft constitu an extreme version of federalism .as a nati ona l governing structure, but assigned to the central gov ernm ent in which all pow er not specifically onal auth orit ies- sett ing the stag e devolves automatically to the regi ely alon g ethnic and religious lines. for a pote ntia l division of Iraq larg onal gov ernm ent, with financial, The draf t anticipates a wea k nati centrated within regional authorities. military, and political pow er all con directly that all pow ers- mil itar y, The pro pos ed constitution stat ed e-"except in wha t is listed as eco nom ic, political or any thin g els orities" are automatically reserved exclusive pow ers of the federal auth ernments. for the regional or prOVincial gov the provincial gov ernm ents In all thos e area s of regional power, lementation of the federal law in are auth oris ed to "am end the imp re or override any constitutional the region" mea ning they can igno or defence of the borders. Besides gua rant ee othe r than foreign affairs ns that regional (read: religious the economic/oil conflict, this mea to political parties and /or religious and /or ethnic) militias acco unta ble of national forces. The process lead ers will be given the imprimatur onal consciousness, and sets in has already und erm ined Iraqi nati ically, sectoral interests affecting plac e risks for both national and , iron t powerful. eac h of the gro ups --ev en the mos per cent) are the dom inan t Shi a: Iraq's Shi a majority (abo ut 60 security agencies, and in alliance force in the interim gov ernm ent and stitutional drafting process. The with the Kurds, dom inat ed the con to favour their interests, and by constitution is Widely und erst ood rule and according to som e sou rces instituting a sem blan ce of majority in the gov ernm ent and cou rt by priviledging religious pow er with nt turns tow ards religion, man y systems, it doe s so. But despite rece all Shi a wan t to institutionalise Shi a rem ain very secular, and not l or nati ona l gov ernm ents . religious control in eith er regiona g the potential to establish a The federalism provisions, includin the nine oil-rich provinces of the Shi a-do min ated "super-region" in man y Shia. However, the extreme sou th, are also a favourite amo ng largely constraining Shi a control federalism has the parallel effect of ich) where they form the largest to the sou ther n area s (however oil-r a influence in the country overall. majority pop ulat ion, thus limiting Shi y the largest Shi a city in Iraq) and Man y Shi a live in Bag hda d (actuall ther n Shia-majority region. The othe r mix ed area s outside the sou

372

Iraq revered Shi a leader, Ayatollah Ni al-Sistani, spoke strongly against dividing Iraq, but the constitution set the groundwork for exactly that. Sun n': Iraq's Sunni population is dom inan t in small areas in central Iraq including Baghdad and its environs. With the constitution's strong focus on building regional economic, political and military power, the Sunnis as a community stan d to lose the most. With major economic pow er-r ead : control of oil inco me- rest ing with the regional governments, the Sunnis will suffer because the area they dominate in central Iraq is devoid of oil reso urces. Following the large-scale Sunni boycott of the Jun e 200 5 elec tion, they are und er represented in the national assembly, and have faced the largest proportion of exclusion from jobs, the military, and the government und er the "de-Baathification" process. Las t-minute cha nge s to the draf t constitution, including limits on de-B aathification pacified some Sunni anger, but is unlikely to result in fullscale proportional involvement and empowerment in the post-refere ndum political processes. Kums: Iraq's Kurdish population, abo ut 20 per cent, is largely (though not entirely) concentrated in the northern provinces. The y have the longest history of a separat e ethnic/religious identity of any of Iraq's major groups, and their sear ch for independence or autonomy has long roots, strengthened by years of oppression by various central governments in Baghdad. Iraq's Kur dish leaders are the closest allies of the US in Iraq, having provided support to the invasion and occupation eve n before the US mili tary attacks began. Because of US protection during the 12 post-De sert Storm sanctions years, the Kurdish region also had access to mor e money (through an intentional distortion of the oil-for-food distribution of Iraq's oil funds), international ties through ope n borders to Turkey and beyond, and the development of US and oth er western-backed civil society institutions than any othe r sector of Iraq. They are by far the best prepared and the most eag er for control of regional oil inco me (their zone includes rich northern oil fields, especially if they end up incorporating the onceKurdish but now overwhelmingly mix ed area aro und Kirkuk) and a weakened central government. Their regional militias, the Peshmerga, are also by far the most powerful of any Iraqi military force. Som e Kurdish forces, however, are already critical of the draft constitution bec aus e the eve n more oil-rich Shia-do minated nine-province region in the south would dwarf their oil-r ich three-province region.

373 Polity

e, Iraq was historically the Sec ula r For ces: Along with Palestin draft constitution, while vag ue most secular of all Arab countries. The groundwork for a far greater role in man y details, certainly lays the ental and judicial institutions. for religious authorities in governm istians, are dismayed by the Many secular IraqiS, as well as Chr in the constitutional court, for priviledging of Muslim clerics with empowerment that allows locaV example, as well as the regional riah, or Islamic law, as the basis regional governments to choose Sha ion rather than secular laws. for som e or all of its court jurisdict cially the draft constitution Rel igio n and Human Rig hts: Offi hum an rights, including a wide includes far-reaching protections of explicitly women's rights, saying range of political and civil rights, and reject the policy of aggression, that Iraq will "respect the rule of law, rights, the elderly and their cares, pay attention to women and their ad the culture of diversity and the children and their affairs, spre and cultural rights are explicitly defuse terrorism." Economic, social than that of the US constitution protected in language far stronger t other countries. But there is and Bill of Rights, or that of mos draft states that "(a) No law can contradictory language as well. The ted rules of Islam. (b) No law be pas sed that contradicts the undispu principles of democracy. (c) No can be passed that contradicts the the rights and basic freedoms law can be passed that contradicts ether basic freedoms will trump outlined in this constitution." Wh will decide, seems a dangerous Islam or vice versa, and crucially, who g the interests of Iraq's diverse risk. Ultimately, instead of balancin ant secular, the draft constitution Muslim majority with its once-domin ane nt Iraq's current occupationreflects, privileges and makes perm fuelled turn towards Islamic identity.

Loc al Go ver nm ent rates (a[wiya, sing., liwa), In 198 8 there were eighteen governo appointed by the President. Each eac h administered by a governor (aqdhiya, sing., qad ha) hea ded governorate was divided into districts ., qaimaqam); eac h district was by district officers (qaimaqamun; sing ; sing., nah iyah ) und er the divi ded into sub-districts (naw ahy (mudara; sing., mud ir). Mayors responsibility of sub-district officers alities were divided into several hea ded cities and towns. Municip of local revenues. Baghdad, the categories dep end ing upo n the size inistrative status. The mayor of national capital, had special adm

374

Iraq

Baghdad and the mayors of other cities were presidential appointees. In 1971, President Bakr promulgated the National Action Charter, a broad statement of Baath Party political, economic, social, and foreign policy objectives. This document called for the formation of popula r councils in all administrative subdivisions. These councils were to be given the right to supervise, to inspect, and to criticise the work of the government. The first councils were appoin ted in 1973, in accordance with a law promulgated by the RCC. As late as 1988, however, there was insufficient empirical research available to determine whether the popular councils were autono mous forums for the channelling of grievances or were merely Baath Party-dominated institutions used to encour age active popula r suppor t of, and involvement in, government-initiated activities.

The Judiciary Although the Constitution guarantees an indepe ndent judiciary,

it contains no provisions for the organisation of courts. Conseq uently,

the legal system was formed on the basis of laws promulgated by the RCC. In early 1988, the judicial system consisted of courts that had jurisdiction over civil, criminal, administrative, religious and other matters. The courts were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, and all judges were appointed by the President. The secular courts continued to function partly on the basis of the French model, first introduced prior to 1918, when Iraq was under Ottoma n rule and subsequently modified, and partly on Islamic law. The three domina nt schools of Islamic jurisprudence were the Hanafi among the Sunni Arabs, the Shafii among the Sunni Kurds, and the Jafari among Shia Arabs. The Christian and Jewish minorities had their own religious courts for the adjudication of personal status issues, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. For judicial administration, the country was divided into five appellate districts centred, respectively, in Baghdad, Basra, A1-HiIlah (Babylon), Kirkuk, and Mosul. Major civil and commercial cases were referred to the courts of first instance, which were of two kinds: 18 courts of first instance with unlimited powers, and 150 courts of first instance with limited powers. The former were established in the capitals of the eighteen governorates (provinces); the latter, all of which were single-judge courts, were located in the district and subdistrict centres, and in the governorate capitals. Six peace courts, two

Polity

375

in Baghdad and one in each of the other five judicial district centres, handled minor litigation. Decisions of these courts could be appealed to the relevant district court of appeals. Wherever there were civil courts, criminal cases were judged by magistrates. Six sessions courts reviewed cases appealed from the lower magistrates' courts. The personal status of both Shia Muslims and Sunni Muslims and disputes arising from administration of waqfs (religiOUS trusts or endowments) were decided in Shariah (Islamic law) courts. Shariah courts were located wherever there were civil courts. In some places Shariah courts consisted of specially-appointed qadis (religious judges), and in other places of civil court judges. Christians, Jews, and other religious minorities had their own separate communal councils to administer personal status laws. Civil litigation against government bodies and the "socialist sector" and between government organisations were brought before the Administrative Court set up under a law promulgated in November 1977. Jurisdictional conflicts between this court and other courts were adjudicated by the Court of Cassation, which on appeal could also review decisions of the Administrative Court. Offences against the internal or external security of the state-whether economic, financial, or political offences-were tried before the Revolutionary Court. Unlike the other courts described above, the Revolutionary Court was not under the jurisdiction of the appellate court system. In addition, the RCC periodically established special security courts, under the jurisdiction of the secret security police, to handle cases of espionage, of treason, and of "anti-state" activities. The proceedings of the Revolutionary Court and of the special security courts, in contrast to the practice of all other courts, are generally closed. The court of last resort for all except security cases was the Court of Cassation. It consisted of a President; Vice Presidents; no fewer than fifteen permanent members; and a number of deputised judges, reporting judges, and religious judges. It was divided into general, civil, criminal, administrative affairs, and personal status benches. In addition to its appellate function, the Court of Cassation assumed original jurisdiction over crimes committed by high government 'Officials, including judges. The Court of Cassation also adjudicated jurisdictional conflicts between lower courts.

376

Iraq

Foreign Policy The Ministry of Foreign Affairs supervises Iraq's relations with other countries and with international organisations. In 1988, the minister of foreign affairs was Tariq Aziz, who had served in that post since 1983. Aziz was a member of the RCC and an influential leader of the Baath Party. Before becoming minister of foreign affairs, he had been director of the party's foreign affairs bureau. Aziz, Saddam Hussein, and the other members of the RCC formulated foreign policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy implemented RCC directives. The Baath maintained control over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and over all Iraqi diplomatic missions outside the country through its party cells that operated throughout the ministry and in all embassies abroad. In 1988, Iraq's main foreign policy issue was the war with Iran. This war had begun in September 1980, when Saddam Hussein sent Iraqi forces across the Shatt ai-Arab into southwestern Iran. Although the reasons for Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran were complicated, the leaders of the Baath Party had long resented Iranian hegemony in the Persian Gulf region and had especially resented the perceived Iranian interference in Iraq's internal affairs both before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. They may have thought that the revolutionary turmoil in Tehran would enable Iraq to achieve a quick victory. Their objectives were to halt any potential foreign assistance to the Shias and to the Kurdish opponents of the regime and to end Iranian domination of the area. The Baathists believed a weakened Iran would be incapable of posing a security threat and could not undermine Iraq's. efforts to exercise the regional influence that had been blocked by non-Arab Iran since the mid-1960s. Although the Iraqis failed to obtain the expected easy victory, the war initially went well for them. By early 1982, however, the Iraqi occupation forces were on the defensive and were being forced to retreat from some of their forward lines. In June 1982, Saddam Hussein ordered most of the Iraqi units to withdraw from Iranian territory; after that time, the Baathist government tried to obtain a cease-fire based on a return of all armed personnel to the international borders that prevailed as of September 21, 1979. Iran did not accept Iraq's offer to negotiate an end to the war. Similarly, it rejected a July 1982, United Nations (UN) Security

Polity

377

Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire. Subsequently, Iranian forces invaded Iraq by crossing the Shatt ai-Arab in the south and by capturing some mountain passes in the north. To discourage Iran's offensive, the Iraqi air force initiated bombing raids over several Iranian cities and towns. The air raids brought Iranian retaliation, which included the aerial bombing of Baghdad. Although Iraq eventually pushed back and contained the Iranian advances, it was not able to force Iranian troops completely out of Iraqi territory. The perceived threat to Iraq in the summer of 1982, thus, was serious enough to force Saddam Hussein to request the Non-Aligned Movement to change the venue of its scheduled September meeting from Baghdad to India; nevertheless, since the fall of 1982, the ground conflict has generally been a stalemated war of attrition-although Iran made small but demoralising territorial advances as a result of its massive offensives in the reed marshes north of Basra in 1984 and in 1985, in Al-Faw Peninsula in early 1986, and in the outskirts of Basra during January and February 1987. In addition, as of early 1988, the government had lost control of several mountainous districts in Kurdistan where, since 1983, dissident Kurds have cooperated militarily with Iran. Saddam Hussein's government has maintained consistently since the summer of 1982 that Iraq wants a negotiated end to the war based upon the status quo ante. Iran's stated conditions for ceasing hostilities, namely the removal of Saddam Hussein and the Baath from power, however, have been unacceptable. The main objective of the regime became the extrication of the country from the war with as little additional damage as possible. To further this goal, Iraq has used various diplomatic, economic, and military strategies; none of these had been successful in bringing about a cease-fire. Although the war was a heavy burden on Iraq politically, economically, and SOcially, the most profound consequence of the war's prolongation was its impact on the patterns of Iraq's foreign relations. Whereas trends toward a moderation of the Baath Party's ideological approach to foreign affairs were evident before 1980, the war helped to accelerate these trends. Two of the most dramatic changes were in Iraq's relationships with the Soviet Union and with the United States. During the course of the war Iraq moved away from the close friendship with the Soviet Union that had persisted

378

Iraq

throughout the 1970s, and it initiated a rapprochement with the United States. Iraq also sought to ally itself with Kuwait and with Saudi Arabia, two neighbouring countries with which there had been considerable friction during much of the 1970s. A more moderate Iraqi approa ch accompanied the alignment with these countries to other Arab countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, which previously Iraq had perceived as hostile. Wester n Count ries: Iraqi relations have been generally part and parcel of their relations with the Third World countries and their national liberation movements, particularly Arab nationalism, which for both historical and geo-strategic reasons has been especially important for Moscow. However, at the same time, particularly between 1958 and 1990, Soviet-Iraqi relations were marked by some special features, putting them in contrast with Soviet links with other Afro-Asian nations and even some states of the Arab Middle East. Iraq was first of all the nearest of all Arab countries to the Soviet borders and because of that proximity the threat of Soviet .axpansion could have bee I') seen as being much more real by its leaders than by the leaders of the other Arab states. Different from the other Arab states of al-Mashreq, Iraq, since its very beginning in the 1920s, contained a very substantial (close to 25 per cent) ethnic non-Arab Kurdish minority with specific constitutional rights, which were granted in 1925 as a condition for the incorporation of the largely Kurdishpopula ted Mosul region into its borders. The Kurdish people, other groups of which live in Turkey, Iran and Russia, have never completely submitted to their division and lack of national self-determination, and in Iraq since, 1961, have constantly deman ded territorial autonomy. Their aspirations towards which the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent, were, however, putting it in the awkward situation of having to make a choice between their recognition and its general support of Arab nationalism and the friendly Iraqi government. The Iraqi Communist Party, which was formally founded in 1934, was one of the most effective and socially influential Marxist organisations in the region. Although it was never strong enough to take power by itself, it nevertheless represented a by no means negligible political force in the country, being for Moscow after 1958, both a valuable asset and an embarrassment in its deals with

Polity

379

the "progressive" but still often viciously anti-Communist Iraqi government. Last but not least, Iraq's economic potential and relative wealth, especially after the 1973 October War and the subsequent rise of the oil prices, made this country a financially attractive partner and customer for Moscow. These economic aspects, which had never been absent in the past, have acquired additional importance since the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of Russia as a separate and pro-capitalist nation. Post-Soviet Russia, rejecting Marxist ideology and the ideological support of the Communist parties and the national liberation movements of the Third World peoples, is nevertheless still interested in cooperation with Iraq, and since 1994 has been supporting Baghdad politically against the US-imposed punitive sanctions. The history, geopolitics and economics at both regional and global levels were inextricably interwoven in the process of shaping its attitudes and foreign policy decisions. Although the main focus of the paper is Post-Soviet Russia after December 1991, the Soviet background needs to be taken into account and analysed in order to find the elements of continuity and change in the present policy. Russian (Soviet) relations with Iraq have a relatively long and complex history. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established for the first time on 9 September, 1944, at the end of World War 11. The monarchic regime in Baghdad was, nevertheless, staunchly anti-communist and established its links with Moscow only because of its dependence on Britain and the British-Soviet alliance dUring the war. In January 1955, relations were broken off after the Soviets criticised the Iraqi government's decision to join the Baghdad Pact. When the pro-Western monarchy was overthrown by a military coup on 14 July, 1958, the new leader of the country, General Abd-al-Karim Quasim immediately re-established diplomatic ties with Moscow and started to buy Soviet arms. Since then, for about forty years until the Gorbachev Perestroika in the late 1980s, Soviet-Iraqi cooperation was both close and multifaceted, and for most of the period it was even officially called a "strategic partnership" . However, this did not mean that during all that time their mutual relations had always been equally friendly and without serious political differences. As an American scholar indicated, because of their support of the national-liberation movements, a number of important Third

