World Infopaedia: Jordan

WORLD infopaedia: JORDAN Pragun Publication WORLD infopaedia JORDAN Pragun Publication (D.K. Publishers Distributor...

Author: M.H. Syed

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WORLD infopaedia: JORDAN

Pragun Publication

WORLD infopaedia

JORDAN

Pragun Publication (D.K. Publishers Distributors Enterprise) 4224/1, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002 Ph: 91-11-41562573-77 Fax: 91-11-41562578 E-mail: [email protected] www.dkpd.com

Published by:

Pragun Publication 4224/1, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110002 Phones: +91-11-41562573-77, Fax: +91-11-41562578 Email: [email protected] visit us at: www.dkpd.com

Pragun Publication is an enterprise of D.K. Publishers Distributors, engaged in distribution and publishing for more than three decades. Its mission and objective is to make Indian publications widely available among the consumers both in India and abroad through its countrywide distribution outreach.

ISBN : 978-81-89645-68-7 First Published 2007

ISBN 81-89645-46-3 (Set) 81-89645-68-4

© Publishers

Published in India and Printed at: liP Printers, New Delhi-110015 Mobile: 9810271526

Publisher Parmil Mittal

Editorial Coordinator M.H. Syed

Editors A.K. Saxena A.M. Bagulia A.Z. Bukharl Arlf Ali Khan Ashok Pachaurl B.D. Usmani B.M. Lal Gian Chand Jagmohan Negi Kamlesh Gupta Kapil Oev M.A. Khan M.M. Sury Madhurendra Kumar Manohar Purl Muhammad Ilyas Naseem Ahmed P.K. Joshi S.K. Chaturvedi S.K. Sharma Seema Sharma Sumit Sethi Sandeep Sury Usha Chaturvedi Usha Purl Vishal Sethi

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

Contents Preface

ix

Jordan at a Glance

xi

1. Introduction History • Physical Features • People • Economy

1

2. Salient Features

5

Technology Leader in Middle East • A New Independence • Military's Significant Role

3. History

13

History in Brief • The Backdrop • R€gion in Antiquity • Advent of Islam and Arab Rule • Ottoman Rule • Arab Nationalism and Zionism • Before and After World War I • Trans-Jordan Area • Hashemiate Kingdom • Development and Disaster· Guerrilla Crisis • War and Diplomacy • Rabat Summit • Camp David Accord • Eventful Decade • Islamic Revolution and New Arab Alignment

4. Geography Topography • Jordan River • Madaba Plains • Climate • Flora and Fauna • Marine Life • Deforestation • Water Shortage • Protecting Aqabah • Various Considerations

87

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5. Society Population • Ethnicity • The Palestinians • Urban Areas and Urbanisation • Villages • Tribes and Tribalism • Migration • Civil Society Relations • Family and Household • Food and Drinks • Gender Issues • Human Rights Problem • Health and Welfare

111

6. Religion Early Development of Islam • Islamic Revival • Islam in Social Life • Religious Minorities • Religious Demography • Religious Freedom

153

7. Heritage and Culture National Culture • Islamic Holy Sites • Petra: World Heritage Site • Military Heritage • Preserving Cultural Heritage

173

8. Art and Architecture Ice Age Archaeology • Architecture • Islamic Architecture • Islamic Art • House of Arts • Music • Handicrafts

191

9. Education Development of Education • Educational System • Education in Practice • Educational Facilities • Types of Institutions • Higher Education • Educational Challenge

217

10. Language and Literature Arabic Language • Arabic Literature • Modern Literature • Non-fiction • Fiction • Modern Poetry • Arabic Poetry • Pre-Islamic Poetry • Poetic Forms • Court Poets • Plays • Criticism • Women's Contribution • Outside Views • Decline of Literature • Media

245

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11. Economy Structure and Dynamics • Gulf War and Economy • Role of Government • The Budget • Development and Planning • Economic Uberalisation • Banking and Finance • Improving Prospects • International Trade • One Year of Stellar Growth • Economic Austerity • Austerity Measures • Labour Force • Industry • Industrial Development • Natural Resources • Oil and Gas • Water • Agriculture • Transportation and Communications

267

12. Polity Political Setting • Political Elite • National Charter • Decentralisation • The Constitution • The Government • Council of Ministers • The Legislature • The Judiciary • Local Administration • The Elections • Political Parties • National Democratic Institute • Women's Participation • Seeking Peace • Palestine Uberation Organisation • National Security • Armed Forces • Military Personnel • Defence Expenditure • Internal Security • Foreign Policy

339

13. Science and Technology Technology Vision on Track • Major Technology Implementations • Technology Sparks • Information and Communication Technology • e-Governance • eLearning • Satellite Earth Stations • Internet Activity

441

14. Sports Jordan's Royal Falcons • Ufting Off from Wadi Rum • National Football Team

451

15. Tourism Ancient Holy Land • Tourist Attractions

461

Bibliography

507

Index

515

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

Preface The world which we all live in came into existence some eighteen thousand million years ago. As for the birth of this universe, there are various theories. Of them, theory of the Big Bang is regarded to be the most authentic one. According to it, a big single explosion took place, which produced condensed material, and that has been expanding continuously. This material is called galaxy/galaxies. Precisely, these galaxies are the huge congregation of stars, which are held together by the gravitational force. Of these stars, our Sun is one and our Earth is one of its nine planets. For the purpose of ease, the earth has been divided into several parts--either dry or wet. The dry ones are known as continents. These are seven in number. All but one (Antarctica) are inhabited and have charming flora and fauna. A continent consists of different countries. For instance, India lies in Asia, Egypt in Africa, France in Europe and US in North America. Total number of countries, in the world, today is nearly 200. Similarly, the waters have been divided into five oceans. The 20th century world witnessed a score of events; and some major events in the last century were determining factors for a number of people to let themselves off the fetters of slavery of centuries long colonialism and enable themselves to declare their status as free nations of the world. Colonial forces were shown doors by their inferior subjects in the third world. In the running up process of imperialist expansion and exploitation, the nations such as Germany, Italy and Japan were left bereft of what they actually deserved and demanded. These disgruntled nations steered the world to the two world wars, which took toll of crores of lives and properties worth billions. Hiroshima and Nagasaki tasted the wrath of atom bombs ever dropped in the world history. After the wars, a new world order emerged. Britain's importance in this new world order almost ceased to exist. The cold war between US and USSR reigned over the world, till the beginning of 1990s, when the Soviet Union finally got disintegrated.

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The collapse of Soviet Union as a nation resulted in the world coming under a unipolar world, with US ruling the roost. Earlier, wars were fought in South Asia, South East Asia and Middle Eastern Asia. United States proved to be a failure in its Vietnam ambitions. India and China are on the path to add up to other superpowers of the world. Most of the African countries remain to be in pathetic condition in respect of economic, political and social status. However, some Pacific and some Latin American countries are emerging as new economic powers. Today, the world has evolved a new economic and cultural order. The whole world has turned into a global village. Hence, every nation and every country has attained its own significance and importance. Each country has its own laws of governance and enjoys full autonomy. But, they have varying capacities in terms of economy, defence, education, etc. That's why conflicts over diverse issues keep surfacing day in and day out. Taking into consideration all these crucial points, some initiatives were taken in order to control any unjust and untoward situation on the basis of mutual cooperation. With this backdrop, a dire need for a comprehensive, authentic, research-based and informative work, covering the whole world, was seriously felt. This endeavour is meant to fill this vacuum only. In this Encyclopaedia of a unique nature, all the important nations of the world are described about. The main themes characterising this Encyclopaedia are; general information and factual data. This Encyclopaedic work reflects the history, politics, and cultural affairs of all nations. All information is given in an interesting and intelligent manner. Every volume is devoted to one nation. This volume, an independent book, in itself, is on : Jordan. These introductory titbits apart, this vast World InJopaedia is a priceless gem in the series of its ilk. Comprehensively and exclusively tailored, this modest work would certainly prove to be a win-win venture. Certainly, this novel work can be made use of by scholars, students, teachers, journalists and general readers, barring all national boundaries. All genuine suggestions and enlightening remarks will be highly appreciated by the undersigned, who would solicit your sincere response and wise comments. -Editors

Jordan at a Glance Introduction • Background: For most of its history, since independence from British administration in 1946, Jordan was ruled by King Hussein (1953-99). A pragmatic ruler, he successfully navigated competing pressures from the major powers (US, UK and USSR), various Arab states, Israel, and a large internal Palestinian population, despite several wars and coup attempts. In 1989 he reinstituted parliamentary elections and gradual political liberalisation; in 1994, he signed a peace treaty with Israel. King Abdullah II, the son of King Hussein, assumed the throne following his father's death in February 1999. Since then, he has consolidated his power and undertaken an aggressive economic reform programme. Jordan acceded to the World Trade Organisation in 2000, and began to participate in the European Free Trade Association in 2001. After a two-year delay, parliamentary and municipal elections took place in the summer of 2003. The Prime Minister appointed in December 2005 said the government would focus on political reforms, improving conditions for the poor, and fighting corruption.

Geography • Location: Middle East, northwest of Saudi Arabia • Geographic Coordinates: 31 00 N, 36 00 E • Map References: Middle East • Area: Total: 92,300 sq km land: 91,971 sq km water: 329 sq km • Land Boundaries: Total: 1,635 km border countries: Iraq 181 km, Israel 238 km, Saudi Arabia 744 km, Syria 375 km, West Bank 97 km

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• Coastline: 26 krn • Maritime Claims: Territorial sea: 3 nm • Climate: Mostly arid desert; rainy season in west (November to April) • Terrain: Mostly desert plateau in east, highland area in west; Great Rift Valley separates East and West Banks of the Jordan River • Elevation Extremes: Lowest point: Dead Sea -408 m highest point: Jabal Rum 1,734 m • Natural Resources: Phosphates, potash, shale oil • Land Use: Arable land: 3.32% permanent crops: 1.18% others: 95.5% (2005) • Irrigated Land: 750 sq krn (2003) • Natural Hazards: Droughts; periodic earthquakes • Environment-current Issues: Limited natural fresh water resources; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification • Environment-international Agreements: Party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Wetlands signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements • Geography-note: Strategic location at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba and as the Arab country that shares the longest border with Israel and the occupied West Bank

Demography • Population: 5,906,760 (August 2006 est.) • Age Structure: 0-14 years: 33.8% (male 1,018,070/female 976,442) 15-64 years: 62.4% (male 1,966,794/female 1,716,255) 65 years and over: 3.9% (male 111,636/female 117,563) (2006 est.) • Median Age: Total: 23 years male: 23.7 years female: 22.4 years (2006 est.) • Population Growth Rate: 2.49% (2006 est.) • Birth Rate: 21.25 births/1,000 population (2006 est.) • Death Rate: 2.65 deaths/l,OOO population (2006 est.)

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• Net Migration Rate: 6.26 migrant(s)/l,OOO population (2006 est.) • Sex Ratio: At birth: 1.06 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.15 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.95 male(s)/female total population: 1.1 male(s)/female (2006 est.) • Infant Mortality Rate: Total: 16.76 deaths/1,000 live births male: 20..04 deaths/1,000 live births female: 13.28 deaths/ 1,000 live births (2006 est.) • Life Expectancy at Birth: Total population: 78.4 years male: 75.9 years female: 81.05 years (2006 est.) • Total Fertility Rate: 2.63 children born/woman (2006 est.) • HIV/AIDS-adult Prevalence Rate: Less than 0.1% (2001 est.) • HIV/AIDS-people Living with HIV/AIDS: 600 (2003 est.) • HIV/AIDS-deaths: Less than 500 (2003 est.) • Nationality: Noun: Jordanian(s) Adjective: Jordanian • Ethnic Groups: Arab 98%, Circassian 1 %, Armenian 1 % • Religions: Sunni Muslim 92%, Christian 6% (majority Greek Orthodox, but some Greek and Roman Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Protestant denominations), Others 2% (several small Shi'a' Muslim and Druze populations) (2001 est.) • Languages: Arabic (official), English widely understood among upper and middle classes • Literacy: Definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 91.3% male: 95.9% female: 86.3% (2003 est.) Government

• Country Name: Conventional long form: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Conventional short form: Jordan Local long form: Al Mar.1lakah al Urduniyah al Hashimiyah Local short form: Al Urdun Formerly: Transjordan • Government Type: Constitutional Monarchy • Capital: Amman • Administrative Divisions: 12 governorates (muhafazat,

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singular-muhafazah); Ajlun, AI 'Aqabah, AI Balqa', AI Karak, AI Mafraq, 'Amman, At Tafilah, Az Zarqa', Irbid, Jarash, Ma'an, Madaba Independence: 25 May 1946 (from League of Nations mandate under British administration) National Holiday: Independence Day, 25 May Constitution: 1 January 1952; amended 1954, 1955, 1958, 1960, 1965, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1984 Legal System: Based on Islamic law and French codes; judicial review of legislative acts in a specially provided High Tribunal; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal Executive Branch: Chief of State: King Abdullah II (since 7 February 1999); Prince Hussein (born 1994), eldest son of King Abdullah, is first in line to inherit the throne Head of Government: Prime Minister Marouf Suleiman Bakhit (since 24 November 2005); Deputy Prime Minister Ziad Fariz (since 24 November 2005) Cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Monarch Elections: none; the monarch is hereditary; Prime Minister appointed by the Monarch Legislative Branch: Bicameral National Assembly or Majlis al-'Umma consists of the Senate, also called the House of Notables (Majlis al-Ayan) (55 seats; members appointed by the Monarch from designated categories of public figures; members serve four-year terms) and the House of Representatives, also called the House of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwaab). (110 seats; members elected by popular vote on the basis of proportional representation to serve four-year terms); Note-six seats are reserved for women and are allocated by a sp~cial electoral panel if no women are elected Elections: House of Representatives-last held 17 June 2003 (next to be held in 2007) Election Results: House of Representbtives-percent of vote by party-independents and others 89:.'6%, IAF 10.4%; seats by party-independents and others 92, IAF 18; Note-one of the six quota seats was given to a female IAF candidate Note: the House of Representatives has been convened and dissolved by the Monarch several times since 1974; in November 1989, the first parliamentary elections in 22 years were held; political

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parties were not legalised until 1992; King Abdullah delayed the 2001 elections until 2003 Judicial Branch: Court of Cassation; Supreme Court (court of final appeal) Political Parties and Leaders: A1-Ahd Party; Arab Islamic Democratic Movement [Yusuf Abu Bakr, president]; Arab Land Party [Dr. Ayishah Salih Hijazayn, secretary general]; Arab Socialist Bath Party [Taysir al-HIMSI, secretary general]; Bath Arab Progressive Party [Fuad Dabbur, secretary general]; Freedom Party; Future Party; Islamic Action Front or IAF [7aki Saed Bani DIrsheid, secretary general]; Islamic Centre Party [Marwan al-Fauri, secretary general]; Jordanian Arab Ansar Party; Jordanian Arab New Dawn Party; Jordanian Arab Party; Jordanian Citizens' Rights Movement; Jordanian Communist Party [Munir Hamarinah, secretary general]; Jordanian Communist Workers Party; Jordanian Democratic Left Party [Musa Maayteh, secretary general]; Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party [Said Dhiyab Ali Mustafa, secretary general]; Jordanian Generations Party [Muhammad Khalayleh, secretary general]; Jordanian Green Party [Muhammad Batayneh, secretary general]; Jordanian Labour Party [Dr. Mazin Sulaiman Jiryis Hanna, secretary general]; Jordanian Peace Party; Jordanian People's Committees Movement; Jordanian People's Democratic Party (Hashd) [Ahmad Yusuf, secretary general]; Jordanian Rafah Party; Jordanian Renaissance Party; Mission Party; Nation Party [Ahmad al-Hanandeh, secretary general]; National Action Party (Haqq) [Tariq al-Kayyali, secretary general]; National Constitutional Party [Abdul Hadi Majali, secretary general]; National Popular Democratic Movement [Mahmud al-Nuwayhi, secretary general]; Progressive Party [Fawwaz al-Zubi, secretary general] Political Pressure Groups and Leaders: Anti-Normalisation Committee [Ali Abu Sukkar, president vice chairman]; Jordanian Bar Association [Saleh Armouti, president]; Jordanian Press Association [Sayf ai-Sharif, president]; Muslim Brotherhood [Salem AI-Falahat, secretary general] International Organisation Participation: ABEDA, AFESD, AMF, CAEU, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO. ICC, ICCt, ICFTU,

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ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, 10C, 10M, IPU, ISO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, MINUSTAH, MONUC, NAM, OIC, ONUB, OPCW, OSCE (partner), PCA, UN, UNAMSIL, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNMEE, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNOCI, UNOMIG, UNRWA, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTO • Flag Description: Three equal horizontal bands of black (top), representing the Abbassid Caliphate, white, representing the Ummayyad Caliphate, and green, representing the Fatimid Caliphate; a red isosceles triangle on the hoist side, representing the Great Arab Revolt of 1916, and bearing a small white seven-pointed star symbolizing the seven verses of the opening Sura (AI-Fatiha) of the Holy Koran; the seven points on the star represent faith in One God, humanity, national spirit, humility, social justice, virtue, and aspirations; design is based on the Arab Revolt flag of World War

Economic Overview Jordan is a small Arab country with inadequate supplies of water and other natural resources such as oil. Debt, poverty, and unemployment are fundamental problems, but King Abdullah, since assuming the throne in 1999, has undertaken some broad economic reforms in a long-term effort to improve living standards. 'Amman in the past three years has worked closely with the IMF, practised careful monetary policy, and made substantial headway with privatisation. The government has also Iiberalised the trade regime sufficiently to secure Jordan's membership in the WTO (2000), a free trade accord with the US (2001), and an association agreement with the EU (2001). These measures have helped improve productivity and have put Jordan on the foreign investment map. Jordan imported most of its oil from Iraq, but the US-led war in Iraq in 2003 made Jordan more dependent on oil from other Gulf nations, forcing the Jordanian Government to raise retail petroleum product prices and the sales tax base. Jordan's export market, which is heavily dependent on exports to Iraq, was also affected by the war but recovered quickly while contributing to the Iraq recovery effort. The main challenges facing Jordan are reducing dependence on foreign grants, reducing the budget deficit, and creating investment incentives to promote job creation.

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GDP (purchasing power parity): $27.86 billion (2005 est.) GDP (official exchange rate): $11.61 billion (2005 est.) GDP-real Growth Rate: 5.9% (2005 est.) GDP-per Capita (PPP): $4,800 (2005 est.) GDP-compositlon by Sector: Agriculture: 3.5% industry: 29.9% services: 66.7% (2005 est.) Labour Force: 1.46 million (2005 est.) Labour Force-by Occupation: Agriculture: 5% industry: 12.5% services: 82.5% (2001 est.) Unemployment Rate: 12.5% official rate; unofficial rate is approximately 30% (2004 est.) Population below Poverty Line: 30% (2001 est.) Household Income or Consumption by Percentage Share: Lowest 10%: 3.3% highest 10%: 29.8% (1997) Distribution of Family Income-Gini Index: 36.4 (1997) Inflation Rate (consumer prices): 5% (2005 est.) Investment (gross fixed): 20.9% of GOP (2005 est.) Budget: Revenues: $2.8 billion expenditures: $4.688 billion; including capital expenditures of $1.092 billion (2005 est.) Public Debt: 77.7% of GOP (2005 est.) Agriculture-products: Wheat, barley, citrus fruits, tomatoes, melons, olives; sheep, goats, poultry Industries: Textiles, phosphate mining, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, petroleum refining, cement, potash, inorganic chemicals, light manufacturing, tourism Industrial Production Growth Rate: 7.5% (2005 est.) Electricity-production: 7.517 billion kWh (2003) Electricity-consumption: 7.959 billion kWh (2003) Electricity-exports: 4 million kWh (2003) Electricity-imports: 972 million kWh (2003) Oil-production: 40 bbVday (2004 est.) Oil-consumption: 103,000 bbVday (2004 est.) Oil-exports: 0 bbVday (2004 est.) Oil-imports: 100,000 bbVday (2004 est.)

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Oil-proved Reserves: 445,000 bbl (1 January 2002) Natural Gas-production: 390 million cu m (2003 est.) Natural Gas-consumption: 390 million cu m (2003 est.) Natural Gas-exports: 0 cu m (2001 est.) Natural Gas-imports: 0 cu m (2001 est.) Natural Gas-proved Reserves: 6.23 billion cu m (1 January 2002) Current Account Balance: -$1.08 billion (2005 est.) Exports: $4.226 billion f.o.b. (2005 est.) Export-commodities: Clothing, phosphates, fertilisers, potash, vegetables, manufactures, pharmaceuticals Export-partners: US 28.9%, Iraq 17.6%, India 7.1%, Saudi Arabia 5.6% (2004) Imports: $8.681 billion f.o.b. (2005 est.) Import-commodities: Crude oil, textile fabrics, machinery, transport equipment, manufactured goods Import-partners: Saudi Arabia 19.8%, China 8.4%, Germany 6.8%, US 6.8% (2004) Reserves of Foreign Exchange and Gold: $5.509 billion (2005 est.) Debt-external: $8.273 billion (2005 est.) Economic Aid-recipient: ODA, $500 million (2004 est.) Currency (code): Jordanian dinar (JOD) Exchange Rates: Jordanian dinars per US dollar-0.709 (2005), 0.709 (2004), 0.709 (2003), 0.709 (2002), 0.709 (2001) Fiscal Year: Calendar year

Communications • Telephones-main Lines in Use: 617,300 (2004) • Telephones-mobile Cellular: 1,594,500 (2004) • Telephone System: General Assessment: service has improved recently with increased use of digital switching equipment, but better access to the telephone system is needed in the rural areas and easier access to pay telephones is needed by the urban public Domestic: microwave radio relay transmission and coaxial and fiber-optic cable are employed on trunk lines;

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considerable use of mobile cellular systems; Internet service is available International: country code-962; satellite earth stations3 Intelsat, 1 Arabsat, and 29 land and maritime Inmarsat terminals; fiber-optic cable to Saudi Arabia and microwave radio relay link with Egypt and Syria; connection to international submarine cable FLAG (Fiber-Optic Unk Around the Globe); participant in Medarabtel; international links total about 4,000 Radio Broadcast Stations: AM 6, FM 5, shortwave 1 (1999) Television Broadcast Stations: 20 (plus 96 repeaters) (1995) Internet Country Code: jo Internet Hosts: 2,793 (2005) Internet Users: 600,000 (2005)

Transportation • Airports: 17 (2005) • Airports-with Paved Runways: Total: 15 over 3,047 m: 7 2,438 to 3,047 m: 6914 to 1,523 m: 1 under 914 m: 1 (2005) • Airports-with Unpaved Runways: Total: 2 under 914 m: 2 (2005) • Heliports: 1 (2005) • Pipelines: Gas 10 km; oil 743 km (2004) • Railways: Total: 505 km narrow gauge: 505 km, 1.050-m gauge (2004) • Roadways: Total: 7,364 km paved: 7,364 km (2003) • Merchant Marine: Total: 26 ships (1000 GRT or over) 218,685 GRT/218,795 DWf by type: bulk carrier 2, cargo 9, container 2, passenger/cargo 6, petroleum tanker 1, roll on/roll off 6 foreignowned: 12 (UAE 12) registered in other countries: 14 (The Bahamas 2, Panama 12) (2005) • Ports and Terminals: Al 'Aqabah Military • Military Branches: Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF): Royal Jordanian Land Force, Royal Jordanian Navy, Royal Jordanian Air Force, and Special Operations Command (SOCOM); notePublic Security Directorate normally falls under Ministry of Interior but comes under JAF in wartime or crisis situations

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• Military Service Age and Obligation: 17 years of age for voluntary military service; conscription at age 18 was suspended in 1999, although all males under age 37 are required to register; women not subject to conscription, but can volunteer to serve in non-combat military positions (2004) • Manpower Available for Military Service: Males age 1749: 1,573,995 females age 1749: 1,346,642 (2005 est.) • Manpower Fit for Military Service: Males age 1749: 1,348,076 females age 1749: 1,158,011 (2005 est.) • Manpower Reaching Military Service Age Annually: Males age 1849: 60,625 females age 1749: 58,218 (2005 est.) • Military Expenditures-dollar Figure: $1.4 billion (2005 est.) • Military Expenditures-percent ofGDP: 11.4% (2005 est.)

Transnational Issues • Disputes-International: 2004 Agreement settles border dispute with Syria pending demarcation • Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Refugees (country of origin): 1,827,877 (Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA)) IDPs: 168,000 (1967 Arab-Israeli War) (2005) • (Information based on: International Fad Sheets)

1 Introduction A constitutional monarchy in West Asia, Jordan is officially called Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It is landlocked, except at its southern extremity, where nearly twenty-six kilometres of shoreline along the Gulf of Aqaba provide access to the Red Sea. Jordan is bordered on the north by Syria, to the east by Iraq, and by Saudi Arabia on the east and south. To the west is Israel and the occupied West Bank. Jordan covers an area of 92,300 sq kms and has a population of 5.9 million. Jordan is an integral part of Arab world, thus it has common features of culture. Jordanians are known for their friendliness and hospitality. A genuinely respectful attitude is highly regarded in the Jordanian culture. The country boasts of having one of the world's most pleasant climates. Summers are dry and warm-to-hot and winters are wet and cool-to-cold. Having an amazingly rich cultural and archaeological heritage and many natural wonders, Jordan is developing rapidly in tourism. The largest city built on seven hills and an enchanting mixture of ancient and modern, Amman is the capital of Jordan. The greatest charm of Amman is found in the hospitality of its residents. The land around Jordan river and Dead Sea plain is revered by Muslims, Christians and Jews as blessed. The Bible calls it "the Garden of the Lord."

History Archaeological evidence shows that neolithic culturz had developed into a sedentary way of life by 8th millennium BC.

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Jordan

Settlements at Bayda on the East Bank and Jericho on the West Bank date from this period. In the 4th century BC the Seleucids conquered the region. By the first century BC the Nabatean prospered. The Romans captured the region in the first century AD. The Roman leader Pompey organised the Decapolis. Decapolis was a league of ten self-governing Greek cities. After the administrative partition of the Roman Empire in 395 AD, the Jordan region was assigned to the eastern or Byzantine Empire. The control over the Jordan region was transformed to the Ghassanids. Arab armies entered the Jordan region in 633. They crushed the Byzantine army at a battle near Yarmuk river in 636. They introduced Islam in Jordan. Jordan region became part of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem after the First Crusade in 1099. It joined the Ottoman Empire in 1517. In the First World War, Ottoman Empire was defeated. The region, east of the Jordan river became a part of the British territory of Palestine. This eastern region, in 1928, became a constitutional monarchy. It was ruled by the Hashemite dynasty. King Abdullah became ruler of the independent Hashemite Kingdom of TransJordan in 1946. During Arab-Israel War (1948) the West Bank and East Jerusalem were added to the kingdom, which changed its name to Jordan. In 1951 King Abdullah was assassinated. In 1953, Hussein acceded to the throne. During the Six Day War of 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Now about one million Palestine refugees live in East Jordan. King Hussein recognised the Palestinian Liberation Authority (PLO) in 1974 as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. King Hussein died on 7 February 1999 and his eldest son Abdullah II became his successor.

Physical Features The country of Jordan can be divided into three geographical areas-the Trans-Jordan Plateau in the east, central Jordan and west Jordan. The Trans-Jordan plateau constitutes 90 per cent of total area and is the most populous region. Central Jordan forms part of the Great Rift Valley. It contains the River Jordan and the Dead Sea. We~t Jordan is now known as West Bank. It is the part of historic Palestine. This region includes the area of Samaria, which is now occupied by Israel. Major part of the East Bank is desert. Most of the land is part of the great Syrian desert. In this area there are broad expanses of

Introduction

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sand and dunes. Jordan River rises in the Anti-Lebanon mountain at the confluence of the Hasbani, Dan, and Baniyas rivers. This river flows towards south through Israel and the Sea of Galilee, and em plies into the Dead Sea. The southern part of the river forms a section of Israel-Jordan border. The main tributary is the Yarmuk River. The Dead Sea occupies the deepest depression on the land surface of the earth. The sea's maximum depth is about 430 metres. The Dead Sea is fed by river Jordan. The sea is situated in a hot, dry region and much water is lost through evaporation. It is one of the world's saltiest waters. On the southern side of the Dead Sea is the rift valley. It is known as the Southern Ghawr and the Wadi alJayb. The Southern Ghawr runs from Wadi al-Hammah. Wadi alJayb is 180 km long from the southern shore of the Dead Sea to Al-Aqabah in the south. The forests of oak and pine, pistachio and cinnabar trees are found in the highlands of Jordan. Olive, eucalyptus and cedar trees can also be seen throughout the highlands and the Jordan valley. Many small shrub plants thrive in the Badia, where local Bedouin tribes graze their goats. Climate: Most of Jordan is desert or semi-desert. The country has a Mediterranean climate. Summer season is hot and dry and winter is cold and mild. During the summer months atmospheric pressure is uniform. The cyclonic winds move eastward from above the Mediterranean Sea, several times in a month. Major areas of the East Bank receive less than twelve centimetres of rain per year. Jordan valley lies in the lee of high ground on the West Bank. It forms a narrow climatic zone that receives 30 cm of rain in the northern reaches per year. Rain at the head of the Dead Sea becomes less than 12 cm.

People A substantial number of Jordanians work and reside abroad, so it is difficult to compile demographic figures. Major population of Jordan is centred in the Governorate of Amman and the smaller urban areas of Irbid, As-Salt and Az-Zarqa. About 70 per cent of the population lives in urban areas. The remainder of the population lives in villages. The nomadic and semi nomadic people are very small

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in number. Most of the families in Jordan are extended families. A household consists of a married couple, their unmarried children, and other relatives such as parents, or a widowed parent or an unmarried sister. Parents arrange "'!arriages for their children. Jordan is a Muslim country. Over 95 per cent of the population comprises Sunni Muslims. A small number of Shia Muslims also reside in the country. Christian communities include Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Maronite Catholic and Greek Catholic. People in Jordan like popular dishes of msakhan, lamb or mutton and rice with a yougurt sauce, and mansaj, chicken cooked with onion. Jordanian food is similar to that of Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Greece. The Bedouin people weave many an item by hand, using sheep's wool and goat and camel hair. Economy

A small country with limited natural resources, Jordan is a developing country. Jordan had made a remarkable economic growth during 1977-82 described as the 'boom years'. Though the country is largely desert, yet, the western region is very fertile. Mostly agricultural activity is concentrated in this area. Wheat, barley, tobacco, lentils are cultivated in rainfed northern and central areas of higher elevation. Fruits and vegetables, including cucumbers, tomatoes, eggplants, melons, bananas and citrus fruits are grown in the fertile Jordan river valley. This valley receives little rain but main source of irrigation is East Ghor canal. The Jordanian economy, in general, is private sector oriented. Private sector comprises telecommunications, tourism, energy, transportation, mining, etc. and establishments like National Petroleum Corporation, Arab Potash Company, Jordan Phosphate Mines Company, etc. Direct state ownership is relatively small. Jordan's major industries include textiles, cement, food processing, petroleum products, iron and fertilizers. Jordan exports phosphates, fruits and vegetables, shale oil, fertilizers, and livestock. It imports capital goods, foodstuff, motor vehicles, petroleum products. Lately, Iraq has become the largest market for Jordanian products.

2 Salient Features Jordan was created out of the greater mandated Palestine following World War I. The British saw an opportunity to appease Abdullah, a son of Hussain ibn Ali, who was ruler of the Hejaz in Arabia. In 1923, the Kingdom of Trans-Jordan was carved out of the area of mandated Palestine and the Hashemite dynasty began. Though TransJordan was an Allies supporter during World War II, in 1948 the country joined the Arab League, changed its name to Jordan and participated in the 1948 war with Israel. As a consequence of this conflict, Jordan gained territory: the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem, whichi-were, annexed in 1950. Many of the Arab refugees from that war were placed in camps in the West Bank and the population of Jordan is today, overwhelmingly Palestinian. The late King Hussain came to the throne in 1952 following the assassination of his grandfather, King Abdullah, and the abdication of his father due to mental illness. Hussain went to war against Israel once again in 1967. The Six Day War left Israel in control of the West Bank and east Jerusalem, along with other territories seized from Egypt and Syria. Though Jordan had once hoped to remain the negotiator for the Palestinians in the matters of territory, it was forced to cede that power to the PLO under Yasir Arafat. Jordan has made some questionable decisions over the years including its opposition to the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and its support of Saddam Hussain during the Gulf War in 1991. But its charismatic king and policies that appeared to Western

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eyes as moderate, particularly when compared with its more radical neighbours, has helped Jordan to be viewed favourably by the US. And, Jordan's decision to make a formal peace with Israel in 1994, also earned the country renewed respect. Hussain's death in 1999 resulted in the ascension to the throne of his son, Abdullah who has pledged to continue his father's efforts on behalf of peace. For most of its history since independence from British administration in 1946, Jordan was ruled by King Hussain (1953-99). A pragmatic ruler, he successfully navigated competing pressures from the major powers (US, USSR and UK), various Arab states, Israel, and a large internal Palestinian population, despite several wars and coup attempts. In 1989 he reinstituted parliamentary elections and gradual politicalliberalisation; in 1994 he signed a formal peace treaty with Israel. King Abdullah II-the eldest son of King Hussain and Princess Muna-assumed the throne following his father's death in February 1999. Since then, he has consolidated his power and undertaken an aggressive economic reform programme. Jordan acceded to the World Trade Organisation in 2000, and began to participate in the European Free Trade Association in 2001. After a two-year delay, parliamentary and municipal elections took place in the summer of 2003. The Prime Minister and government, appointed in April 2005, declared they would build upon the previous government's achievements to respect political and human rights and improve living standards. The present kingdom of Jordan has had a separate existence for almost seventy years, from the time of the creation in 1921 of the Emirate of Trans-Jordan under Abdullah of the Hashemite family, the grandfather of King Hussain. To form Trans-Jordan, the Palestine Mandate was subdivided along the Jordan River-Gulf of Aqaba line. At its creation, Jordan was an artificial entity because inhabitants of northern Jordan have traditionally associated with Syria, those of southern Jordan have associated with the Arabian Peninsula, and those of western Jordan have identified with Palestinians in the West Bank. Moreover, the area that constituted Jordan in 1990 has served historically as a buffer zone between tribes living to the west of the Jordan River as far as the Mediterranean Sea and those roaming the desert to the east of the Jordan River. Over the centuries, the area

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has formed part of vari,ous empires; among these are the Assyrian, Achaemenid, Macedonian, Nabatean, Ptolemaic, Roman, Ghassanid, Muslim, Crusader, and Ottoman empires. The Nabataeans were the first known inhabitants of the area that is now Jordan. The Romans absorbed it into their empire, as part of the province of Arabia, in AD 106. Shortly after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in AD 632, Arab armies entered the region and established the Umayyad dynasty. However, this became something of a provincial backwater after the conquest of Baghdad. During the 11th and 12th centuries, Jordan was the scene of some of the major conflicts between the Christian Crusaders and Islamic forces. Salah-ud-Din (known in the West as Saladin) and his successors ruled Jordan from his main seat of power in Egypt from the late 12th century until they were displaced by the Mamluks, a race of mostly Kurdish and Circassian origin. The Mamluks repelled the Mongol invasion of the 14th century but were eventually overthrown by the Ottoman Turks in 1517. Jordan was governed along with modern-day Palestine and Syria as a single administrative entity (called a vilayet). Turkish rule lasted, in an increasingly anaemic form, until the beginning of the 20th century. After World War I, when the major Western powers began to dismember the old Ottoman Empire and distribute its territories among themselves, the area east of the Jordan River, known as Trans-Jordania, fell to the British. Like neighbouring Palestine, TransJordania came under a League of Nations mandate under which the British maintained control. The mandate ceased in 1946, at which point Trans-Jordania attained full independence under the present constitution. The country came under the rule of King Abdullah ibn Hussain, a member of the Arabian Hashemiate Dynasty who had held the position of Amir since the 1920s. When King Abdullah was assassinated in 1951, the crown passed to his son Hussain ibn Talal. King Hussain assumed the throne in 1952 and ruled the country until early 1999. Jordanian history and politics since independence have been dominated by the Palestinian issue and relations with Israel. When war broke out in 1948 between the newly-declared state of Israel and the Palestinians, backed by the forces from neighbouring Arab countries, the Jordanian army occupied a 6000 sq kms area of

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Palestine bounded by the west bank of the River Jordan. Until a major change in Jordanian policy in 1988, the West Bank comprised three of Jordan's eight provinces, while over half of the Jordanian population claimed Palestinian origin. Relations between King Hussain and the Palestinians were difficult from the very start: his father was murdered by a Palestinian extremist. Jordan lost the West Bank after the Six-Day War of 1967, and gained thousands of Palestinian refugees who fled across to Jordan. Many of them joined one of the myriads of guerrilla groups organised under the umbrella title of the Palestine Liberation Organisation Hussain ultimately came to feel that they constituted a major threat to his authority and, in September 1970, he deployed the Jordanian army to expel them. In 1973, Israel again defeated a combined Arab force, including a small Jordanian contingent, in the Yom Kippur war: Jordan lost no territory on this occasion. Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, Jordan pulled back from regional politics to concentrate more on domestic matters. After 1967, political power in Jordan was concentrated fully in the hands of the King and his Council of Ministers. Political parties and almost all political activity were banned. This prohibition has been substantially relaxed since the mid-1980s to the point where political parties can now campaign openly for election. Nevertheless, the government continues to restrict their activities and is especially wary of any manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism, which, as elsewhere in the Arab world, has been growing in Jordan. Most political parties boycotted the parliamentary poll in November 1997-the only officially represented political party is the small Baath party-and the National Assembly remains, as previously, dominated by supporters of the King. There is also a significant Islamist bloc although it is not formally organised. The Palestinian problem re-emerged as a major factor in Jordanian politics with the onset of the first Intifada (the uprising by Palestinians living in Israeli-occupied areas) in 1987. This led, in July the follOWing year, to a surprise decision by Hussain to cede the residual Jordanian interest in the internal affairs of the occupied West Bank (notably the financing of public services such as education). Then in 1990, another of Jordan's other neighbours, Iraq, became the cause of major problems for the Jordanians when Saddam Hussain invaded Kuwait.

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The ensuing Gulf War of 1991 proved a political and economic disaster for Jordan. Traditionally friendly to both the US and Iraq and, in different ways, economically reliant on both, Jordan was forced into an unwelcome choice. Inevitably, Jordan lost out with both sides through its failure to give wholehearted support for the US-led coalition, which defeated the Iraqis, and by accepting large numbers of Iraqi refugees. During the rest of the 1990s, Jordan suffered badly from the UN sanctions imposed upon Baghdad and it has benefited significantly from the gradual disintegration of the sanctions regime. The Iraqi situation also had the effect of pushing King Hussain into a peace agreement with the Israelis, allowing for security and economic cooperation, which was concluded in 1994. Since 2000, and the second Palestinian Intifada, this agreement has come under serious strain. By this time, moreover, there had been an important change in Jordan. King Hussain's health had been in decline throughout the 1990s and he died of cancer in February 1999. The King's brother, Crown Prince Hassan, had long been the heir apparent. But the King had stipulated before his death that one of his sons, Prince Abdullah, had been chosen to take over upon his death (Hassan remains an important figure in the regime). During his first year in office, Abdullah adopted a more populist style than his father but there has been little change in the substance of policy. A new Prime Minister, Ali Abu al-Ragheb, took office during 2000 as the head of a government composed of independents and members of the main Islamic bloc. During 2002, Abdullah was confronted by the same dilemma as his father as, once again, the Americans have Iraq in their sights. There is strong anti-American feeling in the country due to the Bush administration's support for Israel and its proposed assault on fellow Arabs. The government was also deeply concerned about the economic consequences of a second Gulf War. Elsewhere, Jordan has cut diplomatic relations with Qatar over a broadcast by the AI-Jazeera television station (famous as the main outlet for the AI-Qaeda terrorist setup), which criticised alleged corruption within the Jordanian government.

Technology Leader in Middle East As a country without an abundance of natural resources, Jordan must rely on its people's skills to drive the economy. When Jordan's

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King Abdullah II took the throne in 1999, he challenged the private sector to devise a plan for building the country's young information and communications technology (lCT) sector by utilising Jordan's highly skilled and educated workforce. USAID has been a driving force behind the REACH Initiativea government-business partnership and national strategy to develop Jordan into a leader in exporting ICT products and services. Launched in 1999, USAID funded the initiative's founding document, which outlined a five-year plan for cooperation among industry, government, and other partners to achieve these ambitious goals. To coordinate the private sector's contribution to the initiative, USAID helped create int@j, now the country's most dynamic and active business association. The AMIR Programme assisted int@j in organising workshops and producing new strategy documents for each phase of the initiative. The AMIR Programme also fielded local legal experts to help draft and promote new or revised legislation related to ICT, resulting in the adoption or amendment of twenty-five laws and 273 articles. The REACH Initiative has helped transform Jordan into an ICT leader in the Middle East. Jordan's ICT sector has seen tremendous growth since the REACH Initiative was launched, in spite of persistent regional insecurity and a global decline in technology spending and investment. Since 2000, the number of ICT-related jobs in Jordan has grown from 1,250 to 9,000 the ICT sector has attracted more than $79 million in cumulative foreign direct investment, and export values total more than $47 million. The 2002 Jordan ICT Forum, the culmination of USAID's support to the ICT industry, attracted nearly 1,000 participants from more than thirty-five countries including top US and European executives, who praised Jordan's dynamic approach and strong public-private cooperation.

A New Independence The liberation of Jordan from Ottoman sovereignty was achieved in September 1918, during World War I, by joint action of British and Arab troops. After the war, Jordan, along with the territory constituting present-day Israel, was awarded to Britain as a manda~ by the League of Nations. In 1922, the British divided the mandate into two parts, designating all lands west of the Jordan River as Palestine and those east of the river as Trans-Jordan. Trans-Jordan I

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was placed under the nominal rule of Abdullah ibn Hussain in 1921. In February 1928, Trans-Jordan obtained qualified independence in a treaty with Britain. The government of Trans-Jordan cooperated with Britain during World War II (1939-1945), making its territory available as a base of British operations against pro-Axis forces, which had gained control of the government of Iraq. In 1945, Trans-Jordan became a member of the Arab League, an organisation created for the purpose of coordinating Arab policy in international affairs and curbing Jewish national aspirations in Palestine. The British government relinquished its mandate over Trans-Jordan on March 22, 1946. By the terms of a treaty concluded by the two nations on that date, Trans-Jordan received recognition as a sovereign independent state. The treaty also established an Anglo-Trans-Jordanian military and mutual-assistance alliance, with the British securing military bases and other installations in the country in exchange for an agreement to train and equip the Trans-Jordanian army. Abdullah ibn Hussain was proclaimed king the following May.

Military's Significant Role Jordan is a country rich in history and beauty. Throughout the years, with the increase of tensions in the Middle East, Jordan has been forced to protect its borders. As a result, Jordan has become a major actor in the mine action community and has taken a different approach by promoting the use of its military for demining and its non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for rehabilitation and mine awareness. The first mines were laid in Jordan in 1948 during a war with Israel. Later, during the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and developed a new ceasefire line, Jordan began planting more mines along its western border. In the 1970s, Jordan experienced a Syrian threat, and numerous internal problems led to more mine planting. Thus, Jordan quickly moved from a mine-free country to a kingdom burdened with minefields along its western and northern borders. Over 15,000 acres of land, bountiful in natural resources and sacred sites, quickly became consumed with mines. The total number of landmines stretched beyond 300,000, of which over 225,000 were laid by the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) and over 70,000 by Israel.

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Before his death, His Majesty King Hussain called for the clearance of all minefields by the year 2000. In March 1993, the Jordanian government implemented its first phase in a three-phase demining plan. In 1998, Jordan signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty. Today, the government continues to support numerous mine action conventions and conferences, and submits updates on the status of its stockpile destruction programme. King Abdullah commissioned the National Demining and Rehabilitation Committee (NDRC) in March of 2000. This committee participates in various demining aspects from mine risk education (MRE) to mine clearance. New associations continue to emerge in Jordan, such as the Hashemite Society for Soldiers with Special Needs, Landmine Survivors Network, the International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC) , and the AI-Hussain Foundation for the Habilitation and Rehabilitation of the Disabled, and Queen Noor still plays an active role in demining. However, the Jordanian army's Royal Engineers Corps (REC) remains the key force in demining. Through the REC's success in Jordan, the army has begun to stretch its boundaries. Currently, the REC is working in Afghanistan in an effort to damine the country and return the land back to the Afghan people. Aiding Afghanistan in its move to rebuild a country torn apart by the Taliban is not only noble, but it will also provide the REC with more experience in battling its problem at home. The new estimated completion date for the three-phase demining plan in Jordan is the year 2009. To date, the REC asserts its clearance actions are progressing well, as it has cleared nearly 100,000 AP and anti-vehicle (AV) mines. General Fayez al-Dwairi, Commander of REC, told the Landmine Monitor Report that Jordan's first goal is to concentrate on clearing land that will help improve Jordan's economy through development, even though this land can be the most difficult to reclaim. Jordan is one of the many landmine-infested countries in the Middle East. Thus, the REC's superior knowledge in demining and Jordan's efforts to promote a mine-safe world were the main reasons the international community was delighted to have 13 Royal Jordanian Engineer Corps deminers deploy to Afghanistan. December 2002 marked Jordan's first effort to participate in an international mine clearance operation.

3 History History in Brief The Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan encompasses boundaries defined by the Allied victors of World War I. Amir Abdullah, son of Sharif Hussain of Mecca, whose ancestry can be traced to the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), was awarded Trans-Jordan, the former Ottoman territories east of the Jordan River, in gratitude for Arab support during the war against the Ottoman Empire. Under British supervision, the Emirate of Trans-Jordan moved towards independence in 1946; with independence, Arnir Abdullah became King Abdullah of TransJordan. In 1949, with the annexation of the West Bank, the name of the country was changed to the Kingdom of Jordan. In 1951, King Abdullah was assassinated in front of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem by forces who felt the king was working. for reconciliation with the new State of Israel. Abdullah's 14-year-old grandson, the future King Hussain, was at his side when he was struck down. Hussain ruled from 1953 until his death in 1999, bringing his country through more than 4 decades of wars and crises, walking a delicate tightrope between the larger powers in the Middle East. During this time, Jordan has absorbed and given citizenship to well over a million refugees from the 1948 and 1967 wars, as well as to more than 300,000 Palestinians expelled from Kuwait and other Gulf states in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War. In the last years of his life, King Hussain made the search for peace in the Middle East into a personal crusade. Few in the region

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will forget his committed words and presence at the funeral of Prime Minister Rabin or his personal condolence visits to the mourning Israeli families of Bait Shemesh, whose children had fallen victim to violence. Hussain's son, the Western-educated, innovative King Abdullah, has vowed to continue his father's work for peace. In a land devoid of oil and with few natural resources, Jordan has created one of the most progressive and energetic societies in the Middle East, but the burden of absorbing so many refugees, largely without help from the outside world, has taken its toll on the nation's economy. The annual per capita income, approximately $2,000 in 1990, fell to less than $1,400 in subsequent years. The opportunities afforded by peace may turn this trend around. If it does, tourism will be an important element in Jordan's economic revival. The Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan offers a new horizon for travellers to the Middle East. It contains dazzling, unspoiled deserts capes and countryside and legendary lost cities from ancient times, but it's also an orderly country with a modern infrastructure and a population that has a long tradition of natural hospitality and courtesy. Since 1994, when Jordan and Israel signed a peace agreement ending a 46-year-Iong state of war, the Kingdom of Jordan has been host to a wave of international and Israeli tourists. The word is out that sights are magnificent, roads are excellent, and prices for lodgings and restaurants are far lower than in Israel. In terms of history, as well as logic, the lands east and west of the Jordan River have traditionally existed in a close relationship. Ruth, the Moabite ancestor of King David, came from what is now a central region of Jordan; Herod the Great, an Ideumean, came from what is now the southern part of the country; Jesus was baptised by John the Baptist in Jordan; and the crusaders, who swept in from Akko, Jerusalem, and the Galilee, built the most formidable of their mountain top castles at Kerak. An excursion to the Nabatean canyon city of Petra, one of the wonders of the world, should be a highlight of any visit to the Middle East. For the first time, visitors to Israel can include in their itineraries the wonders of Wadi Rum (backdrop for the filming of Lawrence of Arabia); the sweeping views from Mount Nebo, reputed to be the place where Moses died; the vast Byzantine mosaics at Medaba; the Red Sea coral reefs at Aqaba; and the Hellenistic/Roman ruined city of Jerash (ancient Gerasa), which hosts

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a world-famous festival of Western and Middle Eastern performing arts each July.

The Backdrop Since the earliest times, Jordan has been a region of human settlement where civilization prospered. It has been home for several waves of Semitic Arab migrations. Landmarks of past civilizations built by its inhabitants are still in view. Jordan will always take pride in the imprints made by Arab tribes, which came from the Arabian Peninsula in Pre-Islamic times and contributed, at an early date, to the establishment and maintenance of ties between the Arabian Peninsula and the Mediterranean region. The city of Petra, built by the Nabatean Arabs in southern Jordan, stands as a symbol of Arab staying power, determination and contribution to the region as a whole. The rise of Islam in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina bearing the message of eniightenment and inspiration to mankind, and its spread beyond the confines of the Arabian Peninsula, was met with opposition by existing powers. Muta saw the first collision between Muslims and Byzantines, leading to the fall of a number of Muslim martyrs. Islam then registered a decisive victory along the banks of the Yarmouk. As one of the five legions of Syria, Jordan became a steadfast base and springboard for conquest and liberation. Since then, it has remained part of the Islamic Arab state and a point of contact between the Arabian Peninsula and other Muslim countries. From the beginning of the twelfth century onwards, during the Mamluke and Ottoman periods, the region was regulated by specific administrative arrangements. Like neighbouring Arab states, Jordan saw the establishment of local administration councils with popular participation. However, during the latter phase of Ottoman rule, Jordan was the subject of discrimination exercised by the Union and Progress Committee against the Arab national identity, which led to a rejection of Turanian policy and a rebellion against the rule of those embracing this policy. The uprising was an inevitable consequence of Turkification, oppression, economic malaise, administrative corruption and the inability of the Ottoman Empire to provide a modicum of security of stability for the Arab countries as a whole. Thus the national and

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renascent aim of the Great Arab Revolt, which began on the ninth of Shaban 1334 A.H. (tenth of June, 1916 AD), was to unite the countries of the Arab East into one Arab state which would embrace Iraq, the Hejaz and Greater Syria, including Jordan and Palestine. It was on this basis that Prince Faisal I announced the establishment of the first Arab government in Damascus on 5 October, 1918. However, on 22 October, Britain issued a statement dividing Greater Syria into three regions. This was done not only pursuant to the Sykes-Picot agreement, concluded in 1916, but also to enable Britain to fulfil its promise to the Zionist Movement to establish a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. Meeting in Damascus on 6-8 March, 1920, the people's representatives in the Arab East rejected any division of Arab territory, declared t.he unity and independence of Syria, defined its physical boundaries, and declared Faisal I, the King. RefUSing to recognise the will of the Arab nation, Britain and France agreed at the San Remo Conference on 25 April, 1920 to impose a French mandate on Syria and Lebanon and a British mandate on Iraq, Palestine and Jordan. Despite Arab opposition to those imperialist designs, a new reality was imposed by force as a result of military superiority established over Arab fighters in several battles, the last of which was at Maysalun on 27 July 1920. Prior to the fall of Arab rule in Syria, British forces had retreated from Syrian territory and the French captured Damascus. French forces, however, did not enter Jordan, which remained free of foreign occupation. When Trans-Jordan was placed under British influence, as called for by the Sykes-Picot agreement, the British High Commissioner in Palestine named a number of his officers to administer the territories east of the Jordan. The Umm Qeiss agreement, concluded in a meeting on 2 September, 1920 between a delegation representing the northern region and one of those officers, launched the first national political platform in Trans-Jordan. In that meeting the people called for the establishment of an Arab government in the country independent of the Mandatory government of Palestine. It called for Trans-Jordan to join Syria when union became possible. Jewish immigration to the region should be stopped and the sale of land to Jews prohibited. In order to maintain control, Britain attempted to disrupt the unity of the Jordanian people through the establishment of local

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governments in Irbid, Salt and Karak. Failing to ensure security, protect the population or improve worsening economic conditions, these governments soon collapsed. Jordanians regarded the Zionist Movement as the larger threat both to themselves and to the Arab nation as a whole. The Balfour Declaration issued on 2 November, 1917 and calling for the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine, was a powerful danger signal to Jordanians and other Arabs of the impending threat of Zionist designs. They moved to resist it and thwart the Zionist programme with every possible means. The raid launched from northern Jordan on 20 April, 1920 against British military camps and Jewish settlements in Bisan and Samakh was but one chapter in the struggle and sacrifice by Jordanians in defence of Palestine remaining Arab. Support by Jordanians for the Arab character of Palestine was demonstrated in numerous ways, including popular rallies held on various national occasions. Upon his arrival in Maan on 11 November, 1920, Prince Abdullah ibn ai-Hussain received the full support of Jordanians and the free Arabs who flocked to Jordan, foremost of whom were members of the Independence Party, an Arab group that had publicly launched its activities a year earlier in Iraq and Syria. They all lent their support to Abdullah's bid to liberate Syria from French rule and restore its legitimate Arab government. Thwarted by the Anglo-French alliance, Prince Abdullah forged ahead with the implementation of the principles and aims of the Great Arab Revolt, persisting in his drive to foil the designs of the Allies after they betrayed its leader Sharif Hussain Ibn Ali, who had sacrificed all, including his life, for the defence of Arab principles and rights in Palestine. On 29 March, 1921, the British reached a political settiement with Prince Abdullah calling for the establishment of the first unified national government in Trans-Jordan, over which he would preside. With participation by members of the Independence Party, the new government clearly demonstrated the national spirit of allegiance, which informed the Jordanian populace. In cooperating with their brethren from the Independence Party and placing their faith in them as administrators of the country, in line with the aims of unity, freedom and independence enunciated by the Great Arab Revolt, they ensured that Jordan became a safe haven for those Arabs who

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were struggling against French occupation of Syria and British occupation of Palestine. The next four years witnessed a bitter struggle between the national aspirations of the new government, including its search for the liberation of Syria, and British and French interests in the region. This tug-of-war culminated in the extension of the British Mandatory authority to administrative, financial and military affairs in Jordan and led to the banishment from Jordan of the members of the Independence Party. Despite recognition by Britain of the independence of the Emirate of Trans-Jordan on 25 May, 1923, and despite a promise to strengthen relations between the two countries and to define the constitutional position of Trans-Jordan, the first Anglo-Jordanian treaty, concluded on 20 February, 1928, failed to respond to Jordanian demands for a fully sovereign and independent state. This failure led to widespread disaffection with the treaty among Jordanians, prompting them to seek a national conference, the first of its kind, to examine the articles of the treaty and adopt a plan for political action. The conference was held on 25 July, 1928, with the participation of a large number of leaders, notables and thinkers. Regarding itself as a legitimate representative of the Jordanian people, the conference set up an executive committee to lead the national Jordanian movement. It also issued a Jordanian National Charter. This was the first political document at the national level with a defined platform and as such was a watershed in the history of the Jordanian political and national struggle. It defined the basic political constants for that phase and underlined several important concepts. Among them were: • The Emirate of Trans-Jordan is an independent and sovereign Arab state within its recognised geographic borders. It is administered by an independent government headed by His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah Ibn aI-Hussain and his successors. • No recognition is accorded to the Mandatory Principle except in so far as it constitutes an impartial form of assistance for the country's benefit, provided that such assistance be defined through an agreement or treaty to be concluded between TransJordan and Britain on the basis of reciprocal rights and mutual benefits without prejudice to national sovereignty.

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• The Balfour Declaration calling for the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine is contrary to Britain's official undertakings and commitments to the Arabs and roms counter to religious and civil laws known to the world. • All parliamentary elections held in Trans-Jordan on a basis contrary to that of true representation or on the basis of the government not being answerable to parliament shall not be regarded as representative of the will or sovereignty of the nation under constitutional rules, but rather as an artificial election with no true representational value. Decisions taken by such elected members on any political, financial or legislative rights shall not have any force of law which the people will recognise. They shall rather be regarded as symptomatic of behaviour exercised by the Mandatory Authority on its own responsibility. • All military conscription not authorised by a responsible constitutional government will be rejected, since conscription is an indivisible component of national sovereignty. No costs will be borne on behalf of any occupying foreign force, and any levy imposed of this nature shall be regarded as money usurped from the country's needy workers and peasants. Any extraordinary legislation not based on justice, the common good or the true needs of the people shall be regarded null and void. No financial loan concluded before the establishment of parliament shall be recognised. No disposition of public lands shall be effected before approval by parliament. Any sale concluded before parliament has been assembled shall be regarded as lacking validity. These important principles governed the political struggle of the Jordanian people for many subsequent years until the conclusion of the second Anglo-Jordanian treaty on 17 June, 1946, on the basis of which Britain recognised the independence of Trans-Jordan under the name of the Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan. Immediately following the initialling of the new treaty on 22 March, 1946, municipal councils in the Kingdom adopted a number of resolutions expressing the Jordanian people's desire for a declaration of independence on the basis of a system of constitutional monarchy. The Jordanian Legislative Council met on 25 May, 1946, and voted unanimously

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to declare Jordanian territories a fully independent state with a representative, hereditary, monarchic government, to pronounce fealty to King Abdullah Ibn ai-Hussain as the constitutional monarch at the head of the Jordanian state, with the title of His Majesty the King of the Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan, and to amend basic Jordanian law accordingly. The foundations of the Jordanian State gradually became stronger. Political, social and economic awareness on the part of the Jordanian people were constantly on the rise, leading to demands for popular participation in the political decision-making process as well as for greater democracy, parliamentary representation, an end to British imperialist presence and eradication of its effects on internal policies and Jordan's Arab and international relations. As a result of the Balfour Declaration and Britain's determination to implement the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine, conditions in Palestine rapidly deteriorated. The Palestinian Arabs were placed under emergency rule. Their successive uprisings and armed rebellions were brutally suppressed, thus preventing any form of independence for Palestine or the establishment of a Palestinian state. Meanwhile, Palestine was opened up for Jewish immigrationcivilian, military and political. A Jewish force was trained to fight alongside British forces in the Second World War. Thus, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 on 29 November, 1947, calling for the partition of Palestine, and when the British Mandate came to an end on 15 May, 1948, the Jewish Agency had acquired all the requisites of a state, whereas the Palestinian people were left defenceless in the face of terrorism and oppression. Arab regimes, which were then under imperialist influence, stemmed the supply of arms to the Palestinians, thus enabling the Jews, in collusion with the British, to occupy by force three quarters of Palestine on which they established their state. Large numbers of Palestinians were forcibly evacuated from their homes. The Jordanian Arab Legion, fighting alongside other Arab armies, performed with well-attested bravery. It succeeded in holding on to those Palestinian territories, which later became known as the West Bank of the Kingdom. Its glorious and honourable defence of Jerusalem, together with other battles in defence of Palestine, led to

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the fal! of 370 martyrs and about a thousand wounded. The total strength of the Arab Legion at the time did not exceed five thousand men, armed with light weapons and limited munitions under direct B.ritish command. In addition, Jordanian volunteers took part in the fighting, side by side with Palestinian commandos and their Arab brethren who had flocked to the defence of Palestine. Solidarity between Jordanians and Palestinians again proved to be a most important development in the wake of the 1948 war, when the two banks of the Jordan entered into a union within the framework of the Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan. Representing both banks, the Jordanian Parliament, on 24 April, 1950, took the historic decision of ratifying the union. Political and institutional developments continued apace. In January 1952, King Talal I promulgated the new Constitution passed by Parliament. The Constitution declared that the Jordanian people were part of the Arab nation, that the system of government in Jordan was a hereditary parliamentary monarchy and that the people were the source of all powers. On 11 August, 1952, King Hussain was proclaimed King of the Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan. Upon His Majesty's assumption of his constitutional powers on 2 May, 1953, the democratic process was invigourated. A period of great rapport with the people strengthened public aspiration for greater freedom coupled with the establishment and upgrading of the institutional framework of a modern state. Economic, political and intellectual development picked up momentum, as did Jordanian political movements. Parliamentary life flourished. In 1954, the Constitution was amended to strengthen the democratic base. Coming into effect on 1 November, 1955, the amended constitution ensured that government was answerable to parliament. The government was required to present its programme to parliament and seek a vote of confidence. On 1 March, 1956, His Majesty King Hussain Arabised the high command of the Jordanian Armed Forces through removal of British officers. This momentous achievement served to emphasise national sovereignty and strengthen the Jordanian people's solidarity with their leadership. It was fully in accord with King Hussain's determination since he assumed power to ensure Jordan's freedom and further its independence. It also fulfilled the aspirations of Jordan's people and Armed Forces to achieve liberation from foreign domination. This

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was amply demonstrated following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in the same year, when Jordan's King, government and people stood firmly by the side of Egypt in resisting the tripartite IsraeliFrench-British aggression against an Arab country. The first parliamentary elections held on the basis of political and party pluralism took place in the latter part of 1956. During the tenure of the parliamentary government that ensued, the Arab Solidarity Agreement was signed (January 1957) and the Anglo-Jordanian Agreement was abrogated (13 March of the same year), followed by the evacuation of British forces from Jordan. However, that period proved to be short-lived and the democratic process was interrupted for a variety of internal and external reasons. When Israel launched its aggression against the Arab countries on 5 June, 1967 by attacking Egypt, Jordan joined the war under unified Arab command regardless of any consideration except its commitments to the Arab League Charter and the Arab Joint Defence Treaty. The ensuing occupation by Israel of the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Sinai was a terrible blow with the gravest of consequences for Jordan and the entire Arab World. However, the Battle of Karama on 21 March, 1968 was a turning point. Not only did it check the slide towards deterioration and defeat but also proved that unity, sacrifice and a determination to hold fast were essential ingredients for ensuring victory and dissipating the myth of the enemy's invincibility. The painful events of September 1970 proved no barrier to the continued unity and stability of the Jordanian people. Through their allegiance to their roots and their profound understanding of the dangers of disunity and disarray, Jordan's people were soon able to heal the rift and transcend the effects of that period. The National Arab Union, established in 1971, was an attempt at reform through bridging the then existing political vacuum. However, the Union was a single political organisation, which was incapable of embracing the various political forces in the country or permitting them to operate on a multiparty basis. It was not long before the Union was dissolved and its enabling law abrogated. Since the mid-seventies, as a result of growing political awareness among the Jordanian public and of substantial economic and social development, Jordan has embarked on a new era marked by significant achievements. Among these were the establishment of several large

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productive enterprises and the completion of major infrastructure. The economy registered high levels of growth accompanied by great expansion in education in most regions of the country, including universities. However, these developments were not matched by equivalent progress in the political field. The absence of popular participation and the narrow base of decision-making, whether in political or economic matters, have had a negative impact in recent years on public performance and have led to a loss of public confidence in state institutions. There were other internal factors, both economic and financial, as well, together with the fact that some Arab governments failed to honour their financial commitments to Jordan, as stipulated by the Baghdad Summit of 1978, at a time when Jordan's defence burden was on the rise. The assumption wa5 that the Arab nation would never abandon Jordan as it stood along the longest lines of confrontation with Israel, which was heavily supported by world Jewry and the United States, among many others. These factors combined led to a worsening situation by the end of the eighties, culminating in a political and economic crisis, which affected most sectors of Jordanian society. With the eruption of events in southern Jordan in April 1989, a sense of tension prevailed there and in other regions of the Kingdom. Marking an important turning-point in public affairs, these events led to a comprehensive review of official as well as popular policies and actions at all levels. His Majesty the King decided to expedite the resumption of parliamentary life interrupted in the wake of severing ties with the West Bank on 31 July, 1988. General elections were held in late 1989, thus putting in place the first component of democratic practice. Peaceful movement towards greater democracy had begun. With it came a climate of political openness marked by a frank exchange of views and communication between the people and the institutions of government. A wide-ranging political dialogue ensued, with active participation by intellectuals, political leaders and all other segments of society. The democratic situation, thus conceived, gave rise, in a variety of ways, to a meeting of the minds between the Jordanian people and their leadership on the need for profound and comprehensive reform and reconstruction in all fields. Trans-Jordan's creation reflected in large measure a compromise

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settlement by the Allied Powers after World War I that attempted to reconcile Zionist and Arab aspirations in the area. Britain assumed a mandate over Palestine and Iraq, while France became the mandatory power for Syria and Lebanon. In a British government memorandum of 1922, approved by the League of Nations Council, Jewish settlement in Trans-Jordan was specifically excluded. As Trans-Jordan moved toward nationhood, Britain gradually relinquished control, limiting its oversight to financial and foreign policy matters. In March, 1946, under the Treaty of London, TransJordan became a kingdom and a new constitution replaced the 1928 Organic Law. Britain continued to subsidise the Arab Legion, a military force established in 1923. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Arab Legion gained control for Trans-Jordan of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The war added about 450,000 Palestinian Arab refugees as well as approximately 450,000 West Bank Arabs to the roughly 340,000 East Bank Arabs in Jordan. In December 1948, Abdullah took the title King of Jordan, and he officially changed the country's name to the Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan in April 1949. The following year he annexed the West Bank. Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem in July 1951. Abdullah's son, Talal, who was in ill health, briefly succeeded to the throne before being obliged to abdicate in favour of his son, Hussain, in 1952. Hussain, who had been studying in Britain, could not legally be crowned until he was eighteen; in the interim he attended the British Royal Military Academy at Sand Hurst and returned to Jordan in 1953 to become king. The survival of Hussain as king of Jordan represents one of the longest rules in the Arab world, forty-seven years. Hussain's survival has entailed a keen sense of what is politically possible; moving cautiously and seeking to build consensus, he has exercised skilful diplomacy, both domestically and regionally. For Hussain, survival has involved achieving a balance between more liberal Palestinians and more traditionally oriented Trans-Jordanians, particularly the loyal Bedouin tribes of the East Bank, as well as negotiating a place for Jordan among the Baathist regimes of Syria and Iraq, the Arab nationalism of Jamal Abdul Nasser and Egypt's successor governments, and the conservative rulers of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Moreover, Jordan has the longest border with Israel of any Arab state.

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Despite Hussain's preference tor cautious consensus, he was capable of decisive action when the maintenance of Hashemiate rule was threatened. He took such action in connection with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) guerrilla groups (Fedayeen) in Jordan, based in the refugee camps, who became almost a state within a state. Intermittent fighting occurred from 1967 onward, with Israel engaging in reprisal raids against Jordan for Fedayeen operations launched from Jordan, and the Fedayeen increasingly directing their efforts against the Jordanian government rather than against Israel. Ultimately, in September 1970, a civil war broke out, martial law was reaffirmed, and as many as 3,500 persons are thought to have died. Despite various ceasefire agreements, sporadic fighting continued through July 1971, when the Jordanian government ordered the Fedayeen either to leave Jordan or to assume civilian status. Isolated by the other Arab states because of its repression of the Fedayeen, Jordan gradually had to repair relations with those countries because they constituted the major source of its financial aid. In the process of maintaining Jordan's tenuous position in the

region, Hussain's basic orientation has been pro-Western; he has sought economic and military assistance from the United States and Britain in particular. When arms purchases were blocked by the United States Congress, however, he did not hesitate to buy weapons from the Soviet Union. Regionally, following the Arab world's boycott of Egypt as a result of Anwar as Sadat's signing the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978, Hussain sought a more significant leadership role. Fearful of Syria, which had intervened in Jordan in 1970, and apprehensive over the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution's destabilising influence on the area, Hussain strongly supported Iraq in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and established friendly relations with Iraqi president Saddam Hussain. Hussain's precarious balancing act has resulted, to a significant degree, from Jordan's disparate population. According to unofficial estimates (the government does not provide a breakdown of statistics on East Bank and West Bank inhabitants), from 55 to 60 per cent of Jordan's population is Palestinian. Moreover, in contrast to the strong rural element in Jordan's early history, according to the World Bank in the late 1980s about 70 per cent of the population was urban, one-third of the total residing in the capital of Amman. Tribal

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relations characterised pre-1948 Trans-Jordan, extending to village dwellers and many in the cities as well as rural areas. Although Jordan is a constitutional monarchy, the king has extensive legal powers that allow him to shape policy by appointing the Prime Minister, other cabinet ministers, and the fifty-five Senate, as well as by dismissing the National Assembly (composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives) and ruling by decree if he sees fit. Traditionally, Prime Ministers have come from East Bank families loyal to the Hashemiate. The House of Representatives originally had equal representation from both the East Bank and the West Bank; prior to the elections of November 1989, no general election had been held for more than twenty-two years (since the June 1967 War) in view of the impossibility of elections in the Israelioccupied West Bank. Experts believe that a major reason for holding the 1989 elections was to defuse discontent, reflected in the 1989 riots, among Bedouins and East Bankers traditionally loyal to the crown. Although martial law remained in effect, the 1989 elections were free, the king having released all political prisoners in a general amnesty in the first half of 1989. Elections were preceded by considerable press criticism of government policies and active campaigning by 647 candidates. Among the criticisms was that of disproportionate representation: electoral districts were so drawn as to give greater weight to rural areas at the expense of cities. Political parties had been banned since 1957 so candidates ran with only informal affiliations. To the government's chagrin, twenty Muslim Brotherhood adherents, fourteen Islamists with other affiliations, and ten secular anti-government candidates were elected, leaving progovernment representatives in the minority. The success of the Muslim Brotherhood was not surprising because it was the only organised quasi-political organ participating in the elections and because the PLO intentionally remained on the sidelines. The Muslim Brotherhood appealed to the poor particularly and advocated jihad, or holy war, against Israel to liberate the West Bank. Many observers believed that the Muslim Brotherhood garnered protest votes primarily and that genuine Brotherhood sympathisers were relatively few. It should be noted, however, that Jordan is an overwhelmingly Muslim country. More than 90 per cent of the

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population are Sunni Muslims; there are some Shishans who are Shia Muslims; and the remainder of the population is made up of a small number of Christians of various sects, Druzes, and Bahais. In November 1989, the king named as Prime Minister Mudar Badran, considered to have better Islamic links than his predecessor, Zaid ibn Shakir. Badran succeeded in forming a cabinet that included two independent Islamists and two leftist nationalists from the Democratic Bloc, a new informal political group, but he was obliged to make some concessions to the Muslim Brotherhood, such as bringing Jordanian law closer to Islamic Shariah law. A major task facing the new government is the drawing up of the National Charter (Mithaq al-Watani), a statement of principles to guide the country's political system. This charter is to be devised by sixty representatives of various political persuasions appointed by the king in May 1990. The charter is expected to stress popular loyalty to the monarchy and to limit the existence of political parties controlled by external influences, such as the Communist Party of Jordan. Because of Jordan's large Palestinian population, a major aspect of its external relations concerns its dealings with the PLO. Following the 1970-71 civil war, relations between Jordan and the PLO were strained, but in 1975 Hussain and PLO chief Yasir Arafat agreed to end recriminations. The king, however, refused to allow the PLO to re-establish a military or political presence in Jordan. Jordan was formally linked to the peace process as a result of the signature of the 1978 Camp David Accords, and a number of meetings occurred between Hussain and Arafat. When the PLO was expelled from Lebanon in 1982, Hussain relaxed his restrictions and allowed some PLO presence in Jordan. The Palestine National Council met in Amman in November 1984, strengthening Arafat's position with the more moderate PLO elements. Cooperation between Hussain and Arafat continued with the signing in February, 1985 of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian agreement on a peace framework. By the terms of the agreement, the PLO would represent Palestinians but be part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation at an international peace conference. Hussain, who has long supported United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 242 setting forth terms for a Middle East settlement, sought to persuade

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Arafat to endorse publicly both UN resolutions 242 and 338, which implicitly recognise Israel's right to exist. Arafat's failure to do so eroded their relationship, and Hussain ended the Jordanian-PLO agreement in February, 1986. Both Hussain and Arafat vied for influence in the West Bank in 1986 and 1987, but the intifadah, or Palestinian uprising, which began in December 1987, showed the tenuous nature of West Bank support for Hussain. As a result of this weak support andtbe resolutions of the June 198~ Arab summit conference in Algiers that provided funds to support West Bank Palestinians through the PLO, in July 1988 Hussain formally abandoned Jordan's claim to the West Bank. Jordan has stressed its support of the Arab cause in general, and its relations' with most of the Arab states have been cordial, particularly relations with Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Hussain had advocated Egypt's reintegration into the Arab family of nations as early as 1981-Egypt was expelled from the League of Arab States (Arab League) in 1978, following the Camp David Accords. Jordan was one of the first Arab states to re-establish diplomatic relations with Egypt, doing so in 1984; after this date, relations between Hussain and Egyptian president Husni Mubarak became close. A friendly relationship with Iraq had arisen out of Jordan's support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, also having hereditary royal families, were the major contributors of financial aid to Jordan, in accordance with resolutions reached at Arab summit conferences. (At the Arab summit conference held in Baghdad in late May 1990, Hussain obtained renewed commitments of financial support for Jordan from various participants.) Jordan's relations with Syria were correct but distant. Despite the restoration of diplomatic relations with Libya in June 1990, relations remained somewhat tense because of Libyan support of anti-Hussain Palestinian guerrilla groups since 1970. Potential threats to Jordan's external and internal security led to Jordan's devoting approximately 30 per cent of government spending to national security. In view of his military training and qualification as a jet pilot, Hussain took a keen personal interest in Jordan's armed forces, both as regards top military appointments and material purchases. Because of Jordan's military tradition, dating back to the establishment of the Arab Legion in 1923, in 1990 the Jordanian

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Arab Army was a well-trained and disciplined force with impressive fire-power although it had not seen battle since 1971. Historically, Israel has been seen as Jordan's primary threat. Since the latter half of 1989, Hussain has stressed repeatedly the danger to the stability of the area, particularly to the West Bank and to Jordan, of the influx of thousands of Soviet Jewish immigrants to Israel. In principle, two-year military service was compulsory for Jordanian males, but the number called up annually was limited by economic considerations and potential inductees could postpone service to complete higher education. Jordan also provided qualified military personnel to a number of other Arab states, especially those of the Arabian Peninsula, and trained their nationals in Jordanian military institutions. Jordan's internal security forces, which like the military dated back to the Arab Legion, operated under constitutional legal restraints. The Public Security Force, the national police, came under the Ministry of Interior and was traditionally commanded by a senior army general. Other than maintaining law and order, the police and the General Intelligence Department monitored potentially disruptive elements in the population, such as left-wing factions and right-wing Muslim extremists. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August, 2, 1990 found Jordan itself in a difficult situation, hard pressed both economically and politically. The enforcement of austerity measures in accordance with IMF loan requirements had improved Jordan's balance of payments position, but because of the decrease in the transit trade across Jordan to Iraq after the Iran-Iraq War ended and the return of Jordanian workers from the Persian Gulf states resulting from the downturn of oil prices, Jordanian unemployment had increased to between 15 and 20 per cent. Economic austerity measures had widened the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots" and had caused discontent among elements of the population traditionally loyal to the monarchy: the Bedouins and the East Bankers. To some extent, the discontent had been countered by the opportunity for political expression reflected in the November 1989 elections and by the king's ability to devote more time to East Bank problems following his giving up claim to the West Bank. The latter action minimised to some degree the competing nationalisms of

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Jordanians and Palestinians. The election results, however, indicated a marked degree of dissatisfaction with the government. This dissatisfaction was seen in the growing criticism of corruption among government officials and the demand for trials of those involved. There was also resentment that martial law as well as limitations to press freedom remained in force. Members of the middle class particularly seemed to have gained an awareness that the liberties they enjoyed were based primarily on the king's benevolence rather than on acknowledged democratic rights and a system of checks and balances on what appeared to be increasingly centralised authority. The urban majority of the population considered themselves underrepresented in the National Assembly, and the conservative religious elements felt that little had been done to make existil)g legislation conform with Islam. The victories of the left in elections of professional associations and trade unions in late 1989 and early 1990 indicated the growing public role of the left. Organised political parties began to come into existence after the November 1989 elections. One of the first political entities to be formed, in July 1990, was a leftist grouping, the Arab Jordanian Nationalist Democratic Bloc (AJNDB), composed of Marxists, panArab nationalists, and independent leftists. In August the Democratic Unity and Justice Party was formed, advocating the "liberation of occupied Palestinian Arab territory" by force and a strong role for government in a free economy. In contrast to these leftists inclined groups, in October the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists announced the formation of the Arab Islamic Coalition. The Jordanian Democratic Unity Party, an offshoot of the leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a member of the overall PLO organisation, came into being in November. Thus, it was not surprising that in early January 1991, responding to these political realities, Prime Minister Badran announced that five Muslim Brotherhood members and two AJNDB members were being incorporated into the cabinet. The king also announced his approval in early January of the National Charter that endorsed constitutional rule, political pluralism, and the legalisation of political parties. Regionally, Jordan found itself between Scylla and Charybdis. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the United States response in sending forces to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf and

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encouraging UN economic sanctions against Iraq put Jordan in a quandary. In accordance with the UN resolution, it closed the port of AI-Aqabah to Iraq, and Hussain announced that Jordan refused to recognise Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. But Jordan expressed reservations concerning the Arab League resolution to endorse the sending of an Arab force to Saudi Arabia. Hussain saw his role as that of an active mediator between Saddam Hussain and both the other Arab states and the West. Between August 1990 and late January 1991, the king held countless meetings with Western and Arab world leaders, including President Bush in mid-August. Initially, Hussain sought to promote an "Arab solution" to the Gulf crisis. Disappointed at the failure of this effort, he pursued an "Islamic solution" involving Islamic states outside the Arab world, and after the war began on January 16 he strove to end the conflict. This policy resulted from a number of factors. The king shared the view of the majority Palestinian element of Jordan's population that the West, led by the United States, was using a double standan;l in denouncing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the point that it was willing to go to war, while ignoring Palestinian grievances over Israel's occupation policies in the West Bank. This stance made the king popular with Palestinians, as did permission for the September holding of a pro-Iraqi conference by Jordanians and representatives of several major PLO groups, sponsored by the AJNDB. Yasir Arafat's August endorsement of Saddam Hussain had, however, created a rift in the PLO as well as cut off Saudi financial assistance to the PLo. Hussain also had a long-standing fear that Israel planned to make Jordan the substitute Palestinian state-this aim had been stated on numerous occasions by prominent members of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's Likud Blocthus leading to the downfall of the Hashemiate monarchy. The Gulf crisis was seen as a focus that would divert attention from the Israeli-Palestinian question and allow Israel greater latitude to pursue such a course of action. Both of these elements were reflected in the king's request to Jordanian parliamentarians in August to refer to him as "sharif" Hussain, demonstrating the king's view that the Gulf crisis represented a conflict between the Arab sovereignty and foreign domination similar to the situation that his greatgrandfather, Sharif Hussain of Mecca, faced at British hands in 1925.

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Perhaps the most important reason for the king's seeking to reconcile the conflict was the economic consequence to Jordan of the crisis and the subsequent war. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait created a stream of refugees; primarily Arab and Asian expatriate workers and their dependants, who had been living in Iraq and Kuwait. These persons entered Jordan at the rate of more than 10,000 per day, a total of more than 500,000 as of late September; they required food and shelter before most could be repatriated. This influx further strained Jordan's economy, in part because promised Western financial contributions to help defer costs of the humanitarian enterprise were slow in arriving. For example, Jordan was obliged to ration subsidised foods such as rice, sugar, and powdered milk at the beginning of September. Meanwhile, the boycott of Iraq had a major impact on Jordan because Iraq had been Jordan's principal export market and its major source of cheap oil (providing almost 90 per cent of Jordan's oil), whereas Kuwait had been Jordan's second largest market. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, which had provided substantial economic support to Jordan in the past, was so angered over Jordan's failure to back it in its dispute with Iraq that it cut off oil exports to Jordan on September 20 and shortly afterward expelled twenty Jordanian diplomats. In turn, in early October Jordan closed its borders to trucks bound for Saudi Arabia and instituted fuel austerity conservation measures. The crisis also resulted in a dramatic drop in tourism income, a major component of Jordan's GOP. The situation caused Minister of Finance Basil Jardanah in the latter half of September to estimate that Jordan would lose US$ 2.1 billion the first year of the boycott and would need US$ 1.5 billion (by January this figure had been revised to US$ 2 billion) in aid to avoid economic collapse. He made a strong plea for financial aid to the UN and the West in general; various Western nations and Japan promised loans. In early January, reflecting Jordan's concern over being caught between Iraq and Israel and the tension prevailing, Jordan mobilised its armed forces and transferred a number of troops from the east to the Jordan Valley, indicating that it considered the threat from Israel to be the more serious. As the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait came on January 15, Jordan announced that it would protect its land and air borders against external aggression.

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Whatever the final outcome of the crisis resulting from Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, Middle East alignments have changed appreciably, and the fiction of Arab unity has been destroyed. Jordan's position in the midst of this regional dilemma has been rendered more precarious than it has been for many years. Jordan's location as a buffer zone between the settled region of the Mediterranean littoral west of the Jordan River and the major part of the desert to the east contributed significantly to the country's experience in ancient and more recent times. Until 1921, however, Jordan had a history as a vaguely defined territory without a separate political identity. Its earlier history closely associated with the religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, therefore, comes under the histories of the contending empires of which it often formed a part. By the time the area was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century the inhabitants of three general geographic regions had developed distinct loyalties. The villagers and town dwellers of Palestine west of the Jordan River were oriented to the major cities and ports of the coast. In the north of present day Jordan scattered villagers and tribesmen associated themselves with Syria while the tribesmen of southern Jordan were oriented towards the Arabian Peninsula. Although most of the populace were Arab Muslims the integration of peoples with such differing backgrounds and regional characteristics hampered the creation of a cohesive society and state. In 1921, the Emirate of Trans-Jordan was established under British patronage on the East Bank by the Hashemiate (also seen as Hashemiate) prince Abdullah ibn Hussain al-Hashimi who had been one of the principal figures of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War l. Direct British administration was established in Palestine where Britain (in the Balfour Declaration of 1917) had pledged to implement the founding of a Jewish homeland. In 1947, Britain turned the problem of its Palestine Mandate over to the United Nations (UN). The UN passed a resolution that provided for the partition of the mandate into an Arab state, a Jewish state and an international zone. When on May 14, 1948 the British relinquished control of the area the establishment of the State of Israel was proclaimed. Trans-Jordan's Arab Legion then joined the forces of other Arab states that had launched attacks on the new state. The end of the 1948-49 hostilities-the first of five Arab-Israeli

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wars-left Trans-Jordan in control of the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem. Abdullah changed the name of the country to Jordan proclaimed himself king and in 1950 annexed the West Bank. In the June 1967 War (known to Israelis as the Six-Day War) Israel seized the West Bank and reunited Jerusalem. The dominant characteristic of the Hashemiate regime has been its ability to survive under severe political and economic stress. Major factors contributing to the regime's survival have included British and United States economic and military aid and the personal qualities first of King Abdullah and then of his grandson Hussain ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hussain al-Hashimi. King Hussain has been a skilful politician who has dealt adroitly with foreign and domestic crises by using caution and by seeking consensus. One exception to this style of policy making occurred during the 1970-71 battle against Palestinian resistance fighters when the king ordered his mostly Bedouin-manned army to remove completely the Palestinian guerrillas even after neighbouring Arab states had called for a ceasefire. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, regional events severely tested Jordan's stability. The election of the more hawkish Likud government in Israel and the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank lent urgency to Hussain's quest for an Arab-Israeli territorial settlement. Arab ostracism of Egypt following the 1978 signing of the Camp David Accords and the 1979 Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel ended Jordan's alliance with the Arab world's most politically influential and militarily powerful state. Jordan's vulnerability increased significantly in February 1979 when Shia radicals overthrew Muhammad Raza Shah Pahlavi of Iran. The Iranian revolutionaries threatened to expunge Western influences from the region and to overthrow non-Islamic Arab governments such as that of Jordan. Less than two years later Iran and Iraq were embroiled in a costly war that caused a further shifting of Arab alliances; Jordan and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf sided with Iraq while Syria supported Iran. Syrian-Jordanian relations deteriorated and nearly erupted in military conflict during the 1981 Arab summit conference in Amman when Syrian president Hafiz alAsad accused Hussain of aiding the anti-government Muslim. Brotherhood in Syria. Finally the downward slide of world oil prices that began in 1981 drained Jordan's economy of the large quantities

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of Arab petrodollars that had stirred economic development throughout the 1970s. The turmoil besetting the Arab states in the 1980s presented Jordan with both risks and opportunities. With the traditional Arab powers either devitalised or in the case of Egypt isolated Jordan was able to assume a more prominent role in Arab politiCS. Moreover as the influence of Jordan's Arab neighbours waned, Hussain pursued a more flexible regional policy. The weakness of the Arab states, however, enabled the Begin government in Israel to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy and to accelerate the pace of settlements in the occupied territories. Thus, between 1981 and 1982 the Arab states reacted apathetically to Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, its annexation of the Golan Heights and its June 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Israeli aggressiveness and Arab passivity combined to raise fears in Jordan that Israel might annex the occupied territories and drive the Palestinians into Jordan. These fears were fuelled by frequent references by Israel's hawkish Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon to Jordan as a Palestinian state.

Region in Antiquity The Jordan Valley provides abundant archaeological evidence of occupation by Paleolithic and Mesolithic hunters and gatherers. A people of Neolithic culture, similar to that found around the Mediterranean littoral, introduced agriculture in the region. By the eighth millennium BC, this Neolithic culture had developed into a sedentary way of life. Settlements at Bayda on the East Bank and Jericho on the West Bank date from this period and may have been history's first "cities." Bronze Age towns produced a high order of civilization and carried on a brisk trade with Egypt, which exercised a dominant influence in the Jordan Valley in the third millennium. This thriving urban culture ended after 2000 BC, when large numbers of Semitic nomads, identified collectively as the Amorites, entered the region, which became known as Canaan. Over a period of 500 years, the nomads encroached on the settled areas, gradually assimilated their inhabitants, and-by the middle of the second millennium-settled in the Jordan Valley, which became a Semitic language area. At about this time, Abraham (known to the Arabs as Ibrahim) and his household entered the area from the direction of

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Mesopotamia. The Canaanites and others referred to this nomadic group of western Semites as the habiru, meaning wanderers or outsiders. The name Hebrew probably derived from this term. More abrupt was the incursion of the Hyksos from the north who passed through Canaan on their way to Egypt. After recovering from the Hyksos invasion, Egypt attempted to regain control of Syria, but its claim to hegemony there was contested by the empire-building Hittites from Anatolia (the central region of modern Turkey). The prolonged conflict between these two great powers during the fifteenth to thirteenth centuries BC bypassed the East Bank of the Jordan, allowing for the development of a string of small tribal kingdoms with names familiar from the Old Testament: Edom, Moab, Bashan, Gilead, and Ammon, whose capital was the Biblical Rabbath Ammon (modern Amman). Although the economy of the countryside was essentially pastoral, its inhabitants adapted well to agriculture and were skilled in metallurgy. The Edomites worked the substantial deposits of iron and copper found in their country, while the land to the north was famous for its oak wood, livestock, resins, and medicinal balms. The towns profited from the trade routes crisscrossing the region that connected Egypt and the Mediterranean ports with the southern reaches of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. Midway through the thirteenth century BC, Moses is believed to have led the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt and to have governed them during their forty-year sojourn in the Sinai Peninsula. When they were barred by the Edomites from entering Canaan from the south, the Israelites marched north towards Moab. Under Joshua, they crossed west over the Jordan River. The conquest of Canaan by the Israelite tribes was completed between 1220 and 1190 BC. The tribes of Gad and Reuben, and half of the tribe of Manasseh were allocated conquered land on the East Bank. At about this time the Philistines, sea peoples who originated from Mycenae and who ravaged the eastern Mediterranean, invaded the coast of Canaan and confronted the Israelites in the interior. It was from the Philistines that Palestine derived its name, preserved intact in the modern Arabic word /alastin. Late in the eleventh century BC, the Israelite tribes submitted to the rule of the warrior-king Saul. Under his successor David

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(ca. 1000-965 or 961 BC), Israel consolidated its holdings west of the Jordan River, contained the Philistines on the coast, and expanded beyond the old tribal lands on the East Bank. Ancient Israel reached the peak of its political influence under David's son, Solomon (965-928 BC or 961-922 BC), who extended the borders of his realm from the upper Euphrates in Syria to the Gulf of Aqabah in the south. Solomon, the first Biblical figure for whom historical records exist outside the Bible, exploited the mineral wealth of Edom, controlled the desert caravan routes, and built the port at Elat to receive spice shipments from southern Arabia. With Solomon's passing, however, his much-reduced realm divided into two rival Jewish kingdoms: Israel in the north and Judah (Judea), with its capital at Jerusalem, in the south. The history of the Jordan region over the next two centuries was one of constant conflict between the Jewish kingdoms and the kingdoms on the East Bank. In 722 BC, Israel fell to the Assyrian king, Shalmaneser, ruler of a mighty military empire centred on the upper Tigris River. As a result, the Israelites were deported from their country. Judah preserved its political independence as a tributary of Assyria, while the rest of the Jordan region was divided into AssYrian-controlled provinces that served as a buffer to contain the desert tribes-a function that would be assigned to the area by a succession of foreign rulers. Assyria was conquered in 612 BC and its empire was absorbed by the NeoBabylonian Empire in Mesopotamia. Judah was taken by Nebuchadnezzar, who destroyed Jerusalem in 586 BC and carried off most of the Jewish population to Babylon. Within fifty years, however, Babylon was conquered by the Persian Cyrus II. The Jews were allowed to return to their homeland, which, with the rest of the Jordan region, became part of the Achaemenid Empire. The Achaemenids dominated the whole of the Middle East for two centuries until the rise of Macedonian power under Alexander the Great. With a small but well-trained army, Alexander crossed into Asia in 334 BC, defeated Persia's forces, and within a few years had built an empire that stretched from the Nile River to the Indus River in contemporary Pakistan. After his death in 323 BC, Alexander's conquests were divided among his Macedonian generals. The Ptolemaic Dynasty of pharaohs in Egypt and the line of Seleucid kings in Syria were descended from two of these generals.

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Between the third century Be and the first century AD, the history of Jordan was decisively affected by three peoples: Jews, Greeks, and Nabataeans. The Jews, many of whom were returning from exile in Babylonia, settled in southern Gilead. Along with Jews from the western side of the Jordan and Jews who had remained in the area, they founded closely settled communities in what later became known in Greek as the Peraea. The Greeks were mainly veterans of Alexander's military campaigns who fought one another for regional hegemony. The Nabataeans were Arabs who had wandered from the desert into Edom in.. the seventh century Be Shrewd merchants; they monopolised the ~pice trade between Arabia and the Mediterranean. By necessity experts at water conservation, they also proved to be accomplished potters, metalworkers, stonemasons, and architects. They adopted the use of Aramaic, the Semitic lingua franca in Syria and Palestine, and belonged entirely to the cultural world of the Mediterranean. In 301 Be, the Jordan region came under the control of the Ptolemies. Greek settlers founded new cities and revived old ones as centres of Hellenistic culture. Amman was renamed Philadelphia in honour of the pharaoh Ptolemy Philadelphus. Urban centres assumed a distinctly Greek character, easily identified in their architecture, and prospered from their trade links with Egypt. The East Bank was also a frontier against the rival dynasty of the Seleucids, who in 198 Be displaced the Ptolemies throughout Palestine. Hostilities between the Ptolemies and Seleucids enabled the Nabataeans to extend their kingdom northward from their capital at Petra (Biblical Sela) and to increase their prosperity based on the caravan trade with Syria and Arabia. The New Greek rulers from Syria instituted an aggressive policy of Hellenisation among their subject peoples. Efforts to suppress Judaism sparked a revolt in 166 Be led by Judas (Judah) Maccabaeus, whose kinsmen in the next generation re-established an independent Jewish kingdom under the rule of the Hasmonean Dynasty. The East Bank remained a battleground in the continuing struggle between the Jews and the Seleucids. By the first century Be, Roman legions under Pompey methodically removed the last remnants of the Seleucids from Syria, converting the area into a full Roman province. The new hegemony of Rome caused upheaval and eventual revolt among the

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Jews while it enabled the Nabataeans to prosper. Rival claimants to the Hasmonean throne appealed to Rome in 64 BC for aid in settling the civil war that divided the Jewish kingdom. The next year Pompey, fresh from implanting Roman rule in Syria, seized Jerusalem and installed the contender most favourable to Rome as a client king. On the same campaign, Pompey organised the Decapolis, a league of ten self-governing Greek cities also dependent on Rome that included Amman, Jarash, and Gadara (modern Umm Qais), on the East Bank. Roman policy there was to protect Greek interests against the encroachment of the Jewish kingdom. When the last member of the Hasmonean Dynasty died in 37 BC, Rome made Herod king of Judah. With Roman backing, Herod (37-34 BC) ruled on both sides of the Jordan River. After his death the Jewish kingdom was divided among his heirs and gradually absorbed into the Roman Empire. In AD 106, Emperor Trajan formally annexed the satellite Nabatean kingdom, organising its territory within the new Roman province of Arabia that included most of the East Bank of the Jordan River. For a time, Petra served as the provincial capital. The Nabataeans continued to prosper under direct Roman rule, and their culture, now thoroughly Hellenised, flourished in the second and third centuries AD. Citizens of the province shared a legal system and identity in common with Roman subjects throughout the empire. Roman ruins seen in present-day Jordan attest to the civic Vitality of the region, whose cities were linked to commercial centres throughout the empire by the Roman road system and whose security was guaranteed by the Roman army. After the administrative partition of the Roman Empire in 395, the Jordan region was assigned to the eastern or Byzantine Empire, whose emperors ruled from Constantinople. Christianity, which had become the recognised state religion in the fourth century, was widely accepted in the cities and towns but never developed deep roots in the countryside, where it coexisted with traditional religious practices. In the sixth century direct control over the Jordan region and much of Syria was transferred to the Ghassanids; Christian Arabs loyal to the Byzantine Empire. The mission of these warrior-nomads was to defend the desert frontier against the Iranian Sassanian Empire to the east as well as against Arab tribes to the south; in practice,

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they were seldom able to maintain their claim south of Amman. The confrontations between Syrian, or northern, Arabs-represented by the Ghassanids-and the fresh waves of nomads moving north out of the Arabian Peninsula was not new to the history of the Jordan region and continued to manifest itself into the modern era. Contact with the Christian Ghassanids was an important source of the impulse to monotheism that flowed back into Arabia with the nomads, preparing the ground there for the introduction of Islam.

Advent of Islam and Arab Rule By the time of his death in AD 632, the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) and his followers had brought most of the tribes and towns of the Arabian Peninsula under the banner of the new monotheistic religion of Islam (literally, submission), which was conceived of as uniting the individual believer, the state, and the society under the omnipotent will of God. Islamic rulers, therefore, exercised both temporal and religious authority. Adherents of Islam, called Muslims (those who submit to the will of God), collectively formed the House of Islam, or Dar-ul-Islam. Arab armies carried Islam north and east from Arabia in the wake of their rapid conquest, and also westward across North Africa. In 633, the year after Muhammad's death, they entered the Jordan region, and in 636, under Khalid ibn al-Walid, they crushed the Byzantine army at the Battle of Uhud at the Yarmuk River. Jerusalem was occupied in 638, and by 640 all Syria was in Arab Muslim hands. Conversion to Islam was nearly complete among Arabs on the East Bank, although the small Jewish community in Palestine and groups of Greek and Arab Christians were allowed to preserve their religious identities. Arabic soon supplanted Greek and Aramaic as the primary language of the region's inhabitants in both town and countryside. Muhammad was succeeded as spiritual and temporal leader of all Muslims by his father-in-law, Abu Bakr, who bore the title Caliph (successor or deputy) for two years. Under Umar (AD 634-44), the Caliphate began efforts to organise a government in areas newly conquered by the Muslims. The Quran, Islam's sacred scripture, was compiled during the Caliphate of Uthman (644-56), whose reign was brought to an end by an assassin. Uthman was succeeded by Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law Ali, the last of the four so-called orthodox Caliphs, who was also assassinated in 661.

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A dispute over the Caliphal succession led to a permanent schism that split Islam into two major branches-the Sunni and the Shia. The Shias supported the hereditary claim of Ali and his direct descendants, whereas the Sunnis favoured the principle of consensual election of the fittest. Muslims in the Jordan region are predominantly Sunni. After Ali's murder, Muawiyah-the governor of Syria and leader of a branch of Muhammad's tribe, the Qureshi of Mecca-proclaimed himself Caliph and founded a dynasty-the Umayyad-that made its capital in Damascus. The Umayyad Caliphs governed their vast territories in a personal and authoritarian manner. The Caliph, assisted by a few ministers, held absolute and final authority but delegated extensive executive powers to provincial governors. Religious judges (qadis) administered Islamic law (Shariah) to which all other considerations, including tribal loyalties, were theoretically subordinated. The Jordan region became even more of a backwater, remote from the centre of power. Its economy declined as trade shifted from traditional caravan routes to sea borne commerce, although the pilgrim caravans to Mecca became an important source of income. Depopulation of the towns and the decay of sedentary agricultural communities, already discernible in the late Byzantine period, accelerated in districts where pastoral Arab Bedouins, constantly moving into the area from the south, pursued their nomadic way of life. Late in the tenth century AD the Jordan region was wrested from the Abbasids by the Shia Fatimid Caliphs in Egypt. The Fatimids were in turn displaced after 1071 by the Seljuq Turks, who had gained control of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. The Seljuq threat to the Byzantine Empire and a desire to seize the holy places in Palestine from the Muslims spurred the Christian West to organise the First Crusade, which culminated in the capture of Jerusalem in 1099. The crusaders subsequently established the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, a feudal state that extended its hold to the East Bank. The crusaders used the term Outer Jourdain (Beyond Jordan) to describe the area across the river from Palestinean area that was defended by a line of formidable castles like that at Al-Karak. In 1174 Salah-ud-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub-better known in the

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West as Saladin-deposed the last Fatimid Caliph, whom he had served as grand vizier, and seized power as Sultan of Egypt. A Sunni scholar and experienced soldier of Kurdish origin, Saladin soon directed his energies against the crusader states in Palestine and Syria. At the decisive Battle of Hattin on the west shore of Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), Saladin annihilated the crusaders' army in 1187 and soon afterward retook Jerusalem. Saladin's successors in the Ayyubid Sultanate quarrelled among themselves, and Saladin's conquests broke up into squabbling petty principalities. The Ayyubid Dynasty was overthrown in 1260 by the Mamluks (a caste of slave-soldiers, mostly of Kurdish and Circassian origin), whose warrior-sultans repelled the Mongol incursions and by the late fourteenth century held sway from the Nile to the Euphrates. Their power, weakened by factionalism within their ranks, contracted during the next century in the face of a dynamic new power in the Middle East-the Ottoman Turks.

Ottoman Rule Mamluk Egypt and its possessions fell to the Ottoman Sultan, Selim I, in 1517. The Jordan region, however, stagnated under Ottoman rule. Although the pilgrim caravans to Mecca continued to be an important source of income, the East Bank was largely forgotten by the outside world for more than 300 years until European travellers "rediscovered" it in the nineteenth century. For administrative purposes Ottoman domains were divided into provinces (vilayets) that were presided over by governors (pashas). The governors ruled with absolute authority, but at the pleasure of the Sultan in Constantinople. Palestine was part of the vilayet of Beirut, and Jerusalem was administered as a separate district (sanjak) that reported directly to the Sultan. The East Bank comprised parts of the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus. The latter was subdivided into four sanjaks: Hama, Damascus, Hawran, and Al-Karak. Hawran included Ajlun and As Salt and Al-Karak comprised the area mostly south of Amman. The territory south of the Az Zarqa River down to Wadi al-Mawjib was under the control of the pasha of Nabulus, who was under the vilayet of Beirut. From 1831 until 1839, Ottoman rule was displaced by that of Muhammad Ali-pasha of Egypt and nominally subject to the Sultanwhen his troops occupied the region during a revolt against the

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Sublime Porte, as the Ottoman government came to be known. Britain and Russia compelled Muhammad Ali to withdraw and they restored the Ottoman governors. The Ottomans enforced Shariah in the towns and settled countryside, but in the desert customary tribal law also was recognised. Because of the unitary nature of Islamic law-encompassing religious, social, civil, and economic life-it was inconceivable that it could be applied to non-Muslims. The Ottoman regime used the millet system, which accorded non-Muslim communities the right to manage their personal affairs according to their own religious laws. The European powers also concluded separate treaties (capitulations) with the Porte whereby their consuls received extraterritorial legal jurisdiction over their citizens and clients in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, France claimed the special right to protect the sultan's Roman Catholic subjects, and Russia to protect the sultan's more numerous Orthodox subjects. At every level of the Ottoman system, administration was essentially military in character. On the East Bank, however, Ottoman rule was lax and garrisons were small. Ottoman officials were satisfied as long as order was preserved, military levies were provided when called for, and taxes were paid. These goals, however, were not easily achieved. To stabilise the population, in the late 1800s the Ottomans established several small colonies of Circassians-Sunni Muslims who had fled from the Caucasus region of Russia in the 1860s and 1870s. Although the Ottoman Sultan in Constantinople was the Caliph, Ottoman officials and soldiers were despised by the Arabs, who viewed them as foreign oppressors. Truculent sheikhs regularly disrupted the peace, and the fiercely independent Bedouins revolted frequently. In 1905 and again in 1910, serious uprisings were suppressed only with considerable difficulty. In 1900 the Porte, with German assistance, began construction of the Hijaz Railway. By 1908 the railroad linked Damascus with the holy city of Medina. Its purpose was to transport Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and to facilitate military control of the strategic Arabian Peninsula. To protect the railroad, the Porte increased its Ottoman military presence along the route and, as it had done earlier to safeguard caravan traffic, subsidised rival Arab tribal sheikhs in the region.

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Arab Nationalism and Zionism In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, two separate movements developed that were to have continuing effects for all of the Middle East-the Arab revival and Zionism. Both movements aimed at uniting their peoples in a national homeland. They were to converge and confront each other in Palestine where, it was initially thought by some, they could each achieve their aspirations in an atmosphere of mutual accommodation. The two movements would, in fact, prove incompatible. By 1875 a small group of Western-oriented Muslim and Christian Arab intellectuals in Beirut were urging the study of Arab history, literature, and language to revive Arab identity. By means of secretly printed and circulated publications they attempted to expose the harsh nature of Ottoman rule and to arouse an Arab consciousness in order to achieve greater autonomy or even independence. The idea of independence always was expressed in the context of a unified entity-"the Arab nation" as a whole. After only a few years, however, Ottoman security operations had stifled the group's activities. At about the same time, a Jewish revival was finding expression in Europe that called for the return of the Jews in the Diaspora to their historic homeland. The impulse and development of Zionism were almost exclusively the ~ork of European Jews. In 1897 Theodor Herzl convened the First Zionist Congress at Basel, Switzerland, where the Zionist Organisation was founded with the stated aim of creating "for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law." As a result of Zionist efforts, the number of Jews in Palestine rose dramatically to about 85,000, or 12 per cent of the total population, by the start of World War l. The increased Jewish presence and the different customs of the new settlers aroused Arab hostility. The rising tension between Jewish settler and Arab peasant did not, however, lead to the establishment of Arab nationalist organisations. In the Ottoman controlled Arab lands the Arab masses were bound by family, tribal, and Islamic ties; the concepts of nationalism and nation-state were viewed as alien Western categories. Thus, a political imbalance evolved between the highly organised and nationalistic Jewish settlers and the relatively unorganised indigenous Arab population.

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A few Western-educated Arab intellectuals and military officers did form small nationalist organisations demanding greater local autonomy. The primary moving ,.force behind this nascent Arab nationalist movement was opposition to the policies of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. In 1908 a group of reform-minded nationalist army officers in Constantinople. known as the Young Turks, forced Sultan Abdul Hamid II to restore the 1876 Ottoman constitution. The next year the Young Turks deposed Hamid in favour of his malleable brother, Mahmood V Under the constitution, Ottoman provinces were represented by delegates elected to an imperial parliament. The restoration of the constitution and installation of Mahmood V initially generated a wave of good feeling among the empire's non-Turkish subjects and stimulated expectations of greater self-government. It soon became clear, however, that the Young Turks, led by Anver Pasha, were bent instead on further centralising the Ottoman administration and intensifying the "Turkification" of the Ottoman domains. Arab opposition to the Turkish nationalist policies asserted itself in two separate arenas: among urban intellectuals and in the countryside. One source of opposition developed among Arab intellectuals in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus, who formulated the ideas of a new Arab nationalism. The primary moving force behind this nascent Arab nationalist movement was opposition to the policies of Sultan Abdul Hamid. The removal of Sultan Abdul Hamid by the Committee of Union and Progress (the umbrella organisation of which the Young Turks was the major element) was widely supported by Arab nationalists. The committee's programme of institutional reform and promised autonomy raised Arab nationalist hopes.

After 1908, however, it quickly became clear that the nationalism of Abdul Hamid's successors was Turkish nationalism bent on Turkification of the Ottoman domain rather than on granting local autonomy. In response, Arab urban intellectuals formed clandestine political societies such as the Ottoman Decentralisation Party, based in Cairo; Al-Ahd (The Covenant Society), formed primarily by army officers in 1914; and Jamiat al-Arabiyah al-Futat (The Young Arab Society), known as Al-Futat (The Young Arabs), formed by students in 1911. The Arab nationalism espoused by these groups, however, lacked support among the Arab masses.

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A more traditional form of opposition emerged among the remote desert tribes of Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula, which were politically inarticulate but resentful of foreign control. The link between the urban political committees and the desert tribesmen was Hussain ibn Ali al-Hashimi, the grand sharif and Amir of Mecca and hereditary custodian of the Muslim holy places. Hussain, head of the Hashemiate branch of the Qureshi tribe, claimed descent from the Prophet (Pbuh). Hussain and his sons Abdullah and Faisal (who hqd been educated'as m'embed of the Ottoman elite as well as trained for their roles as Arab chieftains) had spent the years 1893 to 1908 under enforced restraint in Constantinople. In 1908 Abdul Hamid II appointed Hussain Amir of Mecca and allowed him and his sons to return to the Hijaz, the western part of presentday Saudi Arabia. Some.sources contend that Hussain's nomination was suggested by the Young Turks, who believed that he would be a stabilising influence there, particularly if he were indebted to them for his position. In his memoirs, however, Abdullah stated that Abdul Hamid II named his father in preference to a candidate proposed by the Young Turks. Hussain reportedly asked for the appointment on the ground that he had a hereditary right to it. From the outset, Abdullah wrote, his fat~er was at odds with the attempts of the Young Turk regime to bring the Hijaz under the centralised and increasingly secularised administration in Constantinople. Once in office, Hussain proved less tractable than either the Sultan or the Turkish nationalists had expected. Abdullah and Faisal established contact with the Arab nationalists in Syria. Faisal delivered to his father the so-called Damascus Protocol in which the nationalists, who appealed to Hussain as "Father of the Arabs" to deliver them from the Turks, set out the demands for Arab independence that were used by Faisal in his subsequent negotiations with the British. In return, the nationalists accepted the Hashimites as spokesmen for the Arab cause.

Before and After World War I The Kingdom of Jordan is steeped in history and had been a major site for civilization since the Paleolithic Period. Archaeological evidence is constantly bringing to light signs of habitation from the dawn of history to the present day. In 331 BC, the armies of Alexander

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the Great conquered the Near East, introducing Hellenic culture to the area. On Alexander's death the Greek Empire was divided between his two generals. Jordan, Palestine and Egypt were given to General Ptolemy. Between 400BC and 160AD, the Nabatean civilization flourished in the southern part of the Kingdom. The awe-inspiring Nabatean capital of Petra is now Jordan's most popular tourist attraction. Jordan was part of the Roman Empire between 63 and 324AD. A league of ten cities, known as the Decapolis, was established at that time to facilitate the area's trade and commerce. Four cities in Jordan, Jeresh, Philadelphia (now Amman), Umm Qais and Pella formed part of the Decapolis. The Byzantine period, 324 to 632AD, saw the inhabitants of Jordan providing crops and livestock from their farmlands to sustain travellers on the caravan routes, which linked China, India and southern Arabia with Egypt, Syria and the Mediterranean. The year 630AD marked the beginning of the ArabIslamic era. The area was ruled for two centuries by the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties of Baghdad and Damascus. In 1099, the Crusaders arrived in Jerusalem, establishing themselves by building two castles in Jordan at Shobak and Kerek, to protect their conquests. In 1187, Salah-ul-Din (known as Saladin) defeated the Crusaders at Kerek, forcing them to completely withdraw from the Near East. A 300-year rule by the Mamlukes followed, after which Jordan became part of the Ottoman Empire. This period came to an end with the famous Arab Revolt, between 1915 and 1918. World War I: On the eve of World War I, the anticipated breakup of the enfeebled Ottoman Empire raised hopes among Arab nationalists. The Arab nationalists wanted an independent Arab state covering all the Ottoman Arab domains. The nationalist ideal, however, was not very unified; even among articulate Arabs, competing visions of Arab nationalism-Islamic, pan-Arab, and statist-inhibited coordinated efforts at independence. Britain, in possession of the Suez Canal and playing a dominant role in India and Egypt, attached great strategic importance to the region. British Middle East policy, however, espoused conflicting objectives; as a result, London became involved in three distinct and contradictory negotiations concerning the fate of the region.

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In February 1914, Abdullah visited Cairo, where he held talks with Lord Kitchener, the senior British official in Egypt. Abdullah inquired about the possibility of British support should his father raise a revolt against the Turks. Kitchener's reply was necessarily noncommittal because Britain then considered the Ottoman Empire a friendly power. War broke out in August, however, and by November the Ottoman Empire had aligned with Germany against Britain and its allies. Kitchener was by then British secretary of state for war and, in the changed circumstances, sought Arab support against the Turks. In Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon, British high commissioner and Kitchener's successor in Egypt, carried on an extensive correspondence with Hussain. In a letter to McMahon in July 1915, Hussain specified that the area under his independent "Sharifian Arab Government" should consist of the Arabian Peninsula (except Aden, a British colony), Palestine, Lebanon, Syria (including present-day Jordan), and Iraq. In October McMahon replied on behalf of the British government. McMahon declared British support for postwar Arab independence, subject to certain reservations, and "exclusions of territory not entirely Arab or concerning which Britain was not free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France." The territories assessed by the British as not purely Arab included "the districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo." As with the later Balfour Declaration, the exact meaning of the McMahon pledge was unclear, although Arab spokesmen have usually maintained that Palestine was within the area guaranteed independence as an Arab state. In June 1916, Hussain launched the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire and in October proclaimed himself "king of the Arabs," although the Allies recognised him only as king of the Hijaz, a title rejected by most peninsular Arabs. Britain provided supplies and money for the Arab forces led by Abdullah and Faisal. British military advisers also were detailed from Cairo to assist the Arab army that the brothers were organising. Of these advisers. T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) was to become the best known.

While Hussain and McMahon corresponded over the fate of the Middle East, the British were conducting secret negotiations with the

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French and the Russians over the same territory. Following the British military defeat at the Dardanelles in 1915, the Foreign Office sought a new offensive in the Middle East, which it thought could only be carried out by reassuring the French of Britain's intentions in the region. In February 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement (officially the "Asia Minor Agreement") was signed, which, contrary to the contents of the Hussain-McMahon correspondence, proposed to partition the Middle East into French and British zones of control and interest. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Palestine was to be administered by an international "condominium" of the British, French, and Russians, whereas Trans-Jordan would come under British influence. The final British pledge, and the one that formally committed Britain to the Zionist cause, was the Balfour Declaration of November 1917. The Balfour Declaration stated that Britain viewed with favour "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People." After the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Palestine had taken on increased strategic importance because of its proximity to the Suez Canal, where the British garrison had reached 300,000 men, and because of the planned British attack from Egypt on Ottoman Syria. As early as March 1917, Lloyd George was determined that Palestine should become British and he thought that its conquest by British troops would abrogate the SykeS-Picot Agreement. The new British strategic thinking viewed the Zionists as a potential ally capable of safeguarding British imperial interests in the region. The British pledge transformed Zionism from a quixotic dream into a legitimate and achievable undertaking. For these reasons the Balfour Declaration was widely criticised throughout the Arab world, and especially in Palestine, as contrary to the British pledges contained in the Hussain-McMahon correspondence. The wording of the document itself, although painstakingly devised, was interpreted differently by different people. Ultimately, it was found to contain two incompatible undertakings: establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jews and preservation of the rights of existing nonJewish communities. The incompatibility of these two goals sharpened over the succeeding years and became irreconcilable. In November 1917, the contents of the SykeS-Picot Agreement were revealed by the Bolshevik government in Russia. Arab consternation at the agreement was palliated by British and French

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reassurances that their commitments to the Arabs would be honoured and by the fact that Allied military operations were progressing favourably. Hussain had driven the Turkish garrison out of Mecca in the opening weeks of the Arab Revolt. Faisal's forces captured AIAqabah in July 1917, and the British expeditionary force under General Sir (later Field Marshal Viscount) Edmund A1lenby entered Jerusalem in December. Faisal accepted the military subordination of his army to overall British command, but for him the fighting was essentially a war of liberation in which Britain was actively cooperating with the Arabs. The British command, however, considered the Arab army an adjunct to the Allied offensive in Palestine, intended primarily to draw Turkish attention to the East Bank while A1lenby mopped up resistance in Galilee and prepared for a strike at Damascus. In September 1918, the British army deciSively defeated the Turks at Megiddo (in contemporary Israel), and an Arab force under Lawrence captured Daraa, thus opening the way for the advance into Syria. Faisal entered Damascus on October 2, and the Ottoman government consented to an armistice on October 31, bringing the war in that theatre to a close. Between January 1919 and January 1920, the Allied Powers met in Paris to negotiate peace treaties with the Central Powers. At the conference, Amir Faisal (representing the Arabs) and Chaim Weizmann (representing the Zionists) set forth their cases. Weizmann and Faisal reached a separate agreement on January 3, 1919, pledging the two parties to cordial cooperation; however, Faisal wrote a proviso on the document in Arabic that his signature depended upon Allied war pledges regarding Arab independence. Since these pledges were not fulfilled to Arab satisfaction after the war, most Arab leaders and spokesmen have not considered the Faisal-Weizmann agreement as binding. President Woodrow Wilson appOinted an American panel, the King-Crane Commission, to investigate the disposition of Ottoman territories and the assigning of mandates. After extensive surveys in Palestine and Syria, the commission reported intense opposition to the Balfour Declaration among the Arab majority in Palestine and advised against permitting unlimited Jewish immigration or the creation of a separate Jewish state. The commission's report in August 1919

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was not officially considered by the conference, however, and was not made public until 1922. Mandate allocations making Britain the mandatory power for Palestine (including the East Bank and all of present-day Jordan) and Iraq, and making France the mandatory power for the area of Syria and Lebanon, were confirmed in April 1920 at a meeting of the Supreme Allied Council at San Remo, Italy. The terms of the Palestine Mandate reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration, called on the mandatory power to "secure establishment of the Jewish national home," and recognised "an appropriate Jewish agency" to advise and cooperate with British authorities towards that end. The Zionist Organisation was specifically recognised as that agency. Hussain and his sons opposed the mandate's terms on the ground that Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant adopted at Versailles had endorsed the Wilsonian principle of self-determination of peoples and thereby, they maintained, logically and necessarily supported the cause of the Arab majority in Palestine. For the British government, pressed with heavy responsibilities and commitments after World War I, the objective of mandate administration was the peaceful development of Palestine by Arabs and Jews under British control. To Hussain, cooperation with the Zionists had meant no more than providing a refuge for Jews within his intended Arab kingdom. To Zionist leaders, the recognition in the mandate was simply a welcome step on the way to attainment of a separate Jewish national state. A conflict of interests between Arabs and Jews arrd between both sides and the British developed early in Palestine and continued thereafter at a rising tempo throughout the mandate period. After the armistice, the Allies organised the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration to provide an interim government for Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. In July 1919, the General Syrian Congress convened in Damascus and called for Allied recognition of an independent Syria, including Palestine, with Faisal as its king. When no action was taken on the proposal, the congress in March 1920 unilaterally proclaimed Syria independent and confirmed Faisal as king. Iraqi representatives similarly announced their country's independence as a monarchy under Abdullah. The League of Nations Council rejected both pronouncements, and in April the San Remo Conference decided

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on enforcing the Allied mandates in the Middle East. French troops occupied Damascus in July, and Faisal was served with a French ultimatum to withdraw from Syria. He went into exile, but the next year was installed by the British as king of Iraq. At the same time, Abdullah was organising resistance against the French in Syria, arousing both French ire and British consternation. Assembling a motley force of about 2,000 tribesmen, he moved north from Mecca, halting in Amman in March 1920. In October the British high commissioner for Palestine called a meeting of East Bank sheikhs at As Salt to discuss the future of the region, whose security was threatened by the incursion of Wahhabi sectarians (adherents of a puritanical Muslim sect who stressed the unity of God) from Najd in the Arabian Peninsula. It became clear to the British that Abdullah, who remained in Amman, could be accepted as a ruler by the Bedouin tribes and in that way be dissuaded from involving himself in Syria. In March 1921, Winston Churchill, then British colonial secretary, convened a high-level conference in Cairo to consider Middle East policy. As a result of these deliberations, Britain subdivided the Palestine Mandate along the Jordan River-Gulf of Aqabah line. The eastern portion--called Trans-Jordan-was to have a separate Arab administration operating under the general supervision of the commissioner for Palestine, with Abdullah appointed as Amir. At a follow-up meeting in Jerusalem with Churchill, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel, and Lawrence, Abdullah agreed to abandon his Syrian project in return for the emirate and a substantial British subsidy. A British government memorandum in September 1922, approved by the League of Nations Council, specifically excluded Jewish settlement from the Trans-Jordan area of the Palestine Mandate. The whole process was aimed at satisfying wartime pledges made to the Arabs and at carrying out British responsibilities under the mandate.

