On Spinoza

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Contents

I - Introduction

I

2 - BasicMetaphysics

8

3 - Mind andBody

31

4 - Psychology

52

5 - EthicalDoctrine

67

6 - Method

8l

Bibliography

94

1 Introduction

Spinoza's philosophy is attractive and worth studying for many reasons,but perhapsthe most important is that it offers a unified and deep view of all the issueswhich matter to us philosophically,such as the nature of reality, human nature, what we can know and the good life. There are three fundamental features of his philosophy which particularly contribute to its unity-the doctrine of substancemonism, the unrelenting naturalism, and the geometric mode of exposition which Spinozaemploys in the Ethics. The doctrine of substancemonism is the hallmark of Spinoza's philosophy. Spinozawas neither the first nor the last philosopher to espousemetaphysicalmonism, or the doctrine that reality is one. The first was Parmenides(ca. 500 B.C.E.) who maintained that what is (reality) is eternal, immutable, homogeneous,continuous, immobile, completeand whole, "like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere".l In the late nineteenth century the British Idealists conceived of reality as a single all-embracingexperience(the absolute),within which all finite experienceswere somehowsubsumed.2 Spinoza's monism is superior to both of these docffines, but in different ways. Unlike Parmenides, Spinozadoes not deny the reality of difference, but rather explains it. The contrastbetween Spinoza's monism and that of the British Idealists is more complex, but two points can be made briefly. First, unlike the British ldealists, Spinoza does not reduce or subordinate mafier to mind-extension and thought are equally real in his philosophy. Second,in offering the principle of the unity of a single experienceto explain the unity of reality, the British Idealists gave us little more than

Introduction a metaphor which raises more questions than it answers. What principles explain the uniff of a single experience? Spinoza'sdoctrine of substancemonism, however, provides a basis for his articulationof principleswhich explain the unity of reality. Another less immediately evident but pervasive and unifying feature of Spinoza's philosophy is its thoroughgoing naturalism. Spinoza is committed to explaining and analyzing everything in natural terms. As one recent commentator aptly put it, Spinoza even naturalized theology. 3 Spinoza titled the first part of his Ethics "On God," and God is both the beginning and the end of his philosophy in the sensethat He is the ultimate cause in terms of which everything must be understood,and the ultimate object that we seek to know and love. Yet his views on God and His relation to the world bear only a superficial resemblanceto those of traditional monotheism.God is not a being who transcendsnature,but God and the world are one, divine law is nothing but natural law, and God's power is identicalwith that of naturalthings. In his anthropologyhuman beings are not distinguished from others by a transcendentpurpose,by their free will, or even by their possession of a soul or mind. Nothing in nature has a transcendentpurpose or end for which it exists. There are no final causes. Nothing acts by freedom of the will, but everything is determined by antecedentnecessity. And everything is animate or besouled,although in different degrees(panpsychism). Animals are no more unfeeling machines than are humans, although their feelings differ from human feelings. Spinoza's ethical docffine is also completely naturalistic. Terms such as "good" and "beautiful" do not denote any real property of things but only how we are affected by them. We call things "good" becausewe desirethem, not vice versa. Values originate from us, not from a transcendentsource,and are relative to us. The only objective sense which can be given to "good" is that of being genuinely advantageousto human nature. Perhapsthe most obviously unifying-and at the sametime most daunting-feature of Spinoza's philosophy is the geometrical form of exposition in which his major work, the Ethics, t cast. The Ethics contains a complete exposition of his entire mature philosophy and is written in the style of Euclid's Elements. In it Spinozaproceedsfrom explicitly stated definitions, axioms and postulatesto propositions, which are demonstrated from the former along with previously demonstratedpropositions. Commentators have offered a variety of reasonsto explain why Spinozachosethe geometricalform to expound his philosophy. According to one the geometricalmethod of expositon was particularly suited to Spinoza's subject matter, with the logical

Introduction relation of ground and consequentreflecting what he saw as the actual relation of cause and effect.a Another has suggestedthat he used it both for pedagogical reasons-to give a clear presentation to his students-and to conceal his ideas from hostile readers.s And according to yet another he used it becauseit was abstract, enabling him at once to suppresshis own personality and avoid appealsto sense experienceor emotion, and be the "mouthpiece" of reason itself.6 My own view is that there are deeper and more compelling reasonswhy Spinoza chosethe geometric method. One is that it is chiefly through seeingthe interconnectednessof his entire philosophy that a reader can be convinced of its truth. Another is the practical value of a structured framework of thought. In any case,the exerciseof putting his thought into the geometrical form had a uniffing effect, fostering his aim of explaining all things in terms of a fairly small set of basic conceptsand principles. In the following account of Spinoza's philosophy I have tried to interprethis doctrinesand his demonstrationsin ways which show their strengthand minimize internal conflicts. But Spinoza is not a "perfect" philosopher. There are well-known problems both with his substance monism and his attempt to maintain naturalism, as well as puzzles and inconsistenciesat other points in his doctrine. And there are logical erors in many of his demonstrations. I have not focused on finding these flaws, but I have not tried to gloss over'them either. Despite them, Spinoza seems to me to have achieved a degree of successin formulating a comprehensive and unified theoretical and practical philosophy which no other thinker has been able to match. My exposition of Spinoza's philosophy is based primarily on the Ethics, since only this work contains his mature basic philosophical doctrines. With the exception of my final chapter, which deals with various aspects of his philosophical method, I have more or less followed the order in which topics are treated in the Ethics. My discussionof method comes last becauseSpinoza'smethodologyneeds to be understoodin terms of his substantivephilosophy. In many places I have presentedSpinoza's doctrines against a (very roughly sketched) background of those of Descartes. This procedureis useful for understandingSpinoza for two reasons. One is that Descartes is probably Spinoza's most important philosophical predecessor.We know from his Descartes' "Principles of Philosophy" that Spinozahad an excellent and thorough understandingof Descartes, and that his views in fact developed against this background. The second is that in a vast number of its fundamental aspects Spinoza's philosophy is radically different from that of Descartes; viewing the two in contrast is highly illuminating and enhancesthe understanding

Introduction of Spinoza.

Spinozawas born November 24, 1632,in Amsterdam.tHir family were SpanishJewswho had emigrated,via Portugalto the Netherlands in the previous generation. In the NetherlandsJews enjoyed relative freedom from persecution; many, including Spinoza's father, were active in Dutch commerce. Spinoza was given a traditional Jewish education within the community. He grew up speaking Spanish and learning Hebrew. He learnedDutch as a result of living in Amsterdam, and in his early twentiesmasteredLatin. All of his philosophicalworks appearto have beenoriginally written in Latin. The detailsof Spinoza's life reveal a man who lived in accordancewith the values implied by his doctrines-knowledge, independenceof mind, personal integrity, and a broad concern for one's fellow human beings. Both his early biographers, J. M. Lucas and Colerus (Johann Kohler) praise his character, even though Colerus, a Lutheran minister, found his docffines "impious and absurd."8 At the ageof trventy-four Spinoza was officially "anathematized" or excommunicatedby the eldersof the AmsterdamJewish community. This meant he was forbidden to associatewith any Jews from then on, and they were likewise forbidden to associatewith him or to read his writings. Why this event took place is a matter of some speculation. The official proclamation of excommunication referred to "the abominable heresies practiced and taught by him" and "other enorrnitiescommittedby him" for which there were "many trustworthy witnesses."e J.M. Lucas, the only biographerof Spin ozawho actually knew him, recounts how he was enticed by some false friends into admitting that he found nothing in the bible which was inconsistent with God's being corporeal, angels' being mere phantoffis, and the soul's being nothing more than the principle of life. They then spread nrmors about him and reported him to the authoritiesof the synagogu€, who called him to appear before them "to give and account of his faith."l0 At the hearing,the false friendstestified that they had heard him scoff at the Jewsas "superstitious people born and bred in ignorance,who do not know what God is, and who neverthelesshave the audacityto speakof themselvesas His people,to the disparagementof other nations. As for the Law, it was institutedby a man who was forsoothbetterversedthan they were in the matter of Politics, but who was hardly more enlightenedthan they were in Physicsor even in Theology; with an ounceof good senseone

,T

Introduction could discoverthe imposture,and one must be as stupid as the Hebrewsof the time of Moses to believe that gallantman."ll One explanation as to why Spinoza was deemed to have committed acts worthy of permanent excommunication is that the religious authorities, fearful of giving offence to the Dutch, were protecting the place of the Jews of Amsterdam within the larger community. On this way of looking at the matter, the excommunicationof Spinozawas a way of dissociatingthe community from someone whose views were heretical and dangerousfrom the point of view of Christianity.l2 Yirmiyahu Yovel, howver, points out that at the time of Spinoza's excommunication,the position of the Jews in Amsterdamwas relatively secure. Yovel's explanationis that, faced with the continuous task of integrating new Marrano arrivals into Jewish culture, the leadersof the Amsterdam Jewish community saw Spinoza's views and actions as a threat to the survival of the community becausethey tendedto undermine the authority of religious and cultural tradition.13 Lucas' report of the testimony given against Spinoza(above)tends to supportthis explanation.. Although philosophy was the main work of Spinoza's life, he learnedthe craft of lens-grindingby which he partly supportedhimself. While this activity probably contributed to his early death, it also provided a connectionwith some of the leading scientific figures of the duy, such as Huygens. For his subsistencehe had in addition a small annuity left to him by a friend and disciple who died at an early ?Ee, Simon DeVries. But he declined offers of greater support from DeVries, and later, an offer of a pension from the King of France in return for the dedicationof a work to him. He also declinedan offer of a professorshipat the University of Heidelberg,partly bcausehe feared that teaching duties would interfere with his efforts to develop his philosophy, and also becauseit came with the expectation that he would not "disturb the publicly establishedreligion" (letter 47).ta In his words I do not know within what limits the freedom to philosophise must be confined if I am to avoid appearingto disturb the publicly establishedreligion (letrer48). In 1960he left Amsterdamand moved to the village of Rijnsburg, near Leyden, in order to have peace and solitude in which to write. While at Rijnsburg he is thought to have wriffen the (unfurished) Treatiseon the Emendation of the Understanding, the Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being, Descartes' "Principles of Philosopfu, and a draft of at least the first part of his major work, the Ethics. The work on the philosophy of Descartes was begun with the aim of

Introduction instructing a private pupil, but at the instigation of friends, was expandedand published in 1663. It is his only work to be published under his name in his lifetime. In 1663 he moved again, to Voorburg, near the Hague. Here he was introduced to Jan DeWitt, the Grand Pensionaryof Holland. By June, 1665, a draft of what was to become parts III and IV of the Ethics was nearly completed. But, evidently stimulated by current political events and his proximity to them, Spinoza laid it aside to work on his Theologico-Political Treatise. The Dutch Republic, whose center of governrnentwas the Hague,was a loose federationof sevenprovinces, of which the richest and most influential was Holland. DeWitt stood for religious toleration and freedom of expression;he was opposedby the Calvinist clergy and otherswho wanted to establisha statereligion, who supported the Prince of Orange. The struggle between the two camps was complicated by setbacks in the war with England and Sweden (1665-1667), and later the war with England and France (1672). Spinoza became a friend and supporter of DeWitt. In corespondence Spinoza declared that his aim in writing the Theologico-Political Treatise was to expose the prejudices of theologians, vindicate himself against the charge of atheism, and defend the freedom of philosophizing and saying what one thinks (letter 30). When he publishedit in 1670, the situationwas dangerous enough that he had to do so anonymously,even though its publication was under the protectionof DeWitt. In 1670 Spinoza moved to the Hague and resumedwork on the Ethics. Two years later, with a French army of over a hundred thousandmen invading the Netherlands,the peoplelooked to the Prince of Orange to save the country, casting blame on the DeWitts for the unpreparednessof the Dutch. While Jan DeWitt was visiting his brother Cornelius, imprisoned at the Hague, a mob broke in and brutally murdered both brothers. When Spinoza heard this news he uncharacteristically-overcome with emotion. (Lucas reports that he shed tears.tt) Hr wrote a placard denouncingthe act which he intended to post at the scene. His landlord, however, discernedthe danger and locked him inside, thus preventing him from meeting a similar fate from the mob. In the last few years of his life Spinoza finished his Ethics and worked on a political treatiseand a Hebrew grammar. When the mere rumor of the impending publication of the Ethics stirred up controversy,he postponedit indefinitely. He died February 21, 1677, of consumption, from which he had suffered for many years. Following his death the Ethics was published in the Opera Postuma, along with the Treatise on the Emendation of the (Jnderstanding

Introduction (unfinished),the Political Treatise (unfinished), the Hebrew Grammar (unfinished), and someof his correspondence.

Endnotes I Pa.renides, Fragment8, l. 43. 2 A. E. Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics, Book II, provides a highly readable exposition of this version of metaphysicalmonism. 3 Donagan 1988, 32 34. Donagan was the first commentatorto stressSpinoza's nafuralism. a Joachim,12 - 13. 5 Wolfson,I, 22 = 24, 53 - 59. u Hu*pshire, 25. 7 My account of Spinoza's life draws on the early biographies 'of Colerus and Lucas, Spinoza's own corespondence, and the extensive biographical sketches presentedin Pollockand Wolf 1910. t colrrur, 432. n At reportedin Pollock, 18. r0 Wolf 1927, 44 - 48. Jean Maximilian Lucas is believed to be the anonymous author of The Life of the Late Mr. De Spinoza, translated by A. Wolf in his oldest Biography of Spinoza. tt wol f 19274 , g - 49. 12 Pollock, 16. t3 Youel 1989, 12-13. toRrf.rences to Spinoza's correspondencewill be given in the text. All quotations from the correspondenceare from The Letters,trans. Samuel Shirley. tt wolf 1927,65.

BasicMetaphysics

The Historical Roots of Spinoza'sNotion of Substance For Spinoza, everything that is real falls into one of two basic categories,substanceor mode. Substanceis defined as "what is in inself and is conceivedthrough itself, i.e., that whose conceptdoes not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed" (I dft3); mode as "the affections of a substance,or that which is in another through which it is also conceived" (Idfns).t These two categoriesare meant to be exclusive and exhaustiveof what there is. Something cannot be both in itself and in another;and everything rnust be either in itself or in another (Iaxl). Spinoza'sdistinction between substanceand mode has generally beentaken to be that betweena thing or subject and its properties or states (although we shall consider another interpretationbelow, pp. 23 - 28). The concept of substanceultimately tracesback to Aristotle, who wrote in the Categories that Substance,in the truest and primary and most definite senseof the word, is that which is neitherpredicableof a subjectnor presentin a subject;for instance,the individual man or horse.2 Aristotle's conception of substanceemerges from an analysis partly based on grammar, in which the basic divisions are between individuals(Socrates,Trigger) , propertiesof individualsor "accidents" (short, tan), and kinds of individuals or properties (animal, horse, color). Propertiesor accidentsmust exist in an individual subject;i.e.,

Basic Metaphysics there cannot be shortnessapart from an individual that is short. Kinds of things ultimately require individuals of which they are predicted,i.e., animal is predicatedof horse, but horse is predicated of individual horses(Trigger). Individual things such as Socratesand Trigger do not exist in a subjectand are not predicatedof anything. We do not say, for example,that'oHorseis a Trigger." Aristotle appearsto concludefrom these asymmetries that primary substancesare the most basic of everything that exists. He points out that "if [primary substances] did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist" and "primary substancesare most properly called substancesin virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them".' One might object to this by pointing out that there cannot be propertyless subjectsany more than there can be subjectlessproperties-socrates (a subject)must be running or walking or standingor sitting or reclining, etc. Aristotle may have been influenced by the asymmetry of grammatical form which does not allow terms denoting individuals to occupy a predicativeposition. ("Socrates" can only be a grammatical subject.) The asymmetry of grammar, however, does not show that there is an asymmetry in the existential dependencerelation of subject and properties. Aristotle went on to state,however, that The most distinctive mark of substanceappearsto be that, while remainingnumerically one and the same,it is capableof admittingcontraryqualities.o A substanceis that which can (and does) remain the same identical thing through change. If the color of Socrates'face changes becausehe remains a long time in the sun, then the original color (white) ceasesto exist, and a new color (tan) takes its place. But Socrates remains the same individual throughout the change. Aristotle's primary substancesthen, may be viewed as more basic than their propertiesand as underlying them in the sensethat as the subjects in which the propertiesexist, they persistthrough changeof properties. The notion of substanceas a subject in which properties must exist is also expressedby Spinoza's immediatepredecessorDescartes when he writes that the term "substance" appliesto everythingin which whateverwe perceive immediatelyresides,&s in a subject,or to every thing by meansof which whateverwe perceiveexists. By 'whatever we perceive' is meant any property, quality or affribute of which we have a real idea. The only idea we have of a substanceitsell in the strict sense,is that it is the thing in which whateverwe perceive . . . exists

Basic Metaphysics In his Principles of Philosophy, however, Descartesdistinguished two notions of substance. The first construessubstanceas "a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence."6By this definition God is the only substance. But in another sense of the term, namely "things that need only the concurence of God in order to exist" Descartestells us that corporeal substanceand mind (createdthinking substance)are substances.T Although the notion of substanceas a subject of properties and predication is common to Descartesand Aristotle, Descartes'additional criterion of independentexistencesignificantly restrictswhat can count as a substanceeven when that condition is weakened to allow for substanceswhich depend the concurrenceof God alone. Individual bodies, such as that of a human being or horse, easily and inevitably suffer destruction from natural causes,hence fail to qualiry as created substance. Only body "in general" or matter taken as a whole is properly considereda substance.The mind or soul, however, which on Descartes' view is a thing entirely distinct from body, is a substance, i.e., a thing which is incomrptible by natureand unableto ceaseto exist unlessGod deniesit his concuffence.t Spinoza's definition of substanceas that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, taken in conjunction with the definition of mode as "that which is in another through which it is also conceived" suggests that he too thinks of substanceas the subject in which properties (modes) must exist, and as a thing whose existence is independentof other things.e But whereasArisiotle took the term to apply to ordinary individuals such as men and horses,and Descartes took it to apply (in not the same but in related senses)to God, maffer as a whole and createdminds, Spinoza adoptedthe radical position that there is only one substance,namely God, or "substanceconsistingof an infinity of attributes," and consequently,that everything else must be a mode of, or in, the one substanceor God. According to Spinozawhat Descartes held to be the principal attributes (unvarying essential properties) of the two fundamental types of created substanceextension and thought-are properly understoodas attributes of the one absolutely infinite substance; and individual minds and bodies (Aristotle's primary substances--horsesand men) are properly understoodas modes of that one substance. Spinoza's basic doctrine of substanceis developed in the first fourteen propositionsof Ethics I, which culminate in the demonstration that ExceptGod, no substancecan be or be conceived(lpla). We can begin to understandSpinoza's substanceby tracing the route by which he reachesthis startling conclusion.

10

Basic Metaphysics

Spinoza'sArgument for SubstanceMonism In outline Spinoza's argument that there is only one substanceabsolutely infinite substance or God-appears straightforward and simple (Ipl4dern). It is as follows: l. There cannotbe two substancesof the sameattribute (Ip5). 2. God is a substance consisting of an infurity of attributes

(rdtu6).

3. God necessarilyexists (Ip I I ). 4. Any substance other than God would have to have some attribute in common with God (from 2). Conclusion: No substancebesidesGod can exist or be conceived (Ip l4).to We shall examine the reasoning behind each premise of Spinoza's argument.

Premise I Clearly the notion of "afiribute" is a key one here. Spinoza defines an attribute as "what the intellect perceives of a substance,as constituting its essence" (Idfn4). He thinks it follows from this definition along with that of substance("what is in itself and is conceived through itself'-Idfn3) that "Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself ' (Ip l0). It appearsthen that what Spinoza meansby an attribute is very like what Descartesmeans by his notion of a principal attribute,which he elaboratedas follows: A substancemay indeedbe known through any attribute at all' but each substancehas one principal property which constitutesits natureand essence,and to which all its other propertiesare referred. Thus extensionin length, breadth and depth constitutesthe nature of corporeal substance;and thought constitutesthe nature of thinking substance. Everything elsewhich can be attributedto body presupposes extension,and is merely a mode of an extendedthing; and similarly, whateverwe find in the mind is simply one of the various modesof thinking. For example,shapeis unintelligible exceptin an extendedthing. . . ; while imagination,sensationand will are intelligible only in a thinking thing. By contrast,it is possibleto understand extensionwithout shape.. . and thought without imagination

ll

Basic Metaphysics or sensation So Spinozais in agreernentwith Descartesinsofar as he thinks of attributes as conceptually basic, essential features of substance,and even with respect to what known attributes of substancethere are, namely extensionand thought. He disagreeswith Descartes,however, in holding that no two substancescan have the same attribute (Ip5). For Descartes,all finite minds sharethe principle attributeof thought. Spinoza'sreasoningfor Ip5 restspartly on Ip4, that Two or more distinct things are distinguishedfrom one another,either by a difference in the affributesof the substancesor by a difference in their affections. This propoositionis Spin oza'sversion of a metaphysicalprinciple (made famousby Leibniz) known as the ldentity of Indiscernables.In more familiar terminology it says that any numerically distinct things must have sorne qualitative difference, or there cannot be two (numericallydistinct)things which have all the samequalitites, This is a controversialissuein philosophy, and Spinoza'sIp4 merely expresses this principle in his own terms, rather than proves it. In his systemthe only real qualitative differences are differences of the attributes,or differencesof the affections(modes),of substance. Applied to substance, Ip4 says: if there are two (or more) numerically distinct substances,they must have different attributesor different affections. For example, two substancescould differ in one's being extendedand the other's being thinking; or they might both be extendedand differ in one's having a cubic shape,and the other having a sphericalshape. But according to Ip4 they must-if they are twodiffer in one of these ways. With Ip5, however, Spinoza is claiming that fwo numerically distinct substancescannot differ merely in their affections and not in their attributes; that is, there cannot be two numerically distinct extended substances,one of which is a cube and the other a sphere. He argues that if there is merely a difference in the affectionsof substance,then sincea substanceis prior in natureto its affections(by P 1), if the affections are put to one side and [the substance]is consideredin itsell i.e., (by D3 and ,4,'6),consideredtruly, one cannotbe conceivedto be distinguishedfrom another,i. e., (by P4), there cannot be many, but only one [of the same natureor attribute], e.€.d. (Ip5dem) One might think Spinoza is begging the question here, or assuming the very point he wishes to prove. Why assume the affections can be put to one side?r2 What he has in mind, I think is somethinglike this. Consider two bodies,A, which is red all over, and

r2

Basic Metaphysics B, which is blue all over. This qualitativedifferenceis not what makes A and B two different things; rather it is becauseA and B are two different things that they can differ in overall color. So, to explain why A and B are two different things (that is, to say what makes them two) we need to find some more fundamental property in which they differ. Supposeit is their location in space. (We know no two bodies can be in the sameplace.) Again, being in different locationsdoesn't seemto explain why A and B are different; rather it is becausethey are different that they are able to be at different locations. Perhaps the problem is that we are looking for the properties which make A and B distinct among the wrong type of properties. Color and location are what might be called nonessentialproperties, that is, propertieswhich a thing can lose without itself going out of existence(which includes becoming a different thing). An essential property is one which a thing cannot lose without going out of existence. Clearly a body can lose its color (a red body can become blue) or change its location without going out of existence. What is essentialto a body? Propertiessuch as being extended,having some shapeand size(but not any particular shapeor size),some color, and so on. But thesequalitiesare ones which A and B and all bodies sharein common. Hence these essentialproperties are not properties which make one body different from another. At this point we rnight be inclined to say that A's being numerically different from B is just a matter of brute fact, not something which can be explained by their differing in some qualitative way. But if we do this we are simply taking a different position than Spinoza appearsto be taking in Ip4,5, and their demonstrations.We are denying, while Spinoza is assuming, that numerical difference must be explained by qualitative difference. His conclusion would be that if you strip away all the nonessential propertiesof two bodies,and you leaveonly what is necessaryfor them (as bodies) to remain in existence,what is left is only undifferentiated body. This is so becausethere is nothing left which could differentiate one body from another.To connect this with Spinoza's demonstration of Ip5, recall that an attribute is what constitutes the essence of substance. A substancecan change its modes without going out of existence;henceno particular mode is essentialto a substance. Thus, when Spinoza is considering what distinguishesone substancefrom another it is reasonablefor him to "put aside" the modifications of substanceand consideronly its attributes. And since he assumes(lp4) that any numerical distinction must be based on a qualitative distinction, it follows that there cannot be two substancesof the same nature or attribute.