380

Iraq

World countries, including Iraq, "declared their friendship for an improved relations with the USSR and sided with it on a number of international problems". In no instance, however, did theirleaders "compromise their own national interests or become Soviet stooges." Baghdad's interest in cooperation with Moscow "was based on the need for a powerful patron in its efforts to shed all the remnants of Western Colonialism and to establish Iraq as an autonomous member of the world order of nation states." At the same time, however, the Iraqi "ruling elite had shown stubborn resistance towards anything which could be regarded as an intrusion into the country's internal affairs or as an infringement upon Iraq's sovereignty over its international policies." The late 1970s and 1980s brought some cooling of mutual relations and a weakening of cooperation. Iraq's growing financial resources after the rise in oil prices in 1973 created the basis for its widening links with the West and the ratio of the Soviet and Eastern European participation in the country's economic boom steadily declined. As a political outcome of that, some of the differences between the parties "resurfaced, producing visible strains in the 'strategic alliance' between Moscow and Baghdad." Despite all these tensions and even serious political disagreements, Soviet-Iraqi relations remained fundamentally friendly for all that period until the end of the 1980s, and mutual cooperation continued without major disturbances. Soviet-Iraqi relations started to change from the late 1980s. As a Russian scholar indicates: "The basic changes in Russian foreign policy took place before the Soviet Union's collapse, still under the rule of the Communist party of the USSR with Gorbachev's team coming to power and the so-called 'perestroika', which in its turn brought about a fundamental breakdown of the previous political orientation. Since its inception in December 1991, up to the first months of 2001, post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, including its relations with Iraq, has undergone substantial transformations and some of its goals and directions can now be discerned and analysed. Compared with the Soviet era, its first and most striking feature is its weakness. At present the country has no material basis to support its international stature and aspirations. Its population is less than 50 per cent of the previous Soviet population and as early as

Polity

381

1995, its GNP was already more than ten times smaller than that of the USA From the point of view of its foreign policy, at least equally important is the virtual collapse of its military might. Both unsuccessful operations in Chechenya and the submarine Kursk catastrophe bear witness to the very serious shortcomings of the Russian Army and Navy. According to reliable American research, employ ing virtually every standa rd used to measu re military capabilities, Russia's military is in deep trouble caused primarily by a sharp decline in defence expenditure, which is down 80 per cent from Soviet levels. Development of the political and economic relations between post-Soviet Russia and Iraq could be seen as one of the most intriguing and complex examples' of its foreign policy transformation in the search for a proper place in the world community. Since the mid 1990s, the country's new political leadership aims to find a way out of the political crisis and humiliation of the Gorba chev-e arly Yeltsin period and to restore its previous international status. In marked contrast to the Soviet era, the new Russia's foreign policy is conceived as non-ideological and is avowedly based on its national interests, which are understood mainly in strategic and economic categories. For both of these reasons Iraq is a very important country for Russia because of its geopolitical location, the Islamic factor and its natural and financial resources. Moreover, the struggle for an end to the oil embargo on Iraq and against US military intervention becam e one of the main focal points in the Russian game against US world hegem ony and the unipolar world system which is based on it. Bearing in mind its present general weakness in all its efforts, Russia has nevertheless been cautious and moderate. There are quite clear limits which it did not want to overstep, and in all its actions it has always called for restraint, use of peaceful means and strict adherence to bona fide understood international obligations. In marked contrast to its Soviet past, Russia wants to be seen now as a "peacemaker and a factor of stability in the region," and to work in accordance with and in the framework of the broad international consensus. Iraq is also a country of crucial interest to the Russian economy. In the first six months of 1999, Russian compa nies exporte d 43.0 per cent of Iraqi oil which was allowed to be sold according to

382

Iraq

the UN "oil for food" programme and at least two of them: Lukoil and Slavneft, already have their offices in Baghdad. For Russia, whose own federal budget in 1999, amounted to only US $ 24 billion Iraq's orders which now exceed US $ 20 billion are considered to be vital sources of income. In its tough struggle for the restoration of its independence and preservation of its boundaries, Iraq was also apparently "gambling on Russia as the main power which may help to end the sanctions," and for the last ten years has been constantly showing Moscow its "special sympathies" . In 2000, Saddam Hussein elevated Iraqi-Russian relations to the rank of a strategic partnership and on 18 March, 2001, he told the Duma Speaker Gennadii Seleznev who was visiting Baghd ad that "he hopes to meet President Putin in the near future." Gulf Count ries: Iraq's closest relations in 1988 were with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This was a reversal of the pattern of relations that had persisted in the 1970s. The original Baathist view of the Arabian Peninsula sheikhdoms was that they were regimes that had been set up by the imperialist powers to serve their own interests. This attitude was reinforced in the period between 1968 and 1971, when Britain was preparing the countries of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for complete independence. Iraq wished to have an influence on the governments that would come to power, and it provided clandestine assistance to various groups oppose d to the pro-British rulers. Iraqi support of dissident movements was particularly evident in Oman, where an organised guerrilla force was fighting the government from the late 1960s to the mid 1970s. The Baathist perception of Iran's role in the Persian Gulf was an important factor in Iraqi views of the Arabian Peninsula states. In 1969 Iran, which was then providing aid to dissident Iraqi Kurds, unilaterally abrogated a 1937 treaty that had established the Shatt ai-Arab bounda ry along the low water on the Iranian shore; in 1971, Iran forcibly occupied three small islands in the lower Gulf near the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz; and by 1972, Iran was again giving assista nce to anti-go vernm ent Kurds. As Iraq becam e increasingly concerned about Iranian policies, it tried to enlist the cooperation of the Arab monarchies in an effort to keep the Persian

Polity

383

Gulf independent of Iranian influence. Iraq believed it was possible to collaborate with the Arab kings and sheikhs because the latter had proven their Arab nationalism by participating in the 1973 oil boycott against the Western countries supporting Israel. Despite Iraq's new friendliness, the rulers in countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia did not easily forget their suspicion of Iraqi radicalism. Nevertheless, political discussions were initiated, and progress was made toward resolving disputes over borders, over oil-pricing policy, and over support for subversion. By the time the Islamic Revolution broke out in Iran in 1979, Iraq had succeeded in establishing generally correct relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The war with Iran served as a catalyst to develop these relations even further. Although the Gulf States proclaimed their neutrality in the war, in practice they gave Iraq crucial financial support. The unexpected prolongation of the war and the closing of Iraqi ports early in the war had produced a severe economic crunch by the beginning of 1981. In response, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE all provided loans to help replace revenues that Iraq had lost because of the decl,ine of its oil exports. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were particularly generous, providing an estimated US $ 50 billion in interest-free loans up through 1987. In addition, a major portion of Iraq's non-military imports were shipped to Kuwaiti harbours, and then transported overland to Iraq. Saudi Arabia also agreed to provide to Iraqi contract customers part of its own oil from the Neutral Zone, jurisdiction over which it shared with Iraq; it was understood that Iraq would repay this oil "loan" after the war had ended. Arab Countries: The war with Iran changed the Baathist perception of what constituted the principal threat to Arab unity. Prior to 1980, the Baath leaders had identified Zionism as the main danger to Arab nationalism. After the war had begun, Iranian nationalism was perceived as the primary force threatening the Arabs. Under the pressures of war, Iraq became reconciled with Egypt and moderated its once-uncompromising stance on Israel.

This reconciliation was ironic, because Iraq had taken the lead in 1978 and in 1979 in ostracising Egypt for recognising Israel and for signing a separate peace treaty with the latter state. The war with Iran helped to transform Egypt from an excoriated traitor into a

384

Iraq

much-appreciated ally. Factories in Egypt produced munitions and spareparts for the Iraqi army, and Egyptian workers filled some of the labour shortages created by the mobilisation of so many Iraqi men. As early as 1984. Iraq publicly called for Egypt's readmission into pan-Arab councils, and, in 1987, Iraq was one of the countries leading the effort to have Egypt readmitted into the Arab League. The Baath also abandoned its former hostility to countries such as Jordan. Morocco, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). On a smaller scale than Egypt, Jordan provided Iraq with tanks and with labourers, and it served as a trans-shipment point for goods intended for Iraq. The most ideologically significant consequence of the war was the evolution of Baathist views on the issue of Palestine. Prior to 1980, Iraq had opposed any negotiations that might lead to the creation of a Palestinian state on the Israeli-occupied West Bank and in the Gaza Strip on the ground that these territories constituted only part of historic Palestine. Accordingly, Iraq supported the most extreme Palestinian guerrilla groups, the so-called "rejectionist" factions, and was hostile toward the mainstream Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Thus, Iraq provided financial and military aid to such forces as George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Arab Liberation Front. The latter group had actually been founded by the Baath in 1969. In addition, Iraq was widely believed to have links to various Palestinian terrorist groups such as the "Special Operations Branch" of the PFLP, Black June, the Arab Organisation of the 15th May, and the Abu Nidal Organisation. Beginning in 1980, Iraq gradually retreated from its long-held position that there could never be any recognition of Israel. In 1983, Baath leaders accepted the de facto partition of pre-1948 Palestine by stating publicly that there could be negotiations with Israel for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Consequently, Iraq cut its ties to the extremist Palestinian factions, including that of Abu Nidal, who was expelled from the country in November; he subsequently established new headquarters in Syria. Iraq shifted its support to the mainstream Palestinian groups that advocated negotiations for a Palestinian state. Yasir Arafat's AI-Fatah organisation

Polity

385

was permitted to reopen an office in Baghdad. Arafat, whose proposed assassination for alleged treason against the Palestinians had been clandestinely supported by Iraq in the late 1970s, was even invited to visit the country. This shift represented a fundamental revolution in the thinking of the Iraqi Baath. In effect, by 1986, the Baath Party was saying that the Palestinians had to determine for themselves the nature of their relationship with Israel. Iraq's most bitter foreign relationship was with the rival Baath government in Syria. Although there were periods of amity between the two governments-such as the one immediately after the October 1973, Arab-Israeli War and the one in October 1978, when Iraq and Syria both opposed Egypt's plans for a separate peace with Israelthe governments generally were hostile to one another. Relations began to deteriorate once again at the end of 1980 following the outbreak of the war with Iran. Syria criticised Iraq for diverting Arab attention from the real enemy (Israel) and for attacking a regime (Iran) supportive of the Arab cause. Relations worsened throughout 1981 as each country accused the other of assisting anti-regime political groups. In April 1982, Syria closed its borders with Iraq and cut off the flow of Iraqi oil through the pipeline that traversed Syrian territory to ports on the Mediterranean Sea. The cessation of Iraqi oil exports via this pipeline was a severe economic blow; Iraq interpreted the move as a confirmation of Syria's de facto alliance with Iran in the war. The hostility between Iraq and Syria has been a source of concern to the other Arab states. King Hussain of Jordan, in particular, tried to reconcile the Iraqi and Syrian leaders. Although his efforts to mediate a meeting between Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad were finally realised in early 1987, these private discussions did not lead to substantive progress in resolving the issues that divided the two countries. Intense diplomatic efforts by Jordan and by Saudi Arabia also resulted in the attendance of both Presidents, Saddam and Asad, at the Arab League summit in Amman in November 1987. The Iraqis were irritated, however, that Syria used its influence to prevent the conference from adopting sanctions against Iran. The animosities that have divided the rival Iraqi and Syrian factions of the Baath appeared to be as firmly rooted as ever in early 1988.

386

Iraq

Other Countries: In 1988, Iraq maintained cordial relations with Turkey, its non-Arab neighbour to the north. Turkey served as an important trans-shipment point for both Iraqi oil exports and its commodity imports. A pipeline transported oil from the northern oil fields of Iraq through Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea. Trucks carrying a variety of European manufactured goods used Turkish highways to bring imports into Iraq. There was also trade between Turkey and Iraq, the former selling Iraq small arms, produce, and textiles. In addition, Iraq and Turkey cooperated in suppressing Kurdish guerrilla activities in their common border area.

Outside the Middle East, Iraq maintained correct relations with other countries. Iraq identified itself as part of the Non-Aligned Movement of primarily African and Asian nations, actively participated in its deliberations during the late 1970s, and successfully lobbied to have Baghdad chosen as the site for its September 1982 conference. Although significant resources were expended to prepare facilities for the conference, and Saddam Hussein would have emerged from the meeting as a recognised leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, genuine fears of an Iranian bombing of the capital during the summer of 1982 forced the government reluctantly to request that the venue of the conference be transferred to New Delhi. Since that time, preoccupation with the war against Iran, which also was a member of the NonAligned Movement, has tended to restrict the scope of Iraqi participation in that organisation. Participation in International Organisations: Iraq is a member of the UN and of its affiliated agencies. It also is a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Health Organisation (WHO), and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The Iraqi Red Crescent is affiliated with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Iraq is one of the founding members of OPEC. Iraq also belongs to several pan-Arab organisations including the Arab League and the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Military TIes Iraq's armed forces were heavily dependent on foreign military assistance after the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. In 1921, British Mandate authorities undertook the training of Iraqi soldiers who had served under the Ottomans. The British reorganised the former Ottoman units into a force designed to uphold

Polity

387

internal law and order and to serve British interests by putting down frequent tribal revolts. Until 1958, British officers guided the development of the armed forces, and British influence was reflected in the organisation, training, and equipment of the Iraqi military. Senior Iraqi officers regularly were sent to Britain or to India to receive advanced training. Iraq's generally Western-oriented military posture throughout this period culminated in the 1955 Baghdad Pact. The revolution of July 14, 1958, and the coming to power of Abd al-Karim Qasim completely altered Iraq's military orientation. Disagreement with the British (and with the Western world's) stance vis-a-vis Israel, and growing pan-Arab sentiment led Qasim to abrogate the Baghdad Pact and to turn to the Soviet Union for arms. Since 1959 the Soviet Union has been Iraq's chief arms supplier and its most essential foreign military tie. In April 1972, the two states signed a fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in which Iraq and the Soviet Union agreed to "continue to develop cooperation in the strengthening of the defence capabilities of each." By no means, however, was Iraq a "satellite" of the Soviet Union. Baghdad consistently insisted on its independence in policy-making, and on a number of key issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria's role in Lebanon, and the Non-Aligned Movement, the hAlo states held opposing views. Furthermore, Iraq's Baathist ideology remained fundamentally antithetical to Communism. As a further sign of its staunch independence, Iraq insisted on its freedom to purchase weapons from Western sources, and in 1980 it demonstrated its intention to diversify its source of armaments. Although France and Britain both had sold some arms to Iraq during the 1966 to 1968 regime of Abd ar Rahman Arif, between 1974 and 1980 Iraq increased its purchases from France by acquiring helicopters, anti-tank missiles, and high performance Mirage jet fighters. Despite these expressions of Iraqi independence, both mutual interests and practical necessity dictated the Iraqi air forces's reliance on Soviet support. Total Soviet military aid to Iraq between 1958 and 1974 was estimated at the equivalent of US $ 1.6 billion; in 1975 alone such Soviet aid was estimated at US $ 1 billion. Soviet deliveries of military hardware of increasingly higher quality between 1976 and 1980 were estimated at US $ 5 billion. In 1977, for example, Iraq ordered the lIyushin 11-76 long-range jet transport, the first such

388

Iraq

Soviet aircraft provided to a foreign state. Until 1980, nearly 1,200 Soviet and East European advisers, as well as 150 Cuban advisers, were in Iraq. Iraqi military personnel were also trained in the use of SAMs, and observers estimated that between 1958 and 1980, nearly 5,000 Iraqis received military training in the Soviet Union. Although receiving arms and training from foreign sources itself, Iraq provided some military aid to irregular units engaged in pro-Iraqi "national liberation movements" in the Middle East and in Africa prior to 1980. Most of this aid was in monetary grants and in armaments, which amounted to more than US $ 600 million annually. Pro-Iraqi Palestinian groups, such as the Arab Liberation Front, received the bulk of the aid, but some African organisations, including the Eritrean Liberation Front, also received some. Volunteer Iraqi soldiers fought on the side of Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon on at least two occasions, in 1976 against Syrian troops and in March 1978 against Israeli troops.