Trans-Jordan Area At its inception in 1921, the Emirate of Trans-Jordan had fewer than 400,000 inhabitants. Of this number, about 20 per cent lived in four towns each having population of from 10,000 to 30,000. The balances were farmers in village communities and pastoral nomadic and semi nomadic tribes people. The emirate's treasury operated on

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British financial aid established on the basis of an annual subsidy. A native civil service was gradually trained with British assistance, but government was simple, and Abdullah ruled directly with a small executive council, much in the manner of a tribal sheikh. British officials handled the problems of defence, finance, and foreign policy, leaving internal political affairs to Abdullah. To supplement the rudimentary police in 1921, a reserve Arab force was organised by F. G. Peake, a British officer known to the Arabs as Peake Pasha. This Arab force soon was actively engaged in suppressing brigandage and repelling raids by the Wahabis. In 1923 the police and reserve force were combined into the Arab Legion as a regular army under Peake's command. In 1923 Britain recognised Trans-Jordan as a national state preparing for independence. Under British sponsorship, Trans-Jordan made measured progress along the path to modernisation. Roads, communications, education, and other public services slowly but steadily developed, although not as rapidly as in Palestine, which was under direct British administration. Tribal unrest remained a persistent problem, reaching serious proportions in 1926 in the Wadi MusaPetra area. In'the same year, Britain attached senior judicial advisers to Abdullah's government, and formed the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force. This body was a locally recruited unit of the British Army assigned to guard the frontier and was distinct from the Arab Legion. Britain and Trans-Jordan took a further step in the direction of self-government in 1928, when they agreed to a new treaty that relaxed British controls while still providing for Britain to oversee financial matters and foreign policy. The two countries agreed to promulgate a constitution-the Organic Law-later the same year, and in 1929 to install the Legislative Council in place of the old executive council. In 1934 a new agreement with Britain allowed Abdullah to set up consular representation in Arab countries, and in 1939 the Legislative Council formally became the Amir's cabinet, or council of ministers. In 1930, with British help, Jordan launched a campaign to stamp out tribal raiding among the Bedouins. A British officer, John Bagot Glubb (better known as Glubb Pasha), came from Iraq to be second in command of the Arab Legion under Peake. Glubb organised a highly effective Bedouin desert patrol consisting of mobile detachments

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based at strategic desert forts and equipped with good communications facilities. When Peake retired in 1939, Glubb succeeded to full command of the Arab Legion. Abdullah was a faithful ally to Britain during World War II. Units of the Arab Legion served with distinction alongside British forces in 1941 overthrowing the pro-Nazi Rashid Ali regime that had seized power in Iraq and defeating the Vichy French in Syria. Later, elements of the Arab Legion were used in guarding British installations in Egypt. During the war years, Abdullah-who never surrendered his dream of a Greater Syria under a Hashemiate monarchy-took part in the inter-Arab preliminary discussions that resulted in the formation of the League of Arab States (Arab League) in Cairo in March 1945. The original members of the League of Arab States were TransJordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen. In March 1946, Trans-Jordan and Britain concluded the Treaty of London, under which another major step was taken towards full sovereignty for the Arab state. Trans-Jordan was proclaimed a kingdom, and a new constitution replaced the obsolete 1928 Organic Law. Abdullah's application for membership in the UN was disapproved by a Soviet Union veto, which asserted that the country was not fully independent of British control. A further treaty with Britain was executed in March 1948, under which all restrictions on sovereignty were removed, although limited British base and transit rights in Trans-Jordan continued, as did the British subsidy that paid for the Arab Legion. By 1947 Palestine was one of the major trouble spots in the British Empire, requiring a presence of 100,000 troops to maintain peace and a huge maintenance budget. On February 18, 1947, Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin informed the House of Commons of the government's decision to present the Palestine problem to the UN. On May 15, 1947, a special session of the UN General Assembly established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), consisting of eleven members. UNSCOP reported on August 31 that a majority of its members supported a geographically complex system of partition into separate Arab and Jewish states, a special international status for Jerusalem, and an economic union linking the three members. Supported by both the United States and

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the Soviet Union, this plan was adopted by the UN General Assembly in November 1947. Although they considered the plan defective in terms of their expectations from the mandate agreed to by the League of Nations twenty-five years earlier, the Zionist General Council stated their willingness in principle to accept partition. The Arab League Council, meeting in December 1947, said it would take whatever measures were required to prevent implementation of the resolution. Abdullah was the only Arab ruler willing to consider acceptance of the UN partition plan. Amid the increasing conflict, the UN Implementation Commission was unable to function. Britain thereupon announced its intention to relinquish the mandate and withdrew from Palestine on May 14, 1948. On the same day, the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel was proclaimed in Jerusalem. Palestinian Arabs refused to set up a state in the Arab zone. In quick succession, Arab forces from Egypt. Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia advanced into Israel. Except for the British-trained Arab Legion, they were composed of inexperienced and poorly led troops. Abdullah, the sole surviving leader of the Arab Revolt of World War I, accepted the empty title of commander in chief of Arab forces extended to him by the Arab League. His motive for ordering the Arab Legion into action was expressly to secure the portion of Palestine allocated to the Arabs by the 1947 UN resolution. The Arab Legion, concentrated on the East Bank opposite Jericho, crossed the Jordan on May 15 and quickly captured positions in East Jerusalem and its environs. The Legion also created a salient at Latrun northwest of Jerusalem to pinch the Israeli supply line into the city. Abdullah had been particularly insistent that his troops must take and hold the Old City of Jerusalem, which contained both Jerusalem's prinCipal Muslim holy places and the traditional Jewish Quarter. Other Arab Legion units occupied Hebron to the south and fanned out through Samaria to the north {Samaria equates to the northern part of the West Bank}. By the end of 1948, the areas held by the Arab Legion and the Gaza Strip, held by the Egyptians, were the only parts of the former Mandate of Palestine remaining in Arab hands. Early in the conflict, on May 29, 1948, the UN Security Council established the Truce Commission headed by a UN mediator, Swedish

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diplomat Folke Bernadotte, who was assassinated in Jerusalem on September 17, 1948. He was succeeded by Ralph Bunche, an American, as acting mediator. The commission, which later evolved into the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation-Palestine (UNTSOP), attempted to devise new settlement plans and arranged truces. Armistice talks were initiated with Egypt in January 1949, and an armistice agreement was established with Egypt on February 24, with Lebanon on March 23, with Trans-Jordan on April 3, and with Syria on July 20. Iraq did not enter into an armistice agreement but withdrew its forces after turning over its positions to Trans-Jordanian units.

Hashemiate Kingdom The population of Trans-Jordan before the war was about 340,000. As a result of the war, about 500,000 Palestinian Arabs took refuge in Trans-Jordan or in the West Bank. Most of these people had to be accommodated in refugee camps, which were administered under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, set up in 1949. In addition there were about 500,000 indigenous residents of the West Bank. In December 1948, Abdullah took the title of King of Jordan and in April 1949 he directed that the official name of the country-East Bank and West Bank-be changed to the Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan, a name found in the 1946 constitution but not until then in common use. In April 1950, elections were held in both the East Bank and the West Bank. Abdullah considered the results favourable, and he formally annexed the West Bank to Jordan, an important step that was recognised by only two governments: Britain and Pakistan. Within the Arab League, the annexation was not generally approved, and traditionalists and modernists alike condemned the move as a furtherance of Hashemiate dynastic ambitions. Abdullah continued to search for a long-term, peaceful solution with Israel, although for religious and security reasons he did not favour the immediate internationalisation of Jerusalem. He found support for this position only from Hashemiate kinsmen in Iraq. Nationalist propaganda, especially in Egypt and Syria, denounced him as a reactionary monarch and a tool of British imperialism.

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The Arab League debates following the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank were inconclusive, and Abdullah continued to set his own course. The residual special relationship with Britain continued, helping to keep the East Bank relatively free from disturbance. Although not yet a member of the UN, Jordan supported the UN action in Korea and entered into an economic developmental aid agreement with the United States in March 1951, under President Harry S. Truman's Point Four programme. On July 20, 1951, Abdullah was assassinated as he entered the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for Friday prayers. His grandson, fifteen-year-old Prince Hussain, was at his side. Before the assassin was killed by the king's guard, he also fired at Hussain. The assassin was a Palestinian reportedly hired by relatives of Haji Amin al-Hussaini, a former mufti of Jerusalem and a bitter enemy of Abdullah, who had spent World War II in Germany as a pro-Nazi Arab spokesman. Although many radical Palestinians blamed Abdullah for the reverses of 1948, there was no organised political disruption after his murder. The main political question confronting the country's leaders was the succession to the throne. Abdullah's second son, Prince Naif, acted temporarily as regent, and some support existed for his accession to the throne. Naif's older brother, Prince Talal, was in Switzerland receiving treatment for a mental illness diagnosed as schizophrenia. It was widely believed that Abdullah would have favoured Talal so that the succession might then pass more easily to Talal's son, Hussain. Accordingly, the government invited Talal to return and assume the duties of king. During his short reign, Talal promulgated a new Constitution in January 1952. Talal showed an inclination to improve relations with other Arab states, and Jordan joined the Arab League's Collective Security Pact, which Abdullah had rejected. Talal was popular among the people of the East Bank, who were not aware of his periodiC seizures of mental illness. But the king's condition steadily worsened, and in August the Prime Minister recommended to a secret session of the Jordanian legislature that Talal be asked to abdicate in favour of Hussain. Talal acceded to the abdication order with dignity and retired to a villa near Istanbul, where he lived quietly until his death in 1972. Hussain, who was a student at Harrow in Britain, returned

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immediately to Jordan. Under the Constitution he could not be crowned because he was under eighteen years of age, and a regency council was formed to act on his behalf. Before he came to the throne, he attended the British Royal Military Academy at Sand Hurst. When he was eighteen years old by the Muslim calendar, he returned to Jordan and in May 1953 formally took the constitutional oath as king. King Hussain's Early Reign: The chief influences that guided the young Hussain were the example and teachings of his grandfather and his own education in conservative English schools. Although Jordan was a constitutional monarchy, king Hussain had extensive legal powers. For example, the Constitution allowed him to dismiss the National Assembly and to appoint the Prime Minister and other ministers. In addition, he enjoyed the traditional support of the East Bank Bedouin tribes. Considered the backbone of the Hashemiate monarchy, the Arab Legion was composed of intensely loyal Bedouins, whose equipment and salaries were paid for by Britain.

The majority of Jordan's population, however, did not consist of Bedouins. Between one-half and two-thirds of Hussain's subjects were Palestinians, whereas the government elite was mostly from the East Bank. This elite was more conservative and traditional in its political attitudes than the Palestinians, whose spokespersons often reflected a radical brand of Arab nationalism. In Cairo the successful coup d'etat carried out by the Egyptian Free Officers movement (headed by Jamal Abdul Nasser) had overthrown the monarchy in July 1952 and established a republic. Palestinians, who generally blamed Britain, the United States, and the Hashimites for their misfortunes, regarded Nasser as a champion of Arab nationalism. As border incidents with Israel escalated into a succession of reprisals and counter reprisals between Palestinian infiltrators and Israeli security forces, Hussain's problems grew. The Arab Legion tried to secure the armistice line and prevent infiltration, but its numbers were inadequate to proVide complete and continuous coverage of the border. In response to the terrorist attacks, Israel adopted the technique of massive retaliation that often went deep into Jordanian territory. In 1953 and early 1954, Israel tentatively accepted a United States plan (the Eric Johnston Plan) for distribution of the water taken

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from the Jordan River. Although the plan was recognised as technically sound from an engineering standpoint, ultimately it was rejected by Jordan and the other Arab states concerned because it involved cooperation with-and the implied recognition of-Israel. Given the stress of inter-Arab political relationships, it was impracticable for Jordan to initiate a settlement with Israel, even though there were strong incentives to do so. Britain agreed to a new financial aid arrangement with Jordan in 1954 in which London evinced an interest in coordinating military and economic aid to Amman, with Jordanian participation, in the context of an overall Middle Eastern defence system. In February 1955, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan joined Britain in signing the Baghdad Pact, which ultimately became the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). A high-ranking British military delegation visited Amman to discuss conditions under which Jordan might also become a participant. The purpose of the visit was generally known, and Arab nationalist propaganda, especially from Palestinians and Radio Cairo, raised a storm of protest denouncing the pact and the monarchy as "tools of Western imperialism" and a "sellout to the Jews." In December, Hussain asked Hazza al-Majali to form a government. Majali came from a distinguished family of tribal sheikhs and was known to be pro-Western. Shortly after forming his cabinet, he stated unequivocally that he intended to take Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. Three days of demonstrations and rioting in Amman began after the announcement, and the Arab Legion was called in to restore order. The Majali government resigned after only a week in power, and it became clear that Jordan would not become a signatory of the Baghdad Pact. In March 1956, Hussain, responding to the public reaction against joining the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact, attempted to show his independence from Britain by dismissing Glubb as commander of the Arab Legion. Glubb's dismissal precipitated a diplomatic crisis that threatened to isolate Hussain from his principal benefactor, Britain. Relations were strained for many years although the British subsidy was not withdrawn. Hussain designated Ali Abu Nuwar, an officer known for his nationalist sympathies, as Glubb's successor in the Arab Legion. The name of the force was officially changed to the Jordan Arab Army, and British officers were phased out of the

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service. Border incidents with Israel were a continuing source of anxiety in 1956. In October an Israeli task force, supported by aircraft and artillery, attacked the West Bank village of Qalqilyah, killing fortyeight persons in reprisal for a guerrilla attack in Israel. Palestinians clamoured for war, and in this crisis atmosphere Jordanian politics ventured into anti-Western nationalism. In the parliamentary elections of October 21, 1956, the National Socialist Party received a plurality of votes, and Hussain deSignated its leader, Sulaiman Nabulsi, as Prime Minister. Several National Front Party (Communist Party of Jordan) members and members of the Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party) also gained seats in the National Assembly, although independents and the older, conservative parties were represented about equally with the leftists and nationalists. Nabulsi was an ardent admirer of Nasser and shaped the policies of his government accordingly. Nonetheless, when Israel attacked Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula on October 29 and after British and French forces landed at Port Said on November 5, Nabulsi suddenly proved indecisive. Hussain proposed that Jordan attack Israel at once but Nasser discouraged him from wasting Jordan's forces in a war that by then was already lost. British participation in the attack on Egypt made it politically imperative that Jordan end its special relationship with Britain. Under the Arab Solidarity Agreement that resulted from the Arab summit meeting in Cairo in January 1957, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria undertook to pay Jordan the equivalent of US$ 35.8 million annually for ten years, with Saudi Arabia paying an amount equivalent to that paid by Egypt and Syria together. The money would effectively free Jordan from the British subsidy. Saudi Arabia, however, made only one quarterly payment; Egypt and Syria made no payments. The Anglo-Jordanian Agreement of March 1957 abrogated the basic Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948, terminated the British subsidy, and initiated the turnover of British installations and the withdrawal of all British troops still in Jordan. In early 1957, Jordan's internal political scene shaped up as a power struggle between the monarchy and the Nasserist Nabulsi government. Hussain and the conservatives suspected that Nabulsi was manoeuvring to abolish the monarchy. Nabulsi began negotiations to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and obtain Soviet

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arms aid. As political tension increased, in April, Hussain, exercising his constitutional prerogative demanded the resignation of the Nabulsi government. The situation was further confused when; commander of the Jordan Arab Army (then still popularly known in English as the Arab Legion), Ali Abu Nuwar made a statement to Said ai-Mufti, who was then attempting to form a caretaker government. Said ai-Mufti miSinterpreted the statement to be an ultimatum that any new cabinet be approved by the army. A sequence of dramatic events followed that became known as the ''Az Zarqa affair." The public in Amman, sensing the explosive political atmosphere, became restive. Rumours that the king was dead spread at the main army base at Az Zarqa. Taking Abu Nuwar with him, to demonstrate that he, the king, was very much alive and that he was in control, not Abu Nuwar, Hussain set off for Az Zarqa. En route he met several truckloads of troops, who were overjoyed at seeing the king alive but who demanded the execution of Abu Nuwar. At Abu Nuwar's request, Hussain allowed him to retreat to the safety of the royal palace. Continuing to Az Zarqa, Hussain spent several hours amid wildly enthusiastic troops anxious to demonstrate their loyalty to him and to the throne; he returned to Amman after reassuring and quieting the troops. On the next day, Abu Nuwar fled the country. During the balance of April, several cabinet crises occurred, as the remnants of the Nabulsi faction fought a rearguard action against Hussain. Ibrahim Hashim, a Hussain loyalist, eventually succeeded in forming a government and outlawed all political party activity. Hussain had won a remarkable political victory. What had mattered most was the loyalty of the combat units of the army, and that loyalty clearly belonged to the king. But Jordan was beleagueredNasserites were arrayed against the king, the British subsidy was gone, the Arab Solidarity Agreement had evaporated, and the rift was wider than ever between the East Bank and the West Bank. To counteract these disabilities, Hussain unequivocally placed his country in the Western camp and sought a new source of aid-the United States. King Hussain-Crisis and Realignment: The United States replaced Britain as Jordan's principal source of foreign aid, but it did

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so without a bilateral treaty or other formal alliance mechanisms. In April 1957, the White House officially noted that President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles regarded "the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital." Although Hussain did not specifically request aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine-by which the United States pledged military and economic aid to any country asking for help in resisting communist influence-he did state publicly that Jordan's security was threatened by communism. Within twenty-four hours of Hussain's request for economic assistance, Jordan received an emergency financial aid grant of US$ 10 million from the United States-the first of a long series of United States grants. Washington expanded existing development aid programmes and initiated military aid. In seeking a viable, long-term arrangement for political stability in the face of the hostile, Nasser-style revolutionary nationalism then prevalent in the Middle East, Jordan turned to neighbduring Iraq. Iraq, far larger and more populous than Jordan, was also far wealthier because of its oil and other resources. Iraq had usually supported Jordan in Arab councils, although without deep involvement, since the 1948 war. Its conservative government had taken Iraq into the Baghdad Pact in 1955 to ensure continued Western support against the Soviet Union or, more particularly, against radical Arab movements. On February 1, 1958, Egypt and Syria announced the integration of their ~o countries to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). This development was greeted with great enthusiasm by the new nationalist advocates of Arab unity, but it made the position of conservative or moderate regimes more perilous. The initial phase of Jordanian-Iraqi negotiation was qUickly concluded, and on February 14, 1958, Hussain and his cousin, King Faisal II, issued a proclamation joining the Hashemiate kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan in a federation called the Arab Union. Faisal was to be head of state and Hussain deputy head of state. The Arab Union, however, was short-lived. The Hashemiate monarchy in Iraq was overthrown on July 14, 1958, in a swift, predawn coup executed by officers of the Nineteenth Brigade under the leadership of Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd us Salaam Arif. The coup was triggered when King Hussain, fearing that an anti-Western revolt in Lebanon might spread to Jordan, requested

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Iraqi assistance. Instead of moving towards Jordan, Colonel Arif led a battalion into Baghdad and immediately proclaimed a new republic and the end of the old regime. An Iraqi motorised brigade under the command of Brigadier Qasim seized control of Baghdad. King Faisal and other members of the Iraqi royal family were murdered. Hussain, enraged and overcome by shock and grief, threatened to send the Jordanian army into Iraq to avenge Faisal's murder and restore the Arab Union. His civilian ministers, however, advised against taking this course. In Iraq the army and police supported the coup, and Qasim became president-dictator, taking Iraq out of the Arab Union and the Baghdad Pact. Jordan was isolated as never before. Hussain appealed both to the United States and to Britain for help. The United States instituted an airlift of petroleum, and Britain flew troops into Amman to stabilise the regime. Ironically, these aircraft over flew Israel, because clearances for alternate routes over Arab countries could not be obtained in time. These events in Iraq and Jordan coincided with the landing of United States troops in Lebanon to bolster the regime there. For some weeks, the political atmosphere in Jordan was explosive, but the government kept order through limited martial law. The army continued its unquestioning loyalty to the king, and the Israeli frontier remained quiet. The ensuing two-year period of relative trpnquillity was broken in August 1960 when the pro-Western Prime Minister, Hazza al-Majali who had been reappointed in May 1959, was killed by the explosion of a time bomb concealed in his desk. Analysts speculated that the conspirators expected the killing to generate a public uprising. It had precisely the opposite effect; Bedouin troops who moved into Amman maintained order, and Hussain appointed a new conservative Prime Minister, Bahjat-ul-Talhuni. The plot was traced to Syria and further identified with Cairo. Four suspects were caught, convicted, and hanged, and the army made a show of force. In June 1961, Talhuni was replaced by Wasfi at Tal to improve relations with Egypt, after Cairo implicated Amman for influencing Damascus's decision to secede from the United Arab Republic.

Development and Disaster (1964) By early 1964, Arab governments and Palestinian spokesmen had become alarmed by an Israeli project to draw water from Lake

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Tiberias to irrigate the Negev Desert. Nasser invited the Arab heads of state to ilUend a summit conference in Cairo in January 1964 at which the principal issue was the Jordan water question. Despite Syria's militant rhetoric, the conference rejected the idea of provoking a war because-it was argued-the Arab states lacked a unified military command. Instead, three alternative courses of action were approved: the diversion of the tributary sources of the Jordan River north of Lake Tiberias in Lebanon and Syria; the establishment of the United Arab Command under an Egyptian commander; and the recognition of the new Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), headed by a former Jerusalem lawyer, Ahmad Shuqayri (also cited as Shukairi), as the representative of Palestinian resistance against Israel. The Cairo Conference of January 1964 ended in a euphoric atmosphere of goodwill and brotherhood. Talhuni became Prime Minister for the second time in July 1964, pledging his government to implement the spirit of the Cairo Conference "according to the king's instructions." Jordan cultivated friendship with Egypt. In May 1965, Jordan joined nine other Arab states in breaking relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) because of its recognition of Israel. Jordan and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement in August defining for the first time the boundary between the two countries. Under this agreement, Jordan gave up some territory in the southeast but was able to gain an extension of about eighteen kilometres down the gulf from the crowded port of Al-Aqabah. Almost from the start, trouble developed between the PLO and Hussain's government. Shuqayri, famous for his often-hysterical , political rhetoric, had organised the PLO in Jerusalem in 1964 with the objective of liberating Palestine in cooperation with all Arab states but without interfering in their internal affairs or claiming sovereignty in the West Bank. Conflict arose because the PLO attempted to assume quasi-governmental functions, such as taxing Palestinians and distributing arms to villagers in the West Bank and among the refugees, acts that infringed on Jordanian sovereignty. The guerrilla organisation, Al-Fatah, was formed in Damascus with Syrian assistance in December 1957, under the leadership of Yasir Arafat. Jordanian policy since 1949 had been to avoid border incidents

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and terrorism that would generate Israeli reprisals. AI-Fatah and the PLO, however, carried out raids and sabotage against Israel without clearance from either the United Arab Command or Jordan. These attacks, although planned in Syria, most often were launched into Israel by infiltration through Lebanon or Jordan. Israeli reprisals against selected West Bank targets became harsher and more frequent from May 1965 onward. Meanwhile, Syrian propaganda against Hussain became increasingly strident. In July 1966, when Hussain severed official endorsement and support for the PLO, both that organisation and the Syrian government turned against him. In reprisal for the terrorist attacks by the Fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas), in November Israel assaulted the West Bank village of As Samu. Israel was censured by the UN, but public rioting against the Jordanian government broke out among the inhabitants of the West Bank. The levels of rioting exceeded any previous experience. As in the past, Hussain used the army to restore public order. Political pressure against Hussain mounted, however, along with armed clashes on the Syria-Jordan border. Tension also mounted on the Syria-Israel border, where a land and air engagement took place on April 7, 1967. Syria and Jordan severely criticised Egypt for failing to send support. In mid-May Egypt commenced an extensive military build-up in Sinai in response to Syrian allegations that Syria was in imminent danger of invasion by Israel. Nasser declared a state of emergency on May 16 and two days later demanded removal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from Sinai, where it had served as a peacekeeping force since 1957. The UN secretary general acceded to Nasser's demand. On May 23-24, Nasser announced the closure to Israeli shipping of the Strait of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqabah, a measure that Israel immediately declared to be an act of war. Hussain qUickly decided that this time it would be impossible for Jordan to stay out of the impending conflict. He hurriedly proceeded to Cairo and on May 30 signed a military alliance with Egypt. Hussain's move represented a response to political pressures at home and the fulfilment of basic pan-Arab commitments. The alliance put the Jordanian army under the field command of an Egyptian general officer. On June 5, Israel launched a pre-emptive attack against Egyptian forces deployed in Sinai. The Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol,

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attempted in vain to contact Hussain through UN channels to keep him out of the war. The Egyptian field marshal in overall command of Arab forces ordered Jordanian artillery to open fire on Israeli positions, and Jordan's small air force conducted a bombing raid in the Tel Aviv area. Within hours, however, Israeli warplanes had effectively eliminated the Arab air forces on the ground. After only two days of combat, Jordan's main armoured unit had been defeated. Hard fighting continued, as Hussain was determined to hold as much ground as possible in the event that a ceasefire was arranged. By the time he agreed to a truce on June 7, Israeli forces had seized the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem. Of all the Arab belligerents, Jordan, which could least afford it, lost most in the war. Government figures listed over 6,000 troops killed or missing. During the short war, about 224,000 refugees-many of whom had first been refugees from the 1948-49 war-fled from the West Bank to the East Bank. One-third to one half of the country's best agricultural land and its main tourist attractions were lost to Israel. On June 27, the Israeli parliament (Knesset) formally annexed the Old City of Jerusalem, an act that the United States and many other nations refused to recognise. Disaster of 1967: In early 1963, Israel announced its intention to divert part of the Jordan River waters to irrigate the Naqab Desert (also known as the Negev Desert). In response, Arab leaders decided at a 1964 Cairo summit to reduce the flow of water into Lake Tiberias by diverting some tributaries in Lebanon and Syria. To prepare for defence in case of an Israeli military response to these diversions, a joint Arab force was created. The United Arab Command was composed of Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Lebanese elements, and was headed by Lieutenant-General Ali Amer of Egypt. Another outcome of the Cairo summit was the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Concurring with other Arab leaders, King Hussain recognised the need for an organisation of this kind, which could coordinate Palestinian efforts. His only concerns were that the PLO should cooperate with Jordan and that its military activities should be under the strict control of the United Arab Command, lest they should inadvertently drag the Arabs into a war with Israel for which they were unprepared. The mid-1960s also saw the rise of independent Palestinian

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guerrilla groups (known in Arabic as the Fedayeen), the most notable of which was Yasir Arafat's Fatah movement. In their relentless attempts to outbid Nasser, the Baathist Syrian government encouraged guerrilla raids into Israel-not from Syria, but from Lebanon or Jordan. The Israeli reprisals to these militarily senseless raids were predictably harsh, and Jordan was forced to reign in the guerrillas. For this, Jordan was attacked again by the propaganda machines in Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad. Responding to a Fedayeen raid, on November 13, 1966, Israel launched a major attack on the West Bank border village of Samu, rounding up villagers and destroying their houses. A Jordanian armoured column hastened to repel the attack, but was overwhelmingly defeated by the Israelis' superior fire-power. Instead of serving as an alarm warning of the dangers of uncoordinated military raids, the tragedy gave further grist to the opponents of the Hashemiate Kingdom, who argued that the regime was responsible for what had happened at Samu. Radio broadcasts from Egypt, Syria and Iraq prompted rioting in major Jordanian cities. By the spring of 1967, the situation had become extremely intense. On May 16, Nasser shocked the world by asking the United Nations to withdraw its forces from Sinai. To the surprise of many, his request was honoured two days later. Moreover, the Egyptian President closed the Straits of Tiran on May 22. Sensing that war was now likely, King Hussain aligned Jordan firmly with Egypt, suggesting an Egyptian-Jordanian Mutual Defence Treaty. Nasser immediately accepted the idea, and the treaty was signed on May 30. The treaty stipulated that Jordan's forces were to be placed under the command of Egyptian General Abdul Moneim Riad. Iraq also signed the pact, while the Syrians denounced it and refused to sign. The outbidding and rivalry of radical Arab parties allowed Israel to launch a surprise attack on June 5, 1967, virtually eliminating the Egyptian air force in a single blow. At that point, the outcome of the war was decided. In response to the Israeli attack, Jordanian forces launched an offensive into Israel, but were soon driven back as the Israeli forces counterattacked into the West Bank and Arab East Jerusalem. After destroying the Egyptian air force, Israel had complete control of the skies, raining down deadly napalm bombs on the

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defenceless Arab forces. After a spirited defence of Arab East Jerusalem, the outnumbered and outgunned Jordanian army was forced to retreat to preserve the East Bank heartland against the Zionist expansion. When the final UN ceasefire was imposed on June 11, Israel stood in possession of a wide swath of Arab land, including the Egyptian Sinai, Syria's Golan Heights, and, most significantly, what remained of Arab Palestine-the West Bank, including Arab East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Of the states participating in the conflict, Jordan paid by far the heaviest price. As a result of the war, more than 300,000 Palestinian Arabs became refugees and fled to Jordan. For many of them, this was the second uprooting in less than two decades, having been driven from their original homes in 1948. Jordan's economy was also devastated. About 70 per cent of Jordan's agricultural land was located in the West Bank, which produced 60 to 65 per cent of its fruits and vegetables. Half of the Kingdom's industrial establishments were located in the West Bank, while the loss of Jerusalem and other religious sites devastated the tourism industry. Altogether, areas now occupied by Israel had accounted for approximately 38 per cent of Jordan's gross national product. Despite the economic devastation wrought by the war, Jordan continued to shoulder its previous administrative and financial responsibilities for the West Bank. It continued to pay the salaries and pensions of civil servants, while administering religious endowments or waqf and educational affairs.

Guerrilla Crisis In the wake of the June 1967 War, Hussain's government faced the critical problems of repairing a shattered economy, providing for the welfare of the refugees, obtaining external aid, readjusting foreign policy, and rebuilding the armed forces. Internally, however, the major problem was the continuing confrontation with the several Palestinian guerrilla organisations. The Arab League heads of state met in Khartoum at the end of August 1967. The conference reached four major decisions generally considered to represent the views of Arab moderates: resumption of oil production, which some oil-producing states had suspended during the war; continued non-recognition of and non-negotiation with Israel,

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individually and collectively; continued closure of the Suez Canal and the elimination of all foreign military bases in Arab territory; and provision of financial subsidies aid to Egypt and Jordan by Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait. The total annual subsidy promised for the indefinite future amounted to the equivalent of US$ 378 million, of which Jordan was to receive about US$ 112 million. Donor states at first regularly paid their shares in quarterly instalments, but Libya and Kuwait withdrew their support to Jordan during the 1970-71 war between the Jordanian government and the Fedayeen. In addition to the Khartoum subsidies, Jordan also received grants from Qatar, and the sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi, and a special grant of US$ 42 million from Saudi Arabia for arms purchases. Aid also came from Britain and West Germany, with whom Jordan had resumed relations. Although direct United States aid had been terminated, substantial long-term government loans were extended to Jordan for emergency relief, development, and military assistance. In February 1968, the United States resumed arms shipments to Jordan. Jordan narrowly averted financial disaster. After months of diplomatic wrangling, on November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242 as a guideline for a Middle East settlement. The principal provisions of the resolution proclaimed the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by war; withdrawal of Israeli forces from nreas occupied in the June 1967 War; termination of all states of belligerency; acknowledgment of the sovereignty of all states in the area-including Israel-within secure and recognised boundaries; freedom of navigation on all international waterways in the area; and a just settlement of the refugee problem. Jordan, Egypt, and Israel all accepted this resolution in principle but each country interpreted it differently. King Hussain has been the most consistent advocate of UN Resolution 242. He viewed it as the most viable means by which the Palestinian problem could be resolved while also preserving an important Jordanian role in the West Bank. The intractability of the Palestinian problem has been due, in large part, to the widely differing perspectives that evolved after the June 1967 War. For the Israelis, in the midst of the nationalist euphoria that followed the war, talk of exchanging newly captured territories for peace had little public appeal. The government of Levi Eshkol followed a two-track policy with respect to the territories that

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would continue under future Labour Party governments: on the one hand, it stated a willingness to negotiate, while on the other. it laid plans to create Jewish settlements in the disputed territories. Thus, immediately following the war, Eshkol stated that he was willing to negotiate "everything" for a full peace, which would include free passage through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran and a solution to the refugee problem in the context of regional cooperation. This was followed in November 1967 with his acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242. At the same time, Eshkol's government announced plans for the resettlement of the Old City of Jerusalem, of the Etzion Bloc (kibbutzim on the Bethlehem-Hebron road wiped out by Palestinians in the 1948-49 War), and for kibbutzim in the northern sector of the Golan Heights. Plans also were unveiled for new neighbourhoods around Jerusalem, near the old buildings of Hebrew University and near the Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus. The 1967 defeat radicalised the Palestinians, who had looked to the Arab countries to defeat first the Yishuv (the Jewish community of Palestine before 1948), and after 1948 the State of Israel, so that they could regain their homeland. The PLO had no role in the June 1967 War. After the succession of Arab failures in conventional warfare against Israel, however, the Palestinians decided to adopt guerrilla warfare tactics as the most effective method of attacking and defeating Israel. In February 1969, Arafat (who remained the leader of Al-Fatah) became head of the PLO. By early 1970, at least seven guerrilla organisations were identified in Jordan. One of the most important organisations was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash. Although the PLO sought to integrate these various groups and announced from time to time that this process had occurred, they were never effectively united. At first by conviction and then by political necessity, Hussain sought accommodation with the Fedayeen and provided training sites and assistance. In Jordan's internal politics, however, the main issue between 1967 and 1971 was the struggle between the government and the guerrilla organisations for political control of the country. Based in the refugee camps, the Fedayeen virtually developed a state within a state, easily obtaining funds and arms from both the Arab states and Eastern Europe and openly flouting Jordanian law. As the guerrilla effort mounted, Israel retaliated qUickly and with

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increasing effectiveness. In March 1968, an Israeli brigade attacked the Jordanian village of Al-Karamah, said to be the guerrilla capital. Although the brigade inflicted damage, it was driven back and in the process suffered substantial losses. The incident boosted Palestinian morale and gave the PLO instant prestige within the Arab community. In reprisal, Israel launched heavy attacks on Irbid in June 1968 and on As Salt in August. It soon became obvious to the PLO that the generally open terrain of the West Bank did not provide the kind of cover needed for classic guerrilla operations. Moreover, the Palestinian population residing in the territories had not formed any significant armed resistance against the Israeli occupation. By late 1968, the main Fedayeen activities in Jordan seemed to shift from fighting Israel to attempts to overthrow Hussain. A major guerrilla-government confrontation occurred in November 1968 when the government sought to disarm the refugee camps, but civil war was averted by a compromise that favoured the Palestinians. The threat to Hussain's authority and the heavy Israeli reprisals that followed each guerrilla attack became a matter of grave concern to the King. His loyal Bedouin army attempted to suppress guerrilla activity, which led to sporadic outbursts of fighting between the Fedayeen and the army during the first half of 1970. In June 1970, an Arab mediation committee intervened to halt two weeks of serious fighting between the two sides. In June Hussain designated Abd-ul-Munim Rifai to head a "reconciliation" cabinet that included more opposition elements than any other government since that of Nabulsi in 1957. Although the composition of the cabinet maintained a traditional balance between the East Bank and the West Bank. it included a majority of guerrilla sympathisers, particularly in the key portfolios of defence, foreign affairs, and interior. But the king's action did not reflect a new domestic policy; rather, it indicated Hussain's hope that a nationalist cabinet would support peace negotiations generated by a proposed UN peace mission to be conducted by Gunnar Jarring. On June 9, 1970, Rifai and Arafat signed an agreement conciliatory to the Fedayeen. According to its provisions, the government allowed the commandos freedom of movement within Jordan, agreed to refrain from anti-guerrilla action, and expressed its support for the Fedayeen in the battle against Israel. In return, the commandos pledged to

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remove their bases from Amman and other major cities, to withdraw armed personnel from the Jordanian capital, and to show respect for law and order. Small-scale clashes continued throughout the summer of 1970, however; and by early September, the guerrilla groups controlled several strategic positions in Jordan, including the oil refinery near Az Zarqa. Meanwhile, the Fedayeen were also calling for a general strike of the Jordanian population and were organising a civil disobedience campaign. The situation became explosive when, as part of a guerrilla campaign to undermine the Jarring peace talks to which Egypt, Israel, and Jordan had agreed, the PFLP launched an airplane hijacking campaign. Within the space of two hours on September 6, PFLP gangs hijacked a TWA jet, a Swiss air jet, and made an unsuccessful attempt to seize control of an EI ai-airplane. About two hours later, another PFLP group hijacked a Pan Am jet and forced the crew to fly to Beirut airport, where the airplane landed almost out of fuel. The next day the airliner was flown to the Cairo airport, where it was blown up only seconds after the 176 pass.engers and crew had completed their three-minute forced evacuation. King Hussain viewed the hijackings as a direct threat to his authority in Jordan. In response, on September 16 he reaffirmed martial law and named Brigadier Muhammad Daud to head a cabinet composed of army officers. At the same time, the king appointed Field Marshal Habis al-Majali, a fiercely proroyalist Bedouin, commander in chief of the armed forces and military governor of Jordan. Hussain gave Majali full powers to implement the martial law regulations and to quell the Fedayeen. The new government immediately ordered the Fedayeen to lay down their arms and t~ evacuate the cities. On the same day, Arafat became supreme commander of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) , the regular military force of the PLo. During a bitterly fought ten-day civil war, primarily between the PLA and Jordan Arab Army, Syria sent about 200 tanks to aid the Fedayeen. On September 17, however, Iraq began a rapid withdrawal of its 12,000-man force stationed near Az Zarqa. The United States Navy dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, and Israel undertook "precautionary military deployments" to aid Hussain,

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if necessary, against the guerrilla forces. Under attack from the Jordanian army and in response to outside pressures, the Syrian forces began to withdraw from Jordan on September 24, having lost more than half their armour in fighting with the Jordanians. The Fedayeen found themselves on the defensive throughout Jordan and agreed on September 25 to a ceasefire. At the urging of the Arab heads of state, Hussain and Arafat signed the ceasefire agreement in Cairo on September 27. The agreement called for rapid withdrawal of the guerrilla forces from Jordanian cities and towns to positions "appropriate" for continuing the battle with Israel and for the release of prisoners by both sides. A supreme supervisory committee was to implement the provisions of the agreement. On September 26, Hussain appointed a new cabinet; however, army officers continued to head the key defence and interior ministries. On October 13, Hussain and Arafat signed a further agreement in Amman, under which the Fedayeen were to recognise Jordanian sovereignty and the king's authority, to withdraw their armed forces from towns and villages, and to refrain from carrying arms outside their camps. In return the government agreed to grant amnesty to the Fedayeen for incidents that had occurred during the civil war. The civil war caused great material destruction in Jordan, and the number of fighters killed on all sides was estimated as high as 3,500. In spite of the September and October agreements, fighting continued, particularly in Amman, Irbid, and Jarash, where guerrilla forces had their main bases. Hussain appointed Wasfi at Tal as his new Prime Minister and Minister of Defence to head a cabinet of fifteen civilian and two military members. The cabinet also included seven Palestinians. Tal, known to be a staunch opponent of the guerrilla movement, was directed by Hussain to comply with the ceasefire agreements; furthermore, according to Hussain's written directive, the government's policy was to be based on "the restoration of confidence between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestinian resistance movement, cooperation with the Arab states, the strengthening of national unity, striking with an iron hand at all persons spreading destructive rumours, paying special attention to the armed forces and the freeing of the Arab lands occupied by Israel in the war of June 1967." The closing months of 1970 and the first six months of 1971 were marked by

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a series of broken agreements and by continued battles between the guerrilla forces and the Jordanian army, which continued its drive to oust the Fedayeen from the populated areas. Persistent pressure by the army compelled the Fedayeen to withdraw from Amman in April 1971. Feeling its existence threatened, Al-Fatah abandoned its earlier posture of non-involvement in the internal affairs of an Arab state and issued a statement demanding the overthrow of the Jordanian "puppet separatist authority." In a subsequent early May statement, it called for "national rule" in Jordan. Against this background of threats to his authority, Hussain struck at the remaining guerrilla forces in Jordan. In response to rumours that the PLO was planning to form a government-in-exile, Hussain in early June directed Tal to "deal conclusively and without hesitation with the plotters who want to establish a separate Palestinian state and destroy the unity of the Jordanian and Palestinian people." On July 13, the Jordanian army undertook an offensive against Fedayeen bases about fifty kilometres northwest of Amman in the Ajlun area-the Fedayeen last stronghold. Tal announced that the Cairo and Amman agreements, which had regulated relations between the Fedayeen and the Jordanian governments, were no longer operative. On July 19, the government announced that the remainder of the bases in northern Jordan had been destroyed and that 2,300 of the 2,500 Fedayeen had been arrested. A few days later, many of the captured Palestinians were released either to leave for other Arab countries or to return to a peaceful life in Jordan. Hussain became virtually isolated from the rest of the Arab world, which accused him of harsh treatment of the Fedayeen and denounced him as being responsible for the deaths of so many of his fellow Arabs. In November members of the Black September terrorist groupwho took their name from the civil war of September 1970-avenged the deaths of fellow Fedayeen by assassinating Prime Minister Tal in Cairo. In December the group again struck out against Hussain in an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Jordanian ambassador to Britain. Hussain alleged that Libya's Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi was involved in a plot to overthrow the monarchy. In March 1973, Jordanian courts convicted seventeen Black September Fedayeen charged with plotting to kidnap the Prime

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Minister and other cabinet ministers and to hold them hostage in exchange for the release of a few hundred Fedayeen captured during the civil war. Hussain subsequently commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment "for humanitarian reasons" and, in response to outside Arab pressures, in September released the prisoners-including their leader Muhammad Daud Auda (also known as Abu Daud) under a general amnesty.

War and Diplomacy After his victory over the Fedayeen, Hussain sought to re-establish his authority in the country and his image in the Arab world through the implementation of dynamic domestic and foreign policies. In September 1971, he announced the formation of the Jordanian National Union to serve as the nation's sole authorised political organisation, representing-at least in theory-both banks of the Jordan. The union was not a political party in the traditional sense but, according to the king, would be used "as a melting pot for the Jordanian people." With the exception of communists, Marxists, and "other advocates of foreign ideologies," all citizens were eligible for membership within the union, which would "provide constructive opposition from within its own ranks." Hussain also introduced a plan for the creation of a federation to be called the United Arab Kingdom. Under the plan, the West Bank and the East Bank would become autonomous provinces within the sovereign Hashemiate kingdom. Seats in the National Assembly would continue to be divided equally among representatives of the two regions. The PLO repudiated the United Arab Kingdom and the Jordanian National Union, and neither plan was ever implemented. Hussain paid a state visit to the United States in February 1973 during which President Richard M. Nixon assured him of his "firm ... support for Jordan" and promised increased economic and military aid. During interviews Hussain, who earlier had called for United States intervention to bring about a comprehensive Middle East settlement, reaffirmed that he contemplated no partial or separate agreements with Israel that would be prejudicial to Arab unity, but he left the door open for bilateral talks and condemned the PLO for its divisive influence. On his return to Amman, Hussain re-emphasised that all of East Jerusalem must be returned but offered to put the holy places there under international supervision.

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At the Arab summit in Cairo in September 1973, a reconciliation mediated by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia took place between Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the "front-line" or confrontation states against Israel. On October 6, less than a month after the meeting, Egyptian and Syrian armies launched simultaneous attacks across the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights that caught the Israelis by surprise. After initially threatening to break through Israel's inner defences, the Syrians were checked and then thrown back by an Israeli counteroffensive that drove to within thirty kilometres of the strong defence emplacements surrounding Damascus. By October 10, Jordan had mobilised nearly 70,000 men, forcing Israeli troops to deploy in the West Bank. Hussain did not open a third front against Israel but he sent 3,000 Jordanian troops in two armoured brigades to the Golan front on October 13, and they saw limited action under Syrian command in fighting near Lake Tiberias. More than 25,000 regular Palestinian troops also were engaged under separate command. With the Arab armies in retreat, the Soviet Union called a special session of the UN Security Council on October 21 to impose an immediate ceasefire. Although accepted by Israel and Egypt, the ceasefire did not become effective for another three days. On the northern front, Israeli troops retained control of the Golan Heights, and in the southwest they had opened bridgeheads across the Suez Canal and occupied more than 1,500 square kilometres of territory in Egypt. UN Security Council Resolution 338, submitted on October 22, reiterated the Security Council's position on Israelioccupied territory, first expressed in Resolution 242 in 1967. At a postmortem on the fourth Arab-Israeli war held in November in Algiers, the Jurdanian representative stressed that the ceasefire did not mean peace and called again for Israel to evacuate the occupied territories that combined Arab forces had failed to win back in battle. Over Jordanian protests, the summit conference voted to recognise the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Hussain, who conceded in Amman that he did not claim to speak for the Palestinians, supported their right to self-determination"but," he added, "only after the occupied territories are liberated." Hussain stated on more than one occasion his willingness to leave the liberation of the West Bank to the PLO, but he pointedly boycotted a meeting with PLO officials in Cairo at which Egypt and

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Syria were expected to deal with the PLO as the "only legitimate representatives" of the Palestinian people-a position that Hussain admitted he had no alternative but to accept in practice. President Anwar as Sadat of Egypt, however, warned the PLO that its refusal to cooperate with Hussain could lead to an Arab civil war on a broader scale than that of 1970-71. When the Palestinians refused to compromise their claim to total sovereignty in the West Bank, Hussain requested a postponement of the Arab summit scheduled for Rabat in October 1974. The purpose of the summit was to give formal recognition to the PLO's role. In an abrupt turnabout in policy, Egyptian foreign minister Ismail Fahmi responded by declaring that Egypt now opposed the return of the West Bank to Jordan and accepted without reservation the PLO claim to represent the Palestinian people.

Rabat Summit The Rabat Summit conference in October 1974 brought together the leaders of twenty Arab states, including Hussain, and representatives of the PLo. PLO leaders threatened a walkout if their demands for unconditional recognition were not met. The PLO required a statement from the conference that any Palestinian territory liberated by Arab forces would be turned over to the "Palestinian people" as represented by their organisation. Jordan protested, pointing out that recognition on these terms would give the PLO sovereignty over half of the population in the East Bank and that in fact the annexation of the West Bank had been approved by popular vote. A compromise solution was adopted that, nonetheless, favoured PLO interests. The conference formally acknowledged the right of the Palestinian people to a separate homeland, but without specifying that its territory was restricted to the West Bank. Most important, the PLO was for the first time officially recognised by all the Arab states as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." The Arab heads of state also called for close cooperation between the front-line states and the PLO but prohibited interference by other Arab states in Palestinian affairs. The Rabat Summit declaration conferred a mantle of legitimacy on the PLO that was previously absent. It gave official Arab recognition to PLO territorial claims to the West Bank and unambiguously put

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the fate of the Palestinian people solely in the hands of the PLO. Hussain opposed the declaration, although he eventually signed it under intense Arab pressure and after the Arab oil-producing states promised to provide Jordan with an annual subsidy of SUS 300 million. Despite his acquiescence to the Rabat declaration and subsequent statements in support of the PLO, Hussain persisted in viewing the declaration as an ambiguous document that was open to differing interpretations. The PLO, along with the rest of the Arab world, viewed Hussain's consent at Rabat as a renunciation of Jordanian claims to the West Bank. Hussain, nonetheless, continued to have aspirations concerning Jordanian control of the occupied territories. The wide gulf separating the two views was the major source of tension between the PLO and Jordan throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. FollOWing the Rabat Summit, the PLO scored an impressive political victory in the international arena. In late November 1974, the UN recognised PLO representation of the Palestinian people, and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat addressed the General Assembly in Arabic, his pistol at his side. In addition, in a joint communique issued the same month, President Gerald R. Ford of the United States and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev acknowledged the "legitimate interests" of the Palestinians in accordance with the UN resolutions. Nonetheless, a UN draft resolution in 1976 proposing to reaffirm the right of the Palestinians to self-determination-and including the right to establish an independent state-was vetoed in the Security Council by the United States, which called instead for a "reasonable and acceptable definition of Palestinian interests." After the Rabat Summit, Hussain stressed the need for Jordanian political self-sufficiency. He told his subjects, "a new reality exists and Jordan must adjust to it. The West Bank is no longer Jordanian." But having surrendered title to half his kingdom at the behest of the Arab states, Hussain confessed concern that the East Bank might become a "substitute Palestine," swallowed up as the balance of political power there shifted to its Palestinian majority. The tone of Hussain's approach to the Palestinians in the East Bank changed markedly following the Rabat Summit. He advised that the resident Palestinians-estimated at 900,000 or more-must

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choose between Jordanian citizenship or Palestinian identity. No attempt would be made to oust those who chose the latter, he said, and they would be permitted to remain in Jordan as "guests." He also insisted that any Palestinian choosing to keep his Jordanian citizenship must be allowed to do so without endangering his rights in the West Bank; he further promised that any Palestinian living in the East Bank who chose to identify his interests with those of the "Palestinian people" could do so without jeopardising his rights as a Jordanian citizen. In response to the new political situation following the Rabat Summit, Hussain reorganised Jordan's political and administrative institutions. On November 9, he amended the Constitution to give the king authority to dissolve the House of Representatives and to delay elections as he saw fit. Using this constitutional prerogative, Hussain dissolved the lower house of the National Assembly-the elected House of Representatives-when it had completed its work on November 23. The House of Representatives, half of whose sixty members represented West Bank constituencies, could no longer function without undermining the newly recognised representative status of the PLO. The Constitution was amended to provide for the indefinite postponement of elections for a new House of Representatives so as to avoid elections on the East Bank alone, which if held would have symbolised the final separation of the West Bank from Jordan. In addition to dissolVing the House of Representatives, Hussain directed Prime Minister Zaid ar Rifai to form a new government that did not include Palestinians from the West Bank. No move was made, however, to relieve Palestinians in the Jordanian army, where they composed one-third of the officer corps, albeit mostly in noncombatant functions. The government also continued to pay the salaries of 6,000 civil servants and teachers in the West Bank, which amounted to about US$ 40 million a year.

As a result of Hussain's partial reversal from the commitments made at Rabat, Jordanian-PLO relations deteriorated throughout much of 1975. At the year's end, however, the Palestine National Council, meeting in Damascus, backed an effort to reconcile its differences with Hussain. The broadcast of anti regime propaganda was temporarily suspended and, although PLA units remained stationed in Jordan in military camps, the PLO accepted restrictions

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on its political and military presence there. At the Arab summit conference held at Cairo in January 1976, Jordan and the PLO once again were embroiled in a dispute over Jordan's role in negotiating an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Jordan declared that it had no responsibility for negotiating such a withdrawal. In response, the PLO resumed its hostile propaganda shortly after the meeting. In February 1976, Hussain summoned an extraordinary session of the National Assembly-attended by about half of the representatives elected from the West Bank-to enact legislation enabling the king to postpone indefinitely the general elections scheduled for later in the month. The king's spokespersons explained that the action was necessary because of "compelling circumstances" that prevailed in the country. That same month, Hussain abolished the Jordanian National Union. In July Zaid ar Rifai, who had led the government since 1973, stepped down as Prime Minister. Hussain replaced him with Mudar Badran, chief of the royal court. The Badran government set up the Bureau of Occupied Homeland Affairs, headed by former members of parliament from West Bank constituencies, ostensibly to coordinate and advise on relations with Palestinians in Israeli-occupied territory. The government also conducted discussions on the renewed possibility of some form of federation between the West Bank and the East Bank. The PLO charged that the newly created Bureau of Occupied Homeland Affairs had been formed to channel support to proJordanian candidates in municipal elections to be held in the West Bank in April 1977. Badran denied these allegations and reaffirmed Jordan's commitment to the concept that the Palestinians themselves must decide the future of the West Bank. PLO-backed candidates won an overwhelming victory in the April elections.

Camp David Accord During the spring of 1977, the international climate strongly supported some type of superpower-sanctioned settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Newly elected United States president Jimmy Carter and Soviet leader Brezhnev advocated a comprehensive ArabIsraeli settlement that would include autonomy for the Palestinians. On October 1, 1977, in preparation for a reconvened Geneva Conference, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement committing themselves to a comprehensive settlement

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incorporating all parties concerned and all questions. The proposed summit, however, was pre-empted by events in Egypt. Jordan, like the rest of the Arab states, was taken by surprise by President Sadat's decision to travel to Jerusalem in November 1977. Hussain, however, muted his criticism of the Egyptian president's historic trip and called on the Arab states to reserve judgment. The king feared that an outright rejection of the Egyptian initiative might provoke an alienated Sadat to seek a separate agreement with Israel. He also saw many positive elements in Sadat's opening statement to the Knesset, such as his rejection of a separate settlement to the Palestinian problem, his emphasis on the need to find a solution to the Palestinian problem, the recognition of Jordan's special relationship with the West Bank, and the proposal to incorporate Jordan, rather than the PLO, into the peace process. Despite his enthusiasm for Sadat's speech, Hussain was reluctant to join the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. He feared that by joining the negotiations he would isolate Jordan in the Arab world, incur Syria's wrath, and potentially destabilise Palestinians on the East Bank with little possibility for Jordanian gains. Moreover. Hussain did not want to represent Palestinian interests at such negotiations unless he had a clear Arab and Palestinian mandate to do so. The final version of the Camp David Accords signed by Egyptian president Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and United States president Carter separated the issues of the future of the West Bank and the return of Sinai. Whereas the sections dealing with the return of Sinai were very explicit, the sections on the West Bank were vague and open to various interpretations. They called for Egypt, Israel, and "the representatives of the Palestinian people to negotiate about the future of the West Bank and Gaza." A five-year period of "transitional autonomy" was called for "to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority." The agreement also called for peace talks between Israel and its other Arab neighbours, particularly Syria. The Camp David Accords fell far short of meeting even Jordan's minimal demands. Hussain expressed anger that Jordan was included in the Camp David framework without his prior knowledge or approval. He viewed the division of the accords into two agreements with no linkage between Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and progress on the Palestinian issue as a sign that Sadat was more interested in regaining

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Sinai than in brokering a viable peace settlement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hussain was further alienated from the Camp David peace process because Israel refused to negotiate over East Jerusalem, insisted on its rights to establish settlements in the occupied territories, and reserved the right to demand sovereignty over those areas at the end of the transition period. Following the signing of the Camp David Accords, Jordan accepted an Iraqi invitation-accompanied by a US$ 30 million Iraqi grantto attend the Baghdad Conference. The summit conference's decision to allot to Jordan the relatively large sum of US$ 1.25 billion per year helped keep Jordan in the Arab fold. At the Baghdad Conference held in November 1978, the Arab states unequivocally rejected the Camp David Accords and officially ostracised Egypt from the Arab League. Jordanian-Egyptian relations deteriorated even further after the signing of the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. The Israeli government's limited view of Palestinian autonomy became apparent shortly after the peace treaty was signed. In April the Begin government approved two new settlements between Ram Allah and Nabulus, established civilian regional councils for the Jewish settlements in the territories, and prepared autonomy plans in which Israel would keep exclusive control over the West Bank's water, communications, roads, public order, and immigration into the territories. The acceleration of settlements, the growth of an increasingly militaristic Jewish settler movement, and Israel's stated desire to retain complete control over resources in the territories precluded the participation in the peace process of either moderate Palestinians, such as the newly formed National Guidance Committee composed of West Bank mayors, or of Hussain. The PLO refused from the beginning to participate in the peace process. In response, the Jordanian government recalled its ambassador from Cairo on March 28 and on April 1 it severed diplomatic relations with Egypt. Not all ties were broken, however; the Jordanian and Egyptian airlines still flew about ten flights a week between their respective cities and, most important, Egyptian workers in Jordan continued to enjoy the same status as before. The Jordanian media and public officials intensified anti-Israel rhetoric, shOWing particular hostility towards the United States for supporting the accords. Hussain's

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greatest fear was that. with Egypt removed from the Arab-Israeli military balance, Israel might be tempted to transform the East Bank into an "alternative homeland" for the Palestinians. Jordanian fears were fuelled when, at the end of March 1979, Israeli minister of agriculture Ariel Sharon issued a statement to the effect that the Palestinians ought to take over Jordan and establish a government there. Hussain, although fully backing the Baghdad accords, sought a very different objective than the more hard-line Arab states such as Syria and Iraq. His goal was not to punish Egypt or overthrow Sadat, but rather to set up an alternative strategy to the Camp David framework supported by an Arab consensus that would provide a more equitable and viable solution to the Middle East conflict. The essence of the Jordanian alternative was to return the Palestinian problem either to the UN Security Councilor to the Geneva Conference where all the relevant parties-including the United States, the Soviet Union, and the European Economic Community-could work together in reaching a comprehensive Middle East peace plan. Hussain's attempt to develop a united Arab stand did not succeed. At the Tunis Summit of November 1979, in the face of strong Syrian objections, Hussain was unable to mobilise an Arab consensus behind an alternative to the Camp David Accords. Syrian president Asad's strong objections to Hussain's proposal marked the beginning of rapid deterioration in Syrian-Jordanian relations. Hussain was further rebuffed when Asad revived the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front consisting of Syria, Libya, Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), and the PLo. The Syrian leader accused Jordan of supporting Syrian elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been involved in a series of attacks against his regime. Although Syria continued to be a major Soviet ally in the Middle East, Jordan joined nearly the entire Arab world in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Finally, Syria, unlike Jordan, was unwilling to participate in any alternative to the Camp David Accords.

Eventful Decade The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in February 1979 and tbe emergence of Ayatullah Sayyid Ruhullah Musavi Khomeini caused

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grave concern in Amman. The vehement anti-Western, antimonarchical, Islamic revolutionary fervour sweeping Iran throughout 1979 cast a threatening shadow over Jordan. Not only was Hussain a monarch allied with the West, but he also had been a close ally of the Shah for many years.

Islamic Revolution and New Arab Alignment Hussain followed a two-track policy to counteract the looming Iranian threat. One track was domestic; the other, foreign. Domestically, he made a more concerted effort to appear religiously observant in public and to emphasise Islam in the day-to-day life of Jordan. He also increased financial support for mosques and Islamic charities and encouraged the payment of zakat (the Muslim religious tax) by exempting those who paid it during the month of Ramadan from 25 per cent of their income tax. In addition, during the month of Ramadan some of the provincial governors closed down bars and nightclubs on some religious holidays and banned films described as obscene. For most of his reign, Hussain had appeased the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups in Jordan as a way of counterbalancing the more radical and, in his view, more destabilising groups such as the Communists, Baathists, and Nasserists. Although the Muslim Brotherhood came out in support of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the organisation in Jordan was not prepared to challenge openly the authority of the Hashemiate regime that opposed the Iranian Revolution. Hussain altered Jordan's Arab alignments in response to the new regional balance of power caused by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the growing rift with Syria. The focus of Jordan's new regional outlook was improved relations with Iraq. Both countries saw ominous implications in the developments in Iran. Moreover, with Egypt no longer in the Arab fold, Jordan sought an Arab military alliance capable of deterring a more militaristic regime in Israel from meddling in Jordanian affairs. Hussain also needed Iraqi support to stave off the Syrian threat, which had grown significantly during 1980. Finally, Baghdad and Amman feared the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its implications for the regional balance of power. After a series of high-level meetings in the early 1980s, a wide

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range of exchanges took place. Iraq greatly increased economic assistance to Jordan and discussed a possible project for supplying Jordan with water from the Euphrates. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 further tightened relations. From the beginning of the war, Jordan was the most outspoken of the Arab states supporting Iraq. The Iraqi connection became increasingly important as tensions mounted between Jordan and Syria. Between September 1980 and late 1981, Jordan reportedly received US$ 400 million in economic aid from Iraq. In October 1981, an Iraqi-Jordanian Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation was set up. Jordan's most demonstrative act of support for the Iraqi war effort occurred in January 1982 when Hussain announced the formation of the Yarmuk Brigade, a Jordanian force of volunteers that pledged to fight for Iraq. Throughout 1982, as Iran scored significant victories in the IranIraq War, Jordan substantially increased its support to Iraq. AlAqabah replaced the besieged Iraqi port of Basra as Iraq's major marine transportation point. During 1981 and 1982, the turmoil besetting the Arab states both benefited and threatened Jordan. Egypt, the most populous and militarily strongest Arab country, was ostracised; Syria faced serious domestic unrest and a growing rebellion in Lebanon; Iraq seemed to be losing its war with Iran and was in danger of losing strategically important territory in the south; Syria and Iraq were hostile to each other; and the Persian Gulf states were suffering from the downturn in world oil prices. The weakness of the other Arab states enabled Jordan to play a more important role in Arab politics and allowed Hussain to pursue a more flexible regional diplomacy. Jordan's improved status in the Arab world resulted in Amman hosting its first Arab summit in November 1981. Hussain reportedly hoped to obtain a breakthrough on the Palestinian question and to mobilise support for the Iraqi war effort. The summit, however, was boycotted by members of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front led by Syria. In a<..:dition, Syria had massed troops on the Jordanian border. Hussain countered by mobilising a force of equal strength on the Syrian border. Although the situation was eventually diffused through Saudi mediation efforts, the potential for future SyrianJordanian conflict remained

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4 Geography Jordan is situated in South West Asia, northwest of Saudi Arabia. It is considered one of the fifteen states that comprise the so-called "Cradle of Humanity". The territory of Jordan covers about 92,300 square kilometres. Until 1988, when King Hussain relinquished Jordan's claim to the West Bank, that area was considered part of Jordan, although officially recognised as such by only the United Kingdom and Pakistan. At that time the West Bank-which encompasses about 5,880 square kilometres-had been under Israeli occupation since the June 1967 War between Israel and the states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Jordan is landlocked except at its southern extremity, where nearly twenty-six kilometres of shoreline along the Gulf of Aqaba provide access to the Red Sea. A great north-south geological rift, forming the depression of Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), the Jordan Valley, and the Dead Sea, is the dominant topographical feature. Jordan is a relatively small country situated at the junction of the Levantine and Arabian areas of the Middle East. The country is bordered on the north by Syria, to the east by Iraq, and by Saudi Arabia on the east and south. To the west is Israel and the occupied West Bank, while Jordan's only outlet to the sea, the Gulf of Aqabah, is to the south. Jordan occupies an area of approximately 96,188 square kilometres including the Dead Sea, making it similar in size to Austria or Portugal. However, Jordan's diverse terrain and landscape belie its actual size, demonstrating a variety usually found only in large countries.

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Western Jordan has essentially a Mediterranean climate with a hot, dry summer, a cool, wet winter and two short transitional seasons. However, about 75 per cent of the country can be described as having a desert climate with less than 200 mm. of rain annually. Jordan can be divided into three main geographic and climatic areas: the Jordan Valley, the Mountain Heights Plateau, and the eastern desert, or Badia region. Except for small sections of the borders with Israel and Syria, Jordan's international boundaries do not follow well-defined natural features of the terrain. The country's boundaries were established by various international agreements, and, with the obvious exception of the border with Israel, none was in dispute in early 1989. The de jure border with Israel is based on the Armistice line agreed on in April 1949 by Israel and what was then Trans-Jordan, following negotiations held under the auspices of a United Nations (UN) mediator. In general, the border represents the battle positions held by Trans-Jordanian and Israeli forces when a ceasefire went into effect and has no relation to economic or administrative factors. Until the Israeli occupation of the West Bank that occurred during the June 1967 War (also known as the Six Day War), the demarcation line divided the city of Jerusalem, with Jordan holding the Old City and most of the holy places. Jordan's boundaries with Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia do not have the special significance that the border with Israel does; these borders have not always hampered tribal nomads in their movements, yet for a few groups borders did separate them from traditional grazing areas and water sources. By the time political boundaries were drawn across the deserts around Trans-Jordan after World War I, most of the nomadic tribes in that region had longest abolished areas lying within the confines of the new state. To accommodate the few cases where tribal peoples traditionally had moved back and forth across the country's borders, agreements with neighbOUring countries recognised the principle of freedom of grazing and provided for a continuation of migratory practices, subject to certain regulations. The border between Jordan and Saudi Arabia (only partially delimited by a series of agreements between Britain and the government of what eventually became Saudi Arabia) was first formally defined in the Hadda Agreement of 1925. In 1965 Jordan

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and Saudi Arabia concluded a bilateral agreement that realigned and delimited the boundary. The realignment resulted in some exchange of territory, and Jordan's coastline on the Gulf of Aqabah was lengthened by about eighteen kilometres. The new boundary enabled Jordan to expand its port facilities and established a zone in which the two parties agreed to share petroleum revenues equally if oil were discovered. The agreement also protected the pasturage and watering rights of nomadic tribes inside the exchanged territories. The Jordan Valley, which extends down the entire western flank of Jordan, is the country's most distinctive natural feature. The Jordan Valley forms part of the Great Rift Valley of Africa, which extends down from southern Turkey through Lebanon and Syria to the salty depression of the Dead Sea, where it continues south through Aqabah and the Red Sea to eqstern Africa. This fissure was created 20 million years ago by shifting tectonic plates. The northern segment of the Jordan Valley, known in Arabic as the Ghor, is the nation's most fertile region. It contains the Jordan River and extends from the northern border down to the Dead Sea. The Jordan River rises from several sources, mainly the Anti-Lebanon Mountains in Syria, and flows down into Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee), 212 metres below sea level. It then drains into the Dead Sea, which, at 407 metres below sea level, is the lowest point on earth. The river is between 20 and 30 metres wide near its endpoint. Its flow has been much reduced and its salinity increased because significant amounts have been diverted for irrigational uses. Several degrees warmer than the rest of the country, its year-round agricultural climate, fertile soils, higher winter rainfall and extensive summer irrigation have made the Ghor the food bowl of Jordan. The Jordan River ends at the Dead Sea. It is landlocked and fed by the Jordan River and runoff from side wadis. With no outlet to the sea, intense evaporation concentrates its mineral salts and produces a hyper saline solution. The sea is saturated with salt and mineralsits salt content is about eight times higher than that of the world's ocean-and earns its name by virtue of the fact that it supports no indigenous plant or animal life. The Dead Sea and the neighbouring Zarqa Maeen hot springs are famous for their therapeutic mineral waters, drawing visitors from all over the world. South of the Dead Sea, the Jordan Valley runs on through hot,

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dry Wadi 'Araba. This spectacular valley is 155 kilometres long and is known for the sheer, barren sides of its mountains. Its primary economic contribution is through potash mining. Wadi 'Araba rises from 300 metres below sea level at its northern end to 355 metres above sea level at Jabal Risha, and then drops down again to sea level at Aqabah. The seaside city of Aqabah is Jordan's only outlet to the sea. Its 40 kilometre-long coastline houses not only a tourist resort and Jordan's only port, but also some of the finest coral reefs in the world. The rich marine life of these reefs provides excellent opportunities for snorkelling and diving. The highlands of Jordan separate the Jordan Valley and its margins from the plains of the eastern desert. This region extends the entire length of the western part of the country, and hosts most of Jordan's main population centres, including Amman, Zarqa, Irbid and Karak. We know that ancient peoples found the area inviting as well, since one can visit the ruins of Jerash, Karak, Madaba, Petra and other historical sites, which are found in the Mountain Heights Plateau. These areas receive Jordan's highest rainfall, and are the most richly vegetated in the country. The region, which extends from Umm Qais in the north to Ras-un-Naqab in the south, is intersected by a number of valleys and riverbeds known as wadis. The Arabic word wadi means a watercourse valley, which mayor may not flow with water after substantial rainfall. All of the wadis, which intersect this plateau, including Wadi Mujib, Wadi Mousa, Wadi Hassa and Wadi Zarqa, eventually flow into the Jordan River, the Dead Sea or the usually dry Jordan Rift. Elevation in the highlands varies conSiderably, from 600 metres to about 1,500 metres above sea level, with temperature and rainfall patterns varying accordingly. The northern part of the Mountain Heights Plateau, known as the northern highlands, extends southwards from Umm Qais to just north of Amman, and displays a typical Mediterranean climate and vegetation. This region was known historically as the Land of Gilead, and is characterised by higher elevations and cooler temperatures. South and east of the northern highlands are the northern steppes, which serve as a buffer between the highlands and the eastern desert. The area, which extends from Irbid through Mafraq and Madaba all the way south to Karak, was formerly covered in steppe vegetation. Much of this has been lost to decertification, however. In the south,

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the Sharra highlands extend from Shobak south to Ras-un-Naqab. This high altitude plain receives little annual rainfall and is consequently lightly vegetated. Comprising around 75 per cent of Jordan, this area of desert and desert steppe is part of what is known as the North Arab Desert. It stretches into Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, with elevations varying between 600 and 900 metres above sea level. Climate in the Badia varies widely between day and night, and between summer and winter. Daytime summer temperatures can exceed 40°C, while winter nights can be very cold, dry and windy. Rainfall is minimal throughout the year, averaging less than 50 millimetres annually. Although all the regions of the Badia (or desert) are united by their harsh desert climate, similar vegetation types and sparse concentrations of population, they vary considerably according to their underlying geology. The volcanic formations of the northern Basalt Desert extend into Syria and Saudi Arabia, and are recognisable by the black basalt boulders, which cover the landscape. East of the Basalt Desert, the Rweishid Desert is an undulating limestone plateau, which extends to the Iraqi border. There is some grassland in this area, and some agriculture is practised there northeast of Amman, the Eastern Desert is crossed by a multitude of vegetated wadis, and includes the Azraq Oasis and the Shomari Wildlife Reserve. To the south of Amman is the Central Desert, while Wadi Sarhan on Jordan's eastern border drains north into Azraq. Al-Jafr Basin, south of the Central Desert, is crossed by a number of broad, sparsely vegetated wadis. South of Al-Jafr and east of the Rum Desert, Al-Mudawwara Desert is characterised by isolated hills and low Rocky Mountains separated by broad, sandy wadis. The most famous desert in Jordan is the Rum Desert, home of the wondrous Wadi Rum landscape. Towering sandstone mesas dominate this arid area, producing one of the most fantastic desert-scapes in the world. Throughout history, the land of Jordan has been renowned for its luxurious vegetation and wildlife. Ancient mosaics and stone engravings in Jawa and Wadi Qatif show pictures of Oryx, Capra ibex and oxen. Known in the Bible as the "land of milk and honey," the area was described by more recent historians and travellers as green and rich in wildlife. During the 20th century, however, the health of Jordan's natural habitat has declined significantly. Problems

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such as decertification, drought and over hunting have damaged the natural landscape and will take many years to rectify. Fortunately, Jordanians have taken great strides in recent years towards stopping and reversing the decline of their beautiful natural heritage. Even now, the Kingdom retains a rich diversity of animal and plant life that varies between the Jordan Valley, the Mountain Heights Plateau and the Badia Desert region.

Topography The country consists mainly of a plateau between 700 and 1,000 metres high, divided into ridges by valleys and gorges, and a few mountainous areas. Fractures of the earth's surface are evident in the great geological rift that extends southward from the Jordan Valley through the Gulf of Aqabah and the Red Sea, gradually disappearing south of the lake country of East Africa. By far the greatest part of the East Bank is desert, displaying the landforms and other features associated with great aridity. Most of this land is part of the great Syrian (or North Arabian) Desert. There are broad expanses of sand and dunes, particularly in the south and southeast, together with salt flats. Occasional jumbles of sandstone hills or low mountains support only meagre and stunted vegetation that thrives for a short period after the scanty winter rains. These areas support little life and are the least populated regions of Jordan. The drainage network is coarse and incised. In many areas the relief provides no eventual outlet to the sea, so that sedimentary deposits accumulate in basins where moisture evaporates or is absorbed in the ground. Towards the depression in the western part of the East Bank, the desert rises gradually into the Jordanian Highlands-a steppe country of high, deeply cut limestone plateaus with an average elevation of about 900 metres. Occasional summits in this region reach 1,200 metres in the northern part and exceed 1,700 metres in the southern part; the highest peak is Jabal Ramm at 1,754 metres. These highlands are an area of long-settled villages. Until about the 1940s, persons living in these villages depended upon rain-fed agriculture for their livelihood. The western edge of this plateau country forms an escarpment along the eastern side of the Jordan River-Dead Sea depression and its continuation south of the Dead Sea. Most of the wadis that provide

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drainage from the plateau country into the depression carry water only during the short season of winter rains. Sharply incised with deep, canyon like walls, whether wet or dry the wadis can be formidable obstacles to travel. The Jordan River is short, but from its mountain headwaters (approximately 160 kilometres north of the river's mouth at the Dead Sea) the riverbed drops from an elevation of about 3,000 metres above sea level to more than 400 metres below sea level. Before reaching Jordanian territory the river forms Lake Tiberias, the surface of which is 212 metres below sea level. The Jordan River's principal tributary is the Yarmuk River. Near the junction of the two rivers, the Yarmuk forms the boundary between Israel on the northwest, Syria on the northeast, and Jordan on the south. The Az Zarqa River, the second main tributary of the Jordan River, rises and empties entirely within the East Bank. A 380-kilometre-long rift valley runs from the Yarmuk River in the north to Al-Aqabah in the south. The northern part, from the Yarmuk River to the Dead Sea, is commonly known as the Jordan Valley. It is divided into eastern and western parts by the Jordan River. Bordered by a steep escarpment on both the eastern and the western side, the valley reaches a maximum width of twenty-two kilometres at some points. The valley is properly known as the Al-Ghawr (the depression, or valley, also seen as Al-Ghor). The rift valley on the southern side of the Dead Sea is known as the Southern Ghawr and the Wadi al-Jayb (popularly known as the Wadi al-Arabah). The Southern Ghawr runs from Wadi al-Hammah, on the south side of the Dead Sea, to Ghawr Faya, about twenty-five kilometres south of the Dead Sea. Wadi al-Jayb is 180 kilometres long, from the southern shore of the Dead Sea to Al-Aqabah in the south. The valley floor varies in level. In the south, it reaches its lowest level at the Dead Sea (more than 400 metres below sea levell, rising in the north to just above sea level. Evaporation from the sea is extreme due to year-round high temperatures. The water contains about 250 grams of dissolved salts per litter at the surface and reaches the saturation point at 110 metres. The Dead Sea occupies the deepest depression on the land surface of the earth. The depth of the depression is accentuated by the surrounding mounb.ins and highlands that rise to elevations of

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800 to 1,200 metres above sea level. The sea's greatest depth is about 430 metres, and it thus reaches a point more than 825 metres below sea level. A drop in the level of the sea has caused the former Lisan Peninsula to become a land bridge dividing the sea into separate northern and southern basins.

Jordan River The Jordan River is a river in South West Asia flowing through the Great Rift Valley into the Dead Sea. Its tributaries are the Hasbani, which flows from Lebanon, Banias, arising from a spring at Banias at the base of Mount Hermon and Dan, whose source is also at the base of Mount Hermon. The three merge to form the Jordan in northern Israel, near Kibbutz Sede Nehemya. The Jordan drops rapidly in a 75 kilometre run to swampy Lake Hula, which is slightly below sea level in the Rift Valley. Exiting the lake, it drops much more in about 25 kilometres to the Sea of Galilee. The last section has less gradient, and the river begins to meander before it enters the Dead Sea, which is about 400 metres below sea level and has no outlet. Two major tributaries enter from the east during this last phase, the Yarmouk River and Jabbok River. Its section north of Sea of Galilee is within the boundaries of Israel (disputed by Syria), and forms the western boundary of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heigljts. South of the lake, it forms the border between the kingdom of Jordan (to the east) and Israel (to the west). Further south, it forms the border between Jordan and the West Bank. In modern times the waters are 70 to 90 per cent used for human purposes and the flow is much reduced. Because of this and the high evaporation rate of the Dead Sea, the sea is shrinking. All the shallow waters of the southern end of the sea have been drained in modern times and are now salt flats. The waters of the Jordan are an extremely important resource to the dry lands of the area and are a bone of contention between Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians. Route 90 connects the northern and southern tips of Israel and parallels the Jordan River on the western side.

Madaba Plains The historical Madaba Plain is located in the highlands to the east of the northern tip of the Dead Sea. In addition to the town of

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Madaba, well known for its Byzantine mosaics, this region includes Mount Nebo, Hesban, Umm-e-Amad and many lesser known Jordanian villages and towns. It is a region mentioned in the Old Testament in stories involving the Moabites, the Ammonites and the Israelites. It also contains ruins of importance to our understanding of the Greco-Roman, Byzantine and Islamic centuries in Palestine. The event to which the Madaba Plains Project traces its origins is the launching of the Hesban Expedition by Siegfried H. Horn of the Theological Seminary at Andrews University in 1968. As its name suggests, this expedition had as its original mission not to study the history of Jordan's indigenous inhabitants, but to excavate Tell Hesban to see what light, if any, it could shed on Biblical stories about the conquest of the Hesban region by the Israelites (Numbers 21; Joshua 13). That the present-day site of Tell Hesban had once been the Hesban mentioned in the Bible in connection with these events is a claim, which most Biblical scholars had taken for, granted when the project began.

Given the Original mission of the Hesban Expedition, what was produced by the excavations at Tell Hesban was not what had been hoped for. Instead of extensive remains from the Biblical periods, the site produced a prolific quantity of material from the GrecoRoman (ca. 200 Be to AD 600) and especially the Ayyubid-Mamluk (ca. AD 1200 to 1450) periods. Fortunately, this situation did not lead to abandonment of further research at this site. Instead, it catalysed rethinking of the objectives of the entire project. Out of this rethinking emerged the Madaba Plains Project, which has identified as one of its explicit research foci to investigate the history of Jordan's resident Arab population. More specifically, what led to this new focus was the dilemma of how to account for shifts over time in the extent to which Tell Hesban was settled and in the intensity with which its surrounding region had been occupied. The picture, which our research had brought to light, was that of a region undergOing repeated cycles of filling up and emptying out of traces of permanent s~ttlements. Did people simply abandon the region during the emptying out phases of these cycles, or did they convert to nomadic ways, which left few archaeological traces? Were the people who settled down during the filling up phases of these cycles the descendants of the region's

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pre-existing nomadic population or were they primarily immigrants from elsewhere? What was the role of successive central government apparatuses on the one hand, and of tribal polities on the other, in facilitating these changes? These are the sorts of questions, which preoccupy much of the current research of the Madaba Plains Project.

Climate The major characteristic of the climate is the contrast between a relatively rainy season from November to April and very dry weather for the rest of the year. With hot, dry, uniform summers and cool, variable winters during which practically all of the precipitation occurs, the country has a Mediterranean-style climate. In general, the farther inland from the Mediterranean Sea a given part of the country lies, the greater are the seasonal contrasts in temperature and the less rainfall. Atmospheric pressures during the summer months are relatively uniform, whereas the winter months bring a succession of marked low-pressure areas and accompanying cold fronts. These cyclonic disturbances generally move eastward from over the Mediterranean Sea several times a month and result in sporadic precipitation. Most of the East Bank receives less than twelve centimetres of rain a year and may be classified as a dry desert or steppe region. Where the ground rises to form the highlands east of the Jordan Valley, precipitation increases to around thirty centimetres in the south and fifty or more centimetres in the north. The Jordan Valley, lying in the lee of high ground on the West Bank, forms a narrow climatic zone that annually receives up to thirty centimetres of rain in the northern reaches; rain dwindles to less than twelve centimetres at the head of the Dead Sea. The country's long summer reaches a peak during August. January is usually the coolest month. The fairly wide ranges of temperature during a twenty-four hour period are greatest during the summer months and have a tendency to increase with higher elevation and distance from the Mediterranean seacoast. Daytime temperatures during the summer months frequently exceed 36°C and average about 32°C. In contrast, the winter months-November to Aprilbring moderately cool and sometimes cold weather, averaging about 13°C. Except in the rift depression, frost is fairly common during the winter, and it occasionally snows in Amman.

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For a month or so before and after the summer dry season, hot, dry air from the desert, drawn by low pressure, produces strong winds from the south or southeast that sometimes reach gale force. Known in the Middle East by various names, including the khamsin, this dry, and Sirocco-style wind is usually accompanied by great dust clouds. Its onset is heralded by a hazy sky, a falling barometer, and a drop in relative humidity to about 10 per cent. Within a--few hours there may be a 10°C to 15°C rise in temperature. These windstorms ordinarily last a day or so, cause much discomfort, and destroy crops by desiccating them. The shammal, another wind of some significance, comes from the north or northwest, generally at intervals between June and September. Remarkably steady during daytime hours but becoming a breeze at night, the sham mal may blow for as long as nine days out of ten and then repeat the process. It originates as a dry continental mass of polar air that is warmed as it passes over the Eurasian landmass. The dryness allows intense heating of the earth's surface by the sun, resulting in high daytime temperatures that moderate after sunset. July and August are the hottest and driest months of the year, especially in Amman and the Jordan Valley, and in the desert areas, with temperatures over 97°F (36°C). Spring and autumn are the most pleasant times to visit with clear, sunny days and moderate temperatures. The winter months from November to April can be very cold, particularly in Amman, with snow, rain and wind, but there is little rainfall in the desert regions and in Aqaba, which makes a pleasant wintertime resort. About 75 per cent of the country can be described as having a desert climate with very little annual rainfall. Hot and dry summers with cool evenings. The Jordan Valley below sea level is warm during wi~ter and extremely hot in summer. Rain falls between November and March, while colder weather conditions occur in December/January. National Environmental Strategy For Jordan, environmentalism is neither a luxury nor a trend destined to go out of style in time. The country's scarce resources and fragile ecosystems necessitate a viable and ongoing programme of action covering all aspects of environmental protection. In order to maintain a viable resource base for economic growth, as well as

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to preserve the region's natural heritage, Jordan became the first country in the Middle East to adopt a national environmental strategy. With help from the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), in May 1992 a team of over 180 Jordanian specialists completed a practical and comprehensive working document entitled National Environment Strategy for Jordan. The document is a long-term environmental blueprint for government, NGOs, private sector businesses, communities and individuals. It also contains a wealth of information about Jordan's natural and socio-economic environment. The strategy is predicated on the fundamental principle of sustainable development, which the report defines as "development, which increasingly meets human needs, without depleting the matter and energy of the ecosystem upon which development is founded. An economy which develops sustain ably would be designed to perform at a level which would allow the underlying ecosystem to function and renew itself ceaselessly." The document offers over 400 specific recommendations concerning a wide variety of environmental and developmental issues. Moreover, the plan outlines five strategic initiatives for facilitating and institutionalising long-term progress in the environmental sphere: (1) Construction of a comprehensive legal framework for environmental management (2) Across-the-board strengthening of existing environmental institutions and agencies, particularly the Department of Environment and the RSCN (3) Giving an expanded role for Jordan's protected areas (4) Promotion of public awareness of and participation in environmental protection programmes (5) Giving sectoral priority to water conservation and slowing Jordan's rapid population growth.

Environmental Threats The Jordanian habitat and its wildlife communities have undergone significant changes over the centuries and continue to be threatened by a number of factors. A rapidly expanding population, industrial pollution, wildlife hunting and habitat loss due to development have taken a toll on Jordan's wildlife population. Jordan's absorption of hundreds of thousands of people since 1948 has

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resulted in the over-exploitation of many of its natural resources, and the country's severe shortage of water has led to the draining of underwater aquifers and damage to the Azraq Oasis. In recent decades, Jordan has addressed these and other threats to the environment, beginning the process of reversing environmental decline. A true foundation of environmental protection !"equires awareness upon the part of the population, and a number of governmental and non-governmental organisations are actively involved in educating the populace about environmental issues. Jordan's Ministry of Education is also introducing new literature into the government schools' curriculum to promote awareness of environmental issues among the young students. The National Strategy presents specific recommendations for Jordan on a sectoral basis, addressing the areas of agriculture, air pollution, coastal and marine life, antiquities and cultural resources, mineral resources, wildlife and habitat preservation, population and settlement patterns, and water resources. The plan places considerable emphasis throughout on the conservation of water and agriculturally productive land, of which the contamination or loss of either would bring swift and significant consequences to Jordan.

Flora and Fauna Spring is the high season for Jordanian flora, and from February to May many regions are carpeted with a dazzling array of flowering plants. More than 2000 species of plants grow in Jordan, and the variety of the country's topography and climate is reflected in the diversity of its flora. Most of these species, however, depend heavily on the winter rains. When there is a warm, dry winter-as in 1984many flowers either fail to appear or are considerably reduced. Jordan boasts a wide variety of flowering wild flowers, but the most famous is the national flower-the black iris. Fields of this flower, which is not found in Europe, can be seen in masses near the town of Madaba. The highlands of Jordan host forests of oak and pine, as well as pistachio and cinnabar trees. Olive, eucalyptus and cedar trees thrive throughout the highlands and the Jordan Valley. Jordan's dry climate is especially conducive to shrub trees, which require less water. Species of shrubs can be found throughout all the geographical

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regions of Jordan. Contrary to popular conceptions, deserts are often teaming with life. Many small shrub plants thrive in the Badia, where they are often grazed by the goats of local Bedouin tribes. Several species of acacia trees can be found in the deserts, as well as a variety of sturdy wild flowers and grasses which grow among the rocks in this demanding habitat. One can find about 70 species and subspecies of mammals, along with 73 reptile species, in Jordan. The dry climate has limited amphibian species to only four families. About 20 species of freshwater fish are found in Jordan's rivers and streams, while around 1000 species of fish are known to exist in the rich waters of the Gulf of Aqabah. The harsh conditions of the desert wilderness, which covers most of the country, allow only an assortment of nature's hardiest and most adaptable creatures to survive. As with most desert habitats, the majority of faunal life consists of insects, lizards, and small mammals. However, a number of larger mammals can be found in the desert region, including the Asiatic jackal, desert fox, striped hyena, wolf, camel, rabbit and sand rat. The white Oryx, which was hunted almost to extinction, lives on the open plains, while the mountain ibex is at home among rocky, mountainous crags. Both of these two species are relatively rare. Blrdlife: Jordan also possesses a large and varied assortment of birdlife. This can be traced, once again, to the variety of habitats found within the country-from mountains forests to desert oases, from high cliffs to sweeping deserts, and from deep gorges to broad wadis. Two distinct types of avifauna can be found in Jordan: those species, which stay year-round, and migratory visitors. At the junction of the Mediterranean and Arabian faunal regions, Jordan lies on one of the world's major bird migration routes, between Africa and Eurasia. Before the water levels of the Azraq Reserve were depleted over the past ten years, up to 200,000 birds-including spoonbills, white pelicans, egrets, terns and gulls, to name a fewwould congregate there at one time during the migratory season. The numbers of migrants have decreased; as Azraq has grown drier, yet even today up to 220 migratory species continue to transit through Jordan on their journey north or south. The approximately 150 species, which are indigenous to Jordan, seem not to have been affected greatly by the great drought of the 1980s.

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Wildlife Conservation: The diversity of animals in Jordan was formerly much more varied than at present. Ancient rock drawings and Byzantine mosaics suggest that the Jordanian landscape was populated by an abundant variety of wildlife, including ostrich, gazelle, Arabian Oryx, Nubian ibex, Asiatic lion, Syrian bear and Fallow deer. It is also believed that crocodiles used to inhabit the Jordan River. However, many of these species have been either decimated or driven to extinction because of over hunting or habitat destruction. The hunting of gazelle and other wildlife dates back to the beginning of the Paleolithic era in Jordan, many thousands of years ago. However, the advent of automatic weapons and hunting from vehicles decimated the population of larger mammals, particularly carnivores which were always present in low density. Hunting is now carefully controlled by the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (RSCN): laws now include the outlawing of automatic weapon hunting and shooting from vehicles. The RSCN sets the hunting seasons, the maximum quota of animals to be hunted and areas where hunting is allowed. Hunting is completely banned east of the Hijaz Railway. The Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature has been at the forefront of Jordanian efforts for wildlife conservation. Founded in 1966, the RSCN was the first non-governmental organisation of its kind in the Arab world. The Society addresses a wide range of environmental concerns, but its primary concern is for the preservation of wildlife both on the Jordanian mainland and in Aqaba's coral reefs and coastline. The RCSN has planned a complete system of wildlife reserves to cover the different habitats of the country. To date, six have been established, covering 1.4 per cent of Jordan's total area. Six more reserves are planned, and the total land area of the 12 reserves will cover four per cent of the country. The Society's preservation programmes have included notable successes such as the Arabian Oryx, a locally extinct species successfully reintroduced to Jordan in 1978, preservation of the remaining wetlands area at Azraq, and combining environmental preservation, archaeology and community development at the Dana Reserve. The Arabian Oryx, a large straight-horned antelope which had been extinct in Jordan since the 1920s, and in the Middle East since 1972, was reintroduced in the Shomari Reserve in 1978. The breeding programme has been an unqualified success. After introducing eight

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heads to Jordan in 1978, the Shomari Reserve now hosts around 200 Arabian Oryx, together with other endangered animal species. In 1998, the RSCN plans to complete the reintroduction of the Oryx by releasing them all from the Shomari Reserve into their natural desert habitat. A large number of migratory and resident birds rest at Shomari at different times throughout the year, while the park hosts a resident ostrich population on a permanent basis. The Azraq Wetland Reserve is home to around 370· species of birds, 220 of which are migrant and stop in the reserve during their annual trip between Europe and Africa. This wetlands area is rich in animal and plant life and is semicovered by aquatic plants such as Typha and Tamarix. Wolves, red foxes, striped hyenas, Asiatic jackals and several species of insects and reptiles-including five very poisonous snakes-live in the area. The Wadi Mujib Reserve protects the remaining habitat of the Nubian ibex, along with ibex, Arabian gazelles, leopards, foxes, wild boars and a variety of fish and birds. Foxes and hedgehogs are some of the species protected at the Zubia Reserve, near 'Ajloun. The roe deer was recently reintroduced to its original habitat there, and similar plans are in the works for the Persian fallow deer, a very rare species which inhabited Zubia over 110 years ago. The Dana Reserve is home to a number of endangered species including the ibex, the Arabian gazelle, and the eagle ow!. A project involving the RSCN, the Noor ai-Hussain Foundation and the World Bank is working to promote conservation by integrating environmental and archeological concerns with the socioeconomic development of the surrounding area. At the Wadi Rum Reserve, the RSCN is working to conserve the indigenous wildlife, including a herd of Arabian Oryx and a variety of plant species-some of which are rare-as well as archeological relics and cave paintings which are over 8000 years old. In addition to these six wildlife reserves, 20 grazing reserves cover a further 20,000 hectares and provide protection against overgrazing. While the RSCN's immediate and tangible goals are the consolidation and expansion of Jordan's wildlife refuge system, it also aims to increase public awareness of the importance of preserving nature. With the cooperation of the Ministry of Education, the RSCN has established over 500 nature preservation clubs in schools all over the country, with a combined membership of over 20,000 students.

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Marine life The Gulf of Aqabah is home to some of the finest marine life in the Middle East, while its coral reefs are unmatched in the world. The gulf is very narrow-at its northern end it is only five kilometres wide-and quite deep, ranging in depth from between 1000 to 1800 metres. The depth of the gulf, combined with its isolation from sea currents, minimises turbulence and improves visibility. On the sandy shores, one can find creatures such as the ghost crab, sand hoppers and the mole crab. The sea waters, meanwhile, host a plethora of marine life including starfish, sea cucumbers, crabs, shrimps, sea urchins, many species of fish and several worms, which burrow into the sandy sea bottom. A variety of sea grasses can be found in the shallow waters, providing both food and shelter to the fishes, which inhabit the area. Several species of eel make their home in the gulf's grass beds, where one can also find sea horses and pipe fishes. Perhaps the greatest attraction for divers in the Gulf of Aqabah is the colourful coral reefs, found especially near the southern part of Jordan's coastline. There are around 100 varieties of stony coral, and they are found mainly in shallow waters, as the algae that live within them require light for photosynthesis. Many hundreds of fish species m.{ke their homes among the reefs, and some live by eating the algae that grows on the coral. Deforestation Perhaps an even greater threat to Jordanian fauna and flora is the loss of habitat. Historically, Jordan used to be renowned for its forests and verdant vegetation. Numerous verses of the Bible refer to the "land of milk and honey," yet today Jordan's forests are much reduced in area. The main causes of deforestation have been cutting trees for wood, clearance for crop cultivation and the prevention of regeneration by overgrazing. The years 1908-17 were one of the most destructive periods for Jordanian forests, as the Ottoman Turks carried out massive felling operations to fuel their Hijaz Railway from Damascus to Medina. Deforestation has damaged the environment by decimating the habitats of many animal and plant species. Moreover, it has spurred erosion by removing the roots, which keep the soil in place. With little soil stability, much of the topsoil is washed away with rain, thereby speeding decertification. In order to reverse this

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process, the RSCN has initiated a number of afforestation campaigns. The Jordanian Army has also served by planting trees on barren government land in Irbid, Salt, Mafraq, Ajloun and Karak.

Water Shortage The gravest environmental challenge that Jordan faces today is the scarcity of water. Indeed, water is the decisive factor in the population/resources equation. Whereas water resources in Jordan have fluctuated around a stationary average, the country's population has continued to rise. A high rate of natural population growth, combined with periodic massive influxes of refugees, has transformed a comfortable balance between population and water in the first half of this century into a chronic and worsening imbalance in the second half. The situation has been exacerbated by the fact that Jordan shares most of its surface water resources with neighbouring countries, whose control has partially deprived Jordan of its fair share of water. Current use already exceeds renewable supply. The deficit is covered by the unsustainable practice of overdrawing highland aquifers, resulting in lowered water tables and declining water quality. On a per capita basis, Jordan has one of the lowest levels of water resources in the world. Most experts consider countries with a per capita water production below 1,000 cubic metres per year to be water-poor countries. In 1997, Jordanians consumed a total of 882 million cubic metres (MCM). In 1996, per capita share of water was less than 175 for all uses. This placed Jordan at only 20 per cent of the water poverty level. The extent of the crisis is further demonstrated by the fact that, from the 1997 total of 882 MCM, around 225 MCM was pumped from ground water over and above the level of sustainable yield. Likewise, about 70 MCM was pumped from non-renewable fossil water in the southeast of the country. With Jordan's population expected to continue to rise, the gap between water supply and demand threatens to widen significantly. By the year 2025, if current trends continue, per capita water supply will fall from the current 200 cubic metres per person to only 91 cubic metres, putting Jordan in the category of having an absolute water shortage. Responding to the challenge, the government has adopted a multifaceted approach designed to both reduce demand as well as

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increase supply. The peace treaty signed in 1994 by Jordan and Israel guaranteed Jordan its right to an additional 215 MCM of water annually through new dams, diversion structures, pipelines and a desalination/purification plant. Of this 215 MCM, Jordan is already receiving between 55 and 60 MCM of water from across the border with Israel through a newly built pipeline. Jordan is also entitled to build a series of dams on the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers to impound its share of floodwaters. To this end, the Karama Dam in the Jordan Valley has been built to store 55 MCM of water, mainly from the Yarmouk, and its yield will be used to help irrigate some 6000 hectares in the southern Jordan Valley. While significant, the Kingdom's water gains from the peace treaty are barely enough to maintain the status quo. Recognising a mutual problem, Jordan and Israel declared in Article 6, Paragraph 3 of the treaty: "The parties recognise that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional and international cooperation." In addition to securing its bilateral rights from Israel in its 1994 peace treaty, Jordan is actively involved in promoting regional cooperation through the Water Resources Working Group of the Multilateral Peace Talks. Likewise, Jordan is currently involved in discussions with Syria pertaining to issues on the upper catchments of the Yarmouk River in an attempt to reach an understanding over stable water sharing and flood storage between the two countries. Jordan has long been a strong advocate of transforming the zerosum game in water sharing, where there are winners and losers, into a positive-sum game where all the concerned parties will be winners. Hopefully, in the context of future peace, there will be real cooperation among the countries of the region towards achieving the provision of safe and reliable water for future generations.

On the home front, Jordan is striving to balance the water deficit by utilising new sources as well as by decreasing consumption. The Ministry of Water recently unveiled a package of 58 projects, accounting for approximately US$ 5 billion. The projects will be implemented in stages, addressing the most urgent needs first, until the programme is completed in 2010. Upon completion, the package should yield an additional 500 MCM per year. As the explOitation of new water resources is costly, Jordan will invest heavily in the development and

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maintenance of water infrastructure. Among the projects requiring immediate attention are storage dams, wastewater treatment and reuse, rehabilitation of distribution systems, and augmenting urban water supplies. Conserving water, reducing leakage and waste, and utilising a greater proportion of surface water through damming are comparatively economical ways of stretching Jordan's meagre water supply further. Jordan also needs to expand its water supply to meet its growing needs by exploiting new sources. Naturally, these offer fewer and more costly options than conservation. Desalination, for example, could raise the cost of fresh water production by as much as twoor threefold, at a time when budgetary constraints are forcing a broad range of traditional subsidies, including that for water, to be reduced. Other issues and trends also point to a steeply rising demand for funds for the investment, operation and maintenance of water systems in the future. Private sector participation is one way to help develop Jordan's water infrastructure without increasing Jordan's debt burden. Some of the components that can be directly provided by the private sector include BOT/BOO (Build, Operate, Transfer/Build, Operate, Own) schemes for water and wastewater projects, water metres, domestic appliances, leak detection equipment, pipes, pumps and wastewater treatment package plants. To squeeze the most from its limited resources, the Kingdom will have to maintain comprehensive and reliable data, including data on water quantity, quality and utilisation. The supplies and utilisation of surface water, ground water and treated waste water will be carefully monitored. Likewise, the importance of shared surface water supplies and groundwater aquifers demands careful and consistent assessment and monitoring of these resources. Other non-conventional water resources, particularly brackish water, will be assessed as desalination becomes more economically feasible. Jordan will maximise the full potential of surface water and ground water based on economic feasibility, while taking into consideration the relevant social and environmental impacts. Investigative works into deep aquifers have been and are being conducted to support development planning, and the interactive use of ground and surface water with different qualities is being studied. Moreover, the Kingdom will conduct periodic assessments of its

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available and potential water resources. In order to carefully plan for the future, Jordan has adopted a National Water Strategy. The strategy is a comprehensive set of guidelines employing a dual approach of demand management and supply management. It places particular emphasis on the need for improved resource management, stressing the sustainability of present and future uses. Special care will be given to protecting the water supply against pollution, quality degradation and the depletion of resources. Furthermore, resource management will be improved by increasing the efficiency of conveyance and distribution systems, while the applications and uses of water will be more selectively determined. Multiple resources will be used interactively to maximise both the usable flow as well as the net benefit acquired from a unit of water. In conjunction with this, the strategy outlines the need to evaluate future industrial, commercial, tourism and agricultural projects in terms of their water requirements. Performance efficiency of water and wastewater systems will be monitored and rated, and improvements in performance will be introduced with due consideration given to resource economics. The strategy also aims to keep operations &nd maintenance costs to a minimum. The National Water Strategy ensures that the rightful shares of the Kingdom's shared water resources shall be defended and protected through bilateral and multilateral contacts, negotiations, and agreements. Peace water and wastewater projects, including the scheme for the development of the Jordan Rift Valley, shall be accorded special attention for construction, operation and maintenance. Due respect will be given to the provisions of international law as applicable to water sharing, protection and conservation, as well as to those laws applicable to territorial waters. Jordan shall continue to pursue bilateral and multilateral cooperation with neighbouring states, and the Kingdom will continue to advocate regional cooperation. With the National Water Strategy as an umbrella, a set of policy papers has been formulated and approved by the Council of Ministers. The Government policies in the water sector are elaborated in four policy papers. These are: Water Utility Policy, Irrigation Water Policy, Ground Water Management Policy and Wastewater Management Policy. With the National Water Strategy, these four policy papers and the investment programme, Jordan has charted the "road map" for the future of its water sector.

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Protecting Aqabah The Gulf of Aqabah, a branch of the Red Sea with 367 kilometres of coastline, 27 of which belong to Jordan, is one of the Kingdom's primary tourist attractions and its only port access. Fortunately, however, Aqabah has always been acknowledged as more than a centre of trade and tourism. Boasting one of the world's most unique coral reef systems and rich in fish and aquatic plant life, the Gulf of Aqabah is an environmental treasure, which Jordan is endeavouring to protect. The enclosed nature of this marine environment, which encourages its unique biological diversity, also makes it particularly susceptible to pollution from trade, industry and tourism. The existing and potential environmental threats to Aqabah include such industrial pollution as that from phosphates, potash, cement, traffic, electricity generation and shipping. Tourism contributes to individual littering, garbage accumulation, and increases in sewage problems, air pollution and traffic levels. As Aqabah is a major tourism centre and the country's only port, plans for preserving this natural treasure have necessarily been combined with the region's economic and social development. Jordan's early commitment to sustainable development has facilitated this combination, as environmental regulation has been instituted'te1atively early in the industrialisation process. The Aqabah Regional Authority (AHA), established in 1984, is a specialised governing body responsible for the social and economic development of the Aqabah region. The AHA is responsible for monitoring and controlling all major construction activities along the coast. Future industrial development of the area, while encouraged, is controlled by a strict set of requirements. In recent years, the ARA has taken the lead by establishing the Aqabah Marine Reserve. Another function served by the ARA is that of environmental monitoring. In October 1989, in conjunction with the Royal Scientific Society, the AHA began regular monitoring of drinking water, seawater, treated wastewater and cooling water from selected coastal facilities. Another of Jordan's conservation efforts in the Aqabah area is the Aqabah Marine Science Station, established in 1982. The station is the working centre for the study and preservation of Aqaba's marine life. Scientists from the University of Jordan and Yarmouk University are actively engaged here in marine ecology and

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oceanographic research. While Jordan is actively engaged at the national level to preserve Aqaba's environment, the fact that four countries-Jordan, Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia-share coastline around the Gulf of Aqabah means that any long-term planning for preservation of this unique and fragile marine ecosystem must be done on a regional basis. Throughout the Gulf of Aqabah region, industrial and economic growth is being actively stimulated. Therefore, environmental protection must be combined with growth in a comprehensive sustainable development plan. The Gulf of Aqabah Environmental Action Plan (GAEAP) was established by the multilateral working group on the environment to curb existing damage and prevent future harm by establishing a regulatory framework and coordinating policies among the various governmental ministries associated with environmental protection. The plan calls for an environmental audit of Jordan's nearby power plant, updated contingency plans for oil spills, improved monitoring of air and marine water quality and the management of the protected marine area. The primary benefit of the GAEAP will be the local capability to contain the undesirable consequences of development by preserving the marine and desert environments, reducing pollutants and establishing water use efficiency measures. The strategy proposed by GAEAP is complemented by two existing projects: the Egypt Red Sea Coastal Zone Management project and the Yemen Marine Ecosystem Protection project. The peace treaty signed by Jordan and Israel in October 1994 gave special attention to arrangements for the Aqaba/Eilat region, and the two countries recently signed a protocol outlining a detailed framework for cooperation in conserving this delicate ecosystem. Special attention was given to the dangers of industrial pollution from shipping. Moreover, the protocol stipulated the establishment of a jointly run Red Sea Marine Peace Park to ensure protection of the coral reefs and marine environment from abuse and overuse.

Various Considerations Three geographical factors are important to reckon with in order to understand Jordan's two-layered history: namely that of its resident Arab population and that of its transient foreign masters. The first is the semi-arid to arid climate, which has made scarcity of water a constant threat tu the inhabitants of the region since Neolithic times.

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In Jordan it rains primarily between November and March, while the months of June through September are almost always completely without rain. Thus people have been forced either to rely on perennial springs and streams for their year-round water needs or to build and maintain cisterns, reservoirs and aqueducts for collecting and storing winter rains. An alternative option has been to adopt a trans-humant lifestyle and migrate with herds of animals between highland and lowland pastures and depending on both springs and cisterns for water. The second is the country's proximity to the Arabian and Negev deserts. For example, Jordan's entire eastern boundary is located along the frontier of the Arabian desert, while its southern frontier faces the Negev desert along its western boundary. This nearness to the desert has presented both opportunities and threats to the resident inhabitants of Jordan. On the one hand, when there has been sufficient winter rains, these deserts present attractive grazing opportunities for pasture animals. On the other hand, when rains have been insufficient, desert dwelling pastoral nomads are forced to spend longer periods with their herds in Jordan's well-water western highland, thus putting pressure on the region's settled population. The desert has also presented a convenient place to escape to for persons or whole tribes in time of conflict and as a means of resisting the heavy hand of foreign rulers. The third geographical factor upon which much of Jordan's history pivots is the country's position astrides one of the world's most important land bridges-the one which connects North Africa with Europe, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and much of the far east. Together with the coastal plain of western Palestine, the western highland plateau of Trans-Jordan have for centuries and millennia provided armies, caravans and people groups with a corridor along which to pass in order to avoid having to traverse the desert. One of the reasons for the region's being under almost continuous control of foreign masters since the second millennium Be is precisely because of the vital importance of this communication and transportation corridor to the ambitions and designs of foreign rulers to the south, east and north. Together, these three geographical factors provide a set of common denominators for understanding Jordan's history since the dawn of civilization down to the present.

5 Society When the. Emirate of Trans-Jordan was created by the British in 1921, the vast majority of the people consisted of an assortment of tribally organised and tribally oriented groups, some of whom were sedentary cultivators and some nomadic or semi nomadic. The total population was fewer than 400,000 people. By 1988 nearly 3,000,000 people, more than half of whom were Palestinians, inhabited the region east of the Jordan River-Dead Sea-Gulf of Aqabah line, referred to as the East Bank. The term Palestinians refers narrowly to citizens of the British mandated territory of Palestine (1922-48). In general usage, however, the term has come to refer to Muslims or Christians indigenous to the region between the Egyptian Sinai and Lebanon and west of the Jordan River-Dead Sea-Gulf of Aqabah line who identify themselves primarily as Palestinians. Narrowly defined, the term Trans-Jordanian referred to a citizen of the Emirate of Trans-Jordan (1921-46). Generally speaking, however, a TransJordanian was considered a Muslim or Christian indigenous to the East Bank region, which was within the approximate boundaries of the contemporary state of Jordan. The formerly rural society of Jordan had been transformed since independence into an increasingly urban one; by 1985 nearly 70 per cent of the population resided in urban centres that were growing at an annual rate of between 4 and 5 per cent. In the late 1980s, class polarisation was increasingly evident. Nonetheless, a variety of social forces (such as national identity and

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regional or tribal affiliation} continued to cut across class lines. The uprooting of so many East Bank citizens from their places of origin contributed to social fragmentation. In addition to the Palestinians, who retained a strong sense of national identity and outrage at the loss of their homeland, many Trans-Jordanians had migrated from their rural and or desert villages to urban centres in search of work for themselves and education for their children. Many Trans-Jordanians thus shared a sense of ·loss and rootlessness. Probably the most important force supporting cohesion and integration was the Arab-Islamic cultural tradition common to all but a few members of the society. Arabic, a potent force for unity throughout the Middle East was the mother tongue of the overwhelming majority of residents. Also, more than 90 per cent of the population adhered to Sunni Muslim. These communalities, although important, have been insufficient to forge an integrated society. Ev~ry year since the late 1950s, increasing numbers of Jordan's youth have received formal training in the country's rapidly expanding education system. By the late 1980s, all children aged six years to twelve years were attending free and compulsory primary schools. Nearly 80 per cent of children between the ages of thirteen and fifteen attended three-year preparatory schools, also free and compulsory. But possession of an education, once a near certain vehicle for upward mobility, no longer guaranteed employment. Unemployment was probably one of the most critical issues facing Jordan in the late 1980s. It was accompanied by growing political frustration and radicalisation over the Palestinian uprising {intifadah} in the Israelioccupied West Bank. In the pre-1948 East Bank, the dominant socio-political order was tribalism. Tribalism was characteristic'not only of the Bedouin nomads and semi nomads upon whom the Hashemiate (also seen as Hashemite) rulers relied for support, but also of many of the village people and even those who were technically urban. After 1948 this socio-cultural system was inundated by masses of Palestinians, largely sedentary village and town dwellers, many of them literate and well educated. The sheer numbers of Palestinians who came to the East Bank after 1948 and the comparatively simple economy and society of the indigenous Trans-Jordanians made the assimilation of the

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Palestinians to the local patterns improbable. Indeed, some analysts have argued that by the early 1970s Palestinians had established a cultural dominance in the East Bank. In any case, by the late 1980s, Palestinians had considerable economic and cultural influence. Jordanians responded in part to the development of Palestinian economic and cultural elites by upgrading education. By the late 1980s, the gap between Trans-Jordanian and Palestinian educational achievements had narrowed considerably. Jordan's position also was changing in the global political economy. Agriculture and nomadism had gradually given way to more viable livelihoods based on skilled labour, secular education, and increasing levels of literacy. Labour migration, particularly of the skilled and educated, was a key factor in social mobility in the 1970s and 1980s. A concomitant shift in values was apparent: prestige was increasingly associated with modern occupations, and education came to be seen as the key to social mobility. Aside from the fundamental distinction between Jordanians of East Bank origin and those of Palestinian origin, other socio-cultural distinctions or affiliations were evident in Jordanian society, including ethnic and regional origins, gender, class, tribe, religion, and lifestyle {e.g., nomadic, village, or urban}. These various patterns of affiliations structured the ways in which Jordanians related to one another and gave rise to different sorts of individual identity. For example, most Christian Jordanians were Arabs and shared many cultural habits and values with Muslim Jordanians. Their sense of identity, however, was based less on Islamic influences than that of Muslim Jordanians. Christians interacted daily with Muslims, working, studying, and socialising together. But intermarriage between Muslims and Christians remained infrequent. Little information was available on the extent to which these social interactions contributed to conflict or tension. The most that observers could conclude was that religious differences carried a potential for conflict. Class structure in Jordan was exceedingly difficult to assess. Many social divisions, such as East Bank or Palestinian origins and identity, tribal affiliation, ethnicity, and rural or urban lifestyle, cut across class divisions. The forces of the political economy in the late 1970s and 1980s were forging embryonic classes; however, it was debatable to what extent they were self-conscious and cohesive.

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Class structure in Jordan resembled a pyramid. At the top were a small, wealthy group comprising large landowners, industrialists, leading financial figures, and members of their families. The oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s also had created a new class of wealthy Jordanians who made large amounts of money abroad, which was displayed by conspicuous consumption at home in Jordan. Just below this group were professionals, army officers, and government officials who lived a somewhat less grand but still comfortable life. White-collar workers, schoolteachers, and returning migrants struggled to retain a style of life that separated them sOcially from the small shopkeepers and artisans below them. At the bottom of the pyramid, a large lower class included increasing numbers of the unemployed. The system of family support tended to cushion unemployed university graduates and professionals from falling into the ranks of the poor.

Population Official Jordanian statistics gave a 1987 population figure of 2,896,800 for the East Bank. A 1982 population of 2,399,300 thus indicated an annual growth rate of between 3.6 and 4 per cent. United Nations statistics projected a peak in the annual growth rate at 4.11 per cent in the period from 1990 to 1995, followed by a steady decline to 2.88 per cent in 2020. Rapid development in the provision of health care services during the 1970s and 1980s led to a decline in the crude death rate from 17 per 1,000 population in 1965 to 7 per 1,000 population by 1986. During the same period, the infant mortality rate, a major indicator of a country's development and health status, dropped from 115 to 46 per 1,000 live births. In 1986 life expectancy at birth was sixtyfive years (sixty-three for males and sixty-seven for females). The lowered death rate, a high birth rate, and lowered infant mortality rate combined to generate a major demographic problem in the late 1980s. At the end of the decade, more than half Jordan's population was below fifteen years of age. This situation strained the country's already limited resources, and employment for the burgeoning group of young people became increasingly difficult to provide. Accurate demographic figures were difficult to compile because of the substantial number of Jordanians residing and working abroad and the continuous flow of West bank Palestinians with Jordanian passports back and forth between the East and West banks. According

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to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, about 224,000 people were admitted to UNRWA refugee camps in the East Bank immediately after the June 1967 War. In 1986 UNRWA cited 826,128 registered refugees living on the East Bank, of whom about 205,000 were living in refugee camps. The exact number of Palestinians living on the East Bank was unknown. Estimates usually ranged from 60 to 70 per cent of the total population. Official government statistics did not distinguish between East Bank and West Bank Jordanians. The government did not have an officially articulated population policy or birth control programme. Rather, in 1979, it adopted a "child spacing programme" that was designed to improve the health of mother and child, and not specifically to lower the fertility rate. This non-interventionist approach considered family planning to be one component of an integrated maternal-child health and primary health care programme. Government clinics and private medical services delivered family planning services upon request and contraceptives were widely available at low cost. In 1987 there were 116 maternal-child health care centres-up from 93 in 1983providing prenatal and postnatal care and a wide range of birth control information. Jordan's high population growth can be attributed primarily to high fertility rates. In 1986 the World Bank calculated this rate as 6.0 births for each woman over the span of her reproductive years, one of the highest fertility rates in the region. This rate was projected to decline to 4.2 births by the year 2000. The fertility rate varied, however, between women residing in rural and urban areas and according to educational attainment. Educated women tended to marry at a slightly older age than uneducated women, and this delay contributed to a lower fertility rate. Urban women achieved lower fertility rates through modem methods of contraception, particularly the pill. Fertility rates were lowest in Amman, higher in smaller urban areas such as Irbid and Az Zarqa, and highest in rural areas. In rural areas modern contraceptive usage was lower, although breast-feeding, which serves to delay the return of fertility, was extended for a longer period than in the cities. World Bank data indicated that 27 per cent of married women of childbearing age were using contraception in the 1980s.

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A woman was expected to have to bear five children, including at least two sons, in fairly rapid succession. Women gained status and security in their marital household by bearing children. According to a study conducted in the early 1980s by Jordanian anthropologists Seteney Shami and Lucine Taminian in a poor, squatter area in Amman, reproductive behaviour was subject to several factors. If a woman had given birth to two or more sons, she might begin to space her pregnancies or stop bearing children for a while. Household structure-nuclear, extended, or multiple family-also appeared to be a crucial factor in determining fertility. The presence of other women in a household encouraged women to bear more children to improve their relative position in the household. The overall population density for the East Bank in 1987 was established at about thirty persons per square kilometre. There was wide regional variation and the rate of urbanisation was high. East of Al-Mafraq, in an area encompassing almost two-thirds of the country, no towns had a population of more than 10,000. The bulk of Jordan's population was centred in the Governorate of Amman and the smaller urban areas of Irbid, As Salt, and Az Zarqa. The 1987 population totals of the eight governorates ravged from 1,203,000 in Amman to 101,000 in the Maan Governorate. According to World Bank figures, about 70 per cent of the population lived in urban areas. The nation's capital, Amman, accounted for more than onethird of the total population. Rapid urbanisation appeared to be the result of a high fertility rate and rural-urban migration. If urbanisation continued at the high annual rate of 4 to 5 per cent, it was estimated that by the year 2000, nearly three-fourths of the population could be living in Amman, Az Zarqa, Irbid, As Salt, and Ar Ramtha. The remainder of the population resided in villages scattered in an uneven pattern throughout Jordan. The nomadic and semi nomadic population was very small, at most 2 to 3 per cent of the population. The clearest concentrations of villages were in the fertile northwest corner and the Jordan Valley. Village size varied markedly from region to region. At one time, size related to the productive capacity of the surrounding farmland. Larger villages were located in the more fertile, generally irrigated regions where family members could reach their fields with relative ease. While village population continued to grow, rural-urban migration drained off a steady stream of young

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men and sometimes whole families. Villages provided little employment for their residents, and agriculture as a way of life had declined precipitously since the 1950s. Camps of nomadic and semi nomadic Bedouins still existed in the late 1980s. Nomadic tribes were found mainly in the desert area east of a line from Al-Mafraq to Maan. The area, about 400 kilometres long and 250 kilometres wide, is known as the badiya (pl., bawaadi, meaning desert or semi desert). Semi nomadic Bedouins were located in the AI-Ghawr and near Irbid. These semi nomads descended to the Jordan Valley in the winter because of its warm climate and grazing ground for their herds. Traditionally, many of these semi nomads also farmed plots of land in the valley. In the summer, they moved their herds up into the hills to avoid the intense heat. The native inhabitants of the Jordan Valley are known as AI-Ghawarna, or people of AI-Ghawr. Prior to the June 1967 War, the valley was home to about 60,000 people engaged in agriculture and pastoralism. In 1971 the population had declined to 5,000 as a result of the June 1967 War and the 1970-71 conflict between the Palestinian guerrillas and the Jordanian armed forces. By 1979, however, the population had reached 85,000 as a result of government development efforts designed to attract people to settle in this area. Refugee camps emerged in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. The original refugee settlements were tent camps, but in most places tents were replaced by rows of galvanised steel, aluminium, and asbestos shelters. There were initially five refugee camps-Irbid, Az Zarqa, Amman New (AI Wahdatl, AI-Karamah (later dismantled), and Jabal al-Hussain-but six additional emergency camps were established for refugees from the June 1967 War-AI Hisn, Suf, Jarash, Baqah, Talbiyah, and Marka. Most of the camps were located near major cities in the northwest.

Ethnicity In the late 1980s, several ethnic and religiOUS groups coexisted on the East Bank. Roughly 5 to 8 per cent of the total population were Christians. Of these, most were Arabs, including a small numberunique among Christians in the Middle East-who recently had been pastoral nomads. The largest groups of non-Arab Christians were the Armenians, perhaps 1 per cent of the population, who resided primarily

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in Irbid and Amman. The Circassians, a Sunni Muslim community of approximately 25,000 people, were descendants of families brought from the region of the Caucasus Mountains when Caucasian territory was ceded to Russia in the 1880s. By encouraging the Circassians to settle in northern Jordan, the Ottomans sought to provide an element loyal to the Sultan that could counterbalance the Beduins. Circassians originally settled in Amman and the then-abandoned city of Jarash. Despite their small numbers, they have long been important in government, business, and the military and security forces. In 1938, for example, Circassians constituted 7.3 per cent of the non-British government officials in Trans-Jordan. Twenty-six of the thirty-three cabinets between 1947 and 1965 included one or more Circassians. Circassian families included prominent landowners and leaders in commerce and industry. Peter Gubser, a United States authority on Jordan, contended in 1983 that the Circassians were not "politically assertive as a group," although they were known for "their loyalty to the Hashemiates." It is likely, however, that their relative cultural and economic importance diminished with the increasing predominance of the Palestinians on the one hand, and the improved education level of the Jordanians on the other. The Circassians ~ained heavily represented in senior military ranks, however, which caused some resentment among other Jordanians. All Circassians spoke Arabic and the rate of intermarriage between Arab Jordanians and Circassians was high. Another, much smaller group originating in the Caucasus was the Shishans (also seen as Chechens), whose roughly 2,000 members were Shia Muslims, the only representatives of this branch of Islam in Jordan. Another religious minority were a small numbers of Arabicspeaking Druze villagers. A few Arabic-speaking Kurds lived in several northern villages. A category of immigrants different from the Palestinian refugees may be Aoted. Between the early 1920s and the late 1940s, some hundreds of families, perhaps more, settled in Trans-Jordan, having left Palestine, Syria, and the Hijaz region in Saudi Arabia. Arabs, and usually Sunni Muslims, they were nevertheless only partially integrated into the local communities in which they lived. This incomplete assimilation occurred in part because they were foreigners in the context of the tribal structure of such communities, and in part

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because, as merchants, most were looked at askance by tribally oriented groups. Generally, they tended to marry among themselves or with persons of similar origin. In the 1980s, however, most of these families had lived in the East Bank for nearly three generations, and the tribal system that had excluded them had become less significant within the society.

