Japan and the G7 8: 1975-2002 (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledgecurzon Series)

Japan and the G7/8

This book analyses Japan’s participation in the multilateral forum, the G7/8, since its creation in 1975 through to the Kananaskis Summit in Canada in 2002. Alongside this unique political history of involvement in the summit process, Japan’s contributions to the process, its alliance with the US and its position within the East Asian region and international society as a whole are also discussed in depth. Hugo Dobson explores the motivation of the Japanese government and non-governmental actors’ aims and objectives and examines how and to what extent they have been achieved. Presenting a wealth of new research as well as interviews with some of the main Japanese participants in the summit process, this book gives a historically and theoretically informed analysis of Japan’s role in the G7 and G8 from 1975 to 2002. It will be of interest to bureaucrats and politicians, as well as scholars of Asian studies and international relations. Hugo Dobson is a lecturer in the international relations of Japan at the School of East Asian Studies, the University of Sheffield.

Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/ RoutledgeCurzon Series Series Editor: Glenn D. Hook Professor of Japanese Studies, University of Sheffield This series, published by RoutledgeCurzon in association with the Centre for Japanese Studies at the University of Sheffield, both makes available original research on a wide range of subjects dealing with Japan and provides introductory overviews of key topics in Japanese Studies. The Internationalization of Japan Edited by Glenn D. Hook and Michael Weiner Race and Migration in Imperial Japan Michael Weiner Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area Pekka Korhonen Greater China and Japan Prospects of an economic partnership? Robert Taylor The Steel Industry in Japan A comparison with the UK Hasegawa Harukiyo Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan Richard Siddle

Japan’s International Relations Politics, economics and security Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher Hughes and Hugo Dobson Japanese Education Reform Nakasone’s legacy Christopher P. Hood The Political Economy of Japanese Globalisation Glenn D. Hook and Hasegawa Harukiyo Japan and Okinawa Structure and subjectivity Edited by Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle Japan and Britain in the Contemporary World Responses to common issues Edited by Hugo Dobson and Glenn D. Hook

Japan’s Minorities The illusion of homogeneity Edited by Michael Weiner

Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping New pressures, new responses Hugo Dobson

Japanese Business Management Restructuring for low growth and globalization Edited by Hasegawa Harukiyo and Glenn D. Hook

Japanese Capitalism and Modernity in a Global Era Re-fabricating lifetime employment relations Peter C.D. Matanle

Japan and Asia Pacific Integration Pacific romances 1968–1996 Pekka Korhonen

Nikkeiren and Japanese Capitalism John Crump

Japan’s Economic Power and Security Japan and North Korea Christopher W. Hughes

Production Networks in Asia and Europe Skill formation and technology transfer in the automobile industry Edited by Rogier Busser and Yuri Sadoi

Japan’s Contested Constitution Documents and analysis Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack

Japan and the G7/8 1975–2002 Hugo Dobson

Japan and the G7/8 1975–2002

Hugo Dobson

First published 2004 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2004 Hugo Dobson All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Japan and the G7/8: 1975 to 2002/Hugo Dobson. – 1st ed. p. cm. – (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/ RoutledgeCurzon series) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Japan–Foreign relations – 1945–1989. 2. Japan–Foreign relations – 1989–3. 3. Japan–Foreign relations–United States. 4. United States– Foreign relations–Japan. 5. Japan–Foreign relations–East Asia. 6. East Asia–Foreign relations–Japan. 7. Group of Seven (Organization) 8. Group of Eight (Organization) I. Dobson, Hugo, 1971– II. Series. DS889.5.J425 2004 337.520171'3'09045–dc22 2003019841 ISBN 0-203-29959-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-33868-5 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–32188–3 (Print Edition)

For Eric and Anne

Contents

List of illustrations Acknowledgements List of abbreviations and acronyms Introduction

ix x xii 1

The origins of the summit 1 The nature of the summit 4 Japan and the summit 9 The outline of this book 10 1

The first cycle, 1975–81

13

Rambouillet, France, 15–17 November 1975 16 San Juan, Puerto Rico, 27–8 June 1976 21 London, UK, 7–8 May 1977 25 Bonn, West Germany, 16–17 July 1978 29 Tokyo, Japan, 28–9 June 1979 33 Venice, Italy, 22–3 June 1980 38 Ottawa, Canada, 20–1 July 1981 41 2

The second cycle, 1982–8 Versailles, France, 4–6 June 1982 47 Williamsburg, US, 28–30 May 1983 51 London, UK, 7–9 June 1984 56 Bonn, West Germany, 2–4 May 1985 60 Tokyo, Japan, 4–6 May 1986 63 Venice, Italy, 8–10 June 1987 69 Toronto, Canada, 19–21 June 1988 73

46

viii Contents 3

The third cycle, 1989–95

78

Paris, France, 14–16 July 1989 79 Houston, US, 9–11 July 1990 84 London, UK, 15–17 July 1991 88 Munich, Germany, 6–8 July 1992 92 Tokyo, Japan, 7–9 July 1993 96 Naples, Italy, 8–10 July 1994 102 Halifax, Canada, 15–17 June 1995 105 4

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002

108

Lyon, France, 27–9 June 1996 109 Denver, US, 20–2 June 1997 112 Birmingham, UK, 15–17 May 1998 115 Cologne, Germany, 18–20 June 1999 119 Okinawa, Japan, 21–3 July 2000 122 Genoa, Italy, 20–2 July 2001 131 Kananaskis, Canada, 26–7 June 2002 136 5

Actors

140

The prime minister 140 The bureaucracy 153 Other state and non-state actors 156 6

Norms

165

Bilateralism 165 East Asianism 173 Internationalism 176 7

Conclusions

185

Achievements 185 Styles of diplomacy 186 The meaning of the summit 188 Appendices Glossary Bibliography Index

190 195 197 212

Illustrations

Figures 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 5.2 6.1

Comparative frequency of references to Japan in official G7 summit documents, 1975–81 Comparative frequency of references to Japan in official G7 summit documents, 1982–8 Comparative frequency of references to Japan in official G7 summit documents, 1989–95 Comparative frequency of references to Japan in official G7/8 summit documents, 1996–2002 Japanese prime ministers’ dis/approval ratings before and after G7/8 summits, 1975–2002 Japanese people’s awareness of the G7 summit process, 1978–81 Success and failure of G7/8 summits, 1975–2002

17 48 80 110 151 162 181

Table 5.1 Leaders’ attendance at G7/8 summits, 1975–2002

148

Acknowledgements

There are a number of people I would like to thank for their assistance in a project that, to be honest, dampened my cynicism towards, and revived my interest in, academic research. So, taking a deep breath . . . In Japan, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Takahashi Susumu at Tokyo University and Professor Suzuki Yu¯ji at Ho¯sei University for acting as sponsors. In addition, warm thanks are extended to both the International Centre for Comparative Law and Politics at Tokyo University (especially Wada Keiko) and the International Centre at Ho¯sei University (especially Ehara Yu¯ichiro¯ and Kojima Hanae) for making life in Tokyo so comfortable. In addition, Sano Reiji deserves special mention for being as kind and helpful as ever during my extended stay in Tokyo despite his intensive, and ultimately successful, election campaign. Thanks also to Philip Seaton and Someya Masayuki for their photocopying skills, Nicole Takeda and her husband for pinning down rumours, and to Jonathan Able, Chris Braddick, Simon Clay, Anthony Gardner, Peter Poole-Wilson and Tanaka Sayuri for keeping me going until payday. I am extremely grateful to all the politicians, bureaucrats, academics, journalists, interpreters, non-governmental organisations, and people who fit into none of the above categories, in both Tokyo and Okinawa who are too numerous to mention individually but all gave up their time to talk to me. In England, I am especially grateful to all my colleagues in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield for their support, especially Tim Wright for granting me study leave, Sarah Hyde for covering my teaching and Peter Matanle for undertaking my administration in Sheffield for one year thereby allowing me to spend the sustained period of time in Japan without which the research for this book could not have been completed. Thanks to David Envall, Glenn Hook, Christopher Hughes, Caroline Rose and Tim Wright for reading and commenting on previous drafts of this book. I am also grateful to everybody at RoutledgeCurzon, especially Heidi Bagtazo and Zoë Botterill, for all their support and I apologise for being a constant nuisance. Financially, thanks to the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee for support in the initial stages of this project (grant number 173) and especially Ho¯sei University for awarding me the H.I.F. Fellowship from October 2002 to September 2003, which provided me with a base and the funds to conduct the research. If this book

Acknowledgements xi proves to be of interest or use to the reader, the credit belongs to all these people; if there are any errors in fact or interpretation, the fault is mine. Throughout this book, Japanese names are given in the correct order, namely the surname first and the given name second, except when referencing works by Japanese scholars written in English. Long vowels are expressed in the form of a macron, except in the case of Tokyo and, once again, when referencing works by Japanese scholars in English. North American spelling, for example organization, center, and so on, is maintained in citations from North American publications; otherwise, British spelling, for example organisation, centre, and so on, is observed. On 6 January 2001, the structure of Japan’s ministries and agencies was reorganised and, as a result, many of their titles changed. The usage in this book observes the official title in use at the specific period in question. Similarly, when quoting figures in yen and dollars, the exchange rate of the time is used. Hugo Dobson Tokyo, August 2003

Abbreviations and acronyms

ADB AIDS AMF ANA ASEAN ASEAN-PMC ASEAN+3 BOJ CIA CIEC CSCE CTBT DOT force DP DSP EC EEC EMS EPA EU FDI FY FYR G6 G6B G7 G8 G24

Asian Development Bank Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Asian Monetary Fund All Nippon Airways Association of Southeast Asian Nations Association of Southeast Asian Nations Post-Ministerial Conference Association of Southeast Asian Nations, plus China, Japan and South Korea Bank of Japan Central Intelligence Agency Conference on International Economic Cooperation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty digital opportunity task force Democratic Party Democratic Socialist Party European Community European Economic Community European Monetary System Economic Planning Agency European Union foreign direct investment financial year Federal Yugoslav Republic Group of six major industrialised countries: France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States and West Germany Group of six billion people Group of seven major industrialised countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States Group of seven major industrialised countries and Russia Group of twenty-four countries and international organisations concerned with providing assistance to Central and Eastern Europe

Abbreviations and acronyms xiii G77 GAB GATT GDP GNP HFSP HIV IAEA IDA IDI IFAD IISS IMF INF IR IT ITTO JBIC JCP JDA JSDF JSP KEDO LDCs LDP MAFF METI MFN MHW MITI MNCs MOE MOF MOFA MOJ MSA MSDF NAM NATO NCP NGOs NHK NIC NICs NIEs

Group of seventy-seven developing nations General Agreements to Borrow General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gross domestic product gross national product Human Frontier Science Programme Human Immunodeficiency Virus International Atomic Energy Agency International Development Association Infectious Diseases Initiative International Fund for Agricultural Development International Institute for Strategic Studies International Monetary Fund intermediate-range nuclear forces international relations information technology International Tropical Timber Organisation Japan Bank for International Cooperation Japan Communist Party Japan Defence Agency Japan Self-Defence Forces Japan Socialist Party (known as the SDPJ from 1991) Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation least developed countries Liberal Democratic Party Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry most-favoured nation Ministry of Health and Welfare Ministry of International Trade and Industry multinational corporations Ministry of Education Ministry of Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Justice Maritime Safety Agency Maritime Self-Defence Force Non-Aligned Movement North Atlantic Treaty Organisation New Conservative Party non-governmental organisations Nihon Ho¯so¯ Kyo¯kai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) National Intelligence Council newly industrialising countries newly industrialising economies

xiv Abbreviations and acronyms NLC NMD NPA NPSC NPT OAS OECD ODA OPEC PALM 2003 PKO RFE SACO SALT SOTF SDI SDPJ SOFA START TGV TMD UK UN UNCTAD UNDOF UNESCO UNGA UNHCR UNSC UNTAC US USTR VERs WEF WHO WTO

New Liberal Club National Missile Defence National Police Agency National Public Safety Commission Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Organisation of American States Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development official development assistance Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries Third Japan–Pacific Islands Forum Summit Meeting peacekeeping operations Russian Far East Special Action Committee on Okinawa Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Senior Officers Task Force Strategic Defence Initiative Social Democratic Party of Japan Status of Forces Agreement Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty train à grande vitesse (high-speed train) Theatre Missile Defence United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Disengagement Observer Force United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation United Nations General Assembly United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Security Council United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia United States United States trade representative voluntary export restraints World Economic Forum World Health Organisation World Trade Organisation

The secret of being a bore . . . is to tell everything (Voltaire, quoted in Knowles 1999: 797) ’Tis better to remain silent and be thought a fool than open your mouth and remove all doubt (Lisa Simpson)

Introduction

The origins of the summit The G7/8 summit provides both a historical snapshot of just over a quarter-century of international relations and also a framework by which to structure and make sense of these relations. It is also one of the many mechanisms in a constantly evolving network of global governance although, unlike most other mechanisms and because of its inchoate nature, what kind of entity the G7/8 is and how it contributes to the provision of global governance are questions far from readily agreed upon in the extant literature. Despite the claim that ‘economic summitry is like sexual intercourse; unless you’ve done it, it’s pretty hard to describe’ (Hunt and Owen 1984: 659), the summit’s origins and the way in which it functions need to be understood first and foremost. To this end, until the late 1990s there was only one main study of the history and role of the summit (Putnam and Bayne 1984; revised and enlarged as Putnam and Bayne 1987). However, in recent years the G7/8 summit process has begun to receive considerable attention, thanks largely to Ashgate’s G8 and Global Governance series (Hajnal 1999; Hodges et al. 1999; Bayne 2000; Kaiser et al. 2000; Gardner and Stefanova 2001; Kirton and Von Furstenberg 2001; Kirton et al. 2001; Cohn 2002; Kirton and Takase 2002; Bayne and Woolcock 2003; Kirton and Stefanova 2004), its Global Finance series (Fratianni et al. 2002; Fratianni et al. 2003), and a contribution in the Adelphi Papers’ series issued by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (Penttilä 2003). Through these contributions, a more nuanced understanding of the history, documentation, nature, evolution and future of the summit process has been expounded. The G7/8 first met as the G6 (France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom (UK), United States (US) and West Germany) in November 1975 at the château of Rambouillet in France to discuss the state of their economies and foster policy coordination. This first meeting found its origins in an informal gathering of the French, West German, UK and US finance ministers in the White House library in March 1973, later joined by Japan, to discuss the state of the international monetary system (Smyser 1993: 15–16). The impetus behind the meeting at Rambouillet was ‘to recreate at the highest level the same sort of direct and informal exchange’ that had been nurtured within this ‘Library Group’ (Hunt and Owen 1984: 658). According to Sir

2 Introduction Nicholas Bayne, UK diplomat and academic, the first summit met with three objectives, which largely remain the same today: (1) to replace US hegemony with collective management of the world economy; (2) to address interdependence and the resulting tensions between domestic and international issues; and (3) to supplement bureaucratic problem-solving efforts with political leadership (Bayne 2001a: 2). Unlike traditional international organisations, which are the result of an international agreement or formal treaty, the G7/8 was ostensibly intended as an impromptu, one-off informal meeting in reaction to both the 1973 oil crisis and the collapse of the Bretton Woods’ system of fixed exchange rates. However, the utility of this forum as the only opportunity in the calendar of international affairs for the presidents and prime ministers, foreign and finance ministers of the world’s leading free-market economies to meet and discuss macro-economic issues led to a second conference in San Juan, Puerto Rico in June 1976 at which Canada was invited to form the G7. Since that time, other members with varying levels of status have joined – the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) participated from May 1977 at London, and Russia formally joined in June 1998 at Birmingham, after years of being held at arm’s length, to create the G8. It was accorded full and equal membership from the Evian Summit of June 2003. In tandem, the summit’s agenda expanded (almost inevitably) from the original economic focus to encompass political issues of the day, as reflected in the contents of its various communiqués, statements and declarations. The summit now functions at a variety of levels including not only the leaders but also ministerial-level meetings on education, employment, energy, the environment, justice and trade (for an analysis of the increasingly political nature of the summit, see Takase 1993). As a result, the administration and preparation for the annual summit, directed by the leaders’ personal representatives, or sherpas, in turn supported by two sous-sherpas responsible for finance and foreign affairs who meet regularly during the year preceding a summit to decide the topics for discussion, has led to an ever-increasing bureaucratic load that has become one of the main rods with which to beat the summit process in recent years. Yet this has also led to a reconsideration of the purpose of the summit process and numerous calls to return to the simplicity of the original, informal meetings of prime ministers and presidents. On the positive side of the ledger, the G7/8 summit process has been described as unique, adaptable and one of the central foci in the provision of global governance. It is seen to be ‘one of the central institutions of our age’ (Hajnal and Kirton 2000: 5), the ‘pinnacle of global power’ (Kirton and Kokotsis 1997–8: 38), and the ‘board of directors for the free world’ (Antholis 2001: 213). Its first meeting was heralded as a ‘politically, economically and historically epoch-making event ¯ kubo 1996: 24), and it was ‘for a time one of the most [author’s translation]’ (O influential institutions of the twentieth century’ (Smyser 1993: 16). It has been characterised by some as the ‘grand assizes of the Western world, surpranational forums rendering collective decisions on the great problems facing the industrial democracies’ (Putnam 1984: 73), or an ‘international economic fire brigade on hand every time a crisis occurs’ (Freytag 2001: 21). To others, it is a ‘forum for consultation

Introduction 3 and the capacity for effective world management that other institutions cannot provide’ (Lewis 1991–2: 25), and a chance for an ‘unreserved exchange of opinions [author’s translation]’ (MOFA 1984: 240). Ultimately, it is regarded as having come to occupy center stage in the continuing struggle to create order out of anarchy in the world’s economic and political life. . . . Indeed, with its unrivalled combination of predominant power and common purpose, the summit and its allied institutions are slowly supplementing, and in some respects, replacing the much more venerable, more familiar, and better documented multilateral organizations of the United Nations and Atlantic Alliances as the leading force in contemporary international governance. (Kirton 1989: xxi–xxii) On the negative side of the ledger, the exclusivity, ineffectiveness and waste of the summit have been repeatedly stressed. It has been cast as a ‘political festivity’ (Akaneya 2000: 11), a ‘ritualized photo opportunity’ (Ikenberry 1993: 132), a ‘private club’ (Watanabe 1994: 18), and a ‘forum without a purpose’ (Smyser 1993: 23). To some, the summit meetings are ‘evanescent public relations spectacles, increasingly irrelevant to the serious business of national policymaking’ (Putnam 1984: 73). It has been dubbed both ‘a supermarket of international affairs [author’s translation]’ (Shima 2000: 74), and the ‘biggest “show” on the calendar of international politics’ (Mochida 2000: 42). It has been castigated for creating a process that has ‘little to show besides a long, vaguely worded communiqué filled with exhortations and statements of intent’ (Whyman 1995: 139). What is more, this communiqué, the main mouthpiece of the summit, has been described as ‘laced . . . with the anaesthetising gunk of globocratese’ (The Economist, 29 July 2000: 19). The summit meetings have been misunderstood as ‘nothing more than a political show where presidents and prime ministers chat casually [author’s translation]’ (Takase 2000: 2), or equally a ‘closed club of an obsolescent rich white plutocracy’, which amounts to little more than a ‘global hot tub party’ (Kirton 1999: 45). In 1997, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine claimed that the summits had become ‘media circuses [that] only formulate resolutions full of empty rhetoric and stripped of decision’ (The Japan Times, 29 June 1997: 6). So, the extant literature appears divided on the very nature, role and worth of the G7/8 summit process. It is agreed that it is neither an international organisation in the traditionally understood sense, nor does it display the characteristics of a fully formed institution. Michael Hodges has argued that it would be wrong to define the G7/8 as an international organisation or institution: ‘[i]nstitutions have clear organizational centers, the most important characteristics of which in practice, are often their cafeterias and pension plans’ (Hodges 1999: 69). In addition, the G7/8 does not possess its own permanent headquarters, flag, elected executive head, or secretariat to provide administrative support, and attempts to provide any degree of formality or bureaucracy have been strongly resisted (Hajnal 1999: 1). Bayne has even go so far as to state that the ‘[t]he G7 summit is at the same time an institution and an anti-institution’ (Bayne 1995: 494). Nevertheless, an instructive precedence

4 Introduction does exist in the form of the Concert of Europe of the nineteenth century, and through a process of comparison a more nuanced picture of the summit process emerges (Kirton 1989: xxii–xxiii; Lewis 1991–2: 28–9).

The nature of the summit It is possible to probe our understanding of the nature of the summit through reference to a substantial literature on the Concert of Europe and the nature of great power concert diplomacy from the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak of the First World War (Gulick 1955; Medlicott 1956; Albrecht-Carrié 1968; Elrod 1976; Bridge 1979; Dakin 1979; Sked 1979; Bridge and Bullen 1980; Langhorne 1981; Jervis 1985; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991; Holsti 1993; Goldstein 1996). By fast-forwarding and rewinding through almost 200 years of international history, a number of similarities between the Concert of Europe and the G7/8 can be teased out that explain the confusion mentioned above surrounding what kind of grouping the latter is, but also illustrate its true nature. In fact, the embryonic summit process was originally credited as being the pet project of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, author of one of the main studies of nineteenth-century diplomacy, A World Restored, who ‘consciously sought to construct the modern equivalent of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe’ (Kirton 2001–2). First of all, both essentially preserve the right of the powerful – in 2001 the summit members accounted for roughly two-thirds of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank 2002) – to take decisions on behalf of the rest of the world. To this end, the Concert and the summit are founded on agreed, but very different, principles – the Concert emphasised the maintenance of the balance of power through the right of the great powers to intervene in the affairs of smaller states, whilst the G7/8 has reiterated in its communiqués its own principles, chiefly the promotion of democracy and free-market economic principles emphasising noninflationary growth, sound monetary policies and free trade (for a detailed discussion of how the G7 in particular has promoted its own belief system, see Baker 2000). Both are extemporaneous, ad hoc groupings borne of crisis, respectively the Napoleonic Wars and the economic confusion caused by the oil crisis and collapse of the Bretton Woods’ system, which were given longer-lasting lives. Both only work effectively when the core national interests of the participating nations are avoided. Both are able to address broader issues in an iterative fashion but also capable of adding issues of the day to the agenda, such as, in the case of the G7/8, numerous terrorist attacks, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident, Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, social unrest in Indonesia and conflict in Kosovo (Hajnal and Kirton 2000: 8). Connected with this, both are groupings flexible and amorphous enough to respond to changes in the balance of power. The G7/8 has allowed Russia to join, in a steadily increasing gradation of statuses, as well as inviting other participants, in order to address specific issues in the same way as France and the Ottoman Empire were included in the Concert. It is difficult to read the following sentence and not think of the Soviet Union/Russia: the ‘formal admission of the Ottoman state to the Concert of Europe in 1856 . . . could be read as a protectorate of sorts rather than as an admission to genuine parity of status’ (Albrecht-Carrié 1968: 12).

Introduction 5 The summit, like the Concert, emphasises the role of the individual and its success is contingent upon the ability of these individuals involved and the atmosphere of cooperation they create. British Foreign Minister Lord Castlereagh referred to the meetings of the great powers as ‘reunions’ (Elrod 1976: 163); similarly, the original G7 was the creation and personal ambition of French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who had been finance ministers at the original meeting of the Library Group in 1973 and by 1975 had become leaders of their respective countries (Armstrong 1996: 42). The summit demonstrates the utility of a limited number of powerful states acting in cooperation: ‘[a] concert’s small membership facilitates timely joint decision making. A concert is open only to major powers; disagreements are less likely when fewer states interact. . . . A concert’s informal decision structure and lack of codification enhance the body’s flexibility and resilience’ (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991: 140). In specific reference to the G7, UK Prime Minister James Callaghan stated in 1976 that: ‘[t]he numbers attending are small and compact. Discussions are businesslike and to the point. We do not make speeches at one another. We talk frankly but also as briefly as we can, and a lot of ground is covered’ (quoted in Putnam and Bayne 1987: 44). US President Ronald Reagan in an interview after the 1983 Williamsburg Summit described the mood of the summit in the following, almost gushing, terms: Let me just quickly – because I know time is important – point something out. Sitting at that table in this Summit were the representatives – the heads of state – of nations that not too many years ago were deeply engaged in a hatred-filled war with each other. And here we are, sitting as closely as we’re sitting with a really warm, personal friendship that had developed between us, but more than that, with a friendship between our peoples. (Hajnal 1989: 250) Thus, and as will be demonstrated in the chapters that follow, one of the main functions of the summit process has been as a mechanism to foster trust amongst participating leaders. This level of trust and intimacy engendered by the summit is crucial for any success it may have and the use of first names between leaders is important in this respect (Nakayama 1993: 45). In fact, a former Ministry of Finance (MOF) Minister has stated that the level of intimacy at one summit was such that discussion of economic policy with his US counterpart continued away from the meeting room and in the toilet whilst relieving themselves (Interview with former MOF Minister, 18 April 2003). Ultimately, the summit works as an annual forum for the informal and reiterative discussion of the main political and economic issues of the day and the incremental implementation of policy thereafter. This approach was encapsulated by an editorial in The Japan Times prior to the San Juan Summit of June 1976, as relevant today as it was then: Rambouillet as well as the upcoming summit in Puerto Rico are unlikely to be remembered for having taken any historic, once-for-all decision to change the

6 Introduction world’s structure and the flow of history. But the free societies have a patent need for such consultative summits in a world as fluid and uncertain as it is today where old institutions have been discredited in the absence of a firm, new order. (The Japan Times, 5 June 1976: 12) In this light, the G7/8’s most important role is as a point at which actors’ expectations converge over a given issue, and it is more akin to a concert than a formal international organisation. It is equally fair to describe it as a directorate (Lewis 1991–2), meeting ‘the world’s need for an informal steering committee’ (Bergsten and Henning 1996: 2), or a ‘mechanism for the coordination of global policy [author’s translation]’ (Shinyo 1992: 23). In contrast to the Concert of Europe, however, the G7/8 does not seek to enforce policy or punish offenders, rather it seeks to set the agenda, tone or mood for global governance whilst conscious of its position in relation to the other mechanisms of global governance. If anything, it is the mouthpiece of the most powerful members of the international community, a global catalyst and consciousness-raiser, and ultimately the world’s biggest thinktank. The G7/8 has been described both as ‘the control tower of global governance [author’s translation]’ (Takase 2000: 176), and ‘emerging as an effective center, and is prospectively the effective center, of global governance’ (Kirton 1999: 46). However, to talk of centres and control is to talk of rules and a hierarchy; it is more accurate to regard the G7/8 as one of many important mechanisms of global governance closely interconnected with, whilst both relying upon and supported by, these other mechanisms. In other words: The G7/8 is a forum, rather than an institution. It is useful as a closed international club of capitalist governments trying to raise consciousness, set an agenda, create networks, prod other institutions to do things that they should be doing, and, in some cases, to help create institutions that are suited to a particular task. (Hodges 1999: 69) In the words of Bayne writing almost ten years ago, ‘the best future approach for the summits is that of catalyst, providing impulses to wider international institutions but not trying to do their work for them, either from inside or outside’ (Bayne 1994: 20). Thus, the G7/8’s position in the patchwork quilt of global governance can only be truly understood in relation to other institutions and mechanisms that provide global governance. The summit’s communiqué and related documents have been used as a clarion call to coordinate these institutions (for a detailed review of the summit’s promotion of international organisations through communiqués and declarations, see Hajnal 1999: 45–55). For example, the final summit communiqués have repeatedly highlighted the work of the United Nations (UN) and in turn have called for: (1) the streamlining of its functions and the reform of its institutions (Bayne 2000: 125); (2) the evolution of a concerted anti-terrorist policy (Belelieu 2002); and (3) the development of preventive diplomacy and its peacekeeping operations (PKO)

Introduction 7 (Inoguchi 1994: 27–8). In addition to this ‘gentle prodding’, the G7/8 has replaced the UN at times as the international community’s institution of choice. It was the G7/8, not the UN, which played a central role in coordinating Germany and Japan’s financial support of the Gulf War of 1990–1, in addition to ending the Kosovo conflict of 1999. It has also been argued that the G7/8 is more representative of the contemporary great powers than the UN Security Council (UNSC) due to the inclusion of Germany and Japan (Smyser 1993: 19–20). Especially during the USled war on Iraq of March 2003, which was instigated with little regard for the UN, it was suggested by some that real influence and authority was, or in the future will be, transferred to the G7/8 (Penttilä 2003: 46–50, 91–5; Sisci 2003). However, rather than constituting a zero-sum game, the G7/8 and the UN can be seen to complement each other – the G7/8 is, after all, an opportunity for national leaders to meet informally and discuss chiefly economic issues; whereas the UNSC is a highly formalised meeting of ambassadors concerned chiefly with security issues. In this light, calls have been made for a much closer dialogue between the members of the two groupings (Shinyo 1992: 25). Equally, the G7/8 has sought to promote in its annual communiqués and declarations both the work of, and coordination amongst, international institutions and organisations both horizontally and vertically. At the first summit in 1975, UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson claimed there was a glut of international bodies concerned with the same issues discussed in the summit process and that the system needed to be streamlined – an initiative that was not taken up immediately thereafter (Putnam and Bayne 1984: 141). However, at the 1994 Naples Summit, the member states came to agree upon the need for a review of these institutions. This call was more effective in setting the ball rolling and at Halifax the following year the summit agenda focused on international financial issues and recommended a number of reforms in the functioning of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, especially as regards the early-warning mechanisms of the former, and the most effective use of the latter’s resources. However, the objective of the G7/8 member states has not been to pursue radical reform of these mechanisms of global governance, but rather ‘to protect the existing system and make it work better’ (Putnam and Bayne 1984: 141). To this end, the G7/8 has supported the work of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) by regularly emphasising the rapid conclusion of trade negotiations in its communiqués and by creating the Trade Ministers’ Quadrilateral (more commonly known as the ‘Quad’) at the 1981 Ottawa Summit to meet three to four times a year. These initiatives have been credited with some success, particularly in exerting pressure on the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (Hajnal 1999: 35; Bayne 2001a: 11). In addition, formal and informal techniques have been used to link the G7/8 with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the most salient example being the practice from 1976 of holding the OECD Council just prior to the annual summit meeting (Bayne 2000: 53–4). Regional organisations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organisation of American States (OAS), have also taken up the

8 Introduction guidance and political will displayed by the G7/8 in combating issues, such as terrorism (Belelieu 2002: 24–5). Other participants brought into the summit process have included business groups such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the Business and Industry Advisory Committee and the Trade Union Advisory Committee of the OECD (Bayne 2000: 217). Moreover, the participation not only of state actors but also non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has been sought as part of a policy of ‘outreach’. The 1998 Birmingham Summit was billed by Jubilee 2000 (an NGO-led campaign dedicated to resolving debt issues in developing nations) as the People’s Summit and a range of activities was organised in an attempt to raise awareness and ultimately construct a system of global governance from the bottom up (regarded as a more successful mechanism of governance (Rosenau 1995: 17)), rather than from the top down (which had been the mode of most mechanisms of global governance since the Concert of Europe). In reaction to the protests at the 2001 Genoa Summit and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US, proposals were made, on the one hand, to limit the remit of the summit’s agenda and return it to its roots, and, on the other hand, to control and embrace groups claiming to represent civil society at the following year’s summit at Kananaskis, Canada (Kirton 2001–2; Bergsten 2002; G8 Preparatory Conference 2002). Within the framework of the G7/8 institutional depth is also evident. The creation of the Quad has been mentioned above. In addition the G7/8 foreign ministers have met at the annual summit from 1975 and usually meet before the opening of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September each year. Finance ministers have the opportunity to meet regularly: (1) at the annual summit since 1975; (2) within the finance ministers’ group whose meetings have been held three or four times a year since 1986 and, on occasion, include the managing director of the IMF; and (3) at IMF, World Bank and World Economic Forum (WEF) meetings. As mentioned above, ministerial-level meetings on education, employment, energy, the environment and justice have also taken place. The creation of other groups has sought to address pressing global issues. For example, the Group of 24 countries and international organisations (G24) was created in 1989 to assist in the transition of former countries of the Warsaw Pact to a democratic and market economy; in addition, the creation of the Group of 20 finance ministers and central bank governors in September 1999 as a permanent grouping including several important developing countries in order to address financial and monetary reform in cooperation with the IMF and World Bank was a significant achievement (Kirton 2001a). Again, this suggests that the G7/8 has not eclipsed other international institutions, but rather has created a mutually reinforcing division of labour. Thus, in short, the G7/8 has been described as ‘essentially managerial in character’ (Falk 1995: 216). It deliberately has no formal decision-making mechanism or ability to enforce decisions reached; in fact, US proposals to include these functions were deliberately vetoed prior to the first summit (Akaneya 2000: 12). What it does best is offer a blueprint for global governance through its communiqués and declarations in order ‘to provide political will and direction’ (Hunt and Owen 1984: 659), and thereafter delegates to more traditional international institutions to provide the specialisation and implementation. Ultimately, most observers seem

Introduction 9 to agree that the G7/8 represents ‘a recognition of the growing need for coordination of policy and behavior on a number of fronts, reinforced by a conviction that more participatory frameworks, even the UNSC, would be too cumbersome, not sufficiently likeminded, and not as ready to collaborate with global market forces as junior partners’ (Falk 1995: 216–17). The G7/8 offers a more flexible, multipolar mechanism, which, in contrast to the UN, is open to adaptation in the provision of global governance. If the formal institutions of global governance can be regarded as spinning plates, the G7/8 is best thought of as the showman who keeps them all spinning in unison (Dobson 2004).

Japan and the summit So, within the global political economy of the early 1970s, the summit was an expedient application of the concert mechanism that allowed representatives of the leading free-market economic powers of the day to address a number of macroeconomic issues of common concern. By 1975, Japan had clearly become one of the most important economies in this global political economy: its population stood at just under 112 million – more than the population of the UK and France put together. Its economy had grown by an average of 10.4 per cent per annum from 1968 to 1972 and by 4.2 per cent from 1973 to 1977, in contrast to the US economy, which grew by 3.1 per cent and 2.6 per cent during the same time periods. In 1975, Japanese exports accounted for 7 per cent of the world’s total, in contrast to the US share of 13.5 per cent, the West German share of 11.3 per cent, the French share of 6.7 per cent and the UK share of 5.6 per cent. Japanese imports accounted for 7.1 per cent of the world’s total, in contrast to the US share of 11.9 per cent, the West German share of 9.2 per cent, the UK share of 6.7 per cent and the French share of 6.6 per cent (Tokyo Sho¯ko¯ Kaigijo 1980: 2, 6, 21–2). However, despite this vigorous performance, the Japanese economy was heavily dependent on oil imports from the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and, like the Western economies, had been hit hard by the confusion caused by both the collapse of the Bretton Woods’ system and the oil shock of 1973. When the idea of a summit meeting was first mooted, growth rates had dropped and inflation and consumer prices had risen rapidly, thereby providing the Japanese government with every reason to seek the coordination of macro-economic policies with its Western partners. What is more, another trend was in evidence. After defeat in the Second World War, Japan had steadily recovered its position in international society through membership of a number of international organisations. It joined the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 1951, the IMF and World Bank in 1952, GATT in 1955, the UN in 1956, and the OECD in 1964 (Hook et al. 2001: 4, 306–7, 333). On the one hand, it was natural that Japan should be included in the first summit meeting at Rambouillet due to its economic muscle and growing position in the various organisations and institutions that constituted international society. Yet, on the other hand, inclusion in this modernday global concert represented for the Japanese government and its people international recognition of their position as a great power of the day. Thus, it has

10 Introduction been written that for Japan ‘[i]t should go without saying that the G8 summit is important. . . . We must view the summit as one of the important means to be used in this strategic context [the conduct of foreign policy in the world of the twentyfirst century]’ (Tanaka 2000: 9), and what is more ‘[t]he summit was an event of national importance for Japan from the very beginning, despite her [sic] early inferior status’ (Kojima 2001: 103). Notwithstanding this agreed-upon importance, the literature on Japan’s role in the summit process is lacking at best. To a large degree, when the connection between Japan and multilateralism has been explored, the focus has overwhelmingly been placed upon Japan’s role in the UN (Peek 1985; Immerman 1994; Dore 1997; Dobson 1998; Fukushima 1999 – although consideration is also given to multilateralism in the Asia Pacific; Drifte 2000; Dobson 2003). Dennis Yasutomo breaks out of this UN-centred scholarship by shifting attention to emerging multilateral policies towards regional and global development banks and highlights Japan and the G7/8 in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Yasutomo 1995). In addition to the Ashgate series mentioned above, there are some contributions to our understanding of the G7/8 summit process and Japan’s role in various aspects of its work in Japanese (Utagawa 1978; Funabashi 1980; Funabashi 1991; Matsuura 1994; Gaiko¯ Fo¯ramu Zo¯kango¯ 2000; Shima 2000; Watanabe 2002), English (Sakurada 1988; Saito 1990; Takase 2000; Hook et al. 2001; Watanabe 2003; Dobson 2004) and German (Reszat 1992). However, most of these studies either do not select Japan’s role in the summit as their main focus, or are overly descriptive and provide little in the way of a sustained, focused and theoretically informed analysis. Thus, the summit process per se has been largely overlooked as an area of academic enquiry and a multilateral conduit for Japanese foreign policy. The G8 Information Centre at Toronto University had up until recently only received one e-mail inquiry from Japan putting it on a par with Trinidad and Peru, in contrast to six inquiries from Belgium and over twenty-three from Canada (Meikle 1999: 123). This is especially peculiar if one were to cast an eye over the content of Japanese newspapers in the run-up to and during any given summit, as it would be difficult to deny that Japanese interest in the summit process is high. In fact, it has been claimed that ‘the Japanese government and citizens have long focussed more closely on the G7 than their counterparts in most other member countries’ (Morii 2002: 83). Highlighting Japan’s role in the G7/8 summits is instructive for both scholars of international relations (IR) and Japan: the former can learn about the contribution of the second largest economy in the world and only non-Western summit nation to one of the central mechanisms of global governance, whilst the latter is provided with an opportunity to rethink the objectives, roles and influence of a number of actors in Japan’s foreign policy. This book is an attempt to fill these gaps in our knowledge.

The outline of this book This book is structured so that it functions in two ways. Chapters 1 to 4 will outline exactly what the Japanese government has aimed to do and actually achieved at each summit. These chapters are essentially descriptive in order to answer this ‘what’

Introduction 11 question based on original research utilising a range of primary and secondary sources, including interviews with a number of leading Japanese participants in the summit, contemporary newspaper articles, speeches, memoirs, autobiographies, biographies, opinion polls, political cartoons and a careful and sensitive reading of the final summit documents as well as their preparation (on summit documentation, see Hajnal 1999: 73–100). From the first summit in 1975 at Rambouillet château in France to the 2002 summit in the mountain retreat of Kananaskis, Canada, the Japanese government’s successes and failures, achievements and disappointments will be catalogued. The year 2002 provides a logical watershed in that this was the last summit of the fourth cycle that rotated amongst the original seven members. From 2003 the summit process began its fifth cycle at Evian, France, rotating amongst eight nations with Russia due to host its first summit in 2006. Thus, these chapters provide a unique and useful resource of what the Japanese government has done at the summit over more than a quarter-century of recent international history. The sections covering each summit are intended to reflect the slow but steady preparation for the summit, the crescendo reached as the main event arrives, and the fallout as the results of the summit are received at home and interest slowly dissipates until the next summit. It is recognised that one pitfall of this approach is that attention may fall too heavily upon two or three days in the calendar of international affairs; thus, where necessary, this narrative will be placed within the context of contemporary international affairs and broader themes in the development of the summit process. In addition, the sections on the four summits hosted by Japan are, without apology, longer and more detailed than the other sections – after all, this is a book about Japan’s role in the summit process and the Japanese government has tended to roll out the proverbial barrel when it comes to hosting a summit. Whereas Chapters 1 to 4 of this book provide a review of what Japanese policymakers have hoped to achieve at the summit, Chapters 5 and 6 make sense of this twenty-eight-year history and tease out some of the main themes by shifting the focus to an analysis of the actors involved in the summit process and their motivations. This is essentially an attempt to answer the ‘who’ and ‘why’ questions through reference to the IR literature on agency and norms. As regards agency, the study of Japan’s domestic and foreign policies has traditionally focused attention upon elites and the dominance of an ‘iron triangle’ made up of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the bureaucracy and the business world (zaikai) (for a critique of this model, see McCormack 2002). Chapter 5 recognises the legacy of this approach but also embraces a variety of other state and non-state actors usually marginalised or overlooked in traditional studies of Japan. Thus, it will elucidate the role of the prime minister, his influence on the summit’s agenda and his use of the summit to increase his popularity at home through reference to opinion polls conducted before, after and, sometimes, during the summit. This effect has been referred to as ‘the tailwind provided by the summit’ (Putnam 1984: 80). Thereafter, the focus shifts to a range of state and non-state actors: the bureaucracy and their objectives, the role of opposition parties, media, the Japanese people’s opinions as expressed in opinion polls, and NGOs.

12 Introduction Building on this, Chapter 6 investigates the motivations of these actors by referring to norms of behaviour. Over the last decade or so a growing body of IR literature has emerged on the role of norms in general (Nadelmann 1990; Chiu 1992; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Hartigan 1992; Strang and Chang 1993; Finnemore 1993; Klotz 1995; Katzenstein 1996a; Ross 1998; Elgström 2000; Verdirame 2001), and in the case of Japan specifically (Berger 1993; Katzenstein 1993; Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Berger 1996; Hook 1996; Katzenstein 1996b; Berger 1998; Gurowitz 1999; Berger 2000; Hook et al. 2001; Dobson 2003). Chapter 6 will introduce and define bilateralism, East Asianism and internationalism as the chief norms that have shaped the behaviour and objectives of the various actors explored in Chapter 5. This does not mean that the third pole of the structure–agency–norms triumvirate will be ignored. Indeed, the structure of the international system has impacted upon the summit process and Japan in two ways: (1) whether manifested as complex interdependence in the 1970s, the second cold war of the 1980s or globalisation in the post-cold war period, the structure of the international system has ensured that a variegated range of issues have been placed on the summit agenda. Although originally a meeting to discuss macro-economic issues, the summit members have never been able to avoid political, security, social and environmental issues as dictated by the oil crises of the 1970s, the heightened East–West tensions of the 1980s or the inchoate nature of the international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union; and (2) connected with this last issue, the collapse of the bipolar cold war system placed the issue of how to handle the former Soviet Union on the top of the summit’s agenda for most of the 1990s. In fact, not only did this issue top the agenda, it impacted upon the very nature of the summit by changing its composition with the eventual inclusion of Russia as a member. However, this case also provides a classic example of the actors’ ability to resist the supposedly inexorable structure of the international system. The fact that Russia did not become a complete and full member of the summit until the fifth cycle began in 2003, over ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is partly due to the Japanese government’s resistance to both the provision of financial assistance to Russia and thereafter to its inclusion in the summit process. This forestalled impact of the structure of the international system will become clearer from 2003. For Japan, the addition of another essentially European member may well signify a further shift in the geopolitical focus of the summit away from Asia and towards Europe; in reaction to which, the Japanese government may become an even greater advocate of Asian issues and seek to sponsor China’s participation in, and eventually membership of, the summit. Nevertheless, this remains to be seen. As the full impact of the structure of the international system has been obviated for the time being, the focus of the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 is placed upon the chief actors and the dominant norms. Finally, in order to complete this study, the conclusion will highlight Japan’s achievements in the summit process, the various diplomatic styles employed to attain them (in order to answer the ‘how’ question), and the meaning of the summit to both the Japanese government and its people.

1

The first cycle, 1975–81

The use of ‘cycles’ to structure an understanding of the summit process is an artifice of sorts as issues, themes and personalities may feature throughout the history of the summit, or alternatively appear, disappear and reappear in no determined pattern. However, it is a necessary and useful device by which to divide the twenty-eight summits that were held from 1975 to 2002 into some kind of order. Not only does the manner in which each nation hosts the summit in the cycle come into relief, a full stop (or maybe a semi-colon) to the process is created, especially after the rights of full participation were granted to Russia at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit and came into effect at the 2003 Evian Summit. Yet, in order to make sense of these cycles and Japan’s role therein, it is also necessary to be aware of the contemporary international scene, trends in the summit process, and developments within Japan’s domestic politics. Within this first seven-year cycle, the structure of the international system shifted from one of détente and economic interdependence to an embryonic second cold war that would flourish during the second cycle. As stated in the Introduction, the summit was regarded as a novel form of fostering coordination in macro-economic and energy policies amongst the leading free-market economies in reaction to the chaos caused by the collapse of the Bretton Woods’ system and the sudden rise in oil prices instigated by OPEC. Thus, some of the main agenda items demanding the summit’s attention were the encouragement of non-inflationary growth, free trade and responsible oil consumption. However, other international events of a more political nature vied for the summiteers’ attention during this period, including the spate of disparate terrorist activities, especially airplane hijackings, which occurred during the 1970s, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which heralded the onset of the second cold war. The first cycle of the summit represents a process of institutionalisation as the summit evolved from being a path-breaking and ad hoc meeting of leaders centring on macro-economic policy coordination to encompassing a range of both economic and political issues and evolving into a regular date in the calendar of international affairs (Yoshino 1977). Thus, as will be seen below, a range of economic issues featured during summit discussions, such as the promotion of non-inflationary growth, the role of the major economies of Japan, the US and West Germany as engines for this growth, the creation of exchange rate stability, and the conclusion

14 The first cycle, 1975–81 of multilateral trade negotiations, namely the Tokyo Round of GATT talks. However, it was not long before this original and exclusive focus on economic issues was shed. A distinct political hue came into relief, as seen in the 1978 Bonn Declaration on Hijacking and discussion at the 1980 Venice Summit of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian seizure of the US embassy. Concomitantly, as the summits became regularly held meetings, a summit bureaucracy evolved that was characterised by the role of the leaders’ advisors, the sherpas, and a range of meetings in the year preceding the summit to decide the upcoming agenda. Although the issue of actors in Japanese domestic and foreign affairs was mentioned in the Introduction and is explored in more detail in Chapter 5, it is useful to reiterate here that, like most of the postwar period, Japanese domestic politics during the 1970s was characterised by the dominance of the ‘iron triangle’ in the decision-making process that, in theory, prevented or diluted the input of other actors. Any political process occurred within the three poles of this triangle between individuals and political and bureaucratic factions. Although central to the concept and practice of the summit, the role of the prime minister in this domestic process was regarded as marginal, dependent on the bureaucracy, and transitional, suggested by his regular replacement. Once invited to attend the summit, this high-profile meeting provided a site into which these characteristics of Japanese domestic politics were naturally extended. Thus, from its very beginning, Japan’s domestic political rivalries came to be played out on the stage of international summitry. The Japanese government’s reaction to the summit was initially one of pride at being invited and recognised as a contemporary great power. However, this first cycle also represented something of a learning curve for the Japanese delegation in participating at the highest level of international diplomacy for the first time. The Japanese prime minister was unused to being thrust onto the stage of international politics and interacting in an informal manner with his Western counterparts. Thus, the Japanese government welcomed the institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of the summit as support mechanisms in navigating the choppy waters of summit diplomacy. Nevertheless, the Japanese government’s stance at the summit was not wholly founded on pride and awe, and it was not long before it began to assume roles, based on the norms that are explored in more detail in Chapter 6, which would define its participation in the summit thereafter. For example, the summit provided an opportunity to address US–Japan relations, especially in the economic sphere and over trade issues, although the emphasis turned to the political during the second cycle as the second cold war impacted upon the work of the summit. In addition, from the very beginning, the Japanese government embraced the role of representative of Asia (Ajia no daihyo¯) in bringing issues of regional interest to the attention of the West’s leaders, especially development issues and conflict resolution. What is more, its desire to play an active role in this multilateral forum can also be witnessed, represented particularly by the efforts made to secure the right to host, and thereafter ensure the success of, the 1979 Tokyo Summit against considerable odds. Certain diplomatic practices can also be discerned: (1) pre-emptive attempts to avert criticism

The first cycle, 1975–81 15 at the summit through the adoption of various policies prior to the summit; (2) the participation of a wide range of actors in the discussion and preparation of the Japanese government’s stance at the summit, despite the ‘iron triangle’; and (3) the linkage between a successful summit performance and domestic approval for the prime minister of the day. The importance of, and role played by, the Japanese government during this period can be grasped by alluding to the number of references made to Japan in summit documentation. As mentioned in the Introduction, the G7/8 differs from other mechanisms of global governance in that it has no mechanism for enforcing its decisions and relies upon the moral weight of its communiqués and declarations. Although the nature of summit documentation has evolved throughout its history and continues to do so, regardless of the period, references are usually made to an individual summit nation when it is: (1) called upon to do something; (2) praised or thanked for having done something; (3) included as part of a description of world events, for example if a particular nation is endeavouring to revive its economy, or has been the victim of terrorist attack; or (4) expected to host the next summit. These references matter in that: [l]ong after the leaders have flown home, their diplomats in dialogue with difficult foreigners, officials engaged in bureaucratic battles with recalcitrant colleagues in other departments, and leaders tempted to backslide in the parochial here of the political moment, wave these summit documents at their adversaries, have them waved back at them in turn, and see the provisions of those documents having real, continuing political force. Cheat they can and do, but in the cozy world of summitry, they are inhibited from becoming repeat offenders by the knowledge that they are likely to have their transgressions noticed, and by the certainty that they will have to confront, face to face, their powerful peers in less than one year’s time. (Kirton 1989: xl–xli) Summit statements also provide guidance to the other multilateral mechanism that provide global governance: . . . they define the parameters, priorities, principles and work programs for the international institutions of the previous two generations. In short, these texts are not just pious expressions of passing politeness from preoccupied politicians but documents that matter in the real world of politics and economics at the national, international and global level alike. (Kirton 1989: xli) Despite this range of reasons, it is clear that a specific reference to a summit nation or the inclusion of an issue is indicative of its importance in some way to the global political economy and the summit process. In other words, it demonstrates that the leaders of the world’s leading economies have reached an agreement that can range from a ‘soft consensus’ to a ‘fully, negotiated binding settlement’ (quoted in Hajnal

16 The first cycle, 1975–81 1999: 75). The references made specifically to Japan in summit documentation during this first cycle reflect the economic nature of the summit at this time (domestic demand-led growth, increased official development assistance (ODA) contributions and oil consumption), but their frequency also demonstrates that Japan’s role was not one of acting on the margins of the summit and was comparable to those of its fellow summiteers (see Figure 1.1).

Rambouillet, France, 15–17 November 1975 The Rambouillet Summit was attended by the original six members – France, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US and West Germany – and took place at the French president’s summer residence, the fourteenth-century château of Rambouillet, thirty miles southwest of Paris. Pressure had been placed on the French hosts to invite Canada but the French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing held firm on the issue and declared the aim of the summit was ‘to allow the participants of the key nonCommunist nations to become aware of their responsibilities to guide the world out of its economic slump and the wave of unemployment’ (The Japan Times, 14 November 1975: 1). Prime Minister Miki Takeo’s reaction to the meeting was enthusiastic and he went so far as to suggest that Japan might host the next summit meeting – a theme that would occupy both his and his successor’s minds (Yomiuri Shinbun, 2 November 1975: 1). The Japanese government’s preparations began at the very end of October 1975 when the Cabinet took up the suggestion of Fukuda Hajime, Minister of Home Affairs, to convene a meeting of cabinet ministers to formulate Japan’s position at the summit (The Japan Times, 1 November 1975: 1). In the run-up to the summit, Miki emphasised an independent Japanese position that stressed North–South dialogue and the problems faced by developing nations, particularly in Asia, and called for original proposals to be formulated that he could present to the summit as the only representative of the region. Thus, at this early stage, the Japanese government readily assumed the position of representative of Asia, a role it would continue to play in years to come at this meeting dominated by Western leaders (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 1 November 1975: 1). This emphasis on economic and Asian issues was also evident when Miki met leaders of Japan’s business world for a working lunch on 31 October in order to solicit opinions. Doko¯ Toshio, President of Japan Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren) proposed an expansion of a balanced world trade system to guarantee the incomes of developing nations. On the other hand, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Do¯yu¯kai) called upon Miki to act as a representative of Asia, make clear Japan’s willingness to expand assistance to the region and shift the attention of the other participants to Asian issues (Mainichi Shinbun, 1 November 1975: 9; Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 November 1975: 1). Thereafter, during a House of Representatives’ budget committee meeting, Miki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Minister Miyazawa Kiichi and Tsuji Kazuhiko of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) discussed the Japanese government’s responsibilities in representing Asia at the summit (Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 November 1975 evening edition: 2).

0

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Rambouillet, 1975

San Juan, 1976

West Germany

US

UK

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London I, 1977

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Figure 1.1 Comparative frequency of references to Japan in official G7 summit documents, 1975–81

Number of references

Ottawa, 1981

18 The first cycle, 1975–81 Further meetings took place on 8 and 10 November at the prime minister’s residence in order to formulate the Japanese government’s position. At the first meeting, it was decided that Miki would propose the creation of a development assistance fund within the IMF financed by the sale of its gold reserves and targeted at some of the poorest nations, especially in Asia (The Japan Times, 9 November 1975: 1). Prior to this meeting, Miki also announced that the summit would address a variety of trade issues and act as ‘a forum of protection and development of freedom and democracy’, and that he would personally propose the creation of a forum based on the summit’s membership to discuss cooperative ways to develop new energy sources (The Japan Times, 3 November 1975: 2; Mainichi Shinbun, 3 November 1975: 1). In addition, government sources reported that Miki would back a US proposal on extending public and private financial assistance through the IMF and World Bank to developing nations, call for strict observance of GATT, and go as far as proposing a ‘worldwide version of the New Deal’ to encourage the establishment of a new international economic order. Within this range of initiatives, Miki was keen to support the copper, tin and rubber markets – key products in Asia – and promote agricultural development and management in the region through the international agricultural development fund established by the World Food Conference and by making a contribution in the range of ¥18–21 billion (US$60–70 million) (The Japan Times, 4 November 1975: 1, 5). At the cabinet meeting on 10 November, it was agreed that Miki would promise to expand Japan’s ODA, although it was agreed that no concrete figure would be set on the increase in ODA after disagreements came into relief between MOFA Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, in favour of making concrete promises to increase ODA to 0.35 per cent from 0.25 per cent of gross national product (GNP), and MOF ¯ hira Masayoshi, in favour of respecting previous promises and not making Minister O a new ‘easy-going promise’ (The Japan Times, 11 November 1975: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 11 November 1975: 1). The meeting also confirmed Japan’s position as being: the promotion of free trade talks and stable exchange rates; the creation of an assistance development fund aimed at the poorest nations and a lending facility to provide low-interest loans to developing, exporting nations, both within the IMF; and a contribution to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) totalling ¥18 billion (US$60 million). This final measure was decided despite MOF objections at setting a specific figure but with the condition attached that the most industrialised nations can exercise a veto over the management of the fund (The Japan Times, 11 November 1975: 1; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 11 November 1975: 1, 4; Yomiuri Shinbun, 11 November 1975: 1). However, immediately thereafter, Miki was frustrated in his attempts to make a ‘unique’ Japanese contribution to the summit by MOF demands for restraint in making concrete, financial proposals. He was careful to strike a cautious tone and was forced in a Nihon Ho¯so¯ Kyo¯kai (NHK) interview on 11 November to deny any novel plan for ‘grandiose’ aid, warning that: We may not reap an immediate harvest out of the meeting. This, however, will not detract from its significance because it will be able to lay a foundation for future understanding and cooperation. (The Japan Times, 12 November 1975: 1)

The first cycle, 1975–81 19 Opposition to Miki’s plans came not only from MOF but also from within the LDP as anti-Miki factions hoped to replace him as prime minister and were concerned that he was seeking to ‘steal the show’ at the summit in order to improve ¯ hira was one of the main his declining image at home. It was no coincidence that O rivals to Miki and the prime ministership (The Japan Times, 13 November 1975: 5). ¯ hira and Miyazawa paid perfunctory visits The day before their departure, Miki, O to each of the opposition parties, except for the Japan Communist Party (JCP), which generally displayed cynicism towards the summit (Mainichi Shinbun, 13 November 1975: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 13 November 1975: 2). It was in this position that Miki left for Paris on the night of 13 November ¯ hira. Upon his arrival, Miki hailed the ‘spirit of accompanied by Miyazawa and O Rambouillet’, outlined the major issues and tasks facing the summit meeting, especially North–South dialogue and stressed Japan’s position as a member of Asia ¯ hira met with his (Mainichi Shinbun, 15 November 1975: 1). Prior to the summit, O French counterpart Jean-Pierre Fourcade and agreed upon the need for efforts to make the floating exchange rate system more stable (Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 November 1975 evening edition: 1). The summit officially began on the evening of 15 November with a meeting of only the leaders at which Miki declared that the global economic crisis could ‘threaten democracy itself ’ and touched on Japan’s plans to accelerate its economic recovery so that its economy would grow by 2.2 per cent in FY1975 and by 5 to 6 per cent thereafter (The Japan Times, 17 November 1975: 1, 5; Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 November 1975: 1). Rain cancelled the leaders’ photo shoot the next morning before discussions began on monetary and trade issues with the foreign and finance ministers in attendance – the latter topic was chaired by Miki as his assigned topic during the afternoon’s meetings. He reiterated his belief in free trade, explained Japan’s efforts to eliminate import regulations and called for the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations by the end of 1977 (Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 November 1975: 1). He also stressed that economic issues, if neglected, could threaten democracy and called on the other leaders to issue ‘a simplified and yet determined declaration to the world’ (The Japan Times, 17 November 1975: 1). This was a theme that Miki revisited in his concluding statement on the last day of the summit, again attended only by the leaders, when he stressed Japan’s commitment to democracy. In addition, he praised the role of the summit, encouraged a further round of talks on free trade, emphasised Japan’s position as a member of Asia and highlighted efforts to bring the growth of the Japanese economy into line with the economies of the other attending nations (The Japan Times, 18 November 1975: 1–2). Miki was also reported as having suggested to his summit partners on the last day that Japan host the next summit, or at least in the near future, joking that it was unfair that he was the only leader who had to endure a fifteen-hour plane journey (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 November 1975 evening edition: 2). The release of the final, fifteen-point, joint declaration – a practice initially opposed by France and the UK but supported by Germany, Japan and the US (Mainichi Shinbun, 16 November 1975: 1) – was designed to inspire confidence and stressed cooperation in a number of issues including monetary policy, free trade,

20 The first cycle, 1975–81 energy issues, cooperation with other international organisations and stated that ‘the objective must be growth that is steady and lasting’ (G8 2003). Miki emphasised the historical significance of the summit and his personal impression was that it had promoted understanding and trust among the leaders of the six nations, facilitated a concrete effort to promote growth without provoking inflation, and consolidated solidarity between Atlantic and Pacific nations (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 November 1975: 1). Furthermore, he stressed Japan’s development of alternative energy sources and cooperative multilateral measures to stabilise oil supplies, the goal of concluding the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations by 1977, and the importance of US–French compromise on exchange rates. (The French were in favour of fixed exchange rates and the US preferred floating exchanged rates. The compromise of maintaining floating exchange rates whose stability was ensured through surveillance was subsequently fleshed out and written into the revised articles of the IMF at its meeting in Jamaica in January 1976.) Within the Rambouillet Declaration, despite some initial opposition, Japanese proposals provided the basis of Article 2, which stated that ‘[o]ur success will strengthen, indeed is essential to, democratic societies everywhere’, and Article 12, which emphasised that a ‘cooperative relationship and improved understanding between the developing nations and the industrial world is fundamental to the prosperity of each’, and affirmed that the summit nations would play their part ‘through the IMF and other appropriate international fora, in making urgent improvements in international arrangements for the stabilization of the export earnings of developing countries and in measures to assist them in financing their deficits’ (Nakamura 1981: 139–41; G8 2003). In Miki’s summation, the agreements reached at the summit were seen to be broadly favourable to Japan (The Japan Times, 19 November 1975: 1). During the course of the summit, there was also the opportunity for Miki to conduct bilateral talks with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on the final day and Giscard d’Estaing on the first day of the summit, during which he stressed that Japan was both a member of the group of the most industrialised nations but was also a representative of Asia (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 16 November 1975: 1). Miki declared the summit a ‘120 per cent resounding success’, and returned to Tokyo on the evening of 18 November (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 17 November 1975 evening edition: 2). He reported the events and results of the summit to the cabinet and a joint government–ruling party meeting on the morning of 19 November and held a press conference on the afternoon of the same day. In this nationally televised press conference Miki promised to respect the decisions made at the summit and stressed that ‘Japan must assume her [sic] international responsibility commensurate with her economic power. . . . The way of Japan’s isolation in the world will be the way to ruin’ (Asahi Shinbun, 19 November 1975 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 20 November 1975: 1). However, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and MOF were keen to play down the significance of any agreements reached at the summit and their impact upon Japan, especially the US–French reconciliation on exchange rates (The Japan Times, 19 November 1975: 5).

The first cycle, 1975–81 21 Reaction in Japan was mixed. Representatives of the business world largely welcomed the efforts of the world’s leaders to coordinate policy (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 November 1975: 9). LDP Secretary General Nakasone Yasuhiro dubbed the summit a success for its efforts to coordinate policy towards global economic recovery and stressed that the Japanese delegation had cooperated enthusiastically. However, the opposition parties all issued statements cynical of the summit’s role and Miki’s position therein. For example, the JSP’s position was that the summit had resulted in little and that Miki’s claim to have acted as an Asian representative was hollow. The reaction in Asia was similarly negative with one Thai journalist describing the summit as ‘a high society cocktail party’ (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 November 1975: 3). Meanwhile, the Indonesian media largely ignored the summit and a member of its foreign ministry explained this oversight by citing the exclusive nature of the meeting (Mainichi Shinbun, 18 November 1975: 3). As mentioned in the Introduction, summit leaders have sought to instrumentalise the event in order to increase their popularity. However, Miki’s attempt to improve his image through the summit in the face of a declining support rate ultimately failed. According to Asahi Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the Miki administration’s approval rating continued to decline from 34 per cent in June to 28 per cent in December, and the disapproval rating increased slightly from 33 per cent to 34 per cent over the same time period (Asahi Shinbun, 1 December 1975: 1–2). This first summit was not only of historical significance as the first meeting of the leaders of the world’s most industrialised capitalist and liberal democratic nations in peacetime, but also as a mechanism by which to breed confidence and cooperation, or in other words ‘the spirit of Rambouillet’ (Yoshino et al. 1976). Simply the fact that these leaders met was regarded as significant in itself (Miyazaki 1976: 138). Ultimately, the most satisfactory outcomes for the Japanese government were simply being asked to participate in the first place, the recognition given to its position in the world economy, and the inclusion in the final declaration of reference to cooperation with developing countries (Asahi Shinbun, 27 June 1976: 9). In addition, attending the summit of the world economic superpowers was regarded as having had an educational effect on the Japanese government in how to act at such meetings (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 19 November 1975: 4).

San Juan, Puerto Rico, 27–8 June 1976 As befitted its ad hoc nature, no agreement was made at Rambouillet for a second summit and it was not decided until the beginning of June 1976 that the US would host this meeting in the Caribbean – originally both the US territories of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands were mooted as possible venues. US President Gerald Ford convened this meeting with the objectives of consolidating the pledges made at the first meeting held only seven months previously, boosting his image at home prior to an upcoming election, and redressing the imbalance between North America and European membership by unilaterally inviting Canada (Yomiuri Shinbun, 4 June 1976: 1; Penttilä 2003: 11, 64). MOFA, LDP Secretary General Nakasone Yasuhiro

22 The first cycle, 1975–81 and Miki gave initial support at least ‘in principle’ to a second summit meeting (Asahi Shinbun, 2 June 1976 evening edition: 1; The Japan Times, 2 June 1979: 1) In addition, the Japanese government was supportive of Canada’s attendance at San Juan having briefed the Canadian government about discussions conducted at Rambouillet the previous year (Kirton 1998: 293, 306–7). The declaration confirming that the San Juan Summit would take place stated that ‘the participants will discuss problems of mutual interests including the progress of their economic recoveries and the current phase of their efforts to attain sustained economic expansion, financial and monetary matters, trade, energy and relations with developing nations’, and with these objectives in mind MOFA announced that the chief topics of discussion would be North–South problems and world trade issues, in addition to a number of political issues including East–West détente and the civil war in Angola (Asahi Shinbun, 4 June 1976: 1; The Japan Times, 4 June 1976: 1). This position was echoed by a US Treasury Department spokesman who declared that the summit would aim to establish a common position amongst the industrialised nations in dealing with poorer nations in anticipation of the July meeting of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in Paris (The Japan Times, 7 June 1976: 1). As will be demonstrated throughout this book, Japanese prime ministers’ participation in the summit has been compromised on occasions by their domestic position. At this time, Miki was mired in domestic political turmoil with calls for his resignation from within his own party as part of a sustained campaign of ‘drop Miki’ (Miki oroshi) led by LDP Vice President, Shiina Etsusaburo¯. Attending the summit provided him with ‘a welcome, extended respite in the intense pressure mounted by his intraparty opponents to oust him’ (The Japan Times, 5 June 1976: 12), and it was thought by anti-Miki factions within the LDP that this was an attempt by Miki to portray himself in a good light as Japan’s diplomatic leader, demonstrated by his quick and positive response to Ford’s summit invitation (The Japan Times, 4 June 1976: 1). In short, on the one hand, the meeting was widely seen as a ‘political holiday’ (seiji bakansu) for Miki from intraparty discord (Asahi Shinbun, 19 June 1976: 1); however, on the other hand, anti-Miki factions feared that a good performance at the summit might prolong the life of the Miki administration or provide the stage for Miki’s final political legacy before resignation (Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 June 1976: 2). This eagerness can also been seen in both Miki’s declared desire to host the summit in Japan in 1977 in order to shift the focus of the summit towards the Asia Pacific region (Yomiuri Shinbun, 23 June 1976 evening edition: 2), and his statement extolling the virtues of the summit process and suggesting that ‘[o]nce top executives agree [on an issue], working level officials find it easy to conduct negotiations. . . . I believe international summits should be staged as often as possible’ (The Japan Times, 9 June 1976: 1). In this regard, Chief Cabinet Secretary Ide Ichitaro¯ announced that Miki would participate actively in the summit and demonstrate Japan’s international responsibility (Asahi Shinbun, 4 June 1976: 1). In order to paper over the discord within the LDP, Miki agreed to meet with Shiina on 21 June with the objective of creating a truce, at least until his return from Puerto Rico, and thereby postponing a showdown over the LDP leadership (Asahi Shinbun, 18 June 1976 evening edition: 1).