13 Scie nce and Tec hno logy The Ministry of Science and Technology is establishing computer and electronic communication standards, providing computer training for government employees, and planning information technology programmes. The Ministry's new Food and Environmental Safety Laboratory will coiled and analyse samples of foods, water, industrial waste, solid waste, and pharmaceuticals to assure compliance with Iraqi and international standards. A National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) project to engage Iraqi scientists, recently completed a survey of Iraq's science and technology priorities. The survey identified health, water resources, environment, energy, and basic science as critical areas in which to employ Iraqi scientists, technicians, and engineers. This programme iss a partnership among NNSA, the Arab Science and Technology Foundation (ASTF), a pan-Arab non-governmental scientific organisation based in the United Arab Emirates, and the Coope rative Monito ring Centre (CMC) at Sandia Nation al Laboratories. It complements other Bush administration initiatives that seek to support re-construction efforts and prevent the proliferation of weapon s of mass destruction expertise to terrorists or proliferation states. "We are moving with all due speed to implement this programme. This administration places a high emphasis on non-proliferation programmes and the effort to engage Iraqi scientists is a very important one," said NNSA

390

Iraq

Administrator Unton F. Brooks. "As we help re-build Iraqi science and technology infrastructure we help re-integrate Iraq into the international science community while fulfilling important non-proliferation goals." The survey was administered by ASTF scientists, with the permission and guidance of the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqi Governing Council, and drew on interviews and contact with over 200 Iraqi scientists representing universities, govern ment ministries, and scientific and technical research institutes. The surveyors also collected over 450 project ideas. ASTF shared the survey results with Iraqi scientists in meetings in early April in Baghda d and Riyadh, and the scientists unanimously endorsed the report. In the next phase of the project the partners will issue a call for proposals in Iraq with the intention of funding a small pilot project in the area of water monitoring or epidemiology. When this pilot project is completed, the partners will convene a workshop in the region to bring together representative experts from Iraq, the United States, the interna tional scientific commu nity, and fundin g organisations to priorities options for further technical cooperation. Rnancial contributions from donor countries and funding organisations will be sought to initiate work on several of the highest-priority projects, as well as institute a merit-based nomination and review process for future work. The Ministry of Science and Technology has obtained its share from the donation of the International Atomic Energy Agency estimated one million dollar to be invested in carrying out projects which had been frozen and halted due to the sanctions imposed on Iraq in addition to get rid of the radioactive materials. Dr. Rashad Mandan Omar, the Minister of Science and Technology said that the ministry carrying out four projects in agricultural researches domain, get benefit of update d techniques in agriculture in addition to more projects to control the contamination. Meanwhile, Omar confirmed that the ministry has submitted project to the Iraqi Cabinet to create the Supreme Iraqi Board, referring that the board will start its work as soon as it receive a reply from the cabinet, indicating that the board is composed of six ministers will shoulder several responsibilities to attract Iraqi scientists from inside and outside Iraq, particularly professors whether they were contributed in former weapons programme or not.

Science and Technology

391

International Initiative One of the most important tasks that can be undertaken to help Iraqi scientists is to engage them in the development process to the best of their country. Based on that, the Arab Science and Technology Foundation (ASTF) and the Cooperative Monitoring Centre (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories, developed the "International Initiative to Engage Iraqi Science and Technology (S&T) Community in the Development Process". The initiative was established in collaboration with the UNESCO, and is widely opened for further participation of other international agencies. The initiative is planned to developing science and technology projects that engage Iraqi scientists in the development activities. It aims also to engage Iraqi experts to solve their country's local problems, and also to developing new Iraqi business opportunities that provide long-term sustainability to Iraqi science and technology. Out of four phases, two were achieved so for with the third one under execution. The first phase resulted in comprehensive report on the priorities of the Iraqi science and technology community. While the second phase placed mechanism for funding S&T projects implemented by Iraqis inside Iraq. The mechanism was practised on two projects that surveyed the situation of many Health and Water sectors in Iraq. The third phase aims to develop 20 detailed research proposals in 5 topical areas that are targeted at specific sources of funding. The final developed proposals are planned to be presented for funding, during the forth phase, in international forum in front of many potential funding sources that to invited to that event. Redirection of Weapon of Mass Destruction Scientists: Since Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Baghdad had refused to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687. As a result, there have been no UN inspections during this reporting period, and the automated video monitoring system installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq has been dismantled by the Iraqis. Having lost t1~is on-theground access, it is difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraq's WMD programmes.

392

Iraq

Since the Gulf war, Iraq had re-built key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities. It has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment-in principle subject to UN scrutiny-also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Following Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a re-construction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, to include several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, it appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly qUickly for production of CW agents. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq continued to withhold information related to its CW and BW programmes. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s as declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have an additional 6,000 CW munitions hidden. This intransigence on the part of Baghdad ultimately led to the Desert Fox bombing by the US. There is no direct evidence that Iraq had used the period since Desert Fox to re-constitute its WMD programmes, although given its past behaviour, this type of activity must be regarded as likely. The United Nations assesses that Baghdad has the capability to re-initiate both its CW and BW programmes within a few weeks or months, but without an inspection monitoring programme, it is difficult to determine if Iraq has done so. Iraq had continued to work on the two SRBM systems authorised by the United Nations:" the liquid-propellant AI-Samoud, and the solid-propellant Ababil-lOO. The AI-Samoud is essentially a scaled-down Scud, and the programme allows Baghdad to develop technological improvements that could be applied to a longer range missile programme. One believes that the AI-Samoud missile, as deSigned, is capable of exceeding the UN-permitted 150-km-range restriction with a potential operational range of about 180 kilometres.

Science and Technology

393

Personnel previously involved with the Condo r lI/Badr-2000 missilewhich was largely destroyed during the Gulf war and eliminated by UNSC OM-ar e working on the Ababil-100 progra mme. Once economic sanctions against Iraq are lifted, Baghda d probably will begin converting these efforts into longer range missile systems, unless restricted by future UN monitoring.

Scene in New Iraq In the wake of the defeat of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the renunciation by Libya of its weapon of mass destruction (WMD) programmes, the United States has begun to expand the scope of its non-proliferation activities to prevent the migration of former WMD scientists and workers from these countries to other dangerous nations or organisations. The excess scientists, technicians, and engineers from the two states could pose a "brain drain" proliferation threat becaus e of their considerable expertise in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. President Bush underscored the importance of containing WMD expertise from Libya and Iraq in his address before the National Defence University on February 11, 2004.The US has been engaged in brain drain proliferation prevention in Russia and the former Soviet states for over a decade. This experience has underscored the difficulty of the mission of re-directing weapons scientists. The unstable situation in Iraq, in particular, perhaps will make this undertaking even more challenging in that nation. But, accomplishing the administration's objectives is very important for US national security. New Progr amme s The- administration has begun to roll out a numbe r of new programmes designed to re-direct weapons scientists in both Iraq and Libya into peaceful employment. The major programmes are being created by the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Energy (DOE). While these programmes are just getting underway, and their final shape and direction have not yet completely emerged, analysis of them based on public information and official input indicates a need for caution and clarity. In particular, there is a need for a clear understanding of the number and type of scientists the programmes are targeting, the incorporation into the process of the important lessons learned from the Russia and FSU experience, and

394

Iraq

the need to ensure that the multiple programmes being developed and funded by different agencies are complementary and not redundant. During Saddam Hussein's regime, Iraq developed extensive WMD research and development programmes. A large workforce was organised with expertise in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons technology, and in delivery systems such as ballistic missiles. Former Iraq Survey Group (lSG) leader David Kay testified to Congress that, "we have found people, technical information and illicit procurement networks that if allowed to flow to other countries and regions could accelerate global proliferation." Scope of the Weapon Scientist Problem: Despite Kay's assessment, it is unclear if the US had a firm idea of how many scientists and related technical people from the former Iraqi WMD programmes, it really needs to be concerned about. The precise number of experts associated with Iraq's weapons programme has never been definitively stated. In addition, the new US government programmes are not exclUSively focused on re-employing weapons scientists. All the new US programmes seem to have some flexibility in whom they target and the DOE effort in particular has a broad scope. In his pre-war remarks before the UN Security Council, Secretary of State Colin Powell had stated that UN inspectors had "put together a list of about 3,500 names" of individuals linked to Iraq's WMD programme during its post-Gulf War investigations. This was supported by Kay's remarks that Iraq's WMD programmes, "involved thousands of people." But the new ISG leader Charles Duelfer recently has explained that although his team has "met with hundreds of scientists, we have yet to identify the most critical people in any programmatic effort. Many people have yet to be found or questioned, and many of those we have found are not giving us complete answers." A further complication in this effort has been identified as the decision to detain some Iraqi scientists as part of the post-war WMD investigation. US officials did not confirm the number of scientists that wer~ detained during the post-conflict period. But, knowledgeable .experts raised concerns that the combination of lengthy detentions and the possibility of war crimes charges being brought against Iraqi weapons scientists might have created enough fear and uncertainty

Science and Technology

395

to cause some of the WMD workforce to flee Iraq, and possibly enlist in the WMD and missile programmes of other states. Reports in December 2003 indicated that along with the scaling back of the ISG's operations, most Iraqi scientists who had been detained were released. In an address in Washington, DC, in March 2004, the Ambassador-designate of Iraq to the United States Rend Al-Rahim stated that few weapons scientists were still in detention, and that she was unaware of any plans to prosecute any for war crimes. If her assessment of the situation is accurate, a part of the environment for the re-direction of Iraq's weapons scientists may have improved. Unfortunately, fear of cooperating with the US continues to exist within Iraq's scientific community. ISG leader Duelfer's expressed his surprise that many former WMD specialists in Iraq "perceive a grave risk in speaking with us." In fact, David Kay had earlier noted that one Iraqi scientist "was killed immediately after talking to us ... [others] report continuing threats." Whether or not Iraqi weapons specialists face war crimes or detention, they are still imperilled by the basic insecurity of post-war Iraqi society, which creates unique complications for scientific redirection. US Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF) Activities: The CRDF is a non-government organisation, chartered by Congress, that promotes science and technology cooperation between US scientists and their counterparts in other countries. One of the CRDF's principal objectives is supporting the transition to the civilian sector of weapons scientists. CRDF has worked extenSively in the former Soviet Union, including on the improvement of science in those states generally, and with a number of US government non-proliferation programmes that focus on engaging former Soviet weapons scientists.

Given this experience, the CRDF is now planning a pilot activity to assist scientist redirection activities in Iraq. CRDF has been working with the SANC to identify a pool of Iraqi scientists and technicians with WMD-relevant expertise. Six scientists will be selected from this pool to attend a one week "Iraqi Scientist Orientation Visit". During the visit the scientists will have opportunities to meet and forge potential collaborations with US scientists from academia and industry and with US government science funding agencies. CRDF will also

396

Iraq

organise seminars for the visitors on various topics including science ethics and current practices in standards (e.g. ISO). The CRDF will use unrestricted funds to sponsor this initial pilot activity.

Acquisition of Technology Iraq has purchased numerous dual-use items for legitimate civilian projects-in principle subject to UN scrutiny-that also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the Gulf war, Baghdad has re-built key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents. The recent discovery that Iraq had weaponised the advanced nerve agent VX and the convincing evidence that fewer CW munitions were consumed during the Iran-Iraq war than Iraq had declared provide strong indications that Iraq retains a CW capability and intends to reconstitute its pre-Gulf war capability as rapidly as possible. Iraq continues to refuse to disclose fully the extent of its BW programme. Afterfouryears of denials, Iraq admitted to an offensive programme resulting in the destruction of Al-Hakam-a large BW production facility Iraq was trying to hide as a legitimate biological plant. Iraq still has not accounted for over a hundred BW bombs and over 80 per cent of imported growth media-directly related to past and future Iraqi production of thousands of gallons of biological agent. This lack of cooperation is an indication that Baghdad intends to re-constitute its BW capability when possible. Baghdad is developing two ballistic missiles that fall within the UN-allowed 1S0-km range restriction. The Al-Samoud liquidpropellant missile-described as a scaled-down Scud-began flighttesting in 1997. Technicians for Iraq's pre-war Scud missiles are working on the Al-Samoud programme and, although under UNSCOM supervision, are developing technological improvements that could be applied to future longer-range missile programmes. The Ababil100 solid-propellant missile is also under development, although progress on this system lags the Al-Samoud. After economic sanctions are lifted and UN inspections cease, Iraq could utilise expertise from these programmes in the development of longer-range missile systems. We assess that Iraq cO!1tinues to hide documentation, and probably some equipment, relating to key aspects of past nuclear activities.

Science and Technology

397

After years of Iraqi denials, the IAEA was able to get Iraq to admit to a far more advanced nuclear weapons programme and a project based on advanced uranium enrichment technology. However, Baghdad continues to withhold significant information about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, and weapons design.

Situation Prior to Gulf War After UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq in December-1998, US-led forces bombed many sites believed to be chemical weapon plants. After the bombing, reports emerged that Iraq had re-built many of those sites, and that the sites appeared to be operating. It was inferred that Iraq had resumed its production of chemical weapons, and was adding new elements to the portion of its previous stockpile that had never been accounted for. No evidence confirming these inferences has emerged to date.

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

14 Sports The most popular sport is football (soccer), which many people watch on television. In urban areas, every neighbourhood has its own soccer team. Iraq's national team plays internationally and draws large crowds for games at the Baghdad stadium. Ahmad al-Radhi and Hussain Saeed are currently two of Iraq's most famous players. While men and boys mostly play sports in Iraq, Iraq has recently launched a national women's football team. Girls also enjoy volleyball and tennis. Other popular sports for men are basketball, boxing, swimming, horseback riding and weightlifting. Assud Shaker is a well-known weightlifter. Hunting for game such as rabbits and birds is popular in the countryside. Sports facilities are limited, but Iraq hopes to develop teams for the Olympics and other international.competitions. A major aspect of Iraqi social life is spending time with family and friends, often dropping by to visit without an invitation. They expect their friends to do the same. Urban Iraqis attend movies, plays and musical shows, watch television and listen to the radio. People especially enjoy listening to classical and popular Iraqi music on the radio or in concert. Iraqi girls like sewing, aerobics and playing with dolls, while boys play with marbles and kites. Another popular pastime for many Iraqis is reading; Iraqi homes often have a small library, which may include works by prominent Iraqi and Arabic writers, as well as European and American books that have been translated into Arabic.

400

Iraq

Iraq has a long history of active participation in the Olympic Movement. It was first inducted into the Olympic family in 1948. The current President of the National Olympic Committee of Iraq (NOCI) is Ahmad al-Samarai. NOCI Secretary Amir A-Jabbar and DirectorGeneral Tiras Odisho assist him. Iraq first sent a delegation of athletes to the 1948 London Olympic Summer Games and has competed in every Summer Games since. Iraq has yet to participate in the Winter Olympic Games. The first and only Olympic medal won by Iraq was a bronze medal. It was awarded to weightlifter Aziz Abdul Wahid at the 1960 Rome Olympics in the 60-67.5 kg (lightweight) men's division. On May 17, 2003, the International Olympic Committee suspended Iraq. The previous director of Iraq's Olympic Movement was Uday Hussain. In 1984, he seized control of the Organisation and ran it until he fled Baghdad in March of 2003. It has been widely reported that he used his position to accumulate money and power at the expense of the nation's athletic facilities and athletes, many of who were abused and tortured by Uday. Through the support of the Coalition Provisional Authority in post-conflict Iraq, Al-Samarai chaired the Interim Committee to Administer Sport and helped direct more than 500 elections for sports federations and clubs-the first democratic elections in Iraq in more than 35 years. Through these elections the people of Iraq were able to elect a new Olympic Committee on January 29,2004, in the province of Suleymaniyah, and begin rebuilding sports in the country. On February 29,2004, in Athens, Greece, the International Olympic Committee voted unanimously to lift Iraq's suspension and welcomed the country back to the Olympic Family-now with 202 nations as members. The General Assembly of the NOCI is composed of 30 members: the President of each national Olympic sport federation (21 people), former or current athletes who are past Iraqi Olympians (2 people) and Iraqi Citizenship who are liable to enforce the effectiveness of the NOCI rules (7 people). The NOCI's General Assembly selects the Executive Board, which runs the day-to-day operations of the Organisation. That board is made of 11 voting members and one non-voting member. In total,

Sports

401

the NOCI oversees 41 national sport federations, of which 21 officially compete ~n the Olympic games. The Organisation also directs the Iraqi Paralympic Committee. Although, not under the leadership of the NOCl, Iraq has 214 Sports Clubs. These clubs are private sporting clubs and are an essential part of the nation's sports fabric. It is at these clubs that many future and current Olympians train and compete. The NOCI is separate from the Iraqi Ministry of Youth and Sport, although, they do enjoy a close relationship as they both strive to develop sports and sporting activities through out Iraq. The Ministry focuses on more community-based sporting events .and grass roots sport initiatives. At AI-Shaab Stadium in Baghdad on April 2, 2004, the NOCI launched its new logo. Designed in cooperation with the International Olympic Committee, the logo features a green silhouette of a date palm tree encircled by a green wreath of palm leaves. Iraq is a land noted for its countless species of date palms. Also, inside the circle are the Olympic Rings in the five colours, which represent the five continents and the words "National Olympic Committee of Iraq" in both English and Arabic. The new NOCl haS been fortunate to find great support from the International Olympic Committee and several National Olympic Committees. This includes support for Iraqi boxers and wrestlers by the US Olympic Committee; support for Iraqi wrestlers by the Romanian Olympic Committee; support for Iraqi swimmers by the Canadian Olympic Committee; support for track and field athletes -by the German Olympic Committee; support for the Iraqi footballers (soccer players) by the UK Football Association in cooperation with the UK. Foreign Office and by the Italian Olympic Committee; and support for Iraqi Tae Kwon Do by the South Korean Olympic Committee.

Football During the reign of Saddam Hussein his son, Uday Hussain, was in charge of the Iraqi Olympic Committee and, by extension, its ~occer team. Uday routinely tortured Iraqi soccer players for poor performances. With the Hussein's ollt of power, the Iraqi team had a re-surgrance in 2004. Its Under-23 team qualified for the 2004 Summer Olympics

402

Iraq

and then represented -the country in the Asian Cup, where they surprised many by making it to the quarter-finals. But the surprises didn't end there. At the Olympics, Iraq defeated Portugal, Costa Rica, and Australia on their way to fourth place in the tournament. During the 2004 Olympics, team members expressed their objections to commercials by the re-election campaign of George W. Bush which made reference to Iraq's participation in the Games. 'Football United' is a collaborative project, which aims to encourage youth participation in football throughout Iraq and through this to promote relations between the UK and all Iraqis. This will be achieved through investment from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, through the technical and training expertise of the English Football Association, and through the cooperation and commitment of the Iraqi Football Association, delivering a combination of UK and Iraq based training courses for youth and sporting professionals across a wide range of football related diSciplines, culminating in youth training camps and tournaments in 4 regions in Iraq.

