International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES
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International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES
Associate Editors Heinz Eulau, Political Science Lloyd A. Fallers, Anthropology William H. Kruskal, Statistics Gardner Lindzey, Psychology Albert Rees, Economics Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Sociology Edward Shils, Social Thought
Special Editors Elinor G. Barber, Biographies John G. Darley, Applied Psychology Bert F. Hoselitz, Economic Development Clifford T. Morgan, Experimental Psychology Robert H. Strotz, Econometrics
Editorial Staff Marjorie A. Bassett, Economics P. G. Bock, Political Science Robert M. Coen, Econometrics J. M. B. Edwards, Sociology David S. Gochman, Psychology George Lowy, Bibliographies Judith M. Tanur, Statistics Judith M. Treistman, Anthropology
Alvin Johnson HONORARY EDITOR
W. Allen Wallis CHAIRMAN, EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
International Encyclopedia of the
SOCIAL SCIENCES DAVID L. S I L L S EDITOR
VOLUME
The Macmillan Company & The Free Press
12
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International Encyclopedia of the SOCIAL SCIENCES
[ C O N T I N U E D ]
PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS i. A UNIQUE AND OPEN SYSTEM n. COMPONENTS OF AN EVOLVING PERSONOLOGICAL SYSTEM
Gordon W. Allport Henry A. Murray
A UNIQUE AND OPEN SYSTEM
My approach to personality theory has been called both humanistic and personalistic. It is humanistic in the sense that it demands full recognition of all aspects of man's being, including his potential for becoming more than he is. It is personalistic in the sense that its goal is to understand and predict the development of the concrete, individual person. The approach has. likewise been labeled individual or trait psychology and sometimes a psychology of becoming. I prefer to regard it as an eclecticism based upon the conception of personality as a unique and open system (Allport 1964). An open system is one in which constant intake and output of energy occur, as do homeostatic (tension-reduction) processes. While all theories of personality allow for these two criteria of open system, the present view proposes two additional criteria: progressive internal organization over time and creative transaction with the environment (1960a). [See SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, articles On GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY and PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEMS.]
Unlike most major theories, my view is derived not from clinical experience with disordered personalities (as are the views of Freud, Jung, Fromm, Sullivan, etc.) but from the traditions of academic psychology. There is an affinity between my posi-
tion and the theories of Wilhelm Stern, Alfred Adler, Abraham Maslow, Carl R. Rogers, Henry A. Murray, and the contemporary existentialists. Sometimes these views as a group have been labeled the "third force" in psychology (the first two being psychoanalysis and stimulus-response behaviorism). Internationalism. Influenced by historical developments in psychology in continental Europe (especially the schools of act, gestalt, and personalistic psychology), I have tried to relate these movements to Anglo-American empiricism, whose methods I prefer; but I insist that the European view of the person as a self-active (rather than merely reactive) being is sounder than the exaggerated environmentalism and associationism that mark American theories of personality. Some American critics complain that I lean toward German romanticism. Some Europeans, on the other hand, resent my "Americanization" of their thought. Broadly speaking, however, this work is welcomed as a bridge between psychological cultures, and honorary memberships in psychological societies of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria, and Italy attest to this fact. Presuppositions. While my approach is academic, historical, international, and eclectic, it rests also upon the conviction that science as yet lacks an adequate image of the nature of man. For this reason no doors of method or theory should be closed. It is premature and unseemly for psychologists to present their partial and incomplete theories as if these theories were the final word. Because of this conviction my writing is often polemic in tone, for example in my attacks upon reinforcement theory of learning, projective techniques, animal models, and common actuarial 1
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PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS (I)
assumptions—insofar as such particularistic doctrines seem to be overextended in current theorizing. Psychoanalysis, with its heavy emphasis on the unconscious and on ego defenses, contributes much to our understanding of certain human qualities and occasionally provides the best theoretical fit for a given personality; but in general its biologism and reductionism are unsafe guides to follow. Most human conflicts are well configurated in consciousness and for this reason phenomenological report is important. "If you want to know what a person is like, ask him." In place of particularism and reductionism, I advocate a systematic pluralism or systematic eclecticism, which regards human personality as an open system whose potentiality limits are not known. Because any given personality is always in the process of "becoming" (1955), the science of personality should leave doors open for expansion. Since, as a rule, it is purposivists who leave doors open and mechanists who close them, I am aligned with the former, although I do not exclude any valid evidence from any school of thought. I would allow for both the automatic and for the autonomous in human nature. All theories of personality are nothing more than empirically based philosophies of man. Philosophies of materialism, egotism, hedonism, and positivism are too narrow to accommodate all the evidence. More adequate are philosophies of process, growth, and personhood. The unique and the general. This background accounts for the emphasis upon the study of the individual case in preference to the contrived average case. While most writers pay lip service to uniqueness, they do not in fact allow for it in their dimensional methods or in their assertions concerning the laws (or tendencies) of mind in general. Because of the manifest uniqueness of genotype, environment, and experience, the problem is not to justify the study of individual pattern but rather to justify our abstract and approximate nomothesis. We can do so by observing that people have similar (although never identical) physiological needs, comparable learning capacities, and culturally similar environments. Hence they may develop comparable interests and traits. On this basis we are justified in measuring common traits within a population. But while we engage in this familiar practice of differential psychology we should remember that the primary challenge is to invent morphogenic methods for the reliable and valid study of personal dispositions and individual life styles. Just as morphogenic biology lags behind molecular biology, so too does morphogemc psy-
chology lag behind molecular (dimensional) psychology (1961, chapter 1). The morphogenic (sometimes called idiographic) point of view holds that the single life itself should serve as the base line for studies of a person's course of development and also that an individual life is the proper matrix in which to search for the structure and functioning of personal motives and dispositions. I do not deny that the usual dimensional (nomothetic) approaches have their uses, but I argue for increased study of individual patterns of growth. Research. Morphogenic methods are not easy to invent. Some possibilities lie in personal documents, such as diaries, autobiographies, and letters (Airport 1942; Masterson 1946). The widely used Allport-Vernon-Lindzey test (see A Study of Values 1931), is partly morphogenic, partly dimensional. One of my papers (Allport 1962) lists a wide variety of techniques that I consider wholly or partly morphogenic, among them methods such as matching, self-anchoring scales, and personal structure analysis. Eventually such methods should prove to be scientifically more acceptable than the prevalent dimensional (actuarial) methods, since they should enhance powers of prediction, understanding, and control, the three goals of science (1940). As important as such methods are, they are not to be used exclusively. The bulk of my empirical investigations follow the more traditional method of seeking uniformities in such areas as children's imagery, expressive movement, social attitudes, common traits, social perception, rumor, prejudice, and the religious sentiment. These and other research contributions are listed in the extensive bibliography accompanying Personality and Social Encounter (1960b). An early and wholly characteristic field of research is reported in Studies in Expressive Movement (Allport & Vernon 1933), in which quantitative measures are made of handwriting, drawing, gait, gesture, and posture. Correlations of these measures disclose certain common traits of movement, such as expansiveness (versus constrictedness), centrifugality (versus centripetality), and forcefulness (versus light pressure). In general, individuals are consistent in the degree to which their movement manifests such characteristics. But even when an individual does not follow the common statistical trend, one can usually detect a congruence in his personal movement pattern. Thus while most people are consistent in the force they exert in holding a pen in their fingers and in applying it to paper, an artist may grasp the pen firmly but apply it lightly (a reflection of his own pro-
PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS (I) fessional style). In this example we note the dual emphasis upon both dimensional and morphogenic interpretations. Social psychology. My investigations bridge the topic of personality with the field of social psychology. I define the latter discipline as "the attempt to understand and explain how the thought, feeling, and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of other human beings (1954a, p. 5). In this definition the focus is upon the individual rather than upon societal structures or social processes. The contention that the concept of "role" adequately covers the functioning of personality in the social system is rejected. Nor is there acceptance of a definition of personality stated merely in terms of its effect on other people. For me personality "is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic behavior and thought" (1961, p. 28). Thus the field of personality study is related to, but not identical with, the field of social psychology. While The Nature of Prejudice (1954b) endeavors to give due weight to societal factors, it is the attitudes, traits, and character structure of persons that receive major attention. Cultural forces are ineffective unless they are embodied in the habits, attitudes, and motives of individual men. Structure of personality My main interest is in the organization of personality. This fact is responsible for the somewhat misleading statement that I advocate a trait psychology. I define a trait as "a neuropsychic structure having the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide equivalent (meaningfully consistent) forms of adaptive and expressive behavior" (1961, p. 347). An attitude is regarded as a special class of traits, involving an approach or avoidance tendency toward a specifiable object or class of objects. Common traits and attitudes, therefore, are those aspects of personality in respect to which most people within a given culture can be profitably compared. Although I have done a considerable amount of work in this conventional area of differential psychology, this should not obscure my special and more original emphasis on "personal dispositions," or "individual traits" (1937; 1961), conceived as genuine and unique neuropsychic units that guide, direct, and motivate specific acts of adjustment. While common traits are useful as coarse and approximate dimensions for convenient comparison of individuals, the ultimate units we seek are personal dispositions—the actual, organized foci of the individual's life. While objective methods are
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preferable in determining these dispositions, subjective experience and self-report are not to be denied their place. I am inclined to believe that a relatively few (perhaps six to ten) central dispositions can normally account for the congruence and stability found in personal conduct (1960£>, chapter 7). In a few lives one "cardinal" disposition seems to dominate (Hitler's mania for power, the compassion of St. Francis, Albert Schweitzer's reverence for life). Most lives also have "secondary" dispositions, which reflect minor foci of interest or stylistic qualities of behavior (1961, chapter 15). Since even a cardinal disposition never accounts for all of behavior, the full unification of personality is never attained. Somewhat after the manner of Carl G. Jung, I assume that the nearest approach to unity consists in the never realized striving for unity. Proactivity. Most empirical psychology relies on fragmentary and short-run experiments; and clinical psychology and psychiatry rely for their data chiefly on anamnesis and backward tracing of lives. Hence, central motives, thrusting toward the future, are often lost from view. To trace motives into the past (to discover Oedipal conflicts or the history of rewards and punishments) is contrary to the structure of most lives, which strain toward the future. Hence much current theorizing allows only scantily for goals, plans, intentions, ideals, and hopes that mark the course of becoming. Values (defined as "meanings perceived as related to the self") should be considered a chief ingredient in personality structure. Here I am clearly aligned with the third force in psychology. Motivation. Traditional theories of motivation postulate instincts, impulses, and needs, all of which press toward gratification. Equilibrium, tension reduction, or homeostasis, is said to be the goal of all activity. This is the position of most theories of personality, systems which I consider "quasi-closed." Open-system theories insist that men are normally not content with restful equilibrium. Homeostasis, when achieved, merely guarantees, as Walter B. Cannon has said, that man is then free for the "priceless nonessentials" of life. Even the most basic biological drives are individually patterned; food, drink, sex, and sleep involve countless individual tastes. And beyond drives there are innumerable psychogenic interests that defy uniform classification. One should not, therefore, postulate a basic list of motives, as many theories do. Instead I propose that all structural dispositions are in some degree motivational, in that they all "cause" behavior. Those dispositions involving
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PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS
greater momentary tension (including drives with their respective canalized tastes) have a prepotent saliency. Dispositions that we call interests, ambitions, and values—all involving long-range intention—are also persistently dynamic but ordinarily nonsalient. In addition there are stylistic dispositions (e.g., the tendency to act politely) that are directive in conduct rather than dynamic or driving. Stylistic dispositions that reflect qualities of temperament are best studied through expressive movements (vide supra*). Functional autonomy. To allow for the continual growth of motives, I have introduced the concept of "functional autonomy." It refers to "any acquired system of motivation in which the tensions involved are not of the same kind as the antecedent tensions from which the acquired system developed" (1961, p. 229). The existence of functional autonomy has been acknowledged by various authors in various ways, e.g., Franz Brentano, Edward C. Tolman, Wilhelm Stern, and Robert S. Woodworth. The principle of functional autonomy comprises the following points: (1) The character of motives alters so radically from infancy to maturity that we may regard adult motives as supplanting the motives of infancy; this view allows for the variety of goals and interests in adult personality better than any doctrine of fixed instinct or conditioned drive. (2) Even biological drives (breathing, hunger, sex) take on an individuality of patterning. (3) The "go" of a motive is always contemporary, and therefore tracing back to Oedipal conflicts, identifications, or childhood conditioning (except in rare neurotic instances) does not provide an explanation for current motivation. (4) Ontogenetic emergence (here postulated) does not contradict continuity in personality development. One should distinguish perseverative from propriate functional autonomy. The former is due to reverberatory (feedback) mechanisms in the nervous system. The latter is based on the dynamic properties of the self-image and on propriate striving. Except in certain neurotic conditions, a person is not tied to earlier motives, whether these are regarded as conditioned, channeled, or sublimated. Rather, the essence of his nature is to master and extract meaning from his environment and to orient himself toward the future. Propriate functional autonomy is possible because the energy potential possessed by an individual is in excess of his survival needs, drives, and the demands of immediate adjustment. In short, functional autonomy is "a way of stat-
(I)
ing that men's motives change and grow in the course of life because it is the nature of man that they should do so. Only theorists wedded to a reactive, homeostatic, quasi-closed model of man find difficulty in agreeing" (1961, pp. 252-253). It should be noted that post-Freudian ego psychology has modified psychoanalytic theory in the direction of functional autonomy (Heinz Hartmann, Erich Fromm, David Rapaport, Karen Horney). Ego psychology no longer looks for motivation exclusively in the unconscious, nor does it regard adult purposes as mere cathexes or sublimations of the instinctive impulses of sex and aggression. Functional autonomy is a declaration of independence for the normal personality. As a model it allows for authentic maturity and growth. Criteria for the mature personality are extension of the sense of self, warm relating of self to others, emotional security, realistic perception, self-objectification (insight and humor), and a unifying philosophy of life (1961, chapter 12). The proprium. The term "proprium" is used to avoid the historic ambiguities of self or ego. Proprium is defined as the self-as-known—that which is experienced as warm and central, as of importance. Ego involved (propriate) states are measurably different from states that are merely task involved, i.e., peripheral to the proprium (1943). Propriate functions include body sense, self-identity, self-esteem, self-extension, rational coping, self-image, and long-range propriate striving. These propriate functions (which must not be attributed to a separate self or agent) develop gradually, beginning at the end of the first year of life. Early sensorimotor behavior is nonpropriate, as is much of the opportunistic functioning of later life. Most of the investigations conducted in general and experimental psychology deal with nonpropriate behavior. For this reason many psychological principles of learning, motivation, and cognitive operation are not fully adequate to a psychology of the propriate aspects of personality. For example, theories of learning place too much emphasis upon the concept of reward and punishment and neglect the effect on learning of the congruence of an act with the self-image. In the normal course of development, external sanctions give way to internal directives. A student who first seeks the teacher's approval may end up by searching for knowledge for its own sake (functional autonomy). To take a further example: childhood conscience is at first a disposition based on prohibition, fear, and parental sanctions. With time, however, this primitive "must" conscience gives way to an adult "ought" conscience, which is
PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS (II) based not on fear of sanctions but upon a generic image of one's preferred life style. Thus the mature sense of moral obligation reaches far beyond the childhood superego. And so too with all complex sentiments. They are not mere channelings of early formations but are selective, critical, and often adventurous ways of handling the onrush of existence. The interweaving of the propriate functions performs the task of unifying personality (insofar as it is unified) in much the same way as William McDougall's master sentiment of "self-regard." As an academician and eclectic I respect and utilize contributions from the many particularistic approaches. It is, however, a persistent demand for adequacy of outlook that leads me to emphasize what I regard as neglected hypotheses and interpretations. My historical orientation is reflected in my sympathetic biographical interpretations of the work of William James, John Dewey, Wilhelm Stern, and Kurt Lewin—writers with whom I feel intellectual kinship. While I do not claim to have achieved a final eclecticism, I believe that the opensystem view of personality holds hope for such a development (Allport 1964). An open system, as opposed to a quasi-closed system, allows for an increase of internal organization over time and for transactional commerce with the environment beyond the level of mere reactivity (1960a). GORDON W. ALLPORT
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ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1960a The Open System in Personality Theory. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 61:301-310. ALLPORT, GORDON W. (1960b) 1964 Personality and Social Encounter: Selected Essays. Boston: Beacon. ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1961 Pattern and Growth in Personality. New York: Holt. ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1962 The General and the Unique in Psychological Science. Journal of Personality 30: 405-422. ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1964 The Fruits of Eclecticism: Bitter or Sweet? Pages 27-44 in International Congress of Psychology, 17th, Proceedings. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. ALLPORT, GORDON W.; BRUNER, JEROME S.; and JANDORF, E. M. 1941 Personality Under Social Catastrophe: Ninety Life-histories of the Nazi Revolution. Character and Personality 10:1-22. ALLPORT, GORDON W.; and VERNON, PHILIP E. 1933 Studies in Expressive Movement. New York: Macmillan. ALLPORT, GORDON W.; VERNON, PHILIP E.; and LINDZEY, GARDNER (1931) 1960 A Study of Values. 3d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. -» Allport and Vernon were the authors of the 1931 edition. BERTOCCI, PETER A.; and MILLARD, RICHARD M. 1963 Personality and the Good. New York: McKay. -> See chapter 6. HALL, CALVIN S.; and LINDZEY, GARDNER 1957 Theories of Personality. New York: Wiley. -> See chapter 7. MADDI, SALVATORE R. 1963 Humanistic Psychology: Allport and Murray. Pages 162-205 in J. M. Wepman and R. W. Heine (editors), Concepts of Personality. Chicago: Aldine. MASTERSON, JENNY (Govs) [pseud.] (1946) 1965 Letters From Jenny. Edited and interpreted by Gordon W. Allport. New York: Harcourt. -> First published in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. II
[Other relevant material may be found in FIELD THEORY; GESTALT THEORY; PERSONALITY; TRAITS.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
The -most general statement of All-port's position is in Allport 1961. A complete bibliography through 1963 is contained in the 1964 edition of Allport 1960b. ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1937 Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. New York: Holt. ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1940 The Psychologist's Frame of Reference. Psychological Bulletin 37:1-28. ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1942 The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science. Bulletin No. 49. New York: Social Science Research Council. ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1943 The Ego in Contemporary Psychology. Psychological Review 50:451-478. ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1954
COMPONENTS OF AN EVOLVING PERSONOLOGICAL SYSTEM
Without doubt, the ground for my inclusion among contemporary "personality theorists" in this encyclopedia as well as in four recent surveys of the field (Hall & Lindzey 1957; Wepman & Heine 1963; Bischof 1964; Sahakian 1965) is the array of concepts and conceptual relations that were presented in Explorations in Personality (1938), the product of a collaboration for which I have received in print more credit than I can reasonably claim. Since that time, the conceptual scheme that we had designed (for a restricted purpose) has undergone, needless to say, countless expansions, revisions, and reconstructions on its way to the still embryonic and evolving personological system (PS) to which I currently subscribe. I welcome the opportunity to report this much—a bare minimum—in order to accent my belief that today is no time for theoretical fixations. On the contrary, in my case an itch for comprehensiveness has resulted in such a multiplication of idenes, or basic gene-like ideas
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PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS (II)
—stolen goods for the most part—that at this juncture I find myself utterly incapable of packing them coherently into an essay of this length. The present assignment, then, came as a Procrustean bed which called for major surgery, regardless of the prospect that a successful series of amputations, or theoriectomies, would be pretty sure to kill the patient (this PS). The most radical theoriectomy performed for this occasion involved the excision of that large, widely propagated portion of the Freudian system which is concerned with psychopathological phenomena and their determinants. What were left to represent and understand after this huge excision were the more venturesome, progressive, ambitious, proudful, affectionate, joyful, selfactualizing, and creative potentialities of human nature, as well as of some of its higher-level, social and cultural, adult activities. In short, the task here is to set forth something which might serve as a health-oriented extension of, and complement to, the illness-oriented Freudian system. Further reductions of my corpus of ideas have been accomplished by extracting a number of biological, physiological, sociological, evolutionary, and general systems concepts and theories, by deleting expositions and justifications of ideas that are already in the literature, and by condensing nearly everything that needed to be said into the briefest sentences, without the numerous qualifications that accuracy demands. And so, as a consequence of so much surgery, I am afraid that the standing of this present assemblage of mentations must depend on whatever imaginative supports the reader is prepared to proffer. A theoretical conception Definition. A personality at any designated moment of its history (in middle life, for example) is the then-existing brain-located, imperceptible and problematical hierarchical constitution of an individual's entire complex stock of interrelated substance-dependent and structure-dependent psychological properties (elementary, associational, and organizational). Each elementary property is a differentiated (selectively focused), situationally oriented disposition (readiness) and capacity (power) to participate as a process in conjunction with other processes (each in its own way) in a variety of functional exercises or endeavors which will presumptively enhance that individual's feeling of well-being in his world. The vast majority of these selectively focused dispositions and capacities— for example, a multiplicity of more or less energizing interests, valuations, passions, wants, and needs; of more or less adequate imaginal or conceptual representations of objects, persons, events, or abstract ideas; of beliefs, judgments, decisions,
or plans of action; and of more or less competent organizations of subsidiary mental, verbal, and motor processes, that is, special skills—will be dormant (unactivated) at any given time. But a few of them will be operating momentarily in one of the internal or external situational proceedings (temporal units of activity), the ongoing processions of which constitute the daily waking life of that particular individual. Psychological properties. The properties and processes of personality are those that are capable of becoming conscious (experientially discriminated) in the natural course of events or when existing resistances are overcome. In short, this PS conforms to the principle that a scientist should adhere to a thoroughly self-consistent terminology, one that is suitable to the conceptual analysis and reconstruction of the class of phenomena (in this case psychological phenomena) he is investigating. This principle prohibits neither his identification of determinants or of analogous events at other levels of discourse, nor his adoption of the language of general systems theory in addition to his own terms [see SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEMS]. Brain-located properties. Brain-located substance-and-structure dependence simply means that there would be no psychological properties or processes without the operations of the properties of material substances and structures on lower (electronic, chemical, physiological) levels of reality, including the circulating blood and its various essential constituents, such as oxygen, water, energy-bearing food particles, salts, vitamins, and hormones (if no animate brain, then no personality); and consequently that alterations of encephalic functioning beyond a certain critical limit— for example, as a result of anoxemia, lobotomy, arteriosclerosis, drugs, etc.—will change the personality temporarily or permanently in some respects. Furthermore, this dependence on the brain means that increasing knowledge of encephalic structures and their properties—for example, ascending reticular activating system—and various centers of hedonic, emotional, and erotic excitation in subcortical areas—should provide ground for hypothetical conceptions of the hierarchical systems of a personality that not only will conform more and more closely to the operations of the organic structures on which these systems are dependent but will advance our understanding of their situational activities. [See NERVOUS SYSTEM, article on STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE BRAIN.] Comprehensiveness of properties. In this PS, "personality," the most comprehensive term we have in psychology, is given a functional meaning
PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS (II) embracing everything from basic temperamental variables—for example, energy level, hedonic level, affective state of being—to such higher mental processes as may be devoted to superpersonal (cultural) endeavors—for example, artistic, historical, scientific, philosophical. Consequently, even by restricting one's attention (as one inevitably must do and should do) to the most important properties, a personality cannot yet be adequately represented as a functional and temporal whole in less than 5,000 words, let us say; certainly not by a short list of traits. Hierarchical constitution. Hierarchical constitution refers to the conception of three "vertical" divisions (differentiated establishments) of a personality, the states of which in childhood are quite comparable to the Freudian id, ego, and superego. The number, nature, object attachments, relative potency, and interrelationships of the components of each of these establishments change progressively with maturation and learning, stratum upon stratum, in opposition to an underlying tendency (augmented by frustration, etc.) to regress to lower strata, as manifested in sleep, reaction to extreme stress, neurosis, and psychosis. In these regressions the mind is overrun by mythological (archetypal) images from the stratum in which the narcissistic infant's entire world consisted of the providing and depriving mother (matriarchal superego) and the anlage of the ego was nothing but a little actuator of its vocal and its oral muscles. In this PS the adult id embraces the entire stratifled population of instinctual (genetically given, viscerogenic, subcortical, unbidden and involuntary) affective dispositions (hedonic, wishful, emotional, evaluative) with their engendered orienting fantasies, some forms of which have been repressed for years and may or may not be operating influentially "below" the boundary of the ego, but others of which have access to consciousness. The adult ego is the more or less fact-perceptive, knowledgeable, rational, articulate, future-oriented regnant system of the personality with energies of its own (during the waking hours) to fulfill its role as both governor and servant of the id. As the self-conscious "I," who leaves most things to habit (dynamic mechanisms), the adult ego will, on signal occasions, try as far as possible to function as the autonomous (uncoerced) and self-sufficient (unaided) determiner of his destiny—especially as "I" the decision maker (the identifier, interpreter, evaluator, rejector of the "worse" and chooser of the "better" pressing id components) and as "I" the plan-composer for the "better" ones, the executor and adjuster of the plans, and, finally, the achiever of effects which are sufficiently satisfying to self-respect and to the
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destructive and constructive id, greedy for pleasure, companionship, love, possessions, parenthood, power, and prestige. The adult superego (superregnant system of the personality) consists of stratified imaginal representors of the rulers (parent, king, god) and verbal representors of the ruling culture (moral precepts, laws, beliefs, sentiments, principles) of the world (family, group, nation, mankind) of which each ego is a member. Its function is to commit the individual to the support and service of these values. [See PSYCHOANALYSIS, article On EGO PSYCHOLOGY.] Imperceptible, problematical properties. Imperceptible and problematical properties are encountered especially in highly speculative, theoretical constructs, all too complicated to be properly expounded in this article. Personality operations. The operations of a personality during any designated period in its career are the history of the brain-located participations (with more or less frequency, intensity, persistence, and effectiveness) of many, but not all, of its manifold, currently existing properties, a few of these at a time—as manifested objectively and/or subjectively during the waking hours—in each of the succession of different (unique or recurrent) external (e.g., overt interactional) and internal (e.g., covert contemplative) situational proceedings, which, with their varying hedonic accompaniments and effects (negative or positive reinforcements), compose the more or less self-conscious life of an individual as it is carried on in relation to an influential environment of natural, artifactual, human, and cultural entities and events. To be included among the manifest operations and relations of a person's constitutional properties are prolonged emotional states (e.g., melancholy, anxiety, internal conflict, passionate love, creative zest); long spans of proactive, progressive serial proceedings, that is, the continuing, though interrupted, operation of complex systems of interest and enterprise with subsidiary processes (e.g., working for a degree, a long courtship, building a house, a voyage of discovery, writing a novel, etc.); and verbal disclosures of prevalent enduring dispositions (e.g., sentiments, beliefs, ambitions), as well as manifestations of thematic imagination, of knowledge, and of skill in various testing situations. Not all possible operations are included, because nowhere near all classes of situations (e.g., opportunities, tasks, perils) will be encountered by any one person in his lifetime: numerous possible shames and triumphs will be buried with him. Almost as revealing as the classes of situations that a person proactively chooses to encounter may be those he consistently avoids.
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PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS (II)
Succession of proceedings. A person's waking life is characterized by a continuous procession of varying psychic states, processes, and representors. Some of these processions will occur when he is privately absorbed in a random, undirected (involuntary) stream of covert feelings, images, and ideas (e.g., daydreaming) and others, when he is privately absorbed in a directed (voluntary) endeavor to "make up his mind" about something. Temporal strips of this nature are termed undirected or directed internal proceedings. In contrast to these are external proceedings, during each of which the person is proactively or reactively engaged in an environmental transaction, marked by actuations of overt, situationally oriented, motor and/or verbal processes, actuations which may be more or less spontaneous, random, impulsively expressive, aimless, or deliberately directed, intentional, and purposeful. External proceedings have two aspects: an imperceptible experiential aspect and a perceptible and/or audible behavioral aspect. Internal proceedings, however, have only a scarcely appreciable behavioral aspect. There is no space here for an account of how these major (sometimes overlapping) classes of situational proceedings have been classified into families, genera, species, varieties, etc. What needs to be stressed here is that this PS embraces both conventional behavioral psychology and (more particularly) experiential psychology—that is, it uses detailed reports, expertly obtained, of internal proceedings and of the subjective aspect of external proceedings. [See PHENOMENOLOGY.] History. Chronological records of the more important (revealing, consequential), successful or unsuccessful, satisfying or dissatisfying, single and serial proceedings (e.g., overt social interactions, sexual experiences of all sorts, covert dreams, fantasies, conflicts, feelings, self-evaluations, apperceptions of the world, choices of long-range purposes, etc.) in a person's life during the designated timespan, taken in conjunction with his responses to technical procedures, constitute the bulk of the data, the facts, to be analyzed into psychological variables, which, whenever possible, will be incorporated into the systemic components of a total formulation of the existing constitution of a person's more important properties. But, of course, the constitution will be changing, and strictly speaking, this great task of assessment and formulation should be repeated at each of the (Shakespearean seven, let us say) ages of the subject, since personality, as denned by this PS, has not only a comprehensive scope but a comprehensive span: the history of the personality is the personality. I shall now
turn to a much abbreviated conception of the historic changes of the constitution of a personality, paying special attention to their genetical and experiential (learning) determinants. The developmental process A personality constitutionally and operationally considered as a temporal whole from birth to death is the brain-located history of the successive and cumulative constitutional products (say, a few molecules and structural alterations at a time, in cells, axons and dendrites) of two interdependent ongoing, psychometabolic processes: the genetical and experiential systems. The nature and order of the products of the more fundamental of these two interdependent systems are largely determined, in a basic and a general way, by the inbuilt, genetical program of consecutive events (DNA code of instructions), a program which is roughly divisible into three successive but overlapping temporal eras. The first era is marked by the emergence and multiplication of potentialities for a high proportion of new, developmental (associational and organizational), structural compositions, each with its consequential psychological properties. The second era (middle age) is marked by a relatively high proportion of conservative recompositions of the already developed structures and functions. And, finally, the third era (senescence) is marked by a decrease of potentialities for new compositions and recompositions (e.g., less learning and retention) and an increase of decompositions (atrophy) of some previously existing forms and functions. [See ADOLESCENCE; AGING; DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY; GENETICS, article on GENETICS AND BEHAVIOR; INFANCY; INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT; LIFE CYCLE; PERSONALITY, article on PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT; SENSORY AND MOTOR DEVELOPMENT.] Presumably, the progress of the genetical program of events determines the earliest age at which a number of nascent dispositions and aptitudes will successively emerge and be capable of development under favorable conditions (e.g., now is the time to learn to crawl, now to start babbling, now comes the onset of puberty, etc.); the limits of excellence to which a number of special skills (e.g., athletic, musical, mathematical, poetical, etc.) may be perfected under the most facilitating circumstances; a number of temperamental dispositions and susceptibilities; and finally, besides much else perhaps, the onset of senescence and the age of death under the most fortunate conditions. The nature and order of the constructive and conservative products of the experiential interde-
PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS (II) pendent system of psychometabolic processes (the system involved in learning) are largely and specifically determined by the succession and recurrence of diverse concrete environmental encounters, instinctive outbursts, functional endeavors, and their hedonic effects (negative and positive reinforcements, including punishments and rewards for good behavior). Thus, within limits set by the existing potentialities, the operations and fortunes —or misfortunes—of a few, interdependent properties of the personality in each of the critical proceedings of its ongoing life largely determine what will be learned (internally composed, retained, and replicated); then, in a reciprocal manner, what a person learns on one occasion will determine or modify his performance on a subsequent occasion of the same class. Metabolic model. The term "ongoing" points to the fact that the brain-located nature of a human being is marked by a procession of vital processes, from the cessation of which (for example, as a result of even a short span of oxygen deprivation) there is no recovery. Ontogenetically considered, these given vital processes date from the fertilization of the ovum, but phylogenetically considered, they have a presumptive molecular (DNA or RNA) and cytoplasmic thread of historic continuity of some two or three billion years, which started, we may suppose, with the emergence of the genetical systems of a cluster of primordial units of living matter. To represent the sine qua non of life within the boundary of an animal organism, including its brain, and to account for the free energy that sustains its multivarious operations, there are no better general terms than those of biochemical metabolism, the incessant operation in each cell and tissue of catabolic (structure-decomposing, energyreleasing) and anabolic (structure-composing, energy-binding) processes. The succession of intracellular catabolic processes (designated here by De) may be likened to a tiny fire in which energy-rich particles (carbohydrates, fats, and proteins) are decomposed with the aid of enzymes in a watery medium of mineral salts, vitamins, and other substances. To keep these home fires burning brightly in the cells of the brain and other organs, there must be an almost continuous cellular ingestion (symbolized by Ca~) of the above-mentioned necessities—especially oxygen— as well as an almost continuous cellular egestion (symbolized by Rw) of waste products—carbon dioxide, water, and incompletely oxidized nitrogen compounds. Of an opposite nature to the analytic processes of catabolism (De) are the synthetic, molecule-
9
binding, structure-building processes of anabolism (symbolized by Co); the energy for these, as for every other variety of activity, is derived from catabolism. Basically attributable to synthetic processes at the molecular level (e.g., millions of multiplications of giant DNA and RNA molecules, etc.), according to this theory, are all the above-mentioned maturational formations, and, in conjunction with concrete environmental transactions (perceptual and actuational), all the structural compositions and recompositions, the properties of which constitute the specific and general products of experience: what a person has actually learned to attend to selectively, to recognize, to understand, to represent conceptually, to evaluate positively or negatively, to love or to hate, to anticipate with pleasure or with dread, to accomplish with his muscles, to express with words, and to choose as realizable aims—all of which are important focused variables of personality. On the extent and fitness of such acquisitions and also very largely on favorable circumstances and good fortune will depend the possibility of actualizing whatever geneticallygiven, latent resources there may be for love, joy, achievement, and service to mankind. As to the three, above-defined overlapping temporal eras of the life cycle, each of these can be most simply, though roughly, conceptualized in terms of a ratio of the two metabolic terms Co and De: during the era of growth and development of character and powers, Co > De; during the era of maintenance of character and the fruitful use of powers, Co = De; during the phase of induration and decay, Co < De. These are some of the chief reasons why the concurrent, complementary processes of biological metabolism Co and De have been taken as the main components of this PS's basic paradigm, or model, a model that conforms with a conception of reality that is not expressible in terms of spatial structures of matter as such but in terms of the interdependent, operating properties of matter—that is, in terms of process, time, and energy. It is a fundamental animate model that accounts for the vital, vegetative processes (e.g., maturation, growth, differentiation, repair, etc.) that inanimate models do not fittingly represent. It is also applicable, with suitable modifications, to higher levels of mental activity, especially— when taken in conjunction with the widespread need for novelty (change, exploration, experiment) —to those analytic and synthetic imaginations which lead to cultural (scientific, artistic, ideological, ethical, etc.) innovations of all types [see AESTHETICS and ETHICS]. Finally, this model (with its emphasis on the
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PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS (II)
energy-building, antientropic processes of progressive development and creativity) provides the biological ground for what is so conspicuously absent in the purely psychoanalytic system (with its emphasis on energy-reducing, entropic processes, as well as on fixation, repetition compulsion, regression, disintegration) [see CREATIVITY and STIMULATION DRIVES]. Learning and hedonic effects. It is provisionally proposed that among the genetical determinants of the development of personality, none is more influential than the morphology of the primitive brain (subcortex), with its increasing differentiations and integrations of centers (clusters of cellular containers of specialized chemical compounds called micronic structures), each of which will sooner or later constitute an inbuilt readiness to be converted into a more or less distinctive energizing (feeling) state. The most basic centers, related to all others, are those that yield hedonic feelings (pleasure, delight, satisfaction, joy) and those that yield anhedonic feelings (displeasure, distress, dissatisfaction, misery), with expressive movements in each case. From infancy on, hedonic learning, on which so much depends, will consist in the discovery (represented in the brain by more or less enduring spatial structures reconvertible into temporal associations and organizations) of what generates hedonic feelings and what generates anhedonic feelings (of this or that intensity or grade) within the self and then within numerous other selves whose feelings are important to the self. There are many kinds of hedonic and anhedonic determinants (generators), most of which, though analytically distinguishable, operate in relations with a few others, interdependently or consequentially. Some may be experienced together (as compounded sources of joy or misery) or some sequentially, the first being either a necessary forerunner of the second (e.g., tedious rehearsals of a skill before exhibiting it successfully in public) or the "cause" of the second (e.g., the pleasure of bullying a younger sister, followed by a humiliating punishment, a negative social repercussion). Growing up involves, among other things, gradual increases in the prospective time-span; the capacity to foresee the future; the power to postpone the gratification of certain wants, for one reason or another; and the ability to discriminate between pleasures and displeasures which have satisfying or beneficial consequences and those which have dissatisfying or harmful consequences and eventually to regulate one's life so that neither the present nor the future is sacrificed for the other. Of course the operation of a generator, hedonic
or anhedonic, will usually depend on a number of conditions or factors in addition to the past history and developmental age of the subject, factors such as the place, time, duration, and mode of its occurrence, the absence or presence of one or more particular persons, etc. But taking these and other qualifications into account, it might be said that each properly differentiated class of satisfiers (positive reinforcements) and of dissatisfiers (negative reinforcements), taken separately or in combination, deserves some place among the interdependent ends or counterends of individual or collective human living and endeavor. Hedonic and anhedonic generators may be suitably classified in several ways, one being according to their temporal reference: they may be retrospective, involving memories of past experiences which generate present pleasure or displeasure; spective, involving awareness of current delighters or distressors; or prospective, involving anticipations of future experiences which generate present pleasure or displeasure. Current generators may be classified according to their predominant location in space: in the subject, in the environment, or, more often, in subject-environment (especially interpersonal) transactions. Each of these major orders of determinants is divisible into several families, genera, etc. For example, generators in the subject may be located in the body (somatic determinants), in some emotional (e.g., love, hate, fear) center of the subcortex (central determinants), in some type of sensory, imaginal, conceptual, verbal, or motor process (processional determinants), or in the judgments of conscience (superregnant determinants). Environmental determinants. Most of these determinants are dynamically interrelated with environmental determinants. These are dominant in the early months of life when the child's capabilities are pretty much limited to piteous petitioning and to sucking. The hedonic generators in early life consist of whatever provisions (delighters) are gratuitously transmitted by the mother and receptively enjoyed by the child: chiefly bodily provisions (contact, firm support, stimulation, nipple, milk) and affectional provisions (presence, rapt attention, expressions of love, and later of admiration and approval, etc.). The anhedonic generators are constituted either by the absence in the proximal environment of an urgently wanted delighter (e.g., food, mother), whose arrival starts a strip of process pleasure, or by the presence of an unwanted distressor (e.g., pain, loud noise), whose removal restores the status quo. Somewhat later, however, the child may be confronted by an irremovable distressor, in the form of an interloping
PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS (II) newborn sibling and/or (for a boy) of a father, who is perceived as a successful contender for the mother's love. Central determinants. This brings us to a discussion of central determinants. It is assumed that, by necessity, the child is wholly egocentric (selfcenteredly oblivious of other selves and selfishly demanding a complete monopoly of his mother's attention when he wants it); thus, he bellows furiously when he is kept waiting, and the sight of a displacing rival is not unlikely to arouse in him a fiendish jealousy coupled with a profound resentment which engenders murderous fantasies directed toward the rival or revengefully toward the mother as betrayer of his trust. It seems that these fantasies and dreams are promoted, in part, by an inbuilt propensity to compose a bewildering procession of extravagant mythological images, many of which are related to the parents or more generally to the "myth of the hero," who, after performing extraordinary, superhuman exploits (e.g., flying, magic, etc.), kills a king and marries his queen. Complexes resulting from the vicissitudes and disastrous outcomes of these imagined heroic deeds and crimes may reside in the lowest strata of the id for a long time. Among other things, growing up calls for an increasing ability to distinguish between imagined events and actual events "out there," as well as a gradual progression from an utterly dependent state ("What will my parents do for me?") toward a relatively self-sufficient state ("What can I do for myself?"). Achievement determinants. An achievement determinant includes references to the (immediate or distant) past, present, and future and has its location in the subject's impression of whether he is moving toward his goal—whatever this may be—and, if so, whether he is moving faster or slower than he expected; with more ease or difficulty, from moment to moment, day to day, or year to year; or, more generally, whether he is getting better, no better, or worse in some respect. One can observe in the child the beginnings of experiences of this nature: the progressive organization of processes—of elementary sensory processes to arrive at the perception and recognition of an object; of sensorimotor processes (with feedback loops) to arrive at the moment when an object can be confidently reached, seized, and variously dealt with; of vocal processes to form words and sentences, etc.—which constitute, in each case, a stepwise gain of volitional power, which is experienced by the child as a pleasure-enhancing minor achievement, and, as such, is often applauded by a parent (a minor recognition). The central determinant
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here is ambition in the child, first to achieve greater and greater control of his own processes by concentration and persistence (i.e., to develop a variety of afferent and efferent skills in dealing with small portions of the encountered environment) and thus to attain a measure of autonomy and independence (which inaugurates the development of the ego, the executive of the regnant system of the personality) and later to use these skills (athletic, social, and intellectual) in competing with his peers for acknowledged superiority (victory or some form of higher order recognition, such as prizes, election to membership or office, or academic marks and honors), as well as to use these skills in satisfying other (material, social, or cultural) wants. The ways-means-end learning cannot begin until a certain amount of functional learning (walking and moving objects) has occurred, and then, what has to be learned year after year to gain positive social feedback (repercussions) from parents, teachers, or peers becomes progressively more difficult. Under competitive conditions, the prizes and, later, the best jobs and much else are reserved for those who have pushed some relevant types of functional learning to a sufficient degree of competence. In short, positive social reinforcements depend on individual differences in ambition (want to achieve), work enjoyment (process pleasure), persistence, innate aptitude, etc. [See ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION and SENSORY AND MOTOR DEVELOPMENT.] Transactional determinants. Transactional determinants are delighters and distressors that come from dealing (successfully or unsuccessfully) with the environment of things, people, or ideas; from enjoyed or not enjoyed dyadic reciprocations with another person—that is, transmissions and receptions of erotic stimulation (mutual orgasm), of affection or disaffection, of interesting or banal information, self-revelations, or opinions, of comic or pointless stories, etc.; from the processes or outcomes of cooperative endeavors; from the repercussions of socialized (ethical, considerate, conventional) or unsocialized (criminal, offensive, obnoxious) forms or styles of behavior, especially the miseries of ostracism, disgrace, imprisonment, etc.; from the processes and effects of transmitting delighters to those who need them or deserve them (a very common, genuine form of enjoyment not covered by current psychological theories), and much else besides [see SYMPATHY AND EMPATHY]. Let these suffice as illustrations of a few elementary varieties of hedonic and anhedonic determinants. In this PS, those that emanate from others (alters) and are directed toward the subject are classified
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PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS (II)
as press (plural, press); positive press include acceptance, inclusion, promotion, respect, affection, lust-love, and negative press include rejection, exclusion, demotion, contempt, hate. As a personality develops, associations and organizations will constitute the ground for a large number of general and particular (unique), enduring or unenduring positive and negative interests, evaluations (sentiments and tastes), personal affections, beliefs, wants, modes of behavior, and aims (a negative aim being an orientation toward the riddance in the present or the prevention in the future of the operation of a distressor). Learning. The term "learning" commonly implies that its results are "valuable" (in some sense), regardless of the self-evident fact that a person may learn a good deal that "ain't so" or "ain't good": superstitions, prejudices, repulsive tastes, the craft of forgery, etc.—all of which had better be unlearned. Also, in psychology, the term generally implies that its results determine a young person's subsequent behavior, that he or she very soon becomes a creature of habits, with emotions and aims fixated by experienced distressors or delighters and tactics fixated by experienced successes, etc. This might be pretty nearly the whole truth if the genetical program, with its potentialities for self-actualization, ceased to operate at puberty; if the subject were not easily bored and not eager for new sights and new ventures; if the subject were commonly rewarded for frequent repetitions of the same information (old news), the same jokes, etc.; if the human environment, parents, teachers, and peers were unanimous in their support of the same beliefs, codes, manners, political sentiments, and tastes; if the person were not ambitious to emulate successively the more impressive performances and deeds of others; if for the subject the very meaning of achievement (something to be proud of) did not consist in the accomplishment of something new, extraordinary, more difficult or hazardous; if the person were not enticed by future-oriented imagents (fantasies) of unexperienced delights or of untried ways and means; if no person were ever radically transformed by a "second birth," "great emancipation," or religious conversion; and finally, if no person were ever to discover that the creation of an unprecedented, propitious form of living or of culture (scientific, literary, etc.) could be more profoundly joyous than any experience he had had. If it were not for these and other self-realizing, novelty-seeking, ambitious, proudful, imaginative, and creative dispositions in human beings, all of us would stagnate with learned incapacities and a few enthralling memories of infantile attachments. This
is not to deny the essential truth of one of Freud's greatest discoveries: the lasting underlying influence (either beneficial or harmful) of early terrors, conditionings, loves and hates, erotized fantasies, and much else. What is being stressed at this point is the amount of unlearning (hedonic, cognitive, and tactical), experimentation, courage, endurance, and constructiveness that is required for a full life. [See CREATIVITY; FANTASY; STIMULATION DRIVES.] Variables, assessments, and representations Among the criteria in terms of which the worth of a personological system may be suitably evaluated are: (1) the comprehensiveness (coverage, scope), structure (interr elatedness), adequacy (congruence with reality, significance), and operational definiteness (clarity, precision) of its assemblage of concepts and propositions; (2) the efficiency (in corresponding terms) of its assessment system (data-collecting, data-processing, data-evaluating, and data-integrating processes); and (3) the over-all satisfactoriness (in corresponding terms)—the plausibility and verifiability—of the representations of different personalities (explanatory conceptual biographies) that are composed out of the harvest of facts and interpretations yielded by the assessment process. In this PS, the central set of concepts are classified into abstract elementary orders (e.g., propelling energizers and evaluators; representors; movers; organizers; etc.) and these into families, genera, etc., of decreasing generality. The simplest, recurrent associations of these properties with each other or with the properties of environmental entities (e.g., an interest in Z, a positive evaluation of X, a want to gain Y, images of W, the effectiveness of V processes, etc.) are the kinds of abstracted personality variables which are usually obtained with ratings from questionnaires and tests, and in terms of which an individual is ordinarily described in a social conversation. The aim in this PS, however, is to discover how these structural components, converted into their operating properties, interdependently participate in this or that energized, oriented, organized, temporal unit (organizational variable). This synthetic mode of thought eventually results in the conceptualization of a hierarchy of purposive organizations, the largest and longest of which are systems of concern (of planning, activity, enjoyment, and achievement). It is chiefly of these that a personality-in-progress is composed. Of necessity, large portions of this PS have been omitted; but enough may have been said to indi-
PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Study cate that it is basically a psychometabolic system, with energy released for drives, emotions, and movements (electrical and muscular) and for the composition of new convertible structures of all sorts. From this it follows that its root concepts are dynamic, genetical, developmental, organismal (systemic, semiholistic), and hierarchical. It stresses the experiential (existential, subjective), hedonistic, and voluntaristic aspects of a person's life (partly because of their contemporary neglect); but heretofore in practice it has done more justice to unconscious psychological processes, as well as to overt behavior with its situational and sociological (membership and role) determinants. HENRY A. MURRAY [Directly related is the entry PERSONALITY. Other relevant material may be found in MOTIVATION, article On HUMAN MOTIVATION; NERVOUS SYSTEM; PSYCHOANALYSIS; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS; and in the biographies of FREUD; HUXLEY; JUNG; LEWIN; MORGAN, C. LLOYD; WHITEHEAD.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
BISCHOF, LEDFORD J. 1964 Interpreting Personality Theories. New York: Harper. COHN, ALFRED E.; and MURRAY, HENRY A. 1927 Physiological Ontogeny: I. The Present Status of the Problem. Quarterly Review of Biology 2:469-493. Explorations in Personality: A Clinical and Experimental Study of Fifty Men of College Age, by Henry A. Murray et al. 1938 London and New York: Oxford Univ. Press. HALL, CALVIN S.; and LINDZEY, GARDNER 1957 Theories of Personality. New York: Wiley; London: Chapman. MURRAY, HENRY A. 1940 What Should Psychologists Do About Psychoanalysis? Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 35:150-175. MURRAY, HENRY A. 1951 Toward a Classification of Interactions. Pages 434-464 in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (editors), Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. MURRAY, HENRY A. 1958 Drive, Time, Strategy, Measurement, and Our Way of Life. Pages 183-196 in Gardner Lindzey (editor), Assessment of Human Motives. New York: Rinehart. MURRAY, HENRY A. 1959 Preparations for the Scaffold of a Comprehensive System. Volume 3, pages 7-54 in Sigmund Koch (editor), Psychology: A Study of Science. New York: McGraw-Hill. MURRAY, HENRY A. (1963) 1965 Studies of Stressful Interpersonal Disputations. Pages 176-184 in Gardner Lindzey and Calvin S. Hall (editors), Theories of Personality: Primary Sources and Research. New York: Wiley. -» First published in Volume 18 of the American Psychologist. MURRAY, HENRY A.; and MORGAN, CHRISTIANA D. 1945 A Clinical Study of Sentiments. Genetic Psychology Monographs 32:3-149, 153-311. SAHAKIAN, WILLIAM S. (editor) 1965 Psychology of Personality. Chicago: Rand McNally. WEPMAN, JOSEPH M.,- and HEINE, RALPH W. (editors) 1963 Concepts of Personality. Chicago: Aldine.
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PERSONALITY, POLITICAL i. THE STUDY OF POLITICAL PERSONALITY ii. CONSERVATISM AND RADICALISM
THE STUDY OF POLITICAL
Robert E. Lane Daniel J. Levinson
PERSONALITY
Because one cannot write about, or even think about, human affairs without some implicit concept of human nature, the idea of "political personality" is a very old one; indeed, the established classics of political philosophy from Plato through Mill almost always give it explicit attention (Wallas 1908; Lane 1953). Yet at the same time, the development of sophisticated psychology and psychiatry, especially psychoanalysis, is so recent that the modern concept of political personality is qualitatively very different and must here serve as the substance of the discussion. This article will explore the meaning of the concept, examine the ways in which the various psychological schools have left their mark on the idea of a political personality, and then deal more extensively with the ways in which theory and research in this area have helped in our interpretation of political outcomes. The concept of political personality "Political personality" may be defined as the enduring, organized, dynamic response sets habitually aroused by political stimuli. It embraces (a) motivation, often analyzed as a combination of needs and values (the push-pull theory); (fo) cognitions, perceptions, and habitual modes of learning; and (c) behavioral tendencies, that is, the acting out of needs and other aspects of manifest behavior. Each of these has obvious political implications: (a) people who are motivated by needs for power may employ political leverage to satisfy these needs rather than (or in the course of) a pursuit of some explicit policy goal; (£>) cognitively, people who handle information in the defense of their partisanship, rather than as an instrument of broader learning, become dogmatic and obstruct social adaptation to new situations; (c) behaviorally, political life is vitally affected by the tendencies of leaders to act out (externalize) their psychic conflicts, projecting them onto other people and situations or, alternatively, to withdraw into inaction when threatened or, again, to make public demands to assuage their sense of worthlessness. Most simply stated, then, the habitual patterns of feeling, learning and knowing, and behaving in political situations constitute political personality. The definition above states that the elements of
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political personality are "enduring"; this means that they are in some sense central to the personality, not merely the response to somewhat ephemeral situations or the product of a certain occupation or, more generally, a role that a person occupies for the time being. This means that in speaking of political personality, we are dealing with patterns of thought, emotion, and acting out that may be seen in operation in many different situations over a relatively long period of time, perhaps youth, young adulthood, and maturity. Again, this implies that these patterns are laid down relatively early, though their expression and style may reveal differences over time; indeed, there may be fundamental changes in personality at a relatively mature age. Parenthetically, it may be noted that these changes are often the product of a slight change in some set of balancing internal forces (say, strong aggressive impulses held in check by fear of one's own aggression) which may produce a relatively great change in outward personality manifestations (e.g., from ingratiating to domineering behavior). The definition of political personality includes the attribute "organized," implying some interrelationship among the constituent elements such that a change in one, say, a growing need for social approval, would modify other elements, perhaps leading to a decreased willingness to defy authority. Inquiry into this organization implies something like the following paradigm of questions: What patterns of needs, expressed through what need-coping mechanisms (repression, sublimation, ego-striving, etc.), modified by what perceptions of reality and habits of learning, screened through what ideological constellations, produce what behavioral tendencies? The organization of a political personality, then, implies a patterned relationship and interaction among these elements. And, among these elements, the manner of dealing with conflicting needs or motives is probably the most important, followed by the pattern of response to and internalization of authority. There was a third adjective in the definition: "dynamic." Here, this overworked term refers to a capacity to produce change in something else. Operationally this means that if two ideas or emotions are brought into some kind of relationship, the more dynamic element changes the less dynamic element. For instance, the attitude toward authority is generally considered more potent than feelings toward particular leaders. Therefore, when a worshipful attitude toward authority is forced to confront a dislike of a particular political leader, more change will be effected in the attitude toward the
leader than in the posture toward authority in general ("he isn't so bad, after a l l . . . I must have misjudged him . . . at least he looks like a president, etc."). We reserve for the term "political personality" those elements of a person's total psychic pattern which tend to shape attitudes, beliefs, and actions on new issues as they arise. Just as some authorities talk of "reference groups" and "reference persons," so we might here refer to political personality as a constellation of "reference ideas" and "reference emotions"—ideas and emotions to which new problems are referred for guidance and instruction. But, of course, this reference is usually quite unconscious. The concept of political personality borders on other concepts from which it must be distinguished. There is, in the first place, the concept of "attitude," which has been classically defined as a kind of "mental and neural response set." We would distinguish political personality from a single attitude on the obvious ground that the latter is too narrow, and from any conceivable complex of attitudes, however broad, on the ground that such a complex lacks the organization and dynamic potential of a political personality. Personality, as has so often been remarked, is not a bundle of traits. Thus we conceive of a personality as shaping attitudes and not vice versa. [See ATTITUDES.] In the second place, there is the concept of "role," usually defined as a pattern of expected behavior associated with a given position in society. In practice it is not easy to distinguish role-determined behavior from personality-determined behavior when a person is acting out his concept of appropriate role behavior or, worse, when he has accepted the values and beliefs associated with a given role and performs accordingly. Sometimes the only way to distinguish between personality and role is to observe the person in a set of different roles, say, father and bureaucrat. Conceptually, political personality has an earlier genesis, has a different organizational principle, transcends the situation or social position, is more internally motivated or autonomous of the environment, responds to different crises and conflicts, and is more idiosyncratic or individualized than is any (political) role behavior. [See ROLE.] Finally, there is the distinction between personality and culture, a difficult one because personality must be learned somehow from available cultural elements. It is for this reason that personality is sometimes said to be the subjective side of culture. Does individual anxiety reflect an anxietyladen culture? Does the authoritarian personality reflect an authoritarian culture? When we are deal-
PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Study ing with individuals, the distinction is relatively easy, because no two individuals bring together an identical genetic pattern and an identical sequence of experiences; hence, each is in some way unique. When we deal with "modal personality" or "social character," that is, the features of personality which are commonly shared in a group, we have greater trouble distinguishing between these shared personality elements and the dominant themes of a culture. Obviously the carriers of the culture are people; they exemplify it, as well as conveying its themes to others through their norm-setting and norm-enforcing behavior. Perhaps the best way to distinguish between these concepts of modal political personality and political culture is through the different questions each concept poses, the different theoretical structures employed to answer these questions, and the differential focuses upon people and ideas in each instance. Questions dealing with modal political personality elicit answers employing psychological theories of individual development, learning, imitation, conflict resolution, and the like. They are designed to tell us about people, in this case individuals who happen to be in groups. Questions dealing with political culture employ theories of social change, cultural diffusion, group adaptation to ecological factors, functional requirements of a given social structure, the reinforcement of social patterns, social (rather than individual) pattern maintenance, and so forth. Both concepts contribute to an understanding of political phenomena: modal political personality, through its contribution to an understanding of group psychology; political culture, through its contribution to an understanding of the prevailing myths, beliefs, and adaptive responses of the underlying society. Yet it must be said that often these amount to the same thing. [See POLITICAL CULTURE.] Political personality and environment It is now a truism to say that all social explanations employ some variation of what the learning theorists term a "stimulus (S)-organism(O ^response (R)" model, though sometimes it is referred to as "environment(E)-predisposition(P)-response (R)." Social and political explanations place the emphasis now on one term (S or E), now on the other (O or P). Institutional theories, such as those which claim that a separation of powers is a necessary condition for the rule of law or those which assert that the development of a middle class is necessary for the survival of representative government, emphasize the environmental part of this model. Yet while they are silent on the personalities
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of the actors involved, they always quietly impute to them a set of personal qualities, e.g., the universal love of power, which can be restrained only by others with power, or the reluctance of an economic elite to share power with the masses unless coerced by a balancing middle class and/or the incapacity of the masses to govern themselves. Each environmental theory, then, as mentioned in the first sentence of this article, implies a theory of personal motivation and some distribution of motives, values, and capacities in a relevant population. The study of political personality represents, in the one sense, an effort to fill in these never empty but often unexamined cells in the great macro theories which have guided the study of nations. On the other hand, there is a temptation to employ the new concepts of political personality in an exaggerated way, so as to imply that an individual has a set of motives or needs which are evoked in the same way in all situations or, worse, that a given public, say the German people, chose a certain leader, adopted a certain ideology, became bellicose and domineering or whatever because of some national character constellation, as though this constellation operated quite independently of the history and institutions of that particular public. One has only to glance at the early theories of political motivation to see the temptation at work: politicians choose their careers because they (all of them) love power; the Germans chose Hitler and Nazism because they were authoritarian; Americans offered economic aid to other countries because they were other-directed and wanted the world to love them—and partially turned against aid giving when they found that they could not buy love. The lesson is clear, indeed obvious—but often neglected: it is in a combination of circumstances and attitudes, environment and political personality, that the answers to the important political questions will be found. Theoretical interpretations Since, as was said at the beginning, the modern exploration of political personality is encouraged by and feeds on the developments of personality theory and research among psychologists and psychiatrists, it is not surprising that variations in these more molar fields are reflected in the interpretations of the role of personality in political life. For this reason it is useful to touch briefly upon the way in which various psychological theories affect these interpretations. The first approach is that of Pavlov (1927), Watson (1914), Hull (1943), and others in Russia
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and the United States. Originally called learning theory, it is now more generally called behavior theory. The central doctrine of this school is that an understanding of all behavioral responses may be acquired through a grasp of the concepts of drive, cue, response, and reward and their derivatives; rewarded responses become habits through a process of conditioning, and unrewarded responses tend to be extinguished. Personality, then, is the pattern of learned responses, not all of them adaptive in long-range terms but all of them, at least once, reinforced. It has been argued that the behavior of the Soviet elite has been heavily influenced by this concept of personality, leading them, so it is said, to believe that through a fairly gross manipulation of rewards and punishments they can shape the personalities and behaviors of the populations under their control (Tucker 1963, pp. 91-121). Although it is possible to translate behavior theory into the terms and constructs of other more clinically oriented theories, as Bollard and Miller (1950) have shown, the product is somewhat inelegant. Because of its mechanistic emphasis and insistence upon observable (operationalized) ingredients, the theory leaves out the rich, speculative, and often fruitful concepts of internal dynamics, conflict resolution, fantasy and free-associational styles of thought, dream life, analogical thinking, and the secondary elaborations which these theories produce. A second approach to political personality focuses upon the complex of vectors or forces which influence a person in his "life space." Kurt Lewin (1939-1947) was the originator of this theory whose sources lie in gestalt psychology. His associates and followers have gone on into the field of group dynamics exemplified in their small group experiments (Cartwright & Zander 1953). The central work of this school consists of accounting for the impact of the social world, the world of interaction and group life, upon an individual whose goals are constantly shaped and modified by these influential people—the other members of his group. This approach, reflected in the voting studies produced both by the Lazarsfeld-Berelson group (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954) and the Michigan Survey Research Center group headed by Angus Campbell (Campbell et al. 1954; Michigan, University of 1960) has led to some important formulations of the way in which reference groups, interpersonal influence, cross pressures or conflicting identifications, family, school, and work socialization, and group pressures all combine to modify electoral decisions. The findings suggest that in this area of American electoral
decision making, individual differences are not so important as group differences, that is, national modal character is more important than individual personality. Another way to say this is that for any one country, more of the variance is accounted for by environmental factors than by personality factors. The more strictly Freudian approach, now only one of several competing schools of psychoanalysis, focuses, as is well known, upon the channeling and blocking of the libido, the conflict among id and ego and superego (impulse, conscious mind, and conscience), unconscious processes, early determination of central personality characteristics, and the consequent need to return retrospectively to early experience in order to achieve fundamental personality change (Freud 1932). The view of political man which emerges from this perspective on personality and its formation is well symbolized, if not well summarized, by Lasswell's early provocative formulation: The most general formula which expresses the developmental facts about the fully developed political man reads thus: p) d) r = P, where p equals private motives; d equals displacement onto a public object; r equals rationalization in terms of public interest; P equals the political man; and ) equals transformed into. ([1930] 1951, pp. 75-76) This makes of political man the rationalized version of inadmissible private motives and reflects the early emphasis of Freudians and neo-Freudians upon those aspects of personality which could be traced to a wild and assertive id. Anna Freud (1936), Heinz Hartmann (1927-1959), and many others have somewhat restored the balance by giving more weight to ego psychology. But the political personality which emerges from this theoretical framework tends to underemphasize what has been overemphasized by the rest of the world, the plain appeal and obvious influence of economic advantage. More recently, psychoanalytic theory has been re-examined and modified by a group, sometimes called the interpersonal school of psychiatry, which has been led by three important figures: Harry Stack Sullivan, Erich Fromm, and Karen Horney. The label "interpersonal" comes from the central view of personality expressed by Sullivan in the following terms: "Personality I now define in the particularist sense as the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life" ([1940-1945] 1953, p. xi). His work has had less bearing on political
PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Study problems than has that of his two associates, so we now turn to their formulations. Horney (1937), in emphasizing the reflection of the strains of society in the contemporary neurotic trends of her patients (as a sample of some larger group), reveals what social life is doing to people: making them competitive, decreasing their capacity to give of themselves and thereby reducing their capacity to love; at the same time it is increasing their "neurotic need for affection" and generally, and most importantly, making them more anxious. Unfortunately, because she has no base line, Horney cannot substantiate her claim that modern man has more of these problems than did his predecessors—but she can make a strong case that these facets of personality damage are real and important for our time [see HORNEY]. The importance of these neurotic trends for political personality, that is, the personality faced with political decisions, is substantial, though their expression is uncertain: the anxious man may, depending upon the organization of his personality, withdraw, become assertive, cling desperately to some dogmatic belief, or yield utterly to some tendency toward "other-directedness." What is certain is that his anxiety will impair his rational functioning and prevent him from using politics to his maximum long-term advantage. Erich Fromm, the most politically oriented figure in this group, presents three main themes with special relevance to the study of political personality. The first of these has to do with the idea of "social character," which on the one hand is the "root" of ideology and culture and on the other "is molded by the mode of existence of a given society" (1941, p. 296). For Fromm, "the social character internalizes external necessities and thus harnesses human energy for the task of a given economic and social system" (1941, p. 284). In the same sense, one might think of a modal political personality, in a world where personality and political system are in harmony, as providing the motives, values, and capacities for performing the required political acts. Fromm's second theme has to do with the relationship of man to society and to the government thereof. It was he who in modern times first developed an accounting of the costs of "freedom," that is, autonomy won at the expense of weakened ties of family, neighborhood, community, tradition, occupation, and, in some cases, religion. In developing this accounting and in elaborating on some of the political responses which it facilitated, Fromm portrayed, or at least sketched, the atavistic political personality unable to stand alone, searching for some synthetic ties to replace the ones lost in the
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process of modernization. This theme assumed increased importance with the development of the theory of The Authoritarian Personality (1950) by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford. Another sprout from the soil of this theory, nurtured by that very original gardener David Riesman (1950), is a theory of modern man as other-directed, that is, decreasingly reliant on his own conscience and increasingly reliant on cues from other people for his ideas and actions. A third theme in Fromm's more recent work deals with the concept of alienation; it is important because it stands for, although it did not originate, an entire school of criticism of modern society. With roots in the work of Feuerbach and Marx (Fromm 1961) but now more leveled at "modernity" than at capitalism, the idea of the alienated man claims that industrialism has alienated man from his work; that commercialism and the long process of change from status to contract have created an alienated "marketing personality" where people and the self are regarded as "things"; that mass society divorces people from meaningful group life; and that mass politics creates automaton-like, meaningless political responses (Fromm 1955). The alienated personality is said to be "available" for charismatic leadership and anomic destructive social movements. Unfortunately for the theory, most available evidence shows that the attitudes characteristic of alienation are more prevalent in rural societies and are especially frequent in village life relatively untouched by industrialism, commercialism, mass media, and mass politics (Banfield & Banfield 1958). While the "interpersonal school" represents one variation of the original Freudian interpretation of political man, another variation is represented by Erik Erikson (1956), whose public hallmark is the concept of identity. Here we have a shift in focus, from instinctual libido and interpersonal relations to the concept of the self, or the self image, but it is a self image in a group context. The term is somewhat elastic: "At one time . . . it will appear to refer to a conscious sense of individual identity; at another, to an unconscious striving for a continuity of personal character; at a third, as a criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis; and finally, as a maintenance of an inner solidarity with a group's ideals and identity" ([1956] 1960, p. 38). It is important now because of the growing evidence that psychic breakdowns have their origins decreasingly in the repression of impulses, as was the case in the nineteenth century, and more often in "identity-diffusion," that is, the uncertainties and anxieties arising from ill-defined goals, ambiguous
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group identifications, conflicting self images, and vague life patterns. In its political aspects, identitydiffusion leads to low political cathexis and ideological caution (Lane 1962, pp. 381-399). Political personality and political analysis The various concepts and interpretations of political personality are reflected in the applied work of political analysis—but often segmentally, or eclectically, by men seeking personality concepts by means of which they can grapple with the intricate workings of political institutions. The problems of such analysis are many, and the amount of research in this area is small. Legislative behavior. Legislative behavior, the output of which is a set of laws, institutions, and appropriations, is inevitably modified by the personality constellations of the legislators. An early study by McConaughy (1950) suggests that in one American state, South Carolina, a (somewhat unsystematic) sample of legislators were, compared with the average American adult, "less neurotic . . . far less introverted, more self-sufficient and slightly more dominant." McConaughy does not relate these results to legislative behavior. A more comprehensive study of Connecticut legislators by James Barber (1965) finds a large proportion of the legislators lacking in self-esteem and employing their positions in the legislature to compensate for their doubts about themselves; it is the few who are genuinely self-confident who get the legislative business of the legislature done. On a closely related psychological syndrome, the sense of efficacy, evidence from a study of four American state legislatures reveals how important this sense is in affecting the manner in which a legislator sees and handles his role: those with a higher sense of efficacy (ego strength?) look beyond their immediate districts and accept responsibility for the larger unit, in this case the state; more than others, they accept pressure groups and even welcome them as part of the play of forces necessary for developing acceptable policy; and they tend to regard their role as brokers in a cockpit of conflict with equanimity, without becoming personally upset (Wahlke et al. 1962, especially pp. 474-475). But in these four states, as in Connecticut, it appears that more than half of the legislators have grave doubts about their efficacy or even adequacy in the legislative situation. Another theme out of the nosology of personality syndromes is the matter of identity. It seems from Barber's Connecticut study, and from other work on the United States House of Representatives, that the more clearly a legislator perceives his role and
assimilates this role concept to some vigorous and viable sense of identity, the more effective he is—i.e., persuasive, work-oriented, and hard to manipulate. [See LEGISLATION, article on LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR.] Although it does not explicitly deal with personality, Nathan Leites' work on "operational codes," first of the Politburo (1951) and then of the French parliament (1959), embodies in different language many of the themes which are normally conceived to be the stuff of personality. Thus, Leites asserts that two themes of the operational code of the Politburo are a fear of dependency, leading to strong measures to avoid any situation where people or nations are mutually interdependent, and particularly any situation where they might be "used" by others (1951, pp. 40-43), and an unusually strong insistence on "the control of feelings," leading to attacks on sentimentality and emotional responses and to an observable "hardness"—at least during the Stalinist period (1951, pp. 20-24). Speaking of the French legislator, Leites (1959) describes a series of behaviors, especially avoidance of responsibility, efforts so to arrange things that others are "to blame" for unpopular or unsuccessful decisions, inability to form permanent coalitions because of distrust of others (following from and causing this pattern of irresponsibility), and a search for a force majeure to get the French parlement or the nation out of its difficulties. Leites would argue that these are French, as well as legislative, characteristics; hence they also fall under the category of "national character," though of course he would also argue that they are traits to some extent widely shared throughout the world. At the bottom of many of these traits, there seems to be a concept of individualism and a tendency to distrust others, a quality which Almond and Verba found central to the working of a successful civic culture (1963). Judicial behavior. Many years ago Jerome Frank (1930) pointed to the very great variation in the treatment given to defendants in similar situations by judges of different dispositions. Although at first this seemed to reflect different "philosophies," it later became evident that this was another name for the motivations, values, punitiveness, and other elements of a personality constellation. Harold Lasswell (1948) illuminated these problems in his discussion of the influence on judicial decisions of narcissistic, paranoid, latent homosexual, and other tendencies in a group of judges whose life histories were made available to him. Pritchett's study of patterns of decisions made by Supreme Court justices (1948) reveals some-
PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Study thing about the influence of personal characteristics upon judicial decision making, but the personality themes here are only partially developed. [See JUDICIARY, article on JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR.] Electoral behavior. As mentioned earlier, the main themes of the very substantial studies of electoral behavior in the United States, England, France, and Norway deal not with personality features but with group life, media influence, occupational and class differences, electoral laws, and the like. This is for the very good reason that, at least in the United States, and generally elsewhere, modal behavior is situationally determined to such an extent that people with many different personality syndromes tend to behave similarly. The places to look for the influence of personality are in the interstices where social pressures are conflicting or ambiguous. Lane (1959, p. 100) has listed some of these as follows: Selection of the grounds for rationalizing a political act. Selecting topics for political discussion. Selecting types of political behavior over and above voting. Expression of the probable consequences of participation. Holding particular images of other participants. Styles of personal interaction in political groups. In general this means that, at least in the United States, there are no important personality differences between Democrats and Republicans, though radicals of the right and left have been shown to have deviant personality syndromes (Almond 1954; Adorno et al. 1950). On the other hand, there are substantial differences between participants and nonparticipants: the nonparticipants tend to be more neurotic, more anxious, less self-confident, more autistic, less trusting of others, lower in ego strength, and more alienated from themselves and society (Lane 1959, pp. 97-181). In a cross-cultural study by Almond and Verb a (1963), in which personality and cultural differences are, as always, somewhat fused, it appears that those societies in which there is greater interpersonal trust; in which, from the beginning, people have a sense that each person is himself important and influential in the family, school, and place of work; and in which it is possible to work easily and cooperatively with others—such societies develop healthier (more effective and less destructive) patterns of participation and more conciliatory and workable patterns of partisanship. [See POLITICAL PARTICIPATION; VOTING.] Ideology. Electoral participation inevitably leads into a discussion of ideology, but, as Campbell
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and his colleagues (Michigan, University of 1960) make clear, the relationship between voting and ideology is often tenuous. Ideology here means not merely the attitudes and values on topical concerns (foreign aid, civil rights, welfare state) but also the fundamental views which form the ideational counterpart to a constitution: ideas on fair play and due process, rights of others, sharing of power, the proper distribution of the goods of society (equality), uses and abuses of authority, etc. It is in this sense that Adorno and his associates (1950) develop their concept of an authoritarian personality and belief system, and in this sense Lane (1962) explored the ideologies of a group of working-class and lower middle-class men. The problem here is to sort out the conventional beliefs which almost everyone in the society holds, not because these ideas have a special congeniality but because they are, so to speak, "given," from those ideas which are selected from among alternatives because these ideas have a special "resonance." The conventional ideas may be conceived as related to national character, though there can be a lack of congruence here, too; the "resonant" ideas, the more or less individual ones, may more properly be related to and explained by the concept of individual political personality. In the general discussion of ideology, it appears that one central aspect is that of alienation versus allegiance, a rejection of "the system" or some substantial part thereof, compared with a fundamental loyalty to and acceptance of it. Cantril (1958) found this to be a main theme among the French and Italian communists he interviewed; Almond and Verba (1963) suggest that one of the main difficulties of the Italian political system lies in the high incidence of alienation and contrast this with the sense of allegiance and political pride of the Americans and British. Lane found in his Eastport, U.S.A., sample that a failure to support democratic norms and a tendency to see decisions made by conspiratorial groups ("cabalistic thinking") were related generally to just such political alienation but that this did not extend to a more general feeling of social alienation, a rejection of the society and its values (1962, pp. 161-186). On the whole, it seems wise to think of alienation in terms of specific targets of disaffection, a series of topically specific continua, rather than in terms of a dichotomous and total classification, although the tendency of alienation in one area to infect another should be observed. [See IDEOLOGY; LOYALTY.] National character. The study of widespread ideologies or belief systems leads to the study of the broad distribution of political personality types or
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characteristics in a society. At this point we begin to study national or social character—a field which fell into disrepute because of early unsupported generalizations by Le Bon (1894) and others. Following World War n, a series of studies on the German people, sometimes based on interview data and sometimes more speculative (Dicks 1950; Levy 1948; Schaffner 1948), sought to discover what led them down the path to the Nazi revolution. A few comparative studies have indeed suggested that the Germans, more than others, tend to revere both paternal and state authority and have, by a very slight margin, a higher incidence of "authoritarianism" (McGranahan 1946). Subsequent political history has indicated that these elements of political personality are not incompatible with the functioning of certain kinds of republican institutions, and, moreover, they are not fixed in the character of a people forever. Similar studies of the Soviet Union (Dicks 1952; Mead 1951), necessarily more limited because of the inaccessibility of most of the population to such study, have suggested the importance of certain other emotional themes: expressiveness and the felt need for external control (combined, it is true, with a strain between the controlling, overly bureaucratic elite and the mass of people still in transition from traditional to modern behavior and norms); suspicion of "outsiders," implying sharp differentiation between in-groups and out-groups, with some paranoid symptoms; and "identity crisis" posed by the long-term, but recently exacerbated, conflict between Russia and the West—and yet, withal, a lack of "tenderness taboo" (or sadomasochism) which characterized the Nazi mentality. [See NATIONAL CHARACTER.] We are only beginning to study the close interrelationship of personality qualities and political life, particularly the way in which similar institutions function when manned by persons of different personality constellations. This article has not touched upon the important research done on the personality problems of the officials and publics in modernizing nations, as illuminated by Doob (1960), Pye (1962), and Leigh ton (Cornell... 1963), among others, but this is surely an area where further work is needed. Problems of personality and bureaucracy in a world which inevitably is becoming bureaucratized deserve further attention, following the seminal article by Merton (1940). Elite studies have, until now, tended to focus on the more easily accessible data, the external circumstantial forces affecting career choice and selection of the world's elites, but we need to
know more about the internal dynamics and interpersonal characteristics of coopted, appointed, and elected leaders. By now, however, scholars are aware that there is no simple distribution of traits, syndromes, or personality types which is good or necessary (or at least sufficient) for the operation of an efficient and humane political system, and that hence we must direct our research toward discovering relatively subtle patterns of personality characteristics, with varying distributions, meshed into roles and institutions in complementary ways, each "way" modified by the ecology and history of a particular political system. ROBERT E. LANE [Directly related are the entries IDENTITY, PSYCHOSOCIAL; NATIONAL CHARACTER; POLITICAL BEHAVIOR; and the biographies of FREUD; HORNEY; HULL; LEWIN; PAVLOV; WATSON. See also the guide following the next article.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADORNO, THEODOR W. et al. 1950 The Authoritarian Personality. American Jewish Committee, Social Studies Series, No. 3. New York: Harper. ALMOND, GABRIEL A. 1954 The Appeals of Communism. Princeton Univ. Press. ALMOND, GABRIEL A.; and VERBA, SIDNEY 1963 The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton Univ. Press. BANFIELD, EDWARD C.; and BANFIELD, L. F. 1958 The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. BARBER, JAMES D. 1965 The Lawmakers. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. BERELSON, BERNARD; LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and McPHEE, WILLIAM N. 1954 Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign. Univ. of Chicago Press. CAMPBELL, ANGUS; GURIN, GERALD; and MILLER, WARREN E. 1954 The Voter Decides. Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson. CANTRIL, HADLEY 1958 The Politics of Despair. New York: Basic Books. CARTWRIGHT, DORWIN; and ZANDER, ALVIN (editors) (1953) 1960 Group Dynamics: Research and Theory. 2d ed. Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson. CORNELL-ARO MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH PROJECT IN THE
WESTERN REGION, NIGERIA 1963 Psychiatric Disorder Among the Yoruba: A Report, by Alexander H. Leighton et al. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. DAVIES, JAMES C. 1963 Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior. New York: Wiley. DICKS, HENRY V. 1950 Personality Traits and National Socialist Ideology. Human Relations 3:111-154. DICKS, HENRY V. 1952 Observations on Contemporary Russian Behavior. Human Relations 5:111-175. DOLLARD, JOHN; and MILLER, NEAL E. 1950 Personality and Psychotherapy: An Analysis in Terms of Learning, Thinking, and Culture. New York: McGraw-Hill. DOOB, LEONARD W. 1960 Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological Exploration. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Conservatism and Radicalism ERIKSON, ERIK H. (1956) 1960 The Problem of Ego Identity. Pages 37-87 in Maurice R. Stein, Arthur J. Vidich, and David M. White (editors), Identity and Anxiety. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. FRANK, JEROME (1930) 1949 Law and the Modern Mind. New York: Coward. FREUD, ANNA (1936) 1957 The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. New York: International Universities Press. -» First published as Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen. FREUD, SIGMUND (1932) 1965 New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis. New York: Norton. -» First published as Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einfiihrung in die Psychoanalyse. FROMM, ERICH (1941) 1960 Escape From Freedom. New York: Holt. FROMM, ERICH 1955 The Sane Society. New York: Rinehart. FROMM, ERICH (editor) 1961 Marx's Concept of Man. New York: Ungar. HARTMANN, HEINZ (1927-1959) 1964 Essays on Ego Psychology. New York: International Universities Press. HORNEY, KAREN 1937 The Neurotic Personality of Our Time. New York: Norton. HULL, CLARK L. 1943 Principles of Behavior: An Introduction to Behavior Theory. New York: Appleton. LANE, ROBERT E. 1953 Political Character and Political Analysis. Psychiatry 16:387-398. LANE, ROBERT E. 1959 Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -» A paperback edition was published in 1965. LANE, ROBERT E. 1962 Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does. New York: Free Press. LANE, ROBERT E.; and SEARS, DAVID O. 1964 Public Opinion. New York: Prentice-Hall. LASSWELL, HAROLD D. (1930) 1951 Psychopathology and Politics. Pages 1-282 in Harold D. Lasswell, The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. LASSWELL, HAROLD D. 1948 Power and Personality. New York: Norton. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; BERELSON, BERNARD; and GAUDET, HAZEL (1944) 1960 The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. 2d ed. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. LE BON, GUSTAVE (1894) 1898 The Psychology of Peoples. New York: Macmillan. -> First published as Lois psychologiques de devolution des peuples. LEITES, NATHAN 1951 The Operational Code of the Politburo. New York: McGraw-Hill. LEITES, NATHAN 1959 On the Game of Politics in France. Stanford Univ. Press. LEVY, DAVID M. 1948 Anti-Nazis: Criteria of Differentiation. Psychiatry 11:125-167. LEWIN, KURT (1939-1947)1963 Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers. Edited by Dorwin Cartwright. London: Tavistock. MCCONAUGHY, JOHN B. 1950 Certain Personality Factors of State Legislators in South Carolina. American Political Science Review 44:897-903. MCGRANAHAN, DONALD V. 1946 A Comparison of Social Attitudes Among American and German Youth. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 41:245-257. MEAD, MARGARET 1951 Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Problems of Soviet Character. New York: McGraw-Hill.