The first cycle, 1975–81 23 Preparations for the summit began on the morning of 4 June when bureau directors from the main ministries involved – MOFA, MOF, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) – met to prepare the position of the Japanese government (Asahi Shinbun, 4 June 1976: 1). Miki met again with these bureau directors on 19 June and discussed the issue of North–South dialogue in particular (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 June 1976: 2). He also met with representatives of the business world on 21 June to discuss economic issues to be raised at the summit, predominantly focused upon US–Japanese trade (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 June 1976: 9). Japan’s final position agreed upon in the run-up to the summit stressed: (1) moderate economic recovery to avoid provoking inflation; (2) stabilisation of exchange rates; (3) affirmation of the principles of free trade and support for the organisations that promote them; (4) development of new energy sources and preservation of existing ones; (5) understanding between developed, northern nations and developing southern nations; and (6) consideration of the US proposal to create an international resources bank to maintain the supply of fair pricing of natural resources (The Japan Times, 24 June 1976: 2). Miki also met with MOFA Minister Miyazawa Kiichi on 18 June in order to exchange opinions on the upcoming summit and Miki announced that he wanted a summit similar in style to the previous Rambouillet Summit (Asahi Shinbun, 18 June 1976 evening edition: 1). Miki stated in a NHK interview that the summit would provide an opportunity for Japan to strengthen its relations not only with the US but also with Western Europe (The Japan Times, 22 June 1976: 3). However, he was aware before the summit that he would be the target of a number of demands made by his Western counterparts for Japan to increase its imports (The Japan Times, 23 June 1976: 5). Miki left Tokyo for Puerto Rico on the afternoon of 24 June, going via New York, and arrived in Puerto Rico at the extravagant Dorado beach hotel resort on the afternoon of 26 June. He was accompanied at the summit again by MOF Minister ¯ hira Masayoshi, and potential rival in any and immediate prime ministerial rival, O leadership contest, Miyazawa, described as constituting a ‘delicate threesome ¯ hira had returned home [author’s translation]’ (Mainichi Shinbun, 29 June 1976: 2). O earlier than Miki from the Rambouillet Summit and expressed reservations about attending the second summit and thereby assisting in enhancing Miki’s diplomatic ¯ hira was role and reputation (The Japan Times, 14 June 1976: 1). However, O ultimately unable to decline the invitation as the finance ministers of the six other summit nations were participating, but he did anticipate departing for San Juan later than Miki in order to attend a meeting of the Rice Price Council (The Japan Times, 15 June 1976: 1). The summit provided an opportunity for the Japanese government to address its bilateral relations with Canada and the US. Miki met Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau on the afternoon of 27 June immediately prior to the summit’s official opening, and, as mentioned below, held discussions with Ford after the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 26 June 1976 evening edition: 2). The summit began to the sound of 15,000 protestors demanding independence for Puerto Rico (Asahi

24 The first cycle, 1975–81 Shinbun, 28 June 1976: 3). Miki took this early opportunity to praise the state of the US economy and anti-recessionary measures taken, and compliment Ford on the hosting of the summit. He pledged that the Japanese economy would grow by 6 per cent in the coming year and that the government would guard against any accompanying inflation; he extolled the virtues of non-intervention in exchange rates unless to prevent a major crisis and promised that imports would be increased to address the Japanese trade imbalance. At a reception hosted by Ford at the end of the first day, Miki had the opportunity to meet individually with other leaders. He touched upon the Lockheed scandal with Ford and thanked him for the cooperation of the US authorities. The scandal implicated Miki’s predecessor as prime minister, Tanaka Kakuei, who was arrested in July 1976 for receiving bribes from the US aircraft manufacturer Lockheed to assist in the sale of its planes to All Nippon Airways (ANA). Miki also discussed Italian domestic politics and its general election with Prime Minister Aldo Moro, and invited French President Valéry Giscard D’Estaing to Japan in 1977, in addition to receiving praise for the state of the Japanese economy (Asahi Shinbun, 28 June 1976: 1). The summit came to an end on the afternoon of 28 June with the release of the final communiqué and during this second and final day of discussions Miki called for the conclusion of the current round of GATT talks by 1977, and the curbing of unethical practices by multinational corporations (MNCs) through initiatives similar to those taken by the OECD and the UN. In addition, security issues were raised in the context of what the G7 could do to address the situation in Eastern Europe and on the African continent (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 29 June 1976: 2). In summing up the results of the summit, Miki announced that it ‘had succeeded in deepening mutual understanding and trust among the industrialized democracies of the world [and] laid a firm foundation for solving “knotty problems” through mutual talks’ (The Japan Times, 30 June 1976: 1). He also came away believing that the other participants had tacitly agreed to Japan’s hosting of the next summit, a theme he had pursued the previous year at Rambouillet. Miki and Miyazawa returned to Tokyo via Washington DC, meeting Ford on 30 June after the summit. At this one-hour meeting Miki congratulated the US in its bicentennial year and expressed thanks for US cooperation in the handling of the Lockheed scandal. More importantly the two leaders were able to discuss the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), US–Japanese aviation talks, US–Chinese relations and the threatened unilateral imposition by the US of fishing limits and ¯ hira zones. Miki flew on to San Francisco and arrived back in Tokyo on 3 July. O arrived back in Tokyo the same day having visited Belgium and declared that there was no need to change Japan’s trade and currency exchange policies in response to summit discussions (Asahi Shinbun, 1 July 1976 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 4 July 1976: 3). The reaction in Japan to the conclusion of this second summit was largely positive. Doko¯ Toshio, President of Keidanren, spoke for the business world when he rejected the view of the summit as a political show and stressed the importance of a cooperative forum for the frank exchange of views amongst the most industrialised nations – a

The first cycle, 1975–81 25 view echoed by Chief Cabinet Secretary Ide (The Japan Times, 30 June 1976: 1). However, the summit was dismissed by the opposition parties – the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), JCP, JSP and Ko¯meito¯ – in a series of individual statements as nothing more than a political show with no meaningful discussions (Asahi Shinbun, 29 June 1976 evening edition: 2). In Asia, the Chinese government was especially critical of the lack of results from San Juan (Asahi Shinbun, 1 July 1976 evening edition: 2). However, probably the biggest relief for the Japanese delegation was that they were not pressed or singled out over the trade imbalance and an undervalued yen. According to Mainichi Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, support for the Miki administration increased slightly from 31 per cent in May to 32 per cent in September, whereas disapproval dropped from 34 per cent to 30 per cent over the same period (Mainichi Shinbun, 2 June 1976: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 8 October 1976: 1). Nevertheless, Miki was unsuccessful in both his attempts to host the next summit in Japan and ultimately stay in power as he was replaced by Fukuda Takeo on 24 December. A cartoon in a Japanese newspaper amusingly conflated the two issues by portraying the Miki administration as a driverless taxi with 570 days on the meter and a punctured tyre. Miki was to be seen running behind the car with a new tyre in a desperate attempt to keep it going until the ‘Japan Summit’ (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 June 1976: 2).

London, UK, 7–8 May 1977 The London Summit (hereafter referred to as London I) took place at the UK prime minister’s residence in Downing Street and welcomed a new participant in the shape of Roy Jenkins as President of the Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC). For the first time, the word ‘economic’ was dropped from the title of the summit in recognition that the remit of its agenda had expanded into the political sphere. Nevertheless, the summit was charged by UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey with the goal of reassuring the seven most industrialised nations that economic recovery could be sustained without accompanying inflation (The Japan Times, 28 April 1977: 1). Deputy Foreign Minister Yoshino Bunroku acted as sherpa and represented Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo at the first preparatory conference, which decided other summit goals of placing a greater onus on the role of Japan, the US and West Germany as the locomotives leading the world out of recession and addressing North–South problems (Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 May 1977 evening edition: 2). In a meeting organised by MOFA on the afternoon of 12 April 1977 with a number of UK journalists, Fukuda stressed that the main themes of the upcoming summit for Japan would be global economic recovery, promotion of international trade, North–South problems, especially economic assistance and energy and natural resources (Yomiuri Shinbun, 13 April 1977: 2). The clash between the Western nations and Japan over trade issues that never happened at San Juan was expected to occur at London. Japan’s position at the summit emphasised the maintenance of global free trade in line with the OECD pledge in anticipation of other participants, especially the UK and US, calling on Japan to curb exports and increase imports

26 The first cycle, 1975–81 through ‘economic adjustments’ – a synonym for voluntary export restraints (VERs) – to the principles of free trade (The Japan Times, 24 April 1977: 5). The European governments were keen to use the summit as an opportunity to encourage Japan into purchasing more European goods and the US government was eager to see Japan adopt VERs in its export of shoes and electronic goods to the US – either way, the anticipated impression of the summit was one of it being used as ‘a convenient battering ram’ against Japan (The Japan Times, 1 May 1977: 12). London I was also billed as a ‘major diplomatic test’ for Fukuda, especially with a House of Councillors’ election in July 1977 and reports claimed that ‘Fukuda is apparently reluctant to go to London. The international environment is not favourable for us [Japan] as to assure him success in London’ (The Japan Times, 4 May 1977: 5). Fukuda also promised to raise the issue of nuclear fuel reprocessing with President Jimmy Carter at the London summit in an attempt to persuade the US from banning plutonium-producing fuel reprocessing for fear of its use in nuclear weapons and gain US understanding of Japan’s nuclear fuel reprocessing programme (Yomiuri Shinbun, 23 April 1977: 1). However, this stance was to be a unilateral one based on Japan’s dependence on importing energy and need for nuclear fuel, not in collaboration with sympathetic European governments (The Japan Times, 25 and 28 April 1977: 1). Both European and Japanese leaders appeared to be cautious about being overly critical of Carter at such a high-profile meeting as London I (The Japan Times, 3 May 1977: 5). In the process of deciding the Japanese government’s position at London I, Fukuda met with representatives of MOF, MOFA, MITI, MAFF and EPA on 19 April at the prime minister’s residence and confidence was expressed that Japan could attain a growth rate of 6.7 per cent in 1977 (Asahi Shinbun, 20 April 1977: 9). Another meeting was held on the afternoon of 26 April and highlighted the same issues Fukuda had discussed at his meeting with UK journalists mentioned above (Yomiuri Shinbun, 27 April 1977: 2). A further meeting took place on 30 April at which the expansion of Japan’s ODA contributions was discussed and Fukuda expressed the desire to double Japan’s contributions over five years in the face of expected criticism of Japan’s aid policy and pressure to triple its contributions (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 May 1977: 2). It was Fukuda’s desire to go to the summit and be able to announce a substantial increase in Japan’s ODA contributions and, to this end, he ordered government ministries and agencies to conduct a related study (The Japan Times, 2 May 1977: 1). Fukuda also met with Miki, his predecessor as prime minister, on 25 April in order to solicit opinions and draw on his experience. In the thirty-minute meeting, Miki suggested that the issues of business recovery, currency, trade and energy would be of the utmost importance at London I (The Japan Times, 26 April 1977: 4). Fukuda was also expected to express support for the establishment of a US$16 billion special facility within the IMF to assist the debt problems of poorer nations (The Japan Times, 3 May 1977: 5). On the day before his departure, Fukuda met the media outside his private Tokyo residence and mentioned the possibility of Japan hosting the summit, although he promised not to conduct a related campaign at the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 4 May 1977: 2; Asahi Shinbun, 9 May 1977 evening edition: 1).

The first cycle, 1975–81 27 This was a nostalgic trip for Fukuda as he had been despatched to London in the 1930s as a MOF bureaucrat and attended the 1933 World Economic Conference. Fukuda left with a fifty-member delegation including MOFA Minister Hatoyama Iichiro¯ and MOF Minister Bo¯ Hideo for London on the morning of 4 May, flying via Geneva, and arrived in London on 6 May to attend an unofficial banquet hosted by UK Prime Minister James Callaghan. At this banquet, Carter and Fukuda agreed to meet privately during lunch the next day. Prior to the summit, Hatoyama met with his Canadian counterpart Donald Jamieson on the afternoon of 6 May to agree a revision of the bilateral atomic energy treaty (Asahi Shinbun, 7 May 1977 evening edition: 1). The summit began on the morning of 7 May with a broad discussion, with the foreign and finance ministers in attendance, of business and consumer confidence, the balance between curbing inflation and stimulating employment, and the need for each participant to meet their growth targets for the coming year with no particular government singled out. In his statement, Fukuda compared the current situation with that of the prewar depression. Expectations were voiced that Fukuda would propose the creation of both an international forum with greater flexibility than the CIEC to discuss North–South issues and an international organisation to address environmental and energy issues (Asahi Shinbun, 8 May 1977: 1; The Japan Times, 8 May 1977: 1, 4). Thereafter, Fukuda met privately with Carter to exchange opinions on the issue of nuclear energy recycling and stressed the importance of the issue for a resource-poor country like Japan. Both leaders agreed to further bilateral discussions and to this end agreed that Director General of the Science and Technology Agency, Uno So¯suke, would be despatched to Washington later in the month (Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 May 1977: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 May 1977: 2). The final Downing Street Communiqué issued on 8 May stressed the seven nations would seek to meet their growth targets for the fiscal year (Fukuda pledged to ‘dutifully and faithfully implement those lines we have come up with’ to meet Japan’s target of 6.7 per cent (The Japan Times, 10 May 1977: 1)), in addition to calling for the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations. Furthermore, the seven nations sought to present a common front in anticipation of the meeting of the CIEC in an attempt to promote price stability in the raw material exports of developing nations and express good intentions to create a common fund to assist these nations in the case of sudden price fluctuations. A US$1 billion aid package was agreed to assist the poorest nations in their debt problems and an invitation issued to the Soviet Union to assist in addressing developing nations’ debt. On the steadily developing political front, support was expressed for Carter’s diplomatic campaign to promote human rights, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. However, the controversial nuclear fuel issue was left unsolved and delegated to a working party of scientists to conduct a study (The Japan Times, 9 May 1977: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 May 1977 evening edition: 1–2). After the summit meetings were concluded, Fukuda met with Callaghan on the evening of 8 May to discuss the imbalance in trade between the two nations and the threat to UK shipbuilding posed by the pricing policy of Japanese shipbuilders (Asahi Shinbun, 9 May 1977 evening edition: 1). The summit ended officially with a

28 The first cycle, 1975–81 royal banquet that evening at Buckingham Palace and a statement that the possibility of Tokyo hosting the next summit in the autumn was under consideration (Asahi Shinbun, 9 May 1977: 1). Fukuda declared to the Japanese press corps on the final day of the summit that the most significant result of the summit was the confirmation of global free trade and rejection of trade protectionism, in addition to a broad agreement that Japan, the US and West Germany would act as the three locomotives to direct the world economy. Fukuda claimed that by meeting with his summit partners in an ego-free environment he had gained their understanding and assurances surrounding Japan’s nuclear fuel programme and was looking ahead to resolving US–Japanese differences on the issue through an international meeting of experts (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 May 1977 evening edition: 1). Fukuda arrived back in Tokyo on 10 May and conducted a number of debriefing sessions. First he visited the Imperial Palace, thereafter Hori Shigeru, speaker of the House of Representatives, and Ko¯no Kenzo¯, president of the House of Councillors, before addressing his party at the Diet and holding an extraordinary cabinet meeting (The Japan Times, 11 May 1977: 1). However, he was met with a degree of criticism. Four opposition parties – the DSP, JCP, JSP and Ko¯meito¯ – had all issued statements the previous day claiming that ‘the summit had failed to produce tangible results on important problems’ (The Japan Times, 10 May 1977: 5). The JSP claimed that friction (masatsu) had increased amongst the seven participants, that Fukuda had failed to explain Japan’s position to the other summit leaders on energy and economic issues and, instead, had taken on greater burdens – a view echoed by the JCP. Ko¯meito¯ was slightly more positive in its assessment of Fukuda’s role but could not identify any concrete measures to address global economic stagnation. This was a view echoed by the DSP, although support was extended to the working party of scientists charged with addressing the nuclear fuel issue. The JCP criticised the 6.7 per cent growth rate claiming that its pursuit would lead to inflation – ultimately Japan’s GNP grew by 5.4 per cent falling short of the target (The Japan Times, 8 June 1978: 12; Asahi Shinbun, 9 May 1977 evening edition: 2). The reaction in China was largely one of ignoring the summit or dismissing its discussions as ineffective (Asahi Shinbun, 9 May 1977 evening edition: 2; Asahi Shinbun, 12 May 1977: 9). However, Fukuda found a more sympathetic reaction from his own party and the ¯ hira Masayoshi praised the summit for business world. LDP Secretary General O strengthening the free trade system in an ever-increasingly protectionist environment and proposing a peaceful resolution of nuclear energy issues (Asahi Shinbun, 10 May 1977: 2). Fukuda met with business leaders on 12 May to explain the pledges made at the summit (The Japan Times, 13 May 1977: 1), and Keidanren President Doko¯ Toshio welcomed the coordinated effort to promote economic recovery and pledged that Keidanren would cooperate in creating ‘orderly export practices’ (The Japan Times, 10 May 1977: 5). According to Asahi Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Fukuda administration increased slightly from 28 per cent in February to 30 per cent in May, but the disapproval rating also increased slightly from 34 per cent to 36 per cent over the same time period (Asahi Shinbun, 5 June 1977: 1–2).

The first cycle, 1975–81 29

Bonn, West Germany, 16–17 July 1978 The Bonn Summit (Bonn I) took place in the nineteenth-century Palais Schaumburg and in an atmosphere encapsulated by UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey at an IMF meeting in Mexico City in April 1978: ‘[w]e all agreed that the present outlook is not a satisfactory one and that there is a serious risk of rising unemployment, growing pressures for protection, and being trapped in a deflationary spiral’; with this in mind, economic growth was stressed above inflation (The Japan Times, 21 June 1978: 10). Another theme stressed in the run-up to Bonn I was the recurring issue of North–South dialogue. This time a ‘Marshall Plan’ for the developing world was envisioned that would transfer capital from the developed to the developing world and thereby stimulate growth and demand in these countries (The Japan Times, 23 June 1978: 10). An editorial in The Japan Times suggested that, in preparation for Bonn I, Fukuda would have to ensure that he was in a position to take further stimulus measures so that Japan could meet its growth target of 7 per cent and that this growth be noninflationary in order to satisfy the other summit members that the Japanese economy was in a position to act as an engine for the recovery of the world economy (The Japan Times, 8 June 1978: 12). With this in mind, fears that Japan would be singled out by the European and North American leaders because of the value of the yen and its trade surplus were expressed (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 June 1978: 9; Kiyomiya 1984: 187–91). A Yomiuri Shinbun cartoon a week before Bonn I depicted West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and US President Jimmy Carter welcoming Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo to Bonn I as the main player but with only a cushion of spikes upon which to sit (Yomiuri Shinbun, 10 July 1978 evening edition: 2). Thwarted in its attempt to host the 1978 summit, in the run-up to Bonn I the Japanese government once again expressed its desire to host the next summit. A meeting of cabinet ministers concerned with foreign and economic policies declared the Japanese government’s willingness on 9 June (The Japan Times, 10 June 1978: 1), and it was reported that Fukuda would lodge Japan’s appeal at Bonn I (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 June 1978: 1). This success of this appeal was demonstrated on the evening of the last day of the summit when Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shintaro¯ announced that there was ‘a strong possibility’ of Japan hosting the summit in 1979 (The Japan Times, 18 July 1978: 1), and Fukuda was able to declare on the same day that a consensus had been reached and he had been given the green light to host the summit for the first time in Asia in 1979 (The Japan Times, 19 July 1978: 1). Fukuda declared at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club and in a NHK interview in the run-up to Bonn I that he would pledge at Bonn to address the trade imbalance by restraining exports and calling on other participants to address high inflation, seen as one cause of Japan’s high export figures (The Japan Times, 20 June 1978: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 29 June 1978 evening edition: 1). At a later meeting with over 180 Japanese business leaders, Fukuda pledged to raise the issue of stable currency markets and do everything in his power to meet the 7 per cent growth target (The Japan Times, 4 July 1978: 5). In addition, in order to be able to go to Bonn with an impressive declaration, MOFA Minister Sonoda Sunao announced that the government would

30 The first cycle, 1975–81 have details decided in time for the summit of its planned doubling of ODA contributions over three years from 1978 with FY1977 as the base year (The Japan Times, 5 July 1978: 5). Divisions existed over this issue with Sonoda and MOFA in favour of doubling ODA contributions in terms of the yen to send a positive message to the developing world; whereas penny-pinching MOF and its Minister Murayama Tatsuo wanted to double contributions in dollar terms, which would mean less due to the decline in the value of the dollar (The Japan Times, 12 July 1978: 1). Fukuda met with ministers Sonoda and Murayama, who would accompany him to Bonn, on 6 July to confirm that Japan’s position would rest on four points: (1) a pledge to meet the 7 per cent growth rate as part of Japan’s role in leading the world economy and take the necessary stimulus measures as necessary; (2) a call for the leading industrial nations to address the basic conditions that have led to insecurity in the currency markets as witnessed by the high value of the yen; (3) a call to complete the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations; and (4) a plea to the US to control inflation and reduce oil imports (Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 July 1978: 9). In addition to this were the announcement of a plan to double Japan’s ODA contributions and, thereafter, EPA Director General Miyazawa Kiichi’s declaration of a government plan to effectively cancel loans totalling ¥90 billion made to the least developed countries (LDCs) (The Japan Times, 12 July 1978: 1). Four centre-ground parties – the DSP, Ko¯meito¯, New Liberal Club (NLC) and Socialist Democratic Federation – met with Fukuda and agreed that he should use Bonn I to request that the US stabilise the dollar, declare Japan’s increase in aid to the developing world, and promise to continue to stimulate economic growth at home (The Japan Times, 12 July 1978: 1). Further criticism of the US handling of its economy was in evidence. Before the summit, Miyazawa claimed in an interview with The New York Times that with a large budget deficit and a 7 per cent inflation rate the US economy was being mismanaged (The Japan Times, 11 July 1978: 11). In addition, he declared great disappointment that Carter would be travelling to Bonn I with nothing to offer to remedy this (Yomiuri Shinbun, 10 July 1978 evening edition: 2). Fukuda left for Bonn on the morning of 13 July flying via Paris with a sixtymember entourage. Before his departure Fukuda struck a confident note stating that he was ‘ready for anything’, but covering himself by saying that he was no magician (The Japan Times, 16 July 1978: 1). In Paris, the Japanese delegation met with its ambassadors stationed in Western Europe on 14 July to discuss the state of political and economic affairs in Europe and conducted a press conference with the Japanese press at which Fukuda reiterated his belief in reducing Japan’s trade imbalance, the need to address the instability in currency markets at the summit and his pledge to double Japan’s ODA contributions over three years with a focus upon Southeast Asia (The Japan Times, 15 July 1978: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 July 1978: 2). Before leaving Paris on 15 July, Sonoda met with his French counterpart Foreign Minster Louis de Guiringaud to discuss the upcoming summit, and Fukuda met with French Prime Minister Raymond Barre and agreed on the need to stabilise currency markets and, in particular, to prod the US to address the low value of the dollar (Asahi Shinbun, 16 July 1978: 1). Reports from the Kyo¯do¯ News Service that it had obtained

The first cycle, 1975–81 31 a document of Fukuda’s summit statements revealed that Fukuda planned to work with Schmidt in addressing the issues of instability in the US dollar and inflation, and stressing that Japanese exports to the US will not decrease unless inflation is curbed (The Japan Times, 16 July 1978: 1). Fukuda arrived in Bonn on the afternoon of 15 July and the summit began on the morning of the next day. Fukuda and Schimdt held a breakfast meeting at the chancellor’s official residence prior to the official opening of the summit and consolidated their joint approach to the US (Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 July 1978: 1). The summit began under tight security for fear of urban guerrilla attacks – an issue that would come up for discussion during the summit. It was reported that a consensus had been reached on the first day that Japan would host the 1979 summit either in Tokyo, Kyo¯to or Hakone (Asahi Shinbun, 17 July 1978: 1). As planned, Fukuda promised on the first day of the summit to make every effort to meet the target of 7 per cent growth and to endeavour to increase imports and limit exports. He also suggested that in order for Japan to do this, the US needed to address its own high inflation. On the issue of the US economy, Carter promised to continue battling against inflation and reduce oil imports to address its trade deficit. On political issues and within the context of a series of high-profile hijackings at the time, for the first time terrorism and air-hijacking were discussed at the summit in the form of a plan co-sponsored by Canada and Japan ‘banning flights to countries harbouring captive airliners’ (The Japan Times, 18 July 1978: 1). At the end of the first day of meetings, an official dinner was held, which was followed by informal, fireside discussions of issues such as the Middle East, the Soviet Union and Africa (Asahi Shinbun, 17 July 1978: 2). On the second and final day of the summit, a statement on air-hijacking was released alongside the final Bonn Communiqué, which catalogued the undertakings of each summit member. These included a commitment to take measures to reduce both unemployment and US oil consumption, the pledge by Japan to reduce its trade surplus specifically, a need for deficit countries to increase exports and surplus countries to increase imports generally, and emphasis on the three ‘locomotive’ economies of Japan, the US and West Germany to meet their growth targets. Note was also taken that ‘[t]he Prime Minister of Japan has stated that he will strive to double Japan’s official development assistance in three years’ (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 July 1978 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 19 July 1978: 1; G8 2003). Bilateral issues were also addressed when Fukuda met privately with Carter on the afternoon of first day of the summit to discuss the long-term, joint development of nuclear and solar energy (Asahi Shinbun, 17 July 1978: 1). He also met Robert Strauss, the US trade representative (USTR), after the summit had finished on 17 July to discuss the issue of tariff cuts on industrial products such as computers and colour camera film, and agree that the Japanese government would make reductions of approximately 6 to 6.5 per cent and 7 to 8 per cent respectively (The Japan Times, 19 July 1978: 1, 5). After the conclusion of the summit on 17 July, Fukuda departed for Brussels to meet President of the EEC Commission Roy Jenkins and Belgium Prime Minister Leo Tindemans. During this brief and first-ever visit by a Japanese prime minister

32 The first cycle, 1975–81 to the heart of the EEC in Brussels, Fukuda stressed the need for Europe and Japan to improve their relations and promote free trade by Europe’s removal of discriminatory tariffs against Japan. However, in his meeting with Jenkins, Fukuda was urged to import greater numbers of European aircraft and make further concessions in the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations (Yomiuri Shinbun, 19 July 1978: 1; The Japan Times, 20 July 1978: 1). Although it was later reported that for Fukuda participation in the 1978 Bonn Summit was ‘a trying experience . . . [and] . . . not as easy an exercise in diplomacy for him as it must have been for his colleagues from America and Europe’ (The Japan Times, 16 January 1979: 5; Saito 1990: 63), he arrived back in Japan on the evening of 20 July ‘in high spirits’ stepping down ‘jauntily’ from his plane after what was regarded as a successful summit (The Japan Times, 23 July 1978: 1). Again, the worst had been predicted as regards the criticisms Japan would face over its trade policies but these had not materialised. Sonoda and Murayama briefed the leaders of the opposition parties on the afternoon of 21 July 1978 and requested their cooperation in realising the promises made at Bonn I (Asahi Shinbun, 22 July 1978: 2). Fukuda met with his cabinet on 21 July and urged them to fulfil the pledges he had made at Bonn. To this end, he instructed them that it was imperative for Japan to meet its growth target of 7 per cent, reduce the trade surplus, settle all issues in the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations and develop anti-terrorism measures (The Japan Times, 22 July 1978: 1, 4). MITI Minister Ko¯moto Toshio was enthusiastic about Fukuda’s pledge of economic growth and taking the necessary means to achieve it by the next summit (The Japan Times, 19 July 1978: 5). Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Minister Setoyama Mitsuo welcomed the statement on hijacking and, in response, mooted new measures (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 July 1978 evening edition: 3). The possibility of an income tax cut within any supplementary budget seen as necessary to meeting the pledges for growth made by Fukuda at Bonn was welcomed by a number of groups in Japan including the LDP, the business world, opposition parties and the General Trade Council of Trade Unions of Japan (So¯hyo¯) (The Japan Times, 19 July 1979: 1). The business world was particularly positive about the US pledge to curb inflation and economise on oil consumption (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 July 1978 evening edition: 2). However, opposition was expressed about the chances of realising some of Fukuda’s pledges. MOFA was relieved that Japan had not been singled out for criticism but feared that Japan would be placed in a difficult diplomatic position if it did not attain the 7 per cent growth target (The Japan Times, 19 July 1978: 5). As regards the introduction of a supplementary budget, BOJ Governor Morinaga Teiichiro¯ urged caution in suddenly seeking to stimulate the economy (The Japan Times, 19 July 1978: 5). MOF and EPA expressed concern and doubts about the need for any proposed tax cut in light of government borrowing (The Japan Times, 19 July 1978: 1). The opposition parties were mixed in their reaction: the NLC and DSP praised the discussions of a concrete solution to avoid an economic crisis, whilst the JSP denounced the summit as a political show and the JCP accused it of attempting to strengthen a world order based on the superpowers (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 July 1978 evening edition: 2).

The first cycle, 1975–81 33 According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Fukuda administration increased from 19.1 per cent in July to 21.1 per cent in August, and the disapproval rating dropped from 48.1 per cent to 42.7 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 12 August 1978: 1–2). Fukuda used the summit and his expressed desire to host the Tokyo Summit in 1979 to announce effectively his intention to stand and remain as prime minister beyond the LDP presidency election of December 1978 in which LDP Secretary ¯ hira Masayoshi was seen as his rival (The Japan Times, 20 July 1978: 1). General O Ultimately, Fukuda failed in both his pledge to realise 7 per cent economic growth (the Japanese economy recorded 5.8 per cent growth), and his goal of retaining his ¯ hira that played the role of summit host position as party leader; thus, it would be O in Tokyo.

Tokyo, Japan, 28–9 June 1979 Preceding the Tokyo Summit (Tokyo I), a separate summit meeting much more political in colour took place on the French Caribbean island of Guadeloupe from 5–6 January 1979 to discuss European security issues. However, despite all being members of the G7 – and one of them indisputably a member of Europe – Canada, Italy and Japan were not invited by the host French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The French, UK, US and West German leaders who had all attended Bonn I arrived at the Hamak hotel for their beachside meeting on 5 January with the agenda set to include détente with the Soviet and the future of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), policy towards China including arms sales, security on the African continent and the future of the Iranian monarchy (Asahi Shinbun, 5 January 1979: 4). Due to its location, this informal meeting came to be dubbed the ‘holiday meeting’ (bakansu kaigi) and ‘naked diplomacy’ (hadaka no gaiko¯) in the Japanese press (Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 January 1979: 7). The summit concluded with statements of confidence and solidarity but no official declaration. The Japanese government’s reaction to its non-invitation was described as ‘ambivalent’ (The Japan Times, 16 January 1979: 5; see Chapter 6 for further discussion of Japan’s reaction). Tokyo I was the first time the Japanese press used the word ‘summit’ (samitto) to refer to the G7 meetings and took place at the State Guest House (Geihinkan), a mock-Baroque building modelled on the Palace of Versailles and formerly known as the detached Imperial Palace (for a history of the construction and purpose of the Geihinkan, see Coaldrake 1996: 212–22). Security for the summit, in reaction to the threats of over thirty radical groups such as the Japan Red Army and the Middle Core Faction (Chu¯kakuha) to disrupt and overthrow the summit, who saw it as a ‘conspiracy of the imperialists’ (The Japan Times, 29 June 1979: 2)), was at an all-time high costing ¥1.6 billion (US$7.5 million), and heavy-handed to the degree that it even reminded some of Japan’s prewar police (The Japan Times, 10 June 1979: 11; The Japan Times, 20 June 1979: 2; The Japan Times, 18 June 1979: 2). Hosting the summit was regarded as ‘a matter in which the prestige of Japan is at stake’, and the major topics of discussion were anticipated to include the international oil crisis and energy in general, inflation and trade (The Japan Times, 1 June 1979: 2).

34 The first cycle, 1975–81 ¯ hira stressed in early June that energy and the summit’s reaction to OPEC’s O sudden raising of oil prices would be important areas for discussion (The Japan Times, 4 June 1979: 1). The negative impact of the oil crisis on Japan’s economy and the need ¯ hira when addressing for international cooperation at the summit were stressed by O a meeting of the Federation of Bankers’ Associations of Japan (Zenginkyo¯) (The Japan ¯ hira met with his cabinet on 6 and 7 June to prepare for Times, 6 June 1979: 5). O the summit and recognised how divisive the issue of oil prices could be between the US and Western Europe. In fact, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt asked the Japanese government as host to act also as mediator between the two prior to the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 7 June 1979: 9; The Japan Times, 7 June 1979: 1). ¯ hira met with academics and leaders of the business On the morning of 13 June, O world to discuss the upcoming summit and concluded that the summit should pursue energy issues more actively beyond simple economising, and rather invest in new energy sources and promote discussions between oil-consuming countries and with oil-producing countries. In addition, it was agreed that the summit process should acquire both permanency and a political colour (Asahi Shinbun, 13 June 1979 evening ¯ hira confirmed that energy issues – edition: 1). In a televised press conference O economising, oil prices, dialogue between producers and consumers – would top the agenda at Tokyo I (The Japan Times, 16 June 1979: 1). What is more, MITI Minister Esaki Masumi suggested that, as the most important issue at the summit, the seven leaders would agree targets to cut oil imports and control oil prices (The Japan Times, ¯ hira announced on 22 June at a briefing of the major opposition 21 June 1979: 5). O parties that discussions at the summit would focus upon a five-point energy plan based on the preparatory discussions that he would submit to the other leaders based upon ‘crude [oil] import volume targets, controlling spot oil prices, emergency sharing of crude, joint efforts at developing alternative energy sources and dialogue between oil-consuming and oil-producing countries’ – a plan that would hopefully cut Japan’s oil consumption by 5 per cent and yet still allow for a 6.3 per cent growth in the economy (The Japan Times, 23 June 1980: 1). As the opening of the summit approached, it became clear that Japanese efforts to hammer out an agreement on oil targets were to be coordinated with the US in order to introduce country-bycountry targets to limit oil imports for 1979 and 1980, whereas European leaders were keen to maintain 1978 levels of oil imports through to 1985 (Asahi Shinbun, 28 June 1979: 1–2). Former prime ministers Miki and Fukuda were interviewed by the Asahi Shinbun, Kyo¯do¯ News Service and Yomiuri Shinbun and both agreed that the oil crisis and ¯ hira to take up at the summit North–South dialogue would be the key issues for O (Asahi Shinbun, 2 June 1979: 1, 6–7; Yomiuri Shinbun, 2 June 1979: 1, 3; The Japan Times, ¯ hira to 10 June 1979: 3). The two former prime ministers thereafter met with O extend advice (The Japan Times, 17 June 1979: 1; Asahi Shinbun, 20 June 1979: 2). Fukuda was of the opinion that hosting the summit in Japan was of historical significance as it was for the first time to be held in a region dominated by developing countries (The Japan Times, 10 June 1979: 3). Simply managing to secure the hosting of the summit was, in Fukuda’s self-congratulatory opinion, the ‘greatest undertaking since the time of Jinmu, the first Emperor of Japan [author’s translation]’ (Asahi

The first cycle, 1975–81 35 Shinbun, 26 June 1979: 4; Miyazaki and Miyoshi 1979: 6). With this in mind, the government despatched Yasukawa Takeshi, Japan’s chief trade negotiator, to tour ASEAN nations and collect their expectations for Tokyo I (The Japan Times, 1 June ¯ hira met with Indonesian President Suharto on 7 June and was urged to 1979: 2). O play a leadership role on Asian issues at the summit in so far as raising the problem of Indo-Chinese refugees as a regional security issue (The Japan Times, 8 June 1979: 1). Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos was also reported as having said that ¯ hira would speak for Asian countries at the summit (The Japan Times, 8 June 1979: O 10) and in interview with The Japan Times Philippine Ambassador to Tokyo, Carlos J. Valdes, made a similar plea (The Japan Times, 20 June 1979: 7). An Asahi Shinbun opinion poll conducted in mid-June highlighted the expectations of various ASEAN governments. It was widely thought that Tokyo I should focus upon development issues and that the Japanese government as host of the first summit to be held in Asia should play a leading role (Asahi Shinbun, 17 June 1979: 1, ¯ hira intended 4). In response to these demands made of Japan, it was reported that O Tokyo I to centre upon ODA and North–South dialogue and addressed the meeting of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Manila in May ¯ hira implied that he in this vein (Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 June 1979: 9). Furthermore, O would visit ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand in order to explain the results of Tokyo I (The Japan Times, 19 June 1979: 1). He also met with MOFA bureaucrats from its Asia bureau on the afternoon of 24 June to discuss Japan’s position on IndoChinese refugees at the upcoming summit and announced his intention to release a statement on the issue similar to the Bonn statement on hijacking (Asahi Shinbun, 25 June 1979: 2; Asahi Shinbun, 26 June 1979 evening edition: 2). However, it also became apparent that the Japanese government was not willing to overemphasise its Asian allegiances at the expense of its Western identity; as stated by Deputy MOFA Minister and sherpa for Tokyo I, Miyazaki Hiromichi, in a roundtable discussion sponsored by The Japan Times: ‘certainly from the public relations viewpoint, we would like to stress the point that the summit is taking place here in Tokyo, in one of the Asian capitals. But, at the same time, we don’t like to overplay this’ (The Japan Times, 8 June 1979: 10). Other groups within Japan were keen to use the summit to publicise their own causes. The security measures taken against terrorist groups were well-founded as on 29 April members of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association (Kakuro¯kyo¯) exploded a vehicle near Haneda airport and on 8 June members of Chu¯kakuha attempted to ram a truck into the Geihinkan (The Japan Times, 9 June 1979: 2). US President Jimmy Carter was greeted upon his arrival in Japan on 24 June by members of the Revolutionary Marxist Faction (Kakumaruha) seeking to physically stop him entering Japan (The Japan Times, 25 June 1979: 2). Finally, on the first day of the summit a timed incendiary device planted by Kakuro¯kyo¯ was discovered in an ¯ tani (The Japan Times, 29 June 1979: 2). eighteenth-floor room at the Hotel New O Other groups were more peaceful. Labour organisations, including So¯hyo¯, targeted the date of the summit as a ‘no overtime work day’, and organised rallies and pamphleting in an attempt to draw attention to long working hours in Japan (The Japan Times, 7 June 1979: 2). An NGO called Refugees International placed

36 The first cycle, 1975–81 full-page adverts in the national press and established a temporary office in the ¯ kura during the summit in an attempt to publicise the issue of Indo-Chinese Hotel O refugees (The Japan Times, 28 June 1979: 7). Tourist organisations and hotels hoped to prosper from the influx of foreign guests and international attention, especially the residents of Shimoda, whose business as a tourist resort had been damaged by an earthquake in January 1978, and who regarded the visit of Carter as an opportunity to rebuild their reputation (The Japan Times, 14 June 1979: 2). Within Japan, the opposition parties produced a list of issues they expected to be addressed at Tokyo I, including: stability in oil supplies through an independent policy that avoided embroilment in Middle Eastern tensions, concrete efforts to address North–South dialogue, unemployment and labour issues, and an active role for Japan as host beyond listening and coordinating. The DSP, Ko¯meito¯ and NLC tended to be more supportive of the summit process in addressing these problems (Asahi Shinbun, 11 June 1979: 2). However, as usual, harsh criticisms were expressed by JSP and JCP who tended to see a successful summit as an electoral and popularity ¯ hira. The JSP declared that ‘[a] summit of a handful of leaders from the boost to O industrialized Western nations i[s] not an appropriate forum for resolving worldwide economic problems’; the JCP stated that ‘no matter how often they talk, the contradictions stemming from the economic structure of monopoly capitalism can never be resolved’ (The Japan Times, 28 June 1979: 16). The JSP also proposed its own list of topics for discussion that included North–South dialogue as the main topic and a reduction of 5 per cent in military spending (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 June ¯ hira met with the leaders of the opposition parties on the afternoon of 1979: 2). O 22 June to explain the Japanese government’s position and receive the opposition parties’ ‘wish list’ (Asahi Shinbun, 23 June 1979: 1–2). The summit began on the morning of 28 June after the leaders met for a joint breakfast at the prime minister’s residence. After lunch and further meetings in the afternoon, the leaders attended an official banquet at the Imperial Palace in the evening. During this first day discussions focused on Indo-Chinese refugees. A special statement was adopted that urged Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to curb the flood of refugees and come to a solution, in addition to committing greater aid contributions and calling upon the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to host a conference on the issue as soon as possible (The Japan Times, 29 June 1979: 1). Waldheim responded within days by announcing a two-day meeting to be held from 20 July 1979 in Geneva. Other issues touched upon were the need to fight inflation, develop nuclear energy in a safe manner, and the divisive issue of curbs on oil imports with the divisions between North America and Japan, on the one hand, and Europe, on the other hand, coming to the fore as expected (Asahi Shinbun, 29 June 1979: 1–3). The whole of the second day was taken up with meetings and finished with a press conference. During this second day discussion of the oil issue continued, but in a more focused and animated fashion with the predicted divisions appearing between Canada, Japan and the US on the one hand, and Europe on the other hand. The eleventh-hour result was a compromise amongst the leaders by which they agreed to country-by-country targets through to 1985. The daily US levels of consumption would be limited through to 1985 to the 1977 levels of 8.5 million

The first cycle, 1975–81 37 barrels. The EC was to restrict its consumption to the 1978 levels from 1980 through to 1985. In the case of Japan its oil consumption would be limited to 1979 levels for 1980 – 5.4 million barrels per day – and then somewhere in the region of 6.3 to 6.9 million barrels of oil per day through to 1985, an actual increase of almost 30 per cent on 1979 levels. At the same time, the Japanese government pledged to meet a growth rate of 5.7 per cent from 1980 as special dispensation for conceding on the oil issue (Asahi Shinbun, 30 June 1979: 1). Other issues touched upon on during the final day included the need for constructive North–South dialogue, the continuing fight against protectionism and ¯ hira’s announcement of the steady promotion of free trade principles and O implementation of the Bonn Declaration on Hijacking (The Japan Times, 1 July 1979: 5). However, a plan to release a statement on peace in the Middle East promoted by MOFA failed to gain acceptance and was rejected by Giscard d’Estaing as being too political for discussion at the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 11 July 1979 evening edition: 2). ¯ hira held a televised press The day after the conclusion of the summit, O conference and declared his confidence in Japan’s ability to meet its 6.3 per cent growth rate and 4.7 per cent inflation rate for the current year whilst at the same time limiting its oil consumption and developing new, energy sources. He also recognised the low levels of Indo-Chinese refugees so far accepted by Japan and pledged to increase the numbers accepted whilst extending further assistance to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Mainichi Shinbun, 1 July 1979: 1–2; The Japan Times, 1 July 1979: 1). Bilateral relations featured again at Tokyo I. West German–Japanese cooperation was evident in the issues of North–South dialogue and nuclear power safety (The ¯ hira Japan Times, 21 June 1979: 5). Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark met with O on 27 June to coordinate positions on energy. Giscard d’Estaing, Schmidt and ¯ hira the President of the EEC Commission Roy Jenkins all met separately with O same day to discuss the energy issue (Yomiuri Shinbun, 27 June 1979 evening edition: ¯ hira had 2). As for the US–Japan bilateral relationship, it was rumoured that O written personally to Carter at the beginning of June in order to request his assistance in making Tokyo I a success (Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 June 1979: 1). US–Japan relations were strengthened by Carter’s state visit made from 24–7 June 1979 directly before the summit. His itinerary included an audience with the Emperor and talks with ¯ hira on 25 June followed by further talks at former Prime Minister Yoshida O ¯ iso on 26 June and a visit to Shimoda – the sight of the Shigeru’s residence in O signing of the 1854 US–Japan Treaty of Amity – on 27 June. Talks included issues such as the upcoming summit, particularly agreeing on a common position to reduce oil consumption through targets and develop alternative energy sources (symbolically and sartorially encapsulated by Esaki wearing a short-sleeved energy-saving suit when meeting Carter), economic issues, North–South dialogue and Indo-Chinese refugees, as well as the political, economic and security situation in general (Yomiuri Shinbun, 26 June 1979: 1–3; Asahi Shinbun, 27 June 1979: 2). Back in Japan, opposition parties were split in their reaction to the summit with the JSP regretful of the lack of discussion on North–South issues and critical of the

38 The first cycle, 1975–81 effectiveness of the meeting, and the JCP cynical of the efforts to address energy issues and damning of the summit’s failure to address the concrete causes of the Indo-Chinese refugee problem. In contrast, the DSP, NLC and Ko¯meito¯ were more supportive and welcoming of the outcomes of Tokyo I (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 June 1979: 6; The Japan Times, 30 June 1979: 6). LDP Secretary General Saito¯ Kunikichi believed that the summit achieved what had been expected of it. Furthermore, Miki ¯ hira’s role but echoed the regret and Fukuda were upbeat in their assessment of O that there had not been more discussion of issues beyond oil (Asahi Shinbun, 30 June 1979: 2). Despite concerns about oil restrictions, representatives of the business world welcomed the results of the summit and declared it to have been a ‘great success’ (The Japan Times, 30 June 1979: 6). According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion ¯ hira polls conducted around the time of the summit, the approval rating for the O administration was bolstered by the summit rising from 37.6 per cent in May to 39 per cent in June, although the disapproval rating also increased from 34 per cent to 36.7 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 July 1979: 1, 3). As regards Japan’s role as Asian representative, ASEAN foreign ministers welcomed the commitment made to direct assistance to developing countries hit by oil price increases, the reassurances about free trade and support for the work of GATT (The Japan Times, 1 July 1979: 1). After the conclusion of the summit, both Sonoda and US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance flew to Bali to brief these ASEAN foreign ministers about the results of Tokyo I (Asahi Shinbun, 2 July 1979: 1). Tokyo I came to be known as both the ‘energy summit’ and the first summit held in Asia. The Japanese government’s position on the hosting of the summit was ¯ hira who declared summed up (with a strong dose of enthusiasm) by an aide to O Tokyo I to be ‘. . . indeed a historical occasion, a marvellous chance for Japan to buttress her [sic] image as a world leader’ (The Japan Times, 28 June 1979: 16).

Venice, Italy, 22–3 June 1980 The Venice Summit (Venice I ) took place on the small island of San Giorgio Maggiore in the Venice lagoon and proved to be one of Japan’s weaker diplomatic ¯ hira Masayoshi on 12 June 1980 ten days efforts due to the death of Prime Minister O before the summit was due to begin. As regards the agenda of the summit, a familiar list of issues such as currency markets, energy, inflation, North–South relations and trade were mooted for discussion. To this end, the Japanese government sought to arrive at Venice I and announce a plan to double its ODA contributions over the next five years in order to assuage criticisms on trade and energy issues (Asahi Shinbun, 1 June 1980: 1). However, this summit was also touted as the first at which time was given over to the formal discussion of political issues, namely the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of the US embassy in Teheran. ¯ hira’s health came to dominate the run-up to the The issue of seventy-year-old O summit due to his hospitalisation on 31 May with a heart complaint through overwork, later found to be angina pectoris. Although discussion of a replacement ¯ kita being despatched to Venice was conducted in the press and MOFA Minister O Saburo¯ made a similar suggestion, this plan was rapidly denied by Chief Cabinet

The first cycle, 1975–81 39 Secretary Ito¯ Masayoshi, and the government and MOFA proceeded with ¯ hira would be attending (Asahi Shinbun, 6 June 1980 preparations on the basis that O evening edition: 1; The Japan Times, 7 June 1980: 1, 7). Former Prime Minister Fukuda ¯ hira Takeo stressed the importance of attending the summit to Ito¯ and hoped that O would be allowed to recuperate with the summit as a goal (Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 June ¯ hira’s tenaciously held belief that he would attend 1980: 1). It was apparently O Venice I and he had made plans accordingly (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 June 1980: 2). ¯ hira’s health was of even greater concern because of joint House of O Representatives and House of Councillors’ elections to be held on 22 June; one result was that the necessary campaigning tended to draw attention away from the upcoming summit (The Japan Times, 7 June 1980: 1). Doctors at the Toranomon ¯ hira’s illness required another hospital in Tokyo then announced on 9 June that O two weeks of treatment and that attending the summit would be impossible. In reaction, the LDP leadership decided to cancel his election canvassing and withhold ¯ hira’s a formal decision on his participation in the summit until 17 June, in line with O wishes, but began discussion of the manner of Japan’s representation (Asahi Shinbun, 10 June 1980: 1–2). In this light, sources within the administration of US President Jimmy Carter even suggested the possibility of postponing the summit (The Japan Times, 11 June 1980: 1). Debate was ultimately academic and the issue was resolved ¯ hira on 12 June and appointment of Ito¯ as acting prime minister. by the death of O ¯ kita in The immediate decision was made, based on previous discussions, to send O ¯ Ohira’s place accompanied by MOF Minister Takeshita Noboru, MITI Minister ¯ kita in the Sasaki Yoshitake and sherpa Kikuchi Kiyoaki (who would replace O foreign ministers’ meetings), and to this end agreement of the other summit members was sought (Yomiuri Shinbun, 12 June 1980: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 12 June 1980 evening edition: 2). As regards the joint elections, an enormous sympathy vote in ¯ hira’s death ensured a comfortable victory for the LDP when losses had reaction to O been expected. In the run-up to the summit, energy was again to be a major topic for discussion and the declaration of a joint communiqué on the subject was planned. In the initial drafting stages of this communiqué during the preparatory meetings emphasis was placed on the increased use of coal, the development of non-oil energy sources and the effective use of uranium, in addition to the traditional issues of economic growth, inflation, North–South dialogue and currency markets (The Japan Times, 4 June 1980: 4; Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 June 1980: 1). MOFA also announced that it was planning to cooperate with its European summit partners in proposing a new Middle East peace settlement to the US at Venice I (Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 June 1980: 2). The position of the US government was that overtly political issues should be included in the summit’s agenda and it aimed to affirm the solidarity of the summit members in the face of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (The Japan Times, 15 June 1980: 1). To decide the Japanese government’s position on political issues such as East–West relations, Afghanistan and the Middle ¯ kita and other cabinet members met on the morning of 17 June 1980 East, Ito¯, O and decided that their position would be one of maintaining cooperation with the US and seeking ways to act with Western Europe (The Japan Times, 18 June 1980:

40 The first cycle, 1975–81 1). To this end, MOFA announced that overtly political statements on Afghanistan and unity against the Soviet Union would be included in either the final communiqué or special statements (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 June 1980: 2). Although attention was being focused on the ‘novelty’ of discussing political issues, economic issues were still on the agenda and Takeshita declared before leaving for Venice that Japan’s chief concern was to control inflation in the global economy (The Japan Times, 21 June 1980: 1). In addition, it was reported that Carter was planning to raise the issue of the rising number of Japanese car imports to the US and the chances of limits being imposed at the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 19 June 1980 evening ¯ kita asserted that the summit was not the appropriate forum edition: 1). In reply, O at which to discuss bilateral issues (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 June 1980: 2). It was recognised before Venice I that in the absence of the most senior politician it was going to be impossible to escape the fact that Japan’s voice and level of participation at the summit would be severely limited and that, when coupled with financial concerns, ¯ kita would be unable to either propose or commit to O ¯ hira’s new plan to double O ODA contributions over five years (Asahi Shinbun, 13 June 1980: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 13 June 1980: 2). ¯ kita, Sasaki and Takeshita left for Venice on the night of 20 June after O ¯ kita had O met privately with Ito¯ for final discussions. They reached Venice on the morning of ¯ kita and Sasaki stressed that the issue of the US 21 June and upon arrival both O import of Japanese cars was of a bilateral nature and not an appropriate topic for discussion at the summit (The Japan Times, 22 June 1980: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 June 1980: 3). However, on the eve of the summit, it became known that France, Germany, the UK and US had been conducting secret ambassadorial-level meetings in Washington prior to Venice I, which served to create the sense of a two-tier summit process that, like the previous year’s Guadeloupe meeting, excluded Canada, Italy and Japan (Asahi Shinbun, 23 June 1980: 2). The summit began on 22 June with informal discussion over breakfast of the seizure of foreign embassies before the official meetings opened with a silent tribute ¯ hira. Thereafter, the first session was taken up by a roundby the other leaders to O robin of individual leaders’ statements. The rest of the first day was given over to the discussion of political issues, including the Middle East, Iran and the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran, refugee problems and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These discussions resulted in an accord that the summit leaders were united in their efforts, and urged Islamic nations to prevail upon Moscow, to ensure a Soviet withdrawal. In the final communiqué released on the second day a statement was included calling for the total withdrawal of Soviet troops, largely in response to the Soviet announcement of a partial withdrawal on the eve of the summit (The Japan Times, 24 June 1980: 1). The original intent of the summit was not forgotten and energy issues were discussed resulting in agreement to reduce oil consumption, and alternatively double the production of coal and increase the generation of nuclear energy (The Japan Times, 24 June 1980: 5; Chapman et al. 1982: 191–2). Western leaders also took the opportunity to congratulate the Japanese delegation on the LDP’s electoral victory (Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 June 1980: 8).

The first cycle, 1975–81 41 Bilateral issues were addressed on the periphery of the summit. Italo-Japanese friendship was promoted through the Japanese government’s undertaking the restoration of almost 4,000 Japanese works in the Venice Oriental Art Museum (The Japan Times, 22 June 1980: 1). US–Japanese relations were discussed in a private meeting between members of the US delegation led by Treasury Secretary William ¯ kita, Sasaki and Takeshita on the evening of 21 June at which Japan’s Miller and O position towards OPEC and energy problems were discussed (Yomiuri Shinbun, ¯ kita met informally on the morning 22 June 1980: 3). Thereafter, Carter and O of 23 June to discuss rumours of increasing numbers of Japanese car exports to the US in the future. Carter sought Japanese understanding of and even an official statement to clarify the issue by stressing the political nature of the problem in the US and domestic pressures for restrictions on the import of Japanese cars. After ¯ kita met briefly with US Secretary of State Edmund Muskie lunch on the same day, O to exchange opinions on the same issue in addition to the Middle East and the Korean peninsula (Asahi Shinbun, 24 June 1980: 2). Japan’s representatives – handicapped in what they could commit to from the ¯ hira and the joint elections – essentially sought to fill outset by both the death of O a gap and conduct a damage limitation exercise. They arrived back in Tokyo on the evening of 24 June 1980 to resume their temporary duties in Japan’s caretaker ¯ kita this meant giving a press government (Yomiuri Shinbun, 25 June 1980: 1). For O conference the next day at which he confirmed that despite differing interpretations of Soviet intentions to withdraw from Afghanistan and Japan’s refusal to side with either the cynicism of the UK and US, or the optimism of the French, summit members had agreed upon a joint condemnation of the Soviet Union’s invasion and demand for an immediate withdrawal. Although North–South problems had ¯ kita claimed that these issues would be been neglected in favour of political issues, O ¯ hira, if he had revisited in more detail next year at Ottawa and it emerged that O lived to attend the summit, would have committed Japan to doubling its ODA contributions over the next five years (The Japan Times, 26 June 1980: 1). ¯ kita left on 26 June for a Japan– As regards Japan’s role of representing Asia, O ASEAN conference in Kuala Lumpur at which he reported that ‘Japan actively spoke at the recent Venice Summit meeting, keeping fully in mind ASEAN’s request, and stressed the importance of North–South problems and the need to prevent trade protectionism’, and claimed that the final communiqué reflected ASEAN’s interests (The Japan Times, 28 June 1980: 1). According to Mainichi Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the subsequent administration of Prime Minister Suzuki ¯ hira administration’s approval rating of 21 per cent in Zenko¯ increased from the O June to 38 per cent in September, and the disapproval rating decreased from 46 per cent to 21 per cent over the same time period (Mainichi Shinbun, 6 October 1980: 1–2).

Ottawa, Canada, 20–1 July 1981 The Ottawa Summit held in the ‘log château’ of Montebello – the world’s largest log structure located forty miles east of Ottawa – completed the first rotation of

42 The first cycle, 1975–81 hosting the summit amongst the seven members and continued to aim at creating a sense of familiarity amongst the participants. This was especially the case as West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau were the only leaders to have attended a summit previously. With a steadily developing second cold war as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, possible intervention in Poland and deployment of nuclear weapons, it became evident that once again East–West political issues would find their way onto the agenda of what had started as an economic meeting (Asahi Shinbun, 14 July 1981: 1). This summit would also be the first meeting of neo-liberal US President Ronald Reagan and left-wing French President François Mitterrand. It appeared that the Japanese government regarded its role at the summit as one of mediator between diametrically opposed European and US positions on economic issues, North–South dialogue and East–West relations (Mainichi Shinbun, 8 July 1981 evening edition: 1). At the beginning of July 1981, the Japanese government appeared to be placing emphasis on a policy of promoting the maintenance of the global free trade system and invigorating the functions of GATT (Mainichi Shinbun, 1 July 1981: 9). Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko¯ also declared at the beginning of the month his intention to address North–South issues by announcing a plan at Ottawa to double ODA contributions over five years (Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 July 1981: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 July 1981: 2). In the light of these issues, a personal dispute over jurisdictional spheres of influence (nawabari) erupted between MITI Minister Tanaka Rokusuke and MOFA Minister Sonoda Sunao over the composition of the Japanese delegation. Tanaka argued that as economic issues would be prominent at the summit he should attend, whereas Sonoda argued that the attendance of the trade minister was the exception not the rule. Eventually, Tanaka did not accompany Suzuki to Ottawa, but the degree of bureaucratic in-fighting over who represented Japan was evident (Mainichi Shinbun, 12 July 1981: 2). Japanese sherpa Kikuchi Kiyoaki returned from a preparatory summit meeting and highlighted economic issues to be discussed at Ottawa including support for multilateral free trade negotiations in the face of French protectionism. He also stated that divisions were apparent over the economic focus of the summit with Canada and Japan wanting to focus on North–South dialogue and the other summit members wanting to discuss macro-economic policies towards inflation and unemployment, and how to stimulate their own economies (Asahi Shinbun, 16 July 1981: 9). Although economic issues – such as free trade, Japanese exports, US interest rates, stable currency markets and inflation – were still expected to be addressed at Ottawa, it became increasingly clear that this summit would be coloured by East–West political issues, and Kikuchi reported this to Suzuki (Mainichi Shinbun, 2 July 1981: 2; The Japan Times, 14 July 1981: 1). Suzuki even went as far as to say in a television interview that the major purpose of the Ottawa Summit was to ‘reach a consensus on the current international situation and on security matters’ (The Japan Times, 17 July 1981: 1), in addition to stressing Japan’s position as a ‘member of the West’ (nishigawa no ichiin) (Asahi Shinbun, 7 July 1981: 2).

The first cycle, 1975–81 43 Japan’s role as Asian representative was not forgotten. Ambassadors to Japan of a number of South Asian nations – Bangladesh, Burma, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – met with Sonoda on 6 July and expressed their hopes that Japan would play a major role at the Ottawa Summit and made reference to regional instability caused by Vietnamese interference in Cambodia (The Japan Times, 7 July 1981: 4). Sonoda also met with the foreign ministers of Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore whilst in New York prior to arrival in Ottawa. It was reported that Suzuki was keen to respond to these calls from Asia and ensure that the attention of the Western nations was drawn away from security issues in Poland and Afghanistan towards conflict resolution in Cambodia, and that an appropriate reference should be made in the final summit statements (The Japan Times, 16 July 1981: 4). Suzuki departed on the afternoon of 18 July accompanied by his summit delegation including MOF Minister Watanabe Michio, and was joined later by Sonoda direct from the UN conference on Cambodia held in New York. They arrived in Ottawa on the afternoon of 19 July with the goal of ‘get[ting] through it with the least amount of trouble’ (The Japan Times, 20 July 1981: 1). Government sources also stressed that Suzuki’s role would be to prevent the summit becoming purely about East–West confrontation and that in order to do this and avoid a worsening of East–West relations, discussion would be promoted in a variety of areas, including the provision of assistance to developing nations and its impact upon security (Asahi Shinbun, 20 July 1981: 2; Asahi Shinbun, 20 July 1981: evening edition: 1). The evening of the delegation’s arrival was taken up with a dinner hosted by Trudeau at which the summit schedule and its future hosting were discussed (Asahi Shinbun, 20 July 1981: 3). The first day’s meetings began on the morning of 20 July. Suzuki was keen to push two issues: (1) extending greater amounts of aid to LDCs, as part of Japan’s role of ‘batting for Asia’; and (2) the principles of free trade. He backed both this former position up by announcing the second ODA-doubling plan to take place between 1981 and 1986 (Asahi Shinbun, 21 July 1981: 2), and this latter position by urging other leaders to support a ministerial meeting of GATT in 1982 (The Japan Times, 21 July 1981: 1), and by pledging Japan to a greater expansion of its imports of manufactured goods. On political issues, Suzuki spoke the language of the second cold war by declaring that Japan was in agreement with the West on all aspects and agreeing that the Western nations must maintain a military deterrence against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe whilst seeking opportunities for dialogue and claiming that the summit members’ ‘political, economic and social institutions are superior to those in the East’ (Mainichi Shinbun, 22 July 1981: 2; The Japan Times, 23 July 1981: 1). However, he sought to prod the West’s defence position towards one including not just military means but diplomatic and foreign aid measures as part of a policy of comprehensive security (The Japan Times, 22 July 1981: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 22 July 1981: 22). According to a government source, the increasingly political nature of the summit was troubling for Japan. There were already fora such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the UN for the discussion of East–West issues, and

44 The first cycle, 1975–81 the Japanese position was to shift the focus from traditional military security to economic stability and development as important aspects of global security (Asahi Shinbun, 21 July 1981: 3). Suzuki also denied a military role for Japan, was unwilling to tie its defence position to that of the Western powers, and upheld Japan’s position based upon the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (Asahi Shinbun, 21 July 1981 evening edition: 1; The Japan Times, 23 July 1981: 1). Mention was given to the Cambodian people’s right to self-determination in the chairman’s summary and Suzuki was also reported as wanting the final statement of the summit to include a message of solidarity in the spirit of his personal philosophy of harmony (wa or cho¯wa) (The Japan Times, 21 July 1981: 1; MOFA 1982a: 228). In fact, after the summit, sherpa Kikuchi Kiyoaki reported that a number of Japanese proposals, including Suzuki’s spirit of harmony, were included in the final declaration released on the second and final day (Kikuchi 1981: 12–13). Watanabe planned to propose to the meeting of finance ministers that a panel of specialists be convened to discuss high US interest rates and joint intervention into foreign exchange markets in times of currency instability. However, he had to admit failure in gaining US agreement (The Japan Times, 23 July 1981: 12). On trade issues, the Japanese government again feared the worst but, much to its relief, came away from the summit with any differences of opinion with its summit partners deleted from the final Ottawa Communiqué in line with its wishes, despite strong criticism in private meetings, especially from Thatcher (Asahi Shinbun, 22 July 1981: 2; The Japan Times, 23 July 1981: 12). Bilateral issues were dealt with when Suzuki met Reagan in Ottawa over breakfast on 21 July. They also discussed the progress of East Asian (particularly the UN meeting on Cambodia, the role of ASEAN and the importance of Japan–South Korean relations in the light of a bilateral prime ministerial meeting in the autumn) and international affairs since their last meeting in May. Discussions were conducted in an amicable fashion allowing them to reiterate and rebuild their harmonious relationship whilst avoiding the contentious issues of Japan’s remilitarisation and the Soviet ‘threat’ (Asahi Shinbun, 22 July 1981: 1; The Japan Times, 22 July 1981: 1). Suzuki left Ottawa for two days of rest and recreation in San Francisco, eventually arriving in Tokyo on the afternoon of 25 July, whilst Sonoda returned to Tokyo on 23 July and gave a press conference at MOFA to deny that Suzuki had agreed in any talks during the summit to expand Japan’s military role and duties (Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 July 1981: 2). Both attended a cabinet meeting on 28 July at which Japan’s position on free trade and defence issues at the summit was explained (The Japan Times, 29 July 1981: 1). The reaction to the summit amongst government and business circles in Japan was one of qualified satisfaction. Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi hailed the summit as ‘very successful’ but maintained that the Japanese government need not alter its policies in response to the summit (The Japan Times, 23 July 1981: 1). The biggest success for Suzuki was ensuring the deletion of a phrase in the final communiqué that stressed international cooperation to prevent economic friction caused by too great a concentration of exports on a particular market – interpreted as a veiled reference to Japanese exporting practices (The Japan Times, 25 July 1981:

The first cycle, 1975–81 45 7). MITI officials were particularly satisfied that Japan was not criticised for its trade surplus, export practices, and that the summit affirmed the seven nations’ commitment to free trade (The Japan Times, 23 July 1981: 1). Reaction from the business world was largely positive as well with Inayama Yoshihiro, President of Keidanren, and Sasaki Tadashi, Chairman of Keizai Do¯yu¯kai, welcoming the summit’s emphasis on creating the foundations to address inflation and unemployment based on free trade and the eradication of protectionism; however, Sasaki also stressed that further efforts would be necessary to solve these problems (Asahi Shinbun, 22 July 1981 evening edition: 3; The Japan Times, 23 July 1981: 12). Opposition parties were split along the usual lines of the DSP and Ko¯meito¯ extending praise, especially for the handling of trade issues, whereas the JCP and JSP were highly critical of most aspects of the summit, especially the military aspects, and cited its inability to address trade issues and the problems of unemployment and inflation (Asahi Shinbun, 22 July 1981 evening edition: 2; Mainichi Shinbun, 22 July 1981 evening edition: 2). According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Suzuki administration increased from 35.5 per cent in July to 39.9 per cent in August, and the disapproval rating decreased slightly from 38.5 per cent to 37.1 per cent over the same time period (Mainichi Shinbun, 5 September 1981: 1–2). A number of important themes for Japan came into relief during this first cycle of summitry. From the very beginning, Japan’s postwar recovery and growing importance in the world were recognised through its inclusion in this meeting of contemporary great powers. In response, the Japanese government took its participation in, and hosting of, the summit very seriously. What is more, being the only non-Western participant provided the Japanese government with an opportunity to represent the Asian region and have its voice heard. In addition, although the summit was originally conceived to centre upon economic issues, attention soon began to shift to political issues. As will be seen in the next chapter, during the second cycle and the emerging second cold war, politics almost replaced economics as the main topic of summit discussion – a trend that presented challenges for the Japanese government and its people in playing an international role consonant with its economic power.

2

The second cycle, 1982–8

The 1980s saw an intensification of East–West tensions that led to the stationing of missiles in Europe by both sides and created an atmosphere of unease, dubbed the second cold war, which only began to thaw after the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet president in 1985. At the same time, a number of connected and unconnected regional disputes, such as the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and consequent war with the UK, the situation in the Middle East, the Iran–Iraq War and ongoing instability in Cambodia, demanded the attention of the international community. It was to be expected that these political tensions would impact upon the summit’s discussions and shape its agenda. However, the management of various macro-economic issues was still firmly on the agenda. Energy issues and the oil crisis had essentially been resolved during the previous cycle, but the promotion of trade liberalisation and a starting date for the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations came to be the summiteers’ main economic concerns (see Wiener 1995). The second cycle of the summit can be regarded in some ways as a neo-liberal golden era. There was a similar, although accidental, length in the tenure and outlook of the leaders – epitomised by US President Ronald Reagan (1980–8), UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–90) and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–7) – of the kind adumbrated in the Introduction that is crucial to the effective running of groupings like the summit and the Concert of Europe. However, this period was also described at the time as one in which ‘a new cohort of leaders has come to power, less internationalist in outlook and less committed to using summits to solve economic problems’ (Putnam 1984: 73); or, in similar vein, during the 1980s ‘[t]he G7 summit ceased to be an economic coordinating mechanism and became a clubby opportunity for informal talks among world leaders, talks that were often useful but strayed away from the original purpose of the summits’ (Smyser 1993: 19). Thus, during this period, the increasing political nature of the summit became evident due to the changing structure of the international system during a time of renewed bipolar tension. During this second cycle, the Japanese government was concerned with its position within, and the solidarity of, the Western camp at a time of East–West tension, its role in regional conflicts (for example, during the Iran–Iraq War it was the only summit nation to maintain diplomatic ties with both countries) and the

The second cycle, 1982–8 47 opening of its market to foreign goods. Although the Japanese domestic political scene during this period was dominated by the figure of Nakasone, from 1983 to 1986 the LDP was only able to maintain power in coalition with the NLC. The NLC consisted of a small group of LDP politicians led by Ko¯no Yo¯hei who had left the party in 1976 in protest at the Lockheed scandal and in order to promote political reform. They formed a coalition government with the LDP after the December 1983 House of Representatives’ election but disbanded and returned to their former party after the LDP’s spectacular success in the joint elections for both houses in July 1986. In addition to this, and as will be seen later, a variety of other political parties and non-governmental actors continued to display interest in the work of the summit. Nakasone’s stance at the summit was to continue many of the practices mentioned in Chapter 1 by managing the bilateral US–Japan relationship, promoting Asian issues and ensuring the successful functioning of the summit as a multilateral mechanism of global governance. However, both the structure of the international system and the leadership of Nakasone impacted on the way in which the Japanese government’s role at the summit segued from novice on the international stage into more active and robust policies of bilateralism, East Asianism and internationalism. References to Japan made in summit documentation once again demonstrated the economic nature of the summit (strategies for growth, access to markets, exchange rate stability and ODA) but also began to be balanced by references to political issues (peace, security and the unity of the Western camp). Nevertheless, in these terms, Japan’s presence at the summit during this second cycle was comparable to its fellow summiteers (see Figure 2.1).

Versailles, France, 4–6 June 1982 The Versailles Summit, hosted by socialist French President François Mitterrand, began the second rotation of summit hosting (for guides to, and reviews of, the summit, see MOFA 1982b). The meetings were held in the seventeenth-century Palace of Versailles whilst the Falklands War between the UK and Argentina and an Israeli attack on Palestinian bases in Lebanon took place in the background. The impact of the Falklands War was expressed in an Asahi Shinbun cartoon that depicted the conflict as the dynamite waiting to blow up the summit meeting (Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 June 1982 evening edition: 1). However, a feared slowdown in economic growth was to be the chief issue for discussion at the summit. At a final meeting of the sherpas held in Paris from 14–16 May 1982, the main expectations of the summit included: (1) the promotion of cooperative economic measures and technological exchange in order to address the worsening of the world economy since the previous year’s summit in Ottawa; (2) discussion of political issues such as the Falklands War and East–West confrontation; (3) the progress of the Japanese government’s measures to open its market – an issue of particular concern to the European summit partners (Asahi Shinbun, 26 May 1982 evening edition: 2); and (4) it was the intention of French President François Mitterrand to make the meeting less bureaucratic and more of a free discussion between leaders (Asahi Shinbun, 20 May 1982: 9).