The Palestinians Kinship, Family, and Individual: In the late 1980s, social life and identity in Jordan centred around the family. The household was composed of people related to one another by kinship, either through descent or marriage, and family ties extended into the structure of clans and tribes. Individual loyalty and the sense of identity arising from family membership coexisted with new sources of identity and affiliation. The development of a national identity and a professional identity did not necessarily conflict with existing family affiliations. Although rapid social mobility strained kin group membership, kinship units were sometimes able to adapt to social change. Gender and age were important determinants of social status. Although the systematic separation of women from men was not generally practised, all groups secluded women to some extent. The character of gender-based separation varied widely among different sectors of society; it was strictest among the traditional urban middle class and most flexible among the beduins, where the exigencies of nomadic life precluded segregation. However, the worlds of men and women intersected in the home. Age greatly influenced an individual man or woman's standing in society; generally, attaining an advanced age resulted in enhanced respect and social stature. The formation of an educated middle class that included increasing numbers of educated and workingwomen led in the late 1980s to some strains in the traditional pattern. Men and women now interacted in public-at school and in the universities, in the workplace, on public transportation, in voluntary associations, and at social events. Palestinians in Jordan: Jordanians tended to refer to Palestinians as persons who fled or were driven from Palestine during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the June 1967 War. Some immigrants from Palestine who had entered Jordan in preceding centuries, however, were so thoroughly integrated into the local society as to

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be indistinguishable from their neighbours. The Majalis, for more than a century the leading tribe in AI-Karak area, came originally from Hebron. For political and social purposes, they and others like them were considered Jordanians. Other Palestinians from Hebron, who came to AI-Karak as merchants well before 1948, remained to a considerable degree outsiders, for the most part taking their spouses from the Hebron area and maintaining economic and other ties there. Al Karak is not representative of the impact of Palestinians on East Bank society and culture. In 1948 the population of the East Bank was about 340,000. The 1950 annexation of the West Bank increased the population by about 900,000. This increase included the West Bank population itself (around 400,000 to 450,000) and about 450,000 refugees from those areas of Palestine that became Israel in 1948. In addition, many thousands of Palestinians not classified as refugees entered Jordan after 1948. As a result of the June 1967 War, in 1967 an additional 250,000 to 300,000 West Bank Palestinians entered Jordan as refugees. Most of the refugees, inside and outside refugee camps, continued to live in Amman and areas to the north. In 1986 UNRWA reported that 826,128 Palestinians were registered as refugees in the East Bank; of these, nearly one-fourth resided in camps. Many other refugees lived on the fringes of the economy in urban areas. A substantial number of Palestinians had the kind of education and entrepreneurial capacity that enabled them to achieve substantial economic status. A few brought some of their wealth from Palestine. Some became large landowners or businessmen, whereas others became professionals or technicians. A number worked for the government, often in posts requiring prior training. Many Palestinians were merchants on a small or medium scale, craftsmen or skilled workers, or peasants. Whatever the social or economic status of Palestinians in the East Bank, their sense of national identity had aroused much debate. Such identity depended on international and regional political developments with respect to the Palestine question, the interests of Palestinians themselves on the East Bank, and the balancing act of the government between East Bank Jordanians and those of Palestinian origin. One observer indicated that the regime had an interest in perpetuating the idea of a Palestinian majority so that East Bank Jordanians would

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continue to perceive Hussain as ensuring their interests and that of the East Bank. An autonomous Palestinian political identity did not begin to assert itself until the mid-1960s. In the 1950s, no political organisation existed around which a specifically Palestinian identity could be articulated. Pan-Arab ism was a dominant mode of political expression, and the Hashemiate regime strongly promoted Jordanian sovereignty over Palestinian affairs and identity. Nevertheless, and in spite of a security apparatus that kept a close watch on political affairs, Palestinian national identity emerged and grew. The loss of the West Bank in 1967 and the repressive Israeli occupation contributed to nationalist sentiments, as did the Jordanian government's repression of opposition political movements. The rise in the mid-1960s of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and its international recognition furthered this nationalist climate. The PLO offered an organisational format to Palestinian political identity separate from a Jordanian identity. The 1970-71 war between the fedayeen (Arab guerrillas) and the Jordanian government and the 1974 Rabat Summit further enhanced Palestinian nationalist sentiment. Wide divergences in political identity and sentiment existed among the Palestinians in the East Bank. Factors influencing a person's identity included the date of arrival in the East Bank, whether the person was a refugee or lived in a camp, and the degree of the person's economic success. The merchants and professionals who came prior to 1948 generally identified closely with the East Bank. Refugees who came in 1948 but who did not reside in the camps and were government employees or successful professionals or business people tended to be tacit supporters of the regime and to invest heavily in homes and businesses. More militant were the refugees who arrived in the wake of the June 1967 War, including those refugees who were not living in camps. Persons residing in the camps tended to be the most militant. They were the poorest and had the least stake in the survival of the Hashemiate regime. Socioeconomic and political events in the late 1980s converged to fuel growing frustration with East Bank political policies. The reduced flow of remittances to Jordan from expatriate workers in the oil-producing states was a source of anxiety for the regime. For refugees living in the camps and for urban squatters, the economic

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downturn led to greater poverty, compounded by the high unemployment rate in the East Bank. The Palestinian uprising (intiJadah) in the occupied territories caused the Hashemiate regime concern. The continuation of the uprising and the occupation seemed likely to radicalise less prosperous Palestinians in the East Bank.

Urban Areas and Urbanisation From ancient times, Middle Eastern society has been characterised by the interaction of nomads and peasants with the urban centres. The region's highest achievements in cultural, political, economic, and intellectual life took place in the vibrant cosmopolitan centres. Arab-Islamic claims to be one of the world's major civilizations rest largely on the products of city population. No major urban centre existed in what is now Jordanian territory until the late 1940s. East Bank towns served as local markets and administrative centres rather than as centres of high culture. Truncated by external political considerations rather than by internal social or cultural realities, the East Bank consequently lacked the kind of long-established metropolis that for centuries had dominated other parts of the Middle East. Amman, the major city of the East Bank, had ancient roots, but in the 1980s it was scarcely more than a generation old as a modern city. The Circassians were the first permanent inhabitants of Amman, settling there in 1878. In 1921 Amir Abdullah ibn Hussain al-Hashimi established his capital in Amman. It passed its first decades as a provincial trading centre and garrison on the margin of the desert. In 1943 Amman had only 30,000 inhabitants. As capital of the new kingdom of Jordan, Amman grew over the next three decades into a booming, overcrowded metropolitan centre. Population growth was largely a function of the influx of Palestinians since 1948. A high birth rate and internal migration, however, have also been prominent features of the urbanisation process. In 1989, Amman lacked both the old quarters characteristic of most Middle Eastern cities and an established urban population with a unified cultural outlook and an organic bond to the indigenous society of the area. Its people were a mixture of all the elements of the country. Circassians and Christians, rather than Muslim TransJordanians, set the tone before the arrival of the Palestinians, who

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in the late 1980s probably constituted 60 to 80 per cent of its population. The smaller towns of the East Bank retained a good deal of the traditional kin-and quarter-based social organisation characteristic of Middle Eastern towns. In rapidly urbanising areas such as Amman, the quasi-paternal relationship of the rich to the poor had begun to break down and the old egalitarian values had given way to class distinctions based on income and style of life. Increasingly evident, class polarisation was fuelled by remittances from those working abroad. Remittances were invested in residential property, thus driving up the cost of land and housing. New urban areas, dotted with lavish stone villas and supermarkets and boutiques supplied with expensive imported items, coexisted with overcrowded areas where a jumble of buildings housed the multitudes of the lowermiddle class and the poor. Furthermore, Western culture had introduced foreign ideas among the educated that gradually estranged them from the culture of the masses. Cultural and recreational facilities, for example, were limited to the well-to-do because of the high membership fees in the clubs that provided them.

Villages The principles of organisation in settled communities resembled those of the Beduins in that villages were organised around kin groups. The resemblance to nomadic groups was closest in the villages of central and southern Jordan. Their villagers retained, in somewhat loose form, a tribal form of organisation. Most villagers lived in the much more densely settled north, where tribal organisation in the late 1980s remained significant only among the recently settled. In most northern villages, the descendants of a common, relatively distant ancestor formed a hamula (pl., hamail, meaning a clan). The hamula ordinarily had a corporate identity; it often maintained a guesthouse, its members usually resided in a distinguishable quarter or neighbourhood, and it acted in concert in village, and often regional, political affairs. The hamula was the repository of family honour and tended to be endogamous. Some villages in the north were dominated by one hamula; that is, everyone in a village belonged to the same descent group. Sometimes several smaller hamail also resided in a village dominated by one large hamula. Other villages were characterised by the presence of several hamail of nearly equal numerical size and importance in village political affairs and

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landholdings. In some northern regions, a large hamula might have sections in several villages. Intermediate kin groups existed below the level of the hamula and above that of the household. In many cases, a group of closely related households, descendants of a relative closer than the founder of the hamula, formed entities called lineages (or branches). A still smaller unit was the luzum, a close consultation group, usually composed of several brothers and their families. Father's brothers' sons and their families could be included in or even constitute the luzum. This group had the most significance for everyday life in the village. Members of a hamula, especially those spread over several villages, sometimes saw each other only on occasions such as weddings, births, deaths, religious holidays, or a conflict involving a hamula member. Anthropologist Richard Antoun found the luzum to be the significant unit in a variety of matters in the community he studied; its members were responsible for paying truce money in cases where honour had been violated. This was the group that acted as a support system for the individual in the event of need, providing access to resources such as land, bride wealth, or financial aid in the event of illness or to pay for schooling. Lineages and luzums varied in size and sometimes overlapped in functions. For example, a large luzum sometimes carried the weight of a smaller lineage in village politics, and it could be difficult to distinguish them. Kin groups, even at the level of lineages, were not homogenous in terms of class; some members could be quite well off and others rather poor. This internal differentiation increased as some members migrated to urban areas or abroad in search of work, entered the army, or sought higher education. Social control and politics in the village traditionally grew out of the interactions of kin groups at various levels. Social control over individual behaviour was achieved through the process of socialisation and a system that imposed sanctions for unacceptable behaviour. Such sanctions could range from gossip damaging to one's reputation and that of one's kin, to censure by one's kin group, to penalties imposed by the state for infractions of its criminal codes. Respected elder males from the various hamail (or lineages if the village were populated predominantly by members of one hamula)

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provided leadership in villages. They often made decisions by consensus. With the formation and consolidation of the state, traditional leaders lost some power, but they continued to mediate conflicts, and state officials often turned to them when dealing with village affairs. In cases of conflict in the village, leaders of the appropriate kin sections of groups attempted to mediate the problem through kinship ties. Such leaders were usually elderly men respected for their traditional wisdom and knowledge of customs, or slightly younger, secularly educated men, or persons in intermediate positions between the two. If the conflict escalated or involved violence, the state, through the police and the court system, tended to become involved. The state encouraged recourse to traditional forms of mediation sometimes as an alternative and sometimes as an accompaniment to processing the c~e through the court system. The mukhtar, or headman, of a small village linked the villagers with the state bureaucracy, especially if there were no village or municipal council. The mukhtar's duties included the registering of births and deaths, motorising official papers for villagers, and assisting the police with their investigations in the village. Where there were municipal or village councils, generally in villages with a population of 3,000 or more, the mukhtar had little influence. Instead, the councils-bodies elected by the villagers-allocated government authority and village resources. Young, educated men from influential families, whose fathers may have been traditional leaders in the village, often ran the councils. As villages increasingly became integrated into the state economic and political system, social stratification grew. Traditionally, large landowners were able to command labour, surplus, and services as well as social deference from less wealthy villagers. However, a variety of village and religious customs eased this apparent class differentiation. Religious teachings and practices, such as the giving of alms and the distribution of gifts at the festival marking the end of Ramadan and at other festival seasons, emphasised the responsibility of the prosperous for the less fortunate. Wealth also implied an obligation to provide a place for men to gather and for visitors to come, in order to maintain the standing of the village as a whole. Events such as weddings were occasions for the wealthy to provide feasts for the whole village.

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In the late 1980s, social change had strained village structure and values. The older generation's uncontested control of the economic resources necessary for contracting marriage, participating in politics, and even earning a livelihood had guaranteed their authority. The decline in significance of agriculture as a way of life and the appearance of other opportunities led many younger people into other pursuits. As a result, some "agricultural" villages eventually contained a majority of men engaged in other kinds of work. Earning an income independent of their elders' control and often considerably larger than the older generation could command, such young people were in a position to challenge their elders' authority. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, the individual still remained enmeshed in a network of family relations and obligations. The young deferred less frequently to their elders in decisions about life choices than had been the custom, but respect for parents and elders remained evident.

Tribes and Tribalism Before the events of the post-World War II period thrust it onto the centre stage of international affairs, the territory that is now the East Bank was first a provincial backwater of the Ottoman Empire and later a small and weak desert emirate. Straddling the transitional area between the "desert and the sown," it participated only marginally in the social and intellectual changes that began sweeping the Arab world during the nineteenth century. Although ringed by the hinterlands of such major cities as Jerusalem and Damascus, Jordan lacked a significant urban centre of its own until the late 1940s; consequently it did not display artistically, intellectually, commercially, or governmentally the sophisticated form of Arab culture characteristic of urban life. The basic form of social organisation in Trans-Jordan was tribal, and the social relations among the various nomadic and semi nomadic tribes and between them and villagers (many of whom were also tribally organised), was based on trade and the exchange of tribute for protection. In 1983, Gubser classified Jordanians along a continuum: nomadic, semi nomadic, semi sedentary, and sedentary. Nomads, or Beduins, were a fully nomadic group whose livelihood was based on camel herding. Tribes and animals existed in a symbiotic relationship; the camels supplied much of the food and other needs of the beduins, while the tribes people assured the animals' survival

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by locating and guiding them to adequate pasturage. This fine adaptation to an extremely demanding ecological niche required a versatile, portable technology that was, in its way, extremely sophisticated. It also required a high degree of specialised knowledge and a flexible social structure that could be expanded and contracted according to need. The beduins, however, were also dependent upon settled communities-villages, towns, and cities-for trading animals and their products for goods they did not produce. Tribal social structure, as described by tribal members, was based on the ramification of patrilineal ties among men. In reality, matrilineal ties also were significant in providing access to material and social resources. The ideological dimension to patrilineality became more apparent when endogamy, or marriage within the group, was considered. The preference for endogamy-historically prevalent in the Middle East, especially for paternal cousin marriage in the first instance and then in descending levels of relatedness--gives rise to a network of kin relations that are both maternal and paternal at the same time. Ultimately, the kinship system takes on many characteristics of a bilateral system. Descent and inheritance, however, are traced in a patrilineal fashion. Tribes in Jordan were groups of related families claiming descent from a supposed founding ancestor. Within this overall loyalty, however, descent from intermediate ancestors defined several levels of smaller groups within each tribe. Tribes' people described their system as segmentary; that is, the tribe resembled a pyramid composed of ascending segments, or levels, each of which was both a political and a social group. At some point, each unit automatically contained within it all units of the lower level. Ideally, in the event of conflict, segments would unite in an orderly fashion from the lowest level to the highest as conflict escalated. In reality, the system was not so orderly; tribal segments underwent fission, and in the event of conflict, fusion did not necessarily follow the ideal pattern. The pattern of unity was much more varied and complex. Beduins traditionally has placed great importance on the concept of honour (ird). Slight or injury to a member of a tribal group was an injury to all members of that group; likewise, all members were responsible for the actions of a fellow tribal member. Honour inhered in the family or tribe and in the individual as the representative of

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the family or tribe. Slights were to be erased by appropriate revenge or through mediation to reach reconciliation based on adequate recompense. Beduins had specific areas for winter and summers camping that were known to be the territory of a specific tribe. Semi nomadic groups raised sheep and goats and moved much shorter, well-defined distances; they also practised some agriculture. But the semi sedentary groups were more involved in agriculture than either nomads or semi nomadic peoples. Parts of a semi sedentary group moved during different seasons, while others in the group remained in permanent abodes. By the 1980s, these differences among Beduin groups were minimal. Substantial numbers of nomads and semi nomads had increasingly adopted a sedentary way of life. In his 1981 study of one section of the Bani Sakhar tribe, Joseph Hiatt noted that settlement began in the post-World War I period and expanded rapidly after the mid-1950s. In this case and many others, sedentarisation was neither completely voluntary nor a result of an official settlement policy. Rather, it appeared to be a natural response to changing political and economic circumstances, particularly the formation and consolidation of the state. In some cases, the administrative policies of the state disrupted the nomads' traditional pastoral economy. For example, national borders separated the nomads from grazing lands and permanent wells. The creation of a standing army that recruited nomads diluted labour once available for herding. Education had a similar effect. As the nomads took up agriculture and as private titles to land were granted, the nomads' traditional relationship to tribal territory decreased. Faced with these obstacles to a pastoral way of life, nomads increasingly chose alternative occupations, particularly in the military, and the sedentarisation process accelerated. Government policies encouraged settlement by providing schooling, medical services, and the development of water resources. The decrease in the number of nomads continued despite the influx of pastoralists from the Negev Desert after the founding of Israel. By the early 1970s, the beduin tribes constituted no more than 5 per cent of Jordan's population. That proportion had dwindled to less than 3 per cent by the late 1970s. Their small numbers, however, did not correspond to their cultural and political importance in Jordan. Despite the near-disappearance of the nomadic way of life, tribal

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social structure and organisation have not necessarily been transformed as drastically. Hiatt contended that tribal organisation actually was reinforced during the initial process of sedentarisation because the tribe itself was the basis for allocation of land. Leadership patterns have changed significantly, however, as government-appointed officials have assumed many of the tasks formerly associated with the position of sheikh. In the end, tribal social structure was weakened; individual titles to land, which can be rented or sold to outsiders, and individual employment diluted lineage solidarity and cohesiveness. Some indication of the recent status and aspirations of Beduin groups, both settled and nomadic, was provided by a 1978 survey by a team from the University of Jordan. Among the Beduins studied, males increasingly were engaged in more or less sedentary occupations. Many were in the government or the army. The researchers found that most Beduin parents wanted a different way of life for their children. Willingness to settle was contingent upon settlement being more advantageous than the nomadic way of life. For the Beduins, settlement often meant a continued association with livestock raising and its attendant requirements of access to food and water. These hopes and wishes seemed to be consistent with the government's strategy for a revitalised livestock (sheep and goat) industry. The Beduin attitude towards education was two-sided and reflected the difficulty of adapting to a new way of life. Early observers noted that an army career tended to motivate Beduins to acquire an education. Some, such as the French ethnographer Joseph Chelhod, argued that "an educated beduin means an abandoned tent." Implied was abandonment of the entire Beduin way of life. Many Beduin parents interviewed in the 1978 survey were concerned that the education of their children beyond a certain level would threaten the survival of the family. They feared that "an educated child would naturally emigrate to work or pursue further studies in Amman or even outside the country." At the same time, these parents acknowledged that "the best future of their children lay in education and in living and working in a settled society close to the country's urban centres." It is not altogether clear whether the beduins who have not acquired enough education for an ordinary career in the army have not abandoned their allegiance to their families and tribes or whether they have permanently rejected the beduin style of life.

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Jordan was unique among primarily sedentary Middle Eastern countries in that, at least until the mid-1970s, the Hashemiate government gained its most significant political support from the Beduin tribes. Mindful of the intensely personal nature of his ties with the Beduins, Hussain visited them often, socialising in their tents and playing the role of paramount tribal sheikh. People of Beduin origin constituted a disproportionate share of the army; that disproportion continued to prevail at the higher command levels in the mid-1980s. The opportunity for a lucrative, secure career that also carried high prestige and conformed to traditional martial tribal attitudes has for over half a century drawn recruits from the desert, first into the Arab Legion under the British and later into its successor force, the Jordan Arab Army. Army service was an important influence for social change among nomadic tribes because it fostered desire for education and often provided the wherewithal for adaptations to factors affecting the pastoral economy. For example, army pay could permit a Beduin family to buy a truck as a substitute for or in addition to camels, or to invest in the economically more significant sheep. Observers in the 1980s noted that a process of detribalisation was taking place in Jordan, whereby the impact of tribal affiliation on the individual's sense of identity was declining. Sedentarisation and education were prime forces in this process. Smaller groups, such as the extended family and clan, were gradually replacing tribes as primary reference groups. The weakening of tribal affiliation and identity led to the questioning of support for the Hashemiate regime. Tribal sheikhs no longer could guarantee the support of tribal members, particularly the younger ones. This process was uneven, however, with some tribes displaying more cohesiveness than others. The term tribalism was much in use in the 1980s. The intelligentsia proposed that meritocracy rather than tribalism be the basis of selection in the 1984 parliamentary by-elections. Anthropologist Linda Layne compared the intelligentsia's views of tribalism with the electoral behaviour of the beduins. Layne defined the intelligentsia's interpretation of tribalism as "the placing of family ties before all other political allegiances" and concluded that tribalism "is therefore understood to be antithetical to loyalty to the State." Layne recognised the prominent role of tribalism in the 1984 election but stated that

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this was not at odds with a modern political system. Rather, in reconstructing their identity in a modern Jordanian state, Layne held that the beduins were maintaining a tribalism suffused with new elements such as a narrower role for tribal sheikhs in national politics and new sources of political legitimacy. Bedouin electoral behaviour was not homogeneous along tribal lines, evidence that tribal sheikhs could no longer automatically deliver the votes of their fellow tribesmen and women. In this sense, Layne found no tension between the Bedouin's identity as tribesman or tribeswoman and as citizen; rather, these were complementary forms of identity. Tribalism and tradition also lent legitimacy to Hashemiate rule. The legitimacy of tradition, considered almost synonymous with Bedouin or tribal culture, has been defended as part of the near sacrosanct foundations of the state and as central to cultural heritage. In the 1985 public exchange between King Hussain and Minister of Information Layla Sharaf, Hussain responded to Sharaf's calls for liberalising the law, particularly lifting censorship and diluting the influence of tribalism in society. In the 1980s, a debate raged among Jordanians and observers of Jordanian society over the appropriate role tribal influence and tradition should play in a modern state. In early 1985, in the midst of this debate, King Hussain publicly supported the role of the tribe and tradition in Jordan's past and future by stating, "Whatever harms tribes is considered harmful to us. Law will remain closely connected to norms, customs, and traditions. Our traditions should be made to preserve the fabric of society. Disintegration of tribes is very painful, negative and subversive." Thus, the role of tribes and tribalism, although transformed, remained a fundamental pillar of both society and political culture in the late 1980s. Although numerically few Jordanians lived the traditional life of the nomadic beduin, the cultural traditions based on this lifestyle were hardly diminished. Indeed, conceptions of modern Jordanian cultural and national identity were deeply intertwined with the country's Bedouin heritage.

Migration In the late 1980s, Jordan experienced more than one form of migration. Large segments of the labour force worked abroad, and rural-urban migration continued unabated. In rural areas, substantial

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numbers of men were employed outside the village or were engaged in military service. Jordan often has been referred to by economists as a labour exporting country. With the oil boom of the 1970s in the Persian Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, substantial numbers of the well educated and skilled labourforce, from both rural and urban areas, temporarily emigrated for employment. Government figures for 1987 stated that nearly 350,000 Jordanians were working abroad, a remarkably high number for such a small domestic population. Approximately 160,900 Jordanians resided in Saudi Arabia alone. Most of the Jordanians working abroad were of Palestinian origin. The typical Jordanian migrant was a married male between twenty and thirty-nine years of age. His education level was higher than that of the average person on the East Bank. More than 30 per cent of those working abroad were university graduates, and 40 per cent were in professional positions. The average stay abroad ranged from 4.5 years to 8 years and the attraction of work abroad was the higher salary. Unlike most male migrants in the Middle East, Jordanian migrants had a greater tendency to take their families with them to their place of employment. Migration from Jordan was not a recent phenomenon. As early as the late nineteenth century, Jordanian villagers were migrating abroad. Migration abroad since the 1960s has generally been to Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Gulf states. Although most of those migrant workers came from urban areas, more data is available on the rural migrants. The authors of a 1985 study of the effects of migration on a village in the northwest noted that more than 10 per cent of families had at least one member working abroad and 32 per cent of male heads of household were serving in the armed forces. Many others held jobs in nearby urban centres and commuted between the village and their place of employment. Of village migrants to the oil-producing states, more than half were employed in the public sector, particularly in teaching and in the military security forces. As of the late 1980s, both of these areas faced a decline in employment if the oil-prodUcing states continued to reduce their foreign labour force. Labour migration in the 1970s and 1980s did not necessarily indicate a migrant's alienation from the village or a weakening of his

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ties with fellow villagers. Nearly 75 per cent of rural migrants had a relative or village friend in the place of employment abroad. In fact, migrants tended to facilitate the process for others, acting as points of contact for individuals who migrated later. Migration did not radically alter the authority of absent males in their households, whether rural or urban. Wives made many daily household decisions, but, in most cases, major decisions awaited consultation with the husband. The flow of remittances to the village was also a strong indication of the continuing ties between a migrant and his family. Remittances were used overwhelmingly by both rural and urban migrants to payoff debts and then to invest in residential property. The many new villa-style houses built in and around Amman and Irbid and in the villages reflected the large numbers of men working abroad and the presence of "oil money." In the northwest highlands, the purchase of property and the subsequent building of housing reduced the area of cultivable land. In contrast, in the Jordan Valley remittances figured prominently in investments in agricultural technologies. Returning rural migrants resided for the most part in the village and worked in Irbid, casting doubt on projections that international labour migration would contribute significantly to further urbanisation in the Amman area. Since the 1970s, increasing numbers of villagers had migrated to Amman. Most of them had remained poor and had shallow roots in the city. A significant land shortage, lack of job opportunities in rural areas, and the availability of education and health resources in Amman had sent a steady stream of villagers towards the city, overcrowding its housing and overtaxing its resources. Urban housing for the city's poor was neither readily available nor affordable. Rural migrants, however, maintained close ties with their natal villages. On Fridays (the official day off in Jordan) and during holidays, the villages were witness to family reunions of men who worked in the cities during the week and returned home at week's end.

Civil Society Relations The Jordanian constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and speech within the limits of the law. The current Political Parties Law of 1992, which repealed the law of 1955, regulates the framework within which Jordan's twenty political parties operate. The Ministry

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of Interior licenses political parties. They must work through legitimate and peaceful means, adhering to the supremacy of the law, the principle of political pluralism, and the preservation of national unity; they must renounce all forms of violence and discrimination, and avoid utilising the state for partisan purposes. The law mandates that a licensed political party must have at least fifty members, and that its leadership and finances remain public. The headquarters, communications and correspondence of political parties are protected by the law from raids and searches without judicial approval. Parties are allowed to issue publications in accordance with the Press and Publications Law. Government employees are no longer allowed to belong to a political party as of December 2002. A political ban on the leftists and the Islamists was lifted in 1991, opening the way for their representation in the parliament. Some analysts point to "the Jordan example," arguing that parliamentary representation has softened the rhetoric of previously excluded groups. Jordanians have the right to form and join civic organisations. According to the Law on Associations and Foundations of 1996, the use of associations for the benefit of any partisan organisation is prohibited. The Federation of Jordanian Chambers of Commerce, the Amman Chamber of Commerce, the General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions, and the Jordanian Engineers Association (JEA) are important umbrella organisations. About 13 professional organisations constitute effective forces in Jordanian politics. The Jordanian civil society organisations (CSOs) enjoy one of the most favourable political environments in the Arab world for participating in their country's political liberalisation. Important examples are the Charter on Civil Liberties (mithaq), written in 1989 by a committee which included major Jordanian civil society groups, and the National Charter, which sets guidelines for political party activity and affirms the state's commitment to rule of law and political pluralism. The Jordanian Society for Citizens' Rights (JSCR) was shut down in October 2002 making it the first civil society institution to be closed since 1989. The JSCR had to end its activities after the Minister of Interior ordered its closure and the cancellation of its registration for alleged violation of the Societies and Social Institutions Act. Three trade unionists of the Anti-Normalisation Committee of

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the Jordanian Professional Associations (JPA) were imprisoned because they advocated political changes to Jordan's diplomatic ties with Israel, but were later released. The government has threatened to dissolve the Council of the Jordanian Professional Associations. Any discussion of state-civil society relations in Jordan would be incomplete without reference to Jordan's press laws that regulate freedom of expression and are at the heart of the general debate on political participation and transparent governance. All publications in Jordan have to be licensed by the government. Important political pressure groups, such as the Council of Professional Association Presidents and the Jordanian Press Association, have been particularly concerned about some of the constraints on freedom of expression embodied in the 1997 amendments to the 1993 Press and Publications Law. In 1999, following an appeal by King Abdullah for greater openness, a committee set-up in the Press and Publication Department of the Ministry of Culture and Information removed hundreds of books from censorship; and the parliament abolished the prohibited topics listed in the previous press law. Amendments to the Penal Code passed as a temporary law by Royal Decree on October 8,2001, raised new concerns about freedom of the press. Article 150 threatens anyone with prison for "publishing a story, speech or act in any way that offends national unity, stirs people to commit crimes, implants hatred among members of society, instigates sectarianism and racism, insults the dignity and personal freedom of individuals, promotes fabricated rumours, incites others to riot, sit-in or organise public gatherings that violate the laws of the country." Any such violations are now handled by the State Security Council, and the punishments range from three to six month jail terms and/or a fine of 5000 Jordanian Dinars (about US$ 7000). Censorship of the media is allowed in time of martial law (under the Martial Law of 1967) or during a state of national emergency. The Jordan First campaign was launched in October 2002 by King Abdullah, through which he intends to mould citizens in "a unified social fibber that promotes their sense of loyalty to their homeland, and pride in their Jordanian, Arab and Islamic identity." It invites civil society institutions and the private sector to increase their contributions in building a modern state through focusing on achieving economic, social, and political development, fighting

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unemployment, and improving the standard of living. The campaign calls upon the government to construct an atmosphere of tolerance and democracy in which people are treated with dignity and equality by enhancing public freedom and abiding by the principles of accountability and transparency. It also introduced a women's quota for the June 2003 parliamentary elections. More importantly, new temporary citizenship law was formed in November 2002 allowing Jordanian women to pass citizenship on to their children. United Nations agencies work closely with Jordanian Ministry of Telecommunications, Ministry of Social Development, and some civil society organisations. The Jordanian National Forum for Women has close ties with all United Nations agencies. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) works with the National Task Force for Children, the World Health Organisation (WHO) with the Noor ai-Hussain Foundation, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with a number of ministries and the parliament. Changing Social Relations and Values: Relations between men and women, along with all other aspects of Jordanian society, had begun to change as people adopted values, attitudes, and customs much different from those traditional in the country. As new ideas reached all sectors of society, new perceptions and practices began to appear. Increased social and physical mobility have undermined the familial ties and the values that subordinated the individual to the kin group. A growing individualism has appeared, especially among the educated young. Many young people prefer to set-up their own household at marriage rather than live with their parents. Labour migration has had a considerable impact on family structure and relations. In some cases, where men migrate without their families, their wives and children see the husband only once or twice a year when he visits. If the wife and children live alone, this arrangement leads to increased responsibility and autonomy for women. Also, the children in such families grow up without knowing their fathers well. When the wife and children live with the migrant's extended family, they are usually under the authority of her husband's family. Some of the most marked social changes have affected women's roles. In urban areas, young women have begun to demand greater freedom and equality than in the past, although traditional practices

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still broadly govern their lives. Since the 1960s, women have become more active outside the home. In the 1980s, girls' school enrolment was nearly parallel to that of boys, and female graduates entered the work force in increasing numbers. Girls who attended school were not as closely chaperoned as they formerly were, although they rarely went out with friends in the evening. Educated women also tended to marry later, often after working for several years. The average age of marriage for women had risen from the mid-teens to the early twenties; the average age for males was between twenty-six and twenty-eight years. The narrowing of the gap in age between marriage partners signified a changing conception of the conjugal unit and its relation to the larger family group. Companionship and notions of romantic love were playing a greater role in marital arrangements than heretofore. Marriages were still a family affair, but the relationship between man and wife was assuming increasing Significance. This change reflected a dilution in the strength of families as social units with corporate interests that subordinated those of the individual. By the late 1980s, some observers had noted that couples tended to want fewer children. This trend appeared to parallel the changes in women's position in society and shifts in the political economy, which had implications for family structure, relations, and values. Women's education and employment patterns meant that child rearing was no longer the only role open to women. The need for dualincome households pointed to a decrease in the amount of time women could devote to child rearing. In the transition from an agricultural and pastoral society to one based on services, where literacy was a must, children required longer periods of education and thus were dependent for extended periods upon their families. Large families were no longer as economically feasible or desirable as in the past. The spread of the nuclear household encouraged the detachment of the individual from the demands of the extended family. At the same time, social security lessened the dependence of the aged on their children and other relatives. The functions of the extended family, however, were not necessarily diminished; given economic upheavals and a weak infrastructure for state social services, Jordanians continued to rely upon the extended family, even if many of its members resided in nuclear units.

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Generational conflicts, which observers believed to be increasing, strained family relations when young people attempted to adopt standards and behaviour different from those of their parents. Modem, secular education, with its greater emphasis on utility and efficiency, tended to undermine respect for the wisdom of age and the rightness of tradition. Male wage earners also were less dependent on older males for access to resources such as land and bride wealth.

Family and Household The extended family continued to be a viable form of household in the late 1980s. More families had begun to live in nuclear households, but Jordanians continued to rely on extended kin relations for a variety of purposes, which can be described as exchanges. Exchanges might include financial support; job information; social connections; access to strategic resources; marital partners; arrangements, protection, and support in the event of conflict; child care and domestic services; and emotional sustenance. In tum, an individual's social identity and loyalty continued to be oriented largely to the family. Formally, kinship was reckoned patrilineally, and the household usually was based on blood ties between men. There was no one for11VOf family; and household structure changed because of births, deaths, marriages, and migration. A household could consist of a married couple, their unmarried children, and possibly other relatives such as parents, or a widowed parent or an unmarried sister. Alternatively, a household could consist of parents and their married sons, their wives, and their children. At the death of the father, each married son ideally established his own household to begin the cycle again. Although the kinship system was considered patrilineal, maternal kin also were significant. Because the family was central to social life, all children were expected ~o marry at the appropriate age, and eligible divorced or widowed persons were expected to remarry. Marriage conferred adult status on both men and women. The birth of children further enhanced this status, especially for women, who then felt more secure in their marital households. Polygamy was practised in only a minority of cases and was SOcially frowned upon. Traditionally, the individual subordinated his or her personal interests to those of the family. The importance of the group outweighed that of the individual. In the late 1980s, it was still uncommon for a man to live apart from a

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family group unless he were a migrant worker or a student. Grown children ordinarily lived with parents or relatives until marriage. Children were expected to defer to the wishes of their parents. Marriage was a family affair rather than a personal choice. Because the sexes ordinarily did not mix much SOcially, young men and women had few acquaintances among the opposite sex, although among beduins a limited courtship was permitted. Parents traditionally arranged marriages for their children, finding a mate either through the family or their social contacts. In the late 1980s, this pattern had changed substantially. Among village and tribal population, the preferred marriage partner was the child of the father's brother. In most areas, a man had a customary right to forbid his father's brother's daughter from marrying an outsider if he wished to exercise his right to her hand. If the ideal cousin marriage was not possible, marriage within the patrilineal kin group was the next best choice. Such endogamous marriages had several advantages for the parties: the bride wealth payments demanded of the groom's kin tended to be smaller; the family resources were conserved; the dangers of an unsuitable match were minimised; and the bride was not a stranger to her husband's house. A University of Jordan medical department study in the late 1980s pOinted to a 50 per cent rate of family intermarriage: 33 per cent of marriages were between first-degree relatives, 7 per cent between second-degree relatives, and 10 per cent were within the extended family. Nonetheless, in the 1980s, endogamous marriages had declined in frequency; previous rates of intermarriage may have been as high as 95 per cent. Increasing female education and employment allowed young people more opportunities to meet and marry outside family arrangements. Also, there was growing awareness that genetic problems could arise in the offspring of endogamous marriages. In Islam, marriage is a civil contract rather than a sacrament. Representatives of the bride's interests negotiate a marriage agreement with the groom's representatives. The future husband and wife must give their consent. Young men often suggest to their parents whom they would like to marry; women usually do not do so but have the right to refuse a marriage partner of their parents' choice. The

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contract establishes the terms of the union, and, if they are broken, outlines appropriate recourse. Special provisions inserted into the contract become binding on both parties. Islam gives to the husband far greater leeway than to the wife in terms of polygamy and in matters of divorce. For example, a man may legally take up to four wives at one time provided he can treat them equally; a woman can have only one husband at a time. A man may divorce his wife by repeating, "I divorce thee" three times before witnesses and registering the divorce in court; a woman can instigate divorce only under very specific circumstances. Few women seek divorce because of the difficulty of taking a case to court, the stigma attached to a divorced woman, and the possibility of a woman's losing custody of her children. In theory and as a matter of public appearance, men exercise authority over women. That authority, however, is not as absolute as once thought. Women wield considerable power within the home and decision-making often is a joint affair between husband and wife.

Family Relationships: The social milieu in which a Jordanian family lived Significantly affected the position of the wife and her degree of autonomy. In rural agricultural areas and among the urban poor, women fulfilled important economic functions. Traditionally, some women of poor urban families worked outside the home, and rural women performed a wide variety of tasks in the household and in the fields. Such women occupied a position of relative importance and enjoyed a modicum of freedom in their comings and goings within the village or neighbourhood. Although casual social contact between the sexes of the kind common in the West was infrequent, segregation of the sexes was less pronounced than in traditional towns. Among the traditional urban bourgeOisie, women fulfilled fewer and less important economic functions. Artisan and merchant families earned their living from the skills of the men. Women's responsibilities were more confined to the home. Among the new urban middle class, women occupied a variety of positions, some of them contradictory. Some women of this class were educated and employed, and enjoyed a fair measure of mobility within society; others, also educated and skilled, lived a more sheltered life, with minimal mobility. Both groups of women frequently were seen in the streets wearing Islamic dress.

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The allocation of space within the home was often gender specific. The houses of prosperous urban and rural families traditionally contained distinct men's and women's areas: the reception room where the men of the family entertained male guests and the women's quarters from which adult males other than relatives and servants were excluded. Less wealthy urban or rural families were unable to conform as easily to the standards of segregation. They could not afford the extra room for male gatherings. In poorer rural areas, men and women often socialised together in the house. Status within the household varied considerably depending on sex, age, and type of household. In principle, men had greater autonomy than women. Their movements in public were freer, and their personal decisions were more their own. Within the household, however, younger males were subject to the authority of senior males, their grandfathers, fathers, and uncles. Decisions about education, marriage, and work remained family affairs. Older women exerted substantial authority and control over children and adolescents, the most powerless sector within a household. Household structure, whether nuclear or extended, also determined the extent to which women wielded power in a household. In a household with multiple married women, senior women held more power and could exert more control over younger wives. Younger women often preferred to live in a nuclear household where they had more autonomy in running the household and in child rearing. They were then more subject, however, to the direct control of the husband and had to manage the household alone without the help of other women. Children were given much affection and attention. Although not spared spanking and occasional harsh scolding, children were indulged and given much physical affection by household members and neighbours alike. Their behaviour was tolerated with amusement until close to the ages of four and five. Children then were expected to assume some responsibilities in the household. Little girls at this age began to help their mothers with household chores and to care for younger children. Segregation by gender was tied closely to the concept of honour (ird). In most Arab communities, honour inhered in the descent

group-the family and, to a varying extent, the lineage or clan.

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Honour could be lost through the failure 01 sisters, WIVes, and daughters to behave properly (modestly) and through the failure of men to exert self-restraint over their emotions towards women. For women, the constraints of modesty were not confined to sexual matters. Also, women could be held accountable for a loss of honour though they might not have had any obvious responsibility in the matter. Loud speech, a woman's bearing or dress, or her appearing in public places could lead to a loss of honour. For men, overt expressions of emotions (such as romantic love) that revealed vulnerability to women could cause a man's strength to be questioned, leading to a loss of honour. Men were expected to be above such matters of the heart. A wife's failure to behave properly reflected on the honour of her husband and his kin, but even more on her father and brothers and others of the group from which she came. A man's failure to conform to the norm!) of self-control and invulnerability to women shamed his immediate and extended kin group. Above all, honour was a matter of reputation. Perceptions were as important as actions or events. An offence against honour could be very lightly punished if it appeared that only the person's family knew of it. Harsher steps were required if persons outside the family knew of the offence or believed it to have occurred. The penalties for violation of the honour code differed for men and women. Custom granted the males of a family the right to kill female kin known to have engaged in illicit sexual relations. A more common practice, however, was for the families involved to arrange a hasty marriage. Men who lost honour through their actions were ostracised and lost face and standing in the community. On the one hand, the segregation of women worked to minimise the chances that a family's honour would be lost or diminished. On the other hand, the education of women and their participation in a modern work force tended to erode the traditional concept of honour by promoting the mingling of the sexes in public life.

Food and Drinks There are many fine restaurants in most Jordanian towns and cities, offering a wide selection of authentic Arabic food at reasonable prjces. Larger hotels offer a more international cuisine. The Ministry of Tourism publishes a full list of hotels and restaurants throughout

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the Kingdom. Jordan's national dish is known as mansaf; this is a whole stewed lamb, cooked in a yoghurt sauce and served on a bed of rice. Maglouba is a meat, fish or vegetable stew served with rice, and musakhan is a chicken dish, cooked with onions, olive oil and pine seeds. This is baked in the oven on a thick loaf of Arabic bread. Also popular is the famous Middle Eastern sheik kebab, consisting of chunks of lamb or marinated chicken speared on a wooden stick and cooked over a charcoal fire with tomatoes and onions. Wines, spirits and locally produced beer are available, together with imported drinks. All hotels and restaurants are licensed to sell alcoholic beverages. The local drink is known as arak, an anisflavoured drink served mixed with ice and water. All water in urban areas is drinkable. There is plenty of bottled water available to take on trips to more out-of-the-way areas. Cooked food is perfectly safe, but it is advisable to wash all uncooked fruits and vegetables thoroughly before· eating.

Gender Issues The Jordanian monarchy is being pulled in opposite directions by two competing political forces on issues concerning the status of women in the country. Since the mid-1980s, the nation's political liberalisation has increased mobilisation by both Islamic conservatives and women's rights groups. In recent years, the Jordanian government has achieved some gradual reforms despite Islamic opposition. Jordan ratified and acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1992, with reservations as to conflicts with Islamic law. In the nation's last report in January 2000 on their progress in adopting the Convention, government officials stated that they were working to narrow the conflicts between the Convention and Islamic personal law, and that they hope to achieve full adoption of CEDAW. The nation's constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender, but reports indicate that discrimination persists in many areas of Jordanian women's lives. Gender-based violence remains a major problem throughout the nation. Personal status issues such as marriage, divorce, and child custody are decided in courts based on Islamic law. Similar to many Arab nations, the testimony of a woman in Jordanian court counts half

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as much as a man's. Men can freely divorce their wives, while women must present their grounds in a court proceeding. Women receive less inheritance than men and must obtain consent from their husbands before applying for a passport. For many political Islamic groups, these issues of the personal status of women have become a symbol of the conflict between religious and secular forces. Hence, reform of personal status laws has been difficult. Indeed, the 1991 Parliament enacted laws creating unequal distribution of wealth in divorces and segregated educational institutions. Although the king retains much of the political power in Jordan, the return to democratic elections in the late 1980s politically galvanised women. Women consistently exhibit higher voter turnout than men. However, women remain largely excluded from the government itself, as there are only one female minister and three female senators. Major advocates for women in the Jordanian government have been Queen Noor, Queen Rania and Princess Basma. They have supported women's development projects and spoken out on social reform for women. Since the coronation of King Abdullah II in 1999, the monarchy has been generally protective of women's organisations and has shown interest in working to improve the status of women in Jordan. While the Parliament was not in session between 2001 and 2003, the government took the opportunity to amend two bills related to women rights. The first allowed women the right to file for divorce and the second gave the courts more leeway in imposing harsh punishments on those who commit honour crimes. The 1999 parliament had decided to retain impunity for those convicted of honour killings. The new House of Representatives rejected these amendments to Civil Status Law and the Penal Code. According to the new law the age of marriage for men and women, which had been 16 and 15 respectively, was raised to the age of 18. In addition, Jordanian women not married to Jordanian men now have the right to pass on Jordanian citizenship to their children. The latest legislative elections, which took place on June 17, 2003, were disappointing to women. Of the 54 women who ran for the parliamentary seats, none was elected, although over 40 had been active participants in training sessions organised by the National Democratic Institute. Previously only one woman had ever been

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elected in Jordan. However, six women became members of parliament in 2003 as a result of the "female quota" which King Abdullah instated. These women-a dentist, three teachers, a pharmacist, and a lawyer-were elected throughout the kingdom from the north, the south, the east and the west. Women candidates received more than twice the number of votes that women candidates had received four year ago. . To meet Jordan's goals for women's development, the government has established a National Committee for Women that oversees programmes and projects. The female illiteracy rate has fallen from 46 per cent in 1980 to just under 15 per cent in 2001, and women currently comprise half of all university students. Population growth in Jordan is declining, with a total fertility rate (births per woman) diminishing from 4.4 in 1995 to 3.6 in 2001, but it is still above the regional average of 3.3. Studies have indicated that both religious leaders and the general public support family planning as a strategy to reduce family size. Contraceptive use has substantially increased in the last twenty years, but much of the populace still lacks sufficient knowledge of reproductive issues to effectively prevent unplanned pregnancies. A study conducted in October 2001 revealed that men are now less apprehensive about contraception. They are showing a greater willingness to involve their partners in family-planning decisions. According to the study, 85 per cent of the male population of Jordan is in favour of female contraception. Joint spousal decisions on family planning rose from 62 per cent in 1996 to 76 per cent in 200l. In December 1999, the Arab Women's Media Centre (AWMC) was founded in Amman to train journalists and study women's issues. AWMC, whose infrastructure was created with donations from Princess Basma Bint Talal, now has 79 members. Jordanian female journalists occupied the chief editors' seats in the Kingdom's media for one day on 8 March, 2000 as part of an initiative to celebrate Women's day. Women and Work: Despite a seemingly conservative milieu, the number of women working outside the home increased in the 1980s. Women formed a little over 12 per cent of the labour force in 1985. Many poor and lower class women worked out of economic necessity, but a substantial number of working women came from financially secure families. According to the Ministry of Planning, the

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proportion of women working in professional and technical jobs was high. In 1985 women constituted 35.4 per cent of technical workers and 36.1 per cent of clerical staff. Women were least represented in agriculture and production. Women's increased access to education had led them to greater aspirations to work outside the home. Moreover, inflation had made the dual-income family a necessity in many cases. Jordanian women served as a reserve labour force and were encouraged to work during the years of labour shortages when economic expansion -and development plans were high on the government's priority list. In a 1988 study of women and work in Jordan, journalist Nadia Hijab argued that cultural attitudes were not the major constraint on women's employment; rather, need and opportunity were more significant factors. Most employed women were single. Unmarried women, in particular, were initially considered a source of untapped labour. Yet cultural constraints clearly militated against women working in agriculture, industry, and constructionareas of low prestige, but also the sections with the most critical labour shortages. Development programmes for women focused on technical training. Hijab mentions that a typical project was "to train women on the maintenance and repair of household appliances." To make work more attractive to women with children, the government discussed amending the labour laws to improve conditions. Such proposed amendments included granting more maternity leave and providing day-care facilities at the workplace. In addition, the media encouraged a more liberal attitude to women's working. Women's employment gained further legitimacy through national ceremonies sponsored by the government and the royal family honouring women's work. The critical years of labour shortages were 1973 to 1981. By the mid-1980s, the situation had changed as unemployment surged. With high unemployment, women were asked to return to their homes. Publicly and privately, Jordanians hotly debate whether women should work. Letters to the editors of daily newspapers argued for and against women's working. Some government leaders had decided that women should return to their homes. Discussion about amending labour laws was shelved, and Hijab observed that by 1985 there was "almost an official policy" to encourage married women to stay at

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home. Then Prime Minister Zaid ar Rifai bluntly suggested in 1985 that working women who paid half or more of their salary to foreign maids who sent the currency abroad should stop working. Differences in attitude towards women's employment frequently were based on the conditions of work. In a study of attitudes towards women and work, Jordanian sociologist Muhammad Barhoum found that resistance was least to women working in traditionally female occupations such as teaching, nursing, and secretarial work. He believed the change in attitude resulted from increased educational opportunities for girls and their parents' realisation that education was as important for girls as for boys, especially in the event of widowhood or divorce. The erosion of male wages, no longer adequate to support a family, had also been a prominent factor in legitim ising female employment. The impact of women's employment on relations within the family remained difficult to assess in 1989. Employment and contribution to family income accorded women a greater voice in family matters. The traditional division of labour between men and women within the family often remained relatively untouched when women worked. Women's work at home was often taken up by other women rather than shared between men and women. Women earning lower incomes relied on their extended network of female relatives to help with childcare and housework, while upper and middleincome women hired maids (usually foreigners from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, or Egypt) to tend to their homes and children.

Human Rights Problem Despite some improvement in Jordan's human rights record, there is great skepticism that the situation will experience any real changes. According to Dunne, the Arab Reform Bulletin editor, the reforms that are actually being implemented appear to be more of an attempt by the king to "modernise and improve the quality of governance than to democratise" and are largely economic and administrative in nature, resulting in privatisation, anti-corruption efforts, and internal shake-ups within the palace elite. In fact, many of these administrative changes are attempts to remove those who oppose Abdullah's economic reforms. In a June 8, 2005 editorial in The Washington Post, David

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Ignatius, an associate editor who writes about international affairs and business, discussed how recent dismissals within the Jordanian government are part of Abdullah's intention to "accelerate" his administrative and economic reforms. On May 5, Abdullah removed General Saad Kheir, director of Jordan's General Intelligence Directorate, and considered to be the "second most powerful man in Jordan." While General Kheir was a respected official, he was perceived to be a impediment to the palace's attempts to modernise and was removed to pursue a post within the palace as national security advisor, a position with less political influence than the powerful directorate role. This is one of many internal shifts within the government in Amman. In April, the king also formed a new government putting more power in the hands of reformists. He also replaced the chief of the royal palace and the director of public security. According to Ignatius, these assignments were intended to consolidate his pro-reformist base and eliminate those who stood in the way of his desired policies. Among Abdullah's other reforms, as reported by Ignatius, is a plan to battle corruption, putting anti-corruption efforts in the hands of an appointed ombudsmen and not under the auspices of the intelligence services, as has been done traditionally. The king is also ending the practice of giving government contracts to prominent businessmen close to the government.

Health and Welfare Factors affecting the standard of living for the average citizen were difficult to assess in early 1989. Information was scanty. Living conditions varied considerably according to region, kind of settlement, social position, and fortune of war. At the high end of the spectrum, well-to-do city dwellers appeared to enjoy all the amenities of modern life. In cities, basic public services such as water, sewage, and electricity were sufficient to meet the needs of most residents. Nevertheless, mounting pressure on these services, particularly the demand for water, rose steeply during the 1980s and was bound to increase as the urban population continued its high rate of growth. World Health Organisation (WHO) figures indicated that, in the mid1980s, the urban population had a 100 per cent rate of access to safe water within the home or within 15 minutes walking distance; in rural areas the figure was 95 per cent. Adequate sanitary facilities

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were available to 100 per cent of the urban population and to 95 per cent of the rural population. The rural poor, however, generally lived in substandard conditions. Homes in some villages .stilliacked piped water. At the bottom were the poorest of the refugees, many living in camps with minimal services. Open sewage ran through dusty, unpaved streets. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, electricity was gradually extended to nearly all rural areas. Diet was generally adequate to support life and activity. Average daily caloric intake for adults in the 1980s was 2,968 (117 per cent of the requirement), and protein intake was 52.5 grams, 115 per cent of the daily requirement. Nonetheless, nutritional deficiencies of various kinds reportedly were common. The number of health care personnel increased so that by the mid-1980s Jordan had a surplus of physicians. The "brain-drain," or emigration from Jordan of skilled professionals, apparently peaked in 1983, after which the number of physicians started a gradual climb. According to the WHO, in 1983 Jordan had 2,662 physicians. In 1987 the Jordan Medical Association reported a figure of 3,703, of whom 300 were unemployed. In the early 1980s, the medical college 9f the University of Jordan started to graduate students, further increasing the numbers. Fewer opportunities for physicians became available in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia because of the recession in these countries. In 1987 the Ministry of Health and the Jordan Medical Association, concerned about high unemployment among physicians, put forth various suggestions. These included opening more clinics in rural areas and assigning physicians to schools, colleges, and large industrial concerns. Other health care professions showed moderate increases; the number of government-employed dentists, for example, increased from 75 to 110. Pharmacists, a profeSSion increasingly entered by women, nearly tripled in number from thirty-eight in 1983 to ninetysix in 1987. Government-employed nurses increased from 292 to 434 over the same period. In the early 1980s, Jordan had thirty-five hospitals, of which about 40 per cent were state run. A number of other health facilities scattered throughout the country included health centres, village clinics, maternal and child care centres, tuberculosis centres, and school health services. In 1986 government health expenditures represented 3.8 per cent of the national budget.

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Medical care services were distributed more evenly than in the past. Previously most health professionals, hospitals, and technologically advanced medical equipment were located in major urban areas, such as Amman, Irbid, Ar Ramtha, Az Zarqa, and As Salt. People in smaller villages and remote rural areas had limited access to professional medical care. With the focus on primary health care in the 1980s, the WHO commented that treatment for common . diseases was available within an hour's walk or travel for about 80 per cent of the population. The expense and inconvenience of travelling to major urban areas did, however, hinder rural people from seeking more technologically sophisticated medical care. The WHO reported a general decrease in the incidence of diseases related to inadequate sanitary and hygienic conditions. A reduction in the incidence of meningitis, scarlet fever, typhoid, and paratyphoid was noted, while an increase was registered in infectious hepatitis, rubella, mumps, measles, and schistosomiasis. In the mid-1980s, only one reported case of polio and none of diphtheria occurred. Childhood immunisations had increased sharply, but remained inadequate. In 1984 an estimated 44 per cent of children were fully immunised against diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (OPT); 41 per cent had received polio vaccine; and 30 per cent had been vaccinated against measles. Cholera had been absent since 1981. Jordan reported its first three cases of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) to the WHO in 1987. The most frequently cited causes of morbidity in government hospitals, in descending frequency, were gastroenteritis, accidents, respiratory diseases, complications of birth and the puerperium, and urogenital and cardiovascular diseases. Among hospitalised patients, the most frequent causes of mortality were heart diseases, tumours, accidents, and gastrointestinal and respiratory diseases. Traditional health beliefs and practices were prevalent in urban and rural areas alike. These practices were the domain of women, some of whom were known in their communities for possessing skills in treating injuries and curing ailments. Within the family, women assumed responsibility for the nutrition of the family and the treatment of illness. Local health beliefs and practices were important not only for th~ir implications in a family's general state of health but also in

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determining when, and if, people would seek modern medical care. Local beliefs in the efficacy of healers and their treatments prevented or delayed the seeking of medical care. For example, healers often treated illness in children by massages with warm olive oil, a harmless procedure but one that often delayed or prevented the seeking of medical care. Modern medicine had made tremendous inroads, however, into popular knowledge and courses of action. People combined traditional and modern medical approaches. They sought modern medical facilities and treatments while Simultaneously having recourse to traditional health practitioners and religious beliefs. Infertility, for example, was often dealt with by seeking the advice of a physician and also visiting for an amulet. In addition, traditional cures such as "closing the back" were used. In this cure, a woman healer rubbed a woman's pelvis with olive oil and placed suction cups on her back. This acted to "close the back"; an "opened back" was believed to be a cause of infertility. The acceptance of modern health practices and child care techniques was closely related to household structure. A study by two anthropologists noted that younger, educated women encountered difficulties in practising modern techniques of child health care when they resided in extended family households with older women present. The authority in the household of older women often accorded them a greater voice than the mother in setting patterns of child care and nutrition and in making decisions on health expenditures. Discrimination on the basis of gender in terms of nutrition and access to health care resources was documented. In a study conducted in the mid-1980s, the infant mortality rate for girls was found to be Significantly higher than for boys. It was also noted that male children received more immunisations and were taken to see physicians more frequently and at an earlier stage of illness than girls. Girls were more apt to die of diarrhoea and dehydration than males. Malnutrition also was more common among female children; boys were given larger quantities and better quality food. In addition, more boys (71 per cent) were breast-fed than girls (54 per cent). In the 1980s, government efforts to improve health were often directed at women. In the summer, when outbreaks of diarrhoea among infants and children were common, commercial breaks on

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television included short health spots. These programs advised mothers how to feed and care for children with diarrhoea and advertised the advantages of oral rehydration therapy (aRT) to prevent and treat the accompanying dehydration. The WHO noted that the use of aRT h~lped lower the fatality rate among those children hospitalised for diarrhoea from 20 per cent in 1977 to 5 per cent in 1983. During the 1980s, the Ministry of Health launched an antismoking campaign. Posters warning of the dangers to health could be seen in physicians' offices and in government offices and buildings. Success was slow and gradual; for example, cigarettes were less frequently offered as part of the tradition of hospitality. Social welfare, especially care of the elderly and financial or other support of the sick, traditionally was provided by the extended family. Nursing homes for the elderly were Virtually unknown and were considered an aberration from family and social values and evidence of lack of respect for the elderly. Social welfare in the form of family assistance and rehabilitation facilities for the handicapped were a service of the Department of Social Affairs and more than 400 charitable organisations. Some of these were religiously affiliated, and the overwhelmingly majority provided multiple services. UNRWA provided an array of social services, such as education, medical care, vocational training and literacy classes, and nutrition centres to registered refugees. Government expenditures on social security, housing, and welfare amounted to 8.6 per cent of the budget in 1986. Social security was governed by the Social Security Law of 1978, which was being applied in stages to the private sector. As of 1986, all establishments employing ten persons or more came under the law's provisions. Ultimately the law will apply to all establishments employing five or more persons. The employer contributed 10 per cent of salary and the employee contributed 5 per cent, and the contribution covered retirement benefits, termination pay, occupational diseases, and work injuries. The plan was for medical insurance to be included eventually under the social security contribution. In April 1988, the Social Security Corporation covered 465,000 workers employed by approximately 7,000 public and private establishments.

6 Religion More than 9 per cent of Jordanians were to Sunni Muslims in the late 1980s. Although observance was not always orthodox, devotion to and identification with the faith was high. Islam was the established religion, and as such its institutions received government support. The 1952 Constitution stipulates that the king and his successors must be Muslims and sons of Muslim parents. ReligiOUS minorities included Christians of various denominations, a few Shia Muslims, and even fewer adherents of other faiths.

Early Development of Islam In AD 610, Muhammad (Pbuh), a noble belonging to the Hashemiate branch of the ruling Quraish tribe in the Arabian town of Mecca, began to preach the first of a series of revelations granted him by God through the angel Gabriel and to denounce the polytheism of his fellow Meccans. Because the town's economy was based in part on a thriving pilgrimage business to the Kaaba, Muhammad's (Pbuh) vigorous and continuing censure eventually earned him the bitter enmity of the town's leaders. In 622 he was invited to the town of Yathrib, which came to be known as Medina (the city) because it was the centre of his activities. The move, or hijra (known in the West as the hegira), marks the beginning elf the Islamic era. The Muslim calendar, based on the lunar year, begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad (Pbuh)-by this time known as the Prophet-continued to preach, eventually defeated his

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detractors in battle, and consolidated both the temporal and spiritual leadership of all Arabia in his person before his death in 632. After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his words regarded as coming directly from God into the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. Others of his sayings and teachings as recalled by those who had known Muhammad (a group known as the Companions) became the hadith. The precedent of his personal behaviour was set forth in the Sunna. Together the Quran, the hadith, and the Sunna form a comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of an orthodox Sunni Muslim. During his lifetime, Muhammad (Pbuh) was both spiritual and temporal leader of the Muslim community; he established Islam as a total and allencompassing way of life for human beings and society. Muslims believe that Allah revealed to Muhammad (Pbuh) the rules governing proper behaviour and that it therefore behooves them to live in the manner prescribed by the law, and it is incumbent upon the community to strive to perfect human society according to holy injunctions. Islam traditionally recognises no distinction between religion and state, and no distinction between religious and secular life or religious and secular law. A comprehensive system of religiOUS law (Shariah) developed gradually during the first four centuries of Islam, primarily through the accretion of precedent and interpretation by various judges and scholars. During the tenth century, however, legal opinion began to harden into authoritative doctrine, and the figurative bab-ul-ijtihad (gate of interpretation) gradually closed, thenceforth eventually excluding flexibility in Islamic law. Within the Jordanian legal system, Shariah remains in effect in matters concerning personal status. After Muhammad's (Pbuh) death, the leaders of the Muslim community consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his earliest followers, as Caliph, or successor. At that time, some persons favoured Ali, the Prophet's cousin and husband of his daughter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the so-called Shiat Ali or Party of Ali) eventually recognised the community's choice. The next two Caliphs-Umar, who succeeded in 634, and Uthman, who took power in 644-enjoyed recognition of the entire community. When Ali finally succeeded to the Caliphate in 656, Muawiyah, governor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his murdered kinsman Uthman.

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After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his capital to Mesopotamia, where a short time later he, too, was murdered. Ali's death ended the period in which the entire community of Muslim recognised a single Caliph. Upon Ali's death, Muawiyah proclaimed himself Caliph from Damascus. The Shiat Ali, however, refused to recognise Muawiyah or his line, the Umayyad Caliphs; in support of claims by Ali's line to a presumptive right to the Caliphate based on descent from the Prophet (Pbuh), they withdrew and established a dissident sect known as the Shia. Originally political in nature, the differences between the Sunni and Shia interpretations rapidly took on theological and metaphysical overtones. Ali's two sons, Hasan and Hussain, became martyred heroes to the Shias and repositories of the claims of Ali's line to mystical pre-eminence among Muslims. The Sunnis retained the doctrine of the selection of leaders by consensus, although Arabs and members of the Quraish, Muhammad's tribe, predominated in the early years. Reputed descent from the Prophet, which King Hussain claims, continued to carry social and religious prestige throughout the Muslim world in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the Shia doctrine of rule by divine right became more and more firmly established, and disagreements over which of several pretenders had a truer claim to the mystical powers of Ali precipitated further schisms. Some Shia groups developed doctrines of divine leadership far removed from the strict monotheism of early Islam, including beliefs in hidden but divinely chosen leaders with spiritual powers that equalled or surpassed those of the Prophet himself. The early Islamic polity was intensely expansionist, fuelled both by fervour for the new religion and by economic and social factors. Conquering armies and migrating tribes swept out of Arabia, spreading Islam. By the end of Islam's first century, Islamic armies had reached far into North Africa and eastward and northward into Asia. The territory of modern Jordan, among the first to come under the sway of Islam, was penetrated by Muslim armies by AD 633. Although Muhammad (Pbuh) had enjoined the Muslim community to convert the infidel, he had also recognised the special status of the "people of the book," Jews and Christians, whose own revealed scriptures he considered revelations of God's word and which contributed in some measure to Islam. Jews and Christians

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in Muslim territories could live according to their own religious law, in their own communities, and were exempted from military service if they accepted the position of dhimmis, or tolerated subject peoples. This status entailed recognition of Muslim authority, additional taxes, prohibition on proselytism among Muslims, and certain restrictions on political rights. Social life in the Ottoman Empire, which included Jordan for 400 years, revolved around a system of millets, or religious communities. Each organised religious minority lived according to its own personal status laws under the leadership of recognised religious authorities and community leaders. These recognised leaders also represented the community to the rest of society and the polity. This form of organisation preserved and nourished cultural differences that, quite apart from theological considerations, distinguished these communities.

Islamic Revival The 1980s witnessed a stronger and more visible adherence to Islamic customs and beliefs among significant segments of the population. The increased interest in incorporating Islam more fully into daily life was expressed in a variety of ways. Women wearing conservative Islamic dress and the head scarf were seen with greater frequency in the streets of urban as well as rural areas; men with beards also were more often seen. Attendance at Friday prayers rose, as did the number of people observing Ramadan. Ramadan also was observed in a much stricter fashion; all public eating establishments were closed and no alcohol was sold or served. Police responded quickly to infractions of the rules of Ramadan. Those caught smoking, eating, or drinking in public were reprimanded and often arrested for a brief period. Women in the 1980s, particularly university students, were actively involved in expressions of Islamic revival. Women wearing Islamic garb were a common sight at the country's universities. For example, the mosque at Yarmuk University had a large women's section. The section was usually full, and women there formed groups to study Islam. By and large, women and girls who adopted Islamic dress apparently did so of their own volition, although it was not unusual for men to insist that their sisters, wives, and daughters cover their hair in public.

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The adoption of the Islamic form of dress did not signify a return to segregation of the sexes or female seclusion. Indeed, women who adopted Islamic clothing often were working women and students who interacted daily with men. They cited a lag in cultural attitudes as part of the reason for donning such dress. In other words, when dressed in Islamic garb they felt that they received more respect from and were taken more seriously by their fellow students and colleagues. Women also could move more readily in public if they were modestly attired. Increased religious observance also accounted for women's new style of dress. In the 1980s, Islamic dress did not indicate social status, particularly wealth, as it had in the past; Islamic dress was being worn by women of all classes, especially the lower and middle classes. Several factors gave rise to increased adherence to Islamic practices. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Middle East region saw a rise of Islamic fundamentalism in response to economic recession and to the failure of nationalist politics to solve regional problems. In this context, Islam was an idiom for expressing social discontent. In Jordan, opposition politiCS had long been forbidden, and since the 1950s the Muslim Brotherhood had been the only legal political party. These factors were exacerbated by King Hussain's public support for the shah of Iran in his confrontation with Ayatullah Sayyid Ruhullah Musavi Khomeini and the forces of opposition, by continued relations with Egypt in the wake of the 1979 Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel, and by the king's support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. Although Islamic opposition politics never became as widespread in Jordan as in Iran and Egypt, they were pervasive enough for the regime to act SWiftly to bring them under its aegis. By the close of the 1970s and throughoutthe 1980s, government-controlled television regularly showed the king and his brother Hassan attending Friday prayers. The media granted more time to religious programmes and broadcasts. Aware that the Islamic movement might become a vehicle for expressing opposition to the regime and its policies, and in a move to repair relations with Syria, in the mid-1980s the government began to promote Islam.

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Islam in Social Life Despite a strong identification with and loyalty to Islam, religious practices varied among segments of Jordan's population. This unevenness in practice did not necessarily correlate with a ruralurban division or differing levels of education. The religious observance of some Jordanians was marked by beliefs and practices that were sometimes antithetical to the teachings of Islam. Authorities attributed at least some of these elements to pre-Islamic beliefs and customs common to the area. In daily life, neither rural dwellers nor urbanities were overly fatalistic. They did not directly hold God responsible for all occurrences; rather, they placed events in a religious context that imbued them with meaning. The expression inshaallah (God willing) often accompanied statements of intention, and the term bismillah (in the name of God) accompanied the performance of most important actions. Such pronouncements did not indicate a ceding of control over one's life or events. Jordanian Muslims generally believed that in matters that they could control, God expected them to work diligently. Muslims have other ways of invoking God's presence in daily life. Despite Islam's unequivocal teaching that God is one and that no being resembles him in sanctity, some people accepted the notion that certain persons (saints) have baraka, a special quality of personal holiness and affinity to God. The intercession of these beings was believed to help in all manner of trouble, and shrines to such people could be found in some localities. Devotees often visited the shrine of their patron, especially seeking relief from illness or inability to have children. Numerous spiritual creatures were believed to inhabit the world. Evil spirits known as jinn-fiery, intelligent beings that are capable of appearing in human and other forms-could cause all sorts of malicious mischief. For protection, villagers carried in their clothing bits of paper inscribed with Quranic verses (amulets), and they frequently pronounced the name of God. A copy of the Quran was said to keep a house safe from jinn. The "evil eye" also could be foiled by the same means. Although any literate Muslim was able to prepare amulets, some persons gained reputations as being particularly skilled in prescribing and preparing them. To underscore

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the difficulty in drawing a fine distinction between orthodox and popular Islam, one only need note that some religious sheikhs were sought for their ability to prepare successful amulets. For example, in the 1980s in a village in northern Jordan, two elderly sheikhs (who also were brothers) were famous for their abilities in specific areas: one was skilled in warding off illness among children; the other was sought for his skills in curing infertility. Their reverence for Islam notwithstanding, Muslims did not always practice strict adherence to the five pillars. Although most people tried to give the impression that they fulfilled their religious duties, many people did not fast during Ramadan. They generally avoided breaking the fast in public, however. In addition, most people did not contribute the required proportion of alms to support religious institutions, nor was pilgrimage to Mecca common. Attendance at public prayers and prayer in general increased during the 1980s as part of a regional concern with strengthening Islamic values and beliefs. Traditionally, social segregation of the sexes prevented women from participating in much of the formal religious life of the community. The 1980s brought several changes in women's religious practices. Younger women, particularly university students, were seen more often praying in the mosques and could be said to have carved a place for themselves in the public domain of Islam. Although some women in the late 19805 resorted to unorthodox practices and beliefs, women generally were considered more religiously observant than men. They fasted more than men and prayed more regularly in the home. Education, particularly of women, diminished the folkreligious component of belief and practice, and probably enhanced observance of the more orthodox aspects of Islam.

Religious Minorities Jordan's Constitution guarantees freedom of religious beliefs. Christians formed the largest non-Muslim minority. Observers estimated in the late 1970s that the Christian community-comprising groups of several denominations-constituted roughly 5 to 8 per cent of the population. The principal points of concentration of the East Bank's indigenous Christians were a number of small towns in the "sown," such as UI Karak, Madab3, As Salt, and Ajlun. Christians also lived in Amman and other major cities.

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Overwhelmingly Arabic in language and culture, many Christians belonged to churches whose liturgical languages were, until recently, other than Arabic. With some exceptions, the lower clergy were Arabs, but the higher clergy were rarely so. In the past, Christians were disproportionately represented among the educated and prosperous. With increased access to education for all of the East Bank's peoples, it is the disproportion was less significant in the 1980s. As of 1989, religious conflict had not been a problem in Jordan. The influence of Islamic fundamentalism that made itself felt in Jordan in the late 1970s and 1980s had not given rise to religious tensions. As a minority in a largely Muslim society, however, Christians were affected by Islamic practices. With the stricter observance of Ramadan in the 1980s, hotels and restaurants were prohibited by the government from serving liquor to local Christians or foreigners. Restaurants that formerly had remained open during the day to serve such persons were closed. The press and television also gave a greater emphasis to religion. The largest of the Christian sects in the late 1980s, accounting for roughly half of all Jordanian Christians, was that part of the Eastern Orthodox complex of churches that falls under the patriarch of Jerusalem. With an elaborately organised clerical hierarchy, the patriarch ate administered most of the Christian shrines in Jerusalem and the West Bank. The parent church of Eastern Orthodoxy was the Greek Orthodox Church, and the liturgical language of the church in the patriarchate of Jerusalem included both Greek and Arabic. The higher clergy, including the patriarch, were predominantly of Greek descent, but the priests were native speakers of Arabic. Because of the typically national organisation of orthodox churches, the relatively small numbers of Syrians and Armenians adhering to orthodoxy had their own churches. The Greek Catholic Church (Melchite, also seen as Melkite; Catholics of the Byzantine rite) in Jordan was headed by the patriarch of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, who in turn was subject to the authority of the pope in Rome. The clergy generally were Arabs, and Arabic was used in most of the liturgy. Most Greek Catholics lived in the West Bank, but one diocese-that of Petra Philadelphia, the latter an old Greek name for Amman-had its seat in Amman. The Roman Catholic Church had its own patriarch, who was also

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subject to papal authority. Several other Catholic groups, each headed by a patriarch who was in tum subordinate to Rome, were represented. These included several hundred Syrian Catholics and Armenian Catholics. The approximately 11,000 members of various Protestant denominations had been converted primarily from the Orthodox and Catholic churches. Muslims rarely converted to another fait!'. In the rural areas, conversions from one Christian group to another usually involved an entire kin-based group of some size. Such conversions often caused stress between the converting group and another group of which it was part or with which it was allied. Individual conversions in such areas were rare. The effect of urbanisation on this pattern has not been examined. Protestant communities, generally established by North American and European missionary activities, also were represented by the personnel of various international organisations. Some Protestant groups established schools and hospitals and constructed a few churches. The Christian churches also had their own ecclesiastical courts that decided matters of alimony, divorce, annulment, and inheritance. Non-Christian religious minorities in the late 1980s included a small community of Druzes who lived in an area near the Syrian border. They were members of a sect that originally had derived from the Ismaili branch of Shia Muslim. Ismailis were Shias who believed that Imam Muhammad ibn Ismail (died ca. AD 765), the Seventh Imam, was the last Imam, as opposed to others who recognised Twelve Imams. The Druzes, primarily located in the mountains of Lebanon and in southwestern Syria, have many secret beliefs and maintain that Hakim, the sixth Fatimid Caliph, was divine in nature and is still alive in hiding. A small settlement of Bahais inhabited the village of Ul Adasiyah in the northern Jordan Valley. The Shishans, a group whose origins lie in the Caucasus Mountains, were Shias. Estimates in the early 1980s placed the number of Shishans at 2,000.

Religious Demography The country has a total area of 92,300 square kilometres and its population is approximately 5 million persons. Over 92 per cent of the population are Sunni Muslim. Official government figures estimate that Christians make up 6 per cent of the population; however, government and Christian officials privately estimate the

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true figure to be closer to 3 per cent. There also are at least 20,000 Druze, a small number of Shia Muslims, and less than 800 adherents of the Bahai faith. There are no statistics available regarding the number of atheists or persons who are not adherents of any particular religious faith. Officially recognised Christian denominations include the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic (Melkite), Armenian Orthodox, Maronite Catholic, Assyrian, Anglican, Lutheran, Seventh-day Adventist, United Pentecostal, and Presbyterian Churches. Other churches, including the Baptist Church, the Free Evangelical Church, the Church of the Nazarene, the Assembly of God, and the Christian Missionary Alliance, are registered with the Ministry of Justice as "societies," but not as churches. Some Egyptian immigrants are adherents of Coptic Church. There also are a number of Chaldean and Syriac Christians and Muslim Shia represented in the immigrant Iraqi population. With few exceptions, there are no major geographic concentrations of particular religious groups. The cities of Husn, in the north, and Fuheis, near Amman, are predominantly Christian. Madaba and Karak, both south of Amman, have Significant Christian population. The northern part of the city of Azraq is predominantly Druze, as is Umm ul-Jamal in the city of Mafraq. There are also significant population of Druze in Amman and Zarka, and a smaller number of Druze in Irbid and Aqabah. There are a number of non-indigenous Shia living in the Jordan Valley and the south. Foreign missionaries operating in the country include the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons); Jehovah's Witnesses; Campus Crusaders for Christ; Life Agape; Intervarsity; Navigators; Christar; Arab World Ministries; Operation Mobilisation; Southern Baptist International Mission Board; the Conservative Baptist; Frontiers; Brother Andrew; the Jesuits; Christian Brothers; Rosary Sisters; Benedictines; Anglican Church Mission Society; the Society of Friends (Quakers); Comboni Sisters; Little Sisters of Jesus; the Religious of Nazareth; Sisters of St. Dorothy; the Daughters of Mary the Helper (Salesian Sisters); the Little Sisters of Nazareth; the Little Family of the Annunciation; Sisters of St. Joseph of the Apparition; Basiliennes Chouerites; Focolare Sisters; Franciscans (OFM); Sons of Divine Providence (Don Orione Fathers); Association Fraternal International (AFI); Institute of the Incarnate Word; Franciscans of the Cross;

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Dominican Sisters of St. Catherine; Franciscan Missionaries of Mary (FMM); Franciscan Missionaries of the Immaculate Heart of Mary; Daughters of Mary of the Enclosed Garden; Theresian Institute; and the Missionaries of Charity.

Religious Freedom The Constitution provides for the protection of "all forms of worship and religious rites in accordance with the customs observed in the Kingdom, unless such is inconsistent with public order or morality;" however, the Government imposes some restrictions on freedom of religion. The Constitution also provides that "there shall be no legal discrimination with regard to Jordanians' rights and duties based on race, language, or religion;" however, those who are members of religions not recognised by Shariah law (members of religions other than Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and those who convert from Islam may face legal discrimination and bureaucratic difficulties in personal status cases. According to the Constitution, Islam is the state religion. Neither Islam nor the Government recognise religious faiths other than the three main monotheistic religions: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. While Christianity is recognised as a religion and non-Muslim citizens may profess and practice the Christian faith, churches must be accorded legal recognition through administrative procedures in order to own land and to perform marriages and other sacraments. Since 1998 the Prime Minister unofficially has conferred with an interfaith council of bishops representing officially registered local churches on all matters relating to the Christian community, including the registration of new churches in the country. The Government uses the following criteria when considering official recognition of Christian churches: the faith does not contradict the nature of the Constitution, public ethics, customs, or traditions; the faith is recognised by the Middle East Council of Churches; the faith does not oppose the national religion; and the group includes some citizen followers. According to the Government, the role of the State in religious affairs is limited to supervision. Groups that have practices that violate the law and the nature of Jordanian society are prohibited; however, in practice, there were no reports that religious groups were banned. Religious institutions, such as churches that wish to receive official government recognition, must apply to the Prime Ministry for

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mgistration. Recognised non-Muslim mligious institutions do not mceive subsidies; they am financially and administratively independent from the Government and am tax-exempt. Religious instruction is mandatory for all Muslim students in public schools. Christian and Bahai students am not mquimd to attend courses in Islam. In 1996, the late King Hussain and the Ministry of Education approved mligious instruction for Christian students in public schools. In 1998, the Government launched an experimental programme in four districts to incorporate Christian education in the public school curriculum. In 1999, the local Council of Bishops approved the use of the Syrian model of catechism in these test districts; however, the programme has not progressed due to a lack of attention by either the Ministry of Education or the local Christian hierarchy. The Constitution provides that congregations have the right to establish schools for the education of their own members "provided that they comply with the general provision of the law and am subject to the control of government in matters mlating to their curricula and orientation." The Muslim feasts of Eid-ul-Adha, Eid-ul-Fitr, the Prophet Muhammad's Birthday, the Prophet's Ascension, and the Islamic New Year am celebrated as national holidays. Christmas and the Gmgorian Calendar New Year also am national holidays. Easter is a government holiday for Christians and Christians may request leave for other Christian feasts pmscribed by the local Council of Bishops. Them am two major government-sponsomd institutions that promote interfaith understanding: The Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies and the Royal Academy for Islamic Civilization Research (Al-Bayt Foundation). Both institutions sponsor research, international confemnces, and discussions on a wide range of religious, social, and historical questions from the perspective of both Muslims and Christians. The Government facilitated holding an international Christian confemnce in government facilities in May 2001 and hold another confemnce during the summer of 2002. The Government does not recognise the Druze or Bahai Faiths as official mligions but does not prohibit the practice of these faiths. Druze face official discrimination but do not complain of social discrimination. Bahais face both official and social discrimination. The Government does not record the beamr's religion on national

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identity cards issued to Druze or Bahais. The small Druze and Bahai communities do not have their own courts to adjudicate personal status and family matters; such matters are heard in Shariah courts. The Government does not officially recognise the Druze temple in Azraq, and four social halls belonging to the Druze are registered as "societies." The Government does not permit Bahais to register schools or places of worship. The Government does not recognise Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Christ, or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, but each denomination is allowed to conduct religious services and activities without interference. The Government does not interfere with public worship by the country's Christian minority. Although the majority of Christians are allowed to practice freely, some activities, such as encouraging Muslims to convert to Christianity, which is considered legally incompatible with Islam-are prohibited. In June 2000, the Government closed an Arab Orthodox church in Amman that was aligned with the Antioch Patriarch in Damascus, Syria, due to a dispute stemming from an intrachurch rivalry between the Jerusalem Patriarchate and the Antioch Orthodox Patriarchate. Both are members of the Greek Orthodox Church but are affiliated with different geographical divisions. The Government closed the church following a request from the local Orthodox hierarchy to enforce a 1958 law that grants the Jerusalem Patriarchate authority over all Orthodox churches in the country. The church reopened in December 2000 with permission from the Government, but was closed again 1 week later based largely on pressure from the Orthodox hierarchy. The Government stated that the church was free to open under a different name that would not imply affiliation with the Orthodox Church. Shariah law prohibits non-Muslims from proselytising Muslims. Conversion to the Muslim faith by Christians is allowed; however, a Muslim may not convert to another religion. The small number of Muslims who convert to other faiths claim of social and government discrimination. The Government does not fully recognise the legality of such conversions. Under Shariah converts are regarded as apostates and legally may be denied their property and other rights. However, in practice this principle is not applied. According to the Government, it neither encourages nor prohibits apostasy. However, converts from

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Islam do not fall under the jUrisdiction of their new religion's laws in matters of personal status and still are considered Muslims under Shariah. Converts to Islam remain under the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts. Shariah law prescribes the death penalty for Muslims who convert to another religion; however, there is no corresponding statute under national law, and such punishment never has been applied. According to one Christian cleric, the Government generally does not prohibit citizens from proselytising if it is within the limits of the law and based on "the principle of maintaining personal security and safety and provided that it does not contradict the customs and traditions of society." Government policy requires that foreign missionary groups (that the Government believes are not familiar with the customs and traditions of Jordanian society) refrain from public proselytising "for the sake of their own personal safety from fundamentalist members of society that oppose such practices." In the past, the Government has taken action against some Christian proselytisers in response to the complaints of recognised Christian groups who charged that the activities of these missionaries "disrupt the cohesiveness and peace between religious groups in the society." In the past, there have been some reports of local government officials encouraging Christian females involved in relationships with Muslim males to convert to Islam to diffuse family or tribal disputes caused by the relationship. However, there were no known cases in which local officials harassed or coerced individuals to convert. Non-citizen Christian missionaries operate in the country but are subject to restrictions. Christian missionaries may not proselytise Muslims. Christian mission groups in the country complained of difficulty in dealing with local intrachurch politics. In February 2000, the governor of the Amman municipality closed the office of Life Agape-an organisation associated with the Baptist Church-after the director refused to sign a letter stating that he would not "deal with Muslims." The office was closed indefinitely. The members of the organisation currently were meeting at a Baptist Church in Amman, without objection from the Amman municipality, to pursue their activities. In April and September 1999, a foreign employee of a small langunge school in Amman applied for a residence permit from the

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Ministry of Interior. His application was denied, reportedly because government officials believed that he had been attempting to convert Muslims to Christianity. He reapplied in April 2000 and continued to await a response from the Government. The Jordan Evangelical Theological Seminary (JETS), a Christian training school for pastors and missionaries, still had not been accredited. As a result, students and faculty from the US and elsewhere wishing to attend JETS still were unable to obtain student visas. JETS continued its operations with students studying on tourist visas. Of the 80 seats in the Lower House of Parliament, 9 are reserved for Christians. No seats are reserved for Druze or adherents of other religious faiths. In June 2001, the King dissolved Parliament and charged the Government with drafting a new election law. The country's parliamentary election law historically has limited the number of Islamists elected to Parliament. The major Islamic political party boycotted the 1997 elections, stating that the election law must be amended before it would participate in future elections. In March 2000, Jordan University amended the student council election law, granting the university president the authority to appoint half of the university's 80-member student council, including the chairmanship. This decision reportedly was made to curb the influence of Islamists on campus. The Political Parties Law prohibits houses of worship from being used for political activity. The law was designed primarily to prevent Islamist politicians from preaching in mosques. The Press and Publications Department continued its April 2000 ban on a book of poetry by Ziyad ul-Anani. The book contained a poem that reportedly was offensive to Islam. In early 2000, radical Islamists criticised a poem published by Muslim poet Musa Hawamdeh. In March 2000, the Government banned the book in which the poem was published. In June 2000, Hawamdeh was summoned to a Shariah court to face allegations of apostasy. In July 2000, Hawamdeh, without retracting any portion of his poem, was acquitted on all charges in both the Shariah and civil courts. After Hawamdeh's acquittal, he was subpoenaed in October 2001 by the Shariah Court because of technicalities in his previous case, which may allow him to be tried again. Since October 2001, there has been no further activity with regarding to the retrial,

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and most legal experts believe that Hawamdeh would be acquitted if tried again. However, some observers believe that the procedural error is being used as a pretext to continue harassing the poet. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Trusts manages Islamic institutions and the construction of mosques. It also appoints imams, provides mosque staff salaries, manages Islamic clergy training centres, and subsidises certain activities sponsored by mosques. The Government loosely monitors sermons at mosques and requires that speakers refrain from criticising the royal family or instigating social or political unrest. According to the Constitution, religious community trusts (''Awqaf'') and matters of personal status such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shariah courts for Muslims, and separate non-Muslim tribunals for each religious community recognised by the Government. There is no provision for civil marriage or divorce. The head of the department that manages Shariah court affairs (a cabinet-level position) appoints Shariah judges, while each recognised non-Muslim religious community selects the structure and members of its own tribunal. All judicial nominations are approved by the Prime Minister and commissioned officially by royal decree. The Protestant denominations registered as "societies" come under the jurisdiction of one of the recognised Protestant church tribunals. There are no tribunals assigned for atheists or adherents of unrecognised religions. Such individuals must request one of the recognised courts to hear. their personal status cases. Shariah is applied in all matters relating to family law involving Muslims or the children of a Muslim father, and all citizens, including non-Muslims, are subject to Islamic legal provisions regarding inheritance. All minor children of a male citizen who converts to Islam automatically are considered to be Muslim. Adult children of a male Christian who has converted to Islam become ineligible to inherit from their father if they do not themselves convert to Islam. In cases in which a Muslim converts to Christianity, the conversion is not recognised legally by the authorities, and the individual continues to be treated as a Muslim in matters of family and property law. The minor children of a male Muslim who converts to Christianity continue to be treated as Muslims under the law. In 1998, custody of the children of a Christian woman living in

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Irbid was granted, against her will, to the Muslim brother of her deceased husband. A civil court held that Shariah law revoked the mother's custody of the children because she had failed to raise them as Muslims. The children had been raised as Christians because both their mother and father originally were Christian. Their father converted to Islam shortly before his death. As a result of his conversion, the children were considered to be Muslim as a matter of Shariah law. However, the mother, lawfully remained Christian. The civil court rejected the mother's final appeal in February 2002; however, the court's final judgment had yet to be enforced. Some Christians are unable to divorce under the legal system because they are subject to their faith's religious court system, which does not allow divorce. Many such individuals convert to another Christian denomination or the Muslim faith in order to divorce legally. The Government notes individuals' religions (except for Druze, Bahais, and other unrecognised religions) on the national identity card and "family book" (a national registration record that is issued to the head of every family and that serves as proof of citizenship) of all citizens. Atheists must associate themselves with a recognised religion for official identification purposes. The Government traditionally reserves some positions in the upper levels of the military for Christians; however, all senior command positions traditionally have been reserved for Muslims. Division-level commanders and above are required to lead Islamic prayer for certain occasions. There is no Christian clergy in the military. During the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, all citizens, including non-Muslims, are discouraged from eating, drinking, or smoking in public or in vehicles and are discouraged strongly from dressing in a manner that is considered inconsistent with Islamic standards. Restaurants are closed during daylight hours unless specifically exempted by the Government. Only those facilities catering specifically to tourists are allowed to remain open during the daytime and sell alcohol during the month of Ramadan. Under Shariah as applied in the country, female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's inheritance, and non-Muslim widows of Muslim spouses have no inheritance rights. A sole female heir receives half of her parents' estate; the balance goes to designate male relatives. A sole male heir inherits both of his parents' property.

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Male Muslim heirs have the duty to provide for all family members who need assistance. Men are able to divorce their spouses more easily than women are, although a law passed in December 2001 allows women to divorce their husbands in Shariah Court. Since the law went into effect, Shariah courts have granted two divorces brought by women. Shariah as applied in the country regards the testimony of a woman to be equal to half that of a man. This provision technically applies only in religious courts; however, in the past it has been imposed in civil courts as well, regardless of religion. Relations between Muslims and Christians in the country generally are amicable. Relations within the Christian community sometimes are difficult, especially among the evangelical <;:hristian community. There are disputes between and within different Christian denominations. In June 2000, due to a dispute stemming from an interchurch rivalry between the Jerusalem Patriarchate and the Antioch Orthodox Patriarchate, the Government closed an Arab Orthodox church in Amman, which was aligned with the Antioch Patriarch in Damascus, Syria. In general Christians do not suffer discrimination. Christians hold high-level government and private sector positions and are represented in the media and academia approximately in proportion to their presence in the general population. Senior command positions in the military traditionally have been reserved for Muslims. Bahais face some societal and official discrimination. Employment applications occasionally contain questions about an applicant's religion. The majority of the indigenous population views religion as central to personal identity and religious conversions are not tolerated widely. Muslims who convert to other religions often face social ostracism, threats, and abuse from their families and Muslim religious leaders. There is anecdotal evidence that the number of romantic relationships between members of different religions is growing. Such relationships, which ultimately may lead to conversion (either to the Muslim or Christian faiths) usually, are strongly discouraged by the families. Interfaith relationships may lead to ostracism and, in some cases, violence against the couple, or feuds between members of the couple's families.

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When such situations arise, families may approach local government officials for resolution. There were reports that in some cases, local government officials encouraged Christian women involved in relationships with Muslim men to convert to Islam in order to defuse potential family or tribal problems; however, there were no known cases in which local officials harassed or coerced persons to convert from Christianity to Islam. In previous years, when the Government intervened in such cases, it at times placed the women concerned into "protective custody" to prevent retribution by one of the families. There were some cases of mixed faith married couples seeking to immigrate to other countries because of the negative family and societal reactions to their marriages.

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Heritage and Culture The southern Jordan River Valley, the Dead Sea plains, and the surrounding hills and mountains are the home for some of the most momentous events in the history of man's relationship with God. Here Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) arrived in the Holy Land, Jacob and Esau made their pact, God protected Lot while destroying Sodom and Gomorrah, Moses saw the promised land which he would never enter, Joshua crossed the Jordan River into Canaan, Elijah crossed the Jordan River and rode a "chariot of fire" into heaven, Elisha cured the leper in the waters of the river, John the Baptist preached, baptised Jesus, and was killed by King Herod, Jesus received the Holy Spirit and resisted the temptations of Satan, and the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) made his night-time journey from Mecca to Al-Quds (Jerusalem). The Millennium 2000 celebrations in Jordan are an excellent opportunity for religious pilgrims from throughout the world to rekindle their faith and commitment to God by visiting the land and river that have inspired prophets and formed the geographic and spiritual backdrop for God's covenants with mankind. Many of the sites of Biblical events and miracles have been identified, protected and made easily accessible to visitors. Jordan looks forward to hosting more religious tourists returning to the roots of their faith in the Holy Land of Jordan. Jordan is an integral part of the Arab world and thus displays cultural traits common to the region. The family is of central importance

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to Jordanian life. The rural Bedouin population, though declining in numbers, still follows a more traditional way of life, preserving customs passed down from generations. Village life revolves around the extended family, agriculture, and hospitality; modernity exists only in the form of a motorised vehicle for transportation. However, urban-dwelling Jordanians enjoy such aspects of modern, or popular, culture as theatrical productions, musical concerts, operas, and ballet performances. Most major towns have movie theatres that offer both Arab and foreign films. Younger Jordanians frequent Internet cafes in the capital, where espresso is served at computer terminals. The country's cuisine features dishes using beans, olive oil, yogurt, and garlic. Jordan's two most popular dishes are musakhan, lamb or mutton and rice with a yogurt sauce, and mansaf, chicken cooked with onions, which are both served on holidays and on special family occasions. Private and governmental efforts have been made to foster the arts through various cultural centres, notably in Amman and Irbid. Modernity has weakened the traditional Islamic injunction against the portrayal of animate objects; thus, in addition to the traditional architecture, decorative design, and various handicrafts, it is possible to find contemporary forms of painting and sculpture. Elaborate calligraphy and geometric designs often enhance manuscripts and mosques. As in the rest of the region, the oral tradition is prominent in artistic expression. Jordan's most famous poet, Mustafa Wahbah at-Tal, ranks among the major Arab poets of the 20th century. After World War II a number of important poets and prose writers emerged, though few have achieved an international reputation. Jordan is rich in its antiquities and archaeological sites that are spread all over the country. The Department of Antiquities of Jordan is the official body that is legally responsible for the protection of archaeological sites. Quite a number of projects are currently taking place with the aim of conserving and presenting archaeological sites. These projects are being executed by the Department of Antiquities, in certain cases in cooperation with foreign institutions. Most restoration and site presentation work is conducted on sites with above ground structures. Consolidation of archaeological structures found during excavations is conducted only in some cases. There is no great danger of fire or natural hazards that can be

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considered as a threat destroying the cultural heritage of Jordan. However, the lack of continuous proper care and maintenance of some of the sites has resulted in their deterioration. In many cases, excavated archaeological sites are left without proper conservation measures or their reburial, causing them to deteriorate rapidly. The large number of sites requires adequate funding and expertise in order to be well maintained, and to ensure their conservation for generations to come. In many cases, the situation can be remedied with the appropriate maintenance, protection and long-term management. There are individual monuments that require restoration and structural consolidation measures, these being: Qasr Tuba, Qasr-ul-Hallabat, and Qasr-ul-Bint and the Palace Tomb in Petra. Without the provision of adequate funds and expertise the conservation of such cultural heritage places will not be possible. The excavated Neolithic site of Beida in the southern region of Jordan is an example of excavated sites that have been exposed to weathering due to the lack of proper protection and conservation upon excavation. Moreover, Qweilbeh (Abila), situated in the northern part of the country, is a huge site containing many features of Roman and Byzantine times that require some restoration and site presentation works. Petra, the capital of the Nabatean Kingdom and a Roman city after 106 AD, is situated in a high plateau cut by many deep gorges. The signs of decay on the monuments of Petra, that are cut out from the living rock are numerous and alarming. Today 800 tomb facades are listed, once, more than 2000 facades lined the slopes of the steep mountains. We could estimate that more than 80 per cent of the elaborately chiselled and decorated facades have been lost forever. Since the days when the Nabataeans left Petra for good, all buildings of the town have decayed and the rock monuments were reintegrated into the cycle of nature and left unprotected to the forces of erosion and dilapidation. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that only a few of them, though battered, almost miraculously survive this assault. All this clearly indicates that the major underlying reason for the evident and stilI ongoing decay of the monuments is neglect, a neglect that continues to the present. After Petra was declared a World Heritage site by UNESCO in 1985, one would assume that a gradual reversal, from neglect to

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serious efforts of preserving the site and its beauty, would have taken place. The sad truth, however, is that so far very little has happened to ensure the survival even of the most prominent examples of Nabatean architecture, a truth that is indeed alarming. If it took about fifteen centuries to obliterate more than 80 per cent of the facades, how long will it take until these last preserved samples of Nabatean architecture have disappeared? Decay is an accelerating process: the fact that some monuments survived in a relatively presentable shape for almost two thousand years gives no guarantee that they will survive for an equally long period of time. Consequently, the threat of further loss of fabric and irreplaceable architectural detail is imminent and real. To make things worse, the few and surely honourable attempts that have been made to save parts of some of the monuments, e.g. at AI-Khazna and the Palace tomb, were actually failures. They were well-intended efforts in their time, but now we know that they were futile and in fact in the long run may be more harmful to the monuments than if nothing had been done at all. It is above all because of the repeated and excessive use of Portland cement with its entirely different properties that forms an incompatible mix with the sandstone from which the tombs are carved. This is extremely detrimental to the monuments and for many other reasons cement should have no place in Petra. The ancient Nabatean city of Petra has always been the prime tourist spot of the country that has-because of its unique architecture, the peculiar way in which the facades were shaped and its outstanding setting and beauty-attracted travellers from all over the world. Due to its great cultural significance for humanity, it has been recognised as a World Heritage Property. Furthermore, the signing of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in November 1994 greatly contributed to an unprecedented increase in the number of tourists visiting Petra. A boom in hotel construction set in immediately after the peace treaty was signed. Also roads were built and widened and worldwide promotional activities for tourism to Jordan were launched. However, there was not much visible effort to conserve the cultural heritage. A hopeful new attempt for conservation is the German-Jordanian project for the establishment of a Conservation Centre in Petra. Its first project, the restoration of the Tomb of the Fourteen Graves

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(Tomb 825), has been implemented and special guidelines and procedures for the restoration of the monuments as well as their documentation have been developed. When the emirate of Trans-Jordan was created by the British in 1921, the large majority of the people consisted of an assortment of tribally organised and tribally oriented groups, some of whom were sedentary cultivators and some nomadic or semi nomadic. The total population was fewer than 400,000 people. By 1988 nearly 3,000,000 people, more than half of whom were Palestinians, colonised the region east of the Jordan River-Dead Sea-Gulf of Aqabah line, referred to as the East Bank. The term Palestinians refers narrowly to citizens of the British mandated territory of Palestine (1922-48). Narrowly defined, the term Trans-Jordanian referred to a citizen of the Emirate of Trans-Jordan (1921-46). Generally speaking, a TransJordanian was considered a Muslim or Christian indigenous to the East Bank region, which was within the approximate boundaries of the contemporary state of Jordan. The formerly rural society of Jordan had been transformed since freedom into an increasingly urban one; by 1985 nearly 70 per cent of the population resided in urban centres that were growing at an annual rate of between 4 and 5 per cent. Jordanians are known for their friendliness and hospitality. A genuinely respectful attitude is highly regarded in the Jordanian culture. It is one of the marks of a mature person. Another highly respected trait is keeping one's word. It is also very important not to cause embarrassment. Most western visitors to Jordan never know when they have been offensive to a host or business partner. This is because most Jordanians would never want to embarrass a guest by pointing out the offensive actions or words. The culture of Jordan is based around Arab and Islamic elements. Aspects of Jordanian culture include the music of Jordan. Most of the people of Jordan are Arabs. Most of them are Muslims. Jordan is situated on the territory that once was part of ancient Palestine. This is why many Jordanians trace their ancestry to ancient people who lived in Palestine. Daily life of regular people of Jordan is surrounded by great culture and a lot of history. Almost all people of this country live in ancient cities and towns that were built centuries and centuries ago.

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They were built along the shores of the Dead Sea and the River Jordan. Lots of those places are famous in Biblical stories. Jordanians, like many people from Arab countries are very aware of their history. Children are taught in schools much about the history of Jordan and other Arab states.

National Culture In Jordan culture and art go hand in hand. Poets, writers, novelists, painters and other artists preserve their rich Jordanian cultural heritage through their works. The Kingdom has 17 art exhibition galleries ranging between cultural centres; large private art institutions and privately owned exhibition halls. During the summer of 2001, art galleries were busy holding exhibitions of paintings ceramics, wood or metal sculptures, and seminars and lectures on different art issues. The art movement in Jordan passed through several stages, with impressionism finding its way first into Jordanian homes in the 1920s and 1930s. Impressionism was also the most popular style among Jordanian artists during the 1960s, and the country as a whole in the 1970s witnessed considerable increase in artistic activity. The signs of a modern art movement in Jordan started to show in the early 1950s. Eight amateur artists, among them, prominent Arab artists Muhanna Durra and Kamal Oudeh held an exhibition in the country. Art societies were formed in the 1950s and 1960s, such as the Art Club, the Association Patronising Art and the Jordanian Sculpture and Painting Club. In 1966, the Department of Culture and Arts was founded within the Ministry of Youth to support and promote cultural activities related to fine arts, theatre, music and literature. The Ministry of Culture began playing a more active role at the national level in 1990. In 1977, members of the first generation of artists like Durra and Ali Ghul founded the Artists Association, which succeeded in establishing a headquarters for artists where they could meet, discuss their problems and hold occasional exhibitions and lectures. In 1979, the Royal Society of Fine Arts was established to promote visual arts in Jordan, Arab and Islamic countries and the Third World. Meanwhile, Jordan's serious production of novels started in 1967 through the works of three prominent writers: Tayseer Sboul, Ameen Shinnar and Saleem Nahhaass. Novelists in Jordan have firmly moved in this decade from the period of establishing the novel's identity to competing

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with other novels that have acquired international recognition for their artistic merit. Realising the importance of art and culture, Jordan offered Jordanians, Arabs and the international world a festival held in a perfect venue: one of Jordan's most important archaeological sites, Jerash. Her Majesty Queen Noor-ul-Hussain founded in 1981 the Jerash Festival for Culture and Arts to promote Jordanian, Arab and international cultural and artistic interaction at one of Jordan's most important archaeological sites. The annual international festival provides a vibrant venue for Arab and international performing artists, and serves as a dynamic catalyst for the promotion of Jordanian and Arab culture and arts. Moreover, Jordan's capital Amman was chosen by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) as the 2002 Arab Cultural Capital. The decision was made following the 1998 Arab Culture Ministers' conference in the Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. Previously, Beirut acted as a cultural capital in 1999, followed by Riyadh in 2000, then Kuwait in 2001. The UNESCO project aims to highlight the cultural wealth and heritage of the chosen city, and to enhance its global image. In turn, this will contribute to strengthening the capital's capabilities in cultural production and resources, and provide new opportunities for cultural enrichment for all members of society. On several occasions both Their Majesties King Abdullah and Queen Rania have described the event as a springboard that will promote Jordanian culture on the local, Arab and international levels. Their Majesties have also supported and patronised numerous cultural events in the Kingdom including introducing awards to outstanding intellectuals such as the State Award for distinguished writers and artists whose work contributed substantially to progress in the field of literature, abstract art and theatre production. In August 2001, a Royal Decree was issued giving birth to the Song Festival in order to bring back the touch of originality and popularity to Jordanian songs and to enrich the identity of the contemporary local song. Organisers worked hard to crystallise King Abdullah's vision for a better cultural life for the youth and to confirm the aspirations of making Amman's designation as the cultural capital a success. The Greater Amman Municipality also made achievements to

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promote local culture. It launched the JD4.S million King Hussain Cultural Centre to enhance cultural awareness. The centre, first of its kind in the Kingdom, also seeks to create an appropriate environment for intellectual interaction amongst coun~ries and a good setting for creative abilities and intellectual intercourse to prosper. Queen Rania, who heads the National Council for the Amman Arab Cultural Capital 2002, has said the event should be seen as a boost to the Kingdom's cultural movement. Her Majesty also opened, as part of the events marking Amman as the cultural capital, a cultural avenue to promote local art and cultural scenes in Shmeisani. The avenue has several attractions, to mention only a few, the "Sunken Court" , an art gallery constructed below the street and kiosks displaying books and artwork ranging from paintings to handicrafts and photographs. Amman-Culture Jordan is part of the eastern Mediterranean weather system and boasts one of the world's most pleasant climates. There are marked seasonal contrasts, however. Summers are dry and warm-to-hot and winters are wet and cool-to-cold, with occasional snowstorms. In the highlands there are often strong, cool breezes on summer nights and the low-lying areas enjoy pleasant, moderately cool winters. Archaeological cave excavations north of Amman indicate that both conquering and indigenous people have populated Jordan for the last 100,000 years. Called Philadelphia during Graeco-Roman rule, it is one of the best-preserved Roman cities in the region with a number of ancient sites, such as an Odeon, a 6000-seater amphitheatre, a temple of Hercules and a Roman citadel. Thirty miles from Amman is the Dead Sea, the lowest point on earth at 400 metres below sea level and believed to be the site of the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah. To the south, are the ruins of the 2000-year-old city of Petra, carved out of sandstone cliffs and used in the final sequence of Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade. Further south are more historical sites including a 12th-century crusader castle and Wadi Rum, made famous by Lawrence of Arabia. Jordanian food is similar to that of Lebanon. Syria, Greece and Turkey, although most restaurant menus include European as well as local dishes. Many starters (meze) are based on pulses and cracked wheat such as humus, fuul, falafel, kube and tabouleh. A main course

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speciality is mensaf, stewed lamb with yoghurt sauce served on a bed of rice and traditionally eaten with the fingers. Other typical dishes are musakhan, chicken roasted in olive oil and onions with Arab bread and 'Mahshi Waraq inab', vine leaves stuffed with minced meat, rice and spices. Bottled mineral water, beer, wine and soft drinks are widely available. There are no licensing laws, but during RamadaTYsmoking and drinking in public is forbidden between sunrise and sunset. Capital of Jordan with 1.2 million inhabitants. Commercial, industrial and administrative centre of Jordan. Diverse industry, but phosphate extraction and petroleum refining is of the largest importance. Amman has an excellent infrastructure. Amman has grown quickly after World War II, much because of the influx of Palestinian refugees.

Aqabah-Culture Greatly cherished as the only outlet to the sea, the port city of Aqabah located at the southern western point of Jordan provides a breath of fresh air and the only real beach resort to Jordanians and tourists alike who flock there in their droves. Best known for its clean sandy beaches, Aqabah also boasts nine months of mild summer weather during autumn, winter and spring. When temperatures reach a chilly 10 degrees Celsius in Amman, the temperature in Aqabah can be an envious 25 degrees Celsius. Summer is hot though and activities should adapt to the climate, slowing down in midday and reviving in the cool of the evening. When fantasy, sun and sea meet the charms and atmosphere antiquity, the visitor can find himself, at any time of the year, at the Red Sea resort of Aqaba. For water sports and winter warmth, Aqabah is warm, sunny and inviting, fringed with palm trees, lapped by the crystal clear waters of the Gulf of Aqabah, cooled by a steady northerly breeze, and ringed by mountains that change in colour with the change of the hours. Life in Aqabah moves at a slower pace and is the perfect location to unwind and enjoy a tranquil holiday far from the crowds. You'll return home relaxed after spending your days lazing beside the pool or on the beach, wandering around the town, savouring the warm friendly ambiance, and sampling local cuisine and Arabic charm. Aqabah offers a refreshing change from more sophisticated resorts. Whilst all your needs are well catered to, tourism in Aqabah is in its

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infancy, and therefore you won't find crowds of people everywhere you go. Aqabah gives a true flavour of the rich Arabic culture and heritage, from the melodic call of the surrounding mosques, to the tempting aromas wafting from local restaurants, and the enchanting Arabic music heard around every street corner. You don't have to get wet to familiarise yourself with Aqabah's marine life. The Marine Sciences Centre houses an aquarium, which introduces you to some of the exotic underwater species that live in the Red Sea. Besides the joys of sun, sea and sand, Aqabah also hosts interesting sites, which include the Mameluk Fort at the end of the corniche, the remains of the medieval town of Ayla opposite the Miramar Hotel and the castle of Saladin (Salah-ud-din), which is situated on an island in the middle of the Gulf. There is also the museum of the Department of Antiquities dedicated to the preservation of artefacts in the area. The Mameluk Fort, One of the main historical landmarks of Aqabah was originally a Crusader Castle, rebuilt by the Mamluks in the sixteenth century. Square in shape and flanked by semicircular towers, the fort is marked with various inscriptions marking the latter period of the Islamic dynasty. The current excavations at the ancient site of Medieval Islamic Ayla already revealed a gate and city wall along with towers, buildings, a town mosque, courtyards and baths. The Museum houses a collection of artefacts collected in the region, including pottery and coins. It also hosts the house of Sharif Hussain Bin Ali, the great grandfather of King Abdullah II.

Islamic Holy Sites Jordan is also host to the tombs of many of the Prophet Muhammad's companions, who were martyred and buried there. In fact, Jordan has a special place in the history of Islam, as it was the first territory to which Islam spread outside of the Arabian Peninsula. It was also the site of the first contact between Islam and the nonArab world. The most important companions of the Prophet (PBUH) buried in Jordan include: Zaid ibn Haritha (the Prophet's adopted son and the only companion mentioned by name in the Quran); Jafar bin Abi Talib (cousin of the Prophet and elder brother of Ali, who was the husband of the Prophet's daughter Fatima and the father of

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aI-Hasan and AI-Hussain}; Abu 'Ubaydah 'Amir Ibn al-Jarrah (one of the "Blessed Ten" companions promised Paradise); Muath bin Jabal (the Prophet's governor in Yemen); Shurhabil bin Husna (the Scribe of the Quranic Revelation), and Dirar bin al-Azwar (a great general). In fact, many more companions of the Prophet are buried in Jordan. Furthermore, the sites of several of the most important battles in Islamic history are also in Jordan. After two unsuccessful attacks against the Byzantine garrison town of Mutah in 629 CE, the Muslim Arab tribes regrouped for a much wider military operation. After battles at Yarmouk (634 CE) and Fahl (635 CE), the Muslim armies won a decisive battle against the Byzantines at the second Battle of Yarmouk (636 CEl. This victory opened the way to the conquest of Syria and the rapid expansion of the Islamic world.

Petra: World Heritage Site For decades, American organisations have been closely associated with the excavation, presentation, and preservation of the World Heritage site of Petra. Images from Petra have also from time to time entered into popular American culture. Perhaps the most notable example of this is the climax of the 1989 movie Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade featuring scenes filmed in the siq and "Treasury". In addition, Petra has featured in a variety of popular publications, ranging from the children's comic book Tin Tin and the Red Sea Sharks to the cover of the December 1998 issue of National Geographic. On a more serious note, American universities and academic institutions have played and continue to play a vital role in better understanding Petra's past and in presenting it to a wider public. Funding has come from many sources, including private donors and public institutions such as the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This highlights some of the major ways that these and other American entities have contributed to one of the world's great archaeological sites and helped transform it into one of the premiere tourist destinations in the Middle East. As long ago as 1934, William Foxwell Albright, Director of the American Schools of Oriental Research (ASOR) in Jerusalem and

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dean of archaeological studies in the Middle East, initiated excavations in the northern part of Petra. Subsequent excavations undertaken by the American Centre of Oriental Research (ACOR), Brown University and the University of Utah, among others, have played an important role in better understanding the history, culture and legacy of the Nabatean as well as the later Roman and Byzantine civilizations that once thrived at Petra. During the early 1960s, the American Expedition to Petra under the leadership of Dr. Philip C. Hammond, professor of anthropology at the University of Utah, initiated a detailed excavation of Petra's main theatre. Among other things, this work helped establish the Nabatean orIgins of this unique and impressive structure carved into the red sandstone that is characteristic of the region. The American Expedition also played an important role in other excavation work undertaken in Petra. Specific work included the excavation of the first private residence in Petra (1959) and excavation of a series of private Nabatean houses on the northeast slope of Wadi Mousa (1974-1977). Excavations at the Temple of the Winged Lion, located north of the Roman street, are another legacy of the continued involvement of American institutions in Petra. This work, also undertaken by the American Expedition to Petra under the leadership of Dr. Hammond, commenced in 1973 and continues to date. Beginning in 1993, Brown University under the direction of Martha Sharp Joukowsky, initiated a series of excavations at the Great Temple (originally called the Southern Temple), a massive complex located on the southern side of the Roman street and near Qasr al-Bint and the Petra rest house. The purpose is to ascertain the original ground plan for the temple and better understand its character and function. The impressive site was apparently first developed for religious purposes during the Nabatean period and continued to be used throughout the late Roman and Byzantine periods. Funding is provided by Brown University and other private donors, including the Replogle Foundation and the World Monuments Fund. For nearly a decade, ACOR has supported an ongoing series of excavations and related work on two Byzantine churches located on the hill opposite the Great Temple. Known as the Petra Church and the Ridge Church. the excavations am shedding new light on Petra during the sixth and seventh century.

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Kenneth Russell and, later, ACOR Director Pierre Bikai directed the Petra Church project, while Patricia Bikai directed excavations at the Ridge Church. USAID provided funding for much of this work, with additional support coming from the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities and the World Monuments Fund. One unexpected outcome of the Petra Church project was the discovery by ACOR of some 150 carbonised scrolls dating to the sixth century. The fragile but still decipherable texts are written mainly in Greek and offer a wealth of information on the economic and social situation in Petra during the Byzantine period. Many of the texts deal with wills and inherited property. Some references also point to the survival of Nabatean culture in the region well into Byzantine times. Apparently, the scrolls are the remains of the private archive of a wealthy family that owned considerable property in the area around Petra. Working with ACOR, the University of Helsinki and the University of Michigan are publishing the scrolls. The National Endowment for the Humanities and the Samuel H. Kress Foundation have provided major funding in support of this effort. From 1997-1999, ACOR worked with the Department of Antiquities to excavate areas of interest adjacent to the colonnaded Roman street located in the wadi between the Great Temple to the south and the Byzantine churches to the north. The purpose was to enhance tourist interest as well as better understand Petra's urban history. Main features uncovered so far include five rooms that apparently served as shops or taverns and a stairway leading to the upper market. Once again, USAID was a major donor for this effort. Not surprisingly, archaeological research at Petra has been accompanied by a growing tourist interest in the site. In 1999 alone, more than 400,000 tourists visited Petra, by far the most to any of Jordan's impressive collection of tourist sites. The extent to which tourists decide to visit and then stay for more than a few hours depends largely on the level of services available and the extent to which historic sites are presented and made accessible to the general public. Effective preservation and presentation is vital, both to preserve Petra's historic past and ensure that it can be enjoyed, understood and appreciated by future generations. Initial attempts to do this were quite rudimentary and included a USAID-funded initiative to repair

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the "third column" in the Treasury building in 1958. The Treasury building, an impressive monument carved into the rock and immediately visible on emerging from the siq, has in recent years become perhaps the single most recognised symbol of Jordan throughout the world. During the late 1960s, USAID provided funding to the US National Park Service to complete a master plan to guide future development of the Petra site. Although a number of planning exercises have been undertaken with respect to Petra, this study helped focus attention on preserving the site and on developing a comprehensive plan for managing the anticipated growth in the tourist industry. It also identified perennial flooding of the siq entrance as a major problem. Subsequently, USAID funded construction of a dam across the entrance to protect the site, replicating a much earlier structure that had performed a similar function during Nabatean times. In 1994, USAID funding resulted in the completion of a second, updated master plan for Petra and the surrounding region. Among other things, the plan recommended improvements to the visitor's centre, trail identification, landscaping, and signage requirements. What happens "after excavation" is a dilemma that all archaeologists face. In Jordan, this issue is especially acute in the case of mosaics, which, once uncovered, must be protected from wind, rain and sun. In the case of the Petra Church. USAID provided funds to ACOR to design and construct an innovative shelter that now protects one of the best-preserved examples of Byzantine mosaic work in the country. Designed by Shutler Architects of Arlington (Virginia) and built by Starnet International Corp. of Longwood (Florida), the shelter covers 7,200 square feet and was completed in 1998 at a cost of approximately $250,000. Local currency generated by a USAIDfunded private sector commodity import programme has been used to implement important elements of the various Petra master plans. Among other things, during the 1990s, this funding helped paint private residences in Wadi Mousa a rose-red colour to blend in with the landscape; construct walkways and horse paths into Petra; and provide two-wheel horse-drawn carriages that provide access to Petra for children, the elderly or disabled, and other interested visitors. Finally, it should be noted that the ongoing USAID "partnership" with ACOR makes a significant and ongoing contribution towards

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archaeology and site presentation, both in Petra and elsewhere in Jordan. USAID-funded initiatives undertaken by ACOR in Jordan include the Madaba Archaeological Park; excavations at the early Islamic city in Aqaba; excavations at the Citadel in Amman; and excavations at the two Byzantine churches in Petra. In the late 1990s, this support was consolidated with the establishment of an ACOR endowment designed to provide ongoing financial stability for ACOR and support its long-term fundraising efforts. So far, USAID contributions to the endowment exceed $3 million. Additional funding has come from a variety of other sources, primarily American, including the National Endowment for the Humanities. Tourism has in recent years become one of Jordan's major growth industries. It is also the country's second most important source of foreign exchange (after remittances from workers abroad), providing nearly $1 billion annually by the late 1990s. Tourism's contribution to Jordan's foreign exchange account is expected to continue to grow for the foreseeable future. As tourism's contribution to Jordan's national economy increases, it will become even more vital to ensure that historical sites such as Petra are preserved to a high standard and that local inhabitants living in the surrounding regions benefit. The rapid growth in Wadi Mousa, the community immediately outside Petra, is directly related to the growth in the tourist industry. Even in as recently as the late 1970s, Wadi Mousa was a small village with a single government hotel located just outside the entrance to Petra. At this point, nearly 20,000 Jordanians live in Wadi Mousa and the surrounding villages. There are also more than 70 hotels with some 3,000 beds in and around Wadi Mousa, enhancing employment and income opportunities for many in the local community. Unfortunately this rapid expansion in tourist facilities was not accompanied by a comparable growth in water, sewage and other facilities. As part of a long-term effort to ensure a world-class infrastructure in the region, USAID, along with France and Germany, funded the $43 million Wadi Mousa water and wastewater treatment project benefiting not only Wadi Mousa but also the neighbouring communities of Taiba, Bdoul and Beida. USAID's total contribution came to $27 million and included the design alld construction supervision for the entire system,

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as well as funding for the new wastewater treatment plant and a series of pumping stations. The plant fits in well within the Petra environment. Interestingly, digging and construction work resulting from the project has uncovered a variety of archaeological artifacts that would otherwise have remained hidden. A USAID-funded Jordanian archaeologist assessed and catalogued this material under a subcontract to the Petra National Trust. A selection of artifacts is scheduled to go on display in the Petra museum.

Military Heritage When the Emirate of Trans-Jordan was formed in 1921, the small-scattered police elements leftover from Ottoman days were inadequate to maintain order and establish central government control. The police units were expanded, and a small mobile force of balanced elements of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was created. Two years later the police, numbering about 300, and the military force of about 1,000 were combined under the command of British Captain EG. Peake. The establishment was originally known as the Arab Army (AI Jaysh al-Arabi)-a perpetuation of the military force led by the Hashemiates in World War I against the Turks-and this Arabic title has been retained. In English, however, the name became the Arab Legion, a designation that lasted until 1956.

Preserving Cultural Heritage For so long the gene:-al public has seen culture and technology as incompatible. The root of this misunderstanding may well lie in the educational system which has delighted in making a distinction between the arts and the sciences. And yet, whether we plunge into the past, observe the present, or attempt to discern the future, we are constantly brought to using both science and culture, technology and society. Concrete collaboration can open not only the doors of knowledge, but also the path to economic development via the projects engendered. Visitors to this exhibition will certainly notice the traces of the scientific input in this trip through Jordan, and the history they have been invited to share. Winding their way through time, stopping in front of the three :;tatues, the two-headed bust, the masks from Ain Ghazal, they may notice the remarkable reconstitution and restoration by the Smithsonian

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Institute's conservation laboratory. These astounding technological feats allow to admire for the first time these lime washed earthen objects dating 7000 years Be. Further down their path, visitors will see the objects unearthed only 10 years ago in ruins of the fortress at Mafraq by the Jerusalem based Ecole Biblique et Archaeologique franchise. Then the copper scroll from the Dead Sea, discovered 45 years ago at Qumran by Henri de Contenson during an expedition organised by this school. On one hand there are the rare pieces of Islamic furniture, which bespeak of the Umayyad conquest and the beginnings of an art that had yet to make its mark, fine examples of an art subjected to the double influence of East and West. On the other hand, a message that has miraculously reached us after some two thousand years, telling us of the disappearance of a treasure that had been slowly and piously laid up, and prelude to the dispersion of an entire nation. It is our hope that these pieces from the cultural heritage of Jordan, saved, consolidated and restored by the most recent scientific techniques, will convince the visitors that modern technology serves Mankind, both in our desire to discover the traces of our past, and in our need to construct our future.

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8 Art and Architecture There isn't much sign of traditional Arabic music in Jordan, but you will find an interesting hybrid of Arab-style singers backed up by orchestras of western and traditional instruments everywhere you go. The Bedouin are still hanging on to their musical traditions, with groups of men singing trance-like chants to accompany a lone bellydancer. Architecture is the predominant visual art in the Arab world, partly because Islam forbids the depiction of living things. Throughout Jordan you will find spectacular mosques, ancient ruins from the Roman Empire and earlier, and magnific,?nt mosaics. The Quseir 'Amra is notable for its frescoes, one of which shows a nude woman bathing--an unusual art form for this part of the world. The Quran is one of the finest examples of classical Arabic writing, while the Al-Muallaqaat is an even older collection of Arab poetry. One of the best-known works of Arab literature is Alf Layla wa Layla, A Thousand and One Nights, a collection of tales from several centuries and countries. Bedouin artworks include silver jewellery, colourful textiles and a wide range of knives. Hospitality is a cornerstone of Arab life. It is commonplace for Jordanian families, particularly desert dwellers, to welcome strangers into their home. The tradition developed from the harshness of desert life-without food, water and shelter from strangers, most desert travellers would die. Wherever you go in Jordan, you are likely to hear the word, 'Welcome', and you will frequently be invited into people's homes for food or a cup· of tea.

