Japan's Relations With China: Facing a Rising Power (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledgecurzon)

Japan’s Relations with China Japan’s Relations with China examines the fundamental transformation in East Asia’s polit...

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Japan’s Relations with China

Japan’s Relations with China examines the fundamental transformation in East Asia’s political economy given the phenomenon of “a rising China and a stagnating Japan”. Questioning whether their relationship is one of cooperation or conﬂict, the book reviews China and Japan’s bilateral ties to see whether they have deepened and broadened despite diﬀerences in outlook, national interest and political systems. The book adds a new perspective to the Sino-Japanese political relations discussion by looking beyond the interactions of central governments to examine the role of NGOs, local governments and sub-regional linkages. Adopting a range of analytical approaches, an international group of contributors explore case studies including the Taiwan issue, the Japanese Oﬃcial Development Assistance towards China and the problems of history. With perspectives from the US, Russia and Malaysia the book yields new insights into this complex and multifaceted relationship and will be of importance to those studying Asian politics and international relations. Lam Peng Er is Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.

Sheﬃeld Centre for Japanese Studies / Routledge Series Series Editor: Glenn D. Hook Professor of Japanese Studies, University of Sheﬃeld

This series, published by Routledge in association with the Centre for Japanese Studies at the University of Sheﬃeld, both makes available original research on a wide range of subjects dealing with Japan and provides introductory overviews of key topics in Japanese Studies. The Internationalization of Japan Edited by Glenn D. Hook and Michael Weiner Race and Migration in Imperial Japan Michael Weiner Japan and the Paciﬁc Free Trade Area Pekka Korhonen Greater China and Japan Prospects for an economic partnership? Robert Taylor The Steel Industry in Japan A comparison with the UK Hasegawa Harukiyo Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan Richard Siddle Japan’s Minorities The illusion of homogeneity Edited by Michael Weiner Japanese Business Management Restructuring for low growth and globalization Edited by Hasegawa Harukiyo and Glenn D. Hook

Japan and Asia Paciﬁc Integration Paciﬁc romances 1968–1996 Pekka Korhonen Japan’s Economic Power and Security Japan and North Korea Christopher W. Hughes Japan’s Contested Constitution Documents and analysis Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack Japan’s International Relations Politics, economics and security Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher Hughes and Hugo Dobson Japanese Education Reform Nakasone’s legacy Christopher P. Hood The Political Economy of Japanese Globalisation Glenn D. Hook and Hasegawa Harukiyo Japan and Okinawa Structure and subjectivity Edited by Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle Japan and Britain in the Contemporary World Responses to common issues Edited by Hugo Dobson and Glenn D. Hook Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping New pressures, new responses Hugo Dobson Japanese Capitalism and Modernity in a Global Era Re-fabricating lifetime employment relations Peter C. D. Matanle Nikkeiren and Japanese Capitalism John Crump Production Networks in Asia and Europe Skill formation and technology transfer in the automobile industry Edited by Rogier Busser and Yuri Sadoi

Japan and the G7/8 1975–2002 Hugo Dobson The Political Economy of Reproduction in Japan Between nation-state and everyday life Takeda Hiroko Grassroots Paciﬁsm in Post-War Japan The rebirth of a nation Mari Yamamoto Japanese Interﬁrm Networks Adapting to survive in the global electronics industry Ralph Paprzycki Globalisation and Women in the Japanese Workforce Beverley Bishop Contested Governance in Japan Sites and issues Edited by Glenn D. Hook Japan’s International Relations Politics, economics and security Second edition Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher Hughes and Hugo Dobson Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises Yukiko Nishikawa Japan’s Subnational Governments in International Aﬀairs Purnendra Jain Japan and East Asian Monetary Regionalism Towards a proactive leadership role? Shigeko Hayashi Japan’s Relations with China Facing a rising power Lam Peng Er

Japan’s Relations with China Facing a rising power

Edited by Lam Peng Er

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2006 Editorial matter and selection Lam Peng Er; individual chapters the contributors This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Japan’s Relations with China : Facing a rising power / edited by Lam Peng Er. p. cm. – (Sheﬃeld Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–415–37217–8 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Japan – Foreign relations – China. 2. China – Foreign relations – Japan. 3. Japan – Foreign relations – China – Case studies. 4. China – Foreign relations – Japan – Case studies. I. Lam, Peng Er, 1959– II. Title. III. Series. DS849.C5J37 2005 327.52051′09′045 – dc22 2005013137 ISBN10: 0–415–37217–8 (Print Edition) ISBN13: 9–78–0–415–37217–6

Contents

List of ﬁgures and tables List of contributors Acknowledgements A note on conventions Introduction 1 The shifting nature of Japan–China relations after the Cold War

ix x xiii xiv 1 21

¯ SEI KOKUBUN RYO

2 Domestic sources of Japan’s policy towards China

37

¯ JI MURATA KO

3 Japanese writings on post-1945 Japan–China relations

50

KAMACHI NORIKO

4 National mythmaking and the problems of history in Sino-Japanese relations

69

HE YINAN

5 Japanese ODA policy toward China: the new agenda

92

DAVID ARASE

6 The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations

107

¯ TAKAGI SEIICHIRO

7 Forging new bilateral relations: Japan’s sub-national governments in China PURNENDRA JAIN

128

viii Contents 8 Building Yellow Sea bridges: Kyushu’s role in Japan–China Relations

149

GLENN D. HOOK

9 Japanese NGOs in China

166

AKIO TAKAHARA

10 Deputy and debutante: the new geometry of East Asia

180

BRAD GLOSSERMAN

11 Japan–China relations: a Malaysian perspective

199

LEE POH PING

12 Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow

213

GILBERT ROZMAN

Index

234

Figures and tables

Figures 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 11.1 11.2

Comparing GDP growth: China and Japan, 1981–2003 China’s shares of world production in key manufactures, 2001 Sino-Japanese bilateral trade, 1980–2004 Sino-Japanese bilateral trade vis-à-vis the United States, 1985–2003 Japan’s foreign investment in China, 1989–2004 Indicator of sentiment in Japan towards China, 1978–2004 Planned relocation of production sites of Japanese TNCs to China as a result of China’s accession to the WTO Japanese companies looking beyond Malaysia: future investment strategy of Japanese companies in Malaysia

2 4 5 6 7 8 201 202

Tables 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 11.1 11.2 11.3

Countries/regions with which Japanese NGOs are engaged in international cooperation/exchange (2001) Japanese NGOs engaged in international cooperation/ exchange (2002) Size of the operational expenses of the NGOs engaged in cooperation with China Top twenty cooperative activities by Japanese NGOs engaged in China Japanese direct investment in China and Malaysia from 1990 to 2000 Japanese imports from China and Malaysia Total trade between China and Malaysia

169 170 171 172 200 203 208

Contributors

David Arase is an Associate Professor of Politics at Pomona College in Claremont, California. He has written on Japanese foreign policy and East Asian relations including Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japanese Foreign Aid (Lynne Rienner, 1995), editor, The Challenge of Change: East Asia in the New Millennium (Institute of East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley, 2002), and editor, Japan’s Oﬃcial Development Assistance (Routledge, 2005). Brad Glosserman is Director of Research for the Paciﬁc Forum CSIS in Honolulu and a contributing editor to the Japan Times, writing extensively on policy issues and international aﬀairs. He is the editor of Comparative Connections, Paciﬁc Forum’s quarterly electronic journal and writes the chapter on US–Japan relations. He edited—with Tae-hyo Kim—“The Future of US–Korea–Japan Relations: Balancing Values and Interests” (CSIS Signiﬁcant Issues series, 2004), in which he has a chapter, and is the author of numerous monographs on East Asian aﬀairs. Mr Glosserman holds a JD from The George Washington University and an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, both in Washington, DC. He Yinan is an assistant professor of International Security and East Asian Politics at the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University. She holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her research interests include politics of memory, post-conﬂict reconciliation, Chinese and Japanese politics and foreign policy, and East Asian security. Dr He is a recipient of An-Wang Fellowship in Chinese Studies at Harvard University, John M. Olin Fellowship in National Security at Harvard University, Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar Fellowship of the United States Institute of Peace, MacArthur Fellowship on Transnational Security Issues, and Japanese Government Monbusho Scholarship. Glenn D. Hook is Professor of Japanese Studies and Director of the Graduate School of East Asian Studies, the University of Sheﬃeld. His research interests are in Japanese politics, international relations and security. His

Contributors xi publications include Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (Routledge, 1996), Japan’s Contested Constitution: documents and analysis (Routledge, 2001 co-author), Japan’s International Relations: Politics, economics and security (Routledge, 2001 co-author), The Political Economy of Japanese Globalization (Routledge, 2001, co-editor) and Contested Governance in Japan: Sites and Issues (Routledge, 2005, editor). Purnendra Jain is Professor and Head of Adelaide University’s Centre for Asian Studies, Australia. He specializes in domestic and international politics of contemporary Japan with other Asia Paciﬁc nations. His most recent book is Japan’s Subnational Governments in International Aﬀairs (London and New York: Routledge 2005). A Japanese version of this book will be published later in the year (Kyoto: Minerva Shoten). Kamachi Noriko is Professor Emerita of history at the University of Michigan, Dearborn. She is the author of Culture and Customs of Japan (Greenwood Publications), Reform in China: Huang Tsun-hsien and the Japanese Model (Council of East Asian Studies, Harvard University,) and Japanese Studies of Modern China Since 1953: A Bibliographical Guide To Historical and Social Science Research on the Nineteenth And Twentieth Centuries (Co-author with John K. Fairbank and Chuzo Ichiko, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University). Kokubun Ryo¯sei is Director of Institute of East Asian Studies and Professor of Political Science Department at Keio University. His research interests are Chinese Politics and foreign relations. His publication includes The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (eds), Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004. Lam Peng Er is Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He obtained his PhD from Columbia. His research interests are in Japan’s domestic political change, and Tokyo’s political activism in East Asia. Lam’s publications include Green Politics in Japan (London: Routledge, 1999). Lee Poh Ping is Professor and Principal Fellow in the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies, National University of Malaysia. Before this, he was Professor and Head of Department of the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. His research interest is on Japanese relations with Southeast Asia. Murata Ko¯ji is Professor of Political Science, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan. Professor Murata holds his PhD in Political Science from Kobe University, Kobe, Japan, and received the Suntory Academic Award, the Yoshida Shigeru Award, the Yomiuri Merit Award for New Opinion Leadership, and the Shimizu Hiroshi Award from the Japanese Association for American Studies.

xii

Contributors

Gilbert Rozman is Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton, where he received his PhD and has been teaching since 1970. He specializes in Northeast Asia. His interests range from comparative historical sociology to national identities and regionalism. Most of his work has centred on problems of international relations in a region in ﬂux. His recent books include: Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (2004) and Korea at the Center: The Search for Regionalism in Northeast Asia (co-editor, 2005) Takagi Seiichiro¯ is a professor at the School of International Politics, Economics, and Business, Aoyama Gakuin University. He obtained PhD in political science from Stanford University. He is a specialist on Chinese foreign relations and security issues in the Asia-Paciﬁc region. His recent publications in English include “The Asia-Paciﬁc Nations: Searching for Leverage,” in Ramon H. Meyers, Michel C. Oksenberg and David Shambaugh (eds.), Making China Policy (Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 2001), and “In Search of a Sustainable Equal Partnership: Japan–China Relations in the Post-Cold-War Era,” in Japan Review of International Aﬀairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1999). Takahara Akio is Professor of Modern East Asian Politics at the Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo. He received his D Phil in 1988 from the University of Sussex, and later spent several years as Visiting Scholar at the Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong and the Japanese Embassy in Beijing. His English publications include The Politics of Wage Policy in Post-Revolutionary China (1992). His recent research topics include: the reforms in the Chinese Communist Party ideology and organization that have taken place in accordance with the progress in marketization; urban community construction and reforms in basic-level governance; regionalism in East Asia; and Japan–China relations.

Acknowledgements

The genesis of this edited book was a conference on Japan–China relations organized by the East Asian Institute (EAI), National University of Singapore in August 2002. Conference papers which were accepted then went through several rounds of revision and updating. Thanks to all the contributors for their patience and good cheer during this long gestation period. A special appreciation to Brad Glosserman and Tagaki Seiichiro¯ for revising their papers again after Taiwan was mentioned as a common strategic objective of the US-Japan alliance in February 2005. This book would not have been possible if not for the support of Professor Wang Gungwu (Director of EAI) and Professor John Wong (Director of Research, EAI). Heart-felt thanks to both my directors for creating a congenial atmosphere for scholarly research at the EAI to pursue this and other academic projects. Thanks also to the referees of this manuscript for their critical and useful comments. I am also thankful to Stephanie Rogers and Helen Baker for not losing interest in this manuscript and guiding me kindly to the fruition of this collaborative project. My appreciation also goes to Kevin Eaton and his team at Reﬁnecatch Ltd for their editorial and typesetting skills. The following scholars and teachers have inﬂuenced my life-long commitment as a Japan specialist deeply and wonderfully: James W. Morley, Gerald L. Curtis, Aurelia George Mulgan and Chan Heng Chee. I dedicate this edited volume to them.

A note on conventions

Chinese and Japanese names are listed in the Northeast Asian order: family name ﬁrst and given name second. Exceptions are Northeast Asian scholars whose English-language publications give their names in Western order.

Introduction

China and Japan established diplomatic relations in 1972. Since then, the international and domestic structures that originally framed the two countries’ relationship have changed signiﬁcantly. Internationally, it was a shift from the bipolarity of superpowers (the United States and the USSR) to US unipolarity. During the Cold War bipolarity, Beijing, Tokyo and Washington enjoyed a “golden age” in their relationships when they were aligned against Moscow and its allies.1 However, those halcyon days ended after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the subsequent implosion of the USSR. Domestically, both China and Japan have undergone profound changes. Under Deng Xiaoping, China jettisoned revolutionary ideology and autarky, embraced various features of capitalism and embarked on rapid economic growth. China is indeed poised conﬁdently to emerge as a great economic power. In the case of Japan, in 1972, it was an emerging economic superpower with the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) at the helm. However, in the 1990s, Japan was mired in protracted and conﬁdence-sapping economic stagnation. Despite a weakened LDP which since 1994 could no longer hold onto the reins of power alone, the main opposition parties are still incapable of displacing it. A fundamental feature in East Asia’s new political economy since the 1990s is a rising China and a stagnating Japan. The Chinese mainland has been chalking up rapid economic growth for the past decade while the Japanese economy has been languishing just above and even below zero GDP growth (Figure 0.1). Indeed, China is emerging as the “factory of the world”. If this trend were to persist in the next decade or two, it will surely impact on the geopolitical landscape of East Asia. That China and Japan are trading places as the economic superpower in the region is not inconceivable given the feeble domestic attempts at reforming Japan’s political economy. Since 2003, the Japanese economy has shown signs of a recovery. Indeed, it has been at its best since the early 1990s but it remains unclear whether it is a false dawn or that Japan will enjoy sustained economic recovery after the “lost decade”. Regardless of whether Japan’s nascent economic recovery is sustainable or not, China, despite its manifold domestic problems, is surging ahead and emerging as an economic powerhouse in Asia.

Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various issues), Cabinet Oﬃce, Government of Japan.

Figure 0.1 Comparing GDP growth: China and Japan, 1981–2003

Introduction 3 The phenomenon of China rising coupled with Japan stagnating marks a new era for Tokyo’s relations with Beijing. For around a century and half, Japan faced a weak China wrecked by military defeats, the collapse of its dynastic system, civil wars and the self-inﬂicted wounds of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. In contrast, Japan embarked on rapid modernization since the Meiji era, captured an empire, engaged in economic reconstruction after its defeat in World War II, and emerged as the leading goose in the ﬂying geese pattern of the post-war East Asian economic development. In summary, the Japanese were used to the phenomenon of a “strong Japan and stagnant China” for more than a century. However, the 1990s were indeed a structural shift in the political economy of East Asia. Cognizant of China’s rapid rise as an economic power, Newsweek, in its 18 February 2002 issue, marked a new Asian epoch in its front cover: “Now Beijing, Not Tokyo, is Shaping Asia’s Economic Future”. Earlier, Tokyo’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) noted in its 2001 White Paper that the rapid rise of China has changed the ﬂying geese pattern of development in East Asia that had centred round Japan. Indeed, China’s phenomenal economic growth has rendered the Japan-centric ﬂying geese model of economic development obsolete. Simply put, Japan is facing a rising China today. If China’s economy were to register strong growth for the next two decades, it could well underpin greater Chinese political and military power in East Asia. The ﬂying geese model explains that, driven by the international diﬀusion of technology, a developing country upgrades its export and industrial structures and hands down its obsolete industries to succeeding countries. Japan is the leading goose followed by the next echelon of Newly Industrialized Economies (NIES) such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore which in turn are trailed by the next group including Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. These geese are often viewed as part of Japan’s regional production network. The ﬂying geese model anticipates that a relatively late-comer in capitalist development like China would be trailing behind Japan and the NIEs. However, contrary to expectation, the Mainland is “leap-frogging” over its East Asian neighbours. China is gaining comparative advantage not only in the labour-intensive textile industries but across the entire value chain including the technology-intensive IT industry. Not surprisingly, the rise of China has contributed to negative sentiments among some Japanese élites, the media, non-competitive sectors and public opinion that China is emerging as a “threat” to Japan: eclipsing the Japanese sun in East Asia and “hollowing out” its domestic industries.2 (Figure 0.2) However, many Japanese also see China as a great opportunity for Japanese economic interests. Japan’s trade with China is rising exponentially (Figure 0.3). Of signiﬁcance is the fact that, since 2003, the value of Japan’s imports from China has overtaken Japan’s imports from the United States (Figure 0.4). Moreover, Japan’s FDI (Foreign Direct Investments) has also risen substantially (Figure 0.5). If Japan can see the light at the end of the

4

Introduction

Figure 0.2 China’s shares of world production in key manufactures, 2001 (%) Note: *2000, **1999. Source: The Nikkei Weekly, 6 August 2001.

tunnel in 2004, after more than a decade of economic doldrums, it is also due to, in part, rising Japanese exports to the Chinese market. While Japan–China economic ties are mutually beneﬁcial, much ambivalence still underpins Japan’s relations with China (Figure 0.6). The issue of rising and declining great powers is a pertinent one in the study of history and international relations. More than two millennia ago, Thucydides identiﬁed the fundamental cause of the Peloponnesian War: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”3 In recent years, Robert Gilpin4 and Paul Kennedy5 have explored the same theme: that uneven rate of growth in power capabilities among nations often leads to envy, fear, competition, tension and conﬂict. Both Gilpin and Kennedy aﬃrm that international relations are often destabilized when a rising great power challenges a declining great power.

Source: China Foreign Economic Statistics (1979–1991); China Statistical Yearbook (various issues).

Figure 0.3 Sino-Japanese bilateral trade, 1980–2004

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (relevant issues), www.jetro.go.ip, IMF.

Note: 2003 ﬁgures are calculated from trade data from JETRO.

Figure 0.4 Sino-Japanese bilateral trade vis-à-vis the United States, 1985–2003

Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various issues); China’s Monthly Statistics (February issue, 2005); Japan: Ministry of Finance.

Figure 0.5 Japan’s foreign investment in China, 1989–2004

Source: Cabinet Oﬃce, Government of Japan.