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MERTON, ROBERT K. (1940) 1957 Bureaucratic Structure and Personality. Pages 195-206 in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. Rev. ed. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> First published in Volume 18 of Social Forces. MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY OF, SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER 1960 The American Voter, by Angus Campbell et al. New York: Wiley. PAVLOV, IVAN P. (1927) 1960 Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex. New York: Dover. -> First published as Lektsii o rabote bol'shikh polusharii golovnogo mozga. PRITCHETT, C. HERMAN (1948) 1963 The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937— 1947. New York: Octagon Books. PYE, LUCIAN W. 1962 Politics, Personality, and Nationbuilding: Burma's Search for Identity. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. RIESMAN, DAVID 1950 The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. -> An abridged paperback edition was published in 1960. SCHAFFNER, BERTRAM H. 1948 Father Land: A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Oxford Univ. Press. SULLIVAN, HARRY STACK (1940-1945) 1953 Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry. With a critical appraisal of the theory by Patrick Mullahy. 2d ed. New York: Norton. -> First published in the February 1940 and May 1945 issues of Psychiatry. SULLIVAN, HARRY STACK 1953 The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. Edited by Helen Swick Perry and Mary Ladd Gawel. New York: Norton. TUCKER, ROBERT C. 1963 The Soviet Political Mind. New York: Praeger. WAHLKE, JOHN et al. 1962 The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior. New York: Wiley. WALLAS, GRAHAM (1908) 1962 Human Nature in Politics. 4th ed. Gloucester, Mass.: Smith. WATSON, JOHN B. 1914 Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology. New York: Holt. II
CONSERVATISM AND RADICALISM
The preceding article deals with the concept of political personality and with the relevance of personality in various areas of political life. This article deals with the specific problem of personality and political ideology: the questions of what ways, if any, "conservatives" and "radicals" differ in personality and what part personality plays in influencing the individual's preference for a conservative or a radical political outlook. Some of the major problems involved in answering these questions are found in the questions' terms. Conservatism and radicalism are not discrete entities. These terms are, so to say, genotypes rather than phenotypes, analytic categories rather than concrete doctrines. They refer to basic political tendencies or orientations that may be manifested in a variety of explicit ideological forms. The forms vary widely in different classes, countries, and historical periods. There is considerable disagreement
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PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Conservatism and Radicalism
regarding the primary defining characteristics of each viewpoint and regarding the validity and usefulness of employing these analytic categories in political analysis. It would be helpful, for purposes of psychological analysis, if the purely political meaning of the terms "conservative" and "radical" were clearly defined and widely agreed upon. This is, unfortunately, not the case. We must therefore begin by considering briefly the alternative usages of these terms and the bearing of this problem on studies of personality and political ideology. [See CONSERVATISM; RADICALISM.] In the broadest sense—a sense implied by their pairing in the title of this article—the terms "conservatism" and "radicalism" may be used to divide the vast array of political ideologies into two gross categories of "right" and "left." Each term then becomes a relatively complex category under which a variety of more concrete viewpoints are subsumed. In general, ideologies of the right support the (present or imagined past) status quo and emphasize the importance of tradition, stability, and hierarchical social order. Ideologies of the left are critical of the prevailing system and seek major institutional change toward increased social and economic equality. The simple right-left dichotomy, while useful for certain purposes, is in need of further differentiation. Within the right, for example, there are various ideological positions that differ markedly in their social and psychological bases and in their political aims. These include the moderate conservatives (who, especially in the more industrialized countries, accept many "liberal" reforms and the political rules of parliamentary democracy), as well as ultraconservative, fascist, and "lunatic fringe" rightist viewpoints. For certain analytic purposes the similarities among these ideologies are of primary interest, while for other purposes the differences require sharper focus. [See CAUDILLISMO; FALANGISM; FASCISM; NATIONAL SOCIALISM.] Within the left, too, are ordinarily included a wide range of ideologies. There are the modern liberals who espouse continual but gradual reform by democratic methods, seeking to increase the scope of governmental welfare functions while maintaining individual freedom from state control. There are also various types of socialist and communist viewpoints, which differ considerably in their programmatic goals and in the methods they advocate for achieving and maintaining political power. [See COMMUNISM; EQUALITY; LIBERALISM; SOCIALISM.] As a first step toward taking these variations
into account, the right-left dichotomy is often divided further into a four-part spectrum: extreme right, moderate conservative (right-of-center), liberal and moderate left, and extreme left. Within this scheme, radicalism has in the past been equated with the extreme left. More recently, however, a new usage has developed: radicalism is sometimes equated with "extremism" and includes both the extreme left and the extreme right. Witness the growing use of the term "radical right" (Bell 1955) in the United States to refer to antidemocratic racist, militarist, and neofascist movements. This usage involves the assumption that the far left and the far right, despite their differences in stated values and ultimate goals, have important similarities in their methods and psychological characteristics. [See MILITARISM.] An example of this approach is Lipset's six-category schema (1960). He distinguishes the right, center, and left (advancing the interests of the upper, middle, and lower classes, respectively) as basic political orientations; and he suggests that within each there are contrasting moderate-democratic and extremist-antidemocratic positions. Thus, in the case of the center, the opposing views are liberalism and fascism. He asserts that one's political orientation is largely a function of class membership, whereas preference for a democratic or an extremist orientation is strongly influenced by personality. Those who hold an antidemocratic political orientation, whether of right, center, or left, will show greater personal authoritarianism than will their democratic counterparts. These categories have been used in a multiplicity of ways as bases for ideological classification and measurement. Some studies deal with welldefined political parties or groupings; others distinguish only between broad categories such as leftright, liberal-conservative, or moderate-extreme. We are still far from an understanding of the degree to which particular ideologies are associated with distinctive personality syndromes. Thus far we have spoken of conservatism, radicalism, and other viewpoints as inclusive, systematic ideologies. A political ideology is an overarching conception of society, a stance that is reflected in numerous sectors of social life (Mannheim 1929-1931). It deals not only with political issues in the narrow sense but also with economic policy, social stratification, methods of social change, civil liberties and civil rights, international relations, religion and the relation of religious institutions to political institutions, the societal functions of government, and so on. Political ideologies in this inclusive sense have been studied primarily as aspects
PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Conservatism and Radicalism of political parties, movements, or other collective units. We characterize "the" ideology of a given party or group through the analysis of various documents written by its spokesmen, singly or jointly. This characterization is an analytic construction derived from multiple sources. [See Levinson 1964; see also CONTENT ANALYSIS; IDEOLOGY.] The problem is complicated, however, when we seek to study the ideology of the individual citizen. Not everyone has a political ideology in any developed sense. Some persons have fragmentary opinions on a few personally relevant issues. Others have a vaguely defined "leaning" without differentiated views. Still others, more politically involved, have a political outlook that cuts across the established party lines. It is therefore often difficult to identify an individual's political opinions as "conservative" or "radical" in a systematic ideological sense. One way of dealing with this problem in empirical research is to obtain only a general index of the individual's political tendency or leaning, without examining his views in detail. For example, large-scale surveys may simply ask their subjects to categorize themselves politically or to indicate their preference for a party, movement, or political leader. Party affiliation or preference is a relatively useful indicator of ideological orientation in countries having diverse and well-differentiated parties covering a wide range of the political spectrum. Even in this case, however, there are often major ideological variations within a single party; for example, right-wing versus left-wing segments of many European parties, or the French and Italian workers who vote communist without adhering to the general party ideology. In countries such as the United States, where the two major parties are ideologically more amorphous and internally divided, party preference as such tells little about an individual's political orientation. Another way of dealing with the problem is to shift from very general ideological categories to the study of more delimited areas and dimensions of political opinion. Numerous areas and dimensions have been singled out for investigation. For example, in the domain of foreign policy, the dimension of nationalism-internationalism; in religious outlook, the liberalism-conservatism dimension; and similarly in other realms, such as civil liberties, the rights of ethnic and minority groups, the economic and welfare functions of government, and so on. These dimensions are sometimes conceived of as multiple reflections of the more generalized and fundamental ideological vectors noted earlier. To
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the extent that this conception is a valid one, measures of internationalism, religious liberalism, civil libertarianism, and advocacy of governmental welfare functions will be positively intercorrelated to form a more inclusive syndrome of over-all sociopolitical liberalism. It is beyond the scope of this article to review the empirical evidence bearing upon hypotheses of this kind. In general, there is evidence of moderate consistency in the individual across ideological domains, so that we may speak of relatively generalized liberal, conservative, and other orientations. At the same time, the correlations among measures of the various dimensions vary considerably in magnitude. For example, there is a moderate positive correlation between civil libertarianism and economic liberalism; on the average, advocates of the former viewpoint tend also to support the latter, and opponents of one tend also to oppose the other. However, the consistency is far from perfect. We must have room in our thinking for ideological patterns that cut across the simple liberal-conservative polarity. The complexities in the analysis of individual political ideology have important implications for the study of relationships between ideology and personality. How can we define ideological dimensions or patterns in a way that lends itself to psychological analysis? If we group our subjects only in terms of general ideological leaning, such as over-all liberalism and conservatism, a given category will contain persons with diverse concrete ideologies and personalities. Overly gross ideological categories may subsume very different viewpoints and their associated varieties of personality. On the other hand, there are disadvantages in restricting the focus to a specific issue or narrow domain. Personality is most likely to exert influence on the individual's orientation toward a relatively broad sector of political concern. His stand on any particular issue may be strongly affected by immediate situational factors. There is a "forest and trees" dilemma here. We must find intermediate levels of analysis between the forest of global, undifferentiated ideological categories and the trees of specific, segmented opinions and attitudes. In general, work in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge errs mainly in the former direction, while survey research on public opinion and social attitudes suffers from overspecificity and the neglect of ideological patterning. Work in this field is further complicated by disciplinary conflicts. It would be convenient if there could be a simple division of labor between the relevant disciplines. One might hope, for example, that political scientists and sociologists would estab-
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PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Conservatism and Radicalism
lish a standard, widely applicable set of ideological categories; psychologists could then determine whether the different categories have distinctive personality correlates. This disciplinary division of labor has not been successful and probably cannot succeed. The study of relationships between personality and political ideology in principle requires some degree of theoretical synthesis across disciplinary lines. The political categories and dimensions must have psychological relevance; the study of personality in this context requires a grasp of political issues and realities. Progress will come through the joint efforts of political analysts who have some sophistication about personality theory and of psychologists who can think in political and sociological terms. This approach was advocated long ago (e.g., Mannheim 1929-1931; Fromm 1936). Within the last few decades some progress has been made in this direction by a number of investigators taking a multidisciplinary point of view. We turn now to a consideration of their work. Authoritarian personality and political ideology The concept of personal authoritarianism has probably received more empirical study, and more critical attention, than any other personality concept that has been utilized in the analysis of sociopolitical ideology. Its history extends over several areas of modern social science and involves several disciplines. Reviewing the development of work on authoritarianism provides an opportunity to clarify some of the theoretical and empirical problems in the general field of personality and ideology. The first major systematic attempts to formulate a conception of authoritarianism as a personality syndrome were made in the 1930s by Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm. The two worked independently but had much in common. Both were clinical psychoanalysts in the generation after Freud, and they took a leading part in the effort to develop a psychoanalytic social psychology. Both had a "democratic Marxist" conception of society, and each attempted his own synthesis of Marxist and Freudian theory. They were primarily clinical and historical in mode of analysis. Reich's major work on this problem was The Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933). [See REICH.] Fromm (1936) published a long theoretical essay in the volume Studien uber Autoritdt und Familie. This book epitomizes the newly emerging multidisciplinary spirit of the 1930s—a spirit that originated in Europe and was subsequently carried forward in the United States both by Americans and by European emigres. Soon after, Fromm (1941) published his influential work on authoritarianism and historical change, Escape From Freedom.
Reich and Fromm took as a central problem the ways in which personality is implicated (as cause and as effect) in social ideologies, movements, and structures. They saw the family as a primary agency of social control, not only transmitting explicit values and beliefs but, even more important, inducing types of character structure and modes of authority-subordinate relationships that provide a psychological underpinning for adult sociopolitical functioning. The authoritarian character is hypothesized as the psychological structure most receptive to, and most required by, rigidly hierarchical antidemocratic social structures. The rise of fascism offered a prototypic example for the social-psychological analysis of authoritarianism. [See SOCIALIZATION.] As a parallel development in the 1930s, American social psychologists were beginning the systematic study of political opinion. Their concepts, methods, and approach reflected the then prevailing Zeitgeist of American psychology. Conceptually, their focus was not on broad ideological patterns; it was, rather, on more segmental, quantitatively measured social attitudes. The concept of attitude was systematically formulated by Airport (1935) in a widely influential article. This concept had great appeal, both because of its analytic usefulness and because it readily lent itself to measurement and to statistical analysis. Scale methods of attitude measurement were developed by Thurstone and Chave (1929), Murphy and Likert (1938), and others, and in the ensuing years a tremendous number of scales were developed. In the area of conservatism-liberalism—radicalism, attitude scales were correlated with all manner of other variables, ranging from group membership to school achievement to the readiness to tolerate pain. [An extensive review of the early literature is given in Murphy, Murphy, & Newcomb 1931; see also ATTITUDES; SCALING; and the biography of THURSTONE.] By the early 1940s attitude research had become a major field in academic social psychology. However, the studies typically had a concrete, atheoretical, "shotgun" character. Broader theoretical perspectives were needed. On the one hand, the early investigators failed to regard attitudes as aspects of more inclusive ideological patterns, to consider their meaning for the individual, and to relate them to other, motivational-affective-cognitive components of personality. On the other hand, they had only a rudimentary sociological perspective and were largely unable to place individual ideology within a larger social and cultural context. A seemingly unbridgeable gulf separated the European and the American lines of investigation. Perhaps the first large-scale effort to bridge the
PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Conservatism and Radicalism gap was the collaborative research of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford; the study began in 1943 and was published in 1950 under the title The Authoritarian Personality. Sanford (1956) provides a fuller review of the intellectual origins of this work. [See also the biography of FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK.] The research on authoritarianism drew both from the European tradition—with its psychoanalytic-sociological orientation and clinical form of analysis—and from the more measurement-oriented, attitude survey approach of American social psychology (in particular the previous work of Stagner 1936; Murphy & Likert 1938; Newcomb 1943; and more clinical study by Maslow 1943). It used scale methods, but its analytic emphasis was on ideological patterns rather than on single attitudes. In conceiving of ideology as an aspect of personality, it had roots in psychoanalysis and related personality theories, notably that of Murray (see Explorations in Personality 1938). Personality variables were measured by a variety of techniques, including scales, projective tests, semistructured interview, and intensive case analysis (again following Murray in his approach to personality assessment). The research dealt primarily with the relation of ideology to personality—with authoritarianism as an ideology-personality syndrome—and not with the sociology of ideology. Sociological considerations were, however, an intrinsic part of the theoretical approach, and the work has stimulated a good deal of discussion and research along sociological lines (e.g., Christie & Jahoda 1954; Lipset I960; Hagen 1962; McClosky 1958; McClosky & Schaar 1965; Levinson 1964; DiRenzo 1963). The program of research on the authoritarian personality began as a study of anti-Semitism (Frenkel-Brunswik et al. 1947). Its ideological focus gradually broadened to encompass ethnocentric ideology, conceived of broadly as a system of beliefs, attitudes, and values—a way of thinking and feeling—-about "in-groups" and "out-groups" at every level of social organization from the local to the international scene. The overriding concern of the research was the nature of, and the relationship between, ethnocentric ideology and authoritarian personality. To a lesser though still significant degree, attention was given to other ideological domains, notably politics and religion. [See ANTI-SEMITISM.] Political ideology was studied primarily with regard to the liberalism-conservatism dimension. The description of the Politico-Economic Conservatism (PEC) Scale emphasized that the scale yielded only a rough right-of-center versus left-of-center
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distinction and did not distinguish qualitatively important variations within each of these. The PEC Scale showed statistically significant but moderate correlations, averaging .4 to .5, with the various measures of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. Two main conclusions were drawn. First, political conservatives are, by and large, more ethnocentric and authoritarian than are political liberals. Second, there are wide variations in authoritarianism within both the right-of-center and the left-ofcenter groupings, and these variations may be related to specific patterns and styles of political orientation. In The Authoritarian Personality a number of specific concepts were put forward in Levinson's chapter on the PEC Scale and in Adorno's chapter on the interview material. For example, Levinson proposed a distinction between the "genuine" conservative and the "pseudo" (authoritarian) conservative, whose ideologies, while alike in many respects, are fundamentally different in others. Adorno, in his discussion of left-of-center viewpoints, posits several syndromes, such as the "ticket liberal," in which authoritarian features play an important part. The Authoritarian Personality thus gave evidence that authoritarianism has diverse modes of political expression. This point merits emphasis, since the book has been alleged to equate authoritarianism with the political right, equalitarianism with the left (Shils 1954). The research must be seen in the context of the times—World War n and its aftermath—during which the most destructive forms of ethnocentrism (mass genocide) and fascism were the paramount issues. The survey measure of authoritarianism was called the F scale, F referring to "potential for acceptance of fascist ideology." It might better have been called the A scale. Authoritarianism is, indeed, a primary psychological source of receptivity to fascist ideology, but it may take other ideological forms as well. Several studies conducted during and after World War n also deal with the relationship of authoritarian personality to fascist ideology. Dicks (1950) conducted intensive clinical interviews with German prisoners of war, investigating personality differences between the strongly pro-Nazi soldiers and those who opposed or seriously questioned the Nazi ideology. He derived an authoritarian syndrome strikingly similar to that of the American study. Erikson's classic analysis, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth" (1942), is another example of this genre. In the decade following publication of The Authoritarian Personality there were literally hundreds of studies derived from its concepts and measures. Most of them were relatively narrow in
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PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Conservatism and Radicalism
focus, theoretically limited, and concerned with measurement or technique rather than with substantive issues. The 1950s in the United States were dominated by McCarthyism and a spirit of intellectual retrenchment, and few new directions were established in the social-psychological analysis of authoritarianism and political ideology. There were, however, some significant contributions, of which the following are major examples. Several large-scale surveys of U.S. national samples confirmed the earlier findings that authoritarianism is associated with a nationalistmilitaristic stand in world affairs, with opposition to a civil-libertarian position, with racial and ethnic prejudice, and the like (see, for example, McClosky 1958). Inquiries into authoritarianism and social outlook within the working class were carried out by Kornhauser, Sheppard, and Mayer (1956) in the United States, by Spinley (1953) in England, and by Lipset (1960) in several countries. These studies suggest that the incidence of authoritarianism is relatively high in the working class and is a function of the psychosocial conditions of working-class life: material, cultural, and emotional deprivation; familial disorganization; coercive, stressful, anxiety-inducing pressures. In their political views, the more authoritarian members of the working class tend, more often than the others, either to be highly conservative supporters of the status quo or to hold "extremist" positions. In an extensive analysis of the bases for economic growth in countries at different stages of industrialization, Hagen (1962) attributes a major causal role to the influence of "innovative" (as against authoritarian) personalities. Christie and Jahoda (1954) brought together a series of critical discussions of the theory, methodology, and implications of The Authoritarian Personality. The research literature on authoritarianism until 1956 was reviewed by Christie and Cook (1958). Efforts to relate authoritarianism and political ideology within a broader sociopsychological framework were made by Frenkel-Brunswik (1952) and Levinson (1957; 1958). Emerging from the authoritarian personality tradition, but differing from it in several important respects, is Rokeach's The Open and Closed Mind (1960). His shift in theoretical orientation is implied by the use of the term "mind" rather than "personality" in the title. Rokeach takes a strongly cognitive approach deriving from Kurt Lewin and gestalt psychology, although he also acknowledges a debt to Fromm and to Hoffer (1951). He offers the concept of dogmatism as an alternative to that of authoritarianism. His formulation deals primarily with the structure of belief systems and modes
of cognitive functioning, rather than with motivation, ego defense, and psychodynamics. Correspondingly, his research involves experimental, test, and survey methods rather than clinical and observational ones. Rokeach states the hypothesis that dogmatism (and authoritarianism) is uncorrelated with the right-left dimension of political ideology. He suggests that there are dogmatic and nondogmatic viewpoints within every grouping—left, center, and right—along the political spectrum. He singles out the communists as a major dogmatic subgroup within the grouping on the left. He obtains some support for this hypothesis in an English sample, where a small group of communists exhibited a high mean score on his Dogmatism Scale. However, limitations of sampling and other difficulties raise doubts about the generalizability of this finding. Contrasting results were obtained by DiRenzo (1963) in an extensive study of members of parliament in Italy. He obtained a mean score on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale for each political party in the Chamber of Deputies. The rank order of these mean scores was almost identical with the order of the parties from right to left on the political spectrum. The neofascists exhibited the highest mean score (most dogmatic); communists, the lowest. Eysenck (1954) interprets the data of his research in England as indicating that communists and fascists have in common a high degree of tough-mindedness (a syndrome closely related to dogmatism and authoritarianism). His work has been strongly criticized by Rokeach and Hanley (1956) and by Christie (e.g., 1956), who point to serious deficiencies in sampling, data analysis, and data interpretation. Eysenck has, however, provided a defense (e.g., 1956). Although a great deal has been written about the psychological bases for Communist party membership and ideology, remarkably little empirical evidence has been gathered. As Almond (1954) has observed, there are wide variations in the "appeals of communism" between countries, between social classes, between transient and long-term members, and the like. More adequate study of the multiple relationships between personality and communist ideology would have to take into consideration the significant variations in societal context and in the character of the ideology. This is true of other political parties and ideologies as well. In general, it would appear that personality is more closely related to concrete political ideology than to party affiliation or preference. There are appreciable variations in individual ideology and personality within all parties. It is therefore necessary to supplement gross surveys of large samples
PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Conservatism and Radicalism with the more intensive study of individuals, giving equal attention to ideology, personality, and engagement in the societal matrix. What, then, can be concluded regarding the relation of personal authoritarianism to political ideology? On the average, there is significantly greater authoritarianism to the right of center than to the left. The relationship is, however, far from simple. More systematic analysis of qualitatively different patterns of ideology along the rightcenter—left continuum is urgently needed, both for purposes of political analysis and for the study of ideology as an aspect of personality. Authoritarian personality theory calls attention first of all to the democratic—antidemocratic dimension of ideology. One of its central postulates is that authoritarian individuals have a special affinity for antidemocratic viewpoints in all spheres of social life— political, religious, familial, organizational (Levinson 1964). In the case of political ideology, it predicts that authoritarianism will be associated with antidemocratic ideologies, whether of the right, center, or left. The choice of general political direction is related to class membership, as Lipset has shown, and to a variety of other social and psychological variables yet to be elucidated. The ideological relevance of authoritarianism is clearest, and most fully documented, when we shift analytic focus from the broad categories of right, center, and left to more specific ideological dimensions. There is massive evidence that authoritarianism is significantly associated with the following: emphasis upon rigid hierarchy and stratification in political and other structures; rejection of democratic political processes; reliance upon the "great leader" in solving social problems and upon coercive social controls in maintaining social order; chauvinistic nationalism as a stance toward one's own nation and toward international affairs; an ethnocentric view of relationships among various groups within the nation; readiness to place severe restrictions upon civil rights and civil liberties; religious fundamentalism and its extension into political and other spheres; punitiveness as a basic emotional-moral response to deviance (expressed ideologically, for example, in the emphasis upon military solutions to international problems, or upon the use of punishment in the deterrence of legal crime and nonconformity); rejection of innovation, experimentation, and openness in political and other systems. The research to date clearly establishes authoritarianism as a personality constellation having significant implications for political ideology and participation. Much more work remains to be done, however, with regard to the components and vari-
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ant forms of this syndrome and with regard to its political manifestations under different social conditions. Other ideology-personality constellations Since the late 1950s interest in the social psychology of ideology has expanded beyond concern with authoritarianism, and new personality-ideology constellations are being investigated. Although the primary focus of these studies is not on the right-left dimension as such, they have a bearing on this dimension and, what is perhaps more important, they reflect the emergence of new dimensions in the analysis of political ideology and personality. An extensive review of this work is beyond the scope of the present article; it must suffice to indicate briefly some of the relevant concepts and directions of inquiry. The "conspiratorial" view of politics has been subjected to psychological analysis by Hofstadter (1965). Although he uses the term paranoid style to convey the emotional quality of this view, his interest is not in psychopathology or psychiatric diagnosis but in the fantasies, ego defenses, and modes of thought that give coherence, meaning, and emotional appeal to the conspiratorial interpretation of political affairs. Exploring ideologypersonality relationships through a series of intensive case studies, Lane (1962) uses the term cabalist to identify a similar political orientation. Bittner (1963) takes a historical and phenomenological approach in seeking to delineate a genotypic conception of radicalism. He attributes a number of distinctive psychological properties and themes to the radical orientation. One may then ask whether an orientation having these psychological properties would have special appeal to individuals having corresponding personality characteristics. Although Bittner does not take this last step, his analysis suggests interesting leads for personality study. Similarly, Talmon (1962) describes various psychological properties of rnillenaristic ideology. She is concerned primarily with the social antecedents and consequences of rnillenaristic movements, but her discussion is also richly suggestive of hypotheses regarding their psychological bases. [See MILLENARISM; PARANOID REACTIONS.] The 1961 translation of Scheler's classic essays on ressentiment (1912) brings to wider attention an ideology-personality constellation that merits further study. Scheler conceives of ressentiment as a complex syndrome involving conscious attitudes, feelings, and moral judgments as well as unconscious defenses and wishes. The ressentiment-laden person tends to devaluate authoritative persons and groups, not on the basis of genuine
28
PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Conservatism and Radicalism
commitment to his espoused values but, rather, on the basis of secret envy, vindictiveness, and impotent rage. As Lewis Coser points out in his Introduction to the volume, Scheler's formulations are important in their own right and as forerunners of more recent analyses of alienation and anomie. [See the biography of SCHELER.] Since the latter concepts have received greater attention in contemporary work, we shall consider them more fully here. The concepts of alienation and anomie have a long history in sociology but have only recently been singled out for extensive theoretical discussion and empirical investigation. The concept of alienation has its modern origins in the psychological writings of Marx (see Fromm 1961), who postulated that the individual in capitalist society is estranged both from his labor and from himself. Without necessarily accepting Marx's assumptions about the societal roots of alienation, many contemporary social scientists have inquired into its nature, its social and psychological bases, and its manifestations in various sectors of social life (e.g., Keniston 1965; Lane 1962). Alienation has been variously defined to include component dimensions such as sense of powerlessness, isolation, and inefficacy; lack of social rootedness; self-estrangement; noncommitment, cynicism, and failure of identity. It may be expressed in apathy, in empty conformity, or in "rebellion without a cause." Politically, it may be found at every point along the right-left spectrum and may be manifested in lack of political participation or in zealous dedication to a party or movement. The analytic usefulness of this concept at present is limited by the multiplicity and ambiguity of its definitions. At the same time, it has been extremely useful in generating new lines of research and new perspectives on the social psychology of politics. [See ALIENATION.] The concept of anomie was initially formulated by Durkheim (1897). He identified the anomie social system as one characterized by a relative failure of normative order, a lack of moral regulation over human strivings and passions. He gave evidence that anomie societies are characterized by relatively high rates of deviant and self-destructive behavior, including suicide. In seeking to explain these phenomena, he postulated that anomie societies produce certain psychological states in many of their individual members: insatiable craving, sense of futility, lack of responsibility and moral purpose, emotional emptiness and despair. He did not, however, deal with the fact that there are wide individual differences in psychological anomie among the members of a given society and that the development of this state of mind may also be
a function of individual personality. [See the biography of DURKHEIM; see also Inkeles 1959.] Recent investigations, given impetus by the work of Srole (e.g., 1956), have extended Durkheim's formulation to include the concept of the anomie personality. McClosky and Schaar (1965) present a systematic review of this theoretical development, as well as a new conceptualization in which anomie is regarded as a function of both personality and social conditions and some research data derived from large-scale surveys. They find significant correlations between anomie and authoritarianism, alienation, ethnocentrism, political extremism, sense of political futility, misanthropy, mistrust, and punitiveness. While this study requires further validation and refinement, it strongly suggests that anomie is a significant concept in the analysis of personality and political ideology. It also indicates the need for further clarification of the concepts of anomie, alienation, and authoritarianism. In conclusion, we note that the study of personality and political ideology is entering a new and more multidisciplinary period. It is being increasingly recognized that work on this problem extends beyond the traditional province of "individual psychology"; the psychologist who would contribute to it must have some appreciation of the political, social, and historical context within which individuals form and act upon their ideologies (Erikson 1958). At the same time, historians and social scientists working in this field must develop a more systematic and profound conception of the individual as an active agent in the historical process—an agent capable of blind conformity, of irrational destructiveness, and of rational, responsible choice in accord with his interests, values, and motives. Our further progress will thus require the conjoint perspectives of personality theory, political theory, and general sociological theory. DANIEL J. LEVINSON [Directly related are the entries CONSERVATISM; LIBERALISM; RADICALISM. Other relevant material may be found in ANTI-SEMITISM; ATTITUDES; CONFORMITY; FREEDOM; IDEOLOGY; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS; POLITICAL BEHAVIOR; POLITICAL PARTICIPATION; PREJUDICE; PUBLIC OPINION; SURVEY ANALYSIS; VALUES; and in the biographies of FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK; MARX.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADORNO, THEODOR W. et al. 1950 The Authoritarian Personality. American Jewish Committee, Social Studies Series, No. 3. New York: Harper.
PERSONALITY, POLITICAL: Conservatism and Radicalism ALLPORT, GORDON W. 1935 Attitudes. Pages 798-844 in Carl Murchison (editor), A Handbook of Social Psychology. Worcester, Mass.: Clark Univ. Press. ALMOND, GABRIEL A. 1954 The Appeals of Communism. Princeton Univ. Press. BELL, DANIEL (editor) 1955 The New American Right. New York: Criterion. BITTNER, EGON 1963 Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements. American Sociological Review 28:928-940. CHRISTIE, RICHARD 1956 Eysenck's Treatment of the Personality of Communists. Psychological Bulletin 53: 411-430. CHRISTIE, RICHARD; and COOK, PEGGY A. 1958 A Guide to Published Literature Relating to The Authoritarian Personality Through 1956. Journal of Psychology 45: 171-199. CHRISTIE, RICHARD; and JAHODA, MARIE (editors) 1954 Studies in the Scope and Method of The Authoritarian Personality. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. DICKS, HENRY V. 1950 Personality Traits and National Socialist Ideology. Human Relations 3:111-154. DiRENZO, GORDON J. 1963 A Social Psychological Analysis of Personality Structures of Members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Ph.D. dissertation. Univ. of Notre Dame. DURKHEIM, EMILE (1897) 1951 Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -» First published in French. ERIKSON, ERIK H. 1942 Hitler's Imagery and German Youth. Psychiatry 5:475-493. ERIKSON, ERIK H. (1958) 1962 Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History. Austen Riggs Monograph No. 4. New York: Norton. Explorations in Personality: A Clinical and Experimental Study of Fifty Men of College Age, by Henry A. Murray et al. 1938 London and New York: Oxford Univ. Press. EYSENCK, HANS J. 1954 The Psychology of Politics. London: Routledge. EYSENCK, HANS J. 1956 The Psychology of Politics: A Reply. Psychological Bulletin 53:177-182. FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, ELSE 1952 Interaction of Psychological and Sociological Factors in Political Behavior. American Political Science Review 46:44-65. FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, ELSE; LEVINSON, DANIEL J.; and SANFORD, R. NEVITT (1947) 1965 The Authoritarian Personality. Pages 670-679 in Harold Proshansky and Bernard Seidenberg (editors), Basic Studies in Social Psychology. New York: Holt. -> First published as "The Antidemocratic Personality." FROMM, ERICH 1936 Theoretische Entwiirfe iiber Autoritat und Familie: Sozialpsychologischer Teil. Pages 77-135 in Frankfurt am Main, Institut fur Sozialforschung, Studien iiber Autoritdt und Familie. Edited by Max Horkheimer. Paris: Alcan. -» An English abstract appears on pages 908-911. FROMM, ERICH (1941) 1960 Escape From Freedom. New York: Holt. FROMM, ERICH (editor) 1961 Marx's Concept of Man. New York: Ungar. HAGEN, EVERETT E. 1962 On the Theory of Social Change. Homewood, 111.: Dorsey. HOFFER, ERIC 1951 The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: Harper. -> A paperback edition was published in 1958 by New American Library. HOFSTADTER, RICHARD 1965 The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays. New York: Knopf.
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INKELES, ALEX 1959 Personality and Social Structure. Pages 249-276 in American Sociological Society, Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects. Edited by Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. New York: Basic Books. KENISTON, KENNETH 1965 The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society. New York: Harcourt. KORNHAUSER, ARTHUR; SHEPPARD, HAROLD I.; and MAYER,
ALBERT J. 1956 When Labor Votes: A Study of Auto Workers. New York: University Books. LANE, ROBERT E. 1962 Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does. New York: Free Press. LEVINSON, DANIEL J. 1957 Authoritarian Personality and Foreign Policy. Journal of Conflict Resolution 1:37-47. LEVINSON, DANIEL J. 1958 The Relevance of Personality for Political Participation. Public Opinion Quarterly 22:3-10. LEVINSON, DANIEL J. 1964 Idea Systems in the Individual and in Society. Pages 297-318 in George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch (editors), Explorations in Social Change. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. LIPSET, SEYMOUR M. 1960 Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. MCCLOSKY, HERBERT 1958 Conservatism and Personality. American Political Science Review 52:27-45. MCCLOSKY, HERBERT; and SCHAAR, JOHN H. 1965 Psychological Dimensions of Anomy. American Sociological Review 30:14-40. MANNHEIM, KARL (1929-1931) 1954 Ideology and Utopia: An Introdiiction to the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Harcourt; London: Routledge. -> A paperback edition was published in 1955 by Harcourt. Parts 2-4 are a translation of Ideologic und Utopie (1929); Part 5 is a translation of the article "Wissenssoziologie" (1931). MASLOW, A. H. 1943 The Authoritarian Character Structure. Journal of Social Psychology 18:401—411. MURPHY, GARDNER; and LIKERT, RENSIS 1938 Public Opinion and the Individual. New York: Harper. MURPHY, GARDNER; MURPHY, L. B.; and NEWCOMB, THEODORE M. (1931) 1937 Experimental Social Psychology: An Interpretation of Research Upon the Socialization of the Individual. Rev. ed. New York: Harper. -> Newcomb was a joint author only of the revised edition. NEWCOMB, THEODORE M. (1943) 1957 Personality and Social Change: Attitude Formation in a Student Community. New York: Dryden. REICH, WILHELM (1933) 1946 The Mass Psychology of Fascism. 3d ed., rev. & enl. New York: Orgone Institute Press. -» First published in German. ROKEACH, MILTON 1960 The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations Into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems. New York: Basic Books. ROKEACH, MILTON; and HANLEY, CHARLES 1956 Eysenck's Tender-mindedness Dimension: A Critique. Psychological Bulletin 53:169-176. SANFORD, R. NEVITT 1956 The Approach of the Authoritarian Personality. Pages 253-319 in J. L. McCary (editor), Psychology of Personality: Six Modern Approaches. New York: Logos. SCHELER, MAX (1912) 1961 Ressentiment. Edited with an introduction by Lewis A. Coser. New York: Free Press. -» First published in German. SHILS, EDWARD 1954 Authoritarianism: "Right" and "Left." Pages 24-49 in Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (editors), Studies in the Scope and Method
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PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Overview
of The Authoritarian Personality. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. SPINLEY, B. M. 1953 The Deprived and the Privileged: Personality Development in English Society. London: Routledge. SROLE, LEO J. 1956 Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study. American Sociological Review 21:709-716. STACKER, Ross 1936 Fascist Attitudes: Their Determining Conditions. Journal of Social Psychology 7:438— 454. TALMON, YONINA 1962 Pursuit of the Millennium: The Relation Between Religious and Social Change. Archives europeennes de sociologie 3:125-148. THURSTONE, Louis L.; and CHAVE, E. J. 1929 The Measurement of Attitude. Univ. of Chicago Press.
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT Jack Block i. OVERVIEW ii. PERSONALITY INVENTORIES Wayne H. Holtzman in. THE MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY W. Grant Dahlstrom iv. SITUATIONAL TESTS Sebastiano Santostefano
OVERVIEW
The field of personality measurement, viewed in the perspective of its short but busy history, has progressed in a fumbling, digressive manner. It may now, because of hard-won recognitions, be ready for significant and cumulative advances. The problem and strategy The reason for the disappointing disparity between the energies already expended and the accomplishments which may be certified lies in the uncertainty which has surrounded the concept of personality and the naivete in psychology about the logic and justification of measurement. In the physical sciences and in some subareas of psychology where intuitions are strong and widely held, one need not be acutely concerned with the distinction between a concept and the way in which that concept happens to be measured. By and large, measuring length by a ruler and weight by a scale does not generate controversy; the relation of these concepts to their respective methods of measurement seems obvious and beyond dispute. In the study of personality, however, there is no escaping an immediate, insistent, incessant preoccupation with the problem of linking concepts and empirical operations. Personality measurements, if they discriminate at all, always express, in a pure or impure form, explicitly or implicitly, a personality concept in terms of which the differential behavior may be understood. Personality concepts, if they are not hopelessly vague or inconsistent, always imply
specifiable behavioral differences in people. Ttese differences may be impractical to study or tiey may be judged as trivial, but the concept requres that they exist. The distinction between, yet interdependenceof, concept and measurement in the study of persmality requires a spiraling interplay of these levels of analysis—concepts should suggest approaches to measurement, and measurement should reine conceptual formulations. This reciprocal imprcvement of theory and method has come to be caled the process of "construct validation" (Cronbacl & Meehl 1955). Unhappily, in the adolescent md polyglot field of personality, progress has been rrore often circular than helical. And yet, if a scienct of personality is to be formed, the responsibilities of coupling concept and measure must be met. The domain of personality psychology is sprawling and fuzzily delineated. With so many deinitions of the field and with a plethora of vagiely redundant but not readily integrated concepts, it is difficult to know where to try to begin measuring the nebulous notion of personality and tomrd what ends. [See PERSONALITY.] In order not to be immobilized by the endess conceptual possibilities, two tactics have teen adopted. The first of these requires the courage to be arbitrary—to propose, essentially by fiat, thit a small set of concepts comprehends the important, necessary ways of differentiating people. Tlese concepts need not constitute—and thus far hive never been—a formal model of personality. Ratier, they represent simply a set of dimensions or iceas in terms of which their expounder finds it convenient and congenial to conceptualize his view of "personality." Selection of these concepts ma} be supported by observational, introspectional, clinical, test, or experimental data, of varying degiees of quality and persuasiveness, but often is lot. These concepts serve—or should serve—a heurstic purpose; they provide a way to begin and, su>sequently, a way of indicating and integrating diverse phenomena that may fall under the rubric of ;his conceptual assertion. Presumably, the usefuhess of the concepts will be tested, and they will be reshaped under the impact of the empirical coisequences they entail. The reader may wish to
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Overview conceptual structure of the personality phenomena which have been collected for study. Patternings that are found to be stable when these means are applied to variegated data are presumptive evidence of functional entities. These functional entities may be named and employed thereafter as integrative and consequential concepts. By and large, this approach has employed the method of factor analysis, with all of its strengths and weaknesses. A good illustration of the approach is the work of R. B. Cattell, recently presented in an integrating, summary volume (1965). [See FACTOR ANALYSIS and TRAITS.] However an investigator chooses to proceed in articulating and delimiting the sense in which he will define "personality," he will confront the dismaying problem of "measurement." What is measured or recorded is behavior, and behavior has many determinants and many meanings. Identical behaviors may be the expression of fundamentally different mediating sequences or, conversely, different behaviors may be essentially equivalent in the functions they serve or the processes from which they eventuate. Behavior is susceptible to many transient and otherwise conceptually irrelevant conditions; it is susceptible to being organized in many ways and to many levels of interpretation. In all this flux, how are anchor points to be established? By way of illustration, consider the concept of anxiety and its measurement. Perhaps all conceptualizations of personality leave room for or try to encompass the notion of anxiety; by focusing on the measurement of anxiety, most of the problems and logic of personality measurement may be illustrated. The term "anxiety" takes on scientific meaning only by its empirical concomitants and consequences. But, for the present, the sense with which the term should be understood here is perhaps sufficiently conveyed by resort to the tautology of a dictionary definition (Webster's New International Dictionary, second edition). Thus, anxiety means "painful uneasiness of mind respecting an impending or anticipated ill; a state of restlessness and agitation, with a distressing sense of oppression about the heart; expectancy of evil or danger without adequate ground . . . ; concern, dread, fear, foreboding, misgiving, worry, solicitude, uneasiness, apprehension." [See ANXIETY.] Clearly, the notion of anxiety refers to subjective experience. And because anxiety is important regardless of whether it is theoretically conceptualized as a prime mover, as derivative, or as epiphenomenon, psychologists wish to measure it.
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Four basic procedures There are four classes of indicators that may be used: (1) a subject may be observed in his everyday life and actions (presumably without his actions' being affected by these observations) and from his behaviors a judgment is made as to whether he is anxious; (2) a subject may be asked, by means of a questionnaire, to state directly (or in ways he may not completely understand) whether he is anxious; (3) a subject may be placed in a controlled or test situation designed to elicit special behaviors or products relevant to anxiety; (4) a subject's physiological reactions may be assessed by various instruments, to determine whether he shows certain responses or changes presumed to be indicants of anxiety. Observation. We all form impressions of other people in the course of observing them. If these impressions can be objectified and systematized, then there is no reason why observation cannot be employed as one kind of measurement of personality. Observation has an appeal because of its closeness to experience and because of its apparent simplicity. It has been criticized for the other side of these virtues—the data generated are subject to observer idiosyncrasies and often do not meet scientific standards of reproducibility. The method depends heavily on the quality of the observers, the range of contexts in which judges observe the subject, and the way in which the observations are codified so as to formulate a dimensional index. With close attention to these concerns this approach becomes cumbersome, but it still appears to be the method of choice when complex concepts are being considered or when a problem area is being approached for the first time. There are not many instances of appropriate usage of this approach. For consideration of the ways and means of employing it effectively, see, for example, Guilford (1954, chapter 11), Peak (1953), Block (1961). [See OBSERVATION.] When this method of measuring is used, anxiety might be indexed as some composite of the judgments of several psychologists or psychiatrists, each judge having observed the subject in a different but evocative situation and each judge referring the concept of anxiety to his professional (and personal) understanding of the term. Each judge having placed the subject at a (numerical) point along an anxiety continuum, some average value of these numbers can serve as a score or measurement of the subject with respect to anxiety level. Questionnaires, or inventories. By far the most frequent technique invoked to measure personality
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PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Overview
has been the questionnaire. Typically, the questionnaire, or personality inventory, will contain a wide variety of questions on highly personal matters, which the subject is asked to answer. Such devices are extremely convenient for the investigator; explicit answers are provided by the subject regarding a host of matters, and these responses lend themselves immediately to a variety of analytical techniques. However, there are a number of hazards in the use of inventories, and research has for a long time been concerned with identifying and coping with these problems. In the initial usages of personality inventories, it was presumed that the responses of subjects could be believed and that the interpretative or conceptual significance of a response was clearly apparent. This presumption is by no means wholly untrue, but its applicability is conditioned by the motivation of the respondent vis-a-vis the nature and context of the queries and by the complexity of the relations through which an inventory item relates to a personality dimension. People are astonishingly open and cooperative when approached in an interested, supportive, and nondemeaning way. Too often, however, psychologists have impersonally handed out highly personal questionnaires for reasons not appreciated or believed by the recipients. It is not surprising, under such circumstances, that deliberate innocuity of response has been and often still is the order of the day. Indeed, failure to cover up and appear blandly conventional in such settings appears to be a sign of psychopathology. But in the context of seeking psychiatric help, it is far less likely that someone will dissimulate in his responses to an inventory. In any event, many questionnaires incorporate items which, separately or in conjunction, provide an indication of the frankness of the respondent and hence of the validity of his responses. There have been increasingly successful attempts to construct questions or combinations of questions the full implications of which almost no respondent could be expected to understand. A more interesting problem is the establishment of the psychological import of questionnaire responses. The statements to which a subject is asked to respond may or may not be ambiguous. However, the implications of a single response, offered without a context, almost invariably are obscure. Just what is meant by an affirmative answer to the statement, "I know who is responsible for my troubles"? Is the respondent acknowledging that he is his own worst enemy or is he projecting an accusation of persecution upon someone else? The item "I like tall women" is a consistent empirical
indicator of impulsivity in American males, but why? Seemingly equivocal items and items only deviously related to personality dimensions abound in contemporary inventories; and indeed, herein lies their strength, since even a sophisticated subject finds it difficult to anticipate or control the dimensional implications of his response. It was the great conceptual contribution of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, still the dominant questionnaire used in the United States, to turn away explicitly from the apparent cogency of items and turn instead toward a requirement that items (and the scales subsequently developed from these items) discriminate between behavior ally or socially different criterion groups. This attitude toward test construction is not so blandly empirical as has been believed—there are still conjectures regarding fruitful questionnaire statements, and there is recognition that much can be learned from thoughtful reflection on the processes that might underly the emergence of an unanticipated discriminator. But first there is the insistence that beyond question the items separate groups. With this approach, well applied, the problem of dissimulation largely vanishes, since respondents cannot foretell the implications of their answers. To date, because of the formidable labors involved in developing a widely ranging inventory, applying it to large and variegated samples, and then exploring for discriminating items, the full potential of this approach has not been realized. In particular it has often been the case that criterion groups are selected on the basis of poor or uninteresting or confused criteria. Thus, subsequent empirical analyses can provide only weak or trivial or ambiguous response to the particular research inquiry. There has been little systematic consideration given to the problem of which criterion groups might, should, or must be discriminated. However, with the advent of the computer, which can perform the vast clerical labors of comparison, it may be expected that the multiple contrasts required to build more than a narrowly specified validity will be forthcoming. For a discussion of some of these problems, see Block (1965) and Campbell (1957). With regard to the concept of anxiety, it would be necessary first to contrast the inventory responses of a group of individuals considered by experts to be anxious with responses provided by a comparable group of nonanxious individuals. Those statements affirmed or denied with differential frequency by the members of the anxious group and corroborated on other samples would constitute an anxiety scale. Once refined and established
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Overview as a valid discriminator, this scale could be employed to identify individuals responding to items in a way characteristic of the anxious individuals initially studied. Although the significance of a subject's response to any one item relating to anxiety can readily be questioned, it is reasoned that the closer the correspondence between an individual's response pattern and the response pattern typifying the anxious group, the more likely it is that he is anxious. Interviewing. It may be noted that the frequently used technique of the interview falls between the two categories of personality measurement so far discussed. If the interview employs standardized questions, systematically asked of the subject, then the interview may be regarded as a verbally administered questionnaire. If the interview is unstructured and simply provides the interviewer with an opportunity to observe subjects in a social (and tense) situation so that the interviewer can formulate some impressions, then the interview falls into the classification of observations as a basis for personality measurement. [See INTERVIEWING, article on PERSONALITY APPRAISAL.] Test situations. Observations are heavily and cumbersomely dependent on the quality of the judges used, their number, and the significance of the subject's behaviors sampled; questionnaires are convenient enough but often appear too distant from actual behaviors to earn a trust in their relevance. Because of the deficiencies or constraints in these approaches, psychologists often turn to specially devised test situations as a basis for eliciting behaviors to serve as indicants of personality variables. This orientation has special promise, as yet only partially achieved because the special premises on which it depends are not sufficiently understood. Test situations are constructed by the researcher to present to the participating subject a psychological context or influence or choice formulated in a way that makes it relevant to the personality variable under study. The response of the subject to the environmental demand upon him can, provided the subject appropriately interprets the test situation, serve as an indicator of the selected personality characteristic the test situation was designed to elicit. The crucial requirement of this approach, upon which all of its usefulness depends, is signified by the italicized phrase in the preceding sentence—if his response is to have the desired interpretive significance and if the responses of different subjects are to be considered as comparable, the subject must apprehend the test situation in the way the experimenter prefers.
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More often than psychologists have wished to acknowledge, subjects react to experimental situations in ways that foil interpretation or that are idiosyncratic. The usefulness of the test situation may be voided in two ways. First, unrealized by the experimenter, different subjects may enter the situation with different attitudes or sets or expectations, which because of their heterogeneity cause behavior within the test situation to have equivocal implications. Thus, an experimental situation concerned with competition and cooperation, employing actual money as a reward, might fail to recognize the different premises with which, say, a desperately poor subject, a wealthy subject, and a devout Quaker might conceive of their participation in the experiment. Similar responses could well have different bases; different responses could be open to multiple interpretations. Of course, these different premises can themselves become the focus of study, but if they go unrecognized and if subjects are unwarrantedly presumed to be homogeneous, then the results derived from the experiment can have little significance. Second, also without realizing it, the experimenter may have in fact defined the test situation in ways different from those he had intended, so that the behavior of subjects, although they may be homogeneous enough, responds to quite another (and unrecognized) issue or influence than the experimenter has conceptualized. Thus, an experimenter may seek to convey in his test situation the false bit of information that the subject's performance on some task is unusually poor. The experimenter's goal in communicating this "fact" may be to motivate the subject intensely. However, the subject's own view of his performance and general competence, amplified perhaps by ineffective acting by the experimenter, may cause him (and all other subjects) to disbelieve the experimenter and to behave on quite different grounds. For reasons of tact and tacitness the experimenter perhaps may not be confronted with the knowledge of this state of affairs, and he may therefore presume that the subjects responded in the way his situation directed them. Failure to check appropriately on the congruence between experimenters' and subjects' conceptions of the test situation is a frequent error. To exploit situational tests maximally for the purposes of measuring personality, a firmer recognition is required of the interpersonal nature of psychological experimentation and of the manifold structurings of a test situation which can be developed by the facile minds of human beings. An experimenter's presumption about the proc-
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PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Overview
esses operating within his experimental situation is insufficient alone—it must be supported by other views congruent with it. A consensus derived from the judgments of a group of psychologists is helpful, but the most supportable basis for evaluating a test situation is the consensus perception developed by actual subjects or individuals equivalent to the subjects being studied. Chein (1954), Gibson (1960), and Jessor (1956), each from a different viewpoint, have written thoughtfully on the matters involved in environmental specification. Further, the presence and the potency of the experimenter's effects upon his results must be assessed if generalizations beyond the immediately obtained results are to be made. In direct and indirect ways experimenters or examiners influence the behaviors of the subjects they encounter—a friendly, warm experimenter will elicit higher levels of aspiration from subjects than will a stern, aloof experimenter; subjects are often exquisitely sensitive to (and cooperative with) the hypotheses of an experimenter. The review by Kintz and his associates (1965) summarizes to date much of what has been discovered regarding unacknowledged and unrecognized experimenter influences on subject performance. Yet, if experimenters prove to be essentially interchangeable and if the psychological definition of the test situation is personally involving and essentially the same for all subjects and if, therefore, a subject is faced with the necessity of a behavioral choice, his decision must be formed on the basis of intrapsychic considerations. If the environmental directives are not overwhelming, and thereby compelling of a uniformity of response, then differential behavior will result, and this differential behavior will reflect differences in personality. The trick is to be incisive in the behaviors studied, so that the manifestations of personality thus developed are nontrivial. To exemplify a test situation relevant to the measuring of anxiety, consider a rote-learning task involving occasional unforewarned, extremely painful electric shocks. Some subjects will learn the designated material quickly, and others will learn slowly. Provided there is convincing information, obtained separately, that the subjects are of equivalent intelligence and background vis-a-vis the learning task and that they have equal thresholds of pain sensitivity, similar reactions to pain, etc., the hypothesis may be advanced that differential behavior in the learning task is attributable to differences in anxiety level. To help support this interpretation, our research design might call for the same subjects to experience an equivalent learn-
ing task without the threat of shock and its anxiety-evoking potential. In this second context the subjects should, according to theory, certainly manifest a much smaller range of efficiency in the learning situation and, again according to the concept of anxiety held, perhaps an effectiveness that on the average is superior to the average they achieved when threatened by shock. When an individual's performance under both conditions is compared, it becomes possible to infer his level of anxiety. Projective methods. Projective methods, such as the Rorschach ink blots or the Thematic Apperception Test, may be viewed either as test situations or as providing a basis in observation for personality formulations by judges. If responses are scored and these scores are taken as indicants of personality, then the projective technique is being employed as a test situation. If projective stimuli are conceived of simply as the occasion for a complex, semistandardized interview of a kind, eliciting many behaviors, from which an examiner, by virtue of his background and experience can, without scoring responses, evaluate the responding subject, then the projective method serves to provide behavioral grist for the integrative mill of the observer. [See PROJECTIVE METHODS.] Physiological responses. A great deficiency in the three approaches to personality measurement just described is that the behavior of the subject is to a greater or lesser extent under his volitional control—the subject can, more than a little, decide how he will respond when under observation or when faced with an inventory or when functioning in a test situation. He may be caught unawares, and he may not know how to direct his behavior, but he can, often appreciably, shape his manifest behavior. Since so many dimensions of personality relate to behaviors regarding which a subject may be motivated to be—deliberately or without awareness—misleading, it is important to escape this limitation. The autonomic nervous system, however, is not, except in a most unusual and sophisticated individual, under the control of intentions. An increase in heart rate, a hypermotility of the stomach, a rise in circulating epinephrine, cannot in general be volitionally prevented. Accordingly, the use of measures of such functions is attractive to psychologists. The psychophysiological method has enjoyed cyclic popularity in personality psychology. Despite the appreciable investments of time and thought put into the formidable problems of instrumentation, the contributions of psychophysi-
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Overview ology to personality measurement have thus far been few and often without reliable usefulness. The reasons for this are several. One problem is that of recording in sufficient detail and without artifact or the intrusion of irrelevancies the physiological phenomena going on underneath the subject's skin. Although such technical matters have inhibited growth of the field, recently great strides have been made and impressive sophistication has developed with regard to transducing and recording various physiological changes in the individual. While heretofore all psychophysiological measurements required carefully prepared rooms and carefully wired subjects, now the time is near when many of these measures will be telemetrically recorded from unhampered subjects carrying miniature transmitters as they go about their everyday lives. It may be expected that more representative and hence more cogent samplings of psychophysiological changes will be gathered as these technical advances reach maturity and acceptance. However, even with this kind of technological progress, the psychophysiological field (and the possibilities of the field) cannot be advanced unless there is further insight regarding such matters as what physiological channels to record and what facets of the multifaceted physiological process to fix upon as informative and dependable. A second problem of the psychophysiological approach, then, is attributable to the slowness with which truly incisive measures are being found. Quite properly there has been a reluctance to standardize any single set of physiological indexes, because of insufficient orderliness of the measures thus far studied and dissatisfaction regarding their ultimate behavioral relevance. Different investigators continue to employ different measures, and there have been few multivariate studies oriented toward establishing a reduced number of dependable measures. Much cumbersome, trying, and undramatic work must still be done before the necessary systemization and convergence on fundamental measures is accomplished. A third problem affecting the psychophysiological field stems, not from technical lags or deficiencies of discovery, but rather from an attitude underlying much of the research being done. The orientation of many investigators who have chosen to work in the psychophysiological realm is more toward the physiological than the psychological. Physiological reactions or changes, although occurring within the individual's life-span, have often been looked upon simply as end products of physical stimuli or as cause and effect of other
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physiological changes. This kind of focus has its merits and its successes. A more psychological approach, however, would use psychophysiological reactions, given meaning by the context of their occurrence, as signs or tokens of the existence of a subject's motivational state or characterological tendencies. Polygraph recordings of sexual arousal and of sympathy may well look alike; it is the environmental context in which the recordings were made that defines the significance of the interior changes that have been identified. The psychophysiological approach perhaps may realize its potential contribution to personality measurement when it is conjoined with a psychology of context. [See LEARNING, article on NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL ASPECTS.]