l3

Basic Metaphysics

Premise 2 The second premise of the argumentis basedon the definition of God (Idfrt6), and consequently,might seem invulnerable to objection. Writers have different intentions, however, in setting forth defuritions. Sometimesa writer merely intendsto speciff how she will use a term, or the meaning the term will have in her discussion. At other times a writer intendsto assertwhat she takesto be the necessaryand sufficient propertiesof a thing. The former is called a stipulative definition; the latter a real definition. Simon DeVries, who was both a friend and student of Spinoza, wrote to him on behalf of a group engagedin studying an early draft of the Ethics, requesting him to explain his views on the nature of definition. Spinozaresponded: There is the definition that servesto explicatea thing whose essencealone is in questionand the subjectof doubt, and there is the definition which is put forward simply for examination. The former, since it has a determinateobject,must be a true definition, while this neednot be so in the latter case.. . . tA] definition either explicatesa thing as it existsoutsidethe intellect-and then it should be a true definition. . . --or it explicatesa thing as it is conceivedby us, or can be conceived. And in that case. . . lit is required] merely that it be conceived,not conceivedas true So then a bad definition is one which is not conceived(letter 9). Borrowing an examplecited by DeVries to illustrate a bad definition of the latter sort, Spinoza added that if someone says that "two straight lines enclosingan area are to be called figurals" then "if by a strai[ht line he meanswhat we all mean,the thing is plainly incon6iuuble, and so there is no definition." In this passageit appearsthat Spinoza recognized two types of definition, coinciding with what we have called real and stipulative definitions, and that he held the former should be true, but tlie latter need only be logically consistentor conceivable. Given that Spinoza's letter was intended to address difficulties encounteredby a group of persons studying his work, it is somewhat surprising that he doeJ not say of which type his own definitions are intended to be. And, unfornrnately, although he addressesthe topic of definition elsewhere, nowhere doeshe explicitly say that the definitions with which he starts are either real or stipulative. Commentatorshave been divided as regardsthe question of how to take Spinoza's definitions in the Ethics. But it seemsclear that we must take them as being put forth as real, thus subject to evaluation as true or false, since otherwise the Ethics

t4

Basic Metaphysics would be a mere logical exerciseand not a demonstationof the nature of things.t' From the standpointof Cartesianism,there was an objection to his definition of God, which would apply even if that definition were offered merely as stipulative. Recall that according to Descartes,every substancehas only one principal attribute which "constitutes its nature and essence." The reason why a substancecan have only one such affribute is that such attributes are able to be conceived or understood by us entirely independentlyof one another. Therefore,since God can create things to be in whatever way we are able to conceive them, it follows that substanceswith different principal attributes are able to exist separately;and whenever two things can exist separatelythey are ra separatethings. It is not surprising then that in the same leffer in which he requestedSpinoza'sviews on defurition,DeVries wrote "you seem,Sir, to supposethat the nature of substanceis so constituted that it can have severalattributes,which you have not yet proved . . ." (letter 8). With this remark he called into questionthe conceivability of the definition of God as "substanceconsisting of an infinity of atffibutes, each of which expressesan eternaland infinite essence." In his responseto DeVries Spinoza claimed to have given two proofs that a substancecan have more than one attribute: [T]he first . . . is as follows: It is clear beyond all doubt that every entity is conceivedby us under some attribute, and the more reality or being an entity has,the more atffibutes are to be attributedto it. Hence an absolutely infinite entity must be defined. . . . A secondproof-and this proof I take to be decisive-states that the more attributesI attribute to any entity, the more existenceI am bound to attribute to it; that is, the more I conceive as truly existent. The exact contrary would be the caseif I had imagineda chimera or somethingof that sort (letter 9). What Spinoza here calls the first proof appears in the Ethics as Ip9 that "The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it." In its demonstrationSpinozamerely cites the definition of attribute (Idft4). A line of thought similar to that involved in the secondproof appearsin the Ethics in Spinoza's third and fourth proofs for the existenceof God (Ip I I sch), which are discussedbelow. As proofs of the point at issue-whether or not the nature of substanceis such that it can have more than one attribute-both points seemto beg the question. Clearly Spinoza held a conception of the relation between substanceand its essentialattributeswhich was different from that of

15

Basic Metaphysics Descartes,and he acknowledged this difference when he wrote in the scholiumto Ip l0 that From thesepropositionsit is evidentthat althoughtrvo attributesmay be conceivedto be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceivedwithout the aid of the other),we still can not infer from that that they constitutetwo beings, or two different substances.For it is of the nature of a substancethat eachof its attributesis conceived through itself, since all the affributes it has have always been in it together,and one could not be produced by another,but each expressesthe reality or being of substance(lp lOsch). Thus, although Spinoza agrees with Descartesthat the attributes of substanceare conceivedindependentlyof one another,he explicitly rejects the latter's reasoning to the conclusion that they therefore constitute the essencesof distinct substances. I shall return to the irnportant question of how Spinoza understandsthe relation between substanceand its attributesbelow, in the final sectionof chapter3. For now we shall simply accept the logical consistency,or as Spinoza would S&y,the conceivabilityof the definition of God. We shall also not raise any question regarding the truth of Spinoza's definition of God, but a few things need to be said about what it means. The full definition is By God I understanda being absolutelyinfinite, i.e., a substanceconsistingof an infinify of attributes,of which each one expressesan eternaland infinite essence. Exp.: I say absolutelyinfinite, not infinite in its own kind, for if something is only infinite in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributesof it . . . but if somethingis absolutely infinite, whateverexpressesessenceand involves no negation pertainsto its essence(Idfn6). Recall that an attribute is a conceptually basic, essential property of substance. When Spinozasays that God is "substanceconsistingof an infinity of attributes" he need not be taken to mean that God has an actually infinite number of such conceptually basic essentialproperties, but rather that He has all possible attributes. ("Infinite" means "not bounded" or "not limited.") As we have already mentioned, Spinoza agrees with Descartes that extension and thought are attributes of substance. Spinoza nowhere mentions any other attributes, and although he seemsto leave open the possibility that there may be more, it is consistentwith the definition of God that extensionand thought be the only attributes. Each of God's attributes "expresses an eternal and inf,urite

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Basic Metaphysics essence"or is infinite (unlimited) in its own kind. There is, in other words, nothing extendedoutsideof God's attribute of extensionwhich limits extension, and nothing outside of God's attribute of thought which limits His thought. In Ethics II Spinoza demonstrates that thought and extension are attributes of God from the fact of their (intellectually) perceived infinity or unlimitedness in their own kind (IIp I sch, 2dem). Since God consistsof all possibleunlimited-in-theirown-kind essences,He is absolutelyinfinite. Finally, since God consistsof all possible attributes,it follows that any other substancewould have to have some attribute in common with God (step 4 of the argument).

Premise3 Spinoza offers four separateproofs (three in the demonstration, one in the scholium) for Ip I l, that "God, or a substanceconsisting of infinite attributes,each of which expresseseternaland infinite essence, necessarilyexists." We shall focus our discussionhere on the third and fourth because,for a number of reasons,neither the first nor the second appearsto be a satisfactory demonsffation that an absolutely infinite substanceexists. In the history of philosophywe can distinguishtwo basic types of argumentfor the existenceof God. One is a priori, or basedentirely on our understandingof concepts,of which the conceptof God is the most crucial. The other is a posteriori or empirical-based at least partly on some fact or facts known through experience. Examples of the latter kind include the argumentfrom design, which is basedon the premise that the world and things in it are like an intricate machine with the parts fashioned and put together in a way to serve particular functions in the whole; and Descartes'argument for the existenceof God in Meditation lll which relies on the premise that he experienceswithin rs himself an idea of a perfect being. The foremost example of an a priori proof for God's existence is Anselm's famous ontological argument in which he argues that from the mere concept of God as "something than which nothing greater can be thought," it follows that God must exist, since to supposethat such a being does not exist involvesa contradiction.16The notion of "necessaryexistence"or of a being which "exists necessarily"or "whose essenceinvolves existence" is closely related to the a priori form of argumentation. It is becauseit is believedto be possibleto reasonmerely from the conceptof Godwhat God is, or His essence-to the conclusionthat He exists,that God is said to exist necessarilyor that His essenceis said to involve existence. Thus Spinozalays it down as an axiorn that "If a thing can

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Basic Metaphysics be conceivedas not existing, its essencedoes not involve existence" (Iax7), or less cumbersomely, "If the essence of a thing involves existence,then it must be conceivedas existing." Spinoza'sfourth proof for God's existenceis an a priori proof: [S]ince being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more powers it has, of itselt to exist. Therefore,an absolutelyinfinite Being, or God, has, of himself, an absolutelyinfinite power of exiiting. For that reason,he existsabsolutely(lpllsch). This argumentexplicitly statesa principle on which the inference, from the concept of God to the fact that He exists, is supposedto rest. That principle is that the more reality a thing has, the more powers it has to exist. Unfortunately it is not obvious to a modern .rab.r, even granting that God's nature is such that He has an absolutely infinite power of existing, how or that it follows that God in fact exists. Possibly Spinozahas in mind that it would be contradictoryto suppose that a being with an absolutelyinfinite power of existing did not exist since that would be to supposethat there could be some ti*itation on its power to exist. In his third proof, however, Spinoza offers a slightly different line of reasoning based on the same principle. fhere he argues that since ability to exist is power, then, granting that we ourselves exist, if only finite beings exist, finite beings are more powerful (at least with respect to their capacity to exist) than an absolutelyinfinite being. Spinozadownplays this argumentbecauseit rests on the a posteriori claim that we ourselvesexist; but it has the virtue of showing exactly how the advanceis made from the concept of God as having absolutely infinite power to the conclusion that God exists. The advantage and importance of both these arguments can be seen by contrasting them briefly with the first. In that argurnent Spinoza reasonsfrom lp7 that "It pertains to the nature of substince to exist," to the conclusion that an absolutely infurite substancemust exist. Clearly if this reasoning works, it works equally for any conceivable substance. If Spinoza had no other argument for the existence of God or substanceconsisting of an infinity of attributes, then the most he could conclude from the additional premise that no two substancescan share the same nature or attribute (Ip5) would be that either God exists and no other substanceexists or thaf a plurality of substances(all having different attributes) exists and God does not exist- The principle on which Spinoza'sthird and fourth argumentsfor Ipll rests, however, provides a means of arguing that the second alternative is impossible. If what exists were onty a plurality of substanceseach only infinite in its own kind (substancespos.ising

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Basic Metaphysics only a finite number of attributes),then such substanceswould be more powerful than an absolutely infurite substance,which contradicts the principle that "the more reality a thing has, the more powers it has, of itself, to exist." Granted that God is the only substance,then since whatever exists a substanceor a mode of substance,and since modes must either is exist in substance,it follows that "Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceivedwithout God" (Ip l5).

The Developmentof SubstanceMonism If the one substancedoctrine is to have any meaning and interest as a metaphysicalmonism (as a claim that reality is one) it must do two things. First, it must recognizethe diversity of reality; secondit must explain in a non-trivial way how the diverse elements of reality are united into a single whole. In other words, diversity must not be explained away as mere illusion; and the whole must be more than a mere aggregate. Spinoza'ssystem admits two kinds of diversity, that of the attributesof substance(diversity of kinds of thing) and that of its modes (diversity of things within a kind).17 In the remainder of this chapter I shall first discuss how the multiplicity of the attributes of substance presents a serious and fundamental challenge to understanding the unity of substance. I shall then discuss how Spinoza'sconceptionof the relation of substanceand mode securesthe unity of modes of a single attribute. At the end of chapter 3 I shall return to the problem of the unity of the attributesin a single substance.

Substance" Consistingof Infinite Attriblttes " The attributesare conceptually independent,essentialfeaturesof substance,which are general in the sensethat the modes of substance must all be conceivedor understoodin terms of an attribute. A rock, for example, must be conceived as extended, and a mind must be Since the attributes are conceptually conceived as thinking. independentof one another,they are also causally independent-none is the causeor effect of any other. (Conceptual independenceimplies causal independenceaccording to Spinoza, becauseknowledge of an effect involves knowledge of its cause-Iax4.) Thus, for Spinoza to hold that the one substanceconsistsof a multiplicity of attributes is for him to hold that reality consists of fundamentally diverse kinds of things-extended things, thinking things, and whatever other fundamental types of thing there may be. He needs to explain how

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Basic Metaphysics these diverse kinds of thing constitutea single reality, or what is the samething, how the attributesare united in a single substance. One nafural way to attempt to explain the uniry of the attributesis to think of them as being "in" substance,as propertiesare in a subject. Although this appearsto be how Descartes(at least sometimes)thinks of the relation between a substanceand its principal atffibute, it is not how Spinoza thinks of the relation of substanceand its attributes.r8 For Spinoza,what is "in" substanceis a mode. We have alreadyseen, however, that in Spinoza's systemeverything real is either a substance or a mode. Hence, if an attribute is not a mode, then assumingit is something real, it must-at least in some sense-be identicaf with substance.And in fact the definition of atfribute as "what the intellect perceivesof a substance,as constitutingits essence,"seemsto indicate an identity betweensubstanceand attribute-a thing and its essenceare not two things. In ldfn6 as well as other passagesin Ethics I Spinoza appearsto identify God or absolutely infinite substancewith the totality of the atffibutes (Ipl9; 20cor2; 29sch.). But if God is the totaliry of his attributes,and each of the attributesis absolutelyindependentof every other, what makes this totality one? Another way of putting the problem is: how does a single substanceconsisting of an infinity of attributes,each of which expresseseternal and infinite essence,Oiffer from an infinity of substancesof one attribute, each of which is infinite in its own kind? God's essenceappearsto be irreducibly plural. (Obviously this problem is not solved by taking extensionand thought to be the only attributes,since two is still a multiplicity, and reality is bifurcatedinto two distinct and independentrealms.). The problem of the unity of the attributesin a single substance reappearsat the level of modes in the following way. What unites the diverse modes is that they are all modes of the one substance. But a mode is'always a mode of an attributeof the one substance,or a mode of the one substanceconceived under an attribute (fpl4cor2;25cor). Thus, bodies are modes of extension(Ildfn I ); and minds are modes of thought. It would seem then that to explain the unity of modes of different attributes, it is necessaryto explain the unity of the attributes. As we shall see in the next chapter,however, Spinoza seemsto solve the problem by workittg backwards. That is, his answerto the question of how the plurality of attributescan constitutethe essenceof i single substanceemerges from his articulation of the relationship betrveen modes of different attributes.

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Basic Metaphysics

Substanceand lts Modes: Two Interpretations Turning now to Spinoza'streatmentof modal diversity within a single attribute, here we can s?y, without intrusion of the diversiry of attributes,that what unites distinct modes is that they are modes of, or in, the one substanceor God. We may well ask, however, what it means for modes to be in substanceor God. In the remaining part of Ethics I (p 15 p34) Spinoza turns to explaining the relation between the one substance,God, and everything else. The main focus of his treatmentis how God causesthe world. I shall give a brief description of Spinoza's very abstract account. Then, in order to make it less abstract, I shall present two recent interpretations of the relation of extendedsubstanceto bodies(modesof extension) Becauseeverything other than God is in God Spinozarejectsthe traditional conceptionof a creatordistinct from its creation;thus, "God is the immanent,not the transitive,causeof all things" (Ip I 8). Spinoza distinguisheswithin the one substanceor God between what he calls natura naturares("nature naturhg"), by which he means what is in itself and is conceivedthrough itself, or such attributesof substanceas expressan eternal and infinite essence,i.e.,(by Pl4Cl and Pl7C2), God, insofaras he is consideredas a free cause(lp29sch); and natura naturata ("nature nafured"),which he explains as whateverfollows from the necessityof God's nature,or from any of God's attributes,i.e.,all the modes of God's attributesinsofar as they are consideredas things which are in God, and can neitherbe nor be conceivedwithout God. Spinoza holds that God is omnipotent insofar as every mode which can be conceived through any attribute must follow from that attributeor be producedby God (Ip 16, 17cor2sch). And God alone is free in the sensethat "God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelledby no one" (Ip l7). But he is not omnipotent or free in the senseof theseterms which entailsbeing able to do or forebeara thing accordingto an undeterminedwill (Ip32, 32corl,2). Everything which follows from God's nature-both finite and infinite modes-is strictly determined by God, as is summed up in lp29: "In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessityof the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way" (seealso1p25,26, 27, and 33). Within natura naturata (what is in God and follows from or is produced by his attributes) Spinoza distinguishes two chains of causation.The first describesa seriesof things which follow "from the

2r

Basic Metaphysics absolute nature" of (or, we might S&y, directly from) an attribute of God. Since the attributes are eternal (exist necessarily,Ipl9) and infinite (unlimited by anything of the same kind), whatever follows from their absolute nature must itself be eternal and infinite; and whatever follows from a mode which follows directly from an afiribute will itself be eternal and infinite (Ip21,22). In the Ethics Spinoza does not say what these infinite modes are, but elsewherehe identifies the immediateand mediateinfinite modes of extension as motion and rest, and the face of the whole universe; and the immediateinfinite mode of thought as absolutely infinite intellect (letter 64). Since whatever is produced by the absolutenature of an attribute of God or by a modification which is infinite and always exists must itself be infinite and always exist (Ip23), it follows that the causalchain which begins with the absolutenature of an attributewill never descend to finite things. What is infinite and always existscan only give rise to what is infinite and always exists. Finite things can be produced only by "an attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence" (lpz8dem). Thus, since every finite thing requires a prior finite cause,the chain of finite causality extendsbackwards ad infinitum (Ip28). Exactly how the two causal chains are connected and what causal connection there is supposedto be betweenGod's essence(the attributes)and finite modes, is not preciselyspelledout.

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Basic Metaphysics In my discussion of the ancestryof Spinoza's notion of substance (above, pp. 8 - l0) I pointed out that for both Aristotle and Descartes the concept of substanceinvolved being a subject of properties or (in grammatical terms) predication, and I suggestedthat Spinoza's notion of substancealso involved this. E. M. Curley, however, thinks that Spinoza did not intend the relation between substanceand mode to be understood as that of a subject to its properties. One reason is that modes are individual things (horses,humans), but these are of the "wrong logical type" to be predicatedof a subject.le He admits that one might give a senseto saying that one thing (e.g., an individual human being) is a property of another (God). The most obvious meaning to attach to this is that to say one thing is a property of another thing is to say all the propertiesof the first are propertiesof the second. But this has at best unacceptableconsequences-if a person is sinful, then God is sinful, etc.2o According to Curley, the relationof substanceand mode is purely that of a causeto its effects.2r That is, Spinoza's concept of substance as that which is in itself and conceived through itself, is simply the concept of a thing which is causally independentof everything else; and the concept of mode is of a thing which is causally dependent. (The dependenceof propertieson a subject is not to be understood as causaldependence.)Now, on our ordinary way of thinking about cause and effect, the cause of a thing is something separatefrom the thingthe meteor which fell to earth causedthe climatic disruption which led to the extinction of the dinosaurs. Spinoza implicitly recognizesthis ordinary notion of causeand effect when he distinguishesGod's causal relation to his effects as immanent and not transitive (Ip I 8). One way of understandingSpinoza'snotion of immanentcausalityis that it is the relaton of causality betweenthe essentialnature of a subject and its properties. But then to say that one thing is the immanent cause of anotherpresupposesthat they are related as subject and property. Thus, if Curley is correct that the relation of substanceand mode does not involve that of subject and property, he needsto come up with another way of explaining what Spinozameans when he says that God is the immanent,and not the transitive,causeof everything. Curley presentshis interpretationin terms of what he calls the "model metaphysic," a scheme inspired by the views of the logical atomists.22 Consider a complete description of the world. Such a description would include first, an indefinite number of singular statements,or statementsabout individual people and things, e.g., that Socrateslived in ancient Greece,or that this body is heavy. It would also include generalstatements,statementsabout classesof things; e.9., that no humans live at the north pole; or that sound travels slower than light. General statementscan be divided into two types: nomological

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BasicMetaphysics generalizations,or those which are strictly universal, and accidental generalizations. The former contain no reference to particular individuals (or times or places) and support counterfactualinference. What we ordinarily think of as scientific laws are the best examplesof nomological generalizations. Thus, although the book on my desk is not in motion, I can infer, from the law that a body in motion will continue in rnotion unlessactedon by an outsideforce, that if it were in motion it would continueto rnove until it was actedon by some outside force. (This is what is meant by saying that nomological generalizations support counterfactual inference.) Accidintal generalizationsmay contain referenceto particular individualsor times or places and do not support counterfactualinference. Thus from "All Jones' assetsare in savings accounts" one cannot infer that if Jones were to acquire other assetshe would convert them to savingsaccounts. It is not a law for Jones' assetsthat they must be in the form of savings accounts as it is a law for bodies that if they are in motion they must continue in motion unless acted on by an outside force. Another difference between accidentaland nomological generalizationsis that the former can be viewed as equivalentto some conjunctionof singular statementsand the latter cannot. For example, the statement about Jones' assetsis equivalentto the conjunction of "The money Joneshas savedfrom his paycheck for the last ten years is in a savingsaccoutt," and "The money Jonesreceivedfrom the sale of his condominium is in a savings account," etc. But since nomological generalizationsare strictly universal they are of potentially infinite extent, hence, are not equivalentto any conjunctionof singular statements. This complete description of the world mirrors the world. Corresponding to singular statements are singular facts; and corresponding to nomological general statementsare "nomological" facts. But there are no specialfacts correspondingto merely accidental generalizations because these general statementsare equivalent to conjunctions of singular statements. (Singular facts are sufficient to account for the truth of accidentalgen eralizations.) The statements comprising the complete description of the world stand in logical relations to one another. Some general statementsare logically deducible from others, and singular statementsare logically deducible from general ones taken in conjunction with sor. other singular statement(s).Thus, from the nomological generalizationthat a body at rest remains at rest unless it acted on by an outside force, we can conclude that very light bodies remain at rest unlessthey are acted on by an outside force; and taking this statement in conjunction with the statementthat Body A is at rest at t and from t to t1 is not acted on by any outside force, we can conclude that Body A remainsat rest from t to t1.