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Islam is the predominant religion in Jordan. A monotheistic religion, Islam's holy book is the Quran, and Friday is its Sabbath day. Every day, five times a day, Muslims are called to prayer from the minarets of mosques which dot the country. Islam derives from the same monotheistic roots as Judaism and Christianity, and Muslims generally regard Christians and Jews with respect-in Islam, Jesus is regarded as one of the Prophets of Allah, and Jews and Christians are considered fellow 'people of the Book'. Muhammad was the last Prophet (Pbuh), and it was to him that Allah dictated the Quran. Most Jordanian Muslims, including the non-Arab Circassians, belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. The Circassians-as well as the other Jordanian minority, the Chechens were originally from the Caucasus area of Russia. Islamic law forbids eating pig and drinking alcohol, and this law is followed to a greater or lesser extent throughout Jordan. Islam also has a tendency to divide the sexes, and you might find that many eating establishments' only welcome men. Most of these will, if asked, show you to the 'family room', an area set aside for women. When Jordanians eat out they will usually order group meals-a selection of mezzeh, or starters, followed by main meals to share. Arabic unleavened bread, or khobz, is eaten with almost everything. The other staples are felafel, deep-fried chickpea balls, shwarma, spitcooked sliced lamb, and fuul, a paste of fava beans, garlic and lemon. Mensaf is a Bedouin speciality-a whole lamb, head included, on a bed of rice and pine nuts. Art in Jordan is making huge leaps in techniques and styles. The artists are venturing deeper into the use of new mediums, incorporating various technologies in their artistic expression, and also tackling new topics, which address society, politics, sexuality, and other themes. Art in Jordan is still very much influenced by the overriding conservative approach towards all aspects of society. However, along with the many dramatic changes that the urban society is experiencing on all levels, art making and art appreciation are changing as well. Today one finds here an increasing number of national and private art institutions for showcasing art. The local foreign bodies (such as the French, Spanish, and German cultural centres, or the British Council, for example) playa major role in introducing international artists to Jordan. At the same time, through their extensive travelling

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Jordan's artists and cultural managers win more exposure and knowledge to sharpen their role in the local art scene with. Now audiences are more aware of different art forms-and more receptive to them. The number of people attending film festivals, concerts, exhibitions, and theatre productions is steadily increasing. In Arabic, the word "makan" means place. The word is basic, broad, and rather general, but it insinuates something spacious, open, and free of conditions. This is what Makan-The House of Expression strives to be. It occupies the top floor of a two-story building a few steps below street level, and were it not for its new orange sign at the entrance, one might have difficulty finding it. No sooner you go down the steps and enter the space, you find yourself welcomed into a casual set up sometimes flooded with music, sometimes crowded with people attending a workshop or opening, and sometimes quiet and relaxed when groups of artists are just enjoying the sun on the balcony. In this context, Makan-or The House of Expression, as Ola Khalidi prefers to call it-not only provides a space for showcasing contemporary art in various forms. it offers an atmosphere for networking and support, as well as the chance to exchange ideas and to brainstorm, so that art projects can materialise. Makan is situated in an apartment referred to architecturally as a "three-bay house," a typical structure of this region. The central room is the public space, used as the main hall for exhibitions, films screenings, and concerts. Via its doors, this room opens out onto other functional spaces: an office, an artist's workroom on one side, a multipurpose room. a bathroom (which doesn't escape being used as an exhibition space), and a kitchen, which, when necessary, converts into a photography lab on the other side. Makan also makes two of these spaces-referred to as ''Artists' Incubators" -available as studio and/or working spaces. For example, the artist-musician Ala' Diab has occupied one of these spaces for months, and has meanwhile become a member of Makan, as well as its graphic designer. At the end of the house's main bay is the balcony, also used as a meeting space, smoking area, and at times as an exhibition space. The balcony serves as Makan's "eyes" watching the city, and the dramatic terrain of Amman provides dynamic scenery with complex perspectives, allowing whole layers of the city to expand across the view.

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Makan is located in Jabal al-Luweibdeh, a neighbourhood which first came into being at the city's centre during the forties and fifties of the last century. Its beautiful stone villas and lush gardens bear witness to the architecture of that time, as well as to the cultural and economic status of its inhabitants. Today, Jabal al-Luweibdeh welcomes a variety of people of different cultural backgrounds, from small ethnic minorities to transient residents awaiting their immigration visas. This engenders an atmosphere of tolerance and acceptance, and provides the quite streets with a colourful sense of diversity. This area is developing into a hub for the arts in Amman. The Darat al-Funun, an art complex of exhibition spaces, includes a library and artist's quarters; the Jordan National Gallery with its two buildings likewise exhibition spaces, a cafe and graphic studio that skirt a beautiful park; the Artists' Association and Dar al-Anda Gallery, as well as several artist studios, workshops, crafts workshops, and additional exhibition spaces, all of which is only a few minutes walk from Makan. During the first years of its young life, Makan has taken part. hosted, and organised a variety of activities, including exhibitions, music performances, international and local workshops, photography workshops, film screenings, and more. In cooperation with the Young Arab Theatre Fund, it held the ''Amman Meeting Points" in October 2004, a large-scale art, film and music event held at five different venues, featuring artists from Jerusalem, Beirut, London, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Cairo, Paris, and Amman. It focused on the issues of borders and travel, Amman being a relevant backdrop because of its historical role as a crossroads territory. The visitors walked from one place to another, and, in doing so, could experience the urban texture of the city. Sharif Waked from Jerusalem, for example, presented with his video work "Chic Point", his understanding of the oppressive Israeli checkpOint in a humorous fashion. Amal al-Kenawy, from Cairo, shocked her audience with two video installations about women and their bodies, in which love stories and social concepts are projected directly onto them. The Amman photographer Oraib Touqan covered a wall with a large black-and-white photograph of two Palestinian refugee women living in a camp in Beirut. In a clashing contrast with the photograph, the long neon lights arranged across a pink wall,

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and projections on the porcelain surface of a sink in the room, alluded to nightlife in the same city. The Rotterdam-based artist Lidwien Van de Ven displayed her photographs of different borders in the Middle East on large public billboards normally used for advertisements. Currently, Makan and the Young Arab Theatre Fund are in the process of organising this event's second edition, scheduled to take place in November 2005, and intended to develop into an annual festival shown, in turn, in several neighbouring Arab countries and possibly in other locations. An important part of Makan's activities are devoted to children fostering their self-expression as a part of their character development. For example, in July 2004, it organised a summer art workshop in six deprived areas of Amman, in cooperation with the Amman Municipality and its local libraries. Conducted by 6 artists, 270 children participated in three different types of workshops for a month: painting and drawing, music, and theatre. They were introduced to the works of young professional artists, exposed to various art genres, tr3ined in different techniques, and informed of a wide range of materials and styles. In April 2005, a five-day animation workshop was held in Makan, sponsored by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). The participating artists specialised in different fields such as visual arts, theatre, and television. They were trained by animation-film specialists from Sweden. The underlying objective was to train these artists to become trainers themselves for children and young people. One workshop was already held in Amman, in a community centre for the children of economically disadvantaged areas. Makan is now pursuing the idea of conducting others in the Palestinian refugee camps. At present, Makc~n also initiates projects for children outside of the city of Amman, in cooperation with local organisations. Since art is taught in schools in such a formalised and standardised manner, the goal is to encourage the self-expression of these children. The first art workshop, held in the village of Samma, in the North of Jordan, was conducted by the ar~ists Diala and Alma Khasawnih, who volunteered their time and skills in order to work with these children, but also to expand the horizons of their own art-making processes.

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Alma Khasawnih, who until recently was the third member of Makan, is now on her way to the United States to study Community Arts Education. Alma is a strong believer in the power of art and art making. "Creating art is an empowering act. Those people whose whims, desires, opinions, and ideals have been conducted for them by their parents, schools, and governments, if given the chanceand discover in themselves the ability to use a sheet of paper and paints, or maybe scissors and glue, to create from nothing a piece that is admired and acknowledged as art--come to realise a sense of freedom, namely an individual, personal, andself-actualised freedom." Makan continuously explores new ideas and ventures into alternative areas of art. It consistently contributes to the local scene, creating bridges between Jordanian and international artists through exchanging works and experiences, inviting artists and their shows, and by providing opportunities for exposure. Perhaps the most well known example of architecture in Jordan is the Nabatean city of Petra, a World Heritage site protected by the Petra National Trust. A strategic point on trade routes, Petra was partly built and partly carved into rock two thousand years ago. Another World Heritage site in Jordan is the desert castle of Quseir Amra, one of the castles built by the Caliphs of the Umayyad dynasty. Kerak, on the approach to Jerusalem, is an example of a Crusader castle (captured by Salahuddin when he defeated the Christian Crusaders).

Ice Age Archaeology The early prehistory and archaeology of the Middle Pleistocene, or Ice Age, is being revealed in remarkable detail in studies in southern Jordan. The work, begun in the late 1990s, has documented the presence of Homo erectus, our ancient ancestor, at a series of archaeological sites at Ayoun Qedim in the AI-Jafr Basin. Today AI-Jafr Basin is one of the most arid places in the Middle East. During the Pleistocene, the basin was filled with an enormous freshwater lake fed by springs and run off. Its shores were frequented by large animals ancestral to those that occupy the East African savannah today. AI-Jafr Basin was one node on a chain of ancient lake basins that stretched from northwestern Saudi Arabia to northeastern Syria during the wetter times of the Ice Age. These lake

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basins formed an inland corridor for occupation by Homo erectus moving between Africa and Eurasia, say investigators Leslie A. Quintero and Philip J. Wilke from the University of California at Riverside, and Dr. Gary Rollefson from Whitman College, Washington. The sites have yielded hundreds of heavy-duty butchering tools chipped from local deposits of flint. The tools are cleavers, a form of handaxe that could be resharpened by striking distinctive flakes from the cutting end. Even these resharpening flakes were found, showing the tools were maintained as needed. The investigators say the tools were used to butcher animals like elephants and rhinos, which were hunted there when they came for water a quarter-to a half-million years ago. They note the similarity of the cleavers found at Ayoun Qedim with those from as far away as Box grove, England. Box grove was occupied at about the same time, upwards of 400,000 years ago. The cultural complex of that time is referred to by archaeologists as the Acheulian, and is distributed across much of the Old World. The research at AI-Jafr is conducted under permit from the Department of Antiquities of Jordan, and is funded by the American Centre of Oriental Research in Amman and Whitman College. The investigators said their work was significantly aided by logistical support they received from the local Abu Tayeh Bedouin.

Architecture The art of Mosaic came into being over three thousand years ago on the shores of the Mediterranean. After this time the world of Art was never the same. The enduring and magnificent art became basic to the esthetic perfection of various forms of architecture. Moreover, the examples of mosaic artwork that have survived until today, remain as a testimony to their original beauty and splendour and are no less breathtaking today than the day were created. The Middle East and North Africa have been endowed with a wealth of breathtaking examples of this Art. Splend mosaic decorates the thousand ruins throughout this region. At a certain point the art of mosaic virtually disappeared and remained dormant for thousand of years. However, in the 20th century and more specifically in 1994 in a small country called Jordan, this great art slowly arose from its state of dormancy, as a result of the establishment of a small studio

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in the area and our mosaic artwork has reached Europe, The United States, India and the Gulf States. Heritage for has become one of the driving forces behind the revival of this unique form of Art in Jordan. Since our establishment in 1994 we have been able to produce unique works of Mosaic Art that decorates walls and floors of villas, businesses and flats. The establishment and success of our studio comes as a result of a passion for the Art and a sense of responsibility towards preserving an important artistic tradition that is basic to the Jordanian Cultural Heritage. Of course Heritage for could not have become successful without the decoration of the 17 Arab artisans who are the true miracle workers. Our team creates beautiful mosaics with loyalty, dedication and love for perfection. To produce our mosaics, we use predominantly local raw material. Jordan has an interesting variety of stones with around 21 different colours. Therefore, our productions are not only made in Jordan, they are made by Jordanian, using Jordanian raw material. We consider this to be a winning combination, which gives us pride Heritage for Art in Architecture has taken on different streams of production. Each stream satisfies a certain clientele. However, all heritage artwork is produced with pride and care and will remain as a symbol of beauty.

Islamic Architecture In the century after the death (AD 632) of the prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), his Arab followers spread his teachings through Egypt and N. Africa, as far West as Spain, and as Far East as Sassanid Persia. Because of their rapid expansion and the paucity of the earlier artistic heritage of the Arabian Peninsula, the Muslims derived their unique style from synthesising the arts of the Byzantines, the Copts, the Romans, and the Sassanids. The great strength of Islamic art as a whole lies in its ability to synthesise native design elements with imported ones. Abstract decoration of the surface is an important factor in every work of Islamic art and architecture, whether large or small. Curving and often interlaced lines, of which the arabesque is a typical example, and the use of brilliant colours characterise almost all of the finest productions, which are of greatly varied styles. Islamic art eschews

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the realistic representation of human beings and animals, and its floral designs are extremely distant from their original models. While the prohibition against depicting living forms is not contained in the Quran, it is widely thought that the non-representational character of Islamic ornament has its source in the traditional theological prohibition against imitating God's works. The earliest architectural monument of Islam that retains most of its original form is the Dome of the Rock (Qubbat al-Sakhrah) in Jerusalem, constructed in 691-92 on the site of the Jewish Second Temple. Muslims believe it to be the spot from which Muhammad (Pbuh) ascended to heaven. It has mosaics depicting scrolling vines and flowers, jewels, and crowns in greens, blues, and gold. Similar in some aspects is the later Great Mosque of Damascus (built c. 705-14), which was built by Al-Walid over what was originally a Roman temple. The interior walls have stone mosaics that depict crowns, fantastic plants, realistic trees, and even empty towns. This is thought to represent Paradise for the faithful Muslim. Both the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and the great Mosque of Damascus used the Syrian cut-stone technique of building and popularised the use of the dome. The 8th-century desert palace Khirbat al-Mafjar (in present-day Jordan) reveals a wealth of carved and moulded stucco decoration, sculptured stone relief's, and figural fresco paintings. In 750 the Abbasid dynasty moved the capital east to Baghdad, and from 836 to 892 the Abbasid rulers resided at Samarra. The Great Mosque of Samarra is an important example of the Iraqi hypostyle, noted for its massive size and spectacular minaret. In Iran few Islamic buildings erected before the 10th century are still standing. Sassanid building techniques, such as the squinch, were combined with the mosque form. Sassanid influence is also strong in many Umayyad dynasty residential palaces, built mostly in Syria. The most famous is the 8thcentury palace of Mshatta; much of its delicately carved stone facade is now in Berlin. In the middle of the 8th century, the last of the Umayyad escaped to Spain and refounded his dynasty there. The great Mosque of Cordoba was begun in 785 and is famous for its rows of doubletiered arches. The mosque was extended three times. The culture of Islamic Spain reached its apogee in Moorish art and architecture.

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Faience and lacy pierced-stone screens are the hallmarks of its decoration. The same style prevails in N Africa and is seen at its best in Fes, Morocco, where much elaborately carved wood is used. The Mude jarstyle of Spain, employed throughout the 18th century and influential until much later, is based on this architecture. Late in the 9th century the governor of Egypt, Ibn Tulun, initiated the high period of Egypto-Islamic art with the building of his famous mosque in Cairo. In the 10th century the Fatimids introduced into Egypt the decorative stalactite ceiling from Iran and placed emphasis on decorative flat mouldings. The most important Fatimid buildings are the Cairo mosques of AI-Azhar and AI-Aqmar. The cruciform Mosque of Hasanain Cairo, built by a Mamluk Sultan in 1536, still reflects Persian influence. In India a distinct style, preserved mainly in architecture, developed after the Delhi Sultanate was established (1192). This art made extensive use of stone and reflected Indian adaptation to Islam rule. until Mughal art replaced it in the 17th century. The square Char Minar of Hyderabad (1591) with large arches, arcades, and minarets is typical. In Turkey the mosque form was also derived from Persia, as was most Turkish art. The great Byzantine church of Hagia Sophia, adapted for use as a mosque, greatly influenced Turkish architects. The most famous among these is Sinan, chief architect in the Ottoman court from 1539 until his death in 1588. He constructed or designed most of Sulaiman I's buildings, the most noted of which is his mosque (c.1557) in Istanbul, where he is buried. It has four minarets and stained-glass windows flanking the mihrab. The mosque (1614) of Sultan Ahmad I is similarly distinguished by its dome lit by numerous windows, and wall surfaces covered with green and blue tiles. Fine ornate buildings were erected in Turkey until the middle of the 17th cent. Among the ceramic types are unglazed wares, moulded pieces with the lead glaze of Hellenistic tradition, and most famous, the lusterware fragments. In 9th-century Islam the technique of tin-glazed ware was perfected. Lusterware was imported into Egypt and later made there. The Great Mosque of AI-Qayrawan (c.862) is decorated with square luster tiles set in a lozenge pattern around the pierced marble prayer niche. The 9th century also saw the development of metalwork in a distinctive and powerful style under the Umayyad in

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Egypt. Skilled craftsmanship can be seen in rock-crystal carving, a continuation of Sassanid art, using floral motifs that became increasingly abstract. From the 10th to the mid-13th century great strides were made in the arts; Egypt became a centre of these arts and of calligraphy, which was of prime importance all over the Islamic world. Arabic script represents the expression of the will and strength of Allah, and as such is regarded as sacred by the faithful. One of Islam's most renowned calligraphers was Ibn Muqlah (d. 940) of Baghdad who invented the six most prominent cursive scripts. Certain scripts were favoured for specific uses, such as Kufic for copying the Quran. The Kufic script, often executed in gold on parchment, was further animated by floral interlaces. Calligraphy was not used exclusively for two-dimensional works but also appears in architectural ornament, ceramics, textiles and metalwork. During this period calligraphy, bookbinding, papermaking, and illumination were developed and were held in highest esteem throughout Islam. The sloping cursive script most commonly used today, Nastaliq, was perfected in the 15th cent. Before the 13th century rugs, silks, linens, and brocades were produced throughout the Islamic world, but only fragments remain; the same is true of delicate and highly refined carvings in wood and ivory. Early in the 13th century a school of secular manuscript painting arose in the Baghdad area. The pictures may be divided into two types: those that illustrate scientific works, descending directly from late Hellenistic models, and those that illustrate anecdotal tales and whose miniatures display lively detail. In the middle of the 13th century the Mongol invasions devastated Iran and deeply scarred all Islam as far west as the Mediterranean Sea. However, after a period of acclimatisation, the Chinese taste and artifacts imported by the Mongols revitalised the art of Iran, where book illustration reached great heights. With the arrival of the Seljuqs in Iran came a new ceramic technique, frit ware, similar to certain Chinese porcelains. The unique qualities of this ware enabled artists to create richly coloured glazes such as deep blues from cobalt and turquoise from copper. Syria and Iraq continued to manufacture fine black-andturquoise pottery. Textiles and rugs of great beauty were again

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manufactured throughout Islam, and in the 15th cent. Mamluk carpets were renowned for their designs of great complexity and their asymmetrical knots. Turkish ceramics reached their peak in the "Iznik" ware of the 16th and 17th cent. Distinctive green tiles are frequently used in the decoration of Turkish architecture.

Islamic Art The term Islamic art may be confusing to some. It not only describes the art created specifically in the service of Islam, but it also characterises secular art produced in lands under Islamic rule or influence, whatever the artist's orthe patron's religious affiliation. The term suggests an art unified in style and purpose, and indeed there are certain common features that distinguish the arts of all Islamic lands. Although this is a highly dynamic art, which is often marked by strong regional characteristics as well as by significant influences from other cultures, it retains an overall coherence that is remarkable given its vast geographic and temporal boundaries. Of paramount concern to the development of this singular art is Islam itself, which fostered the creation of a distinctive visual culture with its own unique artistic language. Calligraphy is the most important and pervasive element in Islamic art. It has always been considered the noblest form of art because of its association with the Quran, the Muslim holy book, which is written in Arabic. This preoccupation with beautiful writing extended to all arts-including secular manuscripts; inscriptions on palaces; and those applied to metalwork, pottery, stone, glass, wood, and textiles-and to non-Arabic-speaking peoples within the Islamic commonwealth whose languages-such as Persian, Turkish, and Urdu-were written in the Arabic script. Another characteristic of Islamic art is a preference for covering surfaces with patterns composed of geometric or vegetal elements. Complex geometric designs, as well as intricate patterns of vegetal ornament (such as the arabesque), create the impression of unending repetition, which is believed by some to be an inducement to contemplate the infinite nature of God. This type of nonrepresentational decoration may have been developed to such a high degree in Islamic art because of the absence of figural imagery, at least within a religious context.

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Contrary to a popular misconception, however, figural imagery is an important aspect of Islamic art. Such images occur primarily in secular and especially courtly arts and appear in a wide variety of media and in most periods and places in which Islam flourished. It is important to note, nevertheless, that representational imagery is almost invariably restricted to a private context. Figurative art is excluded from the decoration of religious monuments. This absence may be attributed to an Islamic antipathy towards anything that might be mistaken for idols or idolatry, which are explicitly forbidden by the Quran. In Islamic cultures the so-called decorative arts provide the primary means of artistic expression, in contrast to Western art, in which painting and sculpture are preeminent. Illuminated manuscripts, woven textiles and carpets, inlaid metalwork, blown glass, glazed ceramics, and carved wood and stone all absorbed the creative energies of artists, becoming highly developed art forms. These works include small-scale objects of daily use, such as delicate glass beakers, as well as more monumental architectural decoration, for example, glazed tile panels from building facades. Such objects were meticulously fabricated and carefully embellished, often with rare and costly materials, suggesting that the people for whom they were made sought to surround themselves with beauty. Royal patronage played an important role in the making of Islamic art, as it has in the arts of other cultures. The construction of mosques and other religious buildings, including their decoration and furnishings, was the responsibility of the ruler and the prerogative of high court officials. Such monuments not only provided for the spiritual needs of the Muslim community but often served educational and charitable functions as well. Royal patronage of secular art was also a standard feature of Islamic sovereignty, one that enabled the ruler to demonstrate the splendour of his court and, by extension, the superiority of his state. Evidence of courtly patronage is derived from the works of art themselves, but an equally important source of information is the extensive body of historical texts that attest to royal sponsorship of the arts almost throughout the Islamic period. These historical works also indicate that only a fraction of such court-sponsored art has survived; objects made of precious materials are particularly rare.

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From the fourteenth century onward, especially in eastern Islamic lands, the arts of the book provide the best documentation of courtly patronage. Of course, not all works of Islamic art were sponsored by the court; in fact, the majority of objects and manuscripts in museum collections originated elsewhere. Such works of art-including pottery, base metal ware, carpets, and textiles-have often been viewed as the products of urban, middle-class patronage. These objects nonetheless frequently reflect the same styles and make use of the same forms and techniques employed in courtly art. Whether produced in a courtly or an urban setting or for a religious context, Islamic art is generally the work of anonymous artists. A notable exception is in the sphere of the arts of the book. The names of certain calligraphers are well known, which is not surprising given the primacy of the written word in Islam, as are those of a number of painters, most of whom were attached to a particular court. The identification of these artists has been based on signed or attributed examples of their works and on textual references. Given the great number of extant examples, comparatively few signatures are found on metalwork, pottery, carved wood and stone, and textiles. Those signatures that do occur, combined with rare evidence from contemporary textual sources, suggest that families of artists, often over several generations, specialised in a particular medium or technique.

As this discussion may suggest, Islamic art forms a large and complex subject. While there are several different means of classifying Islamic art, the text that follows adheres to the four-part chronological division used in the Islamic galleries at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art. This system of classification is intended to emphasise the overall unity of Islamic art within each of the four chronological periods, while also taking into account the numerous dynasties whose successive reigns punctuate Islamic history and whose patronage had an important impact on the development of Islamic art. The early Islamic period, seventh through tenth century, covers the origins of Islam; the creation of a religious, political, and cultural commonwealth; and the formation of a new style of art. In the early medieval period, from the eleventh through the mid-thirteenth century, and the late medieval period, the mid-thirteenth through the fifteenth century,

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various regional powers emerged, which promoted diverse forms of cultural expression. Finally, the late Islamic period, the sixteenth through the eighteenth century, was an age of great empires, in which powerful dynastic patronage, more than ever before, helped to promote and shape artistic styles.

House of Arts On a hill overlooking Jordan's capital city, within sight of the ancient Roman temple of Philadelphia, stands what looks like an attractive, stone-built private home, with two curving staircases leading to its second-floor entrance. In fact, this is "Darat al-Funun," or "The House of the Arts," Amman's new centre for contemporary art and one of the most innovative meeting grounds for East and West today. With its three galleries, library and studio, the centre has promoted the work of contemporary artists from Jordan and elsewhere in the Arab world since 1993. For some of these artists, it has provided a stepping-stone to greater exposure in the West; for others, living in the West. it has been their link back to the East. And to the neighbourhood in which it stands, Darat al-Funun has brought exposure to a world of creativity. In the field of "modern" or "contemporary" art, the Arab world has long been an unfamiliar and somewhat inaccessible voice, little heard in the West. But a new generation of Arab artists is beginning to change that. Eric Gibson, executive director of the New York-based magazine Art News, explains that the term "contemporary art" can be used as a chronological marker to set off art from after 1945-or after 1960, depending on one's point of view-from that which went before. But, he says, contemporary art can also be loosely defined as "a constellation of ideas that represents a perception of the world in which people can see something they can identify and explore." In order to share their perceptions with the public, artists require venues: galleries, museums and the art-world publications that let viewers know they are there. And therein lies Darat al-Funun's role as a launching pad for Arab artists and as a gateway for exchange within the international art arena. Darat al-Funun's vision is sustained by Jordan's multicultural history. Located in one of the oldest of Amman's residential quarters, the site itself epitomises the Jordanian talent for linking new and old

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with thoughtful grace. Built shortly after the turn of the century, the original building was a private home next to the ruins of a Byzantine church. The garden and the fragmentary columns of this church now serve as the dramatic setting of Darat al-Funun's candlelight poetry readings and performances. During excavations at the site early this century, archeologists found five inscriptions on stone slabs. Two are in Safaitic, a pre-Islamic Arabic script; another is in Kufic, the script commonly used to write Arabic in the early years of Islam in the seventh century. A third indicates that a structure beneath the Byzantine church may have been a Greek temple dedicated to Hercules. And a Byzantine tablet dedicates the church itself to Saint George. Now administered by the Abdul Hameed Shorn an Foundation, the house has been fully restored and renovated. Three bays open off the central hall, and twin staircases rise from the garden to an open, breezy semicircular portico. The windows in the high-ceilinged central gallery allow soft light into the interior and warm the decorative tiles on the floor. A library was added above the old roofline. From there down to the studios on the lower floors, a sense of air and light prevails. With this graceful interior and its elegant limestone exterior, the house provides an appropriate environment for the display of art. The renovations have added momentum to revitalisation efforts in the community surrounding Darat al-Funun, says Ali Maher, the centre's director. Darat al-Funun, he says, "made available a world of art and culture" to a neighbourhood of Amman where such resources are scarce. The musical, theatrical and poetry programmes, held monthly, reach beyond the profeSSional arts community into the community at large, slowly adding, Maher says, to "a sense of pride in [Jordan's] architectural and cultural heritage." Darat al-Funun was "the realisation of a long-cherished dream," says artist Suha Shoman, whose family foundation-created in 1978 with a mandate to "promote knowledge in the sciences and humanities" -had originally established a simple gallery for exhibitions from Jordan and the Arab world. It was not long, however, before the foundation's directors recognised the need for "a more comprehensive centre," says Maher. Darat ai-Fun un was opened in 1993. In addition to showcasing artists and providing communityoriented programmes, Darat al-Funun is also "a haven for study and research," says Shoman.· The library, open to the public, contains

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books in Arabic and English, the latest periodicals and art journals and a comprehensive video collection from the Museum of Modern Art in New York and the Institute du Monde Arabe in Paris. It is building a computer database on contemporary Arab artists. It is the more than 50 artists, all from the Arab world, who give daily vitality to Darat al-Funun. Paying careful attention to installation details, the curatorial staff mounts monthly solo and group shows of work by artists from Jordan, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Sudan. The work is for sale but, unlike other galleries, Darat al-Funun takes no commission. The shows present as wide a range of themes, styles, media and experience as possible, and films, demonstrations or seminars--often led by the artists whose work is being shown-sometimes accompany the exhibitions.

In much of the work they exhibit, the Arab artists reflect their different connections with the West-most often residence, education or travel there-including Western methods and motifs to which they have brought their own cultural idiom. It is abstraction that emerges as the theme that cuts across styles and genres, and because Islamic abstraction and Western abstraction have different roots, many viewers, critics and buyers see an exciting and noteworthy confluence of the two traditions. Western abstraction derives from the embrace of individualism, and is produced in a secular cultural context. Islamic abstraction, on the other hand, is a cultural, intellectual and communal expression of faith. The beginning of Western modern art, from which abstraction emerged as a dominant movement, is generally traced to the Salon des Refuses in Paris in 1863, an exhibition by artists whose work had been refused by the official Salon exhibition. There, Eduardo Manet exhibited work that crystallised two ideas that still guide Western artists today: first, that the artist is free to pursue an individual vision that reflects or anticipates the inquiries of the day; and second, that the artist alone can determine subject matter, and the arrangement of colour and form need not depict real objects or stories. Thus the artist is freed from the requirement of literal representation. The roots of Western modernism run back to the Italian Renaissance. Combining the classicism of the Greek and Roman eras with new humanist values---embodied in the credo "Man is the measure of all things"-the artists of the Renaissance believed they

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reflected artistic aspects of divine creativity. They looked at themselves as "creators," as masters of their own destiny. This view laid the foundation for the individualism that ultimately led to modernism and abstraction. In stark contrast, the Muslim aesthetic tradition is based on the fundamental belief that only God is worthy of worship; from that, Muslims derived the ideas that only His word is to be embellished, and that His magnificent living creations should not be imitated. Particularly with respect to sacred art, Islam adopted abstraction as the pictorial solution to the complicated issue of expressing oneself in concrete works without thereby running the risk of violating the prohibition against the creation of objects that could be worshipped like idols. Abstraction thus serves the purity of Islamic monotheism. As a result, a highly intellectual, collective, abstract visual vocabulary evolved in Islamic art that is dominated by two elements: Arabic calligraphy, the merging of meaning and form through the writing of God's revelation; and architecture, the geometric embodiment of nature, time and space. Western art has embraced diversification and segregation through a multiplicity of styles, artists, regions and generations, as well as by the separation of media and motives: Painting is not sculpture; fine art is not decorative art, and so on. Islamic art, however, seeks a harmony of expression through a collective language symbolic of unity. In calligraphy, sound, words, meaning and form are united. In architecture, geometry unifies the arts, from painting to carving to decoration, into a single experience. The search for unity suffuses the work of Arab contemporary artists such as Shakir Hasan ai-Saeed and Kamal Boullata, each of whose work is part of Darat al-Funun's collection. AI-Saeed, who was born in 1925 in AI-Samawah, Iraq, writes, "through searching for the meaning of the eternal, I attempt to capture the temporal." In one of his abstract watercolours, AI-Saeed uses a sketchy square rotated 45 degrees. Running through the corners of the square, he has drawn lines thatfollow the vertical and horizontal axes of the canvas. A vertical axis is used here to represent one's obligations to God, and a horizontal axis to represent one's obligations to fellow Muslims or the ummah, the community of the faithful. Surrounding the square are code-like scratching, a kind of personal, implied

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calligraphy. Another of AI-Saeed's works is less experimental, but equally revealing of his search. This is a watercolour whose paper is broken by a large, rough-edged elliptical hole. The painting is hung outdoors, and placed so that the torn opening incorporates the landscape behind it in the composition of the picture. We need look only as far as the Alhambra Palace in Grenada to see the same phenomenon. There, each window embrasure incorporates the view of the landscape beyond into a single tapestry of stone, tile and nature. By doing the same thing with paper, AI-Saeed locates himself firmly within the Islamic artistic tradition. For Palestinian painter, printmaker and writer Kamal Boullata, however, geometric abstraction is his link between Western and Islamic traditions. "The neutral language of geometry becomes the bridge between the two visual sensibilities of my world," he writes, "... two modes of expression which historically developed in opposite directions." Boullata recently exhibited "Duets, Quartets and a Triangle" at Darat al-Funun, work that drew upon two years of Fulbright-sponsored research in Islamic geometric art in Morocco. Born in Jerusalem and educated at the Academy of Rome and the Corcorim School of Art in Washington, Boullata has shown throughout Europe, the United States and the Middle East. Although he has lived in Washington for the past 25 years, his ties to the Islamic world and to his place of birth are strong. '~II my work," he writes, "seems to have been done with Jerusalem seen through the mind's eye." This memory of Jerusalem is constantly renewed through Boullata's geometric precision, which seeks to bridge the gulf between cultures and times: "Connections emerged between the presence of contemporary works I saw in the Western metropolis and the memory of the geometric art I have seen within the walls of Jerusalem. Centuries ago the same language of geometry was employed in my culture of origin." In a brightly coloured acrylic work titled '~acob's Ladder," Boullata uses colour and geometry to reflect the architecture, tile work and light of Palestine, and uses the title of the piece to evoke the three monotheistic religions. In using the title as part of the work, Boullata does homage to the "word" and its content, thus connecting the

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verbal imagery of Islamic tradition with the visual tradition of the West. Not all of Darat al-Funun's artists, of course, are painters. Sculptor Samer Tabbaa has had numerous exhibitions in Jordan and abroad. Born in 1945 in Taif, Saudi Arabia, and educated in the us, Tabbaa now lives and works in Amman. One of his bestknown works dominates the Second Circle of the city. There he has positioned a large stone wheel across rough stone supports, with a waterfall cascading over it, so that nature and invention seem to be exchanging energy. Tabbaa is consistent in his choice of an abstract, even archetypal vocabulary. Yet some of his works are highly refined, even painterly, while others are totemic and monolithic. Moroccan artist Farid Belkahia, who was educated in Paris, Prague and Milan and now lives in Marrakech, incorporates a roughly drawn X as a dominant sign in several of his watercolours. He compartmentalises the picture plane to accommodate other signs and gestures. With chalky pastels that suggest the fresh plaster of fresco painting, and an economy of line that evokes the primordial quality of cave drawings, the artist seems to recall a mythology that has not yet been articulated. In contrast to Belkahia's pastels are Afaf Zureiq's moody charcoal and watercolour washes. Educated at the American University of Beirut and Harvard University, this Lebanese artist brings a dark vibrancy to her images. Working in a difficult medium, Zureiq creates a forest of vertical scratching and strokes interrupted by interplay of darks and lights, transparencies and masses. An influential artist who does not shy from socio-political messages is Laila al-Shawa, born in Gaza and educated in Cairo and Rome. She is best known for "Wall of Gaza," which was featured in the travelling exhibit "Forces of Change". Here, through photographs and painting, she documents the urgency of a people's struggle. Sometimes printing her photographs on canvas, AI-Shawa too incorporates geometry in her images, providing, she says, "a sense of order in a chaotic, torn and divided existence." Among the younger artists nurtured in part by Darat al-Funun is Halim Mahdi Hadi, born in Najaf, Iraq, and educated in Baghdad. In Ali Maher's office at Darat ai-Fun un hangs an oversized, vertical canvas by Hadi that exhibits great simplicity and great magnetic presence. This monochromatic acrylic is rich both in earth tones, as

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if Hadi had made the paint himself from fertile soil, and in chunky textures that give his surfaces an uncommon physicality. Hadi was trained as a ceramist, which may account for the thick paint and the furrows of tracings that sometimes appear in his work. The Vust spaces of his canvases and their tactile presence have a powerful effect. Since the opening of Darat ai-Fun un, Hadi has been in effect an artist-in-residence, using a room near the building's entrance as shop and studio. This has given him exposure to collectors, buyers and visitors that might not have been available otherwise. He has since exhibited his work in France and in Lebanon. "We would like to think that we have contributed to establishing him," says Maher. Also receiving direct support from Darat al-Funun is acrylic artist Khalid Khreis of Kerak, Jordan. Educated in Cairo and a frequent visitor to Spain, he received his doctorate at the University of Barcelona in 1993. At Darat al-Funun, Khreis serves as a lecturer and researcher. Claiming the influence of past civilizations from Egypt to Central America to AI-Andalus, his delicately powerful paintings straddle the edge between cultures. Using a variety of media from cardboard to plastics to paper, Khreis creates a vocabulary of strokes, scratches and blotches that allows images to emerge through an improvisational, "accidental" process. With counterpoints of warm yellows and cool aquas in the background, his calligraphy of gestures goes beyond cognitive allusion to enter a subtler realm. "Art is not in the head," he writes. "It must be felt in your heart and deeply rooted in your soul." As the artists of Darat ai-Fun un create visual languages of both West and East, the world of contemporary art is enriched. And as a generous advocate for them, Darat al-Funun is an open window for new visions, and an important bridge across cultures.

Music The music of Jordan can be distingUished from that of its neighbouring countries like Syria and Saudi Arabia by its strong Bedouin influence. Rural zajal songs, with improvised poetry played with a rabab and reed pipe ensemble accompanying is popular. Jordanian Arab music is pentatonic and uses elaborate rhythms. Folk songs are often narratives concerning family, love, death and honour,

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accompanied by rabab, reed pipe, mizmar mujwiz or ney (flutes), gerbeh (bagpipes) and oud (lute), as well as small lap drums. Purely instrumental music is rare. The Bedouin singer Omar al-Abdillat is perhaps Jordan's biggest star, known tor his patriotic song "Hashimi, Hashimi." Another wellknown Jordanian musician is Qamar Badwan, who won the golden prize in the 2000 Cairo Song Festival, the Jordanian Women for Arabic Music Ensemble, percussionist Hani Naser and the pianist and composer Khalid Asad.

Handicrafts There is no real tradition of artisanal crafts in Jordan. Historically people made what was needed by themselves and did not trouble with organising it. Only recently has there been any attempt at this, largely to provide some sort of income for the rural women, many of them who live in the most complete poverty. Help came from the Save the Children Fund and later from the Noor ai-Hussain Foundation. Queen Noor has always been deeply interested in the problems of rural women and her Foundation provided encouragement and a measure of financial help. Since the death of King Hussain, Queen Noor spends much of her time outside the Kingdom, and the Jordan River Foundation, the project of Queen Rania, has been attempting to replace it. Since these foundations are concerned with women, a number of others have sprung up, in different areas around Jordan, all of them directed largely at women, who have a certain amount of leisure but who cannot move far from their homes. Gradually these different organisations are gaining recognition and with it, some additional financing, rather than the shoestring aid that they had to rely on to begin with. Unemployment is fierce in Jordan, and some of these women are becoming the main wage earners for their families; it is interesting to speculate on the eventual social repercussions. One of the problems is to be able to finance suitable premises for workrooms, and to buy the raw materials to make whatever is being made. Undoubtedly this is one reason why embroidery is so very important in nearly every one of the organisations: the raw materials are cheap, and it is something that women can easily do at home.

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Besides the two I have named, some of the more prominent organisation/foundations are the Ghor al-Safi Women's Group, the Women's Trade Cooperation at Salt, the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature, the Iraq al-AmirWomen's Cooperative Society and many others. In fact, almost every small town and village has something of the kind organised, and their main problem is to find outlets for selling their products. This problem is particularly acute for individuals. The Noor ai-Hussain retail outlets have now closed and apart from the showrooms of the richer organisations like Jordan River, the RSCN and the Bani Hamida in Amman, I know of only two places that call themselves "handcraft centres". One is "Made in Jordan" in Petra; the other is the Madaba Handicrafts Centre a couple of kilometres from the centre of Madaba. This is in fact a gigantic shop, and sells some beautiful artisanal work. However, by no means all of the objects on sale here are made in Jordan, and if you want a selection of Jordan made work you almost have to go to "Made in Jordan". Madaba Handicrafts Centre is few kilometres outside Madaba on the road to Mount Nebo. There is a very large collection of objects for sale, many of them beautifully made. There is a workroom for mosaics on the premises and you can watch the work being done there. The Madaba Mosaic School produces a number of graduates each year and by no means all of them specialise in restoring the ancient mosaics, which is physically very demanding work. Some of them find work in tourism, making copies of the better known mosaics for sale, and some others concentrate on making original mosaics, either for direct sale or as gallery pieces. This has led to a considerable market in mosaic pieces in sale in Madaba, which are not to be found elsewhere in Jordan. The pieces are all decorated with mosaic tiles. The great jar shows a cobra climbing up and around it to drink the water supposedly inside. The many mosaic tiles on the right show details of well known mosaics in and around Madaba. The vase on the right above is a direct copy of the very famous and memorable mosaic in the church at Mount Nebo. This mosaic is also very often to be found copied as a rug. This original mosaic of irises and reeds was done by Alaa Hajjeh who works at the Madaba Handicrafts Centre. He is not

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himself a graduate of the Mosaic School, but learnt to make mosaics "on the job". The olivewood carvings shown here are very beautiful, but are not made in Jordan. Many of them come from Palestine, some from Egypt. However, as you can see the work is extraordinary. The Centre sells many other objects. The rugs are also beautiful, but again they are not made in Jordan; most of them are brought from Egypt, although they are based on traditional Jordanian designs. A number of them use the mosaic at Mount Nebo shown on higher up. There is little woven or embroidered work; a good deal of jewellery, most of it imported from either Turkey or India. However, the management does try, even though this cannot really be considered a Jordanian Handicrafts Centre.

Embroidery: This is one of the most important traditional crafts of Jordanian women and one, which has, in recent years, been incorporated into high fashion. Elegant gowns and jackets have been created using traditional needlework together with rich, Middle Eastern fabrics and these designer collections are frequently modelled on the catwalks of Jordan's hotels. It all began much more simply, however, with the young Jordanian girl learning the craft of embroidery in her village and often being judged through her skill on the quality of bridegroom she would attract. Every Jordanian girl from every social class at one time embroidered her own trousseau, which consisted of between six and twelve loosely cut robes and which lasted her for a lifetime. This art of embroidery has been carried over into the making of cushions, which grace the decor of many Jordanian homes. Colours range from shades of red, maroon, purple and pink, with bright additions of green, orange and gold. Simple cross-stitch is the basis for a plethora of complicated designs and recurring motifs include trees, flowers, feathers, waves and geometric zig-zags or triangles. More recently, embroidery crafts have developed to include quilts.

Jewellery: Jewellery has a long history in the Kingdom; stores of gold and silver jewellery dating from Roman times have been unearthed on various archaeological sites. Today, gold jewellery is worn by all strata of society, although the Quran discourages men from wearing this metal. The silver jewellery of the Bedouin (pictured)

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includes bracelets, chokers, rings, hair ornaments, long chains and rows of coins attached to necklaces or headdresses. Filigree work was probably introduced by Yemeni silversmiths and some flat surfaces are engraved with Arabic calligraphy. Until recently, a Bedouin bride carried her entire wealth on her person in the shape of silver jewellery and it was hers to dispose of as she wished.

Weaving: The Bedouin people wove many practical items by hand, using sheep's wool and goat and camel hair. Bedouin weaving served many purposes in the nomadic environment: items included bedding-bags, rugs, saddle-bags, food containers and room dividers for the tents. The preparation for weaving takes at least two months and the tasks of washing the wool or hair, carding, spinning, dyeing and setting up the loom were traditionally shared between husband and wife; the actual weaving, however, is always done by the woman. Traditional Bedouin colours for woven goods are deep red, black, indigo, green, orange and mustard, as well as natural tones of the animal's coat.

Basketry: Hand-woven baskets and trays come in all shapes and sizes and are made from bamboo fronds, split bamboo and palm leaves. Baskets with handles were often used to carry fruits and vegetables to and from market, or to store grain in the home. The large, lidded baskets were used for laundry. Ceramics and Pottery: Jordan has many natural clay deposits, which have been used for many centuries in the making of pottery. Early examples of pottery consisted of vessels for food storage, which had been sun-cured and baked in a pit fired with straw and dung. L.arge coil-and-slab pots, known as jarra, were originally used to store water or olive oil, but are now often seen as garden ornaments in the more elegant of Amman's villas.

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9 Education Jordan has made significant strides in education in recent decades, despite the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and the very large share of the national budget assigned to the armed forces. There are three types of schools in Jordan government schools, private schools, and the UNRWA schools for refugee children. Schooling consists of six years of elementary, three years of preparatory, and three years of secondary education. The Ministry of Education supervises all schools and establishes the curricula, teacher's qualifications, and state examinations; it also distributes free books to students in government schools and enforces compulsory education to the age of 14. The majority of the students attend government schools; About 82 per cent of the Jordanian population ages 15 or older were literate in 1992. In the early 1990s some 926,445 pupils were attending elementary schools in Jordan, more than 100,00 students were attending secondary schools, and 80,442 were enrolled in institutions of higher education. Higher education has developed along two separate lines, with traditional universities on the one hand and non-university-level institutions (community colleges) on the other. The Ministry of Education and the Council of Higher Education supervise all postsecondary education. The council includes the Minister of Higher Education (chair), three other ministers, the presidents of the four universities, two representatives of the public and private community

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colleges, and six other members appointed on the grounds of their distinction in fields relevant to higher education. The University of Jordan was established in Amman in 1962 and comprises thirteen faculties and eleven affiliated centres. Yarmouk University was established in Irbid in 1976 and comprises five faculties and two affiliated centres. Jordan University of Science and Technology (JUST) was part of Yarmouk University until 1986 when it became an independent university. It has seven faculties. Mutah University was established in Karak in 1980. It has two separate divisions. civilian and military, and comprises several departments. Besides these four national universities, in 1986 the Ministry of Higher Education authorised the establishment of private universities. The new Amman University and the Jordan University for Women, opened for the 1990-91 academic year. Within two years, the Applied Science University, Philadelphia University, established in 1975 as a two-year college, began offering four-year bachelor's degrees in 1989. A new government university, AI-Bait University for Arts and Sciences, located in the Mafraq region, was also established to enable more Jordanian students to pursue university education at home (government estimates that 40,000 Jordanians are studying abroad, due partly to lack of space in Jordanian universities). Other facilities for higher education in Jordan include the Statistical Training Centre and institutes for the study of agriculture, banking, social work, and public administration, a Shariah (Islamic Law) seminary, and nursing, military, and teachers colleges. The major libraries of Jordan are the Greater Amman Public Library, the University of Jordan Library, and the Scientific and Technical Information Centre, all in Amman.

Development of Education School education expanded remarkably following Jordan's independence in 1946. In the late forties and fifties there was a great demand for programmes at the bachelor's level to enable Jordanian students to pursue their higher education at home. Several Jordanian institutions and personalities submitted proposals to this effect. Towards the end of 1961, a British Committee undertook a visit to the headquarters of the Jordanian Armed Forces to discuss its needs of arms. The response they received, then, was that ''Jordan

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is not in need of traditional arms and equipment, it is in need of equipping its youth with modern education." Subsequently, a British delegation was invited to the Kingdom from October 23-November 5, 1961 to assess the potential of setting up a university in Jordan. The delegation comprised the following members: • Sir Douglas Veale, Late Registrar, University of Oxford (Leader), • Dr. W. W. Grave, Master of Fitz William House, University of Cambridge, and • Professor R. L. Wain, Wye College, University of London. At the end of their exploratory visit, the delegation came up with a 22-page report about the overall status of education in Jordan and the urgent need to establish the first university in Jordan. In the report, they said: "After weighing the various factors, some in favour and some against, we have reached the conclusion that the time has come for a university to be set up. We feel strongly, however, that in the initial stages, the economic and social needs of the country should be the principal factor in determining the subjects to be available for study. This, short-term development, which we recommend, must be so planned as to lead on without disturbance to further developments as and when opportunity offers. We, therefore, recommend that immediate steps be taken towards the establishment of a university, on a well-chosen site, which should allow for the provision of residential accommodation at some future date, even if it is not provided at once. About the future aspirations of the university, the report read as follows: "We should regret any assumption that the establishment of a university should be for the sole purpose of turning out graduates, for in two most important respects it should be more than this. Any university institution, if it is to win the respect of the academic world, must apply itself to the advancement of knowledge no less than to its dissemination. On its staff, there must be men and women dedicated to the investigation of intellectual problems on their own account, and capable of creating a thirst for knowledge among their pupils. It has been proven over and over again that the best

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Jordan teachers are those who are at the same time advancing the frontiers of knowledge in their own field. Further-and here we revert to our declared concern with the practical problems of Jordan-it is by such activity that the university would become a main centre of enquiry into the physical and social problems of the country. Within its precincts, there could grow up succeeding generations of students with an understanding of the sociological and technical problems of their country, and, as practical experience was added to their theoretical knowledge, these scholars would be in a position to make an outstanding contribution towards their solution."

The report was submitted to His Majesty King Hussain who immediately gave his directives to the then Prime Minister, in a letter he dispatched to him on February 12, 1962, to set up a Royal Commission for Educational Affairs (RCEA) and to entrust it with the task of investigating the potential, prospects, and difficulties towards the establishment of the first university in Jordan. Driven with a sense of duty, RCEA accomplished its mission diligently and promptly, and on August 18, 1962, came up with a recommendation calling for the immediate need for establishing a university in Jordan with a view to meeting the ever-increasing demands for higher education in Jordan. Subsequently, His Majesty King Hussain issued a Royal Decree on September 2, 1962, ordaining the establishment of the first ever 4-year institution of higher education in Jordan.

Educational System Jordan is a relatively young country that places great emphasis on education. Out of a population of 4.2 million, approximately 1.3 million Jordanians, nearly one-third of the entire population, are students. After the nursery and kindergarten years, the education system in Jordan comprises a 12-year comprehensive programme divided into two cycles: basic and secondary. The basic cycle runs from grades 1-10 and is free and compulsory for all Jordanians. At the end of grade 10, the grades of each student for the previous three years (8th, 9th, and 10th) are calculated to determine in which secondary stream that student can continue. Usually, the student's wishes are taken into account, but the final

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decision rests with the Ministry of Education. The secondary cycle of two years is divided into two main streams. The first is the comprehensive secondary education stream that ends with a general secondary education examination, the Tawjihi, and consists of a common core curriculum and optional specialised academic or vocational courses. The second is the applied secondary educational stream, which consists of specialised vocational courses; these prepare skilled labour through apprenticeship programmes run by the Vocational Training Corporation or the Ministry of Education.

Education in Practice The government's good intentions in the area of education contended with straitened financial circumstances, a rapidly changing labour force, and the demographic problem of a youthful population (53 per cent of the population was below the age of fifteen in 1988). Nevertheless, significant progress had been made in various spheres. Education has been a stated priority of the government for a number of years. In 1986, government expenditures on education were 12.2 per cent of the national budget. Education has become widely available, although some observers have questioned both the quality of the instruction and the appropriateness of the curriculum to the economy's requirements. Recognising the need to supply training more suited to realistic employment prospects and to improve the level of teacher training, the government was continuing to strengthen vocational and technical education and to provide in-service training for its teachers. In 1921, when the Emirate of Trans-Jordan was created, educational facilities consisted of twenty-five religiOUS schools that provided a rather limited education. By 1987 there were 3,366 schools, with more than 39,600 teachers and an enrolment of 919,645 students. Nearly one-third of the population in 1987 was involved in education as a teacher or a student at home or abroad. In 1985 nearly 99 per cent of the nation's six-to-twelve years-olds were in the primary cycle, nearly 79 per cent of the twelve-to-fifteen-year-olds were in the preparatory cycle, and 37 per cent of the fifteen-toeighteen-year-olds were in the secondary cycle. Progress in literacy was impressive. The Encyclopedia of the Third World, edited by George T. Kurian, reported that in the mid-1980s Jordan had a 67.6 per cent

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literacy rate, 81 per cent for males and 59.3 per cent for females. The gap between rural and urban areas in terms of literacy was closing, but rural levels remained below those of the urban areas; Maan Governorate lagged behind other rural areas. Education was free and compulsory for children between the ages of six and fifteen. The educational ladder consisted of four parts: primary (grades one through six); preparatory (grades seven through nine); secondary (grades ten through twelve); and post-secondary (all higher education). Promotion from the compulsory cycle to the more specialised secondary schools was controlled by a standardised written examination, as was passage from secondary to the postsecondary programmes. The Ministry of Education, which controlled all aspects of education (except community colleges), administered the examinations. For grades one through twelve, nearly 75 per cent of the students attended the free government schools in the late 1980s; about 15 per cent attended the UNRWA schools, also free; and about 10 per cent attended private schools. In 1987, the Department of Statistics reported that there were 194 UNRWA schools and 682 private schools. The primary curriculum stressed basic literacy skills. Subjects taught included reading and writing in Arabic; religion (Islam for Muslims and the appropriate religion for non-Muslims); arithmetic; civics and history, with emphasis on the history of the Arabs and the concept of the Arab nation; geography, with emphasis on the Arab countries; science; music; physical education; and drawing for male students and embroidery for females. In the fifth grade, English was added to the official curriculum (although many private schools taught it earlier) and some schools offered French. Within the primary cycle, promotion from grade to grade was required by law and was essentially automatic. Children could be held back only twice in six years, after which they proceeded to higher grades regardless of the quality of their work. In the preparatory cycle, work on academic subjects continued, both to improve the skills of terminal students and to prepare those going on to secondary studies. In addition, vocational education began on a limited basis. Each school was required to provide at least one course in a vocational subject for each grade. In general, each school offered only one vocational option, and all students had to

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take that subject for three periods a week for three years. The preparatory curriculum added geometry, algebra, and social studies to the academic courses offered in the primary grades. On completion of the ninth grade, students could sit for the public preparatory examination for promotion to the secondary level. Secondary education was somewhat selective in enrolment and quite specialised in purpose. This level had both academic (general) and vocational divisions; the former was designed to prepare students for university-level studies and the latter to train middle-level technical personnel for the work force. Within the academic curriculum, students further specialised in scientific or literary studies. Because of the speCialised nature and relatively limited number of secondary facilities, male and female students did not necessarily attend separate schools. The secondary programme culminated in the public secondary education examination, which qualified students for post-secondary study. In 1987 around 69,000 students were enrolled in higher education. Nearly half of these were women. Jordan had four universities with a combined enrolment of nearly 29,000; more than one-third of the students were women (11,000). The University of Jordan in Amman had a 1986-87 enrolment of nearly 13,000 students; Yarmuk University in hbid had nearly 12,000 students; Jordan University of Science and Technology in Ar Ramtha had nearly 3,000 students; and Mutah University near AI-Karak had an enrolment of about 1,300. In the 1980s, Jordan strove to implement an education system that would address serious structural problems in its labour force. The country faced high rates of unemployment among educated young people, particularly in the professions of medicine, engineering, and teaching, and also had a need for skilled technical labour. In the 1970s and 1980s, the government began to expand its vocational and technical training programmes to counteract the skilled labour shortage brought about by the large-scale migration of workers to high-paying jobs in the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia. In spite of the recession and high unemployment among professionals, skilled technical labour remained in short supply in the late 1980s. Cultural factors also played a prominent role; great prestige attached to academic higher education as opposed to vocational training.

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In response to the need for education reform, the king called for a reorientation of education policy to meet the needs of the country and the people. Community colleges played an essential role in this reorientation. They were consonant with the cultural value placed on higher education and also helped provide a skilled technical labour force. In the early 1980s, the government's teacher training institutes and all other private and public training institutes were transformed into community colleges. These education institutions offered a variety of vocational, technical, and teacher training programmes and granted associates degrees based on two years of study. Upon graduation students were eligible to apply for transfer to the university system if they wished. In the late 1980s, more than fifty-three community colleges operated under the Ministry of Higher Education, which was created in 1985 to regulate the operations of all community colleges, although individual colleges were administered by a variety of agencies. Scattered throughout the country, the community colleges had an enrolment of about 31,000 students, slightly more than half of all students in higher education. More than half their students, about 17,000, were women. Nearly 100 areas of specialisation were offered in nine categories of professional study: education, commerce, computers, communications and transportation, engineering, paramedical technologies, agriculture, hotel management, and social service professions. According to observers, graduates were able to find employment in industry, business, and government. The government sought to confront the issue of unemployment among university graduates by encouraging more students to join community colleges. In 1987, the government introduced a career guidance programme in the secondary schools that explained the country's problems with unemployment. Most Jordanian students in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were studying medicine and engineering. Some observers have suggested that many of the students in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were Palestinians whose education costs were being borne by the host government. Observers believed that most of the students in Western Europe and the United States were being financed by their families and the rest by the government of Jordan. Perhaps because of these connections, students from West European and American

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schools tended to obtain the more desirable and prestigious positions on their return home. The perceived higher quality of education in the West also was a factor in making these graduates more competitive in the job market. Public education is free and compulsory between the ages of 6 and 15. At the secondary level, about 80 per cent of the male children and 78 per cent of the female children go to school. Some 100 per cent of the Jordanian population age 15 or older was literate in 2001. The development of Jordan's educational system can only be described as dramatic. Starting from almost nothing in the early 1920s, Jordan has forged a comprehensive, high-quality system to develop the human capital of its citizens. Today there are 2787 government schools, 1493 private schools, 48 community colleges, and 19 universities. In Jordan, access to basic education has been emphasised in all the country's development plans. The government has, as a matter of policy, provided every village and community with 10 or more school-going children with a school. As a result, the rapid spread of facilities enabled citizens in poor and remote areas to gain access to education.

Educational Facilities Jordan's population is young -42.2 per cent are 14 or younger, while 31.4 per cent fall between 15 and 29 years of age and currently almost one-third of all Jordanians are enrolled in educational facilities. Education is free for all primary and secondary school students, and compulsory for all Jordanian children through the age of fifteen. It is estimated that Jordan has achieved over 95 per cent enrolment for its school age children, as compared with only 47 per cent in 1960. Unlike in many other countries, in Jordan there is a very small disparity in primary school attendance rates between urban and rural areas. During the year 1997-98, 1,346,178 children attended elementary and secondary schools in Jordan. Of these, 951,831 attended schools run by the Ministry of Education, 229,487 attended private schools, 143,893 went to UNRWA-run schools and the remaining 20,967 attended other government-run schools. In 1997-98, there was one teacher for every 21 students in Jordanian schools. After finishing their basic schooling, more and more Jordanians

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are opting to pursue higher education either at home or abroad. In 1997-98,88,267 students were enrolled in universities while 24,657 pursued their education in Jordan's community college system. A total of 5850 Jordanians were enrolled in graduate school programmes. Women comprise a large percentage of Jordan's higher education attendees, accounting for 66.6 per cent of community college students and 44.7 per cent of the university population in 1997-98. Jordan's quality educational system has also attracted a large number of foreign students. Out of the 88,267 students attending Jordan's universities in 1997-98, 11,376 were from outside the country. The Kingdom has also been a popular choice among students around the world who want to study Arabic in a hospitable and friendly environment. In 1988, the government launched a ten-year education reform package, which cost approximately $1 billion. The plan aimed to improve the quality and relevance of education by restructuring the curricula to focus on developing students' problem solving and critical thinking skills, and linking academic knowledge to real life. The Ministry of Education has launched the second reform plan, for 1998-2002. This plan focuses on upgrading teachers' skills, school administration, educational information systems, preschool education and education for children with special needs. The main problems, which the Jordanian educational system is facing, now are twofold. First, the country's burgeoning youth population demands the continued expansion of the educational system. Along with this quantitative expansion, Jordan seeks to improve the quality of its teachers, books, curriculum and facilities. In the area of higher education, the country has suffered from an imbalance between the university and community college systems. The Ministry of Higher Education is now actively promoting the development of Jordan's community colleges and encouraging enrolment in them, in order to better match the country's educational system with its labour market, which currently suffers from a shortage of mid-level vocational skills.

Types of Institutions Vocational Training: Two-year vocational programmes in trades training and women's education are available at the post-preparatory

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level. As of 1992, there were 95 vocational schools and training centres providing training in 26 specialised trades. These programmes have no academic component. Upon the completion of the two-year period of instruction, students are awarded a certificate of training; no formal examinations are required. This certificate does not permit admission to community colleges or universities.

Teacher Training: Primary-school teachers must hold an associate degree (community college diploma) and an educational qualification certificate. Community colleges offer two-year teacher preparation programmes in most subjects. Secondary-school teachers must hold a bachelor's degree and preferably a diploma of education. Higher-education teachers must hold a doctorate (Ph.D.); in some cases a master's degree is sufficient. The Higher College for the Certification of Teachers, established in 1988, provides educational opportunities for in-service schoolteachers and raises their qualifications to what would be equivalent to a university degree. Community Colleges: In 1990-91, there were 51 accredited community colleges and nine licensed community colleges that had not yet received accreditation. Community colleges are either governmental or private. Private community colleges are, in general, less selective than government community colleges. Like the universities, community colleges operate 16-week semesters and follow a credit-hour system. Community colleges award Associate of Arts (M) degrees after the completion of 66-72 credit hours, depending on the field. The Ministry of Higher Education determines the curricula for public community colleges; the private colleges design their own curricula, which is subject to approval by the Ministry of Higher Education. The community college curriculum has a career orientation rather than academic orientation, and entrance requirements for community colleges are usually lower than that of university. Admission to a given community college programme requires the successful completion of the appropriate General Secondary-School Certificate (tawjihi) with a minimum passing track. University Education: Jordanian universities award bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees as well as diplomas of higher studies in various fields. Bachelor's degrees include four-year Bachelor of Arts degrees and four-to five-year Bachelor of Science degrees. The Education Diploma (also called Diploma of Higher Education or

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Diploma of Higher Studies) is a one-year graduate degree. Master's degrees require one to two years of study, and thesis and non-thesis options are available in most programmes. Doctoral degrees require original research work and a dissertation; they usually include two years of course work and at least one year for the dissertation. University faculties determine their own curricula subject to approval by the Ministry of Higher Education. To enter a public university, a student must attain a score of at least 65 per cent on the tawjihi examination; the private universities require a minimum tawjihi score of 60 per cent. All Jordanian universities have adopted the credit-hour system. In most cases, the minimum credit hours permitted per semester is nine, and the maximum is 18. The academic year usually consists of two 18-week semesters and an optional summer semester. Non-formal Studies: The University of Jordan, Yarmouk University, and the community colleges offer non-formal studies. Courses are in fields related to industry, computer science, agricultural industries, typing, foreign languages, etc. Students must hold the tawjihi certificate. Courses last between one week and four months and students receive a certificate of attendance or achievement. High Marks: Jordan's investment in education has paid off handsomely, as is demonstrated by a soaring literacy rate. In 1960, only 33 per cent of Jordanians aged fifteen and over could functionally read and write. After 34 years of pro-education governmental policies, however, the 1996 literacy rate had climbed to 85.4 per cent. The Kingdom hopes to continue this remarkable rise by achieving 92 per cent literacy by the turn of the century. While the overall literacy rate has risen sharply, a substantial gender gap remains: twothirds of all illiterate Jordanians are women. One of the most significant policy choices that have benefited Jordan's educational system has been the decision to favour spending on basic education over higher education. This has facilitated the country's goal of universal enrolment and has boosted literacy levels throughout the general population. By consistently allocating more than three-fourth of the total education budget to primary and secondary schooling, Jordan has adopted an egalitarian approach to education, which has benefited the entire country in the long term. Jordan's education record has proven impressive by international

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standards, and results from the foresight of the country's leadership, who saw the need to focus on building the country's human capital to meet the challenges of the future. Every village and community with 10 or more school-going children is provided with a schoo!, enabling citizens in poor and remote areas to gain access to education. Education is free for all primary and secondary school students, and compulsory for all Jordanian children through the age of fifteen. It is proved that Jordan has achieved over 95 per cent enrolment for its school age children. Jordan Education Initiative to Roll Out e-Learning across the Kingdom and Beyond Jordan has been announced as the pilot nation for the implementation of an ambitious project for the delivery of effective e-learning to its citizens. The Jordan Education Initiative brings together leaders from the IT and Telecom industries with Jordanian authorities to create the project that will improve education in the Kingdom. By implementing such a model, the government of Jordan, together with World Economic Forum member companies and organisations. will provide Jordanian youth with a nurturing and supportive environment that enables each child to pursue his/her purpose through a conscious process of self-discovery, experiential learning and self-determination. Ninety-six so-called "Discovery Schools" have been selected to pilot the scheme in Jordan. They will serve as a test bed of how ICT can enable new systems to be used and benefit schools and their pupils. Though focused on the advancement of learning in Jordan, the plan also provides the opportunity for the sustained development of the local information technology industry through infrastructure and e-content development activity. The Initiative also supports the Jordanian government's vision of building a knowledge economy by providing lifelong learning opportunities for all Jordanian citizens and providing them with the services and tools to become functioning members of the economy. "By empowering our youth through this education initiative, Jordan and its World Economic Forum partners can create a dynamic and practical model of public-private partnership in the area of ICT that can ignite the engines of growth for future generations in Jordan and the region," said His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan.

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At the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2003 in January, Cisco System's President and Chief Executive Officer John Chambers, along with an esteemed group of non-profit, IT and telecom industry leaders, agreed to come together to improve education within one developing country. Commitments were made by over 20 participants, which led to the establishment of the Jordan Education Initiative. "It is truly an honour to be part of such a groundbreaking educational model where private, public and non-profit organisations come together to drive the marriage of education and technology for the greater good," said Chambers. "My hope is that the Jordan Education Initiative becomes the model for increasing the educational opportunities and standard of living on a global basis."

The Jordan Education Initiative will be a key catalyst for social and economic development not just in Jordan but eventually across the region. For many developing countries the delivery of quality education to their citizens is often difficult due to significant resource constraints and the lack of a coordinated and collaborative approach. The Jordan Education Initiative will change all that: "This bold and exciting initiative embodies the mission of the World Economic Forum and the spirit of the Extraordinary Annual Meeting: to build a better future for the children and citizens of our global community through collaboration and partnership. I applaud the leadership and vision of the Jordan government, companies and organisations involved," said Klaus Schwab, Founder and President of the World Economic Forum. The Jordan Education Initiative is a public-private partnership between the members of the World Economic Forum and the government of Jordan. The following organisations are engaged in the Jordan Education Initiative: Blue Arc Corporation; CISCO Systems; Commercial Ware; Computer Associates; Connectivity Partners International; Corning Cable Systems; Crypthomatic NS; Dell; Digital Envoy Inc.; HP; IBM; Intel; International Technologies; Microsoft; the Ministry of Education of Jordan; the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology of Jordan; the Ministry of Planning of Jordan; NIIT; Pearson; Siemens; SkilIsoft; Sun Microsystems; and World Links.

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Higher Education Higher education in Jordan began with the second half of the twentieth century, namely the sixties, when numerous Teachers' Colleges were established throughout the country. Their establishment provided the necessary teaching manpower needed to meet the high demand on school education characterising that era. The first public Jordanian university, the University of Jordan, was established in 1962. Yarmouk University followed in 1976, and six more public universities were established in different parts of the Kingdom since that date. In 1989, the Council of Higher Education endorsed the first policy document authorising the establishment of private universities. Amman University, the first Jordanian private university, was established in 1990. An impressive number of twelve more private universities were founded since that date. Non-university education is offered at Community Colleges, which were created in 1981 by converting and expanding the existent Teacher Colleges. These institutions are meant to offer specialised, career-oriented training, and prepare their students for work in middlelevel professions. All community colleges are supervised by and affiliated to AI-Balqa Applied University, which is a Jordanian public university. The Jordanian Council of Higher Education was established in 1982 in response to the need for regulation and planning of higher education policies and coordination among Jordanian public universities. The Council formed the core for the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, which was established in 1985. The Ministry and the Council undertook the mission of applying the government's educational poliCies at post-secondary level, and of legislating up-to-date laws on higher education. The Ministry of Higher Education was annulled in 1998, but was re-established in August 2001 according to instructions by His Majesty King Abdullah II, and renamed as The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. New Higher Education Law: Consequently, a new Law on Higher Education was endorsed: Law no. 41 for the year 2001, which cancelled the previous Law. By this law, a Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research was established, and took over

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supervising all higher education issues, and includes the following Councils: • The Higher Education Council (which comprises the Higher Committee for Scientific Research) • The Accreditation Council The new Higher Education Law assigned the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research the following prominent functions: 1. Implementing the general policy of higher education in Jordan. 2. Coordinating between higher education institutions and public and private centres for consultations and research. 3. Signing cultural and scientific agreements in the field of higher education and scientific research. 4. Representing Jordan in international conferences and symposia on higher education. 5. Recognising foreign institutions of higher education and equating certificates issued by them. 6. Setting student eligibility rules for scholarships inside and outside Jordan. 7. FollOWing up the affairs of Jordanian students abroad through Jordanian cultural counsellors. The Law gave the Higher Education Council the following main functions: 1. Formulating the general policy of higher education in Jordan. 2. Endorsing the establishment of new higher education institutions. 3. Issuing instructions concerning administration and finance of the higher education sector. 4. Coordinating between local higher education institutions. 5. Evaluating the quality of higher education in terms of sufficiency and efficiency. 6. Determining the basic admission requirements at higher education institutions. The Accreditation Council is given by the same law the follOWing major duties: 1. Defining the regulations for the accreditation of higher education institutions, amending and developing them in light of the general policy of higher education.

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2. Supervising the performance of higher education institutions and their commitment to applying the rules of accreditation. 3. Appointing the specialised committees needed to carry out the tasks of the Accreditation Council. 4. Ensuring that institutions of higher education reach their predefined goals through continuous evaluation of their programmes. 5. Proposing schemes for regulations and rules of the Council's duties. 6. Publishing the decisions the Council takes concerning accreditation in the official media. University of Jordan: The University of Jordan is both a modern as well as old institution of Higher Education in Jordan. Established in 1962, the University has, since then, applied itself to the advancement of knowledge no less than to its dissemination. In its capacity as a comprehensive teaching, research and communityservice institution, the University of Jordan enables its students to choose from a wide range of programmes. Many current and former staff members head important academic, administrative, and political establishments in the Kingdom; many have served as ministers in a number of government cabinets, top advisers to the Jordanian leadership, members of Parliament, and presidents of Jordanian public and private universities. Among its more than 961 faculty members are freelance writers in the national newspapers and magazines as well as consultants for the radio and TV stations, poets, novelists, short-story writers, and literary critics. Many have also offered their services to some neighbouring countries, and many teach or have taught at a number of prestigious universities all over the world. Most faculty members are active participants in conferences, workshops, and symposia abroad; and most take advantage of the various research and exchange awards. Given the global outlook, the progressive thinking and diverse background, these faculty members shoulder the responsibility of delivering a quality education to the 25,000 students who are pursuing a wide variety of undergraduate and graduate programmes. At the undergraduate level, students have the choice to select

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from among 59 different programmes in the Arts, Business Administration, Science, Shariah (Islamic Studies), Medicine, Nursing, Agriculture, Educational Sciences, Engineering and Technology, Law, Physical Education, Pharmacy, Dentistry, Humanities and Social Sciences, Rehabilitation Sciences, Information Technology and, most recently, Arts and Design. For those interested in graduate education, the University offers 22 doctoral programmes, 61 Master's programmes, 17 programs in Higher Specialisation in Medicine, and one programme in Higher Specialisation in Dentistry, five Professional Diploma Programs, and three interdisciplinary Master's programmes across the wide spectrum of academic disciplines. From an international perspective, the University offers 59 international programmes at the undergraduate level, and 61 internati9nai programmes at the graduate level and in all fields of specialisations. The University has opened up two further opportunities of admission to individuals who wish to continue their university education without having to quit their jobs. The Evening Studies Programme, which started in the fall semester 2001/2002, and Distance Education, dimensions of which have already started, is two new channels of education, which the University is keen on making succeed. All programmes offered by the University combine traditional academic lecturing with the more liberal methodologies of instruction that are based on dialogue, research and creative thinking. Theoretical instruction is further assisted with interactive multimedia teaching techniques and computer-based instructional materials to support, and eventually discard, traditional teaching methodologies. Fieldwork, practical training, and applied research are essential components of most of the programmes offered by the University. For sometime, the University of Jordan has been introducing and implementing the principles ofTotal Quality Management (TQM). With respect to Information Technologies, the University is very well positioned. Yarmouk University: Founded in 1976 by a Royal Decree, Yarmouk University (YU) has grown both in size and stature over the years. It has become a leading institution of higher learning, known for its dedication to service, its innovative approach to academic management and human resource development, and its relentless

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pursuit of excellence in all fields of research and instruction. As chartered, the University is a governmental institution that enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy. It is governed by a Board of Trustees, and Board members are appOinted by a Royal Decree for finite terms. The University is managed according to a set of laws and bylaws specifically adopted for higher education in general and for YU in particular. The University's mission comprises three components. The first is to provide quality education to its students in the various fields of specialisation and at different levels of achievements ranging from the undergraduate levels to the M. Sc. and PhD. levels. The second component is to engage its faculty and students in relevant and timely research programmes that would be needed to fuel economic growth and development of the country, and that would also contribute to human welfare and prosperity in its wider context. The third is to render public service at the local, national, and international levels through fostering a dynamic environment of cultural enrichment, and the provision of educational and training opportunities to non-student groups. In discharging its mission, the University seeks to impart to its students the doctrine of free thought, and the ability to analyse the issues boldly and adopt the most appropriate stand called for. Students are tutored not only in the contents of textbooks and references, but also in what makes them good citizens and leaders of the future. They are given a truly rounded education. Extra-curricular activities are designed not only to laud the virtues of sound moral values steeped in the rich heritage of our Arab Islamic culture, but also to strengthen their character with experiential knowledge. They are trained to employ the scientific method for analysis and problem solving as a discipline of the mind, and to apply it in all walks of life. The profile of our student body is a fairly accurate fulfilment of these goals and objectives. Student enrolment stood at 17,800 at the beginning of the academic year 1999-2000. Nearly 11 per cent were non-Jordanian, with some 46 nationalities represented on the campus. This goes a long way towards the enhancement of cross-cultural experience. The university is coeducational, and around 52 per cent of the student bodies were female. The University is linked to many other universities through bilateral

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agreements for cooperation, collaboration, and exchange of faculty members and students. These include regional Arab universities, as well as European, North American, and Asian universities. Most students, or nearly 90 per cent, were enrolled in undergraduate programmes distributed among 8 faculties and 34 departments. Graduate programmes at the M. Sc. level were offered in 27 areas of specialisation; and at the Ph.D. level in 6 areas.

Mutah University: Mutah University was established in 1980 by a Royal Decree as a military institution of higher education. Later, in 1986, a civilian wing was added to the University. The philosophy behind the establishment of the Mutah University originates from an ambition of the Late HM King Hussain to fulfil Jordan's role as being an inheritor of "The Great Arab Revolt", the greatest Arab revolution in contemporary history. Stemming from this philosophy and to enable the country to steadily face future challenges, Mutah University with it's military/ civilian nature is continuously endeavouring to supply the Jordanian society with competent graduates equipped with both scientific and cultural background coupled with leadership qualities. The University was named after a famous battle that marked the first encounter outside the Arabian Peninsula between Muslim and Byzantine forces in 629 A.D. and it was actually built on the same site where that battle took place. Until 1985, a Special Royal Commission acted both as the University Board of Trustees and the University Council. In 1985, the Council of Higher Education took over the responsibilities of the Board of Trustees and the special Royal Commission continued to perform its duties as the University Council until the University formed its own Council in 1997. The location of Mutah University in the southern part of Jordan, the less developed part of the country, is meant to serve as a source of enlightenment, modernisation and development of this region. The Jordanian economic and social development plans have designated this region as a target area for some important and expensive investment projects. These include phosphate, potash, cement, fertilizers. electricity generation and tourism. The implementation and management of these industries and projects need highly trained human resources

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as well as new technologies and skills, which will hopefully be provided by Mutah University. The University is currently undergoing vigorous expansions in all academic domains so as to enhance its role in serving the local community and the country as whole in addition to providing quality education for the students. Private Universities: As the belt tightens on higher education expenditure in the state systems of industrialised societies, developing countries are struggling to meet the rising demand for higher education within their borders. In the Near East the concept of the private university has emerged as a strategy for expansion of the higher education system. A case in point is Jordan, where public universities are able to accommodate only a small proportion of the secondary students qualified to continue their education at the university level. About 25,000 Jordanians study abroad each year, affecting a shortterm economic drain as well as some subsequent contribution to the brain drain common in developing countries. In partial response to the demand for higher education, the Jordanian government began licensing private universities in 1990; there are now 12 private institutions with an enrolment in 1994-95 approximating 25 per cent of the total student body in Jordan's universities. The history of higher education in Jordan is brief indeed. Originally Trans-Jordan, a British protectorate, the small country of Jordan92, 300 square kilometres and with a current population of about 5 million-was part of the map of the Middle East that was redrawn after World War I. National systems of education emerged in the region in the 1920s, resulting in the rapid expansion of school attendance in Trans-Jordan. After his coronation in 1953, King Hussain created a Royal Education Commission to make recommendations to the Crown for the development of the education system. The commission's first priority was basic literacy. Education Law No. 20 of 1955 made education compulsory for six years; Education Law No. 16 of 1964 extended the period to nine years. The resulting expansion of compulsory and secondary education created a college market for training teachers, with an increase in enrolment in teacher training institutes from 46 in 1952 to 7,000 in 1976. Since 1950, and even after higher education developed within the country, advanced study abroad was the principal technique used by the government to resolve shortages of educated personnel.

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The country's first public university, the University of Jordan, was established in 1962, and the second, Yarmouk University, in 1976. In 1981, these were joined by Muta University and in 1995 by Hashemiate University and AI-Bait University. The public institutions also include the Jordan University of Science and Technology, which was separated from Yarmouk University in the late 1980s at a time of political unrest in the north of Jordan, and the Amman University for Applied Engineering, which evolved from a technical college. In 1990 Amman Private University opened with an enrolment of 1,324 students. In 1991, the Applied Sciences University, AI-Isra', Philadelphia, the Jordan University for Women, and Princess Sumayya University College for Technology opened their doors, followed by the Music Academy in 1992; AI-Zaytoonah, Jarash Private University, and UNRWA College in 1993; and Irbid National University and Zarqa Private University in 1994. Both public and private universities operate under specific Jordanian laws-for public universities the Jordanian Universities Law No. 29 of 1987 and for private universities the Private Universities Act No. 19 of 1989. Private universities also fall under the regulation of the Companies Law as public or private shareholding companies. According to law, each public university has a council of deans that is headed by the president and runs the university, a faculty council for each faculty or college, and departmental councils composed of the academic staff of a department. Each university also has a university council (advisory rather than administrative) that includes lay representation and interacts with the public. In addition each public university has government teaching staff regulations specific to the institution that cover matters such as academic freedom. In contrast, the highest governing body in private universities is the university's board of trustees rather than a president's council. There are no regulations that establish employment conditions. The regulation of higher education that does exist is provided by the Higher Education Council. The council is chaired by the minister of education and higher education, and its additional membership consists of the ministers of planning and culture, the presidents of the public universities, representatives from the community colleges. and six lay members. (The members of the council have so far not detected any conflict of interest in their composition, although there is no private university representation in the body.)

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The Higher Education Council has significant power over private universities. The council must approve the types of studies and fields of specialisation at various levels; set admissions criteria; approve acceptance of donations, gifts, and grants; review performance through examination of budgets and reports, and approve any cultural or technical cooperation agreements the university may wish to make with other institutions and bodies. Regulations are issued for licensing and accreditation with criteria-so specific as the proper student! faculty ratio, the minimum (80 per cent) proportion of full-time academic staff, the maximum teaching load for each academic rank, and the maximum number of credit hours a student may take per semester. Public universities, on the other hand, are not subject to the council's accreditation or review procedures, and may start new programmes and build new buildings without council or other government approval. In recent months considerable dissatisfaction has been expressed with the financial state of the higher education enterprise. Public universities are funded heavily from earmarked taxes--customs duties and license fees. There is also a special "university tax" collected by the Ministry of Finance and distributed annually as decided by the Higher Education Council. Allocation of public monies to higher education is not well defined, and unfortunately the wasta (influence) of an individual President may play a significant role in how much his institution is given. Tuition and fees make up about a quarter of the budget, but have been kept at relatively low levels and have decreased in real terms over the past several years. The current public university deficit is about 30 per cent of expenditures in a total budget of J$ 156 million (about US$ 224 million). Neither private universities nor their students receive financial support from the government. The private university must pay a onetime accreditation fee of J$ 10,000 per department, and under the Companies Law pays an annual tax of 25 per cent of profit to the government. The image of the private university in Jordan is a product less of the private universities themselves and more of the prejudice expressed by members of the public university community. Much is made of the fact that students "pay" for their education, and intimations of unfair practices and substandard education abound. Nevertheless,

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there is no evidence that the private universities are not doing a good job, or in fact that the public universities are doing a better job, and so far the latter have escaped scrutiny in spite of a certain amount of fiscal recklessness. Some resentment arises from the fact that private universities pay better salaries, but this is on a contract basis without the expectation of tenure, whereas Jordanian faculty members in the public universities are guaranteed employment for life after two years of service (this stipulation does not apply to non-Jordanians) and frequently opt for this security rather than taking the risk associated with a private institution's higher salary. Although rarely mentioned, a substantial number of public university officials and faculty members own shares in private university companies. The complaint most frequently heard about private universities is that their admissions standards are lower, and at first glance this would seem to be the case. University admission is based on the results of the tawjihi-the General Secondary School Certificate Examination (GSSCE). The qualifying score is 65 per cent for public universities and 60 per cent for private universities. Actual requirements may be higher in some specialisations owing to competition. For example, medicine generally calls for at least an 85 per cent score and engineering 80 per cent. The GSSCE is given in subject groupings (comparable in concept to the British A-levels) but the largest category by far is the combined total in arts and science. In 1995 a total of 41,000 students took the arts exam, of whom 12,000 scored at least 65 per cent and 15,000 at least 60 per cent; 23,000 took the science exam, of whom 13,000 scored at least 65 per cent and 15,000 at least 60 per cent. (First-year places in the public universities totalled less than 15,000 that year.) This is not the full picture, however. In the public universities about 25 per cent of the available places are reserved for students in special groups who make the qualifying score (65 per cent). The "special" list includes children of the armed and security forces and Ministry of Education personnel, applicants from certain foreign countries (not including Malaysia, which has its own separately negotiated quota), and those with wasta of one kind or another. This exemption means that the sliding scale of competition does not affect a large number of applicants, and consequently many better-qualified students lose their public university slots to the less qualified.

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The basic problem of private higher education in Jordan is that the private universities were established as a "quick fix" for the mushrooming access deficit in a system without surplus money, and where the existing money was not effectively spent. Furthermore, the development of the private university was restricted to the existing tradition in curriculum and delivery rather than reaching out for innovation and creativity. Recent weeks have seen public addresses given by Crown Prince Hasan, Princess Sarvath, and others signifying potential changes. Probable actions are: professionalising the Higher Education Council and adding private university representation, improving the management autonomy of both private and public institutions, and establishing an accreditation body for all higher education. With these first steps taken, the private universities may be able to cross the threshold into a new importance in Jordanian higher education.

Educational Challenge Education has played a Tran formative role in the development of Jordan from an agrarian, subsistence economy to a predominantly urban, industrialised nation. With few natural resources at its disposal, Jordan has opted to develop its human capacity. To date Jordan's record of educational development has been impressive. Jordan's population has a very high literacy rate of 89 per cent. Jordan invests 13 per cent of public expenditure on basic and secondary education. The total enrolment rate for basic education is 90 per cent and decreases to 70 per cent for the secondary cycle. Male enrolment is nominally higher in early childhood and basic education. Female students, however, comprise 55 per cent of the secondary education population. The structure of the educational system in Jordan consists of a two-year cycle of preschool education, ten years of compulsory basic education, and two years of secondary academic or vocational education after which the students sit for a General Certificate of Secondary Education Exam-Tawjihi. The Ministry of Education began reforming the educational sector in the early 1990s. This process was then accelerated when His Majesty King Abdullah II, in early 2001, called for the "remodelling" of the education system as a critical step for Jordan to realise its vision of becoming a regional information technology (IT) hub and fully

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enter into the global economy. The goal of the government's system reform initiative is to create and administer an educational system based on excellence, dedicated to high standards and contributing to the nation's wealth in a global "Knowledge Economy." The reform targets all sectors of basic education, vocational training and non-formal education, as well as teachers, students, managers and educational institutions. Issues of structure of education, e-Iearning and computerisation, examinations and evaluation, certification and training of teachers, curriculum and educational materials development, early childhood development, administration and organisation, and financial administration are the main aspects of the reform process. Thus, anticipated results in the education sector include an improved curriculum, better trained teachers, and a standards and accreditation system that would ensure high quality, consistency, and competitive educational opportunities for Jordan's children. With close to half of the population (43 per cent) below the age of 15 years, the challenge for the 21st century is to ensure that Jordan's youth receive the quality of education and relevant labour market skills needed to effectively compete for domestic, regional and international employment. Currently, there is a mismatch between skills taught in schools and workplace needs, uneven teacher to student ratio, outdated teaching methodologies, and limited use of technology. Although Jordan has one of the highest female literacy rates in the region {82 per cent}, females are often directed into generalist streams. This situation deprives girls from taking part in learning that will serve them in the workforce. It also creates significant gaps in future employment and income as compared with their male peers. Further, although parents value education, economic hardship sometimes forces them to remove their daughters from the educational system at an early age-in many cases to care for younger siblings. This practice negatively impacts female participation rates and ensures a life of economic and social challenges for affected women. Further, Jordan's educational system provides only limited access to early childhood education (ECE), and the current system of preservice and in-service training, necessary for improving and

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standardising teaching methods and sector-specific expertise, does not fully meet the challenges of preparing students for the modern work place. In July 2003, the GOJ launched the Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy (ERfKE) initiative. This five-year, $380 million. programme, developed with USAID assistance, is one of the most ambitious education reform programmes in the Middle East and North Africa region to date. The goal of Jordan's education reform programme is to re-orient education policy, restructure education programmes and practices, improve physical learning environments, and promote learning readiness through improved and more accessible early childhood education. USAID, in coordination with the GOJ and eight other donor nations and multilateral organisations, will provide $14.2 million during this strategy period to support reform efforts through ERfKE. USAID's efforts under this initiative are twofold. First, we are assisting with the government's early childcare initiative-working to create 100 public kindergartens, field-test curriculum, and develop and accreditation system. Second, USAID is working with the Ministry of Education on school-to-work programmes and developing an IT curriculum stream for high school students. USAID/Jordan helped the Ministry of Education develop the Education Reform for a Knowledge Economy (ERfKE) initiative, and is now looking forward to continuing our partnership to successfully implement this Jordanian reform programme.

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Language and Literature All Jordanians, regardless of ethnicity or religion, speak Arabic, the official language of Jordan. Throughout the Arab world, the language exists in three forms: the classical Arabic of the Quran, the literary language developed from the classical and known as Modern Standard Arabic, and the local form of the spoken language. Modern Standard Arabic has virtually the same structure wherever it is used, although its pronunciation and lexicon may vary locally. Educated Arabs tend to know two forms of Arabic-Modern Standard Arabic and their own dialect of spoken Arabic. Even uneducated Arabic speakers usually can comprehend the general meaning of something said in Modern Standard Arabic although they cannot speak it themselves and often have difficulty understanding specific expressions. Classical Arabic is known chiefly to scholars; many people have memorised Quranic phrases by rote but cannot speak the classic form. Dialects of spoken Arabic vary greatly throughout the Arab world. Most Jordanians speak a dialect common to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and parts of Iraq and, like people speaking other dialects, they proudly regard theirs as the best. (Small numbers of nomads traversing Jordan from Saudi Arabia may speak a dialect akin to one used in that country.) Few people believe that their dialect is actually good Arabic in the sense of conforming to the ideal. Although they converse in colloquial Arabic, they generally agree that the written form of Modern Standard Arabic is superior to the spoken form

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because it is closer to the perfection of the Quranic language. Arabs generally believe that the speech of the Bedouins resembles the purer classical form most closely and that the local dialects used by the settled villagers and townspeople are unfortunate corruptions. . Within a given region, slight differences in speech distinguish a city dweller from a villager and more significant ones distinguish either of these from a nomad. Even within the villages, various quarters often display unique pronunciations, idioms, and vocabulary specialised to particular lifestyles. Grammatical structure may differ as well. Arabic is a Semitic language related to Aramaic, Hebrew, various Ethiopic languages, and others. Rich in synonyms, rhythmic, highly expressive and poetic, Arabic can have a strong emotional effect on its speakers and listeners. As the language of the Quran, believed by Muslims to be the literal word of God, it has been the vehicle for recounting of the historic glories of Islamic civilization. Arabic speakers are more emotionally attached to their language than are most peoples to their native tongues. Poetic eloquence was one of the most admired cultural attainments and signs of cultivation in the Arab world; among rural people, sedentary and nomadic, as well as among literate city dwellers, Arabic speakers long have striven to display an extensive command of traditional.phrases and locations. Beauty of expression was highly valued, and the speaker and writer traditionally sought an elaboration and circumlocution in both spoken and written forms that Westerners might find flowery or verbose. The Department traces its beginnings to 1962, the year in which the University of Jordan was established. The first department to be established, the Department of Arabic Language and Literature has also been the first department of the University of Jordan to offer a Ph.D Programme. Its staff includes professors Emeritus, former heads of departments and deans as well as competent associate and assistant professors. Indeed, a good number of its members (three in all) have made it to the top, becoming presidents of the University and others head high-ranking institutions in the country. It also has a few M.A. and Ph.D students studying abroad. All staff members are highly qualified, holding their Ph.D degrees from Arab, European and American universities, thus achieving a great degree of diversity and integration. The current number of staff

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is 30 from different ranks. The Department is also endeavouring to update its programmes in the fields of linguistics, literature, and rhetoric and to keep abreast with recent developments in the Arab world and abroad. In addition, it has followed a steady policy of recruiting the most distinguished academics and of participating in local, regional, and international conferences. The total number of students has risen to more than 800 students after the university introduced the evening programme as well as the follow-up programme and the International programme. It has also, among other groups, organised three exhibitions for the Arabic Papyri. The first at Jordan University, the second at Yarmouk University, and the third at King Faisal centre for Research and Islamic Studies in Saudi Arabia. The Department organises a biannual conference on one of the core-issues related to Arabic Linguistics and Literature.

Arabic Language The Arabic language, is the largest member of the Semitic branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family (classification: South Central Semitic) and is closely related to Hebrew and Aramaic. It is spoken throughout the Arab world and is widely studied and known throughout the Islamic world. Arabic has been a literary language since at least the 6th century and is the liturgical language of Islam. Quite a few English words are ultimately derived from Arabic, often through other European languages, especially Spanish, among them everyday vocabulary like "sugar" (sukkar) , "cotton" (qumkn) or "magazine" (maozin). More recognisable are words like "algebra", "alcohol" and "zenith". The term ''Arabic'' may refer either to literary Arabic or Modern Standard Arabic or to the many localised varieties of Arabic commonly called "colloquial Arabic." Arabs consider literary Arabic as the standard language and tend to view everything else as mere dialects. Literary Arabic, refers both to the language of present-day media across North Africa and the Middle East and to the more articulate language of the Quran. (The expression media here includes most television and radio, and all written matter, including all books, newspapers, magazines, documents of every kind, and reading primers for small children.)

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"Colloquial" or "dialectal" Arabic refers to the many national or regional varieties derived from Classical Arabic, spoken daily across North Africa and the Middle East, which constitute the everyday spoken language. These sometimes differ enough to be mutually incomprehensible. These dialects are not typically written, although a certain amount of literature (particularly plays and poetry) exists in many of them. They are often used to varying degrees in informal spoken media, such as soap operas and talk shows. Literary Arabic or classical Arabic is the official language of all Arab countries and is the only form of Arabic taught in schools at all stages. The sociolinguistic situation of Arabic in modern times provides a prime example of the linguistic phenomenon of diglossia-the normal use of two separate varieties of the same language, usually in different social situations. In the case of Arabic, educated Arabs of any nationality can be assumed to speak both their local dialect and their schooltaught literary Arabic (to an equal or lesser degree). This diglossic situation facilitates code switching in which a speaker switches back and forth unaware between the two varieties of the language, sometimes even within the same sentence. In instances in which Arabs of different nationalities engage in conversation only to find their dialects mutually unintelligible (e.g. a Moroccan speaking with a Lebanese), both should be able to code switch into Literary Arabic for the sake of communication. Since the written Arabic of today differs from the written Arabic of the Quranic era, it has become customary in western scholarship and among non-Arab scholars of Arabic to refer to the language of the Quran as Classical Arabic and the modern language of the media and of formal speech as Modern Standard Arabic. Arabs, on the other hand, often use the term fuc to refer to both forms, thus placing greater emphasis on the similarities between the two. The difference between Arabic of the Quranic era and today's Classical Arabic is only in the degree of eloquence. The vocabulary and syntactic and grammatical rules are the same. It is sometimes difficult to translate Islamic concepts, and concepts specific to Arab culture, without using the original Arabic terminology. The Quran is expressed in Arabic and traditionally Muslims deem it impossible to translate in a way that would adequately reflect its exact menning--indeed, until recently. some schools of thought maintained

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that it should not be translated at all. A list of Islamic terms in Arabic covers those terms which are too specific to translate in one phrase. While Arabic is strongly associated with Islam (and is the language of salah), it is also spoken by Arab Christians, Oriental (Mizraoi) Jews, and smaller sects such as Iraqi Mandaeans. Even so, a majority of the world's Muslims do not actually speak Arabic, but only know some fixed phrases of the language, such as those they use in Islamic prayer. However, to counteract this trend, non-Arabic-speaking Muslims are strongly encouraged to learn the language.

Arabic Literature Arabic literature is the writing produced, both prose and poetry, by speakers of the Arabic language. It does not usually include works written using the Arabic alphabet but not in the Arabic language such as Persian literature and Urdu literature. The Arabic word used for literature is adab which is derived from a word meaning "to invite someone for a meal" and implies politeness, culture and enrichment. Arabic literature emerged in the 6th century with only fragments of the written language appearing before then. It was the Quran in the 7th century which would have the greatest lasting effect on Arabic culture and its literature. The period before the writing of the Quran and the rise of Islam is known to Muslims as Jahiliyyah or period of ignorance. Whilst this ignorance refers mainly to religious ignorance there is little written literature before this time, although a significant oral tradition is postulated. The final decades of the late 6th century though begins to show the flowering of a lively written tradition. This tradition was captured over two centuries late with two important compilations of these poets: the Muallaqat and the Mufaddaliyat. These collections probably give us a biased picture of the writings of the time as only those poems regarded amongst the best are preserved and some of the poems may represent only the best part of a long poem. The Quran had a significant influence of the Arab language. The language used in the Quran is called classical Arabic and while modern Arabic has diverged slightly, the classical is still the style to be admired. Not only is the Quran the first work of any significant length written in the language it also has a far more complicated structure than the earlier literary works with its 114 suras (chapters)

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which contain more than six thousand ayat (verses). It contains injunctions, narratives, homilies, parables, direct addresses from God, instructions and even comments on itself on how it will be received and understood. It is also, paradoxically, admired for its layers of metaphor as well as its clarity, a feature it mentions itself in sura 16:103. Although it contains elements of both prose and poetry, and therefore is closest to saj' or rhymed prose, the Quran is regarded as entirely apart from these classifications. The text is believed to be divine revelation and is seen as being eternal or 'uncreated'. This leads to the doctrine of ijaz or inimitability of the Quran which implies that nobody can copy the work's style nor should anybody try. This doctrine of ijaz possibly had a slight limiting effect on Arabic literature; proscribing exactly what could be written. This may have exerted dominance over the pre-Islamic poets of the 6th century whose popularity may have vied with the Quran amongst the people. There were a marked lack of significant poets until the 8th century. One notable exception was Hassan ibn Thabit who wrote poems in praise 'Of Muhammad (Pbuh) and was known as the "prophet's poet". Just as the Bible has held an important place in the literature of other languages, The Quran is important to Arabic. It is the source of many ideas, allusions and quotes and its moral message informs many works. Aside from the Quran the hadith or tradition of what Muhammad (Pbuh) is supposed to have said and done are important literature. The entire body of these acts and words are called sunnah or way and the ones regarded as sahih or genuine of them are collected into hadith. Some of the most significant collections of hadith include those by Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj and Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari. The other important genre of work in Quranic study is the ta/sir or commentaries on the Quran. Arab writings relating to religion also includes many sermons and devotional pieces as well as the sayings of Ali which were collected in the 10th century as Nahj-ul-Balaghah or The Road to Eloquence. The research into the life and times of Muhammad (Pbuh), and determining the genuine parts of the sunnah, was an important early reason for scholarship in or about the Arabic language. It was also the reason for the collecting of pre-Islamic poetry; as some of these

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poets were close to the prophet-Labid actually meeting Muhammad (Pbuh) and converting to Islam-and their writings illuminated the times when these event occurred. Muhammad also inspired the first Arabic biographies, known as Al-sirah al-nabawiyyah, the earliest was by Wahb ibn Munabbah but Muhammad ibn Ishaq wrote the best known. Whilst covering the life of the Prophet they also told of the battles and events of early Islam and have numerous digressions on older Biblical traditions. Some of the earliest work studying the Arabic language was started in the name of Islam. Tradition has it that the Caliph Ali, after reading a Quran with errors in it, asked Abu al-aswad al-Duali to write a work codifying Arabic grammar. Khalil ibn Ahmad would later write Kitab al-Ayn, the first dictionary of Arabic, along with works on prosody and music, and his pupil Sibawayh would produce the most respected work of Arabic grammar known simply as Al-Kitab or The Book. Other Caliphs exerted their influence on Arabic with 'Abd-ul-Malik making it the official language for administration of the new empire, and AI-Mamun setting up Bayt-ul-Hikma or The House of Wisdom in Baghdad for research and translations. Basrah and Kufah were to other important seats of learning in the early Arab world, between which there was a strong rivalry. The institutions set up mainly to investigate more fully the Islamic religion were invaluable in studying many other subjects. Caliph Hisham ibn Abd-ul-Malik was instrumental in enriching the literature by instructing scholars to translate works into Arabic. The first was probably Aristotle's correspondence with Alexander the Great translated by Salm Abu ai-Ala. From the east, and in a very different literary genre, Abdullah ibn al-Muqaffa translated the animal fables of the Panchatantra. These translations would keep alive scholarship and learning, particularly that of ancient Greece, during the dark ages in Europe and the works would often be first reintroduced to Europe from the Arabic versions. Modern Literature

A revival took place in Arabic literature during the 19th century along with much of Arabic culture and it is referred to in Arabic as Al-Nahda, or Renaissance. This resurgence of writing in Arabic was confined mainly to Egypt until the 20th century when it spread to other countries in the region. This Renaissance was not only felt

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within the Arab world but also beyond with a great interest in the translating of Arabic works into European languages. Although the use of the Arabic language was revived, many of the tropes of the previous literature which served to make it so ornate and complicated were dropped. Also the western forms of the short story and the novel were preferred over the traditional Arabic forms. Just as in the 8th century when a movement to translate ancient Greek and other literature helped vitalise Arabic literature, another translation movement would offer new ideas and material for Arabic. An early popular success was The Count of Monte Cristo which spurred a host of historical novels on Arabic subjects. Two important translators were Rifaah al-Tahtawi and Jabra Ibrahim Jabra. Major political change in the region during the mid-20th century has caused problems for writers. Many have suffered censorship and some such as Sunallah Ibrahim and Abdul Rahman Munif have been imprisoned. At the same time, others who have written works supporting or praiseworthy of governments have been promoted to positions of authority within cultural bodies. Non-fiction writers and academics have also produced political polemics and criticisms aiming to reshape Arabic politics. Some of the best known are Taha Hussain's The Future of Culture in Egypt which was an important work of Egyptian nationalism and the works of Nawal al-Saadawi who campaigns for women's rights. Non-fiction

In the late 9th century Ibn al-Nadim, a Baghdadi bookseller, compiled a crucial work in the study of Arabic literature. Kitab al-Fihrist is a catalogue of all books available for sale in Baghdad and it gives a fascinating overview of the state of the literature at that time. One of the most common forms of literature during the Abbasid period was the compilation. These were collections of facts, ideas, instructive stories and poems on a single topic and covers subjects as diverse as house and garden, women, gate-crashers, blind people, envy, animals and misers. These last three compilations were written by AI-Jahiz the acknowledged master of the form. These collections were important for any nadim, a companion to a ruler or noble whose role was often involved regaling the ruler with stories and information to entertain or advise.

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A type of work closely allied to the collection was the manual in which writers like ibn Qutaybah offered instruction in subjects like etiquette, how to rule, how to be a bureaucrat and even how to write. Ibn Qutaybah also wrote one of the earliest histories of the Arabs, drawing together Biblical stories, Arabic folk tales and more historical events. The subject of sex was frequently investigated in Arabic literature. The ghazal or love poem had a long history being at times tender and chaste and at other times rather explicit. In the Sufi tradition the love poem would take on a wider, mystical and religious importance. Sex manuals were also written such as The Perfumed Garden, Tawq al-hamamah or The Dove's Neckring by ibn Hazm and Nuzhat-ulalbab /i-ma la yujad fi kitab or Delight of Hearts Concerning What will Never Be Found in a Book by Ahmad al-Tifashi. Countering such works are one like Rawdatt-ul-muhibbin wa-nuzhat-ul-mushtaqin or Meadow of Lovers and Diversion of the Infatuated by ibn Qayyim a1-Jawziyyah who advises on how to separate love and lust and avoid sin. Aside from the early biographies of Muhammad (Pbuh), the first major biographer to weigh character rather than just producing a hymn of praise was AI-Baladhuri with his Kitab ansab al-ashraf or Book of the Genealogies of the Noble, a collection of biographies. Another important biographical dictionary was begun by ibn Khalqan and expanded by AI-Safadi and one of the first significant autobiographies was Kitab al-Itibar which told of Usama ibn Munqidh and his experiences in fighting in the Crusades. Ibn Khurradadhbih, apparently an official in the postal service wrote one of the first travel books and the form remained a popular one in Arabic literature with books by Ibn Hawqal, Ibn Fadlan, AI-Istakhri, AI-Muqaddasi, AI-Idrisi and most famously the travels of Ibn Batutah. These give a fascinating view of the many cultures of the wider Islamic world and also offer Muslim perspectives on the non-Muslim peoples on the edges of the empire. They also indicated just how great a trading power the Muslim peoples had become. These were often sprawling accounts that included details of both geography and history. Some writers concentrated solely on history like AI-Yaqubi and AI-Tabari, whilst others focused on a small portion of history such as Ibn al-Azraq, with a history of Mecca, and ibn Abi Tahir Tayfur, writing a history I)f Baghdad. The historian regarded as the greatest

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of all Arabic historians though is Ibn Khaldun whose history Muqaddimah focuses on society and is a founding text in sociology and economics.

Fiction There is comparatively little fictional prose in Arabic literature, although many non-fiction works contained short stories a large proportion of which were probably made up or embellished. The lack of wholly fictional works is in part due to a distinction between a-fusha or quality language and Al-ammiyyah or the language of the common people. Few writers would bother to write works in this Al-ammiyyah or common language and it was felt that literature had to be improving, educational and with purpose rather the just entertainment. This did not stop the common role of the hakawati or storyteller who would retell the entertaining parts of more educational works or one of the many Arabic fables or folk-tales which were not usually written down. The one significant exception to the lack of fiction is the Thousand and One Nights, easily the best known of all Arabic literature and which still effects many of the ideas non-Arabs have about Arabic culture. Although regarded as primarily Arabic it was in fact developed from a Persian work and the stories in turn may have their roots in India. A good example of the lack of popular Arabic prose fiction is that the stories of Ala-ud-Din and Ali Saba, usually regarded as part of the Tales from One Thousand and One Nights, were not actually part of the Tales. They were first included in French translation of the Tales by Antoine Galland who heard them being told by a traditional storyteller and only existed in incomplete Arabic manuscripts before that. The other great character from Arabic literature Sinbad is from the Tales. The Thousand and One Nights is usually placed in the genre of Arabic epic literature along with several other works. They are usually, like the Tales, collections of short stories or episodes strung together into a long tale. The extant versions are mostly written down relatively late, after the 14th century, although many are undoubtedly collected earlier and many of the original stories are probably pre-Islamic. Types of stories in these collections included animal fables, proverbs, stories of jihad or propagation of the faith, humorous tales, moral

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tales, tales about the wily con-man Ali Zaybaq and tales about the prankster Juha. Modem Novels: Characteristic of the nahda period of revival were two distinct trends. The Neo-Classical movement sought to rediscover the literary traditions of the past, and was influenced by traditional literary genres such as the maqama and the Thousand and One Nights. In contrast, the Modernist movement began by translating Western works, primarily novels, into Arabic. Individual authors in Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt created original works by imitating the classical maqama. The most prominent of these was Al-Muwaylihi, whose book, The Hadith of Isa ibn Hisham, critiqued Egyptian society in the period of Ismail. This work constitutes the first stage in the development of the modern Arabic novel. This trend was furthered by Georgy Zeidan, a Lebanese Christian writer who immigrated with his family to Egypt following the Damascus riots of 1860. In the early twentieth century, Zeidan serialised his historical novels in the Egyptian newspaper AI-Hilal. These novels were extremely popular because of their clarity of language, simple structure, and the author's vivid imagination. Two other important writers from this period were Khalil Gibran and Mikhail Naima, both of whom incorporated philosophical musings into their works. Nevertheless, literary critics do not consider the works of these four authors to be true novels, but rather indications of the form that the modern novel would assume. Many of these critics point to Zainab, a novel by Muhammad Hussain Haykal as the first true Arabic-language novel, while others point to Adraa Denshawi by Muhammad Tahir Haqqi as the first true novel. A common theme in the modern Arabic novel are studies of family life with obvious resonances with the wider family of the Arabic world. Najib Mahfuz on the other hand depicts life inside a modern Arabic city, in this case Cairo and his works won him a Nobel prize for literature in 1988. Many of the novels have been unable to avoid the politics and conflicts of the region with war often acting as background to small scale family dramas.

Modern Poetry The revival of Arabic poetry in the late 19th, early 20th century first displayed a neo-classical style. It consciously used the themes

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and forms of some of the earliest poets with Hafiz Ibrahim being one of the best exponents. Later poets would reject the purely Arabic neoclassical style and instead many would seek inspiration from romanticism and particularly the romanticism of English poetry. Poets such as Said 'Aql from Lebanon, with its closer ties to France, would be more influenced by the symbolist movement. A common theme in much of the new poetry was the use of the ghazal or love song in praise of the poet's homeland. This is manifested either as a nationalism for the newly emerging nation states of the region or in a wider sense as an Arab nationalism emphasising the unity of all Arab people. The poems of praise or the madah, and the hija or lampoon also returned. Ahmad Shawqi produced several works praising the reforming Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk, but when Ataturk abolished the Caliphate Shawqi was not slow in attacking him in verse. Political views in poetry were often more unwelcome in the 20th century than they had been in the 7th and several poets faced censorship or, in the case of Abd-ul-Wahab al-Bayyati, exile. After World War II there was a largely unsuccessful movement by several poets to write poems in shir hurr or free verse. Most of these experiments were abandoned in favour of prose poetry. The growth of modernist poetry also influenced poetry in Arabic.

Arabic Poetry A large proportion of Arabic literature before the 20th century is in the form of poetry, and even that which is not is either filled with snippets of poetry or is in the forf!l of saj or rhymed prose. The themes of the poetry range from high-flown hymns of praise to bitter personal attacks and from religious and mystical ideas to poems on sex and wine. An important feature of the poetry which would be applied to all of the literature was the idea that it must be pleasing to the ear. The poetry and much of the prose was written with the design that it would be spoken aloud and great care was taken to make all writing as mellifluous as possible. Indeed saj originally meant the cooing of a dove. Arabic poetry is poetry composed and written down in the Arabic language either by Arab people or non-Arabs. Knowledge of poetry in Arabic dates from the 6th century but oral poetry is believed to

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predate that. The amount of Arabic poetry composed has, at times, been greatly reduced with Persian poetry and Poetry of the Ottoman Empire becoming dominant in the region. While there has been a resurgence of the language for literature, particularly in the 20th century, the poets are usually classified into separate national literatures as their work is often written in a local dialect of Arabic.

Pre-Islamic Poetry The earliest works of Arabic literature are poems, with prose only used later. The distinction between the forms is particularly blurred in Arabic with saj, maqama or rhymed prose being frequently employed. Poetry held an important position in pre-Islamic society with the poet or shair filling the role of historian, soothsayer and propagandist, similar to the Sibyl in ancient Greek society. Words in praise of the tribe or qitah and lampoons denigrating other tribes hija' seem to have been some of the most popular forms of the early poetry. The shair represented an individual tribe's prestige and importance in the Arabian peninsula and mock battles in poetry or zajal would stand in lieu of real wars. 'Ukaz, a market town not far from Mecca, would play host to a regular poetry festival where the craft of the shairs would be exhibited. Along side the shair, and often as his poetic apprentice, is the rawi or reciter. The job of the rawi was to learn the poems by heart and to recite them with explanations and probably often with embellishments. This tradition would allow the transmission of these poetic works and the practice would be adopted later by the haJiz for their memorisation of the Quran. At some periods there have been unbroken chains of illustrious poets, each one training a rawi as a bard to promote his verse and then to take over from them and continue the poetic tradition. Tufayl trained 'Awas ibn Hajar, 'Awas trained Zuhayr ibn Abi Sulma, Zuhayr trained his son Kab bin Zuhayr, Kab trained Al-Hutayah, Al-Hutayah trained Jamil Buthaynah and Jamil trained Kuthayyir 'Azzah. Singers who simply performed works included performed Ibrahim al-Mawsili, his son Ishaq al-Mawsili and Ibrahim ibn al-Mahdi son of Caliph al-Mahdi. Many stories about these early singers were retold in the Kitab al-aghani or Book oj Songs by Abul-faraj al-Isfahani. Some poets, such as Taabbata Sharran, Al-Shanfara, 'Urwah ibn

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ai-Ward, were known as suluk or vagabond poets, much of whose works consisted of attacks on tribal life and praise of solitude. These works were designed to be ironic, criticising all that the Arabs held most dear in their tribal lifestyles in order to sing their praises. While such poets were identified closely with their own tribes others, such as AI-Asha, were known for their wanderings in search of work from whoever needed poetry. The very best of these early poems were collected in the 8th century as the Muallaqat meaning "the Hanged poems" and the Mu/adda/iyat meaning AI-Mufaddal's examination or anthology. The former is named the hanged poems for being hung up on the Kaaba. It also aimed to be the definitive source of the era's output with only a single example of the work of each of the so-called "seven renowned ones", although different versions differ in which "renowned ones" they choose. The Mu/addaliyat on the other hand contains rather a random collection; apparently all that was remembered and perhaps some that was only produced in the 8th century and was not truly pre-Islamic.

Poetic Forms Poetry in Arabic is traditionally grouped in a diwan or collection of poems. These can be arranged by poet, tribe, topic or the name of the compiler such as the Asmaiyyat of AI-Asmai. Most poems did not have titles and they were usually named from their first lines. Sometimes they were arranged alphabetically by their rhymes. The role of the poet in Arabic developed in a similar way to poets elsewhere. The safe and easy patronage in royal courts was no longer available but a successful poet such as Nizar Qabbani was able to set up his own publishing house. A large proportion of all Arabic poetry is written using the monorhyme. This is simply the same rhyme used on every line of a poem. While this may seem a poor rhyme scheme for people used to English literature it makes sense in a language like Arabic which has only three vowels which can be either long or short. Court Poets Ghaylan ibn 'Uqbah (c. 696 - c. 735), nicknamed Dhu al-Rummah, is usually regarded as the last of the Bedouin poets. His works had continued the themes and style of the pre-Islamic poets particularly

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eulogising the harsh but simple desert life, traditionally told round a campfire. Although such themes continued-and were returned to by many modern, urban poets-this poetic life was giving way to court poets. The more settled, comfortable and luxurious life in Umayyad courts led to a greater emphasis on the ghazal or love poem. Chief amongst this new breed of poet was Abu Nuwas. Not only did Abu Nuwas spoof the traditional poetic form of the qasidah and write many poems in praise of wine, his main occupation was the writing of ever more ribald ghazal many of them openly homosexual. While Nuwas produced risque but beautiful poems, many of which pushed to the limit what was acceptable under Islam, others produced more religiously themed poetry. It is said that Nuwas struck a bargain with his contemporary Abu al-Alahijah: Abu Nuwas would concentrate on wine and love poems whilst Al-Alahijah would write homilies. These homilies expressed views on religion, sin and the afterlife, but occasionally strayed into unorthodox territory. While the work of Al-Alahijah was acceptable, others like the poet Salih ibn 'Abd-ul-Quddus were executed for heresy. Waddah al-Yaman was also executed for his verse but this was probably due to his over familiarity with the wife of the Caliph al-Walid I. The Sufi tradition would also produce poetry closely linked to religion. Sufism is the mystical offshoot of Islam and it emphasised the allegorical nature of language and writing. Many of their works appear to be simple ghazal or khamriyyah. Under the guise of the love or wine poem they would contemplate the mortal flesh and attempt to achieve transcendence. Rabiah al-Adawiyyah, Abd Yazid al-Bistami and Mansur al-Hallaj are some of the most significant Sufi poets, but their poetry and doctrine were dangerous and al-Hallaj was eventually crucified for heresy. The Caliph himself could take on the role of court poet with Al-Walid II a notable example, but he was widely disliked for his immorality and was deposed after only a year. An important doctrine of Arabic poetry from the start was its complexity but during the period of court poetry this became an art form in itself known as badi. There were feature such as metaphor, paronomasia (basically puns), juxtaposing opposites and tricky

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theological allusions. Bashshar ibn Burd was instrumental in developing these complexities which later poets felt they had to surpass. Although not all writers enjoyed the baroque style, with argumentative letters on the matter being sent by Ibn Burd and Ibn Miskawayh, the poetic brinkmanship of badi led to a certain formality in the poetic art, with only the greatest poet's words shining through the complex structures and wordplay. This often makes Arabic poetry even less easy to translate then poetry from other languages and much of a poet's skill is usually hidden. Arabic poetry declined after the 13th century along with much of the literature due to the rise of Persian literature and Turkish literature. It flowered for little longer in Andalucia (Islamic Spain) but ended with the expulsion of the Arabs in 1492. The corpus suffered large-scale destruction by fire in 1499 or 1500. It was at the orders of Cisneros, Archbishop of Granada and was apparently due to the 'indecent' nature of a large part of the poetry, though Cisneros conceived of Islam as constituting a state within a state: inspite of this, however, it continued to exert a subtle, almost underground influence, as evidenced by the love poetry of Sebastiano de Cordoba, whose eroticism was re-inverted for a spiritual purpose by the Christian mystic poets Saint John of The Cross and Saint Teresa of Avila.

Plays Theatre and drama has only been a visible part of Arabic literature in the modern era. There may have been a much longer theatrical tradition but it was probably not regarded as legitimate literature and mostly went unrecorded. There is an ancient tradition of public performance amongst Shii Muslims of a play depicting the life and death of AI-Hussain at the battle of Karbala in 680 CEo There are also several plays composed by Shams-ud-din Muhammad ibn Daniyal in the 13th century when he mentions that older plays are getting stale and offers his new works as fresh material. Drama began to be written in the 19th century chiefly in Egypt and mainly influenced and in imitation of French works. It was not until the 20th century that it began to develop a distinctly Arab flavour and be seen elsewhere. The most important Arab playwright was Tawfiq ai-Hakim whose first play was a retelling of the Quranic story of the Seven sleepers and the second an epilogue for the

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Thousand and One Nights. Other important dramatists of the region include Yusuf ai-Ani of Iraq and Sadallah Wannus of Syria.

Criticism Criticism has been inherent in Arabic literature from the start. The poetry festivals of the pre-Islamic period often pitched two poets against each other in a war of verse in which one would be deemed to have won by the audience. The subject adopted a more official status Islamic study of the Quran. Although nothing as crass as literary criticism could be applied to a work which was ijaz or inimitable and diVinely inspired, analysis was permitted. This study allowed for better understanding of the message and facilitated interpretation for practical use, all of which help the development of a critical method important for later work on other literature. A clear distinction regularly drawn between works in literary language and popular works has meant that only part of the literature in Arabic was usually considered worthy of study and criticism. Some of the first studies of the poetry are Qawaid-ul-shir or The Rules of Poetry by Thalab and Naqd al-shir Poetic Criticism by Qudamah ibn Jafar. Other works tended to continue the tradition of contrasting two poets in order to determine which one best follows the rule of classical poetic structure. Plagiarism also became a significant idea exercising the critics' concerns. The works of AI-Mutanabbi were particularly studied with this concern. He was considered by many the greatest of all Arab poets but his own arrogant self-regard for his abilities did not endear him to other writers and they looked for a source for his verse. Just as there were collections of facts written about many different subjects, numerous collections detailing every possible rhetorical figure used in literature emerged as well as how to write guides. Modern criticism at first compared the new works unfavourably with the classical ideals of the past but these standards were soon rejected as too artificial. The adoption of the forms of European romantic poetry dictated the introduction of corresponding critical standards.

Women's Contribution Whilst not playing a major part in Arabic literature women have had a continuing role. The earliest poetesses were AI-Khansa and

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Layla a1-Akhyaliyyah of the 7th century. Their concentration on the ritha' or elegy suggests that this was a form designated for women to work in. A later poetess Walladah, Umawi princess of AI-Andulus wrote Sufi poetry and was the lover of fellow poet ibn Zaidun. These and other minor women writers suggest a hidden world of female literature. Women still played an important part as characters in Arabic literature with Sirah al-amirah Dhat al-Himmah an Arabic epic with a female warrior as the chief protagonist and Shahrazad cunningly telling stories in the Thousand and One Nights to save her life. Modern Arabic literature has allowed a greater number of female writers' Like Suhayr al-Qalamawi, Ulfat Idlibi, Layla Baalbakki and Alifa Rifaat are just some of the novelists and short story writers. There has also be a number of significant female academics such as Zaynab a1-Ghazali, Nawal a1-Saadawi and Fatima a1-Mamisi who amongst other subject wrote of the place of women in Muslim society. Women writers also courted controversy with Layla Baalbakki charged with insulting public decency with her short story Spaceships of Tenderness to the Moon.

Outside Views Literature in Arabic has been largely unknown outside the Islamic world. Arabic has frequently acted as a time capsule, preserving literature form ancient civilizations to be rediscovered in Renaissance Europe and as a conduit for transmitting literature from distant regions. In this role though it is rarely read but simply re-translated into another standard language like Latin. One of the first important translations of Arabic literature was Robert of Ketton's translation of the Quran in the 12th century but it would not be until the early 18th century that much of Arabic's diverse literature would be recognised. Antoine Galland's translation of the Thousand and One Nights was the first major work in Arabic which found great success outside the Muslim world. Other significant translators were Friedrich Ruckert and Richard Burton, along with many working at Fort William, India. The Arabic works and many more in other eastern languages fuelled a fascination in Orientalism within Europe. Works of dubious 'foreign' morals were particularly popular but even these were censored for content, such as homosexual references,

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which were not permitted in Victorian society. Most of the works chosen for translation often helped confirm the stereotypes of the audiences with many more still untranslated. Nor are few modern Arabic works translated into other languages.