Iraq make History with West Asian Football Gold: Desperate to prove a point after being barred from competing by arch foes Iran and Kuwait when they hosted the inaugural and second editions of the West Asian Games in 1997 and 2002, Iraq were helped in their cause by goalkeeper Noor Hasan after the teams were locked 2-2 after extra time. After excelling throughout the 120 minutes of play, Hasan not only stopped two Syrian spot-kicks but also registered his name on the score sheet by scoring the fourth goal for Iraq, which gave them a well-deserved victory. Emad Reda, Haider Hussain and Younis Khaled were the others who scored for Iraq, while Kader Dakka, Muhammad Alaya and Zyad Chaabo were on target for Syria. The Iraqis, who have been virtually living a nomadic existence, hopping from one sympathetic country to the other for training purposes because of the strife in their homeland, failed to defend a 2-1 lead in regulation time much to the despair of hundreds of cheering fans on an emotional night. Syria struck first with Mahmud Amenh putting them ahead in the 20th minute, but Iraq's Razzaq Farhan, who plays as a professional in Doha, hit back to draw level in first half stoppage time. After several near misses by both teams, Iraq went ahead in the 78th minute through Younis Mahmud, but

Sports

403

their fans' ecstasy was short lived as the Syrians snatched a goal through Jehad al-Hussain in stoppage time to take the encounter into extra time. The teams though failed to break the deadlock forcing a shootout in which Iraq kept their cool to etch their name in regional sporting history.

Wrestling Iraqi wrestlers have won major championships in the Arab world but lack experience in international competitions as travel opportunities were limited under Saddam Hussein. Salman was picked to compete at the 2003 World Championships, the first international wrestling competition Iraq competed in for 13 years. Chaos reigned and the team's late arrival in Paris prevented some members from competing while others had to wrestle in divisions above their weight due to a lack of training. But Salman put in a creditable performance in claiming Iraq's best result-20th place in the 96kg Greeco-Roman category. The 21-year-old describes the Olympics as a "liberation" following the war and continuing civil strife in his homeland and has received support from the unlikeliest of sources. He and his three team-mates have fine-tuned their preparations on American soil, after being invited to train with the USA squad in Colorado Springs.

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

15 Tourism Iraq is the country of Mesopotamia or Land Between the Rivers in classical times. Anyone travelling in these lands should read about the many civilizations that have passed through here. As a minimum be prepared on Summer, Babylon, Assur, Persians, Greeks, Romans and finally Arabs. You will find many hundreds of ruins of cities everywhere you go. It has a subtropical climate, with a tendency in direction of continental climate in the north. Iraq is very dependent on water from Tigris and Euphrates, as there is little rain falling here. The west and south is mostly stone desert. The country became known as Iraq in the 7th century. It is the land where paradise allegedly once was. The region's extensive alluvial plains gave rise to the world's earliest civilizations, though in recent times it was not all that civilized. The modern Iraq was created in the aftermath of World War I and gained independence in 1932. Since then there was war on Iran, Syria, and most recently the invasion of Kuwait that led to the Gulf War. Internally the country has known violent uprising of Kurdish minorities answered by bloody suppression. Nter the monarchy was overthrown in 1958, there was a period of political instability with coups and countercoups until Saddam Hussein seized power in the 70s. Iraq used to be one of the world's leading oil producers. In recent decades a steady cash flow generated by the black gold was the engine behind ambitious building projects and development programmes and to build one of the iargest and most powerful

406

Iraq

armies --in the Midd[e East. Its strength was demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Everyone that has seen the images of missiles and bombs falling on the capital Baghdad will understand that this is not a holiday destination for the mentally sane. Economy has been totally disrupted by the war and reconstruction is slow. Tension between US and UK troops are still high. Theoretically there is the possibility to cross the northern borders from Turkey or Jordan, but the ongoing struggle for Kurdish independence also makes this area hazardous. There are no commercial flights to Baghdad and the borders to Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and of course Kuwait are closed of. Should it become easier to visit Iraq then the highlights of your visit would include Mosu[ in the north, with the big Assyrian cities of Ninevah and Nimrod close by, Baghdad, the capital, Karba[a and An najaf just south of Baghdad, with the tombs of Ali and Hussain, two very important Shia religious leaders and Basra in the south. Iraq is the dream of any historian and archeologist. For the west, its where it all began. All those small. hills you see on the highway, those are Tells, the ruins of ancient cities. In comparison with most other Arab countries, Iraq is relatively well endowed with natural and human resources. Under normal circumstances its oil wealth would be sufficient to facilitate the development of its considerable agricultural and industrial potential. Ha[f of the country consists of mountains and deserts. The cultivable area forms about one-sixth of the whole. This area is declining due to inefficient irrigation practices and as a result of large-scale rural to urban migration. The country is completely landlocked except for a 40 km wide outlet at the head of the Gulf. The southern part of the country below Baghdad consists either of desert or of the fertile alluvial plains of the Tigris and Euphrates. In the north and north-east, on the borders with Iran and Turkey are substantial mountain ranges. The climate is mostly desert; mild to cool winters with dry, hot, c1oud[ess summers; northern mountainous regions along Iranian and Turkish borders experience cold winters with occasionally heavy snows that melt in early spring, sometimes. causing extensive flooding in central and

Tourism

407

southern Iraq. Iraq includes important sites for the three religions: Islam, Christianity and Judaism as well as other religions. Najaf, Karbala, Kadhumiah and Samara are holy places for the Shia Muslims in the world. Ein Tamor (Spring of Dates) is a small picturesque spot in the western Iraqi desert, 90 kilometres to the west of the sacred Karbala. It is part of a bigger oasis that contains the Razzazah Lake, many smaller towns, date palm and fruit thick orchards surrounding the lake, and a very important historical fortress called Al-Ekheider Castle. In the seventies, this area was developed as a resort; a tourist complex was built in Ein Tamor. The tourist complex was fifty small flats surrounding the lake and the colourful natural springs. After the 1991 war, and during the UN economic sanctions against Iraq through the nineties until 2003, this tourist area was neglected, like many other similar places all over Iraq. During this period, when tourism was not a priority in Iraq, the complex was mainly visited by newly-wed couples who spent their honeymoon there. In April 2003, after the occupation of Iraq, the complex was looted and damaged, nothing remained except the walls. Now it is a refugee camp for more than 50 Fallujan families, who fled the bombing and killings. It is like Habbaniya, another refugee camp, which was a tourist complex 40 kilometres to the north, near the Habbaniya Lake. Obviously, Fallujans fled to these places because there were walls and roofs which can be used as better shelters than tents in the cold season. Ein Tamor, once one of the most beautiful areas of Iraq where picnics were made especially in winter, is now one of the saddest places. To go there, one has to go through the Triangle of Death, south of Baghdad, where many attacks against the occupying troops take place daily. Usually it takes an hour to go to Karbala. It took us 3 hours, because of the check-points, a bombed car that was still on fire, and traffic jams due to fuel (kilometres-long) queues. The roads are not the same. These are not the roads to go through; they are not roads at all, nothing is straight, just snake-like curves in the dusty wilderness. Paradoxically, the way from Karbala to Ein Tamor was calmer, better, and easier to go through, although the Iraqi Human Rights Watch

408

Iraq

members who accompanied us to the refugee camp warned us of looters. The refugee camp was a club of sadness. Everyone there had a story, even the children.

TImeless Beauty Ever since she was seven years old, when she coloured in a picture of the blue tiles and gold animals in Babylon's Ishtar Gate, Rachel Cornell dreamt of seeing the real thing. This month, at the age of 50, her dream came true when she travelled to Iraq on a tourist trip organised by Hinterland Travel. For the tastefully dressed assistant editor of an up-market consumer magazine going to Iraq was a life-changing experience. "I felt very disoriented-I wouldn't say traumatised-when I returned and I felt I might change my career. I am not sure what to, I am not going to be a nurse, but I think'I could do something more useful". Sitting behind a book and paper-laden desk, in her posh office in central London, Rachel recalls haunting, arid, dusty, decaying archaeological sites, ziggurats and the amazing feeling of walking around a city that is 5,000 years old. "We don't think London will ever be a dusty pile of rubble but who knows?" she says pensively. When they visited Ur, the leading Sumerian city of Mesopotamia dating from 2142 BC with one of the best preserved ziggurats in Iraq, surrounded by a heavily militarised zone, two-thirds of the party of 24 were wandering around while the remainder found the heat too much and returned to the coach. "There was a large explosion in the distance, about a mile away and then anti-aircraft tracer fire. A few of us on the coach said shouldn't we get out of here. Isn't it better to be a moving rather than a sitting target? Everyone else was wandering about peacefully and slowly returned to the.bus. The local guide said 'don't worry, it happens every day'. Give us our daily bomb", Rachel quipped. "But the driver and our two minders said we should get out of there". She admits that she temporarily lost her enthusiasm for archaeology if it meant visiting the nearby site of Eridu, close to where the bombs were dropped. According to Sumerian legends, Eridu was one of the five cities built before the Great Flood. Its exact origins

Tourism

409

are lost in the mists of antiquity but it could be one of the most ancient settled places on earth. "I was very relieved when both the minders and the driver decided there was no way we were going to this place and we whizzed off to Basrah". In Iraq, the timeless beauty of the past is constantly shattered by the stark reality of the present. In Basrah and Baghdad, air raid sirens reminded both tourists and locals alike that a devastating war may not be far away. Dinner on the last night of the tour consisted of mazgouf, Baghdad's famous fish dish cooked over a charcoal fire with peppers, spices, onions and tomatoes. Then came a boat trip on the Tigris, under the full moon. "There was music playing - that sort of yearning Arab music. I will remember that", says Rachel suggesting she would rather be back there now. Tourists-the editors of consumer magazines, a London mailman, an airport worker, a retired banker and a gynaecologist-were among the clientele of British-based Hinterland Travel and Live Limited, the two companies who take tourists to Iraq. Veteran overland tour operator Geoff Hann has made seven trips to the country since the Gulf War. Phil Haines of Live Limited, who has visited every country in the world, can only boast of one trip to Iraq in 1999. But he was among the first travel agents to arrange a tour of post-Taliban Afghanistan. Hann took a tour group to Afghanistan in April 2003. Saddam, sanctions and the threat of war aside, around 50,000 foreign visitors go to Iraq each month. Most are Shia Muslim pilgrims, businessmen and self-appointed emissaries like Bert Sacks who arrived with a taped message of peace and love from American school children. Their Iraqi counterparts responded with changes of "down, down Bush!" The Propaganda Ministry has arranged outings for radical Serbs who inevitably get a sympathetic hearing about American bombs falling on their country, members of Indonesia's parliament, a Spanish professor who arrived with a library of 2000 books and dignitaries from Chad. In Iraq, the line between politics and tourism is always blurred. Earlier, in Baghdad's five-star AI-Rasheed hotel, visitors were forced to walk over the Bush senior 'war criminal' mosaic. But the tourism directorate

410

Iraq

is getting a little public relations conscious now and allows hotels to keep foreign currency earnings so they can spruce themselves up. The country's 300 or so private tourist agencies who handle upto a fifth of the trade say business was getting better. Iraq is a jewel in the crown of Middle Eastern tourist destinations. Its ancient archaeological sites include Ctesiphon-the world's largest single-span brick arch from the 3rd century BC, Babylon, Ur, ziggurats and ruins at their best in Borsippa the place of worship of Nabu, son of the great Babylonian god, Marduk. Seen at dusk they resemble a science-fiction landscape. The story of Baghdad, the legendary city of the thousand and one nights has largely been one of continuous war, pestilence, famine and civil disturbance. Such is the paradox cynical history has been written across the high aims implied in the name "the city of peace" bestowed upon her by her founder, Abu Jafar Al-Mansour. The National Museum, the largest in the Middle East, the Abbasid palace, a remarkable building on the river bank and the Mustansiriyah College, one of the most important centres of learning in the Muslim world, are among the main tourist attractions. In the south, tragic events in the early history of Islam led to the construction of magnificent shrines in the desert cities of Najaf and Karbala. Every year thousands of pilgrims flock to these sites of Islamic splendour, where a tragic massacre that occurred some 14 centuries ago led to the Sunni-Shia divide in Islam. Iraqi Kurdistan in the north is the place for magnificent scenery, sometimes wooded and watered by turbulent streams, sometimes gaunt and bare, but always dramatic and often awesome. The Iraqi people are like a necklace where the threat of nationality unites a variety of unique and colourful beads: the Arabs, Kurds, Mandeans, Turcomans, Armenians, Assyrians and Yezedis. In the words of a lady tourist: "They were very perfectly nice to me on the whole and to all of us. I found that very moving", Rachel says in a voice that suggests she has fallen in love with the country. "The Iraqi people are very dignified, resigned to their fate-they have seen it all before bombing, sanctions, suffering, repression. I really admire them.

Tourism

411 Another thing which came as a very nice surprise is their charming sense of humour. They see the funny side of life despite their circumstances. Despite the poverty, the uncertainty of life, having to keep their mouths shut, that sense of humour is still in place".

She was adamant that an American invasion would have tragic consequences not just for Iraq but the whole of the Middle East. Perhaps there would even l?e a whole scale slaughter when a cornered dictator was to use his chemical weapons against his own people and set the oil fields on fire. She had opined: "Saddam is like a tiger. When you have an extremely large tiger in a cage and the cage is getting smaller you don't go and bang a stick near it unless you want your head bitten off. What Bush is doing is rattling his stick on the cage bars. I don't know what the solution is but I know its not an American or British combined force invasion". Like many of the tourists who visited a country which might soon never be the same again, Saddam stood in awe of its cultural heritage even though he did not hesitate to destroy it if it stood in the way of his political ambitions. "We will fight them [the Americans] with the reeds of the marshes", he had said in a speech. The Iraqi dictator was referring to the watery haven of the Marsh Arabs, which he drained. Like their Sumerian ancestors the Marsh Arabs built cathedralshaped reed houses and bitumen-covered boats and caught fish using spears. Tragically, the Iraqi government's extensive drainage project had reduced the marsh lands from their original 15,000-20,999 km to less than 1,500-2,000km in an attempt to destroy a historic place of refuge of the regime's opponents. Around one-fifth of the estimated half-million Marsh Arabs were now living in refugee camps in Iran, while the rest were internally displaced within Iraq. Who should have the last word on Iraq's future? Perhaps Gavin Young, author of the classic work Iraq: Land of Two Rivers? he wrote: Whatever happens, the rivers-the life-giving rivers for which Abraham, Nebuchadnezzar, Sennacherib, Alexander the Great, Harun Al-Rahid and a billion other dwellers in Mesopotamia must have raised thanks to their gods-would continue to give life to other generations.

412

Iraq

Journey to Iraq Most people in recent times would never have considered touring Iraq. However, fortunate, there were tourist groups on two journeys that covered the history and culture of Iraq just before the latest war. The theme of our tours was "Mesopotamia: Where It All Began." Truly, that sense of origin is what Iraq is (or was) all about. Five thousand years ago, what is now Iraq was home to the first cities in the world, to the invention of writing, monument building and the art of architecture, in short, it was the cradle of civilization. Oft mentioned in the Bible, the land that became modern-day Iraq was also the traditional site of the Garden of Eden, the birthplace of prophets, including Abraham and Jonah, and home to the most well-known of the ancient wonders of the world, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon. Present day Iraq is also home to some of Islam's most important cities, including Karbala, Najaf and Kufa. In times past, the country was the seat of the Abbassid Empire where many of the scientific developments that have played a vital role to modernity, unfolded. It is also the land where the stories that make up the famous 1001 (Arabian) Nights were conceived. In the words of a tourist: "Our two journeys to Iraq were both taken during the era of Saddam Hussein, and the rules for obtaining tourist visa for Iraq were, at best, confusing. The border crossings required a lot of paperwork, including producing certificates proving negative HIV (which had to be no more than six days old-later extended to 10 days). Cameras were allowed only if they did not have powerful lenses. "Powerful" not having being defined, it was left to our smiles and the customs officer's mood, which always changed for the better after the officer had his proud moments showing off to his colleagues the many cameras hanging off his neck. So while the border crossing was a time-consuming affair it was an interesting cultural encounter. To our surprise, during our first visit while all this drill was taking place, we were offered free soft drinks-a warm welcome to our group of North American tourists. The drinks,

413

Tourism coming from the pocket of an underpaid officer working in a land where bottled water sells for more than gas, were a wonderful gesture."