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Versailles, 1982

Williamsburg, 1983

West Germany

US

UK

Japan

Italy

France

Canada

London II, 1984

Summit venue

Bonn II, 1985

Tokyo II, 1986

Venice II, 1987

Figure 2.1 Comparative frequency of references to Japan in official G7 summit documents, 1982–8

Number of references

Toronto, 1988

The second cycle, 1982–8 49 On 12 May, Prime Minster Suzuki Zenko¯ began to seriously consider taking the extraordinary step of inviting MITI Minister Abe Shintaro¯ to accompany him to France as it was expected, in line with French wishes as host, that economic and trade issues would dominate the talks. Abe was invited on 21 May, although this was also seen partly as a political decision by Suzuki to court Abe, who belonged to the Fukuda faction, with one eye on re-election as LDP leader in November (Yomiuri Shinbun, 13 May 1982: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 May 1982 evening edition: 2). On 21 May, Suzuki hosted Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser who urged the Japanese government to promote his three-point plan for the recovery of the world economy at the Versailles Summit based on freezing and slowly eliminating protectionist restrictions on trade – a position towards which Suzuki was sympathetic (Asahi Shinbun, 22 May 1982: 2). On the afternoon of 28 May, Suzuki met with the leaders of the opposition parties in preparing for the summit and discussed the issues of East–West relations, US tactical nuclear weapons and the position of Asia (Yomiuri Shinbun, 29 May 1982: 2). The next day Suzuki outlined the goals he would pursue at the Versailles Summit, namely persuading the other leaders of Japan’s intention to contribute to the world economic recovery, open its domestic markets to foreign imports and a proposal to create an international body of experts to oversee joint research in the field of high technology. As regards political issues, he pledged to explain the significance of the non-military role that Japan played in global security to an unappreciative European audience (The Japan Times, 30 May 1982: 1, 4; Asahi Shinbun, 31 May 1982 evening edition: 2). Suzuki left Japan on the morning of 3 June for a fifteen-day foreign trip that included attending the summit, the UN special session on disarmament in New York and official visits to Brazil and Peru. The Japanese delegation arrived in Paris on the evening of the same day and statements were made that Suzuki would be seeking to promote Asia’s position on various issues at the summit, especially ASEAN desires to promote free trade and avoid protectionism, and the search for stability in Sino-Japanese relations for the sake of regional and global security (Asahi Shinbun, 4 June 1982 evening edition: 1). The summit officially began with a banquet on 4 June hosted by Mitterrand at which discussions focused upon the Falklands War (Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 June 1982 evening edition: 1). UK criticisms of, and disappointment with, the lack of support from the Japanese government at the UN in dealing with the conflict were voiced (Matsunaga 1982: 20; Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 June 1982: 2). In contrast, Suzuki explained the current state of Asia by centring upon Japan’s relations with China and ASEAN and stressing Japan’s contribution to regional and global peace and security (Mainichi Shinbun, 5 June 1982: 1). During the first meeting on the next day, Suzuki spoke second after Mitterrand for twenty minutes. He discussed macro-economic issues and pledged that the Japanese government would continue the difficult task of promoting its domestic, consumption-led, economic growth whilst attempting to reduce its budget deficit. He also supported Mitterrand’s proposal for international technological exchange and stressed the need to include the position of ASEAN and developing nations in

50 The second cycle, 1982–8 summit discussions and outcomes (Asahi Shinbun, 6 June 1982: 2). Meanwhile, the finance ministers announced efforts to create a working group to report to the IMF on stabilisation of the world’s money markets (The Japan Times, 6 June 1982: 1). As regards trade, Suzuki explained the measures that would be introduced to open Japanese markets and stressed the principles of free trade and the work of GATT. During the afternoon’s meetings on the first day Europe and Japan clashed over the issue of protectionism with Mitterrand reporting that the Western leaders had welcomed the measures taken so far but also calling on Japan to take further steps to open its markets (Asahi Shinbun, 7 June 1982: 1; The Japan Times, 7 June 1982: 1). On the trade issue, Abe claimed in a Newsweek magazine interview that although Japan had made numerous ‘drastic’ efforts to cut its tariffs and open its markets, Europeans were practicing protectionism against Japanese products (The Japan Times, 8 June 1982: 10). However, criticism of Japan over this issue was muted somewhat by clashes between Europe and the US over trade issues and East–West confrontation (Asahi Shinbun, 9 June 1982: 1). The third and final day of the summit included meetings in the morning to discuss North–South problems at which Suzuki reported ASEAN’s position on the prevention of protectionist measures and promoted Fraser’s plan for recovery of the world economy. This day also saw the release of the final communiqué, a statement on Lebanon and a banquet in the evening held in the Palace of Versailles’ historic Hall of Mirrors (Asahi Shinbun, 7 June 1982: 2–3). The final communiqué highlighted economic growth and employment, East–West economic relations, energy and development issues and called for a strengthening of the IMF. Suzuki left Paris for New York on the evening of 7 June. The summit provided a chance for the management of bilateral US–Japanese relations when Suzuki met Reagan on 4 June, the first day of the summit, at the US ambassador’s residence in Paris to discuss the degree of Japanese cooperation in limiting credit to the Soviet Union as part of the US cold war strategy of strengthening economic sanctions. Discussion also focused upon further efforts to open the Japanese economy, an agreement on bilateral aviation issues, a consensus to cooperate in GATT, the state of Sino-Japanese relations, the US–Japan Security Treaty and Japan’s defence spending (Asahi Shinbun, 5 June 1982: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 June 1982: 1–2). Suzuki also met West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini before the banquet on the first day of the summit and received encouragement for the efforts to open domestic Japanese markets (Asahi Shinbun, 5 June 1982 evening edition: 2). Suzuki also then met Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau on 6 June to discuss trade issues, especially the automobile industry, but without any agreement (The Japan Times, 7 June 1982: 1). Suzuki also met Mitterrand after the summit on 7 June aboard France’s highspeed train, train à grande vitesse (TGV). This trip from Paris to Lyon together on the world’s fastest train provided an opportunity for the two leaders to size up the countries’ respective rail networks at a time when they were also competing for the contract to construct a high-speed train link between Seoul and Pusan to be built for the 1988 Olympics in South Korea (Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 June 1982: 2; The Japan Times, 9 June 1982: 4).

The second cycle, 1982–8 51 Reaction to the summit from Japan’s business world was largely positive. Keidanren’s Inayama Yoshihiro, the President of the Japan Federation of Employers’ ¯ tsuki Bunpei and Keizai Do¯yu¯kai’s Sasaki Tadashi stressed Association (Nikkeiren) O the importance of the meeting of the leaders of the world’s most industrialised economies, the summit’s commitment to free trade and stability in currency markets, the agreement to resist inflation and stimulate employment, the recognition given by the other summit members for Japan’s efforts to increase imports and the pledge to cooperate in developing high technology as an important pillar of the revival of the world economy and improving North–South relations. However, doubts were expressed about the summit’s position towards the Soviet Union, the agreement to conduct financial relations ‘cautiously’, and ‘prudence’ in limiting the extension of credit (Asahi Shinbun, 7 June 1982 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 8 June 1982: 10; Mainichi Shinbun, 8 June 1982: 8). Opposition parties were divided as usual with the JSP and JCP critical of all aspects of the summits, whereas the middle-ground parties were more positive in their assessment. However, Ko¯meito¯ failed to find any concrete results of the summit (Mainichi Shinbun, 8 June 1982: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 June 1982: 2). According to Asahi Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Suzuki administration decreased from 30 per cent at the very beginning of June to 26 per cent in September, and the disapproval rating increased from 46 per cent to 52 per cent over the same time period (Asahi Shinbun, 4 June 1982: 1; Asahi Shinbun, 10 September 1982: 1).

Williamsburg, US, 28–30 May 1983 The ninth summit took place in the historical city of Williamsburg, Virginia, rich in colonial-period atmosphere. This was the first of five summits to be attended by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who would prove to be the most enduring of Japan’s prime ministers at the summit. Building upon French President François Mitterrand’s initiative at Versailles the previous year, the agenda for the summit was left undetermined and an emphasis placed upon less preparation and formality and freer conversation amongst the summit leaders with the broad goal of finding a way to encourage long-term, economic growth without inflation. However, other issues anticipated at the summit included foreign pressure (gaiatsu) on Nakasone to open Japan’s domestic markets in order to address Japan’s trade surplus and the unity of the West against the threat posed by the Soviet Union – an issue on which Nakasone was willing to place Japan solidly in the Western camp (The Japan Times, 26 May 1983: 1). On the morning of 17 May 1983, Nakasone met with representatives of the relevant ministries at his residence to discuss Japan’s stance at the summit based on five issues: (1) the promotion of non-inflationary growth based on stimulating domestic demand; (2) support of free trade; (3) an active contribution to resolving North–South problems; (4) the promotion of structural adjustment; and (5) the promotion of science and technology (Mainichi Shinbun, 18 May 1983: 1). At a meeting at LDP headquarters on the morning of 18 May, Nakasone made his

52 The second cycle, 1982–8 position at the summit clear by stressing that he stood firmly in the Western camp whilst encouraging US President Ronald Reagan to explore opportunities to relax cold war relations with the Soviet Union and proposing that Japan play an active role as a ‘bridge’ (kakehashi) between North and South in development issues (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 May 1983 evening edition: 1). Nakasone met with MOF Minister Takeshita Noboru, MITI Minister Yamanaka Sadanori and associated bureaucrats the next day to discuss further Japan’s position at the summit. They decided to adopt an active position appropriate to the world’s second largest free-market economy by stimulating domestic demand and calling on summit partners to resist protectionism and address North–South problems through debt relief and the strengthening of economic and technological cooperation (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 May 1983: 1). Nakasone also met with his prime ministerial predecessors, Kishi Nobusuke and Miki Takeo, on the morning of 20 May (Mainichi Shinbun, 20 May 1983 evening edition: 1), and Fukuda Takeo on the morning of 21 May, who advised that the chief summit issues were the threat posed by high interest rates to the global economy and the importance to global peace of unity in the Western camp (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 May 1983 evening edition: 1). Nakasone continued to develop Japan’s role as Asian representative. As part of a historic, official tour of Southeast Asian nations, Nakasone met with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammed on the morning of 9 May and was requested to urge the other summit members to promote world economic recovery (The Japan Times, 10 May 1983: 1). After his return to Japan, Nakasone went further by promising to Indonesian President Suharto in a telephone conversation that he would present the views of ASEAN at Williamsburg (The Japan Times, 15 May 1983: 1). Thereafter, MOFA Minister Abe Shintaro¯ announced that as a result of Nakasone’s visit to ASEAN the issue of conflict resolution in Cambodia was likely to be a topic of discussion (The Japan Times, 18 May 1983: 1). In addition, South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan met with Nakasone’s special envoy to South Korea Sunobe Ryo¯zo¯ during the latter’s visit from 15–18 May and expressed his desire that the summit leaders would cooperate to make the meeting a success, strengthen the solidarity of the Western nations and promote world economic growth (The Japan Times, 18 May 1983: 4). It was also announced by MOFA in the run-up to the summit that Nakasone would be briefed by Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee and urged to present the views of developing nations, especially as regards the debt crisis, at Williamsburg (The Japan Times, 17 May 1983: 1). Nakasone left for the US on the evening of 26 May with Abe, Takeshita and Yamanaka. Before arriving at Williamsburg, Nakasone met with Reagan at the White House, and Yamanaka met with the USTR William Block on 27 May. Nakasone’s meeting over lunch with Reagan turned into an impromptu 65th birthday party for Nakasone with the presentation of a cake and musical band. Nakasone returned the favour and pledged cooperation by metaphorically playing the role of catcher to Reagan’s role as pitcher, to which Reagan asked Nakasone to provide him with the necessary signs (Asahi Shinbun, 28 May 1983 evening edition: 1–2). An Asahi Shinbun cartoon parodied these roles with a diminutive Nakasone leaping to catch a ball marked ‘Western unity’ thrown by Reagan past Soviet leader

The second cycle, 1982–8 53 Yuri Andropov, whilst both pitcher and catcher compliment each other in English and address each other by their first names, latter dubbed the ‘Ron–Yasu’ relationship (Asahi Shinbun, 31 May 1983: 2). Discussions included the upcoming summit, progress in trade issues, North–South issues and the possibility of a summit meeting between the US and Soviet Union. Nakasone expressed his support for the East–West talks and reported the fears of ASEAN nations that the US may withdraw its military presence from the region (Yomiuri Shinbun, 28 May 1983 evening edition: 1–2; The Japan Times, 29 May 1983: 1). Any possible tensions in bilateral US–Japan relations were apparent in the removal, after protests by Japanese Ambassador Okawara Yoshio, of literature critical of Japan’s trade policies and failure to open its domestic markets initially included in an official summit press pack issued by the US State Department (The Japan Times, 28 May 1983: 1). Other bilateral relations were also addressed when Nakasone met separately on 28 May before the opening dinner with Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and Mitterrand to discuss a variety of bilateral economic and trade issues (The Japan Times, 30 May 1983: 1). Nakasone’s arrival at the summit venue on the afternoon of 28 March created immediate controversy when during a formal ceremony, Nakasone and Reagan were accompanied by a US military band that was instructed to play a song entitled Gunkan Ma¯chi (Battleship March), a song popular during the Second World War and closely associated with Japanese militarism. There was some argument as to whether the US or Japanese delegation had requested the march to be played but South Korean journalists stated that the march reminded them unhappily of the war (Mainichi Shinbun, 30 May 1983: 23). However, the same march was also played at Ottawa for Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko¯’s arrival with little controversy, and a similar event happened when Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was welcomed at Williamsburg by a performance of the colonial and divisive song Maple Leaf Forever (Asahi Shinbun, 22 July 1981 evening edition: 3; Mainichi Shinbun, 30 May 1983 evening edition: 10; Yomiuri Shinbun, 31 May 1983: 2). The summit formally began on 28 May with an official summit banquet before which Nakasone met bilaterally with a number of the other summit leaders. The banquet was hosted by Reagan and discussion over dinner centred on security issues including talks to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. Nakasone expressed his support but stressed that these negotiations should be conducted on a global, and not purely European, level (Mainichi Shinbun, 30 May 1983: 3). On 29 May, the second day of the summit, Nakasone addressed the other leaders during the morning session and called for free trade, stabilisation of currency rates and increased assistance to developing nations. On political issues, Nakasone actively supported and verbalised the Reagan strategy of dealing with East–West relations through a dual policy of promoting arms reduction talks on INF whilst approving the NATO deployment of Pershing II nuclear missiles in Europe (The Japan Times, 30 May 1983: 1). At a press conference on 30 May, after the conclusion of the summit, Nakasone declared that Japan was politically bound with NATO and that

54 The second cycle, 1982–8 it ‘cannot shirk its due political part in world affairs as a major economic power’ (The Japan Times, 1 June 1983: 1). Similarly, a MOFA spokesman linked NATO to the US–Japan Security Treaty, hoped to improve relations in the future with all NATO members and stressed that ‘[t]he security of the West as a whole must be considered from a broader perspective’ (The Japan Times, 31 May 1983: 4). A Yomiuri Shinbun cartoon parodied Nakasone’s stance of moving towards a policy of participation in collective security arrangements (a policy regarded as unconstitutional according to the Japanese government’s traditional interpretation of Article 9 of its constitution), by depicting him riding side-saddle with NATO astride a Pershing II missile as if in a scene from Stanley Kubrick’s Dr Strangelove with a Soviet SS-20 missile in the background (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 May 1983 evening edition: 1–2). There was general alarm within the Japanese delegation at the prospect of Soviet withdrawal of its missiles from Eastern Europe only to relocate them to the Russian Far East (RFE) (Armstrong 1996: 47). Thus, the second day also saw the release of the political statement including the sentence inserted at Nakasone’s instigation in order to conflate the Soviet threat in Europe and East Asia: ‘[t]he security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis’ (G8 2003). These declarations were played down back in Japan by government leaders who stressed that this was consistent with Japan’s previous position on INF and did not signify a move by Japan towards incorporation within NATO (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 May 1983 evening edition: 1–2; The Japan Times, 31 May 1983: 1, 4). Discussions on the third and final day of the summit focused on remaining North–South and East–West issues and in the afternoon the final ten-point statement on economic recovery, which pointed to optimistic signs for the global economy and stressed a reduction in high interest rates, was issued (Yomiuri Shinbun, 31 May 1983 evening edition: 1–3). On other issues, the leaders pledged to reduce inflation, stabilise currency markets, increase employment and urged the finance ministers of France, Japan, the UK, US and West Germany to meet more frequently and oversee convergence in their economies (The Japan Times, 2 June 1983: 1). In addition, Abe highlighted Iran’s recent policy of pragmatism in dealing with the West and emphasised the need for constructive engagement (The Japan Times, 3 June 1983: 1). Nakasone left Williamsburg on the morning of 31 May after having been presented along with the other leaders with a caricature bagel of himself, made a stopover in New York and arrived in Japan on the afternoon of 2 June. Abe, using Japan’s position as the only summit nation to maintain diplomatic ties with Iran after the Islamic fundamentalist revolution of 1979, arranged to meet with an Iranian delegation in Tokyo in order to explain the results of the summit specifically related to Iran and ultimately improve relations (The Japan Times, 3 June 1983: 1). In addition to this, on the evening of 3 June, Nakasone reported the results of the summit to the South Korean President by telephone and announced that, in line with Chun’s wishes, he had focused the attention of the summit leaders on the promotion of free trade and the problems faced by developing nations. Nakasone also instructed respective Japanese ambassadors to report back to and seek the understanding of members of ASEAN (Asahi Shinbun, 4 June 1983: 2).

The second cycle, 1982–8 55 Reaction to the summit was varied even within the LDP with praise on the one hand for the declaration of unity with the West, but criticisms on the other hand of Nakasone for overreaching himself on the issue of the stationing of nuclear missiles in Europe (Asahi Shinbun, 31 May 1983: 2). Leaders of the business world were largely positive about the outcome of the summit in economic terms and even praised the political declaration, Nakasone’s policy of taking global responsibilities and the necessity for Japan to cooperate as far as possible in this area (Asahi Shinbun, 1 June 1983: 1; The Japan Times, 1 June 1983: 9). Opposition parties like the JSP and JCP were highly critical of the political nature of the summit, Nakasone’s ‘hawkish’ stand and the linkage between Japan and NATO implied in the summit’s political statement that the security of the seven nations is ‘indivisible’ for fear that this could engender a move towards collective security for Japan (Asahi Shinbun, 31 May 1983: 2; Mainichi Shinbun, 1 June 1983: 2; Mainichi Shinbun, 3 June 1983 evening edition: 3). Tanabe Makoto, acting Secretary General of the JSP, went as far as to claim that Nakasone’s statement violated the Japanese Constitution and the three non-nuclear principles forbidding the possession, production and introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan – a position that was even echoed within the Ko¯moto faction of the LDP (The Japan Times, 2 June 1983: 4; Maki 1988a: 126). Ko¯meito¯ also expressed concerns about the increasingly political nature of the summit and the lack of concrete economic measures, whereas the DSP was largely positive about the results of the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 31 May 1983: 2). Reaction abroad was predictable. The Soviet Union’s news agency TASS issued three statements critical of the summit and warned that ‘the Soviet Union cannot ignore efforts to turn Japan into Asia’s largest springboard for carrying out all kinds of Reagan’s delirious military concepts’ (Yomiuri Shinbun, 31 May 1983: 5; The Japan Times, 2 June 1983: 1). China was equally critical and the official Chinese news agency Xinhua stated on 28 May that the summit did not look like it would produce anything of note (Asahi Shinbun, 29 May 1983: 2). After the summit, it accused the summiteers of hiding their differences and claiming to be united whilst failing to address pressing economic problems (Asahi Shinbun, 1 June 1983: 7). However, the Japanese public appeared to approve of Nakasone and his policies. According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Nakasone administration increased significantly from 38.9 per cent in May to 42.8 per cent in July, and the disapproval rating decreased from 38.3 per cent to 37.5 per cent over the same time period – an increase in approval that Nakasone himself considered could have been due to his prominent position in the summit photograph at Williamsburg next to Reagan (Yomiuri Shinbun, 13 July 1983: 2; Sekai Heiwa Kenkyu¯jo 1996: 181; Nakasone 2002: 435). The joint statement released at the Williamsburg Summit that embraced Japan within the Western security alliance has been described as ‘a landmark in the growing Japanese involvement in global politics – one of the most notable achievements of Western summitry’ (Putnam 1984: 87).

56 The second cycle, 1982–8

London, UK, 7–9 June 1984 The London Summit (London II) took place in the Music Room of Lancaster House and its agenda returned to an emphasis on economic issues after the political controversies of the Williamsburg Summit. To this end, and although international terrorism and disarmament were cited, the familiar subjects of economic growth without inflation, free trade, debt problems and foreign aid were raised as the main topics for the summiteers bound for London. During the preparations for the summit President of the EEC Commission Gaston Thorn spoke with Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro on the morning of 10 May 1984 about the latter’s idea of proposing a new round of multilateral trade negotiations mooted to start in 1985 and acquiring the consent of the European leaders at London II (The Japan Times, 11 May 1984: 1). The US supported the Japanese government in its efforts at behind-the-scenes consensus-building (nemawashi) in the run-up to the summit in order to cajole the West European developed nations out of their protectionist leanings and ease the fears of debtburdened Central and South American developing nations (Asahi Shinbun, 14 May 1984: 2). This idea began to gain a head of steam when Nakasone pledged at a press conference on the afternoon of 30 May that he would strongly urge the other leaders to accept his proposal (The Japan Times, 31 May 1984: 1). US Vice-President George Bush also visited Tokyo in May in his capacity as head of the US government’s task force on US–Japan economic relations and the opening of Japanese domestic markets was discussed as an item on the summit agenda (The Japan Times, 12 May 1984: 14). However, political issues did make their presence felt during the build-up to the summit and on the afternoon of 18 May Nakasone stated at a House of Representatives’ foreign affairs committee meeting that a range of political issues such as securing peace and nuclear disarmament were more important than economic issues. To this end, he declared that he would urge other leaders to formulate measures to promote global peace in light of the Iran–Iraq War and increasing East–West tensions symbolised by the Soviet boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics of the same year (Asahi Shinbun, 19 May 1984: 1). In an interview with UK media representatives on the evening of 23 May, Nakasone again stressed a combination of economic issues, especially the promotion of free trade and a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, and political issues, especially the Iran–Iraq War, East–West tensions and the prevention of terrorism (Asahi Shinbun, 24 May 1984: 2). As regards the Iran–Iraq War specifically, reports circulated of Nakasone’s intention of advocating restrictions on arms exports to both countries and promoting Japan’s role in conflict resolution as a country with diplomatic ties with both countries (The Japan Times, 21 May 1984: 1). The issue of resolving the Iran–Iraq War was regarded by MOFA Minister Abe Shintaro¯ as placing Japan in a central role at London II (The Japan Times, 1 June 1984: 1). These political issues in combination with the economic issues mentioned above were settled upon at the Japan–EC ministerial meeting in Brussels and the OECD annual meeting in Paris in mid-May attended by Abe, EPA Director General

The second cycle, 1982–8 57 Ko¯moto Toshio and MITI Minister Okonogi Hikosaburo¯, all of whom reported back to Nakasone at the prime minister’s residence on the morning of 21 May 1984 (Asahi Shinbun, 21 May 1984 evening edition: 1; The Japan Times, 22 May 1984: 1). The same day, representatives of both the JSP and Ko¯meito¯ announced that they would submit a list of issues to be discussed at the summit but refused to meet Nakasone prior to his departure, despite it having become the custom, in protest at the LDP’s extension of the current Diet session (Asahi Shinbun, 22 May 1984: 2). An Asahi Shinbun cartoon parodied the stand-off by depicting Nakasone, ready to leave for London with his suitcase packed, sat waiting for JSP and Ko¯meito¯ leaders, respectively Ishibashi Masashi and Takeiri Yoshikatsu, to get out of bed and speak with him, as etiquette demanded (Asahi Shinbun, 27 May 1984: 2). From 16–18 November 1983, after the previous year’s Williamsburg Summit, the first ‘old boys’ summit’ of former leaders, officially known as the InterAction Council, took place in Vienna, Austria. In its communiqué, it stressed peace and disarmament, alongside revitalisation of the global economy, and the role of the UN. The second ‘old-boys’ summit’ was held from 24–6 May on the island of Brioni in the Adriatic Sea and attended by former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo as honorary chairman. Former politicians from over twenty nations attended to discuss a range of economic and political issues. On the second day of the summit, Fukuda announced at a press conference with former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that the main issue for London II was to relax East–West tensions after the escalation caused by the Williamsburg Summit (Yomiuri Shinbun, 26 May 1984 evening edition: 2). Thereafter, Fukuda met Nakasone on the afternoon of 1 June and reported the results of the meeting, stressing détente and economic issues such as the lowering of interest rates and developing nations’ debt (Asahi Shinbun, 2 June 1984: 2). In addition, on the afternoon of 5 June, Nakasone met with Fukuda again, and other former prime ministers Miki Takeo and Suzuki Zenko¯ and stressed his desire to emphasise peace and disarmament issues at London II. The former prime ministers expressed their understanding and in return stressed the need for dialogue and détente in East–West relations as well as a number of economic issues (Mainichi Shinbun, 6 June 1984: 2). Nakasone continued to emphasis the political issues for discussion at the summit by declaring his desire to see an official summit statement calling on the Soviet Union to rejoin nuclear disarmament talks, fostering Western solidarity and reiterating the determination to end the Iran–Iraq War (The Japan Times, 25 May 1984: 1; Asahi Shinbun, 26 May 1984: 2; Asahi Shinbun, 31 May 1984: 1). This culminated in a statement at a press conference at the prime minister’s residence on the afternoon of 30 May that a reconfirmation of the political declaration on security issues issued at Williamsburg was necessary – a statement criticised by the Soviet Union as damaging to East–West relations (Asahi Shinbun, 31 May 1984: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 3 June 1984: 2). Nakasone was also eager to have the other leaders discuss terrorist issues, an issue on which he was supported by UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (The Japan Times, 5 June 1984: 5). As regards the Iran–Iraq War, it became clear on 5 June that Nakasone was giving up on securing a ceasefire and was intending instead to announce a less ambitious three-point plan to prevent the

58 The second cycle, 1982–8 escalation of the conflict based on ensuring safe navigation of vessels in the region, banning the export of materials used in chemical weapons’ production, and the provision of oil for nations affected by the conflict. Nakasone eventually met representatives of the DSP, JCP, JSP, Ko¯meito¯ and Socialist Democratic Federation (the JSP and Ko¯meito¯ eventually agreed to meet Nakasone) during separate meetings held on the afternoon of 4 June both to discuss their views on the forthcoming summit – with an emphasis on the Japanese government’s efforts to reduce cold war tensions, solve regional conflicts, and return the summit to its economic roots – and also to solicit their cooperation in completing the regular business of the Diet as smoothly as possible when it had been stalled over the introduction of anti-corruption measures to promote political ethics (The Japan Times, 5 June 1984: 1–2; Mainchi Shinbun, 5 June 1984: 2). As regards regional issues, Nakasone, fresh from an official visit to India and Pakistan, placed an emphasis on the discussion of the debt crisis and North–South dialogue (Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 May 1984: 7). In addition, the ambassadors of eleven ASEAN and Asia Pacific nations met with Abe on 1 June and urged the Japanese government to represent the region at London II especially as regards their interests in multilateral trade negotiations and a more constructive approach to the issue of developing nations’ debt problems beyond simply addressing the symptoms. In response, Abe promised that the Japanese government would play an active role (Asahi Shinbun, 2 June 1984: 2; The Japan Times, 2 June 1984: 6). Nakasone departed for London on the afternoon of 6 June accompanied by Abe and Takeshita and arrived on the evening of the same day. The summit opened the next day with a dinner hosted at the UK prime minister’s residence in Downing Street. On the second day of the summit, Thatcher raised the issue of developing nations’ debt and emphasised a case-by-case strategy and the need for these nations to help themselves (Asahi Shinbun, 9 June 1984: 2). Nakasone respected his presummit promises and raised the issues of providing assistance to developing nations, encouraging their self-help, coordinating this with the IMF, and beginning a new round of trade negotiations. The latter was supported by the other leaders but without any commitment to a specific date (The Japan Times, 9 June 1984: 1; The Japan Times, 10 June 1984: 4). The second day also saw the release of a declaration on democratic values, which mirrored the 1947 Japanese Constitution by stating that, ‘[e]ach of us rejects the use of force as a means of settling disputes’, included on Nakasone’s insistence (Sakurada 1988: 72; G8 2003). The final day’s discussions touched on international terrorism and a commitment to East–West dialogue (as protests demanding nuclear disarmament took place outside the venue) but failed to decide any concrete measures for resolving the Iran–Iraq War beyond supporting UN efforts (Asahi Shinbun, 10 June 1984: 1–3). Individual summit declarations released this day addressed East–West relations, arms control, the Iran–Iraq War and international terrorism. The economic declaration expressed support for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations but without any reference, as proposed by Nakasone, to a concrete time-scale in response to French and Italian opposition. Nakasone’s other proposals that found their way into the economic declaration included his emphasis on the summit’s

The second cycle, 1982–8 59 ‘willingness to conduct our relations with them [developing nations] in a spirit of goodwill and cooperation’, and a pledge to ‘encourag[e] the flow of long-term direct investment; just as there is need for industrial countries to make their markets more open for the exports of developing countries, so these countries can help themselves by encouraging investment from the industrial countries’ (G8 2003). Thanks were also extended to Nakasone for a report on the Hakone Conference of Life Sciences and Mankind organised by the Japan Foundation in March (Asahi Shinbun, 10 June 1984: 1; The Japan Times, 10 June 1984: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 10 June 1984: 1–2; Sakurada 1988: 75). With reference to the summit declaration and statements reflecting the items he put forward for Japan, Asia and the developing world, Nakasone declared the summit to have been a great success at a final-day, postsummit press conference (Yomiuri Shinbun, 10 June 1984: 1). Bilateral issues were also addressed when Nakasone met with Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi before the summit began on the afternoon of 7 June, and then held meetings with Kohl on the evening of 9 June after the summit had officially ended. US–Japanese relations were dealt with in a meeting between Nakasone and Reagan on the first day of the summit before it officially began. In addition to the discussion of political issues such as the Iran–Iraq War, Nakasone also highlighted trade issues and in the process he won Reagan’s approval for the proposed new round of multilateral trade negotiations with a concrete timetable of preparing the talks during 1985 for them to start in 1986, in addition to agreement on the handling of the debt crisis and measures to avoid another oil crisis (The Japan Times, 8 June 1984: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 8 June 1984: 1). Whilst Abe flew to Spain for an official visit and Geneva for the UN conference on disarmament, Nakasone remained in London after the summit for an official three-day visit to the UK including meetings with Thatcher to discuss Japanese investment in the UK, a speech at the IISS, and a meeting with the Sho¯wa Emperor’s grandson who was studying at Oxford University. He eventually returned to Tokyo on the morning of 13 June having declared his intention before departing the UK to brief the opposition party leaders about the summit but also in order to facilitate the smooth handling of Diet business (The Japan Times, 13 June 1984: 1). Nakasone attended the Diet on the afternoon of 15 June to report on the discussions that took place in London, and highlight his contributions to an increasingly political summit process (Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 June 1984 evening edition: 2). The business world reacted to the summit by praising both its efforts to promote a new round of multilateral trade negotiations and its contribution to world peace. However, due to the lack of concrete efforts to address inflation and deficits in finance, fears were also expressed that the summit was becoming less of an economic, and more of a political, forum for discussion. The opposition parties were divided along the usual lines with the JCP and JSP critical of the summit’s failure to produce concrete plans for nuclear disarmament, whereas the DSP and Ko¯meito¯ rated the confirmation of cooperation amongst summit nations but were also disappointed with the lack of concrete results. The Japanese public hardly seemed to react to London II. According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating

60 The second cycle, 1982–8 for the Nakasone administration decreased slightly from 47.6 per cent in May to 46.5 per cent in June, and the disapproval rating increased slightly from 33.4 per cent to 34.3 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 June 1984: 2). Although the reaction in Southeast Asia was one of coolness as regards the handling of debt issues, reaction elsewhere was harsher. The Chinese news agency Xinhua was surprised at the number of political statements emanating from London but regarded the results of economic discussions as poor (Asahi Shinbun, 11 June 1984 evening edition: 2). Soviet reaction was critical of summit calls for East–West dialogue rejecting them as nothing more than a US appeal to its electorate with upcoming elections in mind (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 June 1984 evening edition: 1).

Bonn, West Germany, 2–4 May 1985 The eleventh summit (Bonn II) was held once again at the Palais Schaumburg in the West German capital and was charged with the chief aim of agreeing upon a new round of trade negotiations under the auspices of GATT and discussing US President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). In preparations for the summit, economic issues were at the forefront of discussion and the Japanese government’s fears of being singled out and enduring foreign pressure to expand domestic demand were manifest (Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 April 1985: 1; The Japan Times, 24 April 1985: 1). With these concerns in mind, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro announced a package of market-opening measures on 9 April 1985. Thereafter, towards the end of April, and based on the discussions at the series of preparatory meetings attended by the sherpas, a draft summit declaration was agreed upon that stressed Japanese efforts to open its domestic markets, European measures to reduce unemployment, rescheduling of developing nations’ debts and combined efforts to promote world growth whilst avoiding inflation (The Japan Times, 27 April 1985: 6). Nakasone was again keen, as he had been at London II, to include in the final summit declaration a pledge to open a new round of multilateral trade negotiations during the first half of 1986 (Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 April 1985: 1). To this end, Nakasone agreed with Reagan to cooperate in promoting the new round to begin in the spring of 1986 and persuading the reluctant French and Italian delegations at Bonn II (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 April 1985: 1). Finally, Nakasone and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed that the locomotive theory was now dead and that faced with a slowing US economy their economies would no longer act as the engines to pull the other world economies along (The Japan Times, 3 May 1985: 7). However, political issues were not overlooked and Nakasone was eager to do his utmost to continue the policy of supporting the US and stressing the unity of the Western camp on the one hand, whilst seeking to realise US–Soviet talks on the other hand (Yomiuri Shinbun, 4 April 1985: 1). The political aspects of the summit were to be addressed in discussions at Bonn II under the following topics: (1) to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, declarations would be issued stressing non-belligerency, the support of freedom, democracy and peace, and the promotion of East–West dialogue; (2) general political

The second cycle, 1982–8 61 issues, namely managing military forces, East–West relations, the state of global security and regional problems; and, as promoted by the Japanese government; and (3) the state of Asia, especially Cambodia, China and North Korea (Yomiuri Shinbun, 23 April 1985: 1). However, SDI came to be a prominent issue when Nakasone declared both his understanding of the intention of the research and his plans to take a stance during summit discussions with consideration for the Japanese Constitution and the three non-nuclear principles. MOFA officials were eager both to stress that Nakasone himself had only expressed ‘understanding’ for the initiative and to deny that Nakasone would be acting as Reagan’s catcher by trying to persuade France to accept the initiative (The Japan Times, 24 April 1985: 4). MOFA Minister Abe Shintaro¯ joined the chorus stating that although the summit may discuss SDI and Reagan may make requests for cooperation, the chances of any agreement on the issue at Bonn II were slender (Asahi Shinbun, 26 April 1985: 2). Although an unidentified US official announced that the US government had agreed not to seek a declaration of support on the issue at the summit, Nakasone still urged Western solidarity over this issue in the face of the Soviet Union, whilst respecting the Japanese Constitution and the three non-nuclear principles (The Japan Times, 27 April 1985: 4; The Japan Times, 28 April 1985: 1). Former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo attended the ‘old boys’ summit’ from 25–28 April and spoke to Nakasone on the afternoon of 19 April before his departure, urging him to address US–Japan trade frictions and quickly resolve the issue of how to stimulate domestic demand, which were both proving to be divisive within the LDP (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 April 1985: 2). Nakasone also met with the leaders of the opposition parties in a series of meetings on the afternoon of 22 April at which he explained that he would stress peace and nuclear disarmament, aim towards non-inflationary growth, support the world freetrade system, encourage a new round of trade negotiations to begin by the spring of 1986, promote economic cooperation with developing nations, seek a solution to regional conflicts, such as the Iran–Iraq War, and carefully consider the SDI programme on the basis of expert advice although stating that research into it was necessary as a bargaining chip. Common requests made by the opposition parties included lessening East–West tensions through the promotion of US–Soviet dialogue, removing US–Japanese economic frictions and the reduction of developing nations’ debts (Asahi Shinbun, 23 April 1985: 1–2). Nakasone left early for Bonn on the evening of 29 April in order to undertake a two-day official visit to West Germany prior to the summit. His delegation included Abe (direct from an official tour of Scandinavian countries to discuss East–West issues), MOF Minister Takeshita Noboru and MITI Minister Murata Keijiro¯. US–Japan bilateral relations were addressed in a meeting between Nakasone and Reagan on the afternoon of 2 May to discuss trade issues and SDI. During the meeting both sides agreed on the need to begin a new round of trade negotiations early in 1986, confirmed the indivisibility of the free world’s security and discussed measures to relieve tension on the Korean peninsula (Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 May 1985: 1–2). Nakasone was asked to participate in SDI research but would only consider requesting experts to investigate the request – a cautious attitude that had been

62 The second cycle, 1982–8 adopted by Abe in his meeting with Secretary of State George Schultz the previous day (The Japan Times, 3 May 1985: 1). During Nakasone’s pre-summit visit to West Germany he met twice with Kohl and discussed the upcoming summit, agreed to work towards a new round of trade negotiations to start in 1986, touched upon the West’s strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union in the wake of the more approachable Soviet leadership of President Mikhail Gorbachev, and agreed on the importance of Western unity on the issue of SDI research – an area of military research that was declared to be justified (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 May 1985: 1; The Japan Times, 2 May 1985: 1). Bilateral meetings were also held with President of the EC Commission Jacques Delors and French President François Mitterrand on the afternoon of 2 May. The summit formally began on the evening of 2 May with an official welcome reception and banquet hosted by Kohl. At a dinner for the foreign ministers on the same day, the issues of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the necessity of SDI research were raised (Yomiuri Shinbun, 4 May 1985: 5). On 3 May, the first day of official summit discussions, Nakasone made his call for a new round of trade negotiations, pledged that Japan would concentrate on measures to open its markets and stimulate domestic demand, and joined other leaders in calling on Reagan to address high interest rates in the US. Japan was the target of European criticisms over the number of customs barriers and was called upon to increase its imports, although these criticisms were not as harsh as the Japanese delegation had been expecting, possibly due to the economic package to open markets announced before the summit (Yomiuri Shinbun, 4 May 1985: 7; Mainichi Shinbun, 4 May 1985 evening edition: 2). As regards political issues, the first day of formal summit discussions saw the release of a political declaration on the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, which acknowledged that both ‘[t]he nations of the dynamic Pacific region are drawing ever closer together’ and that ‘[t]he partnership of North America, Europe and Japan is a guarantee of peace and stability in the world’. It also expressed hopes for the reunification of Germany and Korea – ‘in Asia we earnestly hope that a political environment will be created which permits the parties to overcome the division of the Korean peninsula in freedom’ – a statement added on Nakasone’s insistence (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 196; G8 2003). Support was expressed for the ‘positive proposals’ made by Reagan in arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union, but no mention was included of SDI (The Japan Times, 4 May 1985: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 4 May 1985: 1–2). The official summit photograph was taken on this day and, once again, Nakasone took a place shoulder to shoulder with Reagan. On 4 May, the final day of discussions, the need for a new round of trade negotiations was recognised but a concrete starting date could still not be agreed upon due to French concern about its agricultural markets and consequent intransigence on the issue (Mainichi Shinbun, 4 May 1985 evening edition: 1; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 5 May 1985: 1–5). Thus, the final economic declaration was released the same day, stating that the Japanese government would make efforts to increase imports and expressing support for the OECD’s statement that trade talks should begin ‘as soon as possible. [Although m]ost of us think that this should be in 1986’ (G8 2003).

The second cycle, 1982–8 63 With the formal discussion over, Nakasone welcomed the other leaders to Tokyo in 1986 and expressed a desire to invite Australia ‘to mark the advent of the Pacific Age’ (The Japan Times, 5 May 1985: 1). In a televised press conference on the final day Nakasone declared that the summit had been the most difficult for Japan but that he had seen all its objectives met by creating unity amongst the Western leaders and setting the course for the new round of trade negotiations, despite disagreement with France on the way to promote these talks (The Japan Times, 5 May 1985: 1). Nakasone returned to Tokyo on the afternoon of 7 May and briefed his own cabinet on the results of the summit the next day calling for swift action in opening Japanese markets (The Japan Times, 9 May 1985: 1). Reaction in Japan was polarised. The LDP and its conservative partner in government, the NLC, was pleased that protectionism was rejected, Western unity affirmed, and that Japan was not overly criticised or isolated for its trade policies. The business world stressed the importance of the unity of the Western camp whilst promoting East–West dialogue, praised the attention given to German and Korean unity, and rated highly Japan’s avoidance of isolation from summit members and the move towards a new round of trade negotiations. According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Nakasone administration increased slightly from 55.9 per cent in January to 56.3 per cent in May, and the disapproval rating decreased from 26.5 per cent to 24.7 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 25 May 1985: 2). However, the JSP and Ko¯meito¯ claimed that the summit failed to deliver any concrete measures (Asahi Shinbun, 5 May 1985: 2). BOJ Governor Sumita Satoshi also announced that there was no need to alter Japan’s monetary policy as a result of the summit (The Japan Times, 9 May 1985: 6). On political issues, Kudo¯ Akira of the JCP probed Nakasone in discussions in the House of Representatives on the afternoon of 9 May 1985 as to the extent of the ‘understanding’ expressed at the summit on SDI (The Japan Times, 10 May 1985: 1). Reaction to the call for a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula was welcomed by Rhee Kyu-Ho, South Korean Ambassador in Tokyo (The Japan Times, 27 April 1986: 1). However, the reaction in the Soviet Union was to cast Bonn II as a total failure (Asahi Shinbun, 6 May 1985: 3). Attention now turned to Tokyo as the summit venue in 1986, whilst at the same time foreign pressure was increasingly placed upon Nakasone to open Japanese markets in time for the meeting, and doubts were expressed about the utility of the summit process by Mitterrand – leading to rumours of his possible boycott of the Tokyo meeting (The Japan Times, 11 May 1985: 4).

Tokyo, Japan, 4–6 May 1986 The Tokyo Summit (Tokyo II) was held again at the Geihinkan, but Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, as host, expressed a desire after Bonn II that this summit should be more informal and go beyond the simple reading of prepared statements with the aim that Tokyo II ‘will become a forum of frank discussions by world leaders’ (The Japan Times, 15 May 1985: 1).

64 The second cycle, 1982–8 Once again, security was a major concern for the Japanese government and in particular Ozawa Ichiro¯, Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission (NPSC) (for discussion of terrorist threats to Tokyo II, see Ise 1986). On the afternoon of 25 March 1986, rocket attacks took place on the Imperial Palace and the US Embassy thought to be in protest at the hosting of the summit and the sixtieth anniversary of the Sho¯wa Emperor’s reign (The Japan Times, 26 March 1986: 1). The ex-Communist League Battle Flag Faction (Kyo¯sando¯ Senkiha) thereafter claimed responsibility for the attack. Three days after this incident Chu¯kakuha ¯ saka Prefectural Police Headquarters and launched a similar rocket attack on the O again on 15 April fired projectiles at the US air force base at Yokota as part of its threat to ‘crush at all costs’ Tokyo II (The Japan Times, 2 May 1986: 1). Another rocket attack took place on 31 March when one of four missiles launched successfully landed in the Geihinkan – again police suspected that this was the work of a leftwing extremist group protesting against the summit and were proved to be correct when the Hazama faction of Kakuro¯kyo¯ claimed responsibility (Mainichi Shinbun, 1 April 1986: 1; The Japan Times, 2 May 1986: 1). For Tokyo II, the government surpassed the security measures taken for Tokyo I and mobilised 30,000 police officers, 4,000 riot police and an airship to patrol the Tokyo streets and skies at a ¯ tani and Hotel O ¯ kura (The cost of ¥7 billion to protect the Geihinkan, Hotel New O Japan Times, 2 May 1986: 1). Amidst this tight security, a small and unidentified Cessna aircraft was still able to take to the skies of central Tokyo on the evening of 27 April and fly over the Imperial Palace (Yomiuri Shinbun, 28 April 1986: 23). Nakasone was facing a joint election of both houses in July, which represented a chance to wean the LDP away from reliance upon the NLC and restore its clear majority in the House of Representatives. A successful summit in general, and a strong performance on his part, would enhance his political fortunes. To this end, a gentleman’s agreement was struck to shelve internal LDP rivalries between Abe, Nakasone, Miyazawa and Takeshita over the party leadership until the summit was over (The Japan Times, 18 April 1986: 3; The Japan Times, 27 April 1986: 1, 5). One further example of the border between domestic and international politics being blurred was when the Mayor of Nagasaki Motoshima Hitoshi requested a meeting with US President Ronald Reagan during the summit to discuss the possibility of sending a local peace delegation to the US (The Japan Times, 11 April 1986: 3). Reagan welcomed delegations not only from Nagasaki but also Hiroshima (The Japan Times, 7 May 1986: 3). As regards the preparation of the summit agenda, Nakasone agreed after a request from Reagan that anti-drug policies would be a topic for discussion (The Japan Times, 1 April 1986: 1). Other non-economic issues to be discussed included East–West relations and disarmament, international terrorism and the situations in Latin America and the Philippines (The Japan Times, 4 April 1986: 1). In addition, and immediately before the summit, the Japanese government placed the issue of the safety of nuclear power on the agenda in response to the accident at the Soviet nuclear power plant in Chernobyl on 26 April (Mainichi Shinbun, 2 May 1986: 1). A Yomiuri Shinbun cartoon portrayed the summiteers stood atop Mount Fuji as the radiated fallout from the Chernobyl accident, constituting Soviet President Mikhail

The second cycle, 1982–8 65 Gorbachev’s participation in the summit, descends upon them (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 April 1986: 2). In the run-up to the summit, the US was keen to push an anti-Libyan stance as an agenda item in reaction to the suspected Libyan involvement in a bomb blast in a West Berlin nightclub that killed and injured over fifty US servicemen and civilians (The Japan Times, 11 April 1986: 1). Abe met with President François Mitterrand on 7 April in order to request French cooperation in discussing ant-terrorist measures aware of the fact that the French government had refused to allow US bombers to fly over French airspace during their retaliatory attack on 15 April on Libya (The Japan Times, 19 April 1986: 1). As regards economic issues, discussion of Japan’s trade surplus and barriers was once again expected, especially with criticisms from UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and encouragement from West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Yomiuri Shinbun, 2 May 1986 evening edition: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 May 1986: 1, 5). However, it was hoped that these doubts would be undercut by the adoption of a seven-point plan to combat the yen’s appreciation and stimulate domestic demand, which was the product of the Advisory Group on Economic Structural Adjustment for International Harmony and came to be known as the Maekawa Report after the group’s chairperson and former BOJ Governor Maekawa Haruo (The Japan Times, 9 April 1986: 1, 7). With preparation for the summit in mind, a number of foreign visits were conducted: Deputy MOFA Minister Teshima Reishi visited Paris in order to discuss arrangements to facilitate the unconventional attendance of both socialist Mitterrand and conservative Prime Minister Jacques Chirac (The Japan Times, 3 April 1986: 1); and during an official visit to the US from 13–14 April 1986, Nakasone and Reagan agreed to cooperate in making Tokyo II a success (Asahi Shinbun, 15 April 1986 evening edition: 1). Other non-governmental actors also took an interest in the summit. Former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo visited Nakasone on the afternoon of 2 April prior to the ‘old boys’ summit’ held in Hakone from 7–10 April that brought together more than twenty former presidents and prime ministers, including Fukuda as honorary chairman, to discuss East–West détente, stimulation of the global economy and issues of population and the environment (Asahi Shinbun, 3 April 1986: 2). Fukuda’s personal opinion was that US–Japanese bilateral relations were extremely important in stimulating and normalising the world economy (Mainichi Shinbun, 9 April 1986: 13). In addition, a Keidanren-hosted summit of business leaders from Europe, Japan and North America was held from 13–15 April in the Keidanren guest house at the foot of Mount Fuji to discuss a number of similar issues in similarly informal fashion to the summit itself (The Japan Times, 26 March 1986: 13). In contrast, the OECD and So¯hyo¯ organised a ‘labour summit’ from 21–3 April in Tokyo to bring together union leaders from the summit nations to discuss working conditions and communicate their desire for a return to full employment to Nakasone (The Japan Times, 23 April 1986: 2). The final summit agenda was finalised by the sherpas at a meeting in Paris from 18–20 April and included the promotion of economic growth, discussion of the debt

66 The second cycle, 1982–8 problems of developing nations and trade issues, in addition to the political issues of anti-terrorism measures, East–West relations, regional conflicts such as the Korean peninsula and the Middle East (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 April 1986: 1). However, as at Bonn II, there were doubts that agreement could be reached on a date to start a new round of multilateral trade negotiations due to French intransigence and as a result the final economic declaration would simply stress the importance of a new round of talks and welcome the progress made in preparatory meetings thus far (Yomiuri Shinbun, 25 April 1986: 7; Asahi Shinbun, 27 April 1986: 1). Thereafter, other issues were mooted, for example Maekawa called on Nakasone to make the stabilisation of exchange rates a topic of discussion at the summit (The Japan Times, 29 April 1986: 1). Nakasone was eager to promote the image of Japan resolving conflict in the East Asian region and to this end sought to stress the promotion of dialogue on the Korean peninsula through the successful hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, conflict resolution in Cambodia and stability in the Philippines as topics for discussion at the summit (The Japan Times, 4 April 1986: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 27 April 1986: 2). In order to realise the role of Japan ‘batting for Asia’ at the summit, former MOFA Vice Minister Sunobe Ryo¯zo¯ visited both South Korea and the countries of ASEAN from 27 March to 5 April to gather opinions on the upcoming summit and expectations of Japan’s role (Yomiuri Shinbun, 29 April 1986: 7). He reported that ASEAN nations requested that developed nations reject protectionism and open their markets to products from developing nations (The Japan Times, 5 April 1986: 6). However, the Japanese government experienced competition from Reagan in acting as the spokesperson for Asia as he arrived in Tokyo direct from a meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers in Bali having discussed issues of interest to the region that he could raise at the summit, in particular the prevention of protectionism and the promotion of free trade. Reagan promised to promote these issues as a Pacific Rim partner and Thai Ambassador to Japan Sarasin Viraphol went as far as to suggest that ‘[t]here might be a sort of “scrambling” between the US and Japan to speak on behalf of ASEAN at the summit’ (The Japan Times, 3 May 1986: 6). A number of bilateral meetings were conducted on the edges of the summit. Nakasone met Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi on the afternoon of 2 May to affirm the discussion of the safety of nuclear power and state-sponsored terrorism at the summit, and later that day Craxi called for the abandonment of extreme protectionism and an expansion of trade between the two countries (Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 May 1986: 2, 7). MITI Minister Watanabe Michio met with Craxi the next day whilst Nakasone met with Delors on the afternoon of 3 May and agreed on the need for exchange rate stabilisation but could not agree on concrete action (The Japan Times, 4 May 1986: 1). On the day of the summit’s opening, Nakasone met with: (1) Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in the morning and pledged to fight protectionism and promote the work of GATT; (2) Kohl before lunch to discuss currency rate stabilisation; and (3) Mitterrand in the evening, who urged Nakasone not to forget that the summit was essentially an economic forum. On the same day, Abe met with UK Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe before the official summit

The second cycle, 1982–8 67 opening to discuss issues such as terrorism and the Maekawa report as well as bilateral trade issues (The Japan Times, 5 May 1986: 1, 4). As regards US–Japanese bilateral relations, Nakasone met with Reagan on the afternoon of 3 May to discuss trade issues and agree upon an anti-terrorism drive. In a separate meeting, Watanabe and US Secretary of State George Schultz agreed to resolve a dispute over semiconductors as soon as possible. Takeshita also met with US Treasury Secretary James Baker on the same day to discuss the issue of monetary stability in the context of the summit (The Japan Times, 4 May 1986: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 4 May 1986: 1–2, 7). The summit opened officially on the afternoon 4 May with a welcome ceremony that was met by five rockets launched over the Geihinkan from a nearby apartment and immediately thought to have been the responsibility of Chu¯kakuha – a suspicion that was later confirmed (Mainichi Shinbun, 5 May 1986: 1, 18–19; The Japan Times, 6 May 1986: 3). Thereafter a reception and official dinner hosted by Nakasone and his wife were held and at the latter political issues including terrorism and nuclear safety were discussed and it was agreed to improve the regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At a working dinner for the foreign ministers the same evening, regional security issues such as Cambodia and the Korea peninsula were discussed and it was agreed to convene a UNGA session on international terrorism (The Japan Times, 5 May 1986: 4; Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 May 1986: 1–3). A series of declarations was released on the second day of the summit that included emphasis on providing technical and medical assistance to the Soviet Union to address the Chernobyl accident and calling upon the Soviet government to provide complete information regarding the incident. Measures were also announced to combat terrorism that singled out Libya as a state supporting and sponsoring terrorism. This singling out of Libya was something strongly urged by Reagan and Thatcher; however, the Japanese government was far from enthusiastic due to its oil dependency on Arab nations and thus Nakasone proposed unsuccessfully an indirect reference, although reference to combating terrorism within international law was included with respect to the Japanese stance (The Japan Times, 6 May 1986: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 May 1986: 1–5). However, Nakasone was willing to sacrifice the principle in order to facilitate a successful summit; as one Japanese government official stated ‘[t]here was virtually nothing Japan could do but to accommodate their [US and European] insistence in order to win a consensus as host country’ (The Japan Times, 7 May 1986: 1). The anti-terrorist measures included banning exports of arms to states suspected of supporting or sponsoring terrorism, and limiting the diplomatic missions sent abroad by these states. A declaration released on the second day entitled ‘Looking Forward to a Better Future’ included reference to the summiteers’ ‘roots deep in the civilizations of Europe and Asia’, and specifically referred to ‘[t]he countries of North America, enriched by European and Asian cultures alike’ (Hajnal 1989: 323; G8 2003). On economic issues, a US proposal was approved to introduce a system of surveillance to monitor and coordinate closer harmonisation of economic policy through a Group of Seven finance ministers of the summit nations (minus the EC Commission), expanded

68 The second cycle, 1982–8 from the Group of Five (the G7 minus Canada, the EC Commission and Italy). In addition, multilateral trade negotiations were called for as early as possible to combat protectionism (Mainichi Shinbun, 6 May 1986: 9; Mainichi Shinbun, 7 May 1986: 2–3). The summiteers awoke on the final day of the summit to the detonation of smoke bombs and firecrackers at a number of stations on the Tokyo subway to disrupt the rush-hour commute (The Japan Times, 7 May 1986: 1). The economic declaration was issued on this day and Nakasone as chair of Tokyo II summarised the results of the summit by stressing the unified position against international terrorism, the call for peace initiatives in Cambodia, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, North and South Korean membership of the UN and the commitment to economic policy coordination, non-inflationary growth, the early commencement of multilateral trade negotiations, and the inclusion of Canada and Italy in international currency talks through the expansion of the meeting of the G5 finance ministers to G7 (for ¯ ba 1995: 192–6). Although unsuccessful in more on the creation of the G7, see O getting the approval of fellow summit members to a strategy for addressing the appreciation of the yen, Nakasone stressed that urgent measures were needed (Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 May 1986 evening edition: 1; The Japan Times, 7 May 1986: 1). The final ceremonial act of the summit was a banquet hosted by the Emperor at the Imperial Palace. Thereafter, Nakasone met with Thatcher before her departure that evening to discuss the value of the yen and the trade imbalance between the two countries (Mainichi Shinbun, 7 May 1986: 2, 23). Reaction to the summit was mixed both internationally and domestically. Fellow summit leaders were very positive. For example, Reagan upon leaving Japan called Tokyo II the most successful summit so far and expressed particular satisfaction on the terrorist issue. Similar praise was extended by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in a meeting with Abe to agree on follow-up surveillance meetings to coordinate economic growth (The Japan Times, 7 May 1986: 1, 4; The Japan Times, 8 May 1986: 1). The summit’s anti-terrorism measures also pleased the Israeli government (The Japan Times, 13 May 1986: 14). The Philippine government expressed appreciation for the support given to the post-Marcos government of President Corazon Aquino and requested further assistance (The Japan Times, 7 May 1986: 3); and Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja declared with regard to the economic declaration that he had the impression that the Japanese government had included several of ASEAN’s requests (Asahi Shinbun, 16 May 1986: 2). However, there was also a critical international reaction from expected quarters. The Soviet Union’s state news agency TASS was displeased with the amount of time and attention given to the Chernobyl incident (The Japan Times, 7 May 1986: 1). Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammed criticised the industrialised countries of the North for not having consulted the developing countries of the South before the summit (Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 May 1986 evening edition: 2). The Libyan government requested that the Japanese government explain its support for the US in branding Libya a terrorist state, and MOFA decided to despatch officials to Arab nations to assure them Japan’s Middle East policy was not altered by the

The second cycle, 1982–8 69 support given for anti-terrorist measures at the summit (The Japan Times, 9 May 1986: 1). North Korea reacted to a summary of Tokyo II and in particular Nakasone’s statement as chairman that the summit members agreed to separate seats for the two Koreas at the UN as a ‘criminal plot’ intended to divide the peninsula (The Japan Times, 9 May 1986: 3). The domestic reaction was not so positive and opposition parties, especially the JSP, cast the summit as a ‘clear failure’. Nakasone even omitted giving a report on the summit to the Diet (Mainichi Shinbun, 6 May 1986: 1; Sakamoto 1986: 25). The Maekawa Report was received negatively and regarded in the words of a JCP representative as ‘sacrific[ing] the common man on the altar of international cooperation’. A Ko¯meito¯ spokesman added to this by suggesting that ‘Nakasone wants to use the summit to advance his own political fortunes. He isn’t thinking about the long-term interests of Japan’ (The Japan Times, 3 May 1986: 1). In failing to get the other leaders’ support for concerted intervention in currency markets to stabilise the appreciation in the value of the yen, Nakasone was criticised from within both the LDP and the business world, and by the opposition parties (The Japan Times, 7 May 1986: 3, 9). He was ultimately forced to introduce a supplementary budget to stimulate the economy through public works projects – an issue that was seen as one that could possibly endanger Nakasone’s continued survival as prime minister (The Japan Times, 8 May 1986: 1; The Japan Times, 9 May 1986: 3). The reaction of the Japanese people was largely indifferent. According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Nakasone administration decreased slightly from 55.5 per cent in April to 54.5 per cent in May, and the disapproval rating increased slightly from 26.2 per cent to 26.7 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 May 1986: 2). Nevertheless, Nakasone’s continued popularity was such that in the July 1986 joint election he won a clear majority of 300 seats in the House of Representatives, and 72 of the 126 seats up for election in the House of Councillors. This represented the best election result in the history of the LDP.

Venice, Italy, 8–10 June 1987 The Venice Summit (Venice II) took place in the Longhena Library of the Giorgio Cini Foundation on the island of San Giorgio Maggiore under extremely tight security (see Toki no Ugoki 1987). In the run-up to Venice II Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani made a tour of fellow summit nations, visiting Tokyo from 9–11 May 1987 in order to discuss the summit’s agenda with Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. The latter called for measures to stabilise currency markets as the top priority, in addition to issues such as multilateral trade negotiations, developing nations’ debt, energy issues and research into Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). On political issues, he stressed the importance of the solidarity of Western nations whilst conducting arms control talks with the Soviet Union (The Japan Times, 10 May 1987: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 10 May 1987: 2).

70 The second cycle, 1982–8 US–Japan bilateral trade issues were highlighted in the run-up to the summit. Despite reports that US President Ronald Reagan had pledged to remove 100 per cent retaliatory tariffs on imports of Japanese electronic goods before the leaders met in Venice, this remained a chief topic for discussion (The Japan Times, 17 May 1987: 1). These tariffs were originally introduced in reaction to perceived Japanese violations of a bilateral trade agreement on semi-conductors. Again, expectations were high that Japan would be criticised at the summit for its trade surplus and a ¥6 trillion (US$43 billion) package of economic measures was announced by Nakasone on 29 May 1987 prior to Venice II as part of ‘gift-bearing diplomacy’ (omiyage gaiko¯) – a strategy of adopting policies immediately before the summit in order to pre-empt open criticisms of Japan (Asahi Shinbun, 30 May 1987: 2–3; The Japan Times, 2 June 1987: 1; Maki 1988b: 372–3). These measures were largely welcomed and USTR Clayton Yeutter declared that ‘Nakasone can take the package to Venice with pride’ (The Japan Times, 2 June 1987: 8). Agricultural issues and the ending of farming subsidies were also mooted as important topics for discussion by US officials in the face of expected French intransigence and Japan’s doubts, as expressed by MAFF Minister Kato¯ Mutsuki that agricultural negotiations should ‘proceed like a long crop and a slow harvest’ (Asahi Shinbun, 28 May 1987 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 7 June 1987: 5). International cooperation in research on biological functions was also to be stated in the final communiqué with reference to the Japanese government’s Human Frontier Science Programme (HFSP), which was to be comparable to European and US research into information technology (IT) and constitute one area of Japan’s contribution to international society (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 May 1987 evening edition: 1). Just before leaving for the summit, the government made clear Japan’s position on economic matters at the summit based upon: (1) fears about the rapid decrease in the value of the dollar; (2) the reappearance of protectionism; (3) debt issues in developing nations; (4) exchange rate stability and the necessity of policy coordination to address trade imbalances; and (5) pledges of growth in the Japanese economy of 3.5 per cent based on the expansion of domestic demand (Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 June 1987 evening edition: 1). As the summit approached, political issues were also focused upon and Nakasone suggested the adoption of a comprehensive summit declaration at Venice II on political matters that would serve to stress Western unity and support Reagan in his dialogue with the Soviet Union (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 May 1987: 1; Asahi Shinbun, 26 May 1987: 2). In addition, Warren Christopher, former US Deputy Secretary of State, proposed that, considering Japan’s economic interests in the region, Nakasone was in a good position to raise the issue of resolving the Iran–Iraq War at the summit (The Japan Times, 29 May 1987: 1). This was a position to which Nakasone was willing to respond within the framework of the Japanese Constitution, pledging to redouble his efforts to find a peaceful solution, and citing Japan’s ‘unique position maintaining communication with both Iran and Iraq’ (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 May 1987: 1; The Japan Times, 5 June 1987: 1). In addition, MOFA was working to promote the discussion of conflict resolution between Iran and Iraq, and talks on measures to ensure the safe passage of shipping in the region (The Japan Times, 3 June

The second cycle, 1982–8 71 1987: 1). The Japanese government’s role in the peace process in the run-up to its discussion at Venice II was further encouraged by the Iranian President Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei (Asahi Shinbun, 8 June 1987: 1). The US government and the Chief Cabinet Secretary Goto¯da Masaharu also sought to add to the political agenda by stressing the importance of addressing international terrorism; Reagan was especially eager to promote the adoption of a joint statement on combating terrorism (Yomiuri Shinbun, 16 May 1987 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 3 June 1987: 4). Other non-economic issues to be promoted by Nakasone included arms control, discussion of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and an anti-AIDS strategy to be implemented through the World Health Organisation (WHO) (Asahi Shinbun, 5 June 1987 evening edition: 1). Once again, former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo visited Nakasone on 2 June to report the results of the ‘old boys’ summit’ held in Kuala Lumpur in April and pointed to the three crises of military proliferation, economic instability and population growth (Asahi Shinbun, 3 June 1987: 2). There was another domestic input into Nakasone’s preparations for the summit as it was felt in the media that a good performance at Venice II would enable the outgoing Nakasone to influence the choice of his successor in the autumn election to decide the LDP president and consequently next prime minister (The Japan Times, 3 June 1987: 1). Nakasone left Tokyo on the evening of 6 June for Geneva to be briefed the next day by the Japanese ambassadors to the other summit nations. He was accompanied by MOFA Minister Kuranari Tadashi, MOF Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, MITI Minister Tamura Hajime and sherpa Kitamura Hiroshi. Upon his arrival in Venice on the morning of 8 June, Nakasone conducted a number of meetings with other summit leaders and attended the formal reception. These bilateral meetings included West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Reagan in the afternoon. In the meeting with Mulroney the main topic of discussion was US protectionism, in addition to the extension of aid to the poorest nations of Southern Africa and racial issues in South Africa (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 June 1987: 2). Although the bilateral US–Japan talks touched upon the Iran–Iraq War, the safe passage of shipping and the extent of Japan’s cooperation, the main issue of concern was US-imposed punitive tariffs. Reagan announced his promise to withdraw 17 per cent of the tariffs although it was stated that they may be reintroduced if need be (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 9 June 1987: 1). The summit began officially on 8 June with separate official dinners for leaders, finance and foreign ministers. Over dinner, the leaders discussed a range of political issues including East–West disarmament negotiations centred on the reduction of INF and, to this end, the importance of a statement of Western unity (Asahi Shinbun, 9 June 1987 evening edition: 1). Summit sessions on 9 June centred on East–West disarmament talks in general, non-specific terms and called for ‘verifiable arms reductions’. In addition, refusal to submit to the threats of international terrorists, Soviet policy on human rights and withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the safe passage of shipping through the Persian Gulf in addition to resolution of conflict in the region were also included in the political declarations released on this day (G8 2003). Watanabe Hideo, deputy Chief

72 The second cycle, 1982–8 Cabinet Secretary claimed credit for the East–West declaration being based on a Japanese draft (The Japan Times, 10 June 1987: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 10 June 1987: 1–5). Some economic discussions took place on this day in order to include UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who was forced to leave early due to a general election at home. These discussions touched on the chief economic issues of macro-economic policy in addition to the provision of aid to developing nations. Nakasone took the opportunity during these discussions to pre-empt any ‘Japan bashing’ (Nihon tataki) by announcing his pre-summit economic package and stressing his commitment to stimulating domestic demand to the applause of the other summiteers, but scepticism was expressed by Thatcher as to whether Japan could expand its number of foreign imports (Asahi Shinbun, 10 June 1987: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 10 June 1987 evening edition: 2). However, during the discussions on AIDS Nakasone placed his foot firmly in his mouth by claiming that the low rate of the disease in Japan was due to the low number of homosexuals (The Japan Times, 10 June 1987: 1, 4). The foreign ministers’ meeting on 9 June stressed opposition to the South African regime’s policy of apartheid and called for the successful hosting of the 1988 Olympic games in Seoul. On the latter issue, Kuranari described to other foreign ministers Japan’s efforts to facilitate a successful Olympic games as well as touching upon the issue of Indo-Chinese refugees (The Japan Times, 10 June 1987: 1). During meetings on 10 June, Nakasone echoed the foreign ministers’ calls to make the Seoul Olympics a success in creating a climate for North–South dialogue, pledged that Japan would take non-military measures to ensure the safe passage of oil through the Persian Gulf, and work towards securing a ceasefire in the Iran–Iraq War citing Kuranari’s immediate post-summit visit to Iran. In addition, discussion took place on AIDS, ozone depletion, removal of trade barriers, increasing employment, expanding assistance to developing nations. The final day ended with the release of the economic declaration that reconfirmed the Louvre Accord of February 1987 to maintain current exchange rates, highlighted concerns about protectionism, stressed the importance of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, welcomed the HFSP and emphasised the provision of aid by the summit nations to the developing world, especially welcoming ‘the recent initiative of the Japanese government in bringing forward a new scheme which will increase the provision of resources from Japan to developing countries’ (G8 2003). The chairman’s summary on political issues released on the same day condemned the presence of foreign troops in Cambodia, took note of economic reforms in China, extended support for the Seoul Olympics and encouraged the democratic regime of Philippine President Corazon Aquino (The Japan Times, 11 June 1987: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 11 June 1987: 1–4; Hajnal 1989: 332–56). Once the summit was concluded Nakasone declared it a great success: Japan bashing had once again been avoided thanks to the pre-summit economic package and a highly-orchestrated public relations drive. Another cause for satisfaction was that the summit’s adopted statement on East–West relations was based on a Japanese draft (Mainichi Shinbun, 10 June 1987 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 14 June 1987: 1). These feelings were reflected in statements by LDP officials and one government source declared this summit to have been the best one so far for Japan

The second cycle, 1982–8 73 and gave it ninety out of one hundred marks (Asahi Shinbun, 11 June 1987: 2). Statements by leaders of the business world welcomed efforts to stabilise the value of the dollar in order to stimulate growth and rectify trade imbalances (The Japan Times, 11 June 1987: 4, 10). The Japanese public appeared to respond positively to Nakasone’s final summit: according to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Nakasone administration increased from 30 per cent in May to 34 per cent in June, and the disapproval rating dropped from 54.6 per cent to 49.8 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 June 1987: 2). In contrast, the JSP denounced the summit for failing to address nuclear disarmament and claimed that Japanese cooperation in ensuring the safe passage of shipping in the Gulf was an attempt by the government to eventually despatch the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) overseas. Ko¯meito¯ and the DSP were also disappointed with the lack of concrete results in the economic field (Yomiuri Shinbun, 11 June 1987: 3). The Xinhua news agency recognised some new direction in the summit’s role, as seen in the political statements issued at Venice II, but claimed that there was little content to the summit as a result of the participants’ eagerness to avoid conflict (Mainichi Shinbun, 11 June 1987: 7). After the summit, Kuranari attended the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) and Japan–ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting and met with Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew to explain the summit discussions (Asahi Shinbun, 20 June 1987: 2). Nakasone remained in Europe and paid an official three-day visit to Spain from 11–13 June, during which he recognised that although his time left as LDP president and prime minister was limited, he was committed to implementing the commitments made at Venice (The Japan Times, 14 June 1987: 1). Nakasone would be replaced by Takeshita Noboru as prime minister before the Toronto Summit of 1988 thereby ending the longest consecutive participation in a summit by a Japanese prime minister and one of the more popular amongst his Western counterparts.