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Basic Metaphysics Assume that the relationsamong facts which parallelthese logical relationsamong statementsare causalrelations. On this way of looking at things the world is thoroughly deterministic.23Curley suggests applying this model to Spinoza as follows: let the attributesbe thought of as the facts colresponding to the highest level nomological generalizations or scientific laws; the infinite modes as those colresponding to the lower level nomological generalizations or derived scientific laws; and finite modes as those coffesponding to 24 singular statements. This interpretation has much to recommend it. For one thing it does justice to those passageswhere Spinoza talks about causal relations as though they were logical relations, or explicitly compares them to logical relations,as, for example,when he writes that infinitely many things in infinitely many modes,i.e., all things, have necessarilyflowed, or always follow, by the same necessityand in the sameway as from the naturesof a triangle it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles(Ipl7cor2). It gives us a relatively concreteunderstandingof the mysteriousinfinite modes and explains how they are caused by the absolutenature of an atffibute. As derivative laws their causation is the factual counterpart of logical consequence. It explains how the two causal chains mentioned above-the rather short chain of infinite causes which beginswith the absolutenature of an attribute and proceedsthrough the infinite modes, ild the infinite chain of finite causes-are related, and how the absolute nature of an attribute causally determines finite things. The basic and derivative nomological facts are the factual counterpartsof the laws which govern the events in the chain of finite causation. In this way too it assigns a meaning to Spinoza's characterizationof God as the immanent cause of things. Immanent causalityis indeeda specialkind of causality,which coffespondsto the relation between a law and the events it governs. God is the immanent causeof everything becausethe attributes are the factual counterparts of the most basic laws governingeverything. What, if anything, can be said against Curley's interpretation? His claim that for Spinoza the relation between substanceand mode is purely a causal relation and not the relation between a subject and its properties implies that Spinoza broke radically from the tradition on this matter. This in itself, however, means little. But with regard to Curley's point that Spinoza'smodes are the "wrong logical type" to be predicated of a subject, Spinoza had before him the example of Descartes,who took individual bodies (but not minds) to be modes of substance,not substances,i.e., to be made up of variable qualities of

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BasicMetaphysics extension.2sAnd, as JonathanBennett has pointed out, there is a way to construethe claim that one individual is a properfy (predicated)of another, other than saying that whatever is predicated of the first is predicated of the second. For one individual to be a property of or predicableof anothermight simply mean that all talk aboutthe first can be reformulated as talk about the second. Thus, Spinoza'sclaim that there is only one substanceor God, and that everything else is a modification of that substance,means,among other things, that all talk of finite individuals can in principle be replaced by talk about God or substance. According to Bennett, this is in fact just what Spinoza had in mind. Bennett holds that Spinozafollowed the tradition on the notion of substance,that the "root idea" of his concept of substanceis of "what has propertiesor is a subjectof predication."26To this he added the notions of causal and strict logical independence. Substanceis what exists in itself and is conceived through itself (Idfn3). From "exists in itself' he concludedthat it necessarilyexists (Ip7) and is indestructible,hence cannot consist of separableparts. But it also cannot consist of inseparableor conceptualparts, since for it to do so would be contrary to its definition as "conceived through itself." According to Bennett, Spinoza saw that the only extended subject which satisfied the conditions for being substance-having no separableor conceptualparts-was space. The parts of space(regions of space)cannotbe "pulled apart;"and the conceptof spaceis not built up by adding togetherregionsof space. Rather the conceptof a region of space(a limited space)presupposesthat of space. Space,in other words, is one single thing, possessinga unity which can neither be physically decomposednor decomposedin thou ght." On Bennett's view particular bodies are simply the way spaceis characterizedin different regions. A mountain is simply a mountainshapedregion of spacecharacterizedby impenetrability, and whatever else is necessaryfor it to affect other things the way mountains do. The motion of bodies in space is thought of as contiguousregions undergoing change in such a way that a region R at time T closely resemblesits contiguous neighborsat T- I and T+ I . To think of the motion of bodies we must associateeachobject . . . with a spatio-temporally continuousset of place-times,which I call a string of them. If there is a string Rr-Tr, Rz-Tz,. . . such that eachR; qualitatively unlike its spatialneighboursat Ti and is qualitatively like the other regions on the string,then that string definesthe trajectoryof what we call an object in space.

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Basic Metaphysics Bennett goes on to say that "Spinoza's view is that the movement of things or stuff is, deep down, the passing along of something qualitative-a change in which regions are F and which are not, for suitablevaluesof p;Qe It is like a thaw moving acrossthe countryside. (Another analogy might be the movement of a wave across the ocean. When a wave moves acrossa body of water, there is no "thing" which is the wave which changes location; rather contiguous areas of the water successivelyundergochangeof shape.) There is, however,one problem in Benneff'sschemefor replacing talk about bodies with talk about space. It is that in order to expressin space-talk what we mean when we talk about a particular individual body, we need to be able to identiff regions of space. We can say a mountain exists by saying that space is somewhere mountainously characterized;but in order to say that Mt. Everestis 28,000 feet tall, we must be able to refer to or identiry a particular mountainous region. In our everyday talk about bodies, w€ can identiff Mt. Everest by its location. But its location is relative to a set of coordinates,which itself is fixed by its relation to somethingwhich we can relate to ourselves, Ultimately all referenceto individuals involves a referenceto here and now, what philosopherscall "indexicality." As Bennett himself points out, talk about individual bodies can be replacedby talk about space(a statement about Mt. Everest can only be translated into a statement about space)only if we allow such talk about spaceto contain indexical terms-ones which allow us to refer to spacehere and now.'o Bennett remarks that Spinozahas an hostility to the l-now viewpoint; but worse than that, the notion of "space here, now," containsreferenceto what is a modification of spaca, d finite subject. So Bennetthas not succeeded in showing how spacetalk could replacetalk about bodies, and has not shown how individual bodies can be viewed as properties of the one extendedsubstance,space. Both Curley's and Bennett's interpretationswork well, if not perfectly, as accountsof how Spinozaconceivedthe relation between substanceconsideredunder one of its attributesand modes. I shall not attempt to adjudicatebetween them, but I shall briefly consider the appeal and limitations of each. For Curley the unity of the diverse modes of substanceconsideredunder a single affributeconsistsentirely in the fact that modes are governed by a single system of laws. Extended substanceis identified with its attribute, extension, and the attribute is construed as the set of facts coffesponding to the set of highest level laws governing finite bodies. Substanceas a subject or substratumhas droppedout-it is not neededto explain how things are all in the samesubstance,or how God is an immanentcause. Curley's Spinoza is thus radically modern, anticipating empiricist critiques of the notion of substance, excising unnecessary notions from his

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Basic Metaphysics metaphysical system. Bennett's interpretationof space as substance portrays a less radical Spinoza, one who acceptsthe traditional notion of substanceas a subject and substratumin which modes exist, for whom the unity of diverse modes of a single attribute is not merely their subjectionto a single system of laws, but is also their being in a single subject. Bennefi's interpretation is more consistent than Curley's with Spinoza'scharacterizationof modes as "the affectionsof t substance"(Idft5).3 And while it is true (as Curley argues)that the assumption of Bennett's interpretation-that ultimately talk of modes could be replacedby talk of substance-is wrong, it also seemstrue, as Bennett maintains,that Spinozawouldn't have seenthat.32.

Summary Unlike earlier substancetheorists,Spinozareasonedthat there is only one substance, God, and that everything else-rocks, trees, individual human bodies and minds-is a modification of that substance.He reachedthis conclusionvia an argumentbasedpartly on the definition of God as substance o'consistingof an infinity of attributes." An attribute is a conceptually basic, essential properfy of subtance, which is general in the sense that every modification of substancemust be conceived in terms of some attribute. Rocks and human bodies must be conceived in terms of extension;minds must be conceived in terms of thought. How the one substancecan consist of an infinity of independentattributes, or how reality can consist of fundamentally diverse kinds of thing and still be one, is a serious problem for Spinoza'smonistic metaphysics. The relation of substanceto mode in Spinoza has traditionally been taken to be that of a subjectto its prperties. E. M. Curley rejects this, holding insteadthat it should be understoodalong the lines of the relation of the most basic laws of physics to the movements of individual bodies,which on Curley's view is a purely causalrelation. Jonathan Bennett, otr the other hand, acceptsthe traditional view, but maintains that for Spinoza extended substanceis space, and that the modifications of substanceare simply differently qualified regions of space.

Endnotes t

Referencesto Spinoza's Ethics will be given in the text, using the following system of abbreviations: upper case Roman numerals (I V) stand for one of the five Parts of the Ethics; "p"

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Basic Metaphysics 6(dfh" for "definition;" "ax" for "axiom" stands for "proposition;" "cor" for "coroll?ry;" "post" for "dem" for "demonstration;" "postulater"and "sch" for "scholium." Thus, "IIpl3cor,sch" indicates the scholium to the corollary to proposition 13 of part II. All quotationsare from Edwin Curley, The Collected Worksof Spinoza,l. 'zal l-13. t 2b5-17;seealso 2b35.

oro,?lo-12.

'Author's Replies to the Second Set of Objections" in Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch, v. II, ll4. Future referencesto this English translation of Descartes' writings will be indicated by ..CSM." u PrinciplesI,51, in CSM, I, 210. ' Principles l, 52, in CSM , l, 210. t "synopsis" of the Meditations,in CSM II, 10. n In the Principles of Philosophy l, 56, Descartescharacterizes the term "mode" as meaning a variable proptirty or quality of substance

(csM r' 21i l?rl presented the stepsof the argument in adifferent order than that of their occurrencein Spinoza's demonsffation. t' Principles of PhilosophyI, 53; CSM I,210- I I . tt My discussionof this questionis indebtedto Charlton,51415,and Delahunty, ll2-14. 13 Curley 1986 provides a good discussionof what is at stake as well as the evidence on both sidesof this issue. How we can know the definitionsare ffue is discussedbelow, in chapter6, pp. 87 - 88. Ihis is the reasoningexpressedin Descartes'argumentfor the real distinction between mind and body in Meditation VI (CSM II, 54), and in the Principles of Philosophyl,60 (CSM I,213). tt c s M I I , 2 8 - 3l . t6 Proslogion, chapter 2. tt Some commentators,however, have interpretedSpinoza as explainingthe appearanceof diversity as illusion. H. A. Wolfson, for example, took him to hold that the apparent multiplicity of the attributesof substancewas a figment of human subjectivity (Wolfson, I, l43-56). H. H. Joachimseemsinclined to view him as holding that our apprehensionof distinct modes of substanceis illusory (Joachim,

r07-rrr);r

,"Author's

Replies to the Second Set of Objections," CSM II, I 14; Principles of Philosophyl, 53, 56, CSM 1,210-12. re Curley 1969,18, 37-38;1988,31. 20 Curley I 969, l8; 1988,3l- 36.

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Basic Metaphysics tr

C u r l e y I 9 6 9 , 3 6 - 4 3 ;1 9 8 8 , 3 1 . " Cutley I969,50-55. Curley assumesthat all the singular statementsare entailed by general nomological ones,taken in conjunction with other singular statements. 'o Curley I 969,55 - 74; 1988,42 - 48. "Synopsis" of the Meditations, CSM II, 10. Some commentatorsdiscount Descartes'denial of substantialityto the body in this passage,becausehe commonly refers to the body as a substance. But I take the passageto mean that strictly the body is not a substance; and I take it seriouslybecauseit seemsto me to be an implication of his doctrine concerningsubstance. tu Bennett 1984,55. tt Bennett I 984,81-88. tt Bennett 1984,89. tn Bennett 1984,89-90. 'o Bennett lg84,95-96. In the definition of mode, "affections" is a translation of affectiorgrl,which might also be renderedas "states." Curley argues at length against Bennett's interpretationin his "On Bennett's Interpretation of Spinoza's Monism." Bennett counters in his "Sprnoza's Monism: A Reply to Curley." Both appear in Yovel, 1991.

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Mind and Body

The Union of Mind and Body According to Descartesthe mind (a thinking substance)and body (a "certain configurationof limbs and other accidents")are two really distinct entities, capable of existing apart from another. Thus, "the decay of the body does not imply the destruction of the mind." t The essentialfunctionsof the mind-thinking and willing-are independent of the body, and similarly, thoseof a living body-that it be capableof various sorts of cornplex movement--can be accountedfor by the same mechanical principles that govern non-living ones. Non-human animals, which lack a mind or soul, are merely highly complex machines. The principle of all movement of a living body is a kind of heat or fire in the heart, which causesthe circulation of the blood and "animal spirits," a volatile fluid substance.' Descartesdescribes a complex network of nerves "which are like little threads or tubes coming from the brain and containing,like the brain itself, d very fine air or wind which is calledthe'animal spirits'."3 This neuralstructure explains how the brain is able to communicate with the rest of the body, and providesthe basisfor explaining all animal and much human behavior on a purely physiological, stimulus-responsemodel. For example, motions produced in the eye by an external stimulus are transmitted via the nerves to the brain, where they in turn cause "the spirits to make their way to certain muscles rather than others, . so causingthem to move our limbs."a

31

Mind and Body Despite their essentialindependenceof one another,in this life mind and body are intimately connected: Nature also teachesme, by thesesensationsof pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not merely presentin my body as a sailor is presentin a ship, but that I am very closelyjoined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit. If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceivethe damagepurely by the intellect,just as a sailor perceivesby sight if anything in his ship is broken. . . [TJhesesensations. . . are nothing but confusedmodesof thinking which arisefrom the union and, as it were, intermingling of the mind with the body.s In The Passions of the Soul, l, Descartesattemptedto explain the union of mind and body, or to show how the body is able to act on the mind, causing sensationsand passions(statesof consciousness) in the mind; and how the mind is able to move the body (voluntary movement). He maintainedthat while "the soul is joined to the whole body" it "directly exercisesits functions" in the "innermostpart of the brain, which is a certain very small gland situatedin the middle of the brain's substance. .ts6He describedthis mechanismin The Passions 1,34: [T]he small gland which is the principal seatof the soul is suspendedwithin the cavitiescontainingthesespirits,so that it can be moved by them in as many different ways as there are perceptibledifferencesin the objects [of perception]. But it can also be moved in various different ways by the soul, whose nature is such that it receivesas many different impressions-that is, it has as many diffferent perceptionsas there occur different movementsin this gland. And conversely,the mechanismof our body ir ro constructedthat simply by this gland's being moved in any way by the soul or by any other cause,it drives the surroundingspirits towards the pores of the brain, which direct them throughthe nervesto the muscles;and in this way the gland makesthe spirits move the limbs.T For Spinoza,the notion that the mind-something immaterial and unextended-should move or be moved by a body was unintelligible: What, I ask doeshe [Descartes]understandby the union of Mind and Body? What clear and distinct conceptiondoeshe have of a thought so closely united to somelittle portion of quantity? Indeed,I wish he had explainedthis union by its

32

Mind and Body proximatecause. But he had conceivedthe Mind to be so distinct from the Body that he could not assignany singular cause,either of this union or of the Mind itself. Instead,it was necessaryfor him to have recourseto the causeof the whole Universe,i.e.,to God. Again, I should like very mch to know how many degreesof motion the Mind can give to that pineal gland, and how greata force is requiredto hold it in suspense(V, Preface). By Spinoza's lights, Descartessimply failed to explain the union of mind and body. His own account of their union is set in terms of a more general account of the relation between modes of the attribute thought, and those of extensionand whatever other attributesthere may be. The main featuresof the generalaccountare as follows. First, it assertsa kind of equality between thought and the other attributes. Just as all possible things are produced by God or follow from each of his affributes(Ip 16), so God has ideas of all such things (llp3). Second,it deniesthe possibility of causal interaction between rnodes of different affributes. Since an idea is simply a mode of thought, it must be understood through thought alone, apart from any other attribute. Thus, by lax4, that "the knowledge of an effect depends otr, and involves, the knowledge of the cause," it follows that an idea cannot be caused by anything other than an idea or modification of thought (IIp5). The same reasoning applies equally to the modes of other attributes: "The modes of each attribute have God for their cause only in so far as he is consideredunder the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other attribute" (llp6). Finally, the accountassertsthat "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connectionof things" (IIp7). Since the demonstration of this proposition merely cites Iax4, that "the knowledge of an effect dependsotr, and involves, knowledge of the cause," he evidently meansthat the causal order of ideas parallels the causalorder of things, that the causeof an idea of x is the idea of the, \ ) causeof x. As we shall see the general principles expressedby IIp6 and IlpT--that there is no causalinteraction betweenmodes of different attributes, but that the order of ideas parallels that of things-play tremendously important roles in Spinoza's general metaphysical docffine and in his thinking aboutthe mind and knowledge. WhereasDescartesheld human beings to be thinking substances causally linked with bodies, Spinoza (as we should expect, given his substancemonism) maintainedthat "The being of substancedoes not pertain to the essenceof man" (tlp l0), but rather that "the essenceof man is constituted by certain modifications of God's attributes"

33

Mind and Body (IIpl0cor). A particularhuman mind is simply the idea-God's ideaof a particular human body (IIpl l, l3). As such it is "part of the infinite intellect of God" (f Ip I I cor). It may seem odd for Spinoza to say that the mind is an idea; ordinarily we think of the mind as the subject which has ideas,not as being one. The Cartesiannotion of the mind as the finite thinking substancein which ideas exist as modes or statesthus appearsto be more consistentwith our ordinary way of thinking and talking aboutthe mind. But Spinoza's conception of the mind as an idea is a consequenceof (a) his substance monism, according to which everything other than God must be a modification of some attributeof God; and (b) his taking ideas as the basic kind of modification in the attribute of thought, thus putting them on a par with bodies in extension.That ideas are the basic type of modification of thought is assertedby IIax3, that There are no modes of thinking, such as love, desire,or whateveris designatedby the word affectsof th mind, unless there is in the same Individual the idea of the thing loved, desired,etc. But there can be an idea, even thoughthereis no

othermodeof thinking. r,in Spinoza'ssystemthereis nothingfor the humanmindto -r+ V ffin be dxcept an idea.The first part of the demonstration of IIpl l expresses + t,. A line of thought: (a.,1f,\16;t I Theessence of man(by pl0C) is constituted by certain modificationsof God's attributes,viz. (by A2) by modesof thinking,of all of which (by 43) the ideais prior in nature, andwhenit is given,the othermodes(to which the ideais prior in nature)mustbe in the sameindividual(by A3). And thereforean ideais the first thing that constitutes the beingof a humanMind. our discomfortwith reconceptualizing the mind alongthe linesof Spinoza'saccountstemsat leastpartly from the fact that it seemsto threatenwhat we think of as our individuality. If "I" am an ideain the mind of God,then"I" am merelya stateof anothersubject,andthereis no "I" (or I am not myself an individualsubject).one way to dealwith this problemis to adoptcurley's interpretationof the relationbetween substance and mode. on that interpretationfinite modesare causally dependent on substance, but they are not relatedto substance as states of a subject.Rather,asindividuals,they are subjects.KeepingCurley,s interpretationin mind, it may seemodd that spinozashouldcall the basic modificationsof the attribute of thought ideas, since in the cartesiantradition,aswell as in our usage,ideas arethoughtto require a subjectin which they reside. But if ideas are not thought o1 as ffi.

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Mind and Body themselvesresiding in a subject, that removes one impediment to thinking of the mind ar an idea. Even accepting the more traditional interpretation of the relation of substanceand mode as subject and state or property, however, it does not follow that becausethe mind is an idea in the mind of God it cannot itself be an individual subject. For Spinoza what makes the mind an individual subject is that it is the idea of the body, which is an individual subject. In order to understandthis, we need to look more closely at the relation between ideasand their objects, and at the nature of the object of the mind-the body.. Ideasare what may be called primary representors.To understand what this means, consider how words, which are simply sounds or marks on paper, can representthings. A particular sound or set of marks does not naturally representanything, but only by convention, i.e., only,insofaras the speakersof a languageinvest it with a meaning. By contrast, ideas for Spinoza are, by nature or essentially, representativeof or "about" something, or have content. An idea cannot lack this representationalquality, and its very nature-what it is-depends on its content or object. In seventeenth century terms, ideashave "objective reality," in modernterms,"intentionality." As an idea, then, the mind bears an essential, but noncausal, relation to its object, the body. The essentiallinkage between the mind and body in Spinoza has three important aspects. In the first place the existenceof the mind necessarilyparallels that of the body. Thus, Spinoza continuesthe demonstrationof IIp I I (above) inferring funher that the idea which constitutesthe mind is not the idea of a thing which doesnot exist. For then (by P8C) the idea itself could not be saidto exist. Therefore it will be the idea of a thing which actually exists. Bu not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (by lP2l and 2) must always exist necessarily. Therefore,the first thing that constitutesthe actualbeing of a human Mind is the idea of a singularthing which actually exists. The secondaspectof the essentiallinkage betweenmind and body is that as an idea the mind is necessarilyindividuatedby its object.As a mode of extensionthe body is not a substantial individual, but it is nonethelessan individual insofar as it has a distinct and specifiable naturewhich is more or less enduringover time. Spinozadiscussesthe individuation of bodies in the material he presents "concerning the natureof bodies" following IIpl3sch. Although the simplestbodiesare distinguished from one another "only by motion and rest, speed and slowneSS,"what distinguishesa complex body (such as the human body) from other things is either that its component parts "are so

35

Mind and Body onstrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another," or if they move, that "they communicatetheir motions to eachotherin a certain fixed manner" (IIax2, and dfii, following lemma 3). Complex individuals such as the human body are thus able to undergo many types of change,including replacementof their componentparts (as in nutrition and respiration,growth and diminution, and changeof place) while remaining the sameidenticalthing (lemmas4 - 7). Insofar as the body can remain the same individual while undergoing change, it is properly thought of as a subject of properties,i.e., a subject in which different qualitiescome to be or ceaseto exist (e.g.,size,shape). As the idea of somethingwith a distinct and specifiablen4tu1s-4 complex individual-the mind is similarly a complex individual (IIp l5). And as the idea of a thing which is able to endure through many types of change,the mind also is a subjectof properties,i.e., is a subject in which different ideas come to be or ceaseto exist. Like the body it is not a substantial individual, not the ultimate subject of changeor different states.But it is an individual subject,nonetheless. The third aspectof the essentiallinkage betweenmind and body in Spinoza is that mental processesand the abilities and limitations of the mind can be explainedin terms of bodily processesand abilities and limitations. All things are "animate" or God has an idea of each thing just as he has the idea of the human body; but Ideasdiffer amongthemselvesas the objectsthemselvesdo, . . . one is more excellentthan the other, and containsmore reality,just as the object of the one is more excellentthan the object of the other and containsmore reality. And so to determinewhat is the difference betweenthe human Mind and the others,and how it surpassesthem, it is necessaryfor us. . . to know the natureof its object, i.e., the human Body. [IJn proportion as a Body is more capablethan others of doing many things at once, or being actedon in many ways at once, so its Mind is more capablethan othersof perceivingmany things at once. And in proportion as the actions of a body dependmore on itself alone,and as other bodiesconcur with it less in acting,so its mind is more capableof understanding distinctly(IIp l3cor, sch). I turn now to Spinoza's treatment of cognitive mental processes and the extent of human knowledge.