Iraqi Museum (Account of a Tourist) A must-see place in Baghdad was the Iraqi Museum. The twofloor building, each floor with 12 halls specialising in different periods of history, gave a clear picture of the treasures and wealth that this nation, with the oldest recorded history. offered. Probably the best preserved and well-managed museum in the Middle East, the Iraqi Museum had several thousand artifacts captioned with the date and era it belonged to. Centrally located and well planned, it was an easy place to guard. It is a shame that this was not done. The stolen treasures are a loss to humanity and the looting of the museum will be recorded as the darkest moments in the fight for the regime change in Iraq. Besides the archaeological sites, we also visited the bazaars and souqs of Mosul. The stores were stocked with items that were mostly locally manufactured, since Iraq was banned from trading with other countries. It was interesting to see that the roads and basic services, including water, food and telephones, were easily available and not expensive. Iraqis are known to be well-educated and enterprising people, however, importation of essential commodities relating to medicine, hospital usage, higher education did handicap their lifestyle and there was a lot of anger among the people over the sanctions. In spite of all this, we were never questioned, nor did we see any anti-American or anti-West slogans anywhere in the country. All this was very interesting and took all of us by surprise. In most cases, the people, when learning that there we were a group of North Americans, made particular efforts to come to us and welcome us to Iraq. There was a genuine interest in meeting Americans and practising their English. Often they made it clear that they had particular fondness for the American people but did not like the Administration. The currency in Iraq was the Iraqi dinar, with a conversion rate of 750 dinars to one US dollar. Prior to the first Gulf war, the exchal1ge rate, we were told, was one dinar to three US dollars. So there was massive currency devaluation of the dinar after the first Gulf War. We all felt sad to see that unlike other countries where

414

Iraq

we did not find any damage or graffiti on the many stone structures lying across vast areas of these ancient city states. Our first tour of Iraq was in May of 2001, while the second was in October 2002, a year after 9/11. The second tour took place a few weeks after the famous referendum that declared that 100 per cent of the Iraqi people had voted for the continuation of Saddam Hussein as their President. In celebration of the referendum's results, the Al-Rasheed Hotel had a lOO-painting exhibition of Saddam Hussein in different uniforms and garbs performing different roles. It was also the time when heated debates were taking place at the UN Security Council to consider allowing UN inspectors into Iraq. A few weeks after our tour ended, the UN inspectors entered the country. The large archaeological sites had structures made from mud, clay, bricks and stone. Little is known of the state of these objects after the massive bombings. Though there is no report of any bombings targeted at any of the sites, there is no doubt that many of the 7,000-year-old clay and stone structures would not have been able to resist the impact. These tours were very memorable, not only because of historic time at which they were undertaken, but more so for the impressions they left on me. Thinking about them brings back memories of how we were met by smiling children wanting to photographed; by men who asked us to join them smoking their water pipes; by women welcoming us to visit their hom"s and join them for a meal; of the many historical sites we visited (all alone without being disturbed by other tourist groups); of the welcomes when we visited historical monasteries, churches and mosques; of the Iraqi Museum-in short, of the country as it was then. Most Iraqis sincerely believed that there would never be a war and the world would solve this problem in a civilized manner. For, after all, theirs was the land where the very beginning of civilization took place.

Baghdad The name of Baghdad used to evoke images of Arabian Nights, Harems and Sultans. Since the Gulf War, most people think of war, destruction and Saddam Hussein. Both images are more or less correct. Baghdad has had its fair share of warfare in its long history. The Mongol invaders destroyed the fairytale city it once was, capital

Tourism

415

of the Abbaside Caliphate, in 1258. Baghdad did recover but it never regained the supremacy over the Middle East again. There are still a lot of impressive monuments in Baghdad. The Mustansiriyah School, the Abbasid Palace, Khan Murjan and the Al-Khadhimain Mosque are worth a visit. There are also a few good Museums; especially the Iraqi museum should not be missed. Two of the nicer districts in Baghdad. Good restaurants, lovely shopping of all kinds and coffee shops where you can get a feel of how nice the place really was prior to the 1990s. Unfortunately these areas are still somewhat dangerous and evidence of military occupation is everywhere.

Babylone South of the capital, did the Semitic King Hammurabi rule Babylon, the great city once. The cities, and particularly the famous Hanging Gardens, are now being restored. This is a mountainous and forested area. Mosul is the main northern town, with the 13th-century Palace of Qara Sariai and the old Mosque of Nabi Jirjis. Nineveh is an ancient and rich archaeological site near Mosul. Arbil is probably the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world. Kirkuk has assumed importance since the discovery of oil. It is famous for 'Eternal Fires'the endless burning of gas seepage. When German archaeologists began excavations of Babylon in 1899, the entire site was desolate and unoccupied. Except for a brief period of renewal under Antiochus IV (173 BC), Babylon for all practical purposes ceased to exist. At the time of the Parthian takeover of Mesopotamia, Mithridates II (122 BC) apparently found Babylon in ruin. Strabo, the historian and geographer, said as much in 24 BC.. By his time, Babylon had for the most part been abandoned, and only its walls remained. In 116 AD, the Roman emperor Trajan wintered in Babylon, finding nothing except ruins. Babylon's desolation, like that of Nineveh before it, by now was proverbial. A 2nd Century AD piece written by Lucian said that Nineveh had vanished without a trace and that soon men would search in vain for Babylon. The prophecy buffs insist that the destruction of Babylon in ancient times was not literal enough to suit their fancy, so we have to go through the whole shebang once more. It is true that Babylon was not immediately destroyed and abandoned at the time of the

416

Iraq

Persian conquest in 538 BC, but Isaiah never said that the abandonment of Babylon would take place immediately after its fall to the Persians. He did- not set any time limit on the fulfilment of Babylon's abandonment, but clearly it did take place eventually. Isaiah states that God would stir up the Medes against Babylon to carry out the prophesied overthrow of Babylon. Where are the Medes today? Clearly this prophecy was fulfilled in ancient times-there is no need for a double fulfilment or "near and far fulfilment." In Isaiah 13:22, the prophet says of Babylon, "Her time is near to come, and her days shall not be prolonged. " Those who try to prolong the final fulfilment of the prophecy against Babylon and to stretch it out more than 2700 years into the future from Isaiah's time are going against the Word of God.

Mosul Mosul, 396 km north of Baghdad, is Iraq's 2nd largest city, a centre for the tourist resorts of northern Iraq, and the north's major centre for trade, industry and communications, with approximately 570,000 inhabitants. Situated in the north-western part of the country, on the west bank of Tigris, and close to the ruined Assyrian city of Nineveh. Mosul is called Urn al-Rabiain (The City of Two Springs), because autumn and spring are very much alike there. It is also named Al-Faiha (The Paradise), Al-Khadhra (The Green), and Al-Hadba (The Humped), and sometimes described as the 'Pearl of the North'. This city has been continuously inhabited since Assyrian times. Long before Islam, a number of Arab tribes had settled in it, and in later times it played a leading role in the Arab wars of conquest and became a city of great importance. It was an important trade centre in the Abbasid era, because of its strategic position on the caravan route between India, Persia and the Mediterranean. It's chief export was cotton, and today's word muslin is derived from the name of the city. Mosul needs to be wandered about in. It is rich in old historical places and ancient buildings: mosques, castles, churches, monasteries, schools, most of which abound in architectural features and decorative works of significance. The town centre is dominated by a maze of streets and attractive 19th century houses. There are old houses here of beauty. The markets are particularly interesting not simply for

Tourism

417

themselves alone but for the mixture of types who jostle there: Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians & Turkomans. The Mosul Museum contains many interesting finds from the ancient sites of Nineveh and Nimrud. The Mosul House is a beautiful, old-style building, constructed around a central courtyard and with an impressive facade of Mosul marble. It contains displays of Mosul life depicted in tableau form. The Umayyad Mosque: The first ever in the city, built in 640 AD, by Utba bin Farqad ai-Salami after he conquered Mosul in the reign of Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab. The only part still extant is the remarkably elaborate brickwork 52 m high minaret that leans like the Tower of Pisa, called AI-Hadba (The Humped). The Great (Nuriddin) Mosque: Built by Nuriddin Zanki in 1172 AD, next door to the Umayyad Mosque. Ibn Battuta (the great Tunisian traveller) found a marble fountain there and a mihrab (the niche that indicates the direction of Mecca) with a Kufic inscription. The MuJahidi Mosque: Dates back to 12th century AD, distinguished for its beautiful dome and elaborately wrought mihrab. The Mosque of the Prophet Jerjis (Georges): Believed to be the burial place of Prophet Jerjis (Pbuh). Built of marble with beautiful relieves and renovated last in 1393 AD. It was mentioned by the travener Ibn Jubair in the 12th century AD, and is believed also to embrace the tomb of AI-Hur bin Yusuf. Mashad Yahya Abu' Qasim: On the right bank of Tigris, known for its conical dome, decorative brick-work and calligraphy engraved in Mosul blue marble, 13th century. Bash Tapia Castle: Part of Mosul's old walls, which has disappeared, with the exception of these imposing ruins rising high over Tigris.

Najaf Iraq--Investors are flooding into Najaf-a relative oasis of peace in war-tom Iraq-hoping to profit from the millions of religious pilgrims who come to visit the holiest city in Shia Islam. After the cities of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, Najaf attracts the largest number of Muslim pilgrims from across the world. They come mainly to visit the tomb of Imam Ali Ibn Talib, whom Shias consider to be

418

Iraq

the heir to the prophet Muhammad's spiritual leadership. While the city still lacks facilities to reap the profits from all these visitors, that's about to change. For some time, private investors have been competing for contracts to build the holy city into a grandiose destination, with five-star hotels, transportation and recreation. The enthusiasm hints at what might take place elsewhere in the country, were peace and stability to prevail. "We're going to forget the oil for the time being," said Dr. Munthar Ajinah, who's in charge of investments under the governor of Najaf. "We have 3 million pilgrims a year. If each one spends $ 100, that's $ 300 million." The blueprints for million-dollar projects sit on his desk, amid a hodgepodge of furniture in his shared office. Ajinah, 68, a retired mechanical engineer and businessman, left Najaf in 1955 and lives in San Francisco. He returned to the city earlier this year to help it revitalise. From an airport, to a complex of hotels, to a train between the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, Najaf's future is filled with dollar signs. A $ 1 billion contract was signed with a Shia-owned Kuwaiti company, Fedek, to create a railroad system between Karbala and Najaf. One investor, Global Enterprise, plans to invest $ 125 million in a tourism complex in Bahr al-Najaf, a desert area of beautiful stone cliffs and palm tree groves. The centre will be a complex of resort hotels that have their own water supplies and generate their own electricity, said Ajinah. It will outdo the typical small, rundown local hotels that have onl~r one item on the restaurant menus. A stretch of desert north of· the city fenced in and guarded by police officers will be a future airport for pilgrims to fly directly to Najaf. An Iraqi British company, Fahad al-Basra, signed a $ 72.8 million contract to turn this desert area into an airport. A stretch of black pavement cuts through the desert, a runway left from Saddam's military, and will serve as a landing strip in the future Najaf hub. "This is the only thing we inherited from the past regime," said Haider alRamahi, an assistant to the governor. Lebanese and Iranian companies are interested in opening airlines that will transport people to the airport, al-Ramahi said. Lebanon has

Tourism

419

a large Shia population while Iran is overwhelmingly Shia. The construction is slow. Other than a blue and orange tent and a frontend loader removing sand to smooth out the sandy desert, it looks much like what Saddam left. Companies plan to share an agreed percentage of the profits of each project with the province, said Ajinah. Soon, Najaf will be the centre of Iraq. "You will be jealous of us in the future. We're going to bring all the best things here. You'll be jealous of us, Baghdadis," Al-Ramahi said to a visitor from the capital. Small hotels are popping up on the horizon of this city, a soccer stadium was built with coalition money, and nearby in the town of Kufa, about $ 250,00 0 in coalition money paid for the renovation of a restaurant and walkway, complete with spouting fountains and coloured lights, along a branch of the Euphrates River. governor '~ust recently, US aircraft maker Boeing approa ched the several regime 's Saddam about using an old military airport from that op worksh a build hours drive away, near the Saudi border, to ahi al-Ram , would serve as a Middle East destination to repair planes" said. Basic reconstruction of the city is also visible as men cement new bricks into the sidewalks. "The work can't keep up with deman d", said Haider al-Mayali, a local official in charge of reconstruction and development. About $ 50 million is allocated for water, sewage systems, roads, electricity, health and education projects. ''After the fall and now, the suffering increases day after day becaus e consum ption increases day after day, creating relative shortages", al-Mayali said. ''About 20 areas of the province that once had no electricity or sewage now have running sewage and electricity lines", he said. To keep up with the millions of dollars flowing into the city in private investment, a $ 7 million highway surrounding Najaf will be built to alleviate traffic during high pilgrim season. "In part, reconstruction owes its success to the relative security of the city" , al-Mayali said. Coalition forces now hang in the background

420

Iraq

since the handover of the city four months ago. They're seen only at openings of new facilities built with coalition money, at their base, or in the small office they have in the governorate building. Decisions about where money will be spent are left up to local officials, who give coalition forces a prioritised list. "But this is only a start", al-Mayali said. "It was deliberate politics of the past regime to destroy this city," he said. Now Najaf is picking itself up and striving to become the future of Iraq. Ajinah has bold plans for Najaf, including a mall to replace an old marketplace downtown, a spa resort and an amusement park. "I'm 68. When I'm 78, I want everyone to call Najaf the pearl of the Middle East," Ajinah said. He returned to Najaf sadden ed to see its people broken and its development stunted or reversed because of Saddam 's regime and the 2004 battle between rebel cleric Muqtada a1-Sadr's Mahdi Army and US forces. "We are touching everything and renovating and modernising it. The religious aspect of this city will bring money."

Bibliography Abbas, A: The Iraqi Armed Forces, Past and Present, Zed Books, London, 1986. Abdulghani, Jasim M.: Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984. Abu Jaber, Kemal: The Iraq Baath Socialist Party, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1966. Adams, Doris Goodrich: Iraq's People and Resources, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1958. Adams, Martin E.: Lessons from Agrarian Reform in Iraq, Land Reform, Rome, 1972. A1-Khafaji, Isam : State Incubation of Iraqi Capitalism, Middle East Research and Information Project, Washington, 1986, A1nasrawi, Abbas: Arab Nationalism, Oil and the Political Economy of Dependency, Greenwood Press, New Jersey, 1991. - - - - : Financing Economic Development in Iraq: The Role of Oil in a Middle Eastern Economy, Praeger, New York, 1967. - - - - - : Iraq: Economic Sanctions and Consequences, MacMillan, London, 200l. Amove, Anthony: Iraq under Siege: The Deadly Impact of the Sanctions and War, South End Press, Cambridge, 2002. Avishur, Y.: The Aramaic Elements in the Arabic Dialects of Iraqi Jews, Massorot, Jordan, 1999. - - - - : The Folk Literature of the Jews of Iraq in Judeo-Arabic, Peamim, Hebrew, 1979. - - - - : Translations of the Old Testament into Judeo-Arabic in Iraq, Institute for Research on Iraqi Jewry, Hebrew, 1999.

422

Iraq

Axelgard, Frederick w.: Iraq in Transition: A Political, Economic, and Strategic Perspedive, Westview Press, Colorado, 1986. Bar-Asher, M.: Linguistic Traditions of North African Jews, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1998. Batatu, Hanna: Economy of Iraq, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978. - - - - : Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978. - - - - : Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1978. - - - - : Shia Organizations in Iraq: Al-Da'wah al-Islamiyah and Al-Mujahideen, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986. - - - - ' : Sunni Organizations in Iraq, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986. - - - - : The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1978. - - - - : The Old Social Classes in Iraq, MacMillan, London, 1999. - - - - : Iraq's Underground Shia Movements, Roshan Publisher, Lahore, 198!.

Blanc, H.: Communal Dialects in Baghdad, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1964. Blau, J.: A Grammar of Medieval Judaeo-Arabic, Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1980. - - - - : Hebrew and Aramaic Elements in Early Judaeo-Arabic Written in Phonetic Spellingem, Universita delgi 5tudi di Milano, Milano, 1999. - - - - : Judaeo-Arabic Literature: Selected Texts, Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1980. - - - - : Studies in Middle Arabic and Its Judaeo-Arabic Variety, Magnes Press, Jerusalem, 1988. - - - - : The Emergence and Linguistic Background of JudaeoArabic, Ben-Zvi Institute, Jerusalem, 1981.

Bibliography

423

Blau, J. and Hopkins S.:Judaeo-ArabicPapyri - Collected, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, Iraq, 1987. Brown, Michael E.: The Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company, MacMillan, London, 1977. Chetrit, J.: A Sodo-Pragmatic Study of the Hebrew Componenfin the Judeo-Arabic Poetry of North Africa, Textual Aspects, Massorot, 1991. Cohen, D.: Judeo-Arabic Dialects, Oxford, New York, 1978. Cook, MA: Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, Oxford University Press, New York, 1970. Cordesman, Anthony H.: The Attack on the USS Stark: The Tragic Cost of Human Error, Armed Forces, London, 1987. - - - - : The Iran-Iraq War: 1984-1986, Eaton Analytical Assessments Centre, Virginia, 1986. Dann, Uriel: Iraq under Qassem 1958-63, Praeger, New York, 1969. Davidson, Roderic H.: Iraq, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968. Dawisha, Karen: Moscow and the Gulf War, World Today, London, 1981. Devlin, John: The Baath Party: A History from Its Origins to 1966, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1976. Doron, D.: The Arabic Translation of the Torah by Issachar ben Susan Hamma Ravi, Barllan University, Burllan, 1979. Dreze, Jean, and Gazdar, Harris: Hunger and Poverty in Iraq, World Development, Lahore, 1992. Drory, R.: Words Beautifully Put: Hebrew versus Arabic in TenthCentury Jewish Literature, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. Drysdale, Alasdair: The Middle East and North Africa: A Political Geography, Oxford University Press, London, 1985. El, Azhary, M.S.: The Attitudes of the Superpowers Towards the Gulf War, International Affairs, London, 1983. - - - - : The Iran-Iraq War: An Historical, Economic and Political Analysis, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1984. Evans, David and Richard Campany: Iran-Iraq: Bloody Tomorrows, Concept, London, 1985.