Decline of Literature The expansion of the Arab people in the 7th and 8th century brought them into contact with a variety of different peoples who would affect their culture. Most significantly for literature was the ancient civilization of Persia. Persia still liked to think of itself as the epitome of culture despite its decline in importance over many centuries. Shuubiyya is the name of the conflict between the harsh, rural, desert life of the Arabs and the easier, more refined world in Persia. Although producing heated debate amongst scholars and varying styles of literature, this was not a damaging conflict and had more to do with forging a single Islamic cultural identity. Bashshar ibn Burd, of Persian heritage, summed up his own stance in a few lines of poetry: Never did he sing camel songs behind a scabby beast, nor pierce the bitter colocynth out of sheer hunger nor dig a lizard out of the ground and eat it... The cultural heritage of the desert dwelling Arabs continued to show its influence even though many scholars and writers were living in the large Arab cities. When Khalil ibn Ahmad enumerated the parts of poetry he called the line of verse a bayt or tent and sabah or tentrope for a foot. Even during the 20th century this nostalgia for the simple desert life would appear or at least be consciously revived. A slow resurgence of the Persian language and a relocation of the government and main seat of learning to Baghdad, reduced the production of Arabic literature. Many Arabic themes and styles were taken up in Persian with Omar Khayyam, Attar and Rumi all clearly influenced by the earlier work. The Arabic language is still retained its importance in politics and administration as well as in religion but the rise of the Ottoman Empire would confine it solely to religion. The many variants of the Turkic languages would dominate the literature of the region until the 20th century whilst still showing Arabic and Persian influences.

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Media In 1989 Jordan had four daily newspapers, all published in Amman. One, The Jordan Times, was printed in English. The three Arabic dailies were Sawt ash Shab (Voice of the People), Ar Rai (Opinion), and Ad Dustur (The Constitution). The press was mostly privately owned and subject to censorship. The Arabic-language papers had been suspended at various times throughout the 1980s for publishing articles that the government considered objectionable. In 1988, the government ordered the dissolution of the board of directors of all three Arabic papers. The Ministry of Culture and Information was responsible for most press censorship on a daily basis and frequently provided editors with guidance on how to report on sensitive foreign policy and security matters. In practice, editors generally exercised self-censorship to minimise conflicts with the authorities. The government also tried to control individual journalists by rewarding those deemed cooperative and by punishing those whose stories it considered critical. The most common punishment was the withdrawal of government-issued press credentials, which all writers were required to have in order to work for a newspaper or news agency. This procedure was used to prevent several journalists (including a principal writer for The Jordan Times) from publishing during 1987 and 1988. Journalists also have been subjected to house arrest. In June 1987, the government dissolved the Writers' Association, a professional organisation of journalists, charging that it had become a political group and had contacts with illegal parties. The Ministry of Culture and Information subsequently sponsored an official union, the Journalists' Association, and required all writers to join it. The government attempted to discourage the Arabic press of East Jerusalem from publishing critical stories, especially about Hussain's relations with the PLO, by such means as banning single issues of papers and magazines, refusing to renew the passports of West Bank journalists, and sending messages through discreet channels that certain writers or editors would be arrested if they entered Jordan. Foreign publications and journalists also were banned when their articles criticised Jordan.

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In 1986, Western correspondents expressed concern about the government's interference with press freedom during and after the disturbances at Yarmuk University. In 1988, the government expelled an American correspondent for National Broadcasting Company (NBC) because he had reported on political repression in Jordan. The government operated an official news agency known as PETRA. Several international news services maintained offices in Amman, including Agencey France-Presse, Asso~iated Press, Reuters, and TASS. Radio and television broadcasting were controlled by the government. Jordan Radio and Television had twenty hours of Arabic radio programmes daily, and fifteen hours in English. There were an estimated 550,000 privately owned radio receivers in 1985. Jordan Radio and Television also broadcast ninety hours weekly of television programmes in Arabic and English. In 1985, there were an estimated 280,000 television sets in the country. Both radio and television accepted advertisements.

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11 Economy Jordan is a small country with limited natural resources. Just over 10 per cent of its land is arable, and even that is subject to the vagaries of a limited water supply. Rainfall is low and highly variable, and much of Jordan's available ground water is not renewable. Jordan's economic resource base centres on phosphates, potash, and their fertilizer derivatives; tourism; overseas remittances; and foreign aid. These are its principal sources of hard currency earnings. Lacking forests, coal reserves, hydroelectric power, or commercially viable oil deposits, Jordan relies on natural gas for 10 per cent of its domestic energy needs. Jordan depends on Iraq for most of its oil. Although the popUlation is highly educated, its high growth rate (3.4 per cent) and relative youth (more than 50 per cent of Jordanians are under 16) make it difficult for the economy to generate jobs and sustain living standards. Jordan's distance from other markets makes its exports less competitive outside the region, and political disputes among its traditional trading partners-Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states-frequently restrict regional trade and development. King Abdullah has encouraged his government to liberalise the economy, improve economic ties in the region, and seek opportunities in the global information economy. Since 1987, Jordan has struggled with a substantial debt burden, lower per capita income, and rising unemployment. In 1989, efforts to increase revenues by raising prices of certain commodities and utilities triggered riots in the south. The mood of political discontent

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that swept the country in the wake of the riots helped set the stage for Jordan's moves towards democratisation. Jordan also suffered adverse economic consequences from the 1990-91 Gulf War. While tourist trade plummeted, the Gulf states' decision to limit economic ties with Jordan deprived it of worker remittances, traditional export markets, a secure supply of oil, and substantial foreign aid revenues. UN sanctions against Iraq-Jordan's largest pre-war trading partner-caused further hardships, including higher shipping costs due to inspections of cargo shipments entering the Gulf of Aqaba. Finally, absorbing up to 300,000 returnees from the Gulf countries exacerbated unemployment and strained the government's ability to provide essential services. Since 1995, economic growth has been low. Real GDP has grown at only about 1.5 per cent annually, while the official unemployment has hovered at 14 per cent (unofficial estimates are double this number). The budget deficit and public debt have remained high, yet during this period inflation has remained low, and exports of manufactured goods have risen at an annual rate of 9 per cent. Monetary stability has been reinforced, even when tensions were renewed in the region during 1998, and during the illness and ultimate death of King Hussain in 1999. Expectations of increased trade and tourism as a consequence of Jordan's peace treaty with Israel have been disappointing. Securityrelated restrictions to trade with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have led to a substantial decline in Jordan's exports there. Following his ascension, King Abdullah improved relations with Arabic states of the Persian Gulf and Syria, but this brought few real economic benefits. Most recently the Jordanians have focused on WTO membership and a Free Trade Agreement with the US as means to encourage export-led growth. Jordan, a small nation with a small population and sparse natural resources, has long been known by its Arab neighbours as their "poor cousin." In the late 1980s, Jordan was compelled to import not only many capital and consumer goods but also such vital commodities as fuel and food. Officials even discussed the possibility of importing water. Nevertheless, the Jordanian economy flourished in the 1970s as the gross domestic product (GDP) enjoyed double-digit growth. The economy continued to fare well in the early 1980s, despite a

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reversionary regional environment. Indeed, by the late 1980s, Jordanians had become measurably more affluent than many of their Arab neighbours. The 1988 per capita GOP of approximately US$ 2,000 placed Jordan's citizens well within the world's uppermiddle income bracket. Economic prosperity rested on three primary bases. Jordan's status as the world's third largest producer of phosphates ensured a steady-if relatively modest-flow of export income that offset some of its high import bills. More important, Jordan received billions of dollars of invisible or unearned income in the form of inflows of foreign aid and remittances from expatriates. These financial inflows permitted domestic consumption to outpace production and caused the gross national product (GNP) to exceed the GOP. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, GNP exceeded GOP by 10 per cent to 25 per cent. High financial inflows from the mid-1970s to the mid1980s allowed Jordan to maintain a low current account deficit; in some years it registered a current account surplus, without much external borrowing and despite trade and budget deficits. Jordan's economy, therefore, demonstrated many of the characteristics of wealthier and more technologically advanced rentier economies. Jordan also capitalised on its strategic geographic location, its educated work force, and its free enterprise economy to become a regional entrepot and transit point for exports and imports between Western Europe and the Middle East. Because of these factors, it also became a magnet for foreign direct investment, and a purveyor of banking, insurance, and consulting services to foreign clients. Jordan's heritage as a merchant middleman was centuries old, dating back to the Nabatean kingdom of Petra. Because the economy depended so heavily on the professional service sector and remittance income from expatriates, the government sometimes called Jordan's manpower the nation's most valuable resource. Jordan's economic strategy succeeded during the Middle East oil boom of the 1970s. In the late 1980s, however, as the worldwide plunge in oil prices persisted, economic problems emerged. Foreign aid was cut, remittances declined, and regional trade and transit activity was suppressed by lack of demand, leading to deterioration in the current account. The government was deeply concerned about the economy's vulnerability to external forces. Jordan's economy

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depended heavily on imported commodities and foreign aid, trade, investment, and income. But because plans to increase self-sufficiency were only in the early stages of implementation, a short-term decline in the national standard of living and increased indebtedness loomed as the 1990s approached; observers forecast that austerity would replace prosperity. Jordan is a small Arab country with inadequate supplies of water and other natural resources such as oil. Debt, poverty, and unemployment are fundamental problems, but King Abdullah, since assuming the throne in 1999, has undertaken some broad economic reforms in a long-term effort to improve living standards. Amman in the past three years has worked closely with the IMF, practised careful monetary policy, and made substantial headway with privatisation. The government also has liberalised the trade regime sufficiently to secure Jordan's membership in the WTO (2000), a free trade accord with the US (2001), and an association agreement with the EU (2001). These measures have helped improve productivity and have put Jordan on the foreign investment map. Jordan imported most of its oil from Iraq, but the US-led war in Iraq in 2003 made Jordan more dependent on oil from other Gulf nations forcing the Jordanian government to raise retail petroleum product prices and the sales tax base. Jordan's export market, which is heavily dependent on exports to Iraq, was also affected by the war but recovered quickly while contributing to the Iraq recovery effort. The main challenges facing Jordan are reducing dependence on foreign grants, redUcing the budget deficit, and creating investment incentives to promote job creation. Jordan has been implementing, since 1989, with the support of international institutions and countries, a strong stabilisation and structural reform programme. As a result, the improvements achieved in a number of important areas have been satisfying. Real GDP grew between 1992-1997 by seven per cent. Investment to GDP increased substantially from 22 per cent in 1989 to 33.1 per cent in 1997. National savings increased from a negative amount in 1989 to 4.7 per cent in 1997. Excluding grants, the budget and current account deficits were reduced from over 20 per cent of the GDP at the beginning of the programme to 3.6 per cent and 4.9 per cent, respectively, in 1997. Moreover, inflation was reduced

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from 25.6 per cent in 1989 to an average of 3.8 per cent between 1992-1997. Simultaneously, the exchange rate was stabilised while the reserves increased from US$ 400 million two years ago to approximately US$ 1700 million at the end of 1997, an amount sufficient to cover more than four months of imports. Additionally, as a result of the prudent management of new borrowing and debt buy-backs, the stock of external debt to GDP has fallen steadily from 190 per cent in 1990 to 83.7 per centin 1997. This, besides rescheduling operations, resulted in the reduction of the debt service ratio to 7.7 per cent in 1997. In 1992, Jordan's GDP grew by 16.1 per cent, the highest in the Middle East and North Africa region. By 1993, the GDP had grown by 5.6 per cent against a regional average of 4.8 per cent. The steady growth rate in GDP continued in 1994, as Jordan experienced an economic growth of 8.5 per cent against a regional average, which declined to a low of 2 per cent. In 1995, growth in the GDP continued, this time at a 5.9 per cent rate. However, the rates of economic growth in the past two years have not been as high as the rates stipulated in the reform programme. Real GDP grew by 0.8 per cent in 1996 and by 1.5 per cent in 1997-these are the preliminary yet most recent estimates. This trend of decelerating growth to levels well below the target rates may continue in 1998. Jordan has made dramatic progress in boosting exports and reducing imports. The Kingdom's trade deficit decreased by 14 per cent in 1994, and by another 1.1 per cent in 1995, as exports skyrocketed by 26.5 per cent and imports grew by 9.6 per cent during 1995. Between 1985 and 1995, Jordan's exports grew by 293 per cent, while imports increased by only 141 per cent. However, exportswhich grew steadily from 23.7 per cent of the GDP in 1992 to 27.1 per cent in 1996-declined to 26 per cent of GDP in 1997 and are projected to fall further to 25.7 per cent. Domestic exports, which grew in absolute numbers by 2.5 per cent, are estimated to have grown by 1.0 per cent during the period January-March 1998, with exports of miscellaneous manufactures declining by 2.1 per cent. On the other hand, imports are expected to fall by 0.4 per cent between January-March 1998, with raw materials and machinery and transport equipment declining by 25.8 per cent and 9.7 per cent, respectively, for the same period.

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The decline in economic activity that has been recently experienced is due to several factors, each contributing in a unique way towards this adverse economic situation. Prominent among the causes of the recent decline is the situation in the West Bank and Gaza (WB&G), where Jordanian exports (US$ 17 million in 1997) to this area remain marginal in comparison with previous expectations. In the first third of 1998, exports only reached US$ 5.24 million-down by 3 percentage points from their level for the same period last year. The seemingly intractable political situation in the WB&G has taken its toll on the economic welfare of the residents of the WB&G and on their purchasing power, which has significantly impacted their ability to trade with Jordan. This has affected not only trade with the Palestinian National Authority areas, but also the optimism and the spirit of goodwill that were generated after the signing of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994. Additionally, the situation in Iraq continues to reflect negatively on the Jordanian economy. The shrinkage of the Iraqi market due to economic sanctions has limited the capabilities of the private sector in Jordan to export to what l)as been among Jordan's largest export areas. Further, inspections at the Port of Aqabah have hampered the flow of goods to Jordan and imposed delays on the receipt of inputs, thus causing production delays and making several Jordanian industries less competitive. Also, the Gulf market has been a traditional source of employment to Jordanians since the oil boom of the early 1970s. Consequently, training and education became oriented towards employment opportunities in the oil economies of the Gulf. However, these opportunities were severely depressed after the Gulf War and the disastrous repatriation of almost half a million Jordanians who remain now unable to return to their old posts in the Gulf. They continue to impose a massive strain on the domestic economy in terms of infrastructure and job creation. While the labour market in Jordan may be capable of adjusting in the long run to this demand-pull shock, its justifiable inability to meet this pressure in the short run continues to have adverse permanent and distributionary effects on the welfare of the work force in Jordan. Moreover, the low oil prices of last year have affected the availability of employment opportunities in the Gulf and depressed Jordanian exports to the region. These exports, together with exports to the

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Asian markets, which are deeply depressed at the present, comprise 50 per cent of Jordanian exports. This trend will persist in abating Jordanian export activities. In spite of these regional developments, Jordan remains committed to structural reforms and economic stability. Its approach continues to underscore the role of civil society and democratisation in the making and adoption of policy by all parties concerned. The government has undertaken short, medium and long-term programmes aimed at increasing economic growth through the enhancement of productivity based on positive social development through the expansion of an already advanced physical and human infrastructure. The programmes emphasise both public and private sector involvement and partnership, and the growth of international and inter-regional trade, strategically managed within a framework of sustainable development. In April 1989, Jordan signed a five-year structural readjustment package with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the goal of restoring sustainable growth, curbing inflation, stabilising the Dinar's exchange rate, and reducing internal and external financial imbalances. The first phase of the economic reform programme resulted in a strong positive turnaround in the country's economic performance. However, the programme was interrupted due to the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 and its aftermath, as Jordan became faced with a challenge to act qUickly in order to deal with sudden, sizable imbalances in the economy. The second phase was designed to deepen and expedite the reform process. In October 1991, the government concluded a new seven-year economic adjustment programme with the IMF, designed to improve Jordan's balance of payments, reduce inflation, shrink the public sector's share of GDP and boost real GDP growth. In addition, a five-year economic and social development plan for 1993-97 was drafted as a tool for a new deveiopmental strategy. The plan designated a major role for the private sector, and confined the role of the government mostly to infrastructure-related projects that are essential for stimulating private investment. Jordan implemented a plan designed to rectify imbalances and bolster the long-term stability of the Jordanian economy through the following: • redefining the role of the state and enhancing the role of the private sector;

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• encouraging export-oriented investment and production as the primary vehicle for economic growth; • limiting the expansion of liquidity and money supply; • stabilising the exchange rate of the Dinar; • reducing the level of foreign debt to GDP; • increasing the attractiveness of Dinar-denominated savings over other currencies; • increasing Jordan's foreign currency reserves to cover imports for at least three months; • shifting revenue generation from an income-based to a consumption-based tax scheme to encourage saving and investment, while eliminating taxation on investments and savings; • removing market distortions that may arise from price-fixing agreements and monopolies, reducing and restructuring subsidies and dismantling trade barriers; • providing incentives for savings and investments, and encouraging foreign investment; • liberaliSing the flow of trade and capital while actively pursuing regional and global integration; and, • addressing the social dimension of development through systematic plans for the alleviation of the twin problems of poverty and unemployment. The forthcoming third phase builds upon past accomplishments to further consolidate and expand the reform programmes. These programmes, which will also be underscored in Jordan's forthcoming National Economic and Development Strategy, wiil add momentum to the ongoing plans. In general, the Jordanian economy is private sector oriented. Accordingly, direct state ownership is relatively small. It is significant only in the mining sector (phosphates and potash) and in public utilities (electricity, water, communications, and bus, railway and air transport). In 1992, before the privatisation programme began. the proportion of GDP from public sector establishments, excluding producers of government services, reached only 14 per cent. The private sector share of GDP in 1992 was concentrated in construction

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(100 per cent), manufacturing (94 per cent), and in financial, business, community and personal services (95 per cent). However, Jordan recognises that the continued recovery and future growth of the economy depends primarily on a more proactive role of the private sector and a redefinition of the role of the government in the economy. Therefore, the privatisation programme aims at enhancing enterprise efficiency through the sale of shares to technically advanced strategic investors, deepening the financial market through public share offerings, and reducing subsidies and consolidating public finances. A series of policy initiatives were launched to downsize the government's direct participation in the productive sectors and allow the private sector to manage these sectors in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. In order to facilitate the process in a speedy and transparent manner, an Executive Privatisation Unit (EPU) has been established at the Prime Ministry to coordinate the preparation of the divestiture transactions within an overall framework based on comprehensive guidelines and regulations; manage the technical experts and consultants; manage the marketing efforts of enterprises being divested; execute transactions; negotiate with concerned parties, and disseminate information regarding the progress of the programme. The privatisation programme is being implemented in two phases. During the first phase, several entities within the telecommunications, tourism, energy, industrial, transportation, mining, and water sectors are at some stage of privatisation. The second privatisation phase looks at all the restructuring options available for privatising the National Petroleum Corporation, Arab Potash Company, Jordan Phosphate Mines Company, Royal Jordanian Airlines, Jordan Investment Corporation's shareholdings, and the Postal Savings Fund.

The First Phase: • The sale of 40 per cent of the Jordan Telecommunications Corporation to a strategic investor with the participation of an international financial advisor. • The government has sold its shares in several hotels. • A 33 per cent divestment of the shares of the Jordan Cement Factories has been authorised by the Board of Directors of the Jordan Investment Corporation.

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• A privatisation unit within the Ministry of Transportation has been established to privatise the Public Transportation Corporation. • The feasibility of transferring the ownership of the Aqaba Railway Corporation was evaluated, and a concession may be awarded to a Build Operate Transfer (BOT) option in 1998. • The government is currently evaluating privatisation options for the Port of Aqaba and the Jordan Investment Corporation. The Second Phase: • A work plan for corporatising and the privatising the drilling operations of the National Potash Company (NPC) has been submitted to the government for approval. • Proposals for selling the government's shares in the Arab Potash Company and the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company have been submitted to the government for evaluation and approval. • A study of the strategic options for the privatisation of Royal Jordanian Airlines has been completed and submitted to the government for approval. • A proposal to divest from the Postal Savings Fund, with a management contract to be awarded to a commercial bank, has been submitted to the government for review.

Structure and Dynamics In the late 1980s, despite recent re-economic setbacks, Jordan remained more prosperous than many developing countries, and its citizens were more affluent than their neighbours from other no petroleum-exporting countries. Jordan's persistent economic viability was surprising in several respects. Measured both in terms of population and production, the Jordanian economy was one of the smallest in West Asia, according to the United Nations (UN). Its populationnot including the West Bank numbered only about 3 million in 1989. Jordan's 1987 gross domestic product was estimated at less than US$ 5.5 billion. Furthermore, Jordan's natural resources were not nearly as abundant as those of other Middle Eastern nations. Added to these disadvantages was the incalculable cost to economic development of the regional political and military environment. The economy was dismembered by the 1967 Israeli

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occupation of the West Bank. Jordanians regarded the loss of this territory not only as a military and political defeat, but also as an enduring economic catastrophe that cost them a large part of their infrastructure, resources, and manpower. Jordan's defence burden, although only average by Middle Eastern standards, was very large by world standards. The country's 1987 defence expenditure of US$ 635 million constituted 22 per cent of total government spending. Despite such handicaps, the economy grew rapidly in the 1970s and continued to grow in the early 1980s. According to UN data, the annual real (inflation-adjusted) growth rate of GDP averaged almost 16.5 per cent between 1972 and 1975. The average annual growth rate fell to 8.5 per cent between 1976 and 1979, then peaked at almost 18 per cent in 1980. Jordan's economic growth appeared more spectacular in percentage terms than in absolute terms because it started from low base figures; nonetheless, the pace of economic development was one of the highest in the world during this period. Jordan was not a petroleum exporter, a fact that made this growth rate all the more phenomenal. Jordan dealt relatively well with the recession in the Middle East triggered by plummeting petroleum prices. Between 1980 and 1985, the average growth rate decelerated to about 4 per cent a year, but Jordan's economy was able to sustain this growth rate at a time when other regional economies, such as those of the oil producers on the Arabian Peninsula, were actually contracting. The boom in transit trade to and from Iraq after the start of the Iran Iraq War in 1980 accounted for much of the growth. The immunity of the large service sector to demand slowdown also postponed the effects of the regional recession. The government, however, constituted a large component of the service sector. In its role as a major customer and employer, the government sustained an artificial level of growth through continued deficit spending and a relaxed fiscal policy. Despite the extra money and demand that the government injected into the economy, GDP growth eventually stagnated in the late 1980s. GDP growth in 1989 was estimated at only 2 or 3 per cent.

GDP by Sector: The large contribution of the service sector to GDp, versus the small contribution of the industrial and agricultural sectors, has long been a source of concern to economic planners. In the late 1980s, Jordan's aggregate private and public service sector

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continued to contribute about 60 to 65 per cent of total GOP. This figure was exceeded only in some of the world's most industrially advanced market economies. Figures nearly as high were reached by several of the world's poorest economies, however, where unproductive surplus labour was absorbed into the service sector. Some segments of the service sector, such as banking and engineering, relied on advanced and sophisticated skills. Nonetheless, the sector's overall contribution to GOP remained roughly constant in the 1970s and 1980s, even though its share of total employment increased significantly. The relative lack of growth called into question the overall efficiency and productivity of the service sector. In 1987, the government, which employed more than 40 per cent of the labour force and more than 67 per cent of service sector employees, contributed about 18 per cent to GOP. Retail and wholesale trade-which included well-developed hotel and restaurant subsectors-was the second largest contributor to GOP. This sector generated 17 per cent of GOP in 1987, a share that had declined about 2 per cent over the preceding decade. Finance, banking, real estate transactions, insurance, and business services made up 8 per cent of GOP. Transportation and communications contributed about 11 per cent of GOP. Manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and construction-the sectors that produced consumer or capital goods or inputs-together accounted for only about 32 per cent or less of GOP. The steady growth of manufacturing, which climbed from about 4 per cent of GOP in 1970 to almost 15 per cent in 1987, was regarded as a promising sign. Agriculture-including animal husbandry, forestry, and fishing-constituted almost 40 per cent of GOP in the 1950s and about 15 per cent of GOP in the early 1970s. By 1987, however, its share had declined to 7 per cent, which caused the government considerable concern. Construction's contribution doubled between 1970 and 1975, reaching about 8 per cent of GOP as spending on both public works and private housing increased, and then stabilised. By 1987 construction had declined to 6 per cent. Utilities such as electricity and water supply accounted for 3 per cent of GOp, and mining contributed 4 per cent in 1987. Jordan's demand structure in terms of GOP consumption was distorted. In 1986, the government consumed more than 26 per cent

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of GOP, a figure that was the fourth highest in the noncommunist world. Private consumption was about 87 per cent of GOP, also among the highest in the world. Consumption exceeded GOP by 13 per cent, the highest margin in the world except for the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). Jordan's exports of goods and non-factor services (i.e., freight, insurance, and travel) amounted to 49 per cent of GOp, and its negative resource gap-the excess of imports over exports as a proportion of GOP-was minus 44 per cent, by far the highest in the world. Inflows of capital from external sources financed all gross domestic investment (31 per cent of GOP) and part of domestic consumption. Insofar as consumption exceeded GDP and the difference was made up partially by aid and remittances, Jordan did not fully earn the growth it experienced in the 1970s and early 1980s. Jordan's GOP, which rose from about US$ 2 billion to US$ 4 billion during the period, was only between 75 per cent and 90 per cent of its GNP. At the same time, annual inflows of unrequited-or, as the Jordanian government sometimes called them; "unrequested" transfer payments-were in some years more than US$ 1 billion. These unearned transfers, in the form of foreign aid and expatriate worker remittances, permitted Jordan to register only a relatively small curren t account deficit. In several years, Jordan actually registered current account surpluses despite outspending its GOP by the highest margin in the world. In 1980, for example, Jordan had a current account surplus of almost US$ 375 million. As foreign aid declined and remittance income tapered off, Jordan suffered a current account deficit of US$ 390 million in 1983. By 1987 the current account deficit had shrunk considerably, because a reduced trade deficit more than compensated for declining aid and remittance inflows. The total amount of foreign aid that Jordan received was difficult to pinpoint. Jordan never received all the aid it was promised, and some aid was in the form of loans at concessionary interest rates or in the form of commodities and services. Although the amount of aid varied from year to year, it was always substantial. In 1980, for example, foreign aid constituted 46 per cent of government revenue before borrowing; in 1985, it constituted 30 per cent of pre-borrowing revenue. Financial aid was received mostly from the Arab Organisation

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of Petroleum Exporting Countries (AOPEC). At the Baghdad Conference in November 1978, seven countries promised to donate US$ 1.25 billion annually to Jordan for ten years as a "war chest" to fund its ongoing confrontation with Israel. Libya and Algeria reneged on their commitments from the outset, and Iraq stopped paying after the Iran-Iraq War started in 1980. In 1984, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates stopped paying except on an ad hoc basis, and in 1985 Kuwait suspended its payments. Only Saudi Arabia consistently met its payment obligations, which amounted to US$ 360 million per year disbursed in six equal bimonthly instalments. Total Arab aid to Jordan stood at about US$ 750 million in 1980, with aid from non-Arab countries boosting total aid to about US$ 1.3 billion. Arab aid fell to about US$ 670 million in 1983 and to about US$ 320 million in 1984. In 1988, according to Jordanian government figures, financial aid totalled about US$ 474 million and development aid and soft loans (bearing no interest or interest below the cost of the capital loaned) totalled about US$ 260 million, yielding a total of US$ 734 million in outside assistance. This figure included a United States aid package that authorised US$ 28 million of military training, US$ 20 million in budget support, and up to US$ 80 million in commodity credits. The figure also included United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East aid of about US$ 10 million, World Bank soft loans in excess of US$ 100 million, and Arab aid of at least US$ 350 million. The European Economic Community authorised US$ 112.5 million in aid to Jordan was paid in instalments between 1987 and 1991. Worker remittances, the other main source of external income, could not be estimated precisely in 1988, but exceeded US$ 1 billion. Foreign direct investment and re-exports, particularly of goods destined for Iraq, also contributed to GOP growth. The government of Jordan was one of only a few Arab governments that chose to stake its future on an economic system that, if not laissez-faire, was by regional standards free, open, and market oriented. In the 1980s, however, Jordan began to compete for foreign investment with Egypt, which was pursuing its own open-door policy. On the one hand, Jordan's open-door policy posed risks insofar as the country had to compete and cooperate with· Arab governments

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that had protectionist and subsidised state-controlled economies. On the other hand, the policy was particularly effective because it was so rare in the Middle East. Furthermore, with the devastation of Beirut after the start of Lebanon's Civil War in 1975, Jordan was at least partially successful in replacing that city as a prime regional commercial centre. In this role of merchant middleman, Jordan became an entrepot and conduit for trade and investment between the West and the rest of the Arab world. It encouraged transit trade through duty-free zones. Its opendoor policy acted as a magnet for inflows of foreign direct investment. It provided tax concessions to both domestic and foreign businesses. Until 1988 it maintained a sound and freely convertible currency backed by substantial gold reserves. A sound currency combined with relative political stability, made Jordan a safe haven for Arab bank deposits. Jordan also established a strong professional service sector, including well-developed banking and insurance industries that catered to international business. Total net foreign direct and portfolio investment in Jordan could not be estimated, however, because foreign investment was offset by capital flight abroad. Estimates of Jordanian capital invested abroad ranged from US$ 4 billion to $US 40 billion. Net direct investment in Jordan was estimated at US$ 23 million in 1985.

Late 19805: Superficial economic prosperity masked deep underlying structural problems; in the late 1980s, a number of intractable long-term economic problems and a host of short-term potential crises loomed. In the long range, if Jordan's domestic market could not grow sufficiently to permit the economies of scale necessary to sustain large manufacturing industries, capital investment and manufacturing value added would continue to be low; however, this difficulty might be offset if export markets were obtained. Gross barter terms of trade would decline further if the volume and value of manufactured imports rose faster than the volume and value of raw material exports. The merchandise trade deficit would continue because imports of certain commodities would continue to be necessary far into the future. The standard of living as measured by per capita GNP could eventually decrease as modest real economic growth was offset by a rapidly growing population. Domestic unemployment could increase to more than 9 per cent as the young

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population matured and the domestic work force grew. Although a price increase for oil could restimulate the Jordanian economy by reopening Arabian Peninsula markets for goods and services, the resultant increased oil import bill would offset some of the gains. In the late 1980s, however, short-term financial problems including deflation, debt, and devaluation of the dinar, which lost 42.5 per cent of its value between October 1988 and May 1989, commanded the government's attention more than did long-term problems.

Gulf War and Economy Early in the morning on August 2, 1990, more than 100,000 Iraqi troops crossed the border and invaded Kuwait. Few people expected that their relations would reach this bloody end. The Gulf War divided the Arab world into two camps, with a small group supporting Iraq (Jordan, PLO, Sudan, and Yemen), and the rest supporting Kuwait. Many countries would feel the consequences of the invasion, but few are still as deeply affected as Jordan has been by that conflict's economic and political fallout. Even though Jordan is not, of course, itself a Gulf state, its interests are very much influenced by events there. Lacking oil and valuable natural resources itself, trade and aid involving Gulf States are vital for Jordan's economy. As part of the Arab world and Middle East, Jordan also has a special interest in events in that sub-region. Eight per cent of its area is desert and another portion arid mountains that contains no oil. Among its population of 4.9 million people, almost 40 per cent of them under 15 years of age, Jordan requires an inflow of capital to provide jobs and services. During the 1980s, a very significant part of its income depended on billions of dollars in remittances from Jordanian expatriates and hundreds of millions of dollars in financial aid granted by some of the Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Jordan also exported agricultural and industrial products to the Gulf States and Iraq. In addition, Jordanian trucks transported agricultural and industrial products all over the Middle East and beyond. As a result of the 1991 Gulf war, Jordan, Iraq's main economic partner, found itself in a crisis that it did not create. In an attempt to save Jordan from its precarious position, King Hussain proposed the Arab League mediate the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait.

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Although the attempt failed, King Hussain was seen by some as the best hope for a peaceful solution. After the mediation attempt failed and the conflict escalated, Jordan became affected by all of the social, military, political, and economical consequences. Jordan's position was especially complicated by the trade sanctions imposed on Iraq by the UN that resulted in a siege of Aqaba, Jordan's Red Sea port. The massive inflow of returning Jordanians and, temporarily, by the arrival of many foreign refugees on the way back to their home countries contributed to the economic crisis. Aside from their common characteristics as Arab and Muslim neighbours, there was a special historical bond between Jordan and Iraq. When they emerged from the Ottoman Empire after World War One, both countries were ruled by members of the Hashemiate family. Abdullah became king of Jordan and his brother Faisal became king of Iraq. In Iraq, a 1958 military coup overthrew that regime and created a republic. Still, relations eventually recovered. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Jordan and its people genuinely supported Iraq both as a fellow Arab state and as a protector against Iran's brand of radical Islamism, giving the relationship an increasingly important strategic dimension. When Jordan faced a deep economic crisis in 1989, its Gulf friends refused to help, further increasing Baghdad's relative importance for Amman. The economic aspect of relations was quite critical in all these years. During the war with Iran, Jordan's economyincluding transportation, trade, agriculture, and industry-all became essential for Iraq. In exchange, Iraq supplied Jordan with cheap oil, grants, and low-interest loans. Today, Iraq remains the major supplier of discounted oil and Iraqi continues to be the largest market for Jordanian products. Delivering these goods in both directions has become one of the main pillars of Jordan's transportation sector. Jordan's economy faced many problems before the Gulf War. There was a high unemployment rate of 20 per cent. The foreign debt, exceeding $11 billion, was triple the annual Gross Domestic Product (GOP). And the level of financial transfers from Jordanians working in the Gulf was declining. As a result, Jordan had to devalue its currency by 50 per cent in 1989. Another factor was Jordan's sensitivity to trade levels and its dependence on international commerce. For instance, exports were worth almost $1 billion in

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1989, with a further $181 million in goods being re-exported through Jordan. Considering that Jordan's GDP was a mere $4.3 billion, this is a staggering figure. No less important to Jordanian living standards, the country imported $2.16 billion worth of goods in that same year. Before the Gulf war, well over half of Jordan's exports were sent to Gulf states. Iraq alone was the market for 23 per cent of its exports; Saudi Arabia was generally the market for at least 10 per cent more. Iraq's importance was underlined by the fact that it was the source of between 10 and 17 per cent of total Jordanian imports by the late 1980s. Largely as a reaction to the problems of deficit and debt described above, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed Jordan to apply a tough economic reform programme to increase production, decrease imports, reduce government spending, and stop government subsidies. These steps led to massive riots in April 1989 starting in Maan, capital of Jordan's transport sector, and swept throughout the country, forcing King Hussain to change the government and keep subsidies for most basic products. By 1990, Jordan's economy had begun recovering from the 1989 crisis but still needed serious domestic effort, international support, and time to reach better levels of performance. Immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 661, which invoked e~onomic trade sanctions against Iraq, a decision with which Jordan complied. UN sanctions deeply affected Jordan's interests and economy since, as stated above, Iraq was the largest Jordanian trade partner for the previous ten years. Many Jordanian companies lost large amounts because Iraqi companies were unable to repay their debts due to the sanctions. Moreover, key Jordanian economic sectors such as transportation, agriculture, and industry, mainly serving Iraq, were severely affected by the UN resolution. The Amman Chamber of Commerce announced in November 1990 that the trade sanctions had already cost Jordan $2 billion, and the loss was growing. According to the same source, they expected it to reach $3.6 billion in 1991. In addition, before the resolution Iraq was supplying 80 per cent of Jordanian oil at reduced prices. The sanctions forced Jordan to import oil from the international markets at the going rates.

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Iraq was highly dependent on Jordan as the route for importing and exporting needed products. Each year, mi1lions of tons of goods were handled for Iraq in the Jordanian port of Aqaba and this aspect of Jordan's economy had been growing rapidly before the sanctions took effect. Imports via the port went from 6.2 mi1lion tons in 1989 to 3.2 mi1lion in 1990 to 1.5 million in 1991. Exports also were hurt, if less dramatically; from 10 million tons in 1989 to 8.9 million in 1990 to 7.7 million in 1991. The trade sanctions also caused the cancellation of many shipping visits, and as a direct result, the number of ships arriving at Aqaba decreased from 2,583 in 1988 to 2,075 in 1991. This, in turn, made it harder and longer for Jordan to receive products it needed for local industry and agriculture, in addition to disrupting Jordanian exports. Allied warships searched thousands of vessels each year and turned back many shipments belonging to Jordanian merchants who had business relations with Iraq, even if they were targeted for local consumption. Jordanian phosphate and potassium exports were also disrupted since they depended on Aqaba's port. The Gulf War affected (in various ways) forty countries around the world. Some countries lost their exports to the Gulf area. Others lost the remittances of their expatriates. A few had to accommodate thousands of their citizens who returned from the Gulf area. Most countries were affected as a result of the interest rate increase on their old debts and difficulty to get new credits. Many were affected by the increase in oil prices. Jordan, however, was severely affected by all of these issues. Crown Prince Hasan announced that the effects of Gulf War on Jordan could be summarised in three dimensions: the trade sanctions against Iraq, the refugees who fled the Gulf area and passed through Jordan, and the Jordanian expatriates who returned to Jordan. At the time of the crisis, estimates on what losses would occur due to the conflict varied, but in Jordan, they were believed to be massive. Mudhar Badran, Jordan's Prime Minister at the time, estimated Jordan's total loss at $8 billion, Badran added that while Jordan's exports to other Arab countries were $485.7 million in 1989 and had increased by $42.8 million in the first half of 1990, they had since decreased gradually after August 2, 1990 reaching zero at the end of 1990 and the first 3 months of 1991. The Jordanian daily

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AI-Dustur reported that Jordan's loss would reach $1.4 billion in the last five months of 1990, and would reach $8.4 billion in 1991, including both direct and indirect losses. According to another Jordanian daily, Sawt al-Shab, the UN had estimated that Jordan lost $1.52 billion in 1990, and expected it to lose another $3.4 billion in 1991. Sawt al-Shab's Sameh Hanandeh reported in November 1991 that Jordan had lost $1.68 billion in 1990 and would lose $3.97 billion in 1991. Regardless of how much these figures (especially Badran's) were an attempt to get more foreign aid, the real impact was vast and did cause Jordan's leadership to worry enormously about the future of its economy. Jordan's GNP declined by more than 8 per cent, and Jordan's general economic growth dropped especially in the first five months after the war. Jordanian reserves of foreign currencies and government revenues declined leading to an estimated budget deficit of $308 million in 1991, excluding interest payments. The crisis affected almost all production sectors, led to an increase in the unemployment rate to nearly 30 per cent, and also resulted in an increase of the poverty rate to 33 per cent. Moreover, Jordan had to postpone the application of the IMF reform programme. Writing in AI-Dustur, Odeh Sui aim an al-Swais concluded that, after the Iraqi and Kuwaiti economies, Jordan's economy suffered the most due to the Kuwait crisis. Indeed, when compared to other countries, the serious effect on Jordan becomes even clearer. During the eight months after the Gulf War, Jordan lost an estimated $4 billion while Turkey, India and Yemen combined lost $5.5 billion. Turkey estimated its losses to be $3 billion, Yemen announced a loss of $830 million, and India estimated its loss to about $1.6 billion. Even Egypt's actual loss didn't exceed $1 billion dollars. In addition, while those countries' losses were less than Jordan's, they received more and better credits. Jordan obtained only $1 billion dollars from Japan and the European Union. Furthermore, before the crisis Arab and International financial support was vital for Jordan's economy. Before the Gulf War Jordan was receiving almost $600 million a year from the wealthy Gulf States alone. As a result of the Jordanian support of Iraq during the war, those countries cut off their support and European and other countries such as the US and Japan took the same steps (a situation

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not reversed until Jordan became involved in the peace process with Israel, most especially after the Wye River Agreement). In addition, Iraq and Kuwait themselves had previously been the source of 30 per cent of the total financial aid received by Jordan. Jordanian exports to Arab and other countries also declined. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia prohibited the import of Jordanian products because of Jordan's political position during the war. Jordanian agriculture, industry and trade sectors were thus shut out of the most important Gulf markets. The transportation sector was paralysed as a result of the trade sanctions and the decline in exports and imports. Finally, the tourism sector was harshly affected by the Gulf War. Having taken nearly a decade to recover from the loss of the important tourist sites of Jerusalem and Bethlehem in 1967, by 1990, the industry in Jordan had reached all-time highs, with almost 2.6 million tourists entering in that year alone (most of whom were Arab). Utilising its sites like Jerash and Petra to their fullest, tourism had even outperformed phosphates (Jordan's leading export) in net receipts. However, by 1991, this number dropped by almost 25 per cent to 2 million visitors. There were many groups of people who passed through or returned to Jordan due to the Gulf War. These people can be classified into five categories: First, Jordanians who carry Jordanian passports and have Jordan as their only home and who consequently returned to Jordan. Second, Jordan had to host Palestinians who carried identification papers issued by other Arab countries that then refused to receive them. Third, Palestinians from the West Bank, who had Jordanian passports, were forced to stay for a long period in Jordan until Israel allowed them to go back to the West Bank. Fourth, over 30,000 Iraqi refugees who escaped Iraq eventually settled in Jordan. Finally, as many as one million refugees during the last five of months of 1990, according to Prime Minister Badran. Jordan was one of the largest providers of white-collar employees to the Gulf countries. Jordanians living in the Gulf countries before the crisis exceeded one million (20 per cent of Jordan's total population) distributed among Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. These Jordanians living abroad also became the main supplier of foreign currency to Jordan, which official statistics estimated at over $1.2 billion annually in the

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mid-1980s (unofficial estimates ran as high as $3 billion). Jordanians in Kuwait and Iraq alone accounted for almost 40 per cent of the total Jordanian expatriate transfers, as these two countries hosted over half a million Jordanians. However, as a result of the war, these remittances decreased to $460 million (the official statistic) in 1991. It was estimated that Jordan had lost $122 million in 1990 and $318 million in 1991 due to the decrease in the employee transfers. In addition, it was estimated that Jordanian expatriates lost $1.4 billion of their deposits in Kuwait and $1.5 billion of their belongings. Making matters worse, after the Gulf War, former Jordanians working outside Jordan, previously a source of national income, suddenly became a major burden inside Jordan. Jordanians started to migrate to Kuwait in the 1950s, and the total number of Jordanians working in Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion was almost 400,000. Jordanian labour helped in building modern Kuwait, with Jordanian employees working in many government departments such as education, health care, military, as well as in the private sector. The Jordanian media reported that Jordanians were treated as second-class citizens, even though most of them had lived many years there and many were even born and raised in Kuwait. Before the Iraqi invasion many articles requesting the government to deport Jordanians appeared in Kuwaiti newspapers, and the slogan "Kuwait is for Kuwaitis" became widespread. Jordanians were unable to buy private houses or operate their own businesses in Kuwait. Following the liberation, Kuwait started a comprehensive campaign to deport Jordanians out of Kuwait and an estimated 330,000 Jordanians returned to Jordan after the Iraqi troops were expelled from Kuwait by the US-led UN coalition. Many other Jordanians, under indirect pressure and changing economic conditions, returned from other Gulf countries such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. The return of 330,000 Jordanians from the Gulf area, in addition to one million refugees who passed through Jordan, had many serious negative effects on Jordan. Jordanian unemployment rate soared from 20 per cent to 30 per cent. White-collar employees were the main victims since Jordan was one of the major exporters of

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white-collar employees to the Gulf area. The situation worsened after the return of Jordanians from Kuwait and Iraq, a situation which continued until Jordan created more jobs and found vacancies abroad for the large number of unemployed. Returnees increased the pressure on the limited natural resources (e.g., water and food) and on the Jordanian public utilities (e.g., education facilities, housing, and health care units). The return of the large number of Jordanians in a short period increased the number of Jordanians who lived under the poverty level up to onethird of the population. Before the Gulf crisis the total number of Jordanians who were living under poverty was 600,000-almost 20 per cent of the population. A study of 500 Jordanian families revealed that Jordan stepped down from a middle-income country to a low-income country. Salamah Hammad, writing in Sawt al-Shab, reported that over 1,625,000 persons had entered Jordan between August and December 1990, out of whom 885,000 continued their trip to their home countries (e.g., India, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Egypt). This number equals 23 per cent of Jordan's population and would be equivalent to 13 million people passing through England. In order to help these refugees, the Jordanian Government spent over $60 million of its budget, though the UN eventually reimbursed only $12 million of that amount. Thousands of Palestinians also stayed in Jordan because the other Arab countries that issued their papers refused to receive them. Additionally, many other nationalities like Somalis, Liberians, and Eritreans stayed in Jordan for longer periods until they could find another country that would accept them. Jordanian authorities did not charge the refugees or international airlines taking the refugees home any of the fees normally paid by travellers. It also gave up the privileges of the national Jordanian Airline Company (Royal Jordanian) and cancelled many of its flights to allow other airline companies to carry the refugees. Thus, the damage of the Gulf War on Jordan's economy was multifaceted and extensive. Jordan's economy was highly dependent on other Arab countries in several ways, and especially on Iraq. Aside from its heavy dependence on trade, Jordan also served as a major thoroughfare for Iraqi imports and exports and had previously

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prospered on the transport of goods from the port of Aqaba to Iraq. Jordan was also heavily dependent on Arab financial aid, subsidised Iraqi oil, and remittances from expatriate Jordanians working in the Gulf, and to a lesser extent, on international tourism-all of which came to an abrupt halt beginning with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In addition, the Gulf countries stopped importing Jordanian products because of Jordan's political support for Iraq, and many Jordanian employees were forced to return to Jordan from Kuwait and other Gulf countries. Dealing with hundreds of thousands of returning Jordanians became a major challenge for the economy, which was further burdened by over a million refugees in transit. These difficulties still affect Jordan's economy. Gradually, the Gulf countries reopened their markets to Jordanian products and their job markets to the Jordanian employees. However, the UNimposed trade sanctions on Iraq still strongly affect Jordan. The Gulf countries' financial support never returned to the levels reached before the Gulf War and was never entirely replaced by Western aid. Jordan still has strong economic relations with Iraq, which supplies Jordan with oil at half the international market price. With this in mind, it is clear that the already weak Jordanian economic situation could become even worse if the conflict in the Gulf area erupts again.

Role of Government In the late 1980s, the government of Jordan remained a staunch advocate of free enterprise. Unlike many of its Arab neighbours, and for both pragmatic and ideological reasons, Jordan had never nationalised businesses, seised private assets without compensation, or implemented socialism. But although the economic system was as liberal and market oriented as those of many fully developed nations, the government continued to playa large economic role, both in development planning and as a financier. Government encroachment on the economy in the form of ownership or equity participation in corporations was inevitable and, to some extent, inadvertent. The government's role as financier derived from several interrelated factors. Most important, the government was the only channel through which foreign aid, loans, and most expatriate worker remittances were funnelled into the country. Acting as an intermediary in the distribution of these funds, the government acquired a reputation in the private sector for its

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"deep pockets" and fostered in the business world a feeling of entitlement to government support in the capitalisation of certain enterprises. Inadequate private capital investment, resulting in part from an entrenched "merchant mentality," has been a weak point in the economy for which the government has had to compensate. Moreover, the large amount of capital investment required by some extractive industries was beyond the reach of willing private sector investors. In some industries, such as telecommunications, government ownership was viewed simply as a prerogative. In numerous other cases, the government felt compelled to bolster private investor confidence and so stepped in to rescue insolvent private sector companies and banks with an infusion of capital, to buy the receivables of exporting companies unable to collect payment from foreign customers, and, when publicly held companies went bankrupt, to compensate shareholders for the lost value of their stocks. In this manner, the government essentially adopted companies that were abandoned by the private sector. Eventually, the government came to preside over a large mixed economy of some forty semi-public corporations. The government's share of the combined nominal equity of these companies was about 18 per cent, but its share of their combined paid-up capital-a more realistic measure of ownership--was over 40 per cent. The government had contributed 100 per cent of the paid-up capital of eleven of the companies, although its share of their nominal capital was much lower. These firms included Arab International Hotels, the Arab Company for Maritime Transport, the Jordan Cement Factories Company, the Arab Investment Company, and a number of joint ventures with Iraq and Syria. In six of the companies, the government was a minor investor, holding less than 10 per cent of the equity. The largest company in this group was the Jordan Refinery Company, in.which the government held only a 3 per cent share. This group also included the Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company and the Jordan Ceramic Company. Public investment tended to be highest in those companies with strong domestic and export markets. In 1988, the government was pursuing plans to offer the government-owned telecommunications industry and the national air carrier, Royal Jordanian Airlines, for sale to a combination of Jordanian and other Arab private sector investors.

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Clearly, the government assumed responsibility for some aspects of the economy by default because of lack of investment activity and initiative in the private sector. Although total gross fixed capital formation was targeted by the 1980-85 Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (known as the 1980-85 Five-Year Plan) to grow at about 12 per cent annually, it grew at less than 1 per cent per year. Public sector capital investment during the period totalled almost JD60 million, 40 per cent more than stipulated in the pl~n, but private and mixed sector capital investment, at JD540 milliqn, was only 75 per cent of the planned target. The declining value pf share prices' on the Amman Financial Market since the early 198~s also indicated low private participation in equity markets. Government officials have, on occasion, criticised the privat~ sector for its unwillingness to make capital investments and its general preference for trade and consumption rather than production and investment. Revitalisation and expansion of the private sector has been a long-standing official development priority. Perhaps the government's most important policy tool has been Central Bank regulation of bank interest rates on both loans and deposits. By setting ceilings on the interest rates that banks can charge certain borrowers, the government has tried to channel loans to capitalstarved enterprises. The government also has encouraged foreign direct investment in the hope of stimulating growth of the domestic private sector through partnerships and joint ventures with foreign companies. The incentives that the government has had to provide foreign and domestic businesses to invest in the economy have, however, run somewhat contrary to the free market philosophy. Under the 1984 Encouragement of Investment Law, foreign investors were permitted to own up to 49 per cent of a Jordanian company. In certain cases (for example , export-oriented manufacturing enterprises), foreign investors could own all of a Jordanian company. To encourage investment, companies received customs exemptions, almost complete tax exemption for up to nine years, and unlimited profit repatriation. In some cases, they were given free land and facilities. Free zones granting similar concessions were established near Al-Aqabah and near the Syrian border to encourage wholly owned Jordanian companies to engage in manufacture for export.

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Five industrial estates throughout the country offered the use of government-built infrastructure and extensive government-run services to Jordanian companies. Although government economic support was weighted towards fostering investment, the government also provided subsidies that were deemed necessary to guarantee citizens' welfare and political stability. The main government agent for subsidising and setting prices was the Ministry of Supply, which was established in 1974 after merchants' hoarded sugar to force up prices. The hoarding sparked discontent in the country at large and particularly in the armed forces. In the late 1980s, the Ministry of Supply imported wheat, meat, and other basic foodstuffs and distributed them at subsidised prices and bought crops from Jordanian farmers at higher-than-market prices. In the 1989 budget, JD33.2 million was allocated to food subsidies alone. The government also subsidised fuel, water, and electricity. The government repeatedly has stated that it intends to phase out subsidies. The import restrictions imposed in 1988, however, had almost immediate unintended price effects that necessitated further subsidies and price setting. Although the government intended to ban only luxury imports, merchants began to hoard their inventory of imported goods in expectation of future restrictions. Hoarding led to sharp and sudden price inflation of such vital items as medicines and food. Domestic producers of goods that could substitute for imports also raised prices. In 1988, the Ministry of Supply announced that for the first time it would set or subsidise prices for tea, matches, electrical appliances, construction materials, and numerous other goods. For similar welfare reasons, unemployment was mitigated by public sector hiring, and the public payroll swelled to account for more than 40 per cent of the work force in 1987. In 1989, it was difficult to assess whether the government's role in the economy was increasing or decreasing. The government's forceful intervention with specific restrictions to stabilise the economy during the 1988 financial crisis was uncharacteristic. In general, the government appeared uncomfortable with the size of the role it was forced to play in the economy.

The Budget The government of Jordan consistently has run budget deficits.

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Domestic revenues were 67 per cent of current expenditure in 1980, but this figure had improved to 80 per cent in 1985. Budgets tended to be only approximations of actual expenditure and revenue. The government did not present a consolidated budget; that is, the central government budget did not encompass the separate budgets of the municipalities and some public institutions. Moreover, central government income depended on unpredictable disbursements of aid from foreign donors, while spending usually was increased by supplemental budgets submitted throughout the year. The discrepancy between income and expenditures appeared each year as the difference between the planned and actual budget deficit, with disclosure of the latter figure often delayed considerably. For example, the 1988 budget called for a JD67 million deficit, but the 1989 budget planned for a JD122 million deficits. Although the actual 1988 deficit had not been announced by early 1989, the Ministry of Finance disclosed that the planned 1989 deficit represented a 45 per cent reduction from the 1988 level. The minister of finance claimed that the government's 1989 assessment of income and spending was more realistic than in previous years, and that the government was committed to adhering strictly to the budget. Years of deficit spending effectively precluded the option of pursuing a relaxed fiscal policy, which Jordan's price deflation mighf have warranted in 1989. The 1989 budget called instead for austerity to achieve cuts in spending from 1988 levels. The 1989 budget forecast an expenditure of JDl billion, as compared to JDl.l billion in the 1988 budget. Of the 1989 planned expenditure, capital investment and development spending were budgeted at JD346.5 million, a cut of JDI05 million from the previous year. This cut apparently reflected the government's inability to spend the full capital budget in 1988 because of the economy's limited absorptive capacity. Recurrent expenditure was budgeted at JD688.9 million, an increase of aboutJD65 million over 1988. Insofar as the defence component of recurrent expenditure was cut JD4.5 million from 1988, it appeared that other recurrent spending, for example on government salaries and services, was set to increase. Customs revenues from tariffs and a 15 per cent across-theboard import surcharge traditionally have been the largest sources of domestically generated revenue, accounting for almost 40 per cent

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of government income before foreign aid receipts in 1985. Because of a narrow tax base and the granting of numerous exemptions, direct taxes on income have made only a small contribution to government revenue. In 1985, direct taxes accounted for 13 per cent of government revenue, or 4 per cent of GDP. Various indirect taxes, however, were relatively high, so that indirect and direct taxes combined represented 14 per cent of GDP. Jordan's revenue policy dovetailed with its investment policy. High customs charges and indirect taxes were designed to stifle consumer spending, while low personal income taxes and even lower business taxes were meant to channel the resulting savings to investments. For similar reasons, domestic borrowing was limited. In 1986 outstanding internal public debt was only JD419 million. Total 1989 revenue was projected at JD913 million. Customs revenues were expected to contribute JD155 million, but it was possible that the government import ban on luxury goods would slash this figure. Other local revenue generated through direct and indirect taxes was expected to contribute JD392 million. Foreign aid was expected to contribute JD225 million, the same level as projected for 1988, although actual aid disbursed to Jordan in 1988 amounted to JD164 million. Development loans were expected to contribute another JD103 million to 1989 revenues.

Development and Planning To the extent that achieving development planning goals depended on unpredictable inflows of transfer payments, the five-year plans were more useful as guides to intentions rather than capabilities; 37 per cent of the total financing requirements for the 1986-90 FiveYear Plan for Economic and Social Development (known as the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan) were to be provided by aid and remittances. Moreover, even when full funding was available, the economy's limited absorptive capacity prevented the government from spending the full annual development budget. In early 1989, it was not feasible to make a comprehensive assessment of Jordan's progress towards accomplishing the goals of its 1986-90 Five-Year Plan. In the past, development goals had been ambitious but progress was modest. For example, several important goals of the 1980-85 plan were not met: planned GDP growth was 11 per cent per year, but actual growth was about 4 per cent; planned

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investment growth was about 12 per cent per year, but actual investment growth was less than 1 per cent; and planned growth in export of goods and services was 21 per cent per year, but actual growth was 3.4 per cent. Total investment spending under the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan was targeted at J03.2 billion, of which the government was to contribute J01.8 billion and the private and mixed sectors J01.4 billion. National savings were to provide about 36 per cent of the plan's financing, transfer payments such as aid and remittances were to finance about 37 per cent, and external borrowing was to finance about 26 per cent. The plan listed seven broad goals in order of priority assigned by the government. The foremost goal was to attain and sustain a 5 per cent rate of GOP growth and to increase real per capita GOP by 1.3 per cent per year. The second goal was to cap unemployment through the creation of more than 200,000 new jobs, of which almost 100,000 would be created through investment-led economic growth. The remainders were to be created through the eviction of foreign guest workers and the emigration of Jordanian labour. The third goal was to keep growth in public and private consumption below GOP growth so that by 1990 consumption would equal production. The fourth goal was to increase domestically generated government revenue to eliminate deficit spending. The fifth goal was to reduce, but not eliminate, the goods and services trade deficit. The sixth goal was to strengthen inter-Arab economic cooperation through the establishment of international joint ventures and the reduction of trade barriers. Finally, the plan called for more equitable distribution throughout the country of the benefits of development. The plan also listed growth targets for the various economic sectors, including 46 per cent real increases in agricultural income and mining income and a 40 per cent real increase in manufacturing income over the five-year period. The plan envisioned a 23 per cent real increase in service sector income over the same period. Because the goods-producing sectors were to grow faster than the service sector, the latter's contribution to GOP would be reduced to about 61 per cent. The 1986-90 Five-Year Plan listed several longer-range economic godc; to be attained by the year 2000. The most important was to

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keep Jordan's economy growing at a rate faster than the projected rate of population growth so that gains in the standard of living would not be diluted. Assuming a drop in the birth rate over the decade beginning in 1990, this objective would entail maintaining an annual real (inflation-adjusted) growth rate in GNP of 2 per cent. Another goal was to foster 6 per cent annual growth of the consumer and capital goods producing sector of the economy through the year 2000, so that it would eventually account for more than 40 per cent of GDP. Manufacturing value added was to be increased by substituting domestic materials for imported industrial and raw material inputs. A related goal was to reduce imported goods and services to 56 per cent of GDP by the year 2000, down from 90 per cent in 1985. Technical training was to continue to ensure that the labour force remained among the most skilled and professional in the Arab world. Finally, domestic savings were to finance an increasing share of investment. The plan also listed several socioeconomic priorities for the year 2000: to continue to distribute development more equitably throughout the country; to make the country's arid desert regions a focus of future development; and to ensure that all citizens had access to health, education, communications services, housing, and utilities.

Economic Liberalisation Economic liberalisation plays a large role in the king's proposed reform package. According to the World Bank, Jordan's main economic problems are "high and persistent unemployment", lack of natural resources, and its vulnerability to external shocks. The war in Iraq has only exacerbated the negative effect of external shocks onto the Jordanian economy as Jordan has lost one of its largest export markets. The kingdom has also suffered the effects of the large Iraqi expatriate community, estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands, settled mainly in Amman. Mahmood al-Abid of The Jordan Times, an English-language daily paper based in Amman, discussed in an April 17, 2005 article the economic effect of this new expatriate population. The expatriates have placed an enormous burden onto Jordan's trade balance, which has become increasingly negative due to the Iraqi population's high demand for goods. Perhaps the most devastating effect however, is the increasing demand for energy and

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water, the two most costly resources for a country with virtually no fossil energy sources and precious little water of its own. The tumultuous economic situation created by the Iraq War and a generally unstable Middle East has only sharpened the determination within the reformist camp led by King Abdullah to implement economic reforms. The World Bank has evaluated Jordan's recent economic reforms as positive and effective measures, despite the burden created by the political and security instability in the region. According to the Bank, "given the size and frequency of these shocks, Jordan has done well on reforms, accelerating them across a wide area, including macroeconomic stabilisation, trade and private investment, privatisation and sectoral reforms. As a result, recent growth has been relatively robust and the economy has grown more resilient to shocks." Following the April government reshuffle, more economic reforms appear to be on Jordan's agenda. According to Ignatius, new Finance Minister Basim Awadullah plans to announce next month several new liberal economic measures, among them a reduction in oil subsidies, budget deficit reduction, and privatisation of Jordan's telecommunications, power, and mining industries. While democratic elements may not be effectively pursued in the kingdom, the United States and the international community see these economic changes as a positive development.

Banking and Finance The dominant financial institutions in Jordan were the Central Bank and the Amman Financial Market. Jordan's largest commercial bank was the Arab Bank. Until 1989 many small money-changing offices were operated by small proprietors. Jordan also had three Islamic banks. The Central Bank, established in 1964, was responsible for note issue, management of exchange reserves, and regulation of credit. It acted as the fiscal agent for the government, regulated the commercial banking sector, and sponsored the creation of certain new financial institutions. In 1985, for example, the Central Bank acted jointly with the Egyptian government to establish a new bank to finance bilateral trade. The government's presence in the financial sector was augmented by several specialised institutions that filled voids in commercial lending activity: the Agricultural Credit Corporation, the

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Housing Bank (which provided mortgages), and the Industrial Development Bank (which channelled capital to small start-up manufacturing businesses). The government also channelled equity capital to the private sector through large government pension and social security funds. The banking sector more than doubled loans and deposits between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. During the same period, the number of financial institutions tripled. The government encouraged the expansion of banking services as a key to its economic development policy. Deposits were attracted from other Arab nations, and the savings and remittances of the many Jordanians who traditionally had never used banks were captured. These deposits were in turn funnelled as loans to growing companies that needed capital. Monetisation-the use of legal tender as a medium of exchange rather than barter-was very successful. By the mid-1980s, Jordan was the only Arab country in which the value of bank assets exceeded GOP. Total commercial bank assets rose from JD1.1 billion in 1980 to JD2.3 billion in 1985. During the same period, total deposits increased from about JD800 million to JD1.7 billion. Demand deposits decreased from about 35 per cent to 20 per cent of total deposits, while savings deposits grew. Strict Central Bank consumer credit controls and government success in encouraging savings also were indicated by the growth of the liquid money supply at about 7 per cent per year from 1980 to 1987. The liquid money supply reached about JD900 million during this period, with no significant inflation. In the mid-1980s, however, the government became apprehensive that the banking sector was expanding too rapidly. One concern was that the proliferation of banks could engender excessive competition for assets and risky lending activity; as a result, in 1984 the Central Bank imposed a moratorium on the establishment of new commercial banks. The government also was worried that Jordanian banks preferred making loans to foreign companies rather than to Jordanian companies, that the banks avoided long-term lending, and that loans often financed trade rather than capital investment. In 1985 more than 27 per cent of commercial bank credit financed trade, whereas less than 10 per cent financed corporate investment. Another concern was that banks had been so successful in

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attracting deposits that they were diverting public investment from Jordan's stock exchange, the Amman Financial Market. As a result, companies were unable to obtain equity finance and had no choice but to finance themselves through bank loans. The value of traded shares-less than JD70 million in 1984-had always been dwarfed by banking activity. The total value of share prices on the stock market grew an average of 20 per cent annually from 1978 to 1982. From 1983 to 1986, however, share prices dropped an average of 13 per cent annually. Companies in the service and manufacturing sectors were especially hard hit, and in 1986 their total share value was less than it had been in 1978. In 1987 and 1988, the stock market recovered as investors tried to hedge against the shaky dinar. Trading volume reached a record high of JD149 million in 1987. To counterbalance fluctuating stock values and the rapid expansion of banking, the government initiated greater regulation of bank activity. Banks were required to invest 8 per cent of their deposits in government bills and bonds. Investment of at least 15 per cent of capital in public and mixed sector corporate equity also was mandated, and the minimum capital requirement was increased to JD5 million. Binding interest rate ceilings were set on both loans and deposits, and the dinar exchange rate was fixed by the Central Bank. In the late 1980s, thirty major banks and financial institutions operated in Jordan, including eight major locally based conventional commercial banks with numerous branch offices, six foreign banks, two major Islamic banks, and a host of smaller or more specialised foreign and domestic financial institutions, some of which conducted merchant banking, investment banking, and trade or agricultural finance. By far the largest locally based commercial bank was the Arab Bank, a Palestinian institution that moved to Amman from Jerusalem in 1948. Because the Arab Bank catered mainly to Palestinians throughout the world, it was not a dominant force in the local market. In terms of total assets (primarily loans) the Jordan National Bank, the Cairo-Amman Bank, the Jordan-Kuwait Bank, and the Petra Bank were perhaps more important local institutions. Foreign banks included Citibank, Grindlays Bank, the Hong Kongbased British Bank of the Middle East, as well as Iraq's Rafidayn Bank and Egypt's Arab Land Bank. Chase Manhattan Bank left Jordan following the 1984 government-imposed financial regulations.

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The Central Bank had permitted the virtually unsupervised operation of hundreds of small money-changing offices by individual ·proprietors. The system had worked well when the dinar was valued realistically compared to foreign currencies. But throughout 1988, as the government attempted to prop up the value of the dinar by freezing the official exchange rate, moneychangers became an open black market that facilitated the slide of the dinar. In February 1989, the government abruptly cancelled the licenses of all moneychangers, closed their offices, froze their bank accounts, and seized their records. Jordan also had permitted the establishment of three Islamic banks that adhered to Islamic legal tenets proscribing interest rate (riba) transactions. The Islamic banks paid no interest on deposits, and collected no interest on loans. Instead, they made equity investments in companies and then shared in the venture's profit or loss, some of which would then be passed on to depositors. The Islamic banks also were active in financing rural or low-cost housing as well as capital investment by manufacturing companies. Typically, Islamic banks built or bought a housing development or a piece of equipment and then leased it to a client or company on terms that approximated loan repayments. Jordan's Islamic banks attracted the savings of pious Muslims from Jordan and other Arab countries who would not use conventional, interest-charging banks. The Islamic banks also financed SOcially desirable projects that conventional banks regarded as too risky or unprofitable. Islamic banks have had mixed success in Jordan. The Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Investment was created in 1978, as a member of the Saudi Arabian-based Al-Baraka network of Islamic banks, but 90 per cent of its capital was Jordanian owned. By 1986 it had become the sixth largest of Jordan's banks in assets and had financed numerous projects. The Islamic Investment House, which was established with Kuwaiti backing in 1981, was shut down for an indefinite period by the government in 1984 because the projects it had financed were losing money and were putting deposits at risk.

Improving Prospects Jordan's economy is reaping the benefits of an improved geopolitical backdrop and several years of structural reform. Daniel Hanna explains why he expects Jordan to be among the best performing Mid-East economies in 2004 and 2005.

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Early estimates show that Jordan's economy grew by over 7 per cent in real terms in the first half of 2004. Overall we expect Jordan to reach 6 per cent for the full year of 2004 and 4.5 per cent in 2005. Jordan's remarkable export performance continues to drive the economy forward. Exports rose by 46 per cent in the year to August. In part this reflects an improved business climate-the World Bank cited Jordan as having made the most progress in the region in its annual. Doing Business survey-and in part the preferential trade access to the US granted through the Free Trade Agreement. US dollar weakness, and therefore a more competitive dinar, is also helping boost external demand. There are also tentative signs of a recovery in domestic demand. Falling unemployment, rising incomes and a boom in construction is helping support consumer confidence. At the same time business confidence is rising. The recent stock market performance highlights the turnaround, with the general index up 50 per cent year to date in US dollar terms. Industrial production, a useful proxy for domestic output, is up 12.8 per cent January to August. The government's fiscal position also reflects the improved domestic picture. Sales tax revenues have grown by 42 per cent over the first eight months of the year compared to the same period in 2003, while corporate tax receipts are running about 33 per cent higher. This should ensure that the fiscal deficit comes in well below the 3.9 per cent (excluding foreign grants 10.1 per cent) forecast in the 2004 budget. The rebound in growth should be sustained into 2005. In particular the tentative recovery in domestic demand bodes well for next year. There are a number of factors that could lead to growth beating our expectations. Progress with the government's privatisation plans, for example, would do much to support domestic and international confidence. It is the outlook for Iraq, traditionally Jordan's largest trading partner, however, that is key. Jordan is already benefiting from the booming trade between the two countries. Over the first eight months of 2004 Jordan's exports to Iraq have risen by 140 per cent compared to the same period in 2003. Visitor numbers to Jordan are also recovering, partially as a result of business activity related to Iraqi reconstruction. If the security situation in Iraq stabilises, and exports continue to grow, it could add at least another 2 per cent to growth next year.

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Equally, however, Jordan remains vulnerable to a deterioration of the situation in Iraq, or indeed any of its neighbouring states. The outcome of the Palestinian elections, scheduled for January, and the prospects for renewed Israeli/Palestinian peace talks will be closely watched. Further improvements in the regional political situation would be welcome given our expectations for a more challenging global economic environment in 2005. We anticipate a moderation in global growth, with slowdowns in both the US and China. US, and therefore (because of the currency peg) Jordanian, interest rates are expected to continue to rise. Part of the impact may be offset by a projected fall in oil prices. However falling oil prices are not straightforwardly good news. Remittances from expiates working in the Gulf economies provide important balance of payments support. Net remittances totalled USD 1.8bn in 2003. However the biggest economic risk next year will be the end of the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA), which will expose Jordanian textile and clothing exports to the US to a greater degree of competition. The growth in clothing sales has been at the heart of Jordan's export renaissance. They now account for 30 per cent of Jordan's total exports compared to just 3 per cent five years ago. The value of clothing exports, mainly to the US, grew by 50 per cent alone in the first eight months of the year. The IMF has warned that this growth is likely to halt in 2005 and then only grow at a reduced annual rate of 7.5 per cent. This is its best case scenario. Potentially, the IMF suggests, clothing exports could drop by as much as 75 per cent in 2005, widening Jordan's current account deficit by 2.2 per cent. This seems unlikely. Jordan's free trade deal with the US will offer some protection to Jordan's exporters, as they will not have to pay American trade tariffs. However the impact on their market share from low cost producers such as China should not be underestimated. After the lifting of restrictions on 29 apparel categories to the US market in 2001 China's market share went from 9 per cent to 51 per cent in terms of volume in just two years. The impact from the end of the MFA is unlikely to be so sudden nor perhaps as straightforward. Several US textile companies have already petitioned for further tariffs to be imposed against Chinese imports. Nonetheless it underlines the need for Jordan's exporters to move quickly up the value chain. In spite of the challenges posed by the end of the MFA,

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Jordan's outlook is improving. The economy now has a firm macro foundation and government policy continues to move in the right direction. Jordan's geopolitical importance suggests that donor flows will continue to provide economic support. Moreover Jordan's economy has shown remarkable resilience in recent years in the face of a series of external shocks. As 2004's performance demonstrates the economy has much potential.

International Trade Since independence, Jordan has imported far more than it has exported. Throughout the 1970s, the gap widened as imports grew faster than exports. Jordan did not seek to achieve a trade balance with any major trading partner. In the mid-1980s, the United States and Western Europe supplied almost 50 per cent of Jordan's imports, while Arab nations purchased nearly half of the country's exports. Although Jordan's merchandise trade deficit was always high, the total volume of external trade-defined as imports plus exportswas much higher, indicating that exports were significant enough to offset part of the large import bill. Between 1982 and 1985, as economic growth slowed, import volume contracted by about 4 per cent per year. Exports grew by about 5 per cent per year during the same period, shrinking the annual trade deficit from more than JD800 million in the early 1980s to JD623 million in 1985. In 1987 the total value of imports was about JD916 million while total exports were valued at about JD249 million, leaving a trade deficit of JD667 million. When it became apparent that Jordan could not shift the trade balance in the short term by dramatically reducing imports and increasing exports, government economic planners attempted to alter the composition and direction of external trade by slowly pursuing a two-pronged policy. Jordan tried to improve its gross barter terms by exporting products with higher value added; for example, prices of consumer goods tended to be higher and more stable than those of raw materials. Likewise, Jordan tried to increase the efficiency of its imports by increasing imports of capital goods and raw materials while lowering imports of consumer goods. The concept was that Jordan should import relatively more and export relatively less of goods that contributed directly towards economic growth.

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The changes in the relative composition of exports were more pronounced than changes in the relative composition of imports between 1974 and 1986, according to figures compiled by the Central Bank. Nonetheless, changes were not dramatic in either category. Consumer goods declined from 45 per cent to about 37 per cent of total imports, but capital goods also declined from 26 per cent to 23 per cent of total imports. Raw materials increased from 19 per cent to 34 per cent of total imports, but this rise primarily reflected a growing oil bill, as Jordan could no longer obtain oil at discount prices. Raw material exports declined from 53 per cent to 38 per cent of total exports, capital goods exports were cut in half from 12 per cent to 6 per cent, and consumer goods exports were boosted from 35 per cent to 56 per cent of total exports. Phosphates continued to generate 20 per cent of export earnings. Although the shift in external trade composition appeared to coincide with government policy, economist Rodney Wilson has pointed out that part of the shift was illusory. Customs classifications may have been misleading and also may have changed over time. Many consumer imports were listed as capital imports and raw material or capital goods exports often were listed as consumer goods exports. For example, fertilizers, a major export, were listed as consumer goods. Because the categorisation of imports and exports according to their value added or ultimate economic disposition was ambiguous, a more specific breakdown of exports and imports by product was warranted. In 1987, energy imports made up approximately 13 per cent of the import bill; food imports constituted about 11 per cent of the import bill. Basic manufactures, such as textiles, iron, and steel together represented 9 per cent of import cost; machinery and transportation equipment. Constituted 20 per cent, and imports of miscellaneous manufactured articles constituted 10 per cent of imports. In 1987, 28 per cent of Jordanian export earnings were of chemical products, including fertilizers. Raw phosphate exports generated about 25 per cent of export earnings, and potash exports accounted for about 11 per cent of export earnings. Food and food products constituted about 8 per cent and basic manufactures, such as cement, about 4 per cent.

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At least some of the shift in import composition appeared to contribute to economic growth insofar as it was correlated with GNP growth. In the early 1980s, the average value of consumer goods imports as a percentage of GNP dropped marginally, from 23 per cent to 21 per cent, while capital goods imports increased from 15 per cent to 23 per cent of GNP. The value of total imports as a percentage of GNP climbed almost 40 per cent between 1973 and 1983, reaching about 87 per cent; however, the rate of this growth slowed during the period and was outpaced by GNP growth. Whereas almost 50 per cent of Jordan's imports came from the United States and Western Europe, these same countries bought less than 10 per cent of Jordanian exports. The direction of external trade generally followed Jordan's self-perceived economic identity as an indirect intermediary between the West and the developed world on the one hand, and the Arab countries and the Third World on the other. But because other Arab nations remained the most important customers-buying almost 50 per cent of the 1987 export total of almost JD249 million-Jordanian markets were insufficiently diversified to benefit fully from this strategy. In early 1989, the Arab Cooperation Council, composed of Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), wa<; established to promote trade. This development, as well as the creation of the Joint Syrian-Jordanian Economic Committee, could reinforce Jordan's concentration on nearby markets. In the late 1980s, Jordan nevertheless sought to expand its export markets and had targeted Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa as potential prospects. In 1987, Iraq continued to be Jordan's largest export customer. Jordan exported nearly JD60 million worth of goods to Iraq, but most of this figure resulted from transit and re-export rather than from bilateral trade. Saudi Arabia was Jordan's second largest export customer. Jordanian exports to Egypt had grown more than fourfold since 1985, demonstrating that Egypt was an important new outlet. Other major Arab export markets included Kuwait. Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. South Asian and East Asian nations were regarded as promising markets, particularly for the sale of fertilizer and industrial chemicals. In 1987, India was Jordan's third largest export customer. Exports to China, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Japan also were growing.

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Furthermore, trade protocols signed in 1987 with both Thailand and Turkey may have opened the door to greater exports to both the Asian and the European markets. Italy was Jordan's only major West European customer. Jordanian officials envisioned improved prospects in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Jordan regarded Africa as a potentially vast market that could constitute one of the first experiments with the so-called "South-South" relationship advocated in ThirdWorld circles. Whereas exports to Africa remained minimal in 1987, Jordan's apparent willingness to consider counter trade and barter remained attractive to such markets. Jordan imported about J0916 million worth of goods in 1987. Iraq was the largest source of imports, but much of the J099 million worth of products it sent to Jordan were intended for re-export. Imports from Saudi Arabia, Jordan's third largest import source in 1987, consisted mainly of oil. Almost 40 per cent of Jordan's total import bill in 1987 came from eight West European nations, headed by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Britain, and Italy. The United States was Jordan's second largest source of imports and Japan was another significant import source.

One Year of Stellar Growth The Jordanian economy performed exceptionally well in 2004, with real GOP growth estimated at more than 7 per cent, the highest achieved since 1992. Last year's growth compares favourably with the 3.4 per cent growth in 2003, 5.1 per cent in 2002, and an average of 4.3 per cent per year for the period 2000-2003. The surge in business confidence, the expansionary fiscal policy. the increase in exports especially to the US, higher capital inflows especially from Iraqis, the rise in consumer lending, the higher remittances from Jordanians working in the Gulf, and the financial aid that the country is receiving will all contribute to strong economic performance in 2005 as well. Real GOP growth this year was likely to exceed 6 per cent with nominal GOP growth of 8 per cent and per capital income of JO 1,500 ($2,116). Jordan needs to maintain real GOP growth in excess of 6 per cent for several more years to come in order to help absorb the new entrants to the labour force and reduce the existing high unemployment level.

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All economic sectors performed well in the first three quarters of the year. The best performer was the construction sector which grew by 19.9 per cent compared to a year ago level, manufacturing sector rose by 15 per cent, and transport and telecommunication by 13 per cent. Inflationary pressures remained subdued, rising in the first eleven months of the year at 3.2 per cent. Exports surged by 43.4 per cent in the first ten months of 2004 compared to a growth rate of 3.8 per cent during the same period of 2003. Exports to the US, believed to have reached $1 billion in 2004, were mainly goods produced in the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs). The US has become the largest market for Jordanian products, accounting for around 27 per cent of Jordan's total exports. Iraq came second with 17.5 per cent, followed by India with 6.3 per cent and Saudi Arabia with 5.7 per cent. Imports on the other hand rose by 36.2 per cent in the first ten months of the year, compared to an increase of 6.9 per cent in the same period of 2003. The surge in imports was underpinned by robust domestic activity and consumption demand, a rise in oil prices, an increase in the cost of Euro-and Yendenominated products, as well as a growth in re-exports to Iraq. The construction sector, which recorded strong growth in 2003, continued to rise last year as well. The growth in this sector is attributed to the large number of infrastructure projects being implemented and the rising number of housing and apartment buildings under construction. The area approved for residential and commercial construction rose by 21.1 per cent in the first ten months of the year, while the total number of transactions for selling land, apartments and other real estate reached 97,000 by the end of October 2004, compared with 82,000 for the whole of 2003. The construction sector has strong forward and backward linkages with other sectors of the economy (building material, furniture, consumer durables, etc.) and has, therefore, had a positive impact on growth elsewhere in the economy. A strong recovery was recorded in the tourism and transport sectors with visitors mostly from the Gulf and Iraq dominating the flow. Major hotels in Amman reported average occupancy rates of more than 70 per cent in the first ten months of the year. It was a record year for Royal Jordanian Airlines in the terms of cargo and number of passengers, as well as profitability. The instability in Iraq

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encouraged Iraqis to operate out of Jordan. The kingdom became the gateway to and from Iraq with surging re-exports to that country, and with many Iraqis buying apartments and residing in Jordan. Telecom and information technology also did quite well, and so did services such as banking, medical care, education in private universities. The solid rise in real estate prices, up in certain areas of Amman by around 35 per cent last year, and the higher stock prices, with the market index surging by 62.4 per cent in 2004, boosted the "wealth effect" of consumers and reflected positively on their consumption and investments expenditures. Rapid expansion in consumer loans, sizable remittances estimated at $2.5 billion in 2004, and higher expenditures by Iraqis living in Jordan also supported growth in domestic consumption. The government revealed an expansionary budget for 2005, with total expenditures at JD 3,330 million, up 10.7 per cent from the estimated actual spending in 2004 of JD 3,007 million. Current expenditures, which account for 76.4 per cent of total expenditures and include wages, pension and interest payments, are set at JD 2,545 million, rising by 10.2 per cent over last year's actual level. The growth in current expenditures in this year's budget are mainly geared to cover increases in pension payments and additional wages and salaries resulting from the raise in wages of civil servants in education. health and justice ministries, and the creation of new ministries and higher councils. Domestic revenues are estimated to grow by 8.2 per cent to JD 2,000 million due to the envisaged economic growth in 2005 and the improved tax revenues, while foreign grants are forecast to rise by 35.2 per cent to JD 1.06 billion. This means current expenditures in this year's budget would exceed domestic revenues by 27 per cent, a discomforting state of affairs as the government will once again be depending on aid and borrowing to finance more than one quarter of its current expenditures. It is unfortunate that this year's budget did not exhibit the fiscal discipline needed to put a freeze on current expenditures before reducing it gradually in the coming years to a level that does not exceed domestic revenues. Raising taxes to boost domestic revenues is not considered as a viable alternative. On the contrary, it could back fire given the high level of taxation in the country. Capital expenditures, which include this year the JD 161 million

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earmarked for the social and economic transformation plan, are budgeted to increase by 12.6 per cent on last year's actual level to JO 785 million. The budget is forecast to run a deficit of JO 270 million, which accounts for 3.3 per cent of estimated GOP for 2005. The government envisaged a budget deficit of JO 293 million (3.9 per cent of GOP) in 2004, but the actual deficit dropped to JO 277.8 million (3.6 per cent of GOP). Notwithstanding the strong economic growth conditions, Jordan remains highly indebted and will continue to depend on foreign grants for several more years in order to keep the government's budget deficit within safe financing limits. Jordan's domestic and external public debt dropped by 1.4 per cent to JO 7 billion at the end of October 2004, from JO 7.096 billion at the end of 2003, accounting for 89.7 per cent of the Kingdom's estimated GOP for 2004. The outstanding external debt at the end of October stood at JO 5.28 billion or 68.9 per cent of the GOP for 2004 while the outstanding domestic debt stood at JO 1.718 billion representing 22.4 per cent of the GOP. The favourable macroeconomic conditions were underpinned by sound monetary policy. Allowing interest rates on the dinar to move in tandem with those on the dollar helped support stable JO exchange rate vis-a-vis the US currency and encouraged capital repatriation. Foreign reserves at the Central Bank are at an all time high of close to $4.8 billion and the country's competitiveness remain adequate as evidenced by the robust export performance in recent years. The current fixed peg to the dollar is a natural anchor, given that much of Jordan's external current account inflows (aid, remittances, exports of phosphates, potash, etc) are all dominated in dollars or in currencies linked to dollar. The Central Bank should also be commanded on its supervision of the banking sector, considered to be among the better regulated in the region, and on allowing leading Arab banks to have a presence in the Jordanian market. Today, Jordan enjoys internal security and stability, has a free market oriented economy, an attractive investment climate, an advanced judiciary system, a world class infrastructure and communication, qualified and competitive human resources, a developed banking sector, and one of the most advanced and well regulated capital markets in the Middle East. This is why the kingdom

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is now well placed on the radar serene of investors both domestically and from abroad.

Economic Austerity, 1981 Since the creation of Trans-Jordan in 1921, the nation had depended on external economic aid. This dependence rendered it economically vulnerable. For many years the economy was underwritten by Britain. By the early 1950s, after Jordan had officially annexed the West Bank, foreign aid accounted for 60 per cent of government revenues. The crucial event for the Jordanian economy, as it was for the Arab world as a whole, was the quadrupling of world oil prices that followed the October 1973 War. Possessing little oil of its own, Jordan nonetheless became inexorably linked to the volatile world oil market. Between 1973 and 1981, direct Arab budget support rose more than sixteen-fold, from US$ 71.8 million to US$ 1.179 billion. In the same period. the value of Jordanian exports jumped almost thirteenfold, from US$ 57.6 million to US$ 734.9 million. In addition, Jordan sent to the Persian Gulf states an estimated 350,000 doctors, engineers, teachers, and construction workers who by 1981 had sent back home more than US$ 1 billion. Even after deducting the outward flow of dinars from the 125,000 foreign workers inside Jordan holding agricultural and unskilled jobs, net worker remittances rose from US$ 15 million in 1970 to US$ 900 million in 1981. The accelerated pace of economic growth fuelled by the oil price increases of the 1970s also caused inflation and growing import bills. Most important for Jordan, the economic boom years of the 1970s raised popular expectations of continued economic prosperity. As a result, when world oil prices began spiralling downward in the early 1980s, the government halted many large-scale construction projects, slashed food and other subsidies, and significantly reduced public employment. These actions stirred public dissatisfaction. Hussain's response to the rise in public discontent was to ease restrictions on the political process. First, in 1981 he increased membership of the National Consultative Council (NCC) from sixty to seventy-five. The NCC had been created in April 1978 to fulfil the legislative functions of the dissolved House of Representatives. The NCC, however, was empowered only to debate and discuss bills and had no authority to make laws.

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As a result, the enlargement of the NCe's membership did not appease the opposition seeking democratic reforms. In addition, in March 1982 a new weekly publication, AI-Ufuq (Horizons), campaigned for greater democratic freedom and for the reestablishment of political parties banned since 1957. Two political parties were formed: the Arab Constitutional Alignment and the Arab National Party. Both parties called for greater public participation in the affairs of state.

Austerity Measures To contain its financial crisis, the Jordanian government embraced several austerity measures in the late 1980s. It froze the currency exchange rate and halted the operation of moneychangers, who had facilitated the dinar's drop by ignoring official exchange rates and acting as an open black market. In November 1988, the government also imposed new import duties of 20 to 30 per cent on most consumer goods and banned a wide array of so-called luxury imports, including automobiles, refrigerators, cameras, televisions, telephones, cosmetics, and cigarettes. The ban on luxury imports was to last for at least one year, but statements by Jordanian officials indicated that it might last considerably longer. Taxes and service charges at airports and hotels were increased, as were work permit fees for guest workers. The government also adopted an austerity budget that cut both current expenditure and development investment. Prime Minister Zaid ar Rifai sought to reassure Jordanians that the problems were temporary. In a February 1989 interview, he stated that" the Jordanian economy is active and suffers no troubles at all. Its troubles are financial, not economic." To the extent that this was true, however, observers noted that Jordan's successful growth in the 1970s and early 1980s was likewise more financial than economic.

Labour Force In the late 1980s, Jordan both exported and imported labour. The total domestic active labour force in 1987 was about 659,000 workers. Of this number, approximately 150,000 (23 per cent) were foreign guest workers, and approximately 509,000 were Jordanian citizens. Concurrently, an estimated 350,000 Jordanians worked abroad. In 1988 the number of Jordanians living abroad, including dependants, was estimated at up to 1 million.

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The oil price increases of 1973 and 1974 stimulated tremendous labour demand in the Arab petroleum-exporting nations, which tended to have small population. Jordan, suffering from unemployment and having an educated and skilled work force, was prepared to fill this vacuum; over the following decade, several hundred thousand Jordanians left their country to work in neighbouring Arab nations. About 60 per cent of Jordanian emigrants worked in Saudi Arabia, about 30 per cent worked in Kuwait, and most of the remainder found employment in other Persian Gulf states. Remittances to Jordan traditionally have been the largest source of foreign currency earnings and a pillar of economic prosperity. In 1980 remittance income was US$ 666 million, but by 1986, according to official statistics published by the Central Bank, remittance income had increased to an estimated US$ 1.5 billion at the then-prevailing exchange rate. According to a UN estimate, however, Jordan's 1986 remittance income was about US$ 1.25 billion and subsequently declined slightly. Actual remittance income was probably higher because much of the money was funnelled back to Jordan through unofficial channels. Economist Ian J. Seccombe, who has produced authoritative studies of the Jordanian economy, estimated that real remittance inflows were perhaps 60 per cent higher than the official receipts. Another expert, Philip Robins, estimated that real remittances could be twice the official receipts. Official figures did not include remittances in kind, such as automobiles brought back to Jordan and then sold by returning expatriates, nor remittance income exchanged at moneychangers rather than at banks. Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, official statistics reported that remittance income exceeded export income, in some years by over 200 per cent. Remittance income accounted for between 25 per cent and 33 per cent of the liquid money supply, about 20 per cent of the GNp, and exceeded the figures for total government development spending, or total foreign aid receipts. As early as the mid-1970s, however, remittance income and labour export created economic and demographic distortions. The problems were so pronounced that in the 1970s Crown Prince Hasan called for the creation of an international fund to compensate Jordan and other labour-exporting nations for the negative effects of emigration.

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The billions of dollars that Jordanian emigrants pumped back into their home economy fuelled prolonged double-digit inflation, especially of housing prices. To rein in inflation and to attract and capture remittances, the government tried to tighten the money supply by maintaining high interest rates for bank deposits. As a consequence, loan costs rose, hampering the investment activity of businesses and fa"rms that needed finance. Also, and because remittances tended to be spent on imported luxury goods, the merchandise trade deficit expanded. Jordanian labour export also had an unanticipated impact on the domestic labour force. Over time, foreign demand grew disproportionately for Jordan's most highly educated and skilled technocrats and professionals, such as engineers. This "brain drain" caused a serious domestic scarcity of certain skills. At the same time, wages for unskilled labour were bid up as Jordanian employers competed for manual workers. Progress on major infrastructure development projects was hampered. For example, according to a United States government study, the labour shortage idled heavy equipment on the East Ghor (also seen as Ghawr) Canal project for up to 70 per cent of the workday. Ironically, Jordan was obliged eventually to import "replacement labour" -usually low skilled workers from Egypt and South Asia-who transferred their wages out of Jordan. The number of foreign guest workers in Jordan grew compared to the number of Jordanians working abroad. The foreign guest workers also sent home a greater proportion of their wages than did the Jordanians working abroad. In the 1970s, such wage outflows constituted less than 10 per cent of Jordan's remittance inflows, but by the late 1980s they offset nearly 25 per cent of inflows, neutralising much of the benefit of labour export. In the late 1980s, after years of internal labour shortages, Jordan faced a looming unemployment problem. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Jordan sustained a high average annual population growth rate of between 3.6 and 4 per cent. This growth rate was augmented by about 0.5 per cent per year because of immigration into Jordan from the Israeli-occupied West Bank. In 1985, the government calculated that the work force would grow 50 per cent to 750,000 by 1990. In the late 1980s, this prediction was proving accurate; about 40,000 people were joining the domestic labour pool every year. A combination of GNP growth, increased worker efficiency,

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emigration, and attrition created jobs for most new workers, and unemployment was kept to about 9 per cent. Experts believed, however, that unemployment and underemployment would probably increase rapidly in the 1990s as the labour pool continued to grow more quickly than labour demand. In 1986, only about 20 per cent of Jordanian citizens worked or sought work, a figure expected to grow dramatically as the youthful population aged. In addition, because of the recession in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states caused by slumping oil prices, Jordanians who had been working abroad were repatriating and seeking work at home. The Ministry of Labour estimated that about 2,500 Jordanians returned from abroad in 1986. Another source, however, estimated the number of returning workers and their dependants at 35,000 in 1986. Moreover, womenwho in 1986 made up only a little more than 12 per cent of the working population but almost 50 per cent of secondary school and college enrolment-were expected to attempt to join the labour force in growing numbers. The work force had some elasticity in that approximately 150,000 foreign guest workers could be sent home and their jobs given to Jordanian citizens; but even if all guest workers were repatriated, unemployment would persist. By one estimate that did not include repatriating Jordanian workers, unemployment could grow to 30 per cent of the work force in the 1990s in the absence of extraordinary government action. Therefore, although aware of the problems caused by labour emigration, the government remained far more concerned about unemployment-and declining remittances-than about the problem of emigration. As of 1989, the government had stated explicitly that it would continue to permit unrestricted worker emigration.

Industry Manufacturing contributed about 14 per cent of GtpP in the late 1980s. Much manufacturing activity related to exploitation of natural resources and to the mining sector. Although extractive industries were distributed throughout the country, about 90 per cent of both small and large manufacturing entities were concentrated in the north, in an industrial belt between Amman and Az Zarqa. Between 1975 and 1985, total manufacturing value added grew at roughly

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the same rate as GNp, at an annual average rate of 13 per cent through 1980, then decelerating to about 5 per cent. Employment in manufacturing grew slowly, and in the late 1980s was estimated at slightly more than 50,000, less than 10 per cent of the working population. For decades the government had emphasised industrial manufacturing development over other economic sectors, but growing excess industrial capacity prompted a greater priority to agriculture and water resource development in the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan. The manufacturing sector had two tiers. On one level were the large-scale, wholly or partially state-owned industrial establishments that produced chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizers, and mineral products. These manufacturing entities included the "big five" companies that constituted the pillars of the industrial base: the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company, the Jordan Fertilizer Industries Company, the Arab Potash Company, Intermediate Petrochemical Industries, the Jordan Cement Factories Company, and also a recently enlarged oil refinery at Az Zarqa that employed about 3,000 persons. The chemical products sector employed about 4,000 workers at about seventy facilities. Because these industries were established to process the products of Jordan's mining and extractive sector, it was difficult to distinguish between the industrial and natural resource sectors of the economy. Petroleum refining contributed 39 per cent to gross output manufacturing; fertilizers, potash, and other nonmetallic minerals, 13 per cent; industrial chemicals, about 8 per cent; and iron, steel, and fabricated metal products, about 10 per cent. Thus, about 70 per cent of total manufacturing output was closely linked to the mining and extractive sector. The high contribution of these industries to the total value of manufacturing output resulted in part from the high underlying value of the natural resource inputs on which they were based. The same industries accounted for about 57 per cent of total value added in manufacturing. On the other level were small or medium-sized lights manufacturing entities, many privately owned, that produced a wide array of consumer products. Many of these entities were cottage industries or small bazaar workshops. By one estimate, in 1984 more than 75 per cent of the approximately 8,500 manufacturing companies

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employed fewer than five persons each. The most important, in order of contribution to gross output value, were food processing, tobacco and cigarettes, paper and packaging, beverages, furniture, textiles, and plastics. These companies and other smaller industries such as publishing, glass and rubber products, electrical equipment, and machinery-each of which contributed less than 1 per cent of total manufacturing output value-together contributed about 30 per cent of gross manufacturing output and 43 per cent of manufacturing value added. Like most nations with ambitious development plans, Jordan pinned its hopes on growth, particularly in the export of manufactured goods. Although high tariff and non-tariff barriers sheltered selected industries from competition from lower cost imports, both nominal and effective rates of protection generally were low by the standards of developing economies. On the one hand, effective protection was high for paper and wood products, furniture, and apparel. On the other hand, imports of machinery, electrical equipment, and transport equipment were effectively subsidised. In view of its sustained high level of import of manufactured goods, observers viewed Jordan's pursuit of import substitution industrialisation as moderate. Jordan's import policy theoretically was designed to promote domestic manufacturing industries by ensuring their access to cheaper imported capital goods, raw materials, and other intermediate inputs rather than by granting them monopoly markets. The government believed that development of a domestic manufacturing base had to be led by exports because Jordan's small population could not generate enough consumer demand for manufacturing plants to achieve economies of scale or scope. In some cases, consumer demand was too low to justify building even the smallest possible faCility. Domestic consumer demand alone was insufficient to support some manufacturing industries despite the relatively high wages paid to Jordanian workers; the high wages resulted in increased product costs and diminished export sales of manufactured goods. In the late 1980s, according to a Jordanian economist, the country continued to experience constant returns to scale despite its significant exports. Essentially, Jordan was still in the first stage of industrial production, in which the per unit costs were high because of limited output. The relative contributions to manufacturing expansion made by

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domestic demand growth, export growth, and import substitution were difficult to assess accurately. Growth in domestic demand stimulated almost 60 per cent of manufacturing expansion, export growth contributed a moderate 12 per cent, and import substitution contributed nearly 30 per cent. But exports accounted for about 33 per cent of the growth of intermediate goods (fertilizers and other inputs) industries, and about 25 per cent of the growth of consumer goods industries. In contrast, external demand contributed virtually nothing to growth in the metal products, iron and steel, rubber, and glass industries; import substitution, domestic demand growth, or a combination of the two accounted for all domestic manufacturing growth, resulting in self-sufficiency. In the case of the furniture, apparel, textile, and industrial chemical industries, however increased domestic demand, increased foreign demand, or a combination of both led to simultaneous domestic manufacturing growth and increased imports. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the government concentrated on developing the first tier of the manufacturing sector-the production of chemicals and fertilizers-because, unlike consumer goods, these commodities appeared to have guaranteed export markets. The government followed this policy although the second tiers of the manufacturing sector-the production of consumer goods had significantly higher value added. The government strategy was to increase value added in exported commodities by producing and exporting processed commodities, such as fertilizers from raw phosphates and metal pipes from ore and ingots. Because some other Middle Eastern and West Asian nations had adopted the same strategy, competition for markets increased at the same time that demand slumped. Jordan suffered from declining terms of trade as the value of its processed commodity exports fell relative to the value of its consumer and capital goods imports. In the late 1980s, therefore, Jordan was reassessing its industrial strategy and searching for potential areas of comparative advantage in exporting light-manufactured goods and consumer and capital goods that had higher value added. Consumer goods were protected in many foreign markets, and Jordanian exports as a percentage of output in the consumer goods sector ranged only between 2 per cent and 9 per cent, as opposed to a range of 12 per cent to 35 per cent in the extractive industry based manufacturing sector.

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Accordingly, Jordan hoped to take advantage of its educated work force and increase the manufacture of capital goods that were either technical in nature or required engineering and technical expertise to manufacture. Those types of products had more appeal in foreign markets. To promote such development, the government established the Higher Council for Science and Technology, which in turn founded the private sector Jordan Technology Group as an umbrella organisation for new high technology companies. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the profitability of some capital goods industries, measured as a ratio of both gross output value and of value added, fell steeply compared to profit ratios in the commodities and consumer goods sectors. During the same period, profitability of the natural resources sector declined minimally, while profitability of the consumer goods sector rose. The capital goods sector had been much more profitable than the natural resources sector; but by the late 1980s, the two sectors were equally profitable. The main cause of the plunge in profitability among capital goods apparently was price inflation of imported intermediate inputs. Especially affected, for example, were the electrical equipment and plastics industries-precisely the type of technical industries that Jordan envisaged as important to its economic future. The drop in profitability was not irremediable, however, and government officials continued to be optimistic about prospects in technical industries, particularly those that were skill intensive and labour intensive rather than capital intensive. The pharmaceuticals and veterinary medicines industries were examples of the new direction of industrial development policy. The government-established Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company exported more than 70 per cent of its production in 1987. A half-dozen other drug and medical equipment companies were garnering a large share of the Middle Eastern market in the late 1980s. Engineering industries also were a development target. In 1985, this manufacturing sector accounted for about 9 per cent of manufacturing value added, 14 per cent of total manufacturing employment, and about US$ 5 million in export sales. About 95 per cent of the sector was devoted to basic fabrication of metal sheets, pipes, and parts. Jordan also exported in limited quantities more sophisticated products, such as domestic appliances,

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commercial vehicles, electrical equipment, and machinery; eventually it wanted to produce and export scientific equipment and consumer electronics. Another developing industry was plastic containers and packaging, of which about one-quarter of output was exported. The strategy to boost manufactured exports ultimately had to take into account the low manufacturing productivity growth of the 1980s. Average annual productivity growth was estimated at 2 per cent to 3 per cent, and in 1986 it was a mere 1.4 per cent. In several specific sectors, productivity was actually faIling. Because this low or negative growth occurred at a time when labour productivity was increasing rapidly, it was attributable to some combination of insufficient investment and stagnant domestic and foreign demand. Jordan's average industrial capacity utilisation, according to a UN report, was about 57 per cent, but varied widely according to industry. Pent up consumer demand for some products was great enough so that any increase in capacity could be translated automatically into increased production and sales. Capacity utilisation was almost 100 per cent for certain chemical and consumer goods factories, indicating that more investment might be warranted, whereas capacity utilisation in the production of certain household furnishings and building products was very low, suggesting suppressed or little demand. Spare production capacity meant that manufacturers would be able to meet sudden demand surges. In 1987, following a period of declining production, Egypt agreed to import construction materials and output of cement and metal pipes jumped 32 per cent and 48 per cent, respectively. Production of paper and cardboard also increased about 36 per cent as the packaging industry developed, but production of detergent dropped 8 per cent and production of textiles dropped 13 per cent, leaving spare capacity. The variability of capacity utilisation indicated the problems that the government had to confront in forecasting domestic and foreign demand for manufactured goods. Between 1980 and 1985, per capita consumption of electricity doubled from 500-kilowatt hours per year to 1,000-kilowatt hours per year. The demand increase reflected the doubling in the number of households supplied with electricity as rural villages were electrified. By 1985 about 400,000 households, or 97 per cent of the population, had access to electricity. Electricity generation increased 23 per cent

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in 1986 and 18 per cent in 1987 to total 712 megawatts or 3.2 billion kilowatt hours. After rural electrification was completed, growth in capacity outpaced growth in consumption, which was limited by conservation measures to about 3 per cent to 4 per cent per year. Roughly 40 per cent of the electric power generated was used by industry, 30 per cent was used by private citizens, 13 per cent was used by commercial businesses, and the remainder was used by water pumping stations. The Hussain Thermal Power Station at Az Zarqa historically had produced more than 70 per cent of the country's electricity, but at the end of 1987, the opening of the AI-Aqabah Thermal Power Station added 260 megawatts, boosting Jordan's generating capacity to 972 megawatts and ensuring selfsufficiency into the early 1990s. A 400-kilovolt-transmission line connected AI-Aqabah and Amman. The AI-Aqabah plant was to be expanded to a total capacity of 520 megawatts by the mid-1990s, and was planned eventually to supply 1,540 megawatts. Although Jordan depended entirely on imported oil to fire its generating plants in 1988, the government planned to reduce this dependency. The 1988 discovery of natural gas at Rishah, near the Iraqi border, led to feasibility studies of retrofitting the Az Zarqa plant with gas turbine generators. A 20-megawatt hydroelectric station was to be included as part of the planned AI-Wahdah Dam on the Yarmuk River. Discoveries of shale oil in the southern Wadi as Sultani region kindled hopes of a 100-megawatt shale-fired electric plant in that area. In 1989 Jordan also was prospecting for underground geothermal sources. Industrial Development During the first phase of the AMIR Programme, in coordination with the Information Technology Association-Jordan (int@j), the initiative helped launch a strategy for Jordan's IT industry called the REACH Initiative. This private-public sector-led strategy is designed to expand the industry's export base and enhance its regional competitiveness. Since the launch of the REACH Initiative in 1999, a vibrant, export oriented IT services has emerged. With the support of ICT!, int@j has rapidly grown into a dynamic representative of the ICT sector with a broad membership base from IT businesses in Jordan. Since the association's in<:eption, the initiative

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has supported it through technical support and grants. Support to int@j includes the following: • Helping sponsor and coordinate the Jordan ICT Forum in 2002. This premier event helped showcase Jordan's efforts and achievements to position the country as a major player in the information revolution. The event highlighted investment opportunities in the Jordanian ICT sector for foreign investors, and attracted national, regional and international business and media attention. The forum was also the channel through which the REACH Initiative is presented to stakeholders and potential partners. • Building the capacity of the industry through training. One example is the public relations training that coached members in basic PR skills, including media relations and creating effective press kits. • Supporting the association to attend regional ICT tradeshows where the latest in ICT equipment and experience are exchanged.

Natural Resources Jordan's mineral wealth and extractive industries constituted a major source of its gross output manufacturing as well as of its total value added in manufacturing. Such natural resources also represented a significant element in Jordan's exports. Phosphate deposits were Jordan's primary natural resource and a major source of export income. Estimates of Jordan have proven, indicated, and probable reserves ranged from 1.5 billion to 2.5 billion tons. Even if the more conservative figure were the most accurate, Jordan could produce at its present rate for hundreds of years. Total 1987 production was 6.7 million tons, of which 5.7 million tons were exported as raw rock. The remainder was upgraded into fertilizer at several facilities and either retained for domestic use or exported. Jordan was the third ranked phosphate exporter in the world, after Morocco and the United States, and it had the capacity to produce well over 8 million tons annually. In 1986 phosphate sales generated tJS$ 185 million in income, which made up 25 per cent of export earnings and gave Jordan a 10 per cent share of the world market. Sales by volume in 1986 increased approximately 14 per cent over the previous year, but profits rose only 4 per cent, an indication of

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the depressed price for phosphates on the world market. In 1986, long-term agreements were concluded with Thailand and Yugoslavia that assured the added export of almost 1 million tons per year. In 1985, the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company closed the country's original phosphate mine at Ar Rusayfah near Amman because it produced low-grade rock; this left major phosphate mines in operation at Al-Hasa and Wadi Abu Ubaydah near Al-Qatranah in central Jordan, and a new high-grade mine at Ash Shidiyah, forty kilometres south of Maan, where according to one estimate, reserves were more than 1 billion tons. Among Jordan's major development projects was the construction of a US$ 450 million processing facility near Al-Aqabah, completed in 1982, to produce monoammonium phosphate and diammonium phosphate fertilizer, and other chemicals such as phosphoric acid from raw phosphate rock. The project was envisioned as a boon to the extractive industry because it would increase value added in its major export commodity. Instead, it became an encumbrance as the prices of sulphur and ammonia (which Jordan had to import to produce the diammonium phosphate) rose while the price of diammonium phosphate on the world market slumped. Production costs of diammonium phosphate at various times between 1985 and 1987 ranged from 110 per cent to 160 per cent of world market price for the product. Nevertheless, Jordan remained cautiously optimistic about the long-term prospects for the fertilizer industry because of its geographic proximity to the large Asian markets. In 1985 Jordan exported more than 500,000 tons of fertilizer, primarily to India and China. Potash was the other major component of Jordan's mining sector. A US$ 480 million potash extraction facility at Al-Aghwar al-Janubiyah (also known as Ghor as Safi) on the Dead Sea, which was operated by the Arab Potash Company, produced 1.2 million tons of potash in 1987 and yielded earnings of almost US$ 100 million. The facility processed the potash into potassium chloride. Future plans included the production of other industrial chemicals such as potassium sulphate, bromine, magnesium oxide, and soda ash. As in the case of phosphates, India was a major customer, buying almost 33 per cent of output. Jordan was the world's lowest cost producer, in part because it used solar evaporation. There was lingering concern that

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possible Israeli construction of a Mediterranean-Dead Sea canal would dilute the Dead Sea, making extraction far more expensive.

Oil and Gas By the late 1980s, a twenty-year-long period of exploration had resulted in the discovery and exploitation of three oil wells in the Hamzah field in the Wadi al-Azraq region west of Amman that yielded only a small fraction of domestic energy requirements. Jordan also had just discovered oil from what appeared to be a field in the eastern panhandle near the Iraqi-Saudi Arabian border. Jordan remained almost entirely dependent on oil imported from Saudi Arabia and Iraq to meet its energy needs. Jordan refined the imported crude petroleum at its Az Zarqa refinery. In 1985, the Az Zarqa refinery processed about 2.6 million tons of petroleum. Of this total, about 1.8 million tons came from Saudi Arabia, 700,000 tons from Iraq, and 2,800 tons from Jordan's Hamzah field. An additional 400,000 tons of fuel were imported from Iraq. The Saudi Arabian oil was transported to Jordan via the TransArabian Pipeline (Tapline). Oil from Iraq was transported by tanker truck. About 40 per cent of oil imports were used by the transport sector, 25 per cent to generate electricity, 16 per cent by industry, and the remainder for domestic use. Jordan's oil bill was difficult to calculate and was subject to fluctuation as the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) changed its posted price for crude. Since 1985, barter agreements with Iraq to trade goods for crude oil have removed some of Jordan's oil bill from the balance sheet. Jordan also varied its imports of crude oil and other, more expensive fuels, depending on its immediate fuel demand and its refinery capacity, and cut consumption through conservation measures and price increases. The oil bill remained very large, however. A major irony of Jordan's energy dependence was that despite-or because of-its proximity to its main oil suppliers, it was sometimes obliged to pay extremely inflated prices for its oil. In mid-1986, for example, Saudi Arabia charged Jordan the official OPEC price of US$ 28 per barrel at a time when oil was selling on the international spot market for US$ 10 per barrel. Saudi Arabia's motives were perhaps as much political as economic, in that it wanted to maintain the integrity of the OPEC floor price for oil.

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Dependent on Saudi financial aid, Jordan could not alienate its patron by shopping on the world market. In 1985 estimates of Jordan's oil import bill ranged between US$ 500 million and US$ 650 million. At that time, imported oil constituted approximately 20 per cent of total imports and offset 80 per cent of the value of commodity exports. In 1986 and 1987, Jordan's estimated fuel bill declined considerably, to less than US$ 300 million. The drop resulted from barter with Iraq, decreased fuel imports, and OPEC's reduction of its official price of crude oil to bring it into line with world market prices. As prices dropped, the Jordanian government-which had subsidised domestic fuel prices-was able to cut the subsidy from US$ 70 million to US$ 14 million instead of passing on savings to consumers. Since 1984, Saudi Arabia has forced Jordan to underwrite the entire cost of operating the Tapline. This has added more than US$ 25 million per year to Jordan's oil bill. During the Iran-Iraq War, therefore, Jordan tried to persuade Iraq to obtain an alternative oil outlet by building a pipeline across Jordan to Al-Aqabah. The project foundered because of Iraqi concern that the line was vulnerable to Israeli attack and embarrassment over disclosure of Jordanian attempts to obtain a secret Israeli pledge not to attack the line. The 1980 discovery of from 10 billion to 40 billion tons of shale oil deposits in the Wadi as Sultani area raised Jordanian hopes of greater self-sufficiency, but there were doubts that large-scale exploitation of the deposits would be commercially viable in the near future. Since 1985 Jordan has attempted to interest Western oil companies in exploring for oil. Amoco, Hunt Petroleum, Petro-Canada, Petrofina of Belgium, and the Japanese National Oil Company were conducting survey work in Jordan in the late 1980s. Jordanian planners hoped that potentially extensive natural gas reserves discovered at Rishah in eastern Jordan could eventually replace oil for electricity generation, cutting imports by one-quarter.

Water The government was concerned that scarcity of water could ultimately place a cap on both agricultural and industrial development. Although no comprehensive hydrological survey had been conducted by the late 1980s, some experts believed that demand for water could outstrip supply by the early 1990s. Average annual rainfall was about

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8 billion cubic metres, most of which evaporated; the remainder flowed into rivers and other catchments or seeped into the ground to replenish large underground aquifers of fossil water that could be tapped by wells. Annual renewable surface and subterranean water supply was placed at 1.2 billion cubic metres. Total demand was more difficult to project. In 1985 Jordan consumed about 520 million cubic metres of water, of which 111 million cubic metres went for industrial and domestic use, and 409 million cubic metres went for agricultural use. By 1995 it was estimated that domestic and industrial consumption would almost double and agricultural demand would increase by 50 per cent, so that total demand would be about 820 million cubic metres. By the year 2000, projected demand was estimated at 934 million cubic metres. Jordan, therefore, would need to harness almost all of its annual renewable water resources of 1.2 billion cubic metres to meet future demand, a process that would inevitably be marked by diminishing marginal returns as ever more expensive and remotely situated projects yielded less and less added water. The process also could spark regional disputes-especially with Israelover riparian rights. The government had completed several major infrastructure projects in an effort to make maximum use of limited water supplies, and was considering numerous other projects in the late 1980s. The King Tala! Dam built in 1978 on the Az Zarqa River, formed Jordan's major reservoir. In the late 1980s, a project to raise the height of the dam by ten metres so as to increase the reservoir's capacity from 56 million cubic metres to 90 million cubic metres was almost complete. A second major construction project underway in 1989 was the Wadi al-Arabah Dam to capture floodwaters of the Yarmuk River and the Wadi al-Jayb (also known as Wadi al-Arabah) in a 17 million cubic metre reservoir. These two dams and innumerable other catchments and tunnels collected water from tributaries that flowed towards the Jordan River and fed the 50-kilometre-long East Ghor Canal. Plans called for the eventual extension of the East Ghor Canal to the Dead Sea region, which would almost double its length. In 1989 about fifteen dams were in various stages of design or construction, at a total projected cost of JD64 million.

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By far the largest of these projects was a joint Jordanian-Syrian endeavour to build a 100-metre-high dam on the Yarmuk River. The project, which had been contemplated since the 1950s but had foundered repeatedly because of political disputes, was revived in 1988 after the thaw in Jordanian-Syrian relations and appeared to be progressing in early 1989. Called the Maqarin Dam in previous development plans, it was renamed the AI-Wahdah Dam to reflect the political rapprochement that made construction feasible (AI Wahdah mean unity). The dam was to create a reservoir of 250 million cubic metres. The Jordanian estimate of the cost, which Jordan was to bear alone, was US$ 397 million. Independent estimates placed the figure at more than US$ 500 million. Building time was estimated at two years after the planned 1989 starting date, but new political problems threatened to stall construction. In 1988 the United States attempted to mediate between Jordan and Israel, which feared the dam would limit its own potential water supply; Syria, however, refused to join any tripartite negotiations. In 1989 serious consideration was being given to two proposals to construct major pipelines to import water. Completion of either project could be a partial solution to Jordan's water scarcity. Because of cost, however, neither project was likely to be constructed in the near future. One project was to construct a multibillion-dollar 650-kilometre-long pipeline from the Euphrates River in Iraq. The pipeline would supply Jordan with about 160 million cubic metres of water per year. The other project, on which feasibility studies had been conducted, was to construct a 2, 700-kilometre-long pipeline from rivers in Turkey, through Syria and Jordan, to Saudi Arabia. Jordan could draw an allotment of about 220 million cubic metres per year from this second pipeline. The estimated US$ 20 billion cost of the latter project was thought to be prohibitive.

Agriculture Agriculture contributed substantially to the economy at the time of Jordan's independence, but it subsequently suffered a decadeslong steady decline. In the early 1950s, agriculture constituted almost 40 per cent of GNP; on the eve of the June 1967 War, it was 17 percent. By the mid-1980s, agriculture's share of GNP was only about 6 per cent. In contrast, in Syria and Egypt agriculture constituted more than 20 per cent of GNP in the 1980s. Several factors contributed

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to this downward trend. With the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Jordan lost prime farmland. Starting in the mid-1970s, Jordanian labour emigration also hastened the decline of agriculture. Many Jordanian peasants abandoned farming to take more lucrative jobs abroad, sometimes as soldiers in the armies of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states or in service industries in those countries. Others migrated to cities where labour shortages had led to higher wages for manual workers. Deserted farms were built over as urban areas expanded. As the Jordanian government drove up interest rates to attract remittance income, farm credit tightened, which made it difficult for farmers to buy seed and fertilizer. In striking contrast to Egypt and Iraq, where redistribution of land irrigated by the Nile and Euphrates rivers was a pivotal political, social, and economic issue; land tenure was never an important concern in Jordan. More than 150,000 foreign labourers-mainly Egyptians-worked in Jordan in 1988, most on farms. Moreover, since the early 1960s, the government has continuously created irrigated farmland from what was previously arid desert, further reducing competition for arable land. Ownership of rain-fed land was not subject to special restrictions. Limited land reform occurred in the early 1960s when, as the government irrigated the Jordan River valley, it bought plots larger than twenty hectares, subdivided them, and resold them to former tenants in three-hectare to five-hectare plots. Because the land had not been very valuable before the government irrigated it, this process was accomplished with little controversy. In general, the government has aimed to keep land in larger plots to encourage efficiency and mechanised farming. The government made permanently indivisible the irrigated land that it granted or sold so as to nullify traditional Islamic inheritance laws that tended to fragment land. Although the agricultural sector's share of GNP declined in comparison with other sectors of the economy, farming remained economically important and production grew in absolute terms. Between 1975 and 1985, total production of cereals and beans rose by almost 150 per cent, and production of vegetables rose by more than 200 per cent, almost all of the increase occurring between 1975 and 1980. Production of certain cash export crops, such as olives, tobacro, and fruit, more than quadrupled. Because farming had

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remained labour intensive, by one estimate about 20 per cent to 30 per cent of the male work force continued to depend on farming for its livelihood. Even with increased production, the failure of agriculture to keep pace with the growth of the rest of the economy, however, resulted in an insufficient domestic food supply. Jordan thus needed to import such staples as cereals, grains, and meat. Wheat imports averaged about 350,000 tons per year, ten to twenty times the amount produced domestically. Red meat imports cost more than JD30 million per year, and onion and potato imports cost between JD3 million and JD4 million per year. Between 1982 and 1985, the total food import bill averaged about JD180 million per year, accounting for more than 15 per cent of total imports during the period. At the same time, cash crop exports-for example, the export of 7,000 tons of food to Western Europe in 1988-generated about JD40 million per year, yielding a net food deficit of JD140 million. One emerging problem in the late 1980s was the erosion of Jordan's traditional agricultural export market. The wealthy oil-exporting states of the Arabian Peninsula, concerned about their "food security," were starting to replace imports from Jordan with food produced domestically at costs far higher than world market prices, using expensive desalinated water. Observers expected food imports to remain necessary into the indefinite future. Much of Jordan's soil was not arable even if water were available; by several estimates, between 6 per cent and 7 per cent of Jordan's territory was arable, a figure that was being revised slowly upward as dry-land farming techniques became more sophisticated. In 1989 the scarcity of water, the lack of irrigation, and economic problems-rather than the lack of arable land-set a ceiling on agricultural potential. Only about 20 per cent of Jordan's geographic area received more than 200 millimetres of rainfall per year, the minimum required for rain-fed agriculture. Much of this land was otherwise unsuitable for agriculture. Moreover, rainfall varied greatly from year to year, so crops were prone to be ruined by periodic drought. In 1986 only about 5.5 per cent (about 500,000 hectares), of the East Bank's 9.2 million hectares were under cultivation. Fewer than 40,000 hectares were irrigated, almost all in the Jordan River

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valley. Because arable, rain-fed land was exploited extensively, future growth of agricultural production depended on increased irrigation. Estimates of the additional area that could be irrigated were Jordan to maximise its water resources ranged between 65,000 and 100,000 hectares. Most agricultural activity was concentrated in two areas. In rain-fed northern and central areas of higher elevation, wheat, barley, and other field crops such as tobacco, lentils, barley, and chickpeas were cultivated; olives also were produced in these regions. Because of periodic drought and limited area, the rain-fed uplands did not support sufficient output of cereal crops to meet domestic demand. Although the country's ultimate agricultural potential was small, economic factors apparently limited production more than environmental constraints, as reflected by up to 100,000 hectares of potentially arable land that lay fallow in the late 1980s. The government has expressed considerable concern about its "food security" and its high food import bill, and it was implementing plans to increase crop production in the 1990s. Growth in agricultural output was only about 4 per cent during the 1980-85 Five-Year Plan, despite investment of approximately JD80 million during the period, indicating the slow pace of progress. In the late 1980s, Jordan was implementing a two-pronged agricultural development policy. The long-term strategy was to increase the total area under cultivation by better harnessing water resources to increase irrigation of arid desert areas for the cultivation of cereal crops, the country's most pressing need. In the short term, the government was attempting to maximise the efficiency of agricultural production in the Jordan River valley through rationalisation or use of resources to produce those items in which the country had a relative advantage. Rationalisation started with a controversial 1985 government decision to regulate cropping and production, primarily in the Jordan River valley. Farmers there had repeatedly produced surpluses of tomatoes, cucumbers, eggplants, and squashes because they were reliable and traditional crops. At the same time, underproduction of crops such as potatoes, onions, broccoli, celery, garlic, and spices led to unnecessary imports. The government offered incentives to farmers to experiment with new crops and cut subsidy payments to those who continued to produce surplus crops. In 1986 cucumber production

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dropped by 25 per cent to about 50,000 tons and tomato harvests dropped by more than 33 per cent to 160,000 tons, while selfsufficiency was achieved in potatoes and onions. Production of wheat and other cereals fluctuated greatly from year to year, but never came close to meeting demand. In 1986, a drought year, Jordan produced about 22,000 tons of wheat, down from 63,000 tons in 1985. In 1987 Jordan harvested about 130,000 tons, a record amount. Because even a bumper crop did not meet domestic demand, expansion of dry-land cereal farming in the southeast of the country was a major agricultural development goal of the 1990s. One plan called for the irrigation of a 7,500-hectare area east of Khawr Ramm (known as Wadi Rum) using 100 million cubic metres per year of water pumped from a large underground aquifer. Another plan envisioned a 7,500-hectare cultivated area in the Wadi al-Arabah region south of the Jordan River valley using desalinated water from the Red Sea for irrigation. Uvestock production was limited in the late 1980s. Jordan had about 35,000 head of cattle but more than 1 million sheep and 500,000 goats, and the government planned to increase their numbers. In the late 1980s, annual production of red meat ranged between 10,000 and 15,000 tons, less than 33 per cent of domestic consumption. A major impediment to increased livestock production was the high cost of imported feed. Jordan imported cereals at high cost for human consumption, but imported animal feed was a much lower priority. Ukewise, the arid, rain-fed land that could have been used for grazing or for fodder production was set aside for wheat production. Jordan was self-sufficient, however, in poultry meat production (about 35,000 tons) and egg production (about 400,000 eggs), and exported these products to neighbouring countries.