Toronto, Canada, 19–21 June 1988 The Toronto Summit was the fourteenth in the process, brought to an end the second cycle of summits and was held at the Metro Toronto Convention Centre (see Toki no Ugoki 1988). Economic issues were placed on the summit’s agenda when Canadian Prime Minister and summit chair Brian Mulroney announced his desire to return the summit to its economic roots by discussing expanding systems of surveillance to trade policies and domestic micro-economic policies as one of the main topics at Toronto (Asahi Shinbun, 7 May 1988 evening edition: 2; Asahi Shinbun, 14 May 1988: 9). Also at the May 1988 ministerial meeting of the OECD, US Treasury Secretary James Baker levelled criticisms at Asia’s newly industrialising countries (NICs), especially South Korea and Taiwan, for failing to open their markets and addressing trade imbalance with the US – a subject that was expected to be revisited at Toronto (Mainichi Shinbun, 6 June 1988: 3). Deputy Foreign Minister Kitamura Hiroshi acting as sherpa announced that the summit would focus chiefly

74 The second cycle, 1982–8 on macro-economic issues, GATT trade negotiations, aid to developing nations and the Asian NICs: ‘Japan, as the sole representative from Asia, will see to it that the forthcoming summit avoids making onerous demands on the Asian NICs’ (The Japan Times, 28 May 1988: 3). Political items on the agenda were thought to include terrorism, arms control and the Iran–Iraq War, with Japan also pledging to contribute to the peace and security of the Asia Pacific region. To this end, the Japanese government announced its agenda for Toronto on 18 May and highlighted conflict resolution in Cambodia and Indo-China, stability on the Korean peninsula with the upcoming Olympic games that year, and strengthening support for the administration of Corazon Aquino in the Philippines (Asahi Shinbun, 19 May 1988: 2). As regards economic issues, in the run-up to the summit and during an official visit to France, Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru met with French President François Mitterrand on 6 June and discussed the proposal of a plan to lessen the debt burden on African developing nations and Japanese–French cooperation on the issue at Toronto (Mainichi Shinbun, 7 June 1988 evening edition: 2). For once, the Japanese government was not expecting to be criticised for its trade surplus (The Japan Times, 12 June 1988: 4). Alternatively, it was reported that the Japanese government was expecting the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations to dominate discussion and that Takeshita would stress Japan’s continued economic growth at an average of 3.5 per cent and increased aid to developing nations in the region of 0.4 per cent of GNP (The Japan Times, 17 May 1988: 10; The Japan Times, 28 May 1988: 3). In addition, it was reported that Takeshita would warn of the dangers of the development of regional trading blocs in North America and Europe (The Japan Times, 27 May 1988: 7). Once again, actors outside of the government were given the chance to make known their opinions on the upcoming summit. Takeshita met individually with the opposition party leaders on 10 June and discussed issues such as East–West relations, regional conflict resolution, nuclear disarmament and promoting an understanding of Asian NICs to the Western summit nations (Yomiuri Shinbun, 11 June 1988: 3). Once again the sixth ‘old boys’ summit’ was held from 17–19 May but this time in Moscow. Former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo attended as honorary chairman and the meeting called for US–Soviet negotiations to overcome difference in ideology for the sake of humanity (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 May 1988: 3). Thereafter, Takeshita visited Fukuda on the evening of 11 June and discussed the expansion of Japan’s ODA policy ahead of the summit – the scale of which MOFA and MOF were in the process of negotiating (Asahi Shinbun, 12 June 1988: 2; Mainichi Shinbun, 12 June 1988: 2). It was eventually decided on 14 June that Takeshita would announce a five-year plan to double Japan’s ODA contributions to over ¥6 trillion (US$50 billion) targeted at the poorest nations as part of its gift-bearing diplomacy, thereby making Japan the second largest ODA contributor in the world and demonstrating its concrete international contribution (Mainichi Shinbun, 14 June 1988 evening edition: 1). This increase in ODA as part of a policy of gift-bearing diplomacy was parodied in a Mainichi Shinbun cartoon that depicted Takeshita and MOFA Minister Uno So¯suke as traditional Japanese showmen spinning a wad of

The second cycle, 1982–8 75 yen atop an umbrella for the entertainment of the summit leaders (Mainichi Shinbun, 19 June 1988: 2). Takeshita left Tokyo on the evening of 16 June with a delegation including MOF Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, MITI Minister Tamura Hajime and Uno armed with a package of measures to increase Japan’s international contribution in the field of ODA, and reiterating the promise that ‘as the sole representative of Asia, he will see to it that the summit session avoids making oppressive demands on the Asian NICs’ (The Japan Times, 16 June 1988: 1, 3). In playing this latter role of ‘batting for Asia’, Takeshita spoke to South Korean President Roh Tae-Woo by telephone before his departure to inform him that he would seek the support of the other summit leaders for the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympics, stress international cooperation to prevent terrorism and attempt to ameliorate the Western leaders’ understanding of the NICs (Yomiuri Shinbun, 16 June 1988 evening edition: 1). Whilst visiting South Korea immediately before the summit, DSP Chairman Tsukamoto Saburo¯ met with leaders of the main parties and promised that he would meet with, and request that, Takeshita raise the issues of Asian NICs-bashing by the US and the success of the Seoul Olympics as summit items (Mainichi Shinbun, 15 June 1988: 2). It was decided that Kunihiro Michihiko, Chief Cabinet Counsellor for External Affairs in MOFA, would visit Seoul in July to report on Takeshita’s success in promoting these two issues; in addition Takeshita and Uno would do the same during their respective July visits to Australia and the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting (The Japan Times, 23 June 1988: 1). Takeshita arrived in Toronto on the afternoon of 17 June and met with Mulroney the next day. This bilateral meeting discussed trade issues, an emerging North American trading bloc and aviation issues, but also provided Takeshita with the chance to announce an aid-provision programme that promised to write off ¥700 billion (US$5.5 billion) in loans to the very poorest developing nations (Asahi Shinbun, 20 June 1988: 1–2). Whilst protests took place outside the summit venue involving a ceremonial burning of the US flag and calls for the arrest of the summit leaders for crimes against humanity, formal discussions began on the afternoon of 19 June followed by an official dinner (The Japan Times, 21 June 1988: 6; The Japan Times, 22 June 1988: 5). Political issues were touched upon including East–West relations and Reagan’s recent meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, the post-Marcos Philippines and assistance for Afghan refugees (The Japan Times, 21 June 1988: 1). Miyazawa met with other finance ministers and proposed measures to relieve the debt burden of middle-income, developing nations, chiefly in Latin America, through utilising the IMF and World Bank to guarantee loans (The Japan Times, 21 June 1988: 1; Sparks 1988). These measures were not covered in Takeshita’s proposals made to Mulroney the previous day and were based upon the creation of a new fund within the IMF; however, they only received qualified support and eventually could not be adopted as they were seen to be ‘so complicated and delivered on such short notice’ (Asahi Shinbun, 21 June 1988 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 23 June 1988: 1).

76 The second cycle, 1982–8 In addition, during dinner on the first day Takeshita brought a message from the ousted leader of Cambodia Prince Norodom Sihanouk to the summit leaders that urged the international community to cut all forms of assistance to Vietnam and create a peacekeeping force to secure stability in the country. This issue was covered in more detail by Uno at the foreign ministers’ working dinner the same day (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 June 1988 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 21 June 1988: 6). Over dinner on the first day of the summit, Takeshita and Reagan also raised the issue of the Japanese–Soviet territorial dispute over the group of small islands off the northern tip of Hokkaido¯ occupied by the Soviet Union in the last days of the Second World War, known as the Northern Territories. Takeshita thanked Reagan for raising the issue during bilateral US–Soviet talks held the previous month, and MOFA officials were quoted as saying that they hoped their summit partners would extend support over the issue (Asahi Shinbun, 21 June 1988: 2; for detailed discussion of the Northern Territories’ dispute, see deVillafranca 1993; Kimura and Welch 1998). As will be seen in the next chapter, this was a topic that dominated the third cycle of Japan’s participation in the summit. On the second day, the leaders announced the summit’s political declaration and chairman’s summary of political issues that welcomed reductions in US–Soviet nuclear forces, called for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, reconfirmed the rejection of all forms of terrorism, expressed ‘deep concern’ over the Cambodian conflict and called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, and highlighted the necessity of cooperation in dealing with the drugs’ trade (Hajnal 1989: 377–83). Takeshita and Uno continued to stress stability in, and the position of, Asia in their discussion of regional conflict, especially Cambodia, the Philippines and the Korean peninsula, before discussion moved on to the issues of macro-economic policies and developing nations’ debt (Asahi Shinbun, 21 June 1988 evening edition: 1–2; The Japan Times, 21 June 1988: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 21 June 1988 evening edition: 1–3). Takeshita also met privately with Reagan on this second day and in their talks aimed at reinforcing the intimacy of the US–Japan relationship. Reagan went as far as to refer to Takeshita by his given name and highlighted a US–Japan accord to expand Japanese imports of US beef and citrus goods as an example of the strength of the bilateral relationship (The Japan Times, 22 June 1988: 1). On the third day of the summit, the final economic declaration was agreed upon and highlighted a case-by-case range of options for the summit nations to choose from in providing debt relief to developing nations and stressed liberalisation in agricultural markets; however, the summiteers could not agree any concrete resolution on the removal of agricultural subsidies (The Japan Times, 22 June 1988: 1; Asahi Shinbun, 22 June 1988 evening edition: 1–3). The declaration also welcomed the conclusion by the Japanese government of the feasibility study on the HFSP and future proposals for its implementation. The terminology in this declaration adopted the term newly industrialising economies (NIEs) rather than NICs when acknowledging their importance in world trade (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 June 1988 evening edition: 1; Hajnal 1989: 362–76). On this final day, Takeshita also met with Italian Prime Minister Ciriaco de Mita and agreed to expand cultural and scientific exchanges between the two countries (Mainichi Shinbun, 22 June 1988: 3).

The second cycle, 1982–8 77 Takeshita left Toronto on the morning of 22 June and proceeded to Hawaii for some rest and recreation before returning to Japan on the evening of 26 June. He declared ‘a sense of fulfilment’ and was ‘pleased at the great deal of attention that was paid to the problems of developing countries’, ultimately satisfied that there was no Japan bashing in evidence at Toronto and also that the Japanese government’s concern for the issue of food security was included in the final communiqué (The Japan Times, 23 June 1988: 1, 6). In addition, the other leaders made promises to enter into dialogue with the NIEs and the idea of possible NIE representation at future summits was mooted (The Japan Times, 24 June 1988: 10). Domestic reaction was mixed as usual with the opposition parties making statements critical of the lack of concrete results from the summit (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 June 1988 evening edition: 3). The business world was divided on the results of the summit between those such as Keizai Do¯yu¯kai Chairman Ishihara Takashi who saw the summit as an omen of the development of regional trading blocs, and Keidanren President Saito¯ Eishiro¯ who saw value in the summit’s function as a forum for policy coordination and the discussion of agricultural protectionist policies (Mainichi Shinbun, 23 June 1988: 8). According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before, during and after the summit, a surge in support for the Takeshita administration that coincided clearly with the summit can be seen. The approval rating for the Takeshita administration rose from 45 per cent in May to 47.3 per cent in June and then dropped to 43.3 in July. The disapproval rating decreased slightly from 30.1 per cent to 29.4 per cent and then rebounded to 31.6 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 June 1988: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 July 1988: 2). However, within a year Takeshita had fallen from power and was replaced as prime minister by Uno in June 1989; thus, the Toronto Summit proved to be the only summit he attended as prime minister. In contrast, it was Reagan’s final appearance on the global stage before he stepped down as president in January 1989 as a new period in summit and international history could begin to be discerned. This second cycle of summitry and its evolution into a political, as well as economic, grouping is also reflected in Japan’s participation. Economic issues, chiefly the promotion of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, were still of prime concern. However, Japan’s position as a solid member of the Western camp was reinforced during this time of heightened East–West political tensions. Although courting controversy at home for challenging Japan’s traditional anti-militarist stance, Japan benefited from consistency in its leadership and a prime minister in the form of Nakasone, who sought to play a high-profile political role and instrumentalise the summit in order to promote Japan’s bilateral relationship with the US, in addition to continuing the role of representing Asia. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union during the next summit cycle, the Japanese government would face a new concern.

3

The third cycle, 1989–95

The issues that occupied the attention of the world during this third cycle were the end of the cold war, the global surge of democratisation and how best to provide a soft landing for the nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In addition, and as a result, the process of globalisation came to be the buzzword of the 1990s to describe the inchoate and constantly evolving post-cold war international order. This collapse of the bipolar structure of the international system and handling the former Soviet Union commanded the attention of the summiteers throughout this and the next cycle. Yet, the G7’s policy towards the Soviet Union/Russia was not simply a one-way process; in the end, by embracing the state it was seeking to assist, the very nature of the G7 was drastically altered, and it thereby evolved into the G8 (See Takahashi 1993; Matsuura 1994: 185–227; Yasutomo 1995: 151–76; Takase 2000: 28–32, 80–4; Shimotomai 2002). As regards globalisation, the summit was as sensitive as ever to the Zeitgeist and mentioned it for the first time in the 1994 Naples Summit communiqué: ‘We have gathered at a time of extraordinary change in the world economy. New forms of international interaction are having enormous effects on the lives of our peoples and are leading to the globalization of our economies’ (G8 2003). New issues, such as the environment, also came to the attention of the summit during this cycle, and, in addition, both ‘civil society’ and ‘NGOs’ were cited for the first time in the 1995 Halifax Summit communiqué. For Japan, managing the collapse of the Soviet Union and supporting the new Russian state proved to be a long drawn-out process that struck at the heart of one of the Japanese government’s national interests – the Northern Territories’ dispute. Although this issue provided the chief focus for the Japanese government during the first half of the 1990s, attention was also focused upon Japan’s extended economic decline – a downturn in economic fortunes that coincided, and would become irrevocably associated, with the name of the Emperor’s reign, the Heisei recession. Japan’s economic woes were irrevocably linked with political instability that saw the LDP lose its position as the natural government of choice in August 1993 to a coalition of opposition parties. Although recovering the reins of power less than a year later, this was only achieved by forming a coalition with its traditional enemy, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). Thus, as Japan metamorphosed from

The third cycle, 1989–95 79 being one of the summit’s economic success stories to a problem child, and from political stability to unpredictability, it is reasonable to expect that the Japanese government’s performance at the summits would become muted and reactive. However, Figure 3.1 demonstrates that Japan was still an important participant in the summit process with specific references divided between the economic (structural reform to stimulate domestic demand-led growth and developing nations’ debt problems), and the political (the normalisation of Japanese–Russian relations and the Northern Territories’ dispute).

Paris, France, 14–16 July 1989 The Paris Summit, also known as the Arch Summit, coincided with the 200th anniversary celebrations of the French revolution and took place under the shadow of the newly constructed Grande Arche de la Défence (see Toki no Ugoki 1989). Like any other summit, security was of the highest level but this time protests were tied to the historical context with one protest claiming that ‘[t]wo hundred years after the first attack on privilege, the privileged of the planet will meet in Paris, do their sums and look for ways to increase their power’ (The Japan Times, 10 July 1989: 3). In addition a poor man’s summit was held at the same time in Paris to highlight poverty in the developing world (The Japan Times, 13 July 1989: 1). In the weeks preceding the meeting, the strength of the dollar and the stabilisation of exchanged rates were the main issues mooted for discussion, in addition to the violent suppression of pro-democracy movements at Tiananmen Square in Beijing (The Japan Times, 2 June 1989: 11; The Japan Times, 4 June 1989: 8; The Japan Times, 14 June 1989: 10). Unfortunately for Japan, Prime Minister Uno So¯suke, one of the shortest-serving Japanese prime ministers, attended the summit in a weakened domestic position due to involvement in a sex scandal, although he hoped to use the event to strengthen his image back home. As regards economic issues, sherpa Kunihiro Michihiko stated that the Japanese government would offer further economic restructuring at Paris in order to cut its trade surplus and wanted to see inflation, trade issues and protectionism addressed at the meeting (The Japan Times, 28 June 1989: 10). BOJ Governor Sumita Satoshi added to this view by emphasising that the strength of the dollar would have to be addressed (The Japan Times, 29 June 1989: 9). As regards the developing world, a few days before the summit the government declared that it would announce at the summit: (1) a plan to extend and expand its 1987–90 three-year plan for the recycling of new funds to developing nations totalling US$30 billion by another two years to US$35 billion; (2) environmental ODA totalling ¥300 billion (US$20.2 billion) over three years; and (3) the provision of US$600 million in untied grants to the poorest African nations (Asahi Shinbun, 12 July 1989: 9; Mainichi Shinbun, 12 July 1989: 1). Environmental issues, particularly measures to prevent the greenhouse effect and Japan’s announcement of a project to establish a fund to protect the earth’s rainforests within the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO), were mooted to be high on the agenda (Asahi Shinbun, 2 July 1989: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 July 1989: 7). Keizai Do¯yu¯kai had already called on the government to announce its

0

1

2

3

4

5

Paris, 1989

Houston, 1990

London III, 1991

US

UK

Japan

Italy

Germany

France

Canada

Summit venue

Munich, 1992

Tokyo III, 1993

Naples, 1994

Figure 3.1 Comparative frequency of references to Japan in official G7 summit documents, 1989–95

Number of references

Halifax, 1995

The third cycle, 1989–95 81 active policy towards environmental issues at the summit and promote the creation of an international body to protect the rainforests and prevent global warming (Asahi Shinbun, 21 June 1989: 3). Once again, preparations were made to continue Japan’s role of representing Asia prior to the summit. Uno met with former Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru on 21 June 1989 and explained how he would speak for ASEAN and South Korea at Paris (Asahi Shinbun, 21 June 1989 evening edition: 2). He also visited former Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko¯ on the morning of 10 July and was told that it was necessary not to isolate China over Tiananmen Square and that any coordinated action on sanctions should be rebuffed (Asahi Shinbun, 10 July 1989 evening edition: 1). The same day, he visited former prime ministers Fukuda Takeo, Nakasone Yasuhiro and Takeshita once more to exchange views on the summit. Fukuda stressed issues such as East–West relations, population growth and the developing world, whereas Nakasone and Takeshita both called on Uno not to capitulate to Western demands for sanctions against China (Mainichi Shinbun, 11 July 1989: 2). Also that day, representatives of the DSP and Ko¯meito¯ visited the prime minister’s residence to deliver a statement requesting that Uno promote environmental issues and a resolute position on China at the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 11 July 1989: 2). Thus, it increasingly appeared that the issue of China would be one over which Japan, split in its identity between representative of Asia and member of the Western camp, would clash with its summit partners over using the summit to criticise China and call for further sanctions – a clash chiefly with its European partners and specifically the French, who were eager to commemorate the anniversary of the French Revolution by including a statement on human rights (Asahi Shinbun, 30 June 1989: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 1 July 1989: 2). In an interview on 15 June, Uno noted that he did not expect the summit to be concluded quietly (Mainichi Shinbun, 16 June 1989: 3). The Japanese government was wary and reluctant of imposing sanctions upon China for its violent crackdown on pro-democracy protests for fear of: (1) provoking a nationalistic reaction that would only serve to strengthen the position of hardliners, China’s isolation and possible future destabilisation; (2) being accused of hypocrisy in light of the Japanese Imperial Army’s atrocities against the Chinese during the Second World War; and (3) damaging substantial Japanese business interests in China (Takagi 1995: 102–5; Miyashita 2001: 41–8). MOFA Minister Mitsuzuka Hiroshi attempted to paper over any divisions between summit members upon his return from an official visit to the US and meeting with President George Bush at the end of June and stated that ‘to ensure peace and stability in Asia, sanctions that further isolated China should not be imposed’ (The Japan Times, 29 June 1989: 4). On 4 July, Mitsuzuka went further and stated that the Japanese government would oppose any singling-out of China for criticism at the Paris Summit and attempt to persuade its summit partners to refrain from continuing to isolate China. This fear of isolating China was reiterated by Uno when he met US Secretary of State James Baker in Tokyo on the same day. In reaction, Baker called for a united front on the issue of humanitarian abuses in China such as the Tiananmen Square massacre (The Japan Times, 5 July 1989: 1).

82 The third cycle, 1989–95 In addition to policy coordination towards China, how to encourage moves towards democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were expected to be discussed at Paris, specifically economic assistance and to this end Mitsuzuka announced that the Japanese government was considering measures to introduce tariffs favourable to Poland and increase loans to Hungary through the Export– Import Bank of Japan (The Japan Times, 12 July 1989: 2). Uno left Japan on the morning of 12 July and arrived in Paris on the afternoon of the same day accompanied by his wife and the Japanese delegation including Mitsuzuka and MOF Minister Murayama Tatsuo and MITI Minister Kajiyama Seiroku. Upon their arrival and much to their surprise they found that Uno’s presummit meeting with French President François Mitterrand, originally scheduled for the evening of his arrival, had been cancelled at the last minute (Mainichi Shinbun, 14 July 1989: 1). However, on 16 July, the last day of the summit, Uno managed to meet briefly with Mitterrand and promised to enhance cultural exchange (Asahi Shinbun, 17 July 1989: 1). Prior to the official opening of the summit, Uno discussed bilateral issues with a number of other summit and non-summit leaders in Paris to celebrate the bicentennial. On 13 July, Uno met with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to discuss trade and environmental issues, Bangladeshi President Hussain Mohammad Ershad, who urged Uno to assist in the provision of relief against flooding in his country and act at the summit in its capacity as the only Asian member and friend of Bangladesh, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari to discuss environmental and ODA issues, and finally Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to discuss ODA and Japanese cooperation in avoiding a refugee crisis in post-Soviet-occupied Afghanistan (Asahi Shinbun, 14 July 1989: 2). Uno also met with Philippine President Corazon Aquino on 14 July, a meeting at which the latter expressed thanks for the assistance extended to the Philippines. On the afternoon of the same day, despite fears of how she would react to meeting with sex scandaltarnished Uno, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher raised the issue of China and demanded that the summit issue a strong condemnation (Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 July 1989: 2; Shima 2000: 66–7). Finally, Uno and Bush also met on the first day of the summit for less than ten minutes, due to Uno being caught in holiday-related traffic jams, to discuss trade barriers and commit their governments to the resolution of the bilateral, trade imbalance (The Japan Times, 15 July 1989: 1). This meeting also provided an opportunity for the two leaders to reaffirm the US–Japan bilateral relationship on a first name basis through the short-lived ‘George–So¯suke’ relationship (Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 July 1989: 2). Uno and Bush met again briefly in the evening of the same day after the official dinner when the latter offered the former support over the Northern Territories’ dispute with the Soviet Union (Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 July 1989 evening edition: 1). After the official opening ceremony of the summit on the afternoon of 14 July outside the Louvre, the leaders met without their ministers to exchange opinions on the state of the world economy and macro-economic policies, agree on the dangers of protectionism and the need to strengthen GATT, and express fears about inflation and instability in currency markets. Thereafter, an official banquet hosted by

The third cycle, 1989–95 83 Mitterrand was held in the evening at which discussion turned to more political issues such as East–West relations, terrorism and China (Mainichi Shinbun, 15 July 1989: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 15 July 1989 evening edition: 1). On the second day of the summit, a meeting of only the leaders was cancelled and reconvened with the foreign ministers. Thereafter, four political declarations were issued on China, East–West relations, human rights and terrorism. These three latter declarations respectively encouraged East–West disarmament as well as economic and political reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, called for the universal respect of human rights (although a Western definition of rights), and denounced international terrorism whilst promoting a plan for stricter airline security. The declaration on China condemned the Chinese government for abuses of human rights, called for the suspension of World Bank loans, although did not propose any new economic sanctions apart from those already taken by individual nations, and, in consideration of the Japanese government’s position, looked ‘to the Chinese authorities to create conditions which will avoid their isolation and provide for a return to cooperation based upon the resumption of movement towards political and economic reform, and openness’ (Hajnal 1989: 408–15; Takagi 1995: 104–5). In addition, the second day’s meetings also touched upon trade, currency instability and debt issues in developing nations’ with Mitterrand declaring his desire to hold a summit of rich and poor nations, an idea opposed by Bush (Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 July 1989: 4; Mainichi Shinbun, 16 July 1989: 1–4). The surprise for the summiteers on the second day was a letter from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev calling on the summit leaders to fully integrate the Soviet Union into the global economy (The Japan Times, 17 July 1989: 1, 3). The third and final day of meetings saw the release of the economic declaration that called for inflationary control and international cooperation to prevent insider trading, condemned protectionism and the tendency towards unilateralism, bilateralism, sectorialism or managed trade, and supported progress in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The leaders agreed to the Brady Plan proposed before the summit by US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady and based on many proposals originally included in the Miyazawa Plan presented at the previous year’s summit in Toronto (Kunihiro 1989: 14). Environmental issues were also discussed and occupied a sizeable part of the economic declaration. The Japanese government also pledged to promote structural reform in order to stimulate domestic demand (Asahi Shinbun, 17 July 1989: 1–3; The Japan Times, 17 July 1989: 1). On the morning of 17 July before his departure later that day, Uno met with ousted Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk and explained that one reason no new sanctions against China had been included in the summit’s declarations was in consideration of China’s role in the Cambodian peace process (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 July 1989: 2). Uno arrived back in Japan on the morning of 18 July having failed to prevent criticism of China and receiving little from the other summiteers beyond ‘diplomatic lip service’ as regards his aid schemes for the developing world and environmental protection package (The Japan Times, 17 July 1989: 4). The Chinese government condemned the summit’s political statement as ‘gross interference’ in its domestic affairs – a reaction Uno was eager to assuage by directing MOFA

84 The third cycle, 1989–95 officials to brief their Chinese counterparts about summit discussions (Asahi Shinbun, 18 July 1989: 7; The Japan Times, 18 July 1989: 1). Opposition parties were largely critical of Uno: the DSP and Ko¯meito¯ criticised him for not speaking on Asian issues enough, and the JSP were more respectful of Mitterrand’s position on human rights (Mainichi Shinbun, 17 July 1989: 2). Japan’s business leaders were kinder towards Uno and praised the reaffirmation of free trade, East–West dialogue and the absence of any further sanctions against China in the summit’s declarations (Asahi Shinbun, 16 July 1989: 9; The Japan Times, 18 July: 1). The failure of the summit for Uno was reflected in his position on the edges of the official summit photograph, his departure from office almost three weeks after returning to Japan, and an Asahi Shinbun cartoon that depicted him returning from the summit about to walk through the Grande Arche de la Défence, but now labelled ‘House of Councillors’ election’ and about to collapse on him (Asahi Shinbun, 18 July 1989: 2). According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls, before the summit and its fall, Uno’s administration commanded the approval of 22.8 per cent of pollees but was not supported by 56.5 per cent (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 June 1989: 1–2). However, after the summit and the inauguration of Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki’s cabinet, the administration’s approval rating stood at 38 per cent, and the disapproval rating at 41.4 per cent (Yomiuri Shinbun, 31 August 1989: 1–2).

Houston, US, 9–11 July 1990 The Japanese government was once again led at the sixteenth summit, which took place at Rice University, by a prime minister generally perceived to be weak (see Toki no Ugoki 1990). Kaifu Toshiki had neither the support base of a strong faction, nor a great deal of ministerial experience having only previously served at the Ministry of Education (MOE). He was chosen as prime minister essentially for his ‘clean’ image after the sex scandal that had tainted Prime Minister Uno So¯suke. However, he did have experience of the summit process having assisted Prime Minister Miki Takeo at the Rambouillet and San Juan summits (The Japan Times, 7 July 1990: 11; Toyoda 1991: 85–7). During the pre-summit process to draft the economic declaration, topics were mooted such as assistance for Eastern Europe, anti-drugs policies, environmental protection especially in the developing world, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and promotion of both the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and the Brady Plan, based originally on a proposal made by Miyazawa Kiichi, as part of the commitment to reduce the debt burden in the developing world. The discussion of environmental issues at Houston was emphasised by junior LDP members of the House of Representatives in a proposal submitted to Kaifu (Mainichi Shinbun, 6 July 1990: 2; Inoguchi 1994: 32). In addition, agricultural trade was expected to be included in the summit agenda with calls for free trade and the removal of protectionist measures that would come into conflict with Japanese fears surrounding the opening of its rice markets and food insecurity (Asahi Shinbun, 14 June 1990: 1; The Japan Times, 2 July 1990: 1). French President François Mitterrand was particularly eager to promote debt relief measures and encourage

The third cycle, 1989–95 85 his summit partners to adopt similar policies to France claiming that ‘[i]f the US and Japan made a comparable effort [to France] two-thirds of the difficulties of developing nations would disappear’ (The Japan Times, 21 June 1990: 4). In the run-up to the summit, the idea was also mooted in preparatory meetings of issuing a declaration supporting the recent global surge of democratisation. As regards Eastern Europe, the Japanese government’s attitude was supportive as evidenced by its plans to provide ¥3.7 billion (US$25 million approximately) in environmental technology over five years (Mainichi Shinbun, 28 June 1990: 3). However, this was an issue that, in relation to the Soviet Union, had the potential to isolate the Japanese government from its summit partners. Western leaders, especially France and West Germany, were eager to aid Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in his reform programme with considerable amounts of economic assistance. The Japanese government was expected by its summit partners to provide much of this assistance. However, it was wary of extending any assistance more concrete than organisational know-how to the Soviet Union, which was described by MOFA Minister Nakayama Taro¯ as a country whose army was still occupying Japanese territory (Mainichi Shinbun, 21 June 1990 evening edition: 1). Nakayama’s hard-line opposition to the provision of financial assistance to the Soviet Union was reiterated in the strongest terms in a post-summit speech on 20 July when he compared it to throwing money into a ditch – a comment that invited considerable controversy and criticism (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 July 1990: 3). The position of the Japanese government at the summit was encapsulated in a Mainichi Shinbun cartoon that depicted the summit leaders dressed as chefs preparing something to serve an impatient-looking Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev waiting at his table in the background. Kaifu is told ‘You just pay the bill’ (Mainichi Shinbun, 24 June 1990: 2). To discuss this and other topics, Kaifu met with leaders of the opposition parties on the morning of 28 June and exchanged opinions on many of these issues in addition to the reduction of the Soviet Union’s military presence in Northeast Asia and the progress made by China to improve external relations (Mainichi Shinbun, 28 June 1990 evening edition: 1). Kaifu also met with four former prime ministers – Fukuda Takeo, Suzuki Zenko¯, Nakasone Yasuhiro and Takeshita Noboru – on 5 July in preparation for the summit. The need to seek the summit’s understanding of Japan’s unfreezing and early resumption of yen loans to China was discussed and Kaifu announced that his government would not extend economic assistance to the Soviet Union until the Northern Territories’ dispute had been resolved (Asahi Shinbun, 6 July 1990: 2; The Japan Times, 6 July 1990: 1, 3). As regards Japan’s role of ‘batting for Asia’, Nakayama announced that he would emphasise democratisation in the Asian region at Houston and in particular announce support for Mongolia’s membership of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), as well as seek the summit’s understanding of China’s attempts to democratise and Japan’s resumption of loans (Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 June 1990: 3; Yomiuri Shinbun, 4 July 1990: 2). In addition, a week before the summit Kaifu announced to government and LDP leaders that as the ‘Japan of Asia’ he would actively highlight regional issues at Houston, such as Japan–Soviet relations, China and North Korea (Mainichi Shinbun, 2 July 1990 evening edition: 1). To this end, Kaifu assured South

86 The third cycle, 1989–95 Korean President Roh Tae-Woo during a fifteen-minute telephone conversation on the morning of 5 July that he would highlight the security situation on the Korean peninsula and was requested to assure Western leaders of the necessity to the global economy of the development of Asian NIEs (Asahi Shinbun, 5 July 1990 evening edition: 2). The major issue of human rights’ abuses in China also lingered from the previous year’s Paris Summit and Japan’s position was one of hoping to resume loans of up to ¥810 billion promised in 1988 by Takeshita to China, and urging summit partners to ‘encourage’ China’s political and economic development in order to improve human rights (The Japan Times, 5 July 1990: 1). Upon his departure for Houston, Kaifu went so far as to claim that the summit partners were in agreement that for the sake of regional security China should not remain isolated and that he would endeavour to explain China’s economic development to the Western participants; however, it was also intimated that loans to China might well be resumed regardless of the summit’s reaction (The Japan Times, 7 July 1990: 1). This position would lead ultimately to conflict with its summit partners and a glaring contradiction in Japan’s policies of engagement towards China, and intransigence towards the Soviet Union. Kaifu left Tokyo on the evening of 6 July accompanied by MOF Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ and MITI Minister Muto¯ Kabun. Nakayama arrived in Houston direct from official visits to Austria, Belgium and Switzerland and attended both the G24 meeting and Japan–EC troika foreign ministerial meeting in Brussels. At the G24 meeting, Nakayama expressed strong opposition to the provision of financial assistance to the Soviet Union until the Northern Territories’ dispute had been resolved and questioning whether it would be appropriate and effective in promoting democracy (Asahi Shinbun, 5 July 1990: 1). Soon after their arrival in Houston, Nakayama met with US Secretary of State James Baker and Hashimoto met with US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady to discuss upcoming summit issues, such as trade, market-opening and economic assistance to the Soviet Union (The Japan Times, 9 July 1990: 5). Kaifu met with US President George Bush on the morning of 7 July to discuss bilateral issues including agricultural trade and the opening of Japan’s rice market and Bush pledged support for Japan over the Northern Territories’ dispute. However, this meeting also highlighted the contradiction in Japan’s position on China and Russia. Kaifu gained tacit support for the resumption of yen loans to China and stressed that these loans were part of a policy to encourage political and economic reform; in contrast, assistance to the Soviet Union for similar goals was rejected until the territorial dispute was resolved and a free-market economy adopted (Asahi Shinbun, 9 July 1990: 1–3; The Japan Times, 9 July 1990: 1). Kaifu met with UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on the afternoon of the following day and also managed to draw out another tacit understanding for Japan’s resumption of loans to China; it was decided that a MOFA official would visit China after the summit to brief the Chinese government on discussions and prepare the way for the resumption of loans (Asahi Shinbun, 9 July 1990 evening edition: 1–2; The Japan Times, 10 July 1990: 1, 6). On the morning of 9 July, Kaifu met with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and once more no opposition was expressed to

The third cycle, 1989–95 87 Japan’s resumption of yen loans (Mainichi Shinbun, 10 July 1990: 1). After the summit, it was decided that Takeshita would visit China as Kaifu’s special envoy with cabinet approval in contravention of the Paris Summit’s ban on cabinet-level exchange with the Chinese government (The Japan Times, 25 July 1990: 1). The summit officially began on the afternoon of 9 July with a welcome ceremony. Discussions on the first day of the summit centred around agricultural trade including the opening of Japan’s rice market, the environment and reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, and aid to the Soviet Union with little agreement on any issue. At the working dinner, Kaifu announced that Japan would gradually resume loans to China after the summit and that the other summit participants should not isolate China for fear that it might back-pedal in some of its recent economic reforms. In contrast, Kaifu rejected the idea of extending aid to the Soviet Union due to the bilateral, territorial dispute. Thus, the inconsistency in the Japanese government’s position of supporting China in its economic and political reforms, on the one hand, but balking at pressure to assist the Soviet Union in achieving the same goals, on the other hand, came to the fore (Asahi Shinbun, 10 July 1990 evening edition: 1–2; The Japan Times, 11 July 1990: 1, 4). Discussions continued on the second day but failed to agree upon a concrete, common strategy towards the provision of assistance to the Soviet Union and China; in contrast, a compromise was struck that welcomed positive moves in each country and allowed the summit leaders to implement individual approaches. Both a statement on transnational issues, namely terrorism and non-proliferation, and a political declaration entitled ‘Securing Democracy’ were released that reiterated the summit leaders’ support of democracy, human rights and economic reform across the globe in what they hoped would be a ‘decade of democracy’. In the specific case of China, the statement confirmed the continuance of sanctions and other measures against China taken since the previous summit but recognised positive developments and pledged to explore what kind of loans could be extended towards China through the World Bank (Asahi Shinbun, 11 July 1990 evening edition: 1–3; The Japan Times, 12 July 1990: 5; G8 2003). After the summit, in August 1991, Kaifu was the first G7 leader to visit post-Tiananmen China where he announced the full resumption of yen loans (Takagi 1995: 107). On the third and final day, the economic declaration was released and included the Japanese government’s concerns about food security and self-sufficiency, used as an argument in protecting its rice markets. The declaration also welcomed economic and political reforms in the Soviet Union and stated that they deserved the support of the summit members but did not state any concrete, common measures. It also urged summit leaders to support the realisation of a free-market economy in the Soviet Union and note was taken of ‘the importance to the Government of Japan of the peaceful resolution of its dispute with the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories’ (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 12 July 1990: 1–3, 7; The Japan Times, 13 July 1990: 20; G8 2003). This was an initiative promoted by Kaifu and represented a shift away from the traditional policy of the separation of politics and economics (seikei bunri) towards one of the indivisibility of politics and economics (seikei fukabun) supported by the US that claimed to raise the issue ‘every time we sit

88 The third cycle, 1989–95 down with them [the Soviets]’ (The Japan Times, 12 July 1990: 1). Bush lived up to his word by raising the subject in his bilateral meeting with Gorbachev from 30–31 July in Moscow (Lewis 1991–2: 35). This shift in Japanese policy was encapsulated in a Mainichi Shinbun cartoon that depicted Kaifu and Gorbachev sitting down to a game of poker with only four cards. Both leaders point to the fifth card in each other’s pockets – financial assistance and the Northern Territories respectively – and accuse each other of not playing a full hand (Mainichi Shinbun, 15 July 1990: 2). Kaifu remained in the US after the summit on an official tour and returned to Japan on the evening of 15 July. Reaction at home was mixed. The LDP, MOFA, the business world and Chinese government expressed satisfaction with Kaifu’s performance at Houston and defence of Japan’s interests in China, the Soviet Union and the Northern Territories; however the decision to resume loans drew criticism from Chinese dissidents and members of the business world foresaw struggles over the opening of Japan’s rice markets (Asahi Shinbun, 12 July 1990: 2, 8; The Japan Times, 12 July 1990: 3; The Japan Times, 13 July 1990: 1, 3, 10). The opposition parties were both satisfied and critical. The JCP regarded the introduction of Western-style democracy and free-market economics as a condition of economic aid-giving as neo-imperialism. However, the JSP praised Kaifu’s position on the resumption of yen loans to China and the inclusion of the statement on the Northern Territories’ dispute in the economic declaration, although it regarded the linking of the dispute to future economic cooperation as regrettable. Ko¯meito¯’s Kanzaki Takenori also welcomed the mention of the territorial dispute in the economic declaration and hoped it would contribute to a future resolution (Mainichi Shinbun, 12 July 1990 evening edition: 3). It appeared that Kaifu had bucked the trend of a weak prime minister performing badly at the summit; rather, Kaifu actively defended core Japanese national interests in China and the Soviet Union. As an editorial in The Japan Times claimed, ‘[n]ever before has Japan made its presence at an economic summit more strongly felt in the political sphere than in Houston’ (The Japan Times, 12 July 1990: 24). According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Kaifu administration increased from 56.4 per cent in June to 60 per cent in July, and the disapproval rating decreased from 26.6 per cent to 22.8 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 19 July 1990: 2).

London, UK, 15–17 July 1991 The London Summit (London III) was held at Lancaster House and continued from the Houston Summit to address the main issue of providing assistance to the Soviet Union (see Toki no Ugoki 1991). In the words of the Japanese sherpa, Watanabe Ko¯ji, London III was accurately dubbed the ‘Gorbachev Summit’ (Watanabe 1991: 10). As regards aid to the Soviet Union, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev used a Nobel peace prize acceptance lecture given on 5 June 1991 in Oslo to appeal for large-scale Western assistance (Asahi Shinbun, 6 June 1991: 3). However, the related issue of whether or not to invite Gorbachev to London III became a topic of debate in both the West, where it became conditional upon the Soviet Union’s recognition

The third cycle, 1989–95 89 of human rights and self-determination in the Baltic states, and Japan, where opposition was strong and Prime Minster Kaifu Toshiki regarded it as premature and unproductive as no aid package had been decided (Asahi Shinbun, 3 June 1991: 2; The Japan Times, 6 June 1991: 1). However, a proposal to invite Gorbachev to an unofficial, post-summit briefing, at which he would be able to outline his economic reform programme and, as a proviso, no concrete aid pledges would be forthcoming, was regarded by both sides as acceptable (The Japan Times, 8 June 1991: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 2 July 1991: 2). Gorbachev was eager most of all to get the legitimacy that attending a summit would accord him even if aid was not forthcoming and accepted this invitation on 15 June exactly one month before the summit opened and eight days before a scheduled meeting of the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors in London to discuss economic assistance to the Soviet Union and its special associate membership status of the IMF (The Japan Times, 24 June 1991: 1). As part of his effort to court approval, Gorbachev met with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 5 July and support was expressed for his reform programme (The Japan Times, 7 July 1991: 1). However, on 8 July, Kaifu outlined conditions that the Soviet Union would have to meet if substantial assistance beyond that of a technical and intellectual nature were to be extended. The conditions included commitment to an effective programme of economic reform and an application of Soviet foreign policies of openness in Europe to East Asia – regarded as a veiled reference to the Northern Territories’ dispute (The Japan Times, 12 July 1991: 1). Prior to this, the government had already made clear its goal of including reference to the Northern Territories in this year’s summit documentation, as it had done the previous year in the Houston Summit’s economic declaration (Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 June 1991: 2). The relationship both amongst the summit members and with the Soviet Union was encapsulated in a Yomiuri Shinbun cartoon that depicted a battered Gorbachev standing on a dais labelled ‘domestic crisis’ about to put his neck in a noose. Whilst the European and Canadian leaders attempt to pull him back from the edge, US President George Bush looks on unsure and Kaifu, with his rucksack of yen, attempts to pull a rock labelled ‘territory’ from under the dais (Yomiuri Shinbun, 11 July 1991: 7). Kaifu touched on Japan’s role as the representative of Asia by declaring on 3 May during a visit to Singapore that ‘I feel acutely that Japan is expected to make even greater contributions in the Asia Pacific region – not only in the economic sphere but in the political sphere as well’ (The Japan Times, 13 June 1991: 7). Kaifu and MOFA Minister Nakayama Taro¯ declared that having been requested by the leaders of ASEAN, China and South Korea to represent Asia, the Japanese government would promote issues such as Cambodia’s peace process, inspections of North Korea’s nuclear programme and the removal of post-Tiananmen sanctions against China, and elicit the understanding and cooperation of their summit partners at London III (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 July 1991: 3). Nakayama met with Indonesian President Suharto on the evening of 14 June in Jakarta, who requested that the Japanese government promote interest in Asia at London and asked specifically that: (1) aid for Asia not be effected by developments in Eastern Europe; (2) Asian fears about a single European market becoming an obstruction to trade be

90 The third cycle, 1989–95 communicated to the summit; and (3) it be understood that, unlike the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe still burdened by the inheritance of Communism, the nations of ASEAN were able to channel aid directly into development. Nakayama also stated that he wanted to discuss Vietnam at the summit and work towards the improvement of relations with the US (Mainichi Shinbun, 15 June 1991: 3). The Japanese government also set out to have support for Mongolia’s reforming efforts towards a free-market economy and democracy included in the political statement (Asahi Shinbun, 20 June 1991: 2). Towards this goal, Mongolian Prime Minister Dashiyn Byambasüren regarded Japan as a fellow Asian nation and expressed high expectations of the Japanese government’s role at London III (Asahi Shinbun, 28 June 1991: 2). A week before the summit, South Korean President Roh Tae-Woo spoke to Kaifu by telephone and urged him to communicate South Korea’s position supporting dialogue with North Korea and the latter’s acceptance of IAEA standards to the summiteers (The Japan Times, 9 July 1991: 3). However, as regards Asian affairs, it was again the issue of China that was expected to feature high up on the agenda, and in the run-up to the summit during preparatory meetings, the Japanese delegation managed to persuade other summit participants not to mention sanctions in the final summit communiqué (The Japan Times, 3 June 1991: 1). Other issues to be discussed at London III included reform and strengthening of the UN in order to bolster its security functions after the Gulf War of 1990–1, criticisms of Iraq for refusing to allow UN and IAEA nuclear inspectors to complete their work, the Uruguay Round and agricultural trade with specific reference to Japan’s rice markets and the developing world, environmental issues with attention given to the preservation of Brazilian rainforests, and security issues such as disarmament. The Japanese government announced its intention to propose a flexible package of environmental assistance appropriate to the stage of development of the recipient nation in question, from the least developed to the NIEs (Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 June 1991: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 July 1991 evening edition: 2). Kaifu stated that it was necessary to take a leading role in promoting environmental issues at the summit and, immediately before the summit, stated that he would call for summit members to reach an international agreement to outlaw environmental destruction as a tool of war (Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 June 1991 evening edition: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 13 July 1991 evening edition: 1). Kaifu left Japan for the US on the morning of 10 July. He met Bush at the latter’s holiday home in Kennebunkport on 11 July to repair relations damaged by the recently concluded Gulf War to which Japan had failed to contribute personnel, agree upon the resolution of the Uruguay Round and associated rice issues within the year, and discuss relevant issues for the summit. It was agreed that a cautious approach conditional upon political and economic developments would be adopted towards the Soviet Union and that, for the time being, assistance would be of a technical and intellectual nature (Mainichi Shinbun, 12 July 1991 evening edition: 1–2). Kaifu was the first summit leader to arrive in London late in the evening on 12 July. On 14 July, he met UK Prime Minister John Major for the first time. During their two-hour meeting it was agreed that both Japan and the UK would only extend

The third cycle, 1989–95 91 considerable aid if Gorbachev could demonstrate an effective programme moving the Soviet Union towards a free-market economy and democracy – something about which both leaders expressed scepticism (The Japan Times, 15 July 1991: 1). However, disagreement on this issue characterised similar, pre-summit bilateral meetings Kaifu attended with Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti on the evening of 14 July and Kohl on the morning of the next day (Mainichi Shinbun, 15 July 1991 evening edition: 1; Asahi Shinbun, 16 July 1991: 2). The summit opened on the afternoon of 15 July with an official ceremony and, thereafter, discussion amongst the leaders centred on the strengthening of the UN, nuclear inspections in Iraq and the state of the Soviet Union (Mainichi Shinbun, 16 July 1991: 1–3). On the second day of the summit, the political declaration was announced that, amongst many things, emphasised strengthening the role of the UN in the post-cold war security milieu as peacekeeper and arms register. It was suggested that this would possibly encourage the Japan government in passing legislation to facilitate its peacekeeping contribution (Asahi Shinbun, 19 July 1991: 2). Support was expressed for the Soviet Union in its transition to a free-market economy and democracy but stopped short of any large-scale financial aid. The declaration also alluded to the Japanese–Soviet relations and the Northern Territories’ dispute by hoping that the ‘new spirit of international cooperation [in Soviet foreign policy] will be as fully reflected in Asia as in Europe’ (G8 2003). UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd built on this when presenting the chairman’s statement the same day by stating that ‘[t]he full normalisation of Japan–Soviet relations, including resolution of the Northern Territories issue, would greatly contribute to this [new spirit of international cooperation]’, as well as referring to dialogue on the Korean peninsula and welcoming a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian conflict. A declaration on conventional arms transfers and the nonproliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons was also released on the second day (The Japan Times, 17 July 1991: 1, 12; Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 July 1991: 1–3). On the third and final day of the summit, the economic declaration was issued and glossed over economic issues, which had been pushed to the edges of the summit agenda, in non-committed terms but sought to highlight the summit nations’ concern for the countries of Eastern Europe. As regards the Soviet Union, the economic declaration echoed the political declaration in terms of support for its new thinking in foreign policy and status was granted at the IMF and World Bank whereby it could receive technical assistance but no loans. Environmental issues were also addressed with the declaration of funding for a project to preserve the Brazilian rainforests and a promise to reach an accord on climate change. It was also announced that Japan and the UK would submit a joint arms register proposal to the UN (The Japan Times, 18 July 1991: 1, 6; The Japan Times, 20 July 1991: 21; G8 2003). Gorbachev joined post-summit meetings on the final day as part of the G7 plus 1 formula and agreed upon technical aid but no large-scale financial assistance until the reform process in the Soviet Union was seen to make progress (The Japan Times, 19 July 1991: 1). Gorbachev also met with Kaifu in the morning of 17 July 1991 and the latter called for the conclusion of a peace treaty after the resolution of

92 The third cycle, 1989–95 the territorial dispute (The Japan Times, 18 July 1991: 1). In a bilateral US–Japan meeting between Nakayama and his US counterpart James Baker on the afternoon of this final day, the two foreign ministers agreed to cooperate in supporting democratisation in Mongolia (Mainichi Shinbun, 18 July 1991: 2). After the summit Kaifu flew to The Hague on 18 July to meet with European leaders and announce the Japan–EC Joint Declaration, having succeeded in including reference to the Northern Territories’ dispute in the summit’s documentation for the second consecutive year. Reaction to the summit’s declarations back in Japan was largely positive from representatives of the business world fearful of large-scale aid to the Soviet Union. The inclusion of the Soviet Union in various international organisations, including the summit process and the IMF, was praised as being of historical importance (Asahi Shinbun, 18 July 1991 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 18 July 1991: 12). Again, Kaifu was seen as protecting Japan’s national interests and managing to prevent concessions being granted by the West to Gorbachev (The Japan Times, 19 July 1991: 1). According to Mainichi Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Kaifu administration increased slightly from 41 per cent in June to 42 per cent in July, but the disapproval rating increased from 27 per cent to 33 per cent over the same time period (Mainichi Shinbun, 31 July 1991: 1–2). LDP Chairman Obuchi Keizo¯ pointed to the various references to the Asia Pacific region in the summit documents as significant results (Asahi Shinbun, 18 July 1991 evening edition: 2). Rebuilding contacts with China was mentioned in the chairman’s statement reflecting the gradual re-engagement with the Chinese government after the Tiananmen Square massacre. These developments and the call in the chairman’s statement on the US to extend most-favoured nation (MFN) status to China unconditionally were welcomed in China, but warnings were expressed about the increasingly political nature of the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 22 July 1991: 2). After London III and in light of the inclusion of the Soviet Union in the summit process, voices within MOFA and the LDP’s Mitsuzuka faction began to suggest the need for dialogue between the summit members and China in some form, possibly according it observer status at the 1993 summit to be hosted in Japan (Mainichi Shinbun, 19 July 1991: 3).

Munich, Germany, 6–8 July 1992 The Munich Summit was the first summit to take place after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 (see MOFA 1992; Toki no Ugoki 1992). In April 1992, a meeting of the G7 finance ministers agreed upon a US$24 billion package of multilateral assistance channelled through international organisations to support Russia’s economic and political reforms; again, it appeared that the former Soviet Union was to dominate discussions at Munich. Specifically, attention was focused upon the issue of nuclear safety (Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 June 1992: 1). The Japanese government’s basic stance at the summit was founded upon the provision of assistance through multilateral cooperation, and calls for the application of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s diplomacy based on ‘law and justice’ (ho¯ to seigi) to the Asia

The third cycle, 1989–95 93 Pacific region in order to normalise Japanese–Russian relations and resolve the Northern Territories’ dispute (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 June 1992: 2). In response to the Japanese government’s position that it would only consider providing bilateral aid once the territorial dispute was settled, Yeltsin accused the Japanese government of not providing a single yen or dollar to assist Russia and that discussions on the territorial dispute would stall unless more aid was extended (The Japan Times, 30 June 1992: 1, 8; The Japan Times, 3 July 1992: 1). It also became clear that the summit leaders were planning to meet after their formal discussions to examine Yeltsin’s economic reforms and explore the possibility of his future attendance in a G8 summit process – a development towards which the Japanese government reacted coolly (Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 July 1992 evening edition: 1; The Japan Times, 4 July 1992: 1). As regards the political issues to be discussed at Munich, three broad topics were decided: (1) the construction of cooperative global relations including the Asia Pacific region; (2) disarmament and non-proliferation; and (3) the strengthening of the UN’s functions. On regional issues, a MOFA official asserted that Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi would act as the only Asian summit member, stress the Asia Pacific region and highlight issues such as Cambodia, China, the Korean peninsula and Mongolia (The Japan Times, 24 June 1992: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 25 June 1992: 1). As regards China, the Japanese government was also eager to have included in the chairman’s statement a reference to positive developments in China in the fields of economic reform and engagement with international society, as seen in its membership of the NPT, in addition to mention of the need for future improvements in political reforms and human rights (Yomiuri Shinbun, 26 June 1992: 2). The Japanese government also campaigned to have full support for the Cambodian peace process included in the political declaration as a problem of global significance in the face of German efforts to have it included in the chairman’s statement on regional issues (Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 July 1992: 2). As regards disarmament, the Japanese government was hoping to promote nuclear non-proliferation and to this end sought to have reference included in the political declaration to the strengthening of the NPT and international cooperation in dealing with the disposal of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 June 1992 evening edition: 2). On the economic front and during the run-up to the summit, six broad topics were agreed for discussion: (1) macro-economic policy; (2) assistance for the former Soviet Union; (3) nuclear power safety; (4) the developing world; (5) environmental issues; and (6) assistance for Central and Eastern Europe (Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 June 1992: 7). In addition, and in order to stimulate domestic demand-led economic growth, the Japanese government announced a stimulus package of over ¥6 trillion yen on 27 June 1992 prior to the summit despite quarrels between the LDP and MOF after the latter expressed opposition to the statement of a concrete figure (Mainichi Shinbun, 27 June 1992: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 28 June 1992: 1–2). Miyazawa left Japan on the afternoon of 30 June in order to conduct an official three-day visit to the US to discuss bilateral and summit issues with President George Bush before then proceeding to the UK and Germany. Miyazawa’s support at home had declined sharply during the controversial passage of the PKO law through the

94 The third cycle, 1989–95 Diet that facilitated Japan’s participation in UN-led PKO, and the Munich Summit was seen as a chance for him to recover some popularity (Mainichi Shinbun, 24 June 1992: 3). During their meetings on the afternoon of 1 July at both the White House and Camp David conducted in English and without an interpreter, Bush welcomed the Japanese government’s attempts to stimulate domestic demand and assured Miyazawa of his total support for Japan on the Northern Territories’ dispute (Asahi Shinbun, 2 July 1992 evening edition: 1–2). As regards the idea of Russian membership of the summit process, and although Bush expressed willingness to discuss the issue, Miyazawa claimed before leaving the US not to have heard about the idea and one MOFA official was quoted as saying, ‘Russia is not an advanced economy [and should not join the G7]. The West should demand that Russia help itself ’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 July 1992: 11). During a meeting in London on the afternoon of 4 July, Miyazawa received the support of John Major in his capacity as UK prime minister but not in his position as President of the EC Council of Ministers due to the bilateral nature of the problem (The Japan Times, 5 July 1992: 1). Whilst in London, Miyazawa also met with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, and after arrival in Germany, he met with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato on 5 July in order to seek the other summit leaders’ understanding on the Northern Territories’ issue. Although Mulroney expressed complete understanding and support for Japan’s permanent membership of the UNSC, Kohl and Amato extended only qualified support (Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 July 1992 evening edition: 2). The Munich Summit began on the morning of 6 July with an official welcome ceremony followed by a meeting of the leaders. Anti-summit protests took place outside the summit venue whilst negative evaluations of the state of the global economy, and fears about the size of budget deficits and high interest rates were expressed inside the venue. Negative predictions also prevailed about the future of multilateral trade negotiations. On the issue of Russian aid, German pressure on Japan to contribute more without first resolving the territorial dispute was in evidence. German efforts were also directed towards creating a multilateral fund to ensure nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union – something to which the US and Japan were reluctant to agree (The Japan Times, 7 July 1992: 1, 11, 21). On the second day of the summit, the political declaration was issued that extended support for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as they ‘move toward the achievement of democratic societies and political and economic freedom’. The declaration also highlighted conflict resolution in the former Yugoslavia and the need to strengthen the UN, and also welcomed dialogue between Japan and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The declaration also included the following statements much to the satisfaction of the Japanese government: ‘[t]he way has been opened for a new partnership of shared responsibilities, not only in Europe which at long last is reunited, but also in the Asia Pacific region and elsewhere in the world’; ‘[w]e welcome Russia’s commitment to a foreign policy based on the principle of law and justice. We believe that this represents a basis for full normalization of the Russian–Japanese relationship through resolving the territorial issue’ (G8 2003).

The third cycle, 1989–95 95 This was much to the annoyance of Yeltsin, who regarded the territorial dispute as a bilateral issue. As regards regional issues, the Japanese government also drew satisfaction from the inclusion of the statement in the political declaration that ‘[w]e are seriously concerned at the present situation in Cambodia and urge all parties concerned to support United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and uphold the still fragile peace process to bring it to a successful conclusion’ (G8 2003). On the same day, a declaration on the former Yugoslavia was issued that condemned humanitarian abuses and called for a resolution of the conflict. In addition, the chairman’s statement was released and expressed concern about North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons’ programme and, as regards China, stated that ‘[t]he recent developments towards economic reform in the People’s Republic of China are encouraging. We also want to see China making greater efforts towards political reform. The situation with regard to human rights calls for considerable further improvement’ (The Japan Times, 8 July 1992: 1; G8 2003; Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 July 1992: 1–3, 9). On the final day of the summit, the economic declaration was released that emphasised macro-economic policy coordination in the fields of interest rates and currency markets in addition to encouraging a conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. As regards the former Soviet Union, the declaration stated that ‘[w]e offer the new States our help for their self-help. Our cooperation will be comprehensive and will be tailored to their reform progress and internationally responsible behaviour’ (G8 2003). Thus, although the declaration called for MFN status to be extended to former Soviet republics, assistance was to be provided in line with progress in Yeltsin’s reform programme. Miyazawa also took the opportunity to reiterate that Russia would only receive Japanese bilateral aid once the territorial dispute had been resolved. The seven leaders also met with Yeltsin after the summit as part of the G7 plus 1 formula on the final day. Miyazawa and Yeltsin met briefly and informally to discuss the latter’s trip to Tokyo in September and Miyazawa extended respect and encouragement for Yeltsin’s reform programme (The Japan Times, 9 July 1992: 1, 12; Mainichi Shinbun, 9 July 1992: 1–3, 10–11). Miyazawa returned to Tokyo on the morning of 10 July entering straight into a House of Councillors’ election campaign having secured reference to the territorial dispute’s resolution in the political declaration at Munich against the wishes of France, Germany and Russia (The Japan Times, 10 July 1992: 22). Opposition parties reacted largely positively to the Munich Summit and the attempts to construct cooperative structures for the post-cold war world. However, the JSP, JCP and Ko¯meito¯ were critical of Miyazawa for failing to promote the issues he had promised before the summit and the lack of concrete results in the fields of the environment and the developing world (Yomiuri Shinbun, 10 July 1992: 2). This was the third consecutive year that the Japanese government had managed to have reference to the bilateral territorial dispute included in summit documentation. The importance of this issue to the Japanese people was captured in a Yomiuri Shinbun cartoon that depicted Miyazawa making a deliberate appeal for popularity by, on the one hand, arriving straight from the 1992 Munich Summit carrying the

96 The third cycle, 1989–95 political declaration with its inclusion of the Northern Territories’ dispute, and on the other hand, awarding the Japanese people’s award of honour to the recently deceased Hasegawa Machiko’s popular manga character Sazae-san (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 July 1992: 2). According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after both the summit and a House of Councillors’ election in July, the approval rating for the Miyazawa administration increased from 35.3 per cent in June to 38.3 per cent in August, and the disapproval rating decreased from 51.4 per cent to 46.5 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 September 1992: 2). Miyazawa had struck something of a victory for Japanese diplomacy in continuing Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki’s policy of the indivisibility of politics and economics at Houston and London III. However, some quarters in Japan felt that the summit nations had agreed to include this statement in order placate Miyazawa and, thereafter, extricate Japanese financial contributions to Russia. In any case, this issue, which had dominated the summit so far in its third cycle, would continue to dominate at Tokyo (The Japan Times, 26 July 1992: 16; The Japan Times, 27 July 1992: 8; Hironaka 1998: 180–7).

Tokyo, Japan, 7–9 July 1993 ¯ saka and consideration of Chiba, Kyo¯to, Sapporo Despite a half-hearted bid by O and Yokohama, Tokyo was confirmed around the time of the Munich Summit as the site for the nineteenth summit (Tokyo III), held once again at the Geihinkan (The Japan Times, 21 June 1992: 2; The Japan Times, 25 June 1991: 2; see MOFA 1993; Toki no Ugoki 1993). Chiba’s bid, although strengthened by the existence of an international airport and high-quality conference facilities, was damaged by the hospitalisation of its chief advocate MOFA Minister Watanabe Michio on 31 May 1992 (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 June 1992: 2; Hironaka 1998: 172–3). Thus, the first regional summit in Japan would have to wait until 2000. The leaders met during a global economic slump of enough severity to warrant discussion of moving the summit forward to the spring of 1993 (The Japan Times, 11 February 1993: 1; The Japan Times, 19 February 1993: 1), or even convening an emergency summit before Tokyo III (The Japan Times, 10 March 1993: 15). The intention at Tokyo III was to respond to UK Prime Minister John Major and US Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen’s calls for a simplification of the summit process and reduction of the peripheral ‘festivities’ associated with the summit, thereby creating more time for informal and frank discussion between leaders. As one MOFA official put it ‘[o]ur policy is to promote more substantial discussions among the leaders, a move away from a political show’. Especially in light of a two-year recession in Japan, a downsizing of the summit made sense, although ¥1.5 billion (US$12 million) was still budgeted for the event (The Japan Times, 13 January 1993: 10). The general topics to be taken up for discussion at Tokyo III were elucidated by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi in a television interview as being: (1) economic issues in the member nations’ economies; (2) aiding Russia; (3) the post-cold war peace dividend; (4) assistance for developing nations; (5) global environmental

The third cycle, 1989–95 97 problems; and (6) HIV/AIDS (Mainichi Shinbun, 1 June 1993: 1). However, Miyazawa’s ability to host the summit was cast into some doubt when he lost a noconfidence vote in his cabinet on 18 June and was forced to call a general election to be held after Tokyo III on 18 July (Mainichi Shinbun, 21 June 1993: 3). With this in mind, a Yomiuri Shinbun cartoon suggested that Miyazawa might use the summit for his own political ends by depicting him serving the Japanese dish katsudon to fellow summit leaders with the upcoming election in mind – katsudon is a dish thought to be lucky and regularly eaten by Japanese students before exams due to the homonymic verb katsu, meaning ‘to win’ (Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 July 1993: 2). Who would attend Tokyo III became a subject of interest and discussion in the run-up to the summit. Canadian External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall called on Miyazawa to invite Russian President Boris Yeltsin to attend Tokyo III in order to demonstrate the international community’s backing of his government and shore up its domestic support and legitimacy (The Japan Times, 24 February 1993: 1; Miyashita 2001: 48–55). German Chancellor Helmut Kohl also called on Miyazawa to consider Yeltsin’s invitation (The Japan Times, 28 February 1993: 1). After US President Bill Clinton and French President François Mitterrand met on 9 March, the idea of holding an emergency G7 meeting to discuss aid to Russia and Eastern Europe before Tokyo III was put forward for discussion (The Japan Times, 11 March 1993: 1; Yamamoto 1993: 169). Russian Deputy Prime Minister Boris Fyodorov was invited to a meeting in Hong Kong on 14 March with G7 sherpas to discuss the state of economic reforms in Russia, receive the support of the international community for Yeltsin’s programme of reform and have the issue of an emergency summit at the head of state or ministerial level debated (The Japan Times, 15 March 1993: 1). However, the poor state of Japanese–Russian relations had been compounded by Yeltsin suddenly cancelling his September 1992 visit to Tokyo and did little to put the Japanese government in a conciliatory mood. Both Watanabe and Chief Cabinet Secretary Ko¯no Yo¯hei dismissed the idea of Japan as host country organising an emergency or earlier meeting of the summit leaders and estimated that the chances of a ministerial meeting were only ‘slightly higher’ (The Japan Times, 17 March 1993: 1). This statement was directly criticised by Mitterrand in light of the worsening economic and political situation in Russia (The Japan Times, 18 March 1993: 1). However, according to one Japanese diplomat, ‘[w]e were getting pressure from all over the world and . . . did not want to be blamed for “Who lost Yeltsin?” ’; so, the Japanese government eventually gave in to foreign pressure (quoted in Miyashita 2001: 51). By the end of March, Yeltsin was facing a conservative backlash to oust him in the Russian parliament and the Japanese government took this opportunity to announce that an emergency G7 ministerial meeting would take place from 14–15 April only days before a national referendum in Russia on 25 April. At the same time, an invitation was extended to Yeltsin to attend Tokyo III as a show of support from the international community (The Japan Times, 28 March 1993: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 1 May 1993 evening edition: 2). At the meeting, attended by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and newly appointed MOFA Minister Muto¯ Kabun, the

98 The third cycle, 1989–95 Japanese government called a ‘time-out’ in its policy of the indivisibility of politics and economics and announced a new package of aid totalling US$1.8 billion as part of the overall G7 contribution of approximately US$43 billion (The Japan Times, 16 April 1993: 1, 4; Long 2001: 129). In addition, an official visit by Yeltsin to Tokyo was proposed for May and then rearranged for September but eventually materialised in October 1993 (Mainichi Shinbun, 7 May 1993: 1). Yeltsin’s goal, in addition to extracting financial assistance, was ultimately for Russia to be included within a G8 summit process as a full and official member (Mainichi Shinbun, 3 July 1993 evening edition: 2). Not only the invitation of Russia, but also Indonesia, was a topic of concern for the Japanese government. Indonesian President Suharto, who had previously called ¯ hira Masayoshi to represent Asia at Tokyo I, first communicated on Prime Minister O his desire to attend Tokyo III as chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in order to express the opinions of developing nations to Western leaders on 12 January during Miyazawa’s official visit to Indonesia (The Japan Times, 17 January 1993: 1, 3). Suharto was backed in this plea by the Philippine Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo (The Japan Times, 30 June 1993: 1). Thereafter, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao acting as chairman of the developing countries’ Group of 15 (formed partly by NAM) added to this pressure by submitting a letter urging Miyazawa to discuss development issues at the summit (The Japan Times, 30 June 1993: 10). On the eve of the summit, Philippine President Fidel Ramos made a similar request but with specific reference to the nations of ASEAN (Mainichi Shinbun, 6 July 1993 evening edition: 4). MOFA was especially eager to respond to Suharto’s request and accommodate him in some fashion (Asahi Shinbun, 8 May 1993: 2). Miyazawa initially responded to these calls by promising to consider Suharto’s request and sound out other summit members. Both the German and UK governments expressed reluctance to include Indonesia in the summit proceedings (The Japan Times, 19 February 1993: 1; The Japan Times, 8 April 1993: 7). Yet, undeterred, Suharto expressed his intention to visit the summit even if uninvited (The Japan Times, 7 April 1993: 1). Faced with European opposition but encouraged by Clinton’s expression of interest in meeting Suharto at some point during the summit, MOFA hatched the idea of arranging an unofficial meeting between Suharto and interested leaders on the edges of the summit (The Japan Times, 1 May 1993: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 27 May 1993: 3; The Japan Times, 17 June 1993: 3). In the end, Suharto came to Tokyo from 4–7 July and met with Miyazawa on 5 July before the summit officially began to present a written plea as head of NAM for North–South dialogue and aid for developing nations. Miyazawa promised to convey these concerns to his summit partners and promised to despatch his sherpa, Matsuura Ko¯ichiro¯, to report to Suharto on the outcome of the summit – a meeting which took place on 15 July in Jakarta (Mainichi Shinbun, 6 July 1993: 1, 3; The Japan Times, 7 July 1993: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 16 July 1993: 2). In the morning of 7 July, before his departure and the official opening of the summit, Suharto – ‘the summit’s most prominent uninvited guest’ – met with Clinton to convey NAM’s views but was also forced to discuss human rights in East Timor (The Japan Times, 8 July 1993: 4; Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 July 1993: 78).