36

Mind and Body

Cognition SensePerception and Imagination Descartesexplains our ability to perceive external objects as follows: an external object causesmotion in some external organ of sense,which in turn causesa motion in the nerves, which in its turn causesthe pineal gland to move in a certain woy, which causes a ceftain sensationin the mind. Since Spinozadenies that there can be causal relations between modes of different attributes, he must offer a different explanation. His account relies on two basic doctrines: the parallelismthesis,that "the order and connectionof ideasis the sameas the order and connectionof things," and the conception of the mind as God's idea of the body. By parallelism,God has the idea of what happens in any object only insofar as he has the idea of that object (Ilp9cor). It follows from this that the ideas of what happens in the body must be in the human mind, or, as Spinozaparaphrasesin IIpl2, the human mind perceives whatever happens in the human body. When external bodies act on our organs of sense, the state or modification of the senseorgan (and nervoussystem)that they produce is a result of both the nature of the external body and our own body. Spinoza reasons, therefore, that the idea of that state represents ("involves") both the nature of the human body and that of the external body, although in a confused way (IIpl6). Thus, becausethe mind directly perceiveswhat happens in the body, it indirectly perceives externalbodies(IIpl 6corl ). The ability to imagine things which are not present and memory are similarly explainedin terms of the mind's having ideas of the states of the body. As long as the body is affectedin a way that "involves the nature of an externalbody," the mind will regard that body as "actually existing or as presentto it" (IIp l7). Thus,we can imagine things which are not presentor do not actually exist so long as our body is in the state it would be in if the thing we imagine were actually present (IIplTand cor). The associationof ideasinvolved in memory is simply "a certain connectionof ideas involving the nature of thing which are outsidethe humanBody-a connectionthat is in the mind accordingto the order and connection of the affections of the human Body" (IIp l Ssch). Spinozaexplains that he usesthe term "image" to refer to the affections (states)of the human body "whose ideas present external bodies as present to us;" and his general term for thinking which

37

Mind and Body involves such ideas is "imagination" (IIp l Tcor,sch). Thus sense perception,memory, and dreaming, as well as imagining things which do not exist or are not presentare all imaginativefunctionsof the mind. Spinozadistinguishesbetweenthe idea of Peter which constitutesthe essenceof Peter'smind, and the idea of Peterwhich is in another man, say in Paul. For the former directly explainsthe essenceof Peter'sbody, and doesnot involve existenceexcept as long as Peterexists;but the latter indicatesthe constitutionof Paul's body more than Peter's nature, thereforewhile that constitutionof Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as presentto itself, even though Peterdoesnot exist (IIp l Tsch). He might have drawn the same contrast between the idea of Peter which "constifutesthe essenceof Peter's mind" and "directly explains the essenceof Peter'sbody" and Peter's own idea of his body. The idea of the body which constitutesa person'smind--{.g., God's ideaof Peter's body-is not identical with any idea by which the person representshis body to himself or perceiveshis body. As is the case with external bodies, we perceive our own bodies only indirectly, through the ideas of the states of the body which are present in the mind, whose objects are directly perceivedby us (IIp 19 and dem). What the mind can perceive or in any way representto itself is limited to what can be representedby ideaswhich are in God's idea of the human body. And so far the only ideaswhich have been shown to be in God's idea of the human body-the human mind-are the ideas of the body's modifications. In order to explain how the mind is ableto perceive its own ideas and itself (introspection)Spinoza draws on a deeper aspectof the relation of mind and body. Since God has the ideas of all things which can be conceived through each of his attributes, and since ideasare modes of the attribute thought, God must have the idea of every idea, including the idea of the mind. By the parallelismdoctrine,the idea of the mind must be "relatedto God in the same way as the idea or knowledge of the human body" (IIp20). And just as the mind is united to the body through the body's being the object of the mind, the idea of the mind is united to the mind through the mind's being its object(IIp2l). We have referredto IIpT as assertingthat the causalorder of ideas parallelsthat of the modes of extension(or of other attributes). In the scholium to IIpTcor Spinoza appearsto expressa significantly stronger doctrine, that ideas are identical with their objects, from which the parallelism of the causal orders in different affributes follows as a consequence.In IIp2l sch he refers back to this passageas a basisfor assertingthat

38

Mind and Body [TJheideaof the Body, and the Body, i.e.(byPl3), the Mind and the Body, are one and the sameIndividual, which is conceivednow under the attribute of Thought, and now under the attribute of Extension. So the idea of the Mind and the Mind itself are one and the samething, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, viz., Thought. Since, by parallelism, "the ideas of the ideas of the affections follow in God in the sameway and are related to God in the same way as the ideas themselvesof the affections" (llp22dem), it follows that these ideas of ideas will be in God's idea of the human mind, and therefore(by the identity of this idea with the mind), in the mind itself. Thus the mind perceivesits ideas (llp22} and itself, through its ideas (llp23).

Sense Perception (and Introspection) as Inadequate Knowledge Spinoza assesses the knowledge we have of our mind and body and externalbodieswhich we have through the ideasof our own body's modifications (and through the ideas of these ideas) as inadequate,or mutilated and confused. It is confused in that the ideas of the modificationsof the body do not involve a clear differentiation among the propertiesbelongingto the external object, those belonging to our own body, and those belonging to the state which results from the externalbody's acting on our body (IIp l6cor2). And it is mutilated, in that the ideas of the bodily modifications only partially representboth the body and external objects. For example, the idea of the human body which we derive from our idea of some bodily modification is only of the body as affectedin a certain w&y, and not of it as capableof being affected in many different ways (IIp27 anddem). In lldfn4 Spinoza defines an adequate idea as one which "consideredin itsell without relation to an object,has all the properties or intrinsic denominationsof a true idea." He goes on to add in explanationthat by "intrinsic" he meansto excludewhat is "extrinsic," the agreementof a true idea with its object. What these "intrinsic denominations" are is not spelled out in the Ethics, but in corespondencehe indicated that by an adequateidea he meant one from which all the propertiesof the thing could be inferred, and which, as a necessarycondition for this, involved the causeof the thing.8 The reasoningbehindthe secondrequirementis that sincea thing derivesall its properties from its cause,the idea of a thing from which all its

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Mind and Body properties can be inferred must involve the cause of the thing. Following out this line of thought, sincethe completecauseof the thing is required to produce the thing with all its properties, the idea from which all the properties can be inferred must involve the complete causeof the thing. Further, if the causeof the thing dependson some further cause (i.e., if it is not self-caused),then this too must be involved in the adequateidea of the thing, or the idea will not involve the complete cause. What this comesto is that an adequateidea is one which involves the complete and ultimate causeof the thing. To have adequateknowledge of a thing is to understandfully what a thing is and why it is what it is. Because God's mind (the counterpartin thought of the infinite individual which is nature) contains the ideas of all things, and the causalorder of ideasreplicatesthat of things, each thing is perfectlyadequatelyand truly-represented in God's mind (IIp32). Our minds, however, are merely finite parts of God's mind. Hence Spinozawrites [W]hen we say that the human Mind perceivesthis or that, w€ are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explainedthrough the nature of the human Mind, or insofar as he constitutesthe essenceof the human Mind, has this or that idea;and when we say that God hasthis or that idea, not only insofar as he constitutesthe nature of the human Mind, but insofar as he also has the idea of another thing togetherwith the human Mind, then we say that the human Mind perceivesthe thing only partially, or inadequately(IIp I I cor). The human mind doesnot have adequateknowledge of its body or its parts, external bodies, the body's modification, itself, or its ideas becausethe ideasof the causesof all thesethings are beyondthe scope of the mind (1rp24,25,26,27,28,29). They are in God insofaras he constitutesthe minds of other things. Indeed, insofar as all of these things are finite modes which ultimately dependon an endlesschain of prior causes,adequateknowledge of them will be in God only insofar as he hasthe ideasof all theseprior causes(seellp30dem).

AdequateKnowledge: Reasonond the Commonl{otions The mind does, however, have certain adequate knowledge. "Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceivedadequately"(IIp38). This is becausethe ideas of such things are necessarilyadequatein God in so far as he has any idea-including those of the affections of the

40

Mind and Body body-and therefore insofar as he constitutesthe mind of anythingincluding the human mind (Ilp38dem). Why this is so is made clear by the reference in IIp3 Scor to lemma 2, which indicates that what Spinoza has in mind by "things which are common to all" are things As an attribute like extension and (degree of) motion and rest. extensionmust be involved in the idea of any of its modes, and it has no further cause, but is the cause both of itself and its (immediate) infinite mode, motion and rest. These are things, therefore, of which the mind cannot fail to have an adequateidea, since their cause is adequately representedin the mind. Since they are adequate these ideasmust be true, becausefor an idea to be adequatein our mind is for God to have that idea insofar as he constitutesour mind; and in God all ideasare true (IIp32,33 and dem). Becausewhat is common to all does not constitute the essenceof any singular (finite) thing (IIp37), the common notions provide only general or universal knowledge things. But Spinoza goes to some length in Ilp40schI to distinguish the common notions from our ideas of what is designatedby ffanscendentalterms such as "being" and "thing" and universalssuch as man, horse, dog. Both transcendental and universal notions have their origin in imaginative thinking and result from the body's being incapable of forming more than a certain number of distinct imagesat one time. When that number is exceeded, the imageswill be confusedwith one another. Sincethe mind is able to imagine distinctly at the same time only as many bodies as there can be imagesin the body, when the imagesin the body are completelyconfused,the Mind also will imagine all bodiesconfusedly,without any distinction, and comprehendthem as if under one attribute, viz., underthe attribute of Being, Thing, etc. . . . theseterms signify ideasthat are confused in the highest degree. Universalnotionsarise from the samecause,but representa lesser degreeof confusion. The power of the body to form distinct imagesis not entirely overcoffie,but only to the point where the Mind can imagineneither slight differencesof the singular [menJ(suchas the color and size of eachone,etc.) nor their determinatenumber,and imagines distinctly only what they all agreein, insofar as they affect the bodY. Such universal notions vary subjectively from one individual to another,dependingon what the person's body has been affected by, and the what her mind more easily imagines or remembers (also a function of the body). Thus

4l

Mind and Body thosewho have more often regardedmen's staturewith wonder will understandby the word man an animal of erect stature. But thosewho have beenaccustomedto consider somethingelse,will form anothercommon image of mene.g.,that man is an animal capableof laughter,or a featherless biped, or a rational animal. Like our imaginative knowledge of singular things, universal notions formed in the aboveway, i.€., "from singularthings which have been representedto us through the sensesin a way that is mutilated, confused, and without order for the intellect" are only inadequate representationsof things (Iip4Osch2). And becauseSpinoza views our understandingof languageas simply a mafier of the mind's associating ideas in a way which parallelsa linkage in the statesof the body (e.g., the state of the body which results from hearing the word "apple" is linked to its being affectedwith the image of an apple), he also thinks that knowledge we have simply "from signs" or from reading or hearing about something, is inadequate. Spinoza groups these two kinds of inadequateknowledge together in Ilp40sch2, calling them "knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination." In contrastto all imaginativerepresentations, the common notions do not vary with the natureand circumstancesof the individual knower, but rather as adequateideas,accuratelyrepresenttheir objects (what is common to all, and equally in the part and in the whole). They are the basis for what Spinoza calls reason or knowledge of the secondkind (Ilp40sch.2). The second kind of knowledge includes physics, the science of extendedthings or bodies, and psychology, the scienceof thinking things or minds. In addition to thesetwo kinds of knowledge Spinoza mentions a third, which he calls "intuition" and which he describesas proceedingfrom "an adequateknowledgeof the essenceof certain attributesof God to an adequateknowledge of the essenceof things." The basisof intuition is the sameas that of reason-knowledge of an attribute. But, in contrastto reason,which is a kind of general knowledge of things, Spinoza's characterizationof intuition implies that it is a kind of knowledgeof individuals. Becauseknowledgeof the first kind includesall that involves or is based on inadequateideas, it is the "only cause of falsity," while "knowledge of the second and of the third kind is necessarilytrue" (IIpaland dem). It may seem odd for Spinozato speak of knowledge as the causeof falsity, but two points can be made which cast light on this. First, Spinoza regards falsity not as somethingpositive (IIp33), but merely as "the privation of knowledge which inadequate,or mutilated and confused,ideas, involve" (IIp35). "All ideas insofar as they are related to God, are true" (lil32); and falsity, like inadequacy

42

Mind and Body and confusion is relative to a particular mind, arising from that mind's lack of knowledge (Ilp36dem). Second, becauseall ideas insofar as they are related to God are ffue, every idea no maffer how inadequatelyit may representa thing in some particular mind, even in that mind gives some indication of reality. Thus, tro idea is absolutelyfalse. Spinoza's views on senseperceptionand reason appearpartly to coincide with, and partly to diverge from, those of Descartes. Like Descartes,Spinozaholds that senseperception does not provide us with insight into the fundamentalnaturesof things. For such understanding, we need the common notions of reason,which on the surface at least seem rather similar to Cartesian innate ideas. There are, ho*eu.., important differences between Spinoza's common notions and Descartes'innate ideas. In the first place, Spinoza's common notions are in the mind naturally, or in it in virtue of its very nature. The mind, for Spinoza, is the idea of an actually existing body. As such it necessarilyhas the ideasof or perceiveswhatever happensin that body; and insofar as it has any idea of a bodily modification, it must have an adequaterepresentationof what is common to all bodies. Cartesian minds, by contrast, do not by nature have the ideas of extension, size, shape,motion, etc., which are the basis for Cartesianscience,but God has to put them into the mind by a special act. (For Descartes,it is the knowledge that God puts these ideas in our mind that assuresus that they are true.) The same contrastholds between the two philosophers with respectto the idea of God. According to DescartesGod implants in every soul the idea of himself as the "mark of the craftsmanstamped on his work."e But for Spi nozathe adequateknowledge of an atffibute which every idea of an actually existing finite thing involves, alseby definition of an attribute
43

Mind and Bodv reason. Imaginationmakes reasonpossibleby enablingthe mind to have a past in a way that goesbeyondmere existence through time. The mind, as idea of a body which endures, retains its past:and this retention allows it to make the comparisonsbetweenexperienceswhich will issuein common notions. . . . [T]his crucial capacity for abstractionis not independentof body.to But I am not aware of any place in Spinoza'swritings where he statesor implies that the mind must compare ideasof bodily "traces" in order to determinewhat is common to all. On the contrary,he appears to reasonin IIp3Sdemthat sincewhat is "common to all" and"'equally in the part and in the whole" is involved in the idea of any modification of extension,any idea alone can yield its concept. That Spinozaheld the sourceof knowledge to lie in senseexperiencein the way we have describedshows that his doctrine is not typically rationalist;but it is also not so radically empiricistas Lloyd's interpretationimplies.

Judgment, Error and the Will Descartes' theory of judgment is presented in Meditation IV where its purposeis to forestall a potentially fatal objectionto his proof that God exists and is no deceiver. The objectionwould run as follows: if I am the creation of a perfect or non-deceitfulGod, the I ought to be incapableof elror or falsejudgment. But I know from experiencethat I am prone to eror; therefore, I am not the creation of a perfect (nondeceitful) God. The objection is the intellectual version of what is commonly known "problem of evil," which is to explain how a perfectly good and omnipotentGod can allow evil (enor) to exist. Part of Descartes solution to the problem is to present an analysis of judgment and error which makes us, not God, responsible for our CITOTS.

According to Descartes,making a judgment involves the two separatemental facultiesof intellect and will. By meansof the intellect we perceive the ideas which are subjects for possiblejudgments; by means of the will we affirm or deny what is contained in an idea. Judgmentconsistsin affirming or denying what the intellect perceives. Since the will is free, judgments are also free, although Descartes' characterizationof what can count as "free" affirmations andjudgments seems somewhat counterintuitive. He holds that if our will is cornpelledeither by God or by a clear and distinct perceptionto affirm something,such an affirmation or judgment counts as free. [n cases where we do not clearly and distinctly perceive a thing, however,

44

Mind and Body Descartesholds that our will is not compelled,thus that we are "free" in a less contentioussenseto affirm or deny the thing or to suspend judgment altogether(althoughaccordingto Descartes,this is the lowest grade of freedom). Ideas in themselvesare neither true nor false; rather the vehicle of truth and falsity is judgment.rr Error or false judgment, according to Descartes,occurs when we freely choose to affirm or deny a thing which we do not perceiveclearly and distinctly. Since we always have the option in caseswhere we lack a clear and distinct perception of a thing to suspend judgment, error or false judgment is due to us, not God. Since Spinoza'sconceptionof God's perfectionexcludesboth his possessionof a free will and any kind of moral qualities,Spinoza does not have the same need as Descartesto show that error is not due to God. Nonetheless there are reasons why he needs to explain the occulrence of error. In the first place our tendencyto err or make false judgments is a significant fact of human existence. Second,w€ have a practical need to understandhow eroneous judgments differ from true ones so we can avoid the former; and third, we need to understandthe difference between elroneousjudgments and true ones so we do not fall prey to the Upe of skeptical argument which rests on our inability to distinguisha true judgment from a false one. Unlike Descartes,Spinoza takes truth to be a property of ideas (Iax6; 1Ip32,33,34,35, 43). Further,he holds that "All ideas are true in so far as they are relatedto God" (IIp32), becauseby his parallelism docffine all of God's ideasagreewith their objects(IIp7, Iax6). From this it follows that all of our adequateideasare true (llp3a), since for us to have an adequateidea of a thing is simply for God to have the idea of that thing insofar as he constitutesour mind. Falsity, therefore, is nothing positive in ideas (llp33), but rather, "Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas, that is, fragmentary and confused ideas,involve" (IIp35). What Spinozameans by this is illustrated in the scholium following the proposition, where he gives two examples: men are deceivedin that they think themselvesfree. . . an opinion which consistsonly in this, that they are consciousof their actionsand ignorantof the causesby which they are determined. This, then, is their idea of freedom-that they do not know any causeof their actions. Similarly, when we look at the sun,we imagine it as about 200 feet away from us, an error that doesnot consist simply in this imagining,but in the fact that while we imagine it in this way, we are ignorant of its true distanceand of the causeof this imagining. For even if we later come to know

45

Mind and Bodv that it is more than 600 diametersof the earth away from us, we neverthelessimagine it as near. For we imaginethe sun so near not becausewe do not know its true distance,but because an affection of our body involves the essenceof the sun insofar as our body is affectedby the sun. Spinoza seemsto be saying here that consideredin itself no idea is false, but false belief or elror consists in having inadequatefragmentary and confused-ideas, which are not recognized as such, or having such ideasoutside of a context in which they are ovenidden by others. A similar analysis of error is found in IIp I 7sch, where talking about the mind's imagining things which in fact are not present he writes: [T]he imaginationsof the Mind, consideredin themselves containno error, or. . . the Mind doesnot err from the fact that it imagines,but only insofar as it is consideredto lack an idea that excludesthe existenceof thosethings that it imagines to be presentto it. Descartes'analysis of error presupposesthree theses which Spinozaexplicitly denies in IIp48 and 49 andtheir scholia. The first is his doctrinethat the will is free. Spinozaexpresseshis rejectionof this doctrine in IIp48, where he writes that "In the Mind there is no absolute,or free, will, but the Mind is determinedto will this or that by a causewhich is also determinedby another,and this again by another, and so to infinity." This proposition is a consequenceof his general metaphysicaldoctrinethat every finite mode is determinedto existence and action by another, which is in turn determined by another,and so on ad infinitum (Ip28). More radically, Spinozaalso deniesthat actsof will (volitions) are distinct from perceptions(ideas). He expressesthis in llp49, which states that "In the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation,except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea," adding in the corollary that the will and the intellect-singular volitions and ideas-are "one and the same." Spinozaarguesfor the identity of will and intellect by attemptingto establish(i) that an affirmationmust involve an idea; and (ii) an idea must involve an affirmation. The first point seemsplausible and unproblematic. One must have an idea s?y, of a triangle, in order to affirm anything about a triangle or that a triangle exists. But the second is not so obvious. Why can't one just have an idea of a thing without either affirming (or denying) anyhing about it or that it exists? Spinoza's official argument,given in the demonstrationto llp49, fails for a number of reasons. But he has another line of thought which does offer support for his claim that every idea involves an affirmation. It appears in his responseto an

46

Mind and Body anticipated objection to the view, that "experience seems to teach nothing more clearly than that we can suspendour judgment so as not to assentto things we perceive." Spinoza answersthe objection first by giving his own analysisof so-called"suspensionofjudgment": [W]hen we say that someonesuspendsjudgment, we are saying nothing but that he seesthat he doesnot perceive the thing adequately.Suspensionofjudgment, therefore,is really a perception,not [an act ci{Jfree will (Ilp49cor,sch). He continues To understandthis clearly, let us conceivea child imagining a winged horse,and not perceivinganything else. Since this imaginationinvolvesthe existenceof the horse (by P l7C), and the child doesnot perceiveanything elsethat excludesthe existenceof the horse,he will necessarilyregard the horse as present. Nor will he be able to doubt its existence,though he will not be certainof it (Ilp49cor,sch). Spinoza'sreferencehereto IIplTcor seemsto show that what he has in mind is that for someoneto imagine a winged horse and nothing else which excludes the existenceof the horse, is for his body to be affected in the way it would be affected by an actual winged horse. Thus, to imagine a winged horse and nothing else which excludes the existence of the horse is also to be in the same stateof mind as one would be in if one perceivedan actualwinged horse. And sincethe latter involves an affirmation or assent,so must the form er.t' Given that Spinozarejects the Cartesiandoctrine that volitons or acts of will are distinct from ideas, it follows that he must also reject Descartes'analysisof judgment as involving the two distinct acts of perceiving and affirming. But it does not follow, oS some commentators have thought, that ideas simply are judgments or beliefs.r3 Spinoza clearly maintains that we can have an idea of something's being the case without judging that it is the case-as is shown in the exampleof the sun (Ilp35sch; above,pp. 45 - 46). What he seemsto hold is that we judge somethingto be so if our idea that it is so prevails over other competing ideas(or if there are no competing ideas). Although the conception of ideas as dynamic interacting entities is only developedby Spinoza in the context of his psychology (which forms the subject of the next chapter),it clearly underlies his theory ofjudgment and belief.