In applying the psychophysiological method to the measuring of anxiety, we might choose to place the subject in a stressful situation and then measure the level and changes in the electrical conductance of his skin. Despite various problems of artifact and technique, changes in skin conductivity appear to mirror changes in the emotionality of the subject. As he relaxes, his skin conductance drops; as he becomes tense or is placed under explicit stress, his level of skin conductance rises, usually by a series of rapid, superimposed changes. We may judge a subject as anxious if his conductance level has risen greatly from its normal or basal conductance level. Alternatively, we may measure anxiety as a function of the time required for the subject's conductance level to revert from its peak to its basal level. Or we may define anxiety in terms of the number of abrupt conductance changes (galvanic skin responses) a subject emits in a unit of time during which there is no clear external or situational stimulus. In this last definition of an anxiety measure, it is presumed that "nonspecific" or nonattributable galvanic skin responses are tripped by internal, private, even unconscious anxiety stimuli. Additional conductance measures of anxiety of course can be proposed, but it is not yet clear which, if any, may be used with assurance. States and traits. Concern with physiological indexes, such as conductance, brings forward with particular clarity a distinction we have thus far neglected but which in fact exists, however we propose to measure personality, and which confounds many interpretations of personality relevant behavior. This is the "state-trait" separation, a conceptual attempt to distinguish between relatively transient, actually existing internal conditions that an individual experiences (states) and the general tendency of an individual to find him-
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PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Overview
self enveloped by certain classes of circumstances (traits). Are these conductance rises or accommodation differences reflective of subject differences in anxiety level, or do they reflect instead subject differences in susceptibility to stress? Furthermore, when we conceptualize anxiety in general, are we talking of a particular, existential condition at the moment affecting a given subject (i.e., the subject's state) or are we out to measure the likelihood that the subject will experience often the phenomenal state of anxiety, i.e., that the subject has the trait, however achieved, of being anxiety prone? What we measure and how it will be measured depend upon the conceptual position explicitly reached in regard to the state-trait distinction. Much unrewarding research and discussion in the psychological literature has been due to a failure to make this separation or to accept its consequences. In particular, state notions have been measured in ways appropriate only to traits, without recognition of the error—the correlates of anxiety proneness have been presumed to be the correlates of anxiety states (e.g., Taylor 1956). As has been shown by Mandler (1959) and others, there is no logical necessity for this presumption to be true and there are abundant empirical instances of its falsity. Short of special subject selection, prolonged measurement, and perhaps even longitudinal study, the empirical separation of the concepts of state and trait is a difficult task indeed. The recent review by Martin (1961) points up well both the difficulties and the attractiveness of the physiological approach to personality measurement. The necessity of convergence Having assessed a personality concept—in the present instance, anxiety—in multiple ways, it is necessary to evaluate the extent to which these operationally diverse but conceptually equivalent indexes are related to each other. It is embarrassing if the several measures of a concept do not constitute a congruent ensemble. It is also bothersome when a measure proves to relate too closely to an index or behavior conceptually irrelevant to the dimension of immediate interest. Thus, a small or moderate correlation between a measure of anxiety and scores on an established intelligence test is conceptually supportable from a variety of theoretical viewpoints. But an extremely high connection between anxiety and intelligence might cause us to question whether our proposed anxiety index is not, instead, simply a camouflaged measure of intellect. By and large, personality measures to date
have not performed well when evaluated against the criteria of convergence and discrimination. Campbell and Fiske (1959), after an elegant presentation of the logic which should underlie the development of a personality measure, evaluate a variety of commonly used indexes. They find that rather few of the measures psychologists employ meet the criteria that would justify the interpretive labels these measures have been awarded. Their analysis and survey is a significant one, which those interested in personality measurement will wish to read. Humphreys (1960) and Cattell (1961) have offered some useful psychometric tactics for dealing with the problem of excessively low correlations of a measure with conceptually similar measures and excessively high correlations of a measure with conceptually dissimilar indexes. As these and related suggestions gain currency and take hold, we may expect that personality measures will develop a substantiality they do not yet enjoy. The general principle for progress in personality measurement appears to involve aggregating a number of conceptually equivalent but operationally diverse measures and, through the use of standard scoring and factor analysis, constructing an average or expression of the dimension common to the phenotypically heterogeneous indexes being brought together. In sum, the goal of a scientific understanding of personality and its development requires recognition of the inevitable and conducive role of personality measurement. There has been extensive and increasingly sophisticated research oriented toward the development of conceptually univocal and psychometrically sound measures of personality. The basic approaches to personality measurement include the use of observation, questionnaires, specially constructed test or social situations, and physiological indicators. A significant continuing problem in the field is the poor agreement between ostensibly equivalent measures. This problem is being solved by greater care and refinement in the construction and identification of personality measures. JACK BLOCK [See also PSYCHOMETRICS.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
BLOCK, JACK 1961 The Q-sort Method in Personality Assessment and Psychiatric Research. Springfield, 111.: Thomas. BLOCK, JACK 1965 The Challenge of Response Sets. New York: Appleton.
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Inventories CAMPBELL, DONALD T. 1957 Factors Relevant to the Validity of Experiments in Social Settings. Psychological Bulletin 54:297-312. CAMPBELL, DONALD T.; and FISKE, DONALD W. 1959 Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix. Psychological Bulletin 56: 81-105. CATTELL, RAYMOND B. 1961 Theory of Situational, Instrument, Second Order, and Refraction Factors in Personality Structure Research. Psychological Bulletin 58:160-174. CATTELL, RAYMOND B. 1965 The Scientific Analysis of Personality. Baltimore: Penguin. CHEIN, ISIDOR 1954 The Environment as a Determinant of Behavior. Journal of Social Psychology 39:115-127. CRONBACH, LEE J.; and MEEHL, P. E. (1955) 1956 Construct Validity in Psychological Tests. Pages 174-204 in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (editors), The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. -» First published in Psychological Bulletin. GIBSON, JAMES J. 1960 The Concept of the Stimulus in Psychology. American Psychologist 15:694—703. GUILFORD, JOY P. 1954 Psychometric Methods. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. -> First published in 1936. HUMPHREYS, LLOYD G. 1960 Note on the Multi-traitMultimethod Matrix. Psychological Bulletin 57:86-88. JESSOR, RICHARD 1956 Phenomenological Personality Theories and the Data Language of Psychology. Psychological Review 63:173-180. KINTZ, B. L. et al. 1965 The Experimenter Effect. Psychological Bulletin 63:223-232. LAZARUS, R. S. 1966 Psychological Stress and the Coping Process. New York: McGraw-Hill. MANDLER, GEORGE 1959 Stimulus Variables and Subject Variables: A Caution. Psychological Review 66:145149. MARTIN, BARCLAY 1961 The Assessment of Anxiety by Physiological Behavioral Measures. Psychological Bulletin 58:234-255. PEAK, HELEN 1953 Problems of Objective Observation. Pages 243-299 in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (editors), Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences. New York: Dryden. TAYLOR, JANET A. (1956) 1963 Drive Theory and Manifest Anxiety. Pages 205-222 in Martha T. Mednick and Sarnoff A. Mednick (editors), Research in Personality. New York: Holt. -> First published in Psychological Bulletin. II PERSONALITY INVENTORIES
One of the most popular ways of studying personality is to construct a questionnaire, or inventory, containing short statements about a person's behaviors and feelings that he can check as true or false. This deceptively simple idea of a selfreport inventory for personality assessment was first employed on a large scale in World War i, for initial screening of army recruits. Containing items similar to questions a psychiatrist would ask, the Woodworth Personal Data Sheet served as the prototype for numerous personality inventories which have flourished since. [See WOODWORTH.]
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The modern self-report paper-and-pencil personality inventory bears only a slight resemblance to the straightforward, simple approach of Woodworth. Numerous, well-developed scales may be embedded in a single instrument, including some especially designed to detect the individual who is faking or who is failing to read the items carefully. Objectively scored answer sheets, standardized scales with normative reference groups, and actuarial predictions from statistical tables are now commonplace. And yet, most critics would agree that even the more widely used personality inventories today are still limited in validity and general application. The self-inventory approach to personality is appealing on several grounds. Most individuals are more candid and objective in their self-appraisal when responding to statements in an impersonal, printed inventory than they would be in a direct interview or written autobiography. The method is objective, repeatable, economical, and efficient. The results are amenable to examination by multivariate statistical methods and psychometric theory and to rapid analysis by computers. [See FACTOR ANALYSIS and PSYCHOMETRICS.] Major approaches Three major approaches have been employed in the development of personality inventories. The most obvious starts with a definition of the trait being measured, such as extroversion-introversion or neuroticism. A large number of statements are written and gradually refined until the manifest content "looks right," on the face of it, with respect to the trait in question. Woodworth's Personal Data Sheet and many of the personal adjustment inventories that have followed it, such as the Bell Adjustment Inventory, the Bernreuter Personality Inventory, and the Cornell Medical Index, have relied chiefly upon face validity for evidence of their value. Unfortunately, the use of these a priori, direct methods has been almost uniformly disappointing. Such information as they provide is superficial and misleading at best. The second approach, involving strictly empirical methods, arose partly in reaction to the failure of the earlier "common-sense" approach. Starting with a large pool of a few hundred statements, culled from a variety of sources, experimental forms of the inventory are given to samples of individuals drawn from known criterion groups. Those items which discriminate the criterion groups are placed in a provisional scale, while the remainder are discarded or employed for other purposes. The provisional scales are cross-validated by administering
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PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Inventories
a refined version of the inventory to fresh criterion samples. The most widely used instrument of this type is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Ten clinical and four validity scales were originally developed for the MMPI, by using criterion groups drawn from clinical populations. The MMPI pool of 550 items has proved convenient for the construction of many other empirical scales employing similar methods. The possible number of such empirical scales in a large pool of items is almost infinite, being bound only by the number of different specific criterion groups to be discriminated. A third major approach to the problem starts with a large pool of items, as in the MMPI, but sets as a goal the development of homogeneous scales that are logically independent and internally consistent. Ideally, one would first like to know the major dimensions underlying variations in response to every conceivable statement that can be imagined about an individual's personality. Then scales could be constructed to represent these dimensions by appropriate combinations of items. The dimensions of personality emerge only after a long process of internal item analysis, scale construction and revision, and the use of factor analysis to clarify the existing structure. The Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey (Guilford & Zimmerman 1955) and Cattell's Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16 PF) (Cattell et al. 1957) are two wellknown examples of personality inventories constructed by this method. The Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey is appropriate for adolescents and adults. The inventory grew out of work by Guilford and his colleagues (Guilford & Zimmerman 1956), in which 13 primary dimensions of personality were found by factor analysis of 69 item clusters, where three or more clusters per factor had been hypothesized in advance. With some exceptions, intercorrelations of the 13 factor scores are generally close to zero. Ten of these dimensions are included in the temperament survey. Cattell's 16 PF was the result of an ambitious plan to sample the entire "personality sphere" (Cattell 1946) more completely than ever before. A total of 171 personality variables was compiled, and large numbers of items were written. Experimental test forms were gr-en to college students, and a series of factor analyses was carried out, extracting more factors than most other investigators would judge to be meaningful and using oblique rather than orthogonal rotations. The 16 factors believed by Cattell to be most significant form the basis for the 16 PF. While the major scales repre-
sented in the questionnaire closely resemble dimensions found by other investigators using similar approaches, the short scales have very low reliability and, if they are to be used at all, are recommended only for research purposes. The overlap of the scales permits the extraction of second-order factors (Cattell 1956). Cattell and his associates have also tried to extend the use of paper-and-pencil personality inventories down the age scale to six-year-olds (Cattell & Coan 1958). For the most part, however, these attempts have not been very successful below young adolescence. Still a different point of view among factor analysts working with personality inventories is that of Eysenck (1953). Where Cattell and Guilford postulate many primary dimensions, Eysenck insists upon a higher level of abstraction, with only three basic dimensions—neuroticism, introversionextroversion, and psychotic behavior. The first two of these are represented in the Maudsley Personality Inventory, developed by Eysenck and used widely in England. Disagreements as to the number of personality dimensions which can be measured reliably by questionnaire methods arise largely because of disputes over the best way to discover and define such dimensions. Employing different methods of factor analysis, Eysenck conservatively sticks to only very general factors. Moreover, he fails to sample systematically throughout the universe of all personality statements that can possibly be put in questionnaire form. In reviewing this dilemma Coan (1964) has pointed out that behavioral organization or personality structure can be conceptualized on four different levels—specific response, habitual response, trait, and type. The selection of subjects, number of factors extracted, kind of rotation employed, and density of personality-variable sampling affect the degree of referent generality or level within the hierarchy at which inferences about dimensions are made. When viewed in this manner, Eysenck, preferring types, has a much higher referent generality than have Cattell and Guilford, who focus on traits and even habitual responses. It is interesting to note that most second-order factor analyses of primary dimensions in personality inventories yield general factors similar to the three proposed by Eysenck, pointing to a basis for resolving the dispute. The California Psychological Inventory (CPI), developed by Gough (1957), is a hybrid of the strict empirical approach, exemplified by the MMPI, and the dimensional approach of Guilford and Cattell. Instead of using factor analysis as a basis for de-
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Inventories fining dimensions, Gough emphasizes concepts drawn from the folk culture or common language as criteria for scale construction. The CPI covers 15 traits, plus three additional scales for detecting invalid or deviant records. The scales were developed by item analysis in terms of behavioral criteria (usually ratings), without regard for their internal homogeneity. However, Gough did take into account dimensional studies of normal personality before selecting the behavioral ratings to be predicted from questionnaire scales. If major dimensions in personality inventories are really stable, they should appear consistently in different inventories, provided the same aspects of the personality sphere are sampled. A number of studies have been conducted comparing two or more personality questionnaires given to the same subjects. Typical of such studies are the one by Mitchell (1963) comparing the CPI with the 16 PF and the one by LaForge (1962) comparing the MMPI with the 16 PF. Although Mitchell found little relationship between the primary factors in the CPI and the 16 PF, the congruence of secondorder factors in the two inventories was quite striking. Six second-order factors were found among the 34 scales, the largest two of which were easily identified as neuroticism and extroversion—introversion, verifying Eysenck's contention that these two general factors run through most personality questionnaires and are of greater importance than the lower-order traits. LaForge also found neuroticism to be the first factor running through both the 16 PF and the MMPI, although his other factors are complex. Because the MMPI comprises clinically derived scales of an overlapping, empirical nature, dimensional analysis using factorial methods is not very satisfactory unless one works directly with the individual item responses rather than the derived scales. Spurious factors in test taking A major problem in personality inventories is the control of response set, stylistic variables, and spurious factors that may be confounded with the obtained scores on personality scales. Self-report tests are subject to falsification by the individual who wishes to make a good impression. Quite aside from any intentional faking, people do not know themselves well enough to give factual answers to most personality or attitude questions. Since some personality inventories allow the individual a range of responses, some subjects give many extreme answers, while others are characteristically cautious. Some will tend to agree with a statement or check "true" rather than "false," regardless of the
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item content. While these confounding variables have been recognized for many years, only recently has a great deal of interest been generated in their psychological meaning and in methods for their measurement and control. In his critical survey of personality assessment, Vernon (1964) reviews the history of this problem. An exhaustive review has also been made by Rorer (1963), who concludes that response style has been greatly overrated as a factor in personality measurement. Other recent reviews of interest have been published by Jackson and Messick (1958), McGee (1962a; 1962fo), Christie and Lindauer (1963), and Holtzman (1965). [See RESPONSE SETS.] Social desirability and acquiescence. The two response styles upon which the greatest amount of research has been done are social desirability and acquiescence. Socially desirable responding is the tendency to give answers that are independently judged by social consensus to be desirable. Acquiescence is the tendency to agree with a statement, regardless of content. Many writers have taken strong positions concerning the significance of these two response styles, positions from which they retreat only with great reluctance. Using the method of successive intervals for scaling items from the MMPI, Edwards (1957a) developed his Social Desirability Scale as a measure of the tendency to respond in the socially desirable fashion. The 39 items in the scale are keyed so that the higher the score, the more the individual endorses the socially desirable alternative. The correlations between this scale and the first general factor on the MMPI are so high that some investigators have argued that most of the variance in the MMPI can be accounted for in terms of this single dimension of social desirability-undesirability (Edwards 1962). It is clear to most observers, however, that the Social Desirability Scale alone is no match for the full MMPI profile (Marlowe & Gottesman 1964; Wiggins 1962; Elvekrog & Vestre 1963; Jackson & Messick 1962). The standard scales in the MMPI cover much more than social desirability. As in the case of social desirability, considerable debate continues over the importance of acquiescence in personality inventories. Jackson and Messick (1962) computed separate scores for trueor-false keyed items for a large number of MMPI scales, as well as for five social-desirability scales, and performed a factor analysis of the intercorrelations of the 40 variables separately for three large, diverse samples of individuals. The three samples yielded identical results. More than half of the total reliable variance could be attributed to the two stylistic dimensions—-acquiescence and social de-
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PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Inventories
sirability. On the other hand, Dahlstrom (1962) takes Edwards and Jackson and Messick to task for interpreting social desirability or tendency to agree primarily as response style and for not considering the possibility that true-or-false answers may nonetheless be veridical, may be attempts at various impression formations, or may be acquiescences to a particular pressure conveyed by the instructions, the examiner, or the test setting. Block (1962) presents data in support of the idea that social desirability and adjustment are basically different concepts even though they obviously are related. With these many conflicting points of view, it is difficult to reach a firm conclusion concerning the relative importance of response styles as confounding variables in personality inventories. Remaining largely unsettled and for the most part ignored is the more crucial question of external validity. Do these response styles measure anything important beyond their interesting correlates with other variables from paper-and-pencil questionnaires? In general, most attempts to demonstrate the personality correlates of stylistic variables by comparing them with independently derived personality measures have yielded negative results (McGee 1962a; 1962k; Foster & Grigg 1963; Appley & Moeller 1963). The behavioral correlates of response styles are few and of questionable significance. While their existence cannot be denied in at least some personality inventories, their interpretation as important variables in their own right is debatable. Variations among personality inventories Most contemporary personality inventories employ a dichotomous response format of true-false or agree-disagree and are designed as omnibus instruments, with multidimensional scales covering different traits. A few have departed from this standard form in one way or another. Edwards (1957£>) developed the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule by pairing statements having equal social desirability values, requiring the subject to choose the member of each pair which is most like him. This forced-choice method makes it more difficult for an individual to fake a socially desirable picture, although response styles are not really eliminated (Borislow 1958; Corah et al. 1958). The 225 paired comparisons lead to scores on 15 scales, patterned after Henry Murray's list of needs. Low intercorrelations between the scales and moderate reliabilities (.60-.87) suggest that the inventory has promise as a research instrument, although its external correlates have been disappointing. [See PERSONALITY: CONTEMPORARY VIEW-
POINTS, article on COMPONENTS OF AN EVOLVING PERSONOLOGICAL SYSTEM.]
The forced-choice format for responding to personality items usually involves pairs or triplets of statements, from which the subject chooses the alternative most like or least like himself. A more extensive variation of this approach is the Q-sort method, introduced by Stephenson (1953) and popularized by Rogers and his associates (Rogers & Dymond 1954). Typically, a number of statements describing traits are printed on small cards, which can then be sorted by the subject into a forced normal distribution, using a limited set of between 7 and 11 categories arranged on a continuum from "most like me" to "least like me." The same statements can be reshuffled and sorted again, using different instructional sets, such as "how I want to become" or "how others view me," instead of "how I really am." Special statistical problems arise in the treatment of such data, because of the ipsative nature of the distributions. The method has been reviewed thoroughly by Wittenborn (1961). Another variation involves changing the response format from a simple dichotomy of yes-no or truefalse to a continuum represented by five to nine gradations of response. Comrey (1964) found that he could improve item reliability by using a ninepoint response format ranging from "always" to "never" for some items and from "definitely" to "absolutely not" for others. Still in experimental form, Comrey's personality inventory consists of three validity scales plus 30 short scales of six items each, derived by repeated factor analysis of item intercorrelations and construction of new items. The nine-point response format yields more information per item than the usual three-point scale, making it possible to achieve split-half reliabilities ranging from .62 to .93 (median .84) for the 30 short scales. A five-point response format was developed by Moore and Holtzman (1965) by combining the usual true-false dichotomy with an intensity scale for measuring the degree of concern or worry reported by the subject. In addition to the lowest point, "false, or does not apply to me," four levels of personal concern were linked with a response of true, ranging from "true but of no concern to me" to "true and of great concern to me." As in the study by Comrey, the use of a multiple-response continuum yielded better results than a dichotomous true-false, this time in a personal-problem inventory containing eight well-defined scales, used in a study of thirteen thousand high school youth. The adjective check list, or trait list, represents
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Inventories an inventory technique at the other extreme. Instead of a short sentence or statement, each item consists of a single trait adjective, such as "friendly" or "timid." Occasionally, bipolar traits are employed rather than single words. A long list of such adjectives is given to the subject, who is asked to mark quickly the items most like him (and perhaps those least like him). An example of a well-developed adjective check list for use as a personality inventory is the one constructed by Gough and Heilbrun (1965). A rather novel approach to the format of an inventory has been successfully developed by Endler and his associates (1962) in their S-K (stimulusresponse) Inventory of Anxiousness. Fourteen different five-point scales are rated separately for each of 11 different situations, making a total of 154 items. The scales contain such content as "My heart beats faster," and "I get an uneasy feeling," while the situations define common events: "You are just starting off on a long automobile trip." Designed as a research instrument, the S—R Inventory permits systematic study of responses, situations, and individual differences with respect to self-reported anxiety, as well as interactions between them. Of all the dimensions revealed in personality inventories, self-reported anxiety, or "neuroticism," is one of the best defined and most widely used. Consequently, a number of attempts have been made to devise questionnaires to measure anxiety. The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale was developed, using items from the MMPI (Taylor 1953). The IPAT (Institute for Personality and Ability Testing) Anxiety Scale was constructed by Cattell from the 40 items (20 subtle and 20 obvious) most-highly correlated with the second-order anxiety factor in the 16 PF. And Eysenck's neuroticism scale in the Maudsley Personality Inventory is basically a measure of self-reported anxiety. Correlations between these similar measures of anxiety are sufficiently high to indicate a large common core, although each has its own unique variance as well. [See ANXIETY and NEUROSIS.] Variations of anxiety questionnaires have also been developed for use with children. Patterned after his Test Anxiety Questionnaire, Sarason's Test Anxiety Scale for Children (Sarason et al. 1960) deals specifically with anxiety aroused by events in the classroom, particularly being tested or challenged. The complete children's inventory also includes a general anxiety scale, a lie scale, and a defensiveness scale, which can be used as control measures. A somewhat similar inventory, developed independently by a different approach, is the
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Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (Castaneda et al. 1956). Other variations in format, content, and purpose of inventories are described in A Study of Values (Allport et al. I960); the Mooney Problem Check List (Mooney & Gordon 1950); and the Minnesota Counseling Inventory (Berdie & Layton 1957). Mental Measurements Yearbook, edited by O. K. Euros, is a standard compendium of most published personality inventories, as well as of other kinds of psychological tests (e.g., Euros 1959). Validity A major problem with personality inventories has been the establishment of their validity. All too frequently an inventory has been published without sufficient evidence that it either has predictive validity with respect to some future behavioral criterion or has concurrent validity in terms of external correlates. In an exhaustive review of earlier work on this problem, Ellis (1946) concluded that personality questionnaires are of dubious value because they fail to correlate with either practical criteria or independent measures of presumably the same personality traits. While some of the same criticisms can still be leveled at many current personality inventories, the thrust of the argument has been blunted somewhat by the successful efforts of more recent investigators to demonstrate the validity, as well as limitations, of contemporary methods. The most extensive research has been done on various empirically derived scales of the MMPI. This work demonstrates the usefulness of the MMPI for certain kinds of actuarial prediction, screening, and group discrimination, although its value for individual clinical diagnosis is still debatable and depends partly on the skill of the clinician. Since most personality inventories combine both the rational and empirical approaches and involve explicitly derived dimensions with trait names to describe them, validation attempts are usually concurrent rather than predictive. Properly conducted concurrent validation must involve two or more independent methods of measuring the same traits in the same individuals. Comparing the GuilfordZimmerman Temperament Survey with Cattell's 16 PF, for example, does not validate either inventory, since both sets of traits are derived by the same method, the self-report personality questionnaire. Personality scores on the inventory must be compared with ratings of behavior, with clinical judgments of the traits, or with trait scores from some other independent method of assessment. The most extensive cross-method correlational
4*2
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Inventories
studies have been undertaken by Cattell and his associates (Cattell 1950; 1957; Cattell & Scheier 1961). The sheer magnitude of Cattail's work represents a tour de force unequaled by previous investigators, even though he is vulnerable to serious criticism (Becker 1960). Generally speaking, the highest concurrent validities are obtained when inventory scores are compared with peer-group ratings for the same traits, regardless of the particular inventory in question. Ratings by trained observers also correlate to some extent with inventory scores. Validity coefficients of this type on the CPI, for example, range from .21 to .57 (Gough 1957). The lowest validity coefficients arise when crossmedia comparisons involving inventory scores and laboratory-type measures or objective performance tests of personality are made. More often than not, such correlations are close to zero. A crucial design for examining validity by the cross-method technique has been proposed by Campbell and Fiske (1959). Usually an investigator is content to show that the correlation for measures of a given trait across two methods is significantly better than chance. A much more rigorous test of validity requires that the cross-method correlation for a given trait be higher than the correlation between any two different traits, whether within the same method or across the two methods. Insisting that both discriminant and convergent validity must be considered, Campbell and Fiske recommend that all the within-method and crossmethod intercorrelations be arranged in a multitrait, multimethod matrix. This matrix can be examined in a number of ways, to determine both the convergent and discriminant validity. An example of this method applied to five traits purportedly measured by the CPI is reported by Dicken (1963). A more successful application of the CampbellFiske method in the validation of a personality inventory has been carried out by Jackson (1965), working with his newly developed Personality Research Form (PRF). Using four different methods of assessing the same 20 traits in a sample of 51 college students, Jackson demonstrated high convergent and discriminant validity for most of the scales in the PRF. Individual validity coefficients for the PRF, using peer ratings of behavior, ranged from .17 to .71 (median .52). The PRF appears to be a most promising instrument, largely because it is one of the first in a new generation of personality inventories that capitalize heavily upon modern test-construction theory and upon high-speed computers for item analysis. Two parallel forms of the PRF, with precise equivalence, are available. Derived originally from Murray's system of needs,
the 20 scales contain 20 items each and are augmented by two control scales, one for social desirability and one for acquiescence. The next few years should see considerable improvement in the power of the inventory approach to personality assessment. While much of the research of the past ten years has been methodological in nature, sufficiently advanced technology is now at hand to overcome some of the more glaring weaknesses in existing personality inventories. It is unlikely, however, that paper-and-pencil self-report methods of assessing personality will ever be much more than just that, namely, a systematic way of measuring how a person judges himself. WAYNE H. HOLTZMAN [Other relevant material may be found in INTERVIEWING, article on PERSONALITY APPRAISAL; OBSERVATION; PROJECTIVE METHODS; PSYCHOMETRICS.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ALLPORT, GORDON W.; VERNON, PHILIP E.; and LINDZEY, GARDNER 1960 A Study of Values. 3d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. -» Allport and Vernon were the authors of the first edition, published in 1931. APPLEY, MORTIMER H.; and MOELLER, GEORGE 1963 Conforming Behavior and Personality Variables in College Women. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 66:284-290. BECKER, WESLEY C. 1960 The Matching of Behavior Rating and Questionnaire Personality Factors. Psychological Bulletin 57:201-212. BERDIE, RALPH F.; and LAYTON, WILBUR L. 1957 Minnesota Counseling Inventory. New York: Psychological Corporation. BLOCK, JACK 1962 Some Differences Between the Concepts of Social Desirability and Adjustment. Journal of Consulting Psychology 26:527-530. BORISLOW, BERNARD 1958 The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) and Fakability. Journal of Applied Psychology 42:22-27. EUROS, OSCAR K. (editor) 1959 The Fifth Mental Measurements Yearbook. Highland Park, NJ.: Gryphon. CAMPBELL, DONALD T.; and FISKE, DONALD W. 1959 Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix. Psychological Bulletin 56:81-105. CASTANEDA, ALFRED; MCCANDLESS, B. R.; and PALERMO, DAVID S. 1956 The Children's Form of the Manifest Anxiety Scale. Child Development 27:317-326. CATTELL, RAYMOND B. 1946 The Description and Measurement of Personality. New York: World. CATTELL, RAYMOND B. 1950 Personality: A Systematic Theoretical and Factual Study. New York: McGrawHill. CATTELL, RAYMOND B. 1956 Second Order Personality Factors in the Questionnaire Realm. Journal of Consulting Psychology 20:411-418. CATTELL, RAYMOND B. 1957 Personality and Motivation Structure and Measurement. New York: World. CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and COAN, RICHARD W. 1958 Personality Dimensions in the Questionnaire Responses
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: MMPI of Six and Seven-year-olds. British Journal of Educational Psychology 28:232-242. CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; SAUNDERS, D. R.; and STICE, G. 1957 Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire. Champaign, 111.: Institute for Personality and Ability Testing. CATTELL, RAYMOND B.; and SCHEIER, IVAN H. 1961 The Meaning and Measurement of Neuroticism and Anxiety. New York: Ronald Press. CHRISTIE, RICHARD; and LINDAUER, FLORENCE 1963 Personality Structure. Annual Review of Psychology 14:201-230. COAN, RICHARD W. 1964 Facts, Factors, and Artifacts: The Quest for Psychological Meaning. Psychological Review 71:123-140. COMREY, ANDREW L. 1964 Personality Factors, Compulsion, Dependence, Hostility, and Neuroticism. Educational and Psychological Measurement 24:75-84. CORAH, NORMAN L. et al. 1958 Social Desirability as a Variable in the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. Journal of Consulting Psychology 22:70-72. DAHLSTROM, W. GRANT 1962 Commentary: The Roles of Social Desirability and Acquiescence in Responses to the MMPI. Pages 157-168 in Samuel Messick and John Ross (editors), Measurement in Personality and Cognition. New York: Wiley. DICKEN, CHARLES F. 1963 Convergent and Discriminant Validity of the California Psychological Inventory. Educational and Psychological Measurement 23:449459. EDWARDS, ALLEN L, 1957a The Social Desirability Variable in Personality Assessment and Research. New York: Dryden. EDWARDS, ALLEN L. 1957b Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. New York: Psychological Corporation. EDWARDS, ALLEN L. 1962 Social Desirability and Expected Means on MMPI Scales. Educational and Psychological Measurement 22:71—76. ELLIS, ALBERT 1946 The Validity of Personality Questionnaires. Psychological Bulletin 43:385-440. ELVEKROG, MAURICE O.; and VESTRE, NORRIS D. 1963 The Edwards Social Desirability Scale as a Short Form of the MMPI. Journal of Consulting Psychology 27:503-507. ENDLER, NORMAN S.; HUNT, J. McV.; and ROSENSTEIN, ALVIN J. 1962 An S-R Inventory of Anxiousness. Psychological Monographs 76, no. 17. EYSENCK, HANS J. (1953) 1960 The Structure of Human Personality. 2d ed. London: Methuen. FOSTER, ROBERT J.; and GRIGG, AUSTIN E. 1963 Acquiescent Response Set as a Measure of Acquiescence: Further Evidence. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67:304-306. GOUGH, HARRISON G. 1957 California Psychological Inventory: Manual. Palo Alto, Calif.: Consulting Psychologists Press. GOUGH, HARRISON G.; and HEILBRUN, ALFRED B. JR. 1965 The Adjective Check List. Palo Alto, Calif.: Consulting Psychologists Press. GUILFORD, JOY P.; and ZIMMERMAN, WAYNE S. 1955 The Guilford—Zimmerman Temperament Survey. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sheridan. GUILFORD, JOY P.; and ZIMMERMAN, WAYNE S. 1956 Fourteen Dimensions of Temperament. Psychological Monographs 70, no. 10:1-26. HOLTZMAN, WAYNE H. 1965 Personality Structure. Annual Review of Psychology 16:119-156.
43
JACKSON, DOUGLAS N. 1965 The Development and Evaluation of the Personality Research Form. Unpublished manuscript, Univ. of Western Ontario. JACKSON, DOUGLAS N.; and MESSICK, SAMUEL 1958 Content and Style in Personality Assessment. Psychological Bulletin 55:243-252. JACKSON, DOUGLAS N.; and MESSICK, SAMUEL 1962 Response Styles on the MMPI: Comparison of Clinical and Normal Samples. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 65:285-299. LAFORGE, ROLFE 1962 A Correlational Study of Two Personality Tests: The MMPI and Cattell 16 PF. Journal of Consulting Psychology 26:402-411. McGEE, RICHARD K. 1962a Response Style as a Personality Variable: By What Criterion? Psychological Bulletin 59:284-295. McGEE, RICHARD K. 1962£> The Relationship Between Response Style and Personality Variables. Part 2: The Prediction of Independent Conformity Behavior. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 65:347-351. MARLOWE, DAVID; and GOTTESMAN, IRVING I. 1964 The Edwards SD Scale: A Short Form of the MMPI: Journal of Consulting Psychology 28:181-182. MITCHELL, JAMES V. JR. 1963 A Comparison of the First and Second Order Dimensions of the 16 PF and CPI Inventories. Journal of Social Psychology 61:151166. MOONEY, Ross L.; and GORDON, LEONARD V. 1950 Mooney Problem Check List. New York: Psychological Corporation. MOORE, BERNICE M.; and HOLTZMAN, WAYNE H. 1965 Tomorrow's Parents: A Study of Youth and Their Families. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press. ROGERS, CARL R.; and DYMOND, ROSALIND F. (editors) 1954 Psychotherapy and Personality Change: Coordinated Research Studies in the Client-centered Approach. Univ. of Chicago Press. RORER, LEONARD G. 1963 The Great Response Style Myth. Oregon Research Institute, Research Monograph 3, no. 6. SARASON, SEYMOUR B. et al. 1960 Anxiety in Elementary School Children. New York: Wiley. STEPHENSON, WILLIAM 1953 The Study of Behavior: Q Technique and Its Methodology. Univ. of Chicago Press. TAYLOR, JANET A. 1953 A Personality Scale of Manifest Anxiety. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 48:285-290. VERNON, PHILIP E. 1964 Personality Assessment: A Critical Survey. New York: Wiley. WIGGINS, JERRY S. 1962 Strategic, Method, and Stylistic Variance in the MMPI. Psychological Bulletin 59:224242. WITTENBORN, J. R. 1961 Contributions and Current Status of Q Methodology. Psychological Bulletin 58:132142. Ill THE MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is a standardized, American test of emotional status and adjustment. It consists of 550 verbal items to which the subject answers true or false about himself. Scores are obtained on 14 scales: 10 that relate to clinical categories and
44
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: MMPI
4 that help provide an estimate of the validity of the test for individual subjects. Scoring involves applying stencils to an answer sheet, either by hand or by various automatic machine methods. A psychograph is made for each subject that provides a score profile, appropriate weights to correct for defensiveness, and separate normative transformations for each sex. In addition, a number of ratios and indexes may be computed for special applications. The initial derivational steps were undertaken in the late 1930s by Starkc 11. Hathaway, a psychologist, and J. Charnley McKinley, a neuropsychiatrist. All the basic work was carried out in the Department of Psychiatry and Neurology at the University of Minnesota Hospitals in Minneapolis. Inpatients and outpatients served as subjects in the carefully selected criterion groups, while hospital visitors, friends and relatives of patients on the various wards, made up the normal control group. Each component scale was derived empirically, containing only items that separated known patients from normals; each scale usually passed through several preliminary forms. Most of these scales are described in a series of articles in Welsh and Dahlstrom (1956). The clinical categories that were the original referents of the scales are hypochondriasis, depression, conversion hysteria, psychopathic deviate, masculinity-femininity, paranoia, psychasthenia. schizophrenia, hypomania, and social introversion. In Table 1, these scales are listed in the order in which they appear in the profile (Hathaway & McKinley 1943). Since its original publication, a large number of special scales and indexes have been developed from the MMPI items. Most of these special procedures, together with a great deal of the data Table
7 — Basic Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory scales SCALE NAME
ABBREVIATION
Validity scales: "Cannot say" score
Lie Confusion Correction
L F K
Clinical scales:
Conversion hysteria
Hs D Hy
Psychopathic deviate
Pd
Masculinity-femininity
Mf Pa Pt Sc Ma Si
Hypochondriasis Depression
Paranoia Psychasthenia Schizophrenia Hypomania Social introversion
Personality CODE NUMBER
from which the original scales were derived, have been brought together in An MMPI Handbook (Dahlstrom & Welsh 1960). The MMPI items and methods have also served as points of departure for several other widely used personality instruments, most notably Cough's California Psychological Inventory (1957), developed with greater emphasis on social-psychological criteria, and Berdie and Layton's Minnesota Counseling Inventory (1957), devised for high school guidance purposes. In addition, translations of the MMPI have been made into at least 15 different languages (see Dahlstrom & Welsh 1960, appendix N). Most of these versions can be considered to be only at the experimental stage at this time, since linguistic and cultural differences preclude simple translation of the items and routine application of the standard scoring keys. However, in this regard, Horiuchi (1963) showed that the D scale worked surprisingly well in separating clinical cases of depressive disorder from normal controls in her Japanese-language version developed at Doshisha University in Kyoto. French, Italian, and Spanish (Spanish American) versions have been restandardized with sufficient care to warrant their use. Nature of the scales. As indicated in Table 1, the basic scales are usually grouped into categories of validity and clinical scales. Validity scales. The main function of the validity scales is to check on the possibility that the test subject may have been unable or unwilling to comply with the test instructions and procedures. Perceptive and conscientious use of these indexes serves to offset many of the widespread objections to personality inventories, which occur because of their reliance upon a subject's language comprehension, contact with reality, cooperativeness, and personal insight. These validity scales also measure some of the same variance that is measured by the clinical scales. Thus, the L scale reflects personal stability as well as pervasive test defensiveness, the F scale mirrors severity of emotional disturbances and contact with reality as well as poor comprehension of English, and the K scale covaries with prognosis in psychiatric treatment as well as the more subtle tendencies toward selfenhancement or self-excoriation that permeate responses to the inventory. A detailed description of the interpretation of validity scales is available in Dahlstrom and Welsh (1960, chapter 5). Clinical scales. When they were first published, the basic clinical scales were routinely designated by the names of traditional psychiatric syndromes, together with a one-letter or two-letter abbreviation (see Table 1). As the research literature grew, in-
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: MMPI creasing evidence of nonpsychiatric interpretive implications was accumulated. Usage has shifted from the restrictive semantic referents of these scale names to the letter symbols and, more recently, to the numerical designations. Thus, the hysteria scale which was derived by comparing the responses of conversion hysteria cases with those of normal adults came to be designated simply by the symbol Hy when it became clear that this scale was useful in evaluating anxiety hysteria and a variety of psychosomatic syndromes as well. More recently, as its fuller significance in evaluating impulse control, emotional immaturity, level of insight, susceptibility to hypnosis, and repressive defenses is recognized, it is deemed less biasing to refer to the hysteria scale as simply scale 3. [See HYSTERIA.] In a similar manner the implications of the elevation of the component scores have changed over the years. A score falling two standard deviations above the average for normal subjects of the same sex was rather rarely achieved by normal subjects on any particular scale but typically fell close to the central tendency of patients showing the psychiatric characteristics under consideration; early clinical usage employed an elevation of two standard deviations as a critical level in score interpretations. These test inferences usually were part of a diagnostic decision process and the elevations were judged to be either "clinically significant" or not. This argument was a probabilistic one, whereas the decision was a categorical one involving placement within a normal or pathological group. Subsequent research has clarified the interpretive implications of scores and of score combinations at various absolute elevations in the profile. A detailed description of the interpretation of the clinical scales is available in Dahlstrom and Welsh (1960, chapter 6). Profiles. More abstract designations of the scales and greater reliance upon scale patterns at particular levels of score elevation have culminated in a system of profile coding and increasing reliance upon configural interpretive summaries (Hathaway & Meehl 1951; Drake & Getting 1959; Hathaway & Monachesi 1961; Good & Brantner 1961; Marks & Seeman 1963; Gilberstadt & Duker 1965). In one such scheme, most of the information in the score profile is disregarded; only the sequence of relative elevations among the scales and a rough index of absolute elevation are preserved. In such a system, patterns are designated by reference to the highest or two highest scales and for some purposes by reference to low points as well. Within the groupings formed by these criteria, additional distinc-
45
tions about absolute elevation, validity scale patterns, or related scale sequences may be drawn. Extended validation. As a behavioral summary, the psychiatric syndrome seems to have been a felicitous choice for a test criterion. Although there are many problems inherent in using them (Meehl 1959), these syndromes occupy a middle ground in degree of abstraction from the behavioral observations upon which they are based. There is by now a large amount of loosely articulated research in psychiatry bearing upon etiology, therapeusis, and prognosis that is centered upon these personality constructs. By their efforts in deriving these scales, both in compiling item groups and in immediately and successfully cross-validating with new-patient groups, Hathaway and McKinley showed that these constructs were workable and at least minimally reliable. By now a long series of publications has substantiated the validational efforts, showing that these scales can similarly separate normals from patients for a range of ages, races, religions, regions of origin, and educational levels. This research has also made clear that there is no mutual exclusiveness among these psychiatric syndromes. Scales separately constructed to distinguish clinical subgroups from normals do not singly also distinguish among the subgroups themselves. Either the patterns among the clinical scales must be used, or special scales must be constructed for these purposes (Rosen 1962). Useful as the syndrome may be as a summary of behavior, there is a legitimate interest in evaluations that are either more concrete and specific or more abstract and inclusive. MMPI scales derived from syndromes have proved useful in evaluating such specific behaviors as anxiety, hostility, hallucinations, phobias, or suicidal impulses. Similarly, broader psychiatric conceptions such as differentiations of psychosis-neurosis, delinquency proneness (Hathaway & Monachesi 1953; 1963), or prognosis under various forms of psychiatric treatment have been studied. Broader applications. Perhaps the best index that the criteria initially chosen led to fruitful and productive scale variables has been the rapid extension of this instrument beyond the special preoccupations and concerns of psychiatry to general areas of personality, to psychology as a whole, and to sociology and the other social sciences. Examples of such areas are psychodynamic processes such as repression, projection, and perceptual defense and vigilance; emotional maturity and control; social conformity, popularity, and leadership; political participation, religious affiliation, and occupational selection.
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PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: MMPI
Research has also appraised the impact of a variety of personal characteristics and demographic variables on MMPI performance. Thus, while it has been known from the outset that the sex membership of the test subject influenced the component scales sufficiently to justify separate norms on six scales ( 1 , 2 , 3, 5, 7, and 8) in the profile, subsequent work has also revealed that even with separate normative tables systematic variations appear in the frequencies of code configurations (see Dahlstrom & Welsh 1960, appendix M). The reported differences are quite consistent with the long-established sex differences in various psychiatric morbidity trends. Similarly, age trends have been studied, the most detailed analyses being made in older adult age ranges. Recently, a cross-sectional comparison has been made between adolescent and young adult levels and a start made upon some longitudinal follow-up studies (Hathaway & Monachesi 1963). [See INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES, article on SEX DIFFERENCES.] Two different approaches have been made to analyze the impact of social class status on MMPI responses. Most of the work has been based upon family origin, or status bestowed on the test subject by his parents, such as father's education, father's occupational level, or family income level. Thus, Gough (1948) and others have studied differences in test patterns among groups of subjects representing different family statuses. They have demonstrated that there is greater defensiveness in the test responses of subjects from higher status families. Gough developed a scale for this dimension on the basis of test data from high school students; some of the early work indicated that the scale was sensitive to subsequent shifts in social class level. That is, if a student could not manage to live and produce at the social level of his own family, one would predict that he would subsequently occupy a lower status. A second approach was employed by Nelson (1952), who used the earned status of his young adult patients as the basis for determining class level, combining data on their educational and occupational levels. His classifications correlated well, but by no means identically, with Cough's for a sample of general psychiatric patients. He also noted different profile patterns, diagnostic trends, and prognostic outcomes covarying with his socioeconomic classification. Critique. In some contrast to the generally successful and encouraging results from this wide range of application of the MMPI to practical problems in personality appraisal, at least two major
lines of criticism of the instrument and the method should be discussed. One of these patterns of criticism has grown out of the research of Edwards (1957), Jackson and Messick (1958), and Campbell and Fiske (1959) and their coworkers. According to Campbell and Fiske, the total variance of a set of test scores can logically be subdivided into methods variance (variability inherent in the test) and trait variance (variability in the personality attribute under consideration). Using a similar framework Messick and Jackson have advanced the formulation that methods variance can be conceptualized in terms of various stylistic features of test performance, such as response biases. These include preferences for a particular response, e.g., true (or false) to an excessive number of items, acquiescence (or conformity) responses, personally or socially desirable responses (responding to items in terms of possible adverse implications rather than in terms of fact; Edwards 1957) and other test-oriented sets and predispositions. These authors contrast these response sets with valid, content-related endorsements of inventory items, the trait variance in the Campbell-Fiske formulation. To the extent that test scores reflect style variance, they provide less valid information, presumably, about the actual content referents of the items in the various scales. Special scales constructed to evaluate these sources of "invalidity," by both Edwards (1957) and Jackson and Messick (see Messick & Ross 1962), have shown high correlations with component MMPI scales. While the issues here are complex (see Dahlstrom 1962; Block 1965), one limitation of the approach that these workers employ can be readily discerned: there is no reason to believe that MMPI-like personality scales, empirically derived against external criteria, necessarily furnish their discriminations solely on the basis of content of the test items. Although much of the information used in the work of these scales may indeed be stylistic (i.e., relying upon identifiable features of a person's approach to a test situation) it may nonetheless be valuable in characterizing a particular personality attribute. So, when high correlations are obtained between empirical scales and stylistic scales, the common sources of variance reflected in the product-moment correlations need not be interpreted as useless, nondiscriminating information bound to a particular inventory or type of test. [See EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR; RESPONSE SETS.] A sober re-examination of the pragmatics of MMPI usage is well represented by the work of Little and Shneidman (1959). From judges experienced in particular testing techniques, blind clinical
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: MMPI interpretations were obtained of various test protocols from 12 different subjects. These interpretations included clinical diagnoses, ratings of degree of maladjustment, Q sorts, and true—false statements about the behavioral and adjustment patterns of the subjects. Some of the results were probably biased conservatively by limiting features of the Q decks and the statements covering background experiences; nevertheless, there was generally a disappointing degree of correspondence between these blind test interpretations and similar descriptions by judges who knew the case histories. While the results based on MMPI profiles were generally not much better or worse than the interpretations based on other tests (Rorschach, Thematic Apperception Test, Make-a-Picture-Story), the absolute level of success in these psychodiagnostic endeavors was by no means reassuring. Thus, it appears that even though various MMPI indexes are useful when applied to separate and discrete decisions about patients or clients, there remains unresolved the additional problem of integrating the multitude of possible implications of a particular profile and producing a coherent and accurate personological summary of that test subject. Some investigators have begun to work on this crucial problem; most of the relevant MMPI research has been devoted to combinatorial patterns of the MMPI scores and their interpretive implications (see Dahlstrom & Welsh 1960, appendix M). In addition to the problem of finding the best way to combine MMPI results to reach valid and discriminating psychodiagnostic summaries there also remains the broader problem of combining MMPI score data with nontest information on a particular person. Since the nonpsychometric information is generally less reliable and contains data of unknown degrees of redundancy with the profile information, it is even more difficult to collate it with MMPI variables for the common purpose of accurate depiction of personality. One promising approach, exemplified by Kleinmuntz' pioneering efforts (1963), is the utilization of high-speed computers for the storage, retrieval, and most efficient integration of personological variables, once the first-order relationships have been discerned and made explicit. In this way the limitations of the human clinician may be in part bypassed for this routine activity (see Meehl 1963). W. GRANT DAHLSTROM \Other relevant material may be found in CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY; INTERVIEWING, article On PERSONALITY APPRAISAL; PROJECTIVE METHODS; PSYCHOMETRICS; SCALING.]
47
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BERDIE, RALPH F.; and LAYTON, WILBUR L. 1957 Minnesota Counseling Inventory. New York: Psychological Corp. BLOCK, JACK 1965 The Challenge of Response Sets: Unconfounding Meaning, Acquiescence, and Social Desirability in the MMPI. New York: Appleton. CAMPBELL, DONALD T.; and FISKE, DONALD W. 1959 Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix. Psychological Bulletin 56: 81-105. DAHLSTROM, W. GRANT 1962 Commentary: The Roles of Social Desirability and Acquiescence in Responses to the MMPI. Pages 157-168 in Samuel Messick and John Ross (editors), Measurement in Personality and Cognition. New York: Wiley. DAHLSTROM, W. GRANT; and WELSH, GEORGE S. 1960 An MMPI Handbook: A Guide to Use in Clinical Practice and Research. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. DRAKE, LEWIS E.; and GETTING, EUGENE R. 1959 An MMPI Codebook for Counselors. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. EDWARDS, ALLEN L. 1957 The Social Desirability Variable in Personality Assessment and Research. New York: Dryden. GILBERSTADT, HAROLD; and DUKER, JAN 1965 A Handbook for Clinical and Actuarial MMPI Interpretation. Philadelphia: Saunders. GOOD, PATRICIA E.; and BRANTNER, JOHN P. 1961 The Physician's Guide to the MMPI. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. GOUGH, HARRISON G. (1948) 1956 A Scale for a Personality Dimension of Socioeconomic Status. Pages 187-194 in George S. Welsh and W. Grant Dahlstrom (editors), Basic Readings on the MMPI in Psychology and Medicine. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. -» First published in Volume 13 of the American Sociological Review as "A New Dimension of Status: 1. Development of a Personality Scale." GOUGH, HARRISON G. 1957 The California Psychological Inventory: Manual. Palo Alto, Calif.: Consulting Psychologists Press. HATHAWAY, STARKE R.; and BRIGGS, PETER F. 1957 Some Normative Data on New MMPI Scales. Journal of Clinical Psychology 13:364-368. HATHAWAY, STARKE R.; and MCKINLEY, J. CHARNLEY (1943) 1951 The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory: Manual. Rev. ed. New York: Psychological Corp. HATHAWAY, STARKE R.; and MEEHL, PAUL E. 1951 An Atlas for the Clinical Use of the MMPI. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. HATHAWAY, STARKE R.; and MONACHESI, ELIO D. (editors) 1953 Analyzing and Predicting Juvenile Delinquency With the MMPI. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. HATHAWAY, STARKE R.; and MONACHESI, ELIO D. 1961 An Atlas of Juvenile MMPI Profiles. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. HATHAWAY. STARKE R.; and MONACHESI, ELIO D. 1963 Adolescent Personality and Behavior: MMPI Patterns of Normal, Delinquent, Dropout, and Other Outcomes. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. HORIUCHI, HARUYO 1963 An Evaluation of Clinical Depression by Means of a Japanese Translation of the MMPI. Unpublished manuscript, Univ. of North Carolina.
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PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: SituationalTests
JACKSON, DOUGLAS N.; and MESSICK, SAMUEL 1958 Content and Style in Personality Assessment. Psychological Bulletin 55:243-252. KLEINMUNTZ, BENJAMIN 1963 MMPI Decision Rules for the Identification of College Maladjustment: A Digital Computer Approach. Psychological Monographs 77, no. 14. LITTLE, KENNETH B.; and SHNEIDMAN, EDWIN S. 1959 Congruencies Among Interpretations of Psychological Test and Anamnestic Data. Psychological Monographs 73, no. 6. MARKS, PHILIP A.; and SEEMAN, WILLIAM 1963 Actuarial Description of Abnormal Personality: An Atlas for Use With the MMPI. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. MEEHL, PAUL E. 1959 Some Ruminations on the Validation of Clinical Procedures. Canadian Journal of Psychology 13:102-128. MEEHL, PAUL E. 1963 Foreword. Pages vii-x in Philip A. Marks and William Seeman, Actuarial Description of Abnormal Personality: An Atlas for Use With the MMPI. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. MESSICK, SAMUEL; and Ross, JOHN (editors) 1962 Measurement in Personality and Cognition. New York: Wiley. NELSON, SHERMAN E. 1952 The Development of an Indirect, Objective Measure of Social Status, and Its Relationship to Certain Psychiatric Syndromes. Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Minnesota. ROSEN, ALRERT 1962 Development of MMPI Scales Based on a Reference Group of Psychiatric Patients. Psychological Monographs 76, no. 8. WELSH, GEORGE S.; and DAHLSTROM, W. GRANT (editors) 1956 Basic Readings on the MMPI in Psychology and Medicine. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press. IV SITUATIONAL TESTS
A situational test is "a measure of a person's reaction to a situation that requires an actual adaptive response, rather than a mere 'test' response. The situation may be contrived by the examiner but must be recognized as posing a real problem to be solved, independent of its status as a test" (English & English 1958, p. 504). In this definition the key phrases differentiating situational tests from other personality tests are "posing a real problem" and "requiring an actual adaptive response." Thus the ideal situational test would be one that simulates some significant aspect of an individual's environment (e.g., his superior reprimanding him for poor performance) and evokes typical coping behavior without the subject's being aware that he is undergoing testing. It is interesting that laymen seem to evaluate personality by observing and making inferences about everyday behavior, much as psychologists do with situational tests. Thus, if a friend seems always to organize the games and activities of a social event, we may conclude that he is authoritative and perhaps exhibitionistic; or if we notice
that a fellow office worker maintains a careful arrangement of objects on his desk, we may conclude that he is orderly and very controlled. Clinical psychologists, on the other hand, when confronted with the task of describing and predicting the behavior of a person, traditionally base their evaluations upon samples of verbal behavior elicited by questionnaires, pictures, or inkblots. However, psychologists are becoming more aware that a fairly large difference seems to exist between the content and meaning of the verbal behavior observed through use of traditional tests and the content and meaning of the behavior about which they must make judgments and predictions. Because of this difference, inferences about real-life behavior, drawn only from samples of verbal-test behavior, are now being recognized as hazardous and difficult to make. Moreover, the clinician is reminded that fantasy behavior and self-description may not necessarily have a direct relation to overt behavior, and it is suggested that the clinician use tests that will duplicate the general factors underlying the day-to-day demands of the criterion situation (Cronbach 1956). In this connection it is both interesting and significant that expert clinicians are making more use than previously of so-called extratest behavior, for example, by noting that a patient forcefully throws together blocks he has been asked to assemble (suggesting aggressiveness and impulsiveness) or that a patient exclaims upon being shown an inkblot, "Boy, you're really trying to put something over on me with this one!" (suggesting suspiciousness). Since a major goal of personality assessment is to explain and predict overt behavior and since a person's verbal responses to questionnaires or inkblots may spring from levels of personality quite different from those which are activated when he is coping with a real-life situation, psychologists find themselves in a dilemma. One solution to the problem may be for psychologists systematically to observe actual coping behavior, as well as fantasy and self-report behavior. The method of situational testing is ideally suited for this purpose. Situational testing is intended to provide settings and tasks closely approximating those encountered in the normal course of daily living, thereby yielding samples of a person's characteristic ways of coping with real-life demands and of the personality traits and structures implicated in these coping efforts. Definition of coping behavior. Coping behavior is considered goal-directed, adaptive, and instru' mental. Implicit in the concept of coping is the
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Situational Tests assumption that when an individual is confronted with an object, person, or demand of significance to him, he experiences some disruption in his psychological equilibrium along with the need to readapt himself, that is, to re-establish his equilibrium. In order to re-establish his steady state, the individual calls upon a variety of combined personality and intellectual resources by means of which he physically acts upon, manipulates, or avoids the object confronting him in ways that bring about some adaptive resolution. Although coping behavior can be influenced by many factors, it is always assumed to be determined, in part at least, by an individual's needs, drives, goals, personality structure, and history; the nature of these determinants influences the kinds of changes he effects in person-object relationships. Therefore, the goal of coping behavior is generally assumed to be need gratification, threat reduction, and mastery in achieving a readaptation. When coping, the individual responds to actual physical stimuli of some potential significance to him, rather than to conceptually defined or artificial stimuli. As outlined here, then, so-called expressive aspects of behavior (e.g., handwriting), psychomotor behavior, and physiological and reflex responses are not considered coping behavior. Verbal behavior elicited by inkblots or questionnaires is also excluded. Verbal responses, however, may qualify in certain instances as coping behavior. For example, if an individual actually fails a task and then blames his failure on the make-up of the test, the verbal blaming response is considered to be part of the need-determined coping behavior. History of situational testing Galton. One of the earliest significant statements concerning performance testing of personality was made by Francis Galton (1884). After concluding that the character that shapes our conduct is a durable entity and therefore measurable, Galton proposed that it be assessed by observing definite acts in response to particular situations. However, he noted that such observation need not wait for chance happenings in real life that would elicit significant behavior; he pointedly stated, "Emergencies need not be waited for, they can be extemporized; traps, as it were, can be laid" (p. 182). Substituting the term "test" for "trap," we find that Galton was advocating situational testing. He discussed briefly one of his efforts at setting up "traps." After observing that friends who "have an Inclination' to one another [seem to] ... incline or slope together when sitting side by side" (p. 184), Galton devised a pressure gauge to be
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placed on the legs of chairs in an effort to test this hypothesis. Galton's proposal that personality be measured through carefully recorded acts representative of usual conduct received some attention in the years that followed. The work from 1900 to 1930 is reviewed by Symonds (1931). Perhaps the most significant in this period is the work of P. E. Voelker (see pp. 302-304, 306, 308 in Symonds 1931), whose situational tests of "honesty" were later applied with little modification by many workers, including Hugh Hartshorne and Mark A. May (1928) in their now classic Studies in Deceit. For example, one test measuring cheating consisted of a sheet of cardboard on which were printed ten circles of varying diameters. The subject was instructed to close his eyes and try to write in each circle the appropriate number (one to ten). Successful subjects obviously had cheated by opening their eyes while performing, since the task is impossible to accomplish otherwise. [See MORAL DEVELOPMENT.] Expressive behavior. The early efforts discussed above gave way in the 1930s to studies of expressive features of personality. Although research with expressive movements represented a change in focus, it nevertheless made a contribution to the history and development of situational testing by bringing systematic attention to the importance of nonverbal behavior in personality assessment. The suggestion by Allport and Vernon (1933) that a person's forms of expression (e.g., body postures assumed, type of gait, manner of speaking) are determined by, and therefore reveal, personality was followed by many studies. Werner W. Wolff (1942), who made the largest contribution to this area, used a method in one study closely approaching that of situational testing. He proposed that by observing how a child punched a balloon, one could determine whether he was aggressive or insecure and by observing a child manipulating a jar of cold cream, one could determine whether he reacted cautiously, carelessly, or fearfully to his environment. [See EXPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR.] Objective tests. In the early 1940s there appeared a group of workers who contributed more directly to the technique and concept of situational testing and who distinguished themselves by specifically challenging the adequacy of the inventories and projective devices rapidly growing in popularity as instruments of personality assessment. These investigators argued that the behavior measured in personality assessment should include not only introspective, self-assessing, verbal responses but also responses to objective tests not
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dependent upon the judgment of scorers, in which the individual would be unaware of the diagnostic meaning of his performance. R. B. Cattell (1957) and his colleagues have clearly made the largest contribution in this area. Their aim has been to establish a complete taxonomy of personality and to construct a battery of methods that will measure personality in terms of this taxonomy. Their strategy has been to collect observations from three types of sources, observations based on (1) ratings of life in situ and life records; (2) questionnaires (self-report); and (3) objective tests. Then by means of factor analysis, they have attempted to identify the major dimensions along which individuals differ in each of these realms of behavior and to compare and relate dimensions found in one realm with those found in another. Only the objective tests developed by Cattell have relevance for the topic of situational testing. Some four hundred of these objective tests have been used with various clinical groups and age levels. Three methods are employed: pencil and paper tests; physiological and psychomotor tests; and miniature situational tests. As an example of the first, the subject notes whether he agrees or disagrees with a statement presented to him along with an indication of the percentage of persons who agree with it; the score reflects one's tendency to agree with the majority. An example of a situational test is the "impairment of performance by fright test." Here the individual performs the first of three equally difficult finger mazes under normal conditions, the second while he is shocked periodically, and the third while a cage containing a rat and several cockroaches stands adjacent to the maze. Reviews of factor-analytic studies using these objective measures are available (e.g., Cattell & Scheier 1958). In Great Britain, Eysenck and his colleagues (1947) have also made substantial contributions to the development of objective tests of personality, their research strategy and technique broadly resembling those employed by Cattell in the United States. In addition, estimation of the sizes of squares (Krathwohl & Cronbach 1956) has been suggested as a response that reveals personality. This type of research can be credited with having brought to attention the limitations of the exclusive use of verbal responses, the need for objectivity in scoring, and the usefulness of factor analysis for personality assessment. However, from another standpoint many of these studies are themselves limited, because the experiences or response processes activated in the subject by many of the objective tests used may be
unrelated to responses evoked by some real-life situation of potential interest to the student of personality. Simulation of life situations. Also during the 1940s, a fourth phase developed in the history of situational testing. The subject was presented with a situation constructed by the investigator to simulate as much as possible some real-life criterion; judges rated the degree to which the subject manifested personality traits presumed to be critical for handling the situation. Max Simoneit is credited (see Kelly 1954) with the first attempt to use situational tests, which he developed to assess the suitability of individuals for various military assignments in the German army. Believing that military success depended on an individual's personality, Simoneit began by listing the traits that distinguished the personalities of German military heroes. He then devised situations that were likely to evoke these traits and administered them to officer candidates. This program influenced the one set up by the British War Office Selection Board, which, in turn, influenced the program set up by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (1948) in the 1940s. The mission of the OSS was to select and maintain a network of agents who would conduct destructive operations behind enemy lines during World War n. The battery of tests used to screen candidates included situational tests for assessing such variables as emotional stability, leadership, and skill in observing and reporting. For example, candidates were asked to direct two recalcitrant workmen (played by actors) in the construction of a giant cube and to supervise the movement of equipment across a brook. After the war, the OSS found that its test ratings did not correspond with overseas staff appraisals of candidates but noted that some of the contributions of the method could not be assessed statistically because war conditions prevented the gathering of adequate criterion data. The OSS studies brought attention to, and stimulated interest in, the method of situational testing during the first years after World War n. Weislogel (1954) discussed the continued use of situational testing by the military. Kelly and Fiske (1951) used situational tests to investigate the selection of students for professional training in clinical psychology. For example, groups of students were asked to place large cement blocks in specified arrangements, or a student was asked to interview a teacher (played by another student) whose sexual conduct had been called into question. After
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Situational Tests examining their data statistically, Kelly and Fiske reported situational tests contributed little, if anything, to the predictions made. The postwar years also saw the emergence of variants of situational tests. The leaderless-group discussion technique, also originated by a German psychologist, J. B. Riefert, in the 1920s, was extensively investigated in the United States (e.g., Bass 1954) and in Britain (Higham 1952), primarily as a means of selecting personnel for industry. Leadership potential was measured by asking a group of subjects to carry on a discussion about a topic usually determined by the criterion situation, and the amount of leadership each subject displayed was rated. Role playing, another variant, was also explored and developed (Mann 1956). After the postwar years, situational testing, in contrast to projective tests and questionnaires, failed to gain momentum and popularity as a method of personality assessment. This seemed to be due in part to the failure of the OSS and clinicalpsychology programs to report statistical support for the predictive power of situational tests, in part to problems inherent in the method. These problems are discussed below after a brief review of current applications of situational testing. Current applications Military applications. Perhaps the greatest attention currently being paid to situational testing is by the U.S. military. Tupes and his colleagues (1958), for example, employed situational tests designed to simulate the present-day job role of an air force officer. In one test the candidate is asked to play the role of a squadron commander confronted by three pilots (played by actors), all of whom wish a leave at a time when only two can be spared. In another, the candidate interviews an actor playing the role of an irate mayor in whose town airmen on leave have recently been aggressive and abusive; and in another, smaD groups of candidates, placed in a prison compound, are asked to escape. Measures obtained from these various situations related significantly to criterion measures obtained six months after candidates were graduated. Kipnis (1962) predicted job performance of U.S. naval personnel with a "handskills test" intended to measure an individual's motivation to persist beyond minimum standards on a tiring task. The examinee, who views the test as a measure of hand and finger dexterity, pencils tally marks, a task that rapidly promotes hand and arm fatigue. The examiner tells the subject what a passing score is (established empirically) and
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notes whether the subject stops or slows down after reaching the announced passing score or continues to strive. General applications. In civilian psychology, situational testing is receiving isolated but concentrated attention from several workers. Lois B. Murphy and her colleagues (1962) have conducted a series of studies designed to identify the "coping styles" children use to handle demands, new opportunities, and the problems they experience throughout development. Murphy uses various naturalistic situations to elicit adaptive responses; for example, children are observed during pediatric examinations, at the zoo, at parties, and while being transported to and from the clinic. Miniature situations test. Santostefano (1960) developed a Miniature Situations Test (MST) in an effort to make available a method that would overcome some of the disadvantages of the naturalistic assessment situation, while nevertheless providing samples of nearly real-life behavior for systematic study. Under the MST method, a child is presented with two objects and invited to act upon one of them as specified (e.g., "You may either water this plant or break this light bulb"; "You may either see how strong you are by squeezing this [a dynamometer] or raise this flag in honor of Abraham Lincoln"). The child is urged to make his choice quickly and is encouraged to make use of feelings he experiences when confronted with the objects. This method assumes that the child will selectively perceive and respond to the objects presented, endowing them with positive, negative, or neutral incentive values according to the dominant motives and personality attributes unique to him and that he will reveal some aspect of his personality through the objects he values or rejects and through the changes he physically imposes upon them. It is also assumed that the choices presented will activate genuine affective and motive states within the child and that although the nature of the instrumental acts required by various situations may vary, the acts are nonetheless related to or derived from the same motive state. Thus, for example, if a child chooses, in several situations, to water a plant, to repair torn paper with Scotch tape, and to help the examiner put on a pair of gloves, it is assumed that his personality functioning is very much characterized by the disposition to bestow affection and to nurture. The MST, in comparison to the freer naturalistic method, seems to have several advantages for personality research. While allowing the free ex-
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pression of personality dimensions in situations requiring the subject to cope with people and objects, the MST (1) provides identical and restricted stimuli to all subjects, giving some assurance that each subject will become equally involved with the stimulus configuration designated as crucial; (2) produces unequivocally identifiable responses; (3) yields measures whose meanings are not completely dependent on the judgments of raters; (4) elicits a wide sampling of personality dispositions represented in the choices performed; (5) makes available, in addition to specific acts, a wide range of behaviors, encapsuled, however, in brief time samples and available for scrutiny and systematic analysis; and (6) is feasible for use in ordinary research settings. Factor-analytic studies have contributed to the construct validity of the miniature situations, as have studies comparing the performance of various clinical groups (e.g., orphans, delinquents, brain-damaged children) with controls. The job effectiveness and conscientiousness of rehabilitated mentally retarded young adults have also been predicted with promising success. Leaderless-group discussion. The leaderlessgroup discussion technique is one variant of situational testing that has continued, since the 1940s, to receive increasingly widespread use in the United States (in the military and industrial spheres), and in England, Australia, and Germany. In one study (Kiessling & Kalish 1961), for example, groups of applicants to the Honolulu Police Academy were asked to assume that they were alone on foot, patrolling an area noted for "cop haters," when they notice two delinquents stealing a tire from a car and suddenly find themselves surrounded by many other delinquents. The group is asked to discuss what one should do and why, while raters evaluate each candidate. Clinical applications. Recently other variations of the situational-testing technique have been proposed to study questions of interest to clinicians. For example, Lerner (1963) noted that recent social-psychological studies, whose results support the traditional notion that schizophrenics are unresponsive and autistic, have used artificial stimuli, such as asking patients to respond to stick-figure drawings to determine their capacity to perceive cues in social roles. Lerner, instead, asked groups of schizophrenics to clean a ward and rated their behavior in terms of, for example, verbal interaction and dependency on the leader. He reported that schizophrenics exhibit appropriate social motivation and responsiveness when behaving in a
meaningful situation. Similarly, Schulman and his colleagues (1962) have proposed situational testing for investigating parent-child interaction. Non-English-speaking countries. The author finds little evidence that the technique of situational testing is in use in non-English-speaking countries. Japan. A recent review (Kodama 1957) of personality tests used in Japan indicates a clear preference for projective and questionnaire devices borrowed from those most popular in the United States. One performance test of personality developed by Japanese psychologists, and apparently widely used, makes inferences about "excitation, adaptation, and temperament" from an individual's continuous performance with addition problems; but it fails to qualify as a situational test because there seems to be no intent to approximate, in the test situation, behavior associated with some reallife criterion. The Soviet Union. Recent surveys of Soviet psychology indicate that techniques for assessing individual differences and personality are not of central interest to Russian psychologists, who are concerned typically with studying intellectual abilities or aptitudes. However, Brozek (1962) notes that one of the distinctive features of Soviet psychology is its emphasis on studying psychological processes under natural conditions. He points out that Russian investigators tend to see abilities (e.g., scientific, technical, literary) as integral components of personality and that one preferred method of studying these abilities is to observe the performance of individuals in "natural experiments," a method highly regarded by Soviet psychologists as an approach most true to life. According to this point of view, observation of the way in which a pupil solves tasks that are presented to him enables the investigator to assess best the psychological characteristics implicated in various abilities. The resemblance between this methodological philosophy and that of situational testing is noteworthy. Germany. In spite of the fact that situational testing originated in Germany, the writer has found little evidence that the technique, except for the variant of group discussion (Rundgespraech, or round-table talk), is currently widely used in that country (Meili 1937). In a critique of psychological tests Simoneit (1954) argues that increased objectivity and quantification in personality assessment has resulted in less psychological meaningfulness and that the commonly used projective tests are inadequate in evaluating a person's true
PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT: Situational Tests feelings; he proposes situational testing and the study of expressive behavior as a remedy to this problem. Implications for theory and practice Considerations in devising and using tests. Three main procedural steps should be followed in devising and using situational tests. The first step is to select and describe the personality characteristics that are critically implicated in the criterion under investigation. The second is to construct tasks that will elicit these particular characteristics; and the third is to choose a method of observation and scoring. These steps are largely interrelated. The more detailed the analysis and understanding of the criterion situation and of the personality characteristics to be isolated and observed, the better one can construct situations to elicit these traits in ways which are identifiable and scorable. The past failure of situational tests to relate to criteria can be attributed, to a large extent, to the fact that workers have not specified in sufficient detail those aspects of the criterion selected as critical (e.g., Stern, Stein, & Bloom 1956). Thus, if situational tests are being used to assess effective parental performance, it should be made clear whether "effective" means setting limits, giving emotional comfort, or expressing an interest in the child's activities. The situations devised by Tupes and his colleagues (1958) are good examples of tests derived from a detailed understanding of the criterion. Several additional general considerations concerning the make-up and use of situational tests are worth noting. Situational tests are intended to be lifelike and therefore should evoke adaptive responses as isomorphic as possible with the behavior and feelings required by the criterion situation. The tasks should be structured in such a way that each subject experiences the same need to respond and to become involved and each is unaware of the specific psychological meaning of his behavior and the intent of the situation. Ideally, scoring should be confined to whether the personality characteristic under question appears or not; if degrees of appearance of a trait are desired, the gradations should be clearly defined in terms of identifiable forms of behavior. Situational testing can be a costly technique because of the elaborate staging, material, and the use of actors and observers sometimes required. Lastly, it is important to recognize that compromises are available between the degree of experimental control and of lifelikeness built into the situational test. The more
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naturalistic the setting and observations, the closer the criterion is approximated; but at the same time, the more expensive the test, the greater the problem of insuring that subjects will become involved with the same stimuli and the more difficult it is to identify critical responses. The less naturalistic the test, the greater the degree of experimental control over stimuli and responses. The concept of levels. In the investigation and clinical assessment of personality, one major goal is to learn about the psychological organization of an individual. For some time this organization has been viewed by psychologists as containing levels (e.g., conscious-unconscious, latent-manifest, depth—surface). Recently much attention has been given to the relation between levels of personality functioning tapped by traditionally used projective and inventory devices and levels activated by situations in everyday living. This interest seems to have grown out of the fact that psychologists continue to experience failure and frustration in their efforts to assess and predict personality functioning by using projective devices and inventories. Lindzey and Tejessy (1956), in discussing this issue, note that perhaps the most perplexing of the many problems facing the user of projective techniques is the difficulty in assigning an inference made about the patient to some specific level of his behavior; that is, will the attribute inferred from the test response be expressed freely in a public setting, or will it be revealed in rarely encountered circumstances, or only in fantasy? Similarly, workers have wondered whether motive states are necessarily reflected in fantasy and whether fantasies are always mirrored in overt behavior; their research findings are equivocal. Questions and concerns such as these have led some workers to develop a theoretical system dealing with levels of personality (e.g., Leary 1957), defining and distinguishing between public, preconscious, and unconscious levels of functioning and their interrelationships, while others have been led to propose that the psychologist use as data only behavior that is as much like the criterion as possible (e.g., Cronbach 1956). The task facing personologists is to discover which test indices obtained at the fantasy or self-report levels are related to coping behavior and then to learn the systems and principles governing the interrelationships among these various links. Relating standardized social-situational tests to projective and questionnaire devices could contribute to a solution of the problems raised in the consideration of levels of personality.