424

Iraq

Feldman, Shai: The Bombing of Osiraq-Revisited, International Security, Royal, Lahore, 1982. Gabbay, Rony: Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq, Croom Heim, London, 1978. Gallman, Waldemar: Iraq under General Nuri, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1964. Ghareeb, Edmund: Education of Iraq, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 198!. - - - - : History of Iraq, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 198!. : Iraq: Emergent Gulf Power, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1981. - - - - : Iraq and Gulf Security, American Foreign Policy Institute, Washington, 1979. - - - - : Kurdish in Iraq, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1981. - - - - : The Kurdish Question in Iraq, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1981.

Gil, M.: The Origin of the Jews of Yathrib, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, Karachi, 1984. Goitein, 5.0.: A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993. Gotlieb, Yosef: Sectarianism and the Iraqi State, Westview Press, Colorado, 198!. Graham-Brown, Sarah: Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1999. Gruemm, H.: Safeguards and Tamuz: Setting the Record Straight, International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, Vienna, 198!. Grummond, Stephen: The Iran-Iraq War: Islam Embattled, Praeger, New York, 1982. Halliday, Fred: Gorbachev and the Arab Syndrome, World Policy Journal, London, 1987.

Bibliography

425

Hary, 8.: Adaptations of Hebrew Script, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996. - - - - : Hebrew Elements in Egyptian Judeo-Arabic Texts, Universita delgi Studi di Milano, Milano, 1999. - - - - : Judeo-Arabic in Its Sociolinguistic Setting, Israel Oriental Studies. 1995. - - - - : Multiglossia in Judeo-Arabic-With an Edition, Brill, Leiden, 1992. - - - - : The Impact of the Cairo Genizah Documents on the Study of the History of Arabic, Discovery, New Jersey, 1997. - - - - : The Importance of the Language Continuum in Arabic Multiglossia, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1996.

Hassan, A.: The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, Oxford University Press, London, 1966. Helier, Mark: Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, Armed Forces and Society, London, 1977. Helms, Christine Moss: A Handbook of History: The Arab World, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1984. - - - - : Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1984. - - - - : Iraq, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1984.

Hemphill, Paul R.J.: The Formation of the Iraqi Army, 1921, Croom Helm, London, 1979. Hiro, Dilip: Chronicle of the Gulf War, MERIP Reports, Washington, 1984. Hitti, Philip K.: Makers of Arab History, Harper and Row, New York, 1968. - - - - : The Near East in History, Van Nostrand, New Jersey, 1961.

Hodgson, Marshall G.S.: How Did the Early Shia Become Sectarian? Journal of the American Oriental Society, London, 1955. International Monetary, Fund: Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Oxford Press, Washington, 1987.

426

Iraq

Ireland, Philip: Iraq: A Study in Political Development, MacMillan, New York, 1938. Ismael, Tareq Y.: Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1982. Issawi, Charles: The Economic History of the Middle East, 18001914, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1966. Jalal, Ferhang: The Role of Government in the Industrialization of Iraq, 1950-65, Frank Cass, London, 1972. Jansen, G.H.: Iraq: Bleak Outlook, Middle East International, London, 1983. Jasim, M.: Iraq: The Years of Crisis, Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984. Jawad, Saad: Iraq and the Kurdish Question, 1958-1970, Ithaca Press, London, 1981. Kedourie, Elie: Continuity and Change in Modem Iraqi History, Oxford Press, London, 1975. Kelidar, Abbas: Iraq: The Search for Stability, Conflict Studies, MacMillan, London, 1975. - - - - : Modem Iraq, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1979. - - - - : The Integration of Modem Iraq, Se. Martin's Press, New York, 1979. Kerr, Malcolm: The Arab Cold War, Oxford University Press, London, 1971. Khadduri, Majid: A Study in Iraqi Politics, Middle East Institute, Washington, 1978. - - - - : Independent Iraq, 1932-1958, Oxford University Press, London, 1970. - - - - : Introduction of Iraq, Oxford University Press, London, 1969. - - - - : Republican Iraq, Oxford University Press, London, 1969. - - - - : Socialist Iraq: A StlJdy in Iraqi Politics Since 1968, Middle East Institute, Washington, 1978. - - - - : Socialist Iraq: Iraqi Politics and People, Middle East Institute, Washington, 1978. - - - - : The Role of the Military in Iraqi Society, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1963.

Bibliography

427

Khan, G.: Karaite Bible Manuscripts from the Cairo Genizah, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. Klieman, Aaron S.: Foundations of British Policy in the World, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1970. Laffin, John: The Gulf War, Brassey's Defense Publishers, London, 1986. Langley, Kathleen M.: The Industrialization of Iraq, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967. Longrigg, Stephen: Society in Iraq, Oxford University Press, London, 1953. - - - - : Four Centuries of Modem Iraq, Oxford University Press, London, 1925. - - - - : Iraq Nations of the Modem World series, Ernest Benn, London, 1958. - - - - : iraq, 1900 to 1950, Oxford University Press, London, 1953.

Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley, and Frank Stoakes: Iraq Nations of the Modem World Series, Ernest Benn, London, 1958. Mansour, J.: The Judaeo-Arabic Dialect of Baghdad, University of Haifa, Haifa, 1983. Marr, Phebe: History of Iraq, Westview Press, Colorado, 1985. - - - - : Iraq's Leadership Dilemma: A Study in Leadership Trends, Middle East Journal, Washington, 1970. - - - - : Modem Iraq, Westview Press, Colorado, 1985. - - - - : Politics in Iraq, Westview Press, Colorado, 1985. - - - - : Society and People in Iraq, Westview Press, Colorado, 1985. - - - - : The Modem History of Iraq, Westview Press, Colorado, 1985. - - - - : The Political Elite in Iraq, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 1975.

Momen, Moojan: An Introduction to Shia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985. Muhsin, Jabr: The Gulf War, Zed Books, London, 1986.

428

Iraq

Newby, G.D.: A History of the Jews of Arabia from Ancient TImes to their Eclipse under Islam, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1988. - - - - : Observations about an Early Judaeo-Arabic, Jewish Quarterly Review, London, 1971. Niblock, Tim: Iraq: Gulf War in Iraq, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1982. - - - - : Iraq: The Contemporary State, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1982.

Nonneman, Gerd: Iraq, the Gulf States and the War: A Changing Relationship, Ithaca Press, London, 1986. - - - - : Iraq: the Gulf States and the War, Ithaca Press, London, 1986. O'Ballance, Edgar: The Kurdish Revolt, 1961-1970, Archon Books, Connecticut, 1973. Olson, William J.: Iraqi Policy and the Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1986. Paxton. John: The Statesman's Yearbook: Iraq, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1986. Pelletiere, Stephen C.: The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf, Boulder, Westview Press, Colorado, 1984. Penrose, Edith: Iraq: International Relations and National Development, Westview Press, Colorado, 1978. Penrose, Edith and E.E.: Iraq: International Relations and National Development, Westview Press, Colorado, 1978. Penrose, Edith, and Penrose E.E.: Iraq: International Relations and National Development, Westview Press, Colorado, 1978. Petrossian, Vahe: The Gulf War, World Today, London, 1980. Ramazani, R.K.: Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986. Ramberg, Bennett: Attacks on Nuclear Reactors: The Implications of Israel's Strike on Osiraq, Political Science Quarterly, New York, 1982. Renfrew, Nita M.: Who Started The War? Foreign Policy, Spring, London, 1987.

Bibliography

429

Roberts, J.M.: The Pelican History of the World, Penguin Books, New York, 1980. Roux, George: Ancient Iraq, World Publishing, Cleveland, 1965. Sciolino, Elaine: The Big Brother: Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Times Magazine, New York, 1985. Seale, Patrick: The Struggle for Syria, Oxford University Press, New York, 1965 . .Sen, Amartya: Development as Freedom, Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1999. Shahid, A: Agrarian Reform in Iraq, Croom Helm, London, 1978. Shwadran, Benjamin: The Power Struggle in Iraq, Council for Middle Eastern Aff,,:irs Press, New York, 1960. Simon, Reeva: Iraq Between the Two World Wars, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986. Simons, Geoff: Imposing Economic Sanctions: Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool, Pluto Press, London, 1999. - - - - : The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice, St: Martin's Press, New York, 1996. Sluglett, Peter: Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932, Ithaca Press, London, 1976. - - - - : Iraq, Ithaca Press, London, 1976. - - - - : The Kurds in Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq, Zed Books, London, 1986. Snyder, Jed C.: The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad's Quest for the Bomb, Middle East Journal, London, 1983. Sterner, Michael: The Iran-Iraq War,. Foreign Affairs, London, 1984. Stillman, N.A: Language Patterns in Islamic and Judaic Societies, The Institute for Judaic Studies in the Pacific Northwest, Portland, 1991. - - - - : The Language and Culture of Iraq, University of Manchester, Louvin, 1988. Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, and Shaheen Ayubi: The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts, Praeger, New York, 1983. Tarbush, Mohammad A: A Case Study of Iraq, Kegan Paul International, London, 1982.

430

Iraq

Tedhi, J.: A Moroccan mazor in Judeo-Arabic, Hebrew, Massorot, 1994. Thesiger, Wilfred: The Marsh Arabs, Dutton, New York, 1964. Vandenbroucke, Lucien S.: The Israeli Strike Against Osiraq: The Dynamics of Fear and Proliferation in the Middle East, Air University Review, London, 1984. Vaniy, I.C.: Kurdistan in Iraq, Zed Books, London, 1980. Viorst, Milton: A Reporte at Large: The View from the Mustansiriyah, Yorker, London, 1987.

- - - - : Iraq at War, Foreign Affairs, New York, 1987. Warriner, Doreen: Land Reform and Development in the Middle East: A Study of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, Oxford, New York, 2000. Young, Gavin: Retum to the Marshes: Life with the Marsh Arabs of Iraq, Collins, London, 1977. Zaher, U.: Introdudion to Iraq, MacMillan, London, 1982. - - - - : Political Developments in Iraq, Zed Books, London, 1986.

Index A Abbasid, 2, 8, 26, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 48,133, 184, 201, 208, 216,282, 285, 410, 415, 416. Abd ur Rahman, 72, 73. Abdullah,61, 62, 64, 65, 66. Ad Dawah, 11, 82, 83, 108. Administration,S, 32, 33, 38, 44, 49, 51, 73, 78, 79, 101, 102, 103, 109,110, 111, 122, 154, 160,232, 235, 249, 250, 251,253, 346, 362, 366, 367,368, 374, 375, 389, 393,413. Adnan Khayr, 11, 14, 76, 77. Agriculture, 4,7,10,37,42,117, 118, 130, 137, ~42, 151, 155, 204, 249,250,253, 304, 305, 308,339,340, 344, 354, 356,357,390. Airport, 319, 409, 418, 419. Al-Majid, 84, 88, 90, 93, 94, 96, 99. Al-Qumah,3, 115,. 116, 324, 338. An Nasiriyah, 48, 120, 323.

Arab Countries, 60, 216, 275, 276, 316, 346, 355,358, 373, 378, 383, 406. Arab League, 2, 63, 69, 78, 242, 384, 385, 386. Arab Liberation, 384, 388. Arab Science and Technology Foundation, 389, 39l. Architecture, 208, 213, 225, 229, 231, 239, 240,241, 242, 412. Armed Forces, 16, 71, 77, 93, 100, 104, 110, 154,361, 364, 386, 387. Army, 9, 12, 16, 31, 33, 38, 44, 47, 51, 52, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 105, 118, 160, 167,183, 191, 194, 212, 238,239, 261, 284, 296, 381,384, 420. Art, 206, 209, 210, 211,214, 216, 225, 229, 231,232, 233, 234, 235, 236,239, 363, 364, 365, 412.

432 Assembly, 2, 5, 11, 22, 53, 55, 108, 109, 112, 160, 220, 350, 352, 353,361, 362, 363, 372, 400. Assyrians, 1, 2, 7, 32, 33, 49, 56, 57, 58, 90, 98, 132, 153, 181, 197, 198, 199, 200, 206, 217,218, 365, 410, 417. Ayatollah,9, 81, 82, 83, 108, 109, 187, 188, 189,190, 191, 192, 193, 368,372.

B Baath Leaders, 104, 350, 383, 384. Baath Movement, 355, 359. Baath Party, 2, 11, 67, 70, 77, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 97, 99, 107, 122, 143, 159, 169, 181, 183, 194, 195, 196, 201, 243,246, 296, 318, 349, 350,351, 352, 353, 354, 355,356, 358, 359, 361, 369,374, 376, 385. Baath Regime, 87, 103, 105, 107, 143, 157, 189,194, 196, 234, 244, 304,350, 355, 356, 357. Babylon, 1, 2, 8, 25, 31,32, 33, 34, 142, 171, 206, 207, 208, 216, 218,219, 238, 239, 374, 405,410, 412, 415, 416. Baghdad, 1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 13, 14, 26, 27, 35, 36, 38,

Iraq 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 55, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 72, 81, 84, 86, 87, 100, 101, 106, 114, 115,116, 117, 119, 130, 131,132, 138, 139, 140, 146,148, 151, 152, 156, 159,161, 167, 168, 170, 171,172, 173, 179, 182, 184,185, 186, 191, 193, 194,195, 197, 199, 201, 202,206, 208, 213, 214, 217,225, 226, 228, 232, 234,238, 240, 241, 242, 243,244, 246, 248, 249, 250,251, 253, 256, 272, 282,284, 285, 312, 313, 323,324, 328, 330, 331, 332,337, 338, 341, 350, 355,358, 359, 365, 366, 370,371, 372, 374, 375, 377,379, 380, 382, 385, 386,387, 390, 391, 392, 393,396, 397, 399, 400, 401,406, 407, 409, 410, 413,414, 415, 416. Bahrain, 241, 382. Basic Education, 243, 259. Basra, 1, 4, 12, 13, 14, 35, 42, 43, 45, 47, 56, 57, 62, 116, 125, 131, 132, 138, 156, 161, 167,171, 182, 191, 192, 195,197, 199, 217, 232, 241,244, 247, 249, 250, 282,312, 323, 328, 337, 338,347, 374, 377, 406, 418.

Index

Bush, 100, 101, 102, 103, 110, 111, 122, 166,189, 192, 257, 301, 303,366, 367, 368, 389, 393,402, 409, 411.

c Cabinet, 60, 62, 73, 75, 76, 77, 104, 168, 256, 314, 352, 353, 354, 361,363, 364, 390. Cairo, 45, 51, 52, 53, 240, 241, 267, 273, 277,279, 284, 288. Caliph,34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 181, 186, 201, 282, 283, 417. Chemical Weapon, 397. Child Education, 247. Christian, 41, 125, 183, 187, 195, 198, 199, 200,201, 217, 258, 259, 287,374. Citizenship, 90, 400. Civil Court, 375. Civil War, 37, 38, 110, 124, 164, 367. Civilization, 1, 25, 29, 32,33, 39, 133, 170, 184, 199, 203, 205, 207, 212,216, 220, 225, 233, 237,239, 260, 291, 412, 414. Climate, 4, 7, 120, 205, 240, 302, 405, 406. Coalition Forces, 2, 5, 101, 112, 122, 165, 192,231, 233, 237, 238, 239,249, 362, 419, 420.

433

Coalition Provisional Authority, 2,5, 109, 112, 173,234, 302, 306, 362,390,400. Commission, 16, 249, 250, 252, 324, 351, 352; 353, 362, 392. Committee, 11, 12, 176, 255, 363, 369, 386, 400,401. Communication, 29, 47, 51, 215, 275, 277, 324,389. Conference, 48, 51, 52, 53, 175, 179, 180, 246,263, 264, 273, 312, 362,385, 386. Constitution, 2, 5, 8, 11, 16, 27, 45, 53, 54, 55, 60, 69, 76, 77, 100, 109, 110, 111, 112, 163,165, 180, 349, 351, 352,353, 354, 360, 361, 362,363, 365, 366, 367, 368,369, 370, 371, 372, 373,374. Cooperative Monitoring Centre, 389, 391. Council,2, 5, 8, 12, 16, 17, 19, 70, 72, 73, 75, 79, 90, 104, 109, 111, 112, 158, 164, 165, 171,172, 176, 189, 193, 194,195, 196, 200, 251, 259,311, 318, 349, 351, 352,354, 359, 361, 363, 364,377, 390, 391, 392, 394,414. Council of Representatives, 112, 363, 364. Courts, 49, 100, 127, 176, 218, 364, 374, 375,376.

Iraq

434 Cultural Heritage, 180, 184, 199, 206, 207, 209, 214, 215, 216, 233, 255, 260, 411. Culture, 1, 26, 29, 38, 42, 47, 55, 83, 150, 152, 161, 162, 177, 182,184, 185, 197, 199, 203,207, 225, 226, 231, 233,234, 235, 239, 266, 269,270, 272, 273, 276, 278,282, 284, 286, 287, 288,289, 293, 354, 373, 412. Cyrus, 1, 8, 25, 34.

D Democracy, 55, 99, 101, 103, 111, 122, 166, 254,257, 258, 260, 263, 268,301, 366, 368, 373. Demography, 122, 124, 161, 163, 166, 168. Department, 13, 101, 111, 114, 232, 234, 256,319, 335, 393. Development, 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 28, 31, 62, 79, 100, 117, 119,120, 142, 152, 173, 174,175, 176, 177, 178, 179,180, 208, 220, 236, 246,247, 249, 251, 253, 254,258, 267, 268, 269, 270,276, 278, 280, 287, 290,291, 299, 300, 304, 306,308, 311, 312, 313, 314,315, 317, 320, 323, 324,325, 326, 327, 328, 335,336,

339, 342, 344, 372,381, 387, 391, 394, 395,396, 405, 406, 419, 420. District, 79, 94, 159, 168, 172, 197, 213, 236,237, 238, 358, 373, 375. Diyala, 116, 117, 118, 119, 131, 168, 171.