The third cycle, 1989–95 99 The idea of inviting China to Tokyo III had been mooted as far back as London III by both LDP and MOFA representatives keen to focus the summit’s energies on China as much as the Soviet Union in light of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s attendance at post-summit meetings in London (The Japan Times, 19 July 1991: 1). However, Western opposition could be seen during Kohl’s visit to China of November 1993 when he stated that observer status at the G7 would be dependent upon the successful implementation of democratic reforms (The Japan Times, 21 November 1993: 3). As regards the discussion of economic policy at the upcoming summit, a provisionally entitled ‘Tokyo Charter’, which would assist in the promotion of democratic and free-market reforms in developing nations especially in the Asia Pacific region, was to be proposed at the summit (The Japan Times, 7 February 1993: 1). Aid policy towards Russia was also likely to feature in discussions as the Japanese government suggested the idea of adjusting policy towards the settlement of Russia’s external debts rather than attempting to solve its inflation problems (The Japan Times, 8 March 1993: 1). Assistance to the developing world was highlighted when the Japanese government announced it plans to increase its ODA contributions by 40–50 per cent to a total of US$70–75 billion for the next five years – MOFA calling for the higher figure and MOF the lower figure – in tandem with the provision of US$50 billion in public funds by the Export–Import Bank of Japan (now called the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)) (Asahi Shinbun, 10 June 1993: 2; Mainichi Shinbun, 16 June 1993: 1). In addition, other traditional issues such as stability in the currency markets were mooted for inclusion in the summit agenda, especially after the G7 finance ministers’ meetings in London at the end of February and in Washington at the end of April pledged greater cooperation in this field. Once again in the run-up to the summit, it was feared that foreign pressure would be placed on the Japanese government to open its markets and stimulate domestic demand (The Japan Times, 22 June 1993: 10). The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was also highlighted for discussion at the summit by the International Chamber of Commerce in a meeting with Miyazawa (The Japan Times, 25 June 1993: 12). The political agenda was also developed during the run-up to the summit. Mixed signals were emanating from MOFA with Watanabe (who resigned on 6 April because of poor health) announcing that the Northern Territories’ issues would not be discussed at the summit for fear of conflating bilateral and multilateral issues (The Japan Times, 30 March 1993: 1). However, another statement suggested that the issue would be on the summit agenda for fear that if omitted the Russian government might think that the Japanese government no longer accorded it due importance (The Japan Times, 4 April 1993: 1). Finally, and despite some opposition within MOFA, Miyazawa stated that Japan’s position on the dispute was clear and there was no need for it to be reiterated after its inclusion in the Munich Summit’s political declaration – a view echoed by Chief Cabinet Secretary Ko¯no Yo¯hei (Mainichi Shinbun, 6 June 1993: 2; Yamamoto 1993: 173–4). At the very least, Tokyo III would provide the opportunity for the issue to be discussed in a private, bilateral meeting between Miyazawa and Yeltsin (Mainichi Shinbun, 8 May 1993: 3).

100 The third cycle, 1989–95 Other political agenda items proposed by the Japanese government included disarmament, regional security and the strengthening of the UN (The Japan Times, 7 June 1993: 1). In addition, AIDS was mooted for discussion after a letter was sent urging discussion of the issue to Clinton by the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (The Japan Times, 10 April 1993: 2). What is more, the Japanese government tabled a proposal to create an environmental database based on the exchange of information accrued through a global satellite network (The Japan Times, 15 May 1993: 2). Terrorist activity – a perennial summit headache – and the accompanying security were also in the public eye. A total of 36,000 police officers from Tokyo and other prefectures were mobilised to provide security for the summit. For the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department this meant 65 per cent of its personnel were assigned to the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 29 June 1993: 30; The Japan Times, 29 June 1993: 2). This time police concerns were targeted not only at left-wing anti-summit groups such as Chu¯kakuha and Kakuro¯kyo¯, but also right-wing groups protesting against Yeltsin and Russian occupation of the Northern Territories. Compared to Tokyo II terrorist activities were not as prominent. Kakuro¯kyo¯ did admit to firing a home-made rocket at the US air force base at Yokota on 1 July in protest at the summit (The Japan Times, 4 July 1993: 2). On 7 July, another rocket attack took place ¯ saka the former venue of the international on the US army base in Zama and in O flower exposition was bombed (The Japan Times, 8 July 1993: 2). A number of more peaceful groups were also eager to use Tokyo III to bring attention to their cause. Student groups organised non-violent protests on the opening day of the summit and the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (Zenchu¯) organised a summit of international agricultural groups to coincide with Tokyo III and raise consciousness on issues surrounding farming subsidies (The Japan Times, 6 July 1993: 3). Whilst the Japanese government was facing its most severe political crises that ultimately led to the end of the LDP’s thirty-eight year rule, the summit began on 7 July. Prior to its official opening, Miyazawa conducted a number of bilateral meetings with each summit delegation. The EC delegation called on the Japanese government to address its trade surplus; Miyazawa agreed with Italian Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi to make the summit proceedings less elaborate in the future; and Clinton and Miyazawa agreed to create a framework to resolve bilateral economic issues and to cooperate in preventing the development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons’ programme. In addition, Muto¯ met with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher to discuss the framework for future bilateral security talks, and MITI Minister Mori Yoshiro¯ met with USTR Mickey Kantor the same day to discuss access to markets (Asahi Shinbun, 7 July 1993: 1–3; The Japan Times, 7 July 1993: 1, 4). On the morning of the opening day of the summit, Miyazawa met for bilateral talks with Canadian Prime Minister Kim Campbell about the UN’s peacekeeping role, Kohl on the world economy and German interest rates, and Major on unemployment (The Japan Times, 8 July 1993: 4). The first day of the summit began with the protocol of the welcome ceremony, which was followed by discussion of the global economy during meetings of both the leaders and the foreign ministers that followed through to respective working

The third cycle, 1989–95 101 dinners. Other summit leaders called on the Japanese government to stimulate domestic demand and act as an engine for the rest of the world’s economic recovery and in return Miyazawa explained the economic stimulus measures that were to be introduced. Summit leaders also called for an early conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, pledged assistance to and support for Yeltsin, and called for a greater role for the UN in regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping (The Japan Times, 8 July 1993: 1, 4; Mainichi Shinbun, 8 July 1993: 1–3). The political declaration issued on the second day also revisited the UN’s role in peacekeeping as well as highlighting regional conflicts by stressing measures for the resolution of conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East. On regional issues of concern to Japan, the UN welcomed both ‘the more active role played by the countries of the Asia Pacific region in the promotion of regional security dialogues’, and ‘the successfully held election and the announcement of a Provisional National Government in Cambodia to be followed by the establishment of a government on the basis of a new constitution to be enacted in accordance with the Paris Agreements’. The UN pledged continued ‘support for its [Cambodia’s] reconstruction and lasting peace based on national reconciliation’. It also urged ‘North Korea to retract immediately its decision to withdraw from the NPT, and to fully comply with its non-proliferation obligations, including the implementation of IAEA safeguards agreement and the Joint Declaration on De-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula’ (G8 2003). However, the Japanese delegation decided at Tokyo III not to pursue inclusion of reference to the Northern Territories’ dispute and instead the declaration called on ‘Russia to promote its diplomacy based on the principle of law and justice and to continue to play constructive and responsible roles in the international community’ (G8 2003). Debt issues were discussed at the finance ministers’ meeting and the UK led the way in the rescheduling of debt in the face of Japanese opposition. The way in which the summit meets was also discussed with a pledge to find ways to reduce the formalities, keep the declarations to a minimum and allow for informal, frank conversation as was the intention of the original summit. The second day ended with a banquet hosted by the Imperial family (Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 July 1993 evening edition: 1–2; The Japan Times, 9 July 1993: 1, 4–5). On the final day, the economic declaration was released, which condemned global unemployment figures, agreed on measures and funds totalling US$3 billion to assist in the privatisation of Russian enterprises through a Special Privatisation and Restructuring Programme, and made calls for the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. The Japanese government was urged to stimulate domestic demand: ‘Japan has taken a series of stimulative policies including the most recent comprehensive package. Japan will implement fiscal and monetary measures as necessary, to ensure sustained non-inflationary growth led by strong domestic demand, keeping in mind the need for long-term fiscal prudence. This will contribute to the important goal of significantly reducing external imbalances’ (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 July 1993 evening edition: 1–3; The Japan Times, 10 July 1993: 1, 4; G8 2003). During the G7 plus 1 meeting with Yeltsin held immediately after the conclusion of the summit, measures related to Russia’s economy were explained and discussed

102 The third cycle, 1989–95 before debate turned to including Russia more formally within a G8 – an issue that was left for the Italian government as chair of the next year’s summit to contemplate (The Japan Times, 10 July 1993: 1, 5; The Japan Times, 7 October 1993: 4). Miyazawa met Clinton again on the evening of 9 July to continue their discussions on bilateral economic issues (Mainichi Shinbun, 10 July 1993: 1). Reaction to Tokyo III was predictably mixed and later in the same month the LDP fought a general election. Although actually managing to increase its number of seats in the Diet, as a result of the defection of a number of dissatisfied elements within the LDP Miyazawa’s government fell from power. It was replaced the next month by an incredibly popular coalition of opposition parties commanding 75 per cent approval and 9 per cent disapproval ratings led by Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro and thereby ending thirty-eight years of uninterrupted rule (Mainichi Shinbun, 12 August 1993: 1–2). By the time of the next summit in Naples, the LDP had regained a position in government but as a coalition partner of the SDPJ, and as a result Hosokawa never got to attend a summit and instead a Socialist prime minister represented Japan at the summit for the first time.

Naples, Italy, 8–10 July 1994 The Naples Summit took place after the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and before the establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995; thus, for Japan, the issue of opening its domestic markets was likely to top the agenda again (The Japan Times, 24 June 1994: 3). This summit provided the first opportunity for Russian President Boris Yeltsin to attend the political meetings of the summit but not the economic sessions, having previously attended the post-summit G7 plus 1 meetings at the Munich Summit and Tokyo III. In preparation for the Naples Summit, political issues did not feature as highly as previous summits and the main themes for this summit were to be employment and economic growth; as regards Japan, the focus fell upon measures to stimulate domestic demand such as continuing tax cuts and increasing public investment (Mainichi Shinbun, 20 June 1994: 3). To this end, the government decided a few days before the opening of the summit to announce at Naples that it would do its utmost to implement tax cuts totalling ¥6 billion within the year (Mainichi Shinbun, 6 July 1994: 1). Before its fall, the short-lived, non-LDP coalition government had intended for Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu to announce at Naples a plan to implement ¥30 billion (US$300 million) in ODA contributions over the next two years in order to support the move to democracy in post-Apartheid South Africa (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 June 1994 evening edition: 2). Rumours also emanated from government sources that the meeting would discuss the cancellation of two-thirds of debts incurred by the poorest developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa (Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 July 1994: 9). US–Japanese bilateral trade issues were also on the agenda for the summit with talks hurriedly attempting and ultimately failing to resolve automobile disputes prior to the Naples Summit. Finally, currency stabilisation in light of the strong yen and weak dollar was also expected to feature at the summit (Mainichi Shinbun, 28 June 1994: 1). Other issues for discussion included the provision of assistance to the former

The third cycle, 1989–95 103 Soviet Union with specific reference to Ukraine to help ensure economic stability and the safety of its nuclear power plants, environmental issues, the proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons, international structures to support peace, and regional conflict resolution in the former Yugoslavia and on the Korean peninsula (Asahi Shinbun, 21 June 1994: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 June 1994: 1). Seventy-year-old Murayama Tomiichi was appointed prime minister of a LDP–SDPJ coalition government, the unlikeliest of alliances, only ten days before the Naples Summit. Thus, he was Japan’s first (and so far only) Socialist prime minister to attend a summit meeting. He met with MOFA Minister Ko¯no Yo¯hei on 2 July 1994 to discuss the new Japanese government’s position at the summit and stressed the need to reassure the other summit leaders that the administration would continue the foreign and defence policies of previous LDP administrations (The Japan Times, 3 July 1994: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 July 1994: 3). He even went so far as to write individually to each summit partner to reassure them of his commitment to previous policies, and met with the former coalition government’s partners to discuss the Japanese government’s stance at the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 2 July 1994: 2; The Japan Times, 6 July 1994: 7; Hayashi 1994: 10). However, it was feared that the new government was limited in what it could promise at the summit to stimulate the domestic economy and would be forced to wait until after the summit to formulate concrete policy (The Japan Times, 6 July 1994: 1). The predicament in which Murayama found himself was encapsulated in a Yomiuri Shinbun cartoon that depicted him perspiring heavily and suddenly having to fly a plane marked ‘diplomacy’ towards the summit venue masked by gathering storm clouds within which the faces of veteran, battle-hardened summiteers can be discerned (Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 July 1994: 2). In addition, the fact that summit-related posters advertising a pizza restaurant in Naples still carried the portrait of Hata highlighted the suddenness with which Murayama was appointed and his consequent lack of presence (Asahi Shinbun, 8 July 1994 evening edition: 2). Murayama did seek out the counsel of previous participants in the summit and met former Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi on the evening of 5 July immediately prior to his departure in order to solicit advice (Mainichi Shinbun, 6 July 1994: 2). Murayama departed for Italy on the morning of 6 July and arrived on the evening of the same day, accompanied by Ko¯no, MOF Minister Takemura Masayoshi and MITI Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯. He was acknowledged by observers and himself as an absolute beginner in the field of foreign policy and placed in a difficult position to coordinate policy between the LDP and SDPJ coalition partners (The Japan Times, 6 July 1994: 1). Murayama spent the next day resting and preparing for the summit but took a brief walk in the evening with the Neapolitan mayor (Mainichi Shinbun, 8 July 1994: 1). Bilateral meetings were conducted on 8 July before the summit officially began that evening with a working dinner. Murayama and Clinton met in the morning to reconfirm the importance of the US–Japan bilateral relationship to both sides, discuss economic issues and agree on the importance of a multilateral approach to North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons’ programme. Murayama also stressed that although he would continue the diplomatic position of previous governments,

104 The third cycle, 1989–95 he would work to reform Japan domestically. Clinton stressed Japan’s responsibility in addressing the strong yen and weak dollar in addition to ensuring domestic political stability and opening its markets to foreign imports (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 July 1994: 1–4). On the same day, Ko¯no met with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and agreed to continue cooperation in dealing with North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons’ programme (Mainichi Shinbun, 9 July 1994: 2). Takemura met with his US counterpart Lloyd Bentsen and agreed on the necessity of providing stability in currency markets. Murayama also met individually with Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and his Italian host Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to discuss the issue of North Korea (The Japan Times, 10 July 1994: 4). The second day of the summit was overshadowed by news of the death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. However, of equal concern to the Japanese delegation was that Murayama was unable to attend the second day of summit meetings, at which the economic declaration was announced, after retiring from the previous evening’s working dinner, being taken ill and hospitalised with gastroenteritis thought to be caused by food poisoning from either rich Italian food or peach juice (Murayama 1996: 105–7). He was replaced by Ko¯no at the summit meetings but his meeting with Yeltsin was cancelled. In Murayama’s absence, employment issues were discussed, pledges made to reduce global unemployment and the leaders agreed to continue to seek a reduction in trade barriers, although Clinton’s new initiative to remove trade barriers was rejected by French President François Mitterrand. The final economic declaration failed to make any mention of the weakening of the dollar but did promise more assistance to Ukraine in dealing with nuclear safety and introducing a free-market economy, in addition to calling for a comprehensive overview of the international economic institutions that would report to the 1995 Halifax Summit in Canada (The Japan Times, 10 July 1994: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 10 July 1994: 1–2, 9). Murayama was able to return to the political discussions on the third and final day at which Bosnian peace plans and North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons’ programme were discussed and Yeltsin participated officially for the first time. Although Murayama raised the necessity of the complete normalisation of Japanese– Russian relations, he did not raise the Northern Territories’ dispute. In the chairman’s statement released the same day the leaders called on Serbia to accept a proposed Bosnian peace plan, and on North Korea to declare the extent and details of its nuclear development, in addition to declaring support for a democratically elected Haitian government, an independent Lebanon, and the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda. Support was expressed for the indefinite extension of the NPT and notice was given of a meeting to coordinate policy towards organised crime and drug trafficking to be held in Naples in October (Asahi Shinbun, 11 July 1994 evening edition: 1–3; The Japan Times, 12 July 1994: 1). Murayama returned to Japan on the evening of 11 July to face a range of reactions. Opposition parties questioned his physical ability to be prime minister in the light of his hospitalisation at Naples (Yomiuri Shinbun, 10 July 1994: 8; Asahi Shinbun, 12 July 1994: 2). According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, although the approval rating for the Murayama administration

The third cycle, 1989–95 105 increased slightly from 37 per cent at the time of its inauguration at the very end of June to 37.1 per cent in July, the disapproval rating also increased from 44 per cent to 46.2 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 2 July 1994: 1–2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 July 1994: 1–2). In contrast, the business world welcomed the US–Japan talks before the summit and Nikkeiren’s Chairman Nagano Takeshi praised Murayama’s efforts in erasing any doubts in Clinton’s mind as regards continuity in US–Japan security relations (Asahi Shinbun, 9 July 1994: 11). In addition, LDP and SDPJ representatives declared the summit a success in creating mutual trust and dismissed the adverse effects of Murayama’s hospitalisation (Asahi Shinbun, 12 July 1994: 2).

Halifax, Canada, 15–17 June 1995 The concluding summit in the third cycle of the summit process took place in the port of Halifax amidst a continuingly declining dollar against the yen and discussion by G7 finance ministers and central bank governors in Washington prior to the leaders’ summit of what international coordination could be taken (see Toki no Ugoki 1995). The choice of modest, small-town Halifax was an attempt to return the summit to its roots and make it a more intimate meeting once again – a trend that French President Jacques Chirac pledged to continue the next year in Lyon. Political issues discussed in the run-up to the summit included environmental issues in response to the UN conference on climate change held in May 1995, nuclear non-proliferation, UN reform, aid for Russia’s democratisation, regional conflict resolution in the former Yugoslavia, North Korea’s nuclear weapons’ programme, and international terrorism as an issue of increased concern to the Japanese government after the Sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway of 20 March (The Japan Times, 22 May 1995: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 2 June 1995: 3; Hughes 1998). In addition to terrorist issues, the Japanese government was keen to promote the UN’s work in the field of global security at the summit and curb the testing of nuclear weapons in reaction to continued Chinese tests (The Japan Times, 8 June 1995: 11; Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 June 1995: 3). Economic issues centred upon the call made the previous year at the Naples summit to review the efficiency of international institutions and reduce the perceived overlap in the remit of their responsibilities (Asahi Shinbun, 14 May 1995: 1; The Japan Times, 27 May 1995: 19). To this end, reform of the IMF and World Bank to create stronger surveillance facilities and early warning mechanisms to deal with potential financial crises in emerging Asian and Latin American markets was mooted for discussion at Halifax, in addition to an expansion of the funds available to the IMF through the General Agreements to Borrow (GAB) (Asahi Shinbun, 1 June 1995: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 June 1995: 7; the GAB were established in 1962 so that the governments and central banks of eleven industrialised nations could provide the IMF with increased credit in emergencies). In addition, US–Japan trade issues, in particular automobiles, were mooted for discussion by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi and US President Bill Clinton on the edges of the summit in their bilateral meeting (The Japan Times, 11 June 1995: 1).

106 The third cycle, 1989–95 The thirteenth ‘old boys’ summit’ was held from 23–6 May in Tokyo and highlighted issues such as population growth, food security, the role of global institutions and international terrorism. Murayama attended but this was also former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo’s final appearance as honorary chairman (Mainichi Shinbun, 24 May 1995: 3). Murayama left for the summit on the afternoon of 14 June having survived a noconfidence motion in the House of Representatives that morning by 158 to 62 votes (Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 June 1995 evening edition: 1). He was accompanied by MOFA Minister Ko¯no Yo¯hei, MOF Minister Takemura Masayoshi and MITI Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯. Whilst Murayama rested on the evening of their arrival, Ko¯no met with Canadian counterpart André Ouellet to discuss Japan’s peacekeeping contribution to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, and affirm their shared concern as regards the resumption of French nuclear testing and the need to reform the UNSC to include Japan as a permanent member (Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 June 1995 evening edition: 1). On 15 June, prior to the officially opening of the summit, Ko¯no and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher met to discuss the highly anticipated bilateral automobile trade dispute and promised not to let it sour the overall bilateral relationship (Mainichi Shinbun, 16 June 1995: 3). On the morning of the same day, Murayama met with Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and discussed Japanese– Canadian peacekeeping cooperation in the Golan Heights (Mainichi Shinbun, 16 June 1995: 3). Later in the day, Murayama met with Clinton and reaffirmed the closeness of US–Japan bilateral ties and called on their trade negotiators to pursue a rapid resolution of the automobile dispute, although Clinton maintained the threat to introduce sanctions against luxury Japanese cars (The Japan Times, 17 June 1995: 1, 12). The degree to which this pre-summit, US–Japan bilateral meeting had become a custom can be seen in the protests that were voiced on the Japanese side in reaction to US proposals to hold the meeting either during or after the official summit meetings (Mainichi Shinbun, 1 June 1995 evening edition: 1). The first day of the summit was taken up by a working dinner at which the agenda was switched at the last minute at the request of Chirac from world economic issues to the situation in Bosnia and a call for restraint by all parties was issued (Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 June 1995: 2; The Japan Times, 17 June 1995: 1). On the second day of the summit, political issues continued to be raised and Murayama called for further economic and political reform in Russia in order to gain understanding in Japan for the provision of aid to Russia – a topic he raised once more alongside the Northern Territories’ dispute during the second day’s working dinner when Russian President Boris Yeltsin was in attendance. However, Murayama failed to campaign for the inclusion of the territorial issue in any official summit documentation (Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 June 1995 evening edition: 2; Mainichi Shinbun, 18 June 1995: 2). On the second day, discussions surrounding the economic declaration took centrestage. These talks stressed efforts to support growth and job creation, prevent the further decline of the dollar and organise close coordination and surveillance of currency markets. In addition, reform of the world’s economic institutions was called for to prevent duplication of their work and fears were expressed of future financial

The third cycle, 1989–95 107 and economic crises. To prevent this, calls were made for the creation of earlywarning mechanisms under the aegis of the IMF and the doubling of credit available to the IMF provided by participants in the GAB. Implementation of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and the strengthening of the WTO were also highlighted (Mainichi Shinbun, 17 June 1995: 1–3; Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 June 1995 evening edition: 1–3). On 17 June, the summit’s final day, the chairman’s statement was released and revisited political issues, specifically calling for an end to conflict in Bosnia and Chechnya, China’s participation in international society, structural reform of the UN, and the convening of a panel of experts on anti-terrorist measures, in addition to welcoming the indefinite extension of the NPT, calling on North Korea to observe it, and announcing a summit to be held in Russia in April 1996 on nuclear safety, as suggested by Yeltsin (The Japan Times, 18 June 1995: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 June 1995: 1–3). After the summit was concluded, Ko¯no reported the discussion of North Korea to his South Korean counterpart Gong Ro-Myung by telephone and explained that sherpa Hayashi Sadayuki would visit Seoul over the next few days to report in more detail (Asahi Shinbun, 19 June 1995 evening edition: 2). After the summit, Murayama flew to Paris on 18 June to attend the fourth Japan–EU summit the next day and meet Chirac to discuss the resumption of French nuclear testing, which had been announced on the eve of the summit (The Japan Times, 19 June 1995: 4). Government officials were reported as being happy with the results of the summit. According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before, during and after the summit, the approval rating for the Murayama administration increased from 33.6 per cent in May to 40.1 per cent in June and to 40.3 per cent in July, and the disapproval rating dropped from 49.7 per cent to 44 per cent and to 43.6 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 June 1995: 1–2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 July 1995: 2). However, there was also a more critical reaction at home – both the Halifax Summit itself and Japan’s role therein had never been regarded as so small (The Japan Times, 27 June 1995: 16). A Mainichi Shinbun cartoon parodied an event that occurred upon Murayama’s arrival in Halifax when he was presented with an eagle’s feather, seen as a traditional symbol of strong leadership. Rather than an eagle’s feather (washi no hane in Japanese), Murayama refers to himself (washi no ha ne) as a symbol of weak leadership, as the other summit leaders look on bemused (Mainichi Shinbun, 18 June 1995: 2). Japan’s active participation in, and concrete contributions to, this third cycle of summitry were handicapped by both a series of leaders perceived to be weak and an ailing economy. Nevertheless, the Japanese government was skilful in instrumentalising the multilateral forum of the summit in order to pursue the resolution of an essentially bilateral issue – the Northern Territories’ dispute. Although this strategy ultimately failed, Japanese–Russian relations would continue to be salient during the next cycle.

4

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002

During this fourth cycle, international events continued to be framed within an ongoing process of globalisation, concretely manifested in the East Asian economic and financial crises of 1997–8. However, other issues, for example international terrorism, were never out of sight. During this period, anti-US terrorism accelerated from the al-Qaida bombing of a US military base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in June 1996 through to the attacks on New York and Washington DC of 11 September 2001. With the subsequent US-led ‘war on terrorism’, the unilateralism of the administration of George W. Bush would become characteristic of the international behaviour of the leading summit member. The fourth cycle in the summit process represents continuity in the management of Russia and its eventual assimilation as a full summit member. However, at the same time, the summit leaders went through a period of introspection that questioned the aims and praxis of the summit process with the objective of its reform and ultimately led to a rediscovery of its original intent. As mentioned above, various calls had been made for a return to a simplified summit. During the fourth cycle, efforts were made to implement change so that after the profligacy of the 2000 Okinawa Summit and the tragedy of the 2001 Genoa Summit, the 2002 Kananaskis Summit brought the summit process full circle by returning it to its roots as an intimate forum for the frank exchange of opinions (Ishikawa 2002: 67–8). However, this is not to suggest simply a return to the ad hoc, informal, economic summit of Rambouillet. Rather, new initiatives were introduced to make the summit process more open and transparent. Most salient amongst these initiatives was the policy of ‘outreach’ – the invitation of a number of leaders of developing nations and NGOs and their participation in the summit process. As for Japan’s role in this cycle, a degree of political stability was restored as a result of the return of the LDP to power, and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ in particular sought to continue addressing Japanese–Russian relations and raising Asian issues at the summit. However, as in the previous cycle, Japan’s weakened economy once more limited the role it could play in the summit process through the provision of funds for summit initiatives, such as debt relief. Thus, a clear divide can be witnessed between Chapters 1 and 2 where Japan’s economy was buoyant and touted as one of the locomotives to pull along the rest of the world’s leading economies, and Chapters 3 and 4 where its prolonged recession and need for

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 109 structural reform became a topic for debate at the summit. Although attention was given to Japan’s contributions to counterterrorism, the Cambodian peace settlement and landmine prevention, several references to Japan in summit documentation, as expressed in Figure 4.1, were related to the economic and social issues engendered by Japan’s recession.

Lyon, France, 27–9 June 1996 Prior to the Lyon Summit, the Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, called for in the chairman’s statement at the Halifax Summit, took place in Moscow from 19–20 April 1996. Items on the agenda included nuclear disarmament, anti-nuclear terrorism measures, radioactive waste disposal and nuclear power safety (Asahi Shinbun, 7 April 1996: 21). During the two-day summit, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ met with Russian President Boris Yeltsin for the first time and, in addition to discussing bilateral issues such as confirmation of the 1993 Tokyo Declaration to normalise fully bilateral relations, resolve the Northern Territories’ dispute and conclude a peace treaty, he extracted a promise to stop the dumping of Russian nuclear waste in the Sea of Japan and, in return, pledged to cooperate in realising Russia’s membership of the WTO (The Japan Times, 20 April 1996: 1, 6; Mainichi Shinbun, 20 April 1996: 1–3). The summit agreed upon a global ban on nuclear testing through the promotion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and measures to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants and the safe disposal of radioactive waste. To this end, Hashimoto agreed to host a meeting of Asian nations on these issues by the end of the year (Asahi Shinbun, 21 April 1996: 1–2, 6). The first summit in the fourth cycle of summitry took place in Lyon without the attendance of Yeltsin as part of the G7 plus 1 framework due to presidential elections in Russia (see Toki no Ugoki 1996). The overarching theme of the summit was how to conquer the problems associated with globalisation. In the run-up to the summit, individual issues under this banner were mooted for discussion. Transnational organised crime was placed firmly on the agenda after a working group on the issue set up after the Halifax Summit the previous year reported its findings including increased exchange of information and harsher punitive measures (The Japan Times, 3 April 1996: 3). Equally, unemployment and labour issues were a topic for discussion after the failure of the meeting of G7 employment ministers in Lille from 1–2 April to reach a consensus on job creation and employment security with divisions between a free-market-economy approach backed by the UK and US, and a state-interventionist approach backed by France and Germany (Japan Times, 3 April 1993: 11; The Japan Times, 23 May 1996: 9). And, when G7 finance ministers met in Washington on 21 April, the issues of the world and Japan’s economic recovery were also firmly placed on the agenda alongside discussion of reform of the world’s financial institutions, and to this end the heads of the IMF, UN, World Bank and WTO were invited to attend (The Japan Times, 23 April 1996: 10; The Japan Times, 6 May 1996: 2). As regards the Japanese government’s agenda at the Lyon Summit, although it was Hashimoto’s first summit he was expected to make a number of proposals, such

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*FromComparative Birmingham 1998frequency the G7 finance and G8to foreign ministers met separately their leaders and their statements have not been included Figure 4.1 ofministers references Japan in official G7/8from summit documents, 1996–2002

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The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 111 as the creation of an international framework to prevent the production of weaponsgrade plutonium, reform of UN-led PKO, and shifting the summit’s focus to East Asian security issues such as China and North Korea (The Japan Times, 13 May 1996: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 June 1996: 1). In interview with the French media, Hashimoto also stated that he would call for China’s membership of the WTO at Lyon (Mainichi Shinbun, 22 June 1996: 3). In addition, government sources declared that Hashimoto would promote a total ban of landmines and agree to host a meeting in Tokyo to examine measures for the detection and removal of landmines (The Japan Times, 26 June 1996: 1). Prior to the summit, Hashimoto met with South Korean President Kim YoungSam on 22 and 23 June to discuss the situation on the Korean peninsula and agree on promoting four-way talks including China, North Korea, South Korea and the US (Hashimoto 1996). The emphasis Hashimoto was attempting to place on Asian issues in the face of uninterested summiteers was parodied in a Yomiuri Shinbun cartoon that depicted Hashimoto walking a tightrope carrying a banner proclaiming ‘Asia’ and balancing two fans marked North Korea and China, whilst the other summit leaders pay no attention and are absorbed in watching the other circus attractions: a wrestling match to decide the Russian presidential election and the Middle East gun battle (Yomiuri Shinbun, 28 June 1996: 3). After a meeting with journalists at the prime minister’s residence at which he continued to emphasise Asian issues, especially North Korea and China’s entry to the WTO, Hashimoto left Japan on the morning of 25 June as part of the Japanese delegation including MOFA Minister Ikeda Yukihiko, MOF Minister Kubo Wataru and MITI Minister Tsukahara Shunpei (Yomiuri Shinbun, 25 June 1996 evening edition: 1). Before the summit officially began, Hashimoto met with President of the EU Commission Jacques Santer, French President Jacques Chirac, UK Prime Minister John Major and US President Bill Clinton for a series of bilateral discussions to discuss a range of issues including the EU’s role in US–Japan semiconductor talks with Santer, an early ratification of the CTBT with Chirac, China’s early entry to the WTO with Major, and anti-terrorist measures and the resolution of trade issues – especially semiconductors and insurance – with Clinton (The Japan Times, 28 June 1996: 1, 7; Mainichi Shinbun, 28 June 1996: 1–3). The summit began on 27 June with a working dinner and a change in the agenda to allow for the discussion of terrorism in light of a truck bomb attack on a US military base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia two days previously. The result of the discussion was the release of a declaration on terrorism as an expression of solidarity with the US and a pledge to fight it through the adoption of a series of measures to be discussed at a special G7 plus 1 meeting to be held in Paris. This ministerial meeting was held on 30 July and attended by Ikeda and NPSC Chairman Kurata Hiroyuki. It resulted in the adoption of a twenty-five-point plan (Kokusai Tero Mondai Kenkyu¯kai 1996: 63–7; Yomiuri Shinbun, 31 July 1996: 5; Yonemura 1996). The first day’s working dinner included discussion of Russian affairs, but Hashimoto also stressed the importance of China’s entry into the WTO and sought his fellow summiteers’ understanding (Yomiuri Shinbun, 28 June 1996 evening edition: 1–2).

112 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 On the second day of the summit, the economic communiqué was released that stressed the opportunities of globalisation, advanced schemes for the cancellation of bilateral debts to the poorest nations, stressed the strengthening of the IMF and its surveillance mechanisms to ensure financial stability, highlighted further reform and rationalisation of the UN system and its cooperation with financial and regional institutions, and called on the WTO to broaden its remit and discuss the adoption of global labour standards. Hashimoto tabled a ‘World Welfare Initiative’ to allow the summit nations to share information and expertise in the field of social security systems. This proposal was supported by Chirac and Clinton and placed on the agenda for G7 discussion before the 1997 summit (The Japan Times, 29 June 1996: 1, 4; Yomiuri Shinbun, 29 June 1996: 1–4). On the third and final day of the summit, the chairman’s statement and a statement on the peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina were also announced by the G7 plus 1 that included Russia represented by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. The chairman’s statement called for peace in the Middle East, reform of the UN system, a prompt adoption of the CTBT, North–South dialogue on the Korean peninsula and welcomed more rigid regulations on the use of landmines. Alongside his offer of hosting a conference on landmine removal in early 1997 and proposals for UN reform, a considerable amount of Hashimoto’s input was evident in the wording finally adopted, although his call for a statement welcoming China’s inclusion into the international community was omitted. After the official closing of the summit, meetings were held with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the IMF’s Managing Director Michel Camdessus, the World Bank’s President James D. Wolfensohn, and Director General of the WTO Renato Ruggiero and resulted in a statement stressing their partnership in addressing aid and development issues (The Japan Times, 30 June 1996: 1, 4; Mainichi Shinbun, 30 June 1996: 1–3, 7). The summit ended with a fireworks display on the evening of 29 June and Hashimoto arrived back in Japan on the afternoon of 1 July. Reaction to the Lyon Summit was mixed. The US delegation accorded Hashimoto high marks for his first appearance at the summit as prime minister (The Japan Times, 30 June 1996: 4). It was reported in Japan that the French newspaper Le Figaro had dubbed Hashimoto ‘the Asian ambassador’ (Asahi Shinbun, 1 July 1996: 2). According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Hashimoto administration decreased slightly from 49.9 per cent in June to 49.6 per cent in July, but the disapproval rating also decreased from 34.9 per cent to 33.2 per cent over the same time period (Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 July 1996: 2). However, North Korea’s official news agency criticised Japan for acting at the beck and call of South Korea at the summit in trying to promote a North–South dialogue (The Japan Times, 6 July 1996: 2).

Denver, US, 20–2 June 1997 The Denver Summit was commonly and formally known as the Summit of the Eight as it was the first to include Russia in all the summit’s political proceedings

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 113 (see Toki no Ugoki 1997). The idea of almost full Russian participation was greeted coolly in Tokyo due to the lingering dispute over the Northern Territories and doubts over whether Russia was truly qualified to join the most industrialised nations’ highest-level meeting. One senior government official was quoted as saying ‘I still wonder if – and why – a country that accounts for only about 1 per cent of the world economy, like Russia, is really qualified to join the G7’ (The Japan Times, 3 June 1997: 10). Also, US President Bill Clinton decided not to call the summit the G8 due to objections from Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ (The Japan Times, 17 May 1998: 4). However, the Japanese government reluctantly accepted Russia’s participation for fear of alienating other summit members. As one MOFA senior official stated ‘[i]t would not be a wise policy for Japan alone to voice caution’ (The Japan Times, 19 May 1997: 1). The attitude towards Russian participation was encapsulated in an Asahi Shinbun cartoon that depicted the seven summit leaders sat in a rowing boat watching Yeltsin approach in a lifebelt; the conclusion is that Yeltsin is no comparable rower but is needed to provide for the boat’s balance (Asahi Shinbun, 21 June 1997: 2). For the Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the main objective was ‘that the G7 is transformed into a G8 . . . [i]n the future, a G8 will assemble!’ (The Japan Times, 21 June 1997: 6). In the run-up to the summit, issues mooted for discussion aside from the progress of Russia’s economic and political reforms included, on the political side: Iran, Hong Kong, China’s possible participation in the summit, terrorism, international organised crime, drug trafficking and a Japanese proposal to discuss rising tensions within the Cambodian leadership (Mainichi Shinbun, 26 May 1997: 1; The Japan Times, 19 June 1997: 1). On the economic side, the effects of globalisation in terms of unemployment, aging societies, financial crisis prevention, protection of the world’s oceans from pollution, strengthening of the global free trade system by including China within the WTO and the provision of aid for the LDCs were highlighted by the government as issues for discussion (Asahi Shinbun, 4 June 1997: 3; Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 June 1997: 2). In addition, the summit was expected to provide both an opportunity to reaffirm the findings of the April meeting of G7 finance ministers in Washington, which asserted the need for exchange rates to reflect economic fundamentals and not to diverge too greatly from these fundamentals, and to discuss the Hashimoto administration’s measures to promote deregulation and stimulate growth through domestic demand (Asahi Shinbun, 17 June 1997: 11; The Japan Times, 18 June 1997: 12). Hashimoto left for Denver on the evening of 19 June, pledging not to raise the Northern Territories’ dispute during the summit but to urge Yeltsin to resolve the issue during their bilateral meeting. As usual, a series of bilateral meetings were conducted before and after the summit. Hashimoto met with Clinton on the afternoon of 19 June to discuss Japan’s growing trade surplus with the US and agreed on measures to continue deregulation within Japan and stimulate US exports to Japan. On political matters, an interim report on revision of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan–US Defence Cooperation released on 8 June was discussed, China’s possible participation in the summit was touched upon and in addition Clinton backed Hashimoto by agreeing to urge Yeltsin to resolve the Northern Territories’

114 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 dispute (Asahi Shinbun, 20 June 1997 evening edition: 1–2; The Japan Times, 21 June 1997: 1, 6). Japanese–Russian relations were addressed when Hashimoto met with Yeltsin for breakfast on 20 June before the summit began to discuss the possible installation of a hotline between the Kremlin and the prime minister’s residence and agree to instigate annual visits between the two leaders. In addition to Hashimoto calling for resolution of the bilateral territorial dispute and Yeltsin expressing support for Japan’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat, the two leaders also signed a joint agreement to develop the natural resources of the RFE (Asahi Shinbun, 21 June 1997 evening edition: 1–2; The Japan Times, 22 June 1997: 1, 4; Wanner 1997). Hashimoto met the same day with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to discuss a range of bilateral issues and the impact of European monetary union (The Japan Times, 22 June 1997: 4). The summit officially began with a working dinner on the evening of 20 June during which regional insecurity was discussed, especially in Bosnia, Cambodia and the Middle East. Hashimoto expressed his particular concern over Cambodia, the need to act quickly and garnered the support of his summit colleagues for his proposal to despatch the special envoys of both France and Japan to Phnom Penh (Asahi Shinbun, 22 June 1997: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 22 July 1997: 1–3). During the second day’s discussions, Hashimoto put forward a range of proposals to protect the environment in East Asia including monitoring of acid rain and protection of coral reefs and called for Japan to be represented on the UNSC. In addition, an economic statement entitled ‘Confronting Global Economic and Financial Challenges’ was released on the second day in the name of the G7, not including Russia (The Japan Times, 23 June 1997: 4; Mainichi Shinbun, 23 June 1997: 1–4). The Japanese government’s tasks were summarised as follows: Japan has the objective of achieving strong domestic demand-led growth and avoiding a significant increase in its external surplus. Further structural reforms, including broader deregulation initiatives and appropriate structural reforms in the fiscal area, are important over the medium term to revitalize the Japanese economy further. (G8 2003) In the communiqué and statements, released on the third and final day, a whole range of issues were addressed including conflict resolution in Bosnia and Cambodia, landmines, terrorism, environmental issues, aging societies, human rights, international organised crime and UN reform. The Japanese government was praised in particular for contributing to conflict resolution in Cambodia, but also for its input into the political declaration’s section on anti-terrorism measures and its agreement to host a conference on the subject to be attended by Asia Pacific nations. This active policy was possibly in reaction to the four-month seizure of the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru in December 1996 by Tupac Amaru guerrillas (Atsumi 1997; Wanner 1997). To facilitate the initiative on Cambodia, Imagawa Yukio, former Japanese Ambassador to Cambodia, visited Phnom Penh a few days

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 115 later on behalf of the summit leaders (Mainichi Shinbun, 24 June 1997: 2). In addition, the protection of human rights in post-reversion Hong Kong (the reversion took place just over a week after the summit) was affirmed and during the final day’s photo call, Russia’s position as a member of the G8 was confirmed, despite Hashimoto’s misgivings and much to Yeltsin’s satisfaction (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 June 1997 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 24 June 1997: 7). Finally, as well as summarising the discussion of, and suggestions to deal with, aging societies, the communiqué referred to Hashimoto’s ‘World Welfare Initiative’ from the Lyon Summit and stated that ‘Prime Minister Hashimoto’s “Initiative for a Caring World” has provided us [with] the opportunity to focus on the implications of these developments’ (G8 2003). After the summit was concluded, Hashimoto travelled with other leaders to New York and attended the UN special session on the environment. Whilst there he met with South Korean President Kim Young-Sam and explained how at Denver he had linked the issue of assistance for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) to assistance for Chernobyl, and stressed the importance of its work to the Europeans (Mainichi Shinbun, 24 June 1997: 2). Thereafter, he flew to the Netherlands for the Japan–EU Summit, and Norway for a meeting with leaders of five Scandinavian countries, and finally having raised a number of issues of Asian concern ‘return[ed] to Tokyo having made important points about the world that Denver otherwise all but forgot’ (The Japan Times, 28 June 1997: 21). According to Asahi Shinbun opinion polls conducted before, during and after the summit, the approval rating for the Hashimoto administration increased from 44.3 per cent in May to 49.1 per cent in June and to 50.1 per cent in July, and the disapproval rating decreased from 41.8 per cent to 36.1 per cent and to 35.5 per cent over the same time period (Asahi Shinbun, 25 June 1997: 2; Asahi Shinbun, 24 July 1997: 2). However, the expansion of this mechanism of global governance from the G7 to the G8 was regarded by some as ominous for Japan. Emeritus Professor Kamiya Fuji of Keio¯ University suggested that Japan might be placed in a difficult position by adding another European state in the form of Russia to the summit membership: Japan’s position in the G7 was not so bad. The US, Germany and Japan were once called locomotives of the world economy. But Japan’s position in the G8 is extremely vulnerable. It could become isolated in the G8 if it makes a bad move. . . . I would not rule out the possibility that the G8 could give Japan trouble instead of helping it. (The Japan Times, 30 June 1997: 20)

Birmingham, UK, 15–17 May 1998 The Birmingham Summit was the fourth time the UK played the role of host and was novel in three ways: (1) it was the first summit to be held outside of London; (2) it was the first summit to use the title of G8; and (3) it was also the first summit to separate the meetings of the summit leaders from the foreign and finance ministerial meetings, which took place in London from 8–9 May 1998, in order to

116 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 streamline the work of the summit and return it to its informal roots (see Toki no Ugoki 1998). The foreign ministers’ meeting discussed regional security issues such as Cambodia (extending support for the role of ASEAN and Japan), Kosovo (calling for sanctions against the Federal Yugoslav Republic (FYR) without reaching a consensus with Russia), and the Middle Eastern peace process. Global issues such as the environment, disarmament, a comprehensive anti-landmine ban and reform of the UN were also discussed. The meeting gave MOFA Minister Obuchi Keizo¯ the opportunity to meet his Russian counterpart Yevgeny Primakov on 8 May and discuss the resolution of the Northern Territories’ dispute and the conclusion of a peace treaty. Obuchi also met with his US counterpart Madeleine Albright on the same morning to discuss civil unrest in Indonesia in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 May 1998: 1; The Japan Times, 10 May 1998: 1–2). A month earlier, Japan’s economic recovery had been singled out at the previous G7 finance ministers’ meeting in Washington with calls for effective fiscal measures and structural reform (Mainichi Shinbun, 16 April 1998 evening edition: 1). The finance ministers’ meeting in London (from which Russia was excluded on the first day) focused on the Japanese government’s economic stimulus package totalling ¥16.6 trillion and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯’s ‘big bang’ initiative to revitalise the Japanese financial system. In addition, international cooperation was promised to prevent the East Asian economic and financial crises developing into a severe political or social crisis. Before the meeting, MOF Minister Matsunaga Hikaru met with his US counterpart Robert Rubin on the morning of 8 May to discuss the value of the yen and the Japanese government’s efforts to stimulate the economy. He was urged to continue with the ‘big bang’ reforms and settle the problem of Japan’s non-performing loans (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 May 1998: 1; The Japan Times, 10 May 1998: 1). Both sets of ministers came together on the final day with the Managing Director of the IMF, the president of the World Bank and the Director General of the WTO to discuss the topics of development and electronic commerce (Asahi Shinbun, 10 May 1998: 2). Other issues that seemed likely to dominate discussion at the summit leaders’ meeting included unemployment and the East Asian economic and financial crises, which was beginning to cause political and social turmoil in Indonesia with the future of the government of President Suharto in doubt. On the political side of the agenda, transnational organised crime, IT and the millennium bug were mooted as special themes for the summit by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair (The Japan Times, 26 April 1998: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 26 April 1998: 1). The Japanese government was also eager to discuss underground Indian nuclear testing within the framework of the G8 (Yomiuri Shinbun, 12 May 1998: 2). In addition, Hashimoto was credited with developing his own study group and consequent report for discussion at Birmingham on creating a global framework of parasite control (The Japan Times, 4 May 1998: 2). It appeared that Russian President Boris Yeltsin was eager to continue the process of Russia’s full acceptance into the summit process by using incremental, piecemeal, or ‘skilful salami tactics’ (Bayne 2001b: 4). To this end, at Birmingham, he sought

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 117 the G8 leaders and Japanese government’s acceptance of his proposal to host the 2000 summit and for Japan to shift its role as host to 2001. A Yomiuri Shinbun cartoon made light of this by depicting Yeltsin asking another favour of a weary Hashimoto but this time to borrow his 2000 summit necktie (Mainichi Shinbun, 13 May 1998: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 May 1998: 2). Hashimoto left for the UK on the evening of 14 May after the announcement of the Japanese government’s suspension of new yen loans as an extra sanction against India in reaction to its nuclear testing (Asahi Shinbun, 15 May 1998: 1–2). Thus, this issue was placed immediately on the summit agenda as yet another that allowed the Japanese government to play the role of Asian representative. Before the summit began, Hashimoto met with US President Bill Clinton in the morning and both leaders pledged cooperation in dealing with the issues of India’s nuclear tests and riots in Indonesia. Both leaders agreed to cooperate in ensuring Pakistani restraint and seeking a strong statement condemning the Indian government’s actions from fellow summiteers on the one hand, and agreed to promote dialogue between the Suharto regime and the Indonesian people on the other hand. Clinton also praised Hashimoto’s efforts to revitalise the Japanese economy but called for structural reform especially in the banking system. Hashimoto also met with Blair at lunchtime on the same day to discuss bilateral issues and India’s nuclear testing. In the afternoon, Hashimoto met with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to exchange opinions on this issue, the reaction of Pakistan and the need for the summit leaders to issue a strong statement (Asahi Shinbun, 16 May 1998: 7; The Japan Times, 16 May 1998: 1, 13; Yomiuri Shinbun, 16 May 1998: 1, 3, 5). The summit began on the afternoon of 15 May with G7 discussion, excluding Russia, of anti-inflationary measures in the US, Hashimoto’s economic stimulus package and structural reform in Japan, and measures to prevent a reoccurrence of the East Asian economic crisis through the strengthening of the international financial architecture – all included in the chairman’s statement released the same day (Yomiuri Shinbun, 16 May 1998 evening edition: 1–2). Discussions during the working dinner included Russia and focused on regional conflicts, civil unrest in Indonesia and India’s nuclear tests. A special statement on regional issues was released the same day calling on Suharto to practice restraint and promote dialogue, in addition to expressing ‘grave concern’ about the Indian government’s actions, but the leaders were unable to agree on any concrete punishment, with Europe opposed to sanctions, in contrast to Canada, Japan and the US (The Japan Times, 17 May 1998: 1; G8 2003). During the afternoon of the first day’s meetings, Hashimoto met with Yeltsin privately and in response to the latter’s request to host the 2000 summit promised to explore the proposal as part of a strategy to placate Yeltsin and extract a concession on the Northern Territories’ dispute (Mainichi Shinbun, 16 May 1998 2). However, both MOF and MOFA expressed doubts about the proposal and by the final day Hashimoto, eager to protect Japan’s status and position within the summit process, was cooler on the proposal citing objections from Italy and Canada, who would follow in the rotation, and his own dislike for the possibility of Japan going to the end of the rotation (Mainichi Shinbun, 17 May 1998: 2; Bayne 2000: 155).

118 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 On the second day, the leaders retired to Weston Park, a stately home to the southwest of Birmingham, to discuss informally other agenda items and release statements on both drugs and international crime, and the Northern Ireland peace process. Hashimoto announced his initiative on parasite control in the developing world and his intention to establish research centres in Africa and Asia to assist in the training of specialists. The afternoon meetings on the second day were cut short so that Blair could watch the English Football Association Cup final in which his favourite team, Newcastle United, was playing. Hashimoto even went as far as to join Blair in sending the team a handwritten good luck message (The Japan Times, 17 May 1998: 4; Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 May 1998: 1–3). In the evening, Hashimoto gave a press conference at which he pledged to settle Japan’s non-performing loans and explore reforming the tax system. A final meeting was held on the third day to announce the final communiqué, which declared support for the IMF’s policies in East Asia, urged the WTO to broaden multilateral liberalisation, called for cooperation in parasite control and the prevention of contagious diseases, highlighted the millennium bug and unemployment issues, and pledged a reduction in greenhouse emissions (The Japan Times, 18 May 1998: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 May 1998: 1–4). Hashimoto arrived back in Japan on the morning of 18 May having been awarded a ‘B’ for his performance by the G8 Research Group at Toronto University that just fell short of the pass mark of ‘B plus’ (Yomiuri Shinbun, 19 May 1998: 13; the G8 Research Group is an independent organisation promoting research on various aspects of the summit). Although the drunken state of the Japanese economy was parodied in a Birmingham pub’s sale of the high-alcohol ‘Hashimoto’s Tokyo Tipple’, much to Hashimoto’s relief the focus on India, Indonesia and the East Asian economic crisis deflected the summit’s attention from Japan’s economic problems (Yomiuri Shinbun, 16 May 1998: 3; The Japan Times, 18 May 1998: 5). The Japanese public’s reaction was largely positive: according to Mainichi Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Hashimoto administration increased from 24 per cent in April to 27 per cent in May, and the disapproval rating decreased from 50 per cent to 41 per cent over the same time period (Mainichi Shinbun, 27 May 1998: 1–2). However, despite placing a number of Asian issues high up the agenda of the Birmingham Summit, the reaction of the Japanese press was almost unanimous in dismissing the summit as a lost opportunity to address concretely these pressing issues (The Japan Times, 7 June 1998: 18). Two emergency meetings were held after the Birmingham Summit. First, the emergency meeting of G8 foreign ministers to discuss Indian and Pakistani nuclear testing took place in London on 12 June. At this meeting, Obuchi proposed holding a meeting in Tokyo to promote dialogue between the two countries and thereafter took a leading role in the creation of a Senior Officers Task Force (SOTF) to address this issue, although these proposals were not included in the final communiqué. It was decided that non-humanitarian loans to both countries would be frozen and statements were also included on disarmament, based on Japanese proposals, regarding the promotion of the CTBT and the earliest possible commencement and

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 119 conclusion of negotiations for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III (START III) (Asahi Shinbun, 13 June 1998: 1–3; Asahi Shinbun, 29 June 1998 evening edition: 2). Second, the G7 finance ministers met with representatives of ten Asian nations on 20 June in Tokyo to discuss the East Asian economic and financial crises. This meeting highlighted the need for the Japanese government to implement stimulus measures and restructure its financial system, in addition to welcoming the Chinese government’s pledge not to devalue its currency (The Japan Times, 21 June 1998: 1–2).

Cologne, Germany, 18–20 June 1999 The Cologne Summit continued the trend set at Birmingham of separating the meeting of the summit leaders from those of the foreign and finance ministers (see Sekai no Ugoki Rinji Zo¯kan 1999; Toki no Ugoki 1999). The overarching theme for the summit was globalisation, the promotion of its benefits and the minimisation of its iniquities. Thus, in the run-up to the summit a plan entitled the Cologne Debt Initiative was put together to expand the provision of debt relief to the poorest nations (The Japan Times, 8 June 1999: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 10 June 1999: 1, 9). Other political and economic issues placed on the summit’s agenda for discussion included non-proliferation (an issue of concern to Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo¯ as regards North Korea’s missile development), conflict resolution in Kosovo, Cyprus and the Middle East, the strengthening of the international monetary and financial systems to deal with hedge funds and the sudden movement of capital, employment, education and the development of human potential (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 May 1999: 1; Mainichi Shinbun evening edition, 31 May 1999: 1). The summit also continued the trend of integrating Russia into the process to the degree that US President Bill Clinton emphasised, in an interview with a Russian television network, that ‘[t]here is a G8 now. Not a G7, but a G8’ (The Japan Times, 22 June 1999: 6). The foreign ministers’ meetings took place from 9–10 June 1999 in Cologne to discuss conflict resolution and weapons proliferation including concrete issues such as conflict in Kosovo and a number of Asian issues including Indonesia, Myanmar and a Japanese proposal to address North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons’ programme (The Japan Times, 10 May 1999: 1; The Japan Times, 9 June 1999: 3). Previously, the foreign ministers, including MOFA Minister Ko¯mura Masahiko, had met for an emergency meeting on 6 May in Petersberg, Germany to discuss the conflict in Kosovo and issued a statement calling for the withdrawal of all military forces from Kosovo, the deployment of UN-endorsed ‘effective international civil and security presences’, and an interim UN-approved administration (Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 May 1999: 1, 6–7). As a result of Russian disapproval and criticism of the role played by NATO (of which it was, and still is, not a member) in addressing the Kosovo conflict, the G8 became the preferred vehicle for resolution of the conflict that encompassed the main European powers, the US and Russia. Discussions at the Cologne meeting built upon the Petersberg meeting and resulted in statements and the signing of the Southeastern Europe Stability Pact that ensured a Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo, an end to the NATO bombing campaign, the despatch of a peacekeeping force and the provision of assistance for surrounding Balkan states

120 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 (The Japan Times, 11 June 1999: 1, 5; for an examination of Japan and the G8’s role in the Kosovo crisis, see Gilson 2000; Penttilä 2003: 44–6). The financial burden to be shouldered by Japan was parodied in a Yomiuri Shinbun cartoon that depicted withdrawing FYR troops in the background and in the foreground Ko¯mura, laden down with the baggage of expanded assistance for reconstruction, a human contribution and the G8 foreign ministers’ meeting, wondering whether this would be a chance for Japan’s participation (Yomiuri Shinbun, 11 June 1999: 2). In addition to Kosovo, Ko¯mura worked to promote Japan’s conception of, and role in, a comprehensive, non-military definition of ‘human security’, which would be one pillar of the 2000 Okinawa Summit’s agenda. Ko¯mura also worked to ensure that support for South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ of engagement with North Korea was included in the final statement, alongside calls for internal stability in Indonesia, the future resolution of the East Timor issue, and for North Korea to act constructively on humanitarian issues – a veiled reference to the incidents of Japanese nationals thought at the time, and later confirmed, to have been abducted by North Korean agents (racchi jiken) (Mainichi Shinbun, 10 June 1999: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 11 June 1999: 2). The G7 finance ministers met in Frankfurt on 12 June and MOF Minister Miyazawa Kiichi attended. The meeting focused mostly on debt relief, agreeing to expand the number of recipient nations and the scale of debt forgiveness. Measures were also discussed to strengthen the global financial architecture in order to address hedge funds and prevent a reoccurrence of the East Asian economic crisis. Miyazawa explained recent developments in the Japanese economy and, although no further demands were made of Japan specifically at the meeting, US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin later called on the Japanese government to continue with its domestic demand-led growth (The Japan Times, 13 June 1999: 1, 5; Mainichi Shinbun, 13 June 1999: 3, 7). However, as regards financial assistance for Kosovo and the final decision on specific amounts, divisions were reported to be appearing between the foreign and finance ministers (Mainichi Shinbun, 19 June 1999: 2). Obuchi left for Cologne on the afternoon of 17 June as part of an eight-day official visit to Europe emboldened by news that the Japanese economy had grown in the last quarter; as one MOFA official was quoted as saying ‘Japan can now demonstrate its resolve to pursue self-sustained recovery with confidence’ (The Japan Times, 17 June 1999: 3). En route to Cologne, Obuchi declared that he would stress developments in North Korea to fellow summit leaders and make proposals for the strengthening of the UN with Japan playing a central role in the future hopefully as a permanent UNSC member (The Japan Times, 19 June 1999: 1). Obuchi conducted a number of bilateral meetings before the summit officially began. He met Clinton on the morning of 18 June to discuss US–Chinese relations and security issues such as joint research in Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) and Japan’s financial contributions to Russia’s dismantling of its nuclear arsenal. In addition trade issues were addressed and Clinton urged Obuchi to prevent the rise of protectionist sentiments in the US by addressing the trade imbalance. On the same morning Obuchi also met the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to discuss bilateral trade issues. In the afternoon Obuchi met with German Chancellor

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 121 Gerhard Schröder to discuss the Kosovo peace process and pledge cooperation in both nations’ acquisition of permanent seats on the UNSC as part of a broader reform of the UN (The Japan Times, 19 June 1999: 1, 14; Mainichi Shinbun, 19 June 1999: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 19 June 1999: 1–3). The Cologne Summit began on the afternoon of 18 June with a meeting of the G7 focused on economic and financial issues and thus excluded Russia. Optimism was expressed about the world economy, Obuchi was able to report in positive terms about Japanese economic recovery and plans were approved for the expansion of debt relief to the world’s poorest nations that would cancel US$70 billion in total. As regards the global financial architecture, proposals were made to strengthen the IMF and address the issue of hedge funds and the regulation of short-term capital flows in order to avoid a repetition of the East Asian economic and financial crises (The Japan Times, 19 June 1999: 1, 13; The Japan Times, 20 June 1999: 1). These discussions were summarised in the G7 statement released the same day that also stated in the case of Japan that ‘it is still essential to implement stimulus measures until domestic demand-led growth is restored and to pursue structural measures to enhance the economy’s efficiency and competitiveness’ (G8 2003). The topic of developing human potential in increasingly knowledge-based societies and economies was addressed in the ‘Cologne Charter: aims and ambitions for lifelong learning’, promoted by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and released the same day. The working dinner on the first day included Russia and discussions focused on Kosovo. Obuchi pledged not only financial contributions in addition to the US$200 million already promised to assist in the reconstruction of Kosovo, but also indicated his intention to make a human, civilian contribution. He also pressed the case for constructive engagement with China in light of the conflict in Kosovo and the accidental US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, in addition to calling for the reform and strengthening of the UNSC to address conflict. Japan traditionally had distant relations with the Balkans and for some commentators Obuchi’s activism on the issue of Kosovo was seen as an attempt to play a more responsible role within international society and secure a permanent UNSC seat (Yomiuri Shinbun, 19 June 1999 evening edition: 1–2; The Japan Times, 20 June 1999: 5). In encapsulating Japan’s role in Kosovo, an Asahi Shinbun cartoon portrayed Obuchi driving a tank in the shape of a money bag transporting bundles of dollars and yen behind Clinton’s NATO tank (Asahi Shinbun, 19 June 1999: 2). The second day’s discussions focused on the WTO in light of the safety of genetically modified foods, a new round of multilateral trade negotiations and the membership of China and Russia (Yomiuri Shinbun, 20 June 1999: 1–2). Discussions also continued to centre upon conflict resolution in Kosovo and Obuchi’s position was that Kosovo was ‘not just a European problem, but one facing the global community as a whole’ and to this end the Japanese government would contribute personnel and financial aid to the reconstruction of Kosovo (The Japan Times, 20 June 1999: 6). In comparison, and as regards North Korea’s missile programme, Obuchi appealed to his fellow summiteers to issue a strong warning to deter any further missile launches (a cause of particular concern to Japan after the launch of a Taepodong-1 missile over its territory on 31 August 1998), and stressed that this

122 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 problem was one of global non-proliferation and not just confined to Northeast Asia (Mainichi Shinbun, 20 June 1999: 3). On the morning of 20 June, Obuchi met with Russian President Boris Yeltsin to discuss bilateral issues, chiefly the conclusion of a peace treaty by 2000 and resolution of the Northern Territories’ dispute (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 June 1999: 2). During the summit meetings on this final day, Obuchi continued to make assertive appeals to his G8 partners, especially the Russian delegation, as regards North Korea’s nuclear missile programme and the necessity of making a strong statement reflecting the Japanese government’s concerns. The G8 statement on regional issues was released on this day and called on India and Pakistan to resolve tensions over Kashmir and pledged close cooperation both between summit members and with a range of international organisations over Kosovo (Asahi Shinbun, 21 June 1999: 1–3, 7; The Japan Times, 21 June 1999: 1, 6). The communiqué was also released on this day and amongst many issues stated that the G8 nations were ‘deeply concerned’ as regards North Korea’s missile programme (G8 2003). In addition, several sections in the communiqué, especially on the poorest developing nations, education and globalisation, were the result of Japanese insistence (Kondo¯ 1999: 19–28). According to Mainichi Shinbun opinion polls conducted before and after the summit, the approval rating for the Obuchi administration increased from 39 per cent in June to 43 per cent in July, and the disapproval rating decreased from 29 per cent to 24 per cent over the same time period (Mainichi Shinbun, 13 July 1999: 1–2). After the summit was concluded, Obuchi continued his official tour of Europe by visiting the UK and Iceland and returned to Japan on the morning of 24 June having promoted a number of Asian security issues and with attention now firmly focused on Okinawa as the venue for the next summit and first to be held outside Tokyo. To this end, Okinawan Governor Inamine Keiichi and a delegation visited the Cologne Summit to observe the organisation of a regional summit and the promotion of that venue (Asahi Shinbun, 21 June 1999: 34; The Japan Times, 29 June 1999: 16).

Okinawa, Japan, 21–3 July 2000 Although officially named the Kyu¯shu¯-Okinawa Summit, the final summit of the twentieth century soon came to be known simply as the Okinawa Summit. This was the first time a venue outside Tokyo had been selected and the Bankoku Shinryo¯kan (Hall of the Bridge over the Nations of the World) was constructed in Nago City especially for the summit (see Gaiko¯ Fo¯ramu Zo¯kango¯ 2000; Nago Samitto Suishin Shimin Kaigi 2000; Okinawa Taimusu 2000; Sekai no Ugoki Rinji Zo¯kan 2000; Summit 2000 Guide 2000; Toki no Ugoki 2000a; Toki no Ugoki 2000b; MOFA 2001; Okinawaken Biru Mentenansu Kyo¯kai 2001). The idea of Okinawa hosting the summit had emerged some years previously. In a July 1996 article in Sankei Shinbun Okamoto Yukio, former MOFA official and President of Okamoto Associates, a private consulting firm, suggested the idea of Okinawa as summit host (The Japan Times, 20 July 2000: B1). On 30 June 1997, ¯ ta Masahide stated at the Okinawan prefectural assembly Okinawan Governor O

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 123 meeting that ‘[h]osting the summit will be a great opportunity for us to show to the rest of the country and the world the prefecture’s aim of creating an open, international city within Okinawa’ (The Japan Times, 1 July 1997: 2). And in support a signature campaign was conducted, the only one of its kind organised amongst the rival venues, which totalled 200,000 signatures when finally submitted to the government in Tokyo – a considerable support rate given that the total population of Okinawa in 1999 was 1.3 million (Okinawa Taimusu, 14 April 1999: 3; Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 30 April 1999: 2, 5; Okinawa-ken Kikaku Kaihatsubu To¯keika 2002: 16). The bidding process was long and complicated with the government at one point reported as having chosen Fukuoka as the venue (The Japan Times, 26 April 1998: 4). Aside from Fukuoka and Okinawa, cities competing for the prize included Chiba, ¯ saka, Miyazaki, Sapporo and Yokohama. The prefectural government Hiroshima, O ¯ in Osaka went as far as constructing a ¥57 billion (US$470 million) conference centre on the assumption that it would be awarded the summit (The Japan Times, 9 May 1999: 3). The final decision rested with Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo¯ and was announced on the morning of 29 April 1999 by Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu. Okinawa had been ranked last in terms of the facilities and infrastructure necessary to host the summit and, thus, its selection came as a surprise to both the nation and the prefecture. As Nogami Yoshiji, sherpa for the Okinawa and Genoa Summits, wrote after the event ‘Okinawa, frankly, lagged behind in terms of its infrastructure. While the Okinawa prefectural government hoped to be selected, most people predicted that it would not happen’ (Nogami 2000a: 329). In fact, the two local newspapers in Okinawa both reported on the day before the decision was announced that Okinawa was likely to be awarded the environment ministers’ meeting (Okinawa Taimusu, 28 April 2000: 1; Ryo¯kyo¯ Shinpo¯, 28 April 2000 evening edition: 1). As a result of this sudden reversal in Okinawa’s fortunes there was some controversy regarding the government’s intention in hosting the summit there. Obuchi was in favour of Okinawa for a number of reasons that deserve examination in turn. First, he hoped that Okinawa’s hosting of the summit would have a positive economic effect in the poorest prefecture of Japan (The Japan Times, 1 May 1999: 2). Obuchi was reported as having a sentimental view of Okinawa having visited there as a student. Okinawa Governor Inamine Keiichi, who had ¯ ta in November 1998, foresaw won the Okinawan governor’s election against O ‘immeasurable economic effects’ for the hotel industry and IT industries (The Japan Times, 25 March 2000: 2). It was estimated that approximately 4,000 media journalists would descend upon Okinawa (Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 26 June 2000 evening edition: 5). Furthermore, Washita – a national chain of nine shops specialising in Okinawan products and summit-related Okinawan products such as a commemorative can of Orion beer – reported growing interest and sales in all things Okinawan partly as a result of the summit (The Japan Times, 10 May 2000: 3). However, the tight security surrounding the summit and the closing of a number of hotels to tourists also had a negative effect upon Okinawa’s economy, usually so dependent on the summer months for its tourist trade (The Japan Times, 17 May 2000: 3; The Japan Times, 19 July 2000: 3; Mainichi Shinbun, 24 July 2000: 9) – an effect that was also

124 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 predicted at the G8 foreign ministers’ meeting in Fukuoka before the summit and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 (The Japan Times, 30 June 2000: 16). Second, Obuchi hoped that hosting the summit in Okinawa would give the summit an Asian slant and an emphasis on regional issues. At a House of Representatives’ foreign affairs committee meeting on 23 July 1999, MOFA Minister Ko¯mura Masahiko stated that he was considering how to make the 2000 Summit both Asian and Okinawan and to this end was considering holding a meeting of the leaders of various Asian nations before the summit (Mainichi Shinbun, 24 July 1999: 2). On 6 January 2000, whilst visiting MOFA’s summit preparation office, Obuchi pledged that ‘I intend to fully convey Asian voices to my G8 counterparts as the summit will be held in Asia for the first time in seven years’ (The Japan Times, 7 January 2000: 2). Four days later, he left on a three-day tour of Cambodia, Laos and Thailand to garner the opinions of ASEAN states on the summit agenda during which he again stressed that his government would ‘pay sufficient heed to Asian voices while doing its best to prepare for the summit’ (The Japan Times, 15 January 2000: 1). Later in the month, Obuchi instructed the Japanese ambassadors of twenty-four Asia Pacific nations to sound out their host governments on issues to be raised at Okinawa and ‘to cement Japan’s commitment in serving as a close friend’ (The Japan Times, 22 January 2000: 3). Ko¯mura’s successor as MOFA Minister, Ko¯no Yo¯hei, reiterated this objective by announcing in a Diet speech of his call on fellow summit members ‘to be aware of the Asian perspective and pay due consideration to the diversity of cultures and civilisations’ (The Japan Times, 29 January 2000: 4). He also conducted a five-day visit of East Timor, Indonesia and Singapore from 28 April to continue the process of gathering Asian views on the upcoming summit (The Japan Times, 26 April 2000: 2). Subsequently, he announced his intention to visit South Korea directly before the summit to discuss the North–South dialogue with Kim Dae-Jung (Yomiuri Shinbun, 4 July 2000: 1). What is more, and although the Japanese government had announced a month before the summit that it would not raise the issue of China–Taiwan relations, Chang Chun-Hsiung, Chief Secretary of the Taiwanese government proposed that ‘Okinawa provides an ideal venue for a possible summit for the representatives of China and Taiwan. . . . I hope that the joint declaration by the G8 Summit will make a reference to our issue’ (The Japan Times, 23 June 2000: 2; Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 24 July 2000 special edition: 19). Finally, a number of commentators suspected that by choosing Nago as the venue for the meetings of the summit leaders, the Japanese government was attempting to garner support for the relocation of the US air base at Futenma to Henoko in Nago and press home the issue before the summit opened (The Japan Times, 7 May 1999: 20). Under the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) the US and Japanese governments had agreed to maintain the levels of US military personnel but return or close a number of US military bases and relocate the Futenma air base possibly with a fifteen-year limit on its use. However, this linkage of the summit with the relocation of Futenma air base was rejected at an early stage by Inamine (as it constitutes a US–Japanese bilateral issue, this linkage is explored in more detail in Chapter 6).