Figure 0.6 Indicator of sentiment in Japan towards China, 1978–2004

Introduction 9

Themes and features The central theme of this book is: what is the nature of Japan’s political relations with China given the phenomenon of “a rising China and a stagnating Japan”? A corollary is: How has Japan responded to the rise of China? Has Japan sought greater cooperation with China and/or strengthened its ties with other great powers to balance China? Is Japan’s relationship with China best characterized by conﬂict or cooperation? Other themes include: Have bilateral ties deepened and broadened despite diﬀerences in outlook, national interests and political systems? To what extent have Japan–China relations matured beyond the conﬁnes of state-to-state-relations? There are a number of features in this book. First, the analytical approaches adopted by the contributors are pluralistic and eclectic. There is no attempt to impose a particular methodology or orthodoxy on scholarly analysis. As Japan–China relations become more developed and multi-faceted, no single paradigm is likely to capture the full complexity of this bilateral ties. Nevertheless, the contributors, despite divergent analytical approaches, share a common task of addressing the main themes of the book: has the phenomenon of “China rising, Japan stagnating” impacted on their case studies? And are their case studies best characterized by conﬂict and/or cooperation? Second, attention is paid to historiography and the burden of history in Japan’s ties with China. A chapter is devoted to shifting paradigms and interpretations of China by Japanese scholarship over the last half a century. Another deals with the manner in which both countries have used history for their own political purposes. Third, while recognizing the preeminence of the national state in shaping bilateral ties, this book explores lesser known but arguably important dimensions of relations that go beyond the roles of and interactions by central governments, which include the role of non-government organizations (NGOs), local governments, and sub-regional linkages. Indeed, the perceptions and interests of local governments and NGOs in Japan towards China might well be diﬀerent from those of central government and the national media. Thus, “Japan” is not a unitary actor but has to be “unbundled” for a better understanding of Japan–China relations. Fourth, there are also case studies examining the capacity of China and Japan to manage their diﬀerences pragmatically and establish good neighbourly relations. These topics include: the Taiwan issue, Japanese ODA (Oﬃcial Development Assistance) policy towards China, role of NGOs, and interaction between sub-national governments. Such case studies will reveal the multifaceted nature of Japan’s relations with China and oﬀer insights into whether bilateral ties have become more cooperative or conﬂict-ridden against the backdrop of a rising China. Fifth, perspectives from third parties, the United States, Russia and Malaysia are also adopted to view Japan–China relations and its impact on the region. This approach might well yield insights into Japan–China relations

10

Introduction

which are diﬀerent from the views seen from the prisms of Beijing and Tokyo. These three countries are picked for the following reasons: The United States is the sole superpower which has profoundly aﬀected Japan’s relations with China; Russia is the once and future great power and cannot be ignored in Japan–China relations; Malaysia has earlier launched a “Learn from Japan” national campaign but is now seeking to take advantage of China’s rapid economic growth. Malaysia is an interesting case study of a Southeast Asian country which seeks good ties with both Japan and China for its own national interest. Along with its Southeast Asian neighbours, Malaysia has been wooed by Japan and China as they compete for turf in Southeast Asia.

Structure of the book In the ﬁrst chapter, Kokubun Ryo¯sei provides an overview of Japan’s shifting relations with China since oﬃcial diplomatic relations was forged in 1972. He observes that bilateral relations appear less friendly today than when they were ﬁrst established. According to Kokubun, the image of “rising China, sinking Japan” has indeed contributed to negative sentiments in Japan towards China. But the seeds of negativism towards China were already sown before the spectre of a rising China appeared. He believes that the widening gap in Japan–China relations since 1972 can be explained from four angles: 1) structural changes in the international order and within China; 2) deepening interdependence; 3) generational changes; and 4) Taiwan’s transformation. He notes that Japan–China relations are in a transition period and no new framework is yet in sight. Kokubun believes that as long as “China’s rising” cannot be realized without Japan, and China’s economic growth is a key factor to save Japan from a stagnant economy, both countries cannot aﬀord a confrontational relationship in the years ahead. In Chapter 2, Murata Ko¯ji observes that the complicated domestic politics of the Japanese democracy shapes its foreign policy towards China. He focuses on changes in Japan’s political parties, bureaucracies and public opinion. Murata argues that mass negative sentiments towards China, the lack of policy coordination among ruling parties in coalition and the relative decline of the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and its China School have made Japanese policy-making process towards China more complex, diﬀuse and fragmented. He explains that negative Japanese opinion of China is based on three factors: Chinese behaviour in international relations, diversiﬁcation of Japanese society and the “domestic political and economic frustration” in Japan. Indeed, the stagnation of Japan has led to negative Japanese sentiments towards a rising China. However, bilateral problems are mitigated by considerable socio-economic interactions and the need for Japan to cooperate with China to address the North Korean problem. Murata concludes that regardless of domestic diﬃculties and international uncertainties, it is necessary for both countries to become accustomed to a truly equal relationship.

Introduction 11 Both countries need to carefully avoid a zero-sum perception of international politics and be more sensitive to the domestic politics of its neighbour”. Kamachi Noriko examines Japanese scholarship on Post-1945 SinoJapanese relations in Chapter 3. She identiﬁes the major scholars in the ﬁeld and their interpretations of Japan–China relations, and major shifts and academic trends in interpreting China. Kamachi also identiﬁes certain features of Japanese scholarship before diplomatic relations were established: guilt stricken and romantic feelings towards the Chinese Mainland by many scholars; access to China was a privilege extended only to scholars sympathetic to China, and a generally friendly if not uncritical perspective towards the revolutionary regime. However, by the 1990s, the phenomenon of “China rising, Japan stagnating” has led to a ﬂood of books and articles which articulated the China Threat Theory. Kamachi also highlights the solid scholarship achieved by various Japanese academics in promoting a better understanding of Chinese state and society, and Japan–China relations. She also hopes that younger Japanese scholars can directly engage their Chinese counterparts in a third language (English) in international forums. In Chapter 4, He Yinan identiﬁes “national mythmaking” as the thorn in the ﬂesh of Japan–China relations. She argues that both Chinese and Japanese governments expediently downplayed the problems of history to attain immediate geo-strategic interests before the 1980s. However, such geopolitical considerations were weakened by the early 1980s. Both nations then engaged in historical mythmaking due to domestic politics at the expense of bilateral ties. She believes that ties can only improve if there are honest and collaborative eﬀorts to re-examine national histories and work towards a shared transnational memory. He perceives that “against the backdrop of China’s vibrant economy and Japan’s stagnation, the current nationalistic mythmaking patterns in both countries would only aggravate the Japanese perception of ‘China threat’ and Chinese suspicions of Japan’s jealousy and desire to stunt its growth”. The next two chapters deal with inter-state relations at the national level. David Arase in Chapter 5 addresses the “new agenda” in Japanese ODA policy toward China. These include: greater emphasis on the environment, aid with a “human face”, spending cuts, and greater political conditionality. Arase argues that this shift in ODA policy will have implications well beyond the narrow conﬁnes of ODA because Tokyo’s change in ODA policy toward China “reﬂects changes in Japanese thinking about its broader comprehensive security needs.” He implies that the negative mood especially among Japanese politicians towards China (in part frustration generated by China rising, Japan stagnating) have spilled over to its China aid policy. Arase perceives that Japan’s cut in ODA is a signal to China that it is viewed as a potential threat at worst and an emerging economic powerhouse that should be weaned from ODA at best. He warns that if Tokyo no longer employs ODA as its central approach towards Beijing, it might develop expanded security

12

Introduction

and political capabilities which in turn would trigger a negative response from China. In March 2005, Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka oﬃcially announced that Japan will cease extending new yen loans to China in ﬁscal 2008, when Beijing hosts the Olympic Games. The ostensible reason is that Japanese funds are no longer needed given China’s rapid economic growth. The real reason for ending ODA is the rise of negative sentiments in Japan towards China. In Chapter 6, Takagi Seiichiro¯ examines the Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations. He points out that Taiwan was the most serious issue in the negotiations leading to diplomatic normalization. Although Taiwan was not a serious issue between the two neighbours after normalization, the situation changed in the 1990s. Today, many Japanese view Taiwan favourably as a mature democracy and successful economy, and an important trading partner. In the worst scenario, China’s use of force against Taiwan might trigger US military intervention and Japanese response as an American ally. Such a development would deal a serious blow to Japan–China relations. However, Takagi believes that Tokyo has acted prudently towards the Taiwan question after “carefully gauging possible China’s reaction”. On the part of Beijing, its basically peaceful approach to the reuniﬁcation issue means that Taiwan does not become a serious problem in the bilateral relationship. Takagi perceives that the contrasting economic performances of China and Japan have given rise to anti-Chinese sentiments in Japan which simultaneously tend to be sympathetic to Taiwan. But these pro-Taiwanese sympathizers do not carry enough weight to amplify and aggravate the Taiwan factor in the overall Japan–China relations. Nevertheless, the unprecedented mention of Taiwan as a common strategic objective with its US ally in February 2005 at the Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Talks) suggests that Japan is prepared to further strengthen its alliance with the United States to balance and hedge against a rising China. The next three chapters deal with relations between two nations at levels below the central government. While ties between the two national governments were occasionally ruﬄed by the burdens of history and other incidents, relations between local governments, business groups, NGOs and individuals appear to be less tempestuous. They are often driven by economic, cultural and personal factors and even a desire for a local role in international relations. Moreover, local state and non-state actors usually lack the mentality of zero-sum politico-strategic competition characterized by central governments. Indeed the next three chapters highlight Japan–China relations at the regional and local levels which are mostly cordial, practical and mutually beneﬁcial. National governments in Beijing and Tokyo do not monopolize China-Japan relations; local governments and non-state actors in their own ways and at their own pace do enhance better neighbourly relations. Even though the phenomenon of “China rising, Japan stagnating” has contributed to the China Threat Theory among certain politicians, academics and national media, Japanese local governments and NGOs do not appear

Introduction 13 to be perturbed by such concerns; they continue to seek their own niches in fostering better ties with their counterparts in China. In Chapter 7, Purnendra Jain points out that one of the many areas of increasing interaction between the two neighbours is at the level of subnational governments (SNG). He focuses on the following linkages that Japanese SNGs have forged in China: 1) sister relationships between prefectures/provinces, cities, towns and other localities; 2) trade promotion and overseas oﬃces; and 3) technical and economic cooperation. Jain observes that Japanese SNGs have the largest number of sister relationships with their counterparts in China than in any other Asian country. Indeed, more than half of all Japanese prefectures and major cities have at least one oﬃce in China. He opines that friendly sister city relations “oﬀer an important vehicle for Japan to re-establish historical and cultural links and develop a range of programmes at the grassroots level with its powerful neighbour.” Jain even asserts that Japanese SNGs can do much—and sometimes more than the central government—in cultivating close and valuable ties with China. Jain notes that not all relations between Chinese and Japanese SNGs are necessarily good. For example, Governor Ishihara of Tokyo, a ﬁerce critic of China, has downgraded his local government’s ties with its Chinese counterparts. But this is the exception rather than the norm. Glenn D. Hook examines the bridging role of Kyushu in Japan–China relations in Chapter 8. Speciﬁcally, he examines how local actors from Fukuoka prefecture, Kitakyshu city and local businesses have successfully crossed the Yellow Sea to sub-national parts of China, especially the industrial port city of Dalian, a gateway to Beijing. Hook explains that “despite the ascendance of the ‘China threat’ in the national discourse on SinoJapanese relations in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, local actors in Kyushu are linking localities across the Yellow Sea, thereby nurturing crossborder interests as well as forging identities based on cooperation”. He also observes an emerging micro-regional economy integrating both sides of the Yellow Sea and raises the possibilities of “new sites of governance” located in “diﬀerent spatial scales involving substate political authorities and other nonstate actors”. Takahara Akio, in Chapter 9, examines a non-state centric mode of interaction between the two nations. He notes that, as of mid-2001, 988 Japanese NGOs cooperated with China in various social, cultural, economic and environmental issues. Takahara’s case study is the citizen-based Green Earth Network (GEN) of Osaka which was engaged in the “greeniﬁcation” of the loess plateau in Datong, Shanxi province of China. GEN has planted an amazing number of around 13 million trees in Datong. Takahara’s case study shows people-to-people diplomacy, friendship, sincerity, altruism and cooperation at its best. He points out that many peasants of Datong had earlier harboured anti-Japanese feelings because Datong suﬀered serious damage during the Sino-Japanese War. But after making visible achievements, the GEN activists from Japan were able to secure the trust and respect

14

Introduction

of many villagers, experts and the Communist Party cadres of Datong. Takahara observes: “We have seen that Japanese NGOs’ activity in China as global citizens is ‘greenifying’ not only the loess plateau, but also the relationship between Japan and China, where cynical people thought no plant would bear fruit.” Takahara emphatically concludes: “While the rise of China has caused concern among some Japanese opinion shapers, lawmakers and business interests, it has not impacted on the activities of Japanese NGOs in China.” The last three chapters provide a third country perspective of Japan–China relations: an American superpower perspective, one from Malaysia in Southeast Asia while the other is from Russia in Northeast Asia. In Chapter 10, Brad Glosserman studies the new “geometry” of East Asia: the trilateral relations between the United States, as the lone superpower, its Japanese deputy, and the Chinese debutante. He metaphorically describes Japan as the “setting sun” and China as the “ascending dragon” to set the geopolitical stage in East Asia. Glosserman asserts that Japan’s prospects for structural reforms are poor and this poses particular problems for the United States since a pillar of its presence in Asia is its alliance with Japan. He also analyses the geopolitical competition between Japan and China in Northeast and Southeast Asia; in both cases, Beijing’s diplomacy appears more dynamic and Japan’s merely responding to Chinese initiatives. He concludes that there are structural imbalances in the trilateral relationship. As allies, the United States and Japan are able to manage bilateral diﬀerences. However, neither country has a similar “shock absorber” when it comes to dealing with China. Lee Poh Ping, in Chapter 11, points out that many Malaysians are concerned that much of the Japanese investment destined for Malaysia could be diverted to China and that China will emerge as a formidable competitor to Malaysian goods in the Japanese domestic market. From a geopolitical perspective, according to Lee, Malaysians desire cooperation between both giants to ensure the success of East Asian regionalism, an important policy objective of Malaysia. Even though Japanese economic stagnation has aﬀected the Malaysian view of Japan as a rising power, Malaysians have not written oﬀ Japan as an important power in Southeast Asia. Malaysians believe that Japan should embark on political and economic reforms, a course of action that is necessary for Japan to continue playing an important role in Southeast Asia. Implicit in Lee’s analysis is the desirability of a revitalized Japan that can balance an emerging China to ensure the peace and stability of East Asia. In Chapter 12, Gilbert Rozman analyses Russia’s views of China and Japan in the Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin eras. He argues that Beijing and Tokyo should be roughly in balance as regional powers and are likely to turn increasingly to Moscow to “tilt the balance their way as well as to boost regionalism. This puts a newly weakened Russia in an enviable position being pursued by both powers.” Rozman perceives that Russia has the potential to help integrate the region. It can oﬀer vital energy resources to Northeast

Introduction 15 Asia and perhaps “play a constructive role in diﬀusing the security threat from North Korea if US alarm leads to multilateral diplomacy that draws the rest of the region together.” With Putin winning his presidential reelection in 2004 and another four year term, both Japan and China will have to deal with his administration to address issues on regional stability and energy resources.

The ﬁndings of this volume Bilateral ties between China and Japan are complex and multi-faceted. Both cannot readily be labeled as either partners or rivals. It appears that the dialectics of both competition and cooperation exist in Sino-Japanese relations.6 This dualism of cooperation and competition is also present in the bilateral relations of many nations. In this regard, the seeming contradictions and ambivalence in Japan–China relations are not necessarily an aberration in international relations. The contributors of this volume have highlighted several bilateral problems: the controversy over historical interpretations, the souring of public opinion toward each other, the Taiwan problem, Beijing’s negative reaction to the strengthened alliance between Washington and Tokyo, Beijing’s nuclear tests and trade frictions. However, contributors have also noted positive aspects of their bilateral ties: rapidly expanding economic ties, Japanese ODA to China, forging closer ties between local governments and the regions of both countries, and environmental assistance by Japanese NGOs in China. Indeed, Japan–China relations have deepened and broadened especially in economics, and also beyond the level of the central state to local governments and, in some cases, the grassroots level too. While the rise of China has generated some anxiety among many Japanese, it does not inevitably lead to severe strain and armed conﬂict between national governments. Despite the phenomenon of “rising China, stagnating Japan” and other problems (especially historical mythmaking) that have bedeviled Japan– China relations, it appears that both nations have adopted a pragmatic approach toward their overall relationship.7 Even though Japan and China no longer enjoy “golden years” similar to their relations in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have sought to keep their ties on an even keel. The leaders of both nations have neither allowed any issue to rupture their ties nor adopted a hostile stance towards each other. Cognizant of the importance of Japan– China relations, top political leaders and foreign ministry bureaucrats from both countries appear committed to maintaining good bilateral ties. Increasingly close economic ties are obviously an incentive to both national governments to avoid a conﬂict-ridden relationship. Even though China and Japan diﬀer in political systems and their policy orientation toward the United States, the bilateral ties between the two Asian neighbours are not ruﬄed by ideological issues like democracy and human rights.

16

Introduction

Japan’s pragmatic approach can be seen when it was the ﬁrst major country to befriend China after the Tiananmen Incident. Tokyo soon restored its ODA to Beijing. Subsequently, Emperor Akihito’s symbolic visit to the Mainland in 1992 can be interpreted as a signal that Tokyo did not regard Beijing as an international pariah and would wish to normalize relations with its neighbour. Japan has also supported China’s entry into the WTO (World Trade Organization). An example of China’s pragmatic approach to Japan was the visit in 2000 by Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to patch up bilateral ties after President Jiang Zemin’s disastrous trip in 1998 to Japan when he constantly harped on historical issues and alienated Japanese élite and public opinion. Zhu adopted “smiling diplomacy” and downplayed historical issues during his trip. The new leadership of President Hu Jintao has also not harped on historical problems between the two nations. Since 2003, a group of Chinese intelligentsia has advocated a “New Thinking” towards Japan: that Beijing should downplay historical diﬀerences and seek a future-oriented relationship with Tokyo. Though the “New Thinking” is controversial in China, it has been welcomed even by the rightwing media in Japan.

The future of Japan’s relations with China The pragmatic co-existence of China and Japan is by no means automatic or guaranteed to last in the future. Undoubtedly, the greatest incentive to maintain the equilibrium in bilateral ties is the rapidly expanding and mutually beneﬁcial economic relationship. Two-way trade between China and Japan was worth more than US$100 billion by 2002 and will further expand. However, irritations will remain, especially over the interpretations of history. (This perennial issue does indicate the limits of pragmatism in Japan–China relations). Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯ has visited the Yasukuni Shrine (where the souls of war criminals are also reposed) annually and Beijing has retaliated by not inviting Koizumi to China for an oﬃcial state visit. If Koizumi’s successor were to abstain from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, bilateral relations would surely improve. Conceivably, there are at least four developments that will test the mettle and wisdom of leaders and citizens in both nations to maintain pragmatic relations. First is the phenomenon of “China rising, Japan stagnating”. If Beijing, buoyed by its rapid economic growth, behaves like an arrogant power, Tokyo, mired in economic stagnation, is likely to respond negatively. An overbearing China may well spark Japanese nationalism and boost the right-wing in Japan’s political spectrum. If the Japanese economy were to stagnate for another decade, the inexorable rise of China might lead to further envy and fear among many Japanese leaders and opinion shapers. The best outcome for Japan–China relations and stability in East Asia is the revitalization of Japan leading to a balance between two prosperous Asian giants. Moreover, the economic rise of China is not necessarily a zerosum game for Japan. The emergence of a huge consumer market and a

Introduction 17 cheaper manufacturing base for Japanese companies in China means that Japan too has a stake in the stability and prosperity of China. If the nascent Japanese economic recovery since 2003 is sustained, then Japanese angst about a rising and potentially domineering Chinese dragon should ease. Conceivably, the best scenario of “China rising, Japan recovering” might well lead to an Asian Renaissance with both countries acting as the lynchpin of an incipient East Asian community based on mutual equality and respect. Second, there are rising political forces in Japan to amend Article Nine (the no war clause) of its paciﬁst constitution. Increasingly, a new generation of Japanese leaders and citizens are viewing Article Nine as an anachronism which hamstrings their nation from becoming a “normal” country which exercises greater initiatives and autonomy in international aﬀairs. This includes the right for Japan to engage in collective security and international peacekeeping and enforcement without restricting Japanese troops to providing only logistical support. Constitutional amendment might take place within a decade or two. If that comes to pass, it is probable that the Chinese will react negatively: they may keep harping on Japanese “militarism” leading to increasing anti-Japanese feelings and perhaps rising nationalism in China. This in turn will irritate and oﬀend many Japanese. A vicious cycle might well result. Third, the souring of public opinion towards each other could well undermine the pragmatic nature of Japan–China relations. The rabidly antiJapanese sentiments among Chinese soccer hooligans during the August 2004 Asia Cup hosted by China and the critical reaction by the Japanese media to Chinese hostility underscored the lack of a historical reconciliation between the two neighbours. In April 2005, anti-Japanese mass protests erupted in some Chinese cities.8 As the Chinese state and society become much more complex and pluralistic, it will become harder for the state to shape public sentiments in the media and on the Internet. If weak political leaders are caught in internecine factional strife or are afraid of losing their grip on society, it is not inconceivable that they may play the nationalistic card to drum up mass political support. Likewise, weak political leaders in Japan may pander to rightwing interest groups to solicit votes and money. To counteract the erosion of friendly sentiments in public opinion, it is the responsibility of leaders in government (national and local), business, media, academia, think-tanks, friendship associations, and NGOs to manage and mitigate bilateral diﬀerences, and promote mutual understanding and friendly relations. Fourth is the crusade of the US superpower against global terrorism and the “Axis of Evil”. Even though the United States appears to be stuck in a quagmire in Iraq, it is not inconceivable that Washington may go after other “rogue” regimes including Iran and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea. US pressure on North Korea will pose dilemmas to China, South Korea and Japan. While Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Seoul and Tokyo unanimously agree that Pyongyang should not develop nuclear weapons, there is no consensus that

18

Introduction

North Korea must be forcibly disarmed. Any US pre-emptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities is likely to place tremendous strain on US-China and US-South Korean relations. Any Japanese involvement in a conﬂict in the Korean peninsula, even in an indirect role of providing logistical support to US forces, will probably worsen Tokyo’s relations with Beijing. The prospects of pragmatic coexistence between China and Japan are not necessarily bleak. The two neighbours would have to abide by international norms and rules after both subscribe to the WTO framework. This mechanism will help them manage bilateral trade friction. If Tokyo desires a permanent seat in the UNSC (United Nations Security Council), it must behave in a manner that does not alienate Beijing and provoke the Chinese to exercise their veto against Japanese permanent membership in the UNSC. Should Beijing cast its vote against Tokyo’s bid for a UNSC seat, it will surely earn the hatred of many Japanese. Both countries should further acquire a habit of cooperation in Asian regional and multilateral organizations. Perhaps the best logic for pragmatic coexistence between China and Japan is that stable and steady relations between the two ancient neighbours are critical not only to their mutual selfinterests but also to the well-being of the larger East Asian region in the new millennium.