E Economic Development, 253, 299, 308, 317. Economic Growth, 304, 308. Economic Levels, 179, 223. Economic Power, 39, 59, 65, 372. Economic Sanctions, 149, 180, 250, 255, 393, 396,407. Economy, 4, 7, 8, 10, 15, 46, 64, 65, 80, 85, 93, 134, 138, 156, 157, 164, 253, 257, 259, 299,300, 301, 302, 303, 304,306, 308, 309, 310, 316,319, 320, 324, 325, 326,327, 329, 330, 331, 336,357, 360, 381, 406. Education, 28, 37, 49, 59, 65, 80, 128, 136, 140, 152, 174, 178, 179,182, 190, 196, 200, 214,243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252,253, 254, 255, 256, 257,258, 259, 261, 262, 263,264, 267, 275, 303, 310,311, 354, 361, 364, 413,419.

Index Egypt, 9, 10, 13, 31, 34,36,

39,,61, 62, 63, 72, 81, 203, 204, 207, 213,239, 240, 267, 270, 279,286, 287, 288, 289, 311,329, 356, 357, 378, 383,384. Election, 34, 54, 100, 112, 175, 263, 352, 353,364, 372, 402. Electromagnetic Isotope Separation, 17, 21, 22. Embassy, 66, 100. Emergency, 20, 254, 321,328. Euphrates, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 25,

28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 38, 43, 46, 48, 50, 51, 57, 96, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 135, 161,184, 203, 207, 208, 214,225, 226, 228, 270, 337,338, 339, 340, 341, 405,406, 419. Evidence, 6, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 32, 94, 95, 97,198, 225, 227, 245, 247,253, 262, 277, 278, 310,392, 396, 397, 415. Export, 14, 18, 38, 45, 130, 162, 300, 305, 306,313, 320, 321, 322, 323,324, 326, 333, 334, 335,336, 346, 416.

F Fallujah, 101, 154, 260. Family, 3, 11, 28, 40, 43,

48, 52, 66, 75, 76, 77,

435 90, 93, 108, 114, 126, 127, 128, 129, 136,144, 145, 146, 147, 152,153, 154, 156, 157, 158,159, 161, 165, 166, 179,180, 185, 190, 193, 201,205, 210, 221, 222, 223,265, 270, 271, 287, 288,290, 309, 310, 360, 399,400. Federation, 10, 109, 319,327, 400. Finance, 174, 251, 300, 330, 331, 354. Financial Assistance, 232. Financial Resources, 380, 38l. Food Programme, 197, 198, 308. Force, 7, 15, 26, 27, 36, 39, 41, 51, 56, 58, 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, 71, 76, 78, 98, 101, 110, 123, 128, 167, 184, 185, 189, 199, 215, 233, 234, 236,237, 250, 253, 257, 299,314, 327, 329, 339, 342,362, 371, 372, 377, 379,382, 383, 387, 392, 41l. Foreign Affairs, 9, 17, 77, 114, 167, 354, 371, 376,377. Foreign Investment, 73, 302, 303. Foreign Military, 386, 387. Foreign Policy, 56, 60, 65, 69, 80, 82, 374, 376, 379, 380, 38l. Foreign Relations, 79, 377. Foreign Trade, 330, 332, 338.

Iraq

436 Foundation, 6, 165, 213, 230, 240, 244, 251, 302,389, 391, 395. Freedom, 16, 48, 70, 111, 129, 130, 162, 219,246, 263, 267, 268, 270,318, 349, 355, 360, 361,387.

G Games, 275, 399, 400, 401, 402. Geneva, 180, 257, 262, 369. Geography, 113, 114, 120, 122, 124. Government, 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 30, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 89, 90, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106,108, 109, 110, 111, 112,113, 114, 117, 118, 119,120, 122, 123, 125, 126,128, 129, 130, 131, 132,135, 136, 137, 138, 139,140, 143, 149, 151, 152, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160,162, 163, 165, 166, 167,170, 171, 172, 174, 175,176, 177, 182, 183, 184,187, 190, 191, 194, 195,196, 197, 198, 199, 200,201, 220, 234, 235, 243,244,

. 245, 251, 252, 257,261, 262, 268, 271, 282,289, 299, 300, 301, 302,304, 305, 306, 307, 308,309, 310, 311, 312, 313,314, 315, 316, 317, 318,319, 320, 323, 324, 325,326, 327, 329, 330, 331,332, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 340, 341, 342, 343,344, 346, 347, 349, 350,351, 352, 356, 357, 361,362, 364, 365, 366, 367,370, 371, 372, 373, 374,375, 376, 377, 378, 379,382, 385, 386, 389, 390,394, 395. Governor, 34, 35, 36, 37,43, 44,99,167,373, 418,419. Guerrillas, 69, 119, 388. Gulf States, 9, 69, 77, 300, 305, 337, 383. Gulf Study Centre, 250. Gulf War, 5, 16, 20, 112,189, 192, 241, 256, 263,303, 309, 392, 394, 396,397, 405, 409, 413, 414.

H Hammurabi, 1, 7, 25, 31,32, 415. Hanafi, 181, 182, 184, 374. Headquarters, 89, 90, 91, 96, 242, 384. Heritage, 180, 184, 199, 203, 206, 207, 209, 212,214, 215, 216, 225, 232,233,

Index 235, 236, 237, 239,251, 255, 256, 260, 295,411. History, 1, 7, 16, 25, 26,28, 29, 31, 36, 40, 42, 43, 45, 51, 55, 60, 80, 81, 83, 86, 89, 99, 101, 104, 123, 131, 161, 162, 166, 170, 174, 177,181, 182, 183, 199, 201,203, 206, 207, 208, 209,220, 226, 230, 231, 232,235, 236, 239, 243, 251,255, 256, 257, 259, 266,269, 270, 272, 282, 285,289, 290, 291, 372, 379,40 0, 402, 403, 410, 412,413, 414. Human Rights, 7, 84, 122, 171, 174, 175, 177,179, 180, 190, 197, 198,254, 263, 366, 367, 368,373, 407.

I Import, 18, 130, 143, 300, 316, 318, 325, 326,328, 333, 335, 347. Independence, 5; 48, 50, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 86,110 , 170, 178, 257, 267,289, 293, 324, 337, 338,368, 372, 382, 387, 405,406. India, 32, 47, 49, 51, 258, 272, 286, 306; 334,346, 377, 387, 416. Industry,10, 14, 27, 65, 72, 169, 195, 249, 304,308,

437 312, 313, 316, 317,31 9, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 332, 354,35 6, 357, 395, 416. Institute, 117, 215, 235, 247, 250, 251, 255, 269,27 0, 291, 300, 390. Intelligence, 69, 72, 75, 76, 77, 84, 88, 90, 93, 95, 97, 196, 275, 296, 364. Interim Government, 2, 5, 100, 109, 111, 112, 302,30 7, 371. International Agencies, 245, 391. International Community, 7, 100, 101, 102, 103, 163,17 1, 172, 174, 179, 180,25 3, 254, 262, 303, 306,30 8. International Cooperation, 6, 251, 253. International Labou r Organisation, 386. International Law, 92, 180,257. Investment, 73, 146, 246,253, 255, 300, 301, 302,30 3, 304, 306, 310, 311,31 2, 316, 317, 318, 319,32 3, 324, 325, 327, 328,33 9, 357, 367, 370, 402,41 9. Iran, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 26, 28, 32, 34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 57, 60, 63, 65, 69, 73, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 90, 91, 96, 105, 106, 107, 108,11 2,

438 113, 115, 116, 119,120, 122, 123, 126, 128,138, 148, 151, 152, 156,160, 170, 182, 183, 185,186, 187, 188, 189, 190,191, 192, 193, 194, 195,196, 201, 212, 216, 248,255, 256, 261, 263, 265,268, 269, 299, 300, 303,30 4, 309, 311, 312, 317,32 0, 322, 323, 325, 326,33 1, 332, 336, 338, 340,34 1, 346, 351, 357, 376,37 7, 378, 382, 383, 384,38 5, 386, 392, 396, 402,405, 406, 411, 419. Iran-Iraq War, 7, 10, 13, 83, 84, 87, 90, 96, 126, 156, 183, 185, 186,248, 255, 256, 299, 303,30 4, 317, 320, 322, 323,32 5, 331, 332, 336, 338,34 1, 346, 392, 396, 406. Iraqi Communist Party, 63, 104, 151, 187, 378. Iraqi Economy, 15, 64, 300, 301, 308, 320, 324,33 6. Iraqi Families, 3, 144, 148. Iraqi Federation, 327. Iraqi Kurdistan, 43, 87, 88, 90, 91, 99, 106, 410. Iraqi Literature, 288, 296. Iraqi Museum, 228, 233, 234, 413, 414, 415. Iraqi People, 70, 99, 100,101, 103, 109, 123, 124,155, 162, 163, 207, 232,240,

Iraq 254, 258, 260, 262,28 9, 301, 364, 367, 370,41 0, 414. Iraqi Society, 3, 9, 15, 65, 76, 125, 126, 130, 131, 144, 154, 155, 156,17 7, 178, 182, 183, 185,39 5. Iraqi Transitional Government, 112. Islam, 8, 16, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 81, 111, 132, 152, 155, 160, 181, 182,184, 185, 186, 188, 194,20 1, 238, 271, 272, 274,27 8, 281, 282, 284, 291,29 2, 349, 360, 373, 407,41 0, 416, 417. Islamic Community, 2, 26, 34, 35. Islamic Countries, 127. Islamic Jurisprudence, 374. Islamic Law, 35, SO, 178, 373, .374, 375. Islamic Movement, 34, 157. Islamic Party, 362, 369. Islamic Period, 278, 281, 291. Islamic Principles, 11. Islamic Revolution, 80, 81, 82, 108, 109, 156, 160,18 3, 187, 189, 193, 194, 196, 376, 383. Islamic Shariah, 180. Islamic Society, 180. Islamic World, 188, 231, 271. Islands,77, 78, 79, 118,22 5, 382.

439

Index

Israel,2, 78, 126, 383,

13, 14, 16, 64, 74, 81, 86, 106, 122, 141, 148, 256,281, 384, 385, 387.

J Jafari, 181, 374. Jewish, 64, 126, 148, 273, 277, 278, 279, 280,281, 374. Jews, 34, 64, 126, 141, 148, 181, 182, 201, 271,277, 278, 279, 280, 375. Jordan, 1, 3, 13, 35, 66,81, 114, 119, 133, 216,246, 250, 255, 270, 309,311, 321, 378, 384, 385,406. Judge, 145, 222, 375. Judgment, 95, 190, 312. Judiciary, 129, 308, 361, 362, 364, 374. Jurisdiction, 37, 373, 374,375, 383. Justice, 32, 37, 38, 82, 154, 175, 219, 302, 354,374.

K Karbala, 36, 37, 42, 48, 49, 50, 53, 82, 109, 125, 186, 190, 191, 192,201, 241, 247, 288, 406,407, 410, 412, 418. Khabur, 3, 116, 167. Khomeini, 9, 81, 82, 187, 189, 192.

King, 8, 13, 25, 29, 31, 33, 34, 40, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 58, 59, 60, 66, 81, 204, 205, 211, 217,218, 226, 229, 274, 295,385, 415. Kirkuk, 4, 68, 70, 79, 86, 96, 110, 115, 139, 151, 163, 164, 165, 168,169, 171, 173, 199, 212,213, 312, 313, 315, 316,320, 321, 337, 372, 374,415. Kurdish,8, 10, 11, 28, 43, 48, 54, 55, 57, 58, 61, 69, 71, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 105, 106, 107, 110, 118, 119,125, 134, 138, 143, 145, 150, 151, 152, 153, 157,162, 163, 164, 165, 166,167, 169, 172, 181, 182,183, 185, 198, 199, 200,217, 252, 260, 265, 266,267, 268, 269, 270, 344,357, 360, 370, 372, 376,378, 386, 405, 406. Kurds, 2, 3, 8, 11, 15, 28, 43, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 67, 68, 69, 73, 78, 79, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 105, 106, 110, 115, 119, 122, 123, 132,145, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 156, 157, 162, 163,164, 165, 166, 169, 171,181,

Iraq

440 182, 198, 267, 360, 382,

183, 199, 268, 371, 410,

184, 185,197, 200, 265,266, 269, 270,357, 372, 374,377, 417.

L Language, 3, 47, 54, 55, 73, 94, 99, 110, 132, 133, 152, 153, 161, 168,172, 198, 199, 200, 205,222, 242, 251, 252, 256,.265, 266, 267, 268, 269,270, 271, 272, 273, 274,275, 276, 277, 278, 279,281, 282, 283, 284, 285,286, 287, 288, 290, 291,293, 294, 363, 373. Law, 11, 32, 34, 35, 44,48, 50, 53, 59, 61, 64, 67, 72, 76, 92, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 120,127, 128, 129, 143, 156,158, 159, 165, 166, 176,178, 180, 182, 186, 188,189, 190, 191, 202, 204,214, 219, 233, 249, 257,263, 272, 313, 314, 318,335, 342, 343, 344, 352,360, 361, 362, 363, 364,365, 371, 373, 374, 375,387. Leader, 1, 26, 28, 37, 40, 41, 44, 51, 52, 54, 57, 68, ?9, 70, 71, 73, 75, 81, 82, 83, 105, 108, 152, 156, 161, 162,164, 165, 185, 187, 189,190, 191, 192, 193, 200,206,

295, 296, 297, 356,359, 364, 368, 372, 376,379, 386, 394, 395. Legislation, 90, 110, 111,174,_ 177, 320, 325, 326,331, 342, 343, 353, 365. Ubrary, 213, 232, 238, 240, 251, 255, 256, 273,399, 409. Uterature,29, 204, 205, 216, 220, 232, 265, 266,267, 268, 269, 271, 272,273, 275, 276, 278, 279,281, 283, 284, 285, 286,287, 288, 289, 290, 291,292, 293, 294, 295, 296,297. Local Government, 174, 251, 373.

M Madrasa, 201, 267. Magnificent, 33, 42, 410. Majority, 3, 9, 27, 41, 54, 57, 58, 69, 72, 96, 98, 109, 110, 119, 123,125, 126, 129, 132, 139,144, 146, 147, 150, 151,166, 172, 176, 181, 182,183, 187, 189, 191, 192,194, 195, 206, 213, 271,310, 320, 327, 351, 352,360, 362, 364, 366, 368,369, 371, 373. Management, 29, 102, 155, 174, 175, 176, 177,203, 242, 245, 249, 264,322, 325, 331, 334, 343,344.

Index

Masud Barzani, 106, 152, 158, 185. Measurement, 327, 328. Mecca, 36, 43, 48, 52, 61, 186, 273, 281, 417. Medina, 34, 52, 417. Mesopotamia, 1, 2, 7, 8, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 83, 199, 203, 204, 206, 207, 209, 211,212, 213, 215, 216, 225,227,' 229, 405, 408, 411,412, 415. Military, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10, 14, 15, 22, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 39, 40, 42, 51, 52, 53, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 84, 87, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98, 101, 102, 105, 106, 111, 119,134, 135, 136, 153, 154, 156, 157, 163, 164, 167,179, 182, 183, 184, 196, 197, 198, 199, 206, 212,213, 214, 215, 218, 229,232, 233, 237, 238, 239,245, 255, 257, 258, 262,268, 275, 276, 296, 297,306, 350, 355, 356, 357,358, 362, 363, 366, 367,369, 371, ·372, 377, 379,381, 383, 384, 386, 387,388, 415, 418, 419. Military Regime, 8, 51. Millennium Development Goals, 175.

441 Minister of Defence, 11, 14, 61, 76, 99, 354. Minister of Petroleum, 321. Ministry of Education, 140, 245, 247, 248, 251, 253,254, 256, 258, 263. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 376. Ministry of Higher Education, 249, 251. Ministry of Justice, 175, 374. Ministry of Oil, 316, 322, 323. Ministry of Provincial Affairs, 175. Ministry of Science and Technology, 389, 390. Monarchy, 2, 8, 9, 13, 27, 28, 34, 52, 53, 54, 56, 60, 61, 62, 64, 6§, 66, 70, 72, 109, 134, 135, 140, 156, 182, 183,187, 195, 304, 324, 379,405. Mongol,41, 42, 43, 170,208, 414. Mosque, 36, 192, 193, 196, 198, 240, 241, 415,417. Mosul,l, 4, 21, 41, 46, 47, 48, 50, 54, 55, 57, 68, 70, 96, 115, 139, 152, 156, 161, 168, 170,171, 182, 184, 194, 198,199, 213, 215, 221, 232,241, 244, 247, 249, 250,251, 312, 320, 328, 329,337, 338, 340, 374, 378,406, 413, 415, 416, 417. Muhammad, 8, 35, 36, 39, 48, 50, 52, 82, 83, 108,

Iraq

442

109, 155, 160, 164,181, 187, 188, 189, 190,191, 193, 234, 239, 240,288, 402. Muharram, 36, 186, 187. Mujtahid, 50, 188. Muqtada Al-Sadr, 111. Muscat, 240. Museum, 206, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 226,228, 229, 232, 233, 234,235, 237, 238, 251, 410,413, 414, 415, 417. Muslim, 1, 2, 34, 35, 37, 50, 98, 122, 125, 129, 181, 182, 183, 184,185, 198, 272, 278, 373,409, 410, 417. Muthanna, 131, 171, 214.