Transportation and Communications An underdeveloped system of transportation and communications for many years impeded Jordanian economic development, hampering in particular efforts to attract foreign direct investment and to conduct transit trade. The government lavished spending on transportation and communication facilities in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By 1989 in many respects Jordan had surpassed its Arab neighbours in such facilities. Most such development, however, has been confined to a narrow north-south corridor between Amman and AI-Aqabah.

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The transportation system in Jordan comprised roads, railroads, airports, and one port. Road quality varied widely, and newer railroad lines were used primarily for transporting phosphates. One national airline and two smaller airline companies served the public. In 1989 the Jordanian road network, administered by the Ministry of Transportation, was more than 7,500 kilometres long. Of the total system, 5,500 kilometres were asphalted and the remainders were composed of gravel and crushed stone. The backbone of the road system was the 320-kilometre-long Desert Highway running from Amman to Al-Aqabah. A second major highway ran east to west from Al-Mafraq to the Iraqi border. Because these two highways were also the two main parts of the transit trade route between the port of Al-Aqabah and Iraq, they often were congested by truck traffic. Jordan's road construction plans focused on building ring roads, bypasses, and overpasses in the vicinity of Amman, Al-Aqabah, and other major cities to divert this truck traffic and eliminate bottlenecks. The quality of the major traffic arteries varied greatly. Only about 50 per cent of the Desert Highway was more than two lanes wide. A four-lane highway ran south from the Syrian border near Ar Ramtha to Jarash, but the road between Jarash and Amman was winding and narrow. Moreover, the common practice among freight companies of grossly overloading their trucks had resulted in severe damage to many stretches of road. This practice led in 1988 to increased government enforcement of load limits and the imposition of penalties that could effectively put companies that violated the limits out of business. The freight and trucking sector was overdeveloped in the 1980s. Competition among many private freight companies and several large government-owned entities led to price-cutting and excess capacity. The Iraqi-Jordanian Land Transport Company (IJLTC) was the largest of the government-owned freight companies. Established in 1980, in 1987 it carried 1.3 million tons of goods and almost 70,000 passengers between Al-Aqabah and Iraq. In 1988 the IJLTC had a fleet of about 900 trucks, 1,400 employees, and profits of over JD3 million. The Jordanian-Syrian Land Transport Company, established in 1976, was smaller but organised along similar lines. In 1988 trucks made more than 13,000 trips between Al-Aqabah and Baghdad, of which Jordanian trucks made 7,500 trips.

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In 1987 about 250,000 vehicles were registered in Jordan, an increase from 60,000 vehicles ten years previously. This figure included about 131,000 passenger cars, 13,000 taxis, 4,000 buses, and 8,500 heavy trucks of various types. Jordan had 619 kilometres of single-track narrow gauge (1.05 metres) railroad tracks. The main system was the HedjazJordan Railway, part of the old Ottoman-era Hijaz Railway that had once connected Istanbul and the Arabian Peninsula. It ran north south through the length of the country, and lay thirty kilometres east of the Desert Highway. Newer spur and branch lines constituted the AI-Aqabah Railway Corporation, and connected AI-Aqabah's port and mines to the main north-south axis. Both railroad entities came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transportation. The newer system was used almost exclusively for transport of phosphates from the mines at AI-Hasa and Wadi al-Abyad to AI-Aqabah. In 1987, about 2.6 million tons of freight and 20,000 passengers were conveyed by rail. Rolling stock included 26 locomotives and 600 freight, passenger, and tanker cars. The government envisioned in the late 1980s upgrading capacity to 4.5 million tons a year. Located on the Gulf of Aqabah, which leads to the Red Sea, A1-Aqabah was Jordan's only port. The modern port, established in the 1950s, was under the authority of the A1-Aqabah Ports Corporation, part of the Ministry of Transportation. The port grew tremendously in the 1970s and especially in the early 1980s as transit trade through AI-Aqabah became one of Iraq's few lifelines to the outside world during its war with Iran. In 1985, according to the government, 55 per cent to 60 per cent of AI-Aqabah's total cargo capacity was devoted to transit trade with Iraq. Another estimate placed this figure at 70 per cent. Port facilities included seventeen berths, two of them floating, that were specially equipped for loading or unloading general cargo, crude oil, and phosphates. One of the newest berths, completed in 1985, was 580 metres long and configured for handling roll on/roll off cargo and container cargo. Associated facilities and services included warehouses and railheads. Five new tugboats were ordered in 1988 to escort cargo ships in the Gulf of Aqabah, which would bring to twelve the total number of tugs. In 1987, more than 2,600 vessels called at Al-Aqabah, loading 8.7 million tons of freight and unloading about

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11.3 million tons. The combined total tonnage represented a 19 per cent increase over the previous year. Jordan has also established a small merchant marine. The National Maritime Company had four merchant vessels with a combined freight capacity of 71,400 tons. Also, the Syrian-Jordanian Marine Transport Company operated two freighters with a combined capacity of 6,000 tons that transported about 70,000 tons of freight annually between the Middle East and Western Europe. Since 1985 Jordan and Egypt have jointly operated an intermittent bridge and ferry service capable of carrying trucks and cars from AI-Aqabah to the Sinai port of Nuwaybi. The service has cut transit time between AI-Aqabah and Cairo in half, to about nine hours. Royal Jordanian Airlines-known until 1987 as Alia-was the national carrier. Wholly owned by the government and operating since 1946, Royal Jordanian by 1988 had become one of the major Middle Eastern air carriers. From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, passenger and freight traffic and reported profits grew almost 25 per cent annually (although fuel and other hidden subsidies made calculation of actual profitability impossible). Annual traffic growth tapered off to single-digit figures after 1983 and the airline experienced a US$ 30 million loss in 1984. A budget cut of almost 10 per cent in 1986 resulted in staff and other overhead cuts that apparently made the carrier more efficient, and in that year it reported a profit of US$ 5.6 million. In 1986 Royal Jordanian carried more than 1 million passengers and 42,500 tons of cargo. Load factors averaged over 48 per cent. Jordan also had established some of the most advanced flight crew training and maintenance and repair facilities in the Middle East, and it sold these services to African and other Arab airlines. In the late 1980s, Royal Jordanian was in the midst of a major programme of long-term expansion and financial restructuring. The programme included the low-cost lease and purchase of new Airbus Industry airliners. Royal Jordanian also was negotiating an agreement to sell and lease back some of its Boeing and Lockheed aircraft to cut corporate debt. After restructuring the balance sheet, the government planned to offer Royal Jordanian for sale to its 4,600 employees and to private sector investors, retaining only a 15 per cent stake.

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In 1988, the Royal Jordanian fleet consisted of two Boeing 747-200s, eight Lockheed L-1011 Tristars, three Boeing 727-200As, and three Boeing 707-320Cs. In 1987 Royal Jordanian acquired the first two of six Airbus Industry A-31O-300s, which were to replace its Boeing 707s. Royal Jordanian also had an option to purchase six Airbus Industry A-320s to replace its Boeing 727s over the decade from 1990 to 2000, and planned eventually to phase out use of its Lockheeds in favour of new Airbus Industry A-340s. In 1987, Royal Jordanian added Moscow and Calcutta to the more than forty worldwide destinations it already served. New scheduled flights were planned to East Asia, including Seoul, Tokyo, Manila, and Sydney, as well as to Rio de Janeiro via Abidjan. Jordan had two other minor airlines: Arab Air Cargo and Arab Wings. Arab Air Cargo was owned in equal shares by Royal Jordanian and Iraqi Airways. Arab Wings, a passenger charter service, was owned by Royal Jordanian (88 per cent) and the Sultanate of Oman (12 per cent). The latter company also included a flying ambulance service. There were nineteen usable airfields in Jordan in 1988, of which fourteen had permanent surface runways. Of these, two near Amman were major airfields: the Queen Alia International Airport, opened in 1983 and located at AI-Jizah, thirty kilometres south of Amman, and the old international airport at Marka, King Abdullah Airport, used primarily by the Royal Jordanian Air Force. The Jordan Telecommunications Corporation (TCC) , a wholly government-owned semi-autonomous entity under the Ministry of Communications, was in charge of providing domestic and international telecommunications services in 1988. Since 1971 the TCC had exercised a monopoly over all forms of public telecommunications, including telephone, telex, telegraph, facsimile, and television transmissions. The TCC was profitable and a net contributor to the budget. In 1988 the government was moving forward cautiously with plans to privatise the company in stagesusing as its model the privatisation of British Telecom-and planned eventually to sell all or part of the equity to public stockholders. In the 1980s, TCC increased the number of connected telephone lines by almost 20 per cent per year while introducing technological improvements such as digital switching and radio microwave links. International direct dialling was introduced in 1982; in 1989, Jordan

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had one Atlantic Ocean .International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation (INTELSAT) channel, one Indian Ocean INTELSAT channel, and one Arab Satellite Organisation (ARABSAT) channel. In 1988, more than 200,000 direct exchange lines were in service, with about 85,000 applicants on a waiting list, so that only about 70 per cent of demand was satisfied. A private citizen waited about five years for a line, but most businesses could obtain a line qUickly by paying a surcharge to avoid the waiting list. Line density in 1988 was 7 per cent of the population, better than in most countries with similar per capita GNP. Telephone service was concentrated in Amman, where more than 60 per cent of all lines were installed. Altogether, about 75 per cent of Jordanian villages and cities had access to telephone service. Despite 12 per cent forecast annual demand growth, line density was expected to grow to 12 per cent of the population by the early 1990s because of a planned US$ 340 million investment in new equipment and services. Local calls in Amman were free and were ,subsidised by exorbitant international rates. In 1987, however, because of protests by businesses and private citizens, international rates were cut drastically (up to 50 per cent, depending on the country called). Telecommunications Assistance to the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission: The Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (TRC) is the government entity responsible for regulating the telecommunications and postal services markets in Jordan. ICTI supports the TRC by providing regulatory advice on telecommunications matters and assisting the TRC build the capacity of the institution. Other initiative support includes the following:

• Providing general legal and regulatory advice. • Recommending and developing IT systems to help the TRC connect its goals and objectives with the necessary IT systems. • Assisting the TRC in licensing radio spectrum and new wireless services. • Advising on radio frequency spectrum management, including broadband to wireless. • Capacity building for TRe. Telecommunications Infrastructure: The available capabilities

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in the form of telecommunications equipment is satisfactory, yet, it the data communication are there is an apparent deficiency. Jordan still lacks a digital network that is capable of high-speed data transmission. Telephone availability in Jordan is still very poor. In 1994, Jordan's Telecommunications Corporation offered only 7.24 phone lines per 100; a total of 305,500 lines. These lines serve 434 towns but the major concentration is in the Amman areas were 71.5 per cent of the total number of lines was offered. Total demand on telephone lines in that same year was 425,400, making the satisfied demand a mere 71.8 per cent. There are also over 2,200 telex and 1,500 car telephone subscribers served. There is an extreme shortage of public pay phones in Jordan. The total numbers of pay phones are about 210, that is an average of 0.05 phones per 1000 inhabitants. The cost of installing a residential telephone line is approximately $178.9. This is a relatively high cost considering the low per capita income in the country. Monthly telephone line subscriptions are reasonably priced at almost $3.3. There are 17 exchanges in Jordan with one national and one international exchange. Most telephone exchanges in the country are digital, some are semi-digital. Data Transmission is offered to financial institutions and to some governmental organisations. On leased lines or on dial-up bases and at very low speeds. Major plans are now being implemented to install 21 new exchanges and 80 branch exchanges in addition to 86 optical fibre links and 17 microwave links. Although the Jordanian telecommunications infrastructure is relatively weak, it still has capacity for new phone lines and exchanges. Mobile cellular systems were first introduced in the Jordanian market in October of 1995. Jordan Mobile Services, Fast Link, a privately owned company, was granted an exclusive license to provide mobile cellular services in the Jordanian market until October 1998. As of April 1997, Fast Link had over 26,000 subscribers. Paging services are offered by Jordan Radio Paging Company (DROP). DROP is the only national paging company in Jordan delivering public paging services and designing and supplying on site paging systems. Jordan has 5 AM broadcast stations, 7 FM, and 8 TV stations. The TCC recently started offering cable TV upon subscription. There are also two private distributors for Orbit and Show Time.

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12 Polity If one country's fate is determined by its geo-politicallocation, this country has to be Jordan. Situated in a politically and culturally volatile area, Jordan faces the test of surviving, developing and excelling in a tough neighbourhood. Furthermore, being in a semiarid zone, the country is not blessed with natural resources and, ever since its establishment in 1923, the Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan has lived with the challenge of managing its fragile natural environment. The two most important natural resources needed for development, water and oil, are in short supply, but Jordan's main wealth is in its human resources. The now-known Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan was a product of the Arab revolt against the Turkish Empire in 1916. The Hashemiate family that led the revolt was hoping to establish an independent "Greater Syria" in the Fertile Crescent area (Syria-Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq). The Hashemiate's revolution was supported by Arab nationalism and the colonial aspirations of both Great Britain and France who were rushing to fill the gap left by the Turks after World War I. The Hashemites and the Arabs discovered the reality of political alliances with Britain, and were left with only the arid area of East Jordan to rule, after the West Bank of the Jordan River (Palestine) was declared by Britain as a "national home land" for the Jewish people worldwide. The Anglo-Jordanian treaty in 1923 established the Emirate of East Jord'ln, and full independence of Jordan was gained in 1946.

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The political system of Jordan has always been a constitutional monarchy, with short periods of political openness, overtaken by long years of rigidity that stopped political development. Nevertheless, by comparison with neighbouring Arab regimes, the system has not deprived Jordanian citizens from their dignity. The kingdom suffered a tragic civil war in 1970-1971 between the Jordanian regime and emerging fighters of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). The heavy military confrontation resulted in full authority of the regime, the expulsion of Palestinian fighters to Lebanon, declaration of marshal laws, and a deep sociopolitical mistrust between regime supporters, from mainly east Jordanian roots, and PLO supporters that is still evident today. During the late 1980's, a big economic recession coupled with corruption resulted in civil outrage and many demonstrations throughout Jordan, with special concentrations in the regime's main social base: the southern Jordanian towns and tribes. This public movement resulted in political openness and the resumption of parliamentary life for the first time since 1967. Free parliamentary elections were held in 1989, and replicated in 1993 and 1997 before a "stoppage time" between 2001 and 2003 when the latest elections were held. Political development, however, did not reach a satisfactory level for Jordanian politicians and activists in political parties and other institutions. Media is still under strict government control and public freedom are subject to the political mood in the country. Faced with shortages and scarcity of natural resources, Jordan has to come up with many developmental plans to support its fast growing population. In 1990, Jordan had the world's fastest growing population with a growth rate of 3.4 per cent. This was mainly due to political instability in the region and many migrations to Jordan from Palestine. Volatile political surroundings did sustainable damage to Jordan's developmental strategies. Always hostage to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the deep-rooted political instability of the region. Jordan has taken a semi-liberal approach in its policies and economy compared to Arab nationalism slogans raised in Syria, Egypt and Iraq. This approach has put Jordan at the receiving end of pan-Arab political conflicts. However, the shortage of natural resources in Jordan has encouraged development of human resources. High levels of

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education, vocational skills, and entrepreneurship characterise the people of Jordan. In 1999, King Abdullah II accessed the throne after the death of his father King Hussain Bin Talal, the true builder of the Jordanian state for 37 years. The new King was faced with a fragile economy, a stagnant political life, and major regional conflicts in Palestine and Iraq. King Abdullah wanted to insert a new spirit in the Jordanian state, and actively pursued full economic liberalisation, political openness and gradual democratisation, and acted to put the country in a leading regional role in many sectors including ICT, tourism, trade, human development and developing a knowledge society. The experience of Jordan is gaining more momentum in light of the global debate on the identity and future of the Arab World and its attitudes and vision. Jordan is trying to be a regional model in economic development, tolerance, democratisation and investing in human resources. This is why monitoring the Jordanian experiment is vital for crystallising potential for indigenous-driven changes in the Arab World in the 21st century. The Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy with representative government. The reigning monarch is the head of state, the chief executive and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The king exercises his executive authority through the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, or cabinet. The cabinet, meanwhile, is responsible before the elected House of Deputies which, along with the House of Notables (Senate), constitutes the legislative branch of the government. The judicial branch is an independent branch of the government. Since 1989, all elements of the Jordanian political spectrum have embarked together on a road to greater democracy, liberalisation and consensus building. These reforms, which were guided by the late King Hussain, have placed Jordan on an irreversible road to democratisation. The result has been greater empowerment and involvement of everyday citizens in Jordan's civic life, contributing to increased stability and institutionalisation, which will benefit the country far into the future. The reigning monarch, King Abdullah, is the chief executive. The king exercises his executive authority by appointing the Prime Minister, who then organises a cabinet of ministers to be appointed by the king.

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The Prime Minister and the cabinet must then be approved by the Lower House of Parliament, the House of Deputies. If the House of Deputies votes against the Prime Minister, he and his entire cabinet must resign. The Lower House can also vote any individual minister out of office. The king also appoints all of the members of the Upper House of Parliament, known as the House of Notables, or Senate. The number of senators cannot exceed one-half the number of elected representatives. The Constitution stipulates that the reigning monarch must approve laws before they can take effect, although his power of veto can be overridden by a two-thirds majority of both houses of Parliament. The king also authorises the appointment and dismissal of judges, regional governors and the mayor of Amman, and he approves constitutional amendments, declares war and is commander-in-chief of the armed forces. As head of state, the king concludes and ratifies treaties and agreements, with the approval of the cabinet and Parliament. The king is also entitled to grant special pardons and amnesties. The throne of the Kingdom is passed down through inheritance within the dynasty of King Abdullah bin aI-Hussain in the direct line of his male heirs. Since 1921, Jordan has been ruled by four monarchs: King Abdullah (1921-51), son of Sharif Hussain of Mecca and King of the Arabs; King Talal bin Abdullah (1951-52), eldest son of King Abdullah; King Hussain bin Talal (1952-1999), eldest son of King Talal; and, King Abdullah bin aI-Hussain (February 7, 1999-present), eldest son of King Hussain. Jordan is a constitutional monarchy based on the constitution promulgated on January 8, 1952. Executive authority is vested in the king and his council of ministers. The king signs and executes all laws. His veto power may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the National Assembly. He appoints and may dismiss all judges by decree, approves amendments to the constitution, declares war, and commands the armed forces. Cabinet decisions, court judgments, and the national currency are issued in his name. The council of ministers, led by a Prime Minister, is appOinted by the king, who may dismiss other cabinet members at the Prime Minister's request. The cabinet is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies on matters of general policy and can

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be forced to resign by a two-thirds vote of "no confidence" by that body. Legislative power rests in the bicameral National Assembly. The 110-member Chamber of Deputies, elected by universal suffrage to a 4-year term, is subject to dissolution by the king. Nine seats are reserved for Christians, 6 for women, and three for Circassians and Chechens. The 40-member Senate is appointed by the king for an 8-year term. The constitution provides for three categories of courts-civil, religious, and special. Administratively. Jordan is divided into twelve governorates. each headed by a governor appointed by the king. They are the sale authorities for all government departments and development projects in their respective areas. Jordan's continuing structural economic difficulties, burgeoning population, and more open political environment led to the emergence of a variety of political parties. Moving towards greater independence, Jordan's parliament has investigated corruption charges against several regime figures and has become the major forum in which differing political views, including those of political Islamists, are expressed. While King Abdullah remains the ultimate authority in Jordan, the parliament plays an important role. In Late 1989, King Hussain ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hussain al-Hashimi remained in firm control of Jordan's political system as the central policy-maker and legislative and executive authority. He maintained tight control over key government functions, such as national defence, internal security, justice. and foreign affairs. Crown Prince Hasan, the king's younger brother and heir apparent, complemented the small, Hussain-centred circle of power in his role as the king's right-hand man, especially in the areas of economy and administration. Hussain's main power base continued to rest on the Bedouin dominated army, which had been loyal to the Hashemiate (also seen as Hashemiate) family for seven decades. Another source of strength was his astute ability to balance sociopolitical interests at home. Equally important, Hussain was Jordan's most accomplished diplomat negotiator. During the 1980s, Hussain's autocracy also was substantially bolstered by his rapprochement with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). This significant development greatly reduced the threat to Hussain's rule posed since 1970 by various Palestinian guerrilla groups. Some groups, however, notably the Black September

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and Abu Nidal factions, continued to seek the overthrow of the entire monarchical structure. The Trans-Jordanians occupied a dominant place in the existing power structure. Hussain's palace staff and his top civil, judicial, and military officials were mostly Trans-Jordanians. Although there was a Palestinian presence on the periphery of power, the Palestinians' continued exclusion from substantive decision-making positions tended to alienate the Palestinian community and served as a potential source of political instability. Hussain's decision in July 1988 to renounce Jordan's claim to sovereignty over the West Bank and his subsequent recognition of the PLO's declaration of an independent Palestine may further affect the systemic integrity of Jordan because the Palestinians living on the East Bank must choose whether they want Jordanian or Palestinian nationality. Another source of political instability for Hussain's regime at the close of the 1980s was the continued severe recession that had plagued the economy since the mid-1980s. This economic retrenchment was in sharp contrast to the economic growth experienced during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The combination of high inflation and high unemployment rates .contributed to the pervasive sense of dissatisfaction that erupted in major anti-government riots in several cities and towns in April 1989. Although all Jordanians were adversely affected by rising prices and falling income, the Palestinians living in refugee camps-most of whom were poor before . the recession-bore the brunt of the economic decline. Their economic frustrations helped reinforce their political alienation.

Political Setting In 1989, the Jordanian political system continued to revolve around Hussain, who ruled firmly and tolerated no opposition. He had acceded to the throne in 1953, and the longevity of his tenure has been almost unparalleled in the contemporary Middle East. His reign, however, has been marked by numerous political crises: abortive coups, assassination attempts, and the disastrous consequences of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Undoubtedly the most serious threat to his rule was the civil war with the PLO guerrillas in 1970 and 1971. Hussain's ability to remain in power for nearly four decades can be attributed to his own political acumen and a fortuitous combination of domestic and external situations. Nevertheless, the continued

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absence of institutions through which citizens could participate in the political process raised questions about the ultimate stability of his regime.

Political Elite In 1989, Hussain had remained the single most important person in Jordan's politics. His political pre-eminence derived in part from his skill in dealing with various domestic and external problems. He has travelled frequently to keep in touch with cross sections of the population and to establish rapport with his troops, with university students, and with members of tribes. Hussain's personalised approach has tended to counterbalance the virtual lack of independent, institutionalised channels that could serve as barometers of popular sentiments and attitudes towards the government. Also, Hussain's frequent visits to foreign capitals have enabled him to keep abreast of external developments and to obtain needed financial and technical assistance for his kingdom. His ability to maintain generally cordial relations with foreign states has been a critical asset for Jordan, in view of the country's heavy dependence on external aid. Hussain relied upon various political options to consolidate his power. He has used his constitutional authority to appoint principal government officials as a critical lever with which to reward loyalty and performance, neutralise detractors, and weed out incompetent elements. The Hussain-centred power structure comprised the cabinet ministers, members of the royal family, the palace staff, senior army officers, tribal sheikhs, and ranking civil servants. King Hussain has filled most of the sensitive government posts with loyal TransJordanians. Since the early 1950s, he also appointed to responsible positions Palestinians supportive of the Hashemiates. Beginning in the 1970s, he permitted an increasing number of Palestinians from families not traditionally aligned with the Hashemiates to be co-opted into government service. The Hashemiates, the royal family headed by Hussain, formed an extended kinship group related through marriage to several prominent Trans-Jordanian families. The Hashemiate family traces its ancestry back to the family of the Prophet, and for centuries it had been politically prominent in what is now Saudi Arabia. Abdullah ibn Hussain al-Hashimi (1882-1951), a son of Sharif Hussain of Mecca

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(1851-1931), established the Jordanian branch of the family in 1921 after Britain had created the Mandate of Trans-Jordan and confirmed him as Amir. London also permitted Abdullah's younger brother, Faisal (1885-1933), to assume the kingship of Iraq, another future state set up after World War I as a British-administered mandate. Abdullah changed his title from Amir to king in 1946, when TransJordan was granted independence. Following his assassination in 1951, Abdullah's son Talal (1909-1972) ruled briefly. Hussain was Talal's oldest son. Before succeeding his father as king in 1953, Hussain was educated at Victoria College in Alexandria, Egypt and at Harrow School and the Royal Military Academy, Sand Hurst, both in Britain. In 1955, Hussain married his first wife, Dina Abdul Hamid al-Aun, an Egyptian of Hashemiate ancestry. They had one daughter before their marriage ended in divorce. His second wife, Antoinette Gardiner of Britain, converted to Islam and took the name Muna ai-Hussain. She and Hussain had four children, two sons and twin daughters. Hussain divorced Princess Muna in 1973 and married his third wife, Palestinian Alia Tukan. Hussain and Queen Alia had one daughter and one son before her February 1977 death in a helicopter crash. In June 1978 Hussain married his fourth wife, Elizabeth Halaby, an American of Arab and Swiss descent. He proclaimed her Queen Noar ai-Hussain (light of Hussain). Hussain and Queen Noor have four children, two sons and two daughters. Throughout the 1980s, Queen Noar had a visible and active role promoting educational, cultural, social welfare, architectural, and urban planning projects in Jordan. Hussain had two younger brothers and one sister. His brothers Muhammad and Hasan had significant political roles in 1989. The most important Hashemiate after Hussain was Hasan, whom the king had designated as crown prince through royal decree in 1965. Muhammad was a businessman and was active politically behind the scenes. Families that were related to the Hashemiates included the politically prominent Sharaf and Shakir families. Hussain's cousin, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, was a close political adviser throughout the 1970s and served briefly as Prime Minister before his death in 1980. Another member of the family, Layla Sharaf, was Jordan's first woman cabinet officer, serving as minister of culture and information

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in 1984-85. A third cousin, Field Marshal Ash Sharif Zaid ibn Shakir, was a long-time political confidant who served the king in many sensitive positions. In December 1988, Hussain appointed Shakir chief of the royal court and director of the secret police (Mukhabarat); beginning in late April 1989 he served for seven months as Prime Minister. Hussain had been supported throughout his reign by the original Trans-Jordanian population, particularly the Bedouin tribes who revered him as a descendant of the family of the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh) and as a ruler imbued with those qualities of leadership they valued most-courage, self-reliance, valour, and honesty. The Beduin formed a prominent segment within the army, especially among the senior ranks of the officer corps. Their loyalty helped Hussain survive a number of crises and thereby served as a stabilising force within the country. Nevertheless, since the mid-1980s there had been evidence of erosion of Beduin and Trans-Jordanian support for Hussain's regime. Significantly, it was primarily East Bankers, rather than Palestinians, who participated in widespread anti-government riots that swept several towns of Jordan in 1989. Other politically influential individuals were affiliated with the old East Bank families. For example, Zaid ar Rifai, appointed Prime Minister in 1985, was the son of Samir ar Rifai, a politician who had served several terms as Prime Minister under the rule of Abdullah during the 1930s and 1940s and subsequently was a Prime Minister for Hussain. Many members of the Abdul Huda, Majali, Badran, Hashim, Tal, and Qasim families also served the Hashemiates loyally. Another element of the political elite were the non-Arab Circassians, the descendants of Muslim immigrants who came from the Caucasus Mountains in the late nineteenth century and settled in Amman and its environs. The Circassians allied with the Hashemiates in the 1920s, and since that time leading Circassian politicians have held important and sensitive positions in the government and military. The AI-Mufti family has been one of the most politically prominent Circassian families, and one of its members, Said ai-Mufti, served as Prime Minister. In the 1980s, the influential scions of traditional and aristocratic Palestinian families known for their Hashemiate sympathies were outnumbered by Trans-Jordanians in almost all top government

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posts. The distinction between Trans-Jordanians and Palestinians tended to be played down, however, because officially the Palestinians of the East Bank have been accepted as Jordanian citizens. Palestinians continued to hold an important place in society as leading merchants, financiers, professionals, educators, and technocrats.

National Charter In order not to relive the difficulties of the 1950s, a sixty-member royal commission was appointed by King Hussain in April 1990 with the aim of drafting guidelines for the conduct of political party activity in Jordan. The commission comprised members representing all the political groups in the country, and within months produced a written consensus in the form of the National Charter. The Charter was adopted in June 1991 at a national conference of 2000 leading Jordanians. The National Charter outlines general guidelines for constructive dialogue between the executive and legislative organs, as well as between decision-makers and political and intellectual elites concerning questions of authority, rights and responsibility. It enunciates the terms under which political parties could operate-namely, within the framework of the Constitution and free of foreign funding-and also emphasises broad agreement on the need for the political reflection of Jordan's cultural pluralism. Perhaps most importantly, the Charter has given Jordanian leaders a sense of direction, an insurance policy against outbidding by unrestrained groups, and a degree of predictability in political affairs. It has also eased concerns about the consequences of unbridled freedom of expression. The National Charter, along with the Jordanian Constitution, provides a compass for the national debate on fundamental issues.

Decentralisation Historically, as a result of low and limited Jordanian government revenues, a centralised deciSion-making process has controlled the distribution of allocations, leaving local governments relatively weak. Local government expenditures comprise 6 per cent of total government expenditures for the nation (the expenditure decentralisation ratio). The fifth national development plan (19861990) responded to a declining money flows from grants and workers' remittances by decentralising government to increase civic participation

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and diversify revenues. Nevertheless, the Jordanian government remains one of the most centralised in the Arab region. The Jordanian government includes three levels of sub-national government under the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs and Environment (MMRAE). These are the local councils, which include 214 municipal councils (population at least 2,500 people); 142 village councils of 2,000 people; and 170 councils with shared services. There are twelve governorates that act as regional planning agencies. The governorates (muhafazat, singularmuhafazah) are: Ajlun, Al- 'Aqabah, Al-Balqa', Al-Karak, Al-Mafraq, 'Amman, At-Tafilah, Az-Zarqa', Irbid, Jarash, Maan, Madaba. Councils have three sources of financing: the government, independent sources and the Cities and Villages Development Bank (CVDB). Government sources include fuel revenues, fees for traffic violations, customs duties, transportation fees and property taxes. Taxes are collected and allocated by the central government to the local governments according to population, location and necessity. Independent sources are limited and include employment and building licenses as well as taxes on small stores and vegetable markets. Municipalities in Jordan rely upon the national government for most revenues. All municipal budgets must be sent to the MMRAE for approval, leaving little room for tailoring the budget to local needs. Around 40 per cent of local revenues come from fund transfers from the central government. Municipalities also borrow funds for roughly 14 per cent of their expenditures. The CVDB, which has 37 million dinars (US$ 52 million) in reserve capital, provides funds for local production and service projects. Jordan's municipalities retain a limited role in the provision of public services. The Ministry of Education provides primary education. Fire protection is the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Water and Irrigation provides water and sewage services to most areas. The Ministry of Transportation controls public buses. And the Jordan Electric Authority oversees the national electric system. Many of the services provided by municipalities in other countries are the providence of the national government in Jordan. The decentralisation of the fifth national plan was replaced by an emphasis on the privatisation in the sixth national plan (19931997). The new plan sought to increase efficiency through better

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coordination in state owned industries. Some industries were decentralised to branches in the governorates, but the overall structure of governance remains focused on the national level. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has undertaken a project in Jordan to increase administrative efficiency and equitable services at the governorates level. Since 1989, the Jordanian government has expressed its commitment to decentralisation as an integral part of economic reforms that continues to this day. Decentralisation would help to reduce the role of the public sector and increase the role of the private sector. As a result, larger municipalities have been created so as to improve their administrative and economic capabilities. Other measures include developing an accounting system, having clear model budgets and the new municipal election laws. Though the government has expressed its commitment to decentralisation, local governments continue to have very limited duties and responsibilities especially with regards to providing services and raising revenue. In 2001, the government launched a plan aimed at gradual merging of municipal councils and appointing half of their members and heads in order to reform the municipal sector, which suffers a deficit of $ 100 million. The Civil Service Bylaw of 1998 is an initiative towards decentralisation of government services and local-level human resource development. It transferred the central employment authority of the Civil Service Bureau to the governors in the districts. It provided the formation of personnel units in every district chaired by the governor with the membership of the deputy governor, representatives of the concerned agency, a legal counsellor, and one of the directorate's employees in the district. The role of the committee is to recruit and hire employees in the districts. The Ministries of Health and Education, with a workforce representing 87 per cent of total civil service employment, have institutionalised the regional distribution of services and have delegated most of the ministers' powers to the regional directors. In 2003, the Municipal Law was amended allowing the government to appoint half of the members in any city or village council while the other half is elected. In addition, the government nppoints the head of every council. On July 2003, around 58 per cent

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of the 803,000 eligible voters cast their ballots to elect council members to half the seats in the country's municipalities. Candidates in 17 municipalities ran unopposed. Among the 46 women contenders, only five won seats. But the government pledged to appoint a woman in each municipality where women candidates failed to win a seat.

Voter turnout in rural areas was much higher that in the major cities. Where voter turnout was low, analysts pointed to a combination of public apathy and objection to the 2003 amendment to the Municipal Law, marked by a boycott on the part of the Islamic Action Front (lAF) in protest against the amended law. IAF Secretary General Hamzah Mansour charged that the government had no faith in the electorate. The city of Amman, Jordan's capital, has grown rapidly in the last eighty years. In 1920, only 5000 people lived in what is now a metropolitan area of one and a quarter million. The Urban Development Department oversees the city management and development. Local services in Amman are relatively efficient, but the city has suffered from difficulties with urban planning. Growth has caused rapid urban expansion to the west, which has led to a loss of agricultural areas that are vital in a nation of only 10 per cent arable land. Many undeveloped plots remain within the city due to real estate speculation. This has put additional pressures on municipal services that must reach a wider area. The lack of enforced zoning and public transportation has also put pressure on the city's infrastructure. The change in Amman and the problems it faces are emblematic of the pressures on many municipalities in Jordan.

The Constitution The Constitution that was promulgated in 1952 and amended in 1974, 1976, and 1984 remained in force in 1989. It declares Jordan a hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary form of government and defines the people as "the source of all powers." The people are officially stated as being part of "the Arab nation." Islam is the official religion of the state and Arabic the official language . In nearly forty years of experience with the Constitution, adherence to the fundamental law of the land has varied in spirit as well as in practice from time to time, depending upon domestic and external circumstances.

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Articles 5 through 23 of the Constitution stipulate the rights and duties of citizens and guarantee a long list of personal freedom. Citizens are assured freedom from compulsory labour or forced loans, and no one may be discriminated against for reasons of race, religion, or language. Arrest, imprisonment, exile, forced residence, and the expropriation of property without due process of law are forbidden. Freedom of worship, opinion, and the press and the right of peaceful assembly are ensured within the limits of the law. Censorship is allowed in time of martial law or when a state of national emergency exists. The right of petition is guaranteed, and citizens are free to form political parties, trade unions, and associations-provided their objectives are lawful. Political refugees may not be extradited. For grades one through nine, education is compulsory and free in public schools. Every citizen is eligible for appointment to public posts, subject only to the candidate's merit and qualification. The Constitution also outlines various principles of labour legislation and directs the government to promote work and to protect labour. Martial law was declared in 1967 and remained in force in 1989. The emergency regulations under martial law effectively abridged certain constitutionally guaranteed freedom. These regulations permitted the martial law authorities and the secret police-popularly referred to as the Mukhabarat rather than by its formal name of Dairat al-Mukhabarat or General Intelligence Department (GID)-to arrest persons suspected of security offences and to detain them without trial or access to legal counsel for indefinite periods. The emergency regulations also authorised the government to censor the press and other publications, banned political parties, and restricted the rights of citizens to assemble for political meetings and peaceful demonstrations. The powers and functions of the state organs are elaborated in articles 41 through 110. The Constitution includes sections on finance, enforcement of laws, interpretation have the Constitution, and emergency powers and constitutional amendments. An amendment requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of each legislative house, deliberating separately. When an amendment bill is twice rejected by either house, however, the bill must be deliberated in a joint session of the legislature; in this instance, a two-thirds vote

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is required for adoption. An amendment bill takes effect only on royal consent. In a move to ensure dynastic stability. the Constitution forbids any amendment concerning the rights of the king and his heirs during a period of regency. The five amendments to the Constitution that have been approved since 1952 all pertain to the National Assembly. Two amendments were adopted in November 1974. The first permitted the king to dissolve the Senate and to dismiss any individual senator for behaviour unbecoming of the office. The second amendment permitted the king to postpone elections for the House of Representatives for one year. In February 1976, a third amendment permitted the king to postpone parliamentary elections indefinitely. The two amendments adopted in 1984 authorised the government to hold parliamentary elections in any part of the country where it was feasible, thus, only in the East Bank. Until late 1988, when Jordan renounced claims to political sovereignty over the West Bank, the House of Representatives was empowered to select deputies to fill vacant seats from the West Bank. Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy. King Abdullah II bin ai-Hussain is a Hashemiate whose lineage can be traced back to the Prophet and specifically to Ali and Fatima's son Hasan's branch. The revised Constitution of 1952 states that the nation is the source of all powers. Although Article 30 states that the king is immune from any liability and responsibility, the fact that Jordan is not an absolute but constitutional monarchy limits the king's powers. An independent judiciary, headed by the Court of Cassation (the Supreme Court of Appeal), and two documents, namely, the constitution and the National Charter. which contains guidelines for the conduct of political party activities, uphold political pluralism and the supremacy of the law. The signing of the National Charter by the king and the leaders of the main political groups in 1991 meant that political parties were permitted in exchange for the acceptance of the constitution and the monarchy. The king is the head of the state and the head of government; he appoints both the Prime Minister and the cabinet. The king also has extensive lawmaking powers that include the appointment of senators, ratification of laws, abolition of the parliament. and postponement of House elections. In cases where the parliament is not sitting or is dissolved, the Council of Ministers, with the approval

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of the king, has the power to issue provisional laws, which have the force of law. The king also receives foreign envoys, confers honours and medals for meritorious service, grants special pardons and remits sentences. He is the Supreme Commander of the armed, naval and air forces, declaring war, concluding peace and signing treaties. Important mechanisms instituting a system of checks and balances are now in place in Jordan. One significant power given to the House of Representatives alone is the right to cast a vote of confidence in the cabinet. Moreover, the parliament has the power to override the monarch's veto by a two-thirds majority in both houses. The legislative branch has also engaged in investigating corruption charges of several prominent members of the political elite in recent years. The High Tribunal, composed of Senate members and senior judges, has the right to question and try ministers. Similarly, legislative acts may undergo judicial review by the High Tribunal and a Special Tribunal consisting of highest civil court judges and an administrative official. No constitutional amendment may be made affecting the rights of the king. Amendments have to be passed by two-thirds majority of the members of each house and be ratified by the king. The government also ensures, within limits, equality of opportunity through employment and education to all Jordanians. Personal freedom include freedom from discrimination based on race, religion, or language. Freedom from arrest, imprisonment, forced residence and forced labour, exile, expropriation of property without due process of law, freedom of worship, press, opinion, petition, and peaceful assembly are guaranteed within the limits of the law and with th~ provision that their objectives are lawful. The 1928 Constitution, promulgated under the British Mandate by Amir Abdullah, prepared the general framework upon which today's laws are based. Following independence in 1946, the Legislative Council adopted the second constitution in 1947. In 1950, following the armistice with Israel the year before and in the face of strong Arab opposition, King Abdullah formally merged the West Bank with Trans-Jordan and introduced a revised Constitution of the Kingdom of Jordan. That constitution was Iiberalised by King Talal and ratified in 1952. The 1952 Constitution was amended in 1974, 1976, and 1984. In 1974, two amendments enabled the King to dissolve the parliament and postpone House elections for one year.

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The 1976 amendment enabled him to postpone elections indefinitely, but currently postponement is limited to two years, and only when "compelling circumstances" are deemed to impede the electoral process. Parliament was dissolved on June 16, 2001, and new elections were conducted on June 17, 2003. Even though the 1991 National Charter calls for the establishment of a constitutional court, this has not materialised. The Jordanian Bar Association has been pressing this matter for years but prime ministers have refused, citing more pressing matters and an unripe political climate as justification. The Jordanian Constitution allows amendments to take place on most issues except on issues regarding the rights of the king, the royal family and succession to the throne. The king is also allowed to declare martial law in the Kingdom; thereby suspending the provisions of the constitution. To make amendments to the constitution a two-third majority is required from both the House of Notables and the House of Representatives or a two-third majority of a joint session. An amendment cannot come into force unless it is ratified by the king.

The Government The Constitution divides the powers and functions of the government into executive, legislative, and judicial categories. The Constitution assigns the legislative power to both the bicameral National Assembly and the king, who is also vested with executive power. The king exercises his executive authority with the aid of his cabinet ministers, collectively known as the Council of Ministers. Judicial power is vested in independent courts. The authority and services of the central government are extended to all corners of the kingdom through the eight governorates or provinces. Under the Constitution, the monarchy is the most important political institution in the country. Articles 28 through 40 of the Constitution enumerate the king's powers. He appoints the Prime Minister, the president and members of the Senate, judges, and other senior government and military functionaries. He commands the armed forces, approves and promulgates laws, declares war, concludes peace, and signs treaties (which in theory must be approved by the National Assembly). The king convenes, opens, adjourns, suspends, or dissolves the legislature; he also orders, and may postpone, the

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holding of elections. He has veto power that can be overridden only by a two-thirds vote of each house. The Constitution states that the king exercises his jurisdiction by iradah (sing.; pI., iradat-royal decrees), which must be signed by the Prime Minister and the minister or ministers concerned. As head of state, the king is accountable to no one. Royal succession devolves by male descent in the Hashemiate dynasty. The royal mandate is passed to the eldest son of the reigning king, to the eldest son of the successor king, and by similar process thereafter. Should the king die without a direct heir, the deceased monarch's eldest brother has first claim, followed by the eldest son of the other brothers according to their seniority in age. Should there be no suitable direct heir, the National Assembly selects a successor from among "the descendants of the founder of the Arab Revolt, the late King Hussain ibn Ali". The heir apparent to the throne must be sane, a male Muslim, the son of Muslim parents, and born of a lawful wife. In addition, he must not have been excluded by a royal decree from the succession "on the ground of unsuitability." In 1965 Hussain (b. 1935) used this rule to exclude from the line of succession his two sons by his Muslim but British second wife Princess Muna. He also issued a royal decree that excluded his next younger brother Muhammad (b. 1945) and designated a second brother, Hasan (b. 1948), as crown prince. In June 1978, Hussain designated Prince Ali (b. 1975), his son from his third wife (Queen Alia, who was killed in a helicopter crash in February 1977) to succeed Hasan as heir apparent on the latter's succession to the throne. When the throne is inherited by a minor, the powers of the king are exercised by a regent or by a council of regency, both of which may be appointed by a decree of the (previous) reigning king; if the king dies without having made such an appointment, the appointment is made by the Council of Ministers. The king attains majority on his eighteenth birthday based on the Muslim lunar calendar. Should the king be disabled by illness, his powers are exercised by a deputy, by a council of the throne appointed by the king, or by the Council of Ministers if the king is incapable of such appointment. The deputy or the council of the throne may also perform royal duties during the absence of the king from the country. If the absence extends to

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more than four months, the House of Representatives is empowered to "review" the matter. The king has full responsibility for all matters pertaining to the royal household. He appoints the chief of the royal court, an official who can play an influential political role through his control of access to the monarch. Although the rank of the chief of the royal court is equivalent to that of a cabinet minister, his office is not part of the executive branch.

Council of Ministers The cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister and the other ministers, is the top executive arm of the state. Its members serve at the pleasure of the king, but the Constitution requires every new cabinet to present its statement of programmes and policies to the House of Representatives for approval by a two-thirds vote of the members of that house. If the house passes a vote of no confidence, the cabinet must resign. Traditionally, Prime Ministers have been recruited from families that have loyally served the Hashemiates for many years. Zaid ar Rifai, who was Prime Minister from 1985 to 1989, is the son of a prominent Trans-Jordanian politician who had served as Prime Minister to Hussain's grandfather. His successors, Ash Sharif Zaid ibn Shakir (April-November 1989) and Mudar Badran (designated Prime Minister in November 1989) have each worked with the king in a variety of political capacities. Significantly, both men served as chief minister of the royal court prior to becoming Prime Minister. In September 1989, the cabinet included ministers responsible for the following portfolios: agriculture; communications; culture and information; defence; education; energy and mineral resources; finance and customs; foreign affairs; health; higher education; tourism and antiquities; interior; justice; labour and social development; municipal, rural, and environmental affairs; planning; religious affairs and holy places; supply; trade and industry; transportation; and youth. In 1989, the government also was served by a minister of state for Prime Ministerial affairs. In 1986 the bureaucracy employed 109,523 Jordanians, making the government the principal employer in society. Selection generally was based upon merit, although patronage and nepotism remained

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fairly widespread. The government trained civil servants at a school of public administration in Amman, Jordan's capital. A majority of them were Palestinians who had opted for Jordanian citizenship; at the higher levels of the administrative hierarchy, however, TransJordanians probably outnumbered Palestinians. Allegiance to the monarchy and the Constitution remained an important factor in government service. In the aftermath of the Az Zarka affair in 1957 and the civil war of 1970 and 1971, numerous Palestinian civil servants were dismissed because of suspected disloyalty to the throne. From the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in June 1967 until Hussain relinquished Jordan's claim to sovereignty of the territory in July 1988, Amman continued to pay salaries and pensions to serving and retired West Bank municipal government employees. During this period, the West Bank came under the jurisdiction initially of the Bureau of Occupied Homeland Affairs, attached to the Prime Minister's office and headed by a cabinet-level minister; later this office became the Ministry of Occupied Territories. In addition to paying salaries, it was responsible for channelling Jordan's loans and development funds to Palestinian concerns in the West Bank. Following the decision at the Baghdad Summit meeting in November 1978 to set up a special fund for development and other projects in the Israeli-occupied territories, this ministry worked jointly with the PLO in administering aid funds for Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By 1988, when Jordan terminated payments, more than 20,000 West Bank Palestinians were estimated to be receiving salaries from the Jordanian government. All of these employees were granted retirement benefits or severance pay according to the number of years they had been municipal employees.

The Legislature Under the Constitution, the bicameral legislature is called the National Assembly and consists of the thirty-member appointed Senate (sometimes called the House of Notables) and the popularly elected House of Representatives (also called the Chamber of Deputies). Prior to July 1988, both houses had an equal number of representatives from each bank of the Jordan River. The Constitution stipulates that the size of the Senate cannot be more than half that of the lower house. Of the two chambers, the Senate is regarded as the more elite;

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but like the lower chamber, it has had little real influence in the legislative process. Although the House of Representatives was vested with more legislative power than the upper house, both chambers have been overshadowed by the executive side of government. The senators are appointed by the king for four-year terms, with half the membership retiring every two years at the end of a senate session. A senator may be reappointed. Qualifications for a senator include a minimum age of forty years and prior government or military service in relatively senior positions. Senators have included present and past Prime Ministers, former members of the House of Representatives who had been elected at least twice, former senior judges and diplomats, and retired officers who have attained the rank of general. Members of the House of Representatives are elected to fouryear terms by secret ballot. Candidates must be Jordanian citizens more than thirty years of age. Individuals representing foreign interests or having material interests in any government contract are disqualified. Also excluded are persons who have been debarred from public office or who have blood ties to the king within a prescribed degree of relationship. Ten of the eighty seats are reserved for minorities including Christians, Bedouins, and Circassians. Voters must be at least nineteen years of age. Suffrage has been universal since 1973, when women were enfranchised. All Palestinian refugees who have adopted Jordanian citizenship enjoy equal voting privileges with Trans-Jordanians. Prior to the November 1989 elections, the last national elections for the House of Representatives had been held in April 1967. In 1970 Hussain cited the Israeli occupation of the West Bank as reason for postponing elections, but he decreed that serving members would continue in office until circumstances permitted the holding of new elections. The 1974 decision by Arab heads of state at a summit meeting in Rabat, Morocco, that the PLO was the sole representative of the Palestinian people raised questions about the political relationship of the West Bank to Jordan. In response to this decision, in November 1974 Hussain dissolved the House of Representatives, half of whose members represented the West Bank. Nevertheless, Hussain was reluctant to sever ties to the Israelioccupied territory, and subsequently he decreed that elections for a

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new house would be held in March 1976. Whether the elections would include or exclude the West Bank had serious consequences for Jordan's relations with the PLo. Moreover, some Arab states interpreted the Rabat decision to mean that Jordan should renounce its claims to the West Bank-an interpretation to which Hussain did not then subscribe. As the time for the elections drew near, Hussain decided that postponing the elections would be the prudent course to avoid foreclosing future political options. Consequently, in February 1976, he recalled the old house, with its West Bank members. It convened briefly to approve the indefinite suspension of elections for a new House of Representatives, and then it adjourned. In 1978, Hussain issued a royal decree that granted some legislative functions to a newly created sixty-member appointive body, the National Consultative Council (NCC). The NCC, which did not include any members from the West Bank, had a limited mandate to study, debate, and render advice on bills drafted by the Council of Ministers. The NCC possessed no authority, however. to make policy or to approve, amend, or reject any bill. The NCC proVided advisory opinions to the Council of Ministers on general state policy when requested by the Prime Minister. The decree establishing it stated that the NCC would be "lawfully dissolved when the House of Representatives is elected and convened." In January 1984, Hussain dismissed the NCC and reconvened the suspended National Assembly. He appointed new members to the Senate but called back those members of the House of Representatives who were serving when the lower house last met in 1976. By-elections were held in the East Bank in March to fill eight vacancies in the house that had resulted from the deaths of members since the 1967 elections. In accordance with a January 1984 constitutional amendment, the house also voted to fill seven vacant West Bank seats. In March 1986, the house approved a new electoral law that would increase its membership from 60 to 142; 71 members would be elected from the East Bank, 60 from the West Bank, and 11 from Palestinian refugee camps on the East Bank; this law was never implemented. In 1987, the government began registering Jordanians on the East Bank so that they could vote in parliamentary elections scheduled for 1988; these would have been the first national elections in more than twenty-one years. At the end of 1987, however, registration was

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halted and the king issued a royal decree that postponed elections for two years. In July 1988, Hussain renounced Jordan's claims to the West Bank. In light of the new political situation, the king dissolved the House of Representatives. A royal decree issued in October postponed indefinitely elections for a reorganised legislature. A subsequent decree in December abolished the ministerial-level Office of Parliamentary Affairs. Following anti-government riots in April 1989; however, outgoing Prime Minister Rifai promised that the interim government would concentrate on carrying out the long delayed parliamentary elections. In July, Prime Minister Shakir scheduled the elections for November. They were the first national elections for the House of Representatives in more than twenty-two years. Jordan's parliamentary system has undergone important changes that have contributed significantly to the improvement of basic legislative functions of representation, effective lawmaking, and oversight-all integral elements of good governance. The relationship between the legislative and the executive branches may be characterised as "flexible moderate separation of powers." The king partakes in the legislative functions through several methods, including appointing the senators and dissolving both houses of the parliament. The bicameral parliament (Majlis al-Umma) consists of a House of Notables and a House of Representatives. According to the constitution, the senate, including the speaker, should consist of not more than one-half of the number of the members of the House of Representatives. The new Elections Law, issued by Royal Decree on July 22, 2001, raises the number of Lower House seats from 80 to 104, increases the number of constituencies from 21 to 44, redistributes parliamentary seats, and lowers the voting age from 19 to 18. Some seats are reserved for religious and ethnic minorities like Christians, Circassians, Bedouins, and Chechens. The Jordanian parliament meets for four months each year. Both houses meet simultaneously. The king may prolong the ordinary session for a further period not exceeding three months to alloVJ for the dispatch of pending matters. The king may summon the parliament for extraordinary sessions. Both houses of the Jordanian parliament may initiate debates, submit legislation to the government in the form of a draft law, and vote on legislation.

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Each house elects its own speaker. In the case of a tied vote, the speaker casts the tie-breaking vote. The speaker of the House of Notables as of 2003 is Zaid al-Rifai. As of 2003, the speaker of the House of Representatives is Abd al-Hadi al-Majali. Both houses have several permanent committees that deal with legal, financial, administrative, and foreign policy issues. Both houses may create other permanent or temporary committees when the need arises. Committee members in the lower chamber are elected for two years. Resolutions are made by majority vote in both houses. Proposals are referred by the Prime Minister to the House of Representatives, where deputies can accept, amend or reject them. Each proposal is referred to a special committee in the lower house for consideration. If the representatives accept the proposal, they refer it to the government to draft it in the form of a bill and submit it back to the House for approval. A bill approved by the House of Representatives is passed on to the senate for debate and a vote. If approved, the bill is then submitted to the king, who can either grant consent by royal decree or return the bill unapproved with justification for his refusal. In this case, the bill is returned to the House of Representatives, where the review and voting process is repeated. Any bill rejected by the senate is returned to the House of Representatives for amendment. Disagreement between the two houses is settled in a joint session of parliament. Should both houses, meeting jointly, pass the bill by a two-thirds majority, it becomes official, constitutionally overriding the monarch's veto. No law may be promulgated unless passed by both houses and ratified by the king. Laws go into effect after their publication in the official Gazette.

The lower house of the parliament is entitled to question the government on any public issue, make accusations against ministers by a two-thirds majority, and submit a vote of no-confidence in the government. The questions are asked to the ministers in one session, and then in another session the Ministers should have all the answers with the explanation. No senator or representative may be detained or tried during the sessions of the parliament unless the house to which he/she belongs decides by an absolute majority that there is sufficient reason for his/her detention or trial, except in the case of flagrant crime. Members of the parliament also enjoy complete freedom of expression.

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The Judiciary The legal system of Jordan is based on Shariah (Islamic law) and laws of European origin. During the nineteenth century, when Jordan was part of the Ottoman Empire, some aspects of European law, especially French commercial law and civil and criminal procedures, were adopted. English common law was introduced in the West Bank between 1917 and 1948, during most of which time the area was incorporated into the British-administered Mandate of Palestine, and introduced in the East Bank during the years 1921 to 1946, when the East Bank comprised the British Mandate of Trans-Jordan. Under the Court Establishment Law of 1951 and the Constitution, the judiciary is independent. The legal system of Jordan is based on a combination of Civil Law traditions and Islamic legal principles. The Court Establishment Law of 1951 and the Constitution of Jordan, promulgated in 1952 and amended in 1974,1976, and 1984, provide for an independent judiciary. The legal system is influenced by a variety of historical sources. Civil law derives from both Islamic law and the Egyptian Civil Code; family law obtains entirely from Islamic law. The major codifications of the law consist of the Civil Code, contained in Law No. 43 of 1976; the Code of Civil Procedure, contained in Law No. 24 of 1988; the Commercial Code, expressed in Law No. 12 of 1966; the Criminal Code, contained in Law No. 1487 of 1960; and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1961. Laws are made public in the official Gazette. The Jordanian court system is structured into three broad categories of courts: Religious, Civil, and Special Courts. The Religious Courts are further subdivided into Shariah Courts and tribunals for non-Muslim religious communities. The Shariah Courts have jurisdiction over all matters relating to the personal status of Muslims and in instances when one party is non-Muslim but agrees to adjudication by the Shariah Courts. A special court appOinted by the Court of Cassation adjudicates disputes between two Religious Courts and between one ReligiOUS and one Civil Court. The Civil Courts, which hear all civil and criminal matters not reserved for the religious courts, consist of a four-tiered hierarchy. First, the Magistrate Courts are empowered to hear all lesser civil and criminal matters. Their decisions may be appealed to the Courts of First Instance. The seven Courts of First Instance sit in chambers of

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three judges for criminal felony matters, and two judges for misdemeanour and civil matters. Their decisions may be appealed to the Courts of Appeal, which sit in chambers of three judges and may hear cases appealed from the ReligiOUS Courts. At the apex of the judicial hierarchy is the Court of Cassation, which is composed of seven judges. A number of Special Courts have specialised jurisdictions. The State Security Court, composed of both military and civilian judges, has jurisdiction over offences against the state and drug-related crimes. The High Tribunal may interpret the Constitution at the request of the Prime Minister or leader of either legislative chamber. The Supreme Council, or the Special Council, interprets laws at the request of the Prime Minister and is empowered to try members of parliament accused of Penal Code violations. The Supreme Council is composed of the President of the Senate, three Senate members who are elected by the parliamentary body, and five judges who are selected from amongst the highest courts in order of seniority. The High Court of Justice hears private challenges to governmental acts. Jordan currently has one law faculty, the University of Jordan, located in Amman. Prior to its formation in the last decade, Jordanian lawyers trained abroad, mostly in Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus and the United States. Law training in Jordan involves three years of schooling coupled with two years of practical experience in an attorney's office. All lawyers practising in Jordan must be members of the Jordan Bar Association. The Association is presided over by a President and a ten-member council, all of whom are elected every two years. The Association organises the interests of the legal profession and publishes both a compilation of Jordanian laws and a law publication that provides commentaries on legal issues and important Supreme Court decisions. The civil jurisdiction is exercised at four levels: the magistrates' courts, the courts of first instance, the Court of Appeal, and the Court of Cassation (the supreme court of the land). There are fourteen magistrates' courts throughout the country. They exercise jurisdiction in civil cases involving small claims of no more than JD250 (JD or Jordanian dinar) and in criminal cases involving maximum fines of JDIOO or maximum prison terms of one year. The seven courts of

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first instance exercise general jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal. A panel of three judges sits for all felony trials; two judges sit for misdemeanour and civil cases. The courts of first instance also exercise limited appellate jurisdiction in cases involving judgments or fines under JD20 and JDlO respectively. There is a three-judge panel Court of Appeal that sits in Amman. Its appellate review extends to judgments of the courts of first instance. the magistrates' courts, and the religious courts. The highest court is the Court of Cassation in Amman; its president, who is appointed by the king, serves as the country's chief justice. All seven judges of the court sit in full panel when important cases are being argued. For most appeals, however, only five judges hear and rule on the cases. The religious courts are divided into Shariah Courts for Muslims and ecclesiastical courts for the minority Christian communities. These courts are responsible for disputes over personal status (marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance) and communal endowment among their respective communities. One judge, called a qadi. sits in each Shariah court and decides cases on the basis of Islamic law. Three judges, usually members of the clergy, sit in each ecclesiastical court and render judgments based on various aspects of canon law as interpreted by the Greek Orthodox, Melchite, Roman Catholic, and Anglican traditions. Appeals from the judgments of the religious courts are referred to the Court of Appeal sitting in Amman. If any dispute involves members of different religious communities, the civil courts have jurisdiction unless the parties mutually agree to submit to the jurisdiction of one of the religious courts. In case of jurisdictional conflicts between any two religiOUS courts or between a religiOUS court and a civil court, the president of the Court of Cassation appoints a three-judge special tribunal to decide jurisdiction or to hear the case. Special courts include the High Tribunal (or High Councilor Supreme Council), which interprets the Constitution at the request of the Prime Minister or of either chamber of the National Assembly; the Special Council, which may be called on by the Prime Minister to interpret any law that has not been interpreted by the courts of law; and the High Court of Justice, which is to be constituted when necessa:-y by the Court of Cassation.

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The High Court of Justice hears habeas corpus and mandamus petitions and may issue injunctions involving public servants charged with irregularities; it is also empowered to try cabinet ministers charged with offences. There is also a special court known as the Land Settlement Court. After 1976 when tribal law was abolished, tribal matters came under the formal jurisdiction of the regular courts, but adjudication apparently was still handled informally in traditional ways by local intermediaries or tribal authorities.

Criminal Justice: Until the nineteenth century, the only source of law considered to be valid in controlling criminal activity in the region that was to become Jordan was Islamic religious law, or Shariah. This law and its application had remained static for centuries, subject only to interpretation by the Ulema (pI.; sing. Alim, religious scholars) and enforcement by Muslim judges (qadis) in Shariah courts. Temporal rulers could not, in theory, legislate rules to govern social behaviour; they could only hand down edicts to implement the immutable divine law. In the mid-1800s, reforms of the system were instituted to enhance Ottoman control of the area. Comprehensive codes of law based on European models became the basis of a new legal system, and in 1858 a criminal code was adopted to support the reform movement. The new code was based on French law, but in effect it complemented Shariah inasmuch as the French code was modified to accommodate Muslim customs. For example, the Ottoman criminal code imposed the payment of blood money in addition to imprisonment for acts of homicide or bodily injury, and the death penalty for apostasy was retained. When the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist after World War I and Britain became the mandatory power for Palestine and Trans-Jordan, the Ottoman laws in force were supplemented by British statutes. In Palestine, the 1858 criminal code was replaced by a new penal code and a code of criminal procedure patterned on those used in British colonies. The Palestinian courts, staffed by British and British-trained judges, used their power to apply English common law, and decisions could be appealed to the judicial committee of the Privy Council in London. The influence of English law was weaker in Trans-Jordan, however, where there were no British judges, and common law was not applied in the courts. Instead, the laws that dealt with criminal behaviour retained the European flavour of the Ottoman code of

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1858. When the Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan was proclaimed in 1949, the ancient Ottoman code had been largely modified at the insistence of moderates who believed that the Shariah provisions on which it had been based should be supplemented by-and, if necessary, subordinated to-laws that could deal with modern problems. The period of British tutelage did not significantly change the substantive law, but it had the effect of weakening the absolutist traditions of Shariah in the field of criminal jurisprudence. In the early 1950s, a committee of leading Muslim scholars and jurists of several Arab countries convened with the purpose of drafting new codes of criminal law and procedure to replace the 1858 Ottoman code. which had been almost entirely amended during the century it had been in force. In 1956, the Jordanian National Assembly adopted a new criminal code and code of criminal procedure. Both were based on the Syrian and Lebanese codes, which in turn were modelled on French counterparts. Within the realm of criminal jurisprudence, Jordan retained only nominal application of Shariah. Although the codified laws were based on Islamic principles and customs, these were largely modified and extended along European lines in an effort to adapt to the requirements of a changing economy and culture. Criminal Code: The criminal code adopted in 1956, which had been amended many times, contained the bulk of the country's criminal law. In addition, certain codified civil statutes also prescribed penalties for acts such as libel, adultery, and publication of material endangering the security of the kingdom. Individuals could not be punished except for acts made criminal by virtue of penalties prescribed by law. Other than where specified, a person also could not be punished for committing a criminal act in the absence of criminal responsibility or intent, both of which were defined by the code. As a safeguard of personal liberty, the government had the burden of proving both the defendant's commission of the act and the admissible intent of the defendant before guilt could be established. The criminal code, in traditional French form, divided criminal offences into three categories according to the severity of the applicable punishments. In English common law these categories equated roughly to felonies, misdemeanours, and minor violations. Punishments for felonies ranged from death by hanging to imprisonment for periods

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ranging from three years to life. Punishments for misdemeanours included imprisonment for periods ranging from three weeks to three years and a variety of fines. Minor violations could be punished by imprisonment for less than three weeks, small fines, or reprimands by the court. In cases involving misdemeanours or minor violations, a judge also could invoke preventive measures including detention for psychiatric examination, forfeiture of material goods, or closure of a place of business. The criminal code provided for minimum penalties for all major infractions rather than relying on the discretion of the courts. The death penalty was authorised for murder, arson of an inhabited building, assassination of the king (or attempts on his life), and a broad range of serious crimes defined as threats to the security of the state. These latter offences included acts such as treason, espionage on behalf of an unfriendly foreign power, and armed insurrection. The act of selling land in the West Bank to occupying Israeli authorities was considered high treason and, therefore, a capital offence. Some Palestinians had been sentenced in absentia to death under this deccee but as of 1989 these sentences had never been carried out. Executions were rare and politically sensitive in Jordan. Three death sentences for murder were carried out in 1985, none in 1986, and only one in 1987. In the 1987 case, the assassin of a PLO Executive Committee member in the West Bank was put to death. Imprisonment for life was imposed for such felonies as lesser crimes against national security, homicide during commission of a misdemeanour or that resulted from torture, and the more serious forms of theft. Shorter imprisonment was prescribed for these same offences if mitigating circumstances warranted. Such punishment also was authorised for terrorist activity, membership in subversive organisations, counterfeiting, forgery of official documents, and abduction .. Misdemeanours included such offences as gambling in public places, bribery, perjury, simple forgery, slander, embezzlement, assault and battery, and disturbing the peace. The influence of Shariah was still evident in the imposition of prison sentences for desertion of a child, abortion, marrying a girl under the age of sixteen, openly ridiculing the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh), and breaking the fast of Ramadan. Shariah also was important in the criteria for justifiable

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homicide. No penalty was imposed for the immediate killing of someone who defiled a person's or a family's honour. Minor violations covered by the code included traffic violations, seeking redress for a crime without recourse to civil authorities, public drunkenness, and violations of administrative regulations such as licensing and safe housing requirements. These infractions were punishable with or without proven intent. Most minor violations resulted in fines being assessed against the offender. Procedures in Criminal Law: When the police believed that a person had committed a crime or when someone was caught committing a criminal act, the suspect was taken to the nearest police station for registration and interrogation. Usually a warrant was required for an arrest; however, in cases where delay would be harmful or when a person was apprehended in a criminal offence, the accused could be detained without a warrant of arrest for as long as forty-eight hours. After forty-eight hours, a court order was required to continue detention of the suspect. A warrant of arrest could be issued by a magistrate only if there was a presumption that the person had committed the offence for which he or she was charged and if there was reason to believe that the accused intended to escape, destroy traces of the crime, or induce witnesses to make false statements. A warrant also could be issued for offences against national security or other grave acts specified in the criminal code. The police magistrate first informed the accused of the charges and questioned the accused and any available witnesses to determine if there was a prima facie case against the detained person, who had the right to counsel at this preliminary investigation. If the magistrate found evidence of guilt, the case was transmitted to the local prosecutor for further investigation. A prosecutor was attached to every magistrate's court and court of first instance. The magistrate then could either issue an arrest warrant to bind over the suspect for trial or release the suspect on bail. Release on bail was a matter of right when the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence was imprisonment not exceeding one year and where the accused had an established residence within the country and had not previously been convicted of a felony or sentenced to more than three months in jail.

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The right of habeas corpus was provided for under the Constitution, but in practice it had not afforded the same protection as in English common law. The police usually managed to establish the need to detain suspects charged with serious offences. Persons could be detained pending investigation for fifteen days or longer if the court approved a request by the public prosecutor for an extension. The power of detention had been used effectively by the police to forestall disorder. For example, police occasionally dispersed crowds before a disturbance merely by threatening to arrest thOSe! who disobeyed an order to leave the scene. On deciding that legal action against the accused was necessary, the public prosecutor instituted a trial by issuing an indictment to the appropriate court. The fourteen magistrates' courts handled only those criminal offences for which the maximum fine was not more than JDIOO or the maximum prison sentence was not more than one year. The seven courts of first instance tried cases involving misdemeanours before two judges and major felonies before three judges. Trials were open to the public except in certain cases, such as those involving sexual offences. The defendant had the right to legal counsel, but defendants often were unaware of this right and failed to exercise it. The court appointed a lawyer for those who could not afford one if the potential sentence was execution or life imprisonment. Defendants had the right of cross-examination and were protected against self-incrimination. There was no jury system in Jordan. The judge, therefore, decided questions of fact, based entirely on the weight of the evidence, as well as questions of the interpretation and application of the criminal law. Trials began with opening statements by the prosecutor and the defence counsel, followed by an interrogation of the defendant by the presiding judge. After examination of witnesses for the state and for the accused and the submission of documentary evidence, closing arguments by the prosecutor and defence counsel completed the presentation. Decisions were announced in open court and, if the defendant were found guilty, sentence would be pronounced. Either the public prosecutor or the defendant could appeal the decision to the court of appeal and, ultimately, to the Court of Cassation. Incidence of Crime: Detailed criminal statistics were not customarily available but fragmentary data has been released from

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time to time that provided limited information on the nature and scope of criminal activity in Jordan. According to a Jordanian submission to the International Criminal Police Organisation (interpol), national criminal statistics recorded 16,215 offences for 1984. Although it was not clear what offences constituted this total, the number of cases in the following categories was supplied: ordinary theft (3,859 cases reported), aggravated theft (1,208 cases), breaking and entering (1,164 cases), cartheft (178 cases), robbery and violenttheft (44 cases), other forms of theft (2,473 cases), serious assaults (437), homicide (70), and rape (24). Frauds numbered 276 and currency or counterfeiting violations numbered 31. Only sixty-five drug offences were reported. According to Interpol, the total number of criminal offences reported by Jordanian authorities constituted a rate of 630 crimes per 100,000 people. This rate was far lower than that reported by most countries of Western Europe but was typical of some Middle Eastern countries, and higher than many countries of the Third World. The validity of this index was linked to the reliability of the reports of criminal activity submitted to Interpol. The Public Security Directorate released similar data for 1986. In that year, 19,618 criminal offences were reported. Under the category of thefts and robberies, the directorate listed 4,269 violations. According to the directorate, most such crimes were committed by unemployed males and by low-paid labourers between the ages of eighteen and twenty-seven. There were 549 offences listed as "moral" crimes, including rape, abduction, and various forms of public misbehaviour. A total of 348 cases of fraud and embezzlement were recorded, reflecting a rising trend attributed by the police to poor economic conditions and financial difficulties of individuals and companies. The sixty-four murders reported represented a decline from eighty-one in the previous year. Generally, such crimes were the result of personal disputes, family problems, and seeking revenge. Again, the perpetrators of homicides were predominantly in the eighteen to twenty-seven-year-old age group. The police reported that 71 deaths and 513 injuries had resulted from guns fired in celebration or accidentally.

Penal System: The penal system, a responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, was administered by the Prisons Department of the Public

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Security Directorate. The system was composed of roughly twentyfive prisons and jails. All except Amman Central Prison-the system's major institution-were under the management of regional police chiefs and were sometimes referred to as police jails. In addition to the Amman facility, area prisons were located at Irbid and at Al-Jafr, east of Maan in the south-central desert region. The smaller jails were located at or near regional and local police offices. Generally, convicted offenders with more than one year to serve were transferred to the centraJ prison in Amman, those with terms of three months to one year were sent to regional prisons, and those sentenced to three months or less were kept in local jails. Some exceptions were made to this pattern in the case of Palestinian activists or other security prisoners who had been detained for long periods of time in the Al-Jafr facility, largely because of its remoteness. Penal institutions were used to detain persons awaiting trial as well as prisoners serving sentences. Convicted offenders were usually housed separately from those yet to be tried. Major prisons had separate sections for women prisoners, as did a few of the police jails in the larger communities. A juvenile detention centre in Amman housed young offenders who had been convicted of criminal offences. When juveniles reached the age of nineteen, if they had further time to serve, they were transferred to one of the larger prisons for the remainder of their sentences. All institutions operated in accordance with the provisions of the Prison Law of 1953, as amended. This law provided for decent treatment of prisoners and included comprehensive regulations governing the facilities, care, and administration of the prison system. Jordan was one of the first Arab countries to recognise the theory of rehabilitation, rather than retribution, as the basis for punishment of lawbreakers. This concept emphasised that crime was caused by human weakness resulting from poor social conditions rather than by wilfulness and immorality. As such, the approach was in many ways alien to the traditional Muslim custom of personal revenge by the family of the victim, which demanded that the culprit pay for his crime. Although Jordan's penal system was designed to provide punishments suited to bring about the rehabilitation of the wrongdoers, in practice these efforts were hampered by the lack of facilities and professionally trained staff. Some effort was made to provide literacy

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and limited industrial training classes to prisoners in Amman Central Prison, but few modern techniques of rehabilitation were found in other penal institutions. According to the annual human rights reports of the United States Department of State, prison conditions were harsh but not intentionally degrading. There appeared to be no discrimination according to religion or social class in treatment of prisoners. Crowded conditions in some prisons were relieved by a royal amnesty in 1985 that resulted in the release of more than 1,000 inmates. In 1986, a new central prison, Juwaidah, was opened in Amman. It replaced the obsolete and cramped AI-Mahatta prison, which was scheduled to be closed. In its 1988 report, Amnesty International cited a number of cases of apparent mistreatment in prisons, notably at AI-Mahatta and at the Az Zarqa military prison. The report also questioned the authorities' motives in forcing four students and a writer convicted in the martial law court of membership in illegal leftist organisations to serve their sentences under the harsh conditions found at AI-Jafr.

Martial Law Courts: A state of martial law, in effect since 1967, gave the government authority to detain individuals without charge and to adjudicate specified crimes in the martial law courts. These courts consisted of a panel of three military officers trained in the law. Designated martial law crimes included espionage, bribery of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketing, and security offences. Security detainees could be held without charge or brought before the martial law courts for trial. Detainees did not have the right to communicate with their family or legal counsel. Although the martial law courts were not bound to observe normal rules of evidence or procedures, in practice these military courts observed the law of criminal procedure and defendants were given most of the rights they were entitled to in civilian courts. Trials were held in public; defendants were represented by counsel and could cross-examine witnesses. It was not customary to grant bail, however, and there was no provision for habeas corpus. Normal avenues of appeal were not open from decisions of the military courts, but such court actions were subject to ratification by the Prime Minister in his capacity as military governor. The Prime Minister had the authority to increase, reduce, or annul sentences. Before acting,

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the Prime Minister received recommendations on the fairness of a sentence by a legal adviser or the minister of justice. In its annual report for 1988, Amnesty International asserted that some proceedings in the martial law courts failed to meet international standards for fair trials. It noted that in some cases it appeared that confessions allegedly extracted under torture or ill treatment were accepted as evidence. The United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1986 observed that the very quick trials and subsequent sentencing of the Communist Party of Jordan leadership suggested that there were politically motivated exceptions to the norms of criminal procedures and rights in the martial law courts. Military courts also adjudicated all crimes committed by military personnel, applying military regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Defence pursuant to relevant laws. In these cases, the commanding officer of the armed forces was required to ratify the sentence.

Local Administration In 1989, local government authorities were essentially an extension of the central government seated in Amman. Under the general supervision and control of the Ministry of Interior, the local units operated at the Governorate (sing .. Liwaa; pI., aiwiyah), municipality, township and village (or town) levels. The East Bank was divided into the eight governorates of Amman, Al-Balqa, Irbid, Az Zarqa, Al-Mafraq, Al-Karak, At Tafilah, an~ Maan. Each Governorate was subdivided into districts (sing., qada) and sub-districts (sing .. nahiya). The sub-districts comprised towns, villages, and rural areas. Each of the eight governorates was headed by an appointed commissioner. These commissioners were the principal agents of the king and supervised and coordinated the activities of various central government functions within their respective administrative divisions. The basic administrative unit was the village or town. The towns and larger villages had municipal councils elected by popular vote. The normal practice was for the minister of municipal, rural, and environmental affairs to confirm as mayor the council member who received the highest number of votes in each municipal election. Smaller villages continued to be governed by traditional headmen known as mukhtars. The village and town authorities had limited

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responsibilities for administration of markets, law and order, sanitation, and other community activities. The central government provided for local-level social services such as education, health, welfare, and public works. The multiplication and extension of government services during the 1970s and 1980s increased the influence of central authorities throughout the country. The elimination of tribal law in 1976 attested to the all-pervasiveness of central government penetration even in rural areas where tribal leaders traditionally had provided security and limited welfare services.

The Elections A hereditary monarch constitutes the executive branch of the Hashemiate Kingdom of Jordan. Since 1999, King Abdullah II has filled this position. The bicameral legislature, the National Assembly (Majlis al-Umma), is composed of the House of Notables or Senate (Majlis al-Ayan), and the House of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwaab). The King appoints the 55 members of the House of Notables for fouryear terms. The House of Representatives until 200 1 had 80 members elected for four-year terms under a plurality system from 21 multimember constituencies. Each constituency elected between two and nine seats. Candidates must be at least 30 years of age. Voting is not mandatory, and the right was extended to all Jordanian citizens over the age of 19. The new Elections Law, issued by Royal Decree on July 22,2001, raises the number of Lower House seats from 80 to 104, increases the number of constituencies from 21 to 44, redistributes parliamentary seats, and lowers the voting age from 19 to 18. In 2003 another royal decree allocated an additional six seats to women making the number of seats 110. Nine of the seats are reserved for Christians, three for Circassions and nine for Bedouins. Elections to the House of Representatives are governed by the Law of Election to the House of Deputies, No. 22 of 1986. Elections are overseen by the Ministry of Interior, which appoints representatives to organise and monitor election proceedings at the local level. A 1993 act of legislature altered the electoral system from an at-large to a limited vote arrangement. Under this system, voters cast only one ballot, rather than being allowed to cast, as many ballots as there are seats in the constituency, as in the old system. The 2001 Law keeps the controversial one-person, one-vote formula but provides

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for special committees, which include members of the judiciary, to supervise the electoral process in each district. The Political Parties Law, No. 32 of 1992, governs political parties. The law pertains to the manner in which political parties are to conduct themselves and includes stipulations for party formation and party activities. In order to receive a license from the Ministry of Interior, parties must comply with certain regulations, such as having a minimum of 50 members, respect for the Constitution and the ideals of political pluralism. Since the promulgation of the 1992 law, there has been an explosion of party formation. In some cases, smaller parties have since banded together in working coalitions to contest elections. The number of eligible voters was 2.3 million. The rate of participation in the elections was 58.8 per cent. The political parties that ran in the elections were: the Islamic Action Front (the political branch of the Muslim Brothers Movement) and a number of leftist and nationalist parties of the opposition. The latter ran together under the "National Democratic Block". The Islamic Action Front had 30 candidates and the National Democratic Block had 13 candidates. Moreover, dozens of independent candidates who represent tribes and clans ran in the elections, in addition to a number of ex-government officials, retired military officers and businessmen. Also, 54 women ran in the elections, some of whom represented political parties, while others were independent candidates. Election results were as follows: tribal candidates and candidates of conservative social forces achieved a decisive victory by capturing 84 parliamentary seats, while leftist and nationalist political parties failed to win any seat in parliament. The Islamic Action Front won only 20 seats, the lowest achievement in its political history. None of the female candidates were able to win any seat in parliament beyond their allotted quota. The 54 women candidates had to compete among themselves for the 6-seat female quota. Out of the 6 seats, one woman representing the Islamic Action Front was elected, while the other 5 women were independents active in public life. The leader of the Islamic Action Front claimed that there was widespread fraud in the elections. The government, however, denied that accusation. Election results suggest that there will be great harmony between the government and the parliament over the next four years.

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During the latter 1970s and early 1980s, the Jordanian Parliament was suspended and legislative powers reverted to the executive branch. An appointed National Consultative Council (NCC) was created to advise and support the executive. The NCC served in this capacity from 1978 to 1984. In 1984, the government announced a return to Parliamentary governance and reconvened the 9th House of Representatives, which had been suspended in 1978. This body ruled until the 1989 elections chose a new Parliament. Following a long period in which political parties were illegal, the Political Parties Law of 1992 signalled Jordan's return to multiparty democracy. In the 1989 elections, candidates ran without official party affiliation, although in many cases their party identification was popularly known. In 2003, the Municipal Law was amended making half the members of any city or village council appointed by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs as well as the head of any council, while the other half are elected. July 2003 marked the first elections under the amended law, while all councils that had been elected in 1999 had been dismissed in 2001. The Islamic Labour Front party, the largest Jordanian political party, boycotted the municipal election in protest of the amended law. The previous municipal elections were direct and all members were elected. The previous law used to permit the elections of all members of the municipal council. The Islamic labour front party had scored great success in the municipal elections, which took place in 1999 as 80 of its 100 candidates won seats in major municipalities.

Political Parties Although a ban on political parties imposed before the July 1963 elections was not lifted until 1991, the Communists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other political groups played an influential role in the 1989 parliamentary elections. Nine parties contested the country's 1993 elections. Independent candidates loyal to the king gained ground in the 1997 elections, due largely to a boycott by Islamic opposition parties protesting electoral laws they felt were unfair and government restrictions on the press. King Hussain ruled Jordan from 1953 to 1999, surviving a number of challenges to his rule, drawing on the loyalty of his military, and serving as a symbol of unity and stability for both the East Bank and Palestinian communities in Jordan. In 1989 and 1993,

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Jordan held free and fair parliamentary elections. Controversial changes in the election law led Islamist parties to boycott the 1997 elections. King Hussain ended martial law in 1991 and legalised political parties in 1992. King Abdullah II succeeded his father Hussain following the latter's death in February 1999. Abdullah moved quickly to reaffirm Jordan's peace treaty with Israel and its relations with the US Abdullah, during his first year in power, refocused the government's agenda on economic reform. In June 2001, the King dissolved Parliament. Parliamentary elections were held in June 2003 and municipal elections were held in July 2003. The King dissolved the government in October 2003, appointing a new Prime Minister and ushering in three women and several young technocrats as ministers. The cabinet declared its commitment to accelerated economic and political reforms. In April 2005, the King accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Faisal al-Fayez and appointed Adnan Badran in his place. The King subsequently approved Badran's formation of a new government, in which a number of key ministerial posts were reshuffled. Islamic Action Front: The Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islami) is a political party in Jordan. It is said to be the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. At the last legislative elections, 17 June, 2003, the party won 20 out of 84 seats. All other seats were won by non-partisans. The leftist National Democratic Block did not win any seats. Jordanian Communist Party: Jordanian Communist Party (Hizb al-Shuyuiyah al-Urduni) a communist political party in Jordan. The party was founded in 1948. For a long period the party had branches in the West Bank, but later the Palestinian Communist Party was reconstructed as a separate party. Jordanian Communist Toilers Party: Jordanian Communist Toilers Party (in Arabic: Hizb al-Shaghghilah al-Shuyuiyah al-Urduni) a communist political party in Jordan. The party was founded in 1998, through a split in the Jordanian Communist Party. The party is considered as more orthodox than JCP Jordanian Democratic People's Party: Jordanian Democratic People's Party (in Arabic: Hizb ash-Shaab ad-Dimokrati al-Urduni, abbreviated HASHD), is a political party in Jordan. HASHD was

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formed in 1989, when the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine separated their branch in Jordan to become a separate party. Jordanian Popular Democratic Unity Party: Jordanian Popular Democratic Unity Party (in Arabic: Hizb al-Wahdah al-Shabiah al-Dimuqratiyya al-Urduni) , is a political party in Jordan mainly backed by Palestinians. The party was formed in 1990, when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine separated their branch in Jordan to become a separate party.

National Democratic Institute Jordan, a key player in the Arab-Israeli peace process and a model for regional economic stability, is home to a large Palestinian majority. As a result, Jordan's ability to satisfy the political aspirations of all its citizens has a strong influence on the stability of any future Palestinian state. Proximity to Iraq and Syria also poses many pressures on Jordan, as it now strives to balance western ties with regional ones. In Jordan, political parties are not well developed or integrated into the political culture of the country and continue to face challenges to their ability to adequately reach out to citizens and present policy programmes that respond to their needs. They are dominated by individualistic agendas and operate under a restrictive political parties law and outdated bylaws. More importantly, parliamentary blocs lack the support and resources necessary to maintain cohesion and stability. Women in Jordan are also still struggling to overcome institutional and social barriers to their political participation and are especially affected by the parliamentary and party challenges mentioned above. NDI first began programme work in Jordan in 1993. The Institute conducted two seminars on Electoral Systems in 1994 and 1995, contributing to a dialogue on the various forms of electoral systems. In 1995, the Institute brought Middle Eastern politicians from Yemen, Lebanon and Palestine to study Jordan's first local government elections. In 1996, NDI, in conjunction with several Jordanian women's organisations, trained women candidates for the 1997 parliamentary elections. NDI ceased programme activity in 1997 after the elections were marred by widespread irregularities and legal manipulation. Also, the

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amendment of the Press and Publication Law which contained several restrictive provisions, such as preventing local media from criticising the royalty, seemed to be part of a trend to close the political space and limit debate. With the announcement of Parliamentary elections for June 17, 2003, NOI reactivated its programmes in Jordan and identified two key areas of democracy assistance where the Institute can effectively promote a more democratic electoral process: support to women candidates through training and provision of consultations and resources; and assistance to journalists to cover the elections through discussions of proper electoral coverage and individual consultations with leading media organisations. Women have shown increasingly more interest in running for public office in Jordan, but unfortunately, few have been able to realise their goal. The possibility for change emerged in February 2003 when King Abdullah announced the creation of six new parliamentary seats that would be reserved for women in the June elections. To provide Jordanian women with the skills and resources necessary to wage effective electoral campaigns, NOI launched a women candidates' training programme in March 2003 for women wanting to run as candidates in the upcoming elections. NOI worked in partnership with the Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW) and organised a series of training workshops and consultations that addressed such topics as message development, voter outreach, targeting, fundraising, and professional image. Of the 54 women who ran for the parliamentary seats, over 40 have been active participants in NOI's training sessions. NOI also trained four of the six women

MPs. In addition to its work with the JNCW, NOI helped the Jordanian National Forum for Women (JNFW) to establish a "women's campaign fundraising committee" that raised funds from international donors and Jordanian businesses and used them to produce a 30 second "IV spot, a 60 second radio spot, newspaper ads, "IV shirts, posters, and stickers for a general awareness and visibility campaign entitled "When Women Win, the Country Wins." The campaign was effective . in helping people to overcome the cultural constraints against voting for women. Following the elections, NOI produced a documentary

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video on the experiences of Jordanian womer. candidates, with highlights from NDI's women's programmes in Morocco. In July 2002, NDI provided the Centre for the Defence of Freedom of Journalists (CDFJ) with a sub-grant to conduct a three-day workshop that advised Jordanian journalists in ways to effectively cover the elections. In the months preceding the elections, NDI also supported two of CDFJ's electoral programmes: (1) The design and production of a series of political cartoons and public service announcements encouraging people to participate in the elections; and (2) A town hall meeting at Philadelphia University that brought candidates together with university students to discuss the importance of elections and political participation for Jordan's youth. NDI also sponsored two candidate debates organised by Amman Net, the first independent radio station in Jordan to broadcast through the Internet, and organised a training workshop for the Arab Women Media Centre (AWMC). The Institute finally placed an independent media consultant in Amman to coach more than a dozen Jordanian journalists on elections coverage issues. To promote a more representa~ive multiparty political system and strengthen women's political participation in Jordan, NDI seeks to support political parties and parliamentary blocs through a series of consultations and training workshops that address such topics as policy research and development with a focus on constituency outreach; articulation of policy positions and platforms; and media development and media relations. NDI is also working to organise a national forum to debate the valuable role that women activists play within parties and develop strategies by which parties can further encourage women's political participation. With funding from the Institute for Representative Government (IRG), NDI hosted an ll-day study mission in September 2004 to Washington DC and Annapolis, MD for 12 members of Jordan's House of Representatives, and two senior parliamentary staff, including two women. The mission informed participants on the role of political parties, legislative caucuses, legislative staff, advocacy groups and constituents in the democratic policy-making process. NDI recently completed the establishment of a field office in Amman. In February 2005, the Institute conducted a round of consultations with the various blocs in Jordan's House of

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Representatives as well as a limited number of political parties. The purpose of these sessions was to assess each bloc and party's capacity at this time and to inform NDI's future training and exchange activities in the country.

Women's Participation Internal pressures and advocacy for change have raised awareness and precipitated debates about the nature and need for reform processes in many Arab countries. Such debates have drawn in a diverse range of groups articulating interests and defining their own political programmes. In this context, electoral processes, women's participation and political parties have emerged as central issues in political reform agendas in the Arab world. The establishment in the mid-1990s of pan-Arab and transnational satellite television and radio channels widened space for debate that was not subject to national-level restrictions and censorship. In addition, the ratification by many Arab governments of international conventions related to political and economic reforms and the abolition of all forms of discrimination against women has offered new leverage for change. Demographic trends (60 per cent of the population in these countries is under adult age) are giving added impetus to demands for further economic and political reform. As a result, many reforms have been introduced in countries like Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait, while political openness has been developing in Yemen. Advances continue in Jordan and Morocco, where refocms were already in progress. The first United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) (2002), prepared by Arab scholars and experts, identified the three most important development challenges facing the Arab world as deficits in knowledge, freedom, and women's empowerment. In the conclusions of the AHDRechoed in the declarations of many Arab reformers and regional networks-the way forward in Arab countries is seen as lying through 'promoting good governance' and 'reforming the state institutions, and activating the voice of the people'. Emphasis was placed on: • comprehensive political representation in effective legislatures that are based on free, honest, efficient and regular elections; • legal and administrative procedures which guarantee citizens'

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rights and are compatible with fundamental human rights, particularly the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association for all; and • women's participation in political, economic and other societal institutions. By focusing on electoral systems and processes, women's participation and political parties, IDEA's project on Democracy in the Arab World, as defined in the second half of 2002, was directly related to these themes and to the reform agendas being elaborated in the three focus countries, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan. The second AHDR (2003) has since focused on one of the three challenges identified in 2002-the building of a knowledge society. It acknowledges that since 2002 there has been some progress in the advancement of women and in some aspects of popular participation, 'yet these bright spots, accompanied briefly by dawning awareness of the need for reform, were partly eclipsed by new setbacks in the area of freedom of opinion, expression and association'. The need for extensive dialogue and consensus bUilding around agendas for political reform is more important than ever. This report-Building Democracy in Jordan-is one of the most important outcomes of a project carried out by International IDEA, in cooperation with the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND), aimed at discussing democratic reform in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen. The aim of the project has been to contribute comparative analysis and information on good practice so as to enrich debate on democratic reform in the three countries. The project focused on three interconnected themes seen as entry points to help establish a reform-oriented agenda: electoral system reform, the political participation of women and the development of political parties. The challenges, opportunities and recommendations identified in the report are the result of the work of research teams in each of the three countries together with the contributions made during the regional meetings organised by the project. At national level in the three focus countries, teams of experts were set up representing different viewpoints who carried out indepth studies of electoral reform, gender in politics and the functioning of political parties, consulting various local stakeholders. The three expert teams were brought together at a workshop in Beirut in

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October 2003 to review the preliminary conclusions and help in drawing up the country reports. The critical challenges facing democratisation in the Arab world reflect themes that are central to IDEA's work in general-the conduct of free and fair elections, the political inclusion of women, and the functioning of political parties. A regional perspective is crucial to understanding the trends in democracy in the Arab world. IDEA's efforts aim to provide a forum for dialogue within and . between Arab countries, seeking to identify and establish good democratic practice in the region. In this context, this report on Building Democracy in Jordan should be seen as a reflective contribution to the ongoing discussions about democracy, a basis for further dialogue. This project contributes comparative analysis of and information on good practice in democratisation in order to enrich debate about democratic reform in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and beyond. The project has aimed to identify the main challenges and opportunities for reform that may also be valid for other Arab countries engaged in democratic transition or for the international community that is interested in suppo:J:ing the process of reform in the Arab world. Regar<;ling electoral processes, the findings of the project seem to suggest that government and national stakeholders promote greater independence and professionalism in election administration, systematic authorisation for domestic election observation, the establishment of mechanisms for the resolution of electoral disputes, equal access to the media for political parties and some regulation of campaign financing. On electoral system design, the introduction of mixed electoral systems is suggested so as to improve representation and legitimacy. Continued broad national debate on electoral reform is an important way to achieve consensus on this and other matters. To enhance the political participation of women, the report is proposing to government and national stakeholders that more serious consideration be given to the potential of electoral systems, as well as to affirmative measures and gender quotas for political parties and other institutions. Gender issues are best promoted through specific structures inside government as well as specific public institutions such as an ombudsperson on discrimination against women. Civil society should gender mainstream its programmes, and regional

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networks and alliances should be built to support the gender dimension in democratisation agendas. On the development of political parties as effective actors in democratisation, it is suggested that political party law should be modernised and stronger guarantees of freedom of association should be established. In the short term, parties should move to democratise themselves, whether or not legislation is used. Inter-party dialogue should be facilitated at regional and national levels. Country studies prepared during the course of the project indicate three levels of engagement to create change and implement reforms. • The Legal Environment: the amendment of or creation of new legislation that can promote women's participation, strengthen political parties and reform electoral processes. This level concerns mainly governments and parliaments, but it also concerns political parties, research centres and other civil society organisations that should create a dialogue space with governments in order to reach consensus on new laws and measures. • Internal Governance and Capacity: political parties and women's organisations should develop strategies for change and create alliances in order to give an example that governments could follow. They need to be democratic and representative in order to gain credibility, build confidence and construct a strong public opinion base to support lobbying efforts. • The Social, Cultural and Economic Environment: reforming and opening economic sectors in order to enable more women to join in productive activities; and changing educational curricula to raise awareness of women's roles, the importance of political parties, a citizenship culture, and freedom of choice and election. This level also concerns the media and information sectors. The media playa major role in shaping people's minds. Any reform plan should be mirrored by independent and free media where different stakeholders present their views and people choose those who best reflect their interests and values.

IDEA and ANNO consider that there are distinct opportunities for democratisation in the region, but recognise that each country needs sufficient space and time to develop its own reform agenda and democratisation strategy and to craft its own democratic institutions

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according to its particular cultural, political and historical circumstances. For a successful engagement in support of democratisation, international actors need to develop credibility by establishing collaboration based on genuine dialogue and long-term commitment. Both IDEA and ANND hope to build on this first project and contribute in this way to a reform process that is nurtured and shaped by internal debate and dialogue with all interested parties.

Reform Retreats Amid Political Storms: For weeks in the spring of 2005, banners advertising an international gathering at the Dead Sea resort of Shouna adorned every main street in Jordan's capital city of Amman. The government was touting what it regarded as a significant national success: for the third year in a row, the lightly populated, resource-poor kingdom would host the high-powered World Economic Forum on May 20-22. Jordanian officials were also proud to be hosts of a conference of Nobel laureates convening in Petra around the same time. As the dates of the World Economic Forum approached, however, heavily armed soldiers and commandos soon outnumbered the banners in the streets. Units of the Jordanian army and Special Forces spread out across the capital, posting armoured vehicles at all major interchanges. The shows of force may have been intended more to reassure the international visitors than to intimidate the Jordanian population, but they underscored how political reform in this US-allied Arab state has repeatedly taken a back seat to the regime's plans for economic development. Since assuming the throne upon the death of his father Hussain in 1999, King Abdullah II has emphasised economic development above all things, with a particular focus on attracting foreign investment and manufacturing more goods for export. The showpiece achievements of Abdullah's foreign policy are Jordan's entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2000 and the Free Trade Agreement with the United States that took effect in 200!. Meanwhile, even as the Bush administration and Western commentators herald an "Arab spring" of democratising change, political reform has stalled. Jordan's political liberalisation process has surged forward and fallen backward repeatedly since its inception in 1989. The Hashemiate regime began its experiment in limited democratisation largely as an attempt to quell widespread protests and rioting triggered by an

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austerity programme prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and by charges of government corruption. The political opening proceeded apace until 1994. when King Hussain signed a peace treaty with Israel, whereupon the regime rolled back previous reforms in an effort to rein in dissent. With the 1999 royal succession, public expectations for reform increased. The regime's initial moves under the new king appeared to signal a solid commitment to restarting the process of political reform. In the same year of Abdullah's accession, municipal elections were held throughout the kingdom. In 2003, when Jordan held its fourth round of national parliamentary elections since 1989, the electoral law was supplemented by a royal decree reserving six seats in Parliament for women. But for every move towards liberalisation, there have been corresponding signs of demineralisation. The 2003 parliamentary contests, originally scheduled for 2001, were twice delayed. During the two years that Parliament was suspended, the king issued a series of controversial edicts creating "temporary laws" that, among other things, imposed additional restrictions on freedom of assembly and press freedom. In 2002, prominent feminist activist and former parliamentarian Toujan Faisal was arrested and convicted of "defaming" the Prime Minister and the government. While Faisal was later pardoned and released, she was barred from running in the 2003 elections. Today, pro-democracy activists complain of the increased role of the intelligence services (mukhabarat) in public life. As political reform retreats, the regime's economic development priorities are increasingly clear in its government appointments, with top ministries going to business people and technocrats fond of neoliberal economics. In the words of one analyst, these new ministers amount to "liberal authoritarians," in that they support economic liberalisation far more than they do political reform. "The community running Jordan is made up of English-speaking people with Power Point presentations," he continued. "Even in government, they are still business people." Though many of these officials have previously served in government jobs, a conservative former Prime Minister suggested that the new ministers seem "more like Western consultants" than public servants. Especially since the start of the liberalisation process in 1989, the Jordanian regime has allowed its critics room to dissent from its

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domestic policies, but has kept foreign policy-or "national security"off limits to serious opposition. This general tendency was reinforced when the regime signed its peace treaty with Israel. Now, the Jordanian opposition increasingly finds that questions of economic policy are off limits as well. Given the international emphasis of the regime's economic ambitions-specifically, its emphasis on direct foreign investment, tourism and export-driven development-economic reform may be seen as an increasingly international issue. The government's emphasis on economic development, therefore, appears to be causally linked to the stalling of the political reform process. There may be an ethnic dimension to these dynamics as well. The public sector has traditionally been dominated by the ethnic Trans-Jordanians who make up the regime's social base, while the private sector has tended to be a stronghold of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, many of whom are descendants of refugees from the 1948 war or refugees from the 1967 war. Given the ethnic politics underlying the Jordanian political economy, even privatisation, seemingly a purely domestic aspect of economic reform, carries a decidedly politicised tinge. It is difficult to even broach the subject of privatisation without appearing to be adding to inter-ethhic tensions or undermining the regime's '~ordan First" policy. At the beginning of April 2005, King Abdullah appointed a new Prime Minister, Adnan Badran, to succeed the dismissed government of Faisal al-Fayiz. The Fayiz government had earned the ire of the king for failing to convince the Arab League to revive the Arab peace initiative originally put forward by Saudi Arabia in Beirut in March 2002. Jordan's proposal to revive the initiative, intended to assert diplomatic leadership for a regime marketing its closeness to Washington, instead drew the derision of Arab delegations who felt that such a move would reward Israeli military actions against the Palestinians. Arab objections focused not only on the substance of the Jordanian initiative, but also on the perceived inappropriateness of its timing. Several veteran Jordanian policy makers shared this view. But within Jordan, anger at the Fayiz government focused not on Arab summitry, but on the government's controversial attempts to change the laws on professional associations, political parties and the right of free assembly. The government submitted draft laws it insisted were cornerstones

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of Jordan's political reform programme. But in each case the draft laws actually increased restrictions upon civil society. A draft law on political parties prohibited political and party activities from taking place in clubs, mosques and educational institutions. Parties would further be banned from political activities within Jordan's professional associations. The associations, meanwhile, were to be the subject of still another draft law, curbing their political activities and even changing their leadership selection procedures from direct elections by all members to selection by nebulous "commissions." Non-governmental organisations also came under the watchful eye of the Ministry of the Interior, which announced its intention to review carefully foreign sources of funding and even to shut down NGOs suspected of being overly susceptible to foreign influence. Pro-democracy activists reverse the charge of foreign influence. In the words of one, "There is a huge gap between the king's reform rhetoric and the actual policies. It's like they are doing all this to impress the West. ... We are actually cutting back on the freedom of the people." The draft laws turned into a kind of showdown between the interior minister and the professional associations, as well as influential parties such as the Islamic Action Front (lAF). With the dismissal of the Fayiz government, including his unpopular interior minister, Samir Habashneh, the latter groups felt they had won a victory. But soon angry parliamentarians were also mobilising against the new Badran government, in a crisis that has yet to be resolved. By late May, the list of MPs in the lower house threatening to withhold their vote of confidence in Badran had grown to 48 out of 110. The MPs charged that the makeup of Badran's government had been sprung on them out of nowhere. They argued that it under-represented almost the entire southern part of the country, especially ethnic TransJordanian strongholds such as Kerak. The Prime Minister insisted that the allocation of posts in the new government was based not on ethnic or geographic considerations, but rather on expertise and qualifications. He thereby unwittingly insulted the entire parliament (none of whom were included in the cabinet) and perhaps even all of southern Jordan. Members of Parliament objected not only to who was apparently excluded from the cabinet, but also to who was included-specifically

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the cabinet's economic team with its neo-liberal priorities. The main complaints centre on the regime's emphasis on export-oriented growth, foreign aid and foreign investment, along with its lesser emphasis on social welfare and income distribution. Of the new team, by far the most controversial is current Minister of Finance Basim Awadullah. As a minister in the previous Fayiz government, Awadullah had managed, largely by his impatient manner, to antagonise many legislators. "The reformers in the government are just not credible people," said one analyst. "Basim Awadullah may be brilliant. But the thrust of the no-confidence movement against the government is against him more than anyone or anything else." With 48 MPs officially opposed to the new government, and 17 IAF members sitting on the fence, parliamentarians submitted a request for an extraordinary session. The extraordinary session would presumably be held sometime during the summer, but in any case before the October 1, 2005 regular session is slated to begin. The king did not immediately respond, but did remark to the press that dissolving parliament was not an option. This remark suggested that the session will take place, but a no-confidence vote is not certain to be on the agenda, since the agenda is set by the monarchy. If a vote were held, the Badran government would almost certainly lose, in what would be a major defeat for the regime. Yet several other possibilities remain. Many pro-democracy activists expect that the mukhabarat will "cajole, persuade and perhaps even threaten" MPs to change their positions. Alternatively, a cabinet reshuffle prior to the vote could easily address issues of representativeness of the south, while presumably replacing some of the most polarising appointments. Finally, it is possible that the Badran government could actually win the confidence vote, if the Prime Minister can persuade IAF MPs to vote for him. In a series of meetings with the Prime Minister, IAF parliamentarians made several demands, including implementation of Shariah law and abandonment of the peace treaty with Israel. These measures have no chance of approval from the government, and so the IAF may in effect have to vote against the government in order simply to ensure some level of credibility. Indeed, the IAF may be under even more pressure to bolster its own credibility than is otherwise apparent, given that it is viewed by many Jordanians "on the street" as having been co-opted by the regime.

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Yet the Islamist party may be willing to risk that credibility, if it can secure a commitment from the new government to abandon the draconian draft laws on associations, parties and assembly. Since the IAF remains the country's best-organised political party, and since Islamists have won the elections for leadership of each major professional association, they would have much to gain from such a reversal. Sadly, while the IAF has sounded decidedly progressive in its defence of the parties and associations, the party has echoed the state's reactionary line on NGOs, decrying the "foreign influences" on groups working under the "guise" of women's empowerment, democratisation or human rights. Aside from this clear contradiction regarding civil society, however, the IAF may have worked its way into a corner in which it will lose something whichever way it votes on the Badran government. While this wrangling continues, polling by Jordan's Centre for Strategic Studies has shown a steady decline in public confidence in successive governments, including the new Badran administration. Public dissatisfaction appears to be based on a very accurate read of these government shifts as little but reshuffling and recycling of elites. There is also a basic demand for democracy that may be reaching a kind of tipping point. Parliamentarians and civil society activists have increasingly called for a democratically elected government wherein the Prime Minister and cabinet would be drawn in large part from the elected parliament itself rather than appointed by the monarchy. The emphasis by some regime officials on the current crisis as a north-south or even a Palestinian-Trans-Jordanian issue may be intended to deflect the focus from this deeper issue of democratic representation. The "ethnic divide" remains the wedge issue in Jordanian politics; anyone who so much as notes its existence can be made to appear backward looking and even un-Jordanian. What should be most troubling to the regime, however, is that these vocal objections to its government choices are coming from a largely gerrymandered parliament. Jordanian electoral districts are unequal in size, and the electoral law over-represents rural conservative districts while under-representing urban areas that tend to be bastions of Palestinian or Islamist support. The strategy has worked as intended, yielding a parliament made up overwhelmingly of ethnic TransJordanian conservatives, and at times governed by tribal affiliations

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rather than secular left or religious right party loyalties. Yet it is this parliament that is on a collision course with the monarchy's chosen government. Critics within the parliament even include the powerful and conservative Trans-Jordanian speaker, Abd al-Hadi al-Majali. Opposition to the government's continued emphasis on economic over political reform has for some time included Jordan's fairly weak secular left parties as well as the more well-organised Islamist movement. The opposition is mainly opposition to policies and priorities, not opposition to the Hashemiate state. Yet if this opposition to large aspects of the state's agenda is starting to include many elements of conservative, Trans-Jordanian and even Bedouin society, then where exactly is the regime's base of support? Perhaps fearing an eroding political base, in early June King Abdullah issued a new order, setting aside shares of privatised companies to be offered at reduced prices to past and present members of the security forces. Like the public sector in general, the security forces tend to be bastions of ethnic Trans-Jordanian power, and so the king's announcement appears to shore up this traditional base of the monarchy in a very material way. The new policy applies to members (including retirees) of the public security department, the civil defence forces, the armed forces and the mukhabarat. All are now eligible quite literally to profit from the privatisation process. The policy may help the monarchy achieve three goals simultaneously: it allocates direct benefits to the domestic security apparatus, it allows the economic reform process to continue and finally-and most importantly-it may undercut much of the Trans-Jordanian opposition to privatisation and economic reform, as well as the current slate of neo-liberal ministers. In concert with such pork barrel politics, and in the absence of substantive political reform, the regime has launched a series of "initiatives" accompanied by major marketing campaigns that seem to play better with Western creditors than with the Jordanian population. '~ordan First" was succeeded or at least augmented by "political development" and now the new call is for a "national agenda" to be launched by September 2005. Pro-democracy activists in Jordan argue that these initiatives generate plenty of conferences and workshops, but little material change. The question is how long the wheel spinning can continue, and for that matter, why it should.

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Even the regime would benefit from meaningful political reform that would buy it some popular support-and thereby enhance its security. Many Jordanians would be content with incremental progress. "People are not in the streets here really," said one analyst. "This isn't the same as the Kifaya movement [in Egypt], at least not yet." But whether because of resistance from the mukhabarat or for other reasons, the wheels keep on spinning. As the crisis of confidence in the government continues at several levels, another crisis may loom ever closer. Previous bouts of unrest in the kingdom, such as the riots of 1989 and 1996, have often been triggered by austerity measures. But with the collapse of Saddam Hussain's regime and the rise of a new Iraqi government, Jordan no longer gets its oil supplies at artificially low prices. Rather, Arab Gulf monarchies are increaSingly charging Jordan full prices, even as these skyrocket to previously unthinkable levels. The Jordanian government budget simply cannot absorb the difference between the rising cost of imports and subsidised incountry oil and gas prices. Some "adjustment" of prices, probably over the summer, will likely occur, possibly triggering unrest once again. International aid to maintain current prices would avoid this scenario, but at present such a dollar influx does not appear to be forthcoming. The already unpopular neo-liberal and technocratic economic team in government may, in short, have yet another storm to weather.

Seeking Peace Political and social upheaval shook the Arab world again when, on August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied neighbouring Kuwait. Due to its proximity to the crisis, its political stand and its role as Iraq's primary trading partner, Jordan suffered tremendous losses during and after the Gulf War on both the political and economic fronts. Jordan's political position during the crisis has been thoroughly misinterpreted, and deserves explanation. Jordan stood in full agreement with the international community that the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait was a breach of international law, which could not be allowed to stand. However, from the Jordanian viewpoint Arab interests dictated that the matter should be settled on a regional

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basis. Jordan attempted to resolve the matter through the good offices of the Arab League, and King Hussain personally issued vigorous appeals to Saddam Hussain to yield to the demands of the international community. Unfortunately, the intransigent positions of both Iraq and the UN coalition made a negotiated settlement impossible. Despite the political opprobrium and cancellation of economic aid the position brought, King Hussain stood squarely with the wishes of the Jordanian people, who sought to minimise the suffering of their fellow Arabs through a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Aside from Iraq and Kuwait, no state suffered more from the Gulf Crisis than Jordan. With a population of only about three and a half million people at that time, the Hashemiate Kingdom hosted over a million refugees from the conflict. While most of these were third party nationals in transit through Jordan, about 300,000 became permanent "returnees" from the Gulf. Many of these "returnees" were Palestinian refugees who benefited from Jordan's unique policy of granting citizenship to any Palestinian who seeks it. The influx of these refugees led to an increased demand on the country's limited water supplies and infrastructure, rising poverty and a sharp increase in unemployment to around 30 per cent. Iraq had served as Jordan's primary trading partner, and the Gulf Crisis and international sanctions against Iraq created severe economic difficulties for Jordan. It has been estimated that the crisis has cost Jordan over three billion dollars in lost trade and declining revenues. Jordan has complied strictly with the UN-mandated sanctions against Iraq, although they have crippled the flow of commerce at the port of Aqabah and disconnected the overland trade route to Iraq. The Jordanian and Iraqi economies, which once prospered because of their interaction, are now effectively disconnected, to the detriment of both peoples.

Palestine Liberation Organisation Palestinians have been a complicating factor in the Jordanian political process since the annexation of the West Bank in 1950. Trans-Jordanians tended to fear that the numerically preponderant Palestinians could emerge as a dominant force if competitive politics were permitted to resume. For years many Palestinians openly opposed

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Hussain's monarchical absolutism and demanded equality and proportional participation in the political process. Their frustrations under Hussain's rule, at least through the 1960s and early 1970s, provided a fertile ground for their empathy and support for the PLO. Since 1971, when the PLO guerrilla forces were crushed and driven out of Jordan, Palestinians generally have been politically dormant. Given the authorities' effective discouragement of political expression critical of the regime, it was difficult in 1989 to ascertain what the political aspirations or preferences of the Palestinians in Jordan might be. The Palestinian equation became further complicated after October 1974 as external pressures were brought to bear on Jordan. The catalyst was the unanimous decision of the Arab states meeting in Rabat to recognise the PLO as the sole authorised representative of the Palestinian people. Strongly prodded by Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states, Hussain was obliged to assent to the Rabat decision although he still claimed the West Bank as Jordanian territory until 1988. This development has portended uncertain implications for Jordan's domestic politics and its relationship with the West Bank. Following the Rabat Summit, Hussain and PLO leader Yasir Arafat met to reconcile relations, strained since the 1970-71 civil war. Their discussions resulted in the decision in early 1975 for Jordan and the PLO to cease mutual recriminations. Hussain rejected, however, a PLO demand that it be permitted to re-establish its military and political presence in the East Bank. After 1974, there was a noticeable resurgence of Palestinian empathy for and identification with the PLO in many parts of the world. This sentiment was nowhere more evident than in the West Bank. There, in the municipal elections that Israel permitted to be held in April 1976, candidates supporting the PLO defeated most of the candidates identified with Hussain. The outcome was a reversal of the municipal elections held in 1972, when pro-Hussain candidates handily won over pro-PLO candidates. The process of reconciliation also was complicated by the linkage of the Jordanian-PLO equation to the broader configuration of Middle East problems. In March 1977, Hussain and Arafat met in Cairo as part of the Egyptian-Syrian efforts to prepare for an upcoming Geneva peace conference on the Middle East. The two leaders addressed,

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inter alia, the question of future relations between Jordan and a proposed Palestinian state on the West Bank. Their discussions focused on whether the PLO should be represented as an independent delegation at the conference in Geneva or as part of Jordan's delegation. The latter course was preferred by Hussain. The Hussain-Arafat contact became more frequent in the wake of Egyptian president Anwar as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 and his signing of the United States-mediated Camp David Accords in 1978 and the Treaty of Peace Between Egypt and Israel in 1979. Nevertheless, Arafat and other PLO leaders were suspicious of Hussain's ultimate intentions vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords. Although Jordan had no part in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, it was directly linked to the process for settling the future of the West Bank. The first agreement, called ''A Framework for Peace in the Middle East," stipulated that Egypt and Israel would negotiate with Jordan and Palestinian representatives for a transitional self-governing authority to administer the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a noncontiguous Palestinian enclave on the Mediterranean Sea that also was occupied by Israel. Jordan declared it was neither legally nor morally obligated to this agreement nor refused to participate in the negotiations, which consequently made no progress. Hussain's decision to maintain a dialogue with the United States, however, fuelled the fears of some Palestinians that the monarch tacitly supported the Camp David Accords and was seeking ways to preclude the PLO from gaining control of the West Bank. The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon in the wake of Israel's 1982 invasion of that country brought the contradictory Jordanian and PLO objectives into open conflict. Initially, relations improved because Hussain agreed to accept a small contingent of expelled fighters and to permit the reopening of PLO political offices for the first time since the 1970-71 civil war. In several face-to-face meetings held between September 1982 and April 1983, Hussain and Arafat discussed Jordan's role in future negotiations over the fate of the West Bank. Because neither the United States nor Israel was willing to talk with the PLO at this time, Hussain tried to obtain Arafat's endorsement for Jordan to serve as spokesman for the Palestinians. More extreme Palestinian guerrilla leaders-often called "rejectionists" because they

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rejected any compromises that would circumscribe their goal of an independent Palestinian state that included all of pre-1948 Palestinedistrusted Hussain and would not be assuaged by Arafat's reassurances. Without a broad-based consensus within the PLO, Arafat apparently felt he could not agree to a common negotiating strategy with Hussain. Consequently, Hussain broke off the talks in April 1983; for the remainder of the year, Jordan's relations with the PLO were strained. Violent factional feuding engulfed the PLO beginning in May 1983, inducing the moderate elements (who generally coalesced around Arafat) to revive contacts with Hussain. By this time, Jordan had decided to assert its influence in the West Bank more aggressively, albeit within the limits tolerated by the Israeli occupation authorities. The National Assembly, dissolved following the Rabat decision in 1974, was recalled in January 1984 and deputies were appointed to fill vacant West Bank seats in the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, Hussain seemed to welcome the rapprochement with the moderate faction of the PLO and gave his blessing to the holding of a Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Amman in November 1984. The PNC meeting was an historic event that was broadcast on Jordanian television and picked up by viewers in the West Bank. The meeting strengthened Arafat's authority as leader of the PLO and enabled him to negotiate with Hussain without fear of the inevitable recriminations from extremist factions who had boycotted the Amman meeting. Hussain and Arafat continued to cooperate after the PNC meeting, both leaders speaking of the need for Jordan and a Palestinian state to maintain a special relationship. In February 1985, they announced a joint Jordanian-Palestinian agreement on a peace framework. This agreement called for the convening of an international peace conference whose participants would include the five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the PLO would represent Palestinians, its PLO delegates would not attend the conference separately but rather as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian contingent. The agreement stipulated that the Palestinian people would have the right to exercise national self-determination within the context of a proposed confederated state of Jordanians and Palestinians. Following his agreement with Arafat, Hussain pursued two policies

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simultaneously. While trying to serve as a spokesman for the Palestinians in talks with the United States, and eventually even with Israeli politicians, Hussain also tried to persuade Arafat to make a public declaration of PLO support for UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, both of which implicitly recognised Israel's right to exist. Arafat, who still felt he had to be wary of the influence of the more extreme factions in the PLO, was unwilling to be pushed as far towards moderation as Hussain had hoped. The extremist guerrilla groups criticised Arafat for the agreement, claiming that it would deny Palestinians the right to establish a sovereign state within the pre1948 boundaries of Palestine. Some of the extremists demonstrated their potential for undermining any possible compromise solutions by carrying out sensational terrorist acts in September and October of 1985. The international response to these incidents, especially the Israeli aerial bombing of PLO headquarters in Tunisia, increased Arafat's reluctance to make the political concessions that Hussain believed were required to obtain United States support for an international conference. Hussain's disappointment in Arafat contributed to an erosion of their political relationship. In February 1986, Hussain announced that he was terminating the year-old Jordan-PLO agreement. Tensions with the PLO were exacerbated in May by the student demonstrations at Yarmuk University in the northern Jordanian city of Irbid. In July, Hussain ordered the offices of Arafat's al-Fatah organisation closed following criticisms of the harsh manner in which Jordanian security forces had put down the Yarmuk demonstrations. During 1986, both Hussain and Arafat intensified their competition for influence in the West Bank. The king appeared to have the upper hand in this contest because Jordan's banking system controlled the disbursement of pan-Arab funds earmarked for West Bank (and also Gaza Strip) development projects. However, the Palestinian uprising, the intifadah, which began in December 1987, exposed the fragility of Hussain's influence in the occupied territories. It became obvious during the first half of 1988 that, compared with the PLO, proHashemiate sympathisers had little support. Hussain decided that political circumstances required a bold move that would preserve Jordan's interests. Thus, in July he renounced all claims to sovereignty over the West Bank. By doing

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so, Hussain apparently hoped to enhance the Jordanian position in a post-intifadah era. If the PLO succeeded in consolidating its influence in the occupied territories and in winning international support for its claim to rule the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, then Hussain's abdication of responsibility would stand Jordan in good stead. It would enable Jordan to forge political and economic links with a new state, which, because of its small area and lack of natural resources, would be dependent in various ways on its only neighbour to the east. If the PLO failed to deliver on the political aspirations being expressed by the intifadah, then Hussain would be ready to offer Jordan's services as negotiator in terminating the Israeli occupation. The PLO accepted Hussain's challenge. Arafat met with the king during the late summer and early fall to discuss strategy. Among the practical measures agreed to was a scheme for the PLO to assume responsibility for payment of the salaries of West Bank and Gaza Strip municipal employees through Jordanian financial institutions. Subsequently, at an historic PNC meeting in Algiers in November 1988 at which all major factions were represented, the PNC declared the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to be the independent state of Palestine. The PNC olso renounced the use of terrorism, accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 (both of which recognised the existence of Israel), and declared its willingness to negotiate the end of the occupation. Jordan was one of the first nations to recognise the new state and announced its readiness to discuss how the two countries could maintain a special relationship. In 1989, the PLO remained essentially an umbrella organisation of numerous civilian and military groups. It was originally founded in 1964 as a political organisation to represent the interests of Palestinians. The various Palestinian guerrilla groups were formed independently of the PLO, and they initially were critical of the PLO's objectives and policies. In 1968-69, however, most of the guerrilla groups joined the PLO, and their leaders assumed dominant roles in the organisation. Although the PLO has greatly expanded its various service functions in the cultural, diplomatic, economic, educational, health, humanitarian, political, social, and welfare fields since 1969, for most Western observers these functions have been overshadowed by the military and terrorist activities associated with the guerrilla groups.