Notes 1 2

3 4 5 6

See Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming and Tanaka Akihiko (eds), The Golden Age of the U.S.–China–Japan Triangle: 1972–1989 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002). Besides the fear of being overshadowed by an economically powerful China, certain opinion shapers and public opinion were also alarmed by China’s nuclear tests in 1995 and missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. See, for example, Amako Satoshi (ed.), Chu ¯ koku wa kyo¯i ka [Is China a Threat?] (Tokyo: Keiso¯ shoten, 1997). Thucidides, The Peloponneisan War (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1983), p.23. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987). On the issue of competition and/or cooperation in Sino-Japanese relations see Jonathan Lemco and Scott B. MacDonald, “Sino-Japanese Relations: Competition and Cooperation”, Current History, Vol. 101, No. 656, September 2002; Hanns Gunther Hilpert and Rene Haak (eds), Japan and China: Cooperation, Competition and Conﬂict (New York: Palgrave, 2002); David Shambaugh, “China and Japan towards the Twenty-First Century: Rivals for Pre-eminence or Complex Interdependence?” in Christopher Howe and Brain Hook (eds), China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Marie Soderberg (ed.), Chinese-Japanese Relations in the 21st Century: Complementarity and Conﬂict (London: Routledge, 2001), Peter Drysdale and Don Dong Zhang (eds), Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation in East Asia? (Canberra: NCDS Asia Paciﬁc Press, 2000).

Introduction 19 7

8

Caroline Rose did not use the term “pragmatic”. Nevertheless she argues that “Continuities in post-World War II Sino-Japanese political and economic relations provided a stable foundation for the relationship in the late 20th and early 21st century. In the nearly 30 years since the signing of the 1972 Joint Statement, SinoJapanese relations have strengthened and deepened. Despite periodic problems and crises, governments on both sides have been able to avert serious, long-term disruption to the relationship.” Caroline Rose, “Re-assessing the Sino-Japanese Axis in the New Strategic Triangle: A Case for Peaceful Co-existence?” in P.W. Preston and Jurgen Haacke (eds), Contemporary China: The dynamics of Change at the start of the new millennium (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p.243. The immediate triggers were: the spillover eﬀect of dramatic anti-Japanese mass demonstrations in South Korea over the disputed Dokto (Takeshima) on the Chinese public, Tokyo’s bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and the approval of history textbooks deemed to be oﬀensive to the Chinese. There were also background factors which many Chinese were unhappy about: the inclusion of Taiwan as a common strategic of the US-Japan Alliance and territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) and potential gas ﬁelds in the East China Sea. But a fundamental factor underpinning the April 2005 antiJapanese protests is a rising China which is more conﬁdent and assertive towards Japan coupled with a stagnating Japan which perceives the need to stand up to a rising China.

Bibliography Amako Satoshi (ed.), Chu ¯ koku wa kyo¯i ka (Tokyo: Keiso¯ shoten, 1997). Drysdale, Peter and Don Dong Zhang (eds), Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation in East Asia? (Canberra: NCDS Asia Paciﬁc Press, 2000). Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Hilpert, Hanns Gunther and Rene Haak (eds), Japan and China: Cooperation, Competition and Conﬂict (New York: Palgrave, 2002) Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987). Kokubun, Ryo¯sei and Wang Jisi (eds), The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004). Lemco, Jonathan and Scott B. MacDonald, “Sino-Japanese Relations: Competition and Cooperation”, Current History, Vol. 101, No. 656, September 2002. Rose, Caroline, “Re-assessing the Sino-Japanese Axis in the New Strategic Triangle: A Case for Peaceful Co-existence?” in P.W. Preston and Jurgen Haacke (eds), Contemporary China: The Dynamics of Change at the Start of the New Millennium (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003). Shambaugh, David, “China and Japan towards the Twenty-First Century: Rivals for Pre-eminence or Complex Interdependence?” in Christopher Howe and Brain Hook (eds), China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). Soderberg, Marie (ed.), Chinese-Japanese Relations in the 21st Century: Complementarity and Conﬂict (London: Routledge, 2001). Thucidides, The Peloponneisan War (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1983), p. 23. Vogel, Ezra F., Yuan Ming and Tanaka Akihiko (eds), The Golden Age of the U.S.–China–Japan Triangle: 1972–1989 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center: 2002).

1

The shifting nature of Japan–China relations after the Cold War* Kokubun Ryo¯sei

Introduction: the widening gap in Japan–China relations Recently, the issue of “China’s rising” versus “Japan’s downfall” has been the topic of discussion. While China continues to grow, Japan is still struggling to slough oﬀ the recession after the collapse of the “bubble economy,” and more than ten years have passed since then. The contrast between the two great nations must be striking for the world observing East Asia. However, one should not compare both countries simplistically. Japan has already realized a matured economy and an aﬄuent society; China is still a developing economy and yet to realize an aﬄuent society. China is twenty-six times larger in geographic area and has ten times more inhabitants than Japan; however, China’s economy is only about one third of Japan’s GDP. In terms of per capita income, China still has a long way to go before it can even come close to Japan. Nevertheless, Japan will be facing new economic diﬃculties as a whole that cannot be avoided due to its low birth rate and rapid aging and the fact that Japanese corporations are moving their manufacturing plants overseas. On the other hand, China—although forced to deal with domestic economic disparities—is expected to maintain its pace of economic growth in the long-run especially in the coastal areas. If China continues to grow, the balance of power and inﬂuence of Japan and China in East Asia will eventually change in a dramatic fashion. China’s domestic economic problems are piling up and are not easily overcome. However, China cannot reverse itself from its path of market economy and capitalistic economy and has no choice but to follow its course of growth. In other words, the direction of China is very clear and decisive. Probably because of the changes in the composition of the overall relationship and because of the sense of rivalry, both countries have developed a poor image of each other and frictions have been created. According to the public opinion survey carried out in 1980 by the Japanese government, 78.6 per cent of Japanese felt “friendly” toward China and only 14.7 per cent did not. China’s image among Japanese changed immediately after the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. Those feeling “friendly” dropped to

22

Japan’s Relations with China

51.6 per cent and “not friendly” went up to 43.1 per cent and in the 1990’s due to the Taiwan Strait crisis and the rise of China Threat Theory, the feeling of “not friendly” exceeded that of “friendly.” A similar survey in 2004 shows 37.6 per cent feeling “friendly” and 58.2 per cent “not friendly.”1 According to the survey conducted on the image of Japan among Chinese in 2004 by the Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 6.3 per cent of Chinese felt “friendly” toward Japanese and 53.6 per cent “unfriendly.” Moreover, the top three Chinese images of Japan were, “cherry blossoms,” “Japanese military invasion” and “Mount Fuji.” It has been sixty years since the end of the war; however, it seems their idea of Japan has remained ﬁxed.2 Japan–China relations have experienced some friction, particularly as of the latter half of the 1990’s. Starting around 1995, the year that marked the ﬁftieth anniversary of the end of the war, the Chinese Communist Party, in an attempt to cope with the weakening power of the central government, decentralization and political corruption launched repeated patriotic campaigns. The Communist regime highlighted its allegedly leading role in the anti-Japanese war in the nation’s history curriculum to underpin its legitimacy and rise to power. The direct election of the President of Taiwan in 1996, held as the result of democratization, led to China’s military exercises and missile tests targeting waters near Taiwan. Thus, China itself provided the necessary elements leading to the emergence of the China Threat Theory in Japan. In 1998, President of State Jiang Zemin visited Japan. He was infuriated because Japan did not include an “apology” for Japan’s past invasion in the joint communiqué and referred to the issue of historical problems persistently, which oﬀended and repulsed many Japanese. Various issues and problems followed including the case of the Japanese history textbook that contained a description stating that Japan’s past invasion was justiﬁed; Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Japan; and protectionist measures adopted against inexpensive scallions, shiitake mushrooms and tatami mats ﬂowing in from China. And one more issue which persists even now as a main obstacle to Japan–China relations was Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Since the last years of Jiang Zemin’s leadership, China has emphasized positive Japan–China relations, working toward the “future.” The attitude of China became more evident under the new leadership of Hu Jintao. Notwithstanding the fact that China is doing its best not to raise historical issues, China’s current inclination is to base the relationship on “history as paragon” and Japan is suﬀering somewhat from “apology fatigue”. What led into this vicious cycle? The image of “Rising China, Sinking Japan” and its impact on the psychology of many Japanese towards China may be a contributory cause. We certainly cannot deny such aspects. However, to understand contemporary Japan–China relations, we need to study the underlying factors from a viewpoint of shifting historical relationships. These changes in the framework of relations, in this case, represent an ongoing transformation process from the stable relations that were established

The shifting nature of Japan–China relations after the Cold War 23 after the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972, moving through the late 1980s to the 1990s, and after the end of the Cold War. This chapter reviews the transformation of Japan–China relations as of the “1972 framework” from four angles: 1) structural changes in the international order and China; 2) deepening interdependence; 3) generational changes and 4) Taiwan’s transformation. For convenience sake, reference is made to “after the end of the Cold War” in this chapter. However, this study does not attempt to explain everything based on the international factors alone, but rather tries to explain these changes by weighing in other domestic factors that are closely related.

Structural changes in the international order and China The post-1972 framework of Japan–China relations was ﬁrst stipulated within the conventions of international relations. Japan would not have been able to normalize diplomatic relations with China without the consent of the United States. At the same time, this normalization would not have been possible unless China likewise accepted the US-Japan Security Treaty. The rapprochement between the United States and China in 1971–72 led essentially to the fulﬁllment of these conditions. The US-China détente process was aimed at serving as a counterbalance against the Soviet Union, the mutual “hypothetical enemy” and it changed the structural order of the Cold War in Asia that used to be based on the confrontation between the United States and China. The United States approved Japan’s attempt to normalize diplomatic relations with China, and China recognized the existence of the US-Japan Security Treaty, which China judged to be eﬀective as an anti-Soviet strategy. In February 1973, immediately after the normalization, Mao Zedong told Dr Kissinger, President Nixon’s principal aide, “We also believe that rather than Japan having closer relations with the Soviet Union, we would rather that they would improve their relations with you. That would be better.”3 The other factor that has been pointed out frequently in how China came to approve the US-Japan Security Treaty is that China is said to have theorized that such treaty would be eﬀective as a brake against Japan becoming a major militarized nation (the theory called “capping”). Thus, the US, China and Japan all came under the same umbrella for the purpose of countering the Soviet Union and, essentially formed a strategic partnership. This is why the three-way relationship between Japan, the United States and China remained stable until the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. Regarding Japan’s inclusion in the US-China containment of the Soviet Union as of 1972, Japan’s degree of awareness relative to the strategic implications of this process is unclear and needs to be studied. In the process of negotiating and concluding the Japan–China Peace and Friendship Treaty during the latter part of the 1970s, the issue of inserting the “anti-hegemony” clause, which meant anti-Soviet for China, caused

24

Japan’s Relations with China

controversy, although it had already been inserted in the Japan–China Joint Communiqué of 1972 at China’s request. Under the post-1972 framework, China’s modernization was considered mutually beneﬁcial for both Japan and China. However, under Mao’s leadership, China continued political struggles symbolized by the Cultural Revolution and economic development was not a priority. As a result, China was left out of the international competitive market. Starting in the early 1970s, China gradually made a comeback into international society under the leadership of Zhou Enlai; and during Deng Xiaoping’s era that started after 1978, China with its “Reform and Open Policy” actively sought contacts and work with the international community. Both Japan and the United States applauded China’s attitude and full-heartedly backed China to join the international community. However, the Soviet Union, the common target that brought the United States, China and Japan together in a three-way relationship, ceased to exist at the end of the Cold War. As a result, the three nations lost the glue that held them together. Following the Tiannamen Square incident and the end of the Cold War, the United States and China clashed frequently on issues relating to human rights and Taiwan. Moreover certain American opinion shapers began highlighting the so-called China Threat Theory. Meanwhile, repeated US diplomatic pressures against China lead to an increasing discontent in China against the United States that reached its peak when NATO forces bombed the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia “by mistake” in May 1999. In the 1980s, the United States had supplied China with weapons, provided military collaboration for the sake of countering the Soviet Union and hardly questioned China’s nuclear testing or defense spending. Japan assumed the same basic stance. In the 1990s, in seeking to expand Japan’s role in the world including security issues, a re-deﬁnition of the US-Japan Security Treaty was in progress between Japan and the United States. Since the US-Japan Security Treaty initially came into existence due to the Soviet Union, the disappearance of the Soviet Union made it necessary to give the treaty a new meaning in order to continue as an alliance. This new meaning was provided by the US-Japan Security Joint Statement issued after the Hashimoto-Clinton talks in April 1996 and the new guideline-related bills passed by the Japanese Diet in May 1999. To counter the missile development by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Japan started to show its interest in the joint development of TMD (Theater Missile Defense) with the US.4 China was oﬀended by these developments, because it viewed the redeﬁnition of the US-Japan Security Treaty to be a part of anti-China encirclement after the disappearance of the Soviet Union. It seems the timing was bad. The process of re-deﬁning the Security Treaty went on for some time following the end of the Cold War; however, it was played up because of the summit talks that coincided with the March 1996 election of the President of Taiwan and Chinese naval exercises designed to coerce the Taiwanese. For

The shifting nature of Japan–China relations after the Cold War 25 China, it appeared to be strategic joint eﬀort of Japan and the US which was aimed at seeking for more active commitment to the Taiwan issues. China has not discarded its suspicion that, using North Korea as an excuse, the TMD is to be eventually used against China. Speaking of China’s modernization, the attitudes of Japan and the United States are unchanged, i.e. both encourage China to further its reform and open policy and support its eﬀort to enter into the international economic system. The basic stance remains the same even with change of administration from Clinton to Bush. Concerning China’s entry into the WTO, various complicated issues were debated for many years; however, Japan approved it in July 1999 and the United States in November 1999, and China joined the WTO in December 2001. With the advent of the Bush Administration, the US-China relationship became strained. Under the Clinton Administration, China was a “strategic partner”; however, the Bush Administration started to describe China as a “competitive rival.” On top of this, at the beginning of the Bush Administration, a US Navy EP-3 maritime patrol aircraft and a Chinese ﬁghter aircraft collided in mid-air. Immediately after the incident was settled, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack occurred and the United States became absorbed with going after the Al Queda terrorist group and with issues in Central Asia and the Middle East. In the interest of anti-terrorist measures, the United States and China seem to be strengthening cooperative relationships. Beijing basically sided with Washington during the US invasion of Afghanistan and also refrained from criticizing the United States even though Paris and Berlin were critical of Washington. Cognizant of its important relations with Washington and amidst US concerns about North Korean nuclear proliferation, Beijing criticized Pyongyang and even oﬀered to mediate and bring its North Korean ally to the table of the six-party talks. Similarly, China has maintained a low key approach toward Japan. While Japan-bashing has not stopped on the Internet and in the tabloids sold on the street, the stance of the Chinese government has been reserved, not questioning the historical issues, refraining from attacking the Yasukuni Shrine issue as well as the dispatch of the Japanese defence force to Iraq. The US-Japan alliance may be a reason for their reserved attitude. China’s composed attitude should be welcomed. Time will tell whether the change in China’s attitude is real or merely tactical. As far as the US-China relationship is concerned, China and the United States are cooperating in anti-terrorist measures. It is deﬁnitely based on strategic considerations and not because both countries built their relationships based on mutual trust. The United States must be extremely interested in the future of China as a power, in the long-run. Their political regimes and sense of values are distinctly diﬀerent and it is inconceivable for these two great nations to build a long-term friendship easily. Two factors have contributed to a greater diversity of views towards China among the Japanese and Americans in the post-Cold War era: the

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disappearance of a common Soviet threat and the rise of China. At the same time, up to now, bringing China into the international community was in the mutual interests of both Japan and the United States, which seemed to have been accomplished by having China admitted into the WTO. As China is expanding and establishing its position on the international economic and political scene, the focus of Japan and the United States shifted to the role of China in the international order in the future. In any case, the international order that supported the “1972 framework” has changed greatly and as yet a Japan–China relationship compatible to the changes has not been formed.

Deepening interdependence After the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972, various practical agreements were reached between the two governments, namely, the Japan–China Trade Agreement (January 1974), the Japan–China Aviation Agreement (April 1974), the Japan–China Navigation Pact (November 1974) and the Japan–China Fishery Agreement (August 1975). Upon conclusion of these practical agreements, Japan and China began talks on the Peace and Friendship Treaty. It is a well-known fact that in the process, Japan and China argued over inserting an “anti-hegemony” clause, that might further anti-Soviet Union sentiment. After very complicated negotiations, the treaty was ﬁnally concluded in 1978. Up to this point, both governments took the initiative in Japan–China relations. The private sector started to play an important role after the conclusion of the Japan–China Long-Term Trade Agreement (February 1978) that was signed shortly before the Peace and Friendship Treaty and which outlined the trade policy between Japan and China. In the short-run, this agreement was linked to the “Ten-Year Economic Plan” that started at about the same time. This plan failed because it was too ambitious, aiming for excessive increases in oil production, etc. In the long run, the full-scale turn toward China’s economic modernization symbolized by the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central Committee of the Chinese Community Party in December 1978 contributed to the agreement. The agreement established the basic framework of subsequent Japan–China economic relations.5 China was to export raw materials such as oil and coal to Japan and Japan was to export advanced plant and technologies to China. This scheme fell through because of China’s stagnant oil production. However, as trade between Japan and China was aimed at bartering raw materials for advanced technologies, the typical pattern of economic relations between an advanced country and a developing country was established. In other words, the economic relationship was not horizontal but rather vertical. A big change in Japan–China economic relations came about when Japanese companies started to consider going to mainland China in search of cheap labour after the yen became too strong as a result of the 1985 Plaza Accord. Japanese companies were still cautious in late 1980s but inroads into

The shifting nature of Japan–China relations after the Cold War 27 China accelerated in 1990s especially after the speeches in the southern inspection journey by Deng Xiaoping in which he dictated the reform and open policy and proposed the socialist market economy line. Direct investments by Japanese companies, according to the statistics of China (by contract base), totaled only US$27 million reaching US$950 million over the ﬁve-year period from 1979 to 1983, but jumped from US$294 million to US$7.592 billion in 1995 alone. As for trade, imports by China exceeded those by Japan until 1987; however, as of 1988, the position was reversed and imports by Japan have continued to exceed Japanese exports to China to this day.6 This may be a result of China’s eﬀort to gain competitive power through direct investments from overseas and to promote the export industry. In eﬀect, Japan–China economic relations have gone from being vertical at the beginning to relatively horizontal with China’s economic growth in 1990’s. In other words, interdependence further deepened. The situation seems to be accelerating since China’s entry into the WTO. This is related somewhat to Japan’s serious economic recession. To avoid high costs in Japan, manufacturers moved manufacturing facilities overseas, especially to China where labour costs are very low. The “hollowing out of industry” created in Japan became a serious issue; however, for manufacturers with some reservations, the Chinese market was the only way out. This is somewhat related to Japan’s serious economic recession. To avoid high costs in Japan, corporations moved manufacturing facilities abroad, especially to China where skilled labour costs are relatively very low. Japan’s economic recovery was evidenced in 2003. However, this recovery was not necessarily due to a successful “structural reform” but rather, in part, to special procurement demands from China. The trend is unmistakable. Economic dependency between Japan and China will deepen and broaden in the future. This interdependence can be easily detected through people-to-people exchanges. In 1979 when the modernization process began, seven years after the normalization of diplomatic relations, approximately 54,000 Japanese visited China but ten years later, the ﬁgures went up to close to 395,000 in 1989 and about 1,468,000 in 2000. The number of Chinese visiting Japan have similarly increased, i.e. approximately 12,000 in 1979, 100,000 in 1989 and 528,000 in 2002.7 There are also negative exchanges, and, of course, these are not counted in the oﬃcial statistics. Illegal migrants from China increased drastically in 1990s, which created hotbeds of social crime in Japan. Crimes committed by Chinese illegal immigrants that are reported on a daily basis by the Japanese press have contributed to a widespread negative image of China among the Japanese. Deepening interdependence has two aspects: the positive that strengthens ties and the negative that creates friction between the two nations. Japan–China relations started under the banner of “friendship”; however, it was based on the “friendship” among a limited number of people. This interdependence can be easily detected through people-to-people

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exchanges. “Friendship” can essentially be brought to fruition by overcoming and adjusting to “diﬀerences” through exchanges. However, in the case of Japan–China relations, it was the other way around. Because of “friendship” being the premise, a “sense of incongruity” and “heterogeneity” is widespread in the current Japan–China relations.