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The criterion problem. Since the 1930s much effort has been devoted to improving the predictions that can be made from various test devices. Recently, however, workers have expressed dissatisfaction over this one-sided enterprise and the primarily negative results it has produced. There is a growing awareness that solutions to the problem of predicting behavior depend as much upon a definition of the criterion situation (the relevant types of behavior and personality traits it evokes) as upon the development of test instruments. The main goal of assessment is prediction relevant to situations of daily living. But naturalistic situations seldom contain easily defined, well-controlled stimulus configurations that are critically implicated in the evocation of behavior considered adaptive in terms of the demands of the situation. Discussion of the criterion problem (Stern, Stein, & Bloom 1956), when combined with discussion of the philosophy and technique of situational testing, provides psychologists with an approach to constructing adequate criterion stimuli against which personality instruments can be tested, an approach, interestingly enough, which closely parallels that used by Simoneit when first devising situational tests. If, for example, an investigator is interested in developing the power of a projective test to predict a child's ability to handle the stresses of the first days of school, he could develop his criterion by observing children in the first days of school and by interviewing teachers, in an effort to isolate those aspects of a child's personality that appear critical in handling the demands of this situation. Situational tests could then be constructed to evoke systematically and reliably those particular personality dimensions, providing adequate criteria with which the investigator could explore the predictive powers of his instrument. Current research concerned with the effects of television on the aggressive behavior of individuals nicely illustrates how failure to define and develop a criterion may lead to inconsistent findings. After showing subjects an aggressive film, one worker (Feshbach 1961) observed the associations they made to aggressive and neutral words, while others (Mussen & Rutherford 1961) observed answers to questions about the desire to aggress. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that some studies report a decrease in "aggressive behavior" after participation in fantasied aggression and other studies report an increase. It would seem that situational tests, which would provide the subject with the opportunity to aggress overtly and forcefully in terms of well-defined objects and circumstances, would provide a better test of the question whether
fantasied aggression leads to an increase in behavioral aggression. The technique and philosophy of situational testing have been traced historically and related to issues that concern theory, research, and clinical practice in personality assessment. What is the future for situational testing? Some workers have voiced the opinion that its future is dim. However, this writer feels that it is more than a bit paradoxical that psychologists are quick to reject the worthwhileness of test behavior closely resembling aspects of daily living, while at the same time they cling comfortably to their projective devices and inventories, which primarily evoke words as far removed from real-life conduct as the inkblots and pictures themselves. It would seem that the dominating influence of behaviorism and logical positivism has cultivated, at least among American psychologists, a preference for the sterile laboratory as a research setting and a fetish for test instruments, however far removed from the conditions of real life, an influence which seems to be spreading to personality-assessment practices in other countries. However, it is encouraging to note that dissenting voices are growing louder, as are pleas that behaviorism not frighten social scientists away from the study of naturalistic behavior. The survey given here suggests that much of the groundwork has been laid for the development of promising methods that could aid social scientists in predicting the day-to-day behavior of individuals. Use of the situational-test technique might even make the assessing of personality as exciting as Galton's first attempt. SEBASTIANO SANTOSTEFANO [Other relevant material may be found in EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; PROBLEM SOLVING; PROJECTIVE METHODS; PSYCHOMETRICS.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
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STERN, GEORGE G.; STEIN, M. I.; and BLOOM, B. S. 1956 Methods in Personality Assessment: Human Behavior in Complex Social Situations. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. SYMONDS, PERCIVAL M. 1931 Diagnosing Personality and Conduct. New York: Appleton. TUPES, ERNEST C.; CARP, A.; and BORG, W. R. 1958 Performance in Role-playing Situations as Related to Leadership and Personality Measures. Sociometry 21: 165-179. U.S. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 1948 Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services. New York: Rinehart. WEISLOGEL, ROBERT L. 1954 Development of Situational Tests for Military Personnel. Personnel Psychology 7:492-497. WOLFF, WERNER W. 1942 Projective Methods for Personality Analysis of Expressive Behavior in Preschool Children. Character and Personality 10:309-330.
PERSUASION The art of "winning men's minds by words" has occupied the attention of philosophers since long before the time of Plato's and Aristotle's commentaries on rhetoric. But not until the twentieth century has there been any concerted effort of empirically oriented scholars to describe objectively the conditions under which persuasion succeeds or fails. Pioneering contributions. In a recent survey of current knowledge about persuasive communication, four social scientists who made pioneering contributions during the first half of this century have been singled out as the founding fathers of the new field of research on persuasive communication (Schramm 1963). One is the political scientist Harold D. Lasswell, who carried out the first detailed descriptive studies of major propaganda campaigns, focusing on the communications issued by national elites during World War i and by totalitarian movements that tried to influence the masses during the period of the great depression. Lasswell formulated a set of theoretical categories for analyzing the effects of persuasive communications and initiated the development of systematic techniques of content analysis (Lasswell et al. 1949). A second major figure is the sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld, who worked out new methods for investigating the impact of mass media on voting behavior and on the beliefs, judgments, and values of the mass audience. Using poll data from U.S. election campaigns and panel surveys of public reactions to a wide variety of radio programs, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues have described the complex communication networks and cross pressures that exist in modern communities. Their studies (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Katz & Lazarsfeld
56
PERSUASION
1955) highlight the influential role of local opinion leaders, who function as "gatekeepers" by promoting or rejecting the evaluative judgments transmitted in the mass media by political parties, business organizations, public welfare authorities, and intellectuals. A third outstanding contributor to scientific research on social influence is the psychologist Kurt Lewin, whose studies emphasized the powerful barriers to change that are created by the primary and secondary groups with which the individual is affiliated. One of his major explanatory concepts to account for resistance to new sources of social pressure is the counterpressure arising from the existence of group norms, in which attitudes are anchored. When attempting to understand why a person accepts or rejects a persuasive message, according to Lewin (1947), the investigator should examine the person's anticipations about whether or not he will be diverging from the norms of his reference groups, such as his family, his work group, and the social organizations with which he identifies. [See the biography of LEWIN.] Another psychologist, Carl I. Hovland, is the fourth contributor to have helped build up systematic knowledge about communication effects and the processes of persuasion. Hovland initiated broad programs of experimental research designed to test general hypotheses concerning the factors that determine whether or not the recipients of a persuasive message will be influenced. Some of the studies by Hovland and his collaborators (see, e.g., Personality and Persuasibility 1959) bear directly on the hypotheses put forth by Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, and Lewin, while others have led to unexpected discoveries and new theoretical analyses of the psychological processes underlying successful persuasion. [See the biography of HOVLAND.] The sections that follow present some of the main generalizations drawn from these and other studies in order to indicate representative hypotheses and empirical findings. [For a fuller discussion of theoretical approaches, see ATTITUDES, article On ATTITUDE CHANGE.]
Resistance to persuasion. During recent decades many self-styled experts in propaganda, journalism, advertising, and public relations have promoted an image of modern man as highly gullible. The new field of mass-communications research, which developed from the work of these four pioneering social scientists, has shattered this image along with other popular preconceptions concerning the alleged power of the mass media to manipulate, exploit, or "brainwash" the public. A review of the evidence accumulated from relevant research stud-
ies indicates that mass communications generally fail to produce any marked changes in social attitudes or actions (see Klapper 1960). The slight effects produced by the press, films, radio, and television are usually limited to a reinforcement of the pre-existing beliefs and values of the audience. Campaigns designed to persuade people to change their values, to modify social stereotypes, or to foster a new political ideology generally mobilize powerful resistances in the public. So pervasive are these resistances, according to the documented accounts of numerous investigators, that one could characterize "successful persuasion" by the mass media as a relatively rare social phenomenon. Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953), in their analysis of factors that influence attention, comprehension, and acceptance of persuasive messages, call attention to essential differences between educational instruction and persuasion. Most of the differences pertain to the audience's initial expectations, which have a marked influence on motivation to accept or reject the communicator's conclusions. In the case of instructional communications, where high acceptance is readily elicited, the educational setting is typically one in which the members of the audience anticipate that the communicator is trying to help them, that his conclusions are incontrovertible, and that they will be socially rewarded rather than punished for adhering to his conclusions. In persuasive situations, on the other hand, interfering expectations are aroused, and these operate as resistances. The authors point out that the findings from experiments on communication effects seem to converge upon three types of interfering expectations that operate to decrease the degree of acceptance: (1) expectations of being manipulated by the communicator (e.g., being made a "sucker" by an untrustworthy source, who has ulterior economic or political motives for trying to persuade others to support his position); (2) expectations of being "wrong" (e.g., making incorrect judgments on a controversial political issue or overlooking antithetical evidence that would be grounds for a more cautious or compromise position); and (3) expectations of social disapproval (e.g., from the local community or from a primary group whose norms are not in accord with the communicator's position). This third type of resistance, which reflects Lewin's "social anchorage" concept, has been most extensively investigated. Many studies indicate that when the members of an audience are exposed to a communication advocating a position that goes counter to the norms of one or more of their reference groups, their resistance will vary directly
PERSUASION with the strength of the formal and informal sanctions put forth by the norm-setting group. Quite aside from any special sanctions applied to those who violate the group norms, the mere perception that the vast majority of other members accept a given norm operates as a powerful force on the individual to conform-to that norm (Lewin 1947; Asch 1952; Kiesler & Corbin 1965). Determinants of successful persuasion Most of the substantiated propositions about successful persuasion designate factors that help to decrease psychological resistances when the recipients are exposed to a persuasive communication (see Janis & Smith 1965). Exposure requires not only adequate physical transmission of the message but also audience attention, which will not be elicited if the communication is perceived as deviating markedly from pre-existing attitudes and values or as violating the norms of an important reference group. If a persuasive communica-
OBSERVABLE COMMUNICATION STIMULI*
tion evokes sufficient attention to surmount the exposure hurdle, its success will then depend upon comprehension (i.e., the extent to which the audience grasps the essential meanings the communicator intended to convey) and acceptance (i.e., the degree to which the audience is convinced by the arguments and/or is responsive to the motivational appeals presented in the communication). The main types of factors that have been investigated are those specified by Lasswell's classic formula for communications analysis: Who says what to whom with what effect? Janis and Hovland (1959) present a paradigm of interacting factors that enter into successful persuasion (see Figure 1). Communicator characteristics, the content of the message, the manner of presentation, and other crucial situational factors shown in column 1 are considered to be stimulus variables capable of touching off the key mediating processes (represented in column 3)—attention, comprehension, and acceptance—that give rise to the various
PREDISPOSITIONAL FACTORS
i
r Communication situatio Content characteristics: Topic— content of the conclusions
r
OBSERVABLE COMMUNICATION EFFECTS
INTERNAL MEDIATING PROCESSES
1 r ji General persuasibility 11 J u
57
-
r
I
I
*
1
Attitude change
1 Attention Opinion change
Appeals Arguments Stylistic features Communicator characteristics: Role Affiliations Intentions
Specific predispositions: e.g., responsiveness
Media characteristics: Direct vs. indirect interaction Sense modality
__^
Comprehension
to emotional appeals, to logical arguments, to prestigeful sources
(
Perception change
i
r
I
Affect change
Situational characteristics: Social setting
Acceptance
Extraneous noxious stimuli
Action change
Extraneous pleasant stimuli I
1
i
._!
The categories and subcategories are not necessarily exhaustive but highlight the major types of stimulus variables that play a role in producing changes in verbalizable attitudes.
Figure 1 — Major factors in persuasion
Source: Based on Janis & Hovland 1959.
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PERSUASION
effects designated as attitude change (column 4). The magnitude of the influence exerted by the stimulus variables also depends on different types of predispositional variables (represented in column 2). Communicator and content factors. The most thoroughly investigated propositions bearing on the processes of persuasion are those that specify how one or another of the stimulus attributes is related to successful persuasion. Sometimes communications research has merely confirmed certain of the well-known prescriptions formulated by experts in the art of persuasion. But research occasionally leads to the discovery of unexpected limiting conditions or hitherto unknown relationships that call into question the commonly accepted assumptions about how people can be influenced to change their beliefs or attitudes. Prestige and "sleeper" effects. Studies of prestige effects have confirmed some "obvious" assumptions and refuted other, equally "obvious" ones. Several communication experiments have shown, as might be expected, that there is an immediate gain in acceptance of persuasive communications when the message is given by someone who is initially accorded relatively high prestige by the audience or when the arguments are attributed to a relatively trustworthy source. But, contrary to expectations, it has been found that in the long run, persuasive communications from low-prestige sources turn out to be just as effective as those from high-prestige sources. This phenomenon has been termed the "sleeper" effect (see Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 254-259; Kelman & Hovland 1953). Both positive and negative prestige effects seem to wear off over a period of several weeks. When a communication comes from a nonprestigious or distrusted source, the audience tends at first to reject the message. But as time goes on, acceptance of the originally discounted statements has been found to increase, evidently because with the passage of time, the content of the message is no longer spontaneously associated with the source. One-sided versus two-sided presentations. Another issue that has been systematically investigated is whether persuasion is more effective when it concentrates exclusively on the arguments supporting the propagandist's position or when it includes discussion of the opposing arguments. Hitler and other Nazi propaganda strategists have claimed that in appealing for a specific line of action, no rival or opposing ideas should ever be mentioned, because they invite comparisons, hesitation, and doubt. But the available evidence indicates that this principle holds true only under very limited
conditions, such as when the audience is unaware of the arguments for the other side of the issue. When the audience is strongly opposed to the position being advocated, a persuasive message is generally more effective if it includes the opposing arguments than if it presents only the arguments in favor of one side of the issue (see Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 105-110; Hovland et al. 1949, pp. 201227; Klapper 1960, pp. 113-116). Moreover, even when the audience is not initially opposed to the communicator's position, a two-sided presentation will be more effective in creating sustained changes in attitudes if the communication is given under conditions where the audience will subsequently be exposed to countercommunications presenting the opposing arguments. Inoculation devices. When the members of an audience are pre-exposed to the opposing arguments along with some refutations, they are to some extent "inoculated" against subsequent countercommunications, because the new arguments will be much less impressive and more readily discounted (see Lumsdaine & Janis 1953). This type of inoculation has been found to produce a "generalized immunization effect" under certain conditions, notably when a communication advocates recommendations that the audience already regards as being in line with commonly accepted norms, such as simple health rules. Thus, inclusion of a few arguments that momentarily shake the confidence of members of the audience in cultural truisms they had always taken for granted will reduce the chances of their being influenced by subsequent counterpropaganda, because they become more resistant both to the counterarguments specifically mentioned and refuted in the original two-sided communication and to new counterarguments which might otherwise shake their beliefs (McGuire 1961). Another simple inoculation device has been found to be effective in reducing the influence of unconventional communications that take issue with cultural truisms of the type that people are seldom or never called upon to defend. This device consists of stimulating the members of an audience to build up defenses by warning them in advance that their hitherto unchallenged beliefs will soon be exposed to strong attack (McGuire 1961; 1964; McGuire & Papageorgis 1962). The well-known "freezing" effects of public commitment to a newly adopted policy or course of action form the basis for another type of communication device that prevents backsliding. Experimental studies indicate that resistance to subsequent countercommunications can be built up if,
PERSUASION after presenting impressive arguments and appeals, the communicator uses his persuasive influence to induce his listeners to endorse the position publicly—for example, by voting openly for it, signing a petition, or showing other overt signs of acceptance that will be seen by people in their community (see Lewin 1947; Attitude Organization and Change 1960). Other types of inoculation procedures have been studied to determine the conditions under which acceptance of a new attitude or policy recommendation will be sustained despite subsequent exposure to frustrations, threats, or setbacks that arouse strong negative effects. For example, after having been persuaded to adopt a communicator's recommendations, the audience may subsequently be exposed to warnings or punishments that stimulate avoidance of the recommendations. The emotional impact of the subsequent setback will tend to be reduced if the audience has been given inoculating communications that predict the threatening event in advance, thus eliminating the element of surprise and, at the same time, stimulating appropriate defenses (see Janis 1962). Similarly, in the case of "bad news" events that generate pessimistic expectations about the future, preparatory communications that present grounds for maintaining optimistic expectations can help soften the blow and enable the audience to resist being unduly influenced by the impact of the disturbance (Janis et al. 1951). In general, the eventual success of any attempt at persuading people to carry out a given course of action is likely to be attained if the communicator frankly discusses the possible subsequent difficulties and countercommunications, presenting them in a way that helps to create a cognitive frame of reference for discounting or minimizing them if they do, in fact, materialize. Effectiveness of "primacy." Since most inoculation devices involve familiarizing the audience with counterarguments, two-sided communications might be more advantageous in the long run, even in circumstances where a one-sided communication could be expected to be more successful in producing immediate changes in a higher proportion of the audience. There are, of course, many different ways of arranging the opposing arguments in a two-sided communication, and some ways of inserting them have been found to be more effective than others. For example, when the audience is not familiar with the opposing arguments, a two-sided communication from an authoritative source tends to be more effective if the opposing arguments are presented after, rather than before, the favorable arguments that support the communi-
59
cator's conclusion. By giving strong favorable arguments first, the communication arouses the audience's motivation to accept the communicator's conclusion, so that when the negative material subsequently occurs, it can be better tolerated. Furthermore, if a strong case is made for the communicator's position at the outset, there is a greater likelihood that the recipient will make an early decision to accept the communicator's position and thereafter tend to minimize dissonance or conflict by ignoring the opposing ideas (see Brehm & Cohen 1962; Festinger 1957; 1964; Janis 1957; 1959). This primacy effect, when tested with communications designed to induce opposing attitudes toward the same social objects or policies, proved to be extremely pronounced under conditions where the contradictory material was not spontaneously salient and there was no time interval between the first set of arguments and the second, contradictory set (Asch 1946; Luchins 1957a,- 1957b; Janis & Feierabend 1957). Under other conditions, however, such as where the audience is very familiar with the opposing arguments and has initial doubts about the communicator's honesty, a recency effect might predominate, making it more advantageous to give the counterarguments first, with the main affirmative arguments saved for the end of the communication (see Hovland et al. 1957, pp. 130-147). Emotional appeals. It is commonly recognized that when a person remains unmoved by repeated attempts to persuade him with rational arguments, he might nevertheless show a marked change as soon as emotional appeals are introduced. Probably the most widespread form of emotional appeal in modern Western culture involves the arousal of fear by emphasizing anticipated threats. Antiwar propaganda, public health campaigns, and other efforts at mass persuasion frequently rely upon emotional shock devices to motivate people to carry out preventive measures or to support policies designed to avert potential dangers (for example, promoting a ban against a nuclear weapons test by emphasizing the horrors of war). For maximal effectiveness, this device requires not only that the communications succeed in arousing fear but also that the recommendations function as effective reassurances. The latter term refers to verbal statements—plans, resolutions, judgments, evaluations —that are capable of alleviating or reducing emotional tension. Many communication experiments have been designed to test popular claims about the effectiveness of emotional appeals and to determine objectively the conditions under which such appeals are successful.
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Political leaders and public health authorities often assume that the protective actions or practical solutions they advocate will be more readily accepted, the more they succeed in frightening the audience about the dangerous consequences of failing to adhere to their recommendations. This assumption may occasionally be correct, as in the case of recommendations concerning immediate escape actions (e.g., evacuation of a danger area within a few minutes after an emergency warning is issued). But the assumption appears to be questionable in many instances, especially when the goal is to induce delayed actions or sustained attitudes (e.g., evacuating at some future date, if the threat materializes; supporting a disarmament movement; favoring prodemocratic policies). The available evidence indicates that presenting feararousing material in a persuasive communication tends to stimulate the recipient's vigilance and his need for reassurance. But this does not necessarily increase his motivation to accept authoritative recommendations about ways to avert or cope with the danger, since the person may find other ways to reduce his fear. Whenever fear is aroused to a very high level, resistances tend to be strongly mobilized. This will reduce the effectiveness of a persuasive communication, unless it is outweighed by certain other factors that could facilitate attitude change (Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 56-98; Leven thai 1965). Among the facilitating conditions that increase an audience's tolerance for a strong dosage of fear-arousing material in a persuasive message is the inclusion of one or more highly specific recommendations that offer an apparently good solution to the problems posed by the threat, with no obvious loopholes (Leventhal et al. 1965). When this condition is not met, as is often the case in "scare" propaganda, the use of a strong emotional appeal may produce much less acceptance of the communicator's recommendations than a milder appeal, since the audience will then become motivated to attach little importance to the threat or develop some other form of defensive avoidance that enables them to alleviate their fear. Sometimes strong emotional appeals attain spectacular persuasive effects, but it is difficult to predict accurately that a very high dosage of fear will not exceed the optimal level. Preliminary "program assessment" research with cross-sectional samples of the intended audience is usually needed to make sure that the version of the communication containing a strong appeal is more effective than a version containing a more moderate appeal. Implicit versus explicit conclusions. Many claims are made about effective strategies for in-
ducing people to change their attitudes and values, but some of these claims are difficult to assess empirically. One such notion is that a nondirective approach—similar to that used by many counselors and psychotherapists when dealing with people who seek help in making conflictful decisions of an upsetting nature—will generally be more effective in mass communications than a more directive approach [see MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, article on CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING]. One testable implication of this notion is that a mass communication will sway more people if instead of stating an explicit conclusion, the communicator allows the audience to draw its own conclusions from the facts, arguments, and appeals that he presents. Undoubtedly, there are some circumstances where direct suggestions are likely to meet with such insurmountable resistances that an indirect approach is the only hope for exerting any influence whatsoever. But for informative communications dealing with relatively impersonal issues, the available research evidence indicates that it is generally more effective to state the conclusions or recommendations explicitly, even when the propagandist is regarded as biased or untrustworthy (see Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 100-105; Klapper 1960, pp. 84-91, 116-117). One of the main advantages of stating the conclusions explicitly is that it helps to prevent the audience from missing or distorting the essential point of the arguments. Effects of role playing. One type of indirect persuasion that has been carefully investigated involves the use of a special role-playing technique. It has been repeatedly found that when a person is required to play a role entailing the presentation of a persuasive message to others in his own words, he will be more influenced than if he were passively exposed to the same message. This "saying is believing" tendency has been found to occur even when role playing is artificially induced by asking people to take part in a test of their public-speaking ability or to write essays (Janis & King 1954; Kelman 1953). Experimental evidence indicates that mere repetition of a persuasive message has little effect as compared with an improvised restatement and elaboration of the arguments and conclusions (King & Janis 1956). The success of improvised role playing might be attributed to several different psychological processes. Festinger (1957) suggests that the primary gain from role playing comes from efforts to reduce dissonance between what one is saying publicly and what one actually believes, and a number of experiments offer some supporting evidence (e.g., Brehm & Cohen 1962;
PERSUASION Festinger & Carlsmith 1959; Festinger 1964). An alternative explanation is in terms of self-persuasion: when attempting to convey the message to others, the role player is likely to think up new formulations of the arguments, new illustrations and appeals. These are likely to be convincing incentives to himself, especially if he regards the improvised ideas as his "own" (see Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 228-237; Janis & Gilmore 1965; Elms & Janis 1965). This theoretical issue has not yet been settled, and the differential predictions from the alternative explanations are currently under investigation (see Carlsmith et al. 1966; Rosenberg 1965). Personality factors. Numerous studies have shown that social attitudes are frequently resistant to persuasion because they satisfy deep-seated personality needs. Such attitudes are likely to remain unchanged unless self-insight techniques or special types of persuasive appeals are used that take account of the adjustive and ego-defensive functions of these attitudes (see Katz & Stotland 1959; Lass-
61
well 1930-1951; Smith et al. 1956). It is logical, therefore, that assessment of personality attributes should help in predicting whether a given person will be responsive to persuasive messages that deal with a particular topic or that employ one or another type of argument. Studies of authoritarian personalities, for example, indicate that any communication fostering rigid, antidemocratic controls over political dissenters and minority out-groups will tend to be more readily accepted by one particular type of personality (see Adorno et al. 1950). An outstanding characteristic of this personality is a strong latent need to displace hostility away from in-groups toward out-groups—as manifested by symptoms of intense ambivalence toward parents, bosses, and other authority figures, combined with a high degree of inhibition of normal sexual and aggressive activities. Table 1 shows a set of hypothetical diagnostic categories, worked out by Katz (1960), that might prove to be useful for predicting individual differences in responsiveness to persuasion on important
Table I — Determinants of attitude formation, arousal, and change in relation to type of function FUNCTION
ORIGIN AND DYNAMICS
AROUSAL CONDITIONS
CHANGE CONDITIONS
Adjustment
The object of the attitude has proved to be useful for satisfying important needs; it increases one's chances of gaining rewards or decreases one's chances of being punished.
1. Activation of needs. 2. Salience of cues associated with need satisfaction.
1. Failure to gain usual satisfactions from the attitude. 2. Creation of new needs and new levels of aspiration that are not satisfied by the attitude. 3. Shifting of rewards and punishments so that the attitude is no longer reinforced. 4. Impressive demonstration of new and better paths for need satisfaction.
Ego defense
The attitude helps to protect the person from internal conflicts or from becoming highly disturbed by external dangers.
1. Posing of threats. 2. Appeals to hatred and repressed impulses. 3. Rise in frustrations. 4. Use of authoritarian suggestion.
1. Removal of threats. 2. Catharsis which reduces the need for defense against pentup impulses. 3. Opportunity for development of self-insight.
Value expression
The attitude helps the person to maintain his self-identity and his self-esteem; it allows him to express himself or gives him a sense of independence.
1. Salience of cues associated with values. 2. Appeals to individual to reassert self-image. 3. Ambiguities which threaten self concept.
1. Some degree of dissatisfaction with the self. 2. Impressive demonstration of the greater appropriateness of a new attitude for enhancing one's self-image. 3. Loss of usual environmental supports to such an extent that old values are undermined.
Knowledge
The attitude satisfies the needs for understanding, for meaningful cognitive organization, and for consistency and clarity.
1. Re-encounters with the original problem that required a solution or encounters with related problems.
1. Ambiguity created by new information or by a marked change in environment. 2. Meaningful information about a different way of analyzing the problem or about new ways of solving it. Source: From Katz 1960, p. 192.
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PERSUASION
social issues. The first step would be to determine which of the four basic types of functions (column 1) is served by the person's current attitude on the issue in question. The type of need fulfilled by each function is shown in the second column of the table. If one could assess the status of these needs accurately, one would presumably be able to predict the types of situations that would arouse the attitude (column 3) and the general conditions that would have to be met in order to change each individual's attitude (column 4). One of the main reasons why Katz's hypothetical schema is regarded as a promising functional approach to the study of attitude change is that it helps to explain why the conditions required for changing certain attitudes, particularly those diagnosed as serving an ego-defensive function, are not satisfied by the usual forms of persuasion to be found in the mass media. The material in this table carries the implication that no simple psychological formula can be expected to subsume all instances of attitude change. This implication confirms clinical observations, which indicate that unconscious dynamics as well as conscious processes are sometimes involved when a person clings unyieldingly to his stand in the face of strong persuasive arguments or when he readily gives in, without any opposition, on an important social or political issue (see Lasswell 1930-1951). It also agrees with experimental evidence indicating that even when dealing with conscious attitudes, we cannot expect to find only one type of cognitive process that will account for successful persuasion. For example, the striving for consistency among cognitions bearing on the same issue—which Heider (1958) has postulated as a fundamental human tendency in response to all meaningful communications— sometimes appears to be an important determinant of reactions to persuasion, but it does not account for certain instances where other motivational factors, such as pleasurable anticipations of gain, may become the dominant determinants (see Rosenberg & Abelson 1960). Individual differences are to be expected, not only in response to persuasive pressures from arguments that create cognitive imbalances but also in response to emotional appeals (see Janis & Feshbach 1954) and group pressures induced by giving information about the consensus of judgments made by one's peers (see Crutchfield 1955); these are called "content-bound" predispositions. Some research evidence also points to specific personality needs, preferences, and sensitivities that predispose certain persons to be highly responsive to one or another limited type of communicator
(Janis & Hovland 1959); these are termed "communicator-bound" predispositions. In Figure 1, all such sources of individual differences are represented in the second column by the box labeled "specific predispositions." In addition to specific types of predispositional factors, there are also certain personality attributes that predispose people to be swayed by, or to be resistant to, any persuasive message, irrespective of what is said, how it is said, or who says it. This general persuasibility factor (represented by the box at the top of the second column in Figure 1) has been inferred from research on the consistency of individual differences. Such research indicates that when a large audience is exposed to many different types of persuasive communications on many different types of issues, some persons are consistently resistant, whereas others are moderately persuasible, and still others are highly persuasible fsee Abelson & Lesser 1959a; Janis & Field 1959a,- 1959£>). Among the personality factors found to be predictive of low resistance to all forms of persuasive influence are (1) low selfesteem; (2) inhibition of overt aggressive behavior; (3) high fantasy imagery and strong empathic responses to symbolic representations; and (4) other-directed rather than inner-directed orientation, that is, a value system stressing adaptation to the social environment rather than inner standards for regulating one's conduct. It is a puzzling fact, however, that these relationships have been found only in samples of men, since no such relationships have been found as yet in samples of women. These findings have been attributed to differences in the social roles prescribed for women and men in our society, which may also account for the repeated finding that women are more persuasible than men on social and political issues (see Hovland & Janis 1959). Current status of research The hypotheses summarized in the foregoing review of social-psychological studies of persuasion do not constitute an exhaustive prepositional inventory of all available findings but, rather, serve to highlight major relationships that have emerged from systematic research. Supporting evidence comes from carefully controlled experiments, but the studies usually have been carried out with small subpopulation samples, most often limited to American high school or college students in a classroom situation. Consequently, the generality of the hypotheses and the limiting conditions under which they hold true have not yet been adequately explored. There is some reason to expect, how-
PERSUASION ever, that the relationships initially observed in the limited experimental situations will have fairly wide applicability because: (a) they appear to be in line with observations from other, less wellcontrolled investigations of social influence (such as panel studies of opinion trends during political campaigns, market research surveys on widely advertised products, and case studies of responsiveness to psychological counseling or psychotherapy); and (b) in a number of instances where replications have been carried out with other subpopulations in other types of communication situations, confirmatory evidence has been obtained (see Janis & Smith 1965). In any case, the development of experimental techniques, attitude scales, and sophisticated methods for analyzing the effects of many different causal factors and their interactions have now reached the point where we can obtain relevant and cumulative knowledge from systematic studies of the conditions under which persuasive communications are effective or ineffective (see Campbell 1963). As new techniques and methods are used in the rapidly expanding field of communications research, we can expect a fuller account of the influence of the variables discussed, as well as new discoveries concerning the ways in which communication stimuli and predispositional factors interact in the processes of persuasion. IRVING L. JANIS [Directly related are the entries ATTITUDES, article on ATTITUDE CHANGE; PROPAGANDA; SUGGESTION. Other
relevant material may be found in BRAINWASHING; COMMUNICATION; COMMUNICATION, MASS; COMMUNICATION, POLITICAL; GROUPS, articles on GROUP REHAVIOR and GROUP FORMATION; HYPNOSIS; NORMS; SAMPLE SURVEYS; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEMS; THINKING, article On COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION AND PROCESSES; and in
the biographies of HOVLAND and LEWIN.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABELSON, ROBERT P.; and LESSER, GERALD S. 1959a A Developmental Theory of Persuasibility. Pages 167— 186 in Personality and Persuasibility, by Irving L. Janis et al. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 2. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. ABELSON, ROBERT P.; and LESSER, GERALD S. 1959fc The Measurement of Persuasibility in Children. Pages 141— 166 in Personality and Persuasibility, by Irving L. Janis et al. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 2. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. ADORNO, T. W. et al. 1950 The Authoritarian Personality. American Jewish Committee, Social Studies Series, No. 3. New York: Harper. ASCH, SOLOMON E. 1946 Forming Impressions of Personality. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 41:258-290.
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ASCH, SOLOMON E. (1952) 1959 Social Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Attitude Organization and Change, by Milton J. Rosenberg, Carl I. Hovland, William J. McGuire et al. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 3. 1960 New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. BREHM, JACK W.; and COHEN, ARTHUR R. 1962 Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance. New York: Wiley. CAMPBELL, DONALD T. 1963 Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioral Dispositions. Volume 6, pages 94-172 in Sigmund Koch (editor), Psychology: A Study of a Science. New York: McGraw-Hill. CARLSMTTH, JAMES M.; COLLINS, BARRY E.; and HELMREICH, ROBERT L. 1966 Studies in Forced Compliance: I. The Effect of Pressure for Compliance on Attitude Change Produced by Face-to-face Role Playing and Anonymous Essay Writing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4:1—13. CRUTCHFIELD, RICHARD S. 1955 Conformity and Character. American Psychologist 10:191-198. ELMS, ALAN C.; and JANIS, IRVING L. 1965 Counternorm Attitudes Induced by Consonant Versus Dissonant Conditions of Role-playing. Journal of Experimental Research in Personality 1: 50-60. FESTINGER, LEON 1957 A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, 111.: Row, Peterson. FESTINGER, LEON 1964 Conflict, Decision, and Dissonance. Stanford Studies in Psychology, No. 3. Stanford Univ. Press. FESTINGER, LEON; and CARLSMITH, JAMES M. 1959 Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 58:203-210. HEIDER, FRITZ 1958 The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: Wiley. HOVLAND, CARL I. 1957 Summary and Implications. Pages 129-157 in Carl I. Hovland et al., The Order of Presentation in Persuasion. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 1. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. HOVLAND, CARL L; and JANIS, IRVING L. 1959 Summary and Implications for Future Research. Pages 225— 254 in Personality and Persuasibility, by Irving L. Janis et al. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 2. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. HOVLAND, CARL L; JANIS, IRVING L.; and KELLEY, HAROLD H. 1953 Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. HOVLAND, CARL L; LUMSDAINE, ARTHUR A.; and SHEFFIELD, FRANK D. 1949 Experiments on Mass Communication. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Vol. 3. Princeton Univ. Press; Oxford Univ. Press. HOVLAND, CARL I. et al. 1957 The Order of Presentation in Persuasion. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 1. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. JANIS, IRVING L. 1957 Motivational Effects of Different Sequential Arrangements of Conflicting Arguments: A Theoretical Analysis. Pages 170-186 in Carl I. Hovland et al., The Order of Presentation in Persuasion. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 1. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. JANIS, IRVING L. 1959 Motivational Factors in the Resolution of Decisional Conflicts. Volume 7, pages 198— 231 in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Edited by Marshall R. Jones. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press. JANIS, IRVING L. 1962 Psychological Effects of Warnings. Pages 55-92 in George W. Baker and Dwight
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W. Chapman (editors), Man and Society in Disaster. New York: Basic Books. JANIS, IRVING L.; and FEIERABEND, ROSALIND L. 1957 Effects of Alternative Ways of Ordering Pro and Con Arguments in Persuasive Communications. Pages 115-128 in Carl I. Hovland et al., The Order of Presentation in Persuasion. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 1. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. JANIS, IRVING L.; and FESHBACH, SEYMOUR 1953 Effects of Fear-arousing Communications. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 48:78-92. JANIS, IRVING L.; and FESHBACH, SEYMOUR 1954 Personality Differences Associated With Responsiveness to Fear-arousing Communications. Journal of Personality 23:154-166. JANIS, IRVING L.; and FIELD, PETER B. 1959a A Behavioral Assessment of Persuasibility: Consistency of Individual. Differences. Pages 29-54 in Personality and Persuasibility, by Irving L. Janis et al. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 2. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. JANIS, IRVING L.; and FIELD, PETER B. 1959k Sex Differences and Personality Factors Related to Persuasibility. Pages 55-68 in Personality and Persuasibility, by Irving L. Janis et al. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 2. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. JANIS, IRVING L.; and GILMORE, J. B. 1965 The Influence of Incentive Conditions on the Success of Role Playing in Modifying Attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1:17-27. JANIS, IRVING L.; and HOVLAND, CARL I. 1959 An Overview of Persuasibility Research. Pages 1—26 in Personality and Persuasibility, by Irving L. Janis et al. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 2. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. JANIS, IRVING L.; and KING, BERT T. 1954 The Influence of Role Playing on Opinion Change. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 49:211-218. JANIS, IRVING L.; LUMSDAINE, ARTHUR A.; and GLADSTONE, ARTHUR I. 1951 Effects of Preparatory Communications on Reactions to a Subsequent News Event. Public Opinion Quarterly 15:487-518. JANIS, IRVING L.; and SMITH, M. BREWSTER 1965 Effects of Education and Persuasion on National and International Images. Pages 190-235 in Herbert C. Kelman (editor), International Behavior: A Socialpsychological Analysis. New York: Holt. KATZ, DANIEL 1960 The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes. Public Opinion Quarterly 24:163204. KATZ, DANIEL; and STOTLAND, EZRA 1959 A Preliminary Statement to a Theory of Attitude Structure and Change. Volume 3, pages 423-475 in Sigmund Koch (editor), Psychology: A Study of a Science. New York: McGraw-Hill. KATZ, ELIHU; and LAZARSFELD, PAUL F. 1955 Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1964. KELMAN, HERBERT C. 1953 Attitude Change as a Function of Response Restriction. Human Relations 6: 185-214. KELMAN, HERBERT C.; and HOVLAND, CARL I. 1953 "Reinstatement" of the Communicator in Delayed Measurement of Opinion Change. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 48:327-335. KIESLER, CHARLES A.; and CORBIN, LEE H. 1965 Com-
mitment, Attraction, and Conformity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2:890-895. KING, BERT T.; and JANIS, IRVING L. 1956 Comparison of the Effectiveness of Improvised Versus Non-improvised Role-playing in Producing Opinion Changes. Human Relations 9:177-186. KLAPPER, JOSEPH T. 1960 The Effects of Mass Communication. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. LASSWELL, HAROLD D. (1930-1951) 1951 The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. LASSWELL, HAROLD D. et al. (1949) 1965 Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; BERELSON, BERNARD; and GAUDET, HAZEL (1944) 1960 The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. 2d ed. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. LAZARSFELD, PAUL F.; and MENZEL, HERBERT 1963 Mass Media and Personal Influence. Pages 94-115 in Wilbur Schramm (editor), The Science of Human Communication: New Directions and New Findings in Communication Research. New York: Basic Books. LEVENTHAL, HOWARD 1965 Fear Communication in the Acceptance of Preventive Health Practices. New York Academy of Medicine, Bulletin 41:1144-1168. LEVENTHAL, HOWARD; SINGER, ROBERT; and JONES, SUSAN 1965 The Effects of Fear and Specificity of Recommendation Upon Attitudes and Behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2:20-29. LEWIN, KURT (1947) 1958 Group Decision and Social Change. Pages 197-211 in Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Readings in Social Psychology. 3d ed. New York: Holt. LUCHINS, ABRAHAM S. 1957a Experimental Attempts to Minimize the Impact of First Impressions. Pages 6275 in Carl I. Hovland et al., The Order of Presentation in Persuasion. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 1. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. LUCHINS, ABRAHAM S. 1957£> Primacy-Recency in Impression Formation. Pages 33-61 in Carl I. Hovland et al., The Order of Presentation in Persuasion. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 1. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. LUMSDAINE, ARTHUR A.; and JANIS, IRVING L. 1953 Resistance to "Counterpropaganda" Produced by Onesided and Two-sided Propaganda Presentations. Public Opinion Quarterly 17:311-318. McGuiRE, WILLIAM J. 1961 The Effectiveness of Supportive and Refutational Defenses in Immunizing and Restoring Beliefs Against Persuasion. Sociometry 24: 184-197. McGuiRE, WILLIAM J. 1964 Inducing Resistance to Persuasion: Some Contemporary Approaches. Volume 1, pages 191-229 in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. Edited by Leonard Berkowitz. New York: Academic Press. McGuiRE, WILLIAM J.; and PAPAGEORGIS, DEMETRIOS 1962 Effectiveness of Forewarning in Developing Resistance to Persuasion. Public Opinion Quarterly 26: 24-34. Personality and Persuasibility, by Irving L. Janis et al. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 2. 1959 New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. ROSENBERG, MILTON J. 1965 When Dissonance Fails: On Eliminating Evaluation Apprehension From Attitude Measurement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1:28-42.
PETRIE, W. M. FLINDERS ROSENBERG, MILTON J.; and ABELSON, ROBERT P. 1960 An Analysis of Cognitive Balancing. Pages 112-163 in Attitude Organization and Change, by Milton J. Rosenberg et al. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 3. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. SCHRAMM, WILBUR (editor) 1963 The Science of Human Communication: New Directions and New Findings in Communication Research. New York: Basic Books. SHERIF, MUZAFER; and HOVLAND, CARL I. 1961 Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change. Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Vol. 4. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. SMITH, M. BREWSTER; BRUNER, JEROME S.; and WHITE, R. W. 1956 Opinions and Personality. New York: Wiley.
PETRIE, W. M. FLINDERS William Matthew Flinders Petrie (1853-1942) was the founder of Egyptology. An only child, he was born at Charlton, near London. His parents were cultured people, and he inherited an adventurous streak from his grandfather, Matthew Flinders. Considered too delicate for normal schooling, young Petrie followed his mother's interest in numismatics and collected coins for the British Museum. His own reading was extensive, and his education in mathematics, begun by his father, was reinforced by a university extension course, his only contact with orthodox instruction. Long walks in southern England sharpened his eye to the difference between natural contours and traces of man's early constructions, and his first book, Inductive Metrology (1877), presented his idea that the units of measurement used in ancient plans were indicative of date and culture. With his bent for mathematics, Petrie contemplated astronomy as a career, but lack of a degree barred him from it, and he was not pressed to earn a living. Egypt. A casual interest in Charles Piazzi Smyth's theory that Biblical prophecy was enshrined in the measurements of the Great Pyramid grew into a resolve to investigate its truth, and in 1880 Petrie began his survey, which exploded the very theory he had hoped to prove. This work, The Pyramids and Temples of Gizeh (1883), remained the standard account until 1925, when it was partially superseded by a new survey. The journey to Egypt had far-reaching effects, for Petrie saw the destruction of antiquities going on around him and realized that it was his life's work to salvage all he could. During the next fifty years he published about a hundred books, mostly excavation reports. Funds were provided by friends
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and by the Egypt Exploration Fund (now Society), and later he founded the Egyptian Research Account and the British School of Archaeology in Egypt. After his marriage in 1897, he was ably seconded by his wife in the collection of funds. He became the first Edwards professor of Egyptology at University College, London, in 1892, a chair which he held until 1933. Stratigraphy in excavation. In 1890, under the auspices of the Palestine Exploration Fund, Petrie made a brief but revolutionary excursion into southern Palestine. Despite Heinrich Schliemann's excavations of mounds at Troy, none of the people working in the Palestinian field had examined a mound, though Schliemann and Wilhelm Dorpfeld had recognized that these common features of the Asian landscape represented an accumulation of occupation. Using pottery as the main guide, Petrie's new system of recording all finds, however small, was put to the test at Tell el Hesy in a six weeks' campaign, and the results were published in a book of that name (1891). Through erosion, layers of the mound were visible in section, and Petrie noted exactly where each potsherd was found. He saw that every layer had its characteristic pottery, and he outlined absolute dates for the main types, which soon proved to be correct. Sequence dates. Petrie's greatest work was accomplished in the last decade of the nineteenth century, based on his excavation of about nine hundred tombs in Egypt. His book, Diospolis Parva (1901), established the sequence of prehistoric periods before the coming of the Dynastic Race to Egypt, estimated by him at that time as occurring in the fifth millennium B.C., although the date is reduced in current literature by a thousand years. His conclusions were reached by stages: first, he prepared a numbered corpus of pottery; then he listed the contents of each grave, arranging them in order to bring pots (represented by corpus numbers) of like shape together in the series. New forms stood out in the arrangement, and each stage was necessarily linked to older and later phases. He assigned a relative date ("Sequence Date"; e.g., SD 30-80) to each phase, representing a fixed order of a given series of burials. Then he checked the sequence against that based on pottery alone by repeating the process on other grave goods such as stone vases and ivories. Petrie's system is still the standard way of placing prehistoric tomb groups in Egyptian history, and it can be adapted for research in every field. With 25 years of experience behind him, Petrie wrote Methods and Aims in Archaeology (1904), the first book of its kind, and although in later
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years he may not always have followed his own precepts, they remain sound in principle. Sinaitic inscriptions. In 1904-1905 Petrie went to Sinai; he discussed the physical and historic relations between Egypt and Palestine in Researches in Sinai (1906). Besides hieroglyphic records of Egyptian mining expeditions, Petrie found sculpture in foreign style, sometimes inscribed in a new script, perhaps an early attempt at alphabetic writing. Excavations in Palestine. After World War I, Petrie decided to devote his remaining years to problems which could best be solved in Palestine. From 1926 onward, he or his staff dug at four sites south of Gaza, of which the most rewarding was Tell el Ajjul. The rich finds were described in a five-volume report, Ancient Gaza (1931-1952). Petrie died in Jerusalem in 1942 at the age of 89. Dedicated to his self-appointed task, he created Egyptology where before there was dilettantism or mere plunder; and his genius imposed discipline upon the previous disorder. His autobiography, Seventy Years in Archaeology (1931), records his triumphs and frustrations on the way, but nothing can detract from his achievements or from his wide view of what archeology should be—the study of how man has attained his present position and powers.
OLGA TUFNELL [See also ARCHEOLOGY.] WORKS BY PETRIE
1877
Inductive Metrology: Or, the Recovery of Ancient Measures From the Monuments. London: Saunders. (1883) 1885 The Pyramids and Temples of Gizeh. Rev. ed. London: Field & Tuer; New York: Scribner. 1891 Tell el Hesy (Lachish). London: Watt. 1901 Diospolis Parva: The Cemeteries of Abadiyeh and Hu, 1898-1899. London: Egypt Exploration Fund. 1904 Methods and Aims in Archaeology. London and New York: Macmillan. 1906 Researches in Sinai. London: Murray; New York: Button. 1931 Seventy Years in Archaeology. London: Low, Marston. 1931-1952 Ancient Gaza. 5 vols. British School of Archaeology in Egypt, Egyptian Research Account, Publications, Vols. 53-56, 64. London: The School. -> Volumes 1-4: Ancient Gaza: Tell el Ajjul. Volume 5: Ancient Gaza and the City of Shepherd Kings.
PETTY, WILLIAM William Petty (1623-1687), the English economist and first systematic exponent of "the art of political arithmetic," was a self-made man with a
wide range of talents and immense mental energy. He was the son of a clothier, traditionally described by his biographers as "poor," but if, as is likely, Petty's father left him the good house and 8 acres of land that he owned in his birthplace, Romsey, in 1685, the family was comfortably above the poverty line. Certainly, when the young Petty went to sea as a cabin boy at the age of about 14, he was sufficiently literate in Latin and Greek to gain entry to the Jesuits' college at Caen, where he was put ashore on breaking a leg; there he studied Latin, Greek, French, and mathematics. Then, after a short spell in the Royal Navy, he went on to study medicine at the universities of Utrecht, Amsterdam, Paris, and Oxford. By 1651 he had taken his Oxford degree of Doctor of Physic and entered the London College of Physicians. At the age of 28, he became vice-principal of Brasenose College and professor of anatomy at Oxford. Although one of the leading intellectuals of his day and a founding member of the Royal Society, Petty was a man of the world rather than a scholar. He wrote more than he read. He was a persistent inventor: he patented a double-writing device before he got his medical degree, and he pursued his design for a twin-hulled ship through four prototypes. He worked out a scheme for the rebuilding of London after the Great Fire of 1666. In 1652 he went to Ireland as physician-general to the army, which was no sinecure in a country ravaged by the plague and other lethal epidemic diseases. Within two years of his arrival in Ireland he had taken over the complex task of surveying the forfeited estates of the Irish rebels as a basis for their redistribution among the English conquerors. This task, too, he performed with his usual efficiency and drive and with the determination and pugnacity which earned him many enemies and carried him into countless lawsuits. He spent much of his working life defending his Irish survey and handling his own Irish estates, but he still managed to read a number of communications to the Royal Society on topics varying from dyeing practices in the clothing trade to the testing of mineral waters and to achieve a formidable and serious literary output on economic, demographic, naval, medical, and scientific subjects. A good deal has been written about Petty, and the published opinions of his contemporaries leave no doubt of the respect and esteem with which he was regarded. It is unlikely that he was author, as has been claimed, of the "Natural and Political Observations Upon the Bills of Mortality," which was signed by his friend John Graunt (see Graunt [1662] 1963, vol. 2, pp. 314-435), but he could
PETTY, WILLIAM well have been; and the title page of his own "Observations Upon the Dublin-Bills of Mortality" ([1683] 1963, vol. 2, pp. 479-491) explicitly associates him with the earlier work, which was a pathbreaker in demographic analysis. John Aubrey, his first biographer, the diarists John Evelyn and Samuel Pepys, and the economist and statesman, Davenant, all men of distinction in their own right, regarded Petty as one of the outstanding men of their time. Petty's claim to fame as an economist lies not so much in his originality or his theoretical ability as in his analytical skill. His insistence on measurement and his clear schematic view of the economy make him the first econometrician, and he was constantly evolving and using concepts and analytical methods that were in advance of his time. His evaluation of the gain from foreign trade in "Another Essay in Political Arithmetick Concerning the Growth of the City of London" ([1682] 1963, vol. 2, pp. 451-478) is based on a statement of the benefits of the division of labor and specialization and was written a century before Adam Smith's famous account. Petty put so much stress on the role of labor in creating wealth that he has been regarded (for instance, by Marx) as an early exponent of the labor theory of value. But, as is shown by a characteristic and frequently quoted passage from his "Treatise of Taxes and Contributions" ([1662] 1963, vol. 1, pp. 1-97)—"Labour is the Father and active principle of Wealth as Lands are the Mother"—his theory of production and value is based on the two original factors of production of the early economists. He was the author of the first known national income estimates, in "Verbum sapienti" ([1665] 1963, vol. 1, pp. 99120), "Political Arithmetick" ([c. 1676] 1963, vol. 1, pp. 233-313), and "Treatise of Ireland" ([1687] 1963, vol. 2, pp. 545-621), although he did not trouble to define or develop his concepts and was rough, even careless at times, in his use of figures. Some of the calculations in his "Treatise of Taxes and Contributions" and elsewhere are essentially exercises in what is now called "cost-benefit analysis." He was the first writer, so far as we know, to grasp the concept of the velocity of money, again in "Verbum sapienti," although in his "Quantulumcunque Concerning Money" ([1695] 1963, vol. 2, Pp. 437-448) there is no trace of it. He was not above manipulating his data in ways that would justify his polemical arguments, and it would be rash to accept his statistics uncritically. But he was no slave to political prejudice, and his analysis of the economy of his time for England and Ireland —for example, "The Political Anatomy of Ire-
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land" ([1671-1676] 1963, vol. 1, pp. 121-231) — and his various essays on "political arithmetick" are both shrewd and penetrating. PHYLLIS DEANE [Other relevant material may be found in the biography of GRAUNT.] WORKS BY PETTY
(1662) 1963 Treatise of Taxes and Contributions. Volume 1, pages 1-97 in William Petty, The Economic Writings . . . New York: Kelley. (1662-1695) 1963 The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty. 2 vols. Edited by Charles H. Hull. New York: Kelley. -> Contains Petty's main writings and a general bibliography. (1665) 1963 Verbum sapienti. Volume 1, pages 99-120 in William Petty, The Economic Writings . . . New York: Kelley. -* Written in 1665; first published posthumously in 1691. (1671-1676) 1963 The Political Anatomy of Ireland. Volume 1, pages 121-231 in William Petty, The Economic Writings . . . New York: Kelley. -> Written between 1671 and 1676; first published posthumously in 1691. (c. 1676) 1963 Political Arithmetick. Volume 1, pages 233-313 in William Petty, The Economic Writings . . . New York: Kelley. -» First written c. 1676; first published surreptitiously in 1683 as "England's Guide to Industry." The first authorized edition was published posthumously in 1690 by Petty's son. (1682) 1963 Another Essay in Political Arithmetick Concerning the Growth of the City of London, 1682. Volume 2, pages 451-478 in William Petty, The Economic Writings . . . New York: Kelley. (1683) 1963 Observations Upon the Dublin-Bills of Mortality, 1681, and the State of That City. Volume 2, pages 479-491 in William Petty, The Economic Writings . . . New York: Kelley. (1687) 1963 Treatise of Ireland, 1687. Volume 2, pages 545-621 in William Petty, The Economic Writings . . . New York: Kelley. -» Written in 1687; first published posthumously in 1899. (1695) 1963 Sir William Petty's Quantulumcunque Concerning Money, 1682. Volume 2, pages 437-448 in William Petty, The Economic Writings . . . New York: Kelley. -> Published posthumously. The Double Bottom or Twin-hulled Ship of Sir William Petty. Edited by the Marquis of Lansdowne. Oxford: Roxburghe Club, 1931. History of the Cromwellian Survey of Ireland: A.D. 1655— 1656. Edited by Thomas A. Larcom. Irish Archaelogical and Celtic Society Publications, Vol. 15. Dublin Univ. Press, 1851. -> Commonly called the "Down Survey." The Petty Papers. 2 vols. Edited by the Marquis of Lansdowne. London: Constable, 1927. The Petty-Southwell Correspondence: 1676-1687. Edited by the Marquis of Lansdowne. London: Constable, 1928. SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AUBREY, JOHN (1898) 1957 Sir William Petty. Pages 237-241 in John Aubrey, Brief Lives. Edited from the original manuscripts and with a life of John Aubrey by Oliver L. Pick. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
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BEVAN, WILSON L. 1894 Sir William Petty: A Study in English Economic Literature. Volume 9, pages 370472 in American Economic Association, Publications. Baltimore: The Association. FITZMAURICE, EDMOND G. P. 1895 The Life of Sir William Petty: 1623-1687. London: Murray. -» Contains Petty's autobiographical will. GRAUNT, JOHN (1662) 1963 Natural and Political Observatir-^ Upon the Bills of Mortality. Volume 2, pages 314-435 in William Petty, The Economic Writings . . . New York: Kelley. -> The authorship of this work is in doubt. GREENWOOD, MAJOR 1928 Graunt and Petty. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 91:79-85. PASQUIER, MAURICE 1903 Sir William Petty: Ses idees economiques. Paris: Giard & Briere. STRAUSS, EMIL 1954 Sir William Petty: Portrait of a Genius. London: Bodley Head; Glencoe, 111.: Free Press.