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The PLO guerrilla groups recruited most of their fighters from the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Although some of these camps were established as early as 1948 and all have long since been transformed into permanent villages or urban neighbourhoods, high levels of poverty and unemployment remain dominant characteristics. Many young men raised in these camps found the guerrillas' idealisation of Palestinian nationalism and politicomilitary organisation appealing alternatives to the despair fostered by routine idleness and lack of opportunity. Joining one of the guerrilla groups enabled such men to assert their identity and channel their energies. Although the various guerrilla organisations differed in temperament, ideology, and tactics, they all shared the objective of establishing an independent Palestinian state. The oldest, largest, and best equipped of the PLO guerrilla groups was AI-Fatah-the Palestine National Liberation Movement, as the group was officially known. Arafat (also called Abu Ammar) has led AI-Fatah since its formation in 1957. Since 1969, Arafat has also been chairman of the PNC's fifteen-member Executive Committee-and hence the dominant figure of the PLO leadership. For more than thirty years, AI-Fatah has been a coalition of moderate, conservative, and radical nationalists who accepted the tactical necessity of cooperating with Arab governments, including those they regarded as reactionary, to help achieve their goals. Predominantly Muslim in membership, AI-Fatah generally has eschewed commitment to radical ideologies such as Islamic revolution or Marxism and refrained from interference in the internal affairs of Arab states. The progressive moderation of AI-Fatah's goals after 1973 led to major splits within the organisation. The original objective to liberate all of pre-1948 Palestine was replaced in 1974 with the aim of establishing a transitional state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Sabri Khalil al-Banna, known by his code name of Abu Nidal, vehemently opposed this change. Abu Nidal and a small group of his supporters defected from AI-Fatah and formed the AI-Fatah Revolutionary Council. A more serious split occurred in 1983 when Saeed Musa Muragha (also known as Abu Musa) organised AI-Fatah fighters in Lebanon who feared Arafat's reconciliation with Egypt would lead eventually to recognition of Israel. The supporters of Arafat and Abu Musa fought each other for control of Palestinian

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refugee camps in Lebanon during 1983 and 1984, with heavy casualties on both sides. The anti-Arafat forces received support from Syria that helped them expel Arafat loyalists from camps in areas occupied by the Syrian army. Abu Musa and the AI-Fatah dissidents eventually formed a new group called AI-Fatah Uprising. From a tactical and ideological standpoint, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was the principal counterpoint to AI-Fatah. George Habash and Ahmad Jibril founded the PFLP after the June 1967 War. The PFLP was a consciously Marxist-Leninist organisation. It defined as enemies' not just Israel and Zionism, but also imperialism and the Arab regimes that cooperated with the United States, the country it proclaimed to be the main imperialist power. It called such Arab regimes reactionary, advocated their overthrow, and the establishment of progressive, democratic, and secular governments in all Arab states, including Palestine. Habash and the other PFLP leaders soon were divided, however, on the issue of whether armed struggle or political considerations should take precedence in achieving their objectives. Jibril broke with Habash in 1968 and formed a rival organisation, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), which placed primary emphasis on armed struggle. The following year Nayif Hawatmah, who was an East Bank Jordanian, also split from the PFLP and organised the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Hawatmah's DFLP tended to stress exploring political options before resorting to armed struggle. The PFLP, PFLP-GC, and DFLP held attitudes towards reactionary Arab regimes that precluded cooperation with Hussain, whose government they regarded as a prime candidate for revolutionary overthrow. They're openly professed ideology and maintenance of armed bases within Jordan's Palestinian refugee camps were major factors in precipitating the 1970 conflict between the guerrillas and the Jordanian army. After the guerrillas were suppressed, Habash, Hawatmah, and Jibril remained hostile and unforgiving towards Hussain. When Arafat began the process of reconciliation with Hussain in 1973, they opposed any PLO ties or even dialogue with Jordan and publicly called for Hussain's overthrow. Habash and Jibril were the principal organisers in 1974 of the rejectionist front of guerrilla groups, which refused to accept the PLO

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decision to establish a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The rejectionists were those groups that rejected any negotiations or compromises with Israel and insisted on using armed struggle to liberate all of historic Palestine. In 1983, Jibril supported Abu Musa and the AI-Fatah dissidents, joining with them to form the National Alliance, which opposed any diplomatic initiatives or cooperation with Hussain. In addition to AI-Fatah and the Marxist groups, several smaller guerrilla organisations were active in 1989. The most important of these were As Saiqa, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) , the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). As Saiqa was formed in 1968 in Damascus and has continued to be politically and financially dependent upon Syria. Palestinians who lived outside of Syria generally perceived As Saiqa as a tool of the Syrian government. As Saiqa's counterpart was the ALF, formed in Baghdad in 1969. In the 1970s, the ALF supported the rejectionist front, as did Iraq. In the 1980s, however, the ALF aligned itself with Arafat's AI-Fatah, a position consistent with that of Iraq. The PSF has conSistently advocated armed struggle since it was founded in 1967. Prior to 1980, the PSF was supported by Iraq, but since 1980 Syria has been its principal backer. The PLF was formed in 1977 as a result of a split within the PFLP-GC. Originally part of the rejectionist front, since 1983 it has been one of the groups trying to effect reconciliation between Arafat and Abu Musa. The PLO's organisational equivalent to a parliament was the Palestine National Council (PNC) , in 1989 based in Algiers. The PNC's 301 deputies represented the Palestinian Diaspora. Included among them were representatives of the Palestinian parties (the political wings of the various guerrilla groups); the six guerrilla groups which accept the policies of the PLO (AI Fatah, PFLP, DFLP, ALF, PLF, and the Palestine Communist Party); student and educational groups; youth and women's groups; professional associations; labour unions; and the Palestine Red Crescent Society. In addition, the Palestinian communities in various Arab and non-Arab countries were represented. The PNC was supposed to meet once a year, but political complications often forced the postponement of annual gatherings.

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The factional strife that plagued the PLO following the sixteenth PNC conclave in February 1983 prevented convening a full session for four years. Although a PNC meeting was held in Amman in November 1984, its legitimacy was questioned because several of the guerrilla leaders, including Habash of the PFLP and Hawatmah of the DFLP, refused to attend. The eighteenth PNC, which met in Algiers in April 1987, represented the first effort to heal the rift in the PLO and achieve a consensus on policy. Although the PFLP-GC, As Saiqa, the PSF, and the Abu Musa faction did not participate, the PFLp, DFLP, and the Palestine Communist Party-the three guerrilla groups that, like Al-Fatah, had a reputation for independence of Arab governments-did attend and agreed to accept PNC decisions. Abu Nidal also attended the eighteenth PNC. However, the other leaders voted not to grant his group representation on the PNC because they believed his reputation as a notorious terrorist would tarnish the PLO's image at a time when the organisation was seeking diplomatic support for an international peace conference. The 1987 PNC meeting adopted several Significant resolutions pertaining to the PLO's conflict with Israel. It voted to endorse an international peace conference on the basis of UN General Assembly resolutions that recognised the PLO and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination; it called for PLO participation in such a conference as a full partner, and not as part of a Jordanian delegation; it abrogated the PLO-Jordaf\ accord of 1985, but also advocated maintaining "special" ties between Jordanians and Palestinians; and it authorised the PLO to develop relations with groups in Israel that supported Palestinian self-determination. These decisions were a prelude to the even more significant resolutions that were passed at the historic nineteenth PNC meeting in Algiers in November 1988. Between PNC congresses, the Palestine Central Committee (PCC), created in 1973, set policies and carried out specific programmes and actions undertaken by the PLO's cabinet, the fifteen-member Executive Committee. The PCC's actual function, however, was limited to a consultative role; its sixty members, appointed by the PNC based on the recommendation of the Executive Committee, included representatives from the Executive Committee and the major guerrilla groups. The PNC's speaker or chairman presided over PCC meetings. The legislative and executive functions of these top PLO bodies were

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in accordance with the principles and policies contained in three key documents: the Palestinian National Charter; the Fifteen-Point Political Programme; and the National Unity Programme. Although the PNC was officially described as the highest policymaking body and supreme organ of the PLO, the real centre of power was the fifteen-member Executive Committee. The committee's members were elected by and collectively responsible to the PNC. The manner of their election ensured representation of the major guerrilla and political groups on the committee. Arafat was re-elected chairman of the Executive Committee in 1988, a position he has held since 1969. AI-Fatah had three seats on the committee; in addition, Arafat generally obtained the support of the seven "independents," the committee members who were not affiliated with any of the guerrilla groups. The administration of the PLO was grouped under nine main functions that were carried out in different countries depending on local Palestinian needs. These were supported by funds collected and distributed by the PLO's treasury and financial arm, the Palestine National Fund. The fund obtained its revenues from payments made by Arab governments in accordance with agreements made at the summit level (Le., the Baghdad Summit of 1978); from voluntary contributions by Palestinians; from the 3 to 6 per cent income tax levied by some Arab states on the salaries of resident Palestinian workers; and from loans and grants by Arab as well as non-Arab countries. Iraq and Syria provided financial aid directly to particular guerrilla groups despite persistent efforts by the PLO to terminate this practice and to centralise fundraising and fund-distributing procedures. In 1989, the PLO maintained "diplomatic" missions in more than 120 countries that recognised it as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Although the PLO had not proclaimed a government-in-exile for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, more than twenty-five countries recognised it as the de jure government of the independent state of Palestine, declared at the 1988 PNC meeting in Algiers. The PLO has maintained a mission at UN headquarters in New York since being granted observer status in 1974. The PLO also operated numerous "information offices" in the major cities of the world. In 1988, the United States government ordered the closure of PLO's information office in Washington.

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The PLO's nearest equivalent to a Red Cross Society was called the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS). The PRCS supported hospitals and clinics for Palestinians in Arab countries as well as in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Prior to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the PRCS operated ten major hospitals and eleven clinics in that country. These facilities provided a broad-range of medical services to Palestinian refugees at no cost or for nominal fees. The hospitals and clinics were severely damaged during the occupation of south Lebanon and the siege of Beirut. Since 1983, the periodic fighting in Lebanon has seriously impeded the PRCS's efforts to reconstruct medical centres and provide health services. The PLO also sponsored numerous educational and cultural projects and operated an economic enterprise called the Palestine Martyrs' Works Society, better known by its Arab acronym SAMED, which ran small factories. SAMED's workshops produced such items as blankets, tents, uniforms, civilian clothes, shoes, handicrafts, furniture, and toys. SAMED was originally established in 1970 to provide vocational training for the children of Palestinian men and women killed in service to the Palestinian national cause. After 1976 SAM ED decided to accept any Palestinian needing employment if work were available. Most SAMED workshops were in the refugee camps in northern Lebanon and thus were not affected by the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon in 1982. SAMED workshops and activities were disrupted, however, during the 1983-84 fighting between Arafat loyalists and dissidents in Palestinian camps in northern Lebanon. The military function of the PLO was under the supreme command of the chairman of the Executive Committee. The PLO's regular military arm was called the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). Its units were stationed in various Arab countries where they coordinated their activities with those of Arab armies. The coordination was centrally handled by the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command, which also was responsible for law and order among Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

National Security In assessing the Dimensions of national security in Jordan, it is essential to recall that for century's conflicts and rivalries of differing

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political and religious ideologies have generated tension and crisis in this region. Since achieving sovereignty in 1946, Jordan has experienced such destabilising traumas as the assassination of the country's first king and subsequently of two prime ministers, five Arab-Israeli wars, a vicious civil war with Palestinian guerrillas, and repeated assassination attempts targeting King Hussain ibn Talal ibn Abdullah ibn Hussain al-Hashimi. Jordan not only has survived in this volatile climate but also as of 1989, the thirty-sixth year of Hussain's reign, it had achieved a degree of stability in its domestic situation and in its relations with its neighbours. The king's position has been strongly reinforced by the allegiance of the Jordan Arab Army, the former Arab Legion. A highly motivated, disciplined force with impressive firepower and mobility despite its compact scale, the Jordan Arab Army has been regarded as the most competent of any Arab army in the Middle East. In contrast to the Syrian, Iraqi, or Israeli armies, however, Jordanian troops have not been tested by exposure to major conflict for many years. Jordan's international security situation in 1989 seemed less precarious than it had been at almost any time in the past. Relations with surrounding states were on a relatively solid footing. The border facing Israeli-held territories was peaceful. Jordan had succeeded in suppressing attacks from its land that might bring Israeli retaliation, except for isolated incursions into Israeli-held territory by extremist elements of the Palestine Uberation Organisation (PLO). Although differences remained between Jordan and various Palestinian leaders over the approaches to Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, Jordan's relations with the dominant Yasir Arafat wing of the PLO were less strained than with Syrian-supported extremists such as the Popular Front for the Uberation of Palestine-General Command. Disruptive actions by Palestinian militants in Jordan were curbed quickly by the security forces. Worries that the uprising (intifadah) among Palestinians under Israeli occupation might spill over to the Palestinian population of Jordan had not materialised. Unrest arising from the deteriorating economic situation in 1989 had been directed against the Prime Minister rather than the institutions of the monarchy. Jordan's military posture was based primarily on the possibility of conflict with Israel, although on its own Jordan would be unable

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to counter a full-scale Israeli attack. The country's borders also were exposed to a long-term threat from a potentially hostile Syria. Jordan retained sufficient capability to give an aggressively inclined neighbour pause, but it did not have the resources to keep pace with the buildup of modern arms by nearby countries of the Middle East. As of 1989, however, most observers considered the prospect of armed conflict between Jordan and Israel, Syria, or other states in the region as remote. Jordan has had a tradition of military cooperation with Britain and the United States. and its organisational pattern, the outlook of its military leaders, training concepts, and weapons arsenals have reflected these links. The United States Congress had prevented the executive branch from providing Jordan with certain advanced ground and air weapons in the late 1980s. Forced to shift to other sources of equipment, Jordan turned to France as the principal supplier of combat aircraft and to the Soviet Union for an array of ,air defence missile systems. Even with heavy reliance on financial backing from other Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia, defence imposed a heavy burden on the nation's frail economy. By the late 1980s, Jordan's deepening domestic economic plight had combined with the tapering off of Arab aid to place severe pressure on the military budget. Backed by a traditionally loyal military and the efficient forces of public order, Hussain's throne appeared to be secure. Nonetheless, in an era of rapidly evolving weapons technology, a constant effort would be necessary to maintain the credibility of national security institutions as the guarantors of Jordan's domestic stability, its territorial integrity, and its role as a moderating factor in Middle East peace efforts. Dimensions of Military Threat: As of mid-1989, the Jordan River valley, forming the boundary zone with Israel and the Israelioccupied West Bank, had been quiet for nearly two decades. In 1970, Hussain's army had begun its drive against the PLO militia that was using Jordan as a base for attacks on Israeli positions in the West Bank. The Israeli leadership has acknowledged that pacification of this border has been the result of Jordanian measures taken to prevent PLO terrorism. Jordan was not a declared belligerent in 1973 when Egypt and Syria Simultaneously attacked Israel; however, Jordan did commit armoured units to support Syrian defenders on the Golan

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Heights during the last stages of the war in actions confined to Syrian territory. Jordan did not join Syria and the PLO in contesting Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Although Israel throughout the 1980s exercised restraint in its military conduct with respect to Jordan, the.'fiestructive potential of the Israel Defence Forces (lDF) continued to preoccupy the Jordanian command. Despite the long period intervening since raids and bombardments by Israel in retaliation for attacks by PLO guerrillas, the ferocity of Israel's earlier punitive actions-most of the victims being Jordanians with no links to the PLO-had left a permanent impression of Israeli belligerence and hostility. Jordan was also conscious of the sentiment in Israel that favoured solving the West Bank Palestinian problem by ejecting all Arabs from the area and sending them to Jordan. Any attempt to execute such a plan would inevitably require military intimidation or the direct application of Israel's military superiority. In the event of renewed hostilities between Israel and Syria, it was also possible that Israel would try to outflank Syrian positions in the Golan Heights area by swinging south into Jordan. Such an action would present its own problems, including a difficult river crossing. During the 1973 conflict, neither Israel nor Syria violated Jordanian territorial integrity in spite of Jordan's efforts to reinforce the Syrian defences. Jordan was also obliged to take account of Syrian military power. The aggressive Damascus regime had frequently been at odds politically with Hussain until an easing of bilateral relations began in late 1985. Syrian tank units had crossed into Jordan in 1970 to aid the Palestinian militia defying the government. The Syrians had massed three divisions and more than 800 tanks on the Jordanian border in 1980 in a dispute over military training camps in Jordan for opponents of the Syrian regime. Only pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia, together with Hussain's promise to limit anti-Syrian activity inside the kingdom, caused Damascus to back down. Syrian-sponsored terrorist activity beginning in 1983 was intended to intimidate Hussain in his efforts to get the peace process under way between the PLO and Israel. Like Israel's, Syria's military establishment vastly outmatched that at Hussain's command. Syria had a quantitative personnel

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advantage over Jordan by a ratio of four to one, its tank and artillery inventory exceeded Jordan's by a ratio of four to one, and it had four times as many combat aircraft, most of them of more advanced design. A corresponding disparity of scale existed between the Jordanian and Israeli armed forces. The normal personnel strength of the IDF was about 60 per cent larger than that of Jordan's armed forces, but Israel could rapidly expand its personnel by mobilising well-trained reserve units. Jordan also had common borders with Saudi Arabia and Iraq and was separated from Egypt only by a narrow strip of Israeli territory in the Negev Desert. The 1988 ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War left Iraq with a large number of experienced fighting units. As a revolutionary Arab state opposed to settlement with Israel, Iraq had in the past been perceived as a potential threat by the Amman government. Relations between Jordan and Iraq had been good, however, throughout the 1980s. Jordan viewed Iraq as a buffer against the radical Islamic fundamentalism expounded by Iran's leaders and provided tangible support to the Iraqi war effort. Saudi Arabia, with an armed establishment about the size of Jordan's but with no combat experience, was not regarded as a military rival. To the contrary, the Saudi government had been the primary financial source for equipment acquisitions by the Jordanian forces. During the 1960s, Egypt's militant Arab nationalist leader Jamal Abdul Nasser had tried to destabilise Hussain's rule. Since that time, however, Egypt had not been a source of concern military to Jordan. Under the political conditions prevailing in the late 1980s, Egypt was perceived as a peaceful neighbour against which no special security precautions were required. Rather, the Jordanian-Egyptian rapprochement had progressed so far that joint military exercises were held by the two countries in 1985. Further evidence of Jordan's intention to increase its cooperation with other Arab states were the meetings in Amman on February 12, 1989, and in Baghdad on February 16, 1989, that resulted in the founding of an Arab economic association. King Hussain took the lead in creating this organisation, to be known as the Arab Cooperation Council, consisting of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). The permanent secretariat of the body,

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which is patterned on the European Economic Community and the Gulf Cooperation Council, will probably be located in Amman. Except for the Jordan River valley separating Jordan from the West Bank, no major terrain features present a barrier to an invading army. Jordan shares a 375-kilometre border with Syria, and the Syrian frontier is only 60 kilometres from Amman. The Yarmuk River, which forms the western part of the boundary between the two countries, falls into a deep gorge to Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), but farther east a number of major roads link the two countries across undulating terrain with no natural obstacles. The city of Irbid and the air base at AI-Mafraq are fewer than twenty kilometres from the border, vulnerable to surprise attack or artillery bombardment. The 742-kilometre border with Saudi Arabia and the 134-kilometre border with Iraq are in open desert areas to the south and east. The bulk of Jordan's population and its most productive agriculture have concentrated in the northwestern corner of the country, an area only about 60 kilometres wide and 160 kilometres long. In the event of conflict, Amman and other cities would have only a few minutes' warning against air attacks from either Syrian or Israeli planes based nearby. Israeli ground forces advancing from the West Bank would face a major terrain obstacle in the form of the escarpment about 800 to 1,200 metres above the floor of the Jordan River valley. Although a number of surfaced roads lead to the top of it, a wellentrenched defending force could make the operation very costly. In the end, however, Israel's superior air power, possibly combined with a helicopter assault on key high points, would almost certainly succeed in dislodging the Jordanians blocking an advance up the main routes to the central plateau. Israel also would have the option of seizing Jordan's sole port of Al-Aqabah in the south, although its army would face long and exposed supply lines in a subsequent drive north towards Amman. In the event of aggression by one of Jordan's stronger neighbours, the modest forces at Hussain's command might be obliged to confine resistance to the vital northern upland region, holding the heights above the East Bank or defending the likely invasion routes from Syria. The army combats units and most of the air bases were concentrated in the northwest. Jordan's vulnerability, particularly its limited defence against sustained air strikes, would make it difficult

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for even a well-trained and highly motivated army to prevail for long against a strong invading force. The overall national defence strategy was to maintain forces that could give a good account of themselves, even when faced by superior attackers. A potential aggressor might thereby be deterred, realising that a move against Jordan would be a costly venture. Moreover, a strong defensive posture by Jordan would oblige any aggressor to precede its attack by a mobilisation in expectation of major conflict, thus obviating the danger of a surprise takeover. If an invasion nevertheless occurred, the Jordanian strategy would be to conduct a stubborn delaying action to allow time for pressure to be brought to bear by Jordan's friends and the international community for abandonment of the aggression. Military Relations with other Countries: Given Jordan's limited resources and state of development, the maintenance of its modern armed establishment has been possible only with extensive reliance on foreign aid. The sources of military assistance have shifted somewhat during the different periods of the country's existence; however, until the 1980s, Jordan had looked primarily to Britain and the United States for military material. During the 1980s, France emerged as an increaSingly important supplier of combat aircraft, and the Soviet Union increasingly supplied air defence systems. To a great extent, major acquisitions have been purchased on generous credit terms, with financing of the military debt made possible by grants from other Arab countries. From the time the emirate was created in 1921, British aid took the form of direct annual subsidies in conformance with a special treaty relationship. Britain continued to underwrite the entire cost of the Arab Legion until early 1957, when the defence treaty was dissolved by mutual consent. During the last years of the subsidy, the annual payment for the legion was the eqUivalent of about US$ 33.6 million. After 1957, a British-reinforced army brigade and an RAF squadron remained in Jordan for a short period and contributed significantly to the preservation of political stability and internal security. British aid, no longer part of a treaty commitment, eventually tapered off to a moderate level of military sales. American military aid began on a small scale in 1950, but in 1957 the United States became the kingdom's prinCipal source of

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assistance in meeting its national security needs. In the mid-1970s, however, conditions imposed by the United States during lengthy negotiations leading to the sale of Hawk SAMs initiated a period of increasing strain in the relations between the two countries. Hussain's growing independence in purchasing military material was facilitated in part by his strengthened ties to other Arab countries after Jordan joined them in opposing the United States sponsored 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. During the Baghdad Summit of Arab leaders in that year, oil-prodUcing Arab states of the Persian Gulf area, plus Libya and Algeria, pledged to compensate Jordan in the form of US$ 1.25 billion annually for ten years for its rejection of the accords. Following the precipitous drop in oil prices, however, most countries reneged on their commitments or made only partial payments. By 1984, it was estimated that Jordan was receiving only US$ 550 million annually, and only Saudi Arabia was current on its pledge. When the Baghdad Summit commitments expired in 1988, Jordan continued to look to Saudi Arabia, which in that year supplied an estimated US$ 350 million in assistance.

Armed Forces Composed of both regular or career personnel and conscripts, the armed forces in 1988 had an active-duty strength estimated at 85,300 officers and enlisted personnel. Included in this total were an army of 74,000, an air force of 11,000, and a naval element of 300. The naval force, with a coast guard-type mission, was organisationally part of the army. The air force, which enjoyed high prestige arising in part from Hussain's avid personal interest in aviation, had semiautonomous status. Article 32 of the Constitution states that "the king is the Supreme Commander of the Army, Naval, and Air Forces." The words here have a connotation similar to commander in chief as applied to the president of the United States. King Hussain has, however, generally exercised close control over the armed forces and has even assumed direct command of the army on many occasions. The king has the constitutional right to declare war. conclude peace, and sign treaties. The declaration of a state of emergency may be made by decision of the Council of Ministers and is promulgated by royal decree when

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required to "ensure the defence of the realm." In such situations, the country's ordinary laws are suspended. As of mid-1989, Jordan had been formally in a state of martial law since 1967, enabling the king to legislate by the issuance of decrees. Broad policy issues relating to security were decided by the king, advised by a small circle of officials and personal associates. These included his brother, Crown Prince Hasan, senior palace officials, and the Prime Minister. The post of Minister of Defence customarily had been held by the Prime Minister. The Ministry of Defence had mainly administrative functions, including logistics, mobilisation, conscription, and preparation of the defence budget. The operational commander of the armed forces was theoretically responsible to the Minister of Defence, but in reality the minister did not issue directives of an operational nature unless they had the king's approval. The commanding officer of the armed forces had invariably been a, confidant of the king and was generally a leading member of a prominent Bedouin clan. Until he was appointed a ranking palace official-chief of the royal court-in late 1988, Field Marshal General of the Army Ash Sharif Zaid ibn Shakir, a cousin of the king, had been commander in chief for more than twelve years. Zaid ibn Shakir's family had always been close to the royal family, and Zaid ibn Shakir himself had been personally linked with Hussain throughout his military career. In addition to his high palace position, he also filled a newly created post of adviser to the king on national security. The new position implied that Shakir would retain considerable influence over military policies. Operational command of the armed forces was assumed by the chief of staff, Lieutenant General Fathi Abu Talib, after the departure of Zaid ibn Shakir. It was expected that the title of commander in chief of the armed forces, would be eliminated. Accordingly, the senior military commander under the king would henceforward bear the title of chief of staff of the armed forces. The chief of staff presided over a headquarters in Amman known as the Armed Forces General Command. Subordinate to him were the air force commander and chiefs of staff for personnel, intelligence, operations, and administration, corresponding roughly to the G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 functional sections of the general staff under the United States system. These positions were normally held by officers

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of major general rank. By legislation enacted in 1983, Jordan was divided into eight military regions corresponding to the eight governorates, although it was not clear how these regions fitted into the overall military command structure. The commander of the semi-autonomous Royal Jordanian Air Force-subordinated to the chief of staff-derived some logistical support from the army and carried out a degree of policy coordination with the prinCipal officers of the Armed Forces General Command staff. The air force, however, had a separate headquarters at King Abdullah Air Base near Amman. The headquarters had its own staff for the specialised operations, training, logistic, and otoorI"equirements of the air force. Army: The 74,000 troops of the Jordan Arab Army were organised into two armoured divisions, two mechanised divisions, two independent brigades, and sixteen independent artillery battalions. After the June 1967 War, Hussain and his government undertook a major rebuilding and modernisation programme for the army. As of 1989, it was still considered to be the best trained of all the Arab armies and was iarger and better equipped than at any time in its existence. Nevertheless, it had long been outstripped in equipment by the Israeli and Syrian armies, which had been expanded and re-equipped with modern armour and missile systems after the October 1973 War. The basic organisation was pyramidal, with three brigades to a division and three battalions in each brigade. Each of the two armoured divisions consisted of two tank brigades and one mechanised infantry brigade. The two mechanised divisions were made up of two mechanised infantry brigades and one tank brigade. The independent brigades consisted of a Royal Guards Brigade and a Special Forces Brigade, the latter made up of three airborne battalions. Some significant units were missing from each division, and the weapons inventory of each division was closer to that of a reinforced brigade. For economy, the divisions did not have fully integrated organic logistics and support units but depended on main bases for supplies. Although the ratio of combat to support strength was favourable, the capability of independent brigades to operate at a distance from these bases was seriously impaired. The bulk of the ground forces were concentrated in the north,

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at base complexes at Amman and Az Zarqa and at other installations in the vicinity of Irbid and Al-Mafraq. Smaller bases were at Maan and Al-Aqabah to the south. No Jordanian forces were deployed in the Jordan River valley, where they would have been exposed to Israeli air power and artillery. They were instead emplaced on the heights above the valley where they could obstruct enemy movement up the routes to the central plateau leading to the main cities. The most forward troop dispositions were at Umm Qais overlooking the Jordan River in the northwest corner of the country to counter any potential Israeli flanking movement around the strong Syrian defences concentrated in the Golan Heights. In spite of years of American training, British military concepts continued to influence individual units. British forms of organisation were particularly evident in administration, maintenance, and many technical units. The weapons inventory was predominantly of United States and British origin. Jordan's tank force consisted of the United States M-60 model, together with its own conversion of the obsolete British Centurion, known as the Tarik, and an improved version of the British Chieftain called the Khalid. Armoured personnel carriers were the familiar United States M-1l3 models. In 1988, Jordan benefited from a substantial gift of Chieftain and Scorpion tanks and M-113s captured by Iraq from Iran, but it was not known whether the equipment could be introduced into the armoured inventory without extensive repair or reconditioning. The arti1lery battalions were equipped by the United States with guns ranging from 105mm to 203mm, both towed and self-propelled. The ground forces were considered to be insufficiently protected from attack from the air, although efforts were being made to overcome the problem by the introduction of Soviet air defence systems. When the United States refused to replace obsolete forward air defence weapons, Jordan turned to the Soviet Union for help in 1981. Initial Soviet deliveries consisted of the SA-8 truck-mounted surface-to-air missile (SAM) with a range of between ten and fourteen kilometres and the ZSU-23 radar-controlled gun mounted on a lightly armoured carriage. Both weapons had proved vulnerable to suppression measures by Israel in fighting against Syria. In spite of this, additional SA-8s were acquired in 1984, together with infantry SAMs, the shoulder-fired SA-7, and the SA-9. In 1985, the SA-13 and SA-14

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were purchased as successors to the SA-9 and SA-7, respectively. Separate air defence brigades (actually, battalion size) were being equipped with the larger Soviet SAMs to be attached as needed to ground formations to provide close, mobile tactical air defence. Antitank defence was based on the TOW (tube-launched, opticallysighted, wire-guided) antitank missile and the man-portable Dragon system, both from the United States, together with more recent acquisition of the Apilas rocket launcher from France. The LAW-80 antitank missile was acquired from Britain in 1987 to replace the Dragon. In 1985, the air force began taking delivery of twenty-four Cobra AH-1S helicopters equipped with TOW missiles; these were eventually to be transferred to the army. The naval element of the armed forces, although designated the Royal Jordanian Navy, remained an integral part of the army. Performing essentially a coast guard mission, it had 300 officers and men based at AI-Aqabah, the country's only port, with access to the Red Sea. The navy operated five coastal patrol boats of United States manufacture armed with light machine guns. The navy assisted in the maintenance of harbour security, operating in conjunction with customs and immigration personnel to ensure the enforcement of the country's laws and regulations. In late 1987, three larger craft of ninety-five tons each were ordered from Britain. When introduced, each would have a crew of sixteen and would be armed with 20mm and 30mm guns. Israeli units at the adjacent Israeli naval facility at similarly consisted of small, lightly armed patrol boats. Air Force: The Royal Jordanian Air Force was charged with the missions of air defence of territorial integrity, close support of the army, tactical bombing, and airlift of troops and supplies. The air force began operations in 1949 as a component of the Arab Legion. Designated initially as the Arab Legion Air Force, the service depended in large part on pilots and other technical personnel seconded to the legion from the RAE Eventually, selected volunteers from the legion were trained at the unit's airfield near Amman, and some were sent to flight and technical schools operated by the RAF in Britain. Growing unrest in the Middle East soon convinced the Jordanian government of the need to expand the air force's mission to include combat capability, which was achieved in 1955 with a British gift of nine Vampire MK 9 fighter-bombers.

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Since its inception, the air force has struggled to develop and maintain a level of combat capability that would be viable against potential enemies in the region. The primary perceived threat has been the superior air power of Israel. The constant modernisation of aircraft and associated weaponry essential to afford Jordanian pilots some chance of success has posed a severe challenge. From the late 1950s through the mid-1960s, the primary combat airplanes of the air force inventory consisted of Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers that were transferred from the RAF but paid for by the United States. During the first few hours of the June 1967 War, Israeli pilots destroyed all but one of Jordan's serviceable combat airplanes as well as three Hunters on loan from Iraq. To assist Jordan in its recovery from the loss of virtually its entire air arm, additional Hunter aircraft were supplied by Britain and Saudi Arabia. In mid-1969, the United States provided twenty F-104 Star fighters to form the first Jordanian fighter-interceptor squadron. To preclude a future recurrence of the 1967 disaster, Jordan installed surveillance radars to cover most of the country, constructed hardened shelters to protect all combat aircraft, and implemented plans for the emergency dispersal of the air force. When the October 1973 War broke out, Israel refrained from attacking the Jordanian bases and Hussain's air force did not play an active role in the war. In 1974, the United States began deliveries of F-5s. The F-5 was well regarded as a light fighter plane but lacked modem avionics, thus limiting it to daylight, fair-weather combat. Unable to obtain an American replacement for !he obsolete Star fighters because of United States Congressional opposition, Hussain turned to France, acquiring between 1981 and 1983 more than thirty Mirage F-1s, with Saudi Arabian financial assistance. Armed with Matra and Magic air-to-air missiles, the Mirage aircraft were an improvement in terms of range and avionics but were considerably inferior to the American F-15s and F-16s in the Israeli inventory and to the more advanced MiG-25 and MiG-29 Soviet fighters in the Syrian inventory. During the 1980s, repeated efforts were made to include an air defence version of the F-16 or the F-20 in United States military assistance packages, but these were vetoed by Congress because of Israeli objections. In early 1988, it was announced that an order had

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been placed with France for the purchase of twenty Mirage 2000 fighters and for the modernisation of fifteen of the Mirage F-1s. The transaction included an option for the acquisition of a further twenty Mirage 2000s. The cost, estimated at US$ 1.3 billion, was to be repaid under generous credit terms offered by the French and may have involved partial funding by Saudi Arabia. It was also announced that Jordan had contracted to buy eight Tornado strike aircraft from Britain but, according to a subsequent report, Jordan cancelled the transaction for cost reasons. In 1988, the air force was organised tactically into four fighterground-attack squadrons of F-5Es and F-5Fs, two fighter squadrons of Mirage F-1s, an advanced training squadron of F-5As and F-5Bs, a transport squadron, and four helicopter squadrons. The main air bases were King Abdullah Air Base at Marka near Amman, King Hussain Air Base at Al-Mafraq, and Prince Hasan Air Base at pumping station H-5 in the desert east of Amman. These bases were all in the north within a few minutes' flight time of either Israel or Syria. Other bases were at Azraq ash Shishan, also in the eastern desert, and dispersal bases at King Faisal Air Base, AI-Jafr and at AI-Aqabah in the south. The tactical fighter squadrons operated from the bases at Azraq ash Shishan, AI-Mafraq, and pumping station H-5. In addition to serving as home for the air force headquarters, King Abdullah Air Base near Amman accommodated the service's transport squadron and its liaison and air rescue units. Training of flight personnel, formerly accomplished in the United States and Britain, in the later 1980s was conducted in Jordan. The Royal Jordanian Air Academy at King Abdullah Air Base provided cadets with both military instruction and an academic education over a twenty-seven month period preparatory to being commissioned as second lieutenants. Initial flight training consisted of 250 flying hours in British Bulldogs, followed by training on Spanish C-101 that could be fitted as light fighters and reconnaissance aircraft. Pilots who qualified for jets progressed to F-5As and F-5Bs at AI-Mafraq in a five-month course in tactics and weapons employment before being assigned to combat squadrons. The new Mirage 2000s on order and the upgrading planned for the Mirage F-1s and the F-5s helped to compensate in some degree for Jordan's weaknesses in comparison to the air power of its Israeli

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and Syrian neighbours. As of 1989, however, both potential adversaries maintained a decisive advantage, rendering Jordan extremely vulnerable to air attack. The main Jordanian base at Al-Mafraq was only fifty-five kilometres from Israel and only twelve kilometres from the Syrian frontier. Even pumping station H-5 in the eastern desert was only 120 kilometres from Israel and 30 kilometres from Syria. Although the aircraft were sheltered against surprise attack, bombardment of the runways could make the bases inoperative. Radar coverage was being improved but, because of the rough terrain features, gaps remained that experienced Israeli pilots could exploit as attack corridors. Ground-based strategic air defence was the responsibility of the air force rather than the army. The air force operated fourteen Improved Hawk SAM batteries (126 launchers) that were sited to afford protection to key military -and civil targets. The Hawk was a high-quality, all-weather system with reliable target detection and resistance to electronic countermeasures. Being immobile and at well-known sites, however, the Hawks were considered vulnerable to low-level Israeli air attack. Plans by the United States to provide upgrading and mobility packages for these batteries and to sell additional Hawk systems to Jordan had been frustrated by congressional opposition, and as of 1989 no comparable air defence system was being considered as an alternative.

Military Personnel Because such heavy reliance was placed on the military to safeguard the monarchy, the composition and attitudes of armed forces personnel have been of vital importance to Hussain. Recruitment policies and promotion of senior personnel were subject to the approval of the king. During the early years of the Hashemiate regime, a traditional system of recruitment was followed that grew out of British practices associated with the formation and maintenance of the Arab Legion. The legion was officered, trained, and financed by Britain. The enlisted personnel were all locally recruited villagers and tribesmen. Most British officers detached to serve with the legion were contract employees of the Trans-Jordanian government; others were simply seconded from the British army. Initial public reaction to the Arab Legion was indifferent or at times even' hostile, and recruiting was difficult. The military

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establishment, however, soon developed high standards of organisation, discipline, and training. Tribal uprisings and raiding practices were suppressed, and criminal activity by restive tribal elements diminished. Civic assistance activities enhanced the legion's public image, and it evolved into a proud and respected professional force. Its well-trained regulars gained a reputation for firm and effective action, as well as for discipline and justice in dealing with the civilian population. As a result, recruiting became easy, with the further incentive of generous pay scales in the enlisted ranks in relation to other Middle Eastern armies. The flow of volunteers made it possible to impose a system of selection that strengthened confidence in the army as a stabiliSing factor in defence of the monarchy. As Glubb later wrote, "The character and antecedents of every recruit were checked by the police before his acceptance. Then again, in the Arab Legion, a confidential report was submitted on every officer and man every year." This careful screening to exclude potential subversives and those of doubtful loyalty was expensive and time-consuming. But support of a monarchy was at stake, and the background investigation of even the lowest recruit was an important detail in the process. The long-term success of the effort was evident in the devotion the armed forces demonstrated to Hussain through three decades of conflict with Israel, internecine Arab strife, and repeated assassination attempts. The system produced good soldiers, as the legion's record of performance amply demonstrated, and this tradition has persisted. Jordanian troops have proved to be tough and resilient fighters. Men of Bedouin origin, long accustomed to living in a harsh physical environment and enduring Spartan conditions, showed a particular affinity for and pride in military service. For many years, the system of carefully selected volunteers resulted in an army in which the Bedouin element constituted the vast majority, particularly in infantry and armoured units. According to Glubb's account, nearly all of the legion's troops before and during World War II were recruited from the Bedouins of southern Trans-Jordan. After the war, enlistment of Bedouins of northern Trans-tlordan as well as residents of the West Bank was also encouraged. Following the dissolution of the National Guard in 1965, many of its Palestinian members were accepted into the Jordan Arab Army

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after careful security screening. Palestinians formed about 40 per cent of the armed forces. The Palestinian component fell to 15 per cent during the 1970s, when the country was wrecked by internal turbulence (highlighted by the assassination of the Prime Minister in 1971 and the coup attempt financed by Palestinian bribes in 1972). As many as 5,000 Palestinians were estimated to have succumbed to PLO pressure to defect during the 1970-71 civil war, but approximately 20,000 remained loyal to the king and the armed forces. Although no official statistics were available, observers believed that the proportion of Palestinians in the armed forces had risen to between 30 per cent and 40 per cent by 1986. Observers expected this percentage would probably continue to rise as a result of conscription and as doubts over Palestinian loyalty further subsided. Although education standards among the Bedouins had risen sharply, there continued to be a premium in the late 1980s on the educational and technical attainments that Palestinian recruits could more readily offer. Families of traditional background still dominated among senior military officers. The principal tribes were well represented, but a balance was deliberately maintained so that no one group enjoyed a prevailing influence. A significant portion of lower echelon officer positions, excluding first-line combat units, were held by Palestinians. In the upper reaches of the officer corps, however, Palestinians still constituted well under 10 per cent.

Defence Expenditure Jordan's defence outlays have been burdensome for a small country without major resources or a highly developed industrial base. Offsetting this burden to some degree has been the positive impact of defence spending on the national economy. Soldiers' pay, the employment created by the military and security forces, and the contracts and support services generated in the name of national security provided important stimulation for what generally has been regarded as a sluggish economy. The financial and military subsidies that Jordan traditionally has received from other Arab states have represented a net benefit to the economy while reducing the actual burden of the military effort to somewhat less than it appeared to be in statistical terms. Nevertheless,

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the Jordanian defence effort was facing acute budgetary and financial difficulties in the late 1980s, as a consequence of decreased financial aid from the oil-producing Persian Gulf states and reduced remittance levels from Jordanian workers in other Middle Eastern countries. Together, these sources had brought in as much as US$ 2.5 billion annually in earlier years. Although other Arab states had pledged at the Baghdad Summit in 1978 to provide Jordan with more than US$ 1.2 billion annually for ten years, only Saudi Arabia had fulfilled its commitment. The 1988 defence budget of JD256 million (US$ 763 million) was about 60 per cent higher than the allocation of a decade earlier. When inflation was taken into account, however, officially acknowledged defence costs appeared to have remained fairly steady until 1986, when an upward trend became evident. Possible explanations for this rise included moderate increases in the number of men under arms, pay raises, some domestically absorbed equipment outlays, sharp increases in the international price of armaments, and a higher amortisation level of foreign military debt. Published government figures were incomplete since they did not include important elements of defence spending and were, therefore, understated. The United States Department of State estimated that a little more than half of the subsidies from other Arab states was reflected in the budget, with the remainder applied to off-budget defence expenditures. The military debt had become a serious problem by early 1989, as the difficulties of meeting the kingdom's overall debt-servicing obligations continued to mount, placing additional strains on the balance of payments. It was reported that Jordan was running about eleven months behind on its military debt payments, with more than US$ 95 million overdue. In 1988, the officially acknowledged defence budget constituted 15.4 per cent of gross national product. In a comparative analysis by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) covering 1987 defence outlays, the proportion of Jordan's GNP absorbed by defence in that year (13.9 per cent) was near the average for the Middle East, which was 11 per cent, and among the highest in the world, although below that of Israel (16.6 per cent of GNP). Nevertheless, defence expenditures as a ratio of GNP have

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followed a declining trend from 35 per cent in the early 1970s to 20 per cent in the early 1980s. According to the same ACDA study, Jordan's defence expenditures in 1987 were 22 per cent of total government expenditures, well below the Middle East average of 32 per cent. The portion of Jordan's government spending devoted to the military also reflected a steady decline during the 1970s and 1980s. Military expenditures of US$ 285 per capita in 1987 were also lower than the average of US$ 396 per capita for the Middle East as a whole. Jordan had one of the highest proportions in the world of men under arms, with 36.4 uniformed personnel per 1,000 of population. Its ratio of armed forces to population was exceeded only by such countries as Iraq, Israel, Syria, and North Korea.

Internal Security Violence and political murder were hallmarks of the early years of the Hashemiate (also seen as Hashemiate) Kingdom. Hussain was present and was himself a target when his grandfather, King Abdullah ibn Hussain al-Hashimi, was shot to death in Jerusalem in 1951. Two prime ministers were murdered, one in 1960 and the other in 1971. As of 1989, Hussain had survived at least nine attempted assassinations that could be documented; numerous other plots had been rumoured but denied by the Jordanian authorities. The monarchy was beset by attempts at subversion, conspiracy, and assassination and by smouldering tensions in many parts of the society. The principal sources of these threats to overthrow or discredit Hashemiate rule were Arab militants openly hostile to the king's position as a pro-Western moderate in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hussain's pragmatic change of attitude in the late 1970s, when he joined other Arab states in rejecting the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, ended his estrangement and diminished Arab hostility to his regime. Since that time, the internal security risk has assumed two formsleftist, anti-Hashemiate factions of the PLO and extremist groups associated with the Islamic revival. Most of these movements were small and scattered and, as of 1989, appeared to be effectively controlled and contained by the efficient Jordanian security apparatus. Military support was so integral to the monarchy that the stability of the regime was assumed to be in no danger unless the armed forces themselves were to be subverted. Although episodes of

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discontent over conditions of service had occurred from time to time, the Bedouin-dominated army as a whole was one of the most stable institutions in the kingdom. The only open insurrection in the army occurred early in Hussain's reign, in 1957, when a group calling itself the Free Officers (possibly in imitation of the Egyptian 1952 movement by that name) attempted to wrest the throne from the king. The loyalty of most officers and enlisted personnel, together with Hussain's own decisive action, defeated the plot and ushered in much stricter security precautions. The last known conspiracy to involve military personnel occurred in 1972 when 300 army and civilian personnel were arrested after Palestinian militants bribed the acting commander of an armoured car unit to stage a coup detat. The Islamic revival was growing in strength in Jordan as in other Arab countries but, as a security problem, appeared to be under control as of 1989. The Muslim Brotherhood, the most important of the politico-religious movements, had appeared in Jordan as early as 1946. It was officially recognised by the government and had rights of expression denied to other groups. It was believed to have many thousands of members as of 1988, enjoying the support of perhaps 10 per cent of the population. The Muslim Brotherhood had gained a foothold in certain government ministries and was also believea to have insinuated itself into the police and intelligence organisations. Proselytising had occurred in the armed forces. Although hitherto not a source of antigovernment protests and disturbances (as in Egypt and elsewhere), the Muslim Brotherhood had adopted an increasingly activist and critical tone in its pronouncements by the mid-1980s. Other, more militant, Islamic groups remained small and fragmented. Jordanians were uncertain of the potential danger of the Islamic movement to the stability of the monarchy and whether its adherents might make a bid for power should the regime falter. In late 1985, the government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood as a warning against its growing stridency and political involvement. The action was also linked to Hussain's efforts to normalise relations with Syria. Syrian members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been forced to flee to camps in Jordan were accused by the king of subversion aimed against the Damascus government. They were rounded up and extradited to Syria. A new

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law enacted in the same year prohibited political incitement and accusations by Imams and speakers in the mosques. The Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs was designated to review Friday sermons and religious education in the mosques. Since Jordan's population adhered overwhelmingly to the mainstream Sunni form of Muslim, the militancy of the Shia branch emanating from Iran had made no inroads. Unlike most neighbouring Arab countries, Jordan had no significant minority groups that were perceived as problems for the security forces. The 25,000 Circassians, whose forebears had migrated from the Caucasus region of southern Russia, were Sunni Muslims and traditionally loyal supporters of the monarchy. Many Circassians served in the higher ranks of the military or were engaged in security work. Student activism was carefully controlled through restrictions on political organisations, demonstrations, and meetings. At the two major institutions of higher learning, the University of Jordan in Amman and Yarmuk University in Irbid, the student groups were segmented into small organisations, generally associated with some form of Islamic fundamentalism. Student protest rallies occurred at Yarmuk University in 1986, a few days after the United States bombing of installations in Libya. The students rallied against rising tuition costs, dismissals for low grades, and King Hussain's relationship with the United States. The protests were put down violently by government forces, with a number of student deaths and many injuries. Concerned over the possible ideological indoctrination of the several thousand Jordanian students attending universities in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), the government followed a policy of strict passport controls and withdrawal of passports from students believed to have questionable contacts abroad. In April 1989, young people in several southern towns rioted for five days over the sharp price rises on gasoline, cigarettes, and other consumer goods attendant upon certain economic measures agreed to between Jordan and the International Monetary Fund. The demonstrations were aimed at the Prime Minister and the cabinet but there was apprehension that the resulting political disequilibrium could escalate into attacks on the monarchy itself. The Palestinian population did not join the protesters, who consisted primarily of

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Bedouins (normally considered the base of the king's support). Observers claimed that Islamic fundamentalists exerted some influence over the young demonstrators. Various small underground groups that formed the core of leftist opposition to the Hashemiate regime were carefully watched by the security services. They included the Soviet-oriented Communist Party of Jordan (AI Hizb ash Shuyui al-Urduni) and the Jordanian Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party), linked to the socialist movement of Syria. These movements in turn backed other groups that opposed Jordan's association with the West and with the United States, and called for closer relations with Syria and other Arab leftist elements. In addition to supporting some of these groups, Syria had been linked to a number of assassination attempts on Jordanian diplomats abroad, rocket attacks on Jordanian airliners, and grenade and bomb attacks within Jordan between 1983 and 1985. The attacks by Black September, Abu Nidal, or other terrorist groups under Syrian control apparently were calculated to intimidate Jordan into abandoning its Middle East peace initiatives, which ran contrary to Syria's policies. Although the attacks ceased as relations with Syria improved in 1985, the government remained alert to the danger of renewed destabilising attempts by radical Arab groups. The Communist Party of Jordan, led by General Secretary Yaqub Zayadin, had been illegal since 1957, although the organisation enjoyed periods of toleration by the regime, interspersed with periods of repression. A tightly organised network of small cells, its membership was believed to be about 500, but through the party's organ it published steady attacks on the government's Middle East policies and restrictions on civil rights. In an effort to fix blame for the 1986 riots at Yarmuk University, the government arrested the entire seventeen-member politburo. They were released several months later, but the party remained banned. During the April 1989 protests against the government's price increases for many consumer goods, 120 members of the Communist Party were detained after circulating leaflets calling for general strikes.

General Intelligence Department: Internal security, intelligence, and counterintelligence matters were the concern of the police, the armed forces, and the GID, a civilian organisation with principal responsibility for dealing with perceived domestic and foreign

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threats to security. The GID customarily was headed by a highranking army officer answerable directly to the Prime Minister and concurrently a close personal adviser of Hussain. The GID was a large organisation, although its personnel strength was not a matter of public knowledge. Its members were almost invariably persons of proven loyalty to the monarchy and of East Bank origin. It was generally regarded as an effective internal security agency, alert to any evidence of activity that might have subversive implications. Although Jordan had been the target of clandestine operations by other countries, the GID was not known to have a covert branch that engaged in clandestine activity against its Arab neighbours or Israel. The GID was particularly occupied with rooting out Palestinian militant groups and illegal or underground political organisations. It scrutinised activities in the mosques and among student groups. A GID office was located in each refugee camp. The GID's methods and oppressive tactics frequently have been the subject of criticism among Jordanians, although some of its measures, such as checkpoints to monitor domestic travellers, were less obtrusive during the 1980s than they had been in the tense period following the 1970-71 conflict with the PLo. The widely employed system of identity documents facilitated GID control over the population. A passport was needed both for travel and to obtain employment. Passports could only be obtained by producing other identity documents issued by the Ministry of Interior and had to be authorised by the GID. In addition, a certificate of good conduct from the GID was required for public sector jobs, for many private sector jobs, and for study abroad. A young person studying in a communist country might, on returning for a visit to Jordan, find his or her passport confiscated if the GID harboured suspicions concerning the student's conduct abroad. Furthermore, GID approval was required for public gatherings or activities sponsored by private organisations. The GID had authority under martial law to detain persons without trial for indeterminate periods, often lasting from several weeks to many months. Such security detainees normally were held incommunicado for interrogation at GID headquarters in Amman. According to the 1988 annual report of the human rights organisation

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Amnesty International, various forms of torture or ill treatment were believed to have been inflicted at GID headquarters on detainees or arrested persons later transferred to ordinary prisons for trial by martial law courts.

Foreign Policy Jordan's foreign policy has been a function mainly of its response to developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its generally moderate and carefully measured response has been based on its appraisal that effective Arab unity is a precondition for substantive peace negotiations with Israel. The persistence of intra-Arab differences over the form and substance of pan-Arab cooperation has constrained Jordan to steer a flexible and prudent course. In addition, the scarcity of domestic resources and the consequent heavy dependence on outside powers for economic and military support have contributed to Jordan's caution in foreign policy. Moreover, the PLO's enhanced stature since the mid-1970s as a key factor in the processes of Middle East reconciliation and peace has been a further compelling reason for Jordan's generally pragmatic responses to an uncertain foreign policy milieu. Relations with Arab States: In 1989, Jordan maintained relatively cordial relations with most other Arab states. Jordan's closest ties were with Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. King Hussain made frequent trips to these countries to confer with their leaders on regional and international strategy. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil producers provided Jordan with financial aid in accordance with guidelines originally agreed on at the November 1978 Baghdad Summit. The total amount of these grants had declined dramatically by 1984 because of the budgetary problems that depressed oil prices caused in petroleum-producing countries. Nonetheless, they remained an important source of total government revenue for Jordan.

Jordan's close relations with Iraq developed as a result of Hussain's strong support for President Saddam Hussain during the latter's eight-year war with Iran (1980-88). The monarch's ardent backing of Saddam was attributable at least in part to his fears that a collapse of the Iraqi regime could result in Jordan's eastern neighbour being ruled by a radicalised Shia religious government allied to Iran. The

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relationship also benefited Jordan in various ways. For example, Jordan's only port, Al-Aqabah, served throughout the war as a major transshipment centre for Iraqi imports. Goods off-loaded at Al-Aqabah were tucked overland to Iraq by Jordanian transportation companies, in the process generating local employment, handling fees, and profitable business. Jordan also exported a variety of light consumer goods to Iraq, although the value and volume of this trade fluctuated in accordance with Iraqi foreign exchange problems. Both during and after the war, Iraq, whose army used primarily Soviet-made equipment, periodically gave to Jordan United States-and British made military hardware captured from Iran, including at least sixty United Statesmanufactured M-47 tanks. In 1984, Jordan became the first Arab state to re-establish diplomatic relations with Egypt. Hussain had begun advocating Egypt's reintegration into the Arab community of nations as early as 1981. The king perceived Egypt as an effective bulwark against the spread of radical Islamic political movements that he believed were being engendered by the Iran-Iraq War. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the expulsion of the PLO from that country, unofficial consultations with Egypt on regional security issues became routine. PLO chief Arafat's trip to Egypt in December 1983-the first by an Arab leader since the Baghdad Summit of November 1978-paved the way for Jordan's resumption of official relations without fear of being branded a traitor to Arab nationalism. Following the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, Jordan and Egypt became extremely close allies. Hussain frequently praised Egyptian president Husni Mubarak as one of the Arab world's great leaders. Mubarak supported Hussain's pro-Iraq policy, his efforts to involve moderate Palestinians in the peace process, and his cal1 for an international peace conference. Hussain and Arafat met several times on "neutral" Egyptian territory; when their personal relations were tense, such as in 1986-87, Mubarak mediated and kept them on civil terms. Hussain reciprocated M\1barak's diplomatic support by trying to persuade other Arab heads of state that Egypt should be readmitted to the League of Arab States (Arab League). In February 1989 Egypt and Jordan joined with Iraq and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) to form new Arab Cooperation Council, a regional organisation model1ed after the Gulf Cooperation Council.

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Jordan's relations with Syria were correct in 1989, although there had been considerable strain between them during most of the previous two decades. In September 1970, a Syrian military unit had crossed into Jordan to aid the Palestinian guerrillas who were fighting the Jordanian army. The Syrian force was repulsed, but relations remained tense and were severed in July 1971. Relations with Syria improved briefly following the October 1973 War, but deteriorated again by the late 1970s. Syria apparently feared Hussain's close ties with Washington would involve Jordan in the Camp David process. When religiously inspired disturbances broke out in Aleppo and other Syrian cities during the winter of 1979-80, the government immediately suspected-and accused-Jordan of complicity. In addition, Syria had a bitter rivalry with Iraq. Damascus perceived Amman's support of Iraq in that country's war with Iran (initiated by an Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980) as confirmation of conspiracy theories about Baghdad trying to encircle Syria. By the end of 1980, relations between Jordan and Syria had deteriorated to such an extent that military clashes appeared possible along the.common border where both countries had massed troops. The escalating tension eventually was defused by Saudi Arabian diplomatic intervention, although relations remained strained. Jordan broke diplomatic relations with Syria in 1981, charging Damascus with plotting to assassinate its Prime Minister and kidnapping its ambassador to Lebanon. For the next five years, the two neighbours were estranged. Amman accused Syria of assisting radical Palestinian groups who carried out several political killings of Jordanian diplomats in Europe and the Middle East. Tentative efforts to improve relations in 1983-84 were aborted by Syrian denunciation of Jordan's resumption of relations with Egypt. Finally, in the fall and winter of 1985-86, Saudi Arabia mediated reconciliation talks that led to a restoration of diplomatic ties. In May 1986, the Jordanian Prime Minister became the first high-ranking official from Amman to visit Syria since 1977. Relations between Jordan and Syria gradually improved since then. Jordan maintained cordial relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf in 1989. These countries-Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qat1r, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates-were collectively Jorqan's most important source of foreign financial aid. The level of

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their assistance, especially that from Kuwait, has fallen, however, since 1981. Thousands of Jordanians and Palestinians holding Jordanian passports continued to work in the Persian Gulf in business, government, education, and engineering. The remittances they sent to their families in Jordan, especially those living in the refugee camps, represented a significant proportion of Jordan's foreign exchange earnings. The Persian Gulf countries also were markets for Jordanian agricultural and consumer exports. Jordan's relations with the other Arab states-excepting Libya were generally good in 1989. Tensions existed over economic policy between Jordan and Morocco, however, as both countries exported phosphates. The amount of Jordan's reserves of these minerals and the value of its exports were significantly less than those of Morocco, a major international producer. Jordan, which traditionally exported its phosphates to South East Asia, complained that Morocco had stolen its Asian markets between 1985 and 1987 by deliberately selling its phosphates at prices lower than it cost Jordan to mine and transport the minerals. Jordan had a history of tense relations with Libya, deriving from Libyan support since 1970 for Palestinian guerrilla groups opposed to Hussain. The most serious incident between the two countries occurred in February 1984, when the Jordanian embassy in Tripoli was destroyed during demonstrations organised by the Libyan government to protest Hussain's support of Arafat and his call for reconciliation with Egypt. Jordan broke diplomatic relations following this episode. In 1988, Jordan received a Libyan delegation sent to Amman to discuss normalising relations between the two countries.

Relations with United States: Although Amman established diplomatic relations with Washington in 1949, the United States did not become actively involved in Jordan until 1957, when it replaced Britain as the Hashemiate Kingdom's principal Western source of foreign aid and political support. Jordan and the United States never entered into treaty commitments, but Washington's policy was to ensure Jordan's continued independence and stability. Thus, the United States assisted Jordan in equipping and training its military forces. DUring the civil war of 1970-71, the United States firmly supported Hussain, although it did not become directly involved in the conflict.

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After Jordan's army had defeated the PLO guerrillas, Washington extended substantial budgetary and military aid to the Hashemiate Kingdom. This aid contributed significantly towards Jordanian recovery from the damages suffered not only in the civil war but also in the June 1967 War and during the intensive Israeli shelling of the Jordan valley between 1968 and 1970. Hussain's close alignment with the United States before and after the civil war predictably aroused strong anti-American sentiment among Palestinians in Jordan and elsewhere. The October 1973 War, in which Jordan was not a direct participant, brought Jordan and the United States much closer in the peace process that began after the conflict. Jordan joined with the United States in support of UN Security Council Resolution 338. This resolution called on the parties involved in the October 1973 War to cease their hostilities and to implement UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 providing for a peace based on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories_ Hussain hoped to obtain American backing for a return of the West Bank to Jordanian control. His expectations were buoyed by Washington's success in negotiating disengagement and limited withdrawal of forces agreements between Egypt and Israel and Syria and Israel. The failure of the United States during 1974 to persuade Israel to pull back its forces from part of the West Bank as an initial step towards a peace agreement with Jordan disillusioned Hussain with respect to the ability of the Americans to pressure Israel on the issue of withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories. Although he continued to value Washington's reaffirmations of support for Jordan's security and economic progress, Hussain became increasingly skeptical of American assurances that the West Bank would be reunited with the East Bank. Consequently, he refrained from participation in the Camp David process, which he was convinced would be used by Israel to perpetuate its control of the West Bank. After Egyptian and Israeli negotiations on the autonomy plan had stalled, Hussain tried to rekindle United States interest in an international conference to deal with territory for the Palestinians. Throughout the 1980s, the United States continued to assign Jordan a key role in a resolution of the status of the West Bank. Hussain believed, however, that Washington did not understand how essential it was for the stability of his regime to regain full control

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over all of the West Bank and how politically dangerous it would be for him to agree to any partial measures. For example, Hussain did not publicly criticise President Reagan's September 1982 proposal for Middle East peace: but since this plan restricted self-determination for Palestinians on the West Bank to an "autonomous authority" in association with Jordan, he regarded American expectation of his endorsement as unrealistic. Hussain accepted that political developments since 1974 made it impossible to ignore the PLO in any peace negotiations. Thus, one of his policy aims vis-a-vis the United States became to convince Washington to deal-at least unofficially-with the PLo. From the end of 1982 until the end of 1988, Hussain served as an intermediary between the United States and the PLO, attempting to get both parties to make the kind of political concessions that were necessary before a dialogue could be initiated. During the early 1980s, Hussain seriously considered expanding Jordan's military relations with the United States. He gave tentative approval for the creation of an unpublicised 8,000-strong Jordanian strike force that would respond to requests for assistance from Arab countries within a 2,400-kilometre radius of Jordan. The intended target of this special force was to be the Persian Gulf, where the traditional allies of both Jordan and the United States feared the potentially destabilising consequences of the Iran-Iraq War. The United States agreed to provide the special Jordanian unit with weapons and other military equipment. In an apparent effort to obtain approval of the United States Congress for the extra funding needed to arm the strike force, in early 1984 the Reagan administration disclosed its formation. This unexpected disclosure caused consternation in Amman, and news of the Jordanian strike force provoked harsh criticism from Syria and from Palestinian guerrilla groups opposed to Hussain. In order to minimise negative repercussions, Hussain tried to distance his country from the strike force by portraying it as a United States initiative in which Jordan had no real interest or substantive involvement. Congress did not approve the requested funds, and the plan was subsequently abandoned. Hussain's disappointment with American policy increased when Congress later refused to authorise selling weapons to Jordan and

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voted to reduce the amount of aid the administration requested as punishment for its perception that Amman had failed to cooperate with Israel. Hussain resented these measures because he believed he had exerted great efforts in persuading Palestinian and other Arab leaders to adopt more moderate. and flexible positions and had himself agreed to several private meetings with Peres. In 1989 Jordan's relations with the United States remained friendly and cooperative in economic and military matters but were clouded by Hussain's lack of confidence in Washington's policy towards Israel and the occupied territories.

Relations with Israel: In 1989, Jordan still refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. The absence of formal relations notwithstanding, the two countries had cooperated directly or indirectly since 1967 in a multiplicity of matters pertaining to the West Bank, the Israeli-occupied territory whose Palestinian population retained Jordanian citizenship until 1988. Hussain's aim was to maintain influence and eventually regain control of the West Bank, a goal that had not been realised by 1988, when he renounced Jordan's claim to sovereignty of the area. Hussain's ambitions were frustrated by Israel's unwillingness to negotiate seriously any withdrawal from the West Bank and by the increasing popularity of the PLo. As early as 1974, Israel's refusal to consider a United Statesmediated disengagement agreement with Jordan, similar to the ones that had then been concluded with Egypt and Syria, weakened Hussain's image as a leader who could recover occupied Arab land. Israel's refusal also helped to strengthen pan-Arab support for the PLO's claim to represent West Bank Palestinians. Later that year, Arab heads of state meeting in a summit conference in Rabat, Morocco, agreed to recognise the PLO's right to establish an independent state in the West Bank once the latter was liberated from Israel. Although Hussain paid lip service to the 1974 Rabat decision, he continued to hope Jordan would recover the West Bank. His hopes were nurtured by Israel's refusal to deal with the PLO. To maximise Jordan's political leverage from the new situation, Hussain pursued Simultaneously a highly visible policy of reconciliation with the PLO and a less perceptible policy of cultivating pro-Hashemiate politicians in the West Bank. The measures intended to preserve Jordan's traditional links to the West Bank actually were undertaken

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with the tacit approval of Israel. These measures included authorising the continuation of the long-standing economic and family ties between the East and West banks under the "open bridges" policy; continuing payment (until 1988) of salaries to Palestinian officials on the government payroll before and since 1967; strengthening economic links by increased imports from the West Bank and by continued extension of development grants and loans to Palestinian firms in the West Bank; and providing government guarantees for private Jordanian loans to West Bank municipalities. After 1977, when Egypt's President Anwar as Sadat initiated direct negotiations with Israel that led to a separate peace agreement (and Egypt's temporary ostracism from the Arab world), Hussain was unwilling to follow Sadat's lead without prior pan-Arab acquiescence. Hussain apparently believed that in the absence of broad Arab support to legitimise any political talks with Israel, his own rule in the East Bank could be threatened. Consequently, he refused to participate in the Camp David process and was skeptical of President Reagan's 1982 proposal for a West Bank "entity" in association with Jordan. Israel's rejection of the Reagan Plan provided Hussain the boon of not needing to respond to an initiative that the Palestinians claimed would deny them genuine self-determination. Two years later, when Shimon Peres became Prime Minister of Israel, in September 1984, he offered to negotiate directly with Jordan without the participation of the PLO. Hussain decided the state of pan-Arab politics precluded his consideration of a '~ordanian option" at that time. Instead, he called for an international peace conference that would include a joint Jordan-PLO delegation. Hussain perceived an international forum that brought together both the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the principal Arab states and Israel as a protective umbrella under which he could enter into negotiations with the Israelis. Peres, whose Labour Party was willing to consider Israeli withdrawal from at least part of the West Bank, endorsed Hussain's idea of an international peace conference in an October 1985 speech before the United Nations. Subsequently, he initiated secret meetings with Hussain to discuss procedures for convening such a conference and ways to finesse the issue of PLO participation. Peres opposed the presence of the PLO at a possible conference, but did not object

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to non-PLO representatives of Palestinians attending. Hussain was not able to obtain firm Israeli commitments, however, because Peres's coalition partner, Likud Bloc leader Yitzhak Shamir, opposed the convening of an international conference and prevented the government from achieving consensus on the issue. After Shamir became Prime Minister in late 1986, Peres, as foreign minister, continued his diplomatic efforts on behalf of an international conference. Peres had at least one publicised meeting with Hussain in London, but he lacked support from his own government. Hussain, who believed that Peres was interested in substantive negotiations over the West Bank while Shamir was not, took the unprecedented step during the Israeli elections of 1988 of announcing that a Labour Party victory would be better for the peace process. Peace with Israel: Maintaining peaceful relations with Israel is among the least popular of King Abdullah's policies. His attempts to normalise relations are routinely met with opposition from a broad domestic coalition, described in the 2003 congressional report as "Islamic fundamentalist groups, parts of the Palestinian community, and influential trade and professional organisations." Despite the lack of domestic support and pressure from other Arab states, Abdullah has resisted the urge to cut ties with Israel in the face of the escalating tensions since 2000. Jordan continues to participate in many of the landmark peace talks between the two parties and hosted an April 2003 conference at the Jordanian resort town of Aqaba. During this meeting Jordan, the United States, Israel and the Palestinians discussed the "Road Map" to peace.

While Jordan continues to play an active role in peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians, King Abdullah has striven to strengthen Jordan's relations with Israel. Following the 1995 peace treaty, economic contacts have grown each year. David Eshel, a retired Israel Defence Forces colonel and author on military and Middle East issues, evaluated Jordanian-Israeli relations in February 2005 for Military Technology magazine. Eshel explained that the volume of trade between the countries has increased by double-digit percentage points each year and is predicted to reach between $1.5 and $3 billion this year. Jordan has fulfilled its obligations outlined in the treaty not only for economic reasons, but security reasons as well. '~ordan has seen Israel as an important factor contributing to

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its national security. Because of Israel's keen interest in the stability of the Hashemiate regime, Israel serves to deter other external rivals that might threaten Jordan and its regime." According to Eshel, "the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty is a model for the region" and its greatest success is in its self-sustainability. "The Jordan-Israel border requires no international monitoring force and no UN observers." While it is unlikely that domestic co~.litions could curtail King Abdullah's reforms, they are not as ambitiously democratising as many in the West had hoped to see. Despite Jordan's status as one of the more open and quasi-democratic Arab regimes, the kingdom still comes in for criticism over its record on human rights and political liberties, such as free speech and freedom of the press. According to the most recent State Department report detailing the human rights situation in Jordan, released in February 2004, during 2003, the most recent year evaluated, "the Government's respect for human rights improved in some areas during the year." Some notable human rights abuses remain however, mainly at the hands of the security services, including the police and the mukhabarat (Jordanian intelligence services). As detailed in the 2004 report, those observing the human rights situation in Jordan "reported continuing abuses included police abuse and mistreatment of detainees, allegations of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, [and] lack of transparent investigations and of accountability within the security services." Furthermore, "members of the security forces committed human rights abuses." Relations with Other Countries: In the years after independence, Jordan followed a generally pro-Western foreign policy as a result of its special relationship with Britain, to which the Hashemiate Kingdom owed its existence and which became the prinCipal supplier of financial and other aid. Jordan's special relationship with Britain ended, for all practical purposes, in 1957, when the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948 was terminated by mutual agreement. Thereafter, the United States became actively involved in Jordan. replacing Britain as the principal Western source of foreign aid and political support but without treaty commitments. Nevertheless, Britain and Jordan continued to maintain cordial relations. Hussain made annual official visits to London to discuss Middle East policy. In 1984, Queen Elizabeth II made the first trip ever by a British

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monarch to Jordan. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher subsequently visited Amman in 1985. During the 1980s, Britain again became a major weapons supplier for Jordan. As of 1989, the most recent sale (in September 1988) was an agreement to provide Jordan with the advanced Tornado aircraft. In 1989, Jordan maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Amman first established relations with Moscow in 1963. Two years later, Jordan signed its first cultural and technical cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. Hussain made his first state visit to Moscow in the wake of the June 1967 War. Since then there have been numerous exchanges of high-level visits, including several official trips by Hussain. Jordan has purchased military equipment from the Soviet Union periodically since 1980 as part of a policy to diversify military supply sources. In 1985, Jordan bought a major Soviet air defence system after the United States Congress cancelled a planned sale of Stinger antiaircraft missiles to the country. Jordan and the Soviet Union have signed several accords pertaining to cultural, economic, and scientific cooperation. In his advocacy of an international peace conference to deal with the occupied Palestinian territories, Hussain has insisted that the Soviet Union be included. In 1989, Jordan had friendly relations with most other countries, including those in both Eastern Europe and Western Europe. The major exception was Iran, with which Jordan had severed diplomatic relations in 1981 as a demonstration of solidarity with Iraq. The countries of the European Economic Community and Japan were major sources of Jordan's imports. France also sold weapons to Jordan, including twenty Mirage-2000 aircraft in 1988. Membership in International Organisations: In 1989 Jordan was a member of the League of Arab States and the Arab Cooperation Council, a regional economic pact that included Egypt, Iraq, and North Yemen. Jordan was a member of the International Committee of the Red Cross and had been a member of the UN since 1955. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East maintained ten refugee camps in Jordan. UNRWA's biggest task was the provision of primary, secondary, and vocational schools for Palestinian refugee children living in the camps. UNRWA also operated health clinics and provided food for indigent refugees.

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West's Understanding: In the West as well there appears to be a similar understanding and sympathy towards Jordan's precarious balancing act. A small country the size of Indiana with little natural resources, Jordan has been largely dependent on Iraq economically. David Schenker is the Levant Country Director at the Pentagon, responsible mainly for Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. In his 2003 book, Dancing With Saddam: The Strategic Tango of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations, Schenker noted that after the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Jordanian-Iraqi trade experienced a boom. "For Jordan, Iraq was an economic godsend." At the core of this somewhat lopsided relationship was oil. As Schenker described, ''oil is the lubricant of Jordan's relations with Iraq." Before the destruction of Saddam Hussain's regime in Iraq and the current-day insurgency, Iraq's oil subsidies to the Kingdom produced a situation in which Iraq became '~ordan's greatest source of foreign aid." The West was not blind to Jordan's reliance on its close ties to the Iraqi regime.

In the wake of the first Persian Gulf War when the late King Hussain, Abdullah's father, was unwilling to join the alliance against Saddam Hussain, US-Jordanian relations were disrupted. However, this proved to be a short-term situation. The Carnegie Endowment's Dunne noted that "the West forgave Jordan for that and agreed to cut Jordan slack", understanding how the Kingdom's reliance on Iraqi oil necessitated such a position. Despite the apparent understanding towards Jordan's fragile "balancing act" many remain critical of disconnect between the Kingdom's statements of support for the US and actions perceived to be a hindrance to Western policies in the Middle East. While King Abdullah has received much praise from US policy-makers, he, like Jordan itself, has not escaped criticism. In one particularly public example, Jim Hoagland, The Washington Post's senior foreign correspondent, criticised Abdullah for his Arafat-Iike manipulation of American leadership in a March 27,2005 opinion piece. According to Hoagland, Abdullah is "playing both sides" and the monarch "works against US interests in Iraq and elsewhere while pretending otherwise." Among Hoagland's grievances is Abdullah's "meddling in Iraqi affairs" since the fall of Saddam. "The King has exacerbated tensions with his aggressive championing of his co-religionists, Iraq's Sunni minority, who provided the base of past Baathist power and

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of the present insurgency." While Hoagland blames the Bush Administration for being blind to Abdullah's "game" it may be more of a case of an understanding among American policy-makers that Abdullah must operate in a delicate balance of power and sometimes he must pursue policies outside of the US sphere of interest. As a wave of political loosening appears to be sweeping across authoritarian Middle East countries such as Egypt, Lebanon and the Gulf States, King Abdullah has publicly pledged support for democratising Jordan and instituting economic reforms. During a December 2003 speech to the Jordanian parliament, Abdullah announced plans for "radical changes" intended to transform Jordan into a "modern, democratic country." With public opinion towards Abdullah's close relationship to the West low the question emerges however, as to whether the king's ambitious plans will meet opposition from the parliament in Amman and from the Jordanian people-a mix of Bedouin Arabs, Arabs who fled the Pan-Arab wars on Israel and the urbanised Arabs in residence before 1948. Despite many in the country, including the large Palestinian population and Jordan's popular Islamist parties, who strongly disagree with Abdullah's pro-Western orientation, this scenario seems unlikely for two reasons. Rrst, as monarch, Abdullah holds the lion's share of power and the loyalty of the Bedouin-dominated military and is unlikely to be threatened by Jordan's domestic entities. Second, Abdullah's call for political reforms, alongside economic ones, may be more designed to pay lip service to Western pressures than substantial and sincere attempts to democratise the Jordanian regime. Jordan's political system is described as a constitutional monarchy but the 2003 congressional report noted that the Jordanian parliament has but limited powers. "King Abdullah has supported a limited parliamentary democracy, while periodically curtailing dissent when it threatened economic reforms or normalisation of relations with Israel" the report noted. The parliament is largely powerless in relation to the abilities of the king to pursue policies without the support of the legislature or the people.

13 Science and Technology Technology Vision on Track Jordan has marked a key milestone in its initiative to build universal access to technology for all Jordanians, with the completion of the first three phases of its 'Knowledge Station' Technology Community Centre scheme. In all, 75 of the public centres have now been established in Jordan as part of a wide-ranging initiative designed to promote access to technology resources and training for Jordanians. Their Majesties King Abdullah II and Queen Rania Abdullah attended an event, held at the Princess Iman Bint Abdullah Knowledge Station in Amman, which was hosted by the King Abdullah II Fund For Development, to recognise the Royal Commission mandated with overseeing the implementation of the centres, donor organisations, partners and key players involved in the Knowledge Station project. Minister of ICT Dr. Fawaz H. Zubi, Minister of Education Dr. Khalid Touqan, Minister of Planning Dr. Basim Awadallah, Stephen M Case, chairman and co-founder of AOL Time Warner, Mrs. Jean Case, CEO of the Case' Foundation and Dr. Yousuf Nuseir, President of National Information Centre were also in attendance at the ceremony. 'So far, the Knowledge Stations located throughout the Kingdom have enabled over 25,000 people to build new technology skills with a number of training courses ranging from basic computer literacy through to advanced technology skills,' said Dr. Zubi. 'Over 60 per cent of the people who

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have received training at the stations were women, which is a major achievement for the scheme.' In addition to the official trainers housed within each station who conduct official computer literacy and other more advanced training to citizens, the Knowledge Stations are also manned by young people recruited and trained as part of the Net Corps Jordan programme. Net Corps Jordan is a pioneering programme aiming to actively involve Jordan's youth in the socio-economic development of the country through ICT. There are currently 70 interns trained and working in Knowledge Stations, with a target of 550 young people trained and working at the centres and other locations over the next three years. Net Corps Jordan, that is supported by the USAID funded AMIR Programme, is implemented by the Queen Zein al-Sharaf Institute for Development (ZENID) in partnership with the MoICT. 1\11 Jordanian communities, regardless of their geographical location or economic status are being secured with easy and affordable access to the Internet and ICT services through the Knowledge Stations, which will lead to a wealth of opportunities,' said Dr. Awadallah. ' What makes the Knowledge Station project unique is that the stations are managed and operated by local communities and are hosted by youth clubs and other voluntary and charity organisations. We believe that Net Corps helps people to help themselves: It contributes towards the creating of a culture based on selfsufficiency which will, in turn, lead into economic and social advancement. ' The Knowledge Station initiative was launched by His Majesty King Abdullah II's personal efforts. The King Abdullah II Fund for Development was entrusted with the continuous responsibility of bringing together the necessary resources for the development and eventual sustainability of the Knowledge Stations. In addition to their role as training centres, the 75 centres throughout the Kingdom all provide walk-in public access service that includes Internet linked PCs, fax machines, photocopiers and other multimedia technology services. 'This initiative builds opportunities for people to drive community-level education and access to technology, it creates

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opportunities for young people to learn real-world technology skills and it broadens public access to technology. There's no understating its importance,' said Dr. Touqan. 'The Knowledge Stations also provide people with the resources to support adult education and retraining in order to build their technology skills and so provides a major push for Jordan's technology vision.' The Knowledge Station project has already played a major role in developing people's technology skills in many of Jordan's underprivileged areas. Supported by an array of stakeholders in the public and private sectors, including donor agencies and technology companies, the initiative forms part of a major cross-sectoral push in Jordan to build new economic opportunities based on information and communications technologies.

Major Technology Implementations Jordan Telecom announced a multi-million dollar deal with IBM that will allow the telecommunication company to dramatically reduce its infrastructure requirements and provide more advanced valueadded services to its customers in Jordan. The project entails a number of technology deployments including infrastructure consolidation, standards-based data warehousing and business intelligence solutions, personal computers and a sophisticated portal system that will benefit both JT customers and employees. 'Earlier this year, Jordan Telecom embarked on a number of initiatives that drive Internet growth in the Kingdom, including the launch of major innovative services that encourage the adoption of technology by Jordanian businesses. In order to do this, we required a robust and reliable technology infrastructure that would allow us to manage our operations effectively and provide us a sophisticated platform to launch new mobile, fixed and Internet services to our customers,' said Rula Ammuri, Chief Information Officer, Jordan Telecom. 'IBM's broad range of hardware, software and services offerings will enable us to reduce the complexity of our systems and enhance the way we work with our customers today.'

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Jordan Telecom has a long history of innovation. From the beginning in 1921, Jordan Telecom have continuously implemented technology and services in ambitious projects that have enabled them to lead the way in telecommunications for over eight decades in Jordan. ~ordan Telecom is operating in one of the most dynamic telecom markets in the region; an environment that encourage competition and brings new growth opportunities through the launch of advanced value-added services. As convergence and consolidation continue to change the landscape of telecommunications, helping operators embrace the possibilities of new technology models across their enterprise is key,' said Takreem al-Tohamy, general manager, IBM Middle East, Egypt and Pakistan. 'Using sophisticated solutions that are based on open architecture and open standards, we believe that Jordan Telecom will be poised to reap the benefits of convergence and offer the most innovative services to customers in Jordan.'

The deal between Jordan Telecom and IBM includes four major technology projects that encompass a broad range of IBM software, hardware and services offerings: Data Warehousing and Business Intelligence-IBM Business Consulting Services is providing a complete data warehouse and business intelligence solution for Jordan Telecom's current customer base and beyond. Based on the IBM Telecom Data Warehouse (TOW), the end-to-end open-standards solution incorporates existing elements of Jordan Telecom's Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system, and connects into the organisation's other business processes. The data warehouse project can fundamentally transform the way Jordan Telecom interacts with its clients and enable it to benefit from the benefits on an On Demand business model. Infrastructure Consolidation-Jordan Telecom will migrate its existing based of UNIX servers with IBM e-Server p-Series technology that will provide a powerful platform for billing and customer care applications. The new systems will manage increased data loads and provide JT with drastic performance, manageability and cost benefits. Personal Computers-More than 500 Jordan Telecom employees are currently using Think Centre desktops that incorporate the awardwinning and patented Think Vantage Technologies, offering advanced security and PC manageability features.

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Technology Sparks At the Housing Bank Building in Amman, plasma screens display a steady stream of stock data to Jordanian investors. Down the hall in the investor gallery of the Amman Stock Exchange, a sixteen-footlong video wall exhibits real-time market news and information to the public. Supplied by USAID, these information technology tools have helped transform Jordan's capital market from a manual system of trades and transactions using white boards and paper stock certificates into one using state-of-the-art technology. Before the Amman Stock Exchange was modernised, brokers had to be on the trading floor to buy and sell, and used white boards to track trading activity. They bought and sold stocks using the "open outcry" system, gesturing and calling out stock prices to potential buyers. The system was error-prone, inefficient, laborious-and it limited trade volume. Now the public face of Jordan's new high-tech capital market, the investor gallery displays the white boards as historical artifacts. Real-time trading and the instantaneous disclosure of market information have contributed significantly to educating investors and improving market confidence, leading in turn to increased participation from both Jordanian and international investors. In 2003, trading volume on the stock exchange rose by more than 85 per cent, adding $4 billion of wealth to the capital market. Jordan Technology Plan 2002-2007: A Continuous Improvement of Technology Integration. In today's world, technology is core to a genuine learning community. Indeed, access to information and the ability to exchange data are perhaps the two most important keys to real lifelong learning. If technology is core to such an environment, then all students and staff must use electronic resources daily so that accessing, transmitting, and gaining information becomes a habit of mind, not an occasional computer lab experience, pastime or "fill in." An educational environment that values continuous improvement for all, that empowers youth, that mirrors life outside of school, is an environment that motivates young people to learn and fosters the independence, self-confidence, and curiosity we hope for them all: an environment rich in seamless access to technology.

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What Does It Look Like For Students? • Differentiated Learning Potential • Increased Access, Umitless Learning • Discovery Learning, More Creative Thinking • Increased Motivation, Engaged Learners • Benefits for those with Learning Difficulties • Increased home-school communication Goals • Maintain one up to date school computer for every four students • Improve basic skills, critical thinking, information and media literacy • Expand use of online resources and up-to-date information • Increase use of technology resources, projection, video, imaging, and broadcast • Bridge the gap for those with no home access-school check out of laptops • Integrate technology as a utility for teaching, learning, and communicating • Increase communication for teachers, students, and parents Schedule 2002-2003-First year phase in of laptops for sixth grade core teams 2003-2004-Second year phase in of 7th and 8th grade core, increase projection capabilities 2004-2005-Third year increase web based communication via online curriculum, homework, and grading; move forward with video production and explore offering an elective class 2005-2006-Maintain existing equipment and replace or upgrade equipment that is over four years old, increase use of In Class, implement cable broadcast system and class

Information and Communication Technology In 1999, His Majesty King Abdullah II launched an ambitious strategy aimed at transforming Jordan into a knowledge-based economy and society and positioning the Kingdom as the leading ICT

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technology hub in the region. The Information and Communications Technology Initiative (ICTI) supports His Majesty's vision by working to increase ICT access and connectivity for all Jordanians, using technology to improve and enhance government services, increasing business growth and industry employment, and upgrading the skills of people across the Kingdom so they can better use and develop new technologies.

Key Initiatives leT Policy and Regulation (Telecommunications Policy): ICTI is completing a process that began during the first phase of the AMIR Programme-the transformation of the old Ministry of Post and Communications into a new ministry with a focus on ICT: the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology. The initiative is helping build a ministry that can effectively lead the country's ICT efforts. The initiative's activities include the following: • Building the foundation of the new Ministry of Information <;lnd Communications Technology (MOICT) with a focus on human resource development systems and procedures. • Completing the staffing at the ministry. • Working with the government to draft a comprehensive national ICT Policy and using this policy to prepare a national strategic plan for the MOl CT. • Contracting studies for the liberalisation of the mobile and fixed line telecommunications subsectors.

e-Governance Working with the MOICT, the initiative is developing a national communications policy to create an enabling environment for private sector-led ICT growth. e-Governance helps build this enabling environment by bridging the gap between government and the private sector by accelerating administrative reform and automating and streamlining government services. The private sector is more likely to go through proper government channels to accomplish business tasks if it's convenient and easy. Significant assistance has been given to facilitate an e-government environment and includes the following: • Developing an e-government strategic plan. • Connecting government entities through a secure network.

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• Establishing the e-Governance Operations Centre at the National Information and Technology Centre that serves as the hub for connecting government entities. • Building the base infrastructure, this includes procurements, technical assistance and developing standards and gUidelines. • Establishing secure e-mail communications to improve the reliability and security of communications. • Building the capacity at MOICT to lead e-government efforts by establishing a unit to run e-government, called the Programme Management Office. This entity serves as the "go td' entity for gUidance on all e-government projects. • Developing an e-government portal that will offer information for government, businesses, and citizens.

e-Learning The government of Jordan has made great strides in developing a national broadband learning network designed to link all public educational institutions and community-based access stations (Knowledge Stations) to a predominantly fibre-based network. The Connecting Jordanians Initiative (CJI), a government-led initiative, is the strategy leading the way for this national broadband learning network. ICTI worked with the government of Jordan to develop the business plan for the CJI. The government further refined this strategy and introduced an even broader national strategy, the "Connecting Jordanians Forward Agenda. ICTI will continue to assist in the implementation of three major projects within the "Connecting Jordanians Forward Agenda." Knowledge Station Initiative Providing Access and Connectivity: Knowledge Stations are computer access stations located throughout the Kingdom. Staff and interns in these stations teach people how to use ICT tools, then how to use these tools to improve their businesses, attain health care information, participate in e-gov~rnment, acquire entrepreneurial skills, and gain general awareness on social issues. In addition, wide ranges of technical courses are offered including computer literacy, database management, and software applications. ICTI is conducting an in-depth needs assessment and sustainability study of the 75 Knowledge Stations with the goal of empowering them to have a greater impact on

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community development. The initiative has also successfully mobilised private resources from the US-based Case Foundation to compliment the support to the ~nowledge Stations.

Satellite Earth Stations 1 Atlantic Ocean INTELSAT 1 Indian Ocean INTELSAT 1 ARABSAT 1 domestic lV receive-only Jordan also utilises three dishes on AL-Bakaa Earth Station, two of which are connected to geo-stationary satellites on INrELSAT. These dishes offer full communications including telephone, lV, and more. Jordan also has plans to join the F.L.A.G. (Fibre-Optic Unk Around the Globe) network which is a privately owned network being installed by Dallah al-Barakah Group. This network passes through the Middle East through the node in Aqaba; it also passes through the United States and Japan.

Internet Activity Global One/Sprint Jordan was the first commercial full Internet service provider in Jordan after forming a joint venture with the Jordanian company Assas which owns 51 per cent of the project. This project which required a total investment of $2 million, was officially launched in March 1996. Global One provides the same packet switching technology used by Sprint worldwide in Sprint Net. This shared technology provides Jordanian users interconnection with networks, hosting of computers and other organisations. Global One serves over 2000 Jordanian users today. The company offers yearly subscriptions for approximately $89/year which includes 8 free hours online every month. Each additional hour costs the customer approximately $7.86. NETS and ACCESS are two of the major local Bulletin Board Service Providers (BBS's) providing basic e-mail services, file libraries, forums (local news groups), online chat, and online games. NETS has recently began to provide interconnection with servers from all over the world.

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PRIMUS is another local BBS Provider owned and managed by the Computer Networking Services Company (CNS). In addition to providing basic services like e-mail.chatroomsandforums.PRIMUS allows users to design their own HTML-based pages. This company provides many services and interactivity with its customers, which gave it a very good reputation among Jordanian PC users, setting the standard for other ISP's in the country. AT&T in cooperation with a local Jordanian partner, First Telecommunication Group (FTG), has secured a license to operate an Internet service in Jordan. The cost of connectivity to the Jordanian user ranges from around $70-$120/year. This price is relatively high considering that the average per capita income in the country is less than $3000 per year. This cost to the consumer is high due to the price of the bandwidth that suppliers must pay in order to offer customers an acceptable Internet connection. The National Infonnation Centre of Jordan was established in 1993 to "develop common standards necessary for the management of the National Information System." The NIC is a publicly owned and run organisation which was the first in Jordan to establish a local node catering to the needs of governmental organisations and universities. Several web-designing companies have recently started conducting businesses in Jordan among which are Total View, Arab Net, Xroads, and Access. These companies have established a web presence for Jordanian companies and newspapers on the web. Magnet Internet Services in conjunction with Cyber Net Internet Design Services also offers web design services to the Jordanian market. Magnet designed Jordan's first business directory online. As of December 1996, there were only 20 companies listed in this directory. The company has also designed Virtual Jordan which is an interactive website giving customers online access to shopping from mans and stores in the Amman area. Sakhr, a software development company serving the Middle Eastern market, provides Arabic Internet access to Jordanian Internet users through its regional offices in Amman. Sakhr plans to distribute 50,000 copies of its Internet Kit through BYTE and PC magazine's Arabic editions. Digitek and other Sakhr dealers are separately distributing another 2000 copies of the company's Internet Kit around the world.

14 Sports Red Sea Sports Club is Jordan's largest diving centre. The club offers wide variety of diving activities, from the most basic and introductory dive lesson to comprehensive dive training courses, and there are also special diving packages for the experienced divers. The coast south of Aqabah, on the shores of the Gulf of Aqabah, is teeming with tropical fish and coral and is renowned for its excellent year-round diving and snorkelling. The coral reefs are often very close to shore and the water temperature rarely falls below 20°C (68°F). There are several dive centres at Aqabah offering PADI courses, equipment rental and boat tours. It is forbidden to remove coral or shells, or to use harpoon guns and fishing spears. Aqabah's beaches, notably the Aquamarine or Holiday Beach, offer good swimming. Dolphin-, shark-and whale-"Ifatching trips can also be arranged. One of the best destinations is Wadi Rum, a vast area of dry riverbeds, mountains, black hills and sand dunes, located some SOkm (30 miles) northeast of Aqabah, and a location for the film Lawrence of Arabia. Camel treks and jeep trips into the desert are also available, as are hot-air balloon trips over Wadi Rum's Valley of the Moon. Umited hiking equipment and supplies can be rented in the village of Rum; the nearest town is Quweirah. With the new rankings now out, Jordan maintained its Arab and Asian ranking at 11th and 14th respectively. The Kingdom is still out of the top-10 Arab teams trailing Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Oman. On the

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Asian level, Jordan comes behind Japan, Iran, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Iraq, Bahrain, Uzbekistan, China, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Oman. Egypt, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia are still the top Arab teams. Egypt jumped 15 spots after winning the African Cup and is now 18th in world rankings followed by Tunisia, who qualified to the 2006 World Cup, at 21st and Saudi Arabia at 34th. In overall rankings, Brazil remained No.1, followed by the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. The USA jumped up to fourth and Spain to fifth. Argentina dropped four places to eighth preceded by Spain, Mexico, France and Portugal while England dropped to 10th. During the past month, the local league championship restarted and Jordan was idle on the national team front after resuming official competition with the kickoff of the 2007 Asian Cup qualifiers in February. The national team played in the 4th West Asian Football Championship (WAFC) in Beirut. Jordan drew with host Lebanon, Syria and Qatar in Group 1, while Group 2 comprised the UAE, Iraq, Iran and Palestine. Following the WAFC, the national team played its third Asian Cup qualifier against the UAE. Before the Asian Cup qualifiers return leg, with officials and players were hoping to repeat the historic firsttime qualification to the Asian finals in 2004. Jordan was playing in Group C and had an uphill battle after a 3-0 win over lowly Pakistan, followed by a 0-3 defeat at the hands of the Omanis. The UAE leads tha group after beating Pakistan, 4-1. Jordan was one of the most improved sides on the world football scene in the past years after its ranking shot up from 96th in August 2002 to 37th in 2004, boosted by the Kingdom's first ever qualification to the 2004 Asian Cup finals in the event's 49-year history, followed by an impressive showing in the first leg of the 2006 World Cup qualifiers. However, during the past year Jordan played 10 friendly matches and only scored a single 2-0 win over Kazakistan after a 16-month winless drought. Results included five defeats: 1-2 to Kuwait, 0-2 to the Ivory Coast, 2-3 to Georgia, 1-2 to Cyprus and 0-1 to Iraq. Four matches against Thailand, Sweden, Armenia and Norway ended in goalless draws. The rankings dipped from the best ever of 37th in August 2004, to 54th in June 2005, 69th in September, 78th in October, 84th in November, 86th in February 2006. With the slip,

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Jordan also lost its 5th spot in Asian and Arab rankings, which it held in 2004.

Jordan's Royal Falcons Millions of enthusiastic fans have enjoyed their performances since 1978. With their superb airmanship, their willingness to stake their lives on precise control of a few hundred kilogrammes of Dacron, wood and steel and, watchers say, with their personal friendliness and charm, the Royal Falcons-Jordan's unique aerobatics team-have captured the attention of audiences worldwide. Jordan's King Hussain, himself an accomplished pilot, suggested the team's formation 13 years ago and has been the Falcons' keenest supporter ever since. Two pilots, David Rahm and Steve Wolfe, began both to perform and to recruit and train additional pilots in 1976. Their first severe setback came almost immediately: In 1977 Rahm, a Canadian, was killed during a local performance attended by the king, in an accident that called the safety of the whole project into question. Nevertheless, the Falcons persevered, and two years after the team's inception William Farid, Jalal Kattab and Hani Zumot-aU Jordanians trained in commercial aviation by the Royal Jordanian Air Academy set out for Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for six weeks of intensive training in advanced aerobatics and formation flying. By September 1978, though each had less than 400 hours of flight time, their performance had reached air show standards, and the Royal Falcons took flight. Over the next decade, they were to gain international recognition at some of the most prestigious aerobatics events in the world. But local fame came first. The three-man team, flying two Pitts Special S-2A biplanes expressly designed for aerobatics flying, made its domestic debut in October 1978 on the occasion of the Middle East Civil Aviation Conference in Amman. Soon after, the Royal Falcons made their first appearance outside Jordan with two successful displays in Doha, Qatar. Sponsored by the national airline, Royal Jordanian, the Royal Falcons soon became both the country's and the airline's "ambassadors of goodwill." The team is the only one of its kind sponsored by an airline, and the only full-time civilian aerobatics team in the Middle East. Until 1983, it was the only one in the world. Acquiring a third

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Pitts biplane in 1979, the team practised a three-ship sequence for its first tour outside the Middle East, and performed its manoeuvres before at least 1.5 million spectators at the two most prestigious air shows in the world. They made their debut at the Paris Air Show at Le Bourget before King Hussain himself, then went on to open a tour of Britain with the 1979, International Air Tattoo, held at the Royal Air Force's Greenham Common base. Both the Tattoo and the Paris Air shows are held biennially, with the participation of civilian as well as military teams at the French event, and almost exclusively military performers at the International Air Tattoo. The Royal Falcons' tiny red Pitts appeared alongside such air-show giants as the RAF's Red Arrows, the Patrouille de France and Italy's Frecce Tricolouri. The following year, the team went on another British tour, this time presenting 25 displays over a period of four months. By then, invitations to perform in various parts of the world were flowing steadily in, and in 1981 the Royal Falcons once again appeared at both the Paris Air Show and the International Air Tattoo. A1982 North American visit, however, was the Falcons' tour deforce. Their first stop was in Afton, Wyoming, where they took delivery of three brand new Pitts Special S-2S aircraft-single-seat biplanes slightly more powerful than their earlier models-and became the first performance flyers to present formation displays in this plane. The Falcons' American debut was at Detroit's Willow Run Air Show, and officials there said the Falcons "turned the show upside down." They greeted fans, signed autographs and allowed dozens of children to inspect their planes. The Falcons recall one spectator saying, "I never thought Arabs could fly like that!" They went on to perform in more than 20 cities in the United States and Canada in the course of the next five months. Besides their aerobatics displays, they flew 145 hours, or 32,000 kilometres (20,000 miles) cross-country. Equipped with only basic navigational instruments, the Pitts Specials fly in formation behind their twinengine support aircraft, a Britten-Norman Islander that carries spare parts, luggage and the Falcons' maintenance team-one engineer for each aircraft-from one display location to another. Not counting television audiences, approximately two million American and Canadian spectators watched the Falcons fly during

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their first North American tour, including close to 100,000 spectators at the Dayton International Air Show in Ohio, America's numberone aviation event. The next year, the Royal Falcons performed again at the International Air Tattoo and at the annual air display at the RAF base at Church Fenton, and in 1983 they recruited a young Jordanian Air Force pilot, Majed al-Kayed. One year later, Mufeed Hassouneh and Muhammad Ghbour, also from the Air Force, joined Al-Kayed to form a second Royal Falcons team which was, for the first time, made up entirely of non-civilians. Paul Warsaw, who had met the original members during their training in Florida in 1978 and had led and trained the team since, now made way for Jalal Kattab to become director of operations and training. Kattab, the longest-standing member of the Falcons, has held all three positions on the team as well as several administrative jobs. The Royal Falcons resumed their international career in 1985 with performances at the Air Tattoo in Britain, at two air shows in France, four in West Germany, two in Belgium and one in Switzerland. Those were followed by performances at the Indonesia Air Show in 1986 and finally, for the fifth consecutive time, at the International Air Tattoo, held at RAF Fairford in 1987. For all that the Royal Falcons fly relatively slow propeller-driven biplanes rather than blazing jet aircraft, newspapers hailed the team as "spectacular," "dazzling," and "a Middle Eastern jewel." In Britain, the Falcons met with explicit admiration from the usually restrained audiences, and Jalal Kattab recalls the compliment of the leader of the RAF Red Arrows, rated the best military aerobatics team in the world: "Boys, you are doing one hell of a job!" And in the United States, Kattab says, the then president of the Experimental Aircraft Association watched the Falcons perform and then told his son-a member of America's famous Christen Eagles team-"Go train!" A relatively small team, the Royal Falcons design their display sequences to avoid time-consuming rejoining manoeuvres in order to provide the audience with constant action; in a larger team, one element can perform "fill-in" manoeuvres to compensate for the time lapse. They take great care to plan their performances in a sequence that ensures that exit from one manoeuvre will leave the pilots with the altitude and airspeed they need to begin the next. The Pitts

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Special S-2S is a light and highly manoeuvrable biplane, powered by a 260 horsepower Welcoming engine with a redline speed of 327 kilometres an hour (203 mph). Unlike jet teams, the Falcons must, therefore, fly in their maximum power range most of the time, leaving them only a very small margin of power in reserve to correct mistakes in timing. Even more than for their jet-powered colleagues, proper positioning throughout the entire sequence of manoeuvres is essential. Among the team's most thrilling manoeuvres are the hammerhead turn and the knife-edge pass. The hammerhead, also known as the stall turn, requires the pilot to point the nose of the aircraft vertically upward until it reaches zero speed. Within three to five seconds, the pilot must use the rudder to throw the plane sideways before it slides back into a spin. In the knife-edge pass, the planes approach each other head on at a closure rate of 560 kilometres an hour (350 mph) until they are about 16 metres (50 feet) apart. At this point they roll 90 degrees, continuing on head-on courses, and pass each other canopy to canopy with 150 to 300 centimetres (5 to 10 feet) of clearance. To further complicate the manoeuvre, it is carried out so that the actual pass takes place directly in front of the crowd or reviewing stand. Also in the Falcons' extensive repertoire are snap rolls, loop splits, mirror rolls and Cuban eights. Their most spectacular manoeuvre, however, is the formation slow roll, which demands perfect coordination between leader and wingmen. As the name suggests, it is a roll of the entire three-plane formation, and not of the three planes separately. After picking up speed in a V-formation, the lead pilot gradually reduces speed and initiates a roll. The lead aircraft rolls around its own axis, and counteracts excessive drag on the aircraft by redUcing speed to maintain its position, but the right and left-wingers must roll around the leader, and they have to increase their speed accordingly. Maximum coordination of flight controls and throttle must be maintained for the wingmen to keep their proper positions. The Christen Eagles were so impressed by the formation slow roll during a performance in Wisconsin that they requested the Royal Falcons to accompany them to Fond du Lac-where the Eagles were invited to participate in the American Aerobatics Championships-to demonstrate the manoeuvre. The Royal Falcons success is built on skill, mutual trust and teamwork. According to former Director Paul Warsaw, precise

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coordination and nerve are musts. New-member applicants undergo a written exam, a basic plane-handling test and an oral examination. Only if the applicant is acceptable to the existing team members may he begin an eight-month training programme. In keeping with the concept of the Falcons as representatives of their country, pilot and maintenance applicants must be Jordanian citizens. After three years of flying for the Falcons, members have the option of moving to a first officer's position with Royal Jordanian Airlines, a rank normally only obtained after five to seven years of service. The team usually spends the spring and summer months on international air show tours. Before each tour, the Pitts aircraft are dismantled and airlifted from Jordan to an appropriate display location for assembly and test flights. The light structure of the aircraft-a steel-tube fuselage and wooden wings covered with Dacron fabricallows two people to dismantle one in four to six hours. Back in Jordan, the team prepares for autumn and winter performances at home and throughout the Middle East, and new recruits are hired and trained. "Falcon Flight" home base at Amman International Airport is equipped to handle every aspect of aircraft maintenance. Aerobatics enthusiasts the world over recognise the red-andwhite biplanes of Jordan's Royal Falcons, and recognise also the team's cO'1summate skill and dedication. For their part, the team members recognise the importance of their dual roles as both coolheaded performers and dashing ambassadors of their country. To judge by the awe on upturned faces when they perform, the Royal Falcons have succeeded in leaving an indelible impression on their audiences.

Lifting Off &om Wadi Rum The powerful fan blows a gale of air and the bright nylon begins to billow. Minutes later, propane burners roar out a furnace-blast of heat--enough to warm an entire house in half a minute-and the flaccid, earthbound shape fills out, slowly sheds the shackles of gravity, and pulls itself upright, pointing skyward with increasing eagerness. Soon after, the teardrop of coloured nylon, harnessed to a wicker basket, soars silently upward, propelled by a silent principle of physics and carried on the whims of the winds. Hot-air ballooning, now an international sport, has found a

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dramatic site for meets in the Middle East: Jordan's ruggedly beautiful Wadi Rum. Floating dots of colour set against rugged red hills and an azure sky, some 50 "Montgolfieres," as they were originally called, from 15 nations recently filled the horizon over that breathtaking landscape. Ballooning has been around for 209 years, and now commands growing popularity both as a sport and as a marketing tool in Europe and the United States. It is not a sport for shallow pockets, however: A good-sized craft with elaborate markings will cost upward of $ 75,000. Thus many balloons carry advertising for sponsors ranging from carmakers to-appropriately-propane gas bottlers; others are owned by corporations and flown by the companies' enthusiastic executives. Virgin Atlantic Airlines' Richard Branson had three 747shaped balloons entered in the competition at Wadi Rum, and Malcolm Forbes flew a bright yellow Sphinx in Egypt almost 10 years ago. Other balloons at Wadi Rum had the shapes of castles, rolledup newspapers and Smurf heads as well as the traditional teardrop: Whimsy-or advertisement-has free rein in that regard, since odd shapes are not a disadvantage in balloon racing. Once airborne, the balloons fly with, not through, the wind. Nonetheless, a good balloonist knows how to utilise the varying air temperatures and currents at different altitudes to direct his balloon to the desired target. The meet in Wadi Rum consisted of three stages, one flown each day. Each stage was a different sort of race, testing differing elements of a balloonist's abilities. Competing were some of the best balloon pilots in the world, who revealed in the rugged beauty of the wadi even while they dealt with the challenges of navigation through its rocky crags and swirling winds. "There is no other place on earth to fly like this," said one.

National Football Team The Jordan national football team (known by its fans as Nashama) is the national team of Jordan and is controlled by the Jordan Football Association. They have never made the World Cup. The team have improved since Egyptian head coach Mahmood al-Jawhari took over in 2002, and with him they made their first Asian Cup in 2004. The best FIFA ranking ever that Jordan team reached was the 37th on September 2004.

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Since first attempting to qualify for the AFA World Cup Mexico 1986™ Jordan have generally failed to progress very far into the Asian qualifying zone. They have managed some decent one-off performances that have impressed enough to suggest that the team is most dangerous in the role of outsiders and giant killers. AI Wahdat is a sports club founded in 1956 and located in the Amman New Camp. This local club is considered to be of the strongest in Jordan. In soccer, it has a fierce rivalry with long-time local rivals AI-Faisaly. The club has won the Jordanian league eight times and the Jordanian cup six times. There are several other sports offered in this club, such as volleyball, basketball, and table tennis.

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15 Tourism Jordan has an amazingly rich cultural and archaeological patrimony, many natural wonders and particularly welcoming people that should make tourism a motor for the economy. Despite this, the tourism industry shows poor performances and only represents 6 per cent of the national GOP. This is obviously due to the unstable regional situation that deeply affects this particularly exposed sector. The recent events on the international scene also had repercussions, but there are different kinds of tourism Jordan can draw. Business tourism is one of them. The main hotels offer comprehensive range of facilities to organise the most prestigious business meetings, and are experienced in welcoming international conferences. Over the past decade, tourism has emerged as one of Jordan's most rapidly growing economic activities, ranking second in terms of foreign exchange earnings. An estimated 1.2 million people visited Jordan in the millennium year, attracted by the country's stunning landscape, fascinating cultural heritage, and world-class historic sites. Wider international interest will continue to promote Jordanian tourism as a growth industry in years to come. Car rental companies with utmost services will welcome visitors with a fleet ranging from small cars to limousine or four by four. People looking for a deeper immersion in the Jordanian way of life will find a wide variety of quality hotels in Amman and many different possibilities to spend the holiday of a lifetime. Camel ride in Wadi Rom, wonderful nights in Bedouins tents in the desert, birds watching

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in natural reserves are only few examples of the diversity one can encounter while having a trip in Jordan. It is worth contacting professionals such as local travel agencies to organise a tour and see, if not all, most of the wonders of the country. Another attraction is the sporting tourism. Jordan offers a wide choice of climbing, trekking, cycling and horse riding possibilities. The crystalline Red Sea waters are famous all over the world for the richness of their submarine fauna and flora, considered as a paradise for divers. There are thousands of pages to write for the one who wants to describe Jordan's tourism advantages. But the most important thing for the time being is a testimonial approach; that is to bring as many foreign visitors and people from the press to show them that tourism is safe (often more than in European capitals) and business as usual. The recent investments of international hotel chains are there to proof that we are not the only one to trust in the future of Jordan as a leading tourist destination. Tourism in Jordan contributes more than 12 per cent of GOP and this contribution is far too important to be ignored. In 1996, the tourism sector contributed more than JO 604 million or around 11 per cent of the GOP of Jordan. Recognising the increasingly important role of tourism (mainly based on culture/nature resources) in the economies of the Middle Eastern countries policy-makers at both national and international levels are stressing the importance of tourism as a powerful tool for social and economic development. As an industry, the tourism sector has already been defined in 1995 as Jordan's number one foreign exchange earner (JICA 1995). Currently, the main emphasis in tourism is on antiquities. The issue is how to safeguard culture/nature resources to ensure a sustainable development that maintains both economic growth and the fullness of the culturaVnatural diversity for present and future generations of visitors whether local or foreign. The tourism development strategy adopted by the government in "Promoting Jordan as a safe tourism destination by the year 2000" need to take into account both the establishment and enhancement of the proper umbrella for the development and protection of the archaeological and cultural sites including the cultural alive sites for the tourism industry. The second tool for such development needs to be addressed by proper legislation, since the present laws are not

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adequate. Many studies have been done on the Tourism development plan in Jordan. The most recent one is the study executed by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the study by the World Bank for the Second Tourism Development Project. Jordan, a young country dense with history, full of natural wonders and historical sites, a well-travelled bridge between sea and desert, east and west. Situated just east of the River Jordan, it continues to be a bridge between ancient and new civilizations and an open-air museum in almost all its entirety. Jordan is a country for all seasons. In winter it offers therapy at the Dead Sea, the lowest point on earth where "floating" rather than "swimming" is a unique adventure in the extremely saline and mineral rich waters. In summer, Petra, the ancient rose-red city carved in mountain rock is your ultimate, and astonishing destination. It is as beautiful to see as are northern parts of the country, Umm Qais, Jerash with its wonderfully preserved Roman ruins, or the capital, Amman, and the mosaic city of Madaba. A world of mystery and wonderful hospitality is open for tourist just east of the River Jordan. Shopping bargains, souvenirs, excellent oriental and international cuisine, aromas, flavours, colours and most of all smiling people will mix and blend to make your stay in Jordan an unforgettable one.

Ancient Holy Land Jordan has been blessed with a rich religious history. Located between Mecca al-Mukarrama, the holiest place on earth for Muslims, and Al-Quds (Jerusalem), which is sacred to each of the three great monotheistic religions, Jordan has played a central role in the history of the Ahl al-Kitab (People of the Book). The land around the Jordan River Valley and the Dead Sea plain is revered by Muslims, Christians and Jews as blessed. The Bible calls it "the Garden of the Lord" (Genesis 13: 10), and the Holy Quran says that God blessed the land "for all beings." Indeed, half of humanity views the land and the river of Jordan as the geographic and spiritual heartland of their faith.

Tourist Attractions Amman: The seven hills of Amman are an enchanting mixture of ancient and modern. Honking horns give way to the beautiful call to prayer, which echoes from the stately minarets, which grace the city. Gleaming white houses, kabab stalls and cafes are interspersed

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with bustling markets-known in Arabic as souqs-and the remains of civilizations and ages long past. Sunset is perhaps the best time to enjoy Amman, as the white buildings of the city seem to glow in the fading warmth of the day. The greatest charm of Amman, however, is found in the hospitality of its residents. The genuine warmth with which they are greeted continually surprises visitors to Amman-and the rest of Jordan, for that matter-. "Welcome in Jordan" is a phrase visitors will not soon forget. Amman is built on seven hills, or jabals, each of which more or less defines a neighbourhood. Most jabals once had a traffic circle, and although most of these have now been replaced by traffic lights, Amman's geography is often described in reference to the eight circles, which form the spine of the city. First Circle is located near downtown, and the series extends westward through Eighth Circle. Amman has served as the modern and ancient capital of Jordan. It is one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world, with

a 1994 excavation uncovering homes and towers believed to have been built during the Stone Age, circa 7000 BCE. There are many Biblical references to the city, which by about 1200 BCE had become the Ammonite capital of Rabbath-Ammon. The Ammonites fought numerous wars with Saul, David and others. The history of Amman between the end of its Biblical references (around 585 BCE) and the time of the Ptolemies is unclear. We do know that the city was renamed Philadelphia after the Ptolemaic ruler Philadelphus in the third century BCE. After coming under Seleucid and Nabatean rule, Philadelphia was taken by the Roman vassal King Herod in 30 BCE. The city became part of the Decapolis League, a loose alliance of ten Roman-ruled cities including Jerash, Gadara (present-day Umm Qais), Pella, Arbila (Irbid) and others. Under Roman rule, Philadelphia was re-planned and reconstructed in typically grand Roman style with a colonnaded street, baths, an amphitheatre and impressive public buildings. During the Byzantine period, Philadelphia was the seat of a Christian bishop, and several expansive churches were built. The city declined somewhat during the late Byzantine years, and was overrun by the Persian Sassanians in 614 CEo Their rule was short-lived, however, collapsing before the Arabian armies of Islam around the year 635. The name of the city then returned to its Semitic origin

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of Ammon, or "Amman." It remained an important stop on the caravan routes for many years, but eventually trade patterns shifted and dried up the lifeblood of Amman. The city declined to little more than a provincial village for many centuries. Amman's "modern" history began in the late 19th century, when the Ottomans resettled a colony of Circassian emigrants there in 1878. Many of their descendants still reside in Amman. During that time and the early decades of the 20th century, the neighbouring city of Salt was more important as a regional administrative and political centre. However, after the Great Arab Revolt secured the state of Trans-Jordan, Amir Abdullah bin ai-Hussain made Amman his capital in 1921. Since then, the city has grown by leaps and bounds into a modern, thriving metropolis of well over a million people. Amman's growth has been driven largely by political events in the region, and especially by the Arab-Israeli conflict. After the wars of 1948 and 1967, successive waves of Palestinian refugees ended up in Amman. Moreover, the city's population was further expanded by another wave of immigrants arriving from Iraq and Kuwait during the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis. Most of Amman's noteworthy historical sites are clustered in the downtown area, which sits at the bottom of four of Amman's seven hills, or jabals. The ancient Citadel, which towers above the city from atop Jabal al-Qalaa, is a good place to begin a tour of the city. The Citadel is the site of ancient Rabbath-Ammon, and excavations here have revealed numerous Roman, Byzantine and early Islamic remains. The most impressive building of the Citadel, known simply as Al-Qasr ("the Palace"), dates back to the Islamic Umayyad period. Its exact function is unclear, but it includes a monumental gateway, an audience hall and four vaulted chambers. A colonnaded street also runs through the complex. To the north and northeast are the ruins of UmaY'Jad palace grounds. Close to AI-Qasr lie the remains of a small Byzantine basilica. Corinthian columns mark the site of the church, which is thought to date from the sixth or seventh century CEo About 100 metres south of the church is what is thought to have been a temple of Hercules. today also known as the Great Temple of Amman. The temple was built in the reign of the emperor Marcus Aurelius (161-180 CE), and is currently under restoration.

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Also on Citadel Hill, just northwest of the Temple of Hercules, is the Jordan Archeological Museum. This small museum houses an excellent collection of antiquities ranging from prehistoric times to the 1Sth century. There is an exhibit of the Dead Sea Scrolls, a copy of the Mesha Stele and four rare Iron Age sarcophagi. Museum hours are 08:30-17:00 daily. On Fridays and official holidays the museum is open from 09:00-16:00. Downhill from the Citadel and five minutes walk east from downtown, the Roman Theatre is the most obvious and impressive relic of ancient Philadelphia. The theatre, which was built during the reign of Antonius Pius (138-161 CE), is cut into the northern side of a hill that once served as a necropolis--or graveyard. It is very similar in design to the amphitheatre at Jerash, and can accommodate 6000 spectators. The theatre is still used periodically for sporting and cultural events. Two small museums are built into the foundations of the Roman theatre. The Jordan Folklore Museum is in the right wing of the theatre and displays a collection of items showing the traditional life of local people. At the other end of the theatre stage, the Museum of Popular Traditions displays traditional Jordanian costumes, including fine embroidery and beautiful antique jewellery. It also houses several sixth-century mosaics from Madaba and Jerash. The Museum of Popular Traditions is open daily 09:00-17 :00, and closed on Tuesday. The Jordan Folklore Museum is open every day from 09:00-17:00, except Friday when its hours are 10:00-16:00. To the northeast stands the small theatre, or Odeon, which is still being restored. Built at about the same time as the Roman theatre, this intimate SOO-seat theatre is used now as it was in Roman times, for musical concerts. Archaeologists think that the building was originally covered with a wooden or temporary tent roof to shield performers and audiences from the elements. Heading southwest from the theatre complex, Philadelphia's chief fountain, or Nymphaeum, stands with its back to Quraish Street. Much of the fountain, which was completed in 191 CE, is hidden from public view by private houses and shops. The Nymphaeum is believed to have contained a 600 square metre pool, three metres deep, which was continuously refilled with fresh water. Jordan's Department of Antiquities is currently excavating the Nymphaeum, and ultimately hopes to restore the site to its original structure by 2010.