Generational changes In the 1972 joint communiqué signed by Japan and China, Japan explicitly expressed its position concerning Japan’s invasion of China in the past, stating, and “The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damages that Japan caused to the Chinese people through war in the past.” In response, China declared, “In the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and Japanese people, China renounces its demand for war reparations from Japan.”8 By declaring to end the state of war, the two nations mutually aﬃrmed the need to establish “good neighbourly and friendly relations”, overcoming the diﬀerences in their social systems. It was the ﬁrm resolution of both countries not to repeat the past tragedies of invasion and war and this was symbolized by “Japan–China friendship.” There obviously existed diﬀerent views concerning the past invasion and the war; however, what was common among the war generation was their determination to renounce war and the resolution was symbolized by the “Japan–China friendship” slogan with the understanding that “minor diﬀerences of opinion must be ironed out for the best common interests.” ¯ hira Masayoshi, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Japan’s Tanaka Kakuei, O the key leaders involved in the whole process of normalizing Japan–China diplomatic relations, have all passed away. Liao Zhengzhi, an old Japan-hand, is also deceased. Takeiri Yoshikatsu of the Ko¯mei Party who worked as a messenger of Tanaka Kakuei during the normalization process, has retired. Following them, Fukuda Takeo and Sonoda Sunao who were involved in forging the Japan–China Peace and Friendship Treaty also passed away. It is apparent that, in the early years of normalization, the non-partisan Federation of Diet members for Japan–China Friendship was extremely active; but there is no comparison in terms of scale and scope of activities in today’s bilateral interaction among the present batch of Diet members. Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader since the late 1970s, passed away in 1997. Simply put, key Japanese and Chinese leaders who were committed to normalization have all passed away and their replacements are nowhere in sight. China’s relinquishment of its demands for war reparations was one of the conditions for normalization of diplomatic ties with Japan; however, we cannot deny the possibility that it left leaders of various circles and ﬁelds with certain moral responsibilities and sense of atonement, which later worked as an hidden incentive toward economic cooperation with China. As long as relinquishing its demand for reparations was the oﬃcial decision of the

The shifting nature of Japan–China relations after the Cold War 29 Chinese government, its relevancy to yen-based loans and economic cooperation was never mentioned publicly or appeared in any oﬃcial documents. We only have to assume that it was the psychological ties of people of the war generation. The Prime Minister who cleared the way to provide yen-based ¯ hira Masayoshi and the Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs was loans to China was O ¯ kita Saburo¯, both of whom were no doubt of the generation an economist, O that emphasized “friendship” with China. Many business leaders also advocated “friendship” with China. After the Japan–China Peace and Friendship Treaty was concluded in 1978 and the Japan–China Long-Term Trade Agreement was signed by private sectors shortly before the Treaty, Japanese corporations hit the Chinese market like an avalanche. Baoshan Steel (Baogang) in Shanghai, founded with total technological support of Shin Nippon Steel, was the symbol of “friendship.” Persons who worked hard and who devoted themselves to creating a public interest in economic cooperation with China included: Inayama Yoshihiro, Chairman of Shin Nippon Steel, who also served as the Vice-Chairman of Keidanren, and committee chairman of the Committee for the Japan–China Long-Term Trade Council; Doko¯ Toshio who served for a long time as the chairman of Keidanren, and as chairman of Japan–China Economic Association; Kawai Ryo¯ichi who served as chairman of the Board of Japan– China Economic Association; and Okazaki Kaheita who was the advisor to the latter association. “It was Zhou Enlai who said emphatically that China and Japan should cooperate to make Asia a better place and to bring strength to Asia. To that end, he said that (China) was going to forget its grudge against Japan. This would be great if it could be accomplished. From that standpoint, our cooperation with China’s ‘four modernizations’ and our attitude toward the entire Korean Peninsula should be changed considerably, in our conception and ways, in my view.”9 This statement made by Mr. Okazaki sums up the common sentiment of those who lived the same period. After the 1990s, those who supported the relationship between the two nations stepped aside to make room for their juniors and by 1995, the year that marked the ﬁftieth anniversary of the ending of the war, the makeup of the network of individuals supporting Japan–China relations started to change dramatically. Even though the new generation replaced the old, historical facts do not disappear. And no matter how the importance of awareness of history and education is emphasized, the generation that did not live through the war could not feel or perceive the same things as the previous generation who did. The same can be said about China. In China, the teaching of history . . .; contemporary China in elementary and secondary schools is closely related to the history of the Communist Party, while Japan does not put special emphasis on these periods. Thus, nonhomogeneity between Japan and China exists from the standpoint of history education. The friction resulting from such non-homogeneity occurred ﬁrst in the 1982 textbook controversy. The problem was settled in a spirit of

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“minor diﬀerences of opinion must be ironed out for the best common interests.”10 Starting around 1995 coinciding with the ﬁftieth anniversary of the end of the war, China, in its concern over political indiﬀerence among young people and in its attempt to stop the declining conﬁdence in the Communist Party, has intensiﬁed history and patriotic education focusing on the time of war against Japan to appeal and justify the Party’s authority. Meanwhile, issues related to historical awareness, such as the Prime Minister and cabinet members’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and a certain “disrespectful statement” made by a cabinet member, caused a strain in Japan–China relations. In the Fall of 1998, the history issue erupted again during Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan. As he harped on Japan’s past actions in China, even those Japanese who admitted Tokyo’s actions as an “invasion” became somewhat “tired” of hearing it. As stated previously, since Jiang’s visit to Japan, China has refrained from mentioning the historical issues in deliberate consideration of such Japanese sentiments. However, in 2001, a new history textbook for middle schools was published by a group with strong nationalistic views called “Society for New Textbooks,” and Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine in August although the scheduled day was shifted intentionally from 15 August to 13 August. Once again, relations between Japan and China were threatened by historical issues. Later, from late 2002 to the spring of 2003, a new movement called “new thinking” toward Japan started in China. The person who ﬁrst led the discussion was Ma Licheng, an editor of the People’s Daily and the other was Shi Yinhong, a professor at the People’s University of China. The common point of discussion of both was that the historical problem should not continue to be the issue as Japan had apologized; that Japan’s ODA should be valued justly; and that Japan’s expanding international role should be welcomed. This school of opinion had existed in China; however, what is remarkable is that it became public. The new thinking toward Japan drew much attention especially because it started as the new leadership of Hu Jintao began. These individuals were not put under political scrutiny; however, they were criticized severely on the Internet and in the tabloids distributed on the street and the authorities had no choice but to prohibit the discussion. The fact that such discussion was made public is a big change in China; however, China and the Chinese people were not actually ready to accept such discussion. Following this generational change, the “Japan–China friendship” slogan seems to be used less frequently on various occasions and in diﬀerent places. “Japan–China friendship” was the cure-all for friction; however, the younger generation tends to be realistic and logical in perceiving each other. The question is whether there are any capable persons among politicians and business leaders who would devote themselves to “Japan–China friendship.” As compared to those days when people tried to solve all problems under the banner of “friendship,” realistic attempts at strengthening Japan–China relations seem to be under way. And it is imperative that a ﬁrm systematic

The shifting nature of Japan–China relations after the Cold War 31 network of people committed to the goal of “friendship” should be in place to be able to deal with possible conﬂicts. In the absence of suﬃcient preparedness, certain risk factors remain at this stage of Japan–China relations.

Taiwan’s transformation The normalization of diplomatic relations with China was only possible by Japan severing its diplomatic ties with Taiwan and acknowledging the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China. Japan had recognized Taiwan’s “Republic of China” as the legitimate government of China from 1952 to 1972; however, because of the US-China détente, the normalization of diplomatic relations with China materialized at a time when domestic public opinion favoured the process. As for relations ¯ hira, then Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs of Japan, announced with Taiwan, Mr O during a conference the severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan and the end of Japan-ROC Peace Treaty.11 Even after the severance, private relations—mainly economic ties between Japan and Taiwan—continued and after much meandering, Japan managed to retain an air route. From this point on, the existence of Taiwan seemed to diminish in the minds of the Japanese public except for business and tourism. It is not an exaggeration to say that many Japanese who had some political connections with Taiwan, whether they were politicians or scholars, were attracted to Chiang Kai-shek as a person or agreed with his “anti-Communism”, or had strong ill feelings toward China. Without a doubt, while Taiwan was under the one-party dictatorial regime of the Kuomintang with Chiang Kai-shek as the central ﬁgure and under martial law, it was far from being a democratic nation politically. Shortly after the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, his son, Chiang Chingkuo, came to power and appeared to assume the same basic line as his father. However, as if touched oﬀ by the collapse of the Marcos’ dictatorial rule and democratization in the Philippines, a neighbouring country, he embarked on a democratization process in 1986 tacitly approved a multi-party system by accepting the newly founded Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). After his sudden death in January 1988, the then Vice President Lee Teng-hui, a nativeborn Taiwanese, automatically assumed the presidency. Lee Teng-hui fearlessly undertook the democratization policy and radical advancement of “Republic of China’s Taiwanization.”12 In short, it meant the end of the repressive era of the Kuomintang of mainlanders who ﬂed to Taiwan after the war and who ruled as power élites and it also meant the beginning of the era of the Kuomintang of native Taiwanese who had been ruled in spite of plurality. The overwhelming victory of Lee Teng-hui in the ﬁrst direct presidential elections held in Taiwan’s history in 1996 was inevitable, followed by the victory of the DPP led by Chen Shui-bian in the 2000 presidential election after Lee retired and the complete defeat of the Kuomintang. Chen won his re-election in 2004. It actually meant the end of

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the framework of the Chinese Communist Party vs. the Kuomintang. China saw the series of events in Taiwan as a plot by Lee Teng-hui who was “pro-independence in disguise” and China persistently criticized him. When Taiwan was achieving democratization, China also launched its political reforms as if it was trailing Taiwan. First, came the downfall of Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang in January 1987, who was lenient toward the student movements, and under the new Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, China continued to make political reforms. However, China closed this chapter in its history with the tragedy of the Tiananmen Square Incident on June 4, 1989. The outcome was clearly diﬀerent from that of Taiwan, i.e. Taiwan succeeded in democratization without loss in any human lives, while China failed in democratization, taking a toll in human lives. It goes without saying that the Communist Party that was supposed to have “won” had mixed feelings toward the Kuomintang that was supposed to have “lost.” The whole world took notice of these developments. In Japan, as mentioned earlier, the favourable view toward China deteriorated drastically and in turn, a favourable interest in Taiwan increased all of a sudden. What most impressed Japanese élites who visited Taiwan was Lee Teng-hui who spoke Japanese perfectly, as he had developed a special attachment to Japan through his experience under Japan’s rule before the war.13 Thus in Japan, individuals who deeply respected Chiang Kai-shek as a person or because of their anti-China or anti-Communist views, individuals who approached Taiwan with a vested interest in the Kuomintang and others who were only interested in China but not in Taiwan, started to part with the mainlanders and the Kuomintang and started to sympathize with Lee Teng-hui’s Taiwan with “democracy.” Naturally, Japan and the United States recognize the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China to this day and it is out of the question that Taiwan’s Republic of China would be recognized as the legitimate government of China. It is also impossible to support “Taiwan independence” which may trigger China to resort to arms. In this respect, there is a change in the status quo regarding the Taiwan issue since 1972. However, the assessment of Taiwan’s economic and political development on its own has changed a great deal in Japan, the United States and other countries of the world. In other words, it is no exaggeration to say that an aﬃrmative assessment and sympathetic feeling are spreading throughout the world for Taiwan.

Conclusion: ways to cooperation As seen in the “new thinking” toward Japan, a sign of change in China’s attitude to its relationship with Japan exists. The new leadership of Hu Jintao not heavily touching the subject of historical problems, and refraining from issuing its opinion on Japan’s dispatching of troops from its Self Defence Forces to Iraq are signs of change in China’s attitude toward Japan by leaders

The shifting nature of Japan–China relations after the Cold War 33 of the new generation. However, China’s public opinion has not accepted it. Japan has not easily recognized China’s growing power and is not ready to recognize it. Although Japan–China interdependence has deepened economically, the two nations still lack the psychological and emotional readiness to reconcile and forge a new basis for the relationship. This is the reason why a new system is required to replace the “1972 framework.” In the end, the question is whether “China’s rising” and “Japan’s downfall” can inﬂuence the future of the Japan–China relationship, making it stable or unstable. Logically, as long as “China’s rising” cannot be realized without Japan and China’s economic growth is a factor to reverse “Japan’s downfall,” both countries cannot aﬀord to have a scenario of confrontation. However, international aﬀairs are not always based on logical factors. Emotional factors interfere and the mianzi (face) of a nation is sometimes at stake, and especially when such factors are backed by national public opinion, matters may become very complicated. It is possible to predict the future relationship of Japan and China by considering variables to some extent; however, due to unforeseen and accidental factors in the relationship, predicting the future has a limit. What is needed is to conceive and establish a stable new system in place of the “1972 framework” aimed at a constructive relationship between Japan and China. Therefore, in conclusion, I would like to suggest what needs to be considered and done to establish a new system in the Japan–China relationship. First, the Cold War scenario of Japan, the United States and China aligning themselves against the Russian enemy is unlikely to recur in the twentyﬁrst century international order. Creating order in this region will depend greatly upon the direction that China will take both domestically and internationally. External changes such as in the US-China relations and ChinaSoviet Union relations aﬀected Japan–China relations; however, in the twenty-ﬁrst century, Japan–China relations by themselves may greatly aﬀect the formation of a new order in this region. A large number of issues concerning these relations should be dealt with by both nations. At the same time, Japan and China should combine their eﬀorts in regional cooperation projects such as ASEAN + Japan–China-Korea (Ten plus Three) that have ﬁnally started to materialize as a result of the experience of the Asian ﬁnancial crises and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) processes that are rapidly materializing. Through regional cooperation, both nations may be able to establish indirectly the foundations for stable relations. Second, referring to the aspect of deepening interdependence, this by itself it would not be a negative factor in establishing cooperative relations. However, depending on how both nations deal with friction, it may be a source of further confrontation. What is necessary is to try not to cause friction or to develop a mechanism that can keep such friction to a minimum if they were to occur. What is especially important is to avoid frictions in economic relations. It is imperative to have a correct mutual understanding regarding authorities, customs, approaches and the actual economic, legal and political

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support systems. As a member of the WTO, China has to make a huge changeover in its system toward furthering the market economy and in economic transparency. From this standpoint, Japan and China need to work on positioning both countries with respect to international standards before trying to establish standards between themselves. Third, regarding generational changes, coping with this issue is logically easy. In other words, a network of capable individuals must be developed and to set up at every level. At the moment, exchanges at three levels may be needed. The ﬁrst is the governmental channel, i.e. exchanges between political leaders including summit talks. As issues of the US-Japan Security Treaty and economic issues are the probable cause for friction, communication channels of leaders in these ﬁelds should be well-maintained. The second is the grassroots’ level that can lay down the foundations for international relationship, through people-to-people exchanges, regional exchanges and business and exchange students. The third is at the level of intellectuals who can inﬂuence policy-making processes. Today, the intellectual level, called “Track Two” that lies between the governmental level and the grassroots level and can aﬀect both levels, is widely noticed for its eﬀectiveness. Eﬀorts should be made to expand intellectual communication channels in both countries. Fourth, speaking of Taiwan, Japan’s image of Taiwan has surely changed with its democratization; however, feelings and sympathy alone cannot move international politics. A sense of balance vis-à-vis reality is needed. It is unrealistic to think that Japan would restore oﬃcial relations with Taiwan at the cost of relations with China. A peaceful solution between China and Taiwan may be the key and it is necessary for them to continue dialogue, however limited it may be, so as not to build up tension. Japan should indirectly assist in providing such an environment. Any coerced uniﬁcation without public consent will eventually fail, as proven by twentieth century experience. Wasn’t it the historical wisdom of the late Deng Xiaoping to “leave the unsolvable problems to the next generation”? The door to the twenty-ﬁrst century has opened. Japan and China are neighbours that can never move somewhere else and their mutual relations still remain “awkward.” Japan–China relations during the twentieth century did not mature enough after all and the road to cooperation is incomplete. Over the next ten years, both Japan and China will go through hardships in domestic politics and economics and cannot expect any drastic changes. Neighbours facing hardships should be cooperating rather than bickering with each other. This is just common sense. Both nations should not hesitate in making an all-out eﬀort to be resourceful through cooperation.

Notes * This paper was originally published in Japanese in Kokusai Mondai (International Aﬀairs), January 2001, The Japan Institute of International Aﬀairs, and newly and fully revised for this volume.

The shifting nature of Japan–China relations after the Cold War 35 1 Naikakufu Daijinkanbo¯ Seifu Ko¯ho¯shitsu (Public Relations Section of Cabinet Secretariat), Gaiko¯ ni Kansuru Seroncho¯sa (Public Opinion Regarding Diplomacy), October 2004, pp.15–16. 2 Zhongguo Shehuikexueyuan Riben Yanjiusuo (Institute of Japanese Studies, The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Dierzi Zhongri Shilun Diaocha” (Second Investigation of Public Opinion Research in China and Japan), Riben Xuekan (Japanese Studies), pp.33–38, No. 6, 2004. 3 William Burr (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York: The New Press, 1998), p.92. 4 Ryo¯sei Kokubun, “East Asian Security and Japan-US-China Relations,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Bertel Heurlin (eds), China’s Place in Global Geopolitics: International, Regional and Domestic Challenges (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), pp.21–23. 5 Shigeru Ishikawa, “Sino-Japanese Economic Co-operation,” The China Quarterly, No. 109, March 1987. 6 In reference to statistics, Chu ¯ goku Jo¯ho¯ Handbook (Handbook on China Information): 2000 (Tokyo: Mitsubishi Research Institute, So¯so¯-sha, 2000), pp.510–14. 7 Ibid., 2003 version, p.557. 8 Kazankai (ed.), Nicchu¯kankei Kihon Shiryo¯shu ¯ (Collection of Basic Materials on Japan–China Relations), 1949–1997 (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998), p.42. 9 Ito¯ Takeo, Okazaki Kaheita and Matsumoto Shigeharu, Warera no Sho¯gai no nakano Chu ¯ goku (China in Our Lives) (Tokyo: Misuzu, 1983), p.280. 10 For thorough research on the background information concerning the textbook controversy analysing domestic situations of the two nations see: Caroline Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A case study in political decisionmaking (London: Routledge, 1998). ¯ hira’s talks, see Nicchu¯ Kankei Kihon 11 In reference to Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs O Shiryo¯shu ¯ (Collection of Basic Materials of Japan–China Relations): 1949–1997, pp.430–3. 12 See the series of publications by Wakabayashi Masahiro for the political system and democratization process of Taiwan. Especially, Taiwan: Bunretsukokka to Minshuka (Divided Nation and Democratization) (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1992). 13 For Lee Teng-hui’s connection to Japan, see Taiwan no Shucho¯ (Taiwan’s Assertion) (Tokyo: PHP, 1999).

Bibliography Chu ¯ goku Jo¯ho¯ Handbook (Handbook on China Information) (Tokyo: Mitsubishi Research Institute, So¯so¯-sha) Various years. Burr, William (ed.), The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York: The New Press, 1998). Ishikawa, Shigeru, “Sino-Japanese Economic Co-operation,” The China Quarterly, No. 109, March 1987. Ito¯, Takeo et al., Warera no Sho¯gai no nakano Chu ¯ goku (China in Our Lives) (Tokyo: Misuzu, 1983). Kazankai (ed.), Nicchu ¯ kankei Kihon Shiryo¯shu ¯ (Collection of Basic Materials on Japan–China Relations), 1949–1997 (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998). Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan no Shucho¯ (Taiwan’s Assertion) (Tokyo: PHP, 1999). Naikakufu Daijinkanbo¯ Seifu Ko¯ho¯shitsu (Public Relations Section of Cabinet Secretariat), Gaiko¯ ni Kansuru Seroncho¯sa (Public Opinion Regarding Diplomacy), October 2003.