PHENOMENOLOGY The word "phenomenology" is derived from the Greek phainein, "to show," from which came phainemenon, meaning "that which appears." Thus, phenomenology in a general sense could be literally the orderly study of phenomena, or appearances, and could as such encompass much of traditional philosophy and science. In its restricted sense, however, it refers to the study of phenomena as phenomena and more specifically to a twentiethcentury movement in German philosophy centered loosely on Edmund Husserl. A good English introduction to Husserl's philosophy has been provided by Marvin Farber (1943), and the whole phenomenological movement has been reviewed by Herbert Spiegelberg (1960). The various forms of existentialism, which have developed particularly in France since World War n, may be regarded as offshoots of the phenomenological movement but should not be identified with it. Phenomenology and existentialism, while primarily philosophical, have had important repercussions in psychology, psychiatry, theology, literature, drama, and the fine arts. The present article will limit itself to a brief sketch of the philosophical background and a somewhat fuller account of psychological phenomenology [see PSYCHOLOGY, article on EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY, and the biography of HUSSERL]. Philosophical phenomenology Philosophical phenomenology is essentially a method of philosophical analysis rather than a school in the traditional sense of the term. The phenomenologist attempts to suspend or "place in brackets" (einklammern} all metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions, to identify and describe the essences of experience as they are in-
tuitively apprehended (Anschauung, Wesensschau), and on this basis to provide a fresh approach to the classic problems of metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, logic, ethics, and aesthetics. Husserl believed that in this way philosophy could be rescued from unproductive speculation and re-established as a rigorously empirical discipline (strenge Wissenschaft'). Phenomenology is thus empirical in its insistence on a continuous and unbiased scrutiny of experience, but not empiricist as the word is commonly used to refer to explanation through past experience. It shares the empirical emphasis of Locke and his successors and of some of the positivists—e.g., Ernst Mach—differing from these primarily on grounds that their analyses of experience were neither rigorous nor complete. Phenomenology is not to be confused with phenomenalism, the doctrine that knowledge is limited to the data of experience and that the knower is consequently incapable of transcending the world of phenomena, nor with psychologism, the contention that all philosophical problems can be reduced to terms of psychology. History of modern phenomenology. Antecedents of modern phenomenology are to be found in the many classic attempts—e.g., that of St. Augustine—to found a philosophy on the data of intuition. The modern movement begins, however, with Descartes, whose "method" involved the suspension of all beliefs and the acceptance as true of only those ideas which are presented "so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt." Although Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal world rests in part on phenomenological analysis, the post-Kantian (e.g., Hegelian) use of the term "phenomenology" and its loose use in the sciences to denote anything observable are not regarded as relevant. Husserl's phenomenology goes back to Descartes for its inspiration and draws liberally from the psychological analyses of William James (1890) and Husserl's teacher Franz Brentano (1874), particularly from the latter's doctrine of intentionality. Husserl's early interest was in the phenomenological basis of mathematics and logic, from which he moved to epistemology and eventually to a transcendental phenomenology, which is usually regarded as a form of metaphysical idealism. Among his publications the most important for psychology is his Logische Untersuchungen (1900-1901). The Jahrbuch fur Philosophic und phanomenologische Forschung, which he edited from 1913 to 1930, also contains contributions to psychology, and the Husserl archives at Louvain are yielding further material of psychological interest. His more strictly philosophical works, how-
PHENOMENOLOGY ever, have had a profound influence on the existentialist psychologies [see the biographies of JAMES; KANT]. Other influential German philosophers who shared in the phenomenological movement were Alexander Pfander, Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, and Moritz Geiger. Scheler in particular, although not a disciple of Husserl, became widely known for his extension of the phenomenological method into the fields of ethics and value theory. It was Martin Heidegger, however, Husserl's pupil and successor at the University of Freiburg, who perhaps unintentionally popularized the term "existentialism" and who, through his often baffling metaphors and neologisms, has been in some measure responsible for phenomenology's reputation as an obscure and almost esoteric metaphysical system. Since the publication of Sein und Zeit (1927) Heidegger has moved steadily away from a straightforward phenomenology and has concerned himself more and more with the ontological problem—that of the fundamental meaning of being (Sein). In spite of his early enthusiasm for the National Socialist ideology he has been an influential figure in recent continental European philosophy, particularly in French existentialism and in the existentialist movements in theology and psychiatry. Since World War n the phenomenological movement in philosophy has been most active in France under the leadership of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Both men have accepted in principle Husserl's phenomenological method but have pushed further in the direction of a detailed examination of the phenomena of human existence (the human situation) and thus toward a complete existentialist philosophy. Sartre's more strictly phenomenological contributions are to be found in his studies of imagination and emotion; in his novels and plays and in his more systematic philosophical works, e.g., Being and Nothingness (1943), he presents existentialism as a philosophy of life. Merleau-Ponty is also known both as a phenomenologist and as an existentialist. His most important phenomenological contributions have been his analyses of perception (1945) and of language (1952). Psychological phenomenology Psychological phenomenology, too, is essentially a n approach rather than a particular kind of theory or system, and it owes as much to Goethe, Purkinje, and the physiologist Ewald Hering as it does to Husserl. Whereas Husserl's phenomenology is logically prior to all empirical science, concerned w ith essences rather than with "matters of fact,"
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psychological phenomenology is frankly and explicitly descriptive. It represents what David Katz called an attitude of "disciplined naivete," the attempt to suspend all presuppositions (biases, implicit assumptions) and observe and describe the world of phenomena (consciousness, immediate experience, phenomenal world, psychological field) as it is naively apprehended. Husserl regarded this kind of psychology as an important empirical discipline, coordinate with the other empirical sciences but not to be confused with "pure" phenomenology. Psychological phenomenology is in the tradition of all the psychologies since Descartes which have accepted as their task the scientific study of consciousness, and it is thus to be distinguished from the faculty psychologies, the depth psychologies, and the psychologies which limit their subject matter to externally observed or logically inferred behavior. Phenomenology and introspection. Phenomenological description must not be equated, however, with the introspective analysis of the Wundtian school, best represented in the English literature by Edward B. Titchener. For Titchener (1929), "existential" experience consists of the pure, irreducible, conscious content (sensation, feeling, image) which is left after all object reference or meaning context has been deliberately brushed aside. To confuse the sensation itself with the stimulus which arouses it—e.g., the color with the light wave—is to commit the stimulus error. The phenomenologist would accept introspective analysis as a legitimate technique for the establishment of correlations between the variables of physical stimulation and the dimensions of consciousness, as in psychophysics, but he would reject the assertion that the introspectively identified sensations are necessarily the elements of consciousness. He would also agree with the introspectionist that the physical, physiological, or other conditions which give rise to a phenomenon, or which can be correlated with it, should not be confused with the phenomenon itself. Just as color is not an array of light waves, so the person we perceive is not the person who may "really" exist; one is a phenomenal datum, the other an independently definable process, entity, or condition which may or may not be causally related to the phenomenon. The phenomenologist differs radically from the introspectionist in his insistence on the acceptance as legitimate psychological data of the very phenomena which the introspectionist emphatically rejects, namely, such phenomena as organization, directedness, attractiveness, or requiredness—phenomena which for the introspectionist are secondary out-
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comes of association or interpretation. If we suspend our presuppositions, the phenomenologist argues, and refuse to impose on the phenomena any theory as to their origin or their veridicality, we still find ourselves confronted with a meaningful world of things, events, and people, organized and interrelated in vastly complex ways. Elimination of biases and presuppositions. Our first phenomenological task is to observe, describe, and analyze the structures, properties, dimensions, and interrelations of phenomena as they are naively apprehended. This, the phenomenologist contends, is a highly disciplined activity, fully as rigorous as introspection, analogous to but not identical with the phenomenological reduction of Husserl [see the biographies of TITCHENER; WUNDT]. The various biases or presuppositions which must be placed in brackets have been variously classified and need not be detailed here. Some of these stem from the reductive atomism of classical Newtonian physics and can be recognized as implicit in the associationist psychologies developed since the work of John Locke; others stem from the Darwinian emphasis on explanation by reference to origins, evident both in behaviorist learning theory and in Freudian psychoanalysis; and still others reflect the confusion of logical implication with psychological content so frequently encountered in theories of motivation. Without denying the value of reductive analysis or of developmental studies, the phenomenological psychologist would argue that these and other biases involve a prejudgment of the phenomena and the consequent risk that significant phenomena, such as the melodic property of a series of tones or the physiognomic properties of a face, will be dismissed as of no consequence because they disappear in reductive analysis or seem to be the products of past experience. He would argue further that in the recent history of psychology this deliberate bracketing of implicit assumptions and the acceptance of all data of experience, however subtle or evanescent, as intrinsically valid, has led to significant extensions of psychological knowledge and advances in psychological theory. Phenomenology and contemporary psychology The phenomenological method has been applied to many areas of psychology, most systematically perhaps in the experimental study of perception, particularly in connection with the traditional problems of space, time, motion, color, sound, and touch. These are obviously the phenomena most readily accessible to observation under conditions of experimental control. The phenomenal world contains much more, however, than things and
events with their properties and interrelationships. It also contains the phenomenal self and phenomenal "other selves," with their feelings, emotions, and desires; and it contains a whole welter of phenomenal structures, states, and processes which have been traditionally classified as memories, fantasies, choices, beliefs, and the like. These phenomena also invite the interest of the phenomenologist, and even though they are difficult to bring into the laboratory, they are steadily yielding to other techniques of investigation. Some of the most promising of these techniques are being developed by the clinician, whose patient may be incapable of giving a full and free account of his experience and must consequently be induced through indirect devices to reveal what is there for him. The range of phenomenological investigation is thus steadily broadening to include what have been traditionally thought of as noncognitive processes. As facts are being accumulated and techniques refined, more and more attention is being devoted to the reconstruction of the phenomenal world of the "other person," including that of the child, the deviant, the person who has grown up in a culture radically different from one's own, even members of other species. Basic to the investigation is always the attempt to establish the "what" of experience. To explain the "why" one must transcend phenomenology and become a systematic psychologist or even a philosopher. Most of the phenomenologists have gone beyond their phenomenology, but phenomenology has produced no single psychological theory. In the available space only a few of the most significant contributors to psychological phenomenology can be mentioned. Experimental psychology of perception. The pioneer in the experimental phenomenology of perception is undoubtedly David Katz, whose The World of Colour appeared in 1911. Before him, Goethe (1810) and Purkinje (1819-1825) had published detailed descriptive analyses of the world of color, and Hering in Outlines of a Theory of the Light Sense (1872-1875) had countered Helmholtz' empiricist theory of color constancy with a nativist theory based on the acceptance of naively apprehended object color as psychologically valid. Karl Stumpf in his Tonpsychologie (1883-1890) had also made use of the phenomenological method, but Stumpf s interest in phenomenology was as much philosophical as it was psychological. Helmholtz had explained the approximate constancy of object color as the interpretation of primary, physically bound sensation elements by unconscious inference. Katz bracketed Helmholtz' physicalistic assumptions and proceeded to explore the world of color in all its modes of appearance
PHENOMENOLOGY (Erscheinungsweisen'), demonstrating that while film colors (Flachenfarben) vary simply and directly with changes in retinal stimulation, the same does not hold true for surface colors (Oberflachenfarben}, which are phenomenally inherent in the perceived object. Impressions of surface color and of illumination are phenomenally covariant, changes in total retinal stimulation being registered, within very wide limits, as changes in impression of illumination, with the consequence that object color tends to remain phenomenally constant. As a result of Katz's phenomenological studies of color and of his similar studies of the world of touch in Der Aufbau der Tastwelt (1925), the facts of phenomena] constancy have become basic to a reconstructed psychophysics and psychophysiology of perception. [See PERCEPTION, article on PERCEPTUAL CONSTANCY; VISION, article On COLOR
VISION AND COLOR BLINDNESS; and the biographies of HERING; KATZ; STUMPF.] Gestalt theory. Perhaps even more rewarding has been the phenomenological approach to perceptual organization represented by the Berlin group of gestalt psychologists. The reality of gestalt qualities had been recognized by Christian von Erenfels in his article "Uber 'Gestaltqualitaten'" (1890) and by Stumpf, but it was Max Wertheimer's experimental studies of apparent movement (1912) which set the stage for the gestalt movement. The older theories could not admit as psychologically valid an experience of movement when there is no physical movement in the stimuli; phenomenal movement had to be explained away as an illusion. Wertheimer, like Katz, simply accepted the phenomenal fact as valid, insisting that movement as such must have its direct neural correlate; hence the controversial principle of isomorphism. Wertheimer's pioneer experiments led to a long series of studies of gestalt phenomena in perception, memory, thinking, and motivation, many of which have been reviewed by Koffka (1935). While the gestalt theories which emerged, notably the physiological and the psychological field theories, go beyond phenomenology, the basic approach is in each case phenomenological. It should be noted that this approach, although prominently associated with the gestalt group, has been broadly characteristic of experimental psychology in western Europe. Examples of this approach are to be found in the work of Albert Michotte on phenomenal causality, Jean Piaget on developmental psychology, F. J. J. Buytendijk on expressive movement, and Geza Revesz and Albert Wellek on the psychology of music. [See GESTALT THEORY.] Verstehende psychologic. Related to the experimovement but not to be identified with it
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is the "understanding" psychology (verstehende Psychologies of Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Scheler, Eduard Spranger, Karl Jaspers, and Ludwig Binswanger. Distinguishing broadly between the Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences) and the Geisteswissenschaften (mental or humanistic sciences), Dilthey (1883) placed in the former category the reductive or "explaining" psychology of the laboratory and in the latter the psychology which seeks an intuitive understanding of man's value orientations as revealed both in individual life and in history. This kind of psychology, systematized by Spranger as a sixfold value typology in his Types of Men (1914), has had considerable influence on the study of personality, both in Germany and elsewhere. Although the verstehende Psychologic is not strictly phenomenological, it represents the attempt at an intuitive, nonanalytic penetration of the inner life of the other person; a somewhat shaky phenomenological basis for it is to be found in Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy (1913). Scheler's descriptive analysis of the various forms of sympathy is part of his attempt to lay the phenomenological groundwork for a broadly inclusive philosophical anthropology. The relevance of the verstehende Psychologic to psychopathology is perhaps best demonstrated in Jaspers' General Psychopathology (1913) and Binswanger's Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (1942); both authors are to be ranked among the leading existentialists. [See SYMPATHY AND EMPATHY.] The phenomenological movement is still distinctively European. In the United States, leading interpreters of philosophical phenomenology in the Husserl tradition are Marvin Farber and Herbert Spiegelberg. The phenomenological emphasis in experimental, developmental, and social psychology is recognizable in what has come to be known as "cognitive theory," a useful summary and evaluation of which was made by Martin Scheerer (1954). In the psychology of personality and in psychotherapy there is a vigorous and growing existentialist movement, influenced greatly by Binswanger's Daseins analyse. ROBERT B. MACLEOD [Directly related are the entries PSYCHOLOGY, article on EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY; THINKING. Other relevant material may be found in MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, article On CLIENT-CENTERED COUNSELING; PERCEPTION; and in the biographies of HUSSERL; KATZ.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY BINSWANGER, LUDWIG (1942) 1953 Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins. Rev. ed. Zurich: Niehaus.
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BRENTANO, FRANZ C. (1874) 1924-1925 Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. 2 vols., 2d ed. Leipzig: Meiner. DILTHEY, WILHELM (1883) 1951 Gesammelte Schriften. Volume 1: Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. Leipzig: Teubner. EHRENFELS, CHRISTIAN VON 1890 Uber "Gestaltqualitaten." Vierteljahresschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophic I...J Soziologie 14:249-292. FARBER, MARVIN 1943 The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. GOETHE, JOHANN WOLFGANG VON (1810) 1840 Theory of Colours. London: Murray. H> First published as Zur Farbenlehre. HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1927)1962 Being and Time. New York: Harper. -» First published in German as Sein und Zeit. HERING, EWALD (1872-1875) 1964 Outlines of a Theory of the Light Sense. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -» First published in German as Zur Lehre vom Lichtsinne. A revised and enlarged edition was published in 1920 as Grundziige der Lehre vom Lichtsinn. HUSSERL, EDMUND (1900-1901) 1922-1928 Logische Untersuchungen. 2 vols. Halle (Germany): Niemeyer. -» Volume 1: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Volume 2: Untersuchungen zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. JAMES, WILLIAM (1890) 1962 The Principles of Psychology. 2 vols. Gloucester, Mass.: Smith. JASPERS, KARL (1913) 1963 General Psychopathology. Univ. of Chicago Press. -» First published in German. KATZ, DAVID (1911) 1935 The World of Colour. London: Routledge. -> First published in German as Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben und ihre Beeinflussung durch die individuelle Erfahrung. A revised and enlarged edition was published in 1930 as Der Aufbau der Farbwelt. KATZ, DAVID 1925 Der Aufbau der Tastwelt. Leipzig: Earth. KOFFKA, KURT 1935 Principles of Gestalt Psychology. New York: Harcourt. MERLEAU-PONTY, MAURICE (1945) 1962 Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Humanities. -» First published in French. MERLEAU-PONTY, MAURICE 1952 Sur la phenomenologie du langage. Pages 91-109 in Colloque International de Phenomenologie, Bruxelles, 1951, Problemes actuels de la phenomenologie. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer. PURKINJE, JAN E. 1819-1825 Beobachtungen und Versuche zur Physiologic der Sinne. 2 vols. Prague: Calve; Berlin: Reimer. -» Volume 1 was published in Prague and Volume 2 in Berlin. SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL (1943) 1956 Being and Nothingness. New York: Philosophical Library. -> First published in French as L'etre et le neant. SCHEERER, MARTIN 1954 Cognitive Theory. Volume 1, pages 91-142 in Gardner Lindzey (editor), Handbook of Social Psychology. Cambridge, Mass.: AddisonWesley. SCHELER, MAX (1913) 1954 The Nature of Sympathy. London: Routledge. -> First published as Zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefiihle. The second revised and enlarged edition—which was later translated into English—was published in 1923 as Wesen und Formen der Sympathie.
SPIEGELBERG, HERBERT (1960) 1965 The Phenomenalogical Movement. 2 vols. 2d ed. The Hague: Nijhoff. SPRANGER, EDUARD (1914) 1928 Types of Men: The Psychology and Ethics of Personality. 5th ed. Halle (Germany): Niemeyer. -> First published as Lebensformen: Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie und Ethik der Personlichkeit. STUMPF, KARL 1883-1890 Tonpsychologie. 2 vols. Leipzig: Hirzel. TITCHENER, EDWARD B. 1929 Systematic Psychology: Prolegomena. New York: Macmillan. WERTHEIMER, MAX 1912 Experimentelle Studien iiber das Sehen von Bewegungen. Zeitschrift fur Psychologie und Physiologic der Sinnesorgane 61:161-265. -» Reprinted in Wertheimer's Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie published in 1925 by the Philosophische Akademie, Erlangen.
PHILANTHROPY The terms "philanthropy" and "charity" have often been used interchangeably, but changes in attitude to the phenomenon of giving have meant that charity now has a somewhat derogatory connotation, and so it is gradually giving way to the more acceptable concept of philanthropy. The Oxford English Dictionary's definition of philanthropy as being "the disposition or active effort to promote the happiness and well-being of one's fellow men" introduces the modern conception of charitable effort which stresses the total well-being of the individual rather than merely relieving distress. Philanthropy, too, seems a more appropriate term for the highly organized types of giving typical of modern industrialized societies. Participation in philanthropic activity is now more characteristic of the individualistic laissezfaire societies in which the ideology of personal liberty and noninterference by the state is widely held than of those with communist political systems. In some of the individualistic societies it plays such an important role that its organized agencies have become closely integrated with the whole social structure. Every year vast sums of money are collected for an infinite number of philanthropic purposes, and an increasing number of people participate in the work of collecting money through highly organized fund-raising campaigns. So well has this form of activity come to serve certain needs that in many countries it has even been incorporated in government policy in the form of tax exemptions for contributions to charitable agencies. It has become such an accepted form of behavior that few now escape the demands of giving, and many important institutions are partly or wholly dependent on it. On the other hand, in countries in which the
PHILANTHROPY rights of the community take precedence over the rights of the individual, there is less need for voluntary philanthropy because the state takes responsibility for most if not all of the needs of its people. No adequate data have been gathered to tell the history of philanthropy all over the world. Anthropologists have shed light on the practice and attitudes to giving in a number of preliterate societies. Historians have given us accounts, often with much detail, of a few Eastern societies, ancient Greece and Rome, and some of the medieval European countries. These studies show that the scope of charity has undergone many changes with regard to beneficiaries, the type of benefits, and those held responsible and that these have reflected the changing social structures of the societies concerned. But there is very little accurate information on the philanthropic activity of many societies, even in modern times, and there are few scientific studies of the effect of philanthropic activity on the giver and on the recipient. History In early times, charity was usually motivated by religious faith, and so its history in different societies can, in part, be understood by studying their religious ideologies. However, religious zeal is largely the product of a complex of forces; thus, even though the ideal of philanthropy was articulated through the religious functionaries, there were always other underlying reasons that prompted philanthropic giving. It seldom, if ever, occurred either when the giver did not receive some practical or psychological reward, or when there was no punishment for not giving. Active participation in philanthropy has through the ages been much more characteristic of Christian, or Western, than of pagan, or Eastern, societies, and of those belonging to Protestant rather than to Roman Catholic or Orthodox religions (Grubb 1917, p. 837). In preliterate societies, the family, kin, caste, tribe, or clan looked after its own people as a natural duty. The wealthier and those in high positions were expected to bear the larger share of looking after the destitute, and sometimes the village would look after all its members. But almsgiving, in the sense of the duty of everyone to give to those outside their own close circle, was not necessary. For to belong to a large family or clan was to be part °f a system that supplied social and economic security. The continuing strength of the ties of family, kin, tribe, or caste in Africa and Asia is one of the main reasons for the difference in the organization of philanthropy in the East and the
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West. Another is the fact that almost all the new nations have begun their independence with a certain amount of guaranteed social security in their constitutions. Certain current trends in philanthropic thinking and organization go back very far in history. The idea that giving would ensure a reward in heaven was found in Egypt many centuries before the Christian era, and giving was not limited to family or clan. In ancient Rome, the idea was first introduced that citizenship was the basis of the right of relief for every person, no matter whether he was destitute or not; this foreshadowed the principle of universality. Philanthropy in this sense had very little connection with poverty and was not necessarily motivated by pity, nor was it considered an important virtue. The state looked after its citizens, and the wealthy did not give large sums for charity but, rather, aided the state with such gifts as fitting out navies. Some organized charities did eventually develop around the first century A.D. Another philanthropic ideal that is still held by some Christians is the belief that one-tenth of a person's income should go to charity. This idea, called the tithe, goes far back in the history of Hebrew giving and was a religious duty. The system of tithing was fairly common among many ancient peoples and was often collected in the form of a general tax rather than as a gift to God or the poor. Thus our present acceptance of state taxation for charity could be said to be an idea that was also suitable for the charitable needs of earlier societies. The teachings of Jesus with regard to giving, which have had great influence in determining philanthropic attitudes down to the present day in the Western world, can also be traced to earlier religious attitudes toward charity. In particular, Jesus' teaching that the spirit of the giver is more important than the size of the gift, and that it is more blessed to give than to receive, emphasized the virtues of unselfishness and giving as a personal sacrifice. In the East, religion has also usually been the main force to motivate giving. Many verses in the Koran exhort the believer to give alms. This is considered a basic duty, and the destitute and poor can demand alms as a right. The Muslims thus look on almsgiving as a compulsory act, but one that enhances the prestige of the giver. In China, the teachings of Confucius and Mencius were especially important in implanting the ideal of benevolence. The Chinese have always been generous givers, especially in the last two centuries. Up until the communist regime, large amounts of money were donated voluntarily, and
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many local charities were coordinated through organizations like the Hall of United Benevolence, which was established as early as 1805; this foreshadowed the modern trends toward the Community Chest. The idea of state philanthropy, however, did not exist before the communist regime. The Hindu religion also stresses that there will be a reward ior generosity, after death as well as in the present world. But in other respects, the concept of Hindu charity is different from that found in the West. Traditionally almsgiving was not looked on as a matter of bestowing gifts to the poor and needy because of compassion and sympathy, at the whim of the individual giver. Rather, sharing possessions and relieving the wants of others was a habitual activity. This attitude was implanted at such an early age, and was so deeply accepted at all levels of Hindu society, that it explains why ascetics have been able to wander far and wide in India, knowing that they would always be cared for. Manu's teaching, however, did not include the conception of collective, disinterested responsibility, and so it was not until the nineteenth century that the idea of state responsibility and organized philanthropy developed in India. The trends which foreshadowed modern philanthropy can be more easily traced in the Western Christian countries. For since they led the industrial revolution, they were forced to alter their patterns of giving sooner than the less developed countries of Africa and the East. In the early Christian era the religious institutions taught that giving alms was an intrinsic and essential part of a Christian's duty. But there was no over-all control of giving in the sense that all the poor and destitute were equally served. Rather, a giver gave according to his conscience and the amount of social pressure to which he was exposed, directly to the recipient. This meant that the giver usually saw the problems of the recipient at first hand and thus made charity a personal affair. The great changes that took place in the whole conception and organization of charity were due, first of all, to the decline of medieval society in Europe and to the ensuing disorganization which loosed forces that gradually undermined the former, tightly structured feudal way of life. The dissolution of the monasteries, the steady increase in population from 1400 on, the beginning of a serious rural-urban movement, plagues, and wars all aggravated the problem of poverty and destitution. The growing towns, too, gradually provided the possibility of group concern over poverty, for destitution had grown so extensive and evident that it could no longer be ignored. It was soon seen as a
serious, continuing social problem, and this made its relief a social as well as a religious duty. It was soon evident, too, that the church, which had formerly had a near monopoly over charity, could no longer cope with the situation; thus, private and secular charitable institutions began to arise to fill the gap. This movement to secular organizations was nourished by the mounting wealth of the industrial middle classes. Thus historical circumstances, which shifted the power of the former feudal lords and the medieval church, redistributed wealth and power, and brought about the beginning of a new industrial society, also caused a redistribution of responsibility for charity. For the dislocations and maladjustments caused by these momentous changes produced a situation which was too heavy for the church and local piety to handle (Jordan 1959, pp. 55-63). This new approach to philanthropy gradually became defined and supported by law. The earliest and most famous law was that passed by Queen Elizabeth i in 1601 to "create, control and protect the funds that had been allotted or donated to charity." It made the local community responsible for providing for the destitute whose families were unable to look after them. But it went no further than to mark out those responsible for the needy. Laws created to deal with this new social phenomenon, however, necessarily lagged behind the rapidly growing needs. For no one could foresee the extent of the fundamental changes that were taking place or envisage the coming industrial revolution, which would produce new types of destitution and poverty far beyond the capacity of the individual family or voluntary agencies to look after. Part of the gap was filled in by wealthy individuals who gave large gifts of money to relieve the misery of those caught in the new social and economic dislocations. These gifts resembled the grants awarded by the numerous modern American foundations, but differed from them in that they were solely for relief, for in that era prevention was not recognized, nor was the future state of the destitute of much interest (Andrews 1956, p. 38). They did, however, serve the function of enabling people to test out new ways of coping with the situation. In this sense the givers could be looked on as initiators of social change. Social legislation As time went on, the agrarian and industrial revolutions gained momentum, until in the twentieth century the industrialized countries faced a completely new way of life which had brought
PHILANTHROPY about so much economic and social uncertainty that citizens could no longer be protected from the misery of destitution by haphazard relief. Moreover, by that time it was recognized that there were problems to be alleviated in other areas of life. Thinkers, writers, statesmen, and politicians gradually began to accept and then to define a new conception of social welfare. And the public slowly and grudgingly accepted the fact that the state must bear the major share of public relief. This new attitude was gradually incorporated into the state legislation of a number of Western nations. Western countries. The Scandinavian countries, some of the Commonwealth countries, and England, with their relatively stable political systems, were among the first countries to lead the way to the welfare or "social service" state, although part of the Scandinavian experiment was influenced by the first embracing movement to ameliorate the conditions of the workers, which had been introduced in Germany by Bismarck in the 1870s. This statesman had persuaded his government to adopt the most extensive program of social legislation that the world had ever seen, in order to cut the ground from under the feet of his socialistic opponents. The northern European countries and Australia served as the first social laboratories whose experiments could be watched and appraised by the rest of the world. In addition to voluntary or compulsory insurance, introduced in many of the western European countries in the nineteenth century, other social legislation was enacted after World War I and the 1930 depression. Countries such as France and England led the way to further legislation after World War n, inspired in part by the Beveridge Report (Great Britain . . . 1942). This report greatly influenced both public opinion and social legislation, for it was introduced at a time when the destruction and privations of the war had so stirred people that they were ready for a constructive approach to social problems. In England the real change in attitude and practice came about during and after World War n. Rising costs and the heavy taxation of the postwar years caused donations to private charities to decline sharply. This forced many of the former voluntary agencies to depend on the government for at least part of their income in such forms as grants in aid. By the 1960s the social services provided by the welfare state, either directly or through local authorities, impinged on the life of each citizen from birth to death. These services are now regarded as one of the basic rights of all citizens. Thus the principle of universality, the con-
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ception of the desirability of universal coverage for all persons and all needs, gradually emerged. Some of the countries in central Europe, Czechoslovakia in particular, were also early in establishing some governmental measures of social security. The countries of eastern Europe were a little later, and those of Latin America, on the whole, did not bring in state legislation until the 1920s. After that there was a rapid movement toward social assistance in many of these countries, although they were greatly hampered by distances, difficulties of communication, the slow rate of industrial development, and the great number of people living in primitive conditions. Chile, however, has had very advanced social legislation since 1924. In no country did the transition from private giving to state control go through without a struggle, and all countries enacted their social legislation in a piecemeal way and in different sequences of coverages, with no coordinated effort for overall security, until the communists came to power. The advance toward the universal provision of basic support has cut heavily into the former activity of voluntary organizations and private philanthropy, although even in the United Kingdom, with its well-established welfare state, so many voluntary agencies raise money for charitable purposes that it is impossible to estimate their number or the amount of money they raise or spend. Developing countries. As the less advanced countries of Asia and Africa became politically independent in the 1950s and 1960s, they attempted to establish a sound basis of social security for their people. Such attempts were hampered by the conditions of their economies, low standards of living, and overpopulation. Many of them still have to depend on voluntary effort and money to cover all their needs. The history of the extension of philanthropy in India is much like that of the Western countries. In the nineteenth century, changing conditions gradually made it apparent that individual effort alone could not provide for all the contingencies of Hindu life, so voluntary social agencies began to take over some of the burden. In the nineteenth century the Christian missionaries in particular led in setting up social services, and many Hindu reformers, such as Ghandi, were instrumental in furthering this voluntary work. After India had gained its independence in 1947, the government embodied state responsibility for many measures of social security in the constitution of 1950. However, the immensity of the problems faced by the new government, the lack of finances to train personnel to carry out the proposed reforms,
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and the belief that only private volunteers could provide the "human touch" essential to counterbalance the impersonal administrative machinery of a welfare state made the planning commission of the first five-year plan determined to set up the principle that the major responsibility for organizing activities in such schemes as the welfare of women and children, education, and community development should fall to private voluntary agencies. The central Social Welfare Board was established in 1950 to coordinate and administer these agencies. It functions as an autonomous body and enables members to move more rapidly as new problems or social crises arise. A number of foundations have also arisen, and money-raising campaigns on the North American pattern are held in crises such as floods (Kulkarni 1961, p. 68). Most of the less advanced countries are still at the stage when their people are looked after to a large extent by the extended family system of tribal groups. One of their main problems is that sudden and rapid industrialization is making them alter their traditional patterns of duty and responsibility almost overnight. Japan, however, has been an exception. It had a modified pension scheme as early as the 1870s and was the first Far Eastern country to establish a modern social security system (Durand 1953, pp. 85-157). Japan's first Community Chest drive in 1947 showed that the Japanese had accepted the conception of the responsibility of citizenship, which entails impersonal and regular giving. Communist countries. The social legislation and philanthropic outlook of communist countries are difficult to compare with those of capitalist countries, where private initiative and individual ownership of the means of production are dominant. The communist countries have gone further in legislating for the needs of their peoples than have other countries. From the time of the 1917 Revolution in Russia the government has been determined to institute a complete system of social assistance. This ideal was embodied in the first constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which claimed that every citizen had the right to education and to many types of social assistance. Soviet citizens have been trained in this ideology for so long that they now take it for granted that the government will provide them with extensive social welfare benefits and universal education, as well as supply a society in which they will have cultural and even spiritual well-being. In the Soviet Union only religion is not covered by state protection, and must be supported by voluntary effort. Any congregation that is wilting to pay
the salary of its clerics and the costs of maintaining the buildings may hold services in a church, mosque, or synagogue. The Soviet citizen is also able to contribute his time to different voluntary agencies, for the constitution permits Russians to form voluntary organizations to pursue scientific research, experiment in education, encourage sports, etc. There are also occasions when some disaster brings about the need for immediate action. In such cases voluntary contributions are solicited. But there is no formal philanthropic structure for the continued solicitation of funds for long-term projects (Maxwell 1962, pp. 652-655). In the countries with more laissez-faire philosophies and democratic governments the struggle to define the public and private areas of responsibility still continues. In its essence it is an underlying struggle between individualism and collectivism. The individualistic view holds that voluntary charitable agencies must be administered and financed by volunteers because they are one of the important bulwarks against complete state control. Moreover, it is felt that in a period of rapid social change, governments cannot act rapidly enough when new problems arise. So there is still the need for voluntary philanthropists who can experiment on a small scale even in controversial fields, without causing too much general disruption. Many voluntary agencies have gradually been forced to relinquish their control to the state when the financial burden has become too much for them to bear, or when a problem has become so widespread that it cannot be handled by private donations of time or money. North American philanthropy The expansion of philanthropy and its new forms of organization have gone further on the North American continent, particularly in the United States, than in any other part of the world. Indeed, voluntary giving has grown to such an extent in the past seventy years that some people speak of a "philanthropic revolution." North American attitudes to private philanthropy have been very deeply influenced by the tradition of the frontier, with its individualistic philosophy and suspicion of government control. Private initiative is still thought of as the key to American progress and success, for it has led to most of the inventions, medical discoveries, educational experiments, and basic research which have enabled the United States to become the leading industrialized nation. It has also led to the patterns of organization necessary to run a very complex society. This attitude, as well as the businessman's desire to re-
PHILANTHROPY tain control over philanthropic activity, has deeply influenced American business and philanthropic efforts. Indeed, many businessmen feel that corporations should give freely to philanthropy, for in this way they will retain control over areas of life which are still free of government control. This philosophy, combined with the rich resources of the American continent, produced accompanying attitudes that poverty and destitution are mainly the result of a lack of initiative and apathy and that therefore receiving public relief is a shameful thing. As in other countries, however, the twentieth century showed that the social dislocations of rapid industrialization and urbanization were too vast and complex to be relieved by private contributions, even in a rich country. Up to the 1930s, health, welfare, research, and, to some extent, higher education were believed to be mainly the responsibility of private philanthropy. But the great depression of the 1930s forced Americans to accept an enlargement of governmental functions. And so the state began to take over the financing and direction of one voluntary agency after another, assisted by such movements as the New Deal. This movement, however, did not diminish the actual donations to private philanthropy. For they have continued to increase in size, largely because of the affluence of the postwar era and the opening up of new fields for experimentation engendered by the rapidly changing social and economic conditions. Corporate donation. Part of the growth of donations in America is due to the increase in number and size of business enterprises. For as corporations have grown in size, there has been an increasing demand on the part of the public that they take a leading role in financing the social services of the community. Corporations soon recognized that philanthropic activity could become a very important part of their public relations, for it is an excellent medium through which they can demonstrate their interest and participation in community welfare. Today it is one of the most fruitful advertising media for all corporations, big and small. The recognition of the part corporations could play in financing voluntary agencies was first introduced at the end of the nineteenth century by the Y.M.C.A., an organization that had been imported into America in 1851 from England. The Y.M.C.A. had set a new pattern for raising money: intensive drives for money over a short period of time, the use of sophisticated techniques to raise money, and an emphasis on corporation donations. Other voluntary agencies soon copied this pattern, and it is still the typical large North
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American fund-raising practice. Soon definite quotas were set for the contributions of most large corporations. World War i was instrumental in spreading this new philanthropic pattern because it multiplied local problems and brought about many appeals for the relief of sufferers in Europe. At the same time, the patriotic wartime spirit, the large wartime earnings, and the legal right to deduct charitable contributions from the taxable income of individuals and corporations all combined to establish habits of giving on the part of citizens from all income groups. Another trend in philanthropic activity that was established during the war was that of coordination of effort. There was a growing realization that while much of the voluntary work was overlapping, many of the needs were being overlooked. This coordination took the form of Community Chests, which combined a number of charities under one appeal, and United Appeals. By 1929 it was estimated that there were 331 Community Chests in America. These chests had raised $73 million in that one year alone. Again, corporations played a large part in financing this expansion. In 1936 a revenue act was passed which allowed corporations an exemption of up to 5 per cent of their net income for charitable contributions. As the result of this tax and the unprecedented prosperity of the postwar years, corporation giving rose sharply after World War n. This is seen in figures which show that whereas corporation support for 13 Community Chests (for which figures are available) in 1920 was 23.8 per cent of the total amount collected, in 1950 it was 39.5 per cent for 69 Community Chests reporting returns (Andrews 1952, p. 158). The total philanthropic donations of corporations has also risen steeply. The Bureau of Internal Revenue estimates that whereas in 1936 corporations donated $30 million to charitable purposes, in 1951 the figure was over $300 million. Although this figure is large, a breakdown in terms of total giving to philanthropy and type of giver shows that corporation contributions are only 5 per cent of the total annual receipts. The rest is made up of donations from foundations (3 per cent), individual gifts (74 per cent), and other sources (18 per cent) (Andrews 1952, p. 19). The donations do not come only from the corporation budget but also directly from employees. This source was tapped when the growing number of campaigns caused strong competition between fund raisers during World War I and forced them to move further down the economic ladder to achieve their objectives. Employees were a well-
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organized group from which to solicit. This movement was encouraged in so many corporations that by 1950 a large number permitted payroll deductions for the major national and city-wide campaigns in North America (Committee . . . 1953, p. 19). The rise in *he contributions of corporations has enabled them to take over the control of raising and allotting money to many philanthropic agencies. Management can determine the amount that will be given, and since the same men are often found on the boards of a number of the larger corporations, they have come to form an "inner circle" which can control both the gifts that are given and the selection of the top executives in the philanthropic agencies and in the more important and prestigious fund-raising campaigns, such as those for hospitals and universities. Once the modern fund-raising pattern had been established, it did not take the business world long to realize that donating manpower to campaign activity would be as good an advertising device as donating money. Moreover, this was a means by which the organizing and executive ability of promising young men could be tested. In fact, taking part in philanthropic activity, and particularly fund-raising campaigns, has become an essential part of the successful businessman's career. His participation brings him into contact with men who are influential in business, gives him training, and enables him to demonstrate his ability publicly in the highly competitive field of raising money (Ross 1954). Social functions of philanthropy The type of charity has varied from country to country and from one historical period to another, but philanthropy has always been the reflection of a class society because it has depended on a division between rich givers and poor recipients. Even when the poor have themselves been the givers, they have always made up the largest proportion of recipients. The wealthy have not only given because they have more but because, by alleviating distress, they have secured their own positions against those who might displace them and thus have avoided revolt. At the same time, giving has been a means of enhancing their status in the eyes of their fellow men. W. K. Jordan believes that many of our present attitudes toward philanthropy have come down from the early Elizabethan days, in which the maladjustments were so intense that they simply could not be ignored by anyone who was in any way sensitive to suffering (Jordan 1959, p. 146). The Protestant Reformation in England
was partly a product of these conditions and partly in its turn the means of reinforcing the conception of the responsibility of the top classes for the "havenots," even when the structure of the classes changed and the industrialists began to replace the aristocrats. The association of financial responsibility with upper-class position continued to be as strong in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as it had been in the seventeenth. The chief charitable offices in Western Protestant countries have traditionally been the prerogative of the top social classes. The well-known term "Lady Bountiful" suggests the part that upper-class women played in philanthropic activity in the nineteenth century. At that time the aristocratic classes in England had leisure and were just becoming conscious of the necessity of justifying their position because of the growing political strength of the lower classes. They also retained from the past the sense of noblesse oblige, a feeling of responsibility for persons of inferior economic and social status. These factors led them to this voluntary work, although the agencies they established were at first so scattered that they either did not cover all needs or else suffered from overlapping. The idea that the top social classes should bear responsibility for the lower continued in the twentieth century, which ushered in new types of problems and necessitated an expansion of philanthropic activity. Today upper- and middle-class men and women hold many executive positions on boards of charitable agencies and fund-raising campaigns in all countries that engage in private philanthropy. In fact, philanthropy is now such an important part of the expected activity of women as well as men that it is very difficult for them to escape working in at least some of the important fund-raising campaigns. For some women fund raising has become such a time-consuming activity that they often regard it as a career. Training for it begins at home, where children are subtly initiated into their future philanthropic roles. This training may be reinforced in such associations as the Junior League, the top social club for young North American women, where actual practical training is given for leading roles in voluntary agencies. One activity that supports the relationship between philanthropy and the upper classes is that of the charity ball, which has become an important adjunct to the life of the social elite in most large North American cities. These balls are organized by committees of society women and are often
PHILANTHROPY spectacular affairs. They combine the display of wealth and position with the worthy purpose of helping a good cause. Many studies have shown this dual relationship between philanthropic activity and social position. Warner's study of Yankee City (Warner & Lunt 1941) was perhaps the first comprehensive study to demonstrate in detail the relationship between social position, wealth, and philanthropy. Although the philanthropic pattern has moved further down the social scale with the tremendous increase in formal organizations, upper-class men and women still hold far more of the most prestigious community positions in the important voluntary agencies than do those of the lower classes. Modern trends Professionalization. Modern philanthropy serves many and varied functions for the givers, the collectors, and the business world, as well as for the recipients. The more obvious functions that philanthropy has played through the centuries, such as relieving the lot of the poor and needy, is easy to see, but the more subtle aspects of its effects have seldom been analyzed. Nor has the way in which it has become integrated into many aspects of the social structure been fully realized. During this process a core of professionally trained administrators and fund raisers has arisen to handle the complex problems that the extension of philanthropy has brought about. And a number of professional organizations have grown up with the specific purpose of directing the larger fundraising campaigns and training volunteer canvassers. These people were at first looked on as "professional beggars," but by now the importance of their role is recognized and they have an accepted professional status. The organization and coordination of philanthropy have eliminated much of the early spontaneity of giving. They have also brought about a more rational assessment of people's ability to give and the introduction of scientific methods of surveying community and national needs and of raising money. Thus philanthropy has entered the field of planning. This trend has meant that the sense of personal involvement with a problem which in the past led to many worthwhile reforms has given way to impersonal donating to a charitable budget. However, emotional appeals are still effective, and certain charities like the Salvation Army and the March of Dimes draw money easily. The ideology of philanthropy. Parallel to the centralization of many former charities under the
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jurisdiction of the state there has arisen the centralization of private giving under the control of businessmen. Business institutions have thus succeeded the religious institutions on which early charity depended for inspiration and control. This change has brought about a change in the ideology of philanthropy. Implicit in the religious ideology of giving was the idea that the giver, as well as the recipient, would receive some benefit from the gift, either in this world or the next. This is illustrated by such well-accepted quotations from the Bible as "Cast thy bread upon the waters, for thou shalt find it after many days." This implication of future reward is still present in the modern ideology of giving, but the individual reward is no longer thought of as coming in the next world. Rather, it is expected in this one, either in the emotional form of personal satisfaction received from sacrifice and doing one's duty or as a more tangible reward in the form of direct or indirect benefit from better medical services, better homes, playgrounds, and the like. Attitudes of donors. The attitude of the donors, too, has tended to change. Much of the spontaneity and emotional satisfaction that were derived from personal giving to a need that the donor could observe at first hand has disappeared, and people tend to give more from a rational appraisal of the situation or from strong, inescapable pressures exerted by friends and community leaders. These pressures, combined with the multiplicity of demands that most citizens face each year, have made many people apathetic to even the most distressing situations, resentful of canvassers, and resistant to their appeals. Collectors thus face more and more problems in raising money each year. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century there was an almost complete disregard on the part of the public of the donation's effect on the recipient. The recognition that one of the most important rights of the citizen is that of public assistance has changed this attitude and has helped to eliminate much of the humiliation and shame that taking charity had engendered in earlier times. Furthermore, state control has meant a broadening of the base of givers. Not only does a larger proportion of the population give regularly and continuously through taxation but also few people, even in the lowest income brackets, escape the pressures that come through the payroll deductions for charitable gifts that are incorporated in the rules of many large corporations, or the systematic canvassing of people of moderate and low incomes. Even children do not escape, for they can be induced as captive
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audiences in schools to give to as many charitable agencies as the school permits. This is rationalized in terms of training future adult subscribers. The basic problem of philanthropy has changed from that of caring for the physical needs of a relatively few destitute people living in simple societies to attempting to meet the physical, social, and psychological needs of total populations living in highly complex societies. The emphasis is now being placed on securing a "better," "happier," or "healthier" world for all; and the focus has shifted from the relief of immediate want to long-term planning that will prevent future want. This trend toward prevention, whose development has been due to the growth of scientific knowledge, has eliminated the need for charity in some areas. It has also led to a change in the motivation to give; the emotional identification with someone else's problems has been largely replaced by a rational appraisal of present and future needs. AlLEEN D. ROSS
[See also COOPERATION; FOUNDATIONS; POVERTY; TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE; VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, article OH SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS; WELFARE STATE; Other
relevant material may be found under PLANNING, SOCIAL.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ANDREWS, F. EMERSON 1952 Corporation Giving. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. ANDREWS, F. EMERSON 1956 Philanthropic Foundations. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. ANGER, CHARLES A. 1963 Donations, Bequests and Grants. Pages 327-328 in Britannica Book of the Year: 1963. Chicago: Benton. BRUCE, MAURICE 1961 The Coining of the Welfare State. London: Batsford. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GIVING IN CANADA 1953 Corporate Giving in Canada. Edited by Albert A. Shea. Toronto: Clarke. DURAND, PAUL 1953 La politique contemporaine de securite sociale. Paris: Dalloz. -> See especially pages 85-157. FARNHAM, CARL H. 1957 World Trends in Social Security Benefits: 1955-1957. International Social Security Association, Bulletin 10:407-434. GREAT BRITAIN, INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES 1942 Social Insurance and Allied Services. Papers by Command, Cmd. 6404. London: H.M. Stationery Office; New York: Macmillan. -» Known as the Beveridge Report. GRUBB, EDWARD 1917 Philanthropy. Volume 9, pages 837-840 in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. New York: Scribner. JORDAN, WILBUR K. 1959 Philanthropy in England, 1480-1660: A Study of the Changing Pattern of English Social Aspirations. London: Allen & Unwin. KULKARNI, P. D. 1961 The Central Social Welfare Board: A New Experiment in Welfare Administration. New York: Asia Publishing House.
MAXWELL, ROBERT (editor) 1962 Information U.S.S.R.: An Authoritative Encyclopaedia About the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. New York: Pergamon. MENDELSOHN, RONALD 1954 Social Security in the British Commonwealth: Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. London: Athlone. NELSON, GEORGE R. (editor) 1953 Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns in the Northern Countries of Europe. Sponsored by the Ministries of Social Affairs of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Copenhagen: No publisher. Philanthropy. 1962 Volume 21, pages 735-736 in Encyclopedia Americana. New York: The Encyclopedia. PUMPHREY, RALPH E.; and PUMPHREY, MURIEL W. (editors) 1961 The Heritage of American Social Work: Readings in Its Philosophical and Institutional Development. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. RAMAN RAO, AJJARAPU V. 1966 Industrial Social Services in a Developing Economy. Bombay: Allied Publishers. Ross, AILEEN D. 1952 Organized Philanthropy in an Urban Community. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 18:474-486. Ross, AILEEN D. 1953 The Social Control of Philanthropy. American Journal of Sociology 58:451-460. Ross, AILEEN D. 1954 Philanthropic Activity and the Business Career. Social Forces 32:274-280. Ross, AILEEN D. 1958 Control and Leadership in Women's Groups: An Analysis of Philanthropic Money-raising Activity. Social Forces 37:124-131. SCHUMAN, FREDERICK L. 1957 Russia Since 1917: Four Decades of Soviet Politics. New York: Knopf. SEELEY, JOHN R. et al. 1957 Community Chest: A Case Study in Philanthropy. Univ. of Toronto Press. SILLS, DAVID L. 1957 The Volunteers: Means and Ends in a National Organization. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. Social Insurance in the U.S.S.R.: 1933-1937. 1938 International Labour Review 38:226-242. WARNER, W. LLOYD; and LUNT, PAUL S. 1941 The Social Life of a Modern Community. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
PHILOSOPHY For discussion of the philosophy of science and its relationship to the social sciences, see SCIENCE, article on THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE; aZso relevant are the articles CAUSATION; POSITIVISM; SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION; and the biographies of BACON; CASSIRER; COHEN; DEWEY; HUSSERL; JAMES; PEIRCE; SCHLICK; SCHUTZ; WHITEHEAD. The philosophy of history is discussed in HISTORY, article on THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY; and in the biographies Of CROCE; DlLTHEY; HEGEL; HUME; MARX; SlMMEL; SOROKIN; SPENGLER; VlCO. Articles that deal with other aspects of philosophy are ETHICS, article on ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES; POLITICAL THEORY; UTILITARIANISM. The relevance to the social sciences of certain major figures in the history of philosophy is discussed in the biographies, of AQUINAS; ARISTOTLE; AUGUSTINE; BENTHAM; DESCARTES; HEGEL; HOBBES; HUME; KANT; LOCKE; MILL; SPINOZA.
PHOBIAS PHOBIAS A phobia is an irrational, persistent fear of a particular object or place, class of objects or places, etc. Used as a noun or combining form, phobia denotes fear or dread, and in medicine and psychiatry it is joined either with names of objects, situations, etc., or with Greek-derived forms of such names; thus, street phobia, or agoraphobia (from the Greek agora, or "market place"). As a symptom complex the phobia also includes any avoidances and inhibitions employed to forestall impending attacks of anxiety. Thus, an agoraphobic person may be unable to leave his home without incurring anxiety and may therefore remain in it constantly. A person with rat phobia may stop his ears when rats are mentioned in conversation. The phobic person may elaborate and form compromises to keep the dreaded object, or the idea of it or allusion to it, at a distance (e.g., by restricting his activities, putting general or special taboos on certain localities, etc.). Whether a state of mind is to be considered rational or irrational eventually depends on commonsense judgment. This judgment is usually that of the phobic person himself, who knows that the feared object is harmless or in any case should not provoke such intense, unmasterable anxiety. Often ashamed or aware of the absurdity, the phobic patient may nevertheless try to rationalize that there is a possibility of "danger." Accessory circumstances often determine whether a given fear is rational or not, but judging the degree of rationality is still ultimately a matter of common sense. In early childhood the matter of rationality is irrelevant. The fears of small children are rarely rational according to adult standards. Children's insecurity and fear of strangers are neither rational nor irrational. Animal phobias of small children resemble in many ways the fears of certain savages, with whom they share a "totemistic" attitude, the differentiation between man and other animals not being well established. Gradual development of the sense of reality through experience and education leads to such differentiation. History and semantics. Modern interest and ideas about the phobias began with an article by Westphal, "Die Agoraphobic" (1871). The term agoraphobia was invented in this case to denote a morbid fear of open places and is usually extended to mean a fear of streets or the outdoors generally. The German words used were Platzangst and Platzfurcht, which retain the idea of an open square. To one of Westphal's three patients, a certain square in Berlin looked as if it were miles
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wide. The patient complained that any attempt to cross the square or to walk on certain streets brought on a severe attack of anxiety accompanied by trembling, head sensations, palpitation, etc. The presence of a companion prevented or assuaged the anxiety and enabled the patient to skirt the square with somewhat lessened fear. He did not fear traffic; indeed, he felt no anxiety if he could stay near a carriage while crossing. To see houses with windows was also reassuring, but to walk along windowless walls, like those of certain barracks, would bring on an anxiety attack, and he could not go into the Tiergarten, where there were no houses. Absence of human beings or signs of life, an empty street or park, was more dangerous than traffic. Phobeio, the Greek word from which phobia is derived, means "I fear," but in earliest times it meant both "I am afraid" and "I am put to flight"; for Homeric Greeks, emotion and tendency to action were "close together" (Onians 1951, p. 19). Greek words can be readily used in compounds, and phobo- and -phobia were used as combining forms. Hence, -phobia easily became one of a large class of suffixes (including -mania, -philia, -pathy, etc.) that were adopted by medical and psychological writers. Thus we have hydrophobia, fear of water, at one time also called phobodipsia, fear of drinking; photophobia, fear and avoidance of light, a medical but not necessarily a psychiatric term; xenophobia, fear and avoidance of strangers or foreigners. An obsolete term of this sort is panophobia, the night terror of infants. (See Sauvages 1763.) Name inventing has periodically flourished and waned in science and medicine. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, partly in emulation of Linnaeus, imaginative nomenclature was in vogue. Psychiatrists participated heartily in wordbuilding, particularly after Esquirol's adventures with the suffix -mania (1838). They made such wide use of the suffix -phobia that Benjamin Rush (1825) jocularly suggested the name rum phobia for what he opined must be "a very rare distemper." He also facetiously suggested doctor phobia and church phobia (cited in Menninger et al. 1963). Such near-slang usage emphasizes the avoidance aspect and ignores any anxiety. It has been resuscitated in current psychiatric writings in such terms as school phobia, job phobia, and the like, where the anxiety may not be of the conscious phobic type at all. The modern popularity of the word and suffix began with Westphal's coining of agoraphobia. The new term was widely accepted, and many analo-
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gous terms were invented (see Janet & Raymond 1903). For several decades after Westphal many types of phobias were described and named. Some names are still in use, some are obsolete, and others are met with only occasionally. Claustrophobia still refers to the morbid fear of entering or staying in closed spaces, and ereuthophobia is a word generally understood to mean a fear of blushing. Aelurophobia and gephyrophobia are rather rare and are ordinarily superseded by cat phobia and bridge phobia, respectively. Zoophobia, or animal phobia, is inclusive, applying to dogs, cats, birds, etc. Besides the newly described phobias, others were retrieved from earlier literature and given new names. By 1914, G. Stanley Hall could list 136 words ending in -phobia; many of these were never subjects of clinical description but were apparently purely philological virtuoso inventions. The history of this period and pertinent references are to be found in Krafft-Ebing (1895), Janet (see in Janet & Raymond 1903), and Loewenfeld (1904). The study of the phobias and other neuroses went well beyond philology. Obsessions and compulsions were described by Westphal (1877), and many studies dealt with nervousness, neurasthenia, and anxiety states other than phobias, such as hysteria and hypochondria. This work culminated in a general conception of the neuroses, or psychoneuroses, a group of conditions with all sorts of nonpsychotic psychological symptoms not attributable to recognizable pathological changes in the body. [See OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDERS.] Classification. The general tendency was to group phobias along with obsessions and compulsions under one heading, on the grounds that they were "compulsive emotions" (Zwangsaffekte). Even today German textbooks usually put quotation marks around the word phobia or refer to die sogenannten Phobien—-the so-called phobias (Bumke 1924; Bleuler 1916). French writers, following Janet (see in Janet & Raymond 1903), group phobias with other anxiety states, compulsions, and obsessions under the general rubric psychasthenia. Such classification has some point, at least superficially, for many adults troubled by obsessions and compulsions also may have one or more phobias. However, there are certain cases, adult and infantile, in which there are phobias but no obsessional symptoms. Moreover, Stekel (1908), psychoanalyzing phobic patients of the "pure" type, found that they resembled the conversion hysterics he had treated, differing only in that where the phobic patient suffered an anxiety attack, the classical hysterical patient would manifest a conversion
symptom. For this nearly pure type of case Freud suggested to Stekel the designation anxiety hysteria and justified this term in a paper on a childhood phobia (1909). As psychoanalytic conceptions of anxiety developed, and particularly as analysis of phobias in small children progressed, it became evident that phobias might or might not be found in obsessional persons and that they were to be found in patients of all types. Freud's final theory of anxiety (1926), which interpreted phobias in a novel and original way, lessened the interest in classification. Although in a general way earlier authors recognized psychological influences as precipitating and predispositional factors, they did not distinguish the phobia from other neurotic disorders in regard to etiology. From the mid-nineteenth century through the beginning of the twentieth, all neuroses were supposed to arise from constitutional weakness or deficiency ("degeneration" in some authors' terminology) and essentially from a subtle hereditary or inherent defect of the nervous system. Except for Freud and those who accepted his views phobias were, in short, stigmata of the degeneres superieurs or of psychasthenia. Freud and psychoanalysis Freud's early papers on anxiety and the neuroses contained incidental discussion of certain phobias (1894; 1895a; 1895b), but he first clearly expressed his thoughts on this matter in the case history of "little Hans" (1909; see also Strachey 1962). There he recognized a class of phobias of psychic origin, resembling in many ways the agoraphobia previously described; he gave them the name anxiety hysteria. Phobias were conceived not as illnesses, nor yet precisely as signs of an illness, but as a set of findings: anxiety plus certain special avoidances and inhibitions. In such cases, as time goes on, overt anxiety decreases pari passu as restrictive measures increase. An anxiety state becomes more and more of a phobia. Infantile zoophobias. Freud characteristically looked to the phobias of children for a situation that would furnish a clue, uncomplicated by later elaborations, to their essential meaning, much as he had found simple, direct wish fulfillments in children's dreams that threw light on the complicated and distorted wish-fulfilling dreams of adults. The childhood zoophobias did indeed provide a relatively simple picture of the elements in the formation of phobias and ultimately of psychogenic symptoms in general. The two cases best studied and most cited are the horse phobia of "little Hans" (Freud 1909) and the wolf phobia of the young
PHOBIAS Russian referred to as "the wolf-man" (1918). In later discussions of anxiety, anxiety hysteria, and symptom formation Freud constantly used the material of these cases to illustrate; and develop his theories (see 1915a; 1915£>; 1926). In The Problem of Anxiety (1926) Freud explained Hans's phobia as originating in oedipal wishes. Hans was in love with his mother and was jealous of his father, toward whom he harbored hostile wishes; these wishes came into conflict with his love for his father. The aggression led to a fear of castration, the possibility of which he believed to be a reality. Repressing his love for his mother and his hostility toward his father from consciousness, he displaced his aggression and consequent fear from his father to horses, which he feared would bite off his penis. Thus, to form his phobic symptom, after his repression of the original impulses, Hans used three defense mechanisms: displacement, reversal, for actually his feelings were dangerous to his father rather than the other way round, and regression from the genital idea of castration to the oral idea of being bitten. The wolf-man's phobia arose from a different component of the Oedipus complex, from an inverted oedipal wish. Having observed parental coitus, he identified himself with his apparently castrated mother and feared castration if he permitted himself feminine longings for his father. His fear of castration was displaced to the picture of a wolf in a storybook. The fear that came to consciousness when he ran the risk of seeing the picture was of being devoured—an oral equivalent of the desired passive genital satisfaction. Memories recovered during his analysis established the connection between the wolf and the idea of castration. Avoidance here took the convenient form of not looking at the wolfs picture. From these and other cases of childhood zoophobia Freud asserted that the motive for repression was castration anxiety and that the repressed wishes were the erotic or aggressive components of the Oedipus complex, whether normal or inverted. Repression was then followed by an appropriate displacement, determined by individual experience. Other infantile phobias are based on other types of anxiety, particularly on a fear of losing love, which serve as motives for repression. Because of a child's limited experience, the choice of animals is not large. The Angsttier ("dreaded animal") is apt to be a horse, cow, dog, cat, bird, chicken, beetle, or wasp. Totemism and zoophobia. The study of the zoophobias showed that a child could displace his feelings about his father to an animal and that this
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displacement reflected ambivalence. Hans not only feared horses but admired them, and at one point in his therapy he began to jump around like a horse and even bit his father (Freud 1909). His ambivalent attitude and his identification with the animal gave Freud one argument for interpreting the totem animals of primitive peoples as substitutes for the father, and he spoke of the "return of totemism in childhood" (1913, chapter 4). Mechanisms in the phobia. The defense mechanism of displacement, by which the repressed wishes return to consciousness in disguise, is basic for all phobias, including those of adults. Avoidance behavior or restriction of function follows upon this. In adult phobias, too, the wishes are aggressive or erotic—largely the latter; they are the revived wishes of childhood, usually in new garb. Freud compared the content of the phobia to the manifest fagade of the dream (1916-1917), implying that many defense mechanisms may alter the original content and give a conscious picture different from the unconscious latent fantasy. Thus regression modified the wolf-man's fantasy of being castrated into a conscious fear of being devoured. This further altered the picture, in which the father had already been changed to a wolf by displacement. The displacement mechanism is fundamental, since it is the first and invariable means used by the ego in distorting material that comes back from repression. Other defense mechanisms, such as regression, reversal, and identification, are accessory or secondary in altering the content of the manifest phobic picture. Additional defense mechanisms are described by Sigmund Freud (1926) and some relevant to children by Anna Freud (1936). In the more complicated adult phobias several instinctual wishes may gain expression at the same time through the same content, as a dream may fulfill several wishes at the same time through what is called overdetermination (see Deutsch 1929; Weiss 1935; Fenichel 1944; Lewin 1952). From the study of the simple phobias Freud constructed a paradigm for the formation of neurotic symptoms in general: threatened eruption of an instinct from repression (or from the id); anxiety or threatened anxiety as the signal of such impending danger; subsequent alterations in the ego by means of defense mechanisms that produce symptoms, each type of which (conversion, phobia, obsession, etc.) appears because of the predominance of one (or a few) defense mechanisms. Thus, the meaning of the word symptom is completely altered. No longer an indication of some underlying illness, it is considered a "structure"
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composed of alterations in ego functioning due to the mutual interaction of id, ego, and superego. Some individual phobias Like the dream, the phobia may show much variation in regard to its manifest fagade. However, as certain fr°quent types of dreams have a nearly standard interpretation, so certain phobias, studied through psychoanalysis, show a relative constancy in unconscious meaning. For example, many wellstudied cases of agoraphobia show that the feared streets are unconsciously conceived as places suitable for sexual adventures (see Deutsch 1929; Katan 1937; Miller 1953; Weiss 1935). The companion chosen as protector by some agoraphobes represents a person to whom they are unconsciously hostile and whom they therefore put in the same jeopardy as themselves. Fear of crossing bridges is a feminine fear of childbirth. A fear of falling, on the street or elsewhere, is also feminine, one of its meanings referring to the figurative sexual fall. Claustrophobic anxiety is connected with unconscious ideas of being buried alive and with prenatal life (Lewin 1935). Generally speaking, these unconscious fantasies are either of temptation or punishment. Fear of being alone often indicates a temptation to masturbate under such circumstances. Fears of insanity may include this temptation, as well as a fear of symbolic castration (head equals penis). Fears of dirt refer to sexuality thus conceived. Animal fears have been discussed above. An interesting phobia is the fear of spiders, representing the devouring and dangerous female genitalia. Butterflies may represent beautiful and tempting women; beetles and crawling insects may represent genitalia of small children. This list could be extended greatly; but many other interpretations depend on the individual prephobic history, which determines the relative importance of the fantasy and the suitability of the object chosen for its representation. BERTRAM D. LEWIN [For a conception of phobias that contrasts with the one in this article, see MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF, article on BEHAVIOR THERAPY; see also ANXIETY and EMOTION. Other relevant material may be found in DEFENSE MECHANISMS; HYSTERIA; MENTAL DISORDERS, article on CHILDHOOD MENTAL DISORDERS; and in the biography of FREUD.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABRAHAM, KARL (1922) 1953 The Spider as a Dream Symbol. Pages 326-332 in Karl Abraham, Selected Papers. Volume 1: Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books. -» First published as "Die Spinne als Traumsymbol."
BENEDEK, THERESE 1925 Notes From the Analysis of a Case of Ereuthophobia. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 6:430-439. BLEULER, EUGEN (1916) 1951 Textbook of Psychiatry. Authorized English edition by A. A. Brill, with a biographical sketch by Jacob Shatsky. New York: Dover. -» First published as Lehrbuch der Psychiatric. BORNSTEIN, BERTA (1931) 1935 Phobia in a Two-anda-half-year-old Child. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 4:93— 119. H> First published in German. BORNSTEIN, BERTA 1949 The Analysis of a Phobic Child: Some Problems of Theory and Technique in Child Analysis. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 3/4:181-226. BUMKE, OSWALD (1924) 1948 Lehrbuch der Geisteskrankheiten. 7th ed. Berlin: Springer. DEUTSCH, HELENE 1929 The Genesis of Agoraphobia. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 10:51-69. DEUTSCH, HELENE (1930) 1932 Psychoanalysis of the Neuroses. London: Hogarth. -» First published in German. See especially Chapter 6, "Anxiety States"; Chapter 7, "A Case of Hen Phobia"; and Chapter 8, "Agoraphobia." ESQUIROL, JEAN E. D. (1838) 1845 Mental Maladies: A Treatise on Insanity. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard. -> First published in French. FENICHEL, OTTO (1932) 1934 Outline of Clinical Psychoanalysis. New York: Norton. -» First published as Spezielle psychoanalytische Neurosenlehre. See especially Chapter 2. FENICHEL, OTTO 1944 Remarks on the Common Phobias. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 13:313-326. FENICHEL, OTTO 1945 The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. New York: Norton. -» See especially "Anxiety as Neurotic Symptom: Anxiety Hysteria," pages 193-215. FERENCZI, SANDOR (1913) 1952 A Little Chanticleer. London: Hogarth. -» First published as "Ein kleiner Hahnemann." FREUD, ANNA (1936) 1957 The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. New York: International Universities Press. -> First published as Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen. FREUD, SIGMUND (1894) 1962 The Neuro-psychoses of Defense. Volume 3, pages 43-61 in Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -» First published as "Die AbwehrNeuropsychosen." FREUD, SIGMUND (1895a) 1962 On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome From Neurasthenia Under the Description "Anxiety Neurosis." Volume 3, pages 87-139 in Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> First published as "Uber die Berechtigung von der Neurasthenic einen bestimmten Symptomen-Komplex als 'Angstneurose' abzutrennen." FREUD, SIGMUND (1895k) 1962 Obsessions and Phobias: Their Physical Mechanism and Their Aetiology. Volume 3, pages 71-81 in Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. -> First published in French. FREUD, SIGMUND (1909) 1955 Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy. Volume 10, pages 3-149 in Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete
PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1913) 1955 Totem and Taboo. Volume 13, pages ix-162 in Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1915a) 1957 Repression. Volume 14, pages 143-158 in Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1915b) 1957 The Unconscious. Volume 14, pages 161-204 in Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1916-1917) 1952 A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis. Authorized English translation of the rev. ed. by Joan Riviere. Garden City, N.Y,: Doubleday. -» First published as Vorlesungen zur Einfiihrung in die Psychoanalyse. FREUD, SIGMUND (1918) 1955 From the History of an Infantile Neurosis. Volume 17, pages 3-122 in Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. FREUD, SIGMUND (1926) 1936 The Problem of Anxiety. New York: Norton. -» First published as Hemmung, Symptom und Angst. A British edition was published by Hogarth in 1936 under the title Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. FRIEDMAN, PAUL 1952 The Bridge: A Study in Symbolism. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 21:49-80. HALL, G. STANLEY 1914 A Synthetic Genetic Study of Fear. American Journal of Psychology 25:149-200, 321-392. JANET, PIERRE; and RAYMOND, FULGENCE (1903) 1919 Les obsessions et la psychasthenie. 3d ed. 2 vols. Paris: Alcan. -> Pierre Janet was the sole author of Volume 1. KATAN, ANNY A. (1937) 1951 The Role of "Displacement" in Agoraphobia. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 32:41-50. KRAEPELIN, EMIL (1883) 1909-1915 Psychiatric. 8th ed., rev. 4 vols. Leipzig: Barth. -» See especially Volume 4, Part 3. KRAFFT-EBING, RICHARD VON 1895 Nervositat und neurasthenische Zustande. Volume 12, part 2 in H. Nothnagel (editor), Specielle Pathologie und Therapie. Vienna: Holder. LEWIN, BERTRAM D. 1935 Claustrophobia. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 4:227-233. LEWIN, BERTRAM D. 1952 Phobic Symptoms and Dream Interpretation. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 21:295-322. LOEWENFELD, LEOPOLD 1904 Die psychischen Zwangserscheinungen. Wiesbaden (Germany): Bergmann. -> See especially pages 330-355. MENNINGER, KARL; MAYMAN, MARTIN; and PRUYSER, PAUL 1963 The Vital Balance: The Life Processes in Mental Health and Illness. New York: Viking. -» See especially page 444. MILLER, MILTON L. 1953 On Street Fear. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 34:232-240. ONIANS, RICHARD B. 1951 The Origins of European Thought. Cambridge Univ. Press. RUSH, BENJAMIN 1825 Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon the Diseases of the Mind. Philadelphia: G «gg.
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SAUVAGES DE LA CROIX, FRANCOIS BOISSIER DE (1763) 1768 Nosologia methodica sistens morborum classes juxta sydenhami mentem &- botanicorum ordinem. 2 vols. Amsterdam: Tournes. STEKEL, WILHELM (1908) 1923 Conditions of Nervous Anxiety and Their Treatment. London: Routledge. -> First published in German. See especially Part 2, pages 163-376. STERBA, EDITHA (1933) 1935 Excerpt From the Analysis of a Dog Phobia. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 4:135160. -» First published in German. STRACHEY, JAMES 1962 Appendix [to Freud's "Obsessions and Phobias"]. Volume 3, pages 83-84 in Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth; New York: Macmillan. WEISS, EDOARDO 1935 Agoraphobia and Its Relation to Hysterical Attacks. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 16:59-83. WEISS, EDOARDO 1936 Agorafobia: Isterismo d'angoscia. Rome: Cremonese. WESTPHAL, CARL F. O. 1871 Die Agoraphobic: Eine neuropathische Erscheinung. Archiv fur Psychiatric 3:138-161. WESTPHAL, CARL F. O. 1877 Uber Zwangsvorstellungen. Berliner klinische Wochenschrift 46:669; 47:687. WULFF, M. W. 1928 A Phobia in a Child of Eighteen Months. International Journal of Psycho-analysis 2: 354-359.