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 125 For the people of Okinawa and a number of NGOs the summit provided an opportunity to bring attention to their separate identity and history and the burden and threat to their own security they had shouldered by hosting the vast majority of US military bases in Japan. Both these sentiments were echoed by Inamine when he wrote that: We hope summit delegates, visitors and the media will take a close look at Okinawa. In particular, I hope both world leaders and the press will look very carefully at the military presence on our islands. I would like President Clinton to consider the burden that these bases place on Okinawa, and to remember that approximately 75 per cent of the total land area exclusively used by US forces in Japan is located here. I feel it is time for a reconsideration. Secondly, many people think of Japan as a homogenous nation, but those who visit Okinawa soon recognize its unique history and culture. . . . In many ways, we are already an international society, and we believe our traditions and arts will show world leaders how diverse Japan really is. (International Herald Tribune, 17 March 2000: 21) This burden was brought home during the run-up to the summit by the assault upon an Okinawa teenage girl by a drunken US marine in her home on 3 July – thereafter a ban on alcohol was imposed on US military personnel during the summit (The Japan Times, 8 July 2000: 2). However, it appeared that the government in Tokyo was attempting to play down this side of Okinawa by calling on the US government to cease flights from the Kadena air base during the summit and using a civilian airport for the arrival of Clinton, thereby masking the usual levels of noise pollution from the world’s leaders and media (The Japan Times, 17 February 2000: 2). Other groups within Japan also seized on the opportunity provided by the summit. The cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki organised an A-bomb exhibition in Okinawa to coincide with the summit and sent invitations to the summit leaders in order to convey the meaning of the atrocities (Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 22 July 2000 evening edition: 3). NGOs were organised under the umbrella group, Jubilee 2000, which organised an international conference on 19 July 2000 to highlight the debt issue in developing nations (Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 20 July 2000: 31). Security, as always, was a major issue in the run-up to and during the summit and to this end approximately 22,000 police officers and 140 patrol boats of the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) were mobilised in light of the Battle of Seattle between police officers and anti-globalisation protestors at the WTO meeting of late November 1999 (Okinawa Taimusu, 5 August 2000 evening edition: 3). So many officers were flown in from Tokyo so that the annual Sumida river fireworks display was postponed for a month due to the scarcity of police in Tokyo (The Japan Times, 9 May 2000: 2). Plans were even explored to despatch an Aegis-equipped destroyer to patrol the waters off Okinawa (The Japan Times, 17 May 2000: 3). Finally, a medical team was kept on alert in case of a biological or chemical terrorist attack (The Japan Times, 15 July 2000: 3).

126 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 As regards participation, the idea of the Chinese government attending in some capacity was mooted. The Japanese government sounded out other summit members and the leader of the coalition party Ko¯meito¯ Kanzaki Takenori informally asked Chinese government officials in November 1999 to participate as an observer (The Japan Times, 16 February 2000: 1–2). However, before a formal invitation could be issued, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that it was not interested in attending the summit. Within the Chinese government concern existed over the choice of Okinawa as the venue for the summit due to the presence of US bases, seen to be targeting China. In addition, its position was one of opposition to the summit process in general, which was seen to be nothing more than an exclusive, selfappointed club with no legality, and instead emphasis was placed on the central role of the UN in international politics (The Japan Times, 23 February 2000: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun, 23 April 2000: 1). However, this position failed to deter the Japanese government and Inamine called on MOFA to continue to court China (The Japan Times, 11 March 2000: 3). Eventually, Chinese Premier of the State Council Zhu Rongji announced that he would visit Japan in October 2000 but that this official visit was unconnected with the summit (The Japan Times, 16 March 2000: 1). Despite this refusal, the Japan Productivity Centre for Socio-Economic Development (Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu) released a proposal on 13 April entitled ‘Okinawa inishiatibu: Okinawa, Nihon, soshite sekai’ (Okinawa Initiative: Okinawa, Japan and the world’, which proposed inviting China to the summit as part of an effort to promote regional security (Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu 2000; Yonetani 2001: 94). Planning the summit’s agenda began on 12 May 1999 with the government’s first preparatory meeting and included the cooperation of twelve ministries and agencies, including MOFA, MOF, MITI, MOJ, Japan Defence Agency (JDA), Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) (The Japan Times, 13 May 1999: 2). With the same objective, meetings of the sherpas took place in the run-up to the summit and called for the strengthening of international mechanisms to fight moneylaundering, the promotion of IT to bridge the ‘digital divide’, and further arms control measures (The Japan Times, 15 May 2000: 4; The Japan Times, 17 May 2000: 1). Plans were also drawn up to evacuate the summit to Tokyo in case a typhoon struck Okinawa (The Japan Times, 4 May 2000: 3). A number of ministerial summit meetings took place before the Okinawa Summit. A three-day meeting of G8 police, justice and foreign officials on transnational organised crime opened in Tokyo on 7 February 2000. Meetings of G8 education ministers were held in Tokyo and Okinawa from 1–3 April to discuss IT’s role in education (The Japan Times, 3 April 2000: 1). Meanwhile, a meeting of environment ministers was held in Shiga Prefecture from 7–9 April to promote adoption of the Kyo¯to Protocol (The Japan Times, 11 April 2000: 1–2). In addition, the G7 finance ministers met in Fukuoka at the City Museum on 8 July and the foreign ministers met in Miyazaki at the Seagaia resort and convention facility from 12–13 July (Kurihara et al. 2000; Matsuo 2000a; Matsuo 2000b). Whilst protests in favour of debt cancellation by Jubilee 2000 took place in Fukuoka, the finance ministers’ meeting highlighted the continuing need for structural reform, the importance of the IT revolution in strengthening the international financial

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 127 system, the promotion of a rapid and effective reduction of the poorest nations’ debt and agreed measures to reform the IMF (Mainichi Shinbun, 9 July 2000: 1). MOF Minister Miyazawa Kiichi was not singled out for criticism but, rather, received support and encouragement for his monetary and fiscal policies (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 July 2000: 1–2, 9). Meanwhile at the foreign ministers’ meeting, although US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was unable to attend, South African and Nigerian representatives of, respectively, NAM and the Group of 77 developing nations (G77) attended a working breakfast on the second day (Asahi Shinbun, 14 July 2000: 7). The Japanese government was hoping to include concrete reference to the need for UNSC reform and a cartoon in the Yomiuri Shinbun depicted Mori offering Clinton an example of ikebana decorated with the words ‘UNSC reform’ and ‘expansion of permanent members’ as a gift (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 July 2000: 2). Ko¯no also announced the Japanese government’s intention to promote a lasting peace settlement in the Balkans and acknowledge North Korea’s attempts to emerge from its isolation and engage with the world (The Japan Times, 16 May 2000: 1; The Japan Times, 11 July 2000: 1, 5). The first day of the meeting focused upon conflict prevention in its broadest meaning to include preventing the import of small firearms, the financial and development aspects of conflict resolution, the role of children and postwar reconstruction in a plan provisionally entitled the ‘Miyazaki Initiative’ (The Japan Times, 13 July 2000: 1, 6; Yomiuri Shinbun, 13 July 2000 evening edition: 1). The issue of firearms was one that MOFA was especially keen to promote in the run-up to the summit and to this end organised a two-day meeting of Asian ambassadors in Tokyo on the subject and at the Miyazaki meeting the Japanese government promised to contribute US$700,000 to a UN fund for the disposal of these weapons (Asahi Shinbun, 8 June 2000: 4; Asahi Shinbun, 13 July 2000 evening edition: 1). Ko¯no also managed to get the support of his Canadian and Italian counterparts for reform of the UNSC (Yomiuri Shinbun, 13 July 2000: 1), and had the opportunity to meet his Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov and pledge to improve Japanese–Russian relations by signing a peace treaty and resolving the Northern Territories’ dispute (The Japan Times, 13 July 2000: 1, 6). The second day of the meeting formally announced the ‘Miyazaki Initiative for Conflict Prevention’ and welcomed North Korea’s efforts to engage with the rest of the world whilst making reference to peace in the Balkans, East Timor, Indonesia, and the Middle East and highlighting the need to strengthen the UN (The Japan Times, 14 July 2000: 1, 7). As regards other agenda items for the leaders’ meeting, Obuchi announced his desire to place IT at the top of the summit’s agenda (The Japan Times, 29 February 2000: 1). He also stressed the role of ‘human security’ in the run-up to the summit. In this respect, Ko¯no agreed to include the issue of children’s involvement in conflict on the agenda, and food security – an issue of concern to Japan – was also mooted for discussion (The Japan Times, 10 January 2000: 2; The Japan Times, 22 January 2000: 3; The Japan Times, 19 March 2000: 2). However, preparations for the summit that had been guided so firmly by Obuchi were thrown into crisis as a result of his hospitalisation on 2 April after a stroke,

128 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 subsequent coma and eventual death on 14 May. Mori Yoshiro¯ was elected as prime minister by the LDP on 5 April and pledged in a Diet speech to do his utmost to make the summit a success whilst praising the work of Obuchi (The Japan Times, 8 April 2000: 3). Thereafter, he fought an election of the House of Representatives on 25 June and was returned to power. In order to play the role of host at the summit and overcome his low profile on foreign policy, Mori departed on 28 April for a nine-day tour of fellow summit nations (The Japan Times, 28 April 2000: 3). As a result, he pledged to continue the work of his predecessor and ‘reflect Asia’s voices’ whilst promoting IT to bridge the ‘digital divide’, measures against AIDS and other infectious diseases, debt relief, and the strengthening of conflict prevention and disarmament (The Japan Times, 11 May 2000: 18). Obuchi’s funeral provided the opportunity for Mori to meet and discuss the upcoming summit with a number of visiting heads of state and, to this end, ASEAN nations again called on the Japanese government to act as ‘Asia’s spokesman’ at the summit, to which Mori reacted positively stressing a range of Asian issues that he would raise including aid provision, a proposed Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and the impact of globalisation on the region (The Japan Times, 10 June 2000: 1). Mori announced his intention to promote the issues of unification of the Korean peninsula and North–South dialogue at the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 15 June 2000 evening edition: 2); and, in this light, he spoke with South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung on 17 June for twenty minutes on the telephone and emphasised that he was hoping to include support for the North–South dialogue on the Korean peninsula in the final communiqué (Yomiuri Shinbun, 17 June 2000 evening edition: 1). Reference to human rights, possibly with indirect reference to the abduction of Japanese citizens, was also mooted as a topic for discussion by the Japanese government (Asahi Shinbun, 16 June 2000: 2). As the summit approached, attention was being focused increasingly upon new issues, namely the promotion of IT and the creation of an international regime to govern genetic engineering. However, Japanese ministries had different reasons for promoting the same issues. MOFA supported the IT agenda in order to bridge the ‘digital divide’ between rich and poor nations as one element of assistance to developing nations, whereas MITI was in favour in order to increase the competitiveness of Japanese companies overseas (Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 June 2000: 3; Yomiuri Shinbun, 13 June 2000: 1, 11). However, more traditional items were discussed for inclusion in the summit agenda, such as drug abuse issues and providing assistance to the Colombian government in combating drug cartels (Yomiuri Shinbun, 16 June 2000 evening edition: 3). It had also been a goal of the Japanese government to also include a statement on the reform and widening of the UNSC (Yomiuri Shinbun, 19 June 2000: 1). However, as the summit approached this likelihood appeared to be more and more distant (The Japan Times, 5 July 2000: 1). Russia placed the Japanese government in a difficult position as chair of the summit by requesting discussion of National Missile Defence (NMD) although the government believed this to be a bilateral issue (Asahi Shinbun, 4 July 2000: 3). In the week that the summit opened, Mori met with leaders of the coalition and opposition parties to sound them out on summit issues and got feedback

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 129 stressing Japan’s role as Asia’s representative, progress in North–South relations on the Korean peninsula, a possible post-summit visit to Southeast Asia and the establishment of a UN Asian headquarters (The Japan Times, 19 July 2000: 1). A banquet to be hosted by the Imperial family in Tokyo on 20 July – the eve of the summit – was cancelled due to the death of the Empress Dowager (The Japan Times, 18 June 2000: 1). However, Mori still met with a number of leaders of both summit and developing nations at the Geihinkan in Tokyo for talks before departing for Okinawa. He discussed a working holiday programme for eighteen to twentyfive year olds with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and the issue of North Korea with Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (Asahi Shinbun, 21 July 2000: 2). Blair also expressed support for discussion of UNSC reform and the inclusion of Japan (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 July 2000: 2). Meanwhile, on the same day in Okinawa, a NGO centre was opened in the Miyazato district of Nago to complement the press centre (both subsequently demolished) by providing a base for a number of NGOs for the first time in summit history. A ‘human chain’ (ningen no kusari) of over 27,000 anti-US base protestors was also formed around the US air base at Kadena – cited as one possible reason for Clinton’s arrival the next day, although he was also involved in Middle East peace talks at Camp David until the last minute (The Japan Times, 21 July 2000: 2; Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 21 July 2000: 1). On the morning of 21 July, the first day of the summit, Mori met with the representatives of five NGOs calling for the cancellation of African debt, action on infectious diseases and a reduction in the US military presence in Okinawa; this was the first time for a summit host to meet with NGO representatives before the summit began. Mori stressed that the US presence in Okinawa provided regional security in the Asia Pacific region but that he would seek to implement some gradual reduction of Okinawa’s burden as part of SACO (The Japan Times, 22 July 2000: 3; Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 22 July 2000: 14, 31). After his late arrival from the Middle East peace talks, Clinton attended a ceremony at Mabuni Hill Memorial Peace Park, thanked Okinawans for their support in shouldering the burden of US bases, stressed the ‘life or death’ (shikatsuteki) importance of Okinawa and pledged to do everything possible to reduce the footprint of the bases on Okinawa (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 July 2000 evening edition: 1–2, 23; Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 21 July 2000 evening edition: 1–2). The summit meetings on the first day excluded Russia from initial economic discussions, which focused on the world economy with pledges made to accelerate debt relief and address money laundering, and encouraged the Japanese government in its efforts to stimulate growth through domestic demand and promote structural reforms (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 July 2000: 1–3). Later at a working dinner that included Russia, the summiteers welcomed improvements in relations between North and South Korea in a special statement and efforts for peace in the Middle East. However, a statement on debt relief was greeted with disappointment by NGO representatives (The Japan Times, 22 July 2000: 1–3, 9). Protests on the first day were limited to a small anti-summit march near the venue and the arrest of Greenpeace activists for trying to land on a restricted beach near the venue.

130 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 On the morning of the second day of the summit, Mori met with Clinton and received an apology for the crimes committed by US military personnel based in Okinawa. Both leaders stated their resolve to realise SACO and continue hostnation support but no progress was made on the Futenma air base relocation issue (Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 22 July 2000 evening edition: 1–2; The Japan Times, 23 July 2000: 1). During the summit meetings, a statement on IT entitled the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society was adopted that created a digital opportunity task force (DOT force) to oversee the diffusion of IT skills equally throughout the world. Divisions between European wariness and US enthusiasm surfaced over the issue of genetically modified foods with Mori attempting to strike a compromise as chair of the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 23 July 2000: 1; The Japan Times, 23 July 2000: 1). Antisummit protests continued on the second day with activists linking the summit to the issue of Futenma air base (The Japan Times, 23 July 2000: 2). On the evening of the second day, a gala reception was held at Shuri Castle in Naha at which the summiteers dined on Okinawan delicacies (Mainichi Shinbun, 23 July 2000: 26). The summit’s theme song, commissioned by Obuchi and entitled ‘Never End’, was also performed for the leaders with Obuchi’s widow, Chizuko, also in attendance. On the third and final day, once the official summit activities were over, Clinton departed a few hours earlier than originally scheduled to participate in the Middle East peace talks. The final communiqué was released calling for UNSC reform, a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, the disposal of Russian weapons-grade plutonium, attempts to combat infectious diseases through the Japanese-led Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative (IDI) with US$3 billion of Japanese support over five years, the safety of genetically modified food, adoption of the Miyazaki Initiative, international cooperation in the field of genetic engineering and IT, and a continuation of the START process (The Japan Times, 24 July 2000: 1; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 24 July 2000: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 July 2000: 1–3; MOFA 2002a: 87). However, NMD was diplomatically left off the agenda. After the meeting officially closed, Mori met with Putin and pledged to work towards the conclusion of a peace treaty and resolve the Northern Territories’ dispute (Mainichi Shinbun, 24 July 2000: 1). Reaction to the summit was mixed. Inamine was pleased with the opportunity to showcase his prefecture on a global stage (The Japan Times, 25 July 2000: 3). In addition, protestors were largely successful in focusing the attention of the foreign press upon the unequal balance of US military bases in Okinawa (Tokumatsu 2000; Higgins 2001a; Higgins 2001b). The G8 Research Group at Toronto University gave an ‘A minus’ to Mori for his performance (Mainichi Shinbun, 24 July 2000: 3). And finally, at the ASEAN+3 meeting of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea immediately after the summit, the Thai chair of ASEAN praised the efforts of the Japanese government at Okinawa (Nogami 2001a: 109). However, the Japanese government seemed to have had both the spotlight and role of Asian representative wrested from it by Putin as he arrived in Okinawa directly from official visits to Beijing and Pyongyang (The Straits Times, 23 July 2000: 14; Asahi Shinbun, 24 July 2000: 2). Although receiving plenty of media attention for their causes, NGOs represented by Jubilee 2000 were, by and large, critical of the failure to address the debt problem,

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 131 the poor facilities provided in the NGO centre and the overly strict supervision by MOFA, dubbing Okinawa the ‘squandered summit’ (Yomiuri Shinbun, 19 July 2000 evening edition: 22; The Japan Times, 24 July 2000: 2). Hatoyama Kunio, leader of the opposition Democratic Party (DP), criticised Mori for not showing leadership as the summit chair and avoiding controversial issues, rather acting more as a tourist guide. In addition, Doi Takako of the SDPJ and Shii Kazuo of the JCP berated Mori for having ignored the base issue and the feelings of the Okinawan people (Asahi Shinbun, 25 July 2000: 4). A cartoon in a local Okinawan newspaper made light of the name of the summit’s theme song and wondered if the US base issue will ‘never end’ (Okinawa Taimusu, 24 July 2000: 2). The Chinese government announced its usually critical evaluation of the summit claiming that it had achieved little, especially for the world’s impoverished; and the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry expressed its disappointment that cross-straits relations had not been included and suggested that this was so as not to offend China (Mainichi Shinbun, 24 July 2000: 7; Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 24 July 2000: 18). A cartoon in a Japanese newspaper hinted at the difficulties Mori might encounter in honouring his summit pledges by depicting him as a mountaineer finding the way down from the summit peak more difficult than the ascent (Asahi Shinbun, 25 July 2000: 3). According to Yomiuri Shinbun opinion polls conducted at the beginning and end of July, the Mori administration’s approval rating dropped slightly, from 27.3 per cent to 26.6 per cent, but the disapproval rating also dropped slightly, from 61.4 per cent to 60.8 per cent, suggesting that the successful conclusion of the summit had little effect on promoting an inherently unpopular administration (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 August 2000: 2). A number of meetings of G8 and non-G8 members were held before the end of the year in both Tokyo and Okinawa to promote the discussions conducted and pledges made at the summit on the ‘digital divide’, disposal of Russian weaponsgrade plutonium, drugs, infectious diseases and transnational organised crime. However, one of the abiding and unfortunate memories of the Okinawa Summit was the excessive cost – ¥81.4 billion or US$750 million, roughly 100 times more expensive than the preceding 1999 Cologne Summit – which provoked vociferous criticism of both the Japanese government and the summit process from both within and outside Japan (Higgins 2001b: 119–21; The Japan Times, 25 July 2000: 19; The Japan Times, 27 August 2000: 1).

Genoa, Italy, 20–2 July 2001 The discussions and results of the Genoa Summit were overshadowed by the heavyhanded security that resulted in the death of an anti-globalisation protestor (see Toki no Ugoki 2001). Trouble was brewing before the summit and doubts about the choice of venue (made by the previous administration) and security at Genoa were expressed by the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in light of protests at a EU meeting in Göteborg, Sweden and threats from anarchist and left-wing groups to turn Genoa into a battlefield (The Japan Times, 17 June 2001: 5). In preparation for security at the summit, the Italian government suspended the Schengen agreement,

132 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 which ensured the free movement of peoples throughout the EU, and planned to close all railway stations and Genoa’s Christopher Columbus airport (which was equipped with surface-to-air missile launchers). On 16 July 2001, four days before the summit began, a parcel bomb exploded in Genoa, and a number of McDonald’s hamburger restaurants closed during the summit for fear of being targeted. In total, approximately 20,000 police and military officers were brought to Genoa to shore up security (The Japan Times, 15 July 2001: 4; The Japan Times, 21 July 2001: 5). The peaceful side of anti-globalisation protests focused upon an alternative summit, which opened on 16 July to discuss debt relief, in addition to human chains and an anti-globalisation march of more than 100,000 protestors organised by Genoa Social Forum, an umbrella organisation coordinating the actions of NGOs and protest groups. A number of issues were raised for discussion in the run-up to the summit. At the beginning of June, a basic agreement was announced during one of the preparatory meetings for the Genoa Summit amongst G8 members to continue the initiative announced at the 2000 Okinawa Summit and create an AIDS fund at the instigation of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and expectations were that AIDS would be an issue at the top of the agenda (The Japan Times, 9 June 2001: 1). The IT agenda promoted at the Okinawa Summit was also kept on the agenda with discussion of the creation of a body to promote IT in developing nations in order to bridge the ‘digital divide’ (The Japan Times, 14 July 2001: 9). Berlusconi announced that poverty, health issues, social reform and the environment would provide the main focus for the summit – issues on which Japan was comfortable playing an active role. As in the words of Nogami Yoshiji, Japanese sherpa for Genoa, ‘Japan is taking a leadership role in the health fund after we spotlighted the issue so much last year in Okinawa’ (The Japan Times, 16 July 2001: 7; The Japan Times, 17 July 2001: 3) On economic issues, the G7 finance ministers met in Rome on 7 July to discuss ways to stimulate stable growth in the world economy, reform of global development and financial institutions, policies against money-laundering and a policy of economic assistance to the most heavily indebted countries (Asahi Shinbun, 8 July 2001: 2). MOF Minister Shiokawa Masaju¯ro¯ promised his fellow ministers that Japan would press ahead with implementation of its structural reform programme and settle its non-performing loans within two to three years as a central pillar of this programme (The Japan Times, 8 July 2001: 1, 7). This was a direction that was optimistically and wholeheartedly supported by his US counterpart Paul O’Neill, who emphasised his faith in Japan’s ability to execute a decision once it is made (Mainichi Shinbun, 8 July 2001: 1). In addition, Shiokawa stressed the measures that would be taken to prevent the Japanese economy from falling into minus growth including the policy of partial financial deregulation and addressing employment through the division of public works projects (Yomiuri Shinbun, 9 July 2001 evening edition: 2). It was expected that Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro¯ would reiterate these pledges at the leaders’ meeting and stress that the Japanese economy needed time for these measures to take effect (The Japan Times, 19 July 2001: 10; Mainichi Shinbun, 19 July 2001: 1). The final statement stressed that although economic

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 133 recovery was slow, each country’s economic policies were sound and that Japan would speedily deal with its bad loans. In addition, agreement was reached on the creation of a global fund to fight AIDS and other infectious diseases, and cooperation was pledged to deal with money laundering (Mainichi Shinbun, 8 July 2001: 1, 7). The G8 foreign ministers’ meeting took place from 18–19 July in Rome. Prior to the meeting, MOFA Minister Tanaka Makiko conducted an official visit to Belgrade and was asked by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic to convey the message to other summit ministers that the federal system of Yugoslavia needed support, the rapid implementation of assistance and resolution of debt relief (Mainichi Shinbun, 17 July 2001: 4). Upon arrival in Rome, she met for the first time with her Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov and pledged further efforts to resolve the outstanding bilateral issues of the Northern Territories, the conclusion of a peace treaty and fishing rights (Sankei Shinbun, 19 July 2001: 1–2). In addition, she met with her Italian and UK counterparts Renato Ruggiero and Jack Straw to discuss and agree on various initiatives to promote bilateral relations. Straw backed Tanaka’s desire to urge the US government to abide by the Kyo¯to Protocol, although Ruggiero stressed that Europe would go ahead and ratify it without the US (Mainichi Shinbun, 19 July 2001: 1). In a meeting with the US Secretary of State Colin Powell on the evening of the first day, Tanaka discussed changes to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on the management of US military personnel in Japan to make it easier to prosecute those charged with committing crimes (Asahi Shinbun, 19 July 2001 evening edition: 1; The Japan Times, 20 July 2001: 1). During this meeting, she also made comments that suggested possible revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibiting Japan’s right to belligerency and the possession of military means to this end (Asahi Shinbun, 20 July 2001: 1). The meeting of foreign ministers called for an end to violence and the beginning of dialogue in the Middle East, urged a constructive approach from North Korea on security and human rights, agreed upon support for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s reform programme, welcomed top-level talks between the Indian and Pakistani leadership, called for a peaceful and democratic resolution of domestic instability in Indonesia and supported various conventional and nuclear weapons disarmament measures (Asahi Shinbun, 19 July 2001: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 20 July 2001: 7). The ‘Rome Initiative’ was also declared that sought to promote the role of women in preventing conflict and preserving peace (Asahi Shinbun, 20 July 2001: 7). However, Tanaka’s debut at the summit was regarded as something of a disappointment. Despite being a politician known for her frankness and a lack of temerity, her performance at Rome was described as ‘mild’ (otonashii) and ‘slightly restrained’ (osaegimi). During a working dinner on the first day, a lively discussion of the G8 and civil society was conducted but Tanaka offered no opinions and simply made notes. Tanaka was seen to be constrained by consideration for the US during discussion of the Kyo¯to Protocol and possible US withdrawal from the CTBT. Furthermore, although raising the issue of the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents, she was seen to have failed to raise the regional security issues of Indonesia and North Korea (Asahi Shinbun, 19 July 2001: 1; Mainichi Shinbun, 20 July 2001: 2).

134 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 Koizumi arrived in Genoa on the evening of 19 July. Running battles between protestors and security forces broke out the next day, the first day of the summit. Outside of the formal summit proceedings on this first day, Koizumi met with Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and agreed on the need to encourage the US to participate in the Kyo¯to Protocol (Mainichi Shinbun, 21 July 2001: 3). Summit discussions within the Ducale Palace centred upon economic issues, without Russia in attendance, and resulted in the announcement of the G7’s economic statement. Summiteers pledged to cooperate in avoiding a global recession, urged the strengthening of the global financial architecture, promised to extend assistance programmes to the poorest nations and called for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations under the aegis of the WTO. Koizumi outlined the structural reform programme that he pledged to implement and received encouragement from fellow leaders – a strategy seen as garnering international support to legitimise and promote his policies at home (Asahi Shinbun, 21 July 2001: 3; Mainichi Shinbun, 21 July 2001: 1). UN Secretary General Kofi Annan formally announced the fund to fight AIDS and other infectious diseases with the aid of Japanese contributions totalling ¥25 billion (US$200 million). However, this was greeted with disappointment by AIDS awareness campaigners for not reaching UN-set targets for contributions (Mainichi Shinbun, 21 July 2001: 1; The Japan Times, 22 July 2001: 4). In the evening, the G8 members met with African leaders of the developing world for a formal dinner. At this dinner, Koizumi connected the issue of poverty in the developing world to education (the proposed theme for the 2002 Kananaskis Summit) by relating the tale of Kome Happyo¯ (One Hundred Sacks of Rice) in which the starving people of Nagaoka during the Bo¯shin War of 1868–9 refused to consume rice that had been donated to them, and instead sold it in order to raise the funds to build a school with the future prosperity it would bring in mind. Koizumi’s telling of this personal favourite tale, and promise to send an English translation to the summit leaders, was a gesture that was praised by the African leaders (Nogami 2001b: 13; Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 July 2001 evening edition: 2). The second day of discussions centred on environmental issues and ratification of the Kyo¯to Protocol, and the divisions between Europe and the US mentioned above came into relief. The administration of President George W. Bush had decided not to participate in the agreement, whereas the European governments wished to implement the protocol as rapidly as possible, with or without the US. The Japanese government’s position on this issue was that Japan would not ratify the agreement without US participation, thereby finding itself in a difficult position and ultimately unable to negotiate a compromise between the two opposite viewpoints (Asahi Shinbun, 22 July 2001: 1). A cartoon in a Japanese newspaper summed up this problem by portraying Koizumi and Bush welcoming each other warmly as the newcomers to the summit surrounded by a cloud of global-warming gas as the other summiteers look on (Asahi Shinbun, 20 July 2001: 3). In contrast, an EU–Japan compromise was struck on providing environmental assistance to the developing world.

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 135 However, discussions on the second day were overshadowed by the news of the shooting by Italian security forces of 23-year-old protestor Carlo Giuliani the previous day and the resulting discussion of responsibility, and by further riots in reaction. The summit leaders issued an immediate statement expressing sorrow but affirming their right to meet (The Japan Times, 22 July 2001: 1, 4). Statements were also issued on the necessity of the cessation of Israeli–Palestinian violence and the implementation of the findings of the US-sponsored Mitchell Report. As regards the situation on the Korean peninsula, statements called for a freeze on missile testing, the extension of continued support for the work of KEDO and a constructive position on human rights and security – a statement that Koizumi was relieved to have included or else Japan’s role as representative of Asia would have been damaged. In addition, a concrete plan – the ‘Genoa Plan for Africa’, or a ‘Marshall Plan for Africa’ in the words of UK Prime Minister Tony Blair – was announced whereby G8 envoys would liase with African leaders and draw up a working plan to address issues such as poverty, AIDS, health issues, and the promotion of democracy, and report to the summit next year (Asahi Shinbun, 22 July 2001: 3; Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 July 2001: 3; G8 2003). Koizumi met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the evening of the second day and stressed the need to conclude a peace treaty and promote multilateral economic cooperation. The issues of the Northern Territories and fishing rights were only touched upon (Mainichi Shinbun, 22 July 2001: 1). The final day of the summit saw the release of the final communiqué that included promises to integrate developing nations within the global economy so as to alleviate the negative side of globalisation, declared the establishment of the US$1.3 billion fund to fight infectious diseases, and was supportive of policies to ensure food safety. However, it was non-committal on the Kyo¯to Protocol due to disagreement and omitted Bush’s proposed NMD scheme (The Japan Times, 23 July 2001: 1, 5; The Japan Times, 24 July 2001: 18; G8 2003). Satisfied at having attended his first summit, and thereby securing the support of his fellow leaders for his reform programme and projecting the impression of being different from other Japanese prime ministers (Mainichi Shinbun, 22 July 2001: 7), Koizumi returned to Japan on 23 July as the residents of Genoa began their own programme to clean up and recover from the riots, and the Italian government began what would prove to be controversial inquiries into responsibility for the violence. The Koizumi administration had come to power commanding extraordinary approval ratings after the cynicism that was held towards the Mori administration. According to Asahi Shinbun opinion polls conducted respectively in July and August, approval for the administration declined from 77 per cent to 69 per cent, and the disapproval rating increased from 9 per cent to 17 per cent (Asahi Shinbun, 4 August 2001: 1–2). This decline in support was more part of a prevailing trend since the Koizumi administration came to power with record-breaking (and, it could be argued, unsustainable) levels of support, rather than a negative reaction to the summit.

136 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002

Kananaskis, Canada, 26–7 June 2002 As a result of the riots in Genoa, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien chose the mountain retreat of Kananaskis, Alberta instead of Ottawa as the venue for the twenty-eighth and final summit in the fourth cycle (Kirton 2001–2). As a result the leaders were, in the words of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, ‘ringed by mountains, surrounded by greenery and protected by bears’ (The Japan Times, 28 June 2002: 5). This back-to-basics summit was held over two, rather than three, days and saw limits imposed on the size of delegations and summit declarations. In contrast to the previous year, anti-globalisation protests and security in Canada (although tight) were not prominent issues and the focus of peaceful protest was a ‘die-in’ demonstration and an alternative summit called the G6B (Group of six billion people) concerned with focusing attention on social, environmental and development issues, both held in Calgary (The Japan Times, 23 June 2002: 5; The Japan Times, 28 June 2002: 5). Although the Kananaskis Summit had been touted as the ‘education summit’ at Genoa, a number of other issues came to dominate the agenda. As the first summit to be held after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, terrorism was also placed on the agenda and prior to the summit the G7 nations pledged to investigate a project to contribute US$20 billion over ten years to deal with the disposal of nuclear weapons and plutonium in the former Soviet Union and prevent their falling into terrorists’ hands – the Japanese government’s burden would be in the region of US$2–3 billion (¥250–370 billion) (Yomiuri Shinbun, 21 May 2002: 1). In addition, with the invitation of a number of African leaders to participate in the official summit proceedings, the agenda was firmly focused on development issues. Pressure upon Japan to remove tariffs on goods from the poorest nations was felt to be building amongst summit members (The Japan Times, 13 June 2002: 12), and before the summit Koizumi invited African diplomatic representatives resident in Tokyo to discuss issues such as education, insurance and food as the core of Japan’s strengthened assistance to Africa (Sankei Shinbun, 24 June 2002: 2). In the run-up to the meeting of the leaders in Kananaskis, environmental issues were also expected to feature in discussions after the impasse at the Genoa Summit the previous year and a G8 energy ministers’ meeting held in Detroit from 2–3 May 2002 that focused on the use of oil reserves, renewable energy and resolving energy issues in developing nations (Yomiuri Shinbun, 5 May 2002: 8; The Japan Times, 3 June 2002: 14). In addition, a meeting of G8 justice and interior ministers on the response to terrorism was held from 13–14 May in Mont Tremblant in Canada and attended by Sato¯ Hidehiko, Deputy Commissioner General of the National Police Agency (NPA), in place of Murai Jin, Minister of State for Disaster Management and NPSC Chairman (Sankei Shinbun, 18 May 2002: 30). The G8 foreign ministers’ meeting was held in Whistler, British Columbia from 12–13 June and, despite a small number of anti-globalisation protestors, focused on anti-terrorism, measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through strengthening the NPT, promises to support the post-Taliban Afghan government, and calls for dialogue in a number of regional conflicts including the

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 137 Korean peninsula, the Middle East and between India and Pakistan (Asahi Shinbun, 14 June 2002 evening edition: 2; The Japan Times, 14 June 2002: 11; The Japan Times, 15 June 2002: 5). MOFA Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko raised the role of IT assistance to developing nations as part of a policy of anti-terrorism (Sankei Shinbun, 14 June 2002: 3). She also reported on her visit to Afghanistan and introduced a Japanese initiative to facilitate the ‘demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into society’ (MOFA 2002b). Before the meeting, she raised the issue of the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents and received support from US Secretary of State Colin Powell in resolving the issue (Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 June 2002 evening edition: 2). She also met with her Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov and agreed to promote political dialogue towards a peace treaty between the two nations and the resolution of the Northern Territories’ dispute (Mainichi Shinbun, 13 June 2002: 1). After the foreign ministers’ meeting, Kawaguchi, who had visited Israel and Palestine previously in the month, likened Japan’s role in the Middle East peace process to the soy sauce that is needed to make sushi complete, and Powell gave credit to Japan’s attempts to play a constructive role in the region (Asahi Shinbun, 15 June 2002: 2). Meanwhile, the G7 finance minister’s meeting was held in Halifax, Nova Scotia from 14–15 June. This meeting, also targeted by protestors, concluded with pledges to revitalise the global economy and place pressure on the Japanese government to continue its export-led economic recovery by intervening to prevent the rise in the value of the yen. MOF Minister Shiokawa Masaju¯ro¯ explained the state of Japan’s economic recovery to fellow ministers, highlighted tax cuts and reform measures, and promised activism (Asahi Shinbun, 16 June 2002: 2; The Japan Times, 16 June 2002: 7). In response, US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill pointed to positive developments in the Japanese economy (Asahi Shinbun, 15 June 2002 evening edition: 1). Agreement was also struck on the ratio between grants and loans in distributing aid to developing nations through the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) (The Japan Times, 17 June 2002: 1, 4; Mainichi Shinbun, 16 June 2002: 1). Again the leaders’ meeting provided Prime Minster Koizumi Junichiro¯ with an opportunity to address bilateral issues with a number of participating leaders. After his arrival in Kananaskis on 25 June, he met with Chrétien, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and US President George W. Bush to discuss a number of issues, chiefly Japan’s economic recovery, African aid and US efforts to broker peace between Israelis and Palestinians (Asahi Shinbun, 26 June 2002 evening edition: 1–2; Asahi Shinbun, 27 June 2002: 2; The Japan Times, 27 June 2002: 1–2). During the meeting with Bush, Koizumi received high praise and encouragement for his domestic economic reform programme (Yomiuri Shinbun, 27 June 2002: 3). Koizumi also met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, for the third time, on the second day after the summit had been concluded and it was agreed that Koizumi would visit Russia in December in order to restart bilateral negotiations. Putin agreed to communicate Japan’s concerns about the abduction of its citizens to the North Korean government, and it was decided that 2003 would be a year of Japanese cultural events in Russia (Yomiuri Shinbun, 28 June 2002 evening edition: 1 The Japan Times, 29 June 2002: 1).

138 The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 On the first day of the summit, Russia was finally accorded full G8 membership, able to attend economic discussions from 2003 and with the right to host its first summit in 2006. However, some reservations were still expressed by the Japanese delegation and concerns existed within MOFA that this could lead to an increase in Russia’s influence in the summit process at the expense of Japan, as the only Asian member, and the creation of a G7 plus Japan (Sankei Shinbun, 28 June 2002: 3; The Japan Times, 29 June 2002: 1, 5). However, Japan recognised Russia’s full membership of the G8 in consideration of the majority feeling of its fellow summiteers (Mainichi Shinbun, 28 June 2002: 2). So, for the last time at Kananaskis, Russia was excluded from the economic discussions. These discussions dealt with, first and foremost, the state of the Japanese economy and concern about the government’s tardiness in dealing with deflation, and thereafter the direction of global economic growth, the US economy and the low value of its shares and the dollar (Yomiuri Shinbun, 27 June 2002: 1; Yomiuri Shinbun, 29 June 2002: 3). Talks also centred on African aid in terms of IT and a project to dispose of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union to which Koizumi pledged an initial contribution of US$200 million to the estimated US$20 billion required. In addition, a statement on the security of transport to prevent the use of vehicles for terrorist activity was adopted (Yomiuri Shinbun, 27 June 2002: 1). During a working dinner on the first day of the summit, although almost half of the conversation concerned US efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue, Koizumi managed to bring up the issue of the North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens, and called for international cooperation in dealing with North Korea to prevent its isolation (Yomiuri Shinbun, 28 June 2002: 1, 7). The second day’s discussions were also attended by leaders of Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and focused on large-scale aid to Africa in return for anti-corruption and free-market reforms in the recipient nations. Koizumi pledged US$2 billion over five years to be used specifically for education initiatives in Africa. However, these measures were regarded by some representatives of African nations as ‘too little, too late’ (The Japan Times, 1 July 2002: 4). Bush was unable to get the support of fellow summiteers for his peace plan in the Middle East that called for the replacement of Yasser Arafat as Palestinian leader. The Japanese position on the issue was described as ‘unclear’ by the Japanese media but a number of representatives, including Koizumi, Kawaguchi and MOFA officials, did comment that Arafat was the democratically elected and legitimate leader of the Palestinian people (Mainichi Shinbun, 27 June 2002: 2; Asahi Shinbun, 28 June 2002: 2; The Japan Times, 29 June 2002: 1). The final chairman’s statement included the announcement of anti-terrorism proposals, the US$20 billion plan to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, confidence in the recovery of the global economy, increased aid to the poorest developing nations, the expansion of ODA and a proposed action plan on Africa to be explored further at next year’s summit (Yomiuri Shinbun, 28 June 2002: 1). The call for an expansion in ODA was counter to the Japanese government’s policy at the time of decreasing its ODA contributions.

The fourth cycle, 1996–2002 139 Koizumi left Canada on the morning of 28 June accompanied by German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who was essentially thumbing a lift to Japan in the prime minister’s plane to watch the World Cup final. Koizumi was successful in having been voted the ‘most fashionable summiteer’ by Canadian menswear designers and described in the following terms ‘[h]is hair is soft and relaxed. There is a cool understated confidence and strength in his stance. The suit does not distract from who he is’ (The Japan Times, 30 June 2002: 2). Aside from this accolade, Koizumi had received the support of his summit colleagues for his domestic economic reform package. According to Mainichi Shinbun opinion polls both conducted in the first weeks of June and July respectively, support for the Koizumi administration increased from 40 per cent to 44 per cent, and the disapproval rating decreased from 40 per cent to 36 per cent (Mainichi Shinbun 3 June 2002: 1–2; Mainichi Shinbun, 8 July 2002: 1, 3). However, from now on Japan would have to contend with an expanded G8 that fully included Russia. The final summit in this final rotation amongst seven summit nations represented a return of sorts to the ideals of the original Rambouillet Summit (Murata 2002). As one White House spokesman stated ‘leaders [are] literally bumping into each other, talking informally, which is what the G8 was always intended to be’ (The Japan Times, 28 June 2002: 5). Over a period of twenty-eight years, the summit had come full circle from its beginnings as an intimate get-together of presidents and prime ministers, developing into a political as well as economic forum, expanding to include Russia, and then down-sizing to return to being a ‘fireside chat’ between leaders (Kirton 2001–2). This fourth cycle of summitry demonstrated consistency and change in the themes pursued by the Japanese government. On the one hand, Asian issues and the management of Russia still commanded attention, with the latter impacting upon the very nature of the summit process. On the other hand, a range of ‘new’ issues engendered by the process of globalisation came to the attention of the summit, such as IT, the role of civil society and its relationship with the summit, and environmentalism. In order to make sense of this twenty-eight-year history of international relations, the focus of the following two chapters will shift to an examination of the principal actors involved in Japan’s contribution to the G7/8 and an exploration of their objectives.

5

Actors

As seen in Chapters 1 to 4, a number of initiatives and declarations of Japanese origin have been included in summit documentation. What is more, as argued in Chapter 1, to have these included in both the summit’s discussions and statements matters. In order to establish who makes this possible, this chapter explores the main actors involved in Japan’s participation in the summit process, as well as their behaviour and objectives, which are informed by the norms explored in the following chapter. As mentioned in the Introduction, traditional studies of Japanese politics have revolved around an ‘iron triangle’ consisting of the LDP, the bureaucracy and the business world as the most influential actors. Although accurate, and undeniably important, up to a point, there are other actors that need to be taken into account when attempting to reach a more nuanced understanding of Japan’s role in the summit process. In addition, the three poles of this triangle are far from unitary actors and divisions have, on occasions, come into stark relief. To this end, this chapter takes into account both the orthodox iron triangle and more pluralist interpretations.

The prime minister As is evident thus far, the summit was originally intended to be a ‘fireside chat’ amongst the leaders of the contemporary great economic powers, similar to the Concert of Europe. In fact, it could be argued that the primary function of the summit was, and is, to build trust amongst the leaders of the world’s most important economies and Russia. Thus, the attention accorded to, and the role played by, the elected head of government is one of the defining characteristics of the summit process (Watanabe 2002). Despite the fact that a number of articles in the 1947 Japanese Constitution confirm the central and influential position of the prime minister in the decisionmaking process and, as a result, in the conduct of foreign policy, his ability to take a lead in, or even partly influence, the direction of foreign policy has been both affirmed and rejected in the extant literature (for a review of this literature, see Edström 1996). Japanese politics has traditionally been characterised as led by a weakened prime minister who, in the words of Kissinger, is ‘the custodian of the national consensus, not the creator of it’ (quoted in Pyle 1987: 245), and suffers from

Actors 141 a number of constraints including a heavy reliance on the bureaucracy. It has been argued that ‘[t]he one-party dominant system has led to the institutionalization of the intra-LDP appointment and promotion practices based on seniority and factional balance rather than ability of expertise. This system has tended to breed mediocre leaders and led to a situation similar to a crisis of leadership’ (Fukai 1999: 179). In the context of international summitry, ‘the [Japanese] prime minister was merely the representative of a faction in a system that placed the greatest emphasis on consensus formation and found the idea of the political leader as a figure able to take important decisions without prior agreement unacceptable’ (Armstrong 1996: 43). Thus, it could be expected that aspects of Japan’s domestic political system would be amplified on the international stage of summit diplomacy and that the Japanese prime minister’s behaviour at the summit would reflect these domestic constraints. This comes into greater relief when contrasted with the other summit leaders, who have not been as shackled by domestic concerns, or, even if they have been, have tended to take a lead in discussions, stamp their mark on proceedings and foster independent initiatives. In fact, and to a large extent, this characterisation is true. Bayne has claimed that throughout the 1990s the Japanese prime minister was unable to create a relationship of intimacy with any of his fellow leaders (Asahi Shinbun, 29 June 2002: 1). Indeed, even from the very first summit, the Japanese prime minister has been something of an outsider. At Rambouillet, although they used first names with each other, Western leaders referred to Miki as ‘Mr Miki’ (quoted in Shima 2000: 44–5). Although, the use of first names is not so common in East Asian cultures, this still served to create a divide between the Western leaders and their Japanese counterpart. Putnam and Bayne have described participation in the summit as ¯ hira providing a ‘culture shock’ for the Japanese prime minister and, as a result, O Masayoshi is quoted as having said after Tokyo I that ‘I felt naked – like a little child’ (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 257). As a result, the behaviour of Japanese prime ministers when attending international conferences has been summarised as the three Ss – smiling, sleeping and silent (Yomiuri Shinbun, 31 May 1983 evening edition: 3). A number of examples serve to reinforce this stereotype. Fukuda was famed for admitting his ignorance of the issue of the Soviet deployment of medium-range SS-20 missiles to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at Bonn I (Watanabe 2003: 43). Suzuki was described by foreign reporters at the Ottawa Summit as a ‘man who doesn’t speak much’ ¯ hira was equally known more for (The Japan Times, 25 July 1981: 7). Finally, O hesitance than eloquence (The Japan Times, 28 June 1979: B8). The anonymity of the Japanese prime minister can be seen in reports from the Toronto Summit that Canadian journalists requested their Japanese counterparts to point out which member of the Japanese delegation was Takeshita (Asahi Shinbun, 19 June 1988: 2). Ultimately, the Japanese prime minister has usually been regarded as a distant and peripheral character at the summit: ‘the odd man out . . . walking alone’ (The Japan Times, 22 May 1983: 1, 6); and thus, it is not surprising that the seat occupied by the Japanese prime minister has been known as the ‘silent corner’ (Shima 2000: 69).

142 Actors The ability of the prime minister has also been regularly called into question. As described in Chapter 3, 70-year-old Murayama fell ill during dinner on the first day of the Naples Summit with food poisoning and, as a result, missed the second day’s meetings. In Japan, doubts were cast as to whether he was physically up to the job. By his own admission Murayama was inexperienced when it came to diplomacy and weakened by his domestic political position having been appointed just over a week before the summit and able to do little but stress continuity in the LDP–SDPJ coalition government’s policies (The Japan Times, 10 July 1994: 1, 4; Murayama 1996: 59, 98–107). Making light of this, a cartoon in The Japan Times depicted a diminutive Murayama overshadowed by his summit partners repeating a mantra to himself that he is not a weak leader and can demonstrate commitment to, and continuity in, foreign, economic and defence policies to his summit partners (The Japan Times: 10 July 1994: 18). It was reported in Japan during the Halifax Summit that one Canadian newspaper had described Murayama as having no presence whatsoever and that Hashimoto was more of a tough negotiator and heir apparent to the prime ministership (Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 June 1995: 8). Although an extreme example, Mori’s performance at the Okinawa Summit was tarnished not only by a lack of diplomatic experience but also by a reputation for putting his foot firmly in his mouth – as one Japanese political analyst stated ‘[i]t [the Okinawa Summit] should be okay . . . as long as the translator is skilled’ (The Japan Times, 30 June 2000: 3). A series of gaffes in the run-up to this summit included: (1) claiming no knowledge of his first official trip to South Korea despite it having already been announced officially the same day by Chief Cabinet Secretary Aoki Mikio (Asahi Shinbun, 10 May 2000: 4); (2) declaring to a meeting of Diet members affiliated with the Shinto¯ Association of Spiritual Leadership (Shinto¯ Seiji Renmei) that Japan is a ‘divine nation’ (kami no kuni) centred upon the Emperor (Asahi Shinbun, 16 May 2000 evening edition: 1, 15); (3) accusing Okinawa’s schools and newspapers of being controlled by Communists (Arasaki 2000a); and (4) displaying ignorance of one of the summit’s themes, the IT revolution (Morii 2002: 92 – one Japanese newspaper carried a cartoon of Mori cack-handedly trying to teach himself how to use a laptop in time for the summit (Asahi Shinbun, 20 July 2000: 3)). Immediately before the summit, it was reported in the Japanese tabloid press that in a speech to Okinawan high-school students visiting the prime minister’s residence Mori had mispronounced Bankoku Shinryo¯kan – the summit venue – as Bankoku Rinsho¯kan. At the same time, unsubstantiated rumours, which verged on becoming urban myths despite MOFA’s denials, spread through academic and journalistic circles, various websites and the Japanese tabloid press that, despite considerable MOFA guidance, Mori had embarrassed himself when welcoming Clinton to Okinawa, or meeting him in Washington two months previously (the venue differs depending on the rumour), by asking ‘Who are you?’, rather than ‘How are you?’ It was reported that in response to Clinton’s droll answer of ‘I’m Hillary’s husband’, Mori compounded his initial mistake by expecting the answer ‘I’m fine’, and responded ‘Me too’ (Tokyo Supo¯tsu, 21 July 2000: 17; Egawa 2000). However, Mori was not alone. The language barrier has often been cited as hindering effective communication between the Japanese and other delegations.

Actors 143 The resulting divisions were typified by a pre-lunch reception on the last day of the Ottawa Summit when one table was occupied by the Japanese delegation next to an English-speaking table of Europeans and North Americans (Mainichi Shinbun, 22 July 1981 evening edition: 3). Obviously the intimate conversation envisioned at the summit would be hindered by the presence of an interpreter, nevertheless, at the Rambouillet Summit Miki was the only leader allowed to have an interpreter (Takase 1991: 71–3). Although vague about many other aspects of this summit, when interviewed by Tokyo University professor Tanaka Akihiko, sherpa for the following two summits Yoshino Bunroku recalled that: Yoshino:

Tanaka: Yoshino:

He [Miki] probably thought that he was on equal platform personally with other colleagues. But he couldn’t understand the language, and even if he used simultaneous interpreters, it was difficult to keep up with the conversation. I think he was thinking about saying something once. I forgot what he said, though. Wasn’t the system for simultaneous interpretation not [sic] very developed then? No it wasn’t, and the facility in France was not very developed. I think he was very frustrated when he was listening through an earphone. He couldn’t follow the discussion. (Yoshino 1997)

These examples above all support Putnam and Bayne’s assertion that the Japanese prime minister has been unused to and wary of unrehearsed, spontaneous exchanges with his fellow summiteers, and therefore from the beginning of the summit process Japanese policymakers sought to obviate this by supporting the institutionalisation of summit preparations through the sherpas’ meetings (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 35). The media’s portrayal of the Japanese prime minister in contrast to his summit partners has also reinforced the image of reactivity and inferiority by depicting him as physically diminutive and frail in stature. An Asahi Shinbun cartoon depicted a pint-sized Takeshita having to use his proposal for the expansion of Japan’s ODA contributions as a pedestal to physically and politically make him stand shoulder to shoulder with the other summit leaders (Asahi Shinbun, 18 June 1988: 2). Similarly, a Yomiuri Shinbun cartoon suggested that the only fair angle with which to take the official summit photograph was from above (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 June 1988: 2). Both the lack of presence of the Japanese prime minister at the summit and the ignorance of the foreign media can perhaps be best demonstrated in the numerous cases of mistaken identity. For example, at London I the UK newspaper The Sunday Telegraph carried a photograph of MOJ Minister Fukuda Hajime thinking it to be Fukuda Takeo (Asahi Shinbun, 9 May 1977: 2). After this event MOFA made efforts to ensure that the names and faces of Japan’s politicians were known by the foreign press. However, this failed to prevent a similar mistake in a handbook produced by the Canadian government for the Ottawa Summit in which MOFA Minister Sonoda Sunao and MOF Minister Watanabe Michio’s photographs were mixed up

144 Actors (Asahi Shinbun, 20 July 1981 evening edition: 3). The same mistake occurred at London III when SKY television used MOF Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯’s picture when introducing Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki (Mainichi Shinbun, 16 July 1991: 2). Once again the same mix-up occurred in the Canadian newspaper Financial Post before the Halifax Summit when Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi and former MOF Minister Murayama Tatsuo’s photographs were confused (Mainichi Shinbun, 15 June 1995: 3). At a press conference given by Hashimoto after the Lyon Summit, one question from the non-Japanese press began [t]he Japanese Prime Minister is Mr Hashimoto [Ryu¯taro¯], and the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government is Mr Hashimoto [Hiroshi] . . . my company’s editing division did not understand that fact . . . it took so much effort to try to make it understood for the past three days. (Hashimoto 1996) Japanese prime ministers’ wives have also suffered the indignation of being mixed up by the media as was the case at the Cologne Summit with Obuchi Chizuko and Hashimoto Kumiko (Mainichi Shinbun, 20 June 1999: 2). Thus, awareness of, and sensitivity towards, the Japanese prime minister amongst summit participants and the media have generally been low; in the words of Robert Fauver, US sherpa at Tokyo III and the Naples Summit, ‘[m]y [European] sherpa colleagues had virtually no exposure to Japan or its culture. And these are the sherpas of the G7 countries’ (Fauver 2003). Yet, on the other hand, it has been noted that an individual’s personality can matter, and Nakasone has been cited as an example of a strong prime minister who broke the institutional constraints on his exercise of power (Fukai 1999: 179–80). The opportunities for the prime minister to stamp his mark on resulting policy and play a leading role in international affairs is amplified in the case of the G7/8 summit, which provides the only forum in the web of global governance where the prime minister can meet directly with the leaders of the world’s major economies and Russia. In the words of Sakurada Daizo¯, ‘[s]ummitry had undoubtedly energized the Japanese policymaking process by giving the Prime Minister more leverage to bypass internal inertia and allowing him more personal input into policyformulation’ (Sakurada 1988: 104). As seen in Chapters 1 to 4, the prime minister has played a central role in soliciting opinions from a wide range of sources and promoting certain ‘pet’ themes to be placed on the summit agenda. One example of the prime minister’s influence upon G7/8 policy can be seen in Obuchi’s desire to focus the Okinawa Summit’s agenda upon the creation of the DOT force, as outlined in the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society in order to close the ‘digital divide’ between developed and developing nations with the belief that ‘everyone, everywhere should be enabled to participate in and no one should be excluded from the benefits of the global information society’ (G8 2000b). Its first meeting took place in Tokyo in November 2000, a second meeting in Cape Town in March 2001, and a third in Siena in April 2001, after which in May a report entitled ‘Digital opportunities for all: meeting the challenge’ was

Actors 145 released. At the Genoa Summit, the ‘Genoa Plan of Action’ was adopted fulfilling the mandate issued at Okinawa (G8 2001; G8 Research Group 2001b). At the Kananaskis Summit progress was reviewed: [T]he DOT force vision has moved dramatically closer to realization. Participation has reached well beyond its original membership to include almost 100 stakeholder organizations, spanning more than 30 countries. Through the work of its implementation teams, the DOT force has generated more than 20 major bilateral and multilateral initiatives, operating across a broad range of areas crucial to balanced development. . . . Examples of the enabling power of these technologies are now emerging. Community radio stations in Africa are providing vital information on weather disaster warnings, health and nutrition, and HIV/AIDS prevention. The quality of life of many poor women in Bangladesh has improved through the innovative use of cellular phones. In Bolivia, Internet centres have been set up to provide farmers with timely information on crops, production and processing, as well as policies and regulations. (G8 2002) In addition, Nakasone envisioned the HFSP, announced at Venice II and referred to at the Toronto Summit, as part of Japan’s contribution to international society through the development of state-of-the-art technology; and Obuchi placed IT on the agenda at Okinawa. Likewise, the honour of hosting the summit has also held a fascination with Japanese prime ministers. Miki sought to secure the honour of hosting the summit in Tokyo during the 1976 Rambouillet and 1977 San Juan summits, and Fukuda did the same at London I and Bonn I. Finally, at the Birmingham Summit, Hashimoto was reluctant to allow Yeltsin to assume responsibility for the 2000 summit. The motivating factors were to reinforce an image of ability in international affairs, bolster their popularity and, ultimately, to secure their prime ministerial positions (for example, on Fukuda’s bid to win re-election to the presidency of the LDP through securing the position of summit host at Bonn I, see Yomiuri Shinbun, 14 July 1978: 2). The ability of the prime minister to influence the decision-making process can also be seen in Obuchi’s independent decision to select Okinawa as host for the 2000 summit (despite MOFA’s rankings placing Okinawa last) in order to court popular approval and attempt to prolong his term of office (Toshikawa 1999: 75, 84). Prime ministers perceived to be ‘strong’ have tended to perform relatively well at the summit. Nakasone is the most pertinent example and one opposition politician was reported as having said that the only favourable thing about Nakasone was that he was, at least, tall – a definite advantage when appearing in the official summit photograph. Thus, it was predicted before his first summit that ‘Nakasone has generally registered well with the foreigners he has met – not particularly for being relatively tall but for being open, frank and straightforward, unlike his predecessors. . . . Prime Minister Nakasone with his buoyancy and optimism should go over well

146 Actors with his fellow summiteers’ (The Japan Times, 22 May 1983: 1, 6). Upon his return from the Williamsburg Summit it was reported that ‘Nakasone did break with the cautious policy followed by his predecessors . . . [and managed] to elevate Japan’s position by several notches by being regarded anew as “one of the gang”’ (The Japan Times, 5 June 1983: 5). Foreign journalists were generally surprised by his activism and ambition (Yomiuri Shinbun, 31 May 1983 evening edition: 3). He was seen to be ‘more comfortable in spontaneous give-and-take than his predecessors’ and ‘under Nakasone Japan was coming of age in international politics’ (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 171, 180). A great deal of attention was also given to his position in the official summit photograph taken at Williamsburg – his first summit in a series of five he attended. The Japanese prime minister’s regular position at the far right of the photograph since the first summit has been dubbed the Japanese prime minister’s ‘reserved seat’ (Goto¯ 2000: 313). However, it was reported at the time that Nakasone was not going to settle for a place on the edges of the line-up and elbowed his way next to Reagan at the centre of the photo as part of his strategic use of ‘photograph diplomacy’ (hishatai gaiko¯) (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 June 1983: 2; Shima 2000: 54–5). Although Nakasone himself contends this was purely accidental and not his intention (Maki 1988a: 122, 462–3; Nakasone 1992: 317; Nakasone 2002: 434–5), some sections of the media suggested that the regularity with which Nakasone appeared next to Reagan at photo opportunities during the Williamsburg Summit demonstrated his successful instrumentalisation of photograph diplomacy (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 June 1983 evening edition: 2). As regards the language barrier, once again Nakasone has been regarded as an exception to this rule and before the Williamsburg Summit he was able to argue the case for the indivisibility of Western security to Mitterrand in French (Sekai Heiwa Kenkyu¯jo 1995: 202). However, easily the most able communicator in English has been Miyazawa (Kiyomiya 1981: 239–40; Kiyomiya 1992: 253–4; Interview with official summit interpreter, 13 June 2003). At Rambouillet, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explained to US President Gerald Ford how Miyazawa spoke English with less of an accent than he himself did (Nakamura 1981: 146–7), and at the Munich Summit and Tokyo III he was the first Japanese prime minister to conduct discussions in English (Matsuura 1992: 23; Toki no Ugoki 1993: 16). In addition, Koizumi has also been received well and at his debut at the Genoa Summit ‘proved a livelier summit participant than most Japanese leaders’ (Bayne 2002a: 200). Especially in a forum like the summit that depends on the ability of the individuals participating and is essentially an opportunity to build trust amongst these individuals, a ‘strong’ prime minister with a forceful personality is able to exert considerable influence over the agenda, format and statements emanating from a summit. However, one interesting example of a politician whose factional power base at home was generally regarded as weak but who managed to play an active role at the summit is Kaifu. In the two summits he attended – the Houston Summit and London III – the Northern Territories’ dispute was multilateralised, support of summit partners sought and reference to its resolution included in summit

Actors 147 documentation. As regards the Northern Territories’ dispute – an issue of core national interest – and irrespective of their factional weakness or strength, ‘Japanese leaders have felt sufficiently strongly about the issue to take uncharacteristically tough positions on it at G7 summits’ (Kimura and Welch 1998: 217). One reason for this might be that this policy has resonated strongly with the Japanese people, as demonstrated in opinion polls mentioned later, and the considerable increase in approval and decrease in disapproval of the Kaifu administration after the Houston Summit (a similar shift was evident in the case of Miyazawa after the Munich Summit, despite having been a generally unpopular prime minister). It appears that the G7/8, and the emphasis placed upon the individual, provides an opportunity for the prime minister to rise above domestic constraints on his role and that the labels ‘weak’ and ‘strong’, used to describe his domestic and factional position, do not apply in the case of his behaviour at the summit. An examination of attendance at the twenty-eight summits further reveals another aspect of the Japanese prime minister’s role. Table 5.1 catalogues the participation of all the leaders in the summit process and Appendix I details the composition of the Japanese delegation. Admittedly the table does reflect the nature of each nations’ domestic political system (for example, the maximum number of summits the US President can attend is eight and the minimum is four), and includes a number of unrepresentative examples (UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson attended only the first summit despite being a much more important political figure than this might suggest), and omissions (if the president of the EC/EU commission, of which Japan is of course not a member, were included this would add to the level of European participation, and especially the tally of Romano Prodi). It is fair to presume that if there is little consistency in a participating nation’s representation then the chances of building the trust and intimacy that is necessary for the summit to function are slim. Table 5.1 demonstrates that out of the summit members Japan has the highest turnover rate of prime ministers, thus supporting the idea of anonymous and weak Japanese representation at the summit. Fourteen Japanese prime ministers attended the summit between 1975 and 2002 compared with thirteen Italian prime ministers, six US presidents, five Canadian prime ministers, five UK prime ministers, three French presidents, three German chancellors and two Russian presidents. After the Okinawa Summit, it was calculated that the Japanese prime minister attends an average of only 1.9 summits (although this ¯ kita Saburo¯, who stood in at the last minute for statistic includes MOFA Minister O ¯ Ohira at Venice I after the latter’s death but was never appointed prime minister). This was the lowest average with the Italian prime minister and Russian President faring slightly better with an average of exactly two summits. The French president and German chancellor both topped the list with an average of 8.7 summits (Gaiko¯ Fo¯ramu Zo¯kango¯ 2000: 27). In this respect, the Japanese prime minister’s participation bears closest resemblance to his Italian counterpart. Admittedly, Japan has been more unfortunate than other states in the longevity of its leaders – two prime ¯ hira and Obuchi, passed away not long before summit meetings (ten ministers, O ¯ kita replaced O ¯ hira only days before Venice I, days and nine weeks respectively; O whereas Mori was in place two months before the Okinawa Summit). However,

148 Actors Table 5.1 Leaders’ attendance at G7/8 summits, 1975–2002 Elected head of state

Times attended as elected head of government

Times attended in other Total ministerial position

Helmut Kohl (Germany) François Mitterrand (France) Margaret Thatcher (UK) Jean Chrétien (Canada) Jacques Chirac (France) Bill Clinton (US) Brian Mulroney (Canada) Ronald Reagan (US) Helmut Schmidt (Germany) Pierre Trudeau (Canada) John Major (UK) Tony Blair (UK) Valéry Giscard D’Estaing (France) Giulio Andreotti (Italy) Nakasone Yasuhiro (Japan) George Bush (US) Jimmy Carter (US) Gerhard Schröder (Germany) Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ (Japan) Silvio Berlusconi (Italy)* James Callaghan (UK) Bettino Craxi (Italy) Romano Prodi (Italy) Vladimir Putin (Russia)** Boris Yeltsin (Russia)** Miyazawa Kiichi (Japan) Giuliano Amato (Italy) George W. Bush (US) Amintore Fanfani (Italy) Gerald Ford (US) Fukuda Takeo (Japan) Kaifu Toshiki (Japan) Koizumi Junichiro¯ (Japan) Ciriaco de Mita (Italy) Miki Takeo (Japan) Aldo Moro (Italy) Murayama Tomiichi (Japan) Giovanni Spadolini (Italy) Suzuki Zenko¯ (Japan) Joe Clark (Canada) Lamberto Dini (Italy) Takeshita Noboru (Japan) Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (Italy) Obuchi Keizo¯ (Japan) ¯ hira Masayoshi (Japan) O Mori Yoshiro¯ (Japan) Uno So¯suke (Japan) Massimo d’Alema (Italy) Kim Campbell (Canada) Francesco Cossiga (Italy) Harold Wilson (UK)

16 14 12 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 5 4 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0

16 14 12 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 7 6 6 11 5 4 4 4 7 4 4 3 3 3 3 8 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 7 6 5 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1

Notes * Silvio Berlusconi attended the 2002 Kananaskis Summit as both Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs ** Russia participation began officially from the 1997 Denver Summit of the Eight

Actors 149 other leaders of the summit nations have been placed in similar weakened positions. For example Giuliano Amato was appointed as Italian prime minister on 28 June 1992 and the Munich Summit began on 6 July 1992; and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was appointed only fifty days before the Naples Summit but was roundly congratulated by summit leaders and observers on having hosted a successful summit (The Japan Times, 12 July 1994: 6). As noted above, this high turnover rate is problematic in that the summit is meant ¯ hira stated in reference to the summits: to be a forum to foster intimacy. As O ‘[a]lthough the world’s currency and trade problems will not be solved by such conferences, they should be appreciated for the role they play in maintaining understanding and trust among nations and in preventing a crisis in the world ¯ hira 1979: 128). In contrast to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who economy’ (O attended sixteen consecutive summits from Williamsburg to Birmingham, Nakasone holds the Japanese record by attending a total of five consecutive summits from Williamsburg to Venice. As mentioned above, during this time a level of intimacy was created with the Western leaders due in part to his active participation and the perception of him as the least Japanese of Japanese prime ministers (Saito 1990: 80). Before and thereafter, however, the Japanese prime minister was regarded as the transient figure on the sidelines of the official summit photograph (Shima 2000: 53–4). Although this is an accurate representation up to a point, there is one way in which participating Japan delegations have demonstrated consistency in their personnel that is another amplification of the Japanese (and equally Italian) domestic political system. Because of the practice of rotating ministerial positions amongst factional leaders, most Japanese prime ministers have attended the summit previously at the ministerial level. For example, Miyazawa attended the first summits in Rambouillet and San Juan as foreign minister, then Venice II and Toronto as finance minister, Munich and Tokyo III as prime minister, and then Cologne and Okinawa as finance minister again. Few of the Western participants can boast such a veteran of the summit process. Other individuals have attended a number of summits in various capacities, for example Hashimoto (seven times), Takeshita (six times) and Abe (five times). Kitamura Hiroshi, sherpa at Venice II and the Toronto Summit, noted in regard to Takeshita’s one appearance at the latter summit as prime minister that because he had attended the summit on five previous occasions as MOF Minister, he knew the atmosphere of the summit well and was able to participate actively (Toki no Ugoki 1988: 17). Thus, if their other appearances at the summit are included in the calculations, these leaders would be propelled up the ranking depicted in Table 5.1 and appear to be more seasoned summiteers. For example, Miyazawa would become one of the joint sixth most frequent participants, alongside US presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt – one of the founding fathers of the summit process. Hashimoto would overtake, and Takeshita would draw level with, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing – another of the summit’s founding fathers. Other leaders have acquired formative summit experience. Kaifu, for example, during his appointment as Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary attended the first two summits in Rambouillet and

150 Actors San Juan as aide to Miki before he attended Houston and London III as prime minister (Toyoda 1991: 85–7). In the Introduction to this book, it was noted that the Concert of Europe was successful due to the intimacy fostered between participants and the fact that ‘[m]any foreign ministers retained their positions for decades’ (Bridge and Bullen 1980: 17). Equally, it is this consistency in personnel that has been widely credited with facilitating the successful working of the G7 (Bergsten and Henning 1996: 78–9). Thus, although at first glance it may appear as if Japanese representation is fractured, inconsistent and patchy, there are examples of more sustained and assertive participation. The summit process holds special meaning for many prime ministers and presidents, and leaders of all the G8 nations have been accused of exploiting the summit in order to bolster their approval rating at home (Yamaguchi 1986: 68). More cynically, it has been noted that some summit observers believe that the primary purpose of the G7/8 is ‘to re-elect whichever of its “old boy” members, or protégés, was up for re-election that year’ (Kirton 1989: xxvii). In a similar vein, it has been suggested that ‘Nakasone consciously used the summit to build up his personal prestige in a way that was unfamiliar in Japanese politics’ (Bayne 2000: 41). Also, the hosting of a summit has impacted domestically upon the timing of elections; for example, leading Japanese political circles debated whether the House of Representatives’ election, eventually held on 25 June 2000, should take place before or after the Okinawa Summit both in anticipation of a post-summit increase in Mori’s popularity and with the need for continuity in leadership at the summit in mind (Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 7 April 2000: 3). A series of Yomiuri Shinbun cartoons illustrate this perception. One cartoon published after the Rambouillet Summit suggested the domestic influence the summit could have the fortunes of the prime minister by portraying Miki leaping over the Japanese Diet building on a horse that bears a striking resemblance to the château of Rambouillet and has ‘the results of Rambouillet’ (Ranbuie seika) written on its side (Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 November 1975: 2). Another cartoon portrayed Miki and US President Gerald Ford using the San Juan Summit as an opportunity to check that each other’s necks were still there and that they had not been sacked yet (Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 June 1976: 2). A final cartoon depicted Fukuda proudly flexing his muscles ¯ hira (LDP Secretary and showing off his medal with ‘Bonn’ embossed on it to O General at the time), who sweats profusely and wonders what he has to do in order to acquire it (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 July 1978: 2). Thus, the connection between a successful performance at a summit and an increase in the prime minister’s approval ratings, and vice versa, would appear to be intuitive. Owada Hisashi, one of Japan’s most noted and élite bureaucrats, has asserted that the most successful summits for Japan were Bonn I, Tokyo I, Williamsburg, Houston and Tokyo III (Owada 1994). Although the summit is not cited as a specific factor in opinion polls on prime ministerial approval and disapproval, by referring back to the opinion poll results mentioned in Chapters 1 to 4 and summarised in Figure 5.1, it should be possible to establish whether these successful summits had an impact on the attitudes of Japanese people.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Approval

Houston, 1990

Toronto, 1988

Venice II, 1987

Summit venue

London III, 1991

Tokyo II, 1986

Bonn II, 1985

London II, 1984

Williamsburg, 1983

Versailles, 1982

Ottawa, 1981

Tokyo I, 1979

London I, 1977

San Juan, 1976

Rambouillet, 1975

*Venice I, 1980, Paris, 1989 and Tokyo III, 1993 have been omitted because of changes in administration

Halifax, 1995 Naples, 1994

Munich, 1992

Source: Asahi Shinbun, Mainichi Shinbun and Yomiuri Shinbun, various years Note: * Venice I, 1980, Paris, 1989 and Tokyo III, 1993 have been omitted because of changes in administration

Figure 5.1 Japanese prime ministers’ dis/approval ratings before and after G7/8 summits, 1975–2002

%

Disapproval

Bonn I, 1978

90

Kananaskis, 2002

Genoa, 2001 Okinawa, 2000

Cologne, 1999

Birmingham, 1998 Denver, 1997 Lyon, 1996

152 Actors In the case of Bonn I, Fukuda’s approval rating increased by two percentage points, but his disapproval rating demonstrated an even greater change by decreasing by over five percentage points – considerable differences over a period ¯ hira’s approval rating increased from 37.6 of one month. In the case of Tokyo I, O per cent in May 1979 to 39 per cent in June 1979, although the disapproval rating also increased from 34 per cent to 36.7 per cent over the same time period. This could well be interpreted as a positive endorsement of Japan’s debut on the international stage of summit diplomacy, although the time period between opinion polls makes it difficult to pinpoint a single cause. In the case of the Williamsburg Summit, despite misgivings as regards the political content of the summit (see later in this chapter), Nakasone’s approval rating increased not inconsiderably and his disapproval rating decreased slightly. Nakasone’s popularity was such that by the time of the July 1986 joint election the LDP was able to win a clear majority of 300 seats in the House of Representatives and 72 of the 126 seats up for election in the House of Councillors – representing the best election result in its history. Nakasone himself wondered whether this increase in approval could have been due to his active role in the summit and prominent position in the official photograph (Sekai Heiwa Kenkyu¯jo 1996: 181; Nakasone 2002: 435). In the case of the Houston Summit, Kaifu was generally regarded as a weak prime minister with no solid factional support. However, his approval rating increased by over three-and-a-half percentage points to 60 per cent, and his disapproval rating decreased markedly as well. In the case of Tokyo III, Miyazawa fell from power the next month bringing to an end fifty-five years of rule by the LDP. He was replaced by the incredibly popular Hosokawa. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish the impact of the summit in this case. As regards other summits outside Owada’s assessment, as mentioned in Chapter 2 Venice II was regarded at the time by the government as the best one so far for Japan. This was Nakasone’s final summit and although he was by this stage an outgoing prime minister with little to gain from the summit beyond adding to his legacy, his performance was well received by the Japanese people and the approval rating for his administration increased from 30 per cent in May 1987 to 34 per cent in June 1987, whilst the disapproval rating dropped from 54.6 per cent to 49.8 per cent over the same time period. In addition, and as seen in Chapter 2, a clear increase in the approval and decrease in the disapproval of the Takeshita administration occurred at the time of the Toronto Summit. Approval rose from 45 per cent in May 1988 to 47.3 per cent in June 1988 – the month the summit was held – and then dropped to 43.3 in July 1988. The disapproval rating decreased from 30.1 per cent to 29.4 per cent and then recovered to 31.6 per cent over the same time period. Finally, Japan played host to one further summit after Owada’s assessment, the Okinawa Summit. Okinawa was generally regarded as a success by the people of Okinawa (see later in this chapter), the national approval rating for Mori decreased slightly from 27.3 per cent to 26.6 per cent, but the disapproval rating also dropped slightly from 61.4 per cent to 60.8 per cent. It must be remembered that Mori was a chronically unpopular prime minister and without the summit, or

Actors 153 possibly as a result of a bad performance, his dis/approval ratings might possibly have shifted more substantially (as had been the case for another ‘weak’ prime minister, Murayama, after the débâcle of the Naples Summit). In conclusion, it must be remembered that none of these opinion polls specifically asks about the impact of the summit on attitudes towards the prime minister and that there are a number of other factors influencing the expression of approval or disapproval of any given administration. Thus, it is a difficult task to pinpoint the exact influence of the summit on these attitudes. Nevertheless, in some cases, it does appear that opinion polls have behaved as one might expect after a successful summit – the expected surge in popularity is demonstrated particularly well by opinions polls conducted before, during and after both the Toronto and Denver Summits on the Takeshita and Hashimoto administrations respectively (see Figure 5.1). As demonstrated in Chapters 1 to 4, even after prime ministers have retired, their shadows have been cast over preparations for the summit. Through the series of ‘old boys’ summits’, or InterAction Council, held from 1983, former summit participants, such as Helmut Schmidt and Fukuda Takeo, have met and discussed similar issues of the day and agenda items to the summit (more information can be found at: http://www.asiawide.or.jp/iac). The prime minister of the day regularly met not only Fukuda, but also a number of other predecessors, as part of his preparation for the summit and to draw on their expertise. However, it is difficult to measure accurately the influence these meetings have on the agenda-setting process, and they may well be merely perfunctory and more accurately described as an example of Japanese consensus-building.