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Nicchu ¯ Kankei Kihon Shiryo¯shu (Collection of Basic Materials of Japan–China Relations): 1949–1997. Rose, Caroline, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A case study in political decision-making (London: Routledge, 1998). Wakabayashi, Masahiro, Taiwan: Bunretsukokka to Minshuka (Divided Nation and Democratization) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1992). Zhongguo Shehuikexueyuan Riben Yanjiusuo (Institute of Japanese Studies, The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Dierzi Zhongri Shilun Diaocha” (Second Investigation of Public Opinion Research in China and Japan), Riben Xuekan (Japanese Studies) No. 6, 2004.

2

Domestic sources of Japanese policy towards China Murata Ko¯ji

Domestic politics often exert a strong inﬂuence on the foreign policy-making process of democratic countries. Japan is no exception. Given the historical legacies and geographical proximity between China and Japan, in particular, Tokyo’s policy towards Beijing is shaped by highly complicated domestic politics. As Chinese power and ambition surge in Asia and the Japanese economy stagnates, Japanese domestic politics concerning China policy have become even more complex. This chapter examines the changes in Japanese domestic politics and its impact on Japan’s policies towards China since the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989. It focuses on changes in Japan’s political parties, bureaucracies and public opinion. The central argument is that negative mass sentiments towards China, the lack of policy coordination among coalition parties in power, and the relative decline of MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs) and its China School have made the Japanese policy-making process towards China more complex, defused and fragmented. First, I examine the impact of the Tiananmen Incident on Tokyo’s policy towards Beijing. Next, I analyse the trend towards greater diversity of values and interests in the Japanese state and society in the 1990s and its impact on foreign policy towards China. Following that is an examination of the linkage between domestic and international politics during the Koizumi era. I conclude that both China and Japan should seek a relationship based on genuine equality and sharpen their sensitivity to each other’s domestic politics.

The Tiananmen impact In 1985, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev began his political reforms. While China under Deng Xiaoping already had ten years of economic reforms by the late 1980s, the question remained regarding when and how political reforms should proceed. The Tiananmen Incident had a profound impact on Tokyo’s policy towards Beijing. At the July 1989 G-7 Summit in Paris, member countries including Japan condemned the Chinese government for violating human rights and imposed sanctions against it. However,

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the Japanese government was the most cautious among the G-7 countries with regard to taking strong action against Beijing. There were at least two reasons for this cautious approach. Even though Japan is politically a member of the West, it is also an Asian country in close proximity to China. Like most Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, it has to live pragmatically with China and does not wish to have a hostile relationship with Beijing. Moreover, many Japanese still feel a residual guilt about the turbulent past shared by the two countries. This ambivalence towards China was also reﬂected in Japan’s MOFA. While MOFA’s Bureau of North American Aﬀairs emphasized cooperation with the United States and other Western countries, its Bureau of Asian Aﬀairs advocated friendly relationships with China. At critical junctures over policies towards China, bureaucratic divisions within the Japanese government often appeared. In particular, the inﬂuence of the China School in MOFA was important. Sasajima Masahiko¯ notes: “The China School is made up of a group of oﬃcials who are China specialists and a group of bureaucrats who formerly served as ambassadors in China. . . . Among its members, there are those who ﬁrst and foremost believe in good neighbourly friendship with China. Even after retirement from the Foreign Ministry, they speak positively about relations with China through involvement as part of the pro-China faction, since there are those who are members of the faction that go as far as to criticize Japan-US security arrangements, it is seen as a special group within the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs”.1 Furthermore, the China School believed that Japan would lose its diplomatic identity if it were to adopt the same stance as the Western countries towards China; Japan could enjoy an advantage in terms of its relationship with China if it took a slightly diﬀerent position over China from other Western countries.2 Indeed, Japan has kept a “quiet” diplomacy with China. MOFA Deputy Vice Minister Owada Hisashi ﬁrst went to Washington to gain approval from the George H. Bush Administration and later to Western Europe to gather support from the Europeans. Owada argued that the international community ought to welcome China as a large, responsible nation rather than to isolate it. Then, in June 1990, the Japanese government got an agreement from the other G-7 members to resume its third yen loan programme to China, which actually resumed in November 1990. Then Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro¯ and Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki visited Beijing respectively in April and August 1991. Even though the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) oﬃcially decided to freeze its relationship with the Chinese Communist Party, some key JSP Diet members such as Kawakami Tamio personally visited Beijing.3 Nonetheless, Japanese public opinion abruptly turned negative towards China due to the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. To the Japanese, the brutal suppression of mass demonstrators during the Incident contrasted sharply with the peaceful liberalization of the Eastern bloc after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Yomiuri-Gallup joint opinion surveys from 1978 to 1999 asked the question: which ﬁve countries do you consider to be the most trustworthy? 43 per

Domestic sources of Japanese policy towards China 39 cent of the Japanese respondents chose China in 1984 and 41 per cent the following year, both times second only to the United States. However, 1989 was the turning point. In that year, only nine per cent picked China, and China’s popularity subsequently hovered around a low ten per cent between 1990 and 1995. Indeed, in the 1990s, China was never among the top ﬁve countries in the joint opinion surveys.4 In October 1992, Emperor Akihito visited China for the very ﬁrst time. That year held great symbolic signiﬁcance because it marked the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of Japan–China diplomatic relations. Seeking to avoid the international isolation it had suﬀered since the Tiananmen Incident, China tried to show that it enjoyed good diplomatic relations with Japan. To avoid oﬀending Tokyo, Beijing kept silent about the establishment of the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) law in Japan that year.5 However, even after the Emperor’s visit, Japanese public opinion remained negative to China. Certain inﬂuential commentators such as Okazaki Hisahiko, former Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand, criticized the use of the Emperor as a diplomatic tool.6 Against the backdrop of negative e¯lite and mass sentiment towards China, Tokyo began to take a tougher position towards Beijing by the mid-1990s.

The 1990s: an era of profound change in Japan There were at least two trends in Japan during this era which would spillover to Japan–China relations. First, Japan suﬀered not only from economic stagnation but also unstable party politics. Second, Japanese society became increasingly diversiﬁed and pluralistic. In 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost its thirty-eight years of one-party dominance at the national level to an eight-party coalition led by then Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro. Barely a year later, the LDP recaptured power in a surprising coalition with its erstwhile enemy, the JSP. However, the LDP yielded the Prime Ministership to the JSP’s Murayama Tomiichi. Both Hosokawa and Murayama stated their views clearly on historical problems with Asian countries, which were more reconciliatory than those expressed by previous LDP Prime Ministers. Hosokawa viewed the SinoJapanese War as an “aggressive and wrong war” and expressed his feelings of “deep reﬂection and remorse for all of the pain and suﬀering caused to so many people in the past by Japanese aggressive war and colonization”. Murayama also expressed his “deep reﬂection and remorse” and tried to pass the resolution on the history problems in the National Diet at the ﬁftieth Anniversary of the end of World War II. These gestures towards Asia, however, provoked a backlash from many conservative politicians. For example, Nagano Kamon, Minister of Justice in the Hata Tsutomu cabinet, remarked that the Nanjing Massacre was a “fabrication” while Sakurai Arata, Murayama’s Director-General of Environmental agency, said that Japan had not intended to conduct an aggressive

40

Japan’s Relations with China

war. Also, Shimamura Yoshinobu, Murayama’s Minister of Education, stated that it was debatable whether the Sino-Japanese War was really an aggressive war or not. These remarks infuriated China and vituperative Chinese reactions provoked the Japanese conservatives again. This vicious circle continued into the late 1990s.7 At the same time, new concerns about China’s potential military threat emerged in Japan. In 1993, both Prime Minister Hosokawa and his Foreign Minister Hata Tsutomu asked China publicly for greater military transparency. Despite Prime Minister Murayama’s request that China suspend a nuclear test in his visit to Beijing in May 1995, China conducted an underground nuclear test soon after and again in August the same year. These nuclear tests aroused anti-nuclear sentiments within Japanese public opinion of China. Subsequently, the Japanese government suspended US$75 million in grant aid to China as a sign of its displeasure with the nuclear tests. Even the liberal Asahi Shimbun expressed its concerns about the eﬃcacy of Japan’s ODA (Oﬃcial Developmental Assistance) to China.8 This episode exposed the limits of Japan’s economic leverage on China’s international behaviour. Furthermore, Beijing conducted missile tests in the Taiwan Straits in 1995 and 1996 to intimidate Taipei. Not surprisingly, in January 1997, only 8.6 per cent of Japanese respondents from the YomiuriGallup poll picked China as a trustworthy country.9 In contrast, the Japanese public became increasingly positive towards a democratized Taiwan. From the mid-1990s, Tokyo sought to strengthen its security ties with Washington. Some American experts on the US-Japan security relationship were initially concerned about the attitude of Socialist Prime Minister Murayama towards the Alliance. However, the JSP under Murayama expediently jettisoned its hallmark of unarmed neutrality and staunch opposition to the US-Japan Alliance to forge a ruling coalition with the LDP. Ironically, the left factions of the JSP were the most eager to maintain the coalition with the LDP after its miserable experience in the eight-party coalition of the Hosokawa government where the socialists were marginalized.10 As a consequence, China lost the JSP as its traditional ally in Japanese domestic politics which had previously resolutely opposed a stronger US-Japan Alliance. In January 1996, with the resignation of Murayama, conservative Hashimoto Ryutaro¯ became Prime Minister of the LDP-JSP ruling coalition. Hashimoto, a powerful and policy-oriented politician, was the President of the Association of War Bereaved Families and therefore had sterling conservative credentials. At the same time, he represented the former Tanaka faction. Its former faction leader Tanaka Kakuei was the Prime Minister who spearheaded the diplomatic normalization of Japan–China relations in 1972. Ever since, the former Tanaka faction has been reputed to be friendly to China. In March 1996, the Taiwan Straits crisis erupted. Iokibe Makoto notes: “China expressed its absolute refusal of Taiwanese independence by conducting missile exercises across the Taiwan Straits. For its part, the Clinton

Domestic sources of Japanese policy towards China 41 administration signaled to China that the US would not permit uniﬁcation through force by sending two aircraft carriers to the waters surrounding Taiwan, In this way, both China and the United States strategically communicated their reaﬃrmation of the 1972 Shanghai accords.”11 In April 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton signed the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security and in September 1997 the two governments adopted the New Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation. The New Guidelines call on Japan to cooperate in responding to “situations in areas surrounding Japan that have signiﬁcant impacts upon the security of Japan” in forty-two speciﬁc areas such as relief work, dealing with refugees, search and rescue operations, evacuation of non-combatants, activities to ensure the implementation of economic sanctions, oﬀering the use of Japanese facilities to the United States, logistical support in terms of supply and transport, security of United States military installations, communications, surveillance and minesweeping. The reference to “situations in areas surrounding Japan” was very controversial both in Japan and the region. Within the Japanese state, there were diﬀerent bureaucratic interpretations. While the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) tended to consider the concept as geographical, the MOFA was inclined to view it as “situational”. MOFA has been especially concerned about strong Chinese reaction against the inclusion of Taiwan in the scope of activities under this ambiguous concept.12 At the political élite level, there was also sharp disagreement over the scope of the concept. LDP Secretary-General Kato¯ Ko¯ichi, a pro-Chinese political ﬁgure, aﬃrmed that Taiwan was not included in the concept; Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku, former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and Ozawa Ichiro¯ (Liberal Party leader) argued just the opposite. The Japanese government had to dispatch MOFA and JDA senior oﬃcials to explain the New Guidelines to Beijing and Seoul. Tokyo had to face the dilemma of forging substantial security cooperation with the United States while maintaining friendly relations with China. Michael Green notes: “Japanese foreign policy is increasingly being shaped by strategic considerations about the balance of power and inﬂuence in Northeast Asia, particularly vis-à-vis China. . . . Where Japan’s relations in East Asia were primarily determined by the conjunction of mercantile interests and US strategy in the past, they now tend also to reﬂect a self-conscious competition with China for strategic inﬂuence in the region. Conﬁdence that Japanese economic leadership would integrate China on Japan’s terms has ebbed and a new realism has emerged regarding the limits of Japanese economic inﬂuence and the growing power aspirations of Beijing”. Therefore “Japan, in spite of—indeed because of—its economic travails, is set to be a larger actor in international relations”.13 In 1996, a Japanese right-wing organization constructed a lighthouse on Senkaku Island. Shortly after that, Prime Minister Hashimoto visited the Yasukuni Shrine. In the context of Japanese opposition to Chinese nuclear

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tests and the redeﬁnition of the United States-Japan Alliance, China responded to these events by harping on the alleged revival of Japanese militarism.14 Hashimoto himself was caught awkwardly between his position as the President of the Association of War Bereaved Families (an important and loyal supporter of the LDP) and his China-friendly stance. Hashimoto as Prime Minister has not visited the Yasukuni Shrine since then. Japanese domestic politics remained in ﬂux. The Social Democratic Party (SDP), formerly known as the JSP, broke with the LDP in 1997 and fell into oblivion. The LDP lost the Upper House election in July 1997 and Hashimoto resigned in order to take responsibility for the electoral defeat. As a consequence, Obuchi Keizo¯, another leader from the former Tanaka faction, became Prime Minister. Obuchi succeeded in wooing Ozawa Ichiro¯’s Liberal Party to join the coalition government in January 1998 and then the Ko¯meito¯ (Clean Government Party) in October 1998. Ko¯meito¯ played an important role in the 1972 Japan–China diplomatic normalization and has ever since maintained strong ties with Beijing. The establishment of this three-party coalition government helped to stabilize Japanese politics for a time. However, the three ruling parties in coalition, with diﬀerent political ideologies, policies and personalities, had inherent problems. While Ozawa’s Liberal Party sought to remake Japan into a “normal country” with stronger military capabilities, Ko¯meito¯ was a paciﬁstic party interested in welfare policies. In April 2000, the Liberal Party left the ruling coalition. In terms of China policy, Nonaka Hiromu, Obuchi’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, has been one of the most prominent pro-China ﬁgures in the LDP. Nonaka also maintained good relations with Ko¯meito¯. Because of its strong political machine based on the Soka Gakkai votes (a lay Nichiren Buddhist organization), Ko¯meito¯ has enjoyed considerable inﬂuence on LDP’s policies. In the international arena, President Jiang Zemin visited the United States in 1997 and President Clinton visited China in the following year, marking an improvement in Sino-United States relations. Moreover, China was eager to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Furthermore, 1998 was the twentieth anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. Hence, Jiang visited Tokyo in November 1998. Prior to the Jiang visit, South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung visited Japan, and he succeeded in inserting Japanese apologies in the joint communiqué in exchange for making clear his position to never again criticize Japan by resurrecting old historical baggage. China, however, failed to adopt such a reconciliatory position. Some LDP conservative members criticized the Japanese government even for expressing apologies in the Japan-South Korean joint communiqué with China. President Jiang, in his visit to Japan, criticized Tokyo repeatedly by harping on the historical issues. The Japanese media and public opinion responded to the Jiang visit very negatively. Major newspapers including the liberal Asahi Shimbun and the Mainichi Shimbun supported the Japanese government’s stance towards

Domestic sources of Japanese policy towards China 43 Jiang, explicitly or implicitly. In the August 1999 Yomiuri-Gallup joint survey, 46 per cent of the Japanese respondents expressed a negative impression of China (it had been 35 per cent at the January 1995 Yomiuri-Gallup survey) and 47 per cent positive image (40 per cent at the January 1995 survey).15 The Japanese public image of China might even worsen in the future. Also, strong criticism of China and Japan’s China policy began to appear in monthly opinion magazines such as Shokun, Seiron and Voice. Kobayashi Yoshinori, a very popular and nationalist cartoonist, frequently contributed to these magazines. Traditional and moderate magazines such as Chu¯o¯ Ko¯ron (which merged with the Yomiuri Shimbun in 1999) appeared to have lost their relative inﬂuence on public opinion towards China.

The Koizumi era With the sudden demise of Obuchi in April 2000, Mori Yoshiro¯ became Prime Minister through secret negotiations among a few key LDP leaders. From the start of his administration, Mori was extremely unpopular and gaﬀe-prone. In April 2001, at the end of the Mori cabinet, Tokyo issued a visa to former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui for surgery at a Japanese hospital. Due to Beijing’s strong opposition, the China School in MOFA was very reluctant to issue the visa to Lee. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Mori ﬁnally overrode opposition from the China School and Foreign Minister Kono Yohei, ostensibly for humanitarian reasons. Even the liberal Asahi Shimbun supported the government’s decision. Asahi’s attitude presumably had a signiﬁcant impact upon Beijing. Although Beijing suspended the National People Congress Chairman Li Peng’s scheduled visit to Tokyo, nothing more happened. As a result of the Lee Teng-hui episode, the credibility of the China School was further damaged. Later, Murata Ryo¯hei, former administrative Vice Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs and ambassador to the United States, strongly criticized the China School’s approach to this issue.16 After Mori resigned in April 2001, Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯, a dark horse, defeated former Prime Minister Hashimoto in the LDP presidential election and became the Prime Minister. He boosted his popularity ratings to an unprecedented 80 per cent by promising structural reforms and the destruction of traditional LDP pork-barrel politics in order to address the decadelong economic stagnation of Japan. Koizimi then appointed Tanaka Makiko, a daughter of former Prime Minister Tanaka, to be Foreign Minister. She was also extremely popular, especially among women voters. While Koizumi lacked experience in foreign policy, he was very keen to promote United States-Japan security relations. In the aftermath of September 11, the Koizumi cabinet quickly pushed for an anti-terrorism cooperation law. However, Kozumi did not improve relations with Japan’s immediate neighbours. He did not handle well the controversy over the history textbooks. Furthermore, Koizumi insisted on visiting the Yasukuni

44

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Shrine on August 15, 2001, the anniversary of the end of World War II. Presumably, he expected to obtain some support from the Association of War Bereaved Families, which had supported his rival Hashimoto. However, faced with strong criticism from China and South Korea, he visited the Shrine on 13 August instead of 15. Beijing’s shrill criticisms of Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shirine and certain history textbooks were viewed negatively by the Japanese public. To many Japanese, Chinese leaders appear to mobilize popular support and seek legitimacy for the regime by appealing to Chinese nationalism as against “Japanese militarism”, and American hegemony and unilateralism. Against the backdrop of negative Japanese public opinion towards China, it is not surprising that ODA to China also came under ﬁre. In the past twenty years, Japan provided about 2,700 billion yen to China as ODA. Given Japanese economic diﬃculties and strong complaints about the non-transparent use of ODA, MOFA decided to reduce ODA to China in October 2001. Some commentators such as Komori Yoshihisa, a veteran Sankei Shimbun correspondent, repeatedly criticized MOFA’s soft policy toward Beijing and the Chinese military buildup.17 Beijing’s demands for an apology have prompted Tokyo to ask Bejing to publicly express its appreciation for its ODA to China. They have now created a vicious circle.18 Japan’s foreign direct investment in China is also not likely to increase signiﬁcantly. Japanese business circles are becoming more skeptical about making proﬁts in China. A weak legal structure including the protection of patent rights in China is one of the major reasons cited. Furthermore, Japanese business leaders tend to think strategically about Japan’s economic competition with China.19 Plagued by a series of scandals including ﬁnancial misappropriation, MOFA, as a whole, came under attack. Populist Foreign Minister Tanaka tried to reform her Ministry and even ﬁred a number of its senior oﬃcials. Tanaka herself, however, caused a great deal of political problems, especially when she was unable to work with senior MOFA oﬃcials. To break the deadlock and clear the mess in MOFA, Koizumi ﬁred both Tanaka and Administrative Vice Minister Nogami Yoshiji in January 2002. As a consequence, Koizumi’s support rate drastically plunged. Soon after that, MOFA was further implicated by a cozy and corrupt relationship between some of its oﬃcials and Suzuki Muneo, a prominent LDP member, over Japanese economic aid to Russia. Given the negative media publicity of MOFA and the demoralization of its oﬃcers due to the Tanaka ﬁasco and other scandals, it would be diﬃcult for the ministry to eﬀectively execute Japan’s foreign relations with other countries, including China, in the near future. The ﬁasco over Chinese police seizing North Koreans who sought asylum in the Japanese consulate in Shenyang in May 2002 further damaged the prestige and credibility of MOFA. Critics ﬁercely attacked the China School for its compromising attitudes towards China. Like the decline of the US State Department and its China Hands due to McCarthyism, the decline of

Domestic sources of Japanese policy towards China 45 MOFA, especially its China School, might well have a negative impact on Japanese decision-making process towards China.