SubstanceMonism and the Doctrine of Mode

,\7

Mind and Bodv

Identity In chapter 2 we saw that Spinoza's definition of God as "substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresseseternaland infinite essence"presenteda critical problem for his monism. Becauseeach attribute is both causally and concepfually independentof all the others,the one substanceseemedto be little more than a collection of mutually independent entities. Spinoza did explicitly denY,os we saw, that becausetwo attributeswere conceived as "really distinct" or "one without the help of the other" we could therefore concludethat they constitutedtwo substances.And in Ethics II he explains the union of mind and body as a special case of a universal relation between modes of the attribute thought and those of extension(IIp7). This relation showsthat the one substanceis at leasta union, and not a mere collection,of attributes. Further, this union is necessdU,sinceeachof the atfributesnecessarilyexists(Iplgand dem). This meansthat it is impossiblefor substanceto be "decomposed"into its attributes, and that is enough to satisff some commentatorson this issue.ta But this still does not seem to be a sufficient explanationof the unity of substance.What is the difference between a single substance which consistsof a necessaryunion of attributes,and a necessaryunion of substancesof one attribute? Perhapsthe answer is that there is no difference, but Spinoza's claim to have presented a significant metaphysicalmonism would be strongerif we could find one.tt At the other end of the spectrumof solutions to the problem of the plurality of the attributes is that of H.A. Wolfson who takes the attributesto be merely the subjectiveway the human mind perceives God.16 I will not dwell on what can be said in favor of this solution, since I think enoughcan be said againstit to rule it out. What is wrong with it is that Spinoza clearly assertsthat we have an adequateidea of the attributes (they are among the common notions). To say that we have an adequateidea of somethingis to say that God has the idea of that thing insofar as he constitutesour mind, and in God all ideas are ffue. Spinoza also explicitly states that "An infinite intellect comprehends nothing except God's attributes and his affections" (Ilp4dem). Overall, he saystoo much which contradictsthe view that the attributes are merely a figment of human subjectivity to seriously entertainit. Alan Donagan appeared to be on a promising track when he suggestedthat definitions 4 and 6 of Ethics I should be interpretedas assertingnot that God's essenceconsists of an infinity of different essences, but that each diverseattributefully expressesthe one essence

48

Mind and Body of God.r7 A considerationwhich makes it particularly attractive to think of the attributesas each expressingthe samedivine essenceis that this interpretation offers an explanation of the parallelism of the modes of different attributes,which otherwise appearsto be lacking. Spinoza elaborates on the relation between coffesponding modes of different attributesin llpTcor,sch: twlhatever can be perceivedby an infinite intellect as constitutingan essenceof substancepertainsto one substance only, and consequently. . . the thinking substanceand the extendedsubstanceare one and the samesubstance,which is now comprehendedunder this attribute,now under that. So also a mode of extensionand the idea of that mode are one and the samething, expressedin two ways. Someof the Hebrews seemto have seenthis, as if through a cloud, when they maintained that God, God's intellect and the things understoodby Him are one and the same. For example,a circle existing in natureand the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, areone and the samething, which is explained through different attributes. Therefore,whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute,we find one and the sameorder, or one and the sameconnectionof causes,i.e., that the samethings follow one another. In this passage Spinoza takes parallelism (expressed in the last sentence)to be a consequenceof something deeper, namely, mode identiQ (expressedhere in the secondsentence). That the mind and the body are one and the same thing-a special case of mode identity-is expressedby him atllp2lsch and IIIp2sch. Recently some commentatorshave focused on the mode identity thesis,interpretingit in ways which also provide a basisfor explaining how each of the conceptuallyindependentattributescan be understood as expressingthe same, single divine essence.tt I shall not elaborate here on their interpretations, but I want to make clear why it is importantthat ways have beenfound to make it intelligible how a mode of extensionand the idea of that mode can be one and the same thing (numericallyidentical). Recall the questionwe askedabove: what would be the difference between a single substanceconsisting of a necessaryunion of an infinity of attributes,and a necessaryunion of an infinity of substances each having one attribute? One difference would seem to lie in the relation between the modes of the substances. That is, if A and B are then the modificationsof A and those numerically distinct substances,

49

Mind and Body of B must be numerically distinct. (It seemsindisputablethat Spinoza would have acceptedthis principle.) Conversely,if the modifications of substanceA and substanceB are not numerically distinct-i.e., if they are identical-then A and B are not numerically distinct substances,but they are one and the same substance. In other words, the significance of Spinoza's claim of substancemonism lies in numerical mode identiW.

Summary For Descartes,mind and body are two essentiallydistinct entities, a thinking substanceand a certain configuration of accidents(modes) of extension,joined by God in the concretehuman being in such a way that they are able to interact causally with one another. For Spinoza who holds that there is only one substance,God, mind and body are modes,of thought and extension,respectively. Since Spinozadenied the possibility of causal interaction between modes of different attributesas unintelligible, he rejectedthe Cartesianexplanationof the union of mind and body. On his own account mind and body are essentiallylinked as idea and object: the mind is God's idea of an actually existing body. It differs from God's ideasof other bodiesas its body differs from others (in complexity, etc.). Spinoza held further that the relation between any mode of any affribute and its idea in God (hencethe relation of mind and body) was that of identity. For him all of the mind's cognitive limitationsand abilities,including its ability to know the nature of the external world and the essenceof God, ffe explainedin terms of the mind's being the idea of the body. Thus, for Spinoza,the mind is not a specialcreation of God, and knowledge is a natural function, not a supernaturalgift. Spinoza's tendency toward naturalism is also shown in his rejection of Descartes'analysisof judgment and the accounthe offers in its place. For Descartesto judge that something is the case is to freely affirm or deny an idea. Spinoza, however, denies both the existenceof free will (human and divine), and that ideas are separate from volitions or affirmations. On his account to judge that something is the caseis for that idea to prevail over others in the mind. Judgment, in other words, is a natural occurrence,not the act of a being which is outside of nature or insulated from natural forces (a thinking substance). Finally, Spinoza's thesis of mode (mind-body) identity is an integralpart of his doctrine of substancemonism, and providesthe key to understandingthe unity of the one substance.

50

I

Mind and Body

Endnotes t "synopsis" of the Meditations, CSM II, l0; Meditation Yl CSM 1T,54. ' The Passionsof the Soul I, 8; CSM I, 330. t The Passions of the SoulI,T;CSM I,330. o The Passions of the Soull, l3;CSM I 333. t MeditationVl; CSM II, 56. u The Passionsof the Soul l, 3l ; CSM I, 340. t c s M 1 , 3 4 1. t Letters59 and 60. ' Meditation III, CSM II, 35. to Lloyd 1996, 97. tt Descartesdoes allow that ideasmay be materially false. For a discussionof materialfalsity, seeWilson, l0l - 120. t2 In my "spinoza's Theory of Belief' (unpublished)I show how his doctrine that every idea involves an affirmation appearsto be linked to his doctrine that everything strives to perseverein its being. (The latter is discussedbelow, in chapter4.) t' SeeBennett1984,162-6i;Matson,67-8l. ra Curley is one example(1988,29 - 30). The French commentator, Martial Gueroult, held that Spinoza'sGod is a union of one-attributesubstances(Gueroult, 232). His explanationof their unity is complicated,but at leastpartly is based on the necessityof their union. His interpretationis critically discussed in Donagan1973. ruwolfson I, 148- 56. Donagan 1973, 176-77. The same point is made by Joachim,25; 103. " BennettI 984, l4l-149; Della Rocca lgg3; 1996,chs.6 - g.

51

Psychology

Introduction Spinoza'spsychology and ethics-his doctrinesexplaining why human beingsthink, feel, and act the way they do, and how they should live and interact with each other-are presentedin Ethics III - V (through Vp20). These doctrinesrest on his conceptionof the mind which is developedin Ethics II. According to this conception(a) the mind is the idea of the body; (b) the mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived under different attributes; (c) the mind is a complex systemof ideas,just asthe body is a complex systemof bodies;and (d) the mind has much inadequate and some adequate knowledge of things. The imaginative knowledge it has of itself, the body, external bodies, and finite modes in general, is inadequate;but the common notions or knowledge of the attributes of extension and thought and what can be deduced frorn them, are adequate. Spinoza opens Ethics III with some critical remarks directed at previous writers who have dealt with human psychology, viz., that they have treated their subject matter as something "outside nature," conceivingof "man in natureas a dominion within a dominion." As a result, they have failed to determineboth "the nature and powers of the Affects" or what "the Mind can do to moderatethem." Even Descartes, who had the explicit aim of giving a scientifictreatmentof the emotions, was guilty of this eror sincehe took the will to be exempt from the causal

52

Psychology determinism which pervades all physical nature, and concluded that absolutecontrol over the passionswas within anyone'scapacity.' Spinoza assertshis own commitment to naturalismwhen he writes in the Preface to Ethics III that lN]arure is always the same,and its virtue and power of acting are everywhereone and the same,i.e., the laws and rules of nature, according to which all things hapPetr,and changefrom one form to another,are always and everywherethe same. So the way of understandingthe nature of anything, of whatever kind, must also be the same,viz., through the universallaws and rules of nature. The Affects, therefore,of hate, anger,env), etc., consideredin themselves,follow from the samenecessityand force of nature as the other singular things. Consistentwith this naturalisticapproach,Spinoza's psychology is thoroughly deterministic. As we saw in the last chapter, it is a consequenceof Spin oza's generalmetaphysicaldoctrine that there is no such thing as freedom of the will. As a finite mode the mind is necessarilydeterminedto exist and act by another finite mode, which in turn is determinedby another,and so on ad infinitum (IlpaSdem). At the heart of Spinora's psychologyand ethics are two fundamental concepts:the active/passivedistinction and his notion of the conatus,or striving of each individual to persevere in its own being. The distinction is the distinctionbetweenbeing self-determined activelpassive and being underthe control of somethingexternal. To suffer a passionor passiveemotion is to be underthe control of somethingexternal. Human virtue and happinessconsistin becomingmore active or self-determining and less passive. And human interactionsare most beneficial to all concernedwhen the participants are active or self-determining. The endeavoror striving of a thing to persistin its own being both explains why human beings think and act as they do, and provides the basic prescription or "dictate of reason" for what everyone should do, viz., i'lou. himself, seekhis own advantage.. . and. . . strive to preservehis own being as far as he can" (lvp I Ssch).

The Active/PassiveDistinction At the beginning of Ethics III, Spinoza distinguishesbetweenwhat he calls adequateand inadequtecausation:

53

Psychology D I : I call that causeadequatewhose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceivedthrough it. But I call it partial or inadequate,if its effect cannot be understoodthrough it alone. Based on this definition he formulates a general notion of action and passion(being actedon):

\

f.

,l

Y

I I t r

t

I

! i

{ ; \\ i

D2: I say that we act when somethinghappens,in us or outside us, of which we are the adequatecause.. . . I say that we are actedon when somethinghappensin us, or something follows from our nature,of which we are only a partial cause. As we have already seen Spinoza denies that there can be any interactionbetweenbody and mind; hence passivemental statescannot be causedby any bodily statesor events (IIp6, IIIp2). But since "the Mind and the Body are one and the samething," it follows that "the order of actionsand passionsof our Body is, by nature,at onewith the order of actionsand passionsof the Mind" (IIIp2sch). Spinoza maintains in IIIp I and p3 that insofar as the mind has adequateideas it acts and insofar as it has inadequateideasit is passive. This is becausewhen an idea is adequatein the mind, God hasthat idea or is the causeof that idea insofaras he constitutesthe mind. In general, the causeof an idea of x is the idea of the causeof x (by the parallelism of modesof thought and extension). Those things of which the human mind has adequateideasare things the ideasof whosecausesare also in the human mind, i.e., things which are "common to all" and "equally presentin the part and in the whole." These include the attributesand whatever follows from the attributes (the infinite modes). Becausean attributeis conceivedthrough itself or has no further causethrough which it must be understood,the idea of an attribute (and consequently,of whateverfollows from an attribute)must be adequatein every mind. By contrast,when the mind has an inadequateidea of a thing, the idea of the causeof the thing is beyond the reach of the mind. That is, God doesnot have the idea of the causeof the thing insofar as he constitutesthe mind. Therefore,sincethe idea of the causeof the thing is the causeof the idea of the thing, the mind itself is not (doesnot contain)the causeof its idea. For Spinozathe passionsproper, or passiveemotions,are simply a subclassof inadequateidea. But he also maintainsthat there are active emotions,ones which we have in virhre of our capacityto form adequate ideas. Minimizing the former and maximizing the latter is a goal of rational behavior.

54

Psychology

The Conatusor Striving to Persist Spinoza's doctrine of the conatus or striving to persist, is expressedin IIIp4 -p9. Its core is constitutedby propositions6 and 7, which are as follows: P6: Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strivesto . l..l * .. q -fr li r r persevere in its being. 'r' i, ?o' .-,,,*,,,,, \ P7: The striving by which eachthing strivesto perseverein its being is nothing but the actualessenceof the thing. F

.

/

,

-

A fundamentalquestionconcerningthis doctrine is whether or not the striving which these propositions attribute to things should be interpretedteleologically. A -El-ealogicalinterpretation would construe these propositionsas assertingthat each thing aims at its own selfpreservation,or that the goal of continuing in existenceis a fundamental and irreducible factor in explaining the behavior of things. Such an interpretationneednot hold that individualsare necessarilyconsciousof this goal or tendency,that they consciouslyaim at self-preservation.A nonteleological interpretation would construe the conatus doctrine as asserting merely that each thing has a certain nature which is a determining factor in whatever happensto it, and which, if the thing were left to itself (not interferedwith, or affectedby anything external),would determinethat the thing continue indefinitely in a certain way. Viewed in this woy, the principle that each thing strivesto continue in its being would be a generalizationof the principle of inertia, which Spinoza expressesas "a body in motion moves until it is determinedby another . a body at rest also remains at rest until it is body to rest; and determinedto motion by another" (lemrna3cor, following IIpl3). Elsewhere in the Ethics Spinoza explicitly rejects teleological explanationsor explanationsof happeningsin terms of a goal or purpose or aim. He usesthe term "final cause"to refer to a purpose or aim taken as having explanatorypower, and writes in I Appendix that \,, Nature hasno end set before it, and . . . all final causesare nothing but human fictions. . . . tAlll things proceedby a certaineternalnecessityof nature,and with the greatest perfection.

\ : ,'

. . . tT]his doctrineconcerningthe end turns nature completely upsidedown. For what is really a cause,it considersas an effect, and conversely. . . . What is by nature prior it makes posterior.(l Appendix; seealso IV Preface.)

55

Psychology Another important point in support of the nonteleological interpretation of the striving to persist is that there is nothing in the demonstrations of IIIp4-9 which requires or supports a teleological interpretation. In fact, the demonstrationof IIIpT (and the proposition itself) strongly suggestsotherwise: From the given essenceof eachthing somethings necessarily follow (by IP36), and things are able [to produce] nothing but what follows necessarilyfrom their determinatenature (by lp29). So the power of each thing, or the striving by which it (either alone or with others)doesanything,or strives to do anything-i.e., (by P6), the power, or striving, by which it strivesto perseverein its being, is nothing but the given or actualessenceof the thing itself, q.e.d. This passageseemsto say that what explainswhat a thing does alone or how it interactswith other things, is the thing's essence-its fundamental nature. And that seemsto be quite different from saying that the goal of continuing in existenceexplainswhat the thing does. By contrast,the use Spinoza makes of his conatus docffine in his psychology strongly supportsa teleologicalinterpretationof the notion of striving. This is particularly evident in the usehe makesof the doctrine to derive tIIpl2 and pl3, which are fundamentalto his entirepsychology. Proposition l2 statesthat "The mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increaseor aid the Body's power of acting." Spinoza proves this propositionby first pointing out that when the mind imagines things which increasethe body's power of acting, the body is in fact affected in a way in which its power of acting is increased;hence the mind's power of acting must also be increased.He then arguessimply that "Therefore (byP6 or P9) the mind, as far as it can, strives to imagine thosethings,q.e.d." The demonstrationof IIIpl3, that "When the Mind imagines those things that diminish or resffain the Body's power of acting, it strives,as far as it can, to recollect things that exclude their existence,"is similar. In it Spinozareasonssimply that since the mind's own power of acting is diminished as long as it imaginesa thing which diminishesthe body's power of acting, and sincethe mind continuesto imagine a thing until it imagines somethingelse which excludesthe thing's existence,it follows that the mind will strive, as far as it can, to imagineor recollectwhat will excludethe thing's existence.Clearly,in both thesepropositions,the mind's increasingor retaining undiminished its own power of acting is invoked as a goal to explain the direction of thought. This teleological use of the principle of the conatus or striving

56

Psychoto*t l appearsto be inconsistentnot only with Spinoza'srejectionof teleologicali explanations and final causes,but also with his commitment to the i naturalistic premise that we must understandeverything in nature in the ' samegeneral kind of way. There is no evidencethat Spinozathinks that there is room for teleologicalexplanationsin physics. The movementsof a body are to be explainedpurely in terms of efficient causation,i.e., in terms of the forces acting on that body, not in terms of any goal sought by it. (In this respectthe basicallyCartesianphysicsof Spinozadiffers from that of Aristotle who held that different kinds of bodies have a natural tendencyto move to the centeror periphery of the universe.) How then can there be such explanationsin psychology or the human sciencesin general? The only way I can think of to reconcile Spinoza's rejection of teleology,his commitmentto the view that all things can be explained in the samegeneralkinds of ways, and his teleologicaluse of the principal of striving is that he regardsa teleologicalprinciple of striving as a kind of stopgapexplanationof the behavior of many things until we have a better understanding of the efficient causes which determine their behavior. In other words, he holds that in principle, any teleological explanation-any explanationin terms of the aims or goals of the subject, including the airrn of perseveringin its own being-can be replacedby one in terms of efficient causation. Consider for a momentwhat is involved in the behaviorof complex individuals when they appearto be acting for the goal of self-preservation, or where their actions appearto be explainablein terms of a tendency toward self-preseration. Behaviorappearsto be most obviously oriented toward this goal when an individual does somethingadaptivein response to an environmentalchange. For example,when the environment turns colder, the blood vesselsclose to the skin in a warrn-blooded animal contract, with the result that less heat is lost and body temperature is maintained. Under conditionsof scarcefood supply or near starvation, so lessfuel is burned and body the metabolic rate of an animaldecreases, weight is maintained. We know that many such adaptivebehaviorsare explainablein terms of "feedback"mechanisms,that the body of a wann blooded animal, for instance,has a biological thermostaticmechanism which functions analogouslyto that of the thermostaton a furnace. It is not implausibleto believethat all suchadaptivebehaviorscan be similarly explained. Clearly, having a sizablerepertoireof suchadaptivebehaviors enablesa complex individual to endure and preserveits being just as though it were ultimately governed by the tendency or goal of selfpreservation. Thus, to say an individual "strives to perseverein its being" may be

57

Psychology taken to mean simply that an individual has some feedbackmechanisms which enable it to respond adaptively to its environment. Such mechanismsand responsescan include oneswhich are preemptive,such as storing fat when food is plentiful, or other activities under "friendly" conditions which result in an increasedcapacity to adapt to and endure hostile ones. Spinozaneed have no more than this in mind when he reasonsfrom the fact that "Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to perseverein its beirry" to "The Mind, as far as it can, strivesto imaginethosethings that increaseor aid the Body's power of acting."

The PassiveEmotions (Passions) Spinozaoffers the following definition of an affect or emotion: D3: By affect I understandaffectionsof the Body by which the Body's power of acting is increasedor diminished,aided or restrained,and at the sametime, the ideasof these affections. He then addsin explanation: }i:'

Lr

\; \

Therefore, if we can be the adequatecauseof any of these affections,I understandby the Affect an action;otherwise,a passion. Spinoza speaks of the emotions both as they relate to the mind alone,and as they relate to mind and body. By the identity of mind and body, the idea of a bodily statewhich involves a transition to greateror lesserpower of acting will itself constitute the mind's transition to a greateror lesserpower of acting (IIIpl l). Consideredin relationto the mind alone,the passionsproper, or passiveernotions,are ideasof passive statesof the body which involve a changein the body's power of acting. As such,they area subclassof imaginativeideas(ideasof the affections of the body causedby externalbodies),hence arenecessrilyinadequate or confused(IIp28). Spinozarecognizesthree primary affects in terms of which all the otherscan be understoodor analyzed. Joy is the passionby which the mind passesto a greaterperfection;sadnessthat by which it passesto a lesserone (IIIpl lsch). What Spinozaidentifiesasthe third of the primary affects,desire,is in fact not coveredby the official definition of "affect" (IIIdfn3, above), although in the "General Definition of the Affects" (given at the end of Ethics III) Spinozaadds a somewhatawkward clause to cover desire.2 In a generalsensedesireis simply the striving for self preservation(lllp9sch; "Definitions of the Affects I"). For a personto

58

Psychology have a particular desire is for the person to be determined to act in a certain way; and for the mind to have a particular desire is for it to be determinedto think certain thoughts (III, "Definitions of the Affects I"; "General Definition of the Affects"). The principle of striving (IIIp6) implies that in generalwe will seekor desireto obtain joy and avoid or minimize sadness(IIIp 12, 13, 25, 26, 28, 29, 54). All other emotionsare either varietiesofjoy, sadness,or desire,or combinationsof these. Thus, love is joy accompaniedby the idea of an external cause;hatred is sadnessaccompaniedby the idea of an external cause; and jealousy is a vacillation of mind between love and hate (IIIp I 3cor,sch;p35sch). The passiveemotionscan be arouseddirectly by our body or a part of it being affectedby somethingwhich itself causesit to undergo some ffansition in its power of acting; or indirectly,through the associationof ideas (IIIpl4). Through associationanything can become a source of pleasureor pain or an object of desire(IIIpl5); we can feel love or hatred for things for no other reasonthan becausethey resemble or otherwise remindus of otherthingswhich we love or hate(IIIpl5, lSsch., l6). The passive emotions can also be arousedby "sympathy" or our becoming aware of someonelike ourselveswho is experiencingsome emotion. Sharing or imitating someone'ssadnessin this way is pity; sharing or imitating their desireis emulation. The imitation of a person's love for what she alone can possessleadsto a desireto possessthat thing which being ftustratedleadsto envy, a speciesof hatred (sadness)causedby another'sgood fortune (III, "Definitions of the Affects" XXIII). In addition to the passiveemotions,there are emotions which are related to us insofar as we act. "When the mind considers itself and its power of acting it rejoices" (IIIp53). Since insofar as it has adequate ideasit doesnecessarilyconsideritself and its power of acting, adequate thinking (thinking in which we are the causeof our own ideas) involves joy. Further, sinceour sffiving to perseverein our own being is expressed both in adequateand inadequateideas(IIIp9), and since this striving is desire,desirecan be active as well as passive. But there are no active emotions of sadness,sinceby Spinoza'sconafusdoctrine, we cannot be the causeof our own sadness(transitionto a lower level of activity).