PHONETICS See LINGUISTICS. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY The article under this heading provides a broad overview of the field of physical anthropology. Specific areas within the field are reviewed in EVOLUTION, articles on PRIMATE EVOLUTION and HUMAN EVOLUTION; GENETICS, article OU RACE AND GENETICS; RACE; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, ANIMAL, article
on PRIMATE BEHAVIOR. Parallel areas within the field of psychology are reviewed in EUGENICS; INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES; PSYCHOLOGY, article On CONSTITUTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. Also relevant are the biographies of BOAS; BROCA; DARWIN; HOOTON; HRDLICKA; KRETSCHMER; KROEBER; PEARSON; ROHEIM; WEIDENREICH; WISSLER. Physical anthropology, linked by tradition and by academic usage with the behavioral science of anthropology, is nevertheless a discipline that is basically biological. The long-established connection between two such apparently disparate subjects might suggest a common origin obscured by increasing specialization and ultimate subdivision. This, however, is not the case. Physical anthropology had an origin quite independent of anthropology, or to put it another way, it had roots going back to developments that had little or nothing to
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do with the beginnings of anthropology and its cultural preoccupation. Origins of physical anthropology. One of the classic themes of physical anthropology—the races of mankind—emerged from the zoological and taxonomic studies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Ac early as 1684, Bernier published an article in the Journal des s$avans on this subject; this article was one of the first attempts, if not the first, to do for the varieties of mankind what the zoologists and botanists had for some time been seeking to achieve for the bewildering and exciting array of newly discovered flora and fauna that the age of discovery had made known to European students. Following Bernier's pioneer attempt at a classification of man, Linne in 1735 proposed another based on taxonomic principles developed from the experience of several generations of botanists and zoologists attempting to find some kind of order in the enormous variety of nature. By including man in the world of living organisms susceptible to a common systematic treatment, he did much to advance the notion that it was proper to consider man as a biological organism and an object of scientific study. By the end of the eighteenth century, the anatomical and morphological variation of man as a field of serious investigation was well established by the contributions of anatomists, physicians, and representatives of other cognate fields. By the turn of the century the contributions of two anatomists, Blumenbach and Camper, stood out as particularly formative in this area, which had not yet developed into what we would now call a discipline. Both were notable for seeking new methods of analyzing racial differentiation and Camper in particular for introducing quantitative techniques in the search— particularly the measurement of the facial angle. The predominance of anatomy in the formative stages of physical anthropology is also reflected in the contributions made by the studies on man and the primates that were initiated by Tyson's Orangoutang, sive homo sylvestris (1699). The very nature of the inquiry into the racial differentiation of mankind required a comparative methodology, the basis of which was supplied by Tyson. The comparative method has continued to be one of the distinctive features of physical anthropology. The intimate relationship between anatomy and physical anthropology was maintained during the nineteenth century. Some of the outstanding physical anthropologists continued to be men trained in anatomy or medicine. The first names that come to mind are Retzius, Broca, and Virchow, but there are many others. This tradition has continued down
to the present day in Europe, where medical training remains a standard preparation for research in physical anthropology. And, indeed, this tradition is so strong that the association of physical anthropology with cultural and social anthropology is far less intimate there than it is in the United States and in England. Nineteenth-century developments. Despite its early connections with anatomy and other biological subjects, physical anthropology eventually came under the aegis of anthropology. One of the reasons for this association lies in the fact that among the dominant problems to which the emergent anthropology of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries addressed itself were the cultural evolution of mankind and the relationships of various groups within such a frame. Every body of data that appeared to contribute to an eventual solution was appropriated. Thus, anthropologists not only used data on cultural phenomena but also drew evidence from racial and anatomical studies, as well as from linguistics. Later, when archeology became productive of appropriate information it was drawn into the association. Since at this stage of its development physical anthropology had neither a disciplinary identity nor much of an organizational life of its own, it was readily absorbed, at least in the tradition followed in the United States. Indeed, its very name suggests this. The subject matter of physical anthropology remained largely confined to the races of man and whatever comparative anatomical studies were pertinent until the era inaugurated in 1859 by Darwin's publication on the origin of species. Interest in the fossil record of man and its significance for the unraveling of human evolution became evident almost at once. Human fossils such as the Gibraltar and Neanderthal skulls (both discovered just before Darwin's publication and virtually ignored at the time for the lack of an intellectual readiness to see their importance) now took on a new meaning and eventually became recognized as appropriate for physical anthropological techniques which were concerned with comparative human anatomy. Thus, although many of the specialists in the area of human evolution were drawn from older and well-established academic disciplines such as anatomy, medicine, and paleontology, their special interest in the fossil record of man was generally regarded as falling within the category of physical anthropology and served to widen and enrich the subject. Race, comparative human anatomy (with special emphasis on osteology), and human evolution continued to constitute the major concerns of physical anthropology until well into the present
PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY century. This does not mean that expansive tendencies into related areas and problems were absent. But for the most part these tentative explorations were abortive either because the intellectual environment was not favorable or for lack of a fruitful methodology. Broca, for example, examined in an interesting, but ultimately sterile, way the problem of hybridism in man. Without the benefit of modern genetics, this inquiry lacked the foundations for a solid development and now has only historical interest. Methodology. During the nineteenth century, physical anthropology established its classic techniques for measuring the human form; they remained the primary instruments for its research until well into the twentieth century. Data were obtained by a series of standardized observations and measurements. The observations, mainly on qualitative characteristics or those not readily open to measurement, were evaluated by reference to graded scales and charts meant to cover the range of variation. The direct measurements were taken from fixed landmarks wherever these could be established or from areas that could be described with some degree of precision. As variations of technique and measurement proliferated and interfered with comparability of results, it became necessary to establish some uniformity of practice. Several international congresses dealt with this problem, the last one being held at Monaco, in 1911. The techniques along these lines that were designed for osteological material are collectively known as osteometry. Those adapted especially for living subjects are grouped under anthropometry. Physical anthropology was one of the first of the biological disciplines to make extensive use of mathematics, particularly statistics. The problem of dealing with populations, the necessity of using a sampling process, and ultimately the need to devise methods of handling large bodies of data derived from an array of individuals required mathematical evaluation. The suitability of the data of physical anthropology for statistical treatment was especially recognized by Karl Pearson. Almost from the beginning the pages of Biometrika, a journal he established in 1900, were opened to papers that exploited this potentiality, and he himself contributed notably to this development (see Pearson 1920; Wilks 1941). Twentieth-century trends In the present century the field of physical anthropology has grown rapidly to become something closer to a biology of man than it was before. This growth has come about through the development
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of traditional inquiries and the influence of discoveries in other disciplines. Postnatal growth, for example, has become a subject closely linked with physical anthropology, in part because it is a phenomenon that contributes to the understanding of human variation, in part because the technique for studying growth was derived originally from the anthropometric measures devised by physical anthropologists, and perhaps to some extent because it had not been already firmly attached to some established discipline. More recently, physical anthropologists have explored the patterns of over-all growth and have investigated a wide variety of growth problems relating to specific areas of the body, such as the dentition and face. They have established norms. They have examined the factors that affect growth and have sought to discover the dynamics in the growth process that throw light on various anomalies and abnormalities. Discoveries in other areas of science, such as genetics, have also had profound effects upon the recent developments in physical anthropology. In the study of isohemagglutination, the observation of the Hirszfelds in 1916 that various populations exhibited distinct and different frequencies of the ABO blood groups led shortly afterwards to a very active interest of physical anthropologists in exploring this approach as a means of clarifying racial differentiation (see Hirszfeld & Hirszfeld 1919). Field studies in great number were undertaken to determine world-wide variations in these reactions and to seek some basis for their use in identifying racial differences. As other systems of blood groups, such as M-N and Rh, and various hematological characters were discovered, they were added to what has now become an impressive array of hematological variations arising from genetic mutations. And although blood typing and hematology have developed into highly specialized areas with their own problems and goals, they continue to be employed as tools by physical anthropologists, not only in studying racial problems but also in analyzing the dynamics of population genetics. A considerable portion of the physical anthropological literature is still devoted to these applications. It is perhaps worth noting that the earlier expectation that blood groups would provide a genetic and quantitative basis for racial classification replacing older methods has not yet been borne out. The use of blood groups alone has thus far proven to be less than adequate for this purpose, although they retain much value as adjunct criteria. Perhaps even more significant in the recent history of this discipline has been the general impact of genetics upon it. Beginning as early as 1905,
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when Farabee published a study on the inheritance of brachydactyly in man—the first on human heredity based on Mendelian genetics—physical anthropologists have applied genetic principles to their problems and have gained, thereby, considerable insight into processes that would otherwise have been inaccessible. Similarly, Eugen Fischer, a decade after the effective establishment of genetics as a branch of biology, applied this new method to the study of racial hybridism in man with his study of the Rehobother bastards (1913). This was followed by Shapiro's field study (1929) on the English-Tahitian descendants of the mutineers of the Bounty, Rodenwaldt's investigation of the hybrids on Kisar (1927), and Davenport and Steggerda's work on the Negro-white mixtures on Jamaica (1929). At present, population genetics is the aspect of genetics that is being applied most fruitfully to many areas traditionally cultivated by physical anthropology. As in other interdisciplinary contacts, the resulting interactions have created a flow of geneticists into physical anthropology and of physical anthropologists into genetics. Population genetics has been especially valuable in providing insights and leads in the study of the racial differentiation of mankind. The dynamic interaction between mutation and environmental selection and the processes of adaptation that result from this are seen as basic to human racial differentiation, just as they are to animal differentiation. The effects of isolation and genetic drift have become as valid for human groups as they are for Drosophila. Even some of the older concepts of race have been swept away. One can no longer entertain the view, once widely held, that the races of man were originally uniform and that the present heterogeneity of human populations is entirely the product of miscegenation. According to the conclusions drawn from studies based on population genetics, it is more likely that some degree of polymorphism has always been characteristic of human races. Illustrative of the tendency of physical anthropologists to make use of other specialties that promise to throw light on traditional problems is their use of physiological approaches to race. Although not much has as yet been done along this line, some work shows promise. In particular, the adaptative responses of man to various environments is an area of much significance but one which is as yet little known. Enough, however, has been achieved to indicate that this represents an area fruitful of insights into the biological nature of man. Another interesting example of the interaction
between physical anthropology and other disciplines—in this case medicine and psychiatry—is the field of studies of human constitution. The notion that personality types are recognizable from physical stigmata has existed since Greek antiquity. From this ancient concept came the medieval terminology of "humors" of the body, from which the words "phlegmatic" and "sanguine" are derived. About a century ago, this rather naive and certainly primitive idea began to be re-examined in the effort to find, if possible, a more convincing demonstration of a linkage between body build and variations in behavior, disease, and temperament. The pioneering work of MacAuliffe in France and of Pende in Italy culminated in the system proposed by the psychiatrist Kretschmer (1921) in Germany and was later extended into clinical and diagnostic medicine by Draper in the United States (see Draper et al. 1944). This system envisaged a threefold division of body types—asthenic, athletic, and pyknic—with associated and distinctive types of temperament and susceptibility to specific diseases. It was based upon the assumption that body variations in build were correlated with psychological and physiological patterns of behavior. Although much skepticism existed then, as now, on the validity of this thesis, it has continued to engage the attention of a number of researchers. Sheldon, in particular, has evolved a far more sophisticated and useful classification of body build based on three major variables, which he has termed ectomorphy, mesomorphy, and endomorphy (1940). According to this system each individual can be rated for each component, whereas in earlier schemes most individuals could scarcely be fitted into the extreme types. This is the method preferred by most investigators currently working in this field. One of the more recent developments in physical anthropology reflects a growing appreciation of the role that culture and social organization have played in human evolution. One form of this trend is the study of primate behavior. It is notable that after a period of development during which physical anthropology had turned increasingly to strictly biological concerns, in turning to the study of the behavior of primates it is, in a sense, renewing its links with anthropology itself. The pioneer work in this area—beginning with the investigations of Carpenter (1934; 1940) and Zuckerman (1932; 1933)—has recently been carried forward vigorously by a number of students who have not only experimented with the behavior of primates in captivity but have made prolonged and detailed observations of wild animals. Much
PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY of *his work has been inspired both by the insights into human behavior that such studies may be able to furnish and by the belief that social and behavioral characteristics have played a greater role in human evolution than has been previously appreciated or, at least, identified. This development, which certainly in part arises from physical anthropology's continuing interest in human evolution, has, I believe, been stimulated specifically by the great advances made in the last generation in recovering the fossil record of man's emergence. The important discoveries made in China in the late 1920s and 1930s by Black (1930), Weidenreich (1935), and Pei (1934); the enrichment of the record through the work of von Koenigswald in Java in the 1930s (1950); and the opening of totally new geographic areas and systemic groups in south Africa by Dart and Broom in the 1920s and 1930s mark the beginning of a new era in the study of human fossils (see Dart 1925; Broom & Schepers 1946). The south African fossils (the Australopithecines), in particular, forced a revolutionary re-examination of the older concepts, leading to their rigorous modification to fit the new facts, and in general provided a stimulus to the whole field, which has remained in active ferment ever since. More recently, Leakey's discoveries relating to early hominids in the vicinity of Olduvai in east Africa have served to sustain this interest (1951; 1959). From these and other fossils and from the assistance now available from related fields, it is possible to place the appearance of manlike primates at the beginning of the Pleistocene, perhaps as long as 2V2 million years ago. Contrary to the older conception of a hominid evolving both in brain and in his adaptation to erect posture pari passu, it is now clearly evident that it was the latter that came first and, in fact, triggered the former. The anatomical evidence that early hominids had gone a long way toward an accommodation to erect posture before much expansion had occurred in the brain is overwhelming. To many students it seems likely that erect posture, by freeing the hands, with their innate capacity for grasping and manipulating objects, opened the way for the development °f technology. And this, in turn, as it became part °f man's environment, exerted a selective pressure that was reflected in an expansion of the brain. Such an interplay, with its continuation of a selection for intelligence, was reinforced by social developments and particularly by the perfection °f language with its abstract symbolism. HARRY L. SHAPIRO
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BERNIER, FRANCOIS 1684 Nouvelle division de la terre, par les differentes especes, ou races d'hommes qui 1'habitent . . . . Journal des scavans (Amsterdam) 12:148-155. BLACK, DAVIDSON 1930 On an Adolescent Skull of Sinanthropus pekinensis in Comparison With an Adult Skull of the Same Species and With Other Hominid Skulls, Recent and Fossil. Paleontologia Sinica, Series D, Vol. 7, no. 2. Peking: Geological Survey of China. BLUMENBACH, JOHANN F. (1795) 1950 On the Natural Variety of Mankind. Pages 25-39 in Earl W. Count (editor), This Is Race. New York: Schuman. -> An extract from the original De generis humani varietate nativa. BROCA, PAUL 1877 Les races fossiles de VEurope occidentale. Paris: No publisher given. BROOM, ROBERT; and SCHEPERS, G. W. H. 1946 The South African Fossil Ape-men: The Australopithecinae. Transvaal Museum, Pretoria, Memoir No. 2. Pretoria: The Museum. CAMPBELL, BERNARD 1966 Evolution: An Introduction to Man's Adaptations. Chicago: Aldine. CAMPER, PIETER 1791 Dissertation physique sur les differences reelles que presentent les traits du visage chez les hommes. Utrecht (Netherlands): Wild & Altheer. ->• Written in Dutch. Published posthumously. CARPENTER, C. R. 1934 A Field Study of the Behavior and Social Relations of Howling Monkeys (Alouatta palliata). Comparative Psychology Monographs 10, no. 2:1-167. CARPENTER, C. R. 1940 A Field Study in Siam of the Behavior and Social Relations of the Gibbon (Hylobates lar). Comparative Psychology Monographs 16, no. 5:1-212. COMAS Y CAMPS, JUAN 1960 Manual of Physical Anthropology. Springfield, 111.: Thomas. -» First published as Manual de antropologia fisica. COON, CARLETON S. 1962 The Origin of Races. New York: Knopf. DART, RAYMOND A. 1925 Australopithecus africanus, the Man-ape of South Africa. Nature 115:195-199. DARWIN, CHARLES (1859) 1964 On the Origin of Species. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -> A facsimile of the first edition. Numerous editions have been published, including a reprint of the sixth edition in 1927 by Macmillan, and a variorum text edited by Morse Peckham, published by the University of Pennsylvania Press in 1959. DAVENPORT, CHARLES B.; and STEGGERDA, MORRIS 1929 Race Crossing in Jamaica. Washington: Carnegie Institution. DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSius 1964 Heredity and the Nature of Man. New York: Harcourt. DRAPER, GEORGE; DUPERTUIS, C. W.; and CAUGHEY, J. L. JR. 1944 Human Constitution in Clinical Medicine. New York: Harper. FARABEE, WILLIAM C. 1905 Inheritance of Digital Malformations in Man. Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Museum. FISCHER, EUGEN 1913 Die Rehobother Bastards und das Bastardierungsproblem beim Menschen. Jena (Germany): Fischer. HARDY, G. H. 1908 Mendelian Proportions in a Mixed Population. Science 28:49-50. HIRSZFELD, L.; and HIRSZFELD, H. 1919 Of Different Blood. Lancet 197, no. 2:675-679.
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HULSE, FREDERICK S. 1963 The Human Species. New York: Random House, KOENIGSWALD, GUSTAV H. R. VON 1950 Fossil Hominids From the Lower Pleistocene of Java. Part 9, pages 59-61 in International Geological Congress, Eighteenth, London, 1948, Report. London: Geological Survey and Museum. KRETSCHMER, ERNST (1921) 1936 Physique and Character: A": Investigation of the Nature of Constitution and the Theory of Temperament. London: Routledge. -> First published in German. LEAKEY, L. S. B. 1951 Olduvai Gorge. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. LEAKEY, L. S. B. 1959 A New Fossil Skull From Olduvai. Nature 184:491-493. PEARSON, KARL 1920 The Problems of Anthropology. Scientific Monthly 11:451-458. PEI, WEN-CHUNG 1934 A Preliminary Report on the Late Paleolithic Cave of Chou Kou Tien. Geological Society of China, Bulletin 13, no. 3:327-358. RETZIUS, GUSTAF (1909) 1965 The Development of Race Measurements and Classification. Pages 94-102 in Alfred L. Kroeber and T. T. Waterman (editors), Source Book in Anthropology. Rev. ed. New York: Johnson Reprint. -» First published as "A Review of, and Views on the Development of Some Anthropological Questions." RODENWALDT, ERNST 1927 Die Mestizen auf Kisar. 2 vols. The Hague: Nijhoff. SHAPIRO, HARRY L. (1929) 1962 Heritage of the Bounty: The Story of Pitcairn Through Six Generations. Rev. ed. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. -> First published as "Descendants of the Mutineers of the Bounty" in Volume 11 of Bernice P. Bishop Museum, Honolulu, Memoirs. SHELDON, WILLIAM H. 1940 The Varieties of Human Physique: An Introduction to Constitutional Psychology. New York: Harper. TYSON, EDWARD (1699) 1751 Orang-outang, sive homo sylvestris: Or, the Anatomy of a Pygmie Compared With That of a Monkey, an Ape, and a Man. 2d ed. London.- Osborne. VALLOIS, HENRI V. 1937 L. Mac Auliffe. Anthropologie 47:419 only. VIRCHOW, RUDOLF 1882 Der Kiefer aus der SchipkaHohle und der Kiefer von la Naulette. Zeitschrift fur Ethnologic 14:277-310. WEIDENREICH, FRANZ 1935 The Sinanthropus Population of Chou Kou Tien. Geological Society of China, Bulletin 14, no. 4:427-461. WEINBERG, W. 1908 Uber den Nachweis der Vererbung beim Menschen. Verein fur Vaterlandische Naturkunde in Wiirttemberg, Stuttgart, Jahreshefte 64: 369-382. WILKS, S. S. 1941 Karl Pearson: Founder of the Science of Statistics. Scientific Monthly 53:249-253. WRIGHT, SEWALL 1948 On the Roles of Directed and Random Change in Gene Frequency in the Genetics of Populations. Evolution 2:279-294. ZUCKERMAN, SOLLY 1932 The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes. New York: Harcourt. ZUCKERMAN, SOLLY 1933 Functional Affinities of Man, Monkeys, and Apes. New York: Harcourt.
PHYSIOCRATS See under ECONOMIC THOUGHT.
PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY See under PSYCHOLOGY. PIGOU, ARTHUR CECIL Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877-1959), professor of political economy at Cambridge University from 1908 to 1943, is today best known for his contributions to the theory of economic welfare. He succeeded Alfred Marshall as professor at the age of 31 (a remarkable fact in the mature society of Edwardian Cambridge), to the delight of Marshall but to the chagrin of the older generation, and particularly Foxwell, who had believed their claims superior. He remained a professor at Cambridge until his retirement and indeed continued to live in King's College, of which he had been a fellow from 1902, until his death in 1959. Pigou was born in 1877, the eldest son of Clarence Pigou and his wife, Nora, at Beachlands, Ryde, in the Isle of Wight, the family home of his mother. His father was a retired army officer, descended from a Huguenot line which had long had connections with India and China, first as traders, in later generations as civil servants. His mother's family came from a line which had earlier won distinction and wealth in Irish administration. With such a family background it was rather a matter of course that Pigou should be sent, like his father, to Harrow, but it was his own very considerable abilities that won him an entrance scholarship. At Harrow he was a good enough athlete to win approval in an age in which athletics carried more honor than did scholarship and serious enough scholar to win many of the prizes open to Harrovians. He ended his schooldays as the first boy on the modern side to be head of the school. He went to Cambridge as a history scholar of King's College and spent his first two years reading history as a pupil of that remarkable oddity, Oscar Browning. But to his Cambridge contemporaries Pigou was best known as a leading figure in the Union Debating Society, where from his first term he made his mark and was outstanding as an orator, in a generation of brilliant speakers. It was not until his third year at Cambridge that Pigou began to study economics, and only because the Cambridge syllabus of that time required it as part of the moral sciences tripos. Thus, Pigou's introduction to economics came first by way of history and second by way of philosophy and ethics. Indeed, until he became a fellow of King's College and began to teach economics, Pigou could scarcely be regarded as a specialist in that subject. He had
PIGOU, ARTHUR CECIL submitted, in his first attempt to obtain a fellowship at King's, a thesis entitled Robert Browning as a Religious Teacher, which later became his first book, published in 1901. He had won the chancellor's medal for English verse, as well as the Adam Smith prize for an essay on the principles and methods of industrial peace. He began to lecture on economics in 1901, before his election to the King's fellowship (at a second submission) and was made Girdler's lecturer in the summer of 1904. He was lecturing in 1903, surprisingly, on the history of labor in the nineteenth century. But in 1901/1902 he had already begun to give to the second-year students the course on advanced economics that was the basis of the education of hundreds of Cambridge economists over the next thirty years. In that course Pigou acted as expositor of the theoretical ideas developed by Marshall. Inevitably, as presented by Pigou, those ideas took a form of their own. But it was primarily through Pigou that the Marshallian tradition was handed down and became the Cambridge school of economics. While Marshall's lectures had become less and less systematic as the years went on, Pigou (educated in the more systematic habits that the school of moral sciences had inherited from Sidgwick, whose lectures on ethics and political science he had attended) gave to the exposition of Marshall's theories a clarity and architecture that they had lacked in Marshall's personal teaching. To the end, Pigou remained a devoted and almost uncritical pupil of Marshall's, indeed an almost idolatrous worshiper. It was Pigou, more than any other, who brought up a generation of Cambridge economists in the conviction that (in his often-repeated words) "it's all in Marshall" and the belief that if they were in error, it was because they had misunderstood Marshall or had overlooked some essential passage in the holy writ. It was not until the coming of Piero Sraffa in the middle 1920s and of such younger lecturers as Joan Robinson and John Hicks in the 1930s that Cambridge escaped from an uncritical acceptance of the Marshallian orthodoxy; but then, and even much later, through Robertson, Guillebaud, and others of us, Cambridge retained its essentially Marshallian tradition. In these years it was as a lecturer that Pigou was at his best. The Cambridge economists of the 1920s owed to Keynes their sense of the importance of the economic issues and their sense of urgency to achieve essential reforms; but it was Primarily to Pigou (and also, in later years, to Dennis Robertson and others) that they owed their training in the disciplines of economic reasoning.
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The same qualities that one finds in Pigou's books were paramount in his lectures. Clarity of analysis, division and subdivision where it was appropriate, a willingness to follow an argument through to the end and to refine it as it needed to be refined, all these were the characteristics of his own presentation and of what he demanded in others. Curiously, this eloquence and clarity in teaching did not ordinarily carry over, as it did so abundantly in the case of Keynes, to an enjoyment of personal argument and discussion with his pupils. We admired Pigou; after a lecture we would sometimes shyly ask him a question, and he would answer, either jocularly or even more shyly. But most of us as undergraduates hardly knew him outside a lecture room, while we knew Keynes quite intimately, through his Political Economy Club. Pigou's first book on economics, Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace, an expansion of his Adam Smith prize essay, appeared in 1905. It is interesting to go back to that book, not only for its matter but also for its method, which remained characteristic of Pigou throughout his life and which deeply impressed his pupils. He applied to economic material the method of the philosopher, clarifying the issues, dissecting them and analyzing them, trying to see how different assumptions regarding the material might modify conclusions— the analytical method applied with great precision to an essentially qualitative argument. He used statistics but rarely, and only to establish or to indicate the order of magnitude of some relevant fact. This is very far from the form of argument of the modern, statistically minded economist. While Pigou, as his working life continued, gradually acquired the habits of mathematical economics, he was not by instinct and training a mathematical economist. His thinking remained primarily that of a philosopher trained in analysis. His first book eschews mathematics completely. Welfare economics. It was in 1912 that Pigou published the book which, in retrospect, is the most important of his works—Wealth and Welfare, as it was called in its first edition. It was expanded vastly over the next thirty years and, as The Economics of Welfare (1920a), played a major part in the education of the Cambridge economists of the 1920s and 1930s, and indeed of economists generally. Those who came to it when it had acquired middle-aged embonpoint would do well to restudy it in its slimmer, more youthful, and more rapidly moving form. Its characteristics are those of the 1905 book—beautiful clarity of reasoning and thought; the method of qualitative analysis rather than of statistical argument; the sparing
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introduction of mathematical argument, and only where necessary to a precise formulation. Above all the early version possessed a beauty of architectural design and construction that was lost as new extensions were added over the years. Pigou's ultimate reputation will, one suspects, depend on the judgment by future generations of the work in the field of economic welfare that was principally enshrined in that book. He started from two existing ideas, to be found, in the Cambridge tradition, in the work of Marshall and of Sidgwick. Marshall had discussed (as had Bastiat and others before him) the concept of maximum satisfaction and the conditions under which an economy would achieve it. Sidgwick, in dealing at a less rigorous level with the same problem, had made use of the idea of divergence between utility to the individual and utility to society. Pigou's book was more ambitious. He set out to examine, first, the full conditions of maximum satisfaction; second, the conditions under which private and social product (as he preferred to call them) might be different, so that the maximum would not be achieved under a system of private enterprise; and third, the measures which might be taken to bring the two into equality. In one important respect Pigou's work was fundamentally different from that of his successors in the field of welfare theory. He was primarily concerned (as his first chapter shows) with "fruit" rather than "light": with writing a theory of welfare that was applicable in practice. Pigou's definition of maximum economic welfare made it dependent on the average volume, the distribution, and the variability of the national dividend. Any course, he argued, which without compulsion increased efficiency and the volume of the dividend or which increased the proportion of the dividend which was received by poor persons or which (without diminishing its volume or injuring its distribution) diminished the variability of the dividend would increase economic welfare. The greater part of Wealth and Welfare as originally written, and an ever-increasing part of it as it grew through the various editions of Economics of Welfare, was devoted, in the first place, to the differences between social and private marginal net products arising from imperfect divisibility, to elements of monopoly and similar factors, and to the methods of controlling monopoly and otherwise correcting these divergencies; second, it considered methods of remunerating labor and the practicability and desirability of interference to raise the wages of poorer workers. Wealth and Welfare treated rather scantily the whole question of taxation as it involves transfers from the rela-
tively rich to the relatively poor, which later editions of Economics of Welfare treated more fully and systematically. Much of Pigou's work, as far as it relates to monopoly, to pricing policies of public activities, and to wage bargaining, for example, has been so thoroughly absorbed into the present corpus of economic doctrine that it has long ceased to be identified consciously with his name. Antipathy to his conclusions has been much keener and much more continued with regard to his argument that measures to equalize incomes would increase economic welfare. Pigou himself in 1912 was a liberal —neither an extreme radical nor a socialist. He was almost certainly thinking in terms of minor, marginal changes within the framework of a liberal society. By definition he excluded redistributions which would so affect incentives as to reduce the national dividend. But his conclusions were inherently so radical that they evoked criticism and resistance among economists who would not have felt equally critical of his more familiar and acceptable arguments where they related to monopoly or public utility pricing. Once these criticisms had been voiced, other economists felt bound, from a purely academic standpoint, to examine their validity. In later editions Pigou slightly modified his actual presentation of the argument for increased welfare with less inequality of income, but the essentials remained the same. He began by assuming that individuals are of similar temperament and anticipating the potential criticism that at present rich and poor are temperamentally different, argued that there is evidence that with greater income equality and with time any differences of temperament and taste would disappear. He satisfied himself, by appeal to evidence based on social inquiries, that the assumption he proposed was a plausible one. But in a strict sense, he did not prove it. The subsequent discussions of welfare theory have started with the problem of the meaning and measurability of utility and that of the validity of interpersonal comparisons and have inevitably led to the difficulties of measuring the national income in welfare terms and defining the circumstances in which it can be said to have increased. In particular, ingenious attempts have been made to identify the cases in which, without any interpersonal comparisons and thus without ambiguity, welfare can be said to have been increased. But even with the addition of the compensation principle, these discussions have tended to leave untouched a large number of real cases in which (as in the case of redistributional taxation) the poorer may be sup-
PIGOU, ARTHUR CECIL posed to benefit at the expense of the richer who will suffer some loss; even the compensation principle does not provide a complete and satisfactory solution. Pigou himself took no active part in these discussions, but he was persuaded in 1951 (when he was in his 74th year) to contribute to the American Economic Review a short article which shows his final thinking. In this final summing up of his thinking, Pigou argued, first, that (in Bertrand Russell's words) satisfactions are not in principle incomparable, even if they are not directly measurable. One can thus attach meaning to marginal changes. But he conceded that one cannot hope to establish absolute magnitudes of total utility or to be able to answer the question (which in his Study in Public Finance [1928] he had attempted to answer) whether a tax proportioned to total income will inflict equal sacrifice upon everyone, whatever the size of his income. Second, he turned to interpersonal comparisons and argued that "the utilities enjoyed by different people are not in their nature incomparable. . . . The question whether they are comparable in fact is a more difficult one" (1951, pp. 291-292). His final stand so well states not only his own attitude and that of Robertson (who in this, as in many other respects, remained his pupil and adherent) but also the attitude of many working economists, other than the specialists in this field, that it deserves quotation in full: Now, if we take random groups of people of the same race and brought up in the same country, we find that in many features that are comparable by objective tests they are on the average pretty much alike; and, indeed, for fundamental characters we need not limit ourselves to people of the same race and country. On this basis we are entitled, I submit, to infer by analogy that they are probably pretty much alike in other respects also. In all practical affairs we act on that supposition. We cannot prove that it is true. But we do not need to do so. Nobody can prove that anybody besides himself exists, but, nevertheless, everybody is quite sure of it. We do not, in short, and there is no reason why we should, start from a tabula rasa, binding ourselves to hold every opinion which the natural man entertains to be guilty until it is proved innocent. The burden is the other way. To deny this is to wreck, n ot merely Welfare Economics, but the whole apparatus of practical thought. On the basis of analogy, observation and intercourse, inter-personal comparisons can, as I think, properly be made; and, moreover, unless we have a special reason to believe the contrary, a given amount of stuff may be presumed to yield a similar amount of satisfaction, not indeed as between any one man and any other, but as between representative members of groups of individuals, such as the citizens of Birmingham and the citizens of
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Leeds. This is all that we need to allow this branch of Welfare Economics to function. Of course, in working it out, positive conclusions can only be reached subject to very important qualifications, (ibid., pp. 292293) Pigou, that is to say, remained to the end a believer in the validity of the welfare economics that he had done so much to create. He admitted that certain conclusions rested on assumptions that could not be proved, but he believed that these assumptions accorded best with the available evidence. He believed that the economics of policy making was a serious academic study and not merely a politically loaded exercise. In some repects Pigou, even if imprecise, at least was on the side of the angels: If he believed, rather than proved, that a transfer from richer to poorer was likely to increase welfare, it was, one suspects, partly because he was the sort of person he was. Public involvement and retreat. Throughout his life he was a passionate believer in justice; this was apparent in the way he handled all the problems of running the faculty of economics at Cambridge. If you were working with him, you had to satisfy him that what you proposed was a completely just solution of the problem in hand. To him it was just and proper, whatever could or could not be proved about capacity to absorb satisfactions, that the poor should be treated as if they were equal in value and capacity to the rich. If one could invent exceptions, the exceptions would seem, to anyone of his Victorian uprightness, a case of special pleading. He was always a protector and defender of the underdog. At moments we could visualize him as the severe but just head of the school at Harrow. Pigou's early years, before he was made professor, were the years of the great tariff disputes. Fresh from his triumphs in the Union debates, Pigou threw himself into the conflict and toured the country making free-trade speeches. The probable line of his argument can be deduced from political pamphlets, including The Riddle of the Tariff (1903), and from the much more sophisticated and academic Protective and Preferential Import Duties (1906). But to those who knew him only later in life, what is interesting is that at this stage he was a speaker widely in demand and responsive to those demands, anxious to influence public opinion and policy. With Alfred Marshall he was a signatory in 1903 of the professors' letter to The Times, which gained some notoriety in the tariff disputes of the day. In this phase of his life he was very far from being the recluse he became in later years. His powerful conscience created problems for
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him when war came in 1914, as was the case with many of his Cambridge contemporaries. Although still young (he was then 36), he was not prepared to undertake military service that entailed an obligation to destroy human life. But he devoted all his university vacations to driving an ambulance for a Friends' ambulance unit, and he insisted, no doubt at the instigation of the same conscience, on undertaking jobs of particular danger. Toward the end of the war he was persuaded by Clapham, in peacetime one of his colleagues at King's, to accept a post in the Board of Trade. He achieved, however, no distinction as a civil servant. It could not be claimed for him that he ever possessed the practical administrative abilities that carried Keynes, Walter Lay ton, Hubert Henderson, and others of the Cambridge economists of that generation rapidly into positions of authority and responsibility. He was never, as an economist, quick to see intuitively the order of magnitude and the potential dangers of economic forces, and he was never a person to whom colleagues turned instinctively for advice in the sphere of economic policy making. This limitation betrayed him when, first as a member of the Cunliffe Committee of 19181919 and later as a member of the Chamberlain Committee of 1924-1925 on currency and Bank of England note issues, he was one of those who recommended an early return to the gold standard at the pre-1914 exchange rate—-a. policy that was to be flagellated by Keynes in his Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill (1925). From the early 1920s onward, Pigou withdrew, save for brief exceptions and an occasional letter to The Times, from taking part in national affairs and devoted himself more and more completely to Cambridge. Increasingly, over these years, Pigou retreated into the ordered life of a recluse. He lectured a couple of hours a week in a course which, excellent as it was, remained essentially unchanged for twenty years and cost him little effort. He worked incessantly and regularly at his books. He consumed all that was written in economics, seeking always realistic illustrations for quotation in his own work, and in addition he devoured every detective story available. He would march out on an afternoon walk to Coton or thereabouts. Within this private world were a few privileged friends. They were usually chosen because they shared his love of mountains, and they climbed with him at Buttermere, where he had built a house, or in the Alps. No account of Pigou would be complete without mention of the mountains. These he loved, with these he illustrated problems in his lectures, and to these he hurried away when term ended. He was
a keen and enthusiastic, but not a supremely great, climber; he introduced to climbing many who, like Wilfrid Noyce, became greater climbers. Around Buttermere he invented and pioneered new rock climbs. In the Alps he achieved most of what is possible to the best. Into this private world few women were admitted; the exceptions in later life were the wives of his climbing friends and other women who knew him in that life. His clothes progressively became more and more those of a hermit, and one never knew in what sartorial disarray or in what superannuated castoffs he would next appear. It was through exposure while climbing that he acquired an illness affecting the heart, which from the beginning of the 1930s increasingly curtailed both his climbing and his other activities. This affliction greatly impaired his vigor and energy and left him, through the rest of his life, with intermittent phases of debility. It affected his lecturing: in the 1920s he had been vigorous and immensely stimulating; in the 1930s the liveliness and stimulus somehow slipped out of the lectures; and in his later years, although essentially unchanged, they had lost something of their power to grip an audience. And in the same way, something of the vigor and domination departed from his writing, distinguished as it still remained. Other writings. Over these years he had written much. Unlike the present generation, he tended to write books rather than articles, although on occasion he contributed the latter also. In 1914 appeared Unemployment, a small, popular book in which Pigou, following the thinking of that time, attributed unemployment principally to lack of flexibility of wage rates. In the 1920s there appeared two books reflecting his interest in war finance, A Capital Levy and a Levy on War Wealth (1920Z?) and The Political Economy of War (1921), books which had great influence on current thought. In 1923 a collection of his journal articles was published, entitled Essays in Applied Economics; in this volume was included an important article which had first appeared in 1917 in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, "The Value of Money." In a period in which economists at Cambridge were all expectantly waiting for Marshall to publish his formulation of monetary theory (Money, Credit & Commerce appeared only in 1923), this 1917 article had for long been the only printed source other than Marshall's evidence before the Gold and Silver Commission. Industrial Fluctuations (1927), A Study in Public Finance (1928), and The Theory of Unemployment (1933) continued Pigou's stream of output.
PIGOU, ARTHUR CECIL They represent the most distinguished work of the pre-Keynesian epoch and played a significant part in the rapid development of economics during that period. Inevitably these books, in retrospect, have become dated more than his work in other fields. But one wonders whether some of this work, with its emphasis on variations of harvests, on variations of the rates of invention and of consumer stock-building of newly invented durables, and on other nonmacroeconomic factors, may not be overdue for rediscovery and adaption to newer macroeconomic theories. In 1935 there followed The Economics of Stationary States. This book, which appeared shortly after the publication of the ideas developed by Chamberlin and Joan Robinson and makes occasional use of concepts worked out by them, is in another sense very remote from their thinking. Pigou set himself the question of the way in which equilibrium is reached in a stationary state, defined rigorously as one in which the population, its quality and age and sex distribution, its stock of equipment, technology, and tastes, are all fixed. He approached his results through a long series of simplifying assumptions, beginning with Robinson Crusoe economics and progressing only by stages into the problems of specialization and exchange and a monetary economy with markets, many commodities, elements of monopoly, of transport cost, and the rest. He rejected the idea of a progression from perfect competition to monopoly through a chain of closer and less close substitutes. He assumed that "there can only be one single type of (homogeneous) commodity or service. Commodities that are good substitutes for one another are not, as is sometimes suggested, in 'an imperfectly competitive market.' My use does not allow this. In respect of any number of different commodities or services, however good substitutes they may be, there are at least that number of different markets" (1935, pp. 77-78). Pigou was, in fact, not directly concerned in this book with the same problems as Chamberlin and Joan Robinson. As "The Passage to Real Life," its last chapter, makes clear, this work on stationary states presented itself to his mind as a path-clearing operation in a longer progress toward a more dynamic economics. But he conceived of the development of an economy, not as more or less steady, dictated by continuous technical progress and capital accumulation, but rather as a set of steps— stationary states that are disturbed by spasmodic changes in technology, in accumulation, or in other factors. A new set of environmental conditions Would imply a transition (which, he emphasized,
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lay outside the scope of the book) toward a new stationary state. This work represents Pigou's analytical skill at its highest. But it made curiously little impression on contemporary economics, either in Cambridge, elsewhere in England, or in America, and it now seldom receives detailed study. A rereading discloses some of the difficulties of relating Pigou's thinking to that of others. He seldom acknowledged an idea; his acknowledgments are more numerous than a very unworthy index would suggest, but they are, as always, almost entirely acknowledgments of facts or terminology. That he had read and absorbed a great deal is evident. But, like Keynes, he was never a writer who began with a systematic reading of the literature of his predecessors and contemporaries. Throughout this period there were numerous revisions of The Economics of Welfare; there were, in fact, four main editions and six additional reprintings between 1920, when Wealth and Welfare first acquired its new name, and 1952. These occupied most of Pigou's time. There were also a variety of smaller books of essays and lectures; as well as some elementary and pedagogic writings of lesser importance. These latter include Income (1946), The Veil of Money (1949), and Essays in Economics (1952). For a period they had their place in the teaching of economics. Relationship with Keynes. Keynes's General Theory appeared in 1936. It affected Pigou doubly. First, Keynes had dared to attack Marshall, for whom Pigou had more than a pupil's reverence. The contemporary Cambridge belief that "it's all in Marshall" was certainly Pigou's belief. But it was enshrined in the more fundamental belief that if you could not find it in Marshall, it was because Marshall had had to write for the general reader and not because the idea would have been anything new to Marshall. That apart, Keynes had made his chief attack on the classical economics as embodied in Pigou's Theory of Unemployment (1933). Thus, Pigou was on the defensive—principally, I think, because of Marshall; while he had a great sense of authority as professor, he was not a vain man, and as subsequent events showed, he was not unprepared to admit that he had been in the wrong. His defense took the form of a severe review of the General Theory in Economica. He condemned Keynes's "patronage extended to his old master Marshall," and his iconoclastic treatment of classical economists as a group. Thus, indignantly, he imagined Keynes making the following attack: "Professor Pigou, in a book on Unemployment, . . . has committed a variety of sins. Professor Pigou is a classical economist; therefore
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the classical economists have committed these sins!" (Pigou 1936, pp. 115-116). In defense of Marshall, Pigou was prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice himself. Whether Keynes could have achieved a radical rethinking of economics without wounding, as he did, Pigou and Robertson, among others, is a question that will be eternally debated. I have always believed that this was the sad but necessary cost of the revolution of thought. With Robertson, the wounds went so deep that they never could be healed. With Pigou, time brought a healing. And indeed the wounds were never as severe: Keynes and Pigou were both fellows of King's; they dined at the same high table; they immensely respected each other. And Keynes, anxious as he was to see his theories accepted, was almost equally anxious to see Pigou's reputation preserved; he was very conscious that in attacking Pigou, he was attacking ideas which he himself had held only a few years earlier. When Pigou asked for something to be published in the Economic Journal, which at that time Keynes and I edited, Keynes would accept it without demur but would seek to persuade Pigou to agree to minor changes on points where he believed that subsequent discussion might show Pigou to be wrong. When Keynes was ill for a period and I accepted from Pigou, and printed as Pigou wrote it, the article "Real and Money Wage Rates in Relation to Unemployment" (1937), Keynes was greatly distressed lest I should have done something that might discredit Pigou. It was an oddly tolerant and mutually admiring relationship, which never came near to reaching the misery of the cleft between Robertson and Keynes. Pigou continued his work on the problems of the General Theory, publishing in 1941 Employment and Equilibrium, which remains a vigorous defense of the classical position, with new refinements but with essentially the traditional approach. He emphasized the multiplicity of the causes of unemployment and argued that it results from a complicated system of interrelated factors. He brought to the surface the real-balance effect that has since come to be associated with his name. This socalled Pigou effect identifies one of the possible ways in which rising prices may tend to reduce excessive demand and thus restore equilibrium: they decrease the net indebtedness of the public sector to the private sector, and this reduction in the real assets of the private sector may serve to lower aggregate demand. But Pigou's thinking in this field continued to change and develop; he had, indeed, a remarkable fertility of mind until well into his seventies. And in 1949 Pigou, eight years
after retirement, asked some of us who were then running the economics faculty at Cambridge whether he might have a couple of lectures in which to say certain things about the General Theory. In those two lectures, even more moving to hear than to read, he said, in effect, that he had come to feel, with the passage of time, that he had failed to appreciate some of the important things which Keynes had been trying to argue in the General Theory and that he had been oversevere in his Economica review. It was the noble act of a scrupulously honest man, who put truth beyond vanity and another's reputation beyond his own. Assessment. It is not easy to place Pigou in the theogony of economists. In the reactions of the 1960s he has probably been more underrated than any other economist of first distinction. Outside the field of welfare economics, one does not instantaneously associate him with any of the major instruments of economic analysis that one uses daily. He is not, in that sense, to be ranked with Smith, Ricardo, Marshall, or Keynes, if one thinks only of the British school. But modern economics would have been very different without him. MarsJiall was almost certainly right in thinking that Pigou was the proper successor to create a new disciplined and professional school of analytical economics in Cambridge. As teacher and creator of a tradition within Marshall's economics tripos, he set a pattern for a generation of Cambridge economists, and Pigou's pupils, teaching a Pigouvian version of Marshall's economics, are widely distributed around the Anglo-Saxon world. But Pigou's innate and notorious shyness, ever increasing as the years went by, cut him off from all informal discussion of economics, both with Cambridge colleagues and foreign visitors. Pigouvian economics came from the brain of Pigou and from his reading of published material; it was not refined by the cut and thrust of personal argument. Occasionally he would ask privileged pupils and friends (David Champernowne for example) to help him with mathematical or other analysis and accept from them criticism and suggestions. But to the ordinary run of his Cambridge colleagues he could not have been more different from Keynes and Robertson in these respects. Even those of us who were privileged to stay with him in the mountains learned to limit our conversation to the problems of ascents, the merits and demerits of the authors of detective stories, and, occasionally, the flaws in a book on economics, to save the others the labor of reading it. Pigou's isolation from the world inevitably meant
PINEL, PHILIPPE isolation from foreign economists. He read conscientiously, but he was not sufficiently intimate with any non-Marshallians to project himself into their minds and thinking; and he was too loyal an admirer of Marshall to want very much to do so. Pigou's great qualities were those of the classical economists. He was, it might truly be said, the last of the classical school and the last of the great Victorians, who had the misfortune to survive to an age which had lost its reverence for them. He himself showed to the end unflagging interest in the work of the younger generation and no trace of embitterment at its development of economics along lines that he had not foreseen. AUSTIN ROBINSON [See also CONSUMPTION FUNCTION; MONEY, article on QUANTITY THEORY; WELFARE ECONOMICS; and
the
biographies of KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD; MARSHALL; ROBERTSON; SIDGWICK.] WORKS BY PIGOU 1901 Robert Browning as a Religious Teacher: Being the Burney Essay for 1900. London: Clay. 1903 The Riddle of the Tariff. London: Johnson. 1905 Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace. New York: Macmillan. (1906) 1935 Protective and Preferential Import Duties. London School of Economics and Political Science. 1912 Wealth and Welfare. London: Macmillan. 1914 Unemployment. New York: Holt. (1917) 1951 The Value of Money. Pages 162-183 in American Economic Association, Readings in Monetary Theory. Philadelphia: Blakiston. -> First published in Volume 32 of the Quarterly Journal of Economics. It is thought that Pigou's first title for the essay was "The Exchange Value of Legal Tender Money," and it appears under this title in Essays in Applied Economics 1923. (1920a) 1960 The Economics of Welfare. 4th ed. London: Macmillan. 1920fo A Capital Levy and a Levy on War Wealth. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. (1921) 1941 The Political Economy of War. New & rev. ed. New York: Macmillan. 1923 Essays in Applied Economics. London: King. (1927) 1929 Industrial Fluctuations. 2d ed. London: Macmillan. (1928) 1956 A Study in Public Finance. 3d ed., rev. New York: St. Martins. 1933 The Theory of Unemployment. London: Macmillan. 1935 The Economics of Stationary States. London: Macmillan. 1936 [A Book Review of] General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, by J. M. Keynes. Economica New Series 3:115-132. 1937 Real and Money Wage Rates in Relation to Unemployment. Economic Journal 47:405-422. (1941) 1949 Employment and Equilibrium: A Theoretical Discussion. 2d rev. ed. London: Macmillan. (1946) 1948 Income: An Introduction to Economics. London: Macmillan. 1949 The Veil of Money. London: Macmillan.
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1950
Keynes's General Theory: A Retrospective View. London: Macmillan. 1951 Some Aspects of Welfare Economics. American Economic Review 41:287-302. -> This article forms Appendix XI of the 1952 and subsequent printings of Economics of Welfare (1920a). 1952 Essays in Economics. London: Macmillan. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
BRAHMANANDA, P. R. 1959 A. C. Pigou (1877-1959). Indian Economic Journal 6:466-487. CHAMPERNOWNE, DAVID G. 1959 Arthur Cecil Pigou, 1877-1959. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A 122:263-265. JOHNSON, HARRY G. 1960 Arthur Cecil Pigou, 18771959. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 26:150-155. KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1925 The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill. London: Woolf. KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1936 The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmillan. -»• A paperback edition was published in 1965 by Harcourt. KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD 1937 The General Theory of Employment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 51: 209-223. MARSHALL, ALFRED (1923) 1960 Money, Credit &• Commerce. New York: Kelley.
PINEL, PHILIPPE Modern psychiatry was born of the efforts of a few great pioneers. Among them, Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) stands out: his was the first major achievement, at once scientific and humanitarian, in the treatment of insanity. The oldest of seven children, Pinel was born to a pious Roman Catholic family in a small village in the Tarn in southern France. His grandfather and father were physicians; his mother, a very strong character, dominated his youth. Her death, when Pinel was only 15, moved him to take orders. He joined the Oratorians but soon left monastic life, becoming instead deeply imbued with the new philosophical outlook of Locke, Condillac, Voltaire, and Rousseau. Pinel was a brilliant student and a great admirer of the classics, of Hippocrates, and of Plutarch; he read Greek, Latin, and also English, from which he was to translate some of the works of his contemporary, William Cullen. Initially Pinel studied in the Faculty of Letters at Montpellier, but he was above all interested in natural science and mathematics. Personal acquaintance with Paul Joseph Barthez, a renowned physician of the faculty at Montpellier, led him to study medicine. Studious, reserved, and simple in tastes, Pinel had few friends, but those he had were close ones, especially Jean Antoine Chaptal,
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the future scientist. Pinel's erudition made a variety of careers possible, but once he arrived at Paris he decided to devote himself to psychiatry. Pinel's career is inseparable from its political context: The French Revolution made it a duty to protect all individuals, even the insane, against enslavement by others. Pinel first became professor of medical physics, but he was next appointed physician of the hospital of Bicetre, the ancient grange aux gueux ("beggars' farm") at the gates of Paris, where "the insane . . . are treated as criminals, by mercenaries, contrary to either reason or humanity." Pinel denounced this state of affairs, asserting, "I am convinced that the only reason these insane people are so intractable is that they are deprived of air and liberty" (Semelaigne 1888, p. 35). At that time they were, in fact, kept chained. Thanks to his persistent efforts, reason triumphed over prejudice, and soon the insane were no longer regarded as possessed by demons, but as mentally ill. This was certainly Pinel's greatest achievement. However, he refused to accept the excesses of the revolutionary movement: churches were being robbed, and Pinel from within his hospital coolly condemned the raging iconoclasts and the powerful authorities who supported them. During one uprising the mob was about to hang him; he was saved by the vigilance of a recently "unchained" patient whom he had taken into his personal service. Beginning in 1795, Pinel held a position at the Salpetriere hospital in Paris. There too he had to start from the ground up, replacing the orderlies, refurbishing the sordid rooms, and eliminating the use of chains. His psychiatric researches led to two fundamental works, La nosographie philosophiquc (1798), awarded a prize by the Directory, and Le traite medico-philosophique sur I'alienation mentale (1801), his major work. He had a wide audience among medical students; although not eloquent and sometimes absent-minded, Pinel was greatly appreciated in scientific quarters. The fundamental innovations to be found in Pinel's works are of several kinds. First, he insisted on the humanitarian treatment of patients. He had a humane, moral attitude toward the mentally ill, having long talks with them in which he "skillfully gave them a drive that they thought was due to their own initiative" (Semelaigne 1888, p. 118). He substituted understanding and gentleness for violence, strait jackets for chains, and insisted on the temporary nature of even this restraint. Second, he made administrative changes. He
distributed patients in several pavilions according to their condition, thus foreshadowing the dynamic organization of the psychiatric hospital of today. He also urged that asylums be governed by physicians. Finally, he made innovations in therapy. He tried to diversify the treatment of the "raving" patients according to the etiology of their disease. He saw to it that they had games and music to amuse them. "Skill," he said, "consists less in the use of remedies than in the deeply judicious art of using or not using them at the right times" (ibid., p. 102). He completely rejected unnecessary bleedings and sudden cold baths but made good use of warm, sleep-inducing baths. In addition to such physical measures, he had workshops set up for therapeutic purposes, paying the patients wages. He advocated having farms—to be worked and managed by the convalescent patients—attached to asylums. Far in advance of his time, he proposed the establishment of institutions for convalescents in transition between the hospital and the outside world; this innovation was developed further by his students. The doctrine that Pinel had worked out was not universally accepted after his death. Although the basic elements of his approach were applied, they were applied incompletely and without the effort and commitment he had had. We do not know if this failure was due to postrevolutionary political reaction, to a lack of medical men capable of carrying on his work, or to the absence of a sufficiently elaborated theoretical structure. In any case, only today are the foundations laid by Pinel being properly developed. P. SIVADON and P. SABOURIN [For discussion of the subsequent development of Pinel's ideas, see CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY; MENTAL
DISORDERS; MENTAL DISORDERS, TREATMENT OF; PSYCHIATRY.] WORKS BY PINEL (1798) 1818 La nosographie philosophique: Ou, la methode de I'analyse appliquee a la medecine. 6th ed. Paris: Bros son. (1801) 1962 A Treatise of Insanity. New York: Hafner. -» First published as Le traite medico-philosophique sur I'alienation mentale. WORKS ABOUT PINEL
COURBON, P. 1927 Pinel psychiatre. Annales medicopsychologiques 85, part 2:30—52. FOUCAULT, MICHEL (1961) 1965 Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. New York: Pantheon. -» First published as Folie et deraison: Histoire de la folie a I'age classique. LECHLER, WALTHER H. 1960 Neue Ergebnisse in der Forschung iiber Philippe Pinel. Thesis, Univ. of
PIRENNE, HENRI Munich. -» This work is the result of research conducted by Pierre Chabbert and Walther H. Lechler. PINEL, C. 1860 Philippe Pinel. Journal of Psychological Medicine and Mental Pathology 13:184-205. SEMELAIGNE, RENE 1888 Philippe Pinel et son oeuvre au point de vue de la medecine mentale. Paris: Imprimeries Reunies.
PIRACY See INTERNATIONAL CRIMES.
PIRENNE, HENRI Henri Pirenne (1863-1935) was a Belgian historian. After studying under Godefroid Kurth and Paul Fredericq, he received his doctorate of letters at the University of Liege in 1883. In 1885 he was appointed to a teaching position at that university but the following year moved to the University of Ghent. There he taught until 1930 and between 1919 and 1921 acted as rector of the university. He taught medieval history and from 1893 on held the first chair of economic history in Belgium. Several circumstances contributed to Pirenne's interest in the social aspects of history. He had personal experience with the Walloon woolen industry, since his father managed a factory in the town of Verviers, and he became aware of the acuteness of social distress in Belgian industry at the time that he completed his university studies. His interest in social and economic history was enhanced by postgraduate studies in Germany with Gustav Schmoller and through his acquaintance with Karl Lamprecht; his contact with Arthur Giry in Paris in 1884-1885 strengthened his interest in urban history. Pirenne worked out a synthesis of social, economic, and political factors in the study of the history of his own country (1900-1932), especially of certain mass movements. Thus, he ascribed the process of political unification of the areas on opposite sides of the language frontier to their similar economic and social structure. This does not mean that he was a historical materialist: important individuals play a significant part in his explanation of events, as does chance. Throughout his career, Pirenne studied the history of towns. In his first important contribution to this field (1893-1895), he rejected previous e xplanations of the origin of towns. His own theory w as that towns developed as the result of the revival of commerce in the tenth and eleventh centuries and that their original nuclei were settleof merchants. When he later, in 1927, wrote
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Les villes du moyen age, characteristically subtitled Essai d'histoire economique et sociale, he remained loyal to his original theories but developed certain aspects of the subject more fully. He expanded especially the discussion of Italian and Russian towns. In order to place in proper perspective the effect of the development of the cloth industry on the growth of Flemish towns, Pirenne decided to write a history of that industry. A preliminary step was the collection and publication of the available source materials, and this was accomplished by Pirenne in collaboration with Georges Espinas (1906-1924). Pirenne himself, however, was never to write the history of the industry; others did so, piecemeal, according to his guidelines. Pirenne pioneered in historical demography. His study of the population of Ypres in the fifteenth century set the pattern for such studies in Belgium (1903). Another of his important intellectual contributions was contained in his article "The Stages in the Social History of Capitalism" (1914), which aroused great interest in international historical circles at the beginning of this century; it presented the theory that the evolution of capitalism did not follow a straight line but rather a cyclical pattern, in which each phase of development toward freedom and progress was followed by one characterized by regulation and conservatism, which was in turn succeeded by a phase in which a generation of homines novi reintroduced progressive tendencies. Pirenne's comprehensive interpretation of medieval social and economic history in his Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe (1933) was to influence economic historians for at least a quarter of a century after his death. Two aspects of this work deserve particular mention: the importance of the role ascribed to long-distance trade as the primary stimulus to economic evolution and the characterization of the end of the Middle Ages as a period of contraction. The scope of Pirenne's influence may be inferred from his close connection with the two most important Continental periodicals devoted to social and economic history, the Vierteljahrschrift fur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte and the Annales d'histoire economique et sociale: both these journals published important articles by Pirenne in their earliest issues. Even after his death, Pirenne attracted considerable attention through his posthumously published book, Mohammed and Charlemagne (1935), in which he suggested that the crucial break between
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antiquity and the Middle Ages did not occur in the fifth century but rather about the year 700, when the Muslims had conquered the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The theory was based chiefly on economic considerations and gave rise to heated controversy. H. VAN WERVEKE [Directly related are the entries CAPITALISM; CITY. Other relevant material may be found in HISTORY, article on ECONOMIC HISTORY.] WORKS BY PIRENNE
(1893-1895) 1939 L'origine des constitutions urbaines au moyen age. Volume 1, pages 1-110 in Henri Pirenne, Les villes et les institutions urbaines. Paris: Alcan; Brussels: Nouvelle Societe d'Editions. 1900-1932 Histoire de Belgique. 7 vols. Brussels: Lamertin. (1903) 1951 Les denombrements de la population d'Ypres au XVe siecle (1412-1506). Pages 458-488 in Henri Pirenne, Histoire economique de I'occident medieval. Bruges (Belgium): Desclee de Brouwer. 1906-1924 ESPINAS, GEORGES; and PIRENNE, HENRI (editors) Recueil de documents relatifs a I'histoire de I'industrie drapiere en Flandre. 4 vols. Brussels: Kiessling. -» Additions to this work were published in Volume 93 of the Academic Roy ale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-arts de Belgique, Brussels, Commission Royale d'Histoire, Bulletin. (1910) 1915 Belgian Democracy: Its Early History. London and New York: Longmans. -» First published as Les anciennes democraties des Pays-Bas. A paperback edition under the title Early Democracies in the Low Countries was published in 1963 by Harper. 1914 The Stages in the Social History of Capitalism. American Historical Review 19:494-515. (1927) 1956 Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade. Gloucester, Mass.: Smith. -> First published as Les villes du moyen age: Essai d'histoire economique et sociale. 1932 Guilds, European. Volume 7, pages 208-214 in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. (1933) 1936 Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe. London: Trubner. -> First published in French. A paperback edition was published in 1956 by Harcourt. A new, revised French edition with a critical bibliography by H. van Werveke was published in 1963 by Presses Universitaires de France. (1935) 1958 Mohammed and Charlemagne. London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Barnes & Noble. -> First published, posthumously, in French. A paperback edition was published in 1963 by World. (1936) 1956 A History of Europe: From the Invasions to the XVI Century. 8th ed. New York: University Books. -» First published, posthumously, in French. SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
GANSHOF, F. L. 1959 Henri Pirenne. Volume 30, columns 671—723 in Academie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-arts de Belgique, Brussels, Biographie nationale. Brussels: Bruylant. Henri Pirenne: Hommages et souvenirs. 2 vols. 1938 Brussels: Nouvelle Societe d'Editions. LYON, BRYCE 1960 L'oeuvre de Henri Pirenne apres vingt-cinq ans. Moyen age 66:437-493.
PITT-RIVERS, A. H. L. F. Augustus Henry Lane Fox (1827-1900), the man who now holds a very high place in the history of archeology and anthropology as General Pitt-Rivers, was born into an ordinary English and Scottish aristocratic family. His father was W. A. Lane Fox of Hope Hall in Yorkshire, and his mother, Lady Caroline, was a daughter of the eighteenth earl of Morton. He changed his name to Pitt-Rivers in 1880, when he unexpectedly inherited the estates of his uncle George Pitt, the second baron Rivers. Owing to his own exceptional endowments, he and his descendants were to enter into a more intellectual aristocracy, for he himself married a daughter of Lord Stanley of Alderley, and one of his daughters became the wife of the well-known archeologist John Lubbock, afterward Lord Avebury. He began his career in the conventional aristocratic tradition, going to Sandhurst Military College and afterward being commissioned in the Grenadier Guards. He was. in fact, a successful soldier, distinguishing himself in the field in the Crimean War and retiring with the rank of lieutenant general. Quite early, however, his originality and gift for research made themselves felt and he was charged with tasks which involved investigating the history of small arms in the British Army and, subsequently, their improvement. His work in this field had important military results, but far more important was the influence it had on his own thinking. This was a time when biological evolution was on everyone's mind, and Pitt-Rivers' study of muskets and rifles made him realize that principles similar to those of biological evolution could be applied to human artifacts. They, too, evolved in a sequence of minute improvements—or, occasionally, followed abortive lines of development which led to their disappearance. While he thought, he also bought—-and gathered in. He had soon amassed large collections of specimens, some ancient, some the handiwork of surviving primitive peoples (or savages, as he usually called them). His house in London became so crowded with weapons, skulls, stone implements, pottery, and other works of primitive art and craft that he decided to found a public museum, arranged according to his evolutionary system. The authorities established the greater part of it in Bethnal Green in east London, and Pitt-Rivers himself wrote the illustrated catalogue in time for the opening in 1874 (South Kensington Museum 1874).
PITT-RIVERS, A. H. L. F. In a paper presented to the Anthropological Institute in that year, he pointed out that, while archeology had imposed classifications on prehistoric artifacts, nothing of the kind had been attempted in ethnology and museums had hitherto been arranged by regions (see Evolution of Culture). His own collections were now exhibited to show the development of forms and their transmission from one people to another. Although he classified the objects of material culture, he insisted on the mental processes behind them, seeing each category as representing an idea —the idea of the spear thrower, of the bow—each original idea subsequently being modified by lesser ideas for improvements. He carried the biological analogy so far as to say that human ideas can be divided into genera, species, and varieties. The collections soon grew too large for the accommodation at Bethnal Green and were transferred to Oxford, where the Pitt-Rivers Museum, still arranged on evolutionary lines, now plays an important part in the teaching of anthropology at the university. Pitt-Rivers had long been interested in ancient cultures, and when he inherited the vast (29,000 acres) Rivers estates around Cranborne Chase in Dorset, the focus of his attention inevitably shifted from ethnology to prehistory. For the Chase lay in the heart of chalk country exceptionally rich in prehistoric remains, and he found himself the possessor of large numbers of monuments dating from the Stone Age down to Roman times. It is a proof of his gifts and of his stamina that, beginning in a new field on retirement from military service, when he was over fifty years old, he was able to make himself one of the world's pioneers in scientific archeology. Almost at once he set to work on the excavation of burial mounds, earthworks, and prehistoric villages. And the precision and thoroughness which he had developed in the army he applied to such effect that his excavating techniques were, from the first, as accurate as those demanded by modern standards. In particular he saw that things still incomprehensible to him would be understood by later workers and that it was therefore a duty to record everything he observed in meticulous detail. This he did, regardless of either time or cost, and as a result it has indeed proved possible for Modern archeologists to utilize his findings. He was an innovator, too, in paying attention especially to the exploration of settlement sites and m excavating them completely. These laborious a nd expensive undertakings were in striking contrast to the hasty opening of burial mounds which
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was then still prevalent. They provided almost the first reliable evidence concerning the living conditions of early man in Britain. He not only recorded every type of find on plans and sectional drawings that were far ahead of their time but also had exact models carved in mahogany of all the principal excavated monuments. Soon he had again accumulated so much material that only a museum could house it. He had one built not far from his house at Rushmore, and it is still maintained, with its fine display of local antiquities, in the midst of the Dorset countryside. He had set altogether new standards in excavation, and he did no less in scientific publication. Between 1887 and 1898 he published his discoveries in four privately and sumptuously produced volumes entitled Excavations in Cranborne Chase. The importance of Pitt-Rivers' work received adequate public recognition even in his own day, although his reputation has certainly increased as archeology has caught up with this extraordinary pioneer. In fact, he became the first inspector of ancient monuments in Britain after the passing of the Ancient Monuments Protection Act in 1882. He was made a fellow of the Royal Society, vice-president of the Society of Antiquaries of London, and was a most energetic president of the Anthropological Institute. Although he had made himself a scientist, General Pitt-Rivers remained very much a soldierly aristocrat. He caused his numerous assistants to wear his colors and on occasion to ride to excavations on penny-farthing bicycles, following humbly in the wake of his high dogcart. As a landowner he was, however, somewhat eccentric. He planted his estate at Rushmore with exotic trees and shrubs and stocked it with wild animals, which are said sometimes to have terrified visitors and countryfolk. He also provided a brass band to play for his tenants on Sundays—and expected them to attend. He remained true to his rational and scientific principles to the end. He ordered his body to be cremated after his death and left his head to the museum of the Royal College of Surgeons. This museum was destroyed by a bomb during World War n. JACQUETTA HAWKES [For discussion of the subsequent development of PittRivers' work, see ARCHEOLOGY.] WORKS BY PITT-RIVERS
1883
On the Development and Distribution of Primitive Locks and Keys. London: Chatto & Windus.