Epilogue The inﬂuence of domestic politics on the Japanese policy-making process towards China has indeed changed in various ways since 1989. First, at the societal level, Japanese public sentiment towards China has become more complex and even worsened. This trend is due to three factors: Chinese behaviour in international relations; diversiﬁcation of Japanese society; and domestic political and economic frustration in Japan. According to Funabashi Yoichi, a renowned journalist, problematic Chinese international behaviour can be summarized into ﬁve Ts: Tiananmen, Tibet, Taiwan, Trade and Technology. The diversiﬁcation of Japanese civil society was further facilitated by the Non-Proﬁt Organization (NPO) Law of 1997. Many voters no longer take for granted that the government is the only institution capable of truly representing them. Even for Japan–China interaction, nongovernmental actors are playing a more important role today. Domestic political and economic frustration seems to cause not only anti-Chinese sentiment but also anti-American sentiment. Interestingly enough, those who express strong anti-Chinese sentiments are often anti-American, anti-Russian, and anti-North Korean too. Examples include populist Governor Ishihara Shintaro¯ and Kobayashi Yoshinori, a cartoonist highly popular among many younger Japanese. Second, at the political level, no single political party can form a cabinet, and any coalition government suﬀers from diﬃculties in policy coordination with regard to China. Even within the LDP, the inﬂuence of its faction leaders and elders is waning. Older pro-Chinese politicians such as Nonaka and Kato as well as older anti-Chinese politicians who adhered to antiCommunist ideology are losing their inﬂuence. Younger politicians are less ideological and more parochial and issue-oriented. In this sense, the traditional categories of pro-China and pro-Taiwan politicians are no longer useful for analysing Japanese political circles. Third, at the bureaucratic level, the relative decline of MOFA and its China School is clear. While the China School may have strong preferences and vested interests in China policy, it also has experience, specialties and a deep knowledge of China. These assets could not be actively utilized for Japanese policy towards China for some time. Also, through strengthening the security ties with the United States, Japanese bureaucracies such as Bureau of North American Aﬀairs of MOFA and JDA may be more inﬂuenced by their counterparts’ views on China. President George W. Bush tried to take a tougher position towards China in security aﬀairs at the beginning of his administration. In sum the, Japanese policy-making process towards China has become increasingly decentralized and fragmented. At critical junctures, the Japanese

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public, politicians and bureaucrats are often sharply divided on issues over China. This increasingly pluralistic structure and process of decision-making towards China is not necessarily to the advantage of Beijing. The Chinese government can no longer ﬁnd reliable allies in the Japanese state and society. Indeed the political clout of the ex-Tanaka faction (ex-Hashimoto faction) has weakened during the Koizumi era. Nonaka, for example, retired after not running in the 2003 November Lower House Elections; the JSP has disintegrated; pro-Chinese voices in academia and the mass media have become muted; and the credibility of MOFA’s China School has been damaged. Beijing is likely to face diﬃculties trying to predict the Japanese reaction to its policies towards Tokyo due to the increasing diversity of values and interests within Japanese state and society. Nonetheless, socio-economic interactions between the two countries are growing stronger. As of 1998, 20,000 Japanese citizens are living in China and 272,000 Chinese in Japan. Both countries are among each other’s best trading partners. By 1998, Japan’s cumulative direct investment to China was US$32.5 billion. More importantly, younger people in both nations are, in general, becoming more pragmatic and ﬂexible, even if they are sometimes outspoken and emotional. Japanese popular culture (J-pop) now has mass appeal in East Asia and beyond.20 Japan–China cooperation is essential for regional stability in Asia. It is necessary for Japan, for example, to cooperate with China in order to address the North Korean problem. But Henry Kissinger notes: “Until the emergence of modern Japan in the late nineteenth century, China had not encountered an Asian state capable of contesting Chinese preeminence in Asia. Until China was uniﬁed by Mao Zedong, modern Japan had never encountered another Asian country it needed to treat as a permanent competitor”. However, “China’s emergence has awakened Japanese fears, conferring an entirely new impetus to its considerations of strategy.”21 With regard to the United States, after 11 September, the Bush Administration has sought a stable relationship with China to secure international support for the war on terrorism. Thus far, this trend has persisted. Furthermore, to squeeze concessions from Pyongyang through the Six Party Talks, Washington and Tokyo need greater cooperation with Beijing. Moreover, Japanese public opinion seems to positively accept China’s mediatory diplomacy towards North Korea.22 On the one hand, the strategic importance of China for the United States and Japan has increased. Beijing’s successful negotiation with Southeast Asian countries over Free Trade Agreements (FTA) makes Tokyo anxious to catch up, and the increased trade deﬁcits between China and the United States make Washington, especially Congress, impatient. The rise of China, either imagined or in reality, is and will be a concern for the United States and Japan. Complicated considerations of strategy towards China will be further refracted through the prism of Japan’s pluralistic domestic politics. The lack

Domestic sources of Japanese policy towards China 47 of a stable party system and a more diverse society in Japan will be a challenge to Tokyo’s policy formulation towards Beijing. It seems that China’s contacts with the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the largest opposition party in Japan are still weak; and the party’s strategy toward China, even after the November 2003 Lower House Elections, is still unclear. In the July 2004 Upper House Election, while the ruling coalition kept their majority, the DPJ increased its seats and votes especially in the urban areas. With decreasing electoral support, Prime Minister Koizumi’s foreign policy has seemingly become more and more populist. His repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have provoked strong Chinese reactions which in turn caused more anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan. After a Chinese nuclear submarine intruded into Japanese waters in November 2004, 59 per cent of a public opinion poll perceived that Japan–China relations are bad and 71 per cent did not trust China.23 Regardless of domestic diﬃculties and international uncertainties, it is necessary for both Japan and China to become accustomed to a truly equal relationship. Both countries need to carefully avoid a zero-sum perception of international politics and be more sensitive to the domestic politics of its neighbour.

Notes 1 Sasajima Masahiko¯, “Japan’s Domestic Politics and China Policymaking” in Benjamin L. Self and Jeﬀrey W. Thomson (eds), An Alliance for Engagement: Building Cooperation in Security Relations with China (Washington DC: Henry Stimson Center, 2002), p.83. 2 Kotake Kazuaki, “The Tiananmen Incident and Sino-Japanese Diplomacy: Japan as a Mirror of Modernization” in Kojima Tomoyuki (ed.), Japan–China Relations in the Asian Era; The Past and the Future (Tokyo: Simul Press, 1995), pp.130–1. [Japanese]. 3 Kawakami Tamio, Japan Socialist Party’s Diplomacy for a New Era (Tokyo: Simul Press, 1994) p.19. [Japanese]. 4 Yomiuri Shimbun, The Public Opinions of Japan (Tokyo: Kobundo, 2002), pp.213– 14. [Japanese]. 5 Tanaka Akihiko, “Sino-Japanese Political Relations” in Okabe Tatsumi (ed.), International Environment Surrounding China (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001), pp.70–1. [Japanese]. 6 Okazaki argued that the Emperor could be utilized as a diplomatic tool only once in a century. Okazaki Hisahiko, “The China Problem Revisited: The Biggest Taboo in Postwar Japan” in Chu ¯ o¯Ko¯ron, February 1993. [Japanese]. 7 Tanaka, “Sino-Japanese political relations”, p.72. 8 Asahi Shimbun, 20 May 1995. 9 Yomiuri Shimbun, The Public Opinion of Japan, p.513. 10 Hara Yoshihisa, The Japan Socialist Party in Postwar History (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2000), pp.313–14. [Japanese]. See also Mori Tasuya, The Study of the Japan Socialist Party: Political Process of Changing the Party Line (Tokyo: Mokutakusha, 2000). [Japanese]. 11 Iokibe Makoto, “Japan’s Relations with China in the Post-Cold War”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 February 2004.

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12 Glenn D. Hook, et. al., Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security (London: Routledge, 2001), p.141. 13 Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp.6, 9. 14 Tanaka, “Sino-Japanese political relations”, p.74. 15 Yomiuri Shimbun, The Public Opinion of Japan, p.214. 16 Murata Ryo¯hei, Naze gaimusho wa dame ni natta noka [Why did MOFA became so Incapable?] (Tokyo: Fusosha, 2002), pp.87–93. In particular, Murata strongly criticized Makita Kunihiko¯, then Director-General of Asian-Paciﬁc Aﬀairs and Anami Koreshige, Ambassador to China. 17 Komori Yoshihisa, Sino-Japanese Relations Reconsidered (Tokyo: Sankei Shimbun, 2001) and Illusion of Sino-Japanese Friendship (Tokyo: Shogakan, 2002) [Japanese]. 18 Arai Toshiaki, Henbo¯ suru chu ¯ goku gaiko¯ [Changing Chinese diplomacy] (Tokyo: Nichu¯ shuppan, 2002), p.178. 19 Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p.100. 20 Douglas McGray, “Japan’s Gross National Cool”, Foreign Policy, May/June 2002, pp.44–54. 21 Henry A. Kissinger, Does America Need A Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p.125. 22 See, for example, comments by Kato Chihiro in Asahi Shimbun, 31 August, 2003 and Uemura Koji in Mainichi Shimbun, 31 August 2003. 23 Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 December 2004.

Bibliography Arai Toshiaki, Henbo¯ suru chu ¯ goku gaiko¯ [Changing Chinese diplomacy] (Tokyo: Nichu Shuppan, 2002). Asahi Shimbun, Various years. Green, Michael J., Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001). Hara Yoshihisa, The Japan Socialist Party in Postwar History (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2000). [Japanese]. Hook, Glenn D., et al., Japan’s International Relations: Politics, economics and security (London: Routledge, 2001). Iokibe Makoto, “Japan’s Relations with China in the Post-Cold War”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 February, 2004. Kawakami Tamio, Japan Socialist Party’s Diplomacy for a New Era (Tokyo: Simul Press, 1994) [Japanese]. Kissinger, Henry A., Does America Need A Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York: Simon & Schuster 2001). Komori Yoshihisa, Sino-Japanese Relations Reconsidered (Tokyo: Sankei Shimbun, 2001) and Illusion of Sino-Japanese Friendship (Tokyo: Shogakkan, 2002) [Japanese]. Kotake Kazuaki, “The Tiananmen Incident and Sino-Japanese Diplomacy: Japan as a Mirror of Modernization” in Kojima Tomoyuki (ed.), Japan–China Relations in the Asian Era; The Past and the Future (Tokyo: Simul Press, 1995), pp.130–1. [Japanese]. Mainichi Shimbun, 31 August, 2003. McGray, Douglas, “Japan’s Gross National Cool”, Foreign Policy, May/June 2002. Mori Tasuya, The Study of the Japan Socialist Party: Political Process of Changing the Party Line (Tokyo: Mokutakusha, 2000). [Japanese].

Domestic sources of Japanese policy towards China 49 Murata Ryo¯hei, Naze gaimusho wa dame ni natta noka [Why did MOFA became so Incapable?] (Tokyo: Fusosha, 2002). Okazaki Hisahiko¯, “The China Problem Revisited: The Biggest Taboo in Postwar Japan” in Chu ¯ o¯ Ko¯ron, February 1993. [Japanese]. Sasajima Masahiko, “Japan’s Domestic Politics and China Policymaking” in Benjamin L. Self and Jeﬀrey W. Thomson (eds), An Alliance for Engagement: Building Cooperation in Security Relations with China (Washington DC: Henry Stimson Center, 2002). Tanaka Akihiko, “Sino-Japanese Political Relations” in Okabe Tatsumi (ed.), International Environment Surrounding China (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001). [Japanese]. Yomiuri Shimbun, The Public Opinions of Japan (Tokyo: Kobundo, 2002). [Japanese].

3

Japanese writings on post-1945 Japan–China relations Kamachi Noriko

Any discussion of post-1945 Japan–China relations cannot be free from the shadow of pre-1945 history. In Japan for the past ﬁfty plus years, a national debate on how to account for the Japanese aggression in Asia in the past has continued with varied intensity. Over the course of time the participants in the discussions were drawn from a wide range of people, from ex-soldiers of the imperial army to a graduate student studying in a Chinese university.1 This chapter, however, focuses on a survey of writings on post-1945 Japan– China relations by leading Japanese scholars. It addresses the questions: Who are the major scholars and what are their interpretations of Japan–China relations in the postwar era? Are there diﬀerent schools of thought centred on ideology, methodology, personalities and universities? What were the major shifts and trends in interpreting Japan–China relations reﬂecting developments in China and changes in world politics? With hindsight, what are the strengths and weaknesses of past scholarship on Japan–China relations?

The scholars In post-war Japan, a great number of China specialists were trained in various aspects of China, including language, literature, history, philosophy, religion, and ﬁne arts, as well as the government and economy. Regardless of their discipline, China specialists naturally wished to visit and see China, but during the three decades before the conclusion of the peace treaty in 1978, their access to China was severely limited. Only those who were invited as guests or members of delegations as a part of the “people’s diplomacy” had this privilege, and an invitation from China was a highly prized award. Naturally, China inﬂuenced Japanese academic politics and public opinion beyond the academic community. In general, “pro-China” scholars and intellectuals were regarded as “progressives,” and those who maintained critical approaches were grouped together as “conservatives” or even “reactionaries.” In retrospect, it is apparent that “pro-China” meant uncritical acceptance of the statements of Chinese Communist leaders of the time, including the era of the Cultural

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51

Revolution. The great majority of Japan’s China specialists were inﬂuenced by pro-China sentiment until they began to have access to China and realized the complexity of real life in China. In this regard, the scholars of international relations that I discuss below were a relatively small minority among China specialists in Japan. Education in international relations as an interdisciplinary ﬁeld of study was new in post-war Japan. In the wake of the tragic war there was a strong passion for paciﬁsm and a determination not to repeat the mistakes of the past. Promotion of the study of international relations was part of the Japanese determination to build a new Japan as a peace-loving nation. In the pre-war Japanese universities, there were highly respected scholars of international politics in the faculties of law and political science such as Takagi Yasaka (1889–1984), Oka Yoshitake (1902–1990), and Iriye Keishiro¯ (1903–1978). These scholars covered international relations in Asia, but their focus was on politics among the Western powers involved in Asia. The newly established discipline of international relations encouraged regional studies to focus on Asia and other less developed areas of the world. At the University of Tokyo the discipline of international relations was instituted in the early 1950s and developed as one of the most viable ﬁelds of study by attracting the best and the brightest among the new generation of students. It owed its success not only to the national enthusiasm for paciﬁsm and internationalism but also to the personality of the individuals who nurtured this new ﬁeld. Among them, Professor Eto¯ Shinkichi was the single most important leader in the study of China’s international relations, at the University of Tokyo. At his seminar at the Komaba campus of the University, where he taught from the mid-1950s through his retirement in 1984, he nurtured a host of scholars who became leaders of the ﬁeld. Some of the most prominent are Okabe Tatsumi, Hirano Ken’ichiro¯, Takagi Seiichiro¯, Ishii Akira and Tanaka Akihiko, who are among the leaders in this ﬁeld. Professor Eto¯’s inﬂuence and inspiration extended beyond the circles of his students and associates at the University. He opened his seminars and his oﬃce to students outside the University and gave advice and encouragement to promising young scholars from all over Japan and abroad. Acknowledgements of scholarly debts of gratitude to him in many of the major books are testimonies to the breadth and depth of his generosity. After he left the Komaba campus, Eto¯ has been active continually as an educator, college administrator, and leader of academic associations. He also led the national campaign to raise funds for compensation of the women in Asia who were forced to serve as “comfort women” during wartime. He also engaged in public discussions on national and international aﬀairs in numerous essays published in popular journals and newspapers. As a pioneering scholar, Eto¯ contributed important works in the ﬁeld. He applied the methodology of content analysis by examining Chinese oﬃcial publications in the late 1950s in his study, published in 1966, of Chinese

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government policy toward Japan. It was a new methodology that he learned while he did research at Columbia University in the early 1960s. He was one of the ﬁrst post-war Japanese scholars who did research at American universities and among the ﬁrst to publish his works in English. One of his aspirations was to produce scholarly works that would deserve international recognition. Indeed, publication of his “Hai-Lu-Feng: The ﬁrst Chinese Soviet” in China Quarterly in 1961–62 was a major contribution.2 In the background of Eto¯’s scholarship was his personal tie to China and his education in prewar Japan’s higher school, which included rigorous training in classical Chinese. He was born in 1923 in Manchuria as the son of a Japanese librarian and was named after the city, Shenyang. He grew up there until he was admitted to the First Higher School in Tokyo, after which he attended the University of Tokyo. As a student toward the end of the war, he was drafted into the army and stationed in Hiroshima when the atomic bomb was dropped on the city. Immediately after the war he returned to the University and studied international politics under Takagi Yasaka and Oka Yoshitake. He also participated in a seminar led by the renowned Sinologists Enoki Kazuo (1913–1989) and Kanda Nobuo (1921–2003). The combination of study in political science and in Sinology forged the foundation of his scholarship. His ﬁrst academic appointment was at To¯yo¯ Bunka Kenkyu¯jo (Institute of Oriental Culture) at the University of Tokyo. Among his colleagues was Banno Masataka (1916–1985), who also received training in political science and Sinology, and who published acclaimed studies of the late Qing government’s response to the West. Eto¯ and Banno were among the last generation of scholars who received pre-war training in kanbun, the Japanese method of reading classical Chinese. They were also among the ﬁrst China scholars in Japan who learned to speak the modern Chinese language.3 The study of China’s international relations was not limited to the University of Tokyo. At Keio¯ Gijuku Daigaku, Japan’s oldest private university, the leader was Ishikawa Tadao (1922–), Professor and the Dean of the Law Department in the 1970s, and later, the President of the University. His scholarly works were centred on analyses of the political power of the Chinese Communists and their government. He also wrote articles on managing Japan–China relations for Sankei Shimbun and other popular periodicals. Yamada Tatsuo, a leading historian of Republican China, had a primary research interest in Japan–China relations in the modern period. Ikei Masaru, a specialist in Japanese diplomatic history, extended his research to Japan–China relations. The scholarly tradition at Keio¯ nurtured scholars who are most productive in the study of contemporary Chinese government and international relations. Among the members of faculty at Keio¯, Kojima Tomoyuki, Kokubun Ryo¯sei and Soeya Yoshihide are highly valued commentators on contemporary China and Japan–China relations. At Waseda Daigaku, the second oldest private university, Saneto¯ Keishu¯ (1896–1985), a specialist of modern Chinese language, devoted his entire

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53

academic life to the study of Japan–China friendship. He compiled an extraordinarily informative collection of literature on Chinese students who came to Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the 1960s, Ando¯ Hikotaro¯ (1917–), who led a study group of South Manchurian Railway Company, and Niijima Atsuyoshi (1928–2002), a language and literature teacher at Waseda, were active national ﬁgures among the pro-China scholars. At Hitotsubashi University, the prominent economist, Ishikawa Shigeru (1918–), led research on economic development in contemporary China and China’s economic relations with Japan. Nakagane Watsuji and Amako Satoshi, leading scholars of China’s economy and government, received graduate education at Hitotsubashi. At Jo¯chi Daigaku (Sophia University), Kawata Tadashi, Mushako¯ji Kinhide, Ro¯yama Michio and other scholars of international studies developed a strong research centre for international relations. Ogata Sadako, who recently served the United Nations as High Commissioner of Refugees, taught there and published an important work comparing the processes of normalization with China in Japan and in the United States. Soeya Yoshihide of Keio¯ was educated at Sophia University. Aside from the universities, research institutes created in postwar Japan for studies of international relations accommodated many promising young scholars. Among them, Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu¯jo (Japan Institute of International Aﬀairs), founded in 1960, and Ajia Keizai Kenkyu¯jo (Institute of Developing Economies), founded in 1958, and Chu¯goku Kenkyu¯jo (Chinese Research Institute), founded in 1947, are the most important organizations that supported research on contemporary China. On China’s international relations, the Japan Institute of International Aﬀairs has published a series of important books by its aﬃliates and scholars outside the institute, as well as the monthly journal, Kokusai Mondai (International Aﬀairs), a major forum for discussion among the specialists in this ﬁeld.