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From the Nymphaeum, the short stroll to the King Hussain Mosque bustles with pedestrians, juice stands and vendors. The area around the King Hussain Mosque, also known as AI-Hussaini Mosque, is the heart of modern downtown Amman. The Ottoman-style mosque was rebuilt in 1924 on the site of an ancient mosque, probably also the site of the cathedral of Philadelphia. Between the Al·Hussaini Mosque and the Citadel is Amman's famous gold souq, which features row after row of glittering gold treasures. The town of Salt was of great importance in the 19th and early 20th century, during the time of Turkish rule in Jordan. It was the chief administrative centre for the surrounding area and, in the 1920s, it seemed the likely choice for the capital of the newlyindependent state of Trans-Jordan. However, Salt was bypassed in favour of the more centrally located village of Amman. The result is that Amman has been transformed into a thriving modern city, while Salt has retained its small town charm. Due to its history as an Ottoman centre of government, Salt is filled with wonderful Ottoman architecture in the classical style. Immediately recognisable are the Ottoman houses with their longarched windows. An array of tall Ottoman minarets towers over the village, along with church steeples, as Salt is also known for its Christian community. A morning or evening spent strolling through the picturesque streets of this charming hill village is time well spent. Salt is also the final resting place of the Prophet Ayyub (Job), whose legendary patience and faith gave him strength to endure tremendous hardships and ultimately be rewarded with blessings (Job 1-3, Quran 38: 41-44). Another prophet-Shoaib (Jethro), the Midianite father-in-law of Prophet Musa (Moses)-is said to be buried in a tomb near Salt in Wadi Shoaib. Salt is about thirty kilometres northwest of Amman. Just before you enter the main part of the city (from Amman), you will see the Department of Antiquities Museum and the Tourist Office on the left. The museum houses an assortment of pottery and coins dating from the Chalcolithic period (4500 BCE) through the Mamluk period (1516 CEl, as well as Byzantine mosaic panels and early photographs of Salt. The museum is open 08:00-14:00 every day except Friday. Entrance is free. Just off the main street is the Salt Cultural Centre. This complex, which opened in 1989, houses another museum, a

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library, a handicraft school and Salt's main hall. The handicraft school teaches ceramics, weaving, silkscreen printing and dyeing to students, who then sell their craftwork, making the project selffinancing. The project is sponsored by the Noor ai-Hussain Foundation and the Salt Development Foundation. South of Amman: There are two routes connecting Amman with the south of Jordan: the Desert Highway and the King's Highway. If your time is limited, use the straighter and faster Desert Highway. However, by far the more interesting route is the King's Highway, which twists and winds its way through the heart of Jordan, connecting Madaba, Karak, Tafileh, Shobak and Petra. The King's Highway is the world's oldest continuously used communication route, and is mentioned early in the Bible. In Numbers 20, Moses requests the king of Edom to allow his people to "travel along the king's highway and not turn to the right or to the left until we have passed through your territory. " The town of Madaba, located 30 kilometres southwest of Amman, is most famous for its exquisite 6th-century mosaics. Its history dates back at least 3500 years, however. Madaba, which was known in the Bible as the Moabite town of Medaba, is mentioned in the Old Testament account of Moses and the Exodus (Numbers 21: 30). David also vanquished an Ammonite and Aramean coalition near Madaba (I Chronicles 19: 7). His victory was short-lived. however, as in the mid-ninth century BCE the Moabite King Mesha freed the city from the control of the Israelites (2 Kings 3). Mesha, whose capital was the ancient city of Dibon (now called Dhiban, and located just north of Wadi Mujib), recorded his victories on the famous Mesha Stele, an inscribed stone set up in about 850 BCE. The rich farmlands around Madaba were coveted and fought over by the Edomites, Moabites, Ammonites, Israelites and other local kingdoms. The Ammonites had conquered Madaba by 165 BCE, but it was taken from them by Hyrcanus I around 110 BCE. His son Hyrcanus II later gave the city to the Nabateans in exchange for their help in recovering Jerusalem from Aristobulus II. Near the beginning of the second century CE, Trajan ousted the Nabateans from Madaba, and the city gradually became a Roman provincial town with the usual colonnaded streets and impressive public buildings. The Byzantine era saw Madaba enter its most affluent era. Grand buildings and a

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reservoir were constructed, while in the sixth century CE bishops were assigned to the city and a number of religious structures were erected. The importance of Madaba as a Byzantine ecclesiastical centre is demonstrated by the wealth of elaborate mosaics scattered throughout the town. After the Persian invasion of 614 CE and a devastating earthquake in the year 747, the town was gradually abandoned. Madaba then lay virtually untouched until it was resettled in the late 19th century by Christians from Karak. The city's greatest treasures, its mosaics, were uncovered then when these migrants were digging foundations for their houses. Madaba's most famous mosaic is located in the Church of St. George in the middle of town. The Mosaic Map of Palestine represents the Holy Land and its surrounding regions. Clearly visible on the map are AI-Quds (Jerusalem) and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Dead Sea, the Jordan River, Nablus, AI-Khalil (Hebron), Ariha (Jericho), Egypt and the Nile River, Turkey and Lebanon. The mosaic was made around 560 CE, originally composed of over 2.3 million pieces, and measured a staggering 25 by 5 metres. It is thought that 11,500 man-hours would have been required to lay the entire mosaic. The church is open to the public every day 08:3018:00, except for Friday and Sunday when it is open 10:30-18:00. A small donation to the poor is requested. Madaba's museum is located down a small alley a few blocks south of $t. George's Church. Just follow the signs. The museum's greatest attraction is a collection of mosaic collages, some of which are in excellent condition. It was established on the site of an ancient chapel, so its own mosaics form the hub of the museum's collection. The museum also exhibits traditional embroidered Jordanian dresses, jewellery and pottery dating back to various ages. The museum is open Wednesday through Monday 09:00-17:00, holidays 10:0016:00. Adjacent to the museum is an innovative mosaic schoo!. In an effort to preserve Madaba's heritage and develop its tourist potential, the Ministry of Tourism established the school to train technicians to repair and restore mosaics. It is the only project of its type in the Middle East. At the southern entrance to Madaba, near the King's Highway, is the Church of the Apostles. The ruins of this Byzantine church date to 578 CE, and are currently being restored. One of Madaba's most

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beautiful mosaics adorns the floor of this church. The mosaic is known as "Personification of the Sea" and it vividly depicts a woman emerging from the sea, surrounded by mythical aquatic creatures. and a hodgepodge of rams, bulls, parrots and exotic vegetation. A mosaicist named Salamanios signed the mosaic. In addition to its spectacular collection of mosaics and Byzantine treasures, Madaba is also well known for its hand-woven carpets, saddlebags and tapestries. You can actually see them being crafted on the loom in several shops. To get to Madaba, take the airport road south from Amman. Turn off at the road to Naur and follow the signs to Madaba, which is about 30 kilometres southwest of Amman. The Madaba Visitors Centre is located in a white building near St. George's Church and open Saturday through Thursday 08:00-14:00. Less than 10 kilometres west of Madaba is Mount Nebo, known as Pisgah in the Bible. It is where the Bible says "Moses lived out his remaining days and viewed the Promised Land, which he would never enter" (Deuteronomy 34: 1-8). Mt. Nebo offers a fantastic view westward, with a vista that includes the Dead Sea, the West Bank, the Jordan River, and, on a clear day, Bethlehem and Jerusalem. There are actually two peaks on Mt. Nebo, Siyagha and Al-Mukhayyat. During the sixth century CE, a Byzantine monastery was constructed at Siyagha. It was built on the foundations of an even earlier chapel, which was erected by monks from Egypt during the third or fourth century CEo Although little remains of the buildings that housed them, the mosaics of this period can be seen today inside the modern-day shrine atop Siyagha. The main mosaic, which measures three by nine metres, depicts the monastic pastime of winemaking, as well as hunters and an assortment of animals. Outside the building is an enigmatic Serpentine Cross. The figure represents the bronze serpent taken up by Moses in the desert, as well as the cross upon which Jesus was crucified. Just beyond Feisaliyya, a small town just east of Mt. Nebo are the remains of the village of Nebo. The place, now known as Khirbet al-Mukhayyat, was mentioned in the Bible as well as on the Mesha Stele. Here, during the middle of the sixth century, villagers constructed their own church dedicated to the Saints Lot and Procopius. The floor was, of course, decorated with yet another rich carpet of mosaics, which can be seen today. Travellers to Mt. Nebo seldom venture on

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to Khirbet al-Mukhayyat, so a brief detour here might be especially rewarding. The area of Nebo, Siyagha and AI-Mukhayyat was purchased by the Franciscan Fathers in 1934. A road was built to connect the area with Madaba, and then excavations of the area began.

North and West of Amman: The road to 'Ajloun, located 25 kilometres west of Jerash and 73 kilometres from Amman, winds through fertile green hillsides lined with olive groves. The main attraction in 'Ajloun is the stronghold of Qalaat al-Rabadh, a fine example of medieval Arabllslamic military architecture. The castle was built between 1184-85 CE by the nephew of Salah-ud-Din al-Ayyubi (known in the West as Saladin), the great Muslim commander who waged a successful campaign to recover lands lost to the invading Crusaders. 'Ajloun's strategic position commanding the Jordan Valley, as well as the three small valleys leading to it, made it an important link in the defensive chain against the Crusaders, who spent decades unsuccessfully trying to capture the castle and nearby village. The fortress is built upon the apex of the hill above 'Ajloun, and offers a breathtaking view of the surrounding countryside. On a clear day you can see the Dead Sea, the Jordan Valley, the West Bank, and Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee). The original fortress had four corner towers, with arrow slits and a 16-metre-wide moat. !twas enlarged in 1214-15 CE by the Mamluk officer Aibak ibn Abdullah, who added a new tower in the southeast corner and constructed the main one. In 1229, the castle fell to the Emirate of Karak. In 1260, it was largely destroyed by the Mongol invaders, but was reconquered and rebuilt almost immediately by the Mamluk Sultan Baybars. The southwest tower was constructed at that time. During Mamluk times, Qalaat al-Rabadh was one in a network of beacons and pigeon posts that allowed messages to be transmitted from Baghdad to Cairo in only twelve hours. Entrance is free to the castle, which is open seven days a week during daylight hours. Forty minutes north of 'Ajloun (88 kilometres from Amman), the bustling city of Irbid is an excellent staging point for excursions to Umm Qais, Pella and other sites in northern Jordan. Irbid's importance as a trading centre with Haifa ended in 1948, but in recent years it has gained importance as the industrial centre and

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administrative capital of the north. The city has a good selection of restaurants, a number of banks and hotels, and the campus of Yarmouk University. Artifacts and graves in the area show that Irbid has been inhabited since the Bronze Age. Scholars have debated whether Irbid is the Biblical site of Beth Arbel, or Bait Arbil in Arabic. Under Roman rule, the city was renamed Arbila. While most of this heritage is hidden beneath the new city of Irbid, there are two excellent museums located within Yarmouk University. The Museum of Jordanian Heritage is considered the finest archeological museum in the country, while the Natural History Museum is also worth a visit. Both museums are open from 10:00-17:00 in winter (15:00 in summer) every day except Tuesday. The modern town of Umm Qais is the site of the ancient GrecoRoman town of Gadara, one of the cities of the Decapolis and, according to the Bible, the place where Jesus cast out the devil from two men into a herd of pigs (Matthew 8: 28-34). Rising 518 metres above sea level with views of Lake Tiberias and the Golan Heights, there is no better vantage point in northern Jordan than Umm Qais. Gadara was renowned for its cosmopolitan atmosphere, attracting an array of writers, artists, philosophers and poets. It also served as a resort for Romans vacationing in the nearby AI-Hem rna hot springs. Like Pella, its sister Decapolis city, Gadara was blessed with fertile soil, abundant water, and a location astride a number of key trading routes connecting Asia and Europe. The city was probably founded by the Greeks during the fourth century BeE. Gadara was overrun by the Seleucid ruler Antiochus III in 218 BeE. When the Romans under Pompey conquered the East and formed the Decapolis, the fortunes of Gadara, taken in 63 BeE, improved rapidly and building was undertaken on a large scale. During the early part of Roman rule, the Nabateans (with their capital at Petra) controlled the trade routes as far north as Damascus. Aiming to put an end to this competition, Mark Antony sent King Herod, the Great, to weaken the Nabateans, who finally gave up their northern interests in 31 BeE. In appreciation for his efforts, Rome rewarded Herod with Gadara. The city remained under Herod's rule until his death, and then reverted to semi-autonomy as part of the Roman province of Syria. The Byzantine era witnessed the decline of Gadara into relative

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obscurity. Earthquakes destroyed many buildings, and by the dawn of the Islamic era Gadara had become just another village. The town became known by the Arabic Umm Qais during the Middle Ages. Today, a considerable portion of the original Roman amphitheatre has survived. The seats face west, and are brought to life at sunset. Covered passageways stand in the back, and until recently, a six-foot headless white marble goddess sat at the foot of one of the amphitheatre's internal staircases. The statue-thought to be of Tyche, the patron goddess of Gadara-can now be seen in Umm Qais' archeological museum. The museum, which also houses a Byzantine mosaic frieze and a marble sarcophagus, is open from 08:00-17:00 in summer, and in winter from 08:00-16:00, every day except Tuesday. No charge is required. Next to the theatre is a colonnaded street that was once probably the town's commercial centre. Also near the black basalt theatre are the columns of the great Basilica of Gadara. Further west along the colonnaded street are a mausoleum and public baths. After a few hundred metres you can barely make out the remains of what once was a hippodrome. Meals are available in Umm Qais, but as yet there is no overnight accommodation. This should not present a problem, however, as the city is only 30 kilometres northwest of Irbid and 120 kilometres from Amman. Ten kilometres to the north, the road from Umm Qais winds down towards the Yarmouk River and the Golan where it ends at the baths of Hemma. There, Roman holidaymakers sought rejuvenation and vitality from these health-giving hot springs. These are open to modern-day travellers as well. The main hot spring, whose mineral-rich waters are a warm 57°C, pours into an indoor pool. A number of chalets are also available for rent within the complex. The Hemma facilities have been renovated, and are now available for tourists. Umm al-Jimal strange black city is located about 20 kilometres east of the provincial capital of Mafraq, 87 kilometres from Amman, and only 10 kilometres from the Syrian border. Umm al-Jimal is now known as the Black Oasis because of the black basalt rock from which many of its houses, churches, barracks and forts were built. The precise history of Umm al-Jimal is still unclear, but historians believe that it was built originally by the Nabateans around 2000 years ago.

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Under the Nabateans, the city played host to a great number of trading caravans. Indeed, the name Umm al-Jimal means, "Mother of Camels" in Arabic. The large vacant area in the town centre was reserved for travelling caravans stopping in Umm al-Jimal. When the Romans took the city in the first century CE, they incorporated it into the line of defence for Rome's Arab possessions. The city lay only six kilometres east of the Via Nova Triana, which connected Rome's northern and southern Arabian holdings. Umm al-Jimal may have had as many as 10,000 inhabitants during its heyday. During the third century CE, it seemed as though local residents faced some major threat, as they resorted to using tombstones and other available basalt to construct wall fortifications. This wall was then refortified during the fourth century CEo Most of the buildings of Umm al-Jimal were practical and residential in nature, with little evidence of the systematic layout that can be seen, for instance, at Jerash. After surviving a number of catastrophic events including the Persian invasion, plagues, and minor earthquakes, the city was destroyed by a massive earthquake in 747 CEo There are no accommodations in either Mafraq or Umm al-Jimal. East of Amman: Stretching east of Amman, the parched desert plain rolls on to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. This is a place where endless sand and barren basalt landscapes give proof to man's ability to thrive under harsh conditions. The discovery of flint hand-axes in this desert indicates that Paleolithic settlers inhabited the region around half a million years ago. But the most remarkable remains of human habitation are the palaces built by the Damascus-based., Umayyad Caliphs during the early days of Islam (seventh-eighth centuries CEl. During the height of the Umayyad dynasty, architecture flourished with the cultural exchange that accompanied growing trade routes. By 750 CE, when the Umayyad dynasty was overthrown by the Abbasids of Baghdad, a richly characteristic Muslim architecture was evolving, owing considerably to the cosmopolitan influence of builders and craftsmen drawn from Egypt, Mesopotamia and elsewhere throughout the region. Today it is possible to see many relics of the early and medieval Islamic periods in Jordan. Dotted throughout the steppe-like terrain of eastern Jordan and the central hills are numerous historic ruins,

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including castles, forts, towers, baths, caravan inns and fortified palaces. Known collectively as the desert castles or desert palaces, they were originally part of a chain stretching from north of Damascus down to Khirbet al-Mafjar, near Ariha (or Jericho). There are various theories about the purpose of the desert palaces, yet the lack of a defensive architectural design suggests that most were built as recreational retreats. The early Arab rulers' love of the desert led them to build or take over these castles, which appear to have been surrounded by artificial oases with fruit, vegetables and animals for hunting. Other theories suggest that they came to the desert to avoid epidemics, which plagued the big cities, or to maintain links with their fellow Bedouin, the bedrock of their power. Most of the desert castles can be visited over the course of a day in a loop from Amman via Azraq. The following description details a road trip taking the northern route from Amman to Azraq and the southern highway on the return trip. Qasr al-Hallabat is located just off the main road about 30 kilometres east into the desert from Zarqa. It was originally a Roman fort built during the reign of Caracalla (198-217 CE) to defend against raiding desert tribes. There is evidence that, before Caracalla, Trajan had established a post there on the remains of a Nabatean settlement. During the seventh century CE, the site became a monastery, and the Umayyads then fortified it and decorated it with ornate frescoes and decorative carvings. Two kilometres past Qasr al-Hallabat, heading east, are ruins of the main bathing complex known as Hammam ai-Sarah. The baths were once adorned with marble and lavish mosaics. Today, you can still see the channels that were used for hot water and steam. Azraq is located about 110 kilometres east of Amman at the junction of roads leading northeast into Iraq and southeast into Saudi Arabia. With 12 square kilometres of lush parklands, pools and gardens, Azraq has the only water in the entire eastern desert. The oasis is also home to a host of water buffalo and other wildlife. There are four main springs, which supply Azraq with its water as well as its name, which in Arabic means, "blue." Over the past 15 years or so, the water level in Azraq's swamps has fallen dramatically due to large-scale pumping to supply Amman and Irbid. This has resulted in the destruction of a large part of the marshlands.

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While Azraq remains one of the most important oases in the Middle East for birds migrating between Africa and Europe, its declining water levels have led many species to bypass Azraq in favour of other stops. The area was once home to numerous deer; bear, ibex, Oryx, cheetah and gazelle, many of which have been decimated in the last sixty years by overzealous hunters. Although the Iraqi border is far to the east, the town of Azraq has the feel of a border town, as there is no major settlements further east. There are a number of cafes and small hotels, along with a Government Rest House, in Azraq. About 13 kilometres north of the Azraq Junction, on the highway to Iraq, you will find the large black fortress of Qasr al-Azraq. The present form of the castle dates back to the beginning of the 13th century CEo Crafted from local black basalt rocks, the castle exploited Azraq's important strategic position and water sources. The first fortress here is thought to have been built by the Romans around 300 CE, during the reign of Diocletian. The structure was also used by the Byzantines and Umayyads. Qasr al-Azraq underwent its final major stage of building in 1237 CE, when the Mamluks redesigned and fortified it. In the 16th century, the Ottoman Turks stationed a garrison there, and Lawrence of Arabia made the fortress his desert headquarters during the winter of 1917, during the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The castle is almost square, with 80-metre long walls encircling a central courtyard. In the middle of the courtyard is a small mosque that may be from Umayyad times, along with the main well. At each corner of the outer wall, there is an oblong tower. The primary entrance is a single massive hinged slab of granite, which leads to a vestibule where one can see carved into the pavement the remains of a Roman board game. Above the entrance area is the chamber that was used by Lawrence during his stay in Qasr al-Azraq. The caretaker of the castle has a collection of photographs of Lawrence; in fact, his father was one of t~e Arab officers who served with the legendary Brit. Jerash: Jerash, located 48 kilometres north of Amman is considered one of the largest and most well preserved sites of Roman architecture in the world outside Italy. To this day, its colonnaded streets, baths, theatres, plazas and arches remain in exceptional condition. Within the remaining city walls, archaeologists have found

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the ruins of settlements dating back to the Neolithic Age, indicating human occupation at this location for more than 6500 years. This is not surprising, as the area is ideally suited for human habitation. Jerash is fed year-round with water, while its altitude of 500 metres gives it a temperate climate and excellent visibility over they surrounding low-lying areas. The history of Jerash is a blend of the Greco-Roman world of the Mediterranean basin and the ancient traditions of the Arab Orient. Indeed, the name of the city itself reflects this interaction. The earliest Arab/Semitic inhabitants, who lived in the area during the pre-classical period of the first millennium BCE, named their village Garshu. The Romans later Hellenised the former Arabic name of Garshu into Gerasa, and the Bible refers "the region of the Gerasenes" (Mark 5:1; Luke 8:26). At the end of the 19th century, the Arab and Circassian inhabitants of the small rural settlement transformed the Roman Gerasa into the Arabic Jerash. It was not until the days of Alexander the Great that Jerash truly began to prosper. After falling under the rule of the Seleucid King Antioch in the second century BCE, Jerash was conquered by the Roman Emperqr Pompey in 63 BCE. It was during the period of Roman rule that Jerash, then known as Gerasa, enjoyed its golden age. The Romans assimilated Jerash into the province of Syria, and .later named it as one of the great cities of the Decapolis League. The Decapolis was a prosperous confederation of ten Roman cities formed during the first century BCE, and linked by powerful commercial, political and cultural interests. Pliny mentioned the confederation in his Natural History, listing the cities as Damascus, Philadelphia (now Amman), Gerasa (Jerash), Scythopolis (Beisan), Gadara (Umm Qais), Hippos, Dion, Pella, Canatha and Raphana.

Over the next century and a half, trade flourished with the Nabateans and Jerash prospered. The city also benefited from the rich surrounding farmlands and from iron ore mining in the Ajloun area. This period saw the implementation of a typically Roman city plan featuring a colonnaded main street intersected by two side streets. In 106 CE, the Emperor Trajan annexed the wealthy Nabatean kingdom and formed the province of Arabia. The Romans secured lines of communication and trade with the Via Nova Triana

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(Trajan New Road), which was built between 112-114 CE and stretched all the way from Syria to Aqaba. With even greater trading riches pouring in, Jerash enjoyed another burst of construction activity. Granite was brought from as far away as Aswan (Egypt), and old temples were razed and rebuilt according to the latest architectural fashion. The city received yet another boost in stature with the visit of Emperor Hadrian in 129 CEo To honour its guest, the citizens raised a monumental Triumphal Arch at the southern end of the city. Jerash's prosperity reached a peak in the beginning of the third century, when the rank of Roman Colony was bestowed upon it. During this "golden age," Jerash may have had a population of 20,000 people. The ancient city preserved today was the administrative, civic, commercial and cultural centre of this community, while the bulk of the city's citizens lived on the east side of Wadi Jerash. As the third century progressed, shipping began to supplant overland caravans as the main route for commerce. Jerash thus fell into decline as its previously lucrative trade routes became less travelled and less valuable. This trend was speeded by frequent uprisings against the Romans-such as the destruction of Palmyra in 273 CE-that made the overland routes more dangerous. In the year 330 CE, Emperor Constantine converted to Christianity and proclaimed it the state religion of the empire's eastern, or Byzantine, half. By the middle of the fifth century, Christianity had become the major religion of the region and numerous churches were constructed in Jerash. In fact, most of these were built of stones taken from pagan temples. No more churches were built after the year 611 CEo Jerash was hit further by the Persian invasion of 614 CE, which also sacked Damascus and Jerusalem, and by the Muslim conquest of 636 CEo The city was rocked again in the year 747 CE by a series of earthquakes, and its population shrunk to about 4000. Although the site was occupied in the early Islamic period until around 800 CE, Jerash was nothing more than a small rural village. The Crusaders described Jerash as uninhabited, and it remained abandoned until its rediscovery in 1806, when Ulrich Jasper Seetzen, a German traveller, came across and recognised a small part of the ruins. The ancient city was buried in sand, which accounts for its

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remarkable preservation. It has been gradually revealed through a series of excavations which commenced in 1925, and continue to this day. Tickets to the ruins are available at the Jerash Visitors' Centre at the South Gate. There, you can also find free maps of Jerash as well as souvenir shops selling guidebooks and trinkets. The ruins are open from around 07 :00 until dark. From July through October, sound and light shows take place from 20:30-22:30. Visitors to Jerash in late July or early August can enjoy the Jerash Festival of Culture and Arts an exciting celebration of both Jordanian and international culture. The ancient Roman amphitheatre comes to life once more as dancers, musicians, acrobats, theatrical troupes and others from all over the world come to celebrate the link between ancient and modern culture in Jordan. Jordan Valley: The Jordan Valley is a low-lying strip, which cleaves down the western border of the country. It is part of the Great Rift Valley, which extends down southwards into East Africa. The Jordan Valley is divided into several distinct geographic sub-regions. Its northern part is known as the Ghor, and it includes the Jordan River. Several degrees warmer than the rest of the country, its yearround agricultural climate, fertile soils and water supply have made the Ghor the' food bowl of Jordan. The Jordan River rises from several sources, mainly the Anti-Lebanon Mountains in Syria, and flows down into Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee), 212 metres below sea level. It then drains into the Dead Sea which, at 400 metres below sea level, is the lowest point on earth. South of the Dead Sea, the Jordan Valley turns into the hot, dry Wadi 'Araba, the "wilderness" or ''Arabah desert" of the Bible.

People first started to abandon the nomadic lifestyle and plant crops in the Ghor about 10,000 years ago. Villages were built, waterharnessing schemes were implemented, and by about 3000 BCE, produce from the valley was being exported to neighbouring regions. The area's fertile lands were chronicled in the Old Testament, and the Jordan River is revered by Christians as the place where John the Baptist baptised Christ. After 1967, when Israel conquered the "West Bank" of the Jordan River, the population of the Ghor fell from 60,000 down to about 5,000 by 1971. During the 1970s, however, new roads and

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villages were built, and the population has now soared to over 100,000. There are no major cities along the Jordan River. In the last few decades, modern methods of farming have vastly expanded the agricultural output of the area. The latter years of the 1950s, witnessed the construction of the East Ghor Canal (now known as the King Abdullah Canal), which runs down the east bank of the Jordan Valley for 69 kilometres and has brought substantial areas under irrigation. The recent introduction of portable greenhouses has brought about a sevenfold increase in productivity, allowing Jordan to export large amounts of fruit and vegetables year-round.

River Jordan: The Jordan River-or River Jordan, as it is commonly called-is one of the most sacred places, both historically and symbolically, for Christians throughout the world. Joshua, Elijah, Elisha, John the Baptist and Jesus Christ all crossed it during their lifetimes, and it is associated with some of the most important events in the Bible. After the death of Moses, the Bible says that God stopped the waters from flOWing, allowing Joshua to lead his people across the River Jordan into Canaan (Joshua 3: 14-17). This reportedly took place at a ford in the river directly opposite Jericho known as Bethabara, or Bait 'Abara ("house of the crossing"). This place, opposite Jericho, is believed to be the same place where the Prophets Elijah and Elisha parted the waters and crossed miraculously to the east bank of the Jordan. From a nearby spot on the east side, Elijah then ascended into heaven ''on a chariot of fire and horses of fire" (2 Kings 2: 5-14). For Christians, the most significant event associated with the River Jordan is undoubtedly the baptism of Jesus Christ by John the Baptist. Interestingly enough, this also took place very close to Bait 'Abara, where Joshua, Elijah and Elisha crossed the river. In New Testament times, it became known as Bethany, the village of John the Baptist. This Bethany is not to be confused with the village of Bethany near Jerusalem, where the Bible says Lazarus was raised from the dead. The Bible clearly records that Jesus was baptised by John the Baptist (Matthew 3: 13-17), and that John the Baptist lived, preached and baptised in the village of Bethany, on "the other side of the

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Jordan" (John 1: 28). The baptism site, known in Arabic as Al-Maghtas, is located at the head of a lush valley just east of the Jordan River. It was protected and by early 1999 it became accessible to visitors. After Jesus' baptism at Bethany, he spent forty days in the wilderness east of the River Jordan, where he fasted and resisted the temptations of Satan (Mark 1: 13, Matthew 4: 1-11). Dead Sea: The Dead Sea is 75 kilometres long and from 6 to 16 kilometres wide. It is fed by the Jordan River, but it has no outlet. As its name suggests, the Dead Sea is entirely devoid of plant and animal life. This is due to an extremely high content of salt and other minerals-350 grams of salt per kilogram of water, as compared to about 40 grams in the world's oceans. This concentration is caused by a rapid rate of evaporation. These natural elements give the waters of the Dead Sea certain curative properties, recognised since the days of Herod, the Great, over 2000 years ago. Also famous for their restorative powers are the thermal mineral springs of nearby Zarqa Maeen, which hosts a therapeutic health spa.

The Dead Sea is also famous geographically as "the lowest point on earth," lying some 400 metres below sea level. In addition to the historical significance of the "Salt Sea," as it was referred to in the Bible, the Dead Sea is today an important and rich source of minerals essential for agricultural and industrial development, as well as for the treatment of various medical conditions such as psoriasis. Visitors to the Dead Sea come away with an unforgettable swimming experience, as the high density of the water makes sinking virtually impossible. Indeed, swimming is also difficult, as one is lifted too high in the water to be able to stroke properly. More appropriate is the often-photographed pose showing a visitor reclining in the water, leisurely reading a perfectly dry newspaper. While marine enthusiasts will find a paradise in Aqaba, the Dead Sea is a great place to catch up on your reading. At the southern end of the sea, the Arab Potash Company has built vast evaporation ponds covering over 10,000 hectares to extract potash from the mineral-rich waters. The project has allowed Jordan to become one of the world's leading potash exporters. The main resort area is located on the northern shores of the Dead Sea at Sweimeh, about 45 kilometres southwest of Amman. In Sweimeh, the Government Rest House provides showers and

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changing facilities, a restaurant, and a choice stretch of beach. The only accommodations currently available are at the Dead Sea Spa Hotel, a few kilometres past Sweimeh. There, you can enjoy a variety of mineral treatments at the German medical centre: as well as the waters of the Dead Sea, other therapies include black mud, highly oxygenous air treatment, filtered sunrays, massage and gymnastics. Private bungalows are also available. Work is progressing towards the completion of additional resort hotels along the Dead Sea. In addition to being an attraction for leisure and medicinal tourism, the Dead Sea was the location for a number of significant Biblical events. The Bible refers to it as the Sea of the Araba, the Salt Sea, and the Eastern Sea (Deuteronomy 3: 17; Joshua 3: 16; Numbers 34: 12; Ezekiel 47: 18). The Aqabah desert, or "wilderness", of the Bible is the arid basin between the Dead Sea and the Gulf of Aqabah today known as Wadi Araba. Of particular importance is the wide plain along Jordan's southeast Dead Sea coast known today as the Southern Ghor. Known in the Bible as the Valley of Salt-undoubtedly because of the natural salt f6rmations which form along the water's edge-it is where David "slew 18,000 Edomites" (2 Samuel 7:29). This wide plain is also where Abraham and Lot divided their herds and people, going their separate ways after the journey from Egypt. While Abraham journeyed into Canaan, "Lot chose for himself the whole plain of the Jordan and set out towards the east" (Genesis 13: 11). The Bible then says that "Lot lived among the cities of the plain and pitched his tents near Sodom" (Genesis 13: 12). The Southern Ghor may thus be associated with one of the most dramatic stories in the Bible, that of Sodom and Gomorrah. While conclusive proof has not yet been found, some scholars see Bab al-Dhra' and Numeira as good candidates for the Biblical Sodom and Gomorrah, destroyed by God because of their wickedness (Genesis 19). The other Biblical "cities of the plain-"Admah, Zeboiim and Bela (or Zoar)-may still be waiting to be rediscovered under the ruins of Early Bronze Age towns as Feifa, Safi, Khneizirah, and other places throughout the Biblical Valley of Salt. Deir Ain Abata: One of Jordan's most exciting archeological discoveries of recent times is at Deir Ain Abata, the cave where Lot and his family sought refuge from the devastation of Sodom and

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Gomorrah. A pillar of salt near Deir Ain Abata is said to be Lot's wife, after she turned to watch the destruction of Sodom. A monastery built by early Christians in commemoration of Lot's sanctuary was recently unearthed at the site. The monastery obviously welcomed pilgrims to the cave of Lot's refuge, which can be visited as well. A host of Bronze Age, Nabatean, Byzantine and early Islamic artifacts have also been found at Deir Ain Abata. Not surprisingly, the Byzantine period saw the laying of elaborate mosaic floors, some of which can still be seen today. It is likely that the monastery was abandoned during the eighth century CE, probably because seismic pressure forced the collapse of the basilica and other structures. The monastery and cave are situated precariously on the side of a slope, and at least a third of the monastery has tumbled down the hill. Deir Ain Abata is situated about two kilometres north of the phosphate-mining town of Safi, on the hill overlooking the Dead Sea. Deir Alia: Deir Alia is located in the Northern Ghor along the main Jordan Valley road, a short distance southwest from 1\jloun and 50 km. north of the Dead Sea. An impressive temple was built on the hill of Deir Alia around 1500 BCE, and it is likely this ancient cultic and market centre was the Biblical Succoth, visited by Gideon as he chased the Midianites back to the east (Judges 8: 5-16). The sanctuary was in use until about 1200 BCE, when it was destroyedprobably either by an earthquake or by the legions of Pharoah. Three miles to the east lies Biblical Mahanaim (known in Arabic as Tulul al-Dhahab al-Gharbi, or "the western hills of gold"), where Jacob camped on his way to meet his brother Esau (Genesis 32: 1). Just east of Mahanaim is Tulul al-Dhahab al-Sharqi ("the eastern hills of gold"), which may be the ancient Penuel ("the face of God"), where Jacob wrestled all night with God in the form of a man before reuniting with his brother Esau (Genesis 32: 22-32).

Tabaqat Fahl: The ancient city of Pella, known in Arabic as Tabaqat Fahl, is believed to have been inhabited as early as 5000 3CE. It was during the Greco-Roman period, however, that Pella truly Jrospered. Strategically placed at the crossroads of numerous trading ·outes linking Europe, the Near East and Asia, the city flourished ·rom trade and was influenced by a multitude of diverse cultures. Like nany of the ancient cities of Jordan, Pella came successively under

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the rule of the Ptolemies and the Seleucids. Disaster struck in 83 BCE, however, when the Hasmonean leader of Judea, Alexander Jannaeus, largely destroyed the city when its inhabitants refused to embrace Judaism. Pella was one of several Hellenistic communities on the east bank of the Jordan River that was targeted by Jannaeus. Pella and a host of other Hellenistic cities were freed from the Hasmoneans in 64 BCE when Pompey of Rome extended his rule southwards. Pella was incorporated into the Decapolis, the confederation of ten cities linked by commercial and political interests, which Pompey formed after his conquest of Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Because of its proximity, Christians fled from Jerusalem to Pella to escape the First Jewish Revolt in CE 66-70 and Roman persecution during the first and second centuries after Christ. The Byzantine era saw a revitalisation of Pella, as trade routes strengthened and local industries developed. Approximately 25,000 people lived in or near Pella during the late fifth century CEo The Byzantine armies were defeated by the Arab armies at the Battle of Yarmouk in 636 CE, and Islam soon became the dominant religious and cultural influence throughout the land. Pella-which received the Arabic name of Fahl-continued to prosper under Islamic Umayyad rule, until the great earthquake of 747 CE brought much of the city crashing down. Even then, archeological evidence indicates that the city remained inhabited on a modest scale. The Mamluks occupied it in the 13th and 14th centuries, but then the city was virtually abandoned forfive centuries. Today, Pella is gradually being unearthed by teams of American and Australian archaeologists. As you climb up the steep wadi, you will notice to your left three columns, which mark the spot of the Sixth-century West Church. Continuing along, there are the remains of a 14th century Mamluk mosque and a graveyard. Off to the left is an immense water tank, built by the Byzantines to hold 300,000 litres of water. You then approach the main ruins, which consist of houses, shops, storehouses and other staple constructions of city life. Below on the right lies an assortment of Byzantine and Roman public buildings. Sitting on the streambed, or Wadi Jirm, is a first century CE Roman odeon or theatre. Next to this are the ruins of a large Byzantine church, built in the sixth and seventh centuries on top of a Roman shrine. The remains of Roman baths are also visible in this

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area. Perched up on the east, on a natural balcony overlooking the valley, is the East Church, erected during the late fifth century CEo To the south is Tel Husn, on top of which was a Byzantine fortress. Pella is located 30 kilometres north of Deir Alla on the Jordan Valley Road. From Amman, it is a 95 kilometre drive. To reach the site from the main road at the city of Al-Masharia, hike two kilometres up the path to the east of the road. Shomari Wildlife Reserve: Situated about 15 minutes south of Azraq, the Shomari Wildlife Reserve covers 22 square kilometres. The park is open daily from about 07:30 until around 16:00. It can be reached by following a desert road to the western side of the reserve, which is completely encircled by a fence. Numerous species of wildlife, including ostrich, gazelle, wild donkey, Arabian Oryx and others inhabit Shomari. While the park has been able to protect these animals from being hunted, the lack of water in this area has caused 'these species' habitat to shrink. Shomari's great success story is 'Operation Oryx.

This project has attracted worldwide recognition for its reintroduction into the wild of an almost extinct species, the Arabian Oryx. With its two straight horns and black face markings, the white Oryx once roamed the deserts of Arabia and the Fertile Crescent. Over-hunting almost brought the species to extinction, but because of careful management Shomari now boasts around 200 Arabian Oryx. The reserve has also fostered 14 ostriches from a single pair, and about 30 gazelles call Shomari home, as well. Grand Palaces Quseir Amra: Heading back towards Amman on Highway 40, Quseir 'Amra is about 28 kilometres from Azraq. This is the best preserved of the desert castles, and probably the most charming. It was built during the reign of the Caliph Walid I (705-715 CEl as a luxurious bathhouse. The building may have been part of a larger complex that served to host travelling caravans, which was in existence before the Umayyads arrived on the scene. The building consists of three long halls with vaulted ceilings. Its plain exterior belies the beauty within, where the ceilings and walls are covered with colourful frescoes. Directly opposite the main doorway is a fresco of the Caliph sitting on his throne. On

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the south wall other frescoes depict six other rulers of the day. Of these, four have been identified-Roderick the Visigoth, the Sassanian ruler Krisa, the Negus of Abyssinia, and the Byzantine emperor. The two others are thought to be the leaders of China and the Turks. These frescoes either imply that the present Umayyad Caliph was their equal, or it could simply be a pictorial list of the enemies of Islam. Many other frescoes in the main audience chamber offer fantastic portrayals of humans and animals. This is interesting in itself because after the advent of Islam, any illustration of living beings was prohibited. The audience chamber, which was used for feasting, meetings and cultural events, leads through an antechamber into the baths. The caldarium, or steam room, is capped with a domed ceiling where a fresco lays out a map of the heavens, with the constellations of the northern hemisphere and the signs of the Zodiac. The two bathrooms have fine mosaic floors. Qasr al-Harraneh: This well-preserved castle is located about 16 kilometres west of Quseir 'Amra and 55 kilometres east of Amman. The spot is marked by an assortment of tall radio pylons on the other side of the highway. Qasr al-Harraneh remains an enigma to archaeologists and historians. Some experts believe that it was a defensive fort, while others maintain it was a caravanserais for passing camel trains. Yet another theory is that it served as a retreat for Umayyad leaders to discuss affairs of state. With its high walls, arrow slits, four corner towers and square shape of a Roman fortress, Qasr al-Harraneh would appear to be a defensive castle. However, the towers are not large enough to have been an effective defence, and may have instead been built to buttress the walls. The arrow slits are also cosmetic, being too narrow on the inside to allow archers sufficient visibility and too few in numbers for effectiv,e military usage. We do know that an inscription in a second storey ro~m dates the construction of Qasr al-Harraneh to 711 CEo The presence of Greek inscriptions around the main entrance frame suggests that the castle was built on the site of a Roman or Byzantine building. Qasr al-Mushatta: Just south of Amman, Qasr al-Mushatta offers an excellent example of characteristic Umayyad architecture. The castle is an incomplete square palace with elaborate decoration

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and vaulted ceilings. The immense brick walls of the complex stretch 144 metres in each direction, and at least 23 round towers were nestled along these walls. The palace mosque is sited in the traditional position, inside and to the right of the main entrance. Throughout, there is a powerful symmetry and axiality in the planning, with a tendency for compartmentalisation, often into three sections. The vaulting systems are considered essentially Iraqi, but the stonemasonry and carved decoration is Hellenistic. Both influences are modified by their interaction, and this palace presents the most complete fusion of the two traditions in Umayyad architecture. Historians believe that Qasr al-Mushatta, the largest and most lavish of all the Umayyad castles, was begun by the Caliph Walid 11who was assassinated by forced labourers angry over the lack of water in the area. The palace was constructed between 743-744 CE, but was never fully completed. Qasr al-Mushatta is not on the Desert Castle Loop. To get there, take the Desert Highway south of Amman to Queen Alia International Airport. The castle is situated right at the end of the north runway. You must drive around the perimeter of the airport to get there. Turn right at the Alia Gateway Hotel as you approach the airport and the road will take you past two checkpoints and on to the castle. Qastal: Qastal is one of the oldest of the Umayyad palaces, as well as one of the best preserved. The remains at Qastal include a wide variety of sites such as the central palace, baths, a reservoir, a mosque, small houses, a cemetery-the oldest Muslim graveyard in Jordan-and a dam. The central palace was decorated with stone carvings, and twelve semicircular turrets buttressed and guarded the walls. The courtyard of the palace housed a central water tank. North of the central palace are the remains of the mosque. Interestingly, it is not oriented precisely eastwards facing Mecca. One kilometre east of the main complex are the remains of a stone dam, constructed to retain rainwater. Formed from the quarry, which supplied stone for Qastal's palace, the dam had a capacity of around two million cubic metres. Qastal was probably built in the early Islamic era by the Umayyad Caliph Abd-u.l-Malik ibn Marwan, who is known primarily for building the magnificent Dome of the Rock Mosque in Jerusalem. The palace of Qastal is very easy to find, 100 metres west of

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the Desert Highway near the town of Qastal, 25 kilometres south of Amman.

Mkawer: One of Jordan's undiscovered gems is Herod the Great's ancient fortress of Machaerus, located by the village of Mkawer. There, it is said, the beautiful Salome danced for Herod Antipas, who presented her with the head of the Prophet Yahya or John the Baptist to honour her wishes. According to Matthew 14: 9-12, "The king was sad, but because of the promise he had made in front of all his guests, he gave orders that her wish be granted. So he had John beheaded in prison. The head was brought in on a plate to the girl, who took it to her mother." The fort was perched on a 700-metre-high hill, which was first fortified about 100 BeE, and expanded by Herod, the Great, seventy years later. The greatest attraction of Machaerus, however, is the stunning panoramic view it presents of the surrounding countryside, the Dead Sea, and the West Bank. On a clear night you can easily make out the lights of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) and Ariha (Jericho). Far removed from the tourist circuit, the quiet of this area transports you back into Biblical times. Indeed, shepherds and their flocks still find shelter in the myriad caves and grottoes around Machaerus. Hike down towards the Dead Sea from Machaerus and you will truly feel that you are on top of the world. Mkawer is about 40 kilometres southwest of Madaba. To get there, go from Madaba south to Libb, then take a right and continue on the road until it ends in front of Machaerus. Food is available in Mkawer at Herod's Rest House. Hammamat Maeen: The hot springs and baths of Hammamat Maeen have been enjoyed for therapeutic and leisure pursuits for thousands of years. The public springs and commercial resort area are located 35 kilometres southwest of Madaba, along a winding road, which crosses some of the most spectacular territory around the Dead Sea. It is, however, impossible to drive directly from Hammamat Maeen to the Dead Sea. Hammamat Maeen should not be confused with the actual town of Maeen, which is 15 kilometres before the springs. The main public attraction is a large spring-fed waterfall, while a number of smaller ones spurt forth within the private resort area (08-545-500). Shower facilities and a swimming pool are also available

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for public use. Within the spa complex, one of the most popular attractions is the body mudpack treatment, followed by showering and a hot bath. Other spa and health facilities are also available in Hammamat Maeen, as are accommodations. The hot springs are open from 08:00 until midnight daily. Healing Waters: Sunlight splashes over the rim of the wadi, burnishing the hills and accenting the red sandstone walls that tower on either side. Ferns, reeds and a few trees dot the rock with green. In the cool of the desert morning, a plume of steam rises off the shallal, the waterfall, as it tumbles to the river below. Even at this early hour, families who have slept on the hard ground are already bathing, singly or in small groups, amid the rock perches and pools of the naturally hot mineral waters of Main, in Jordan. Generations of their ancestors have done the same. Main is rugged and spectacular and-though only 60 kilometres (37 miles) south and west of Amman-lies well off the beaten path. Nestled in the bottom of a wadi, or valley, the hot springs attract not only casual bathers. They are also the centre of the Main Spa Village, specialising in the treatment of arthritis, joint pain and circulatory diseases. Built in 1989 and operated by a private corporation under government supervision, the complex contains a hotel, tourist chalets, restaurants, two swimming pools, a fitness room, and even a market. A similar spa village at the Dead Sea Hotel, soon to be directly linked with Main by a mountain road, specialises in the treatment of skin diseases. Weary bodies have sought curative waters to ease their ailments for thousands of years. There is archeological evidence of Neolithic and Bronze Age devotions at hot springs in France, Italy, and Switzerland. The founding of Bath, England, is attributed to Bladud, the father of King Lear, who in 863 BC was cured of a "raging disease" by immersion in the steamy swamps near the present-day city. The ancient Greeks erected temples to Asclepius, god of medicine and healing, near natural springs, and a Roman cult, aimed at relief of a plague around 293 BC, grew up around such springs. The springs at Main have been known at least since Hellenic times, and the Roman-era historian Josephus recorded them as Therma Callirhoes, or "beautiful thermal waters."

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Centuries later, motivated by the belief that God provides help in nature for human afflictions, Muslim physicians and naturalists were quick to explore the curative powers of hot springs. Muslim baths fused eastern traditions with what was by then a largely Roman technology, and the result has been a fixture in Middle Eastern cities for centuries. Combining the ancient with the contemporary, the staff at the Main spa prescribes an individual treatment regimen for each patient only after screening him or her for high blood pressure or heart difficulties that could be aggravated by the hot waters. There are several types of whirlpool baths, a hot-water pool, massage treatments, and hot-mud therapy. The spa is divided into men's and women's sections, each with the same up-to-date facilities, and each patient's programme is overseen by a physiotherapist. The hot spring water of Main contains a number of apparently curative agents. The most important element is the heat itself, which averages 56 degrees Centigrade (133°F), but in some of the five dozen springs around Main can reach as high as 63 degrees (145°F). It improves skin circulation by dilating the superficial arteries, which allows an easier flow of blood. As anyone who has ever relaxed in a warm bath knows, the heat also relaxes muscles, thereby easing joint pain. High sulphur levels in the water serve as a tranquilliser for the respiratory system, making breathing easier. Some visitors drink the water, but only after it stands, cooling, to dissipate the radon gas it contains, which is harmful if taken internally. Ingested, the high levels of carbon dioxide act like seltzer in aiding digestion. Not all who come to Main, however, come for the spa. The natural springs are open to the public, and on Friday mornings they are especially full as entire families often bring picnics. Women and children clamber on rocks and wade in the waters of the stream below the steamy plume of the shallal, while young men often opt for higher ledges under hot cascades. Some stay the night, sleeping under the stars and enjoying the desert evening while soaking in effervescent luxury. According to geologiSts, the springs were formed when this part of the earth's crust began a process called rifting. Responding to magma flows deep below, the rock plates that make up the earth's crust pulled apart and, over tens of thousands of years, formed deep

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valleys. In the Middle East, this movement has produced an enormous rift stretching nearly 3000 kilometres (1900 miles) from western Syria southward all the way to the Gulf of Aden, including both the Red Sea and the Dead Sea. Dr. I1yas Salamah, professor of hydrogeology at the University of Jordan, explains that as the Arabian Peninsula moves slowly east and Jordan moves north, the Red Sea widens by about four and a half centimetres (1 %") each year-three times the rate of rifting in the mid-Atlantic. "This is what we call an active geological zone," Salamah says. The rifting is responsible for the nearly 200 hot springs in Jordan, for it allows surface water to reach deep, hot underground levels and eventually circulate back to the surface. Radioactivity and volcanism heat the water, underground and under pressure, as high as 130 degrees (266°F), but it cools as it moves towards the surface. Geologists estimate that the water at Main has been underground for at least 3600 years. A few kilometres from the springs, the stream empties into the Dead Sea, the lowest-lying body of water on earth, whose salt content is eight times that of most oceans. Intense sunlight and less than 10 centimetres (4") of annual rainfall have created a unique, fragile community of flora and fauna around the Dead Sea, many of whose 300 species of plants are found nowhere else. Zaqqum trees (Balanites aegyptiaca) dot the hills; the local name refers to the tree mentioned in the Quran "that springs out of the bottom of Hell-fire," and whose bitter fruit is the food of the damned. There is also the yusur tree (Miringa peregrina), with its brittle branches and delicate pinkish-white flowers, which produces 30-centimetre (12") pods whose beans have been used for generations to make the misbaha, the socalled "worry beads." These are popular in some parts of the Middle East with both Muslims and Christians, who use them in their devotions. Along the barren and rocky shoreline, the Dead Sea Spa Hotel, like its cousin in Main, has become a haven for what the industry calls "medical tourism." The high oxygen content of the air 400 metres (1280') below sea level relieves bronchial asthma. On the women's side, mud is used for the notorious "mud facial" that is believed to remove wrinkles. The mineral-laden waters of the Dead Sea, combined with the dry air, hot sun and mud, have also proved to be uniquely helpful in healing more than 80 types of psoriasis,

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a painful disease of the skin. As the spa's doctor told, "You can't take the waters of the Dead Sea to Scandinavia and do what we do here!" Psoriasis patients spend up to eight hours a day in the spa's solarium, seven days a week, alternating sun with shade to avoid sunstroke and heat exhaustion. Under supervision, the heat, occasional mud, small amounts of water and more heat gradually dry and close their sores, taking patients to progressively higher levels of healing. The spa attracts patients from Europe, particularly from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, where government medical insurance pays for the three-to six-week stay required for effective treatment. And the hotel recently signed a contract with the Psoriasis Association of Italy to treat Italian patients. But many visitors pay their own way, too, says Kamel Ajami, general manager of the hotel. "They like it because it is quiet here." Karak: Variously known throughout history as Qir Heres, Qir . Moab, and Hareseth, Karak has been a prized possession of a number of civilizations. It lies on the ancient caravan routes that used to connect Egypt to Syria, and its commanding position almost 1000 metres above the Dead Sea Valley made it a strategic asset of great importance. The city was the ancient capital of Moab, and was also used by the Greeks and Romans. During Roman times it was known as Characmoba. But it was not until the arrival of the Crusaders in the 12th century that Karak reached its full splendour. It is recorded that the Crusader King Batwing I of Jerusalem had the castle built in 1132 CEo With its loeation midway between Shobak and Jerusalem, Karak formed part of a great line of Crusader castles stretching from Aqabah to Turkey. Karak became the capital of the Crusader district of Oultrejourdain, and, with the taxes levied on passing caravans and food grown in the district, it helped Jerusalem prosper. Even with its impressive defensive fortifications, Karak could not hold out against the forces of Salah-ud-Din. After the governor of Karak, the infamous Reynaud De Chatillon, broke several truces with Salah-ud-Din, the Muslim leader responded with a massive bombardment of Karak. De Chatillon, who was captured and executed by Salah-ud-Din in 1187 CE, was known for throwing his captives off the top of Karak's battlements with wooden boxes over their heads to ensure that they remained conscious until they hit the ground.

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Salah-ud-Din's armies besieged and conquered the fortress in 1188, marking the beginning of the Crusaders' loss of power throughout the area. The Mamluk Sultan Baibars refortified the castle in the late 13th century, and it was also later used by the Ottomans. The fort itself has been partially restored, and is a maze of vaulted passages and rooms. To the west across the moat is the tower from which De Chatillon cast his prisoners to their deaths. The tower in the northwest corner was added by the Mamluks in the 13th century. The multistoried building at the southern end was the dungeon. To the right of the castle entrance, a stone staircase descends to the museum, which holds one of the many copies of the Mesha Stele, along with Mamluk pottery, and Nabatean and Roman coins. The castle is open free of charge during daylight hours, while the museum is open daily 09:00-17:00 with a 1 JD admission. The town of Karak lies 129 kilometres south of Amman, or 88 kilometres south of Madaba. Within Karak, numerous small hotels are available. Karak can be reached via the Desert Highway by turning right at Qatrana. However, the King's Highway is the recommended route, as it will take you over one of Jordan's most spectacular sights, Wadi Mujib. About 50 kilometres north of Karak, this canyon is over 1000 metres deep. Wadi Mujib was the "Arnon Gorge" or "Arnon River" of the Bible (Numbers 21: 24; Judges 11: 18), a natural boundary which separated the Moabites in the south from the Amorites in the north. Petra: Undoubtedly the most famous attraction in Jordan is the Nabatean city of Petra, nestled away in the mountains south of the Dead Sea. Petra, which means "stone" in Greek, is perhaps the most spectacular ancient city remaining in the modern world, and certainly a must-see for visitors to Jordan and the Middle East.

The city was the capital of the Nabateans-Arabs who dominated the lands of Jordan during pre-Roman times-and they carved this wonderland of temples, tombs and elaborate buildings out of solid rock. The Victorian traveller and poet Dean Burgon gave Petra a description which holds to this day-"Match me such a marvel save in Eastern clime, a rose-red city half as old as time." Yet words can hardly do justice to the magnificence that is Petra. In order to best savour the atmosphere of this ancient wonder, visit in the quiet of

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the early morning or late afternoon when the sandstone rock glows red with quiet grandeur. For seven centuries, Petra fell into the mists of legend, its existence a guarded secret known only to the local Bedouins and Arab tradesmen. Finally, in 1812, a young Swiss explorer and convert to Islam named Johann Ludwig Burckhardt heard locals speaking of a "lost city" hidden in the mountains of Wadi Mousa. In order to find the site without arousing local suspicions, Burckhardt disguised himself as a pilgrim seeking to make a sacrifice at the tomb of Aaron, a mission which would provide him a glimpse of the legendary city. He managed to bluff his way through successfully, and the secret of Petra was revealed to the modern Western world. Much of Petra's fascination comes from its setting on the edge of Wadi Araba. The rugged sandstone hills form a deep canyon easily protected from all directions. The easiest access to Petra is through the Siq, a winding cleft in the rock that varies from between five to 200 metres wide. Petra's excellent state of preservation can be attributed to the fact that aimost all of its hundreds of "buildings" have been hewn out of solid rock: there are only a few freestanding buildings in the city. Until 1984, many of these caves were home to the local Bedouins. Out of concern for the monuments, however, the government outlawed this and relocated the Bedouins to housing near the adjacent town of Wadi Mousa. Petra is located just outside the town of Wadi Mousa in southern Jordan. It is 260 kilometres from Amman via the Desert Highway and 280 kilometres via the King's Highway. There are numerous and varied accommodations available in Wadi Mousa, as well as a few hotels on the panoramic drive between Wadi Mousa and the nearby (15 kilometres) village of Taybet. Camping is now illegal inside Petra. Archaeologists believe that Petra has been inhabited from prehistoric times. Just north of the city at Beidha, the remains of a 9000-year-old city have been discovered, putting it in the same league as Jericho as one of the earliest known settlements in the Middle East. Between that time and the Iron Age (circa 1200 BCE), when it was the home of the Edomites, virtually nothing is known. The Bible tells of how King David subdued the Edomites, probably around 1000 BCE. According to this story, the Edomites were enslaved, but eventually won their freedom. A series of great battles were then

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fought between the Judeans and the people of Edom. In one of these, the Judean King Amaziah, who ruled from 796 to 781 BCE, "defeated ten thousand Edomites in the Valley of Salt, and captured Sela in battle" (2 Kings 14: 25). The summit of Umm al-Biyara Mountain, in central Petra, is often identified as the Sela of the Bible. However, Sela is also sometimes identified as the mountain top stronghold of Sele', near Buseirah, one of the Edomite capitals north of Petra. The area's principle water source, Ain Mousa (Spring of Moses), is thought by some to be one of the many places where the Prophet Musa (Moses) struck a rock with his staff to extract water (Numbers 20: 10-13). Prophet Aaron, brother of Moses and Muriam, died in the Petra area and was buried atop Mount Hor, now known as Jabal Haroon (Mount Aaron). Sometime during the sixth century BCE, a nomadic tribe known as the Nabateans migrated from western Arabia and settled in the area. It appears as though the Nabatean migration was gradual and there were few hostilities between them and the Edomites. As the Nabateans forsook their nomadic lifestyle and settled in Petra, they grew rich by levying taxes on travellers to ensure safe passage through their lands. The easily defensible valley city of Petra allowed the Nabateans to grow strong. From its origins as a fortress city, Petra became a wealthy commercial crossroads between the Arabian, Assyrian, Egyptian, Greek and Roman cultures. Control of this crucial trade route between the upland areas of Jordan, the Red Sea, Damascus and southern Arabia was the lifeblood of the Nabatean Empire and brought Petra its fortune. The riches the Nabateans accrued allowed them to carve monumental temples, tombs and administrative centres out of their valley stronghold. The Seleucid King Antigonus, who had come to power in Babylonia when Alexander the Great's empire was divided, rode against the Nabateans in 312 BCE. The Nabateans eventually repelled the invaders, and records indicate that they were eager to remain on good terms with the Seleucids in order to perpetuate their trading ambitions. While the Seleucids could not conquer the Nabateans militarily, their Hellenistic culture made a lasting impact upon the Nabateans. New ideas in art and architecture influenced the Nabateans at the same time that their flourishing empire was expanding northward

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into Syria, around 150 BCE. The term "empire" is used loosely here, for it was more a zone of influence. As the Nabateans expanded northward, more caravans routes and, consequently, trading riches, came under their control. It was primarily this, rather than territorial acquisition or cultural domination, that motivated them. The growing economic and political power of the Nabateans began to worry the Romans, and in 63 BCE Pompey dispatched a force to cripple Petra. Nabatean King Aretas III either defeated the Roman Legions or paid a tribute to keep peace with them. Later, the Nabateans made a mistake by siding with the Parthians in their war with the Romans. After the Parthians' defeat, Petra had to pay tribute to Rome. When they fell behind in paying this tribute, they were invaded twice by the Roman vassal King Herod the Great. The second attack, in 31 BCE, saw him take control of a large swath of Nabatean territory, including the lucrative northern trading routes into Syria. With their trading empire reduced to a shell of its former glory, the Nabatean Empire staggered on for almost another century and a half. The last Nabatean monarch, Rabbel II, struck a deal with the Romans that as long as they did not attack during his lifetime, they would be allowed to move in after he died. Upon his death in 106 CE, the Romans claimed the Nabatean Kingdom and set about transforming it with the usual plan of a colonnaded street, baths, and the common trappings of modern Roman life. Much of what is known about Nabatean culture comes from the writings of the Roman scholar Strabo. He recorded that their community was governed by a royal family, although a spirit of democracy prevailed. Strabo also notes the materialism of the Nabateans. With its in corporation into the Roman Empire, Petra began to thrive once again. The city may have housed 20,00030,000 people during its heyday. The fortunes of Petra began to decline with the shift in trade routes to Palmyra in Syria and the expansion of sea borne trade around Arabia. The city was struck another blow in 363 CE, when the freestanding structures of Petra were thrown to the ground in a violent earthquake. Fortunately, Petra's greatest constructions were preserved, carved as they are into the rock faces. It is not known whether the inhabitants of Petra left the city before or after the fourth century earthquake. The fact that very few silver

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coins or valuable possessions have been unearthed at Petra indicates, however, that the withdrawal was an unhurried and organised process. One theory holds that the city of Petra was primarily a religiOUS and administrative centre, used occasionally as a fortress during times of war. The preponderance of temples and tombs supports this theory, which holds that as the dead began to consume more and more of Petra's space, the living relocated to other caves or tents outside the inner confines of the "holy" city. It seems clear that by the time of the Muslim conquest in the seventh century CE, Petra had slipped into obSCUrity. The city was damaged again by the earthquake of 747 CE, and housed a small Crusader community during the 12th or 13th century. It then passed into obscurity and was forgotten until Johann Ludwig Burckhardt rediscovered it for the outside world in 1812. The entrance to Petra is just past the town of Wadi Mousa. Petra is open from roughly 06:00 until 18:00, and 20 dinars is the cost of a one-day adult ticket for non-Jordanians. From the Government Rest House, where you can stock up with film, a map of the ancient city, food and souvenirs, the path leads down to the Siq (the narrow winding valley that leads in to Petra). There you will see dozens of local Bedouins with horses that you can hire to transport you the 1.5 kilometres or so down to the actual Siq. Even before you reach the Siq, you will notice three square freestanding tombs on your right. No evidence of bones has been found, but it may be that these are a type of tombstone. Further along on the left, built high into the cliff, stands the Obelisk Tomb, which once stood seven metres high. Five graves were found inside the tomb, four represented by pyramid-shaped pillars and the last by a statue between the middle pillars. Closer to the Siq, rock-cut channels once brought the waters of Ein Mousa through ceramic pipes to the inner city as well as to the surrounding farm country. When designing a new dam, excavators uncovered the Nabateans' ancient dam and used it as a model for the modern one. As you enter the Siq, the path narrows to about five metres and the walls tower over 200 metres overhead, casting enormous shadows on the niches that once held icons of the gods Dushara and AI-Uzza. The icons were meant to protect the entrance and hex unwelcome visitors. The entrance to the Siq was once topped by a ceremonial arch built by the Nabateans. It survived until the late ninth century,

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and you can still see remains of it as you enter the gorge. The original channels cut in the walls to bring water into Petra can also be seen, and in some places the original terra-cotta pipes are still in place. After winding around for 1.5 kilometres, the Siq suddenly opens upon the most impressive of all Petra's monuments Al-Khazaneh (Arabic for "The Treasury"). One of the most elegant remains of antiquity, it is carved out of solid rock from the side of a mountain, and stands over 40 metres high. Although it served as a royal tomb, the Treasury gets its name from the legend that pirates hid their treasure there, in a giant stone urn, which stands in the centre of the second level. Believing the urn to be filled with ancient pharoanic treasures, the Bedouins periodically fired guns at it: proof of this can be seen in the bullet holes, which are clearly visible on the urn. Much speculation has gone into the barely distinguishable reliefs, which can be seen on the exterior of the Khazaneh, although consensus is that they represent various gods. The Khazaneh's age has also been debated, with estimates ranging from 100 BCE to 200 CEo As the Siq, turns right and leads down towards the city, the number of niches and tombs increases, becoming a virtual graveyard in rock arching around behind the 8000-seat Amphitheatre. Originally thought to have been built by the Romans after their defeat of the Nabateans in 106 CE, it is now believed that the Nabateans cut the Amphitheatre out of the rock around the time of Christ, slicing through many caves and tombs in the process. Under the stage floor were storerooms and a slot through which a curtain could be lowered at the beginning of a performance. Through this slot a marble Hercules was discovered several years ago. After the Amphitheatre, the wadi widens out and you soon come to the main city area, which covers about three square kilometres. Up on the right, carved into the rock of Jabal Khubtha, are the Royal Tombs. The first is the Urn Tomb, with its open terrace built over a double layer of vaults. The room inside measures 20 by 18 metres, and the patterns in the rock are striking. The Urn Tomb commands an impressive view and was once used as a church in Byzantine times. Next along is the Corinthian Tomb, allegedly a replica of Nero's Golden Palace in Rome. Finally, the Palace Tomb is a three-storey imitation of a Roman palace and one of the largest monuments in Petra. The tomb had to be completed by attaching reassembled

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stones to its upper left-hand corner. Around the corner to the right is the Mausoleum of Sextus Rorentinius, a Roman administrator under Emperor Hadrian. Continuing down the Siq, several restored columns mark the sides of the paved Roman colonnaded street. During the Roman era, columns lined the full length of the street, with markets and residences branching off on the sides. The slopes of the hills on either side are littered with the remains of the ancient city. Along the colonnaded street you will see the ruins of the public fountain, or Nymphaeum. At the northwestern end of the colonnaded street is the triple-arched Temenos Gateway, which was originally fitted with wooden doors and marked the entrance into the courtyard, or "temenos", of the Qasr al-Bint. To the right of the Temenos Gateway, or Triumphal Arch, is the Temple of the Winged Lions. This was named after the carved lions that adorn the capitals of the columns. The temple was dedicated to the fertility goddess Atargatis, who was the partner to the main male god, Dushara. Several hundred metres to the right of the street, near the Temple of the Winged Lions, is an immense Byzantine Church rich with mosaics. Each of the side aisles of Petra Church is paved with 70 square metres of remarkably preserved mosaics, depicting native as well as exotic or mythological animals, as well as personifications of the Seasons, Ocean, Earth and Wisdom. The church is thought to have been a major fifth-and sixth-century cathedral, throwing into question theories of Petra's decline during this era. In December 1993, a cache of 152 papyrus scrolls in Byzantine Greek and possibly late Arabic were uncovered at the site. The scrolls, which constitute the largest group of written material from antiquity found in Jordan, are currently being deciphered and are yielding a wealth of information concerning the Byzantine period in the area. Passing through the Temenos Gateway, one enters the piazza of the Qasr bint al-Faroun (in Arabic, "Palace of the Pharoah's Daughter"). This Nabatean construction dates from around 30 BCE, and is also known as the Temple of Dushara, after the god who was worshipped there. It was probably the main place of worship in Nabatean Petra, and it is the only freestanding structure in Petra. The Qasr was in use up until the Roman annexation, when it was burned. Earthquakes in the fourth and eighth centuries destroyed the remainder

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of the building. Just beyond the Qasr al-Bint is the small massif of A1-Habis. Steps lead up to the small, free museum which has a collection of artifacts found in Petra over the years.

High Places: There are a number of places in Petra that require a bit of effort to reach, but the effort is well worth the spectacular views that await. As well as the following climbs, you can make the longer hikes to Umm al-Biyara-which may be the Biblical precipice of Sela (2 Kings 14: 7; Isaiah 16: 1)-, AI-Beidha, or the six-hour hike to the top of Mt. Hor and Aaron's Tomb (in Arabic, Jabal Haroon). For these climbs either a detailed guidebook with maps or an actual guide is recommended. As always, bring plenty of water. The easiest of these climbs is up to the Crusader castle, or Citadel, on top of AI-Habis. The steps leading to the top start from the base of the hill on the rise behind the Qasr Bint al-Faroun. The path goes all the way around AI-Habis, revealing more caves on its western side. The entire round trip hike takes less than an hour. From the Qasr, it takes around an hour to reach one of Petra's most spectacular constructions, AI-Deir ("The Monastery"). To truly experience Petra's immensity and power, a visit here is essential. The climb leads up the hillside, but the ancient path is easy to follow and not steep. Not far along the track, a sign point's left to the Lion Tomb set in a small gully. The two lions that give it its name can be seen facing each other at the base of the tomb. The Monastery itself is similar in appearance to the Khazaneh, but, at 50 metres wide and 45 metres tall, it is far bigger. Undertaken between the third century BCE and the first century CE, but never completed, it is less ornate than the Khazaneh. The Monastery receives its name from crosses on the inside walls that suggest it was later used as a church. AI-Deir's primary distinguishing feature is its crowning urn, which, unlike the Khazaneh, is not backed against the rock. The urn can be reached via a series of ancient steps, which connect the left of the facade with the rim of the urn. The views from on top are simply stunning. One of the more popular hikes is the High Place of Sacrifice. This one-and-a-half hour trip is best done in the early morning with the sun behind you. Coming from the Khazaneh, steps head up to the left just as the Amphitheatre comes into view. Follow the right prong when the trail levels and forks at the top of the stairs. The top

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of the ridge has been flattened into a platform, and two large depressions with drains show where the blood of sacrificial animals flowed out. There are also altars cut into the rock, along with obelisks and the remains of buildings used to house the priests. The path then leads down to the Lion Fountain. A stone altar opposite the fountain suggests that it originally had a religious function. The first complex beyond this is the Garden Tomb, which archaeologists believe was more likely a temple. Below this is the Tomb of the Roman Soldier and the Triclinium (Feast Hall), which has the only decorated interior in Petra. The track then flattens out and leads by the site of ancient rubbish dumps, ending up at the Pharaon Column, the only surviving column of another temple.

Aqaba: With its balmy winter climate and idyllic setting, Aqaba is Jordan's year-round aquatic playground. In winter, while Amman shivers around 5°C (41°F), the temperature hovers steadily at about 25°C (77°F) in Aqaba. The thriving underwater marine life and the crystal clear waters of the Gulf of Aqaba make diving conditions there among the acknowledged best in the world. Snorkelling, water skiing, windsurfing, fishing and other water sports are also popular. For the history enthusiast, Aqaba contains sites reflecting human habitation back to 4000 BCE, resulting from the city's strategic location at the junction of trading routes between Asia, Africa and Europe. According to the Bible, "King Solomon also built ships in Ezion-Geber, which is near Elath in Edom, on the shores of the Red Sea." This verse from the Old Testament (1 Kings 9: 26) probably refers to an Iron Age port city on the same ground as modern Aqaba. The name Elath refers to the Israeli town of Eilat. The Queen of Sheba (ancient Yemen) travelled from Jerusalem to the port city of Ezion Geber to visit the splendorous court of King Solomon in the tenth century BCE (1 Kings 10: 1-13). In one of the most exciting discoveries in recent times, archeolOgists working in Aqaba have unearthed what they believe to be the world's oldest church. Dating from the late third century CE, the 26 x 16 metres structure is thought to be the oldest building built specifically as a church. It is slightly older than the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, both of which date from the fourth century. The church is found on a plot of land east of Istiqlal Street, near the parking lot of the JETT bus

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station. Trading routes developed connecting Aqaba with southern Arabia and Yemen, and the town grew into a thriving city. The Nabateans populated the region extensively, drawn by the strategic trading location of Aqaba. In Roman times, the great Via Nova Triana came down from Damascus through Amman to Aqaba, where it connected with a west road leading to Palestine and Egypt. The early days of the Islamic era saw the construction of the city of Ayla, which was described by the geographer Shams-ud-Din Muqaddasi as situated next to the true settlement, which was lying in ruins close by. The ruins of Ayla, unearthed in the mid-1980s by a American-Jordanian archeological team, are a few minutes walk north along the main waterfront road. The Crusaders occupied the area in the 12th c.entury and built their fortress of Helim, which remains relatively well preserved today. The Aqaba fort was rebuilt in the 14th century under one of the last Mamluk sultans, Qansah al-Ghouri, and has been substantially altered several times since then. The Hashemiate Coat of Arms was placed above the main doorway during the Great Arab Revolt of World War I, after the Turks were driven out of the city. The fort is open daily and entrance is free. In addition to building a stronghold within Aqaba, the Crusaders fortified the small island of Ile de Graye, now known as Pharoah's Island, about seven kilometres offshore. The island, which is now in Egyptian territorial waters, can be reached via tour excursions, which leave from the Aquamarina Hotel. By 1170, both Aqaba and the island had been conquered by Salah-ud-Din. The Mamluks took over in 1250, but by the beginning of the sixth century they had been overtaken by the Ottoman Empire. The city then declined in status, and for 400 years or so it remained a simple fishing village of little Significance. During World War I, however, Ottoman forces were forced to withdraw from the town after a raid by Lawrence of Arabia and the Arab forces of Sharif Hussain. The capture of Aqaba helped open supply lines from Egypt up to Arab and British forces afield further north in Trans-Jordan and Palestine. In 1965, King Hussain traded 6000 square kilometres of Jordanian desert to Saudi Arabia for another 12 kilometres of prime coastline to the south of Aqaba. This gave Jordan's only port room to expand and added the magnificent Yamanieh coral reef to the Kingdom's list of treasures.

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With its tranquil, clear waters and thriving marine population, Aqaba is ideal for divers as well as casual water sports enthusiasts. As the Gulf of Aqaba is an inland sea with few strong currents, its waters remain warm and clear throughout most of the year. Conditions are ideal for underwater photography, and a lavish array of exotic fish and plant life makes for excellent snorkelling and diving. Over 140 species of coral have been identified in Aqaba's waters.

Wadi Seer: Around 24 kilometres southwest of Amman, the high desert plateau suddenly gives way to the lush, tree-covered valley of Wadi Seer. About 10 kilometres past the village of Wadi Seer, which was settled largely by fair-skinned, red-headed Circassians, the road leads to the ruins of Qasr al-Abd (Castle of the Slave) and the ancient caves of 'Iraq al-Amir (Caves of the Prince). Local legend has it that Qasr al-Abd was built by a love-smitten slave named Tobiah. While his master was away on a journey, Tobiah built a palace and carved lions, panthers and eagles on its walls in order to win the love of his master's daughter. Unfortunately, the master returned before Tobiah could finish the work, and the slave's efforts went unrequited. Little is known for sure about the actual history of this castle, but it is widely believed to have been built in the second century BCE by Hyrcanus, head of the powerful Tobiad family and governor of Ammon. The name "Castle of the Slave" may thus refer to Hyrcanus himself, who, as governor, was a "slave of the people." The firstcentury historian Josephus recorded the wealth of the Tobiad family and the exploits of Hyrcanus, who built a strong fortress of white stone, which was decorated with carvings of "animals of a prodigious magnitude." Perhaps the most interesting part is the north entrance, with one of the original carved animals, a giant stone lion, peering down over all who pass underneath. The entire building was once covered with such figures. The estate was originally surrounded by a wall and included a lake and a park with trees and shrubs. The castle itself is unique, in that it was built from some of the largest blocks of any building in the Middle East. The largest block measures seven by three metres, but as most were only about 40 centimetres wide, the whole construction was quite flimsy. An earthquake in 362 CE completely flattened the palace. The ruins of Qasr al-Abd have been partially restored, thanks to

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the efforts of a French archeologist who spent three years making detailed drawings of the fallen stones. After having made cardboard cutouts of each stone and piecing the "jigsaw puzzle" together, he then spent another seven years on the actual reconstruction. The result is a fine monument, which has, so far, remained mostly undiscovered by tourists. As you return up the valley, stop around 500 metres from the Qasr. On the left you will find a group of caves cut from the rock. These are known as 'Iraq al-Amir. The caves, eleven in total, are arranged in two tiers and are thought to be man-made. They were once used as cavalry stables, while the villagers today use them to house their goats and store chaff. At the front of one of the caves, easily recognisable by its carved doorway, the word "Tobiad" is engraved in Aramaic. This gives credence to the theory that Qasr al-Abd was built by the Tobiad family.

Wadi Rum: Stunning in its natural beauty, Wadi Rum epitomises the romance of the desert. With its "moonscape" of ancient valleys and towering sandstone mountains rising out of the sand, Wadi Rum is also home to several Bedouin tribes who live in scattered camps throughout the area. Climbers are especially attracted to Wadi Rum because of its sheer granite and sandstone cliffs, while hikers enjoy its vast empty spaces. Wadi Rum is probably best known because of its connection with the enigmatic British officer T.E. Lawrence, who was based here during the Great Arab Revolt of 1917-18. Much of David Lean's Lawrence of Arabia was filmed in Wadi Rum. The main route to Wadi Rum, and the small village of Rum, branches east off the Desert Highway about five kilometres south of Quweira and 25 kilometres north of Aqaba. From there the road extends about 35 kilometres through the desert to end at Rum. It is best to take your own vehicle to Rum, as public transportation to the village is very difficult. The village consists mainly of several hundred Bedouin inhabitants with their goat-hair tents and concrete houses, a school, a few shops and the headquarters of the famous Desert Patrol. There are several options available for exploring Wadi Rum. At the Government Rest House, located just inside the village, you can rent out a four-wheel-drive jeep with a Bedouin driver for short or long~r day tours of the area. Also available are camels, which you

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can hire for short excursions or for the desert trip to Aqaba. The only accommodations in Rum are in the Government Rest House, where tents are available. For those with a bit more time and/or sense of adventure, the best way to see Wadi Rum is by hiking and camping in it. Indeed, the vast silence and grandeur of the landscape is best experienced on foot. All you need for hiking in Wadi Rum is plenty of water (at least 2-3 Iitres per day), some food, good shoes and a sleeping bag. Those with a four-wheel drive, a map and plenty of fuel can see more of the landscape, while saving their energy for spectacular hikes such as the Rock Bridge of Burdah, one of Wadi Rum's most popular attractions. True adventurers can test their skills and endurance by climbing Jordan's highest mountain, Jabal Rum. The climb is a gruelling and treacherous challenge which should only be attempted by those of stout heart and indomitable will. A guide is recommended for the ten-hour round trip to the summit, and arrangements should be made the previous day at the Government Rest House.

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Holt, P.M., Ann K.S.: The Cambridge History of Islam, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970. Hurewitz, J.C.: The Struggle for Palestine, Schocken Books, New York, 1976. Ibrahim, Saad Eddin: The New Arab Social Order: a Study of the Social Impact of Oil Wealth, Westview Press, Boulder, 1982. Johnson, Stanley: World Population and the United Nations: Challenge and Response, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987. Johnston, Charles H.: The Brink of Jordan, Hamilton, London, 1972. Jureidini, Paul A. and McLaurin, R.D.: Jordan: the Impact of Social Changes on the Role of the Tribes, Praeger, New York, 1984. Kedourie: Palestine and Israel, Frank Cass, London, 1978. Keely, Charles and Bassem Saket: Jordanian Migrant Workers in the Arab Region, MacMillan, London, 1984. Khader, Bichara: Targets and Achievements of Jordan's Last Five-Year Plans, Croom Helm, London, 1987. Khouri, Rami G.: King Receives United States Team of University Professors, Jordan Times, Amman, 1987. - - - - : The Jordan Valley: Life and SOciety below Sea Level, Longman Group and Jordan Valley Association, United Kingdom, 1981.

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Lewis, Norman N.: Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987. Libiszewski, Stephan: Water disputes in the Jordan Basin Region and their Role in the Resolution of the Arab Israeli Conflict, Centre for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Zurich, 1995. Lowi, Miriam: Water and Power: the Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. Lukacs, Yehuda: Israel, Jordan, and the Peace Process, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1997. Masri, Salwa: Sex Discrimination against Girls in Nutrition and Health Care, North Africa, Amman, 1985. Massad, Joseph Andoni: Colonial Effects, Columbia University Press, New York, 200l. Mdanat, F.rida: Steps to Ease Unemployment, Jerusalem Star, Amman, 1987. Miller, Aaron D.: Jordan and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: the Hashemite Predicament, Winter, London, 1986. - - - - : Jordan and the Palestinian Issue: the Legacy of the Past, Middle East Insight, MacMillan, London, 1986. Miller, Judith: King Hussein's Delicate Balance, Oxford, New York, 1984. Mishal, Shaul: West Bank/East Bank: the Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-1967, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978. Mousa, Suleiman: A Matter of Principle: King Hussein of the Hijaz and the Arabs of Palestine, Yale university Press, New Haven, 1978. Mutawi, Samir A: Jordan in the 1967 War, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1987. Najjar, N:ljwa: Experts Seek to Prevent Defects Caused by Inbreeding, Jordan Times, Amman, 1988. Noor, A: Leap of Faith: Memoirs of an Unexpected Life, Miramax, 2003.

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Paiva, Heikki: Narratives and Poems from Hesban: Arabic Texts Recorded among the Semi-nomadic Al-:4garma Tribe, Al-Balqa' District, Jordan, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, Goteborg, 1978. Patai, Raphael: The Kingdom of Jordan, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1958. Peake, Frederick: A History of Jordan and Its Tribes, University of Miami Press, Florida, 1958. Plascov, Avi.: The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948-57, Frank Cass, London, 1981. Quandt, William B.: Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977. Rivier, Francois: Jordan: a Disturbing Dependence on a Deteriorating Regional Situation, Croom Helm, London, 1987. Robins, Philip: Jordan to 1990: Coping with Change, Economist, London, 1986. Rogan, Eugene L. and Tariq Tell: Vii/age, Steppe and State: the Social Origins of Modern Jordan, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 1995. Sahliyeh, Emile: Jordan and the Palestinians, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1988. Salameh, Elias and Helen Bannayan: Water Resources of Jordan: Present Status and Future Potentials, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Amman, 1993. Satloff, Robert B.: Troubles on the East Bank: Challenges to the Domestic Stability of Jordan, Praeger, New York, 1986. Seccombe, Ian J.: Labour Migration and the Transformation of a Vii/age Economy, Croom Helm, London, 1987. Seccombe, Ian J. and Rodney Wilson, J.: Trade and Finance in Jordan, University of Durham Press, United Kingdom, 1987. Shami, Seteney, and Lucine Taminian: Reproductive Behaviour and Child Care in a Squatter Area of Amman, The Population Council, Dokki, Giza, Egypt, 1985. Share, M.A.J.: The Use of Jordanian Workers' Remittances, Croom Helm, London, 1987.

Bibliography

513

Shlaim, Avi: Collusion Across the Jordan-King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine, Clarendon Press, NYC, 1988. - - - - : The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists, and Palestine, 1921-1951, Oxford, New York, 1990. Shwadran, Benjamin: Jordan: a State of Tension, Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, New York, 1959. Sinai, Anne and Allen Pollack: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank, American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, New York, 1977. Sullivan, Michael B.: Industrial Development in Jordan, Croom Helm, London, 1987. Tehboub, Naser: Jordan's Role in Middle East Peace: an Analytical Note, South Ac;ian, Spring 1984. Vandyk, Anthony: Royal Jordanian Upholds its Reputation as a Progressive Carrier, Oxford University, London, 1987. Vatikiotis, Panayiotios J.: Politics and the Military in Jordan: a Study of the Arab Legion, Praeger, New York, 1967. Wahlin, Lars: Diffusion and Acceptance of Modern Schooling in Rural Jordan, Croom Helm, London, 1987. Wilson, Mary c.: Jordan's Malaise, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987. - - - - : King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987. Wilson, Rodney J.: Jordan's Trade: Past Performance and Future Prospects, International Journal of Middle East Studies, New York, 1988. Wren, Christopher S.: Man on the Spot: Sadat's Peace Becomes Hussein's Trial, Praeger, New York, 1979. Yorke, Valerie: Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria, and Israel, The End of an Era? Gower Publishing for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vermont, 1988. Young, Peter: Bedouin Command with the Arab Legion, 1921- 57, Frank Cass, London, 1967. Zeine, N.: The Emergence of Jordan Nationalism, Caravan Books, Delmar, 1973.

"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"

Index A Abbasid, 41, 47, 199, 252. Abu Dhabi, 69. Abu Nuwas, 259. Agricultural Development, 330, 33l. Agriculture, 4, 35, 36, 83, 91, 92, 99, 113, 117, 126, 128, 146, 174, 218,224, 234, 278, 283, 284,285, 287, 316, 327, 328,329, 357, 410. Air Cargo, 335. Air Force, 66, 67, 335, 412, 413, 414, 416, 417,418, 419, 455. Air Tattoo, 454, 455. Aircraft, 60, 63, 334, 407, 409, 411, 417, 418,419, 438, 454, 455, 456,457. Airlines, 82, 275, 276, 289, 291, 308, 334, 335,457. Airport, 72, 335, 457, 470, 487. Airways, 335. Ajlun, 42, 74, 159, 349.

Al-Alahijah, 259. AI-Balqa, 231, 374. AI-Ghawama, 117. AI-Hasa, 323, 333. Al-Hutayah, 257. AI-Jazeera, 9. Al-Karak, 41, 42, 120, 223, 349, 374. Al-Kayed, 455. Al-Mafraq, 116, 117, 332,349, 374, 410, 415, 418,419. Al-Qaeda, 9. AI-Saeed, 208, 209. Ali Amer, 66. Allah, 82, 154, 192, 20l. Amman, 1, 3, 25, 27, 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 47, 52, 59, 61, 63, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 84, 85, 90, 91, 96, 97, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 122,123, 129, 133, 134, 145, 148, 150, 159, 160, 162, 165, 166, 170, 174, 179,180, 181, 187, 193, 194, 195, 197, 206, 210, 213,218, 223, 231, 238, 264,265,

516 270, 283, 284, 292,297, 298, 300, 308, 309,315, 321, 323, 324, 331,332, 335, 336, 337, 342,347, 349, 351, 358, 364,365, 372, 373, 374, 381,386, 397, 403, 409, 410,413, 414, 415, 416, 418,425, 427, 430, 431, 433,434, 438, 440, 441, 445,450, 453. 457, 459, 461,463, 464, 465, 467, 468,470, 471, 473, 474, 475,476, 477, 481, 485, 486,487, 488, 489, 493, 494,501, 502, 503. Andrews University, 95. Anti-Normalisation Committee, 134. Antiquity,35, 181, 498, 499. Aqabah, 3, 31, 37, 50, 52, 64, 65, 85, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 100, 103, 108, 109, 111, 162, 177,181, 182, 272, 292, 321,323, 325, 331, 332, 333,334, 349, 394, 410, 415,416, 418, 429, 451, 482,492. Ar Ramtha, 116, 150, 223, 332. Arab Air Cargo, 335. Arab Alignment, 84. Arab Armies, 2, 7, 20, 40, 76, 405, 414, 484. Arab Community, 71, 429. Arab Country, 22, 85, 270, 299. Arab Force, 8, 31, 50, 53,66.

Jordan

Arab Land Bank, 300. Arab Leaders, 50, 66, 412,434. Arab League, 5, 11, 22, 28, 31, 54, 55, 56, 57, 68, 82, 282, 388, 394, 429. Arab Legion, 20, 21, 24, 28, 29, 33, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 61, 130, 188, 406, 411, 416, 419, 420. Arab National Party, 312. Arab Nationalism, 24, 44, 45, 47,58,256,339, 340,429. Arab Politics, 35, 85, 435. Arab Potash Company, 4, 275, 276, 316, 323, 481. Arab Revolt, 16, 17, 33, 47, 48, 50, 55, 236, 339, 356, 465, 476, 502,504. Arab Rule, 16, 40. Arab Union, 22, 62, 63. Arab-Israel War, 2. Arabian Peninsula, 6, 15, 29, 33, 36, 40, 43, 46, 48, 52, 182, 198, 236, 257, 277, 282, 329, 333,491. Arabic Language, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252,256,263. Arabic Literature, 249, 250,251, 252, 253, 254, 256,257, 260, 261, 262, 263. Arabic Poetry, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260. Archaeology, 101, 187, 196. Architecture, 38, 174, 176, 191, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 208,209,

Index

517

444, 467, 471, 474,476, 486, 487, 495. Armed Forces, 11, 21, 28, 32, 68, 72, 73, 117, 132, 217, 218, 293, 341.342, 355, 374, 392, 409,412, 413, 414, 416, 419,420, 421, 423, 424, 426. ~,15, 174, 178, 179, 188, 194, 195, 196, 198,201, 202, 203, 204, 205,206, 208, 218, 227, 234,240, 479. Associated Press, 265. At Tafilah, 374. Atlantic Ocean, 336, 449. Attitude, 1, 129, 146, 147, 177, 423. Az Zarqa, 3, 42, 61, 72, 93, 115, 116, 117, 150,315, 316, 321, 324, 326,373, 374, 415.

B Baath Party, 8,

60, 426.

Badia, 3, 88, 91, 92,

100. Badran Government, 80, 389, 390, 391. Bahrain, 282, 287, 288, 382, 430, 451, 452. Basic Education, 225, 228,241, 242. Basim Awadullah, 298, 390. Battle, 2, 22, 29, 34, 40,42, 71, 73, 76, 88, 148,154,

183, 236, 260, 452,484, 495. Bedouin, 3, 4, 24, 34, 52, 53, 58, 63, 71, 72, 100, 112, 131, 174, 191,192, 197, 211, 212, 214,215, 258, 343, 347, 392,413, 420, 424, 440, 475,504. Bible, 1, 37, 91, 95, 103, 250, 463, 468, 470,472, 477, 479, 480, 481,482, 493, . 494, 495, 501. British Administration, 6, 33,53. British Assistance, 53. British Bank, 300. British Military, 17, 48, 49, 59, 415. Byzantine, 2, 14, 39, 40, 41, 47, 95, 101, 160, 175, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 200, 206, 236, 464, 465, 467, 468, 469, 470,472, 473, 478, 483, 484,485, 486, 498, 499.

c Cabinet, 26, 27, 30, 53, 59,

61, 71, 72, 73, 75, 168, 341, 342, 345, 346,353, 354, 355, 357, 358,366, 378, 389, 390, 391,403, 425. Cairo, 45, 48, 52, 54, 58, 59, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 72, 73, 74, 76, 80, 82, 194, 200, 210, 211,

518 212, 255, 300, 334,364, 395, 471. Camp David Accords, 5, 25,27, 28, 34, 81, 82, 83, 396, 412. Catholic, 4, 43, 160, 161, 162, 365. Celebration, 371, 479. Central Bank, 292, 298, 299, 300, 301, 305, 310,313. Chief Executive, 230, 341. China, 47, 303, 306, 323, 452, 486. Civil Society, 133, 134, 135, 136, 273, 384, 385,389, 391. Civil War, 25, 27, 39, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 155,281, 340, 344, 358, 395, 396, 406, 421, 431, 432. Civilization, 15, 35, 46, 47, 110, 164, 246, 263. Commission, 50, 55, 56, 207, 220, 236, 237, 336,348, 367, 368, 380, 441. Communication, 23, 110, 248, 310, 331, 337, 446,468, 477. Communist Party of Jordan, 27, 60, 374, 426. Conference, 16, 18, 27, 28, 31, 34, 50, 51, 52, 64, 68, 76, 77, 80, 82, 83, 164, 179, 247, 280,348, 386, 395, 396, 397,398, 403, 429, 432, 434,435, 436, 438, 453.

Jordan

Constitution, 7,21, 24, 45,53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 79,133, 143, 153, 159, 163, 164, 168, 264, 342,343,348, 351, 352, 353,354,355, 356, 357, 358,361,363, 364, 365, 370,376,412. Constitutional Monarchy, 1, 2, 19, 26, 58, 340, 341, 342, 353, 440. Corporation, 4, 152, 221,230, 275, 276, 298, 333,335, 337, 489, 496. Council of Ministers, 8, 53, 107, 341, 342, 353, 355,356, 357, 360, 412. Courts, 74, 143, 144, 161, 165, 166, 167, 168,170, 258, 259, 343, 355,363, 364, 365, 366, 368, 370, 373, 374, 428. Craft, 214, 257,385, 416,458. Crimes, 135, 144, 364, 368, 371, 373, 374. Criminal Activity, 366, 371,420. Criminal Police Organisation, 371. Criminal Procedure, 363, 366, 367, 373. Criticism, 26, 30, 81, 261, 427, 433, 437, 439. Crusade, 2, 13, 41, 180, 183. Cultural Heritage, 131, 175, 176, 178, 188, 189,198, 206, 263, 461. Culture, 1, 35, 38, 39, 47, 120, 122, 123, 126, 131,

519

Index

135, 178, 183, 202, 248, 263, 379, 495, Custom,

160, 179, 184, 206, 249, 264, 385, 496. 126,

173, 180, 185, 209, 251, 346, 442,

174,177, 181,182, 188,199, 235,238, 252,254, 357,367, 462,479,

142, 372.

D Damascus, 16, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 64, 67, 76, 79, 103, 126, 155, 165, 170,199, 255, 364, 402, 408, 424, 430, 472, 474, 475,477, 478, 495, 502. Daratal-Funun, 194, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211. Dead Sea, 1, 2, 3, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 111, 173, 177, 178, 180,189, 323, 324, 326, 386,463, 466, 469, 470, 471,479, 481, 482, 483, 488,489, 491, 492, 493. Democracy, 20, 23, 136, 341, 377, 380, 383, 384,387, 389, 390, 391, 392,440, 496. Density, 101, 116, 336, 481. Diplomacy, 24, 75, 85. Dynasty,2, 5, 7, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 182, 196, 199, 342, 356, 474.

E Eastern Europe, 70, 224, 306, 307, 425, 438. Economic Conditions, 17, 288, 371. Economic Development, 35, 108, 188, 230, 276, 277,299, 331, 341, 386, 387,388, 442, 462. Economic Growth, 4, 97, 109, 235, 268, 271, 273,274, 277, 281, 286, 296,304, 306, 309, 310, 311,344, 462. Economic Performance, 273, 307. Economic Sanctions, 31, 272. Economy, 4, 9, 12, 14, 23, 30, 32, 34, 36, 41, 68, 98, 112, 113, 120, 128, 130, 137, 153, 187,210, 229, 241, 242, 243,267, 268, 269, 272, 273,274, 275, 276, 277, 282,283, 284, 285, 286, 289,290, 291, 292, 293, 297,298, 301, 302, 304, 307,308, 310, 311, 312, 313,314, 316, 327, 328, 329,340, 341, 343, 344, 367,388, 407, 414, 421, 446,461. Education Council, 232, 238, 239, 241. Educational Challenge, 241. Educational Facilities, 221, 225. Educational System, 188, 220, 225, 226, 228, 241,242.

520 Egypt, 5, 7, 22, 25, 28, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, 54, 55, 56, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 72, 76, 77, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 109, 147, 157, 198, 200,201, 211, 214, 251, 252,255, 260, 280, 289, 306,314, 320, 327, 328, 334,340, 346, 383, 384, 393,395, 396, 400, 407, 409,412, 424, 428, 429, 430,431, 432, 434, 438, 440,444, 451, 452, 458, 469,470, 474, 478, 482, 492,502. Eid-ul-Adha, 164. Eid-ul-Fitr, 164. Electricity, 108, 148, 149,236, 274, 278, 293, 320,321, 324, 325. Elizabeth, 346, 437. Emergency, 20, 62, 65, 69, 117, 135, 352, 412,417. Energy, 4, 98, 210, 267, 275, 297, 298, 305, 324,357, 505. England,197, 289, 452, 489. Entertainment, 254. Environmental Affairs, 357, 374. Europe, 44, 70, 99, 102, 110, 198, 209, 224, 251,262, 269, 304, 306, 307,329, 334, 371, 425, 430,438, 458, 472, 476, 483,492, 501. European Free Trade Association, 6.

Jordan

Evaluation, 233, 242, 276. Evidence, 1, 35, 46, 131, 152, 170, 203, 204, 240,347, 369, 370, 373, 374,409, 427, 474, 475, 484,489, 497. Executive, 18, 41, 53, 205, 230, 275, 341, 342,343, 348, 355, 357, 359,361, 368, 375, 377, 400,403, 404, 405, 407. Exports, 4, 32, 267, 268,269, 270, 271, 272, 273,279, 280, 281, 283, 284,285, 287, 289, 302, 303,304, 305, 306, 307, 308,309, 310, 311, 317, 318,320, 322, 325, 329, 431.

F Fatimid Caliph, 42, 161. Fauna, 99, 103, 462, 491. Fedayeen, 25, 65, 67, 69,70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 121. Federation, 62, 75, 80, 134. Festival, 15, 125, 179, 195, 212, 257, 479. Fiora, 99, 103, 462, 491. Foreign Affairs, 71, 343, 357. Foreign Investment, 270, 274, 280, 281, 386, 388,390. Foreign Labour Force, 132. Foreign Minister, 54, 77, 436. Foreign Policy, 24, 35, 53, 68, 264, 362, 386, 388, 428, 437.

521

Index Forests, 3, 99, 100, 103, 267. Foundation, 12, 99, 102, 136, 164, 184, 185, 206,208, 212, 304, 441, 447,449, 468. France, 16, 24, 43, 48, 51, 187, 211, 256, 265,339, 407, 411, 416, 417,418, 438, 452, 454, 455,489.

G Galilee, 3, 14, 42, 50, 87, 89, 94, 410, 471, 479. General Certificate, 241. Georgy Zeidan, 255. Germany, 48, 57, 64, 69,187, 307, 455, 492. Ghassanids, 2, 39, 40. Glubb, 53, 54, 59, 420. Governance, 135, 147, 350, 361, 377, 385, 447,448. Governor, 41, 72, 154, 166, 183, 200, 343, 350,373, 492, 503. Great Rift Valley, 2, 89, 94. Greek,2, 4, 38, 39, 40, 47, 160, 162, 165, 185,206, 207, 252, 257, 365,486, 493, 495, 499. Gulf Area, 285, 288, 289,290, 412. Gulf Countries, 132, 268, 282, 287, 288, 290, 431. Gulf Nations, 270. Gulf of Aqabah, 37, 52, 65,

87, 89, 92, 100, 103, 108,109,111,177,181, 333, 451, 482. Gulf States, 198,282, 286,440. Gulf War, 5, 9, 13, 268, 272, 282, 283, 284, 285,286, 287, 288, 289, 290,393, 439.

H Hadith, 154, 250, 255. Hafiz, 34, 256, 257. Handicrafts, 174, 180, 212, 213, 214, 405. Hardware, 429, 443, 444. Hasan, 155, 183, 208, 241, 285, 313, 343, 346,356, 413, 418. Hashemiate, 7, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 31, 33, 34, 46, 54, 56, 58, 62, 67, 75, 84, 112, 121, 122, 130, 131, 153,238, 283, 339, 341, 343,345, 346, 347, 353, 356,367, 375, 386, 392, 394,398, 419, 423, 426, 431,432, 434, 437, 502. Heritage, 1, 92, 98, 131,173, 175, 176, 178, 179,182, 183, 188, 189, 196, 198, 206, 235, 263, 269,461, 469, 472. High Commissioner, 16, 48,52. High Court, 203, 364, 365, 366.

522

Jordan

Highway, 332, 333, 468, 469,

475, 476, 485, 486,487, 488, 493, 494, 504. Human Rights, 6, 147, 373, 374, 383, 391, 427,437. Husni Mubarak, 28, 429.

I Ice Age, 196. Improvement, 147, 361, 417, 445. Independence, 6, 7, 10, 11,

13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 37, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 59, 62, 111, 218, 304, 327, 339,343, 346, 354, 384, 403,412, 431, 437, 445. India, 47, 198, 200, 214,254, 262, 286, 289, 306,308, 323. Indian Ocean, 336, 449. Industrial Development, 108, 299, 319, 321, 325,481. Industry, 10, 68, 108-, 118, 129, 146, 181, 186, 187, 224, 228, 229, 230,283, 284, 285, 287, 291,315, 318, 320, 321, 322,323, 324, 334, 335, 357,447, 461, 462, 491. Institute, 162, 163, 164, 207, 379, 380, 381, 442. Intelligence, 29, 148, 352,387, 413, 424, 426, 437,443, 444.

Internal Affairs, 8, 64, 74, 400. Internal Security, 28, 29, 310,

343, 411, 423, 426,427. International Affairs, 11, 126, 148. International Aid, 393. International Airport, 335, 457, 487. International Investors, 445. International Law, 107, 393. International Monetary Fund,

273, 284, 387, 425. International Trade, 304. Internet, 174, 381, 442, 443, 449, 450. Iran, 25, 28, 29, 34, 59, 83, 84, 85, 157, 199, 200, 201, 277, 280, 283,325, 333, 409, 415, 425,428, 429, 430, 433, 438,439, 452. Iran-Iraq War, 25, 28, 29, 85, 157, 280, 283, 325,409, 429, 433, 439. Iraq, 1, 4, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17, 24, 25, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 62, 63, 67, 72, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 91, 157, 201, 207, 208, 210, 213, 245, 261,267, 268, 270, 272, 277,280, 282, 283, 284, 285,286, 287, 288, 289, 290,291, 297, 298, 302, 303,306, 307, 308, 309, 324,326, 327, 329, 330, 334,335,

523

Index

339, 340, 341, 346,379, 394, 402, 404, 409,410, 415, 417, 423, 428,429, 430, 433, 438, 439,451, 452, 465, 474, 475,476, 503, 504. Irbid,3, 17, 71, 73, 90, 104, 115, 116, 117, 118,133, 150, 162, 169, 174,218, 223, 238, 349, 372,374, 398, 410, 415, 425,464, 471, 472, 473, 475. Islamic Action Front, 351, 376, 378, 389. Islamic Architecture, 198. Islamic Art, 198, 200, 202,203, 204, 208. Islamic Bank, 301. Islamic Civilization, 164, 246. Islamic Fundamentalism, 8, 157, 160, 409, 425. Islamic Labour Front, 377. Islamic Law, 41, 43, 143, 154, 192, 218, 363, 365. Islamic Poetry, 250, 257. Islamic Polity, 155. Islamic Revolution, 84, 400. Israel, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 50, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 93, 94, 105, 109, 120, 128, 135, 157, 176,268,

272, 354, 395, 402, 409, 418, 427, 436,

280, 378, 396, 403, 410, 419, 428, 437,

287, 387, 399, 406, 412, 420, 432, 440,

326,327, 388,390, 400,401, 407,408, 415,417, 422,423, 434, 435, 479.

J Jamil Buthaynah, 257. Japan, 286, 306, 307, 438, 449, 452, 463. Jarash,39, 73, 117, 118,238, 332, 349. Jericho, 2, 35, 55, 469, 475, 480, 488, 494. Jerusalem, 2, 5, 13, 14, 20, 24, 34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 47, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 75, 81, 82, 88, 126, 160, 165, 170, 173,183, 189, 194, 196, 199,209, 264, 287, 300, 396, 423, 463, 468, 469, 470,478, 480, 484, 487, 488,492, 501. Jordan Arab Army, 59, 61, 72, 130, 406, 414, 420. Jordan Phosphate Mines Company, 4, 275, 276, 316, 323. Jordanian Air Force, 335, 414, 416, 455. Jordanian Bar Association, 355.

524

Jordan

Jordanian Citizens, 229, 312, Jurisdiction, 43, 166, 168, 333, 356, 358, 363, 364,365, 315, 340, 348, 359,375, 366. 457. Jordanian Communist Party, 378. Justice, 19, 30, 162, 309,3,43, 357, 364, 365, 366,374, Jordanian Companies, 284,292, 420, 493. 293, 299, 450. Jordanian Culture, 1, 177, 179. Jordanian Democratic Unity K Party,30. Karak, 17, 41, 42, 90, 104, Jordanian Economy, 4, 268, 120, 159, 162, 218,223, 272, 273, 274, 276,282, 349, 374, 468, 469,471, 297, 307, 311, 312,313. 492, 493. Jordanian Food, 4, 180. Khalil Gibran, 255. Jordanian Government, 9, 12, King Abdullah, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 25, 65, 69, 82, 121,143, 12, 13, 14, 20, 34, 135, 144, 148, 237, 270,279, 144, 145, 179, 182,229, 280, 289, 312, 325,328, 231, 241, 267, 268,270, 348, 349, 350, 358,393, 298, 335, 341, 342,343, 416, 419. 353, 354, 375, 378, 380, 386, 388, 392, 414,418, Jordanian Law, 20, 27, 70. 423, 436, 439, 440,441, Jordanian National Commission, 442, 446, 480. 380. King Faisal, 62, 63,76,247,418. Jordanian National Forum, 136, King Hussain, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 380. 12, 13, 21, 34, 58, 61, Jordanian Press Association, 135. 62, 66, 67, 69, 72, 87, Jordanian Products, 283, 287, 131, 155, 164, 180,212, 290, 308. 220, 236, 237, 268,282, Jordanian Professional Associa283, 284, 341, 342,343, tions, 135. 345, 348, 356, 377,378, Jordanian Society, 23, 113,131, 387, 394, 406, 409,412, 134, 136, 163, 166,236. 418, 428, 439, 453,454, Jordanian Troops, 76, 406,420. 467, 502. Jordanian Workers, 29, 315, Korea, 57, 423, 452. 317, 422. Kurdish, 7, 42. Judge, 365, 368, 370, 457. Kuwait, 8, 13, 28, 29, 30, Judiciary, 310, 353, 363, 376. 31, 32, 33, 69, 179,280,

525

Index

463, 466, 468, 469,470, 471, 488, 493. Magazines, 233, 247, 264. Magistrate, 363, 369. Mamluk, 42, 95, 200, 202, L 467, 471, 484, 493,502. Language, 35 , 40 , 44 , 160, Maqama, 255, 257. 163, 166, 202, 208,209, Marine Ufe, 90, 99, 103, 108, 245, 246, 247, 248,249, 182, 501. 250, 251, 252, 254,255, Martial Law, 25, 26, 30, 63, 256, 257, 258, 259,261, 72, 135, 352, 355, 373, 262, 263, 264, 297,351, 374, 378, 413, 427,428. 352, 354. Mecca, 13, 15, 31, 41, 42, Leader, 2, 9, 10, 17, 40, 41, 43, 46, SO, 52, 153,159, 173, 253, 257, 342,345,' ,55, 60, 70, 75, 80, 83, 154, 219, 256, 364,376, 463, 487. 395, 397, 409, 429, 434, Medi~, 82, 135, 145, 146, 1'57, 170, 203, 207,208, 436, 455, 456, 484,492. Legal System, 39, 154, 169, 211, 233, 247, 248,264, 363, 366. 288, 322, 340, 380,381, Legislation, 10, 19, 30, 80, 384, 385, 446. 352, 361, 385, 414,462. Medina, 15, 43, 103, 153. Ubya, 28, 69, 83, 280, 412, Mediterranean, 3, 6, 15, 33, 425, 431. 35, 36, 38, 47, 72, 88, Uterature, 44, 99, 178, 179, 90, 96, 100, 180, 197, 201, 324, 396, 477. 191, 245, 246, 247,248, 249, 250, 251, 252,253, Migration, 100, 113, 116,122, 254, 255, 256, 257,258, 131, 132, 133, 136,138, 260, 261, 262, 263. 223, 495. Military Commander, 413. Military Heritage, 188. M Minister of Finance, 32, 294, Maan, 17, 116, 117, 222, 390. 284, 323, 349, 372,374, Ministry of Communications, 335. 415. Madaba, 90, 94, 95, 96, 99, Ministry of Defence, 374, 413. 159, 162, 187, 213,349, Ministry of Education, 99, 102, 282, 289, 382, 431,

284, 290, 393, 451,

286, 300, 394, 452,

287,288, 306,313, 428,430, 465.

526 164, 217, 221, 222,225, 226, 230, 240, 241,243, 349. Ministry of Finance, 239, 294. Ministry of Health, 149, 152. Ministry of Higher Education, 218, 224, 226, 227,228, 231, 232. Ministry of Information, 230, 447. Ministry oflnterior, 29, 133, 167, 349, 371, 374, 375,376, 427. Ministry of Justice, 162. Ministry of Social Development, 136. Ministry of Tourism, 142, 185,. 469. Ministry of Transportation, 276, 332, 333, 349. Missiles, 416, 417, 438. Modern Literature, 251. Modern Poetry, 255. Monarchy, 1, 2, 19, 21, 26, 27, 29, 31, 51, 65, 69, 71, 72, 74, 76, 85, 143, 144, 340, 341, 342,351, 353, 355, 358, 390,391, 392, 406, 432, 440. Morocco, 200, 207, 209, 322, 359, 381, 382, 431,434, 451. Moscow, 335, 438. Mosque, 13, 57, 156, 168, 182, 199, 200, 467,476, 484, 487. Mount Nebo, 14, 95, 213,214, 470.

Jordan

Muath bin Jabal, 183. Mufeed Hassouneh, 455. Muhafazat, 349. Muhammad (Pbuh), 13, 40, 153, 154, 155, 173,198, 199, 250, 251, 253,347, 368. Muhammad Daud, 72, 75. Muhammad Ghbour, 455. Music, 177, 178, 182, 191, 193, 194, 195, 211,212, 222, 238, 251. Muslim Armies, 155, 183. Muslim Authority, 156. Muslim Brotherhood, 26, 27,30, 34, 83, 84, 157, 377, 378, 424.

N Nabataeans,7, 38, 39, 175. National Assembly, 8, 26, 30, 58, 60, 75, 79, 80, 342, 343, 353, 355, 356, 358, 360, 365, 367, 375,397. National Bank, 300. National Culture, 178. National Demining and Rehabilitation Committee, 12. National Democratic Institute, 144, 379. National Economy, 187, 421. National Guard, 420. National Maritime Company, 334. National Oil Company, 325.

527

Index

National Park, 186. National Petroleum Corporation, 4, 275. National Security, 28, 148,368, 369, 388, 405, 407,412, 413, 421, 437.

p Painting, 174, 178, 195, 201, 203, 208, 209, 210.

Pakistan, 37, 56, 59, 87,289, 306, 444, 452. Palestine, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, National Socialist Party, 60. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,21, Natural Gas, 267, 321, 325. 24, 25, 27, 30, 33, 36, Natural Wonders, 1, 461, 463. 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 47, Neolithic Culture, 1, 35. 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, Network, 12, 92, 126, 127, 54, 55, 56, 64, 66, 68, 147, 301, 332, 337,383, 70, 72, 78, 79, 95, 110, 426, 447, 448, 449,471. 111, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121, 177, 207,209,214, NGOs, 11, 98, 389, 391. 280, 339, 340, 341, 343, Nuclear, 35, 116, 137, 138, 141. 344, 363, 366,379,394, 397, 398, 399,400,401, 402, 403, 404,405,406, 438, 452, 469,484,502. Oak,3, 36, 99. Palestinian Liberation Authority, Occasion, 8, 76, 292, 453. 2. Oil Production, 68. Parliament, 19,21, 45, 66,80, Oman, 282, 287, 288, 335, 134, 135, 136, 144, 145, 430, 451, 452. 167, 233, 342,343,353, Opportunity, 5, 29, 130, 144, 354, 355, 361, 362, 364, 146, 173, 219, 229,354, 376, 377, 378,387,389, 400. 390, 391, 392, 402, 440. Orthodox, 4, 40, 43, 153, 154, 159, 160, 161, 162, Parliamentary System, 361. Partnership, 10, 186, 229,230, 165, 170, 365, 378. 243, 273, 380, 442. Ottoman, 2, 7, 10, 13, 15, Persian Gulf, 24, 29, 30, 34, 33, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 36, 85, 132, 223, 268, 47, 48, 49, SO, 103,126, 311, 313, 328, 412,422, 156, 188, 200, 257,263, 430, 431, 433, 439. 283, 333, 363, 366,367, 467, 476, 502. Petroleum, 4, 63, 89, 181, Ownershi;>,4, 274, 276, 290, 270, 275, 276, 277, 280, 291, 328. 313, 316, 324, 325,428.

o

528 Phosphate, 4, 181, 236, 275. 276, 285, 305, 316,322, 323, 483. Pine, 3, 99, 143, 192. Pistachio, 3, 99. Poetry, 167, 191, 206, 211, 248, 249, 250, 255,256, 257, 258, 259, 260,261, 262, 263. Poets, 174, 178, 233, 249, 250, 251, 256, 257,258, 259, 260. 261, 472. Political Development, 135, 340, 392. Political Parties, 8, 26, 27, 30, 133, 134, 167, 312,340, 343, 348, 352. 353, 376, 377, 378, 379, 381,382, 383, 384, 385, 388,389. Political Power, 8, 78, 144,496. Political Process, 311, 345,394, 395. Political Rights, 156. Political Situation, 79, 272,303, 361. Political Stability, 62, 281, 293, 411. Political Struggle, 19. Political Support, 130, 290,431, 437. Political System, 27, 125, 131, 340, 343, 344, 381,440. Polity, 155, 156, 339. Pompey, 2, 38, 39, 472, 477, 484, 496. Power Station, 321.

Jordan

Prayers, 57, 156, 157, 159. President, 25, 28, 31, 34, 50, 57, 62, 63, 67, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83, 167,230, 238, 239, 355. 364,365, 396, 412, 428, 429,433, 435, 441, 455. Press,26, 30, 134, 135, 160, 167, 264, 265, 322,352, 354, 377, 380, 387,390, 437, 462. Pressure, 3. 65, 74, 78, 96, 97, 110, 135, 148, 165, 272, 288, 289, 351,390, 407, 408, 411, 421,432, 436, 483, 490, 491. Prime Minister, 6, 9, 14, 26, 27, 30, 31, 57, 58, 60, 63, 64, 65, 73, 74, 79, 80, 81, 147, 163, 168, 220, 285, 287, 312,341, 342, 346, 347, 353,355, 356, 357, 360, 361,362, 364, 365, 373, 374,378, 387, 388, 389, 390,391, 406, 413, 421, 425,427, 430, 435, 436, 438. Prince Faisal, 16. Prince Hasan, 241, 285, 313, 343, 413, 418. Prince Naif, 57. Prison Law, 372. Protection, 97, 98, 99, 102, 107, 109, 126, 138, 158, 163, 174, 175, 303,317, 349, 370, 419, 462. Public Sector, 132, 274, 292,

Index

529

280, 283, 285, 287, 288, 289, 290, 352, 359,388, 394, 405, 438, 465. Relation, 88, 137, 420, 440. Religion, 39, 40, 113, 153, 154, 155, 160, 163, 164, 165, Q 166, 169, 170, 192,222, Qatar, 9, 69, 280, 282, 287, 245, 250, 251,259,263, 288, 382, 430, 451,452, 351, 352, 354,373,478. 453. Resolution, 20, 27, 31, 33, Queen, 12, 144, 179, 180, 55, 69, 70, 76, 78, 171, 212, 335, 346, 356,437, 284, 384, 394, 432. 441, 442, 487, 501. Rivers, 3, 93, 100, 105, 326, Quraish, 153, 155, 466. 327, 328. Quran, 40, 154, 158, 182, Riyadh, 179. 191, 192, 199, 201,202, Roman Army, 39. 203, 214, 245, 246,247, Roman Empire, 2, 39, 47,191, 248, 249, 250, 251,257, 496. 261, 262, 463, 467,491. Royal Academy, 164. Quranic Revelation, 183. Royal Engineers Corps, 12. Quranic Story, 260. Royal Falcons, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457. R Royal Jordanian, 12, 275, 276, 289, 291, 308, 334,335, Rabat, 77, 78, 79, 121, 359, 414, 416, 418, 453,457. 360, 395, 397, 434. Royal Jordanian Air Force, 335, Rarnadan, 84, 125, 156, 159, 414, 416. 160, 169, 181, 368. Royal Jordanian Airlines, 275, Red Cross, 12, 405, 438. 276, 291, 308, 334,457. Red Sea, 1, 14, 87, 89, 92, 108, 109, 181, 182, 183, Rural Migrants, 132, 133. 283, 331, 333, 416,451, Russia, 43, 49, 118, 192,425. 462, 491, 495, 501. Refugees, 2, 5, 8, 9, 13, 14, S 24, 32, 56, 64, 66, 68, 104, 115, 117, 118,120, Saddarn Hussain, 5, 8, 25, 31, 394, 428, 439. 121, 149, 152, 181,217,

293, 321, 350, 388,392, 427. Public Security, 29, 148, 371, 392.

530 Salah-ud-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, 41. Samaria, 2, 55. Samir Habashneh, 389. Sassanid, 198, 199, 201. Satellite, 39, 336, 382, 449. Saudi Arabia, 1, 24, 28, 30, 31, 32, 46, 54, 55, 60, 64, 69, 76, 87, 88, 89, 91, 109, 118, 132, 149, 196, 210, 211, 223,245, 247, 267, 280, 282,284, 287, 288, 306, 307,308, 313, 315, 324, 325,327, 328, 345, 388, 407,408, 409, 410, 412, 417,418, 422, 428, 430, 451,452, 474, 475, 502. Scenario, 303, 393, 440. Scholar, 42, 496. Science, 108, 188, 218, 222, 223, 227, 228, 234,238, 240, 319, 441. Scientific Research, 231, 232. Season,3,93,96, 97, 99,100. Secondary Education, 217, 221, 223, 237, 241. Senate, 26, 341, 342, 343, 353, 354, 355, 358,359, 360, 361, 362, 364,375. Several National Front Party, 60. Shariah,27, 41, 43, 154,163, 165, 166, 167, 168,169, 170, 218, 234, 363,365, 366, 367, 368, 390. Shia, 4, 27, 34, 41, 118,

Jordan

153, 155, 161, 162,425, 428. Social Affairs, 152. Social Development, 22, 108, 136, 236, 273, 292, 295, 357. Social Life, 119, 138, 154, 156, 158. Social Welfare, 152, 346, 390. Society, 12, 23, 33, 40, 45, 101, 108, 111, 112,113, 119, 120, 122, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140, 154, 156, 160, 162, 163, 166, 177, 178,179, 188, 192, 213, 214,236, 254, 255, 257, 262,263, 273, 341, 348, 357,383, 384, 385, 389, 391,392, 402, 405, 423, 446. Software, 443, 444, 448, 450. Soldier, 42, 501. Sovereign, 11, 18, 75, 398. Soviet Union, 25, 54, 55, 60, 62, 76, 78, 80, 83, 224, 407, 411, 415, 425,435, 438. Spanish, 192, 247, 418. Successor, 2, 24, 36, 40, 48, 59, 130, 154, 356. Sufi, 253, 259, 262. Summers, 1, 96, 97, 128, 180. Sunni, 4, 27, 41, 42, 43, 112, 118, 153, 154,155, 161, 192, 425, 439.

531

Index

Supremacy, 134, 353. Sweden, 195, 452. Switzerland,44, 57, 455, 489, 492. Syria, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 25, 28, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 72, 76, 77, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 105, 118, 154, 157, 161, 165, 170,180, 183, 196, 199, 201,207, 211, 245, 255, 261,268, 291, 306, 337, 339,340, 379, 408, 412, 413,415, 417, 418, 419, 420,421, 422, 423, 428, 431,432, 436, 437, 438, 439,440, 452, 472, 477, 478,479, 484, 491, 492, 496.

T

I I

I

Talal Dam, 326. Technology, 9, 10, 127, 188, 189, 218, 223, 229,230, 234, 238, 241, 242,309, 319, 321, 407, 436,441, 442, 443, 444, 445,446, 447, 448, 449, 490. Telecommunications, 4, 136, 275, 291, 298, 335,336, 337, 444, 447. Terrorism, 20, 65, 399, 407.

Terrorist, 9, 58, 65, 74, 368, 398, 399, 403, 408,426. Textiles, 4, 191, 201, 202, 203, 204, 305, 317,320. Thailand,289, 307, 323, 452. Topography, 92, 99. Tourism, 1, 4, 14, 32, 68, 107, 108, 142, 176,181, 185, 187, 213, 236,267, 268, 275, 287, 290,308, 341, 357, 388, 461,462, 463, 469, 482, 491. Tourist, 47, 66, 90, 108, 167, 176, 183, 185, 186,187, 268, 287, 462, 463,467, 469, 488, 489. Trans-Jordan Area, 52. Travel,81, 93, 150, 194,207, 253, 279, 427, 462,468. Treasury, 52, 183, 186, 404. 498. Treatment, 57, 74, 106, 150, 187, 188, 372, 373,374, 428, 481, 482, 489,490, 492. Tribalism, 112, 126, 130, 131. Tunisia, 207, 398, 451, 452. Turkey, 4, 36, 59, 89, 180, 200, 214, 286, 307,327, 469, 492.

u UAE, 451, 452. U Q 39 47 90 415 m~63~is464: 47i, 472,473: 477.

532 UN Security Council, 55, 69, 70, 76, 83, 284. 398, 399, 432. UNESCO, 175, 179. UNICEF, 136. Uniform, 3, 96. United Arab Emirates, 179, 280, 282, 287, 288, 306,382, 430. United Nations, 20, 27, 33,54, 56, 65, 67, 88, 114,115, 136, 179, 276, 280,350, 382, 397, 435, 438. United States, 23, 25, 30, 31, 34, 54, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 118,183, 196, 198, 209, 224,280, 298, 304, 306, 307,314, 322, 327, 364, 373,374, 386, 396, 398, 401,404, 407, 408, 411, 412.413, 415, 416, 417, 418,419, 422, 425, 426, 429,431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 449, 454,455, 458. University, 70, 95, 108, 114, 129, 132, 139, 145, 149, 156, 159, 167, 184, 185, 197, 210, 211, 217,218, 219, 220, 223, 224,226, 227, 228, 231, 233,234, 235, 236, 237, 238,239, 240, 241, 246, 247,265, 345, 364, 381, 398,425, 426, 472, 491.

Jordan

Urban Areas, 3, 115, 116, 120. 122, 123, 124, 132, 136. 143, 150, 222, 328,391. Urbanisation, 116, 122, 133. 161. USSR,6. Uzbekistan, 452.

V Valley, 2, 3, 4, 32, 35, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 105, 107, 116, 117, 133, 161,162, 173, 328, 330, 331,407, 410, 415, 432, 451,463, 471, 479, 480, 481,482, 483, 485, 489, 492,495, 497, 503, 504. Victory, 15, 22, 61, 75, 78, 80, 183, 376, 389, 436, 468. Violation, 134, 142. Visitors, 14, 89, 100, 125, 173, 177, 186, 188,189, 194, 211, 287, 308,386, 461, 462, 464, 470,479, 481, 490, 492, 493,497. Volume, 281, 300, 303, 304, 322, 429, 436, 445. I

w Wadi al-Abyad, 333. Wadi al-Hammah, 3. Wadi al-Jayb, 3, 93, 326. Wadi MUjib, 90, 102, 468,493.

I

Index Wadi Shoaib, 467. Wahabis,53. Washington, 62, 147, 197, 209, 381, 388, 404,430, 431, 432, 433, 439. Welfare, 68, 148, 152, 235,272, 293, 346, 375,390,399. Wisdom,125, ,138, 251, 499. World Bank,25, 102, 115,116, 280, 297, 298, 302,463. World Cup, 452, 458, 459. World Health Organisation, 136, 148. World Trade Organisation, 6, 386. World War, 2, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 20, 24, 33, 44, 46, 47, 51, 54, 55, 57, 88, 126, 128, 174, 181,188, 237, 256, 283, 339,346, 366, 420, 502. Worship, 163, 165, 167, 208 352, 354, 499. ' Writers, 174, 178, 179, 233, 252, 253, 254, 255,260, 261, 262, 263, 264,472.

y Yaqub Zayadin, 426.

533 Yannouk, 15, 94, 105, 108, 183, 218, 228, 231,234, 238, 247, 472, 473,484. Yannuk, 2, 3, 40, 85, 93, 156, 223, 265, 321,326, 327, 398, 410, 425,426. Yasir Arafat, 5, 27, 64, 78, 395, 406. Yathrib, 153. Yemen, 54, 83, 109, 183, 279, 282, 286, 306,379, 382, 383, 384, 409,425, 429, 438, 501, 502. Youth, 112, 178, 179, 219, 226, 229, 242, 267,357, 381, 402, 442, 445. Yugoslavia, 307, 323.

Z ZaidarRifai,79, SO, 147, 312, 347, 357. laid ibn Shakir, 27, 347, 357, 413. Zainab, 255. Zakat, 84. Zein al-Sharaf, 442. Zionism, 44, 49, 401. Zones, 49, 281, 292, 308. 000

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