The Strength of the Passions One of Spinoza'saims in Ethics III and IV is to give an account of the "nature and strength"of the passions,with a view toward determining how we can control them, and to what degree. What is bad about the 59

Psychology passionsis that in so far as we are subjectto them, w€ are "driven about in many ways by externalcauses,and that, like waveson the sea,driven by contrary winds, we toss about,not knowing our outcomeand our fate" (IIIpS9sch). Because we are finite modes, or part of Nature, it is inevitable that we are acted on or passive;and becausefor every finite thing in nature,there is anotherwhich is more powerful, or by which the first can be destroyed,it follows that our power is infinitely surpassedby the power of externalthings (lVax l, p2-p4). Spinoza's doctrine of the force or strength of the passionsrests ultimately on his conception of ideas as dynamic entities, and a semiimplicit theory of force relationsamong them. Every idea is an individual modification of thought, hence every idea has itself a certain force of existing or strives to perseverein its being. The passionsof joy and sadness(and all their varieties)area subclassof imaginativeideas,viz., those whose objects are modifications of the body which involve a transitionin the body's power of activity. Becausea passionis the idea of a bodily modification,its strengthis proportionateto that of the bodily modification, and like that of the bodily modification, is partly derived from and partly dependson its externalcause(IVps). For this reasonany emotion may be beyond our control (lvp6). Further,as an imaginative idea, a passionwill persist as long as the bodily modification persists (IIp I Tcor) and it will be able to be resffainedor removedonly by the idea of a bodily modificationwhich involvesthe oppositetransition,i.e., an oppositeaffect (Ivp7). Whether it is resffainedor destroyedwill depend on the relative strengthof the two affects. Although Spinoza'saccount of the strength of the passions focuses on their external causes,we ourselvesare a causeof the strengthand persistenceof joyful passions, insofar as by our nature we seek to be affected with joy. Spinoza recognizesthis when he notesthat a desirethat arisesfrom joy "must be defined both by human power and the power of the external cause" (IVpl8dem). As an imaginative idea an emotion is strengthenedby other ideas which posit the existenceof its object and restrainedby other ideaswhich exclude its object'sexistence.Thus our emotionstoward things which we imagine as present are stronger than those toward things which we imagine as future or past and not present,sinceto imagine a thing as not presentis to imagine it along with somethingthat excludesits existence. Similarly our emotionstoward things which are not presentbut which are imagined as nearer in time-e.g., in the recent past-are strongerthan those toward things which are more removed from the present,sinceto imagine a thing as nearerin time is to imagine things which excludeits existencelessthan if it is imaginedas temporallymore distant(IVp9 and

60

Psychology dem and sch;.p10 and dem and sch). Modality affectsour imagination of things,and henceour emotionstoward them, in a way similar to time. Thus, an emotion toward a thing we imagine as necessaryis (other things being equal) stronger than one which we imagine as possible or contingent, since to imagine something as necessaryis to affirm its existence,but to imagine it as merely possibleor contingentis to imagine what excludesits presentexistence(IVpl l-pl3).

-*"1 ,! rt

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Controlling the PassiveEmotions Spinozaremarks in the Prefaceto Ethics V, that becausethe power of the Mind is defined only by understanding,&sI have shownabove,we shall determine,by the Mind's knowledge alone,the remediesfor the affects. There is one obvious sensein which control of the passionsdepends on knowledge, viz., w€ needffue judgmentsconcerningwhat is good and bad to guide our actions. But sincethe force of an idea is not a function of its truth, suchjudgments have no power to move us and no power againstthepassionsinsofaras they aretrue (IVplsch; pl4).Only insofar as such judgments are themselvesaffects (ideas of a transition in the body's power of acting) are they able to exercisea restrainingforce on emotionswhich are opposedto them (IVp8, l4). Descarlesagreeswith Spinozathat ffue judgnents are necessarybut, in themselves,insufficient "weapons" against the passions. What is needed rather are "firm and determinatejudgments bearing upon the knowledgeof good and evil, which the soul has resolvedto follow in guiding its conduct."3 What is needed,in other words, are judgments backedup by the power of the will. Descartesdefinesthe passionsas "those perceptions,sensationsor emotionsof the soul which we refer particularly to it, and which are caused,maintainedand strengthened by somemovementof the spirits."4 By the "spirits" Descartesmeans what he calls the "animal spirits," a rarified bodily fluid which circulatesthroughoutthe brain, nervoussystem and muscles(seeabove,p. ). When he saysthe passionsarery,1p$pd!"9.-. fk_ryyl"he meansthat we feel them as being in the soul (in contrastto e.9.,hunger,which is referredto the body, and heat which is referredto

6l

Psychology some external body). He notes that as perceptions,the passions are obscure and confused; and that they are better called "emotions" on account of their ability to agitateand disturb the soul.s Descartesdoesnot hold that we have direct, voluntary control over the passionsbecausethe passionsare a type of perception,and in general, we do not have direct'control over whether we will perceive a thing or not. Thus, just as I cannot prevent my hearing a loud noise merely by willing not to hear it, so I cannotprevent my feeling a surgeof anger or fear merely by willing not to feel it. We do, however, have direct voluntary control over our bodily movementssuchas striking or running; hencewe are generallyable,by an act of will, to preventthe movements of the body which accompany a passion, or to intemrpt the natural sequenceof physical eventswhich occurs in casesof anger and fear.u (The physical manifestationsof a passionare not causedby the passion, but on Descartes' account, are simply a reflex responseto the same physical stimuluswhich also setsin motion the chain of eventsthat results , in the passion.) We alsohave a kind of indirect voluntarycontrol over the passions insofar as we have the ability to alter the natural or learned sequencesof eventswhich result in our feeling someemotion. Descartes appearsto think that we can do this either by breaking a connection between certain movementsof the pineal gland and certainthoughts in the mind; or by breaking a connectionbetweendifferent movementsof the pineal gland and animal spirits. In other words, we can recondition or train ourselvesto feel courageinsteadof fear when we seea dangerous animal or shared pleasure instead of envy when we hear about a colleague'ssuccess.Descaftesis somewhatvagueaboutthe mechanism by which new emotionalresponsepatternsare created,but he evidently thinks there is no limit to our ability to createthem. He writes

l"JJffi ;'"lli:ii';Ilr;Hl;,'il,TiiTi::3i,,' evident that we can do so still more effectively in the caseof men. Even thosewho have the weakestsoulscould acquire absolutemasteryover all their passionsif we employed sufficient ingenuity in training and guiding them.7 But even on Descartes' own theory of mind and body, it is implausible to hold that the mind can have such absoluteor unlimited control of its passions.Grantedthat the will is free, the body is still, as Spinoza would put it, a part of nature, and the mind, insofar as it perceives,is subjectto the effects of extendednature. Hence the body. and the mind insofar as it is subject to being affectedby the body, may resistour best attemptsto reprogramtheir responses.Spinozahad this in

62

Psychology mind when he remarkedin criticism of Descartes, [N]or do I know whetherthe motions of the Passionswhich we havejoined closelyto firm judgments can be separated from them againby corporealcauses. If so, it would follow that although the Mind had firmly resolvedto face dangers, and had joined the motions of daring to this decision, nevertheless,oncethe dangerhad been seen,the gland might be so suspendedthat the Mind could think only of flight (V Preface). Nevertheless,Spinozais in agreementwith Descartesin holding that the ability to create new patternsof emotional responseis an important part of the control we have over our emotions,althoughthis ability is not unlimited or absolute. When the mind is not in a state of emotional agitation it is able to order and connect the affections of the body "accordingto the order of the intellect." For example, By this power of rightly ordering and connectingthe affections of the Body, we can bring it about that we are not easily affectedwith evil affects For example,we have laid it down as a maxim of life . . . that Hate is to be conqueredby Love, or Nobility, not by repaying it with Hate in return. But in order that we may always have this rule of reasonreadywhen it is needed,we ought to think about and meditatefrequently on the common wrongs of men, and how they may be warded off best by Nobility. For if we join the image of a wrong to the imaginationof this maxim, it will always be ready for us(by IIP 18) when a wrong is done to us (Vp l0sch). The differences between Spinoza and Descartes,however, go beyonddisagreementover whetheror not we can have absolutemastery over our passions. For Descartes,the source of our power over the passionslies in the will. By the strengthof our will we reprogram our brainsand the rnind-bodyconnectionin the way our intellectjudges to be the best. Igf lp riroza'\vill and intellectare one and the same"(Ilp49cor), andthe sourceof the mind's power lies in knowledge. Reprogramingour emotionalresponsesis more than just replacing "bad" responseswith "good" ones. It involvesdevelopingand restrucfuringour mind or mental life in such a way that our thoughts and emotions become more determinedfrom within and lessdeterminedby externalcauses. In both our cognitive and our emotional lives, the strengthor power of the mind is manifest in adequatethinking (lllp 1,3; IVdfnS). In

63

Psychology adequatethinking the mind itself is the cause of both its affective or emotional and non-affective or cognitive states,althoughthesecannot be separated,since insofar as the mind thinks adequatelyit experiencesjoy (IIIp58). A strong mind is one whosethought is generally,orto a greater extent,governed by its adequateideas. Such a mind may have as many inadequateideas as any other, but these play a lesserrole or are even insignificant in determining the direction of its thought. Spinoza's example of our two ideas of the sun can be used to illustrate this (Ilp35sch; IVplsch; above,pp. 45 - 46). What we know fully adequately is only the common notions and what follows necessarilyfrom the common notions-€xtension and the infinite eternalmodesof extension. Such knowledge finds expressionin the most basic laws of physical science.No idea of the sun's actualdistancecan be fully adequatefor the samereasonthat no knowledgeof the actualpropertiesof individual furite things can be fully adequate.The ideasof the causesof such things are beyond the reach of the human mind. But the idea of the sun as "more than 600 diametersof the earthaway from us" fits into a theory about how things are,whose framework is provided by the common notions,better than the purely imaginative idea of it as about two hundred feet away. Thus, the idea of the sun as more than 600 diametersof the earth away from us derives more support from the comrnon notions than the idea of it as about 20A feet away. Although the latter doesnot disappear(since it is reinforced by immediateexperience),it is the former which plays a significantrole in our thinking aboutthe sun. A mind whoseconception of the world is predominantly formed by ideas which are connected "according to the order of the intellect" is cognitively strong. Such a mind, however,will also be emotionallystrong,sinceit will dealwith its passionsin the samemannerit dealswith the "illusions" of sense."Illusion" is a poor word to describean ideasuchasthat of the sun as being about 200 feet away, sincethis idea is not about or indicative of nothing real. Rather it is a highly confusedidea of a modificationof our body which is causedby the sun. When we form a broad conceptionof things which includes an idea of the sun's actual distance and a conceptionof how the senseswork and how the modification of the body is causedby the sun, and whose framework is provided by the common notions, then the idea of the sun as about 200 feet away becomes relatively weak in our minds. Like our original idea of the sun,the passiveemotionsare confused or inadequateideas. Through fitting them into a broaderconceptionof things which is framed by the common notions, and within which we understandboth their natureas ideasof modificationsof our body and the nature of their objects, we weaken their relative force. Consider, for

64

Psychology

I

example,my anger at (hatredof) a friend who has betrayeda confidence. To the extent that I understandthe causes of her action I view it as t necessitated,and my hatred is thereby diminished (Vp6). And to the l \ extentthat I understandmy emotion for what it is, viz., a kind of sadness \'\, 1 or idea of my body's transitionto a lower level of activity, I distinguish 1 or separatethe emotion from its object-my friend and her action. Thus t \ L I ceaseto project somethingwhich is only in me-sadness---{n to the t (This is analogousto world as an objective quality of a thing+vil. separatingwhat is merely a featureof a modification of one's body from what is really a properry of the sun.) Insofar as I am able to make such a detachmentof my sadnessfrom its object, I destroythe emotionof hatred, (sadnessaccompaniedby the idea of an external cause),and thus remove one obstaclewhich would preventme from dealing in a rationalway with the sadnessof having a friend betray a confidence. Thus, insofar as a passionis better understood-i.e., insofar as we are able to relateit to the basicconceptualframework provided by the common notions-it ceases to be a passion. Although we can never rid ourselvesof passionsor ensurethat we will never be overcome,through knowledgeor adequate ideaswe put ourselvesmore in charge of our emotions and render them lesseffective. il

ll

I

Summary Spinoza'sdoctrine of the conatu.sor striving of a thing to persevere in its being is a fundamentalprinciple of his psychology.The use Spinoza makesof this principle clearly indicatesthat it is teleologicalin nature, i.e.,to invoke the principle is to explain a thing's behaviorin terms of the goal of increasing or maintaining its power of activity. But such a teleological principle would be in conflict with Spinoza's general rejectionof teleology and with his dual commitment to naturalismand explanation in terms of efficient causation in physics. I suggested, therefore,that for Spinozathe principle of striving is not an ultimate one, but that in principle, any explanationof a thing's behavior in terms of the goal of maintainingor increasingits power of activity could be replaced with one in terms of effrcientcausation. How this can be the casecan be understoodby consideringthe way in which "feedback" mechanisms work to enable complex organisms to respond adaptively to their environment. Spinozadistinguishesthreebasic affects or emotions:joy, sadness desire. Joy and sadnessare sirnply ideas of the body's transitionto and

65

Psychology a greaterand lesserpower of activity, respectively. Desirein the general senseis the mind's sffiving to perseverein its being; specificdesiresare its determinationsto specifickinds of thoughts,e.g.,to desirea houseis to be deterrninedto think aboutthe advantagesof a house. The passions proper, or passiveemotions,are ones of which we ourselvesare not the adequate(complete)cause. The passiveemotionsofjoy and sadness(and all their varieties) are nothing but inadequateideasof bodily stateswhich involve a transition to a greateror lesserpower of activity. And passive desiresare ones in which we are deterrninedby somethingother than ourselves. Thus, to be subjectto the passionsis to be subjectto the control of things outside us. And, insofar as we are finite parts of nature, it is inevitablethat we suffer passions.It is also inevitablethat at timeswe be overcome by a passion, since the strength of a passion is partially dependenton that of its external cause, and our strengthis infinitely surpassedby that of things outsideus. For Spinoza,the sourceof our strengthagainstthe passionslies in knowledge,not, as for Descartes,the will. Like the illusionsof sense,the passionsare simply inadequateideasof the body's modifications. Our power is expressedin adequatethinking. To the degreethat we are able to understandour imaginative ideas which are effors or illusions, and placethem within a conceptualframework which is basedon the common notions of extensionand thought, they ceaseto be illusory, althoughthey do not disappear.Similarly, to the degreethat we understandthe passive emotionsand fit them into the order of the intellect,they too lose their power to compel us.

Endnotes ' ThePassions of the Soul I,4l , 50; CSM I,343,348. 2 The "General Definition of the Affects" is "An Affect that is calleda Passionof the mind is a confusedidea,by which the Mind affirms of its Body, or of some part of it, a greateror lesserforce of existingthan before,which, when it is given, determinesthe Mind to think of this rather than that." 3 ThePassionsof the Soul 1,48; CSM 1,347. o ThePassions of the Soul 1,27; CSM I, 338-39. s ThePassions of he Soul 1,28; CSM 1,339. u ThePassions of the Soul l, 46; CSM l, 345. 7 The Pqssions of the Soul I, 50; CSM I, 348.

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EthicalDoctrine

The metaphysics,theory of knowledgeand psychology of Ethics IIVpl8 providethe frameworkwithin which Spinozadevelopshis ethical doctrine. Insofaras it involvesnotionsof the good, happiness,virtue, and what we should do or how we shouldact, Spinoza's ethics is not strictly deduciblefrom thesedoctrines. Rather,they provide the baseon which Spinozaconstructshis ethicsby addingto them (l) naturalisticdefinitions of "good," "evil" and "virtue;" and (2) the prescriptive premise that (reasondictatesthat) everyoneshould pursue his own advantageor strive as far as he can to perseverein his own being.

Spinoza'sEthical Naturalism Spinoza's analysis of "value terms in general is completely naturalistic.In other words, for him, all suchterms are able to be replaced without loss of meaning,with oneswhich are purely descriptive. Thus, "good," "evil," "beautiful," "ugly," and others"indicate nothing positive in things,consideredin themselves,"but rather are descriptiveof how we or our imaginationis affectedby things (lV Preface; I Appendix). What to us, or preservesour being, or is a source of joy or is advantageous pleasure, or satisfies some desire is said to be good; what is etc., is saidto be evil. Thus, "we neither strive for, nor disadvantageous, will, neitherwant, nor desireanythingbecausewe judge it to be good; on the confrary,we judge somethingto be good becausewe strive for it, will it, want it, and desireit" (IIIp9sch). "Good" and "evil" are thus generally

67

Ethical Doctrine

I i \,,1 '. !\.! t,i'

i;' ";*

relativeto the individual. Becauseindividual humanbeingsdiffer with respect to what affects them with joy or pleasureand have different desires,what is good to one may be indifferent or bad to another (IV Preface;IIIp5 I and sch). Only in a civil stateis therecommon agreement as to what is good and evil (lvp37sch2). In Ethics III Spinozawrites that each personjudges what is good and what is bad "from his own affbct" (p39sch, p5 lsch), but in Ethics IVpS he identifiesthe judgment that a thing is good or evil with the affect or emotion(ofjoy or sadness) itself. This is becauseto judge that a thing is good or evil is simply to be awareofjoy or sadness, i.e.,to have an idea ofjoy or sadness.Hence,by the identity of idea and object,to judge that a thing is good or badjust is to be affectedwith an emotion. The importanceof this identification is that for SpinozaJalue judgments have affective force. To judge that somethingis good (evil) is to be moved to seek(avoid)it. The "strength" of any such judgment is independentof its truth or falsity, and can be outweighedby countervailingpassions,particularlywhen the judgment concernsthings in general(or future or contingentthings)and the passion is fueled by a presentobject (lVp 14-17). Noncognitivism is the view that value judgments do not express facts, or are not susceptible of being true or false. In general, philosophers who identiff moral judgments with (expressions of) emotion-"spotivists"-41s noncognitivists. But this is not the casewith Spinoza,sincehe rejectsthe more basic distinctionbetweenjudgment and emotion on which the cognitivist/noncognitivistdistinction rests. The emotionsfor Spinozaarea subclassof ideas,and a prevailing idea is a judgment. Value judgments generally expressonly a fact about the subject,but they are factual,nonetheless. Spinoza'sanalysisof virtue is similarly naturalistic:"By virtue and power I understandthe samething, i.e., (IIIP7), virtue, in so far as it is relatedto man, is the very essenceor nature of man, in so far as he has the power of bringing about certainthings, which can be understoodthrough the laws of his nature alone" (IVdfnS). Spinoza'snotion of virtue appearsto be relatedto the ancient conceptionofi[gug aSgxqellence. Like that concept,it is applicableto non-humanindividualsas well as to humans,and islot a specifically moral concept. Spinoza's commitment to ethical naturalismis also shown in his "derivation" of the basic ethical doctrine that everyoneshould pursueher own advantage.In this regardhe writes Sincereasondemandsnothing contraryto nature,it demands that everyonelove himself, seek his own advantage,what is really usefulto him, want what will really lead man to a

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Ethical Doctrine greaterperfection,and absolutely,that everyoneshould strive to preservehis own being as far as he can (lvp I Ssch). Although Spinoza speaksof the "dictatesof reason,"on his accountethics reducesto psychology. Knowledgeof human good is simply a matter of knowing what human beings are; and the "guidance of reason" is the guidancewhich adequateknowledgeof human natureprovides.

SomeInitial Difficulties There are two probleffiS,which seemto arise at the outset,for Spin oza's propounding any sort of ethical doctrine. One has to do with his determinism. If human beings are, like everything else in nature, completelynecessitatedin all that they think and do, what point is there in trying to educatethem regardinghow they should live? The answer to this is that although every personis completely determinedin her actions, being introducedto new ideasregardinghow one should live can itself be a determiningfactor in her subsequentbehavior. In fact, if determinism were false, or if, in particular,education,information and new ideas had no tendencywhatsoeverto influencepeople or be a factor in determining their behavior, then it would make no senseto write treatiseswith the intention of demonstratingto them how they should live. If teaching and (. " ""'' educationare to make a difference,determinism must be true. value of with analysis Spinoza's The second problem has to do terms,and is a bit more complicated.If good is not a properff of things, and what is good is relativeto the individual's desires,how can Spinoza claim to offer a generalprescriptionregardinghow a personshould live? Spinoza'sresponseto this potentialobjectionwould be to acknowledge that insofar as human beingsare subjectto passions,almostanything can be an object of desire,henceanything can be a good. But insofar as a personis under the influenceof a passionshe is determinedby external causes,not by her own naturealone. What is truly good for a person is what she sffives for from her own nature alone, what satisfiesher active desires.He also holds, however,that human beings differ in their affects as much as they differ in their nature or essence(IIIp57). Insofar therefore,as he is offering a generalprescription regardingwhat is good for all human beings, Spinozamust assumethat there is some common humannature which all humansshare,or that all human beingsare at least sufficiently similar that his generalprescriptionsmake sense. Based on this generalconceptionof humannature (which I discussat more length below, pp. 76 78), what Spinoza aims to provide with his ethical

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Ethical Doctrine doctrine is knowledge regardinghuman good. Such a good is relative to human nature, in the sensethat what is advantageousor pleasurableto human beings is not necessarilyso to horsesor dolphins,but it is absolute (invariant) with respect to individual human beings insofar as it is a function of human nature or desire.

The Ethical Doctrine To contemporary readers one of the most striking aspects of Spinoza's ethical doctrine is that it is primarily concernedwith the questionof how a person should live and the personaltraits she should cultivate, rather than with questions of right and wrong and our obligations to others. Perhapsa sufficient explanationfor this is his naturalism-outside of a civil societythere are no obligationsto others, and no right and wrong. In any case,in this respecttoo he is more akin to classicalwriters (Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics)than to modernones. Our most fundamental desire is to preserveour being or to live (IVp2l ). To the extent to which we are self-determiningor do what follows from our nature alone,we necessarilydo what preservesour being flIlpa). Virtue is the power to do what follows from our naturealone, to be self-determining(IVdfnS). Sincethere is nothing beyondthemselves for whose sake individuals strive to preserve themselves, selfdeterminationor virtue is an end in itself (IVpl8sch;p25). We are selfdeterminedonly insofaras we have adequateideas(lIIpl,p3). Hence,we act from virnre only insofar as we understand or are determined by adequateideas;and ultimately we seekno end other than understanding. Thus, [TJhingsare good only insofar as they aid man to enjoy the life of the Mind, which is defined by understanding.On the other hand, those that prevent man from being able to perfect his reasonand enjoy the rational life, thoseonly we say are evil GV Appendix, v). SinceGod is an absolutelyinfinite being, and without God nothing else can be known, knowledge of God is both our greatestgood-most advantageousto us-and our greatest virtue-the source of our power (IVp28). We are,however, finite modes,and thus necessarilysubjectto the effects of things outside us and dependenton them. For a personto be completely free, or self-determining,is an unattainableideal, although it is the model which guidesSpinoza'spracticaldoctrine(lV Preface;p67-

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Ethical Doctrine 73). Part of his doctrine is negative,educatingus with respectto the real harm or evil involved in the pursuit and possessionof many apparent goods and virtues. Thus, while joy is always directly or in itself good (since it is an increasein our power of acting), and sadnessis always directly or in itself bad (since it is a decreasein our power of acting),joy can be excessiveand evil. It is so when, as a bodily affect it primarily increasesthe power of acting only of one part of the body, thus disrupting thebody's equilibrium and renderingit lessable to affect, andbe affected by, otherbodies(IVp38,41,43,44). When this happens,the mind is less ableto think and perceive,so suchjoy is actually harmful. Typically, on Spinoza'sview, the passionsare excessive,even to the point of madness: [T]he affects by which we are daily torn are generally related to a part of the Body which is affected more than the others. Generally,then, the affectsare excessive,and occupy the Mind in the considerationof only one object so much that it cannot think of others.. . . [WJe sometimesseethat men are so affected by one object that, although it is not present,they still believe they have it with them. When this happensto a man who is not asleep,we he that is mad or insane.Nor are they thought to be less say with Love, and dream, both night and duy, only burn who mad of a lover or a courtesan.. . . But when a greedyman thinks of nothing elsebut profit, or money, and an ambitiousman of esteem,they are not thoughtto be mad, becausethey are usually troublesomeand are consideredworthy of Hate. But Greed,Ambition, and Lust really are speciesof madness, eventthough they are not numberedamong the diseases ..; (IVpaasch). /': In a similar vein, hUni[ty Qndrepentance,two emotionsordinarily ,:" commendedas virtues,are really speciesof sadness(sadnesswhich comes from considering our own lack of power, and sadnesswhich is accompaniedby the idea of something we believe we have done, respectively-Ill Definitions of the Affects, xxvi, xxvii). Thus, in themselves,they are evil, not good and not virtues, althoughthey may be useful in restraining excessiveemotions, especially ones which are antisocial. Spinozaobserves: The mob is tenifying, if unafraid. So it is no wonder that the not that of Prophets,who consideredthe common advant&Be, the few, commendedHumility, Repentance,and Reverenceso greatly (lVp5asch).