Public discussions of post-war Japan–China relations As to the question of whether there are diﬀerent schools of thought centred on ideology, methodology, personalities and universities, it is diﬃcult to identify distinct diﬀerences among political scientists. They seem to share common research interests and use methodologies that are compatible with each other, organize joint research projects and often publish their works in the same volume or the same series of books. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences in approaches, personalities, and ideologies exist not among the political scientists, but between political scientists and the rest of China specialists among humanists and journalists. The leading political scientists during the 1960s and 70s, including Eto¯ Shinkichi and Ishikawa Tadao, who were inﬂuenced by Western scholarship on Communist regimes, maintained critical views of the Communist government in China. Nomura Ko¯ichi, an esteemed scholar of political thought who was educated at Kyoto University and taught at

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Rikkyo¯ University, tried hard to structure a sympathetic understanding of New China and the Cultural Revolution but did not follow Maoist propagandists. In inﬂuencing Japanese public perception of China in the postwar era, humanists and journalists played much greater roles than political scientists did. In Japan there are small but inﬂuential groups of intellectuals who are sought after by the mass media for their comments on national and international aﬀairs, and the public gives considerable attention and respect to them. The public status of news commentators in Japan is somewhat diﬀerent from that in the United States, where they are dismissed as “talking heads” or “pundits.” Today they are active not only in print journalism but also on television screens. During the early decades after the war, the most important forum for them was the monthly magazine. Sekai (World). Published by the prestigious Iwanami Shoten since December 1945, it carried more reports and discussions of China than any other monthly magazine.4 Sekai paid great attention to the ongoing Communist revolution and the Civil War in China from its early days and provided the most respected forum for discussions for Sinologists and social scientists. Shortly before the establishment of the PRC in 1949, it published a special issue on China featuring discussions of leading academics in Chinese studies, including Niida Noboru (1904–1966), Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯ (1904–1980), Matsumoto Yoshimi (1912–1974), and Kaizuka Shigeki (1903–1987). It was new for academic Sinologists to comment on events in contemporary China that had previously been relegated to journalists and political scientists. Recognizing the signiﬁcance of the unprecedented transformation of Chinese society, they admitted the need for new approaches to the study of China. During the early decades of the PRC through the 1970s, the views published in Sekai were mostly sympathetic to the Communist revolution and hopeful for the Communists’ success in reform in China. For thirty years Japanese discussion of China was based on severely limited information published in Chinese oﬃcial documents and reports in Japanese and foreign newspapers. For interpretation of events in China, Japanese commentators relied heavily on foreign observers. One of the reasons for Japanese dependence on foreign reporters was their lack of language training. Unlike their American counterparts, Japanese universities did not have facilities for spoken language education or an information centre in Hong Kong. The writings of Owen Latimore, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley and Anna Louise Strong were among those featured in Sekai in its early years. In the late 1960s and 70s, Mark Selden and other American China scholars who wrote for the publications of the CCAS (the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars) received great attention. The CCAS attracted Japanese intellectuals because it was the most outspoken group of academics in the United States who expressed their opposition to the American war in Vietnam. Among humanists, Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910–1977), a specialist of modern

Japanese writings on post-1945 Japan–China relations

55

Chinese literature, especially of Lu Xun, was one of the most inﬂuential writers for Sekai. Takeuchi was bitterly critical of Japan’s élitist academic establishment that had failed to accommodate the study of modern China and modern Chinese literature in his day. He exerted considerable inﬂuence on intellectuals by tapping their deep vein of guilt, stemming not only from Japan’s treatment of its Asian neighbours, but more fundamentally, from the transformation of its cultural identity in pursuit of modern Western ideals.5 Many Japanese intellectuals tended to engage in idealistic speculation on contemporary China. They discussed an idealized China in order to criticize the Japanese government. Their imagined China was a magic mirror to reﬂect the negative image of Japan led by the pro-American, pro-big business LDP government. During the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, a Sekai editorial blamed the Japanese government for its intention to renew the Japan-US security treaty and for its refusal of a diplomatic relationship with Mainland China. When Beijing exploded its atomic bomb in 1964, Sekai published an article expressing alarm and opposition to China’s nuclear weapons, but also published articles that sympathized with the Mainland’s decision. During the Cultural Revolution, Sekai published articles in praise of Maoist approaches. It also published a symposium that included academics who cautiously expressed some skepticism about the Cultural Revolution. In the atmosphere of the day, any skepticism let alone criticism could be construed as an unfriendly attitude toward China. Many books and articles were published in praise of the Cultural Revolution and warning against Japan’s continuation of a pro-American foreign policy. Among academic writers, Ando¯ Hikotaro¯ and Niijima Atsuyoshi were true believers in Chinese idealistic rhetoric and propaganda.6 To the pro-China intellectuals as well as to the conservatives in the government, President Nixon’s 1971 announcement of his intent to visit China and start talks for normalization with Beijing came as a shock. It forced the Japanese intellectuals to recognize the gap between the real and imagined China. Thereafter, those who praised the Cultural Revolution simply quietened down.7 Only since the 1980s, when China opened itself to ordinary tourists, did it become a part of the real world for the Japanese public. For some idealists among the intellectuals, it was disappointing to discover a real China inhabited by ordinary humans driven by proﬁt-making. By this time, discussion of new China was no longer the monopoly of a small group of privileged “friends of China”. The Mainland became the most popular tourist destination and the modern Chinese language became the most popular second foreign language in colleges. Various stories of experiences in China, including very shocking stories, were published in popular publications, including tour guides. In addition, many Chinese began to live in Japan as workers and students. Naturally, Japanese views of China became diverse. Throughout the post-war period, the Asahi Shimbun, a highbrow but still one of the three largest daily papers, has been reputed to be the most pro-China media outlet. In 1971, the Asahi Shimbun published a series of

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books, China and Japan, to promote normalization with China. Its senior columnist, Shiraishi Bon (1898–1984), edited a volume in the series, Nitchu¯ kankei towa nanika (What is Japan–China Relationship?). In the preface he made an euphoric statement on the dawn of a new age as “the visit of the Chinese ping-pong team brought fresh breeze and bright hope to the stagnant and confused world.” An essay in the volume condemned signs of the revival of Japanese militarism and Tokyo’s diplomatic ties with Taipei, and concluded that the Japanese do not want to be tied to Taiwan and become orphans in Asia.8 Despite Japan’s close ties since the days of its colonial rule, Taiwan had been neglected by academics and treated by the mass media merely as the exiled base of the Nationalist government. A new development in the 1980s was that specialists of contemporary Taiwan including Wakabayashi Masahiro of the University of Tokyo began to write for Sekai and other major publications.

Interpretations of postwar Japan–China relations A good starting point is Okabe Tatsumi’s edited volume Chu ¯ goku o meguru kokusai kankyo¯ (International Environment Surrounding China), published as one in an eight-volume series of studies of contemporary China by Iwanami Shoten in 1990. Okabe is one of the most respected leaders among the scholars studying China’s international relations. The editors of this series, Nomura Ko¯ichi, Yamanouchi Kazuo, Uno Shigeaki, Kojima Shinji, Takeuchi Minoru and Okabe Tatsumi, and the collaborators, Ando¯ Masahi, ¯ ta Katsuhiro, Kojima Reiitsu, Tsuji Ko¯go and Mo¯ri Kazuko, are among the O well established scholars in research on contemporary China. This volume examines not only relations between the PRC and Japan, the United States, Soviet Union, and Asian countries other than Japan, but also Taiwan, Hong Kong and overseas Chinese. The most active specialists in China’s international relations, namely, Okabe Tatsumi, Tanaka Akihiko, Maruyama ¯ ta Katsuhiro, Wakabayashi Masahiro, Nobuo, Takagi Seiichiro¯, Ishii Akira, O Tanigaki Mariko, and Tanaka Kyo¯ko, contributed chapters. In the introductory chapter reviewing forty years of China’s foreign relations, Okabe stated that the authors in the volume aimed at a realistic understanding of China’s actions in international relations by eliminating various myths about China. One of the persistent myths was that China was a revolutionary regime founded on Marxist-Leninist ideology and therefore conducted its foreign relations on fundamentally diﬀerent principles from those of capitalist states. China and the Soviet Union had encouraged such a myth. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s extraordinary talent and personality as a diplomat made China bigger than its actual size. In fact, Okabe emphasized, the Chinese Communists’ primary goals were not fundamentally diﬀerent from those of any nation state. Even the famous “Five Principles of Peace” presented by Zhou Enlai during this 1954 trip to India, Okabe pointed out, were no more than a ﬁve point summary of classical

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57

norms of international relations. At the same time Okabe emphasized the importance of remembering that shock and humiliation brought on by the Japanese invasion in the twentieth century had an unprecedented impact on the Chinese much greater than imperialism of the Western Powers. It may sound like a truism now, but from the 1950s through the 1980s, the prevailing views of China among Japanese intellectuals and the public were inﬂuenced by myths. The authors of this volume treated China as a normal country pursuing its own national interests. In 2001, a decade after its ﬁrst publication, Okabe’s volume on China’s international environment was republished as a monograph with updated material. Continued demand for this volume is a testimony to its success in creating an analytical framework that has withstood the changes of ten years. In the introductory chapter of the new volume Okabe discussed the negative eﬀects of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident on China’s foreign relations and its recovery from this setback by 1992. The growing economic power of China thereafter made Chinese leaders conﬁdent enough to state that China had become one of the two greatest world powers, next only to the United States. Domestically, however, Okabe regrets that old leaders with old ideas continue to have inﬂuence. To oﬀset the erosion of the Chinese people’s conﬁdence in the Communist Party and their belief in socialism, government leaders resorted to an old fashioned campaign for patriotic education. The campaign started in the 1980s and was accelerated in 1995 to commemorate the ﬁftieth anniversary of the end of the war of resistance against Japan. Okabe pointed out that this anti-Japanese patriotic education campaign aroused negative reaction among the Japanese populace leading to a dislike of China. It dampened the friendly image of China held by the Japanese people and their feeling of closeness to China that had been Beijing’s greatest intangible asset in Japan. Okabe fully recognizes the importance of remembering the past, but is concerned about Beijing’s exploitation of the emotional issue that could bring about an explosive situation beyond its control. He noted that Jiang Zemin’s excessive emphasis on history during his visit to Japan in 1998 had a negative eﬀect and that even the usually pro-Chinese mass media was critical of Jiang’s remarks. Okabe concluded on a hopeful note that the younger generation of China’s leaders, with new thinking, would steer the bilateral relationship toward one based on mutual beneﬁt. Tanaka Akihiko, who wrote the chapter on Japan–China political relations in Okabe’s volume, published a most comprehensive book-length analysis of Japan–China relations covering the entire postwar period from 1945 through 1990.9 He centred his discussion of the bilateral relation on the international environment in which China and Japan were each surrounded; domestic politics in each country; and the dynamics of interactions between the international and domestic factors. To measure the importance of bilateral relations to each country and the changes in the relations over time, he used trade statistics. Tanaka assumed that the volume of trade between the two

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countries and the share of the bilateral trade in the whole international trade of each country was an indicator of the strength of the bilateral relations. His analysis demonstrated the correlation between major political events and the rise or fall of trade volume. For the period after 1978, when diplomatic relationships were stabilized and trade volume increased dramatically, Tanaka discussed various speciﬁc issues and controversies that arose between the two countries. In his view, the main factors that contributed to the overall stability of Japan–China relations throughout the 1980s were: China’s commitment to opening-up; Japanese war-guilt although it was diminishing among the younger generation; and the favourable international environment in East Asia (that is, Tokyo’s relations with Washington and Beijing’s relations with Washington) that permitted closer Japan–China relations. In an appended chapter, Tanaka discussed Japanese institutions and the decision-making process towards China. In his discussion of the roles of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, Cabinet Secretariat, Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI), other ministries, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its factions, China-related groups of Diet members, opposition parties, and the mass media, Tanaka underscored the importance of China specialists among the bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry. Curiously enough, however, he did not mention the roles of academic specialists like himself either as advisors to the bureaucrats and politicians or as the educators of the students who would later serve as bureaucrats at the Foreign Ministry. In his chapter on Japan–China relations in the 2001 edition of the Iwanami volume, Tanaka discussed the question of why the Chinese leaders made a political issue of a newspaper report on history textbooks in Japan in 1982. He suggested that because the market economy-oriented reforms had undermined the legitimacy of Marx-Leninist ideology, the CCP leaders felt the need for a history lesson for China’s younger generation that would maintain the legitimacy of the government of the CCP as the leader of the antiJapanese war. Tanaka characterized the overall bilateral relations during the 1990s as “full of confusion”. These include: the freezing of Japan’s new loans to China after the Tiananmen Incident, the apology issue, Japanese anxiety over China’s military expansion, China’s 1995 nuclear tests which led to Japan freezing its grants in aid to China again, and Jiang’s harping on the historical issue during his visit to Japan in 1998. Nevertheless, he concluded his chapter with an optimistic prediction that the increasing contact and economic interdependency between the two nations would create a sense of community bound by common interest.10 The concern over the possibility of nationalistic clash between China and Japan was a main point in Ishikawa Tadao’s foresightful warning as early as in 1972 on the eve of diplomatic normalization. At the time, Ishikawa feared that the lack of national consensus in Japan would weaken its bargaining position in negotiations with China. He anticipated unhappy results if the

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59

Japanese government made excessive compromises that would cause its people to feel humiliated. He warned that the new conﬁdence and national pride of the Japanese as an economic power would not tolerate any sense of humiliation and that there was a danger that it could develop into anti-Chinese nationalism.11 A persistent question in Japan–China relations is whether Tokyo and Beijing should follow the universal norms of international law, or if there should be special norms between them because of their common past. Nakai Yoshifumi touched on this question in his discussion of Japan–China relations in the post-Cold War Paciﬁc-Asian region. In the early 1990s, Tokyo expressed its new concept in a phrase “Japan–China relationship in the world”. It was supposedly used for the ﬁrst time by Prime Minister Kaifu during his 1991 visit to Beijing, and became a keynote of Japan’s diplomacy. What the Japanese meant by this phrase was that common international rules should be applied to Japan–China relations. The Chinese leaders, however, interpreted this phrase as an expression of Japan’s chauvinistic ambition to become both a political and economic power. To them, any suggestion of Japan’s aspiration to have an active role in the Asia-Paciﬁc region was a reminder of Japan’s wartime slogans and aggression in the region, and they suspected that it would be a step toward creating another Japan-centred regional order.12 The diﬃculty of using the common logic of international relations in Japan–China relations has been a constant theme in Japanese discussions. Soeya Yoshihide pointed out that the cause of the diﬃculty lies not only in the Chinese use of the “history card” but also in the mentality of Japanese leaders that inhibits them from engaging in open discussion in strategic terms. Such a mentality was, according to Soeya, a product of the paciﬁst culture of post-war Japan.13 In 2001, another important book on China’s international relations was published by the University of Tokyo Press as part of an eight volume series titled Gendai chu¯goku no ko¯zo¯ hendo¯ (Structural Change in Contemporary China). This series resulted from a joint project involving some seventy specialists on contemporary China. From 1996 to 1998, they held seminars in small groups studying speciﬁc areas and open forums, inviting large numbers of China scholars from within Japan and from abroad. In the preface, Mo¯ri Kazuko, the principal organizer of the project, stated that China is now referred to as “the superpower of the 21st century. We must think how to get along with China that emerged as a great power in Asia. But did China really change? Was it really possible that truly structural change took place in the matter of some twenty years in China’s government, economy and society?” To answer these questions, each volume was dedicated to examining the changing aspects of China during the 1980s and 1990s. The volume on China’s international relations, edited by Tanaka Kyo¯ko, and subtitled “China and the Asia-Paciﬁc Regional Order” analyses China’s interaction with other nations, organizations and overseas Chinese

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communities in Asia and the Paciﬁc region during the 1990s. The analyses are presented in a multinational context. The chapters include discussion of the viewpoints of China’s neighbours, such as the Vietnamese Communists’ view of China. The chapter on the disputes over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai) in the East China Sea is presented from the viewpoint of the residents of the oﬀshore islands of Okinawa. The introductory chapter by Tanaka Kyo¯ko is a lucid analysis of China’s position and options in the post-Cold War world. She underscores the importance of ASEAN countries and Japan for China’s strategy to counter the inﬂuence of the United States that triumphantly emerged as the unchallenged superpower, and of the march of self-proclaimed American values of “human rights” and “democracy”. In her analysis, Tanaka Kyo¯ko touched on China’s use of history as a weapon in foreign relations. She noted that since the 1970s, China has been successful in using history to extract concessions from Japan. A problem is that success creates an illusion among the Chinese people that Japan owes an unlimited debt of guilt to China, and the people develop unrealistic expectations of their government to recover that debt endlessly. Such an expectation by the people reduces the options of the leaders to take ﬂexible approaches in foreign relations. In the case of Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998, his repeated reminder of Japan’s historical guilt turned oﬀ the Japanese audience. For Jiang, Tanaka Kyo¯ko pointed out, it was an important part of his performance aimed at people in China, and it was perceived in China as a great success. Another problem she pointed out in using history as psychological pressure is that it works only if the other party shares a similar understanding of the past and has a sense of guilt. When time passes and generations change, the national memories on both sides fade away, making its use less and less eﬀective. The discussions in this volume pay great attention to the interaction of individuals and local communities across national borders. For example, a chapter is dedicated to a study of the network of overseas Chinese who brought economic prosperity to Amoy. Perhaps this volume represents a new trend in Japanese scholarship because discussions of international relations are not limited to the state-to-state diplomacy conducted by government oﬃcials or to quantitative studies of economic interactions, but include studies of interactions among ordinary peoples in the Asia-Paciﬁc region.14 Another volume on Japan–China relations with emphasis on individual and local level contact is the book edited by Amako Satoshi and Sonoda Shigeto titled Nitchu¯ ko¯ryu¯ no shihanseiki (A Quarter Century of Japan– China Interactions). The essays in this volume discussed the experiences of various individuals including those who played key roles on both sides in building trade networks before normalization of diplomatic ties; Japanese small businesses in China; Chinese students who worked as trainees in Japanese businesses; individuals who were active in Sino-Japanese Friendship Associations and other cultural exchange groups; and the sister cities in Japan and China. Two of the ﬁve authors who contributed chapters in this

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volume are Chinese scholars settled in Japan. The authors report on warm friendships between individuals on both sides, but also note practical problems arising from contact in everyday life, especially from diﬀerences in commercial customs and practices. Amako noted that the Japanese image among the Chinese populace is quite negative. For example, according to a survey of young people by a Chinese periodical publisher in 1996, the most typical Japanese in their minds was To¯jo¯ Hideki, the wartime military leader of Japan. The authors in this volume seem to think that Chinese memories of the war would not fade away easily and that it is important to explain the circumstances in which the Japanese made the unfortunate decision to invade China.15 As the most symbolic episode of Japanese imperialism in China, the Nanjing massacre has become the focal point of controversy over historical writing in Japan since the early 1970s. The ongoing debate reﬂects the depth of nationalistic sentiment both in China and Japan. It has developed into an international discussion over historical facts, memories, and the historian’s craft.16 The 2001 decision of the World Trade Organization heralded China’s ascent to the status of world economic giant. In Japan, conﬁdence in its own ability to maintain the long-held position as the most advanced economy in Asia and the second largest in the world had been eroding through the 1990s. Japan’s decade-long economic stagnation endangered its position as the leader of developing Asian economies. The initial response in Japan to the breathtaking developments in China was denial and wishful thinking that it would take a long time for China to achieve a level of development equal to that of Japan. During the 1990s many observers in Japan focused on the diﬃculties of economic reform in China, especially the problems of stateowned enterprises. By 2001, when it became undeniable that China had become the world’s great manufacturing centre, sensational books presenting China as a threat ﬂooded bookstores in Japan. China’s expansion of its military capacity was another factor. Moreover, the possibility of China’s move toward creation of a China-centred East Asian community loomed. Many in Japan began to fear Japan’s eventual marginalization and isolation in East Asia. For them the “Japan Bashing” of the 1980s was long past. The new nightmare became “Japan Passing”—that is, to be passed over by Asian nations who would turn to China as their primary economic partner. To reﬂect on the Japanese responses to the rise of China, major Japanese monthly periodicals featured special discussions. In 2002 Chu ¯ o¯ Ko¯ron published a series on “Rising China: How to Counter the Threat of ‘Japan Passing’?” Later in the year, commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the normalization of Japan–China relations, Sekai published a discussion titled “Is China a ‘Threat’?” The participants in these discussions, Kuroda Atsuo (1960–), Takahara Akio (1958–) and others, warned the public against emotional antagonism toward a rising China and called for positive thinking in order to ﬁnd ways to make the best of China’s development.17

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A noteworthy phenomenon in Japan’s national soul-searching for its identity in the new century is that a considerable number of Chinese scholars in Japan’s academic institutions and research organizations took centre stage in the discussions. Among them, Shin Saihin (Shen Caipin, born in Jiangsu Province in 1944) and Shu Ken’ei (Zhu Jianrong, born in Shanghai in 1957), participants in the above-mentioned Chu ¯ o¯ Ko¯ron discussion, are very popular and their writings are widely circulated in Japan. In diplomatic relations, the outstanding issues that China has persistently raised with Japan since the 1980s have been the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and the contents of Japanese history textbooks for high school students. Both of these issues stemmed from China’s dissatisfaction with Japanese attitudes toward Japan’s aggression in China in the past. In Japan, renewed examinations of Japan’s war responsibility and colonial rule in Asia are on. A series of discussions in Sekai under the title of “Postwar Responsibility: How Have We Confronted Japan’s War Responsibility and Japan’s Colonial Rule?” started with the question, “Why Can’t We Leave Behind the Tokyo War Crimes Trial as History?” The panel discussants in its ﬁrst installment underscored the fact that the Japanese people do not quite understand what had happened between 1931 and 1945. They admitted that intellectuals have failed to present a viable account of the Japanese aggression in Asia acceptable to the general public, including the ex-soldiers of the imperial army. They also pointed out that the organizers of the rightwing movement to write a new history textbook took advantage of the shortcomings of Marxist interpretations by mainstream historians. They further noted that the veterans’ association and the association of the war bereaved families, very powerful political groups, can attract such a great number of members because Japanese society has neglected to extend help to ex-soldiers who are still suﬀering from the psychological wounds of the war.18 This kind of discussion signals a renewed eﬀort in Japan for true reconciliation not only with victims of Japanese aggression but more importantly with their own past. It would be a prerequisite for their search for a new identity in a changing East Asia.