1 02
PLANNED PARENTHOOD
1887-1898 Excavations in Cranborne Chase, Near Rushmore, on the Borders of Dorset and Wilts: 1800-1896. 4 vols. London: Printed privately. 1890 King John's House, Tollard Royal, Wilts. London: Printed privately. 1900 Antique Works of Art From Benin: Collected by Lieutenant-General Pitt-Rivers. London: Printed privately. The Evolution ~f Culture, and Other Essays. Oxford: Clarendon, 1906. Edited by J. L. Myres. -» Essays first published between 1867 and 1875. See especially pages 1-19, "Principles of Classification." SUPPLEMENTARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
GRAY, HAROLD ST. GEORGE 1905 Index to Excavations in Cranborne Chase and King John's House, Tollard Royal. Taunton Castle, Somerset: Printed privately. -» See especially "A Memoir of Lieut.-General PittRivers," pages ix-xxxvi, and a bibliographical list of the works of Pitt-Rivers, pages xxxvii-xliii. SOUTH KENSINGTON MUSEUM, LONDON, BETHNAL GREEN BRANCH (1874) 1877 Catalogue of the Anthropological Collection Lent by Colonel Lane-Fox. London: Science and Art Department of the Museum. TYLOR, EDWARD B. 1901 Augustus Henry Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers: 1827-1900. Volume 22, pages 1140-1142 in Dictionary of National Biography, Supplement. London: Smith. WISSLER, CLARK 1934 Pitt-Rivers, Augustus Henry LaneFox. Volume 12, pages 141-142 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD See FERTILITY CONTROL.
PLANNING, ECONOMIC i. WESTERN EUROPE ii. EASTERN EUROPE in. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
J. Tinbergen John Michael Montias W. Arthur Lewis
WESTERN EUROPE
Planning is engaged in by all sorts of institutions; among them, business enterprises and governments. This article mainly deals with government planning. Present-day planning is rooted partly in socialism, partly in modern economic ideas as expressed in national accounts, Keynesian theories, and anticyclical policy generally. The latter expresses the desire to understand and influence the economy—the national economy, to begin with—as a whole. This desire was strengthened by the great depression, when it was clear that something had gone wrong. At the same time, planning, based on market analysis and similar techniques, has been increasingly applied in big business enterprises. Over-all government planning was not applied in western Europe before World War n. Restricting
ourselves to democratically ruled countries, we may say that the first examples of over-all planning were found in the United Kingdom, where the Economic Section of the Cabinet Offices prepared estimates of the national product and some of its components as a basis for the organization of the war effort. Immediately after the war, when a number of democracies started to function again, the Netherlands and Norway followed the British example— each in its own way and for the purpose of postwar reconstruction. France soon followed in 1946. In a sense, some national planning was imposed on all member countries of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), created to administer the European Recovery, or Marshall, Plan, which started operations in 1948. Not long afterward Italy began an exercise in planning, known as the Vanoni Plan, for a balanced development of north and south. This plan was not given official status but served as an important background to Italian policy. In Sweden and Denmark planning developed gradually out of business cycle policy: the annual reports, for instance, of the Swedish Konjunkturinstitut hesitantly progressed in presenting estimates of the next year's inflationary or deflationary gaps, adding suggestions for counteracting them. Several years later, in 1959, Belgium established its Programming Bureau. The remaining countries did not have official agencies in charge of planning, but all OEEC members fully cooperated in the planning exercise of that organization for the period 1955-1960 (OEEC 1957). The planning issue became relevant for Germany when, in its Action Program, the Commission of the European Economic Community stated the necessity for some planning at the community level (European Economic Community 1962). The topic was widely discussed (Albrecht 1964; Plitzko 1964), and these discussions showed the differences in terminology and ideology still prevailing in western Europe, mainly in Germany, though even there they were more seeming than real. This article will discuss the definition of planning which seems to be the most practical one; the theory of planning; the concepts of economic order and economic policy serving as the background of planning; the methods of short-term and long-term planning; the organization and procedure of planning activities; the supervision of plans and their testing; and the impact of planning on society. Definition and theory of planning. Present-day western European countries have "mixed" rather than purely "capitalist" or "free-enterprise" econ-
PLANNING, ECONOMIC: Western Europe omies. They have public sectors of considerable size, and they exert various types of controls over the private sectors. This state of affairs is a product of a pragmatic policy but is consistent with modern economic theory. If the question is asked what economic order—that is, what set of institutions— will maximize welfare under the constraints imposed upon us by nature—that is, the laws of technology and psychology—the answer is a mixed order (Tinbergen 1959; Myrdal 1960). The old idea of Paretian welfare economics, according to which free enterprise would produce the optimum, is tenable only if the laws of technology exclude external effects and indivisibilities [see WELFARE ECONOMICS]. Where external effects and indivisibilities do exist, activities characterized by either of them should not be left to private enterprise. A set of tasks for the community, represented by government, can be derived on the basis of this distinction. They consist of activities showing external effects or indivisible means of production and of a number of otherwise determined policy tasks. Among the former we have public production of energy, transportation services, education, and information. Among the latter we encounter the regulation of unstable markets, the redistribution of income (as required even by the Pareto optimum conditions), the organization of the monetary system, and the determination of the optimum level of savings and of an optimum level of total demand (high and stable employment). Taken together, these tasks constitute such a complicated set of activities that their efficient execution requires preparation. Planning is just that. (Over long periods the most desirable development of an economy should coincide more or less with the theoretical concept of optimal growth [see ECONOMIC GROWTH, article on MATHEMATICAL THEORY].) We will not use the word "planning" in the sense of a particular order or policy, such as a command order with detailed intervention. Depending on the scope of the tasks assumed by the government, planning of these tasks will also be more or less extensive. Independently of the scope of the tasks, however, their preparation requires, in principle, the determination of general goals for the most desirable economic development of the country. The government's activities then must be conducive to that most desirable development. To the extent that such an optimum development requires government activities, it represents a task-setting device for various public institutions. The delineation of private activities is not, as a rule, coercive but, rather, "indicative." It constitutes a background for
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the appraisal—in the future—of the actual accomplishment of the private sector. This does not necessarily mean that all deviations from the plan must be considered "errors" of the private sector. There may have been good reasons to deviate from the plan. Moreover, the difference between the role of the plan for the public sector and for the private sector should not be exaggerated. Only in the abstract can government completely control all its activities. In reality it consists of so many levels and units that its activities cannot all be determined at the top. The lower units, such as the municipalities, can be influenced mainly by indirect means, and there is not so much difference, from this point of view, between municipalities and private enterprises. Moreover, a certain degree of codetermination may be given to the private sector in the formation and the execution of the plan. Planning should be seen as a manifestation of the ever-growing tendency consciously to organize human activity. In this process there is a continuous search for efficiency in its broadest sense. In the particular case of economic planning this means, on the one hand, that social or group needs are increasingly recognized as aims and, on the other hand, that no means, including planning, should be used where not positively contributing to these aims. We observe a gradual expansion of the fields to which planning is being applied; thus, education is now rapidly becoming more planned than some decades ago, and there is a tendency to extend planning to ever larger geographical areas. Finally we observe the integration of hitherto isolated and incoherent pieces of planning into a broader, more coherent frame. Thus, town and country planning are now becoming integrated into national economic planning. Economic order and economic policy. We have already stated that the optimum economic order must be described as a certain set of institutions. Examples of such institutions are private enterprises, public enterprises, markets, social insurance schemes, tax systems, monetary systems, and hierarchies of public authorities. Institutions in turn are characterized by certain rules of conduct or as instruments of the society's economic policy. Examples are tax rates and social insurance benefits. Apart from a static concept of an optimum order, there is a continual process of striving for and managing the optimal order, which we usually call economic policy. In a general way, any economic policy may be described by its aims and its means. Both aims and means may be qualitative or quantitative.
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Most institutions as such must be described in qualitative terms; their rules of conduct or policy instruments can sometimes be described in a quantitative way. Thus, the level of a tax rate, of an import duty, or a public investment has a quantitative aspect. We will use the word "target" for a quantitative aim and the word "instrument" for a quantitative means and reserve the words "aims" and "means" for situations where both qualitative and quantitative aspects are present. There is a causal nexus from means to aims, with intermediary consequences of the use of means which may be called intermediate or derived aims, as distinct from final aims. Thus, the ultimate aim may be higher utility or satisfaction for the citizenry, but higher consumption may be the first derived aim, higher incomes the second, higher employment the third, and higher investments the fourth. Clearly, short-term policies will be characterized more by derived or "nearer-by" aims than long-term policies will be. We will put the dividing line between short-term and long-term policies at somewhat more than a year. The standard example of short-term plans will be an annual plan and that of long-term plans a five-year plan. Often a five-year plan will be classed as a mediumterm plan and the phrase "long-term plan" or "perspective plan" will be used to indicate 15- to 25-year plans. In western Europe the emphasis has been on the shorter range, mainly because of the already developed character of the economies. For less developed economies, perspective plans are more important than for developed economies. For short-term policy in western Europe a wellknown set of targets has been (1) full employment; (2) balance of payments equilibrium; (3) a level of net investment somewhere near 15 or 20 per cent of national income; (4) an increase in the share of lower income groups in national income; and (5) stable prices. It should be noted that full employment has been interpreted variously, but often as a level of unemployment less than 2 or 3 per cent of the labor force. It should also be noted that the fourth aim has seldom been expressed in figures and, finally, that price stability has not been attained. A compilation of the targets or "objectives" of economic policy in Western countries, including the United States, was made by Kirschen and his collaborators (Kirschen et al. 1964, p. 148). They added a listing of instruments, making a two-entry table indicating which instruments are supposed to help attain which objectives. The table contains 16 objectives: (1) full employment; (2) price sta-
bility; (3) improvement in the balance of payments; (4) expansion of production; (5) promotion of internal competition; (6) promotion of coordination; (7) increase in the mobility of labor; (8) increase in the mobility of capital; (9) international division of labor; (10) satisfaction of collective needs; (11) improvement in the distribution of income and wealth; (12) protection and priorities to regions or industries; (13) improvement in the pattern of private consumption; (14) security of supply; (15) improvement in the size or structure of population; and (16) reduction in working hours. The main instruments of economic policy in western European countries have been public finance and social insurance, the regulation of unstable markets, and some quantitative restrictions in foreign trade. A fuller list is given in the table just discussed. It is subdivided into 17 instruments of public finance; 17 instruments of money, credit, and the exchange rate; 16 instruments of direct control; and 11 types of changes in the institutional framework. These numbers probably do not exhaust the number of instruments available. One may enter into much more detail by distinguishing between a number of sectors or industries, and both in wartime and postwar Western economies and in communist-ruled economies, a very large number of instruments consist of investment encouragement or quantitative restrictions for single industries. In many instances there is a choice among several instruments to attain the same target. In principle, both the aims and the means are the subject of autonomous choices of the community: questions of taste, in a way. The restrictions on this autonomy are that the means and the aims should not be mutually inconsistent; this implies that the means should, in the degree used, lead to the aims. In practice the autonomy is of little consequence because of the similarity in tastes among different nations. As a rule the aims are not very different among nations; the autonomy on the side of means usually consists of excluding some extreme means, such as forced labor and detailed intervention. The choice among the some sixty instruments mentioned by Kirschen depends largely on the effects expected from each. The knowledge of these effects is equivalent to knowledge about the operation of the economy. Kirschen's table suggests some qualitative knowledge of this kind in that it indicates, for each objective, the instruments supposed to effect it. What is needed for planning purposes, however, is quan-
PLANNING, ECONOMIC: Western Europe titative knowledge. This has been accumulated for the last half century by an ever-increasing volume of statistical and econometric research. The remainder of this article will discuss the various elements of the planning process, that is, of the preparation of economic policy. The main elements may be defined as the tasks, the methods, the organization, and the procedure of planning. What is meant by the tasks will be clear from what has been said in the present section. They consist primarily of making up plans, either year by year or for longer periods. In addition there are preparatory studies, especially those concerning alternative methods of production in some industries and those concerning the structure of consumer demand. There may also be special studies of the effects of the introduction of new institutions or of particular measures—for instance, to increase productivity or to regulate a given market. Studies about the consequences of European integration represent another example of an element in the planning process. The methods of short-term planning. By the "methods of planning" will be understood the technical methods used to estimate the framework of figures constituting the hard core of any plan. This quantitative job must always be preceded by a qualitative analysis of the changes in the social order deemed desirable and of the significance that should be attached to the economic phenomena that are to be estimated quantitatively. For shortterm plans the changes in the social order cannot be large, since such changes usually take time. The main emphasis will be on the quantitative part of the process, which may be seen as the necessary adjustment of the economy to short-term changes in world markets and to autonomous changes in private behavior, with a view to maintaining full employment and achieving some of the other targets mentioned in the preceding section, including the portion of a long-term plan of development pertaining to the year considered. As already stated, this requires knowledge of many reactions of the economy to autonomous changes and to induced ones. Examples of such reactions are demand and supply elasticities (both with regard to prices and to other determinants) in a number of markets, such as the market for consumer goods, for export goods, and so on. The main problem is to find the values of the instrument variables—taxes, public investments, credit and wage policies, etc.—given the policy targets and the changes in external or exogenous data. We will use the latter term here in the restricted sense of not including changes in
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instrument variables. Sometimes such exogenous variables are indicated as "other data." Essentially there are two methods of solving the main problem: trial and error and the mathematical method. By the latter is meant a systematic use of symbols and equations (or more generally constraints, including inequalities) expressing the reactions mentioned before and a number of technical relationships, which must be satisfied simultaneously by all the figures in the plan. As a rule, combinations of both methods will be used; one may even argue that certain portions of mathematics do not surpass the level of trial and error. Yet the weight given to one or the other of the two extremes differs among countries, and the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau is known for a rather extensive use of simple mathematical models for the framework of planning. The models used (Netherlands . . . 1956; Tinbergen 1956) can be characterized as generalized Keynesian models, since the Keynesian consumption equation is one of the most important. Since the Netherlands is a small country, export and import demand play a considerable role. Supply equations have been given the special shape of price fixation equations. Capital as a factor limiting production does not enter the system: it is assumed that in the short run capital goods are redundant, but labor does enter as a limiting factor. Public finance is described in some detail, distinguishing various types of revenues. Investment is split into private and public, and the private into investment in fixed equipment and in stocks. The models used often consist of some thirty or forty equations. They are adapted to the particular purpose they have to serve. The models used for the general plan differ from those used for special studies (see below). They do not contain financial flows, that is, changes in the main types of financial assets, since so little is known about the propensities to hold various kinds of assets. Financial flows are dealt with separately, using balance equations and a number of less formalized assumptions about the changes in single asset holdings (see below). The formal model refers to the main commodity flows, prices, and current payments of incomes, expenditures, taxes, etc. The application of the model starts with an estimate of the initial position, that is, the situation in the year preceding the plan year. This position, of course, has to be in part estimated and is presented in the form of national accounts and the balance of resources and expenditures. The next step consists of an estimate of the
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probable changes in exogenous data (in the restricted sense defined before, that is, excluding policy instruments). An important part is played by estimates of the changes in exports, taking into account income changes of the country-groups of destination, changes in the price levels of competitors and of Dutch exports, incidental changes in trade policies, etc. Another important datum is the level of private investment to be expected in the coming (plan) year. Investment estimates are based partly on econometric relations but, because of the latter's unreliability, also on a direct survey of a large number of firms. A number of items of public expenditure are also considered data, and figures for these are obtained from the treasury. Agricultural supplies are usually known from crop statistics for the current year and are estimated at the "normal" level for the plan year. Seasonal fluctuations in building and demand for fuel are also assumed to be normal. The coefficients of the equations reflecting reactions, technological or institutional relationships, etc., are taken from econometric and statistical studies and are revised periodically. With these figures given and with given targets, the system of equations can be used to determine the most desirable values of the instrument variables and of the economic variables not representing targets. The results are discussed with various ministries, and as a rule the published plan will be the result of these discussions, avoiding a deviation of policy and plan. The influence the plan exerts is mainly through these discussions. Sometimes alternative figures are added in order to show the possible effect of changes in instrument variables. Thus, the effects of possible changes in wages other than the ones envisaged or of public expenditure for different purposes have been shown in some plans. Once the current money flows have been estimated, financial flows (changes in assets) are estimated so as to produce the most desirable development. The main problems involved in annual planning may be summarized, using the schema of B. Hansen (1955) as follows. From the table of resources and uses we derive the permissible volume of private consumption as the residual between production on the one hand and investment and public expenditure on the other (assuming balance of payments equilibrium on current account). From permissible consumption we derive the necessary tax level. From the financing equation for private investment we derive the necessary increase in banking credit to business. From the balance sheet of the commercial banks we then
derive the necessary change in reserve requirements, which constitutes the main instrument of monetary policy. The methods of long-term planning. France has given attention to long-term planning to a greater extent than has the rest of western Europe. The French example is now being followed by other countries, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Long-term planning has not been entirely absent in the other countries but has been applied somewhat less systematically. The method of the French Fourth Plan, as set out by Gazes (1962, pp. 33 ff.), was that of successive approximations. In a first approximation, a projection was made for a set of 17 sectors—presumably using input-output coefficients in addition to those already mentioned in "The methods of short-term planning"—employing three alternative assumptions with regard to the general rate of growth: 3, 4.5, and 6 per cent annual growth. In a second approximation, after the government expressed a preference for a rate of 5 to 5.5 per cent, more detailed figures were prepared by "vertical committees" covering 27 main branches and 300 subbranches. The figures were checked by "horizontal committees" dealing with general aspects such as financing of investment, current demand versus supply, manpower and education supply, and so on. The method is not too different from methods several authors have recommended to developing countries; one difference is in the relative scarcities of the factors of production. Capital is less scarce and labor more scarce in developed than in developing countries. This will come up in the concrete appraisal of single projects and in the choice of technologies. For developing countries this appraisal of projects is often added as a third phase. Lately, a geographical subdivision of the nation to be planned for has been added and a corresponding phase in long-term planning methods distinguished. Long-term planning methods have also been developed for special purposes, such as the preparation of institutional reforms or educational planning. In the Netherlands, an extensive study was made of the introduction of unemployment insurance in a new form and of the introduction of profit sharing by workers. In both cases mathematical models were used in which variables appeared characteristic for the particular problem studied; for instance, in the first example the contributions to be made by employers and employees, the benefits to the unemployed, etc. A further example of special models is the model used to study
PLANNING, ECONOMIC: Western Europe the consequences of Benelux integration (Verdoorn 1960). Organization and procedure of planning. The "organization of planning" considers the hierarchic relations within the group of persons and administrative units charged with the tasks of planning. The "procedure of planning" considers the nature and time order of outside contacts made during the execution of planning activities. In the description of the organization, the distinction will be made between the external and the internal organization of the main administrative unit charged with planning. This unit will sometimes be an office, like the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau, within one of the ministries; sometimes it will have a more independent status, as in France, where it is called a commissariat. In a number of developing countries it is a ministry by itself. The level may thus be different, but as a rule it has some interdepartmental character. It may either be organized under the prime minister or, if elsewhere (treasury, ministry of economic affairs), have the right to deal with all ministries
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without special permission of the minister concerned. The ideal situation, in the author's opinion, is for the planning unit to be directly responsible to the prime minister. The preceding remarks refer to the external organization. The internal organization is determined by the number and nature of the divisions and subdivisions and the division of labor among them. It also depends upon the size and the background of its staff. As a rule, different divisions will deal with long-term and short-term planning work, since experience teaches that charging the same persons with these two types of work leads to neglect of the long-term tasks—they are usually considered less pressing than short-term ones. Research in the narrower sense of basic scientific analysis, as distinct from the applied type of planning proper, will be entrusted to a separate division or be the task of the long-term planning division. Current advisory work can best be entrusted to the short-term planning division. Sometimes subdivisions will be established to deal with individual sectors of economic life.
Table 1 — Schedule of the French Fourth Plan
GOVERNMENT
PLANNING COMMISSARIAT AND RESEARCH SERVICE
SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONSULTATION
Preliminary studies for 1965 and 1975 (1959 and beginning of 1960) - Investment and Planning Section of the Economic and Social Council (spring 1960) Directives of government to Commis--^sariat; appointment of members of Committees of Modernization Elaboration of accounts for 1965 derived from government directives (July 1960) Start of work of 27 Modernization Committees (summer 1960); reply to questionnaire (February 1961) First check of physical and financial consistency of work by committees (March 1961); elaboration of a provisional synthesis for 1965 on the basis of a growth rate of 5 per cent Decision by government on rate of ^~ growth and distribution of public investments (April 1961) -^ Continuation of work on the basis of new growth rate of 5.5 per cent Final synthesis (May 1961); draft plan <EApproval of draft by government ^(September 1961) ~^ Consultation of High Planning Council (October 1961); consultation of Economic and Social Council (November 1961) Parliamentary vote on draft law approving Fourth Plan Source: Adapted from Gazes 1962, p. 34.
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The planning unit may have branches for individual sectors, for instance, in some specialized ministries (agriculture, manufacturing industry, trade, transportation, education) or for individual regions (state planning units in a federation). But the organization may also be different, if the tasks are entrusted f o the corresponding ministries or lower public authorities. In our terminology the contacts with these branches are then no longer internal but external, and form part of the "procedure" of planning. Clearly, the number of persons engaged by the central unit depends on which of these two forms of organization has been chosen. Usually in western European countries this number is not very high. In France the Commissariat employs only about forty persons; the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau is somewhat more centralized and employs some one hundred persons, whereas the Norwegian unit is smaller. In the French system, however, about three thousand persons, distributed over some three hundred working groups, collaborate in the committees dealing with the single sectors (Gazes 1962, p. 35). This number far surpasses the number of committee members in the Netherlands, which amounts to less than one hundred. We now come to the subject of the procedure of planning. In France, as the preceding figures show, outside contacts are highly developed. The time order of the various contacts is well illustrated in Table 1. In the Netherlands, sector plans have occasionally been discussed with representatives of some sectors but not systematically prepared by working groups, as in France. Some steps in this direction have recently been taken. Until now, since the emphasis is on macroeconomic means of economic policy, the usual procedure, once agreement has been reached provisionally with the various government departments, has consisted mainly of consultation with central organizations of employers and employees, and with independent experts, both in the Socio-economic Council and in the Central Planning Commission. Apart from the committee work, which is far more voluminous in France than elsewhere, so far the procedure is not very different from that of the French. Major changes in general government policies in the Netherlands (where wages are, to some extent, under the supervision of the government) have as a rule been preceded by advice given by the Socio-economic Council, based on research and plans made in the Central Planning Bureau.
Supervision and testing of plans. In western Europe, planning agencies are not charged with the supervision of the implementation of plans. There is far less scope for such supervision by a separate agency than there may be in developing or in communist-ruled countries, since in the latter such an important part is played, within economic policy, by the individual public investments envisaged. Such projects may be in need of progress supervision by a special agency, although this is a debatable issue. The general view held in western Europe is that planning units are advisory bodies and that supervision proper is precisely the government's responsibility, that is, the responsibility of the executive agencies. Indirectly, any deviation of actual policies from those recommended by the planners will show up in the next plan, since this always starts out with a survey of the year preceding the plan year. Routine statistics will show any such deviations; but there may be a need for some special statistics on the progress made in big investment projects. Such statistics have been developed in the Netherlands during the last decade. It has become customary also, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, to report not only investment planned for the coming year by private business but also actual investments completed in the year before and estimated investments in the current year, therefore covering three years in all. If supervision proper is not considered a task of the planning unit, testing of previous plans is very much so. By testing is meant an analysis of actual compared with recommended development. In principle, actual development of any variable may be considered the result of three types of factors, each of them also used to get the estimated "most desirable" development of the same variable: (a) the values of the exogenous variables (excluding policy instruments); (b) the values of the instrument variables; and (c) the values of the coefficients of the model used. As a consequence, deviations between planned and actual values may be ascribed to (a) deviations in the values of the exogenous variables, that is, forecasting errors in these variables; (b) deviations in the values of the instrument variables, that is, between actual and recommended policies; and (c) deviations in the values of the coefficients, or errors in the model. If we like, we can combine (a) and (c) and call them forecasting errors in the endogenous variables. It is possible to give a special form to the comparison between predicted and observed values of either exogenous or endogenous variables by count-
PLANNING, ECONOMIC: Western Europe ing the number of cases where, in three successive years, turning points were either (i) correctly predicted, or (ii) wrongly predicted, i.e., predicted where none occurred, or (iii) not predicted, i.e., where they did occur. The reason for choosing this particular test is that with so-called naive forecasting methods, turning points will never be found: it is essential for these methods that they extrapolate the direction of change observed between the first two years. Thus, Theil (1958) found that the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau correctly predicted 13 out of 14 turning points in a number of variables over a number of periods, wrongly predicted another 5 and did not predict the one left of the 14 observed turning points. The record for a number of forecasts made by Scandinavian institutions was that out of 21 turning points, (i) 15 were correctly forecast, (ii) 3 wrongly forecast, and (iii) 6 were not forecast. A similar test consists of scrutinizing whether acceleration or deceleration occurred. Out of 91 Dutch cases, 71 were predicted in the correct way (either acceleration or deceleration); out of 74 Scandinavian cases, 62 were characterized in the correct way. From other studies (by C. van der Panne, in Dutch) it was found that relatively good forecasts between 1949 and 1955 were made of price indexes, indirect taxes, public employment, and the value of exports, whereas relatively poor forecasts were made of invisibles, imports and exports, investments, productivity, and the salaries of civil servants. The impact of planning on society. To conclude, we may ask the general question "What has been the impact of planning of the western European type on society?" Clearly the effects, if any, must be the justification of the efforts and other sacrifices made. For the time being, the answers to this question can only be approximative; and even this phrase may be a euphemism. For well-defined markets with well-defined regulations, the impact of such regulations may sometimes be estimated with a fair degree of accuracy. For the economy as a whole only little can be said. The main point to be made is that planning has succeeded in avoiding the main inconsistency in unplanned economies of the pre-1914 type, namely, the underutilization of productive capacity as a consequence of business cycles and of structural disequilibria. It is highly probable that the disappearance of the business cycle after World War n has been obtained with the aid of macroeconomic planning of the type described in this article. A
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crude estimate of the contribution to national product to be attributed to anticyclical policy can be obtained from the estimates of unused capacity prevailing in pre-1914 economies. Two measures are conceivable: the extent of unused labor and the extent of unused equipment. The figures for unused labor are represented by unemployment percentages. Figures on capacity are very uncertain, as shown by recent studies by Hickman (1965, p. 114). This is due in part to the fact that production at lowest cost is well below capacity production. Therefore our estimate must be seen as only a first crude approach to the problem. But a fair guess of unused capacity may be 10 to 15 per cent, meant as an average for unplanned societies. This guess implies that anticyclical policy may have contributed 10 to 15 per cent to national income. The further question may now be asked, "What degree of detail in planning is optimal?" It is the author's contention that the optimum degree of detail in planning is below the degree of detail applied in the communist-ruled societies. Some support is given to this contention by a recent assessment of the fluctuations in economic activity in various countries over the period 1950-1960 (Staller 1964). These fluctuations appear to be roughly 4 per cent for all communist countries, 1.5 per cent for the Soviet Union, 4 per cent for all Western countries, and 7.5 per cent for the United States. The gain from more detailed planning as applied in the Soviet Union appears to be less than 3 per cent. This points to decreasing returns for the intensification of planning, if one tries to imagine the much higher level of planning effort in the Soviet Union as compared with western Europe. The question is in need of more precise research. J. TlNBERGEN
[See also ECONOMETRIC MODELS, AGGREGATE.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALBRECHT, KARL 1964 Planifikateure beim Werk: Wirtschaft zwischen Zwang und Freiheit. Dxisseldorf (Germany): Econ-Verlag. BJERVE, FETTER J. 1959 Planning in Norway: 1947— 1956. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. CAZES, BERNARD 1962 La planification francaise: Esprit et methodes. Problemes de I'Europe 18:31-39. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, COMMISSION 1962 Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Programme of the Community for the Second Stage. Brussels: The Commission. FOURASTIE, JEAN; and COURTHEOUX, JEAN PAUL 1963 La planification economique en France. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. FRISCH, RAGNAR 1961 Survey of Types of Economic Forecasting and Programming: A Brief Description
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of the Oslo Channel Model. Unpublished manuscript. -> Paper read at the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, 7th Conference, 1961. GEARY, ROBERT C. (editor) 1962 Europe's Future in Figures. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. HANSEN, BENT (1955) 1958 The Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. -> First published as Finanspolitikens ekonomiska teori. HICKMAN, BERT G. 1965 Investment Demand and U.S. Economic Growth. Washington: Brookings Institution. JOHR, WALTER A.; and SINGER, H. W. 1955 The Role of the Economist as Official Adviser. London: Allen & Unwin. KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, ALBERT 1962 La progranimation en Belgique. Problemes de I'Europe 18:24-30. KIRSCHEN, ETIENNE S. et al. 1964 Economic Policy in Our Time. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. KLEIN, LAWRENCE R.; and GOLDBERGER, A. S. 1955 An Econometric Model of the United States: 1929-1952. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. KRUSE, HANS H. 1962 L'Allemagne et la planification de 1'economie. Problemes de I'Europe 18:12-23. MASSE, PIERRE (1959) 1964 Le choix des investissements: Criteres et methodes. 2d ed. Paris: Dunod. MEADE, JAMES E. 1955 The Theory of International Economic Policy. Volume 2: Trade and Welfare. Oxford Univ. Press. MYRDAL, GUNNAR (1960) 1963 Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its Implications. Yale University School of Law, Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence, 1958. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. NETHERLANDS, CENTRAAL PLANBUREAU 1956 Scope and Methods of the Central Planning Bureau. The Hague: The Bureau. ORGANIZATION OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 1957 Europe To-day and in 1960. Volume 2: Europe in 1960. Eighth annual report. Paris: The Organization. PLITZKO, ALFRED (editor) 1964 Planung ohne Planwirtschaft. Basel (Switzerland): Kyklos. SANDEE, J. 1962 La planification economique aux PaysBas. Problemes de I'Europe 18:45-48. SANDEE, J. (editor) 1964 Europe's Future Consumption. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. STALLER, GEORGE J. 1964 Fluctuations in Economic Activity: Planned and Free-market Economies: 19501960. American Economic Review 54:385-395. STAMMATI, GAETANO 1962 La programmation economique en Italic. Problemes de I'Europe 18:40-44. STONE, RICHARD; and BROWN, J. A. C. 1962 A Longterm Growth Model for the British Economy. Pages 287-310 in Robert C. Geary (editor), Europe's Future in Figures. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. THEIL, HENRI (1958) 1961 Economic Forecasts and Policy. 2d ed., rev. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. TINBERGEN, JAN (1956) 1964 Economic Policy: Principles and Design. 2d ed. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. TINBERGEN, JAN 1959 The Theory of the Optimum Regime. Pages 264-304 in Jan Tinbergen, Selected Papers. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing. TINBERGEN, JAN 1964 Central Planning. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. VERDOORN, PETRUS J. 1960 The Intra-block Trade of Benelux. Pages 291-329 in International Economic Association, Economic Consequences of the Size of
Nations. Edited by E. A. G. Robinson. New York: St. Martins. WOLFF, PIETER DE 1960 Wirtschaftsprognose als Grundlage der Volkswirtschaftspolitik unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der niederlandischen Verhaltnisse. Pages 109-124 in Dortmund, Sozialakademie, Internationale Tagung, 1959, Wirtschaftsprognose und Wirtschaftsgestaltung. Edited by Hans Bayer. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. ZWEIG, FERDYNAND 1942 The Planning of Free Societies. London: Seeker & Warburg. II EASTERN EUROPE
The nations of eastern Europe, defined to encompass Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania, are ruled by Marxist-Leninist parties exercising dictatorial powers in the name of the proletariat. While the leaders of these parties may differ among themselves in points of doctrine or in their foreign policy, they are all committed to public ownership of the basic means of production and to the pursuit of certain economic goals, including chiefly the promotion of heavy industry by means of state direction and control. The economies of eastern Europe, with the partial exception of Yugoslavia, are centrally managed by a complex apparatus of government and party officials similar in most respects to that prevailing in the USSR. Yugoslavia differs from the other communist states in that its economic organization is substantially more decentralized; in the Yugoslav system, which will be described in the last part of this article, market prices play a significant role in determining the allocation of resources under the over-all guidance and supervision of state policy. Early stages. Nationalization of large-scale industry, banking, and foreign trade in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia proceeded rapidly after liberation from Nazi occupation and was virtually completed by 1946. In the countries allied with the losing side in the war—East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria—which were burdened with heavy reparations payments, mainly in favor of the Soviet Union, comprehensive nationalization measures were delayed until 1947 and 1948. In the area as a whole the "socialization" of local industry and retail establishments and handicrafts, which were either placed under state management or reorganized as cooperatives, occurred chiefly between 1949 and 1951, after which date a minority of these enterprises were allowed to remain in private hands. Since then the number of private enterprises has varied from time to time as state policy became more or less liberal in the issuance of licenses and in the allocation of raw
PLANNING, ECONOMIC: Eastern Europe materials to the private sector. Agriculture, for a time, represented a notable exception to the policy of rapid socialization. Over three-quarters of existing farms remained in private hands until the late 1950s in all countries but Bulgaria, where a majority of farms were already collectivized in 1951. By 1962, however, collectivization was "virtually completed in every east European country, with the exception of Poland. By 1949-1950 the principal features of the Soviet economic model had been adopted in the management of the socialized sector of the east European states. The resulting economic systems were virtually identical up to 1956. Each Politburo, ostensibly under the guidance of the Central Committee of the Party, formulated the general economic policies of the country. The Secretariat of the Central Committee supervised the execution of these policies by government organs. Responsibility for drafting long-term plans (from four to six years in the several countries) and for elaborating current (one-year) plans was vested in a Planning Commission formally attached to the Council of Ministers. In the late 1940s the economic ministries, which supervised the management of the state-owned industries, were organized according to broad sectors (e.g., industry, light industry, agriculture). In the course of time, these ministries underwent progressive fragmentation. By 1955, for instance, Czechoslovakia's machine-building and equipment industry was managed by three separate ministries. Enterprises were directly subordinated to industrial departments of the ministries, called chief administrations or central boards (e.g., in Poland, the Central Board for Agricultural Fertilizers under the Ministry of the Chemical Industry). In conformance with Soviet practice, enterprises were normally placed on khozraschet: they became autonomous accounting and financial entities which, subject to the directives they received from their superior authorities, were expected to minimize costs, show profits, and pay taxes to the central budget; each had its own account at the national bank, which financed its short-term credit requirements. Up to 1953-1954, the trend was toward ever more comprehensive planning under centralized direction. The bulk of materials consumed by industry were rationed out by the Planning Commission to economic ministries on the basis of balanced estimates. In theory, all state-run enterprises were supposed to take an active part in the process of elaborating the plans: on the basis of the control figures handed down by their ministries, they drew up counterproposals, which usually
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proposed more ambitious output targets than those they had received and which also called for more materials and other resources than the control figures provided for. When the Planning Commission summed up the "counterplans," they frequently turned out to be internally inconsistent. The changes in targets and materials allocations the Planning Commission eventually had to make to harmonize the plans rendered most of the preliminary paper work nugatory. The above system, known as "planning from below" or "counterplanning," was replaced in Czechoslovakia in 1953 and in Poland in 1954 by a new scheme known as "planning from above," where enterprises were formally cut out from the planning process. Henceforth, the option to consult subordinate enterprises was left to the discretion of the ministries. They could do so, if they wished, to obtain information on the consumption of materials or on productive capacities at the plant level; but they could also rely on statistical data obtained through other channels. This more centralized procedure for elaborating the plans was accompanied by a gradual reduction in the workload of the Planning Commission, as an increasing number of balancing and allocation decisions were delegated to the ministries and to lower administrative organs. The new scheme was designed to enable the central authorities to cut the time spent on the mechanics of plan setting and to concentrate their efforts on improving the substance of the plans. To this reform, which took place about the time of Stalin's death, there corresponded certain changes in economic policy which also affected the role of the plans as instruments for governing the pace and pattern of economic growth. Prior to 1953, industrialization proceeded at an extremely rapid pace in every nation of the area, irrespective of its initial level of development. The long-term plans promulgated during the Korean War overtaxed the capacities of the individual economies, which could not simultaneously build up their heavy industries, including armaments manufactures, expand their output of consumer goods, and promote their agriculture. The yearly plans, which were bent toward the achievement of the long-term plans, also overcommitted resources. Hence, priorities had to be established to determine which sectors would suffer the shortfalls. Each year, resources in short supply were deflected from light industry, residential construction, and agriculture and toward metallurgy, machine building, and other branches of heavy industry. Since the yearly plans were often poorly balanced, crucial allocation
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decisions had to be taken in the course of the planyear on an ad hoc priority basis. The rationing of consumer goods, which prevailed in the entire area in the early 1950s, was symptomatic of this abnormal state of affairs. Increased emphasis on consumer goods. In the summer and fall of 1953, however, a New Course was launched by the ruling parties of eastern Europe, in line with developments in the Soviet Union, which significantly raised the priority standing of consumers' goods and services. Consumers' rationing was generally abolished either just before the death of Stalin (as in Poland) or shortly thereafter (as in Czechoslovakia and Rumania). From then on, shortfalls in the output of consumer goods manifested themselves in declining inventories in retail stores, in queues, and in overt or covert price increases; in countries such as Czechoslovakia, which are dependent on food imports to supply their population, agricultural failures gave rise to balance-of-payments crises. Now that the claims on resources of heavy and light industry and of agriculture were more nearly equal, an allocation system based on ad hoc priority decisions was too blunt an instrument to carry out state policy. The current plans had to have sufficient "authority" to guide the economy throughout the year. The need for a priori consistency of the plans compelled the planners to budget their resources more realistically. The trend toward more careful balancing was reinforced after the Poznan riots of June 1956 and the Hungarian revolution in October and November of the same year. Since that time the ruling parties in the region, but especially in the more developed nations, have recognized as a political constraint on the formulation of national economic plans that the total level of consumption and the average level of urban real wages must not be adversely affected by investment efforts or by circumstances of any sort. (It is remarkable, for instance, that private consumption increased slightly in Czechoslovakia in 1963, even though national income declined by 3-4 per cent during that year.) Another factor making for a more systematic attempt to achieve consistency in the current plans after 1953 was the increasing relative scarcity of labor available to industry, not only in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, where the pool of surplus labor from agriculture had been exhausted some time previously, but even in Rumania, where the intake of labor from the countryside was greatly reduced, compared with the first industrialization campaign after 1949. (The area-wide shortage of housing and other urban fa-
cilities contributed to the decision to slow down rural-urban migration.) The increasing scarcity of manpower reduced the planners' ability to correct mistakes in the allocation of materials or investment funds by lavishing surplus labor on the sectors that had not received their share of critical resources. In the years since 1956, the economic reforms carried out in certain of the east European states have broken the previous pattern of institutional uniformity and have given rise to discrepancies from the Soviet model as well as to divergencies among the individual states of the region. Before describing the reforms that eventually caused the systems to diverge, it may be in order to consider the problems the central planners of these economies continued to face in common. Principal planning problems. The principal problem the central planners have to solve consists in preparing an internally coherent set of balanced estimates for materials and equipment. The "material balances" actually worked on by the Planning Commission in each country are those for "funded" materials and equipment, that is, for the crucial items which it rations out with the approval of the Council of Ministers. In Czechoslovakia these items made up less than half of the total consumption of materials in the mid-1950s. In both Czechoslovakia and East Germany, this proportion was higher in heavy than in light industry and in the production of raw materials and semifabricates than in processing sectors. What is also significant is the share of each material's "consumption for productive purposes," calculated according to standard norms based on approved engineering practice. In Poland, according to a special survey conducted in 1959, this share was over 90 per cent for steel semifabricates and for cement, 84 per cent for sulfuric acid, 67 per cent for bituminous coal, between 60 and 65 per cent for tanned leather, salt, soda ash, and pine lumber, and as little as 5 per cent for refined petroleum products. The principal gaps in the availability of information at the planning center are, first, the coefficients relating the inputs of nonfunded materials to the outputs of funded or nonfunded goods and, second, the coefficients corresponding to the consumption of funded products not subject to standard norms. The reliability of the coefficients themselves has often been limited. Allotments of materials were made to economic ministries, which then subdivided them among their central boards. These latter ultimately parceled out their quotas among their subordinate enterprises. At each administra-
PLANNING, ECONOMIC: Eastern Europe tive level—whether functional or regional—lower organs bargained for more generous rations of materials from their immediate superiors. If the central authorities persisted in drafting overambitious plans, then there was pressure from above, at each echelon, to cut back requirements below what enterprises considered a safe minimum. While the range within which this bargaining can affect final allotments has become more narrow with the passage of time, the bargaining process has not been eliminated. Decreasing or increasing returns to scale have also been a source of instability in the technical coefficients. If an industry has surplus capacity that may be utilized during periods of peak demand for its products at a high unit cost—due to the operation of worn or obsolete equipment—its average input coefficient will tend to rise with the level of its output. When the product was homogeneous—electric power, for instance—the coordinating organ on occasion made rough adjustments in the coal- or oil-input coefficients for varying levels of power output; but where the product-mix was complex, this task defied bureaucratic solution. Another factor bearing on the stability of coefficients, about which next to nothing is known at the planning center, is the possibility of reducing the consumption of material inputs by the substitution of other factors. Enterprises were frequently forced to adapt to materials shortages by expending more labor on their products. At best, the central authorities could make a rough adjustment in the allotments of materials to enterprises in anticipation of these economies; but neither input—output nor any of the planning techniques.in use at present are capable of predicting with any degree of precision the enterprise's ability to make these adjustments without running into acute shortages of material inventories, such as may eventually cause production breakdowns. In the absence of electronic computers, which were not available in planning practice in any country of eastern Europe during the period under consideration, the preparation of an internally consistent central plan is a laborious and time-consuming task. Given the limited information on input coefficients and productive capacities available to the Planning Commission, failure to make optimal use of this information in order to relate the total outputs targeted in the various sectors to the quantities of each product available for final demand adds a significant source of potential error. The principal theoretical problem in this regard is the occurrence of "feedbacks" on output levels due to interdependences in the technology matrix. If the
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planners proceed from a known final demand to calculate a mutually consistent set of output levels, they will find that as soon as they have added enough output to an initial level to satisfy materials requirements derived directly from final demand, they will need to make a secondary adjustment to meet the added demand for materials caused by this last increase in output. Theoretically, it may take five or six rounds of adjustment before a satisfactory degree of consistency has been achieved (satisfactory at least in terms of the range of error to which the coefficients are subject). In practice, however, feedbacks were reduced by two factors. It was known in advance that a certain number of sectors—in eastern Europe these were generally the sectors producing raw materials and semifabricates—would be operated at capacity; their output being known in advance, no feedback effects had to be allowed for in these sectors. The only feedbacks were those associated with sectors that were free of capacity restraints in the normal range of their operation, and these feedbacks were likely to be small. Furthermore, the balancing usually started with trial levels of gross output for all sectors. If these output levels were not too far removed from the final, mutually consistent targets, large feedbacks were avoided. Since there was flexibility on the final demand side, insofar as the planning authorities were more or less indifferent between various closely related bills of goods, fewer output adjustments were necessary; this also helped to cut down on the computing workload. While it was possible to prepare a single balanced version of the plan, there was usually no time to draw up alternative versions or to trace the effects of a change in demand for one or more endproducts on the outputs that were not tightly restricted by capacity limits. Another computing task which, while presenting no theoretical difficulty, was still extremely demanding on the limited bureacratic facilities of the central planning organizations is the reconciliation of the material and equipment balances with the "synthetic" plans. These include the costs and profits plans of industry and trade, investment plans, the state budget, and all other macroeconomic plans that may be affected by the material balances (via reductions in material costs, larger sales due to increased outputs, etc.). Repeated references in the economic literature of the area to national economic plans whose component parts were not harmonized testify to the difficulty of elaborating "complex" plans. To construct efficient as well as consistent plans,
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the Planning Commission would have to collect information on alternative production processes open to enterprises and to choose from among these processes the ones most likely to economize on factors in short supply. In practice, the central planners had no systematic procedure either for collecting or for processing this information. (There was no analogue in current practice to linear or nonlinear programming.) This deficiency was especially serious insofar as it affected investment and foreign-trade decisions, which normally involve choice either among domestic processes for producing a given good or between domestic production and imports. (Since exports alone in countries such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary represent between 30 and 45 per cent of national income, the correct allocation of resources between industries supplying the national market and industries oriented mainly toward exports is crucial.) Since the mid-1950s, economic calculation, based on comparisons of capital outlays with economies in operating expenses and on comparisons of the domestic costs of exportables with their foreign-currency prices, has become an important alternative to the traditional method of balanced estimates in arriving at suboptimal decisions. These calculations, however, are undermined by defects in domestic prices, to the extent that the latter are used to compute costs and returns. As late as 1965, the price systems of the east European socialist states, with the single exception of Yugoslavia, were still grounded on the principle that the price of each producer good should be set at its average cost of production among the enterprises responsible for the bulk of its output, plus a small profit margin calculated as a percentage of costs. Since price reforms were promulgated only once every three to five years, and relative costs tended to change rapidly, the structure of current costs soon diverged from established price ratios. Even current cost levels did not express opportunity costs, if only because neither interest charges on capital nor rents on the use of land were accounted for. It should also be noted that prices of imported goods, owing in part to the artificiality of exchange rates applied to foreign prices, were improperly related to the domestic prices of home-produced substitutes. 1956-1965: divergencies among states. During 1956 the excessive centralization of the command economies came in for sharp public criticism, particularly in Poland and Hungary. The immediate reforms that were promulgated at the time, however, went no further than the extension of certain
rights and prerogatives to the directors of enterprises, in line with recent Soviet initiatives in this direction. Prior to mid-1957, when the Soviet government abolished most ministries in charge of industrial sectors and subordinated most industrial enterprises to regional economic councils, the organization of the east European economies was still closely patterned after the Soviet. It may fairly be said that the first important divergence stemmed from the failure of the east European states to follow the Soviet example and shift from a functional to a regional hierarchy of economic organs. Bulgaria and East Germany. Only two countries—Bulgaria and East Germany—eventually adopted, in whole or in part, the new Soviet design. Both of these countries abolished their industrial ministries. In East Germany, the supervision of industrial sectors was entrusted to specialized departments of the state Planning Commission, whose role as chief planning organ was reinforced, from 1958 on, by new executive responsibilities. Enterprises of national significance were grouped in associations (Vereinigungen Volkseigener Betriebe) directly subordinated to the Planning Commission. Economic councils were also formed in regions (Bezirke) and districts (Kreise), but, in contrast with the situation of the councils in the Soviet Union, they had direct authority only over enterprises of local importance. In view of this crucial limitation on the power of the councils, the reforms of 1958 and 1959 did not alter the essentially functional character of East Germany's industrial organization. In Bulgaria, however, out of 800 large enterprises formerly attached to ministries, 700 were given over to district national councils. The remaining 100 enterprises were placed under the central control of the Committee for Industry and Technical Progress, the Committee for Construction and Architecture, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication, the Ministry for Education and Culture, and the Central Union of Cooperatives. In conjunction with the reorganization of the economy, 30 districts, corresponding to natural economic regions, were carved out of the 12 existing districts. But even in Bulgaria the regionalization was not complete, inasmuch as the branch committees, in particular the Committee for Industry and Technical Progress, retained exclusive responsibility for issuing methodological instructions to enterprises and continued to exercise certain "directional" functions, described in official language as "the fulfillment of the plan of industrial enterprises for the development of new products, for inter-enterprise cooperation and specialization,
PLANNING, ECONOMIC: Eastern Europe for the introduction of technical progress, for the timely manufacture of essential machines and equipment earmarked for construction projects of national importance, and for the distribution of machines and equipment among districts in cases where the districts concerned have not reached agreement with each other." In Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, the old system of industrial management by specialized ministries has been maintained to the time of writing in 1967. Within this system, however, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and, to a minor extent, Hungary have introduced reforms tending toward the devolution of administrative powers onto lower organs and toward the increased autonomy of socialized enterprises. In 1964 and 1965, Bulgaria and East Germany also took further initiatives in this direction. The only countries that have adhered strictly to the old, tightly centralized system for planning and managing industry are Rumania and, as far as is known, Albania. Czechoslovakia. The most comprehensive of the reforms tending toward decentralization were undertaken in Czechoslovakia for the first time in 1958 and 1959 and again in 1966 and 1967. In 1958, enterprises were consolidated into "productive economic units"—operating as enterprises in their own right or as associations of enterprises —which were directly responsible for the entire production of a sector; in certain cases where production facilities were spread over a large number of plants, the productive economic units were entrusted with the guidance and supervision ("gestion") of the entire output of the sector, including by-products originating in other units. The balancing and distribution of less essential products formerly carried out in the Planning Commission and in the ministries devolved on the productive economic units, which were expected to keep in close touch with their customers and to coordinate their production decisions with each other, without supervision of higher authorities. The old ministries remained in operation, but their activities were oriented less toward routine direction of their subordinate enterprises than toward ensuring the technical progress and the rationalization of production in their sector. Two new types of incentives were created: (1) to recompense the managerial staff and workers, the average wage of the enterprise was linked to labor-productivity increases, and a bonus fund was set up on the basis °f the fulfillment of the enterprise's profit plan; (2) to widen the financial autonomy of the enterprise, it was authorized to keep a significant share of the year-to-year increases in its registered profits,
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which share could be raised by higher authorities if the enterprise agreed to take on more challenging tasks. As a result of the new system of "enterprise stimulation" and of certain changes in financial regulations, the share of decentralized investments, in large part financed from enterprise profits and depreciation allowances, rose to 60 per cent of total investments in 1960 and 1961. While the 1958-1959 reforms enlarged the autonomy of Czechoslovak enterprises in a number of areas, price setting for all important producer and consumer goods remained the exclusive prerogative of the central authorities. No alteration was made in the practice of pegging producers' prices to an initial level of average unit costs and keeping them in force for several years, regardless of changes in supply and demand relations. In 1963, when the reforms were for the most part abandoned and recentralization took place, the failure to adapt the price system to the decentralization was widely criticized. The collapse of the reforms and the eventual abandonment of the five-year plan originally scheduled for 1961 to 1965 were attributed by the partisans of decentralization to the distorting effects of prices on the decisions of enterprises, to the plan's excessive tautness, which made demands on the construction sector and export industries widely in excess of their capabilities, and to a crisis in the balance of payments, due in large part to shortfalls in agriculture. The proponents of tight central controls, including the highest Party authorities, laid the failure to an excessive devolution of powers on lower organs and to a slackening of discipline. In late 1964 and early 1965, after a year and a half of debate, the views of the decentralizers apparently prevailed. The Central Committee of the Communist party called for another round of decentralizing reforms. This was effected in 1966-1967. The newest Czechoslovak reforms, in a significant departure from all previous attempts at remodeling the economic system, now provide for some flexibility in producers' prices. Prices set by free negotiation between suppliers and purchasers will apply to goods representing an estimated 7 per cent of total industrial output. The bulk of these freely priced items are produced in consumer goods industries. In addition, lower and upper limits within which prices are allowed to fluctuate have been imposed on a wide range of goods. Recent experience has shown that prices quickly gravitate to the upper limit, so that the significance of this innovation is rather restricted. These limits and the prices of all other goods will still be set by central organs. In general, the quasi-monopolistic
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position of enterprises, most of which have once again been consolidated and now compass the bulk of the output in their speciality, and the narrow leeway open to buyers to substitute imports for domestic supplies rule out any substantial degree of competition in the newly created "markets." The 1966-1967 economic reforms also call for the imposition of charges on the fixed capital and the inventories of enterprises, at rates of 6 and 2 per cent respectively, to be paid into the state budget. (As early as 1964, Hungary had introduced a similar "capital users' charge," calculated at a rate of 5 per cent of the gross value of fixed assets and of working capital.) The chief incentive to enterprises now consists in the part of "gross income" (equivalent to value added) left to them after deduction of capital charges and of various other obligations to the state. This residue is earmarked for decentralized investments, contingency reserves, housing projects and other social amenities, and wages, salaries, and bonus payments to the staff of the enterprise. In the spirit of the new system, plans are to be implemented via financial pressures and inducements rather than by direct commands. Output targets and limits on the consumption of materials and other inputs, however, may still be issued to enterprises by central planning authorities. Although it is not yet apparent how widely the central organs will avail themselves of their prerogatives, there was considerable apprehension among the proponents of the reforms that this permissive regulation might be used to reimpose the petty tutelage over enterprises that prevailed in former years. Poland. In Poland, wide-ranging discussions took place between 1956 and mid-1958 which became known as the "debate over the Polish economic model." The Economic Council, whose membership included Poland's most influential economists, issued a number of "theses" on the economic model and on price-setting policy which proposed the establishment of a partially decentralized economic system, guided by prices shaped under the influence of supply and demand. However, these theses were not approved by the Party and never received legislative sanction. The decentralizing measures actually promulgated in 1959 did not go as far as the Czechoslovak reforms. Moreover, these measures were eroded by centripetal forces between 1960 and 1963. The associations of enterprises, created in 1959 to replace the old central boards formerly operated as functional departments of the ministries, gradually ceased to represent the interests of their members, as their
mission had initially been conceived. In July 1964, however, new legislation designed to widen the powers of the associations was put into effect, which may tend to reduce the excessive degree of centralization attained in recent years. In Poland, as in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary, a number of enterprises have been assigned a special status. Their managers are for the most part rewarded according to a bonus system based on profits; some of them have also been given a privileged position in choosing their suppliers and in procuring the materials they require to adapt the structure of their output to market demands. A few have been given permission to alter their sales prices. These experiments, if they are successful, may pave the way to comprehensive legislation covering the bulk of industry in the countries mentioned. Yugoslavia. The "Yugoslav model" has exerted considerable influence on the character of the economic reforms at present contemplated in the experimenting countries. It may be observed that the first steps taken toward decentralization in Yugoslavia in 1950 and 1951 were also aimed at relaxing the rigid system of distribution in light industry. Retail trade establishments, formerly bound by the plan to specific sources of supply, were allowed to choose their suppliers among wholesalers and manufacturers. These first reforms, in the case of Yugoslavia, were approximately coeval with the formation, in July 1950, of the workers' councils, which already entailed a more radical departure from Soviet precedent. (In Poland and Hungary, workers' councils were set up in many enterprises in the summer of 1956; they were liquidated in Hungary by the end of the same year and had lost all effective power in Poland by 1959.) The members of the Yugoslav councils, which represent a little over 10 per cent of the total number of employees in the socialized economy, are elected from among the workers and the management staff of each enterprise. The main prerogative of the workers' council is to determine the share of the profits remaining at the disposal of the enterprise to be distributed as bonuses and extra income to the staff and the share to be plowed back as investment. The council also has a voice in appointing and dismissing enterprise directors. In general, it is expected to supervise the over-all orientation of the enterprise, including the composition of its output, technologies employed, and price-setting decisions. Prior to 1952, the influence of Yugoslav workers on output and price policy was hampered by the centralized system, which bound up the enterprise
PLANNING, ECONOMIC: Eastern Europe in minute regulations. At the beginning of that year, a sweeping program of decentralization was undertaken. Operational planning by central authorities was scrapped, along with its panoply of allocation orders and mandatory production targets. The Planning Commission, as well as the interindustrial councils, whicn had inherited many of the operational responsibilities of the economic ministries abolished in early 1950, were deprived of their executive powers. Henceforth, the coordination of production and investment decisions was to be achieved through a flexible price mechanism, while the federal government, using indirect financing controls and centralized investment policy, was to prod the economy toward the goals specified in the long-term plans. Prices were freed in three steps. First, the planners worked out new "economic prices" for raw materials and semifabricates. These prices were roughly on a level with the free prices of nonrationed consumer goods (which far exceeded the former prices of administratively rationed producer goods), while imported materials were priced according to a higher, more realistic exchange rate. Second, after January 1, 1952, all producers, wholesalers, and retailers of manufactured goods were invited to set prices for their products on the basis of market demand and costs, in line with the recently established level of materials prices. In the third phase, which was put off until May 1952 to avoid upsetting the freshly established markets, prices of raw materials and semifabricates were finally allowed to seek their natural level. By taxing enterprises in proportion to their wage bills, however, the federal government retained a decisive influence on cost levels and, indirectly, on prices. Later, as more flexible financial regulations were introduced, the central authorities partially relinquished even this indirect method of price control. In May 1954, the Yugoslav government found it necessary to impose price ceilings on a few raw materials and semifabricates to curb monopolistic tendencies and an incipient inflation. By 1955 the list numbered 40 materials, including steel, gasoline, copper, and lumber, altogether amounting to some 50 per cent of the total value of materials bought by industry. In addition to these outright controls, less stringent regulations were later issued to prevent unjustified price increases in other sectors. The extent to which the government has resorted to these more flexible price regulations has varied with the degree of inflationary pressure to which the economy has been exposed: they were loosened in 1961 and tightened again in 1963 and 1964 to check inflationary tendencies.
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Foreign exchange, except for short-lived experiments in the mid-1950s, has remained subject to centralized allocation. Up to 1961, the foreign exchange proceeds of exports were converted into domestic currency at the official exchange rates, which were then multiplied by coefficients varying according to the type of product exported. The coefficients were calculated to cover the domestic costs of exporters, whether the items exported were high-cost or low-cost. Coefficients were also applied to the payments in domestic currency for imports. They were scaled so as to discourage what were considered to be unnecessary imports and to protect high-cost domestic producers from foreign competition. In 1961 the dinar was devalued and the coefficients were nominally abolished. Nevertheless, exports were still facilitated by subsidies in the form of bonuses amounting to 10 to 32 per cent of the official rate. Quantitative restrictions remained in force for 70 per cent of the total value of imports. Together with the allocation of foreign exchange, the distribution of investments provides the government with significant leverage to conduct its economic policy. The federal government makes available to the Investment Bank and to the Agricultural Bank, via the general fund, fiscal receipts from the socialized sector—including taxes on capital assets, on profits, and on the turnover of retail trade—together with the proceeds of foreign loans. The general fund of the federation, in addition to seven constituent republics' investment funds, which are also managed by the Investment Bank, make up 70 per cent of the resources used for investment lending. The Investment Bank lends these funds to socialized enterprises, in contrast with the situation prevailing in the rest of eastern Europe, where almost all long-term investments are financed by outright budgetary grants. Enterprises are induced to economize on funds not only by the necessity of repaying loans, along with interest charges, but also by having to invest some of their own funds in projects in which the Investment Bank participates. This method of matching funds provides the central authorities with additional control over the volume of investments. The Investment Bank distributes investment funds in accord with Yugoslavia's long-term development plan. While the economic viability of projects and their profitability in terms of dinars are taken into account, these are not overriding considerations. In the mid-1950s, however, some of the bank's funds were auctioned off to enterprises according to the rates of return claimed on investment projects and to the interest rates borrowers
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were willing to pay for borrowed funds; but this system could not be allowed to remain in effect under conditions where prevailing prices provided such an inadequate reflection, in terms of the planners' priority scale, of the relative importance to the national economy of the different sectors. In 1965, the Yugoslav economy, despite the introduction in recent years of various recentralizing measures taken in conjunction with the government's efforts to subdue inflation, remained far more decentralized than any other east European economy. Nevertheless, a number of Yugoslavs concerned with economic affairs, including highplaced officials in Croatia and Slovenia, have voiced their support for further decentralization along market lines and for the elimination of some of the formal and informal controls hemming in the management of socialized enterprises. Opposition to these views emanates from economists and officials concerned with the development of the less industrialized regions of the country, such as Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where socialized enterprises are not yet capable of withstanding competition from abroad or from the more advanced republics to the north and where, in the opinion of these "centralizers," funds ought to be invested on a priority basis even if market criteria cannot be met. As in the rest of eastern Europe, divergent views on the goals of development policy and on the speed at which they might be attained underlie the conflicts among the proponents of different institutional means for integrating the national economy. JOHN MICHAEL MONTIAS [See also COMMUNISM, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF; ECONOMIC DATA, article on THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE; ECONOMIC THOUGHT, article OU
SOCIALIST THOUGHT.] BIBLIOGRAPHY ACADEMIA REPUBLICII POPULARE ROMINE, INSTITUTUL DE CERCETARI ECONOMICS 1964 Dezvoltarea economicd a Rominiei: 1944-1964 (The Economic Development of Rumania: 1944-1964). Bucharest: The Academy. ALTON, THAD P. 1955 Polish Postwar Economy. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. ARNOLD, HANS; BORCHERT, HANS; and SCHMIDT, J. (1955) 1961 Okonomik der sozialistischen Industrie in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. 6th ed. Berlin: Die Wirtschaft Verlag. BALASSA, BELA A. 1959 The Hungarian Experience in Economic Planning: A Theoretical and Empirical Study. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. BRUS, WLODZIMIERZ 1961 Ogolne problemy funkcjonowania gospodarki socjalistycznej (General Problems in the Functioning of a Socialist Economy). Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
DABCEVIC-KUCAR, SAVKA 1963 Decentralized Socialist Planning: Yugoslavia. Pages 183-216 in Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, Planning Economic Development: A Study. Edited by Everett E. Hagan. Homewood, 111.: Irwin. FLEMING, J. MARCUS; and SERTIC, VICTOR R. 1962 The Yugoslav Economic System. International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers 9:202-242. HOFFMAN, GEORGE W.; and NEAL, FRED W. 1962 Yugoslavia and the New Communism. New York: Twentieth Century Fund. KASER, MICHAEL 1965 COMECON: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies. Oxford Univ. Press. KORNAI, JANOS (1957) 1959 Overcentralization in Economic Administration: A Critical Analysis Based on Experience in Hungarian Light Industry. Oxford Univ. Press. -» First published in Hungarian. MARCZEWSKI, JAN 1956 Planification et croissance economiques des democraties populaires. 2 vols. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. MICHAL, JAN M. 1960 Central Planning in Czechoslovakia: Organization for Growth in a Mature Economy. Stanford Univ. Press. MONTIAS, JOHN M. 1962 Central Planning in Poland. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. PORWIT, KRZYSTOF (1964)1967 Central Planning: Evaluation of Variants. New York and London: Pergamon Press. -» First published in Polish. PRAGUE, VYSOKA SKOLA EKONOMICKA, KATEDRA NARODOHOSPODARSKEHO PLANovANi 1963 Ndrodohospoddfske pldnovdni v CSSR (National Economic Planning in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic). Prague: Nakladelstvi Politicke Literatury. PRYOR, FREDERIC L. 1963 The Communist Foreign Trade System. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. SIROTKOVIC, JAKOV 1961 Problemi privrednog planiranja u Jugoslaviji (Problems of Economic Planning in Yugoslavia). Zagreb (Yugoslavia): Naprjied. SPULBER, NICHOLAS (1955) 1957 The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE 1961 Economic Development in Rumania. Economic Bulletin for Europe 13, 2:55-107. WARD, BENJAMIN 1957 Workers' Management in Yugoslavia. Journal of Political Economy 65:373-386. WELLISZ, STANISLAW 1964 The Economies of the Soviet Bloc: A Study of Decision Making and Resource Allocation. New York: McGraw-Hill. ZAUBERMAN, ALFRED 1964 Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, 1937-1962. Oxford Univ. Press. Ill
DEVELOPMENT
PLANNING
This article confines itself to development planning in economies with substantial private enterprise sectors. In this context, a development plan is a document which sets out the chief measures that the government intends to take in order to raise national output per person. The typical development plan will include most of the following: (1) a survey of current economic conditions, especially national income, productivity, foreign trade,
PLANNING, ECONOMIC: Development Planning and trends in each major industry; (2) a survey of the current social situation, especially population changes, education, health, housing, and social security; (3) an evaluation of progress achieved under the preceding plan; (4) a statement of general objectives of economic and social policy; (5) estimates of growth, or targets, for each major economic or social component during the period covered by the plan; (6) suggested measures designed to raise the rate of economic growth, especially measures to stimulate saving and investment and to increase productivity, and measures to improve the institutional framework of economic activity, such as land reform or reorganization of the markets for commodities, labor, or capital; (7) a program of government expenditures, capital and recurrent. The plan normally looks several years ahead. Typical periods are three, four, five, and six years. Longer plans are sometimes made for 10, 15, or even 20 years ahead; these are sometimes called "perspective" plans. The shorter (three- to five-year) plans include statements of what the government intends to do. A 15- or 20-year plan cannot serve this purpose; its object is partly to try to identify long-term trends, as a guide to planning services which require a longer perspective, such as harbors, hydroelectricity, roads, and education. A fiveyear period is too short for perspectives in such matters but is also too long for specific commitments to some others. Hence, governments normally make a new capital budget every year, and this, rather than the plan, is the final commitment to expenditure. Similarly, statements relating to policy are not final until embodied in legislation. The first documents resembling development plans were published just after World War n. Most countries had established economic controls during the war, including rationing of some consumer goods, raw materials, or foreign exchange, and this experience gave to the idea of planning a degree of respectability which it had not achieved before the war. In Europe the emphasis of these plans was on reconstruction, with equal attention to the private and public sectors, but in the less developed countries the prime concern of the early Plans was to improve government policy making, a nd to establish priorities for government expenditure. There is nothing novel in surveys of current economic or social conditions; many governments nave issued such surveys from time to time and several now do this annually, whether or not there !s a development plan. There is also nothing novel J n announcing measures designed to raise the rate
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of economic growth. What development planning introduced was a comprehensive review of public expenditures looking several years ahead, with publication of a priority list. Before this concept was introduced, it was not usual for governments to review all their likely expenditures for more than a year ahead; reviews stretching five or ten years ahead were a novelty and were an improvement of government procedures. Despite much subsequent elaboration of planning techniques, medium-range projection of expenditures continues to be the main object of a development plan. With time, the emphasis of a development plan has tended to shift away from the review of government expenditures and toward other measures designed to raise the rate of economic growth. The general economic survey aspect and concern for the economy as a whole have increased. Some development plans are now devoted mainly to discussing such subjects as industry, agriculture, mining, investment, saving, and the balance of payments, and a few give only a sketch of proposed government expenditures. The nature of a plan for industry or agriculture or mining depends, in the first place, on whether the sector is under public ownership and operation, as in countries under communist control. Where public ownership and operation are in effect, a plan acts as an authorization to managers of industrial plants, telling them how much capital they may invest, and even perhaps how much of each commodity to produce and how much labor and material to use. Exactly what such a plan must contain is now under active discussion in communist countries. If industry depends on private investment, a development plan can exert negative control but not positive control; i.e., it can prohibit investment in certain fields, but it cannot force persons to invest in other fields if they do not wish to do so. Hence, in the private sector, "plan" is not quite the right word for what a development plan tries to do; it is as much concerned to analyze, inform, persuade, and indicate inducements which the government offers as it is to describe the restrictive controls with which the economy will be managed. How comprehensively the private sector is treated varies from plan to plan. If the government intends to take the initiative in inducing private investors to follow a particular course, or in shaping industrial institutions (e.g., marketing), or in providing finance through credit institutions, the plan may contain an extended discussion of each major industry, indicating what the govern-
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ment hopes will be the outcome. The closer the relations between government and commodity production, the more extensive must be the sections of the plan which deal with individual commodities. Beyond this, a development plan may make a projection, for the whole economy, of output, consumption, saving, investment, imports, and exports in every sector for, say, five years ahead. The primary purpose of such a projection is to provide a consistent background for policy. It ensures that assumptions about investment are consistent with assumptions about domestic savings, foreign borrowing, and the budget surplus; that each of these, in turn, is consistent with assumptions about income, taxes, government expenditure, and demand and supply in each major sector. The use of an input-output matrix is particularly helpful in economies where industries use each others' products as raw materials or equipment, since it is otherwise difficult to assess the full ramifications of an expected change in demand for any particular commodity (e.g., to trace the effects of an expected increase in the demand for bicycles on the steel, iron ore, rubber, coal, oil, chemical, and other industries which produce components or components of components). A projection is not a plan; it is a background exercise which planners do to clarify the interrelationships in their thinking. It is worth doing in complex economies, where interrelationships are not easily held in the head, but is less useful and hardly necessary in small countries with simple economies. A forecast for the whole economy is also the basis of what is now called "indicative planning." The argument here is that it helps investors in any one industry to know what is proposed in all other industries, since these others generate demand for its product. If all investors believe that the economy will grow only at an average annual rate of 3 per cent, they will keep their own investment levels low, and so bring about a low rate of growth. If, on the contrary, they all expect an annual growth rate of 10 per cent, they will all make large investments to cope with this rapidly growing demand, and so the growth rate will be high. Consequently, if, after consultation with all concerned, the government issues a projection based on the highest rate of growth that can be achieved with the resources likely to be available, this "indication" of what is possible in each industry may itself serve to induce a higher level of private investment than would otherwise occur. France is the leading practitioner of indicative planning, which is gaining ground mainly in
western Europe because the sophisticated relationship between government and private enterprise which the exercise requires is more common and the statistics more readily available in the advanced than in the poorer countries. Policy objectives. The elements which go into deciding what to put into a development plan cannot be described in a few words. The following section sketches briefly a few of the principal concerns of development planners. At low levels of development, ignorance is the principal obstacle to development: ignorance of physical resources, ignorance of markets, and ignorance of techniques. The first object of the plan must be to reduce ignorance. Development planners begin with surveys. The land should be mapped and surveyed for minerals, water, and fertile soils. Adequate staff must be provided for the departments of geology, hydrology, meteorology, survey, and soil survey. Equally important is research into the utilization of these natural resources, especially agricultural research, and research into industrial uses of local products. Next comes economic, statistical, and market research. The planner's first task is to see that all these fields of survey and research are covered, since it is these that will yield potential development projects. Development flows from applying skills to natural resources. A policy for improving skills is therefore fundamental to planning. This covers all levels of training and education, including general (primary, secondary, university) as well as vocational (trade schools, farm institutes, specialized institutions) education, institutional as well as onthe-job training, and adult education (especially agricultural extension) as well as schooling for the young. Since a poor country cannot afford all the education which is offered in rich countries, choices have to be made. It is possible by projecting national income to estimate roughly how many jobs there will be for persons with various kinds of special skills, and provision can be made for training them. Projecting the effects of general education is more difficult and not, perhaps, so helpful, since in most poor countries today the demand for places in school exceeds any figure that could be reached by trying to estimate the productivity of general education expenditures. Infrastructure plays an important role in attracting (or its absence in repelling) new investment. Electric power, water, and communications (railways, roads, ports, telephones) often absorb nearly as much capital as industry and agriculture added together. Because of the need to build in advance
PLANNING, ECONOMIC: Development Planning of demand, such investments are especially risky in less developed countries. Thus, the governments of such countries play a larger role in providing infrastructure, or in guaranteeing investment in such undertakings, than is necessary in more developed countries. The planner's objective is to discover the most productive projects, public or private, and to ensure them priority. Productivity cannot be calculated simply in terms of current prices, since current prices do not necessarily reflect the true relative scarcity of resources or the true net benefit to the economy as a whole, and also may not sufficiently reflect future gains. A large part of the literature of development economics discusses the desirable criteria for investment; the substitution of "accounting prices" or "shadow prices" for current prices when calculating costs and benefits to the economy as a whole; and the assessment of benefits and costs deriving from the interdependence of investments. Such calculations show that the set of projects which private investors would choose if seeking to maximize their profits is not necessarily the set which maximizes national income. Hence, if the government seeks to maximize national income, it must offer inducements to invest in some projects and impose restrictions on investment in others. Administering such inducements and restrictions is an important art, in which the poorer countries tend to be relatively unskilled. Investment criteria include capital-intensity, that is, the ratio between the capital invested in a project and the number of persons whom it employs. In countries plagued with unemployment, open or disguised, labor-intensive techniques are preferable to capital-intensive techniques if the difference in cost per unit of output is not very great; for lower productivity per man may yield a larger total output if more men are employed. Another consideration is the distribution of investment among the geographical regions of the country. It is desirable to concentrate investment where the growth potential is greatest, but this may have to be modified in favor of reducing regional disparities in per capita income or of providing work where unemployment is relatively high. Given an adequate infrastructure and adequate knowledge of feasible investments, the planners must persuade or induce entrepreneurs to invest. Persuasion and inducement are seldom needed for investments within the scope of small-scale enterprises; in most underdeveloped countries there is no shortage of small businessmen to invest in commerce or small industrial enterprises, such as grain mills, printeries, trucking, bottling plants,
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cinemas, and the like. What is lacking is experience in building and operating large factories or mines. Most governments are anxious to attract outside entrepreneurship for such undertakings and at the same time to arrange training programs in which their own people may acquire managerial skills. Most countries start developing by exporting agricultural products or minerals. The income thus generated creates demands which are met in the first instance by imports, but which also present an opportunity for domestic production of substitutes for imports. The possibilities of import substitution are limited, however, partly by natural resources and partly by the economies of specialization. When these limits are reached, further development will bring an increase in imports which has to be matched by an increase in exports. Development planners therefore need to watch the effect of development on imports and to keep the import propensity in balance with the export propensity, either by increased efficiency in import substitution or by increased efficiency in exporting. Failure here brings a balance of payments crisis and structural inflation. Failure of agricultural output to expand at an adequate rate is normally one of the main causes of slow economic growth or of structural inflation. Small farmers are quick to take up profitable crops and have produced large supplies of such commercial crops as cocoa, coffee, bananas, rubber, and cotton. Now that population is increasing more rapidly in the less developed than in the more developed countries, the challenge to farmers is, rather, to meet domestic needs by increasing the productivity of existing crops (especially domestic foods), and this seems harder to achieve. Measures to raise agricultural productivity (especially new breeds and varieties, use of fertilizers, disease and insect controls, irrigation, and new methods of processing and storing) are the core of any good development plan, since increases in agricultural output are needed to raise living standards, to provide an expanded market for industrial output, and to serve as a basis for higher savings, taxes, and earnings of foreign exchange. Before World War n, governments of poor countries spent mainly on day-to-day administration of law and order. Planning can easily double the recurrent budget and add as much again in public expenditure on capital account, if the money can be raised. Public expenditure increases partly because an infrastructure of services is required to support an increased output of agriculture or manufactures, but it increases just as much because the public demands some services for their own sake,
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irrespective of their effect on productivity (e.g., curative medicine, general education, social security benefits). How much to spend on public services is a political rather than an economic decision, in the sense that from the economic standpoint the public should have as much service as it is willing to pay for. When development planning began, most poor countries were spending less than 20 per cent of gross national income on gross capital formation and public expenditure together, whereas the rate of growth and standards of public service they now demand would require at least 30 per cent. Foreign investment and foreign aid contribute, but at the beginning of the 1960s the net inflow from these sources averaged only about 4 per cent of the poorer countries' incomes; the main part of the cost must be met from domestic sources. Domestic private saving is low and has to be supplemented by public saving out of taxes and other revenues. Rapidly increasing demands for public expenditure and for public savings have forced equally rapid increases in taxation; in this sense, creating a good tax structure with adequate rates is fundamental to success on both the economic and the political levels. What development planning tries to ensure is that the moneys so raised will be spent intelligently, but this depends even more on political institutions and good sense than it does upon economic techniques. Development plans are full of figures, but policy matters more than figures. The public sector, to which most of the figures relate, is seldom as large as 20 per cent of a poor economy, and development cannot be ensured even by the most intelligent planning of the public sector. In the last analysis, economic growth depends on the willingness of thousands or millions of private citizens to make some change: to change their jobs, acquire new skills, try out new techniques, or invest in new resources. The secret of successful development is to provide a framework which induces people to make the best use of the opportunities which exist in their economy. Effectiveness. Development plans vary widely in the extent to which they are taken seriously. A few are followed faithfully by the governments which have issued them, a few cease to be consulted within six months of publication, and the rest range between these extremes. The hazards of the plan derive from three sources: (1) lack of realism and commitment; (2) differences between those who make the plan and those who make economic decisions; (3) difficulties in forecasting. The original purpose of planning was to select
priorities in government expenditure. However, a five-year plan is not an expenditure authorization; normally authorization occurs only in the annual budget. Hence, what a government actually authorizes in due course is not necessarily tied to what it has put into the plan; and it cannot be assumed that the plan is a true statement of what it intends to do, even at the moment when the plan is issued. If this is true of the public-sector part of the plan, it applies even more to the private sector. Nobody is committed by what the plan says about the private sector. Hence, those who prepare the plan are not constrained by having to put into effect what they are saying. Why does a government issue a plan to which it does not intend to adhere? Such a plan usually predicts a larger achievement than is possible with the available resources. This may be done for one of two reasons, either as a political smoke screen or as a means of attracting larger resources. A development plan has something of the same status as a party's political program. It is not a final commitment (only the annual budget authorizes ), so the government can make promises which it would like to carry out if it had the resources, without stopping to count the actual resources too closely at the moment of publication. Obviously a document published in this frame of mind does not deserve to be called a plan, since the essence of planning is matching needs against resources and determining priorities. The second reason for publishing a plan in excess of available resources is to attract more resources. A large gap between needs and resources may attract either internal or external resources. One problem of poor countries is that people have not learned to pay large sums in taxes. Their governments have in the past taxed only for administration, war, and personal enrichment, so it is axiomatic that paying taxes is a useless burden. The modern welfare state, supplying schools, hospitals, agricultural education, farm-to-market roads, village water supplies, and so on, is a new phenomenon; the public is accustoming itself to demanding these services from the government faster than it is accustoming itself to paying taxes. The strategy of making a plan in excess of resources demonstrates to the public that it can have more of what it wants if it is prepared to pay more taxes. The government of the typical underdeveloped country has substantially increased the share of taxes in the national income over the past 15 years, and this has certainly been aided by the practice of setting high targets for the public sector in development plans.