7l

Ethical Doctrine Most desireswhich spring from the passiveaffectsare blind in that they have no regardfor what would be good for the whole individual; all are blind in that they take no account of the long ilr, or whether their satisfactionwill causethe individual to suffer some greaterevil or lose somegreatergood (IVp58schl.,p60 and sch). The most innocent,purest, and greatestpassivejoys have the potential to be bad or harmful-to our disadvantage-when everythingis taken into account. For this reasonwe should sffive to becomethe active generatorsof our desires. We actively generateour own desiresto the extentthat they spring from or are governed by our adequateknowledge. Adequatethinking itself is affective becauseinsofar as the mind thinks adequately it experiencesjoy, and the more it understands,the more it desires to understand. Further, insofar as a person has an adequateunderstanding of himself as a finite mode of thought identical with a certainfinite mode of extension,i.e., as embodied,he understandsthat he has bodily needs that must be satisfiedin order that his mind be capableof understanding, and that bodily pleasureswhich involve an increasein the power of acting of the body as a whole are necessarilyaccompaniedby an increasein the mind's power to think. Therefore, To use things. . . and take pleasurein them as far as possible-not, of course,to the point where we are disgusted with them, for there is no pleasurein that-this is the part of a wise man. It is the part of a wise man, I say,to refreshand restorehimself in moderationwith pleasantfood and drink, with scents,with the beautyof green plants,with decoration, music, sports,the theater,and other things of this kind, which anyone can use_withoutinjury to another. For the human Body is compoGdof a greatmany parts of different natures, which constantlyrequirenew and varied nourishment,so that the whole Body may be equally capableof all the things which can follow from its nature,and hence,so that the Mind also may be equally capableof understandingmany things (IVpa5cor2sch). To experience an emotion or do something which in fact is conduciveto our real advantageis to experienceor do what agreeswith reason;to be determinedby our adequateknowledge of ourselvesto experienceor do it is to experienceor do it from reason. We are genuinely best off when we act from reason becauseonly reasonhas regard to the whole person and for the long run. In any given

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Ethical Doctrine circumstancea person may do the samething under the influence of a passiveemotion as he would do if he were determinedby reason. Under the influenceof pity (sadnessgeneratedin us by another'ssuffering), for example, a personmay be moved to help someone,just ashe would desire to do if he were determinedthrough reasonalone. But only reasonis a reliableguide to action. That is, only when we act from reasondo we do what we know for certain is good (IVp50dem; p50cor,sch). While those passive emotions which are conducive to our real advantageagree with reason, others are always opposed to it. These include all those which essentially involve ignorance-pride and despondency,overestimation and scorn. One cannot be proud or despondentwithout misestimatingone's own power; and one cannot overestimateanotherpersonor be scornful of her without ignoranceof her nature. In general affects of sadnessand the desireswhich arise from them, e.9., hope and fear, are not always opposedto reason,since they may be useful in curbing excessive or harmful pleasures(fear of may preventus from doing somethingpleasantbut foolish), consequences but insofar as we are guided by reason these passive affects serve no necessaryfunction. Reasonalonedeterminesus to choosea lesserpresent { evil over a greaterfuture one. This differencebetweenacting from fear, { f which is a passion, and acting from reason, is important becausethe personwho actsout of fear is motivatedby sadness,while the personwho acts from reason is motivated by joy. And thg latter is sffonger since TI desireswhich spring from joy are,other things being equal,sffongerthan thosewhich spring from sadness,sincethe former derive their strength from ourselvesand an external cause,whereasthe strengthof the latter dependson us alone. The personwho is guided by reasonis strongerthan she who is moved only by a desire that springs from sadness,partly becausethe former is able to harnessthe natural forces of her passive emotions in the service of her own genuine advantoge,much as technology harnesses-but does not create-the forces of physical nature. 4i

F fl {r

ll I ! t

Interpersonal Ethics Spinoza'sethical doctrine appearsto be unequivocallyegoistic.t Reasondemandsthat "everyonelove himself, seekhis own advantage,. . . [and] striveto preservehis own being as far as he can" (lvplSsch). The foundation of virnre is the striving to preserveoneself (IYp2Zcor). The more a person succeedsin obtaininghis advantageand preserving

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Ethical Docffine his being, the greateris his virtue (lvp20). "Acting absolutelyfrom virnre is nothing else in us but acting, living, and preservingour being (these three signify the same thing) by the guidance of reason, from the foundation of seekingone's own advantage"(IVp2$. Spinoza's version of egoism, however, is an enlightenedone. Reasondiscernsthat we needother human beings in order to survive and flourish. "To man . . . there is nothing more useful than man," and the more one human being flourishes,the more useful sheis to others(IVpl8; p35cor2). Reasonthus guidesus to seekthe samegood for othersthat we seekfor ourselves,to be 'Just honest,and honorable"and to form bonds basedon mutual nust and love (friendship),to submitto the common laws of the state,and to return hatredwith love (IVplSsch; p46, p7I,p73). The egoistic principle that everyoneshould seek his own advantageis the foundation not of immorality, but of morality and virtue (in the ordinary as well as Spinoza'ssenseof that tenn-IVpl8sch). Even though Spinoza'segoisrnis enlightened,thereare two features of his doctrine which are difficult to reconcilewith egoism. One is his assertion in lYp72 that "A free man always acts honestly, not deceptively." This propositionis puzzling because(l) the free man is the personwho always actsaccordingto reason; (2) reasonfor eachperson prescribesthat he do whateveris conduciveto his self-preservation;and (3) situationsmay very well arisein which a personcan preservehis being only by deception. That Spinozameant what he said in this propostion is shown by his remarksin the scholium which follows it. There he poses the question"What if a man could savehimself from the presentdanger of death by treachery? Would not the principle of preservinghis own being recommend, without qualification, that he be treacherous? His answer is negative. Spinoza'sremarks in IVp72 and its scholium are problematic in light of his egoism because while an egoist-and particularly an enlightenedegoist-may recognizesthat there are limits on what she "should" do, those limits are a function of self-interest. Spinoza's remarks here, however, clearly state that deceptive or ffeacherousaction is always prohibited by reason,even when not to act deceptivelyor treacherouslymeansimminent death. The second difficulty for Spinoza's egoism is his claim in IVp35 that "Only insofar as men live accordingto the guidanceof reason,must they always agree in nature." Since he has already establishedthat "Insofar as a thing agreeswith our nature,it is necessarilygood" (IVp3 I ), it follows that insofar as human beings live accordingto the guidanceof reason,what they do must always be good for one another. But reason counselseach individual to do what is most advantageous to her, hence,

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Ethical Doctrine '\ i'\ I the true interestsof everyonemust always coincide.2 .'-'l f"t t\ d4 4 The line of thought which is generallytaken to underlie Spinoza's presumptionthat the true interestsof all personscoincide is as follows. Everyone needsthe security and protection of an organized society in order to pursueor enjoy any good, and whateverelse a personmay seek, an org anizedsociety also provides the positive benefits of division of labor and the easy and efficient exchangeof goods. Hence, all persons share a common interest in doing whatever is necessaryto promote the existenceof an organized society. In addition, since true human good g1 consistsin the perfection of the intellect, it is by nature somethingwhich [ | t Ll human beingsneed not compete for, but which all can equally posses (fffi6t Finally, nothing can assista person more in the attainmentof" this good than other human beings, especiallythose who are guided by reason(thosewho are already in possessionof this good). On this view the welfare of others is insffumentally linked with that of each individual. From this view it is supposedto follow that what profits one, profits everyone, and vice versa; and as Spinoza assertsin IVp3 5cor2,"W'heneach man most seekshis own advantagefor himself, then men are most useful to one another." There is a problem with the "instrumentalist" line of thought. While it is sufficient to show that the true interests of all persons generally coincide,or coincideto some degree,it is not sufficient to show that they must always coincide, as IVp35 implies. As C. D. Broad pointed out, even though the highestgood is non-competitive,the lessergoods which are neededin order that one may enjoy it are not: Philosophersand scientistsand artistsneed as much food, clothing, shelter,and warmth as anyoneelse. And they need considerablymore leisure,and a long and expensivetraining. Now the supply of all thesethings is limited. Unlesssome peoplemainly devotethemselvesto producing suchthings, and thereby forfeit their own chanceof any great intellectual or artistic development,it is certain that scientistsand philosopherswill not have the leisureor the training or the freedomfrom practical worries which are essentialto their intellectualdevelopmentand activity.3 In orderto justiff the contentionthat insofar as human beingslive accordingto the guidanceof reason,they must always agreein nature,or must always be good for one another, Spinoza needs another line of thought than the one outlined above. In fact, another appearsto be operativein the demonstrationof IVp35. There Spinonappears to argue that when I judge somethingto be tmly good for myself it follows that it

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Ethical Doctrine is good for each human being, becausewhatever is truly good for an individual humanbeing must be good for her human nafiire;and since all human beingssharehuman nature in common, what is truly good for one is thereforegood for all. We have already seenthat in order to propound a general ethical doctrine Spinozamust assumethat all human beings share a common nature or at leastare sufficiently similar that it makessenseto speakof a generalhuman good and virtue. We neednow to inquirewhat this human natureis. The questionis complicatedby his view that universalnotions such as "man" are formed by the imagination and do not indicate any common propertyof things. But even if he took "man" to designatesome real property common to all human beings, it is hard to see how this would help his argument. Each personwould still be a separateinstance of the universalhuman nature,and there doesn't seemto be any reason why one instanceshouldn'tflourish independentlyof other instances. What Spinozaneedsin order to reasonfrom ( I ) When I do what is truly good for myself, I do what is good for human nature,to (2) when I do what is truly good for myself I do what is good for every other human being, is a strongerway of identiffing the naturewhich all human beings have in common. That is, he needsa conceptionof human naturewhich does not have numerically distinct instances,but which is strictly numerically one in all human beings.One possibility is that he thought of it as the nature of a complex whole-humanity-and as somethingthat human beings sharein common in virtue of each one being part of this whole. Consider the relation between a complex finite individual and its parts. What gives a complex finite individual the unity of a whole, distinguishingit from a mere collection of different individuals,is that a constant relation or set of relations is preservedamong its parts. If a change occurs in one part which, by itself, would tend to destroy that relation, then if the individual is not to be destroyed,there must be an appropriateresponseor compensatingchangein the other parts. Thus a complex individual is necessarilycharacterizedby a tendencyto maintain its being, which is nothing more than the tendencyof its partsto reactto changesin one anotherso as to preservethe relationswhich constitutethe unity of the whole. The parts can thereforebe seenas at leastpartially governedby the tendencyof the whole toward self-preseryation.In this sense,the natureof the parts involves the natureof the whole, although the parts are not instancesof the nature of the whole. The human body exemplifies Spinoza's concept of a finite individual. Its parts are partially governedby laws of homeostasissuch

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Ethical Doctrine that when certain sortsof externallyinduced changesoccur in one port, other balancing changesoccur in others. The nature or essenceof the body as a whole consistsin its partsbeing related in this way. To say that something,e.9.,the heart,is a part of the human body, is to say that it is partially governedby a setof laws whose overall tendencyis to preserve the body as a whole. Thus, the natureof the heart is partially constituted by being governedby theselaws. Since the same thing can be said of every part of the human body, Spinozacould have said that every part of the natureof the whole in common with every other the body possesses part. That is, every part of the body involves the nature of the body as a whole, but is not itself a distinct instanceof that nature. Analogously, if Spinozaheld humanity as a whole to be a complex individual whose parts are individual human beings, then the human nature which all human beings have in common would simply be the natureof the complex individual,humanity. According to this conception each human being is partially governed by laws which constitutethe nature of the whole-humanity. The individual's nature is partially constitutedby that of the whole, just as the heart's nature is partially constitutedby that of the body as a whole. This view doesnot deny that every human being is himself an individual. The distinctionbetweenpaft and whole is relative in that every thing is both a whole consistingof parts and a part of a greaterwhole. But just as hearts would not be hearts if they were not parts of human bodies,human beings would not be human if they were not eacha part of humanity. One objection to this interpretation is that it seems obviously contradictedby empirical fact.a There is no world-society, and even single societiesappearto lack the unity which this view requires. The responseto this is that humanity is a large, but finite, individual. Consequently,its unity is necessarilysubject to the disrupting influences of external forces. In addition a description of a thing under certain circumstancesis not a descriptionof its nature. To describethe nature of a thing we must considerit apart from any environment, as if it were free. If humanity were free, i.e., not a part of nature, its unity would be perfect and evident. Individual human beings would be governed in all their interactionsby a set of laws whoseoverall tendencywould be to preserve humanity as a whole. They would be, from our point of view, perfectly moral. That human beingsdo cooperatein social organizations,that they have the conceptof a universalmorality, and that many of them strive to live according to universal moral laws is evidence of the unity of humanity. That a good deal of human interaction is not harmoniousis evidencethat humanity, as such, is weak and needsto strengthenitself.

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Ethical Doctrine Like the free man (lYp67-73), afree humanity is only hypothetical;it is an ideal which can be approachedbut never attainedbecausehumanity is necessarilya part of nature. Spinoza appearsto have had this ideal in mind when he wrote Man. . . can wish for nothing more helpful to the preservation of his being than that all should so agreein all things that the Minds and Bodiesof all would compose,as it were,one Mind and one Body; that all should sffive together,as far as they can, to preservetheir being; and that all, together,should seek for themselvesthe common advantageof all (IVp l8). The interest or advantageof humanity builds a limitation into Spinoza'sothenviseegoisticethics. Reasoncounselseachof us to pursue what is tmly for our advantd3e,but it perceivesthat we are essentiallynot merely instrumentally-linked with all other humanbeings,and that we cannotflourish at the expenseof humanity as a whole. This explains *hy, insofar as human beings act from the guidanceof reason,they must always agree in nature or be good for one another. The limitation which the interest of humanity places on what an individual should to do in pursuing her own interestthus enablesSpinoza to avoid one criticism which is justly aimed at ordinary egoism, nEunely,that it providesno way of deciding interpersonalconflicts of interest,which is not relativeto an individual. To return to Broad's example: if it is in the interest of humanity as a whole that certain people have the leisure to study and develop their intellectual and artistic talents, while others lack such leisure,then the former should have it while otherslack it, and reason counselsus all that this is the way things should be. The limitation which the interestof humanity placeson what we can do to preserveour being or pursueour own advantagealso can explain Spinoza'sreasoningbehind the assertionthat a free man would never act deceptivelyor treacherously, even to savehimself from imminent death. He must have viewed such actionsas always detrimentalto humanity, hencenever in an individual's true interest. (Why, or even if, deceptiveor treacherousaction is always detrimentalto humanify, is anotherquestion.) Let us now reconsiderthe questionof how to characterizeSpinoza's ethical docffine. One writer has argued that it should not be regardedas a morality becauseit does not recognizethe effectsof one's actionson other sentientbeings as directly relevantto questionsof how one should act.s On the interpretationof human nature which I have presentedhere, this is not true. Becauseit belongs to the nature of eachpersonto be a paft of humanity, we are essentially,not merely instrumentally,linked with other human beings, and to determine what is truly to our own

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Ethical Doctrine we must considerhow our action affectshumanity. Shouldwe advant&g€, .continueto call Spinoza's doctrine egoistic? His expressionof it is egoistic,but insofar as all human beingsare part of the single individual which is humanity, their welfare and advantage coincide, and the distinction between egoism and its chief alternative,utilitarianism (the ethicaldoctrinebasedon the welfare of all), collapses.

Summary Spinoza'sethics is thoroughly naturalistic. A thing is said to be good insofar as it is advantageousto someoneor satisfiesher desire,and or thwarts her desire. Thus, "good" evil insofaras it is disadvantageous and "evil" do not denotequalitiesof things,but only how things affect us, and are in generalrelative to the individual. Insofar as human beings are influencedby passion,nearly anything can be an object of desire, hence "good;" what is truly good is what satisfiesthosedesiresthat spring from us insofar as we act-i.e., insofar as we have adequateideas. But insofar as we have adequateideaswe seeknothing but to understand;so understandingis our ultimate good, and things which are conduciveto understandingare good in relationto it (useful). Becausewe are finite, embodiedbeings, it is inevitable that we suffer passionsand stand in need of many things outside us. One part of ethicalwisdom is knowing and satisffing the needsof the body, doing what will sustainand enhanceits abilities to affect and be affectedby other bodies,so that the mind will be better able to think and perceive. Another is understandingand managingthe passions. Only reasoncan judge the true worth of an object of desire. And while the desiresdirectly generatedby reasonitself are often too weak to counter those generated by the passions,we can exercise a kind of indirect control through cultivating passiveaffects that "agree with reason," such as fear of the of excessivepleasureor desire. Understandinghow certain consequences passiveaffects"agree with reason" enablesus to to turn what is in itself harmful into somethinguseful for achievingour own aims. Spinoza'sinterpersonalethicsis expressedin terms of egoism;the fundamental"dictate of reason"is that everyoneshould love himself,seek his own advantage,and strive to preseryehis own being as far as he can. But there are two features of Spinoza's ethics which are difficult to reconcilewith egoism. One is his assertionin lYp72 that reasonwould nevercounsela personto act deceptivelyor treacherously;the other is the

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Ethical Doctrine implication of IVp35, that insofaras human beingsact from reason,there will be no conflicts of interestamong them, but what they do will always be good for one another. One way to understandthese claims is to interpret Spinozaas holding that all human beingsare essentiallypart of the individual which is humanity; and that the welfare of humanity in effect placesa limit on what an individual may do to preservehis being, thus providing a decisionmechanismto resolvewhat would otherwisebe irresoluble conflicts of interestamong individuals.

Endnotes 'The material in this section was previously presented in Steinberg1984. t That there are no conflicts of interest betweenpersonswho act from reasonis also expressedby Spinozain IVp37sch2. 3 Broad 43. , o Rice offers other objectionsand anotherview of human nature. s Frankena.96 - 98.

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Method

Spinoza's philosophical methodology differs from that of his predecessorDescartesin a number of salientways. The first is his use of the geometric method of exposition employed in his major work, the Ethics. A secondis that Spinozadoes not view overcoming doubt as a fundamentaltask of philosophy,althoughhe thinks his philosophy does overcome it; and doubt plays no methodologicalrole for him as it does for Descartes.A third is that knowledgeof the mind or self is not primary, or basic to all other knowledge. At first glanceCartesianmethodology may appearvastly superiorto that of Spinoza. The Meditations is highly accessible to the reader, while the Ethics is nearly impenetrable; skepticism needsto be refuted; and the cogito and other immediate data of consciousnesssurely provide the most securefoundation on which knowledge could rest.r In this chapterwe shall explorethe basis for these differences between Spinoza and Descartes,and try to gain a deeper understandingof Spinoza'smethodology.

Spinoza'sRejection of Methodological Doubt' TheRole of Doubt in Descartes'Meditations Both Descartesand Spinozaare rationalist philosophers insofar as that the sourceof our knowledge of reality lies within the mind, hold both not observationof the world throughsenseexperience, reasoning, and that we obtainknowledge. The American philosopherC. S. Peirce, is the way

8l

Method dubbed the rationalists' method the a priori method, and wrote of it that It makesof inquiry somethingsimilar to the developmentof taste;but taste,unfortunately,is always more or lessa matter of fashion,and accordingly metaphysicianshave never come to any fixed agreement,but the pendulum has swung backward and forward between a more material and a more spiritualphilosophy,from the earliesttimes to the latest.3 Peirce himself advocatedthe scientific method, one which involves testing beliefs against reality by means of senseexperience. Writing roughly 250 yearsbefore Peirce,Descartesacknowledgedthe fact of wide disagreementamong metaphysicians.But he took experienceto be part of the problem, not the solution. He might well have agreedwith Peirce that metaphysicians(other than himself) are guided by taste, since accordingto him the diversity of their views is a result of differencesin their experience("example and custom"),combinedwith the fact that no one is born able to make full use of his reason. On Descartes'view everyone,including metaphysicians,comes to maturity with his mind cloudedwith prejudicesand generallyinational opinionsderivedfrom his own experienceof things, including the influenceof teachersand,through their books, ancient writers.o What is needed,therefore,accordingto Descartes,is a method which will enableus to overcomeour entrenched opinionsbasedon senseexperienceand penetrateto the truth of things. Descartes'Meditations is a kind of manual for a readerto perform this task. Meditation I presentsthree argumentsto underminetrust in the senses--that the sensesare occasionallyunreliable,that thereis no way to tell the differencebetweendreamingand reality, and that we might be the creationof an omnipotentGod who deceivesus with regardto everything. These arguments serve as an exercise to induce the reader's doubt regardingall her former, sense-derivedopinions. With her mind thus preparedshe is led in subsequentmeditationsto the discoveryof those things which can only be perceivedby the intellect--thereal natureof her mind, the distinction between mind and body, the existenceand natureof God and the nature of genuine certainty. Doubt thus plays an integral role in what Descartescalls his "analyic" method of demonstration which he characterized as showing the true way by meansof which the thing in questionwas discoveredmethodically. . .so that if the readeris willing to follow it and give sufficient affentionto all points,he will make the thing his own and understandit just as perfectlyas if he had discoveredit for himself.s

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Method By contrast, what Descartescalls the "synthetic" method employs a long seriesof definitions,postulates,axioms, theoremsand probleffiS,so that if anyonedenies one of the conclusionsit can be shown at once that it is containedin However,this method is not as what has gonebefore satisffing as the method of analysis,nor does it engagethe minds of thosewho are eagerto learn,sinceit does not show how the thing in questionwas discovered.6 On Descartesview, it is the analyic, not the synthetic,method of demonstration which is most appropriate for the subject matter of metaphysics,becausein metaphysicsthe greatestobstacleis "making our perceptionof the primary notions clear and distinct." The argumentsof Meditation I lead the meditator to the point where he is "compelled to admit that there is not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised." But despitethis realization he also admits that out of habit he continuesto hold his former beliefs, and proposesto rid himself of them by intentionally regarding them as false "until the weight of preconceivedopinion is counter-balancedand the distorting influenceof habit no longer preventsmy judgement from perceivingthings correctly." Thus he resolves: I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth,colours, shapes, soundsand all externalthings are merely the delusionsof dreamswhich he [a malicious demon] has devisedto ensnare my judgement. I shall considermyself as not having handsor eyes,or flesh, or blood or senses,but as falsely believing that I have all thesethings.T Thesepassagesshow that the Cartesianwithdrawal from the senses distinct stages:first, by means of the arguments against the two has reliability of what the sensestell us, the meditatorcomesto the realization that all of his formerly held opinions may be false. This realizationby itself is not sufficientto eradicatebelief in the old opinions, but it does motivate him to make the effort to regard all of his former opinions as false, in order to counterbalancehis tendency to retain them. By this means,the secondstage--genuineCartesiansuspensionofjudgment--is reached. The mind at this secondstageassentsneitherto the old opinions nor to their denial.