N Najaf, 36, 42, 48, 49, 50, 53, 81, 82, 101, 125, 160, 186, 187, 188,189, 190, 191, 192, 193,201, 215, 238, 337, 406,407, 410, 412, 417, 418,419, 420. Nation, 1, 6, 26, 45, 46, 51, 58, 83, 92, 102, 104, 123, 124, 128, 156,162, 166, 167, 194, 258,260, 266, 333, 349, 355,356, 357, 364, 368, 379,380, 393, 413. National Assembly, 2, 5, 11,

109, 112, 350, 352,353, 361, 362, 363, 372. National Defence Council, 73. National Economy, 310, 316, 357, 360. National Identity, 26, 28, 184. National Museum, 214, 251, 410. National Security, 63, 100,158, 317, 361, 393. Nations, 5, 6, 12, 16, 17, 27, 48, 53, 55, 56, 57, 63, 87, 102, 103, 109, 114, 142, 148, 162,167, 173, 179, 180, 191,205, 253, 270, 303, 306,313, 320, 334, 335, 339,377, 378, 386, 391, 392,393, 400. NATO, 6, 102, 103. Natural Gas, 120, 162, 323. Natural Resources, 120, 326, 329. Nature, 6, 21, 22, 25, 26, 29, 65, 92, 127, 205, 232, 271, 278, 306,363, 385. Nuclear Capabilities, 16, 17, 18. Nuclear Weapons, 16, 17, 19, 397. Nuri as Said, 48, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66.

o Obedience, 37, 129. Occasion, 82, 94.

443

Index

Occupation, 6, 9, 46, 62, 63, 102, 103, 108, 109,154, 169, 172, 187, 188,192, 231, 238, 256, 257,258, 259, 260, 261, 262,302, 304, 307, 362, 366,367, 368, 369, 370, 372,373, 376, 407, 415. Oil, 1, 4, 14, 15, 27, 28, 47, 54, 55, 64, 65, 67, 68, 74, 79, 80, 81, 86, 110, 114, 115, 141,148, 149, 150, 151, 162,163, 164, 169, 197, 198,207, 232, 249, 250, 257,258, 259, 290, 299, 300,304, 305, 306, 308, 309,312, 313, 314, 315, 316,317, 320, 321, 322, 323,324, 325, 326, 328, 332,333, 338, 339, 345, 354,357, 364, 365, 366, 370,371, 372, 379, 380, 381,382, 383, 385, 386, 405,406, 411, 415, 418. . Oil Production, 4, 14, 304, 309, 312, 314, 316,320, 321, 322. Olympic, 400, 40l. Opportunity, 11, 51, 63, 80, 81, 84, 152, 178, 194, 263, 265, 302. Opposition Party, 108. OppreSSion, 66, 170, 372. Organisation, 3, 13, 31, 68, 71, 76, 108, 122, 126, 127, 128, 133, 135,142, 144, 160, 179, 180,197,

237, 258, 259, 313,316, 322, 336, 339, 358,374, 384, 385, 386, 387,389, 395, 400, 40l. Ottoman, 5, 8, 26, 27, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 54, 55, 57, 61, 70, 81, 113, 123, 130, 140,151, 155, 159, 170, 182,184, 186, 187, 200, 232,266, 267, 291, 292, 293,320, 324, 330, 334, 345,374, 386, 387.

p Painting, 225, 414. Parliament, 27, 45, 54, 56, 140, 167, 232, 352,363, 365, 369, 409. Partnership, 174, 215, 379, 382, 389. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, 80, 87, 106, 151, 152, 157, 165, 185. Persian Gulf, 1, 3, 9, 13, 32, 43, 83, 115, 116, 119, 120, 134, 300, 301,303, 312, 315, 320, 322,337, 338, 341, 376, 382,383. Petroleum, 15, 54, 55, 120, 304, 305, 312, 313,315, 316, 320, 321, 322,323, 324, 325, 332, 333,336, 386. Philosophy, 63, 187, 272,294. Physical Features, 3, 119.

444

Policy, 6, 10, 13, 27, 33,45, 52, 53, 56, 58, 60, 65, 69, 70, 71, 76, 80, 82, 88, 103, 106, 107, 157, 158, 167, 169, 170,172, 174, 175, 176, 177,182, 198, 236, 245, 246,249, 255, 256, 259, 261,263, 268, 299, 301, 307,309, 313, 317, 319, 320,324, 325, 330, 335, 353,359, 364, 370, 373, 374,376, 379, 380, 381, 383,387. Political Parties, 11, 16, 63, 64, 72, 103, 105, 107, 163, 165, 166, 199,297, 355, 361, 366, 371. Political Power, 28, 39, 43, 81, 123, 140, 184, 200,366, 371. Political Process, 27, 43, 64, 66, 70, 368, 369. Political System, 10, 27, 52, 57, 64, 351, 349. Polity, 109, 110, 349. Population, 14, 29, 38, 42, 43, 50, 51, 54, 61, 81, 84, 89, 90, 99, 108, 120, 122, 123, 125,128, 130, 131, 132, 138,139, 140, 141, 150, 151,153, 155, 161, 162, 164,166, 168, 169, 170, 171,177, 181, 182, 183, 184,185, 187, 189, 192, 195,197, 228, 238, 243, 245,260, 263, 267, 268, 281,310, 311, 347, 352, 358,360,

Iraq

365, 366, 369, 371,372, 381, 419. Poverty,l43, 176, 236, 293, 411. Prayer, 191, 196, 198, 227, 280. President, 1, 2, 13, 16, 65, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 101, 103, 156, 158, 163, 165, 185, 187,189, 194, 196, 259, 295,296, 317, 349, 350, 351,352, 354, 356, 357, 360,361, 362, 363, 364, 373,374, 375, 382, 385, 393,400, 414. Prime Minister, 53, 62, 70, 72 73, 74, 75, 255, 363, 364, 370. Production, 4, 14, 18, 19,20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 29, 30, 32, 41, 67, 86, 130, 134, 170, 197, 203,204, 253, 267, 268, 269,304, 309, 312, 313, 314,315, 316, 320, 321, 322,325, 327, 328, 329, 330,334, 335, 339, 342, 343,345, 346, 347, 357, 360,366, 392, 396, 397. Provision, 18, 49, 63, 85, 109, 110, 111, 129,136, 158, 254, 343.

Q Qadiri, 185.

445

Index

Qadisiyah, 131, 1~1, 194,244, 340. Qasim, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 141, 142, 187, 189, 190, 296, 324, 356,387, 417. Qatar, 10, 242, 253, 382, 383. Qufa,20l. Quran, 132, 198, 222, 271, 272, 273, 274, 276,277, 281, 283, 284.

R Red Sea, 15, 32l. Regional Command Council, 195. Regional Director, 180. Religion, 30, 42, 46, 111, 155, 181, 184, 185, 186, 188, 196, 205, 238,246, 254, 271, 283, 284,349, 360, 371, 373. Research,14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 83, 177, 188, 216, 231, 247, 249, 250,251, 252, 253, 256, 257,260, 263, 291, 327, 350,354, 374, 381, 390, 391,394, 395. Resolution, 12, 16, 23, 51, 259, 319, 377, 384,39l. Responsibility, 102, 144, 154, 165, 178, 188, 251,316, 317, 326, 330, 343,351, 357, 361, 362, 364,373.

Revolution, 2, 8, 45, 51, 59, 66, 67, 69, 73, 80, 81, 82, 108, 109, 117, 129, 141, 156, 160, 178,179, 183, 185, 187, 189, 193, 194, 196, 208, 209,268, 299, 304, 313, 317,324, 325, 342, 350, 353,355, 356, 376, 383, 385,387. Command Revolutionary Council, 8, 75, 90, 195, 318, 349, 35l. Rural Areas, 88, 90, 117, 128, 131, 133, 135, 136, 137, 146, 147, 153, 195,245. Rural Society, 8, 130, 133. Russia, 294, 378, 379, 381, 382, 393.

s Saddam Hussein, 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 28, 43, 68, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 91, 105, 112, 139, 143, 156, 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 172, 178, 179, 193,194, 196, 200, 202, 242,246, 295, 301, 317, 318,319, 320, 336, 349, 350, 351, 354, 356, 357, 359,362, 376, 377, 382, 385,386, 393, 401, 403, 405,412, 414. Saudi Arabia, 1, 9, 10, 13, 15, 57, 63, 78, 80,114, 119, 185, 250, 270,273,

446 289, 305, 313, 321,338, 378, 382, 383, 385,406, 417. Scholar, 50, 160, 188, 191, 202, 257, 272, 380. Science, 32, 201, 216, 246, 252, 255, 272, 273,282, 389, 390, 391, 395,396, 410. Secretary General, 6, 12, 17, 77, 84, 88, 350, 355, 356, 359. Security, 2, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 30, 46, 63, 81, 84, 88, 89, 90, 97, 100, 101, 102, 107, 112, 134,146, 158, 160, 164, 166,176, 191, 194, 196, 197,200, 214, 216, 223, 234,248, 259, 302, 306, 310,311, 317, 318, 336, 352,361, 364, 371, 375, 376,377, 389, 391, 392, 393,394, 414, 419. Security Council, 2, 5, 12, 16, 17, 19, 112, 158, 259, 311, 377, 391, 392,394, 414. Shafii, 182, 184, 374. Shariah,35, 127, 178, 180, 373, 375. Shatt al-Gharraf, 116. Shia, 3, 9, 11, 16, 26, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 46, 48, 50, 52, 55, 57, 60, 67, 81, 82, 83, 108,

Iraq 109, 111, 122, 125,132, 134, 137, 141, 156,157, 160, 162, 181, 182,183, 184, 185, 186, 187,188, 189, 190, 191, 192,193, 194, 195, 196, 197,198, 201, 217, 222, 238,288, 357, 368, 370, 371,372, 374, 375, 406, 407,409, 410, 417, 418, 419. Significance, 86, 90, 207,208, 209, 416. Social Affairs, 174, 354. Social Forces, 62, 70, 153. Social Structure, 26, 27, 28, 43, 51, 55, 66, 70,140, 158. Social System, 130, 135. Society,3, 8, 9, 15, 45, 59, 65, 76, 100, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131,132, 133, 137, 138, 144,151, 154, 155, 156, 158,159, 160, 166, 170, 174,175, 177, 178, 180, 182,183, 185, 190, 204, 214,243, 255, 261, 282, 287,289, 297, 308, 351, 357,368, 372, 395. Soldier, 164, 299. Soviet Union, 9, 62, 78, 104, 306, 315, 330, 334,337, 377, 378, 387, 388,395. Sports, 399, 400, 40l. Structure, 26, 27, 28, 32, 43, 46, 51, 55, 57, 59, 66, 67, 70, 76, 89, 130,

Index

132, 135, 140, 145,153, 154, 155, 156, 158,175, 231, 242, 243, 252,278, 280, 281, 287, 304,309, 316, 352, 365, 371. Sufism, 182, 185, 272. Sulaymaniyah, 8, 119, 138, 150, 151, 158, 247. Sumeria, 1, 225. Sunni,2, 9, 16, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 46, 50, 51, 52, 55, 57, 60, 67, 68, 75, 81, 83, 111, 123, 132, 134, 137, 156, 164, 181, 182, 183, 184,185, 186, 187, 194, 195,199, 217, 355, 357, 362,363, 365, 367, 368, 369,370, 372, 374, 375, 410. Supremacy, 31, 43, 415. Supreme Federal Court, 364. Syria, 1, 3, 10, 33, 35, 37, 46, 48, 49, 51, 53, 57, 63, 65, 71, 72, 74, 75, 78, 81, 86, 107, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119,122, 133, 151, 161, 175,200, 261, 265, 267, 269,270, 287, 288, 297, 300,314, 321, 338, 341, 357,384, 385, 402, 405, 406.

T Teacher Education, 252. Teacher Training Institutes, 252. Technical Education, 249, 250.

447 Technical Institutes, 244, 249, 250, 251, 252. Technology, 6, 30, 216, 244, 246, 249, 253, 329,339, 389, 390, 391, 394,395, 396, 397. Tehran, 74, 82, 108, 109, 152, 192, 376. Territory, 9, 10, 12, 28, 46, 49, 55, 68, 74, 78, 83, 86, 88, 111, 113, 119, 136, 138, 161, 265,266, 267, 268, 299, 300,340, 376, 377, 385. Terrorism, 7, 122, 373. Tigris, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 25,28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 38, 43, 46, 51, 96, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119,120, 135, 161, 184, 200,203, 207, 208, 214, 225,226, 270, 338, 339, 340,341, 405, 406, 409, 416,417. Tourism, 309, 405, 407, 409, 418. Tourist, 202, 208, 332, 407, 408, 410, 412, 414,416. Trade, 7, 13, 30, 38, 42,67, 68, 100, 127, 138, 155, 177, 178, 209, 300,305, 308, 309, 318, 326,327, 330, 332, 333, 334,335, 336, 338, 354, 361,386, 410, 416. Transitional Administrative Law, 108, 112. Transitional Government, 112, 302.

448 Transitional National Assembly, 2, 5, 109, 112. Transport, 20, 92, 312, 316, 321, 323, 329, 334,337, 338, 354, 388, 418. Travel, 302, 306, 361, 403, 408, 409. Turkey, 1, 3, 11, 26, 46, 47, 48, 54, 55, 58, 60, 65, 86, 87, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123,148, 151, 265, 267, 268,269, 270, 293, 306, 309,316, 321, 334, 338, 340,341, 372, 378, 386, 406. Turks, 8, 26, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47, 52, 55, 110, 122, 123, 148, 160, 161,167, 184, 266, 268, 271,290.

U UAE,382, 383. UK,5, 232, 233, 259, 401, 402, 406. Umayyad, 36, 37, 57, 167, 417. UN Security Council, 2, 5, 12, 112, 259, 394, 414. UNESCO,212, 214, 216,240, 249, 253, 254, 262,263, 264, 391. UNICEF, 173, 174, 175, 245, 247, 248, 256. United Nations, 6, 12, 16, 17, 63, 87, 102, 103, 109, 142, 173, 179, 180,191, 270, 303, 377, 391,392.

Iraq United States, 13, 69, 78, 86, 100, 101, 102, 103,105, 106, 114, 150, 164,192, 233, 246, 247, 257,276, 301, 303, 312, 316,334, 362, 368, 378, 390,393, 395. University, 117, 228, 232,233, 239, 241, 244, 246,247, 249, 250, 251, 252,253, 255, 264, 276, 361,393. Urban Society, 9, 130, 133, 137. Uruk,29, 30, 205, 206, 208, 213, 217, 226, 230. USSR,265, 379, 380. Uzaym, 3, 116.

v Version, 14, 186, 275, 365, 371. Victory, 34, 48, 91, 100, 181, 229, 232, 291, 376,402. Violence, 68, 70, 107, 11Q, 163, 167, 245, 259,260, 261, 303, 306, 366,367. Visitors, 117, 148, 396, 409, 413, 418.

w War, 2, 11, 20, 47, 62, 84,

5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 28, 30, 33, 48, 49, 56, 63, 64, 74, 87, 89, 90,

9, 15, 37, 58, 75, 91,

10, 16, 38, 61, 83, 92,

449

Index

96, 100, 102, 106, 108, 110, 112, 113, 114,117, 118, 119, 122, 124,126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 137, 138,139, 140, 142, 143, 144,146, 147, 152, 155, 156,157, 164, 170, 171, 172,173, 174, 183, 184, 185,186, 189, 192, 194, 195,196, 200, 207, 212, 214,228, 236, 238, 239, 241,244, 248, 250, 251, 255,256, 258, 260, 261, 262,263, 267, 268, 269, 288,293, 299, 300, 301, 302,303, 304, 305, 306, 308,309, 310, 311, 312, 314,315, 317, 320, 322, 323,324, 325, 326, 330, 331,332, 334, 336, 338, 341,346, 351, 352, 361, 362,363, 367, 376, 377, 378,379, 383, 384, 385, 386,387, 392, 393, 394, 395,396, 397, 403, 405, 406,407, 409, 410, 412, 413,414, 417. Washington, 102, 111, 164, 192, 395. Welfare, 129, 317. Western Countries, 269, 378, 383. Western Education, 59. Western Languages, 45. White House, 101, 102, 367.

Wildlife, 28, 120. Wisdom, 101, 219, 25l. World Bank, 245, 246, 263. World Health Organisation, 180, 386. World War, 5, 8, 47, 58, 61, 63, 130, 131, 135, 140, 155, 170, 171, 184,200, 262, 267, 268, 312,320, 324, 330, 341, 379,386, 405. Worship, 213, 231, 410.

y Yahya Kemal, 292, 293. Yanbu, 15, 32l. Yasar Kemal, 294. Yazidis, 152, 181, 198. Yezedis, 410. Youth,175, 177, 217, 267, 357, 401, 402. Yugoslavia, 334.

z Zaffa, 223. Zakhu, 58, 84. Zalmay Khalilzad, 367, 368. Zeidan, 287. Ziggurat, 30, 212, 219, 23l. Ziya Pasa, 292. Zoroastrianism, 152. Zubayd, 155. Q(JQ

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"