PLANNING, ECONOMIC: Development Planning The same strategy may work with administrators of foreign aid. These administrators look for gaps in a development plan which they think they can fill. A plan which showed resources equal to desired expenditures would leave no room for foreign aid. This problem can, however, be solved without violating the chief purpose of planning, which is to determine priorities. A good development plan assigns degrees of priority to the projects which it includes. Hence, there is always a list to use for drawing out more taxes or more foreign aid. Implementation. The plan may be well designed in every sense but yet may fail because it is made by people who cannot put it into effect. This is obvious in regard to the private sector; what the planners write may bear no relationship to what investors mean to do. But it applies also to the public sector. A government is not monolithic; power to make decisions is diffused among many ministries and departments. Many a "good" plan fails because it is ignored by the very ministries which are supposed to implement it. Hence, the machinery for implementing the plan is of crucial importance. If the plan is to have a good chance of being implemented, the agency which makes the plan must meet three tests: (1) it must have the support of the head of the government; (2) it must allow all the leading decision makers in the economy to participate in drawing up the plan; and (3) it must control crucial decisions at the stage of implementation. Governments usually establish a special agency for making a development plan. Its size varies according to the size of the country, the complexity of the plan, how the preparatory work is shared with other government agencies and departments, and the extent of the planning agency's responsibility for implementation. Normally ministries and departments prepare their own proposals and have preliminary survey and estimation done by their own engineering and other experts; but if the departments are weak in these techniques, a good deal of preparatory technical work will fall on the agency, which must then have its own architects, engineers, accountants, and other experts. The agency should also be able to rely on the statistical authorities, the government's economic advisory services, and the development corporations for a great deal of the statistical and economic material it needs but may have to supplement this to a greater or lesser extent with its own investigations. There is no formula for dividing the preparatory w ork between the planning agency and other government agencies, other than that the planning
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agency will find itself having to do such necessary work as the others fail to do. Similarly, implementation depends to some extent on the competence of the other agencies. There are cases where the planning agency has become the sole authority for executing all public works, cases where it merely records how implementation is proceeding, and extreme cases where it has nothing whatsoever to do with implementation. Since the plan accords priorities to ministerial proposals, rejecting many outright, the planners must have authority vis-a-vis the ministries. Typically the planning agency is responsible to the prime minister or president, and its chief executive officer is frequently a well-known administrator brought in from outside the civil service and paid above the civil service rates. Unless the agency's head has the confidence and support of the head of the government, the agency will have no effective influence on what goes into the plan. This is not enough, however. The planning agency needs the support not only of the head of the government but also of his strongest ministers. A typical device is to have a special subcommittee of the cabinet for "development plan affairs" which includes the minister of finance and the chief ministers for industry and agriculture. However, the problem is not confined to ministers. Department heads and civil servants are also powerful and can sabotage a plan if they do not agree with it. The only way to have fair certainty that the plan will be effective is to bring into the planning process all the leading persons in the government apparatus, ministerial and administrative, who have the power to make important decisions, and produce a plan which is, as far as practicable, acceptable to them. The same goes for the part of the plan relating to the private sector. A plan for private investment in which the private investors have had no say is not likely to have much effect. Hence, persons knowledgeable and influential in all the industries where substantial change is desired must be consulted in the making of the plan. The machinery for consultation varies in structure and formality. In some small countries all the chief decision makers can sit around the same table, whereas large countries need a network of planning committees including officials and private citizens. Typically, not enough opportunity is given for consultation. The planning agency makes a plan which is unacceptable to important decision makers outside its circle, and they simply ignore it. This is especially apt to happen in countries with a federal structure, where the plan covers many
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functions which are state or provincial responsibilities without adequate assurance that state and provincial authorities are willing to play the role which the plan assigns to them. If the plan is to be effective, the planning agency must have some control over its implementation. In the public sector, implementation is governed by the annual capital budget, which is the authority for expenditure. The planning agency is in the strongest position when the making of the annual capital budget is assigned to it rather than to the authority which makes the annual recurrent budget (the ministry of finance or the budget bureau). This division brings its own problems. Since capital expenditure brings recurrent expenditure, the planning agency must consult the budget bureau when making the capital budget, and the budget bureau must consult the planning agency when making the recurrent budget. If, as is sometimes the case, the planning agency has no control over the annual capital budget, the plan is soon forgotten, and actual expenditure may bear little relation to the plan forecast. The part of the plan relating to the private sector is not so easily controlled by a single agency. Implementation may involve the issue of licenses (for building, imports, or investment), tariffs, subsidies, recommended legislation, and many other kinds of action, vested in half a dozen ministries. The planning agency should be represented on all committees which make decisions involved in implementing the private sector of the plan, though it cannot hope to have a controlling voice. Implementation does not depend entirely on machinery. The most important prerequisite is a realistic plan. If the plan makes assumptions which are far from reality, civil servants and private persons are forced, willy-nilly, to ignore it when making important decisions. However realistic the plan may be at the time it is made, its influence will decline unless it is continually revised. Events turn out differently from what was expected; new physical resources are discovered; the financial situation changes; and so on. With the passage of time the relevance of the published document must inevitably decline. Hence, the plan must be flexible. The private-sector part of the plan is necessarily flexible. If investors turn up with good schemes not previously considered, they will not be turned away; and if other investors decide to abandon proposals which were highly regarded at the time of making the plan, they cannot be forced to continue. Usually the government's concern is only to ensure a high level of private investment; whether this is in one project or an-
other is likely to be of secondary importance, except in industries considered (rightly or wrongly) to be "strategic" in some sense. Not all governments see the situation in this light; some believe that their officials' assessment of investments is better than the private investor's and try to induce or coerce the private investor to keep in line with the published plan; they have only limited success. The public-sector part of the plan is revised every year for the annual budget. Whether conditions have changed or not, the government is continuously besieged by ministers trying to bring forward schemes which are not in the plan, some that were previously rejected, some that are new. As time passes, the published plan must become less relevant. Some countries will openly abandon a plan two or three years before it is due to expire, and issue a new one in its place; others establish new priorities without formally abandoning the plan; still others abandon both the plan and any consistent priorities. A plan must not be considered to have failed merely because things turned out differently. Its value lies in organizing consistent thinking at the time it is made. Constant revision is as important a part of planning as is the process of making the original document. The fact that the economy will not turn out as forecast is not an argument against planning. Decisions cannot all be postponed because we cannot forecast the future correctly; planning helps to clarify what we expect, to reveal its inconsistencies, and therefore to improve the process of making decisions. W. ARTHUR LEWIS [Directly related are the entries CAPITAL, HUMAN; CAPITAL, SOCIAL OVERHEAD; FOREIGN AID, article on ECONOMIC ASPECTS; INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
HAQ, MAHBUBUL 1963 The Strategy of Economic Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press. HIRSCHMAN, ALBERT O. 1958 The Strategy of Economic Development. Yale Studies in Economics, No. 10. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. LEWIS, JOHN P. 1962 Quiet Crisis in India: Economic Development and American Policy. Washington: Brookings Institution. LEWIS, W. ARTHUR 1966 Development Planning. London: Allen & Unwin. MASON, EDWARD S. 1958 Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas: Government and Business. New York: Fordham Univ. Press. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, CENTER FOB INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 1963 Planning Economic Development: A Study. Edited by Everett E. Hagen. Homewood, 111.: Irwin. TINBERGEN, JAN 1958 The Design of Development. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
PLANNING, SOCIAL: Introduction UNITED NATIONS, SECRETARY GENERAL 1963 Planning for Economic Development. New York: United Nations. WALINSKY, Louis J. 1963 The Planning and Execution of Economic Development: A Nontechnical Guide for Policy Makers and Administrators. New York: McGrawHill.
PLANNING, SOCIAL i. ii. in. iv.
INTRODUCTION REGIONAL AND URBAN PLANNING RESOURCE PLANNING WELFARE PLANNING
Charles Madge Herbert J. Cans Richard L. Meier Martin Rein
INTRODUCTION
Social planning involves the drawing up of plans for future action in regard to social institutions and resources. A "social" plan is designed to meet the needs of a society, which means, in many cases, an entire nation. This usage, in which social planning is equivalent to societal planning, is generally accepted by social scientists (see, for example, Myrdal 1959); but social planning is sometimes also used to mean planning by a group as opposed to planning by an individual. Also social planning is sometimes viewed as complementary to, rather than inclusive of, economic planning; in that case, social planning means the planning of a society's noneconomic activities. Recent history. In the present century, and especially since World War n, there has been a rapid growth in the importance of social planning, both as an idea and as an institutional complex. Although the index to the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences does not refer to social planning as such, its article entitled "National Economic Planning" concludes: ". . . the direction of modern society would seem to be toward a planned economy" (Lederer 1933, vol. 11, p. 205). In spite of controversy, often at a high level of intellectual abstraction, on whether so comprehensive a concept of planning is either possible or desirable, the idea of social planning appears to have been institutionalized over the greater part of the modern world and in the programs of international organizations, so that, whatever its logical and philosophical status, it has achieved de facto recognition. In this it may be compared to the ideas of progress, equality, and welfare, stemming from the same broad trend of modern life toward industrialization and technical rationality. During the earlier part of the industrial era the liberal ideology of laissez-faire was in the ascendant. Governments did indeed make social and eco-
125
nomic interventions, but on the whole it was only old-fashioned autocrats and certain socialist minorities who thought in more total terms. Military general staffs were, in the pre-1914 period, the bodies most likely to draw up "plans." Since modern warfare depends on industry, military planners could not ignore industrial and civil questions. World War i involved a far more comprehensive mobilization by the major belligerent governments of all their resources, economic and social as well as military, than had ever before been contemplated. National emergency brought home the importance of, for instance, national levels of health and education to a total war effort. In some countries the war was followed by revolution, and in all the major European countries involved there was a recognition, at all political levels, of the need for social and economic reform. The idea of social planning, and especially of national economic planning, emerged into full daylight during the interwar years. The problem of the business cycle, and unemployment, strengthened this tendency and led to increased state intervention and planning even in the United States, where, however, faith in individual private enterprise remained strong. World War n repeated and intensified the effects of World War i. Not only was there total planning for the war itself, but plans for postwar reconstruction began to materialize, in Great Britain and some other countries, almost as soon as the war started. After the war, international organizations multiplied, and social planning became international. Moreover, by the mid-1960s nearly all colonial territories had gained independence, and a large group of new nations had started programs of national development, in which the idea of a "plan" was almost de rigueur. Scope and theory As early as 1841, Friedrich List had written: "It is the task of politics to civilise the barbarous nationalities, to make the small and weak ones great and strong, but, above all, to secure to them existence and continuance. It is the task of national economy to accomplish the economical development of the nation, and to prepare it for admission into the universal society of the future" (1841, p. 142 in 1§04 edition). While his doctrines served the purposes of militaristic nationalism in Germany after Bismarck and in Japan after the Meiji restoration, they also contributed, if indirectly, to Soviet Russian state planning. "Historically, Friedrich List preceded Marx as the father of the theory of planning; Rathenau, who organized the first modern
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planned economy in the Germany of the first world war, preceded Lenin, whose approach to the problem of planning in Soviet Russia was consciously based on the German precedents" (Carr 19511953, vol. 2, p. 363). List also emphasized the distinction between present and future advantage from the national standpoint. He not only justified protective tariffs for young industries but stressed the importance of developing "immaterial" productive forces, such as technical knowledge and skill. Thus even during this early period it was seen that while the core of social planning consists in a plan for balanced capital investment in industry and agriculture, national plans must also allocate resources for education, health, housing, and other kinds of social investment. Planning and social values. Decisions on priorities to be adopted cannot simply be based on economic calculations; essentially they are political decisions based on social values. The decisions embodied in a plan are made for political reasons; they also have long-term political effects (Diesing 1962, p. 231). Although the models of development currently used by national planners are economic and based on quantitative analysis, it can be argued that only when the economic model has been transformed into a general social model can policy conclusions logically be inferred from it (Myrdal 1959, p. 166). It is relatively easy to decide that capital should be invested, for instance, in a steel plant with a given capacity and location. An economic decision, such as the siting of an industry, can to some extent control the direction of social trends, such as urbanization and population movement. But even in societies with comprehensive state planning, it has not been possible to achieve full control over internal migration, let alone over demographic growth. The noneconomic part of social planning must at the present time largely consist in attempting to foresee some of the ways in which economic decisions will affect social behavior and some of the ways in which social behavior will impede or facilitate the implementation of the economic decisions. Thus, social planners must take logical account of nonlogical motivation (Pareto [1916] 1963, vol. 3, chapter 11). "Radical planners have to cope with the paradoxical situation that the success of their intellectual labor, which is an achievement of reason and logic, is best secured if the indispensable consensus rests on a non-logical basis" (Speier 1937, p. 476). How rational can planning be? But these difficulties are not new. They are inherent in govern-
ment and in the framing and execution of policies and programs generally. In what, then, does the added problem of the social planner consist? It would seem to stem from the more ambitious attempt of the planner to arrive at decisions rationally. By comparison with earlier procedures, this attempt involves more systematic fact-finding before the plan is formulated, more systematic coordination of separate decisions and policies, and more explicit formulation and phasing of objectives. Another feature of planned, as against unplanned, national development is the greater stress on evaluation of results achieved and on objective measurements of success or failure. In a nutshell, the problem of social planning is how to insure that it at least approximates to its rational intentions— a problem that falls fairly and squarely in the lap of the social sciences. Social planning as ideology: pro and con. The idea of comprehensive social planning has been criticized as a pseudo-scientific or "scientistic" delusion stemming from Comtean positivism, which in turn is seen as stemming from the Ecole Polytechnique instituted in Paris after the French Revolution. The desire to apply engineering technique to the solution of social problems is seen as a dangerous aberration (Hayek et al. 1935, p. 210; Hayek 1944 passim; 1952, pp. 94, 105). "All such general plans of social reconstruction are merely the rationalization of the will to power. For that reason they are the subjective beginnings of fanaticism and tyranny" (Lippmann 1937, p. 365), Such strictures were a reaction not so much against Bolshevik or Nazi total planning (though these of course were conspicuous features of the interwar political scene) as against the idea that liberal democracies could, and indeed should, seek to avoid maladjustment (socioeconomic and psychological) by democratic planning (Zweig 1942; Mannheim 1935; 1950). Early in the 1930s Karl Mannheim propounded a new stage of "thought at the level of planning," in which the balance of the planned and unplanned activities of society was about to be decisively tipped in the direction of the former. In this view, liberalism appeared "as a transitional phase between two forms of planned order" of which the earlier was that of medieval Christendom, while the new phase was the result of "the growth of a coherent and co-ordinated system of social techniques" within the modern national state (Mannheim [1935] 1940, pp. 160, 362). Although freedom and democracy, in the sense these words have in the liberal West, were undoubt-
PLANNING, SOCIAL: Introduction edly highly valued by Mannheim, his penchant for portentous phraseology laid him open to charges of "historicism" (a belief in inevitable laws of historical development) and "holism" (a belief that social reconstruction should be all-embracing). Karl Popper sharply attacked Mannheim's concept of planning as Utopian and totalitarian; instead, Popper advocated piecemeal social engineering, in which social arrangements are changed "by small adjustments and readjustments" rather than by trying to redesign society as a whole. However, he did not exclude the possibility "that a series of piecemeal reforms might be inspired by one general tendency, for example, a tendency towards a greater equalization of incomes. In this way, piecemeal methods may lead to changes in what is usually called the 'class structure of society'" (Popper 1957, pp. 66, 68). While a Popperian social planner might fail to see the wood for the trees and a Mannheimian might lose his way in the wood, it is doubtful that we really have to choose between these two approaches. The controversy, begun in the 1930s and concluded in the 1950s, seems increasingly unreal. Without wishing to suggest a unilinear trend, one cannot fail to observe the continued increase in the number of plans and planning agencies, both in advanced industrial and in underdeveloped countries. There has, however, been no corresponding development of a general theory of social planning. For hints of such a theory one must look at comparative cross-national studies by economists, historians, political scientists, and sociologists (Shils 1963; see also Duveau 1954; Bettelheim 1959; Ossowski 1959). In the rich countries planning takes on a less comprehensive and programmatic character than in the poor countries, which are compelled to attempt what in the light of the history of the rich countries appears as a short cut (Myrdal 1959, P- 159). In some underdeveloped countries (for example, India) social planning is combined with a democratic political system of free elections based on universal suffrage. In others (for example, China) there is planning along with what has been described as a "mobilization system," in which the goals of development are high and possibly unrealistic and stress is placed on militancy and single-party organization (Apter 1963a). The more ambitious the plan, the more necessary it will seem to promote consensus by fostering a sense of emergency in the face of external and internal danger (Speier 1937). If the plan succeeds, perhaps this a tmosphere of "political religion" can be relaxed
127
(Apter 1963£>). It may be surmised that "total" and "piecemeal" theories are the poles between which actual ideologies of social planning vary. Practice and organization Historical priority for comprehensive national planning in peacetime must go to the Soviet Union. After initial hesitations, planning machinery was effectively established by 1925 (Carr 1958-1964, vol. 2, p. 490); the first five-year plan started in 1928. In Germany, the first Nazi four-year plan started in 1933. Fascist Italy launched a plan in the same year, which also saw the start of the Roosevelt administration's scheme for the development of the Tennessee Valley in the United States, while in 1934 the Turkish government adopted a five-year plan for the industrialization of the country (Zweig 1942), and there was published in India, not yet independent, a pioneering first program of planned development (Visvesvaraya 1934). In 1950, soon after independence, the Indian government set up its Planning Commission. India's first five-year plan covered the period 19511956. This was probably the first instance of so influential a planning body being set up within the framework of a parliamentary democracy, and its constitutional status has been criticized (Chanda 1958, p. 92; Jagota 1963). Ghana has had three five-year development plans, the first dating from 1951, when it was still a British colony (Gold Coast); the second and third plans were instituted after the country became independent in 1957. Since 1950 both the number of newly independent nations and the number of national economic plans have been increasing rapidly. In 1964 there were about 125 nations, of which some 93 were currently defined as "developing." Nearly all these had development plans (Moyes & Hayter 1964). Wide variations in political context and in the capacities of nations to provide expert staff for planning bodies must be borne in mind, but the trend toward the institutionalization of social planning is unmistakable. Comparative study by social scientists and historians of this new wave of national plans has barely begun but must surely in coming decades become a leading concern of macrosociology. The example of India. The Indian government's Planning Commission has nine members, drawn from the central political leadership and including the prime minister, the finance minister, the defense minister, and the minister for planning. It is assisted by a National Development Council (which includes the chief ministers of the
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states) and has a secretariat of 369, excluding the 240 attached to the Program Evaluation Organization and the Community Projects Administration (Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1958). The staff includes economists and other social scientists and promotes relevant research proje<^s in the universities and research institutes. It is also assisted by numerous foreign advisers, either on a bilateral or an international basis. In broad terms, the members, staff, and advisers of the Planning Commission constitute the intellectual, theoretical, perspective-seeking wing of the political elite. Their function of preparing middleterm and long-term plans serves to remove many of them from the cruder pressures of everyday political existence. There is thus an institutional differentiation between long-term and short-term politics. Can the long-term prevail over the shortterm? What is the interaction between the two? These are important questions for future empirical investigation. Planning as propaganda. National plans are "approved" by parliaments and other national bodies. To this extent they are statutory, though in practice their standing is somewhere between a legal prescription and a political aspiration. "Consensus is the key phenomenon of macrosociology" (Shils 1963, p. 23). In 1954 the Indian Planning Commission requested state governments to arrange for the preparation of district and village plans, especially in relation to agricultural production, rural industries, and cooperation (India [Republic], Planning Commission, 1956). In some states not only were village plans requested but each family was asked to prepare its plan. It is hardly surprising that this kind of "planning" remained a device of political propaganda and even as such had little impact. Nonetheless the propagandistic significance of the national plan, and its place in the ritual of "political religion," are not to be ignored. The function of a plan is not only to allocate national resources but to mobilize national effort. CHARLES MADGE [Directly related are the entries PLANNING, ECONOMIC; POPULATION, article on POPULATION POLICIES. Other relevant material may be found in FOOD, article on WORLD PROBLEMS; HOUSING; PUBLIC HEALTH;
and
in the biographies of LIST; MANNHEIM.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
AFTER, DAVID E. 1963a System, Process and the Politics of Economic Development. Pages 135-155 in North American Conference on the Social Implications of Industrialization and Technological Change, Chicago,
1960, Industrialization and Society: Proceedings. Paris: UNESCO. AFTER, DAVID E. 1963& Political Religion in the New Nations. Pages 57-104 in Chicago, University of, Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations, Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. Edited by Clifford Geertz. New York: Free Press. BETTELHEIM, CHARLES 1959 Problemes et techniques de la planification sociale. Pages 169-197 in World Congress of Sociology, Fourth, Transactions. Volume 2: Sociology: Applications and Research. London: International Sociological Association. CARR, EDWARD H. 1951-1953 The Bolshevik Revolution: 1917-1923. 3 vols. New York: Macmillan. -* Constitutes Volumes 1-3 of Edward H. Carr's History of Soviet Russia. CARR, EDWARD H. 1958-1964 Socialism in One Country: 1924-1926. 3 vols. New York: Macmillan. -» Constitutes Volumes 5-7 of Edward H. Carr's History of Soviet Russia. CHANDA, ASOK K. 1958 Indian Administration. London: Allen & Unwin. DIESING, PAUL 1962 Reason in Society: Five Types of Decisions and Their Social Conditions. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press. DUVEAU, GEORGES 1954 Utopie et planification. Cahiers internationaux de sociologie 17:75-92. HAYEK, FREDERICK A. VON 1944 The Road to SerfdomLondon: Routledge; Univ. of Chicago Press. HAYEK, FREDERICK A. VON 1952 The Counter-revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. HAYEK, FREDERICK A. VON et al. 1935 Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism. London: Routledge. INDIA (REPUBLIC), PLANNING COMMISSION 1956 Second Five Year Plan. New Delhi: Government of India Press. INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, NEW DELHI 1958 The Organisation of the Government of India. Bombay: Asia Pub. House. ->• See especially Chapter 26 on the Planning Commission. JAGOTA, S. P. 1963 Some Constitutional Aspects of Planning. Pages 173-201 in Ralph J. D. Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (editors), Administration and Economic Development in India. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press. LEDERER, EMIL 1933 National Economic Planning. Volume 11, pages 197-205 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan. LIPPMANN, WALTER (1937) 1943 Inquiry Into the Principles of the Good Society. Rev. ed. Boston: Little. LIST, FRIEDRICH (1841) 1928 The National System of Political Economy. London: Longmans. -> First published in German. MANNHEIM, KARL (1935) 1940 Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure. New York: Harcourt. -» First published as Mensch und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Umbaus. MANNHEIM, KARL 1950 Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. MOYES, ADRIAN; and HAYTER, TERESA 1964 World III: A Handbook on Developing Countries. Oxford: Pergamon Press; New York: Macmillan. MYRDAL, GUNNAR 1959 The Theoretical Assumptions of Social Planning. Pages 155-167 in World Congress of Sociology, Fourth, Transactions. Volume 2: Sociol-
PLANNING, SOCIAL: Regional and Urban Planning ogy: Applications and Research. London: International Sociological Association. OSSOWSKI, STANISLAW 1959 Social Conditions and Consequences of Social Planning. Pages 199-222 in World Congress of Sociology, Fourth, Transactions. Volume 2: Sociology: Applications and Research. London: International Sociological Association. PARETO, VILFREDO (1916) 1963 The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology. 4 vols. New York: Dover. -> First published as Trattato di sociologia generale. Volume 1: Non-logical Conduct. Volume 2: Theory of Residues. Volume 3: Theory of Derivations. Volume 4: The General Form of Society. POPPER, KARL R. 1957 The Poverty of Historicism. Boston: Beacon. SHILS, EDWARD 1963 On the Comparative Study of the New States. Pages 1-26 in Chicago, University of, Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations, Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa. Edited by Clifford Geertz. New York: Free Press. SPEIER, HANS 1937 Freedom and Social Planning. American Journal of Sociology 42:463-483. VISVESVARAYA, MOKSHAGUNDAM 1934 Planned Economy for India. Bangalore (India) : Bangalore Press. ZWEIG, FERDYNAND 1942 The Planning of Free Societies. London: Seeker & Warburg. II REGIONAL AND URBAN PLANNING
In its generic sense, planning is a method of decision making that proposes or identifies goals or ends, determines the means or programs which achieve or are thought to achieve these ends, and does so by the application of analytical techniques to discover the fit between ends and means and the consequences of implementing alternative ends and means. Urban (or city) and metropolitan planning apply this method to determine public investment and other policies regarding future growth and change by municipalities and metropolitan areas. City planning has existed ever since man began to build towns and to make decisions about their future. In most societies, but particularly in the United States, there has been little consensus about these decisions. The diverse classes, ethnic groups, and interest groups that live in the city have different conceptions of how the city ought to grow a nd change and of who should benefit from the policy and allocation decisions. Consequently, these groups have attempted, directly or indirectly, to influence the ends, means, and techniques of planing, and even the role of the planners. A sociological analysis of American city planning must ask who plans with what ends and means for which interest group. Since the variables in this paradigm are affected by changes in the population and power structure of the American city, the analysis is best carried out historically.
1 29
Planning as civic reform American city planning can be said to have begun with the laying out of the infant country's first cities, usually by engineers who mapped grid schemes of rectangular blocks and lots, largely for the benefit of land sellers and builders (Blumenfeld 1949). Most American cities came into being without prior planning, however, and with only sporadic attempts to regulate their growth. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the provision of utilities and other municipal services could not keep up with the rapid increase in population, and the cities became overcrowded and congested, with vast slums in which epidemics, unchecked crime, and political corruption were commonplace. Shortly before the Civil War, these conditions stimulated the formation of a number of civic reform movements, which were the forebears of contemporary city planning. The reform groups were made up of predominantly Protestant and upper-middle-class civic and religious leaders whose major end was the restoration of order. They sought physical order through slum clearance and the construction of model tenements to improve housing conditions and through the park and playground movement, which tried to preserve the supposedly healthgiving features of the countryside by building parks and other recreational facilities in the crowded areas. They sought social order through the erection of educational and character-building facilities such as schools, libraries, and settlement houses, hoping that these would Americanize the immigrants and make them middle class, and thus eradicate crime, vice, and even the harmless forms of lower-class hedonism. They promoted political order through the "good government" movement, which advocated nonpolitical methods of urban decision making to eliminate the new political machines and the fledgling socialist movement. They were attempting to maintain the cultural and political power they had held before the arrival of the immigrants by imposing on the city the physical and social structure of Protestant, middle-class, preindustrial America. The means by which they proposed to achieve these ends included new legislation to regulate and control city growth; the use of public administration and, later, scientific management procedures to run the city; and the establishment of "facilities," such as parks and settlement houses, which would improve living conditions and alter the behavior of their users. After the reformers had built a few model facilities with private funds in the slums of
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several eastern cities, they realized that they lacked the resources to alter the entire city by this approach, and so they began to use their considerable social status and what remained of their political influence to propose that the cities take over their programs as municipal functions. The reformers' efforts were supported by architects, who had created the City Beautiful movement during the 1890s to develop park, civic center, and other schemes to enhance the city, and by downtown business and property interests, who sought higher land values and also favored efficiency in government to minimize taxes. Others, especially upper-middle-class homeowners, were disturbed by the invasion of commercial and industrial establishments, low-status residents, and slums into previously "good" neighborhoods. These groups called on the city to pass zoning legislation, which would prohibit such invasions by regulating the kinds of buildings and land uses permitted in different zones. Zoning not only encouraged the kind of order, beauty, and efficiency sought by its advocates but also segregated land use and population by class. The rise and fall of the "master plan" By the end of World War I, planning and zoning had become municipal responsibilities. Since their advocates usually opposed the political machines, these functions were incorporated in quasi-independent city planning and zoning commissions, headed by lay boards of civic leaders and businessmen. These commissions were staffed principally by civil engineers and architects, who were called city planners. The new agencies and professionals codified and further operationalized the ends and means they had inherited from the reformers, principally through the "master plan," which proposed both the traditional solutions and some new ones in a single comprehensive scheme. The typical master plan, which has changed relatively little since the first one was drafted in 1914, portrays a future ideal: a city without slums, divided into zones for each major land use, with efficient highway and mass transit systems, vastly increased amounts of open recreational space and other public cultural facilities, and served by a system of neighborhood, district, and downtown retail and civic centers. The proposals for new facilities and rearranged land-use and transportation patterns are synthesized into a master plan map, with proposals for implementing this map through a zoning ordinance to order land use as prescribed by the plan, building codes to discourage slums, subdivision regulations to guide the development
of vacant land, and governmental reorganization schemes to coordinate the proposed changes (Bassett 1938; Dunham 1958; Kent 1964). No master plan has ever become a blueprint for the growth of the city, although individual recommendations have often been implemented. Perhaps the main reason for the failure of the master plan was its assumption of environmental or physical determinism. Like the nineteenth-century reformers, the master planners assumed that people's lives are shaped by their physical surroundings and that the ideal city could be realized by the provision of an ideal physical environment. Since they were architects and engineers, they believed the city was a system of buildings and land uses that could be arranged and rearranged through planning, without taking account of the social, economic, and political structures and processes that determine people's behavior, including their use of land. The ends underlying the planners' physical approach reflected their Protestant middle-class view of city life. As a result, the master plan tried to eliminate as "blighting influences" many of the land uses and institutions of lower-class and ethnic groups. Most of the plans either made no provision for tenements, rooming houses, second-hand stores, and marginal loft industry, or located them in catch-all zones of "nuisance uses," in which all land uses were permitted. Popular facilities that they considered morally or culturally undesirable were also excluded. The plans called for many parks and playgrounds but left out the movie theater, the neighborhood tavern, and the clubroom; they proposed churches and museums but no night clubs or hot dog stands (Wood et al. 1966). The units into which the plan divided the city were determined by transportation routes and other physical criteria, and did not reflect established social groups or ecological conditions of change and growth. Neighborhood boundaries ignored class and ethnic divisions in the population, and the planners made a conscious effort to break up ethnic enclaves in order to achieve nineteenthcentury Americanization goals. The planners' certainty about how people ought to live and how the city ought to look resulted in a nearly static plan, a Platonic vision of the city as an orderly and finished work of art. The only land uses programmed for future growth were those favored by middle-class residents, high-status industrial and commercial establishments, the real estate interests catering to both, and the tax collector. The planners' unwillingness to recognize alternative values also made them unable to see the
PLANNING, SOCIAL: Regional and Urban Planning role of politics in implementing the plan. Believing that their solution was the best blueprint for the future, its formulators thought that they needed only to publish their report, obtain support from the civic leaders and businessmen who sat on the boards of the planning commission, and then persuade elected officials that the plan expressed the public interest. The planners' opposition to partisan political methods of decision making convinced them that the plan was "above politics" and that anyone who rejected it was acting from selfish, and therefore evil, motives. The master planners did not realize that the ends they sought were opposed by many voters, that most city residents place less value on parks and open space than planning ideology dictated, and that most residents do not center their life on the elementary school, as the neighborhood unit plan proposed. Worse yet, the plan advocated a middle-class life style for all, but it did not recommend economic programs to enable low-income people to move out of tenements and buy singlefamily houses. As a result, master plans have rarely generated any widespread enthusiasm among the voters but have always aroused considerable political opposition from the groups who would have to pay economically, socially, and politically for the proposed changes. The master planners were also hampered by conditions not of their making. For one thing, their authority to plan stopped at the city limits, although the growth processes which they sought to control cover a much wider area. Also, the planners were poorly funded, so that their conclusions were often based on whatever data, however inadequate, were already available. Yet their methodology was ultimately also a function of their own ends, means, and techniques. Their belief in physical determinism limited their analysis to the determination of the land-use implications of their demographic and economic projections, and their faith in the solutions they proposed discouraged consideration of the fit between ends and means and of the consequences of these means (Meyerson & Banfield 1955; Altshuler 1965). Yet although master plans had little impact on city development, some of the planners' ideas were adopted. For example, their arguments that excessive land coverage inevitably produced traffic congestion, that off-street parking was necessary, and that zoning too much land for commercial use in the hope of increasing tax income would also leave ^uch land lying needlessly unused were eventually ac cepted in principle by city officials. Being politically weak, however, the planners could not stand
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up to the powerful economic interests who opposed the implementation of these principles, and being apolitical in their approach, they could not develop compromise solutions, which would have salvaged at least some of their proposals. Master planning activity reached a new high after World War n, especially in areas of rapid suburbanization. At the same time, however, planners working in the cities began to lose confidence in the master plan. As cities began to grow and rebuild again, many of the development proposals that came before the planning commission conflicted with the master plan, and the conflict was usually resolved in favor of the new proposals. Some planners argued that, in order to be useful, the master plan had to be constantly revised and updated, but others began to suggest that planning was not only a method but also a process of decision making and that master planning was only one tool among many to be employed in this process. The emergence of rational planning Since 1950 the city has increasingly become the residence of a small number of rich people and a rapidly rising number of poor nonwhites. The latter are forced to live in ghetto slums, and these slums, as well as the pathologies associated with poverty, are reducing the livability of the city for the middle class and creating new problems for city officials. Low-income neighborhoods and residents cannot pay the taxes needed to provide them with municipal services, and the exodus of middleclass residents, stores, and industries to the suburbs is also depriving the city of its most profitable sources of tax income. Some help is now coming from the federal government, which is providing financial support for new city programs. City planning has been funded by federal subsidies as well, particularly for transportation and urban renewal plans. Transport and metropolitan planners. Master planners have concerned themselves with transportation ever since car ownership began to increase urban congestion and suburbanization. After World War n, however, the new spurt in car buying and the growth of suburbia resulted in the building of expressways, subsidized by federal grants, in every American city. These made it more convenient to use cars and thus encouraged the exodus to suburbia even more. As a result, they not only failed to reduce congestion but also took more customers away from the already declining mass transit systems. Consequently, by the late 1950s a number of large cities began to formulate massive transporta-
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tion planning studies, which aimed to determine the location of future expressways and to revitalize mass transit as part of a metropolitan-area transportation system serving the city and its suburbs. Since new transportation facilities stimulate further urban development and thus affect land-use patterns and the economic base of the cities (Mitchell & Rapkin 1954), the transportation planners were in effect formulating a new kind of master plan (Fagin 1963). In this process, they introduced several innovations into planning. Well financed and able to measure the amount and flow of traffic with relative ease, the planners obtained large masses of data and brought in the newly available computer to analyze them. Moreover, since the aim of their plan was limited to serving the transportation needs of the area and the achievement of the economically most productive and most efficient land-use patterns, they were working with a smaller number of ends than were the master planners. This enabled them to formulate a number of alternative schemes, rather than a single one, using the computer and later the simulation model to choose a final plan from among the alternatives ("Land Use . . . " 1959). Because the studies were staffed by transportation experts, economists, and operations researchers rather than by architects and master planners, the ends and means of traditional city planning were of lesser importance. Finally, their plans were metropolitan. Because so much of the traffic flow was generated in the suburbs, transportation planning could not end at the city limits, and regional planning bodies were set up to do the studies. Metropolitan planning had been advocated by city planners and public administrators for more than a generation. The control of growth and the achievement of order and efficiency required a metropolitan government to coordinate municipal services and planning for the city and its suburbs in a single supergovernment, which would do away with the duplication and conflict among the many hundreds of local bodies. The appeal for metropolitanism fell on deaf ears, however. The suburbs rejected any plan which would require them to share their power with, or give up their local authority to, the city. The cities were predominantly Democratic, working class, and Roman Catholic, and the suburbs were predominantly Republican, middle class, and Protestant; thus political, class, and religious conflicts were endemic, and they were magnified when cities became increasingly nonwhite (Banfield & Grodzins 1958). Moreover, the suburbs had no great interest in metropolitan planning or coordination.
Their middle-class homeowners could well afford the duplication of municipal services and were unwilling to accept any infringement on their local autonomy, not to mention the possible arrival of lower-status and nonwhite city residents in exchange for a slight saving in taxes. These considerations may even prevent the implementation of the regional transportation systems now being planned. Urban renewal programs. The second stimulus for change in city planning theory and practice has come out of urban renewal programs. In 1949 the federal government set up the urban renewal program, which funneled considerable amounts of money to the cities, with a view to the elimination of slums (Woodbury 1953; Wilson 1966). Intense political opposition to public housing prevented it from making any significant inroads on the slums, and thus the federal government turned to private enterprise, hoping that it would rebuild on land that had been cleared and reduced in price by federal grants. The program received strong local support from the cities, which expected that new building programs would increase their tax revenues, and from downtown businessmen, who saw urban renewal as a way of replacing the slum dwellers of the inner city with more affluent customers and, later, as a way of modernizing downtown districts with federal aid. The theory behind urban renewal was the traditional nineteenth-century one that if slum dwellers were relocated in decent housing, they would give up their lower-class ways and the social pathologies thought to "breed" in the slums. Since inexpensive housing was in short supply, however, and the private redevelopers of cleared sites were building only luxury housing, the displaced were often forced to move into other slums, where they usually had to pay higher rents (Anderson 1964; Hartman 1964; Greer 1965). In clearing entire neighborhoods, urban renewal also destroyed viable social communities, thus saddling the displaced with emotional costs as well (Gans 1962; Fried 1963). In the larger cities, the unanticipated consequences of slum clearance created so much political opposition that by the start of the 1960s, when the market for luxury housing had been sated, the promiscuous use of the bulldozer was halted. Renewal agencies are now experimenting with rehabilitation, so as to minimize relocation, and are proposing new subsidies for both builders and lowincome residents in order to increase the supply of low-cost housing (Frieden 1964; Abrams 1965). Initially, renewal had been carried out on a project-by-project basis, but once the choice sites desired by private builders had been used up, city
PLANNING, SOCIAL: Regional and Urban Planning planners were asked to develop more comprehensive urban renewal programs. The selection of future renewal sites required the determination of the best re-use of the sites on the basis of city-wide considerations; and the federal government provided planning grants to the cities to create "workable programs," which had to demonstrate how individual projects fitted into a larger, more comprehensive renewal plan before federal renewal funds were made available. Subsequently, the federal government broadened its requirements, for example, by including social considerations in the choice of sites, and set up the "community renewal program" (Grossman 1963). In many cities the community renewal programs resemble the traditional master plan, but in others the failure of urban renewal to help the slum dwellers has called attention to the need for solving the more basic problems of the low-income population. This concern, together with the "War on Poverty," is encouraging planners in a number of cities to develop quite different kinds of plans. Thus there have been innovations in the choice of ends and means as well as in the techniques of planning. Urban renewal is no longer conceived solely as a process of eliminating slums, but as a means of dealing with the problems that force poor and nonwhite people into them. Some community renewal programs are exploring programs of job creation, opening up housing, educational, and other opportunities to nonwhites, and improving social services in the hope that these, together with housing programs, will eliminate the deprivation of the slum dwellers as well as the slums. New ends, such as equality of opportunity and redistribution of public resources to the poor, are complementing those of order and efficiency, particularly since it is being realized that social order can be maintained only through greater economic and political equality. The means are new as well, since, to an increasing extent, programs to help people are being added to those for changing the physical environment. In 1966, the federal government formally integrated social and physical planning for urban renewal by developing the Demonstration Cities program, later retitled the Model Cities program, through which 60 to 70 American cities were to be funded to rebuild and rehabilitate almost completely the physical and social structures of their major slum ghetto neighborhoods (Taylor et al. 1966). Systemic planning. The extension of economic a nd other opportunities bears little resemblance to traditional planning solutions, and the outcome of the planning process is no longer en-
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visaged as a master plan but as a set of incremental or developmental programs that will improve present conditions, formulated so that they can be plugged into the ongoing decision-making processes of city officials (Fagin 1959; Mitchell 1961; Webber 1963a). Physical determinism is thus being replaced by a broader systems approach, which seeks to deal with the causes of the problem. In this conception of the planning process, land-use studies are less relevant, and the community renewal planners are turning to surveys of the present behavior and future wants of the populations for whom they are planning, analyses of the quality of opportunities and social services now available to them, and economic as well as political studies to determine the feasibility and the results of the programs and policies they recommend. This conception of planning also presages a change in the role of the planner. The city planner is no longer a nonpolitical formulator of long-range ideals but is becoming an adviser to elected and appointed officials. Planning commissions are being reorganized into planning departments that take their place in the mayor's cabinet, and consequently the planner's traditional antipathy to politics has decreased. The planner's new role and his rising influence are partly a result of changes in the city and in city hall. The new problems of the city and the gradual replacement of the working-class machine politician by the middle-class, college-educated politician-administrator, supported by professionally trained bureaucrats, have made city governments much more responsive to expert advice, while the reduction of class differences between the planners and the new politicians has improved communication between them. In addition, downtown business and property interests have become more favorable to planning, partly because they, too, face new problems they cannot solve themselves and partly because the planners share their concern with the revitalization of the central business district. Moreover, planners are becoming more sympathetic to the city and are giving up their traditional antiurban ideology. As the suburbs threaten to engulf the city and to endanger the survival of the upper-middle-class cultural and civic institutions that have traditionally been located in the city, the planner has become an advocate of urbanism, supporting schemes to bring the middle class back into the city. Finally, with federal funds rapidly becoming a major source of support for local planning and state planning agencies and metropolitan ones also participating in local planning activities, the
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planner is no longer so closely tied to the small group of local businessmen and civic leaders who have traditionally supported him against his political opponents. This has encouraged him to pay more attention to the needs of other interest groups in the city, and, since the advent of the "War on Poverty," p?rticularly the low-income population. His greater concern with people has also made him more aware of the diversity of values among residents and more in favor of direct citizen participation in the planning process, rather than depending on the traditional appeal for citizen endorsement of the planner's decisions (Wilson 1963). The rational programming approach. The changes in the conditions under which planners work have been complemented, and even preceded, by changes within the planning profession and in the recruitment of planners, especially the entrance of social scientists into city planning. During the 1930s, social scientists helped to conduct national and regional planning studies in various federal agencies. After World War n, the University of Chicago established a planning school which taught national as well as city planning and was the first to stress social science rather than architectural techniques (Perloff 1957). Subsequently, this curriculum spread to other planning schools, and students with social science backgrounds streamed into them, so that today architects and engineers are fast becoming a minority in these schools. The Chicago school approached planning as a method of rational programming. Briefly, it argued that the essence of planning is the deliberate choice of ends and the analytic determination of the most effective means to achieve these ends, these being means which make optimal use of scarce resources and which, when implemented, are not accompanied by undesirable consequences. The Chicago planners argued that ends are not imposed by planning ideology or by a priori determinations of the public interest, but by political and market processes and by other forms of feedback from those affected by planning. According to this view, means and consequences are determined through predominantly empirical analyses, and by other studies that test the fit of means to ends and predict the consequences of these means (Meyerson & Banfield 1955; Meyerson 1956; Davidoff & Reiner 1962; Perloff & Wingo 1962). Rational programming has much in common with concepts of planning and methods of rational decision making being developed in political science, public administration, and management; thus, it is reducing the differences between city planning and planning for other clients and ends.
In turn, this has enabled city planning to use the personnel and approaches of other disciplines, including operations research (Branch 1957; Wheaton 1963), decision theory (Dyckman 1961), costbenefit analysis (Lichfield 1960), input-output studies (Isard et al. I960), information theory (Meier 1962), and simulation models ("Urban Development Models" 1965), as well as sociological and manpower analyses for understanding the behavior, attitudes, and ends of the clients of planning [Willmott & Cooney 1963; Reiner et al. 1963; see also ADMINISTRATION, article on ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR; REGIONAL SCIENCE]. The social scientists and the rational programmers owe no allegiance either to the master plan or to physical determinism. Aided by research findings, which indicate that the portions of the physical environment with which city planners have traditionally dealt do not have a significant impact on people's behavior (Rosow 1961; Wilner et al. 1962), and by studies of social organization and social change, which demonstrate that economic and social structures are much more important than spatial ones, the rational programmers devote their attention to institutions and institutional change rather than to environmental change (Webber 1963b; 1964). The new conception of planning has also affected general land-use planning, creating a greater concern with the social and economic functions of land use and leading to incremental policy formulations for rearranging it (see, for instance, Wheaton 1964). Even urban design, traditionally based primarily on aesthetic considerations, is now paying attention to the social processes that shape what city planners call the "urban form" (Lynch I960; Wurster 1963). New towns. Nevertheless, traditional master planning and land-use planning have received new support through the revival of another nineteenthcentury concept—the "new town." Originally conceived as a way of moving urban slum dwellers into the countryside and halting the growth of cities (Howard 1898), the new town is a relatively self-sufficient and independent community located beyond the city limits; it provides local employment opportunities for many of its residents, thus reducing their journey to work, the city's traffic congestion, and the alleged defects of the suburbs as so-called "bedroom communities" (Stein 1951)The hope is that if the master plan and related solutions cannot work in established cities, they might be applied on the tabula rasa of a new town. It seems likely, however, that the same political and market forces that prevented the implementa-
PLANNING, SOCIAL: Regional and Urban Planning tion of the master plan will also frustrate portions of the new-town schemes, particularly if they do not meet the wishes of the people who will have to be attracted as home buyers (Eichler & Kaplan 1967). Social versus physical planning In the 1960s rational programming is rapidly achieving dominance at the level of planning theory and is being advocated and used by professors and researchers in the profession. However, it has not yet been accepted by most city planning commissions and departments. Instead, the city planning practitioners have typically reacted to the new theory—and the new urban problems—by adding programs of "social planning" to the traditional land-use approach, now often called "physical planning." "Social planning" is used to describe planning for people or, by implication, for lowincome people, probably because physical plans have catered so largely to building programs for more affluent city residents. The dichotomy between physical and social planning is theoretically unjustifiable, however, because physical plans affect people, rich and poor, as much as do social plans. Even so, planning agencies are now adding social planning divisions to their staffs (Perloff 1963; 1965; Dyckman 1966). The first social planning activities were intended to meet the requirements of the federal community renewal program and to correct the inequities of slum clearance for the slum dwellers, but increasingly they are being carried out to coordinate city planning and renewal with the community action activities and other programs of the "War on Poverty." Frequently, however, this so-called social planning is only a modernized version of previous attempts to impose middle-class ways on the lowincome population, with "human renewal" educational and social work schemes to "rehabilitate" the slum dwellers while—or even in lieu of—improving their living conditions, thus subverting the antipoverty efforts into yet another device for maintaining the present inequality of the lowincome population (Cans 1964). This possibility has led to proposals for bringing planners into closer contact with the low-income population. Davidoff (1965) has suggested that because most planners are employed as technicians to pursue the interests of the so-called Establishment—that is, city hall, the political party, and the business community—other planners ought to become "advocate planners," that is, technical consultants and even spokesmen for the low-income population. In several U.S. cities, planners have begun to work
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with local civil rights groups and with community organizations in poor neighborhoods; they have formed a national professional association, Planners for Equal Opportunity; and they are questioning orthodox planning beliefs about how to plan for the slum ghetto (Piven & Cloward 1966). The politicization of planning. These activities are leading to the politicization of the city planning profession. It appears that the profession is being split into progressive and conservative wings: the former calling for social planning to reduce economic and racial inequality, and the latter defending traditional physical planning and the legitimacy of middle-class values. The rational programmers are a third wing, seeking to develop an approach that makes it possible to plan for all interest groups, but they, too, are split over the issue of working with or against the Establishment. In their day-to-day practice, city planning agencies tend to favor the conservative wing and the traditional land-use approach to planning, although they are both threatened and influenced by the progressives and the rational programmers. Not only are the planning agencies in existence to conduct land-use planning, but most of the directors and senior staff members are trained in this approach, and some of the leading practitioners in the profession still come from architectural and civil engineering backgrounds. Rational programmers and progressives are more often found among the junior staff and have less influence on agency activities. Moreover, since planners are employees of municipal bureaucracies, they are expected to conform to agency policy on the job, and in some cities they are even restrained from off-hours participation in activities and groups that question or oppose agency policy. This naturally reduces the impact of progressive ideas on local planning activities. The future of planning. The future direction of city planning is at present uncertain. As architecturally trained planners become a minority in the profession, city planning will undoubtedly make more use of the concepts and methods of rational programming and will pay more attention to the social and economic problems of the city. Traditional physical planning is still needed to modernize the city, to raise its efficiency in housing and moving workers and residents, and to prevent further physical and aesthetic deterioration. The ends of physical planning may be most relevant to the suburbs and to the newer communities of the western United States, although even they do not always favor the particular kinds of order, efficiency, and attractiveness that physical planners
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seek. In the older American cities, however, poverty, unemployment, racial and class discrimination and their pathological consequences are not only the most crucial problems but also are major causes of the low quality of city living, the middleclass exodus, and the city's financial difficulties (Cans 1965; Wilson 1966). The inequalities and pathologies of the urban low-income population must, therefore, be eliminated, before the attractive, efficient, and slumless city for which physical planners are striving can be realized. When these traditional planners can be persuaded of the validity of this approach, it may be possible to achieve a synthesis of the so-called social and physical planning approaches and thus to create a city planning profession that uses rational programming to bring about real improvements, not only in the lives of city residents but also in the condition of the cities themselves. HERBERT J. CANS [See also CITY; HOUSING; NEIGHBORHOOD; REGION; TRANSPORTATION; and the biography of GEDDES.] BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABRAMS, CHARLES 1965 The City Is the Frontier. New York: Harper. ALTSHULER, ALAN 1965 The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. ANDERSON, MARTIN 1964 The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. BANFIELD, EDWARD C.; and GRODZINS, MORTON 1958 Government and Housing in Metropolitan Areas. New York: McGraw-Hill. BASSETT, EDWARD M. 1938 The Master Plan. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. BLUMENFELD, HANS 1949 Theory of City Form, Past and Present. Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 8:7-16. BRANCH, MELVILLE C. 1957 Planning and Operations Research. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 23:168-175. DAVIDOFF, PAUL 1965 Advocacy and Social Concern in Planning. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 31:331-337. DAVIDOFF, PAUL; and REINER, THOMAS A. 1962 A Choice Theory of Planning. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 28:103-115. DUNHAM, ALLISON 1958 City Planning: An Analysis of the Content of the Master Plan. Journal of Law and Economics 1:170-186. DYCKMAN, JOHN W. 1961 Planning and Decision Theory. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 27:335-345. DYCKMAN, JOHN W. 1966 Social Planning, Social Planners, and Planned Societies. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 32:66-76. EICHLER, EDWARD P.; and KAPLAN, MARSHALL 1967 The Community Builders. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
FAGIN, HENRY 1959 Organizing and Carrying Out Planning Activities Within Urban Governments. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 25:109—114. FAGIN, HENRY 1963 The Penn-Jersey Transportation Study: The Launching of a Permanent Regional Planning Process. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 29:9-18. FISHER, JACK C. (editor) 1966 City and Regional Planning in Poland. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press. FRIED, MARC 1963 Grieving for a Lost Home. Pages 151-171 in Leonard J. Duhl (editor), The Urban Condition. New York: Basic Books. FRIEDEN, BERNARD J. 1964 The Future of Old Neighborhoods: Rebuilding for a Changing Population. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. CANS, HERBERT J. (1962) 1964 The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans. New York: Free Press. CANS, HERBERT J. 1964 Social and Physical Planning for the Elimination of Urban Poverty. Pages 629-644 in Bernard Rosenberg, Israel Gerver, and William Howton (editors). Mass Society in Crisis. New York: Macmillan. GANS, HERBERT J. 1965 The Failure of Urban Renewal: A Critique and Some Proposals. Commentary 39, no. 4:29-37. GREER, SCOTT 1965 Urban Renewal and American Cities. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill. GROSSMAN, DAVID A. 1963 The Community Renewal Program. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 29:259-269. HARTMAN, CHESTER 1964 The Housing of Relocated Families. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 30:266-286. HOWARD, EBENEZER (1898) 1951 Garden Cities of Tomorrow. Edited with a Preface by F. J. Osborn. With an introductory essay by Lewis Mumford. London: Faber. -* First published as To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform. ISARD, WALTER et al. 1960 Methods of Regional Analysis. New York: Wiley; Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. KENT, T. J. 1964 The Urban General Plan. San Francisco: Chandler. Land Use and Traffic Models. 1959 Journal of the American Institute of Planners 25:59-103. -> A special issue. LICHFIELD, NATHANIEL 1960 Cost-Benefit Analysis in City Planning. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 26:273-279. LYNCH, KEVIN 1960 The Image of the City. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. MEIER, RICHARD L. 1962 A Communication Theory of Urban Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. MEYERSON, MARTIN 1956 Building the Middle-range Bridge for Comprehensive Planning. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 22:58-64. MEYERSON, MARTIN; and BANFIELD, EDWARD C. 1955 Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest: The Case of Public Housing in Chicago. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. -> A paperback edition was published in 1965. MITCHELL, ROBERT B. 1961 The New Frontier in Metropolitan Planning. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 27:169-175. MITCHELL, ROBERT B.; and RAPKIN, CHESTER 1954 Urban Traffic: A Function of Land Use. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
PLANNING, SOCIAL: Resource Planning PERLOFF, HARVEY S. 1957 Education for Planning: City, State and Regional. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. PERLOFF, HARVEY S. 1963 Social Planning in the Metropolis. Pages 331-347 in Leonard J. Duhl (editor), The Urban Condition. New York: Basic Books. PERLOFF, HARVEY S. 1965 New Directions in Social Planning. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 31:297-303. PERLOFF, HARVEY S.; and WINGO, LOWDON JR. 1962 Planning and Development in Metropolitan Affairs. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 28: 67-90. PIVEN, FRANCES F.; and CLOWARD, RICHARD A. 1966 Desegregated Housing: Who Pays for the Reformers' Ideal. New Republic 155, no. 25:17-22. REINER, JANET S.; REINER, EVERETT; and REINER, THOMAS A. 1963 Client Analysis and the Planning of Public Programs. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 29:270-282. Rosow, IRVING 1961 The Social Effects of the Physical Environment. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 27:127-133. STEIN, CLARENCE S. (1951) 1957 Toward New Towns for America. Rev. ed. New York: Reinhold. TAYLOR, H. RALPH et al. 1966 Comments on the Demonstration Cities Program. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 32:366-376. Urban Development Models: New Tools for Planning. 1965 Journal of the American Institute of Planners 31:90-184. -» A special issue. WEBBER, MELVIN M. 1963a The Prospects for Policies Planning. Pages 319-330 in Leonard J. Duhl (editor), The Urban Condition. New York: Basic Books. WEBBER, MELVIN M. 1963b Order in Diversity: Community Without Propinquity. Pages 23-54 in Lowdon Wingo, Jr. (editor), Cities and Space: The Future Use of Urban Land. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. WEBBER, MELVIN M. 1964 The Urban Place and the Nonplace Urban Realm. Pages 79-153 in Melvin M. Webber et al., Explorations Into Urban Structure. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. WHEATON, WILLIAM L. C. 1963 Operations Research for Metropolitan Planning. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 29:250-258. WHEATON, WILLIAM L. C. 1964 Public and Private Agents of Change. Pages 154-195 in Melvin M. Webber et al., Explorations Into Urban Structure. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. WILLMOTT, PETER; and COONEY, EDMUND 1963 Community Planning and Sociological Research: A Problem of Collaboration. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 29:123-126. WILNER, DANIEL M. et al. 1962 The Housing Environment and Family Life. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. WILSON, JAMES Q. 1963 Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 29:242-249. WILSON, JAMES Q. (editor) 1966 Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. WOOD, EDWARD W. JR.; BROWER, SIDNEY N.; and LATIMER, MARGARET W. 1966 Planners' People. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 32:228-233. WOODBURY, COLEMAN (editor) 1953 The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment. Univ. of Chicago Press.
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WURSTER, CATHERINE B. 1963 The Form and Structure of the Future Urban Complex. Pages 73-102 in Lowdon Wingo, Jr. (editor), Cities and Space: The Future Use of Urban Land. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Ill RESOURCE PLANNING
A plan is a course of action laid out in advance. A resource is an opportunity in the environment that has been identified and appraised by a population of potential users. Resource planning is a general term for the process of laying out better programs for the development of natural resources than are formulated from the opportunistic, short-run expediting of independent resource use projects. Resource planning is an outgrowth of the principles for preserving natural resources and utilizing them economically [see CONSERVATION]. When optimal use cannot be achieved automatically through the workings of the price system, but only through adjusting technologies on a regional, national, or international scale, then some form of centralized, long-range planning must be adopted. Long-range planning is often undertaken for other reasons than the rationalization of resource development, but resource planning almost always becomes a major component of such national and regional plans. Resource planning has not been fully centralized in any society but is distributed among departments and bureaus responsible for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining, education, recreation, and regional development. After national plans become explicit, they still contain an assortment of specialized programs initiated and implemented by these functional units, as well as by cooperatives and private corporations, that are only partially controlled and coordinated by the national planning effort. No typical