The bureaucracy On 28 February 2003 TV Tokyo broadcast an episode of Kuizu!!! Akappaji Aoppaji (Quiz: Common Sense) – a weekly quiz programme based on the premise of testing the Japanese public’s general knowledge and exposing their ignorance. This week’s episode posed the question: ‘In which country will the 2003 G8 summit take place’ to four Japanese politicians from four different parties in both the House of Representatives and House of Councillors. Out of the four politicians only the representative of the DP (Ogawa Toshio) gave the correct answer: France. Politicians of the LDP (Matsunami Kenta), JCP (Haruna Naoaki) and New Conservative Party (NCP) (Tsuruho Yo¯suke) answered incorrectly, with the final politician even guessing at Greece. This anecdotal episode possibly suggests something about the level of interest of the average Japanese politician in foreign affairs in general, and the summit specifically – a process often regarded as largely the preserve of the prime minister, as seen above, and the bureaucracy. Within the bureaucracy, MOFA and MOF dominate Japan’s policy towards the summit but, for one reason in particular, MOFA is able to exert the greater influence upon the summit’s agenda. During the annual series of preparatory summit meetings held to finalise the summit’s agenda and documentation, the leaders’ personal assistants, or sherpas, play a central role and maintain an intimate relationship with the prime minister of the day. In contrast to some G7/8 nations,

154 Actors the Japanese sherpa has without exception been the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (gaimu shingikan) – a high-level MOFA bureaucrat with a speciality in economics. It is necessary that the sherpa is competent in foreign languages and displays excellent coordination skills. He is assisted by two sous-sherpa: one for foreign affairs also taken from MOFA, and one for financial affairs taken from MOF. Mainichi Shinbun journalist and summit-watcher Shima Nobuhiko has pointed to the power of MOFA in the summit process in relation to the prime minister by highlighting an English newspaper article that described how, at the Naples Summit, Prime Minister Murayama was ordered by MOFA bureaucrats not to say anything, smile in front of the camera and not be late for the plane home (Shima 2000: 168). Thus, MOFA’s role in the preparations for the summit is dominant, but not exclusive, due to the presence of one MOF sous-sherpa (Gaiko¯ Fo¯ramu Zo¯kango¯ 2000: 13, 59; Takase 2000: 148). MOFA is positive about the summit process and regards it as an important opportunity both to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to international society and for the leaders of the world’s most important economies and Russia to meet faceto-face, coordinate policy and establish common rules in international affairs. To this end, and as seen in the preceding chapters, concrete policies have included increasing ODA contributions, promoting North–South dialogue and an IT agenda, embracing political (such as conflict resolution) as well as economic issues, representing Asia (whilst not alienating the West), and rethinking the format of hosting a summit in order to ensure its success. MOFA is keen also to see the summit develop a higher degree of transparency and promotes the policy of ‘outreach’ to include the leaders of other nations, especially those from the developing world, and NGOs. Thus, at Okinawa, facilities were provided to support the work of a number of NGOs. The separation of the foreign and finance ministers’ meetings from the leaders’ meeting, from the Birmingham Summit onwards – another summit reform, has been regarded in a positive light by MOFA. Although initially opposed to Russian participation in the summit process until the Northern Territories’ dispute had been resolved, MOFA now regards it as more justifiable in contrast to China’s membership, discussion of which is regarded as premature as China is not democratic, industrialised or a responsible member of international society (Interview with high-level MOFA bureaucrat and former sous-sherpa for foreign affairs, 29 May 2003). MOF also regards the summit process as necessary in order to coordinate policy amongst the world’s leading economies. However, in contrast to MOFA, it was initially wary of attending the summit, reluctant to alter its policies in line with summit decisions and penny-pinching when it came to the provision of funds for various ODA schemes. However, due to the more regular meetings of the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors, MOF is constantly involved in preparations for these meetings and thus the separation of ministerial meetings since Birmingham has had little impact. MOF tends to regard the summer meeting of the finance ministers that precedes the leaders’ meeting as an opportunity to reiterate the positions of each member nation, rather than a forum for debate. Its position on Chinese and Russian membership is that in the case of the former it would be

Actors 155 peculiar to have an aid recipient deciding ODA policy within the summit, and in the case of the latter, although its claim to summit membership is more sound, it is still finding its feet at the summit meetings (Interview with high-level MOF bureaucrat, 22 May 2003). Finally, MITI (from January 2001, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)) has also joined the Japanese summit delegation on several occasions, although this has been regarded as the exception rather than the rule. In addition, the sherpa has had to coordinate amongst a number of other ministries and agencies, namely, EPA, JDA, MAFF, MHW and MOJ, which have also attended meetings in preparation for the summit and dealt with issues such as, respectively, economic growth, security issues, agricultural trade, infectious diseases and terrorism. The summit has provided a venue for these ministries, but especially MOFA and MOF, to conduct disputes over their respective policy positions and bureaucratic spheres of influence. These examples of disputes over jurisdictional territory again illustrate the link between the international and domestic levels. As seen in Chapter 1, before the Ottawa Summit a personal dispute erupted between MITI Minister Tanaka Rokusuke and MOFA Minister Sonoda Sunao over the composition of the Japanese delegation and Tanaka’s inclusion. Whilst stressing a high level of coordination between the ministries in preparation for the summit, one MOFA official referred to the meeting of the finance ministers as a mafia (Interview with highlevel MOFA bureaucrat and former sous-sherpa for foreign affairs, 29 May 2003). These battles have usually been fought over influencing the summit agenda, meeting pledges and funding efforts to do so. As Putnam notes, ‘[i]n Japan prostimulus officials also used the American pressure to exploit international divisions in Tokyo and help override the objections of the powerful finance ministry’ (Putnam 1984: 80). The prime minister has also come into conflict with his bureaucracy but has generally been able to assert his position. Before Bonn I, ‘Fukuda, despite his background as a “stingy” MOF bureaucrat, was by all accounts eager to be accepted as a responsible world statesman, conscious of his unfulfilled promises of London and concerned about trade frictions with the Americans and (less vitally) the Europeans’. In order to meet the target, a range of domestic stimulus measures were discussed but eventually only by utilising a greater or lesser degree of foreign pressure was MOF overruled and a new growth target of 7 per cent for 1978 and accompanying fiscal stimulus measures agreed (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 74–5). Other differences between the prime minister and the bureaucracy have come into relief. Hashimoto on the one hand, and MOFA, MOF and MITI on the other hand, were divided over promoting China’s membership of the WTO at the Lyon Summit with Hashimoto eager to see China’s inclusion, in contrast to the ministries’ doubts, as mentioned above, about its readiness. It was rumoured that Hashimoto’s enthusiasm for this issue led him at one point to suggest that if Italy was a member of the G8 then why could China not also join, much to Italian offence (Asahi Shinbun, 1 July 1996: 2). And, on occasions, the summit has been utilised by the prime minister as a deadline in order to overcome bureaucratic squabbling. For example, before the Versailles Summit, Miyazawa (Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time) is said to have demanded that the bureaucracy stop their in-fighting and prepare for the summit

156 Actors (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 258). Thus, although the bureaucracy plays an important role in preparation for the summit, it is far from acting as a unitary actor and remains answerable to the prime minister.

Other state and non-state actors A variety of other actors have taken an interest in the summit from its outset and have sought to exert varying degrees of influence. For example, the opposition parties and the business world through their regular pre-summit consultations with the prime minister of the day, the media through its intense coverage of each summit, and the Japanese public through a variety of opinion polls. In addition, new actors have been included in the summit process as it has evolved and developed a policy of ‘outreach’ to encompass a variety of NGOs constituting and representing civil society (Kondo¯ 2002: 22). Representatives of the range of organisations that constitute the business world – the third pole of the ‘iron triangle’ – have met with the prime minister prior to his departure for the summit and have been in favour of the idea of the summit process since its inception. The business world has regarded the summit as an important forum for the world’s leaders to exchange opinions and coordinate policy and, in this regard, has welcomed its permanence as a diplomatic fixture. The business world’s primary concerns centre, on the one hand, upon promoting free trade, antiprotectionism and stability in currency markets, and, on the other hand, resisting inflation and addressing unemployment. However, interest is not limited to the economic sphere and the politicisation of the summit agenda has, by and large, been welcomed – as seen in the business world’s support for the declarations of unity within the Western camp and German and Korean reunification during the second cold war of the 1980s. The opposition parties have also regularly met with the prime minister before his departure for the summit and offered their opinions on items to be discussed at the upcoming summit. In fact, the degree of institutionalisation of these meetings becomes evident when they are threatened with not taking place, as was the case before London II. Equally, these parties have expressed a range of opinions after the conclusion of the summit with the left-wing parties of the JCP and JSP tending to be consistently negative, in contrast to the critical but occasionally more supportive centre-ground and centre-right parties, such as the DP, DSP, Ko¯meito¯, NLC and Socialist Democratic Federation. Like the meetings with the business world and former prime ministers, it is difficult to gauge the exact degree of influence these consultations exert upon the evolution of the summit agenda. They may be purely customary and more characteristic than anything else of the Japanese style of consensus-building. Nevertheless, the general importance accorded to the summit is demonstrated by the fact that opposition parties had previously opposed prime ministerial overseas trips whilst the Diet was in session, but in the case of the Rambouillet Summit muted their opposition (Nakamura 1981: 131). The Japanese media have paid a great deal of attention to each summit and, as seen above, the position of the Japanese prime minister within the summit

Actors 157 photograph. However, the fact that there are a number of photographs taken during the summit with the leaders in different positions undermines the validity of this attention. Their attention on the trivial or peripheral has tended to add to the carnivalisation of the summit rendering it little more than a ‘political show’ in the media coverage (Shimizu 1986). What is more, at times their judgement on the success or failure of a summit has been somewhat harsh. For example, within Japan both Tokyo II and III were widely criticised and regarded as failures; however, it has been noted that in foreign government and media circles they were generally acknowledged to have been successful (Teshima 1986: 18–19; Matsuura and Kasuya 1993: 66). Nogami Yoshiji, sherpa at the Okinawa and Genoa Summits, has gone as far as to state that the Japanese media do not digest summit documentation (Nogami 2000b: 8–9). The opinions of the Japanese public are regularly sought and analysed by both the media and the government. Although Japanese summit-related opinion polls are comparatively few in number in contrast to other foreign policy issues, and it is problematic to assess their impact upon the government, there are enough to draw out a number of attitudes towards the summit process. The first opinion poll on the summit was conducted by the Prime Minster’s Office Secretariat, Public Relations Office in August 1978, 64.8 per cent of pollees claimed to have been aware of Bonn I, whereas 35.2 per cent were unaware. When asked about their interest in the contents of the Bonn Communiqué, 23.6 per cent selected ‘attaining economic growth without inflation’, 18.6 per cent chose ‘currency stability’, 10.8 per cent stated ‘energy-saving and development’, 5.8 per cent selected ‘the support of free trade’, and 2.6 per cent chose ‘assistance for developing nations’. When asked whether it was good for the leaders of the most industrialised economies to meet and discuss the world’s problems, 37.6 per cent of pollees believed that it was an extremely good thing and 39.2 per cent stated that if they were forced to choose they would say it was a good thing. In contrast, 1.5 per cent of pollees did not believe that it was a good thing and 2.6 per cent stated that if they were forced to choose they did not believe it was a good thing (Naikaku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ Ko¯ho¯shitsu 1980: 112). According to an Asahi Shinbun opinion poll conducted on the eve of Tokyo I, 75 per cent of pollees replied that they had heard about or seen the upcoming summit in the media, whereas 24 per cent had not. When asked about their interest in the agenda of Tokyo I, 56 per cent selected ‘oil issues and energy development’, 27 per cent chose ‘planning for economic growth whilst controlling inflation’, 6 per cent stated other issues, 5 per cent chose ‘mutual prosperity and coexistence of the most industrialised nations and developing nations’, 4 per cent selected ‘stability in international currency markets’, and 2 per cent stated ‘promoting prosperous trade between nations’. When asked their opinions about hosting the summit in Tokyo, 27 per cent of pollees believed that it would be ‘useful in promoting Japan’s international position’, 23 per cent believed it would be ‘useful in solving problems between Japan and the other participating nations’, 23 per cent believed that it had ‘no connection with the lives of average Japanese people’, and 15 per cent regarded it as ‘a waste of tax money’. When asked to rank the standard of living in Japan in

158 Actors contrast to the other summit nations, 44 per cent of pollees believed it to be somewhere in the middle, 31 per cent placed it towards the top, and 19 per cent placed it towards the bottom (Asahi Shinbun, 26 June 1979: 12–13; Naikaku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ Ko¯ho¯shitsu 1981: 504). According to an opinion poll conducted by the Prime Minster’s Office Secretariat, Public Relations Office in August 1979, 89.2 per cent of pollees replied that they were aware that Tokyo I took place, whereas 10.8 per cent were not aware. When asked about their interest in the contents of the Tokyo Communiqué, 70.8 per cent selected ‘the reduction of energy consumption and the development of new energy resources’, 3.2 per cent chose ‘the strengthening of a constructive relationship between the most industrialised nations and developing nations’, 2.5 per cent stated ‘currency stability’, 2.4 per cent selected ‘the advancement of long-term, efficient productivity in order to bolster the world economy’, and 1.6 per cent chose ‘support of free trade’. When asked whether it was useful for the leaders of the most industrialised economies to meet and discuss the world’s problems, 22 per cent of pollees believed that it was extremely useful and 51 per cent stated that if they were forced to choose they would say it was useful. In contrast, 3.6 per cent of pollees did not believe that it was useful and 8.7 per cent of pollees stated that if they were forced to choose they did not believe it was useful (Naikaku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ Ko¯ho¯shitsu 1981: 135). According to another opinion poll conducted by the Prime Minster’s Office Secretariat, Public Relations Office in May 1980 before Venice I, 55.6 per cent of pollees replied that they were aware that Venice I was taking place, whereas 44.4 per cent were not aware (Naikaku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ Ko¯ho¯shitsu 1982: 117). According to a similar opinion poll conducted in May 1981 before the Ottawa Summit, 41.9 per cent of pollees replied that they were aware that the Ottawa Summit was taking place, whereas 58.1 per cent were not aware (Naikaku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ Ko¯ho¯shitsu 1983: 124). A NHK survey conducted on the weekend of 11–12 June 1983 included two questions regarding the agenda of the Williamsburg Summit and Nakasone’s position. First of all, in light of the agreement to station missiles in Europe against the Soviet Union, pollees were asked to state with which opinion they agreed: (1) In order for US–Soviet nuclear reduction talks to bear fruit, a balance in the nuclear capability of both sides is necessary. This strong stance is inevitable; or (2) I cannot agree with the stance based on power politics as this will lead to an escalation of the nuclear arms race. Of those asked 19.1 per cent agreed with the first statement, 49.8 per cent agreed with the second statement, and 13.5 per cent disagreed with both statements. When asked specifically about Nakasone’s active support for the stationing of these missiles in Europe, pollees were asked again to state which opinion with which they agreed: (1) I evaluate his position highly. It is natural for Japan to be a member of the Western camp and in the long term it is connected with global nuclear disarmament including Asia; or (2) This is a dangerous position as it goes against the Japanese Constitution and the spirit of the three non-nuclear principles and Japan may become embroiled in the nuclear strategy of the US and NATO. 16.4 per cent agreed with the first statement, 50.4 per cent agreed with the second

Actors 159 statement, and 15.7 per cent did not agree with either statement (NHK Ho¯so¯ Bunka Cho¯sa Kenkyu¯jo 1986: 123–4). A Yomiuri Shinbun survey conducted in March 1986 asked pollees to choose up to two issues which they hoped would be discussed at Tokyo II. The response was that 46.8 per cent answered ‘promotion of peace and disarmament’, 38 per cent answered the ‘recovery of the world economy’, 20 per cent chose ‘the correction of trade imbalances’, 18 per cent had no particular expectations, 8.1 per cent stated ‘cooperation against the Soviet Union’, 6.7 per cent selected ‘strengthening of cooperation between the Asia Pacific and Atlantic regions’, and 6.2 per cent hoped for ‘cancellation of developing countries’ debt’ (Yomiuri Shinbun, 28 April 1986: 1, 12–13; Naikaku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ Ko¯ho¯shitsu 1987: 552). According to an NHK poll conducted on the weekend of 24–5 May 1986, 3.9 per cent of pollees believed that Tokyo II produced great results, 36.3 per cent tentatively believed it produced some results, and 44.2 per cent believed there were no results to speak of (NHK Ho¯so¯ Bunka Cho¯sa Kenkyu¯jo 1989: 301). According to another Yomiuri Shinbun opinion poll conducted in January 1991, 58.1 per cent of pollees replied that the Soviet Union should sooner or later become an official participant of the summit process, 19.1 per cent believed that it should immediately become an official participant, and 10.2 per cent believed it was unnecessary (Naikaku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ Ko¯ho¯shitsu 1992: 503; for an abridged version of the same opinion poll, see Yomiuri Shinbun, 31 January 1991: 2). Yomiuri Shinbun conducted another survey in June 1993. Pollees were asked whether they were interested in the upcoming Tokyo III, to which 10.2 per cent answered that they were very interested, 31 per cent stated that they were somewhat interested, 39.5 per cent said that they were not very interested, and 17.8 per cent answered that they had no interest. When asked whether they thought that the summit process since its inception had assisted in the resolution of political and economic problems, 5.7 per cent believed that it had assisted to a large extent, 51.1 per cent stated that it had helped to some extent, 27.1 per cent believed that it had not helped very much, and 3.7 per cent stated that it had not helped at all. When asked (allowing for multiple answers) what issues they expected to see addressed at Tokyo III, 44.3 per cent of pollees selected ‘economic recovery and the revitalisation of the world economy’, 43.7 per cent stated ‘destruction of the earth’s environment and prevention of pollution’, 31.4 per cent chose ‘the non-proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons’, 19.7 per cent chose ‘the correction of trade imbalances’, 19 per cent stated ‘stability in exchange rates’, 18.6 per cent chose ‘the resolution of ethnic and regional conflicts, like the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia’, 15.2 per cent chose ‘the support and promotion of free trade’, 14.9 per cent chose ‘resolution of the AIDS problem’, 13.8 per cent selected ‘the promotion of development in developing nations’, 11.8 per cent had no particular expectations, 11 per cent believed ‘support for Russia and the former Soviet Union’s economic and political reforms’, and 10.8 per cent stated ‘strengthening the UN’s functions’ (Naikaku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ Ko¯ho¯shitsu 1995: 464). When asked about increasing economic assistance for Russia at Tokyo III beyond the US$43.4 billion to which the summit nations had already agreed, 6.3 per cent

160 Actors of pollees agreed with this policy and 19.9 per cent agreed if forced to chose. Multiple answers given as reasons for agreeing included: ‘political and economic stability in Russia is important for international peace’ (59.3 per cent); ‘it is unbearable to watch the distress in Russia’ (29 per cent); ‘providing economic assistance is the duty of the most industrialised nations’ (28.8 per cent); ‘if Yeltsin were to lose power the reform movement in Russia would be set back’ (15.1 per cent); and ‘the original amount of assistance was insufficient’ (9.8 per cent). In contrast, 26.5 per cent of pollees were against this policy and 37.9 per cent disagreed with this policy if forced to choose. Multiple answers given as reasons for disagreeing included: ‘economic assistance will not be used effectively’ (58.5 per cent); ‘the issue of the Northern Territories has not been resolved’ (48.8 per cent); ‘the Russian attitude regards the receipt of assistance as a matter of course’ (40.3 per cent); ‘the original amount of assistance was sufficient’ (14.1 per cent); and ‘inherent opposition to the idea of providing economic assistance’ (11.2 per cent) (Naikaku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ Ko¯ho¯shitsu 1995: 464–5). In addition, when asked about the future of the summit after the end of the cold war, 23.4 per cent believed that the number of summits should be increased and it should play a more active role, 58.6 per cent believed that it should continue as it had done so far, and 7 per cent believed that the summit process was unnecessary (Naikaku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ Ko¯ho¯shitsu 1995: 465). As regards Japanese people’s attitude towards China’s membership of the G8, in contrast to government hesitation and according to a Yomiuri Shinbun opinion poll, 68.7 per cent of pollees were in favour of China’s participation, whereas 12.5 per cent were against it (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 September 1999: 15). The attitudes of the people of Okinawa towards the Okinawa Summit were mixed. On the one hand, there was interest in the immediate run-up to the summit. One opinion poll found that 75.3 per cent of Okinawans welcomed the decision to hold the summit in Okinawa, as opposed to 11 per cent opposed to the decision. In addition, 77 per cent replied that they were interested in the summit, as opposed to 21.8 per cent who were not interested in varying degrees (Okinawa Taimusu, 20 July 1999: 1–3). Later that year another opinion poll discovered that almost 80 per cent of Okinawans were interested in the summit and that almost 60 per cent wanted to be involved in some capacity (Okinawa Taimusu, 29 October 1999: 24). Another opinion poll announced two months before the opening of the summit that a majority of 54 per cent of people had expectations of the summit. When given the opportunity to choose multiple reasons for these expectations, 51 per cent of pollees wanted to see global economic stability discussed, compared to 40 per cent emphasising environmental problems, 30 per cent highlighting disarmament and 26 per cent stressing educational problems. On the other hand, 35 per cent held no expectations of the summit and an additional 9 per cent expressed no interest in it. When asked about their reasons, 43 per cent stated that the summit is nothing more than a ceremony for political leaders, 19 per cent complained that the voices of civil society are not reflected in the process, and 16 per cent expressed doubts about the Japanese prime minister’s ability to lead (Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 28 May 2000: 6). One journalist described Okinawa during the summit as something akin to a ‘tropical Alcatraz’ (quoted in Johnson 2002, and detailed in McCormack and

Actors 161 Yonetani 2000). In line with this statement, before the summit, 51.8 per cent of Okinawans feared excessive security during the summit (Okinawa Taimusu, 29 October 1999: 24). However, after its conclusion, 33.3 per cent believed the security to have been harsh and 59.5 per cent regarded the security as something with which they ought to cooperate (Okinawa Taimusu, 1 August 2000: 29). In another opinion poll, 39.7 per cent of Okinawans regarded their everyday lives as having been damaged by the security measures and traffic regulations surrounding the summit, whereas 60.3 per cent did not regard the measures as having been damaging (Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 11 August 2000: 3). The final summit-related opinion poll conducted during this twenty-eight-year history concerned the ¥2000 banknote carrying the image of Shuri Castle’s Shurei Gate in Naha released to commemorate the Okinawa Summit. This was met with public disapproval – 61.1 per cent of pollees were opposed in varying degrees to its issue, in contrast to 38.9 per cent who were by and large in favour – and failed to generate the desired semiotic response by being associated more with Obuchi (52.5 per cent) than the summit itself (35.2 per cent) (Orikkusu Kurejitto 2000: 931–8). Other opinion polls as regards the Okinawa Summit are examined in Chapter 6 in the context of the US–Japan bilateral relationship. Thus, in these chronological, summit-related opinion polls, the Japanese public have expressed a variety of different attitudes towards the summit process, although some common themes can be discerned. Despite a significant section of the public who doubt whether summit decisions have an impact upon their lives, the Japanese people have generally been supportive of the summit process and welcomed the recognition given to Japan’s position in the world through membership in it, even using the other summit nations as a yardstick to measure their own development. Interest in the summit agenda has altered in line with the issues of the day from stimulating economic growth to oil and energy to peace and disarmament. However, Nakasone’s attempts to play a more active and overtly political role at the Williamsburg Summit in the field of security were not received positively by the Japanese people, whose position reflected traditional, postwar anti-militarism. As regards awareness, the results of these opinion polls suggest that the Japanese people become increasingly aware of the summit as a Japan-hosted summit approaches. Interest then peaks in the immediate aftermath of the summit before then steadily declining to a majority position of ignorance about the summit process (see Figure 5.2). By expressing support for and interest in both the summit process and the decision to host it in Okinawa, the attitudes of the people of Okinawa towards the summit have in some ways mirrored those of the Japanese people. However, Okinawans tended to have higher expectations of the summit (for reasons detailed in Chapter 6) to the extent that they were willing to bear the burden of the associated security. As regards the management of the Soviet Union/Russia in the post-cold war world, although the Japanese people recognised its political importance and the inevitability of it eventually joining the summit process, they, like the government, were wary of extending economic assistance. This opposition can be contrasted with opinion polls conducted in the US at the same time, which stated that an

162 Actors 90 80

Aware Unaware

70 60

%

50 40 30 20 10 0

Bonn I, 1978

pre-Tokyo I, 1979

post-Tokyo I, 1979

Venice I, 1980

Ottawa, 1981

Summit venue

Figure 5.2 Japanese people’s awareness of the G7 summit process, 1978–81 Source: Naikuku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ Ko¯ho¯shitsu 1980–3

average of 63 per cent supported increasing financial aid to Russia for a variety of purposes (Kokotsis 1999: 247). Japanese government officials have regularly justified their position on the extension of financial aid to Russia with reference to domestic pressures to resolve first and foremost the Northern Territories’ dispute. As these opinion polls demonstrate, the Japanese government’s stance at the summit has been supported by and played well with the Japanese electorate, although this attitude has been criticised: Taxpayers in all the other G7 countries seem to understand the provision of aid to Russia in national security, not historical terms, despite the fact that Russia’s predecessor may have inflicted economic and human hardships on them on a scale exceeding the seizure of four islands. (deVillafranca 1993: 623) Eventually, the Japanese government did jettison its policy of the indivisibility of politics and economics at Tokyo III claiming that it had made its point as regards the Northern Territories but it was also faced with considerable foreign pressure (Miyashita 2001: 48–55). Thereafter, at the Denver Summit, the reversal in the Japanese government’s policy was evident when Hashimoto stated in a press conference that, ‘this [the territorial issue] is an issue that must be settled bilaterally, and during the summit meeting this time, I congratulated this opportunity of welcoming Russia as a member of the G8’ (Hashimoto 1997).

Actors 163 As regards other non-state participants, the Japanese government has responded to the summit’s calls for a policy of ‘outreach’ and sought to include a variety of these actors in the summit process for the first time. Before the Okinawa Summit, a meeting was arranged in Tokyo on 19 July 2000 between most G7/8 leaders and representatives from a range of developing countries (Bayne 2001a: 14). South African Prime Minister Thabo Mbeki, as chair of NAM, and Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, as chair of the G77, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, representative of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai as Chair of UNCTAD and the ASEAN Roundtable, were invited to meet on 20 July 2000 with both G7/8 nations and representatives of the World Bank, WHO, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Kojima 2001: 102; Nogami 2001a: 108–9). Whilst preparing the IT agenda for this summit, the Japanese government enlisted the participation of a number of MNCs and Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro¯ held a roundtable discussion with international business leaders in Tokyo three days before the summit began (Bayne 2001a: 14; Ullrich 2001: 235). Finally, at this summit, the opinions of a range of NGOs were sought and the government constructed an NGO centre to provide these groups for the first time with necessary facilities. In the immediate run-up to the summit, a number of events organised by NGOs highlighted issues such as US bases, debt issues, human ¯ tsuka security, environmental issues, women and children’s rights (Kunitomi 2000; O 2000; Takazato 2000; Ui 2000; Sakurai 2001). The NGO centre was symbolic of the first time that the importance of NGOs had been recognised by the host nation. However, the centre was under-used, possibly because it was some distance from the press centre, cost ¥10,000 (US$91) per NGO to use, and involved procedures such as submitting individual photographs and registering details such as address and height, suggesting surveillance and possible cooption by the Japanese government (The Japan Times, 25 July 2000; Toyoda 2000: 21). However, both NGOs and business were involved in the follow-up to the summit including the creation of the DOT force to address the ‘digital divide’, another task force on renewable energy and a programme to combat infectious diseases (Bayne 2001a: 15). Thus, the Japanese government has recognised that governance cannot simply be furnished by the world’s leading economies and has sought to supplement their efforts through a policy of ‘reaching out’ to the governmental and nongovernmental institutions that constitute the patchwork quilt of global governance mentioned in the Introduction. Nevertheless, civil society can at times be decidedly uncivil. The summit has been the target of several protest groups prepared to use violent means to bring attention to their causes, but which have been excluded from the above policy of ‘outreach’ and ultimately limited in their impact on the summit beyond causing disruption. Chu¯kakuha probably represents the most active and vehement opposition to the summit within Japan as demonstrated in its launching of missiles over the summit venue during the opening ceremony of Tokyo II. Chu¯kakuha’s position is that the summit represents a neo-imperialist and undemocratic forum that only serves to reinforce the interests and privileges of the leading economies at the expense of the developing world. In the run-up to the Okinawa Summit, Chu¯kakuha dubbed

164 Actors the summit a ‘war conference’ that kept the Korean peninsula divided and sought to organise protests against not only the summit but also the Mori administration, Clinton’s speech at Mabuni Hill Memorial Peace Park, and US military bases in Japan and South Korea, preaching that ‘[t]he struggle to smash the Okinawa Summit has become a fateful battle to decide for the coming 21st century where to go. Let’s stand up, in solidarity with the fighting Korean people and Okinawa people, for a huge demonstration to crush Okinawa Summit!’ (Chu¯kakuha no date). In short, the ‘iron triangle’ is both instructive and outdated. Although the process of deciding Japan and the summit’s agendas is dominated by the prime minister of the day (who is more powerful than has been traditionally argued) and the bureaucracy, there are a number of other state and non-state actors that take an active interest in the summit process and seek to influence the Japanese government’s stance. Having elucidated these actors and their attitudes, the next chapter will explore the motivations for these positions and the range of policies pursued at the summit by focusing on the three norms of bilateralism, East Asianism and internationalism.

6

Norms

Without reinventing the wheel each time (for more detail, see the literature cited in the Introduction), norms can be defined simply as ideals or expectations of how a system should, or should not, be organised and how individual actors within that system should, or should not, respond (it is no coincidence that norms are also frequently ‘-isms’). The identities and consequent behaviour of the various actors explored in the previous chapter are shaped by a range of these norms. Not only may these norms complement, reinforce or negate each other, their influence also waxes and wanes. In the case of the Japanese state and its people, the three norms that constitute the core of its behaviour in the G7/8 are bilateralism, East Asianism and internationalism.

Bilateralism Bilateralism in foreign policy, simply defined, states that the resolution of international issues should be conducted on the level of interaction between two governments. In the case of Japan, this has been internalised and taken to an extreme, which has resulted in a hard-nosed realist policy of repeated alignment and bandwagoning with the most powerful state in the international system. In fact, the history of Japan’s international relations can be seen as responding repeatedly and predominantly to this norm, as evinced by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–23, the Tripartite Pact with Germany (and to a lesser extent Italy), 1940–5, and the US–Japan Security Treaty, 1952–present day. As demonstrated in Chapters 1 to 4, not only has the summit provided an opportunity for Japanese prime ministers, foreign and finance ministers to meet their counterparts in a multilateral setting within the official summit meetings, it has also allowed them to meet in a bilateral setting before, during and after the summit on its periphery. Thereby, it represents another conduit by which bilateral relationships with other summit participants, most importantly the US, can be managed. In the case of Europe, the summit has provided a valuable occasion for the Japanese government to meet with representatives of France, Germany, Italy and the UK, and diversify a predominantly US-centred foreign policy. Furthermore, in the 1990s, the Japanese government seized the chance to address a number of bilateral issues with the Soviet Union/Russia through the summit, most notably,

166 Norms the Northern Territories’ dispute and the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Nuclear Safety and Security Summit held in Moscow in April 1996 provided Hashimoto and Yeltsin with their first opportunity to meet in what would prove to be one of the warmest personal relationships in the history of the two countries. Yet, it is chiefly the US–Japan bilateral relationship – often dubbed ‘the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none’ – that has been strengthened and managed within the context of the summit throughout its twenty-eightyear history. In fact, the degree to which these bilateral meetings have become institutionalised at the summit is clear when their scheduling has been tampered with and consequently the Japanese government has voiced strong opposition, as was the case at the Halifax Summit. Examples of managing the bilateral relationship include: (1) US President Gerald Ford’s support of Miki’s attempt at the San Juan Summit to promote Tokyo as the host of the 1977 summit (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1 July 1976: 1); (2) although nuclear reprocessing was cited as a bilateral problem between Japan and the US, it was mooted for discussion by Fukuda at London I (Yomiuri Shinbun, 2 May 1977: 2); and (3) trade relations have also been resolved with the summit acting as a deadline – the 1988 agreement on Japanese imports of US beef and citrus fruits hammered out before the Toronto Summit of the same year providing a pertinent example (Takase 2000: 170–2). Also, on occasions, the Japanese government has even sacrificed its interests at the summit so as not to damage the bilateral relationship. As regards the provision of assistance to Russia and the resolution of the Northern Territories’ dispute, although the Japanese government demonstrated an active and independent stance, as seen in Chapter 3, once US support was withdrawn Japan was unwilling to stand alone and antagonise its other summit partners. Before Tokyo III, it was suggested that ‘[h]elping Russia, in the US view, now matters more than catering to Japanese sensibilities. That is a serious, if still not irrevocable, sea change for Japan’ (The Financial Times, 2 April 1993: 4). As mentioned above and seen in Chapter 2, Nakasone, in particular, believed that US–Japan bilateral relations ought to be addressed and strengthened through the summit (Yamaguchi 1986). At their meeting on 27 May 1983, before the Williamsburg Summit, the cooperative relationship was expressed through the use of first names as part of the ‘Ron–Yasu’ relationship and the assignment of the roles of pitcher and catcher to Reagan and Nakasone respectively. What is more, at their meeting before London II, Reagan welcomed Nakasone with an embrace and kiss on both cheeks (Maki 1988a: 119, 299; Sekai Heiwa Kenkyu¯jo 1995: 202). In concrete policy terms, their cooperation at the summit was at the heart of the declaration of the indivisibility of the security of the Western summit nations and the uncompromising position towards the Soviet Union. Nakasone iterated five principles of contemporary global strategy to Reagan: (1) the Williamsburg Summit should take up the issues of disarmament and economic revival; (2) the ‘zero option’ is the foundation of restraint in security issues and balance in INF on a global basis; (3) if the Soviet Union does not respond by withdrawing its SS-20 missiles, the Western camp should implement its previously prepared plans to deploy Pershing II missiles; (4) they should promote the successful conclusion of East–West

Norms 167 negotiations as far as possible; and (5) as far as economic issues are concerned, cooperation should be strengthened to achieve sustained growth and currency stability. Aware that he would be lambasted at home, Nakasone argued along these lines and stressed the importance of declaring the unity of the Western camp during summit discussions. Reflecting upon the Williamsburg Summit, Nakasone regarded it as a pivotal moment in heralding the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union (Nakasone 2002: 429–36). Issues of regional security, the management of the US–Japan Security Treaty and the summit process have impacted upon the domestic level. The summit is often regarded as exerting a ‘deadline effect’ on decision-making processes and examples can be seen in the US–Japan trade agreement on beef and citrus fruits in 1988, as mentioned above, and the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in December 1993. For a similar reason, and as mentioned in Chapter 4, it has been argued that the Japanese government, and Obuchi in particular, chose Okinawa as the 2000 summit venue in order to resolve the issue of relocating the Futenma air base to Henoko on the eastern coast of Nago before the arrival of US President Bill Clinton, the first president to visit Okinawa since Dwight Eisenhower in 1960 (for detailed discussions of the politics of US bases in Okinawa, see Eldridge 1997; Eldridge 2000; Johnson 2002). In fact, it has been claimed that ‘[b]etween the lines of the carefully crafted and costly script that was written for the event [the Okinawa Summit] lay the Futenma relocation issue’ (Yonetani 2001: 71) and that the ‘[t]he July 2000 summit meeting of the G8 group of nations [sic] was in retrospect more notable for the fact that it was held in Nago than for anything it decided’ (McCormack and Yonetani 2000). A number of NGOs, Okinawan and Okinawan Studies scholars have argued to this effect (Arasaki 2000b; Hantaikyo¯ News, October 2000: 4; Arasaki 2001; Egami 2001; McCormack and Yonetani 2000; Medoruma 2000; Yonetani 2001). The decision to host the summit in Okinawa was made unilaterally by the Japanese government (especially Obuchi as seen in the previous chapter) in the face of the US government’s initial opposition. A report issued by a US government think-tank, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), interpreted this decision as one example of the Japanese government’s policy of, on the one hand, strengthening the US–Japan alliance to prevent its ‘drifting’ and ensure that it, and not China, remained the most important strategic partner of the US in the region, whilst, on the other hand, attempting to forge an independent line as an insurance policy. Other examples of this independence included the adoption of a tougher and less apologetic stance towards China on the issues of war responsibility and Taiwan; plans to introduce Japan’s own spy satellites; and the decision by the Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) to open fire on unknown ships entering Japan’s territorial waters (Asahi Shinbun, 25 July 1999: 3; Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 23 August 1999: 1). However, rather than a sign of disagreement, the Japanese government’s independent decision to host the summit in Okinawa was regarded ultimately as an attempt by both the Japanese and US governments to bring pressure on the resolution of the relocation of the Futenma air base, thereby strengthening the bilateral alliance and ensuring Japan’s position as the favoured

168 Norms strategic partner of the US in the region (Arasaki 2000b: 10; Arasaki 2001: 163). In addition, along with the hosting of the summit, the Tokyo government also awarded northern Okinawa an associated ten-year economic stimulus package worth ¥100 billion per annum in the hope that this would grease the wheels and facilitate the relocation of US military facilities from Futenma to Henoko (Yonetani 2001: 80). Thus, one of the chief controversies surrounding the Okinawa Summit is that it was used as an incentive in order to resolve US–Japan bilateral issues. Although evidence is sparse, based upon the statements of Japanese and US politicians and bureaucrats there may well be some truth in this assertion. At the end of the Cologne Summit the previous year, Clinton was quoted as having made statements that indicated clearly that this was the case and that Okinawa’s hosting would ‘provide some opportunities to resolve and implement some of the elements that we agreed to in terms of our military presence in Okinawa, including relocating an air station’. Furthermore, he added that ‘I don’t want to go over and have all these things hanging out. I hope they will be all resolved’ – statements and the linkage of issues that the Japanese government was quick to deny (The Japan Times, 23 June 1999: 1; The Japan Times, 29 June 1999: 2). However, both Saito¯ Kunihiko, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, and Clinton made further statements hoping that the G8 summit would provide a deadline for the resolution of the issue (The Japan Times, 24 June 1999: 2; The Japan Times, 27 June 1999: 1). In addition, MOFA Minister Ko¯no Yo¯hei announced that the issues of US bases in Okinawa would be raised on a bilateral basis during the Okinawa Summit away from the multilateral meetings (The Japan Times, 17 January 2000: 2). An opinion poll conducted by a Japanese academic indicated that ‘a large proportion of the [Okinawan] people believe the summit was held in Okinawa to appease the Okinawans or was a ploy by main island politicians to retain the US bases on the islands’ (Matsui 2001: 125). However, if the Japanese government was culpable of using the occasion of hosting the summit to resolve US–Japan bilateral issues, then NGOs and Okinawans demonstrated little or no regard for the meaning of the summit process and the provision of global governance, eager instead to instrumentalise the associated publicity in order to promote the local economy first and foremost and, only thereafter, address bilateral issues. By examining opinion polls in the run-up to and after the summit, the intentions of the Okinawan people as regards the summit become clear. Although most Okinawans doubted that the decisions made at the summit would impact upon their lives, a majority of 69 per cent regarded the choice of Okinawa as host to have been a good decision, whereas only 14 per cent were negative (Matsui 2001: 124–5). According to an Okinawa Taimusu opinion poll conducted one year before the summit, out of 75.3 per cent of those polled who stated that holding the summit in Okinawa was a good thing, 42.5 per cent believed that this was because Okinawan would become known to the world, 39.8 per cent expected a positive, economic effect, 13.9 per cent hoped it would resolve the US base issue, and 2.9 per cent believed that more foreign tourists would come to Okinawa. Of the 11 per cent who responded that hosting the summit in Okinawa was a bad thing, 42.4 per cent believed that it would reinforce the presence of US bases and 16.7 per cent expected

Norms 169 no positive effect on the economy or tourism. As regards what appeal Okinawa could make to the world, 50.8 per cent responded ‘the peace-desiring heart of the Okinawan people’, 19.8 per cent answered ‘the potential of economic development’, 14.2 per cent selected ‘Okinawan traditional culture’, and 12.8 per cent chose ‘Okinawa’s abundant nature’. As regards the linkage between the summit and the issue of US bases and Clinton’s statement of not wanting to visit Okinawa until the relocation of the Futenma air base had been decided, 62.3 per cent of pollees (62.6 per cent of pollees who welcomed the summit and 71.2 per cent of pollees who did not welcome the summit) regarded this linkage as peculiar, whereas 30 per cent believed the summit and the issue of Futenma should be connected. Thus, before the summit it appeared as if the majority of Okinawan people welcomed the summit and the opportunity it provided to promote their prefecture, and, what is more, regardless of their support or opposition for the summit, they believed that linkage between the summit and the bilateral base issue was inappropriate (Okinawa Taimusu, 20 July 1999: 1–3). An Okinawan prefectural opinion poll was organised in September 1999 and posed the question, allowing multiple answers, of ‘what appeal should Okinawa make to the world through the summit?’ In response, 44.6 per cent believed it was US bases, 33.2 per cent suggested ‘the peace-loving heart of the Okinawan people’, 32.7 per cent highlighted the unique culture and history of Okinawa and 31.6 per cent stressed Okinawa’s natural beauty (Okinawa Taimusu, 23 October 1999: 2). Another opinion poll sponsored by the Bank of the Ryu¯kyu¯s, also allowing multiple answers, discovered that 54.2 per cent of Okinawans expected the recognition levels of Okinawa to increase as a result of the summit, whilst 38.2 per cent looked forward to a positive, post-summit economic effect (30.6 per cent expected a similar economic effect during the summit), 36.9 per cent expected roads and communications to improve and 19.8 per cent hoped that the US base problem would be solved (Okinawa Taimusu, 29 October 1999: 24). A pre-summit opinion poll jointly organised by Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯ and Mainichi Shinbun also asked what was expected from the summit: 37.5 per cent wanted the summit to promote the local economy, 36.5 per cent wanted to see an increase in Okinawa’s levels of recognition, and 20.2 per cent wanted the summit to lead to a resolution of the US base issue (Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 13 November 1999: 2). After the summit, local newspapers conducted summit-related opinion polls within the prefecture. In one poll, 65.8 per cent of Okinawans regarded the summit as a success, in contrast to 14.5 per cent who regarded it as a failure. When asked what Okinawa had promoted to the world, 39.1 per cent of pollees replied that the summit provided the Okinawa people with a chance to project its ‘heartfelt desire for peace’ to the world, 24.4 per cent cited the pressure placed on US bases, and 10.8 per cent suggested the prefecture’s welcoming nature. In addition, 27 per cent believed that holding the summit in Okinawa would lead to a resolution of the issue of the Futenma air base’s relocation. Of those who expected resolution, 63.5 per cent expected it to be resolved by the realisation of the plan to relocate to Henoko. However, a total of 61.9 per cent doubted that hosting the summit would promote the resolution of the issue or result in any change, again suggesting that the summit

170 Norms and US bases were separate in the minds of a majority of Okinawans (Okinawa Taimusu, 1 August 2000: 1–3). In another opinion poll held after the summit, 79 per cent of Okinawan people believed that through the summit their love of peace and the US base issue had been broadcast to the world; when asked to select two of the main achievements of the summit, 56.8 per cent believed that this was the summit’s main result. In contrast, 28 per cent thought it was the chance to promote Okinawa’s natural beauty and tourism; 27.8 per cent selected the opportunity to promote Okinawa’s own culture and history; and 11.6 per cent cited the economic effect of the summit. No summit agenda appeared in the poll and the only political result of the summit cited was the attention given to the activities of NGOs, chosen by only 6.5 per cent. In addition, the human chain organised to surround the US base in Kadena was regarded as significant by 75.9 per cent. The number of those opposing the transfer of the US air base in Futenma to Nago increased by 16.1 per cent after the summit to a majority of 55.1 per cent. Finally, Clinton’s speech at Mabuni Hill Memorial Peace Park thanking Okinawans for their support in shouldering the burden of US bases and pledging to do everything possible to reduce the footprint of the bases on Okinawa was praised by 75.2 per cent (Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 11 August 2000: 1–3). The expectations of the Okinawan people towards the summit were summarised in the following terms by Miyagi Tokujitsu, Mayor of Kadena: At the upcoming G8 summit, I’m not so strongly concerned about bringing our current status to the forefront, and highlighting how many bases are concentrated in Okinawa. I’m interested to see how other countries judge our situation from their own perspective. While it’s hard to predict how long the bases will be here, they are certainly not permanent, and shouldn’t be. (quoted in Nishimura 2000: 8) This was a sentiment also expressed by Okinawan Governor Inamine Keiichi: I want the people who come to the summit to witness conditions in Okinawa for themselves and to see why the people of Okinawa are so adamant in their desire for the US military facilities and areas to be realigned and reduced. (Nishimura and Inamine 2000: 11) Okamoto Yukio, former MOFA official, went as far as to suggest that the ‘summit could bring a true end to Okinawa’s postwar period’ (quoted in Nishimura 2000: 9). Essentially for the people of Okinawa the summit had everything to do with benefiting economically from the summit by promoting their islands to the world, and at the same time, making the world aware of the presence and burden of US bases. In this scenario, little interest was demonstrated in the summit process, its agenda and global governance, thereby marginalising the norm of internationalism, as discussed below. It appears that certain sections of Japanese society had failed to understand the summit process and, by suggesting that the issue of US bases should be placed on the summit’s agenda, had gone ‘a little overboard’ (Nogami 2000a:

Norms 171 331). Thus, rather than debt issues, global economic recovery or anti-terrorist measures, making a profit, regional pride and US bases – a bilateral issue for which the G8 is the unlikeliest of venues – were the chief interests of the Okinawan people towards a central mechanism of global governance. In other words, ‘[f]or a majority of local residents, the summit itself was no more than a passing interlude in their everyday routine – a brief spectacle featuring important people gathered from faraway places’ (Yonetani 2001: 89). By selecting Okinawa as host, bilateral issues were bound to be thrust into the spotlight. However, as far as the Japanese government was concerned, the choice of Okinawa as summit venue was not wholly motivated by the norm of bilateralism. Rather, the decision constituted a present to the people of Okinawa and an opportunity for them to showcase the islands in the same way that the previous three Tokyo summits had provided opportunities to promote the capital and the nation. This was a present to which they responded enthusiastically. This can be seen in the fact that at the time the decision was announced at the end of April 1999, the most influential actors in the selection procedure – Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo¯, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Suzuki Muneo – had all served as directors-general of the Okinawa Development Agency at some point in their careers (Obuchi from November 1979 to July 1980; Suzuki from September 1997 to July 1998; and Nonaka from January to October 1999). Obuchi had also developed a strong attachment to Okinawa at the end of his student days when he visited the islands as part of a graduation round-the-world trip and was taken care of by Inamine’s father, Ichiro¯ (Toshikawa 1999: 77). The importance of Okinawa’s hosting of the summit to Obuchi was also evident during his hospitalisation. In order to induce him out of his fatal coma, his family played Okinawan folk songs and urged him to wake up by telling him the summit was about to start (Obuchi 2000: 97–8). Finally, the strong connection between Obuchi and Okinawa and the gratitude of the Okinawan people for selecting it as the summit venue are demonstrated by the erection of a statue of him at the Bankoku Shinryo¯kan after the summit, funded by public subscription. Thus, rather than the resolution of bilateral issues, stimulating the Okinawan economy was one of Obuchi’s main intentions in his selection, and the main reason that hosting the summit was embraced by the majority of Okinawans. However, whether the summit had a positive economic effect is a moot point. A number of commentators and NGO representatives have pointed to what has been called a ‘summit recession’ (samitto fukyo¯ or samitto fukeiki) especially in Nago (Toyoda 2000: 19; Arasaki 2001: 171; Interview with Council for Opposing Offshore Base Construction (Heri Kichi Hantai Kyo¯gikai) representative, 12 March 2003). The pre-summit recession in Okinawa was only compounded by the hosting of the summit. There are a number of reasons for this. Most journalists ate and drank the complimentary food and alcohol at the press centre’s cafeteria nearby and did not venture as far as the bars and restaurants in the centre of Nago. One local journalist, fondly remembering the free alcohol and chance to chat with foreign colleagues, wished there had been a summit everyday (Interview with Okinawan journalist, 10 March 2003).

172 Norms The number of flights to Okinawa also decreased during a peak tourist period. Official statistics do point clearly to a blip in tourist numbers during the hosting of the summit: in July and August 1999 respectively 440,700 and 522,600 tourists visited Okinawa, in July and August 2000 respectively this figure dropped to 340,100 and 496,800, and then recovered in July and August 2001 to 453,300 and 557,000. The total number of tourists visiting Okinawa steadily rose from 1984 to the end of the century; however, in contrast to this trend, 1994 and 2000 stand out as the only years in which tourist numbers declined by 7,900 and 37,500 respectively (Okinawaken Kikaku Kaihatsubu To¯keika 2002: 287). In addition, total tourist revenue declined from ¥467.7 billion in 1999 to ¥414.8 billion in 2000 (Okinawa-ken Kikaku Kaihatsubu To¯keika 2002: 289). However, whilst recognising a negative effect on the economy during the actual summit, the Bank of the Ryu¯kyu¯s predicted an economic effect generating ¥44 billion and leading to the employment of 4,400 people, and hinted at further effects beyond these figures based on the attention Okinawa received through hosting the summit (Gaiko¯ Fo¯ramu Zo¯kango¯ 2000: 86–7). In a number of interviews with Okinawan bureaucrats, journalists and business people, the majority feeling was that there might have been some long-term economic benefits, but that they were difficult to quantify concretely. Both short-term and long-term economic benefits can be suggested. In the short term and in preparation for the summit, summit souvenirs sold out, Okinawa’s roads were improved and the Bankoku Shinryo¯kan has to date attracted 300,000 visitors. In the long term, the hosting of the summit was one part of the steady development of Okinawa into a convention island and in this context the Okinawan prefectural office regarded the summit as having an important and positive effect on the local economy. The Bankoku Shinryo¯kan has since been used for international summits such as the Third Japan–Pacific Islands Forum Summit Meeting (PALM 2003) held from 16–17 May 2003 (The Japan Times, 17 May 2003: 1). Equally, one local journalist pointed to the fact after the Halifax Summit showcased this Canadian city a number of people were motivated to move there and possibly the Okinawa Summit would have the same effect in the longer term. Whatever the reasons for the selection of Okinawa, ultimately the world’s leaders and media came to Okinawa, saw the bases and went home. Possibly they were educated about the burden suffered by the Okinawan people as a result of bilateral US–Japan security relations, and the need for these problem to be addressed, but it is equally possible that they were made to realise the importance of the US presence to regional security and were confirmed in their belief that the bases should remain (Arasaki 2000a: 21). Thus, the Okinawa Summit has been regarded as a lost opportunity to highlight security issues sufficiently: The G8 leaders should have officially recognized both the contribution and the political, social, and other costs born by Okinawa for regional security. This was a signal opportunity opened by the Obuchi initiative, and by not taking it the Japanese administration under Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro¯ betrayed Obuchi’s political motive. (Soeya 2000: 23)

Norms 173 Although the Okinawa Summit did focus attention momentarily on the US– Japan bilateral relationship, its future and impact on the people of Okinawa, the actors involved in the summit proceedings were not simply responding to this norm alone. Other norms were exerting an influence on the perceptions, behaviour and decisions of these actors, as will be explored in the following sections.

East Asianism The norm of East Asianism proposes that Japan should play a leadership role within its immediate region. During the postwar period, whilst constrained by domestic and regional anti-militarist sentiments, it was easier for the Japanese government and business world to play this role in the economic field, despite some resistance based on the perception of Japan’s economic imperialism. However, with the end of the cold war, there have been numerous calls both within Japan and the East Asian region for Japan to play a higher profile regional role in the political arena. Over the twenty-eight years of its four cycles, the summit has provided a multilateral forum of which Japan is the only Asian participant and in which the focus could easily be deflected from the region. Thus, the Japanese government has responded to the petitions of numerous East Asian governments, especially ASEAN leaders such as Mahathir and Suharto, by seeking to act as the region’s representative or spokesperson, or at least an equal member of the region (Ajia no ichiin), and ensuring that issues of concern to developing nations are not overlooked at the summit. At the very first summit, Miki stressed the importance of Japan’s position of ‘batting for Asia’ and making the other summiteers aware of the region (Naikaku So¯ri Daijin Kanbo¯ 1977: 127). Miki’s intention is corroborated by Yoshino Bunroku, his sherpa at San Juan and London I: Tanaka: Yoshino:

[D]id Miki feel very strongly that Japan was representing Asia at Rambouillet or San Juan? Yes. I think Miki always felt that way. He always felt strongly about speaking for Asia. Also, I am not sure if ASEAN had this feeling – if ASEAN existed already – but I think Miki and Japan’s initiative for a Southeast Asian ministerial conference started to create the atmosphere which enabled those types of feelings to emerge. At that time Southeast Asian nations that participated in the ministerial conference such as Indonesia or Thailand didn’t have a lot of confidence then, so I think they welcomed Japan’s willingness to speak for them and were willing to support Japan. I think that is why he spoke about Southeast Asia with confidence. (Yoshino 1997)

Before departing for the summit, Nakasone made a point of visiting the nations of Southeast Asia in order to collect, reflect and include the opinions of the region’s leaders within the summit (Nakasone 2002: 449). Before London II, he made a tour of South Asian nations and was asked by the Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq during

174 Norms their meeting on 1 May 1984 to reflect the opinions of developing nations at the summit as the representative of Asia (Maki 1988a: 291–2). When Mitterrand and others objected to the discussion of Asian issues, such as Nakasone’s pre-summit meeting with the South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan and his visit to the nations of ASEAN, at what was meant to be a predominantly economic meeting, Nakasone stressed Japan’s position in Asia and the scarcity of fora in which to discuss international affairs with Western nations (Sekai Heiwa Kenkyu¯jo 1996: 221). Kaifu claimed that at London III he had made efforts to play the traditional role of Asian representative at the summit: ‘[b]eing the only country from the Asian region participating, I took up Asian views positively, making a special effort to ensure that this summit was global’ (quoted in Edström 1999: 146). Moreover, after each summit, it has been the custom for the sherpa to report the summit’s discussions to his South Korean counterpart (Matsuura 1994: 59). The need to represent the region has been especially strongly felt on the occasions when Japan has acted as summit host. Returning to the choice of Okinawa as the summit venue, as explored in the previous section, the promotion of the East Asianist norm was an important factor in Obuchi’s decision as Okinawa has been described as ‘a place where Japan ends and Asia begins and where Asia ends and Japan begins’ (Nishimura 2000: 7). The Bankoku Shinryo¯kan was constructed using local and East Asian materials such as Okinawan tiles and limestone, Chinese stone, Indonesian timber and Philippine rattan (Interview with Director of Bankoku Shinryo¯kan, 13 March 2003). Not only the choice of venue but the content of the discussions at Okinawa were given a deliberate East Asian ‘look and feel’. The ‘G8 Statement on the Korean Peninsula’ was released on 21 July 2000, the first day of the summit, and strongly supported all efforts by both North and South Korea ‘to reduce tension and establish lasting peace on the Korean peninsula that contribute to stability in Northeast Asia’, and looked forward ‘to a constructive response to international concerns over security, non-proliferation, humanitarian and human rights issues’ (G8 2000a). This was regarded as ‘[o]ne product of Japanese initiative – perhaps the only one’ (Soeya 2000: 23). In addition, the Japanese government has demonstrated its response to the East Asian norm by seeking to amplify Asia’s voice at the summit through the issue of participation. Since the beginning of the summit process the Japanese government has worked, ultimately unsuccessfully, to include Australia, and at Tokyo III, as seen in Chapter 3, sought to accommodate Suharto within the proceedings in order for him to represent the opinions of developing nations as chair of NAM to the summit leaders (Eguchi 1993: 42–4). As regards the G7/8’s relationship with China, the Japanese government has played an independent role of mediator and bridge-builder in two particular cases: (1) accommodating China’s participation in the summit process in some capacity; and (2) the international society’s reaction to the Chinese government’s violent repression of pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square of June 1989. As regards the former issue, concerted efforts were made in the run-up to the Okinawa Summit by a range of actors to invite China, and both Japanese and Chinese public opinion polls have demonstrated a desire to see China participate

Norms 175 (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 September 1999: 15; Kirton 2001b). Moreover, in reaction to the addition of Russia to form the G8 and the full isolation of Japan as the only Asian summit member, the Japanese government has come to the conclusion that ‘[i]n effect, China is Japan’s Russia’ (Yasutomo 1995: 167). However, efforts to include China have been frustrated by four factors: (1) Obuchi’s initiative at Okinawa to invite China was always tempered by the proviso that all G8 members would have to be in agreement – a consensus that has not been achieved. It was suggested that at Okinawa the Japanese government was aware that the US would veto any proposal to include China on the grounds of its poor record in human rights and so Japan was free to be seen to be acting as a representative of Asia without disrupting the composition of the summit (Kirton 2001b: 203); (2) any overtures have been flatly rebuffed by the Chinese government, although Chinese President Hu Jintao did participate in the enlarged dialogue meeting with developing nations at the 2003 Evian Summit. This suggests that China’s attitude may change as a result of both a new leadership in favour of greater integration that was ushered into power in March 2003, and a declining UN (Sisci 2003); (3) it has been regularly asserted that China is ‘too different’ and does not subscribe to the principles shared by the summiteers of free-market economics and democracy, although again this may well change in the future (Penttilä 2003: 87); and (4) a number of other candidates exist who already subscribe to the summit’s principles, are major economies and add to the global representation of the summit, such as Australia, Brazil and India (Kirton 2001b). As regards international society’s reaction to Tiananmen Square of imposing sanctions on China, the Japanese government worked through the forum of the G7 to ensure that these measures were eventually lifted for fear that a harsh, uncooperative policy would antagonise the Chinese government and push it further into isolation. At the Paris Summit, Japanese efforts resulted in a somewhat toneddown final statement by which no new measures would be introduced. Thereafter, at the Houston Summit, Kaifu worked to have comments encouraging political developments in China included in the final statement, although sanctions were to continue. Although it has been argued that the Japanese government did not differ greatly from its summit partners in its policy of resuming yen loans, it did seek to soften the international community’s initial reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre, and attempted to keep China engaged and avoid its isolation (Miyashita 2001: 41–8; Yasutomo 1995: 72–4). However, the specificity of this norm has been fuzzy at times and the remit of the Asia that Japan represents has also been unclear. At times, it has been chiefly Southeast Asia and expanded to East Asia. However, as seen above, Nakasone sought to embrace South Asia, and sherpa Matsuura Ko¯ichiro¯ expressed his desire to include Australia and New Zealand to make Japan the representative of the Asia Pacific region (Gyo¯ten et al. 1993: 39). This terminology has been adopted in summit documents, such as those released at London III, the Munich Summit and Tokyo III. In addition, the Japanese government’s role as Asian representative has not gone unchallenged. Both at Tokyo II and Okinawa, Ronald Reagan and Vladimir Putin respectively were seen to seize the role of representative of Asia from Japan.