Spinozeond Doubt

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Method Spinoza showed in his Descartes' " Principles of Philosophy" that he was awareof the heuristicrole of doubt in Descartesphilosophy.s In addition he sharedDescartes'view that opinions which derive from our use of the sensesare liable to error and tend to interferewith our ability to graspmetaphysicalnotions and truth. An exarnpleof such an opinion, which on Spinora,'sview is particularlytroublesome,occurs in Ipl5sch, where he tracesthe failure to apprehendthat extensionis an attributeof God, to the imaginativeconceptionof extension(quantity) as divisible, composedof parts,and (hence)finite. Nevertheless,Spinozacasthis own major work in the synthetic or geometric mode, and nowhere in expoundinghis own philosophydid he recommenddoubt as a meansof freeing the mind from eroneous opinions derived from the sensesand preparing it for the apprehensionof metaphysicaltruth. To understandwhy Spinozarejecteddoubt as a methodologicaltool, we must examinemore closelywhat doubt involvesfor him. In fact he has fwo notions of doubt which, in important ways, parallel the two stagesof the Cartesianmeditator'swithdrawal from the senses.The first, which I shall call second-levelor reflectivedoubt,consistsin a person's perceiving that her idea of a thing is inadequate(Ilp49sch). The other consistsin vacillation betweentwo conflicting ideas,e.g., betweenmy friend's coming to see me tonight, and his not coming (IIIplTsch; Ilp44sch). This Upe of doubt doesnot involve reflectivethinking. The two types of doubt appearto be separablemental stateswhich can and often do occur together,and whose separateoccurrencewill eachtend to producethe other. Each can, however,occur in the absenceof the other. Spinoza's reflectivedoubt--theperceptionthat one's idea of a thing is not adequate--is not merely analogousto, but is the stateof mind of the meditator,with respectto all her former beliefs, in the first stageof the Cartesianprocedure. And Spinozamust surely agreewith Descarteshere, that this kind of doubt is not by itself sufficientto eradicatebelief. On the contrary, once we have studiedthe Ethics, we know that all our opinions regarding our immediate surroundingsat any moment are based on inadequateideas,hence subjectto this kind of doubt; but we do not for this reasonceaseto believe them. We do not, for example, ceaseto believe there is furniture in the room we are occupying. Spinoza'sfirst level doubt (vacillation) is not identicalwith the stateof mind experienced by the meditator in the second stageof Descartes'procedure,but it is analogousto it in two respects. First, it is the statewhich existswhen conflicting ideascounterbalanceone another;second,it is incompatible with belief. That is, insofar as someonevacillatesbetweenthe ideathat p and an idea which excludes p, she cannot be described as either

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Method believingp or believingnot-P. Had Spinoza chosento use or recommendthe method of doubt as a meansof enabling the mind to withdraw from the sensesand free itself from those opinions which are a banier to the apprehension of metaphysicaltruth, it is first-level doubt or vacillation which would be required. Although sucha stateis not identicalwith Cartesiansuspension ofjudgment, it is equally a stateof non-belief. Why then did Splnozanot recommendfirst level doubt regardingall our former opinions (derived asthey are from imagination--hearsayand random experience)as a means of removing the barrier such opinions presentto the apprehensionof metaphysicaltruth? The Cartesianprocessof doubt in the first Meditation culminates in a statein which the meditator suspendsjudgment regardingthe existence of everything in the physical world, including her own body. The Spinozistanalogueto this statewould be one in which the mind vacillated betweenits ideasof things, including that of its own body, as existing, and ideasof them as non-existing. But given Spinoza'stheory of imaginative perception,it is impossiblefor the mind to form an idea of its own body asnon-existing;henceno one can achievea stateof vacillation or doubt with respectto the existenceof her body. In order to form an idea of its own body as non-existing,the mind must have an idea which excludesthe existenceof the bodY, i.e., an idea of a thing x, whose existenceis incompatiblewith the existenceof the body. In order to have such an idea, however,the mind must have the idea of a modification of the body which was causedby *.n Since, by hypothesis,the existenceof x is incompatiblewith the existenceof the body, there can be no suchmodification of the body, henceno idea of x. But this only shows that the mind cannot have an idea of an actually existingthing whose existenceis incompatiblewith its body. What we needto know is: can the mind imagine an actually non-existentstateof affairswhose existencewould be incompatiblewith the existenceof the body? Again, the answerseemsto be no. To do so would involve having an idea of a bodily modification identicalto one which would be caused by a stateof affairs which is incompatiblewith the body's existence. Put simply we can say: the mind cannot have an idea which excludes the existence of the body because all its ideas are directly ideas of modifications of the body, and there is no suchthing as the way the body would be affected by a stateof affairs in which it did not exist. First-level doubt, or a stateof genuinedisbeliel regardingthe existenceof the body is impossible.

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Method

The Geometric Method and the Structure of Knowledge'o That it is impossible for us not to believe our body existsexplains why Spinoza rejected doubt as a methodological tool and also why skepticismregarding the existenceof the material world was not a real issuefor him. But it doesnot explainwhy he choseto give a "synthetic', rather than "analyic" presentationof his philosophy; and it leaves unanswereda serious challengeto his system,viz., why shouldthe reader accept its basic starting points? As a number of commentatorshave pointedout, the basic definitionsand axioms are not self-evident;and we have already seen in connection with the questionsraised by DeVries concerningthe definition of God, that Spinoza'scontemporariesdid not find them so." Spinozacould have forestalledthis sort of objectionhad he been willing to expound his philosophy analytically,i.e., in a way which would enablethe readerto follow the route of discoveryof his flrst principles. (Of coursefor Spinozathis route would not be via doubt,or a withdrawal from the senses.) Spinoza'sfailure to give an analyticdemonstrationof his philosophy is undoubtedly connected with his admitted inability to formulate a satisfactorymethod of discovery. His early Treatiseon the Emendation of the Intellectbreaks off in the midst of an affemptto do justthis; and as late as 1675 he wrote in responseto a coffespondent'srequestfor his "Method of rightly directing the reason in acquiring knowledge of unknown truths," that his views had not yet been "written out in due order."l2 Why was formulating a method of discovery such a difficult, even impossible,task for Spinoza? One explanationlies in the way he cameto view what may be called theTustificationalstructure of knowledge. By 'Justificational the structure" of knowledge I am referring to u puttirular way in which things said to be known or believeddependon one another. There are different relations of dependenceamong our beliefs. For example a detective might come to believe that a certain person X committedthe crime he was investigatingbecausehe believed(falsely) that personsof a certain type are inclined to criminal behaviorand that X was a personof that type. His former belief causallydependson the latter fwo beliefs,but is not justified by them. A mathematicianmight believe a certain(unproven) theorem is true becausehe believesit is similar to anotherwhich he knows to be true. Again, the first belief is not justified by the second, although it causally depends on it. In order for the

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Method detective'sbelief that X committed the crime to be justified he must come to believethat there is genuineevidence(e.g.,furgerprints)linking X with justified he the crime; and in order for the mathematician'sbelief to be is Justification must come to believe the stepsin a proof of the theorem. invest or hold a mafier of a belief s being one which someoneought to to full confidencein; and the justificational structureof knowledge refers merited that the way the confidencemerited by somebeliefs dependson by others. The exampleof the mathematicianalso shows that what leads to the discoveryof a truth need not be what what justifies our believing it.

Speakingvery broadly and ignoring many complexitiesof the topic, justificational one may say there are two types of view regarding the structureof knowledge. Descartesheld what is called afoundationalist or or linear view of justification; Spinoza, by contrast, held a holistic philosophy nonlinear view. Understanding this feature of Spinoza's providesa key to understandingwhy he chosethe syntheticor geometric a method to expoundhis doctrine, why he never managedto formulate defrnitions the satisfactorymethod of discovery, and clarifies the statusof of the Ethics.

Descartes' Foundqtionalism Descartesis a foundationalistwith respectto the justification of knowledge. That is, accordingto him there is a classof things which are of known, or of which we are certain, independentof our knowledge own his of knowledge person, anythingelse. This classincludes,for each existenceand factsabout his immediatestatesof consciousness.All other knowledge logically rests otr, or is justified by virtue of, this basic knowledge. For example, in answerto the question "How do you know that a perfectbeing exists?" Descarteswould reply that he knows this the idea of sucha becausehe knows that he has within his consciousness logically restson exists perfectbeing. His certainty that a perfectbeing the idea of a mind his in has (among other things) his certainty that he any other from derive not perfectb.hg; but the certainty of the latter does or is being, perfect a of knowledge. He is certain that he has the idea his of independently justified ln believing that he has such an idea, the uses Descartes knowledge of anything else. In the Meditations analytic method to lead the reader from the apprehensionof facts about the herself which are indubitable or certain apartfrom anything else, to justified His steps. discoveryof things beyond herself, via a seriesof

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Method analytic method is thus at once a method of discovery and a method of justification.

spinozq's AIon-linear view of Justification The doctrine of the Ethics clearly holds knowledge to be foundational in one sense. We have adequateknowledge of a ifring only insofar as our idea of it is derived from or causedby another idea in our mind of the causeof the thing. Consequently,all ouiadequateknowledge terminatesin ideasof what is causeof itself--Godor one of God's infurite attributes- But this causalfoundationalismdoesnot commit Spino za to a foundationalist view regarding the justificational structure of knowledge' That is, he neednot hold that the ideaswhich are required to be the causal basis of knowledge (ideas of things conceived ihrougtr themselves)are also self-justiffing or certain independentlyof all other ideas. And he neednot hold that ideaswhich are requiredto be the causal basis of knowledge are the single source of whatever certainty or justification attachesto other ideas. In the Ethics Spinoza'sanswerto the question"how can someone know certainly that he has ideaswhich agreewith their objects,,,is that a personcan know this becausehe has an adequateidea of his idea (IIpa3 and sch)- Let us considerwhat is involved in suchreflectivekno*i.ag.. We have an adequateidea or knowledge of a thing when our idea of it derivesfrom our idea of its ultimate cause,and thus is an idea from which all the properties of the thing can be deduced.13 put more simply, adequateknowledge involves the explanationof why the thing exists and has the propertiesit has. Thus, adequateknowledgeof an adiquate idea A will involve the cause of A and will explain why A adequately representsits object. But the explanationof why an idea A is adequate in some mind (or in the human mind in general)will necessarilyinvolve the nature of the mind and its relation to the rest of reality, or in other words, the conception of the mind as God's idea of an actually existing body. Spinozaprovides an exampleof adequateknowledgeof an adequate idea with IIp38, whose demonstrationproves that and explains why the common notions are adequatelyconceivedby the mind. This explanation is that since the "objects" of the common notionsare equally in the part and in the whole of all things (bodies)their ideaswill be adequatein God insofar as God has any idea, including that of the human body; and since the mind simply is God's idea of the human body, these ideas will be adequatein the mind. Adequate knowledge (an adequateidea) of an

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Method adequateidea thereforeinvolves virtually the entire basic metaphysical systemof the Ethics. But if this is so, then certainty (the adequateidea or knowledge of an adequateidea) is necessarilyan holistic property, one which emergesat the level of reflective knowledge only insofar as a personhas the entire basic metaphysicalsystem. Thus, in the order of justification, neither the idea of the human mind nor that of God (or that of any of God's attributes)is basic or prim ary. Ratherthe certainty of any idea or knowledge consistsin a person's having at the same time the systemof knowledgewithin which that idea can be completelyexplained. We are now able to answer the questions regarding Spinoza's methodology which have been raised in this section. First, since justification or certaintyfor Spinozais nonlinear or holistic in the way we have explained,the certaintyor justification of the definitions and axioms derivesfrom their placewithin the systematicexplanationof the whole of reality. And the geometric presentation, which exhibits the of the whole, is particularlywell suitedto exhibit their interconnectedness justification. Further,we should concludethat one reasonwhy Spinoza chosethe geometricmethodof demonstrationwas becauseit was the one which best exhibitedthe justification of his philosophicalviews. We can seetoo why Spinozawas never able to formulate a method of discovery, and why he did not give an analytic demonstrationof his philosophy. On a nonlinearconceptionofjustification such as Spinoza's there are no independentlyjustified bits of knowledge from which one can proceedto build up the system,tro independentlyjustified starting points of knowledge. Knowledge doesnot grow by proceedingfrom one thing, indubitable and certainin itself, to another,but ratherby making explicit what is already implicitly contained in the system as it stands,or by revising the system--replacingsome of its componentbeliefs with others. Suchrevisionsarejustified with respectto the systemas a whole, i.e.,to the extent that the revised system has greater explanatory power or coherencethan the unrevised.

Knowledge as Power and the Geometric Method On Spinoza's view knowledge and its pursuit are not, and cannot be, disinterested.That we cometo hold the beliefswe do is not independent of our desires. We saw in chapter3 that for Spinoza belief or judgrnent is not a matterof the mind's affrming (by an act of will), what it perceives(by an

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Method act of the intellect).For him every idea involves an affirmation, and there is no affrmation in the mind exceptthat which is involved in an idea. Not every idea, however, is a belief. To believe that I am not at home right now is to have the idea that I am at home and another, stronger,idea which excludesmy being at home, e.g.,that I am in my office. My idea that I am at home involves the affirmation that I am at home sinceevery idea involves an affirmation, but it is not itself a belief. The bestway to understandSpinoza'snotion of belief is that belief is a prevailingidea;to believethat p is for one's idea that p to be strongerthan any ideaone has that excludesp (whose object is incompatiblewith p, €lsmy being in my office right now is incompatiblewith my being at home). That our imaginative beliefs are influencedby our desiresand the affects of pleasureand pain which give rise to desire is evident. Thus becausewe desire to increase our power of acting (pleasure)and to prevent its decrease(pain), we tend to imagine,hence believe,things which increaseit, and avoid imaginingthingswhich decreaseit. Thisls why we readily believe good things about ourselves-that we are attractive,generous,objective in our judgments,etc. It might seemthat we are able to be disinterestedin matterswhich are of no concernto us, e.9.,the distancebetweenParis and London. Not every irnaginativeidea is an affect, i.e., involves an increaseor decreasein our power of acting (Illpostl), hencenot every imaginativejudgment is directly influencedby our desire. No imaginative judgments, however, are immune to the indirect influenceof our desire. My desireto believegood things about myself which generatesand strengthensmy belief in my own objectivity may in turn lend support to my belief regardingthe distancebetweenparis and London, or to any other belief I have. In addition, by Spinoza's principle of associationof ideasand affects, dfryidea can acquireaffective force (IIIp I 5). Our beliefs which are basedon reasonor adequateideasare also not disinterestedor formed and maintained independentof our desires. Adequateideasare the active manifestationof our power or striving to perseverein our being. They derive their force or strengthfrom us. We experiencepleasure insofar as we are able to think adequatelyand structureour ideas according to the order of the intellect, since such adequatethinking is accompaniedby the reflective consciousness of an increasein our power of acting. Hencewe desireto do this, and the more we do it, the more we desire it. We have, in other words, an interestin maintaining the system of knowledge which is basedon our adequate ideas. We are not impartial. We have already seen that skepticismregarding the existenceof

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Method one's body is impossible for human beings. But what about a slightly mitigated skeptical position, which holds that while there is no doubting that a material world exists,still there is no reasonto think that we know anything about the nature of that world? We have also seenin the last sectionthat Spinoza's answerto this skeptic is that we know we have knowledgeof the nature of the material world becausewe have adequate knowledgeof our knowledge. Besidesan answer,however, Spinozahas a diagnosisof the causeof such skepticism. It resultsfrom weaknessof mind. Such a mind is not determinedfrom within, by its own adequate ideas,but from without, by externalthings, in a disorderly fashion. Thus it may seemto such a mind that anything can be anything, that God could have human attributes,that there can be an infinite fly.'o Such a mind will also be most vulnerable to the illusions of sense, to ideological propaganda,and to the sway of the passive emotions. The "cure" or remedy is to empower the mind by strengtheningits adequateideas. It may be that Spinoza'schoiceof the geometricalform to expound his systemwas partly intendedto accomplish this practical aim. The Ethics gives the readerwhat shehas probably not yet acquired"by fate," namely a systematic framework of adequate ideas into which all her thoughtsand experiencescan be integrated.rsA personwho assimilates this framework has more than theoreticalknowledge. To the extent that we are able to arrangeour ideasaccordingto the order of the intellect, we act or determinewhat we do. Ideas are dynamic entities;the more a person's are related in a single system, the more they reinforce one another. The person is therebystrengthened,becoming lessvulnerable both to every sort of external influence. The Ethics is thus a practical tool in our struggleto becomemore free, not merely by pointing the way, but by giving us the only effectivemeans.

Summary For Spinozagenuinedoubt concerningthe existenceof one's body is humanly impossible. For this reasona Cartesian-stylewithdrawal from the sensesis impossible,and doubt plays no role in his philosophical method. Overcoming doubt is also not something philosphersmust (or can) do before anything else. Doubt (on any subject) is remedied by knowledgeor adequateideas. Spinoza'suse of the geomefficor synthetic method of demonstration is at leastpartly explainedby his holistic or nonlinear view regardingthe justification of knowledge. Unlike Descartes,Spinozarejectsthe view

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Method that there are bits of knowledgeof which we can be certainindependently of any other knowledge. This includesknowledgeof our own mind and of thosethings explainedin the definitions and axioms of the Ethics. The certainU of these, like that of any other knowledge, derives from their place in the entire systemof our knowledge. Thus, Spinozachose the geometricmethod of demonstrationbecauseit was bestsuitedto exhibit the interconnectedness of the systemand the (consequent)justification of his philosophical views. It is also a consequenceof his holistic conceptionofjustification that therecan be no analyic presentationof his systemin the Cartesiansense,i.e., none which proceedsalong a route of discoveryvia a sequenceof fully justified (certain)steps. Finally, Spinoza'spresentationof his philosophyin the geometric form was also probably motivated by the practical value of a powerful systemof ideas. In my Introduction I focused on three features of Spinoza's philosophy which contributeto its unity: substancemonism,naturalism, and his use of the geometricform of exposition. In subsequentchapters I have tried to show how the substancemonism is developed,how naturalismcharacterizesall of his docffinesaboutthe universeand human beings, including ethics, and finally, to explain why he chose the geometrical form of exposition. There is, however, one doctrine of Spinoza'swhich I have not touchedon, which is a particularproblem from the point of view of the overall unity of his system. This is the doctrineof the eternity of the mind, expressedin Ethics Vp2 l-p42. This doctrine is problematic first of all because it appearsto contradict Spinoza'sview that mind and body are one and the samething, conceived under different attributes,and the more generalthesisof the identity of modesof different attributes. If, as Spinozaassertsin yp23,,.The human Mind cannot be absolutelydestroyedwith the Body, but somethingof it remainswhich is eternal,"then how can mind and body be identical? A secondproblem is that the view of the mind as eternalseemsinconsistent with his otherwise exceptionlessnaturalism. This problem is one with which many commentators,including myself, have struggled,and I will not attemptto offer a solutionhere. But I wish to point out two things. First of all, Spinozahimself points out in Ethics Yp4l that none of his earlier doctrinesregardingmorality or how we should live dependon the doctrine of the eternityof the mind. This suggeststhat there may have been some questionin his mind regarding this doctrine. The secondpoint is somewhatmore complicated.Spinozamakesa

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Method connection in the latter portion of Ethics V betweenthe eternal part of the mind and its capacity to have adequateideas. Although I have not mentionedthem, thereare also problemsin Spinoza'aaccountof adequate thinking. Briefly, they come down to his assertionthat in adequate thinking the mind is able to act or be the completecauseof its own states. Given that the mind is a finite mode, which in turn is determinedby anotherfmite mode, and so on ad infinitum, this assertionis problematic. At one time I took his doctrine of the eternityof the mind to be a solution to the latter problem.16That is, I took him to have seenthat the view of the mind as merely the idea of an actually existing body was unable to explain how adequatethinking was possible;and to be offering in Ethics V an amendmentto the original theory of the mind. To make a long story short, I no longer am convinced that in order to account for adequate thinking, Spinozaneedsan actual eternalpart of the mind-whatever that may be. And I am hopeful that along with a solution to the problem concerning adequatethinking, an interpretation of the last part of the can be found which will renderit consistentwith his Ethics (Vp2lpa\ metaphysicsand his naturalism.

Endnotes t "The cogito" refers to the thinking self s immediate of its own existence. consciousness The material in this section was presented in SteinbergI 993. 3 P e i r ce , 2 4 1 . o Discourseon the Methodll, CSM I, ll7-19. 5 "Author's Repliesto the SecondSet of Objections," CSM II, I IO. 6 "Author's Repliesto the SecondSet of Objections," CSMII,III. ' MeditationI, CSM II, 14 - 15. 8 Descartes' " Principles of Philosophy," Part I, Prolegomena, in Curley 1985,231. e Seech. 3, p. 37. r0 The discussion in this section is partly based on Steinberg1998. t' Abov€,p. 15. SeealsoBennett1984,16-25;Curley 1986, 152-58;Hampshire,30; Kennington, 97-98; Walker, 50. 12Lefiers59 and 60.

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Method '' Seechapter3, pp. 39 - 40. roAn example used by Spinoza in the Treatise on the Emendationof the Intellect 58 (Curley 1985,27). tt See the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, 44 (Curley 1985,21). 'u Steinbergl98l .

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Gueroult, Martial. SpinozaI: Dieu. Paris:Aubier-Montaigne,1968. Hampshire, Stuart. Spinoza. Rev. ed. Baltimore:Penguin,1962. Joachim, Harold H. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. 1901. New York: Russell& Russell,1964. Kennington, Richard. "Analytic and SyntheticMethodsin Spinoza'sEthics." The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Ed. Richard Kennington. Washington,D. C.: CatholicUniv. of America Press,1980. 293- 318. Lloyd, Genevieve. Part of l{ature. Ithaca,N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Press.1990. ---. Spinoza and the Ethics. London: Routledge, 1996. Matson, wallace r. "Spinozaon Beliefs."Yovel 1994. 67 - 81. Parmenides. Fragments. Trans. and intro. David Gallop. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press,1984. Peirce, Charles Sanders. "The Fixation of Belief." Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol. 5: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism. Ed. Charles Hartshorneand Paul Weiss. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard-Belktr&p, r 965. 223 - 247. Pollock, Frederick. Spinoza: His L{e and Philosophy. London, 1880. Wm. E. Brown Reprint Library. Rice, Lee. "Tanquam Naturae Humanae Exemplar: Spinoza on Human Nature." TheModern schoolman 68 (1991):291 - 303. Steinberg, Diane. "spinoza's Theory of the Eternity of the Mind." Canodian Journal of PhilosophyI I (1981): 35 - 68. ---. "Spinoza's Ethical Doctrine and the Unity of Human Nature." Journal of the History of Philosophy22 (1934): 303 -324. ---. "Spinoza, Method, and Doubt." History of Philosophy Quarterly l0

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