176 Norms

Internationalism In a comparative study, John Kirton has gone as far as to state that ‘both Japan and Canada have shared a strong interest in having it [the G7] and its associated institutions develop as the primary instrument through which to pursue their foreign policy priorities and to shape international order’ (Kirton 1998: 292, emphasis added). Although the continued centrality and reinforcement of the US–Japan bilateral relationship renders this last statement something of an exaggeration, the Japanese government has certainly regarded its role in the summit seriously. On the one hand, a certain amount of pride can be discerned – a position that is partly a manifestation of the closely related developmentalist norm, by which the Japanese government and its people seek recognition of their status in the world and equal standing with the ‘advanced’ Western nations. On the other hand, and more importantly, Japan has regarded the summit as one of several multilateral conduits by which to conduct its foreign policy as a fully-recognised and responsible member of the international community, as the norm of internationalism dictates. This norm was manifested concretely in Nakasone’s policy of turning Japan into a responsible ‘international state’ (kokusai kokka) that contributes to the international society of which is it is a part through active participation in, and successful hosting of, the summit (Sekai Heiwa Kenkyu¯jo 1996: 665–71). It could well be argued that the summit matters more to Japan than any other member nation. To this end, whilst promoting its own national interests, the Japanese government has sought to demonstrate its responsibility to the international community by ensuring the success of the summit both as participant and host. In addition, it has on occasions sacrificed its national interest and recognised the demands and needs of the international society. Examples include the compromise struck on oil consumption at Tokyo I described in Chapter 1, and, as Owada Hisashi has maintained, the Japanese government’s recognition of its duty as a member of the G7 to help Russia in its reform programme despite the unresolved Northern Territories’ dispute (Owada 1993). Yet, at times, over-enthusiasm has led the Japanese government and its people to trivialise the work of the summit through excessive hospitality (settai), and a process of carnivalisation (o-matsurika) (Dobson 2004). As former MOFA Minister Tanaka Makiko stated in reference to the Okinawa Summit, ‘isn’t it mistaking the summit for a world’s fair? [author’s translation]’ (Ryu¯kyu¯ Shinpo¯, 26 March 2000: 6). The Japanese government’s reaction to Giscard d’Estaing’s original proposal for a summit was, on the one hand, to ask what a summit could possibly be (Amano et al. 2000: 56); and, on the other hand, to welcome the summit as a forum in which to live up to its international responsibilities (Moriya 1975: 15). Since that time, the summit process has provided an opportunity for the Japanese government to diversify and ‘build strong substantive and political ties with major nations other than the US at the top level’ (Inoguchi 1994: 30). Thus, the summit has served a supplementary function by providing a multilateral forum for the Japanese government to handle not only the US–Japan bilateral relationship, but to act as Asia’s representative and develop relations directly with its European summit

Norms 177 partners, as seen above, and, in addition, to play an international role consonant with its economic power. As Owada has noted: Japan is unfortunately outside most of the institutional machineries in existence for policy coordination among the major partners in the industrialized democracies. . . . Under these circumstances, it is easy to see that the summit process has acquired special significance for Japan as a continuous process for policy coordination of major world issues of common interest. (Owada 1994) Bayne has cast Japan’s foreign policy before the inauguration of the summit as ‘hesitant and withdrawn’. However, the participation in the summit gave it ‘new confidence’ and he even goes so far as to state that ‘[t]he most durable achievement of the summits was to bring Japan firmly into the circle of Western consultation and cooperative action’ (Bayne 2000: 41). Moreover, ‘[f]or the Japanese government, the G7 summit is a place of high-profile diplomacy where Japanese leaders seek to go beyond the constraints of the US–Japanese bilateral relationship, in which Japan’s influence and agenda-setting ability are limited (Katada 2001: 113). Furthermore, ‘[t]he summit is supposed to be a meticulously planned display of Japan’s ability to command a larger role in international affairs. In the absence of a permanent seat on the UNSC, the G7 is Japan’s best hope of acquiring such a role’ (The Financial Times, 18 March 1993: 4). It is not only Japan that takes great pride in its position in the G7/8, Canada ‘cherishes its membership in the G7’ (Stairs 1999: 78). However, having been excluded from the top echelons of other international institutions and being the only Asian summiteer, the Japanese government and its people have imbued the summit process with a considerable amount of importance (Suzuki 1993: 59). In other words, whilst Japan’s full and active participation within the UN is for the time being constrained, ‘[t]he G7 forum has turned out to be congenial for Tokyo, a way of demonstrating its participation in the highest councils. . . . The suppleness, the informality, the consensus approach of the G7 – or the G71/2 – suits them nicely’ (Lewis 1991–2: 33–4). Thus, Japan’s membership of and role in the G7/8 summit has been simultaneously one more diplomatic means of supplementing an overly bilateral foreign policy, and also a source of pride, prestige and recognition of its standing in international society. According to a former Japanese sherpa, ‘[m]embership in the G7 has constituted symbolic and substantive proof that Japan is a major economic power among the industrial democracies, and that it shares a leadership role in managing and shaping a new world economy’ (Watanabe 1999: 95). When the idea of the summit was first proposed, the ‘Japanese reaction was satisfaction at being invited’ (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 35). Participating in the Rambouillet Summit has been regarded as one of Miki’s diplomatic highlights and proudest moments, and proof of Japan’s position in the world (Nakamura 1981: 128–9). Yoshino Bunroku, later to be Japanese sherpa at the second and third summits, is quoted as saying that the significant thing for Japan was simply being invited to Rambouillet and attending (Funabashi 1991: 16). What is more, MOFA’s Diplomatic Bluebook described this

178 Norms meeting as having great historical and political meaning as it was the first time in the postwar period that the Japanese prime minister had met with his Western counterparts and was thus symbolic of Japan’s improved position in international society (MOFA 1976: 172). However, reinforcing this developmentalist norm, there has often been a strong sense that, in reality, there is a core group within the G7/8 of four nations: France, Germany, the UK and US. As a result of a number of separate meetings of the leaders of these four nations, for example at San Juan, London I and Tokyo I, this impression has been reinforced, although Kikuchi Kiyoaki, the sherpa at Venice I and Ottawa, asserts that the media misreported events and denies that the leaders of these nations met as the Gaudeloupe Group at Venice I (Kikuchi 1980: 27–8; Funabashi 1991: 210–11). The Japanese government’s reaction to these exclusive meetings has been founded on both the internationalist norm of recognising the best mechanisms of global governance and the developmentalist norm of seeking to gain recognition of its position. The best example of this is the Guadeloupe Summit of January 1979, as mentioned in Chapter 1. In reaction, LDP and press opinions expressed both understanding for the four nations’ gathering as a ‘family affair’ without Japan on the one hand, and, on the other, a sense of rejection and isolation for not being invited to a meeting where issues of Japanese interest, such as China and the Middle East, were discussed (The Japan Times, 16 January 1979: 5). Of equal concern to the Japanese government was the fact that economic issues, such as the European Monetary System (EMS), the dollar’s stability and oil issues, were also discussed at this meeting prior to Tokyo I (Yomiuri Shinbun, 6 January 1979: 7). As a form of protest, the Japanese government withheld contributions to the financial rescue package agreed in the Caribbean for Turkey and aimed at bolstering NATO’s most eastern and southern member (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 105). MOFA Minister Sonoda complained to West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that these four Western nations had decided on this assistance without inviting Japan but presuming it would provide the funds (Funabashi 1991: 20). Nevertheless, Japan’s commitment to the full summit process informed by the norm of internationalism can be measured in a number of ways. According to the G8 Research Group at Toronto University, Japan’s overall performance in the summit from 1996 to 2002 has been rated a ‘B plus’, ranking it above Italy and Russia and on a par with Canada, the EU, France, Germany, the UK, and US (G8 Research Group 2003a). Attention has also focused upon remit mandates, which are: formal instructions contained in the documents the leaders collectively issue at the annual G7/8 Summit, specifying that they will deal with an item at their summit the following year or in subsequent years. [They] . . . may indicate the priority or seriousness that leaders attach to an agenda item, normative direction or decisional commitment . . . may represent a way of one year’s host trying to bind a subsequent year’s host to the priority items preferred by the former . . . may represent issues on which the summit is unable to reach

Norms 179 meaningful consensus and agreement, and thus politely or tenaciously defers the subject for ‘further study’ next year. (Kirton 2003) Having issued five mandates as host at both Tokyo III and Okinawa, Japan is the second most consistent mandator (see Kirton 2003). Research has also been conducted on the level of compliance with promises and pledges made at the G7/8 summits (see Kokotsis 1999 for the most comprehensive study of compliance and the criteria used to measure it). It would appear intuitive to equate compliance to the pledges included in summit declarations with a commitment to the norm of internationalism in general. Japan’s level of compliance with G7/8 pledges has been rated as a middling power. Its level of compliance in the G7 from 1975 to 1989 was rated at 26.2 per cent – ranked fifth out of the seven summit members, above France and the US and below the average compliance score of 30.7 per cent. From 1996 to 2001, its level of compliance had risen to 48 per cent – still ranked fifth out of the now eight summit members, above France, Germany and Russia, but also above the average compliance score of 45 per cent (Kirton et al. 2002: 272). It has been suggested that Japan’s average levels of compliance demonstrate either its skill ‘at not having to bear a burden commensurate with its capabilities’ or that Japan practices ‘anticipatory adjustment’ (Kirton 1998: 305, 313). In this context three factors ought to be considered: (1) both before and after a number of summits, the fear of being singled out and the relief of having avoided criticism are evident in a number of examples in Chapters 1 to 4; (2) the number of initiatives introduced as part of the Japanese government’s giftbearing diplomacy suggest the practice of anticipatory adjustment; and (3) it has been suggested that the desire to avoid becoming the summit’s ‘whipping boy’ lies behind the Japanese government’s behaviour at the summit and the avoidance of criticism has been singled out as one of the main concerns in the Japanese government’s preparations for the summit (Inoguchi 1994: 33–4; Takase 2000: 144). Although also serving to lionise the nation and its prime minister, one further expression of Japan’s commitment to the G7/8 is through its hosting of the summit. As seen in Chapter 1, for both Miki and Fukuda bringing the summit to Tokyo was ¯ hira the hosting of Tokyo I – an event of historical a deeply held desire and for O proportions as it was to be the first time that the world’s leaders were to meet in Japan – was the biggest issue he faced after his appointment as prime minister and was described by MOFA as a state event unprecedented in Japan’s diplomatic history (MOFA 1980: 183; Kawauchi 1982: 137). The Japanese commitment to hosting a ¯ hira’s speech to the Diet at the beginning of successful summit can be seen in O 1979, the year Japan hosted Tokyo I, which would prove to be a nerve-racking experience and demonstrate the lengths to which the Japanese hosts would go in order to ensure a successful summit: It is most significant that the summit meeting of major industrialized countries will be held in Japan this year for the first time in Asia. This meeting is a very important forum for the leaders of the nations concerned to discuss frankly

180 Norms their policies and to seek international cooperation for the stable expansion of the world economy. We intend to do our utmost as host country in preparation for this meeting and to work with the other participating countries for its success. ¯ hira 1979: 180) O The importance accorded to the hosting of the summit is also evident in Hashimoto’s defence of Japan’s right to host the 2000 summit. In response to Yeltsin’s proposals for Russia to take Japan’s place, Hashimoto referred to his fellow summiteers and the customs of the summit process: The other day, when I had the tête-à-tête with President Yeltsin, he raised this point. While Japan is to host this G8 Summit in the year 2000, would it not be ready to yield that to Russia? Now, the year 2000, needless to say, is a very important year between Japan and Russia. We are engaged in very intensive political discussions, and the year 2000 is a year we have to mark as a symbol of strengthening friendly ties between our two countries as well. So in response I said, ‘It is not for Japan alone to make a decision on that. I have heard you, but following Japan comes Italy and then Canada. This order of hosting countries has already been set, and we have a rule for this order. So we have to discuss your request in our gathering with the other Leaders.’ (Hashimoto 1998) Based on the G8 Research Group’s evaluation of each summit, Japan has been described as the only G7/8 member to consistently host successful summits (Kirton 1998: 301–2). This high level of consistency is clearly demonstrated in Figure 6.1, which plots the grades given to each of the twenty-eight summits by Sir Nicholas Bayne, the master grader of the summit (for references to the criteria in grading the summit, see G8 Research Group 2003b). The Japanese government’s enthusiasm for the summit and desire to ensure its success have been fuelled by a strong sense since Tokyo I that, if a summit were to fail, it would be regarded as the Japanese government’s fault (Kawauchi 1982: 145). The hosting of the Tokyo II, in Nakasone’s mind, ‘indicated that Japan was an international power on a par with the important Western industrial countries and that it was necessary for Japan to contribute positively to the international community: it had become impossible for Japan not to shoulder its due responsibility’ (Edström 1999: 127). In September 1983, after the Williamsburg Summit, Nakasone gave a speech that stressed the success the summit had been in recognising that INF negotiations were of global, not just European, significance: This success resulted from our country’s playing a political role in advancing the cause of peace and disarmament, and I intend to continue through consideration and deliberate actions to contribute positively to maintaining peace and promoting disarmament, especially the abolition of nuclear arms. (quoted in Edström 1999: 125)

Source: G8 Research Group 2003b

E–

E

E+

D–

D

D+

C–

C

C+

B–

B

B+

A–

A

A+

Figure 6.1 Success and failure of G7/8 summits, 1975–2002

Grade awarded

Rambouillet, 1975 San Juan, 1976 London I, 1977 Bonn I, 1978 Tokyo I, 1979 Venice, 1990 Ottawa, 1981 Versailles, 1982 Williamsburg, 1983 London II, 1984 Bonn II, 1985 Tokyo II, 1986

Summit venue

Venice II, 1987 Toronto, 1988 Paris, 1989 Houston, 1990 London III, 1991 Munich, 1992 Tokyo III, 1993 Naples, 1994 Halifax, 1995 Lyon, 1996 Denver, 1997 Birmingham, 1998 Cologne, 1999 Okinawa, 2000 Genoa, 2001 Kananaskis, 2002

182 Norms As mentioned above, this assertion of a more active, political and international role was an important part of Nakasone’s overall foreign policy orientation. On the one hand, the summit process provided another avenue through which to promote the bilateral relationship with the US; and on the other hand, it represented another conduit to encourage Japan’s international role. In fact, the Japanese government has also used the summit in order to promote awareness and understanding of its contribution to the international community. During Tokyo II, MOFA produced approximately 10,000 copies of a twenty-page colour pamphlet with the aims of improving Japan’s public relations and image in the eyes of foreign media representatives visiting Tokyo, ensuring that Japan was not cast as the world’s bad boy and demonstrating that Japan was living up to its international responsibilities. The pamphlet included phrases describing Japan as a ‘responsible partner’, claims that Japan was the world’s second largest provider of ODA, third largest trading nation and source of considerable amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI), and explanations that the image of Japan as a closed market was an ancient myth (Asahi Shinbun, 27 April 1986: 2). Furthermore, in the case of the Okinawa Summit, a great deal of thought was put into making the meeting a success and it could be argued that Okinawa was chosen as it served as a venue conducive to discussion amongst the summit leaders. This was certainly one view echoed by Okamoto, who, in rather selfcongratulatory style, claimed the credit for having mooted the idea of Okinawa’s hosting the summit: I was involved in various G7 summits during my tenure at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but one meeting I can not [sic] forget was the second summit held in San Juan in 1976. In a setting of bright sun, pure white sand, and shining blue sea, the delegates got involved in some very progressive discussions. It seemed to me very important for the content of the debate. The summit this year in Okinawa will be the first time since then that meetings will be held alongside the ocean. (quoted in Nishimura 2000: 8) However, throughout its history the summit has also been accused of becoming little more than a carnival. Whoever the summit host, the leaders have attended a number of peripheral ceremonies ranging from rodeos to pop concerts. On the occasions when the Japanese government has played the role of host, and especially at Okinawa, there has been a similarly high degree of holiday or carnival atmosphere surrounding the summit to a degree that obfuscates rather than facilitates understanding of the summit as a mechanism of global governance (Dobson 2004). In the case of Tokyo II, MOFA’s Summit Preparation Division received contributions from a number of private organisations to assist in the hosting of the summit and the catering for the attending news media: NEC, Fujitsu and Sony lent audiovisual goods, Asahi, Kirin and Suntory provided refreshments, and a range of other groups organised exhibitions of traditional Japanese culture (The Japan Times, 2 April 1986: 3). Free ten-day rail and bus passes were issued to foreign journalists and

Norms 183 summit delegations and informed the holders that ‘We hope you meet with many Japanese people and enjoy some of our famous sites in the countryside’ (Mainichi Shinbun, 11 April 1986 evening edition: 9). Like some summit nations, the government issued a commemorative ¥60 stamp on 2 May 1986 to mark Tokyo II and over 63,000 colourful posters were distributed to schools and libraries to publicise the summit to children (The Japan Times, 24 April 1986: 2; for an examination of the political use of postage stamps, see Dobson 2002). At Tokyo III, and despite MOFA pledges to the contrary, a degree of political festivity was still in evidence. Once again, visiting foreign officials and reporters were issued with free rail and bus passes whilst in Tokyo in order ‘to help promote their understanding of Japan’ (The Japan Times, 16 June 1993: 3). However, the degree of profligacy and ‘festivity’ surrounding the Okinawa Summit was higher than at the three previous summits held in Tokyo. The new international conference centre built in Nago in traditional Okinawan and Asian styles cost approximately ¥3 billion. A national competition was held to decide its final name and was won by Tamamori Emi, a student whose winning suggestion – Bankoku Shinryo¯kan – referred back to Okinawa’s history as the independent Kingdom of the Ryu¯kyu¯s (Okinawa Taimusu, 7 August 1999 evening edition: 3). A press centre was also constructed in Nago especially for the summit and completed on 31 May 2000 at the cost of ¥2.6 billion (US$25 million) (Okinawa Taimusu, 1 June 2000: 31). In addition, MOFA organised a seminar so that Okinawan hotel staff ¯ kura, used at previous summits in Tokyo and contracted to could visit the Hotel O provide the catering for the Okinawa Summit, to exchange expertise in hosting the summit (The Japan Times, 25 January 2000: 2, The Japan Times, 10 May 2000: 3). To commemorate the summit, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MOPT) also issued a commemorative ¥80 stamp for local use on 21 June 2000 featuring the venue and a commemorative ¥90 postcard partly made of sugarcane fibre. The degree and nature of carnivalisation extended at times into the bizarre and unnecessary. One Okinawan chef created ‘summit sushi’ – raw fish in the shape of the flags of summit members (The Japan Times, 22 June 2000: 3). There was also an inordinate amount of attention given to the summit dinner, ostentatiously named ‘Okinawa 2000’, held at Shuri Castle on the second day (Abe 2000a; Abe 2000b; Gaiko¯ Fo¯ramu Zo¯kango¯ 2000: 110–19). An Okinawan summit edition of the popular doll Rika-chan was produced (Mainichi Shinbun, 28 June 2000: 8). A Japanese holiday resort company created a replica of Clinton’s home in Arkansas in Nago (The Japan Times, 20 July 2000: 2). Furthermore, Obuchi commissioned Komuro Tetsuya, Japanese pop music mogul, to write a theme song for the summit that, it was later decided, would be sung by Okinawan-born pop star Amuro Namie at the banquet on the second day of the summit (The Japan Times, 25 January 2000: 18; Yomiuri Shinbun, 16 June 2000: 2). Furthermore, a new ¥2000 banknote carrying the image of Shuri Castle’s Shurei Gate in Naha was released on 19 July 2000 to commemorate the summit being held in Okinawa in the year 2000 – although printing errors were later discovered (Asahi Shinbun, 19 July 2000: 2; Asahi Shinbun 22 July 2000: 1). Thus, although the Japanese government has ensured that it hosts a successful and well-organised summit in response to the norm of internationalism, signs of both

184 Norms profligacy and carnival have come into relief. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Japanese government spent over ¥81 billion on the Okinawa Summit. It was reported in Japan that a British newspaper had estimated the costs of the Okinawa Summit to be the equivalent of one year’s debt of five nations: Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia (Yomiuri Shinbun, 22 July 2000: 2). In contrast, the Birmingham Summit cost the equivalent of ¥1.1 billion and the Cologne Summit was estimated to have cost ¥700 million. This profligacy at Okinawa extended not only to the budget but also to the summit agenda and its documentation with multisubject themes and the release of a final communiqué of over 8,000 words alone, which was 70 per cent longer than that issued at the previous year’s Cologne Summit (Bayne 2002b: 25; Takase 2002: 106–8). Considering that the construction of the Bankoku Shinryo¯kan as the summit venue was one of the major expenses, this total amount was justified by Okamoto as necessary, similar to building a stadium in order to host the Olympics (Gaiko¯ Fo¯ramu Zo¯kango¯ 2000: 28). The Japanese government also attempted to defend the cost on the grounds of it being the first summit held outside Tokyo and therefore investment in infrastructure was necessary (Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 July 2000 evening edition: 2; Asahi Shinbun, 25 July 2000: 2). However, criticisms of profligacy were compounded almost a year after the summit when two MOFA officials were arrested on suspicion of having ‘massaged’ the costs of limousines hired in preparation for the summit and excessive hospitality, ultimately swindling ¥13 million (US$120,000) out of state coffers (The Japan Times, 17 July 2001: 1). The two bureaucrats were eventually awarded suspended prison sentences (The Japan Times, 29 May 2002: 2). This scandal came to public attention at a time when confidence in MOFA was already being undermined by a number of other embezzlement cases. However, this extravagance came into greater relief as the trend at previous summits had been to make them less formal and more intimate in order to ensure their successful functioning. The Japanese government seemed to have missed this point. Through this examination of the norms that drive the participation of the Japanese government and its people in the summit, an inkling of what the summit means to them becomes salient. Simultaneously, it represents: (1) a site for the management and resolution of a number of bilateral issues, chiefly with the US; (2) an opportunity to consolidate Japan’s role as representative of the East Asian region and ensure that issues that would otherwise be ignored are brought to the attention of this predominantly Western forum; and (3) affirmation of its position in the world and an example of Japan’s ability to act as a responsible member of the international society to which it belongs.

7

Conclusions

As mentioned in the Introduction to this book, the summit provides a snapshot of over a quarter-century of international history and imposes a structure upon events that might otherwise appear to be inchoate. Thus, the G7/8 would appear to provide a highly resonant framework or case study for a number of further studies on the mechanisms of global governance and the functioning of concert diplomacy. This is especially the case as a result of the US-led ‘war on terrorism’ in response to the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001 and the apparent marginalisation of the UN. It no longer appears fanciful to suggest a renaissance of both the G7/8 in the provision of global governance and related studies of its workings. The preceding chapters have contributed to our understanding by both describing Japan’s role at the summit and analysing this twenty-eight-year history in order to establish the key actors and their chief motivating factors, shaped by norms. This chapter will adumbrate some of the broader themes in order to reiterate the power and resonance of this multilateral forum by suggesting the most important achievements of Japan’s participation in the summit process, the styles of diplomacy employed and what the summit means to the Japanese government and its people.

Achievements Two broad effects are immediately evident as a result of the Japanese government’s participation in the summit since 1975. On the one hand, the summit process has impacted upon Japan’s international relations insofar that ‘[t]he summit . . . has been largely responsible for bringing Japan into much closer consultation with North America and Europe’ (Hunt and Owen 1984: 659). On the other hand, it can also be argued that simply being invited to the summit in the first place and thereby being recognised as a major power was achievement enough for Japan. Ultimately, Japanese policymakers have gained access to the highest level of international diplomacy and have thereby been able to reinforce and supplement a predominantly bilateral foreign policy. As regards the success of specific summits, as mentioned in Chapter 5, a number of individual summits can be pointed to. However, Japan’s achievements should be regarded in terms of what was successful not only for the Japanese government and its people but also for the summit process specifically, and international society in

186 Conclusions general. In this respect, the Okinawa Summit could also be added to this list due to its exceptionally high compliance score of 81.4 per cent, which led to it being dubbed ‘the most credible G7/8 summit ever held’ (G8 Research Group 2001a). In addition, the Japanese government’s assumption of the role of Asian representative and efforts to promote Asian issues at the summit have constituted another of its most salient achievements. The Japanese government has impacted upon the summit process by endeavouring to bring Asian nations into its discussions, through the gathering of topics for discussion during regular pre-summit meetings with leaders of these countries and post-summit briefing sessions to report the results of the summit. At the actual summit meetings, the Japanese position has ranged from defending Asian NIEs against Western criticism to promoting conflict resolution in Cambodia, the Korean peninsula and Indonesia. The inclusion of reference to the Cambodian conflict as a global issue within the political declaration at the Munich Summit, faced with German insistence as the host on inserting it in the chairman’s statement on regional issues, was a considerable achievement for the Japanese government. In short, if Japan were not represented at the summit, much less attention would be focused upon Asia.

Styles of diplomacy The summit is intended to be a forum for the frank exchange of ideas amongst world leaders. However, as seen in Chapter 5, at times the Japanese prime minister and his delegation have been impeded by a number of obstacles and unable to participate in ‘naked diplomacy’, as originally envisioned at summit meetings. As a result, the style in which the Japanese delegation conducts its policy has been, at times, to simply arrive at the summit ready to endure a degree of Japan bashing. This was demonstrated when the Japanese delegation arrived at the Ottawa Summit with the objective of simply making it through the summit with the least amount of trouble. Thus, there is certainly truth in the statement that ‘[s]ummitry is a place for compromise rather than conflict as far as Japan is concerned’ (Sakurada 1988: 102–3). At times, especially by practicing gift-bearing diplomacy, the Japanese government has acted as a reactive state – the classic representation of Japan’s foreign economic policy, as outlined by Kent Calder (Calder 1988). Nevertheless, the Japanese government has not acted in a solely reactive fashion, and has, on several occasions, demonstrated a willingness to pursue its own national interests whilst responding to the norms of bilateralism, East Asianism and internationalism. To this end, Japanese policymakers, and especially the prime minister, have displayed a range of diplomatic styles. Japanese policymakers have demonstrated considerable willingness and skill in instrumentalising the multilateral forum of the G7/8 for the resolution of essentially bilateral issues. Although written in reference to the Concert of Europe, at times the summit process has provided ‘no provision for curbing the primacy of the national interest’ (Albrecht-Carrié 1968: 11). Also in reference to the Concert, but equally pertinent to the summit process, this mechanism could ‘provide the framework for the settlement of crises in which the powers were anxious to reach agreement. But

Conclusions 187 it could not satisfy the territorial ambitions of great powers when these were in conflict with each other’ (Bridge and Bullen 1980: 4). In the case of the Northern Territories’ dispute – an issue of core national interest – the Japanese government sought to instrumentalise the framework of the G7 and multilateralise the dispute from the Houston Summit to the Munich Summit (Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 July 1992: 11). In fact, Yasutomo goes so far as to argue convincingly that the Japanese government multilateralised its entire policy towards the former Soviet Union during this period (Yasutomo 1995: 151). However, neither Japan nor Russia were willing to compromise and this strategy was ultimately rendered unsuccessful, as seen in Chapter 3. However, it was adopted once again at the 2003 Evian Summit in handling the issues of North Korea’s nuclear weapons’ programme and the abduction of Japanese citizens. However, at other times, and in line with the idea that the summit is not a forum for confrontation but for fostering trust, the Japanese government has instrumentalised ‘quiet diplomacy’; in other words, it has behaved actively but preferred to conduct policy behind the scenes, and to this end the style of the summit suits Japanese policymakers. An illustrative example, as seen in Chapters 2 and 3, is the way in which MOF Minister Miyazawa Kiichi’s proposals to address the debt issue in middle-income, developing nations made at the Toronto Summit metamorphosed into the Brady Plan by the time of the Paris Summit. The Japanese government has also sought to play the role of a bridge, chiefly in two ways: between Asia and the West, on the one hand, and between and Europe and North America, on the other hand. As seen above, with a sense of acting as either a representative or member of Asia, Japanese policymakers have sought to shift the focus of discussions to the region and promote a variety of political, economic and security issues at the summit that may well have been ignored by a predominantly Western summit process. Simultaneously, they have also been aware of Japan’s position as a member of the West and have sought to ensure the unity of the summit nations, especially when hosting a summit and with varying degrees of success, by acting as a go-between when the US and its European partners have come into conflict with each other over issues such as oil prices, genetically modified foods and the Kyo¯to Protocol. As seen in Chapter 2, the Japanese government was especially sentient of this role at the 1981 Ottawa Summit, which was the venue for the first meeting between the seemingly unbridgeable ideological positions on economic issues, North–South dialogue and East–West relations of neo-liberal US President Ronald Reagan and left-wing French President François Mitterrand. Finally, although trivial and irrelevant at times, the Japanese media have focused an inordinate amount of attention on the position of the prime minister in the official summit photograph as symbolic of his relative importance in international affairs. Although refuted in his memoirs, Nakasone was regarded as a prime minister possessing a strong sense of this semiotic resonance and an ability to instrumentalise this ‘photo-op’ as part of photograph diplomacy, in order to promote his vision of Japan as an international state in addition to reinforcing the bilateral relationship with the US.

188 Conclusions

The meaning of the summit For a number of other reasons and despite a tendency to carnivalise its proceedings, the G7/8 summit process is important to the Japanese government and its people: ‘[t]he summit . . . has provided an invaluable opportunity for Japan to discuss many varied economic and political matters, at a level where heads-of-government are present, and as a full member of the group of major nations’ (Kojima 2001: 103). Since the very first summit, European leaders have been surprised by the coverage of and enthusiasm for the summit process in Japan (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 14 November 1975: 5). Thus, the summit has provided the Japanese government and its people with an opportunity to promote an internationalist, multilateral agenda hand-inhand with a focus on East Asian issues and the bilateral relationship with the US. This stance was encapsulated in a Japanese government policy statement entitled Rondon samitto no igi to wagakuni no kihonteki tachiba (The meaning of the London Summit and our nation’s basic position) released on 6 July 1991 in preparation for London III. This MOFA-prepared statement declared that the summit was important as a forum to support and promote political and economic cooperation in addition to planning ways to strengthen international order. For the Japanese government, the summit provided a forum in which it could take appropriate responsibility and draw attention to the Asia Pacific region as the only Asian participant (Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 July 1991: 1, 3). The summit is symbolic of Japan’s position in the world and in this regard it may well be of more importance to the Japanese government and its people than to any other participating nation. What is more, participation in the summit has frequently and in a variety of ways blurred the line between politics on the domestic and foreign levels and impacted upon the Japanese government at home. One salient example is the approval and disapproval ratings referred to at the end of each summit in Chapters 1 to 4, which suggest that on occasions the prime minister of the day has benefited from a strong performance at the summit and has managed to either increase his popularity or stem his unpopularity. As the G8, now with added Russia, begins a fifth cycle of meetings, both the summit process and Japanese policymakers face new challenges. Despite discussion at Tokyo III of whether the summit should even continue (Sakamoto 1995: 130), the summit has been ‘one of a few global mechanisms for the Japanese government to show its independent initiatives in times of need’, and can be expected to continue to do so (Katada 2001: 123). However, the inclusion of Russia within the G8 represents the final dénouement and delayed impact of the collapse of the cold war system of bipolarity. As the membership of the G8 is now even more heavily weighted towards Europe than it ever was in the past, this numerical imbalance may result in the tail wagging the dog, rather than vice versa (Owada 1994). The possible participation of China in an even broader summit process is also now a topic for discussion as a result of Russia’s integration and President Hu Jintao’s attendance in the extended dialogue meeting with developing nations at the 2003 Evian Summit. If China were to be admitted, it is unclear whether this would contribute to the representation of the Asian region, or provide Japan with a rival for its role

Conclusions 189 of regional spokesperson. In either case, this scenario forces Japanese policymakers to consider what role Japan can play in future summits. For the summit process itself, the challenges ahead are no less important and focus attention upon the issue that has haunted it since its inception: legitimacy in the eyes of the world. As James Rosenau has written ‘[i]n order to acquire the legitimacy and support they need to endure, successful mechanisms of governance are more likely to evolve out of bottom-up than top-down processes’ (Rosenau 1995: 17). Accusations of representative imbalance in the summit’s membership may deflect from an accurate understanding of the true nature, intent and functioning of the summit as an important mechanism of global governance for fostering trust, coordination and concerted leadership among the leaders of the world’s most powerful economies. However, this is a resonant accusation that was levelled specifically at the 1998 Birmingham Summit by the alternative forum of the People’s Summit, and has been a constant criticism throughout the G7/8’s history: ‘[m]any people question the right of eight countries . . . to take decisions affecting the rest of the world’ (quoted in Patomäki 1999: 132). Thus, what Castlereagh, in reference to the origins of the Concert of Europe, dubbed ‘the habits of confidential intercourse’ will most likely be shed in the future in favour of a continuing policy of ‘outreach’ to non-summit members (Bridge 1979: 34). It is clear that the G8 will neither return to being a purely economic forum (although it is arguable if this ever was the case) due to the ‘war on terrorism’, nor will it be condemned to irrelevance despite continuing calls for its disbandment. As a result of the decline of the UN to influence US foreign policy, the G8 may well become the preferred focus of global governance. If so, then how to provide the legitimacy for a meeting of the leaders of the most powerful states in the world conducted behind closed doors will constitute one of the main challenges for the summiteers. Japan will host its next summit in 2008 as part of the fifth cycle. Whether the government will once again experiment with a regional summit (as has been the recent trend), or whether it will fall back on Tokyo as the host venue remains to be seen. Nevertheless, what is certain is that the organisation and execution of the summit will be undertaken with enthusiasm and aplomb in recognition of the importance it is accorded in Japan’s foreign policy.

Appendix I G7/8 summits and Japanese delegations

Rambouillet, France, 15–17 November 1975 PM Miki Takeo MOFA Minister Miyazawa Kiichi ¯ hira Masayoshi MOF Minister O Sherpa Ushiba Nobuhiko

San Juan, Puerto Rico, 27–8 June 1976 PM Miki Takeo MOFA Minister Miyazawa Kiichi ¯ hira Masayoshi MOF Minister O Sherpa Yoshino Bunroku

London I, UK, 7–8 May 1977 PM Fukuda Takeo MOFA Minister Hatoyama Iichiro¯ MOF Minister Bo¯ Hideo Sherpa Yoshino Bunroku

Bonn I, West Germany, 16–17 July 1978 PM Fukuda Takeo MOFA Minister Sonoda Sunao MOF Minister Murayama Tatsuo Sherpa Miyazaki Hiromichi

Tokyo I, Japan, 28–9 June 1979 ¯ hira Masayoshi PM O MOFA Minister Sonoda Sunao MOF Minister Kaneko Ippeo Sherpa Miyazaki Hiromichi

Appendix 191

Venice I, Italy, 22–3 June 1980 ¯ kita Saburo¯ MOFA Minister O MOF Minister Takeshita Noboru MITI Minister Sasaki Yoshitake Sherpa Kikuchi Kiyoaki

Ottawa, Canada, 20–1 July 1981 PM Suzuki Zenko¯ MOFA Minister Sonoda Sunao MOF Minister Watanabe Michio Sherpa Kikuchi Kiyoaki

Versailles, France, 4–6 June 1982 PM Suzuki Zenko¯ MOFA Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio MOF Minister Watanabe Michio MITI Minister Abe Shintaro¯ Sherpa Matsunaga Nobuo

Williamsburg, US, 28–30 May 1983 PM Nakasone Yasuhiro MOFA Minister Abe Shintaro¯ MOF Minister Takeshita Noboru MITI Minister Yamanaka Sadanori Sherpa Motono Moriyuki

London II, UK, 7–9 June 1984 PM Nakasone Yasuhiro MOFA Minister Abe Shintaro¯ MOF Minister Takeshita Noboru Sherpa Motono Moriyuki

Bonn II, West Germany, 2–4 May 1985 PM Nakasone Yasuhiro MOFA Minister Abe Shintaro¯ MOF Minister Takeshita Noboru MITI Minister Murata Keijiro¯ Sherpa Teshima Reishi

192 Appendix

Tokyo II, Japan, 4–6 May 1986 PM Nakasone Yasuhiro MOFA Minister Abe Shintaro¯ MOF Minister Takeshita Noboru MITI Minister Watanabe Michio Sherpa Motono Moriyuki

Venice II, Italy, 8–10 June 1987 PM Nakasone Yasuhiro MOFA Minister Kuranari Tadashi MOF Minister Miyazawa Kiichi MITI Minister Tamura Hajime Sherpa Kitamura Hiroshi

Toronto, Canada, 19–21 June 1988 PM Takeshita Noboru MOFA Minister Uno So¯suke MOF Minister Miyazawa Kiichi MITI Minister Tamura Hajime Sherpa Kitamura Hiroshi

Paris, France, 14–16 July 1989 PM Uno So¯suke MOFA Minister Mitsuzuka Hiroshi MOF Minister Murayama Tatsuo MITI Minister Kajiyama Seiroku Sherpa Kunihiro Michihiko

Houston, US, 9–11 July 1990 PM Kaifu Toshiki MOFA Minister Nakayama Taro¯ MOF Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ MITI Minister Muto¯ Kabun Sherpa Watanabe Ko¯ji

London III, UK, 15–17 July 1991 PM Kaifu Toshiki MOFA Minister Nakayama Taro¯ MOF Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯

Appendix 193 MITI Minister Nakao Eiichi Sherpa Watanabe Ko¯ji

Munich, Germany, 6–8 July 1992 PM Miyazawa Kiichi MOFA advisor Matsunaga Nobuo (in place of hospitalised MOFA Minister Watanabe Michio) MOF Minister Hata Tsutomu MITI Minister Watanabe Ko¯zo¯ Sherpa Matsuura Ko¯ichiro¯

Tokyo III, Japan, 7–9 July 1993 PM Miyazawa Kiichi MOFA Minister Muto¯ Kabun MOF Minister Hayashi Yoshiro¯ MITI Minister Mori Yoshiro¯ Sherpa Matsuura Ko¯ichiro¯

Naples, Italy, 8–10 July 1994 PM Murayama Tomiichi MOFA Minister Ko¯no Yo¯hei MOF Minister Takemura Masayoshi MITI Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ Sherpa Hayashi Sadayuki

Halifax, Canada, 15–17 June 1995 PM Murayama Tomiichi MOFA Minister Ko¯no Yo¯hei MOF Minister Takemura Masayoshi MITI Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ Sherpa Hayashi Sadayuki

Lyon, France, 27–9 June 1996 PM Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ MOFA Minister Ikeda Yukihiko MOF Minister Kubo Wataru MITI Minister Tsukahara Shunpei Sherpa Ogura Kazuo

194 Appendix

Denver, US, 20–2 June 1997 PM Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ MOFA Minister Obuchi Keizo¯ MOF Minister Matsunaga Hikaru BOJ Governor Hayami Masaru Sherpa Ogura Kazuo

Birmingham, UK, 15–17 May 1998 PM Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ MOFA Minister Obuchi Keizo¯ MOF Minister Matsunaga Hikaru BOJ Governor Hayami Masaru Sherpa Haraguchi Ko¯ichi

Cologne, Germany, 18–20 June 1999 PM Obuchi Keizo¯ MOFA Minister Ikeda Yukihiko MOF Minister Miyazawa Kiichi BOJ Governor Hayami Masaru Sherpa Haraguchi Ko¯ichi

Okinawa, Japan, 21–3 July 2000 PM Mori Yoshiro¯ MOFA Minister Ko¯no Yo¯hei MOF Minister Miyazawa Kiichi Sherpa Nogami Yoshiji

Genoa, Italy, 20–2 July 2001 PM Koizumi Junichiro¯ MOFA Minister Tanaka Makiko MOF Minister Shiokawa Masaju¯ro¯ Sherpa Nogami Yoshiji

Kananaskis, Canada 26–7 June 2002 PM Koizumi Junichiro¯ MOFA Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko MOF Shiokawa Masaju¯ro¯ ¯ shima Sho¯taro¯ Sherpa O

Glossary

Ajia no daihyo¯ Ajia no ichiin Brady Plan

cho¯wa Chu¯kakuha hadaka no gaiko¯ hishatai gaiko¯ gaiatsu ho¯ to seigi kakehashi Kakumaruha Kakuro¯kyo¯ kami no kuni Keidanren Keizai Do¯yu¯kai kokusai kokka Miki oroshi Kyo¯sando¯ Senkiha masatsu Nihon tataki Nikkeiren nawabari nemawashi ningen no kusari nishigawa no ichiin Northern Territories’ dispute

representative of Asia member of Asia A plan proposed by US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady in March 1989 to provide debt relief for developing nations, chiefly in Latin America, tied to assurances of economic reform harmony Middle Core Faction naked diplomacy photograph diplomacy foreign pressure law and justice bridge Revolutionary Marxist Faction Revolutionary Workers’ Association divine nation Japan Federation of Economic Organisations Japan Association of Corporate Executives international state campaign to oust Prime Minister Miki Takeo, literally ‘drop Miki’ ex-Communist League Battle Flag Faction friction, often associated with US–Japanese trade criticism of Japan, literally ‘Japan bashing’ Japan Federation of Employers’ Association jurisdictional sphere of influence behind-the-scenes consensus-building, literally ‘digging around the root’ human chain member of the West dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union/ Russia over a group of islands – Etorofu,

196 Glossary Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai – off the northern tip of Hokkaido¯ occupied by the Soviet Union in the last days of the Second World War omiyage gaiko¯ gift-bearing diplomacy racchi jiken incidents of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korean agents seikei bunri separation of politics and economics seikei fukabun indivisibility of politics and economics settai hospitality Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu Japan Productivity Centre for Socio-Economic Development sherpa personal representative of each prime minister or president, whose role it is to ‘guide’ the leaders to the diplomatic ‘summit’. They meet regularly during the year preceding a summit to prepare the agenda and related documentation. Shinto¯ Seiji Renmei Shinto¯ Association of Spiritual Leadership So¯hyo¯ General Trade Council of Trade Unions of Japan three non-nuclear principles the policy of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan wa harmony zaikai business world Zenchu¯ Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives Zenginkyo¯ Federation of Bankers’ Associations of Japan

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Index

Abe Shintaro¯ 29, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 148 Abe Yasushi 183 Afghanistan, Soviet invasion of 13, 14, 38–42, 62, 71 agriculture 70, 76, 90, 100 Akaneya Tatsuo 3, 8 Albrecht-Carrié, René 4, 186 Albright, Madeleine 127 All Nippon Airways (ANA) 24 al-Qaida 108 Amano Kazutoshi 176 Amato, Giuliano 94, 129, 148 Amuro Namie 183 Andreotti, Giulio 91 Andropov, Yuri 53 Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902–23) 165 Angolan War 22 Annan, Kofi 132, 134, 138 Antholis, William J. 2 Aoki Mikio 142 Aquino, Corazon 68, 72, 74, 82 Arafat, Yasser 138 Arasaki Moriteru 142, 167, 168, 171 Armstrong, J.D. 5, 54, 141 Asahi 182 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 85 Asian financial crisis 116 Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 128 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 7, 35, 41, 44, 52, 116 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) 73 Atsumi Kenji 114

Battle of Seattle 125 Bayne, Sir Nicholas 1–2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 62, 116, 117, 141, 143, 146, 150, 155, 156, 163, 177, 178, 180, 184 Belelieu, Andre 6, 8 Bentsen, Lloyd 96, 104 Bergsten, C. Fred 6, 8, 150 Berlusconi, Silvio 104, 131, 132, 136, 148 Bhutto, Benazir 82 bilateralism 165–73 Birmingham Summit (1998) 8, 115–19, 145 Blair, Tony 114, 116, 117, 118, 121, 129, 135, 137 Block, William 52 Bo¯ Hideo 27 Bonn Communiqué 31, 157 Bonn Declaration on Hijacking (1978) 14, 37 Bonn Summit (Bonn I) (July 1978) 29–33, 145, 157 Bonn Summit (Bonn II) (May 1985) 60–3 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 163 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 112 Brady, Nicholas 83, 86 Brady Plan 83, 84, 187 Bretton Woods 2, 4, 9, 13 Bridge, F.R. 4, 150, 187 Bullen, Roger 4, 150, 187 Bush, George 56, 81, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89, 90, 93 Bush, George W. 108, 134, 135, 137 Business and Industry Advisory Committee 8 Byambasüren, Dashiyn 90

Baker, James 67, 73, 81, 86, 92 Bank of Japan (BOJ) 20 Bank of the Ryu¯kyu¯s 172 Barre, Raymond 30

Calder, Kent 186 Callaghan, James 5, 27 Cambodian conflict 43, 52, 66, 74, 76, 91, 95, 114–15, 186

Index 213 Camdessus, Michel 112 Campbell, Kim 100 Carter, Jimmy 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41 Castlereagh, Lord 5 Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives 100 Chang Chun-Hsiung 124 Chapman, J.W.M. 40 Chernobyl nuclear accident 4, 64, 67, 68 Chernomyrdin, Viktor 112 Chirac, Jacques 65, 105, 106, 107, 111, 112 Chrétien, Jean 104, 106, 120, 129, 134, 136, 137 Christopher, Warren 70, 100, 104, 106 Chuan Leekpai 163 Chu¯kakuha see Middle Core Faction Chun Doo-Hwan 52, 54, 174 Ciampi, Carlo 100 Clark, Joe 37 Clinton, Bill 142, 148, 164, 167–70; at Birmingham Summit 117; at Cologne Summit 119–21; at Denver Summit 113; at Halifax Summit 105–6; at Lyon Summit 111–12; at Naples Summit 102–5; at Okinawa Summit 125, 127, 129, 130; at Tokyo III Summit 97, 98, 100 Cohn, Theodore H. 1 Cologne Debt Initiative 119 Cologne Summit ( June 1999) 119–22, 145 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 109, 111, 118 Concert of Europe 3, 4, 6, 8, 140, 150, 186–7, 189 Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) 22, 27 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 94 Craxi, Bettino 59, 66 Dakin, Douglas 4 debt relief 84–5, 86, 117, 120, 126, 133, 175 Delors, Jacques 62, 66 De Mita, Ciriaco 76 Democratic Party (DP) 156 Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) 25, 28, 30, 32, 36, 38, 58, 156; on Ottawa Summit 45; on Uno 84; on Venice II Summit 72–3 Denver Summit (June 1997) (Summit of the Eight) 112–15, 162

deVillafranca, Richard 76, 162 digital opportunity task force (DOT force) 130, 144, 145, 163 Dobson, Hugo 9, 10, 176, 182 Doi Takako 131 Doko¯ Toshio 16, 24, 28 Dore, Ronald 10 Drifte, Reinhard 10 drug abuse 128 East Asianism 173–5 Economic Planning Agency (EPA) 23, 26, 32 Edström, Bert 140, 174, 180 Egami Takayoshi 167 Eguchi Yu¯jiro¯174 Eisenhower, Dwight 167 Eldridge, Robert D. 167 Elrod, Richard B. 4, 5 energy, non-oil sources of 39, 40, 41 see also nuclear energy; oil environmental issues 79, 90, 91 Ershad, Hussain Mohammad 82 Esaki Masumi 34, 37 European Community 2 European Monetary System (EMS) 178 European Union 2 Evian Summit (June 2003) 2, 11, 13, 175, 187 Export–Import Bank of Japan ( Japan Bank for International Cooperation ( JBIC)) 82, 99 Falk, Richard 8, 9 Falklands War 46, 47, 49 Fanfani, Amintore 53, 69 Fauver, Robert 145 Federation of Bankers’ Associations of Japan (Zenginkyo¯) 34 Ford, Gerald 21, 22, 23–4, 146, 150, 166 foreign direct investment (FDI) 182 Fourcade, Jean-Pierre 19 Fraser, Malcolm 49 Fratianni, Michele 1 Freytag, Andrea 2 Fujitsu 182 Fukai, Shigeko N. 141, 145 Fukuda Hajime 16, 143 Fukuda Takeo 34, 38, 39, 52, 57, 61, 65, 71, 74, 81, 85, 106, 143, 153, 166, 179; assessment 28, 32–3, 141, 150, 152; in Bonn I Summit 29–33, 145; at London I Summit 25–8, 145

214 Index Fukushima Akiko 10 Funabashi Yo¯ichi 10, 177, 178 Futenma air base 124, 130, 167–8, 169 Fyodorov, Boris 97 Gardner, Hall 1 Gaudeloupe Group 178 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 7, 9, 18, 24, 38, 42, 43, 50, 60, 82; Tokyo Round 10, 14, 19, 27, 30, 32; Uruguay Round 7, 72, 74, 83, 84, 90, 95, 99, 101, 107 General Agreements to Borrow (GAB) 105, 107 General Trade Council of Trade Unions of Japan 32 genetically modified food 130 Genoa Plan of Action 145 Genoa Social Forum 132 Genoa Summit (July 2001) 8, 131–5, 145 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 68, 178 Gilson, Julie 120 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry 5, 16, 20, 24, 33, 37, 148, 176 Giuliani, Carlo 135 Goldstein, Erik 4 Gong Ro-Myung 107 Gorbachev, Mikhail 46, 62, 64–5, 75, 83, 85, 88–92, 99 Goto¯ Kenji 146 Goto¯da Masaharu 71 Greenpeace 129 gross domestic product (GDP), World 4 gross national product (GNP), Japan 18, 28 Guidelines for Japan–US Defence Cooperation (1978) 113 de Guiringaud, Louis 30 Gulf War 7, 90 Gulick, Edward Vose 4 Gyo¯ten Toyo¯ 175 Hajnal, Peter 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 72, 76, 83 Hakone Conference of Life Sciences and Mankind 59 Halifax Summit (June 1995) 7, 78, 104, 105–7, 142, 144, 166 Haruna Naoaki 153 Hasegawa Machiko 96 Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ 86, 103, 106, 108, 144, 145, 148, 155, 162, 180; assessment 112, 115, 118, 142; at Birmingham Summit 115–18; at Denver Summit 113–15; at Lyon Summit 109–12

Hata Tsutomu 102 Hatoyama Iichiro¯ 27 Hatoyama Kunio 131 Hayashi Sadayuki 103, 107 Healey, Denis 25, 29 Heisei recession 78 Henning, C. Randall 6, 150 Henoko military base 167, 168, 169 Higgins, Janet M.D. 130, 131 hijacking 13, 31, 35 Hironaka Yoshimichi 96 HIV/AIDS 69, 72, 97, 100, 132, 133, 134 Hodges, Michael 1, 3, 6 Holsti, K.J. 4 Hook, Glenn D. 9, 10 Hori Shigeru 28 Hosokawa Morihiro 102, 152 Houston Summit (July 1990) 84–8, 175 Howe, Geoffrey 66 Hu Jintao 175, 188 Human Frontier Science Programme (HFSP) 70, 72, 76, 145 human rights 27, 81, 84, 98, 115, 128 Hunt, John 1, 8, 185 Hurd, Douglas 91 Ide Ichitaro¯ 22, 25 Ikeda Yukihiko 111 Ikenberry, G. John 3 Imagawa Yukio 114 Immerman, Robert M. 10 Inamine Keiichi 122, 123, 125, 126, 170, 171 Inayama Yoshihiro 45, 51 Indian nuclear testing 116–17 inflation, Japanese 29 information technology (IT) 132, 145 Inoguchi Kuniko 7, 84, 176, 179 InterAction Council 57, 153 interest rates 52 intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) 53–4, 71 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 67, 101 International Chamber of Commerce 8, 99 International Development Association (IDA) 137 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 18 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 7, 8, 9, 18, 20, 26, 50, 58, 75, 89, 91, 92, 105, 107, 112, 118, 121, 127 International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) 79

Index 215 internationalism 176–84 Iran–Iraq War 46, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 70, 71, 72, 74 Iraq War (March 2003) 7 Ise Akifumi 64 Ishibashi Masashi 57 Ishihara Takashi 77 Ishikawa Kaoru 108 Ito¯ Masayoshi 39, 40 Ivanov, Igor 133, 137 Jamieson, Donald 27 Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Do¯yu¯kai) 16, 45, 77, 79 Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) (Export–Import Bank of Japan) 82, 99 Japan Communist Party (JCP) 19, 25, 28, 32, 36, 38, 58; on Houston Summit 88; on London II Summit 59, 156; on Miyazawa 95; on Nakasone 55; on Ottawa Summit 45; on Tokyo II Summit 69; on Versailles Summit 51 Japan Defence Agency (JDA) 126 Japan–EC Joint Declaration 92 Japan Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren) 16, 28, 45, 51, 65 Japan Foundation 59 Japan Productivity Centre for Socio-Economic Development 126 Japan Red Army 33 Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) 73 Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 21, 25, 28, 32, 36, 37, 57, 58; on Bonn II Summit 63; on Houston Summit 88; on Kaifu 88; on London II Summit 59, 156; on Mitterrand 84; on Miyazawa 95; on Nakasone 55; on Ottawa Summit 45; on Tokyo II Summit 69; on Venice II Summit 72–3; on Versailles Summit 51 Japanese bureaucracy 153–6 Japanese Constitution (1947) 55, 58, 61, 70, 140 Japanese exporting practices, criticism of 44–5 Jenkins, Roy 25, 31, 32, 37 Jervis, Robert 4 Jinmu 34 Johnson, Chalmers 160, 167 Joint Declaration on De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 101 Jubilee 2000 8, 125, 126, 130

Kadena air base 129, 170 Kaifu Toshiki 96, 144; assessment 88, 146–8; at Houston Summit 84–8, 175; at London III Summit 88–92, 174 Kaiser, Karl 1 Kajiyama Seiroku 82 Kamiya Fuji 115 Kananaskis Summit (June 2002) 8, 13, 136–9, 145 Kantor, Mickey 100 Kanzaki Takenori 88 Kasuya Kazuki 157 Katada, Saori 177, 188 Kato¯ Mutsuki 70 Kawaguchi Yoriko 137, 138 Kawauchi Issei 179, 180 Khamenei, Ayatollah Seyed Ali 71 Kikuchi Kiyoaki 39, 42, 44, 178 Kim Dae-Jung 120, 124, 128 Kim Il Sung 104 Kim Young-Sam 111, 115 Kimura, Masato 76, 147 Kirin 182 Kirton, John 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 15, 22, 136, 139, 150, 175, 176, 179, 180 Kishi Nobusuke 52 Kissinger, Henry 4, 140, 146 Kitamura Hiroshi 71, 73, 148 Kiyomiya Ryu¯ 146 Kohl, Helmut 53, 60, 62, 65, 66, 71, 89, 91, 94, 97, 99, 100, 114, 117, 148 Koizumi Junichiro¯ 146; assessment 135, 139; at Genoa Summit 132, 134–5; at Kananaskis Summit 136–9 Kojima Akira 10, 163, 188 Kokotsis, Eleonore 2, 162, 179 Ko¯meito¯ 25, 28, 30, 36, 38, 51, 55, 58, 156; on Bonn II Summit 63; on Miyazawa 95; on Ottawa Summit 45; on Uno 84; on Venice II Summit 72–3 Ko¯moto Toshio 32, 57 Ko¯mura Masahiko 119, 120, 124 Komuro Tetsuya 183 Kondo¯ Seiichi 122 Ko¯no Kenzo¯ 28 Ko¯no Yo¯hei 47, 97, 99, 103, 104, 107, 124, 127, 168 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) 115, 135 Kosovo conflict 4, 7, 116, 119–20, 121, 122 Kozyrev, Andrei 97 Kubo Wataru 111 Kudo¯ Akira 63 Kunihiro Michihiko 75, 79, 83

216 Index Kunitomi Kenji 163 Kupchan, Charles A. 4, 5 Kupchan, Clifford A. 4, 5 Kuranari Tadashi 71, 72, 73 Kurata Hiroyuki 111 Kurihara Kazutomi 126 Kusumaatmadja, Mochtar 68 Kyo¯sando¯ Senkiha 64 Kyo¯to Protocol 126, 133, 134, 135, 187 Kyu¯shu¯-Okinawa Summit see Okinawa Summit landmines 111 Langhorne, Richard 4 least developed countries (LDCs), loans to 30 Lee Kwan Yew 73 Lewis, Flora 3, 4, 6, 88, 177 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 32, 40, 47, 57, 78; on London III Summit 92; on Miki 19, 22; on Nakasone 55, 69, 72–3; on Naples Summit 105 Lockheed scandal 24, 47 London Summit (London I) (May 1977) 25–8, 145 London Summit (London II) ( June 1984) 56–60, 156 London Summit (London III) ( July 1991) 88–92 Long, William J. 98 Louvre Accord (1987) 72 Lyon Summit ( June 1996) 109–12, 144 Maekawa Haruo 65, 66 Maekawa Report 65, 69 Mahathir bin Mohammed 52, 68, 173 Major, John 90, 94, 96, 111 Maki Taro¯ 70, 146, 166, 174 Marcos, Ferdinand 35 Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) 125 Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) 167 Matsui 168 Matsuo Takafumi 126 Matsunaga Hikaru 49, 116 Matsunami Kenta 153 Matsuura Ko¯ichiro¯ 10, 78, 98, 146, 157, 174, 175 Mbeki, Thabo 163 McCormack, Gavan 160–1, 167 McDonald’s 132 McDougall, Barbara 97 Medlicott, W.N. 4 Medoruma Shun 167 Meikle, Sian 10

Middle Core Faction (Chu¯kakuha) 33, 64, 67, 100, 163–4 Miki Takeo 26, 34, 38, 52, 57, 84, 141, 143, 179; assessment 21, 22, 24–5, 150; at Rambouillet Summit 16–21, 145, 177–8; at San Juan Summit 21–5, 145, 173 military spending/defence 44 Miller, William 41 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) 23, 26 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 155 Ministry of Finance (MOF) 20, 23, 26, 30, 32, 126; on Miki 18–19; role of 153, 154–5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 30, 32, 35, 37, 39–40, 68, 70, 98, 99, 126, 128, 182; role of 153–4 Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) 126 Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 23, 26, 126, 128; role of 155 Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 126 Mitchell Report 135 Mitsuzuka Hiroshi 81, 82 Mitterrand, François 42, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 62, 65, 66, 74, 82, 83, 84, 97, 104, 146, 174, 187 Miyagi Tokujitsu 170 Miyashita Akitoshi 97, 162, 175 Miyazaki Initiative for Conflict Prevention 127 Miyazaki Hiromichi 21, 35 Miyazawa Kiichi 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 30, 44, 64, 71, 75, 84, 103, 120, 148, 155, 187; assessment 95–6, 102, 146, 147, 152; at Munich Summit 92–6; at Tokyo III Summit 96–102 Miyazawa Plan 83 Mochida Takeshi 3 Mori Yoshiro¯ 100, 147, 150, 163; assessment 131, 142, 152–3; and Okinawa Summit 127–31, 142, 172 Morii Yuichi 10, 142 Morinaga Teiichiro¯ 32 Moriya Masatsune 176 Moro, Aldo 24 most-favoured nation (MFN) status 92, 95 motor industry 40–1, 52, 105, 106 Motoshima Hitoshi 64 Mukherjee, Pranab 52 Mulroney, Brian 66, 71, 73, 75, 82, 86, 94

Index 217 multinational corporations (MNCs) 24 Munich Summit (July 1992) 92–6, 147 Murai Jin 136 Murata Keijiro¯ 61 Murayama Tatsuo 30, 32, 82, 144 Murayama Tomiichi 144, 154; assessment 104–5, 107, 142, 153; at Halifax Summit 106–7; illness 104–5; at Naples Summit 103–5 Muskie, Edmund 41 Muto¯ Kabun 86, 97 Nagano Takeshi 105 Nakamura Keiichiro¯ 146, 156, 177 Nakasone Yasuhiro 21, 46, 47, 56, 77, 81, 85, 144, 148, 166, 167, 173–6, 182; assessment 55, 59–60, 63, 69, 72–3, 145–6, 150, 152, 158, 161; at Bonn II Summit 60–3; at London II Summit 56–60; at Tokyo II Summit 63–9, 180; on Venice II Summit 69–73; at Williamsburg Summit 51–5, 146 Nakayama Taro¯ 5, 85, 89, 92 Naples Communiqué 78 Naples Summit ( July 1994) 7, 102–5 Napoleonic Wars 4 National Missile Defence (NMD) 128 NEC 182 New Liberal Club (NLC) 30, 32, 36, 38, 47, 156 newly industrialising economies (NIEs) 76–7 Nihon Ho¯so¯ Kyo¯kai (NHK) 18 Nishimura Kunio 170, 174, 182 Nogami Yoshiji 123, 130, 132, 157, 163, 170 Nonaka Hiromu 123, 171 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 98 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 129, 130–1, 154, 156, 163, 170, 171 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 43, 53–4, 119 North Korea’s missile programme 103–4, 111, 119, 121–2, 187 North—South dialogue 16, 19, 22, 23, 27, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 125, 128 Northern Territories’ dispute 76, 78, 82, 85, 86, 87–8, 89, 91, 93, 99, 101, 113–14, 117, 122, 137, 146–7, 166, 176, 187 nuclear energy 26, 27, 28, 31, 64, 67, 109, 166 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 24

Nuclear Safety and Security Summit (April 1996) 166 nuclear weapons 49, 53–4, 55, 93–4 Obasanjo, Olusegun 163 Obuchi Chizuko 130 Obuchi Keizo¯ 92, 116, 118, 130, 147, 183; assessment 122, 161; at Cologne Summit 119–22; illness and death 127–8; and Okinawa Summit 123–4, 145, 167, 171, 175 official development assistance (ODA) 18, 30, 74–5, 82, 138, 182; contributions to 26, 30, 35, 38, 47 Ogawa Toshio 153 ¯ hira Masayoshi 18, 19, 23, 28, 98, 148, O 180; assessment 38, 141, 150–2; illness and death of 38–9, 41, 147; at Tokyo (1979) Summit 33–8, 179 oil crisis (1973) 2, 4, 9, 34, 36–7, 176 Okamoto Yukio 122, 170 Okawara Yoshio 53 Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society 130, 145 Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative (IDI) 130 Okinawa Summit (July 2000) 122–31, 142, 145, 160–1; assessment 17–2; attitudes to 168–71; costs 123, 184; impact 172; success of 182 ¯ kita Saburo¯ 38, 40, 41, 147 O Okonogi Hikosaburo¯ 57 ¯ kubo Yoshio 2 O Olympic games: Los Angeles (1984) 56; Seoul (1988) 50, 66, 72, 75 O’Neill, Paul 132, 137 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 7, 9, 24, 25; Trade Union Advisory Committee 8 Organisation of American States (OAS) 7 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 9, 13, 34, 41 Orikkusu Kurejitto 161 ¯ ta Masahide 122 O ¯ tsuka Teruyo 163 O ¯ tsuki Bunpei 51 O Ottawa Communiqué 44 Ottawa Summit (July 1981) 7, 41–5, 143 Ouellet, André 106 Owada Hisashi 150, 152, 176, 177, 188 Owen, Henry 1, 8, 185 Ozawa Ichiro¯ 64

218 Index parasite control 116, 118 Paris Summit (July 1989) (Arch Summit) 79–84, 175 Patomäki, Heikki 189 peacekeeping operations (PKO) 6, 94 Peek, John M. 10 Penttilä, Risto E.J. 1, 7, 21, 120, 175 Powell, Colin 133, 137 Primakov, Yevgeny 112, 116 prime minister, role of 140–53 Prodi, Romano 147 protectionism 28, 41, 49, 50, 52, 66, 68, 71, 84, 120 Putin, Vladimir 130, 135, 137, 175 Putnam, Robert D. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 46, 62, 141, 143, 146, 155, 156, 177, 178 Pyle, Kenneth B. 140 Rambouillet Declaration 20 Rambouillet Summit (November 1975) 1, 5, 9, 16–21, 23, 141, 143, 145 Ramos, Fidel 98 Rao, Narasimha 98 Reagan, Ronald 5, 42, 44, 46, 50, 52, 53, 55, 59–62, 64–8, 70, 71, 75–7, 146, 148, 166, 175, 187 refugees 35–6, 37, 38, 40 Refugees International 35 Reszat, Beate 10 Revolutionary Marxist Faction (Kakumaruha) 35 Revolutionary Workers’ Association (Kakuro¯kyo¯) 35, 100 Rhee Kyu-Ho 63 Rice Price Council 23 Roh Tae-Woo 75, 86, 90 Rome Initiative 133 Romulo, Roberto 98 Rosenau, James 8, 189 Rubin, Robert 116, 120 Ruggiero, Renato 112, 133 Saito¯ Eishiro¯ 77 Saito¯ Kunikichi 38, 168 Saito Shiro 10, 148 Sakamoto Yoshikazu 188 Sakurada Daizo 10, 59, 145, 186 Sakurai Kunitoshi 163 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos 82 San Juan Summit (Puerto Rico, June 1976) 2, 5, 21–5, 145 Santer, Jacques 111 Sasaki Tadashi 45, 51 Sasaki Yoshitake 39, 40, 41

Sato¯ Hidehiko 136 Schengen agreement 131 Schmidt, Helmut 5, 20, 29, 31, 34, 37, 42, 50, 57, 141, 148, 153 Schröder, Gerhard 121, 134, 139 Schultz, George 62, 67 Sekai Heiwa Kenkyu¯jo 146, 152, 166 Senior Officers Task Force (SOTF) 118 September 11 (2001) 8, 136, 185 Setoyama Mitsuo 32 Shii Kazuo 131 Shiina Etsusaburo¯ 22 Shima Nobuhiko 3, 10, 82, 141, 146, 148, 154 Shimizu Hideo 157 Shimotomai Nobuo 78 Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership 142 Shinyo Takahiro 6, 7 Shiokawa Masaju¯ ro¯ 132, 137 shipbuilding 27–8 Sihanouk, Norodom 76, 83 Sisci, Francesco 7, 175 Sked, Alan 4 Smyser, W.R. 1, 2, 3, 7, 46 Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) 78, 105; on Naples Summit 105 Socialist Democratic Federation 30, 58, 156 Soeya Yoshihide 172, 174 So¯hyo¯ 35 Sonoda Sunao 29, 30, 32, 42, 43, 44, 143, 155, 178 Sony 182 Southeastern Europe Stability Pact 119 Spadolini, Giovanni 50 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) 124 Special Privatisation and Restructuring Programme 101 Stairs, Dennis 177 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 133 Stefanova, Radoslava 1 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 33 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III (START III) 119, 130 Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) 60, 61, 62, 63 Strauss, Robert 31 Straw, Jack 133 Suharto, President 35, 52, 89, 98, 116, 117, 173, 174 Sumita Satoshi 63, 79

Index 219 summits: achievements 185–6; carnivalisation of 176, 182–4; compliance on promises/pledges 179; Japan and 49–51; Japanese awareness of 156–162; Japanese overall performance 178–9; leaders’ attendance at 148–50; meaning of 188–9; nature of 4–9; origins 1–4; styles of diplomacy 186–7; success and failure 180–1; see also under place names Sunobe Ryo¯zo¯ 52, 66 Suntory 182 Suzuki Katsunari 177 Suzuki Muneo 171 Suzuki Zenko¯ 53, 57, 81, 85; assessment 51, 141; at Ottawa Summit (1981) 41–4; at Versailles Summit (1982) 49–51 Svilanovic, Goran 133

Tokyo Summit (June 1979) (Tokyo I) 14, 33–8, 157–8 Tokyo Summit (May 1986) (Tokyo II) 63–9, 157, 159 Tokyo Summit (July 1993) (Tokyo III) 96–102, 157, 159–60 Toronto Summit (June 1988) 73–7, 141, 145 Toshikawa Takao 145, 171 Toyoda Ko¯ji 150, 171 Toyoda Naomi 163 Trade Ministers’ Quadrilateral (‘Quad’) 7, 8 Tripartite Pact 165 Trudeau, Pierre 23, 42, 43, 50, 53 Tsuji Kazuhiko 16 Tsukahara Shunpei 111 Tsukamoto Saburo¯ 75 Tsuruho Yo¯suke 153

Takagi Seiichiro 83 Takahashi Minoru 78 Takase Junichi 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 78, 166, 179, 184 Takase Tamotsu 143 Takazato Suzuyo 163 Takeiri Yoshikatsu 57 Takemura Masayoshi 103, 106 Takeshita Noboru 39, 40, 41, 52, 58, 61, 64, 67, 81, 85, 86, 87, 143, 148; assessment 77, 141, 152; at Toronto Summit 73–7 Tamamori Emi 183 Tamura Hajime 71, 75 Tanabe Makoto 55 Tanaka Akihiko 10, 143 Tanaka Kakuei 24 Tanaka Makiko 133, 176 Tanaka Rokusuke 42, 155 tariffs 31, 32, 50, 70, 71 terrorism 8, 13, 31, 35, 56, 58, 67–8, 71, 83, 100, 111, 136, 138 Teshima Reishi 65, 157 Thatcher, Margaret 42, 44, 46, 57, 58, 59, 65, 67, 68, 72, 82, 86 Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) 120 Thorn, Gaston 56 Tiananmen Square 79, 81, 92, 174, 175 Tindemans, Leo 31 Tokumatsu Nobuo 130 Tokyo Charter 99 Tokyo Communiqué (1979) 158 Tokyo Declaration (1993) 109 Tokyo Round 10, 19, 27, 30, 32

Ui Jun 163 Ullrich, Heidi K. 163 unemployment 31, 116 United Nations (UN) 3, 6, 7, 9, 24, 101, 112 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 35 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) 106 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 9 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 8, 67 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 37 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 7, 9, 106, 127, 128 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 95 Uno So¯suke 27, 74–7; assessment 84; at Paris Summit 79–84 Uruguay Round 7, 46, 72, 74, 83, 84, 90, 95, 99, 101, 107, 167 US–Japan Security Treaty 50, 54, 165, 167 US–Japan Treaty of Amity (1854) 37 Utagawa Reizo¯ 10 Valdes, Carlos J. 35 Vance, Cyrus 38 Vedrine, Hubert 3 Venice Summit (June 1980) (Venice I) 14, 38–41, 158 Venice Summit (June 1987) (Venice II) 69–73

220 Index Versailles Summit (June 1982) 47–51 Viraphol Sarasin 66 voluntary export restraints (VERs) 26 Von Furstenberg, George M. 1 Waldheim, Kurt 36 Wanner, Barbara 114 Warsaw Pact 8 Washita 123 Watanabe Akio 3, 10, 140, 141 Watanabe Hideo 71 Watanabe Ko¯ji 88, 177 Watanabe Michio 43, 44, 66, 67, 96, 97, 99, 143 Welch, David A. 76, 147 Whyman, William E. 3 Williamsburg Summit (1983) 5, 51–5, 56, 146, 158 Wilson, Harold 7, 147 Wolfensohn, James D. 112 Woolcock, Stephen 1 working hours 35 World Bank 7, 8, 9, 18, 75, 87, 91, 105 World Economic Conference (1933) 27 World Economic Forum (WEF) meetings 8

World Food Conference 18 World Health Organisation (WHO) 71 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 7, 102, 111, 112, 118, 121, 134 World Welfare Initiative 112, 115 Xinhua News Agency 60 Yamaguchi Masayuki150, 166 Yamamoto Yoshinobu 97, 99 Yamanaka Sadanori 52 Yasukawa Takeshi 35 Yasumoto, Dennis 10, 78, 175, 187 Yeltsin, Boris 92–3, 95, 97–102, 104, 106, 107, 109, 113–17, 122, 145, 160, 166, 180 Yeutter, Clayton 70 Yonemura Toshiro¯ 111 Yonetani, Julia 126, 160–1, 167, 168, 171 Yoshida Shigeru 37 Yoshino Bunroku 13, 21, 25, 143, 173, 177 Zhu Rongji 126 Zia-ul-Haq 173