Strengths and weaknesses of Japanese scholarship on China The strength of Japanese scholars comes from the fact that they are confronted with the real question how to get along with China in a changing world. For Japanese academics, the Chinese giant is much more than merely a research object to satisfy their intellectual curiosity. For Japan, both past and present, China is important in the areas of national security, economies and culture. Because of the close cultural aﬃnity nurtured from the ancient past, China has been capable of exerting moral pressure on Japan as part of its diplomatic tactics. This situation made Japanese academics take their scholarship seriously not only for their intellectual satisfaction but also for their own moral integrity.

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This very fact also made it more diﬃcult for them to keep a necessary distance from China. It requires discipline in order to keep from getting too involved in current polemics. Many intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution were swayed by Maoist rhetoric. However, mainstream political scientists, especially those who were trained in international politics, were capable of maintaining a consistent stand of their own in a diﬃcult situation. That is the reason why we do not see drastic shifts in their interpretations of Japan–China relations despite the excesses of the Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution or the end of the Cold War. In sum, I think that their close proximity to China and their training in discipline-based judgments are a source of strength for Japanese scholars of international relations. As to the weaknesses of Japanese scholarship on contemporary China, these have been delineated in an excellent discussion by Kokubun Ryo¯sei. First, Japanese scholars tend to insist that China is unique and have refused to develop theoretical frameworks for comparative studies. Second, because of the academic tradition that makes scholars proud of staying away from politics, Japanese scholars are generally unwilling to oﬀer their expertise to help government leaders shape policies toward China. Third, there is a sharp division of labour between historians of China and scholars of contemporary China, and communication between the two groups is not easy. This situation hinders the development of a balanced perspective with regard to elements of continuity and change in China. Fourth, Japanese scholars are isolated from academic communities abroad because most of them write only in Japanese. The younger generation of scholars tends to be satisﬁed with its ability to speak Chinese, but unfortunately their ability to communicate in English is very limited.19 Kokubun’s points, especially the last one, cannot be overemphasized. In general, Japanese scholars pay great attention to the viewpoints of foreign scholars, but they are not quite willing to participate in international forums. Among China specialists in Japan, scholars of international relations have a relatively greater opportunity to publish in English and participate in international conferences. More publication in English would help them engage in international dialogues, especially with the younger generation of Chinese scholars who are increasingly active in international forums. Possibly, greater use of communication in English might help steer the Japan–China relationship toward a more normal relationship based on universal norms.

Notes 1 See, for example, Mizutani Naoko, “Watashi wa naze Azuma Shiro¯ shi ni igi o tonaeruka” [Why I Object to Mr Shiro¯ Azuma], Sekai, August 1999. “Kako no kokufuku: Nihon to Doitsu” [Overcoming the Past: Japan and Germany (A Roundtable Discussion)], Kokusai Mondai, No. 501. (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu¯jo, December 2001). 2 Eto¯ Shinkichi and Okabe Tatsumi, “Content Analysis of Statement in Regard to Japan Made by the People’s Republic of China,” Developing Economies,

64

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12

Japan’s Relations with China Vol. 3 (Tokyo: The Institute of Developing Economies, 1965); Eto¯ Shinkichi, “Hai-Lu-Feng: The First Chinese Soviet Government” The China Quarterly, No. 8 and No. 9 (1961, 1962). For information on Professor Eto¯ and the programme of international relations at Komaba Campus, see Hirano Ken’ichiro¯ and Ishii Akira (eds), Eto¯ Shinkichi sensei: Hito to gyo¯seki [Professor Eto¯ Shinkichi: His Personality and Works] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1984). As a guide to trends in discussions published in Sekai, an analysis by Baba Kimihiko, a China specialist on the editorial staﬀ of Iwanami Shoten, is very helpful. See his “Sengo Nihon ni okeru tai-Chu¯ ninshiki kairo no hen’yo¯: Zasshi Sekai kanren kiji ni miru” [Changes in Post-war Japanese Perceptions of China as Seen in the Articles in Sekai], Chu ¯ goku Kenkyu¯ Geppo¯, No. 643 (Tokyo: Chu¯goku Kenkyu¯jo, September 2001), pp.21–41. At present, Sekai no longer exerts a powerful inﬂuence on the thinking of the Japanese public as in the past; however, it still maintains prestige as a journal of the left-leaning intellectuals. Its counterweight on the right, Bungei Shunju ¯ , and the centrist Chuo¯ Ko¯ron, also deserve examination. Joining the ranks of these established magazines are two rightwing magazines: Shokun (published also by Bungei Shunju¯sha since 1969) and Seiron (published by Sankei Shimbunsha since 1973). However, a student of the University of Tokyo informs me that nowadays, students do not read these monthlies but manga (Japanese cartoons). Takeuchi Yoshimi, Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshu ¯ [Complete Works of Takeuchi Yoshimi], seventeen volumes (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯, 1980–82). See especially “Kindai no cho¯koku” [To Overcome Modernity], “Nihon to Ajia” [Japan and Asia] in Vol. 8; “Nitchu¯ kankei no yukue” [The Future of Japan–China Relations], “Nihon no dokuritsu to Nitchu¯ kankei” [Japan’s Independence and Japan–China Relations], “Amerika no zaidan no shikin kyo¯yo o meguru mondai” [Problems of Research Grants from American Foundations] in Vol. 9; and essays on normalization of Japan–China relations in Vol. 11. Ando¯ Hikotaro¯, Nihonjin no Chu ¯ gokukan [Japanese Views of China] (Tokyo: Keiso¯ Shobo¯, 1971). This is a collection of Ando¯’s essays written between 1955 and 1970, including the essays written during his extended stay in Beijing as a guest of the Chinese government in the 1960s. Nakajima Mineo was the ﬁrst among Japanese academics to raise serious doubts on the prevailing views of pro-PRC intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution. See Nakajima Mineo, Pekin retsuretsu [Firestorm in Beijing], two volumes (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯, 1981). Shiraishi Bon and Takaichi Keinosuke (eds), Asahi shimbun kyo¯shitsu: Nihon to Chu¯goku [Asahi Lecture Series for Citizens: Japan and China], Vol. 2: Nitchu¯ kankei towa nanika [What is Japan–China Relationship?] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1971). Around this period, the Sankei Shimbun carried many articles critical of pro-China “fever”. Tanaka Akihiko, Nitchu¯ kankei: 1945–1990 [Japan–China Relations: 1945–1990] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991). Tanaka Akihiko, “Nitchu¯ seiji kankei” [Japan–China Political Relations] in Okabe Tatsumi (ed.), Chu ¯ goku o meguru kokusai kankyo¯ (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001), pp.41–78. Ishikawa Tadao, Nitchu¯ mondai shiken [My Personal Views of Japan–China Issues] (Tokyo: Sakai Shoten, 1973), pp.179–81. Nakai Yoshifumi, “Nitchu¯ kankei—Ajia Taiheiyo¯ chiiki ni okeru kyo¯cho¯ to so¯koku” [Japan–China Relations: Cooperation and Rivalry in Asia-Paciﬁc Region], Takagi Seiichiro¯ (ed.), Datsu reisenki Chu¯goku gaiko¯ to Ajia Taiheiyo¯ (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu¯jo, 2000), pp.105–33.

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13 Soeya Yoshihide, “Kokusai seiji no naka no Nitchu¯ kankei: kokko¯ seijo¯ka 25 nen no kiseki” [Japan–China Relations in International Politics: 25 Years’ History Since the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations], Kokusai Mondai, No. 454, January 1998, pp.40–56. 14 Tanaka Kyo¯ko (ed.), Kokusai kankei: Ajia Taiheiyo¯ chiiki chitsujo [International Relations: Asia-Paciﬁc Regional Order], Vol. 8 of Gendai Chu¯goku no ko¯zo¯ hendo¯ [Structural Changes in Contemporary China] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2001). 15 Amako Satoshi and Sonoda Shigeto (eds), Nitchu¯ ko¯ryu¯ no shihanseiki [A Quarter Century of Japan–China Exchange] (Tokyo: To¯yo¯ Keizai Shimpo¯sha, 1998), pp.24–5. 16 For a well-documented analysis of the debate in Japan over the Nanjing massacre, see Yoshida Takashi, “A Battle over History: The Nanjing Massacre in Japan” in Joshua A. Fogel (ed.), The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) pp.70–132. 17 Special issue: “Chu¯goku no bokko¯: Susumu ‘Nihon hazushi’ ni do¯ taiko¯ suruka” [Rising China: How to Counter the Threat of “Japan Passing”?] Chu ¯ o¯ Ko¯ron, February 2002. “Chu¯goku wa kyo¯i nanoka” [Is China a “Threat”?] Sekai, November 2002. ¯ numa Yasuaki (eds) “Sengo sekinin: 18 Tanaka Hiroshi, Utsumi Aiko and O watakushitachi wa senso¯ sekinin shokuminchi shihai sekinin ni do¯ mukiatte kitaka [Postwar Responsibility: How Have We Confronted Japan’s War Responsibility and Responsibility for Japan’s Colonial Rule?]” Sekai, January 2003. 19 Kokubun Ryo¯sei, “Nihon no Chu¯goku kenkyu¯: Kaizen subeki yottsu no mujun” [Chinese Studies in Japan: Four Contradictions that Need to be Corrected] Sekai, March 2001, pp.117–21.

Bibliography Amako Satoshi and Sonoda Shigeto (eds), Nitchu¯ ko¯ryu¯ no shihanseiki [A Quarter Century of Japan–China Exchange] (Tokyo: To¯yo¯ Keizai Shimpo¯sha, 1998). Ando¯ Masashi and Kotake Kazuaki (comps), Nitchu¯ kankei [Japan–China Relations], Vol. 8 of Mo¯ri Kazuko (et al. eds), Genten Chu¯goku gendaishi [Original Documents in Contemporary Chinese History] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994) Baba Kimihiko, “Sengo Nihon ni okeru tai-Chu¯ ninshiki kairo no hen’yo¯—Zasshi Sekai kanren kiji ni miru” [Changes in Post-war Japanese Perception of China: As Seen in the Articles in Sekai], Chu ¯ goku kenkyu ¯ geppo¯, No. 643 (Tokyo: Chu¯goku Kenkyu¯jo, September 2001) Furukawa Mantaro¯, Nitchu¯ sengo kankeishi [Postwar History of Japan–China Relations] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo¯, 1981, 1988) [Note: A detailed account of events along the line of the PRC viewpoint.] Gaimusho¯ [Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs], Waga gaiko¯ no kinkyo¯ [Recent State of Diplomacy of Japan], (1957– Annual) Gaimusho¯ Ajiakyoku Chu¯gokuka [Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Bureau of Asian Aﬀairs, China Section] (comp), Nitchu¯ kankei kihon shiryo¯shu ¯ 1949–1969 [Basic Documents on Japan–China Relations 1949–1969] (Tokyo: Kazankai, l970); Nitchu¯ kankei kihon shiryo¯shu ¯ 1970–1992 (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1993) Gaimusho¯ Sengo Gaiko¯shi Kenkyu¯kai, Nihon gaiko¯ 30nen—Sengo no kiseki to tembo¯ [Thirty Year History of Japan’s Diplomacy: Its Record and Future Perspective] (Tokyo: Sekai-no-Ugoki sha, 1982) Hirano Ken’ichiro¯ (ed.), Ko¯za gendai Ajia: Vol. 4. Chiiki shisutemu to kokusai kankei

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[Series Contemporary Asia, Vol. 4. Regional Network and International Relations] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1994) Ishikawa Tadao, Nitchu¯ mondai shiken [My Personal Views of Japan–China Issues] (Tokyo: Sakai Shoten, 1973) Ishikawa Tadao, Nakajima Mineo, Ikiei Masaru (comps), Sengo shiryo¯: Nitchu ¯ kankei [Post-war Documents on Japan–China Relations] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyo¯ronsha, 1970) Kajima Heiwa Kenkyu¯jo (comp.), Nihon gaiko¯ shuyo¯ bunsho nempyo¯ 1941–1960 [Primary documents and chronology of Japanese diplomacy 1941–1960] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo¯, 1983) Kazankai (comp), Nitchu¯ kankei kihon shiryo¯shu ¯ [Collection of Basic Documents on Japan–China Relations] 1949–1997 (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998) Kojima Tomoyuki, “Gendai Nitchu¯ kankei ron” [Contemporary China–Japan Relations], in Hirano Ken’ichiro¯, (ed.), Ko¯za gendai Ajia Vol. 4. (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1994) Kokubun Ryo¯sei, “Reisen shu¯ketsu go no Nitchu¯ kankei: ‘72nen taisei’ no tenkan” [Japan–China Relations after the Conclusion of the Cold War: Transformation of the ‘1972 System’], Kokusai Mondai No. 490, (Tokyo: Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu¯jo, January 2001) Komori Yoshihisa, Nitchu¯ saiko¯ [Japan–China Relations Reconsidered] (Tokyo: Sankei Shimbunsha, 2001) Maruyama Nobuo, “Nitchu¯ keizai kankei” [Japan–China Economic Relations] in Okabe Tatsumi (ed.), Chu ¯ goku o meguru kokusai kankyo¯ (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001) Maruyama Nobuo, “Nitchu¯ keizai kankei” in Okabe Tatsumi (ed.), Iwanami ko¯za gendai Chu ¯ goku, Vol. 6 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990) Mo¯ri Kazuko (et al. eds), Gendai Chu ¯ goku no ko¯zo¯ hendo¯ [Structural Changes in Contemporary China] eight Vols. (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku, Shuppankai, 2000–2001) Nakai Yoshifumi, “Nitchu¯ kankei—Ajia Taiheiyo¯ chiiki ni okeru kyo¯cho¯ to so¯koku” [Japan–China Relations:Cooperation and Rivalry in Asia-Paciﬁc Region], Takagi Seiichiro¯ (ed.), Datsu reisenki Chu ¯ goku gaiko¯ to Ajia Taiheiyo¯ (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu¯jo, 2000), pp.105–33. ¯ ko¯ [Is Nakajima Mineo and Komori Yoshihisa, Chu ¯ goku wa kyo¯i ka: Genso¯ no Nitchu ¯ yu China a Threat: Myth of Japan–China Friendship] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyu¯jo, 2000) Nakajima Mineo, Chu ¯ goku ni jubaku sareru Nihon [Japan, Spellbound by China] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju¯sha, 1987, 1988) Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu¯jo Chu¯goku bukai (comp), Shin Chu ¯ goku shiryo¯ shu ¯ sei [Collection of Documents on New China] (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu¯jo, 1969, Vol. 3) Nitchu¯ Kokko¯ Kaifuku Sokushin Giin Remmei [League of Diet Members for Resumption of Japan–China Diplomatic Relations] (comp), Nitchu¯ kokko¯ kaifuku kankei shiryo¯ [Documents on Normalization of Japan–China Relations] (Tokyo: Nitchu¯ Kokko¯ Shiryo¯ Iinkai, 1972) Nitchu¯ Yu¯ko¯ Kyo¯kai [Japan–China Friendship Association], Nitchu¯ yu ¯ ko¯ undo¯ goju ¯ nen [Fifty Years of Japan–China Friendship Movement] (Tokyo: To¯ho¯ Shoten, 2000) Nomura Ko¯ichi, Yamanouchi Kazuo, Uno Shigeaki, Kojima Shinji, Takeuchi Minoru and Okabe Tatsumi (eds), Iwanami ko¯za gendai Chu ¯ goku [Iwanami Series on Contemporary China], 8 Vols., (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990–91)

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Ogata Sadako, Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988). Ogura Kazuo, Chu ¯ goku no ishin Nihon no kyo¯ji [China’s Prestige and Japan’s Pride] (Tokyo: Chu¯o¯ Ko¯ron sha, 2000) Okabe Tatsumi (ed.), Chu ¯ goku o meguru kokusai kankyo¯ [International environment surrounding China] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001) Okabe Tatsumi (ed.), Iwanami ko¯za gendai Chu ¯ goku, Vol. 6: Chu ¯ goku o meguru kokusai kankyo¯ [International Environment Surrounding China] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990) Okabe Tatsumi, “Tai-Nichi seisaku” [Policy towards Japan] in Chu ¯ goku So¯ran [Handbook on China, pp.125–40] (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1978) Shimada Masao, Tian Jianong, Sengo Nitchu ¯ kankei goju ¯ nen: Nitchu¯ so¯ho¯ no kadai wa hatasaretaka [Fifty years of Post-war Japan–China Relations: Were the Tasks for Both Japan and China Accomplished?] (Tokyo: To¯ho¯ Shoten, 1997) [Note: Shimada Masao was the Managing Director of the Japan–China Friendship Association from its foundation in1949 through 1984. Tian Jianong was a chief editor of the Peoples’ Daily.] Soeya Yoshihide, “Japan’s Relations with China,” in Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming and Tanaka Akihiko (eds), The Golden Age of the U.S.-China–Japan Triangle, 1972–1989 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Centre, 2002) Soeya Yoshihide, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978, (London: Oxford University Press, 1998) Soeya Yoshihide, Nihon gaiko¯ to Chu ¯ goku 1945–1972 [Japanese Diplomacy and China 1945–1972] (Tokyo: Keio¯ Tsu¯shin, 1995) Takagi Seiichiro¯ (ed.), Datsu reisenki no Chu ¯ goku gaiko¯ to Ajia-Taiheiyo¯ [Chinese Diplomacy and Asia-Paciﬁc in the Post-Cold War-Era] (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu¯jo, 2000) Takagi Seiichiro¯, “Ajia ni okeru datsu reisen katei to Nichi-Bei-Chu¯ kankei” [JapanUS-China Relations in the Process of Ending the Cold War Era in Asia], in Hirano Ken’ichiro¯ (ed.), Ko¯za Gendai Ajia: Vol. 4 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994) Takeuchi Yoshimi, Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshu ¯ [Collected works of Takeuchi Yoshimi] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯, 1980–82) Tanaka Akihiko, “Nitchu¯ seiji kankei” [Japan–China Political Relations] in Okabe Tatsumi (ed.), Chu ¯ goku o meguru kokusai kankyo¯, 2001 Tanaka Akihiko, “Tai-Nichi seisaku” [Policy towards Japan] in Chu ¯ goku So¯ran [Handbook on China] (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990,1994, 2000) Tanaka Akihiko, Nitchu¯ kankei 1945–1990 [Japan–China Relations 1945–1990] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991) Tanaka Akihiko, “Nitchu¯ seiji kankei” [Japan–China Political Relations] in Okabe Tatsumi (ed.), Iwanami ko¯za gendai Chu ¯ goku, Vol. 6, Chu¯goku o meguru kokusai kankyo¯, 1990 Tanaka Kyo¯ko (ed.), Gendai Chu¯goku no ko¯zo¯ hendo¯, Vol. 8: Kokusai kankei—Ajia Taiheiyo¯ chiiki chitsujo [International Relations: Asia-Paciﬁc Regional Order] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2001) Tsuji Ko¯go, “Nitchu¯ kankei” [Japan–China relations] in Nomura Ko¯ichi, Yamauchi Kazuo, Uno Shigeaki, Kojima Shinji,Takeuchi Minoru, Okabe Tatsumi (eds), Gendai Chu¯goku kenkyu¯ annai [Guide to study contemporary China] Iwanami Ko¯za Gendai_Chu ¯ goku: Bekkan [Iwanami Series: Contemporary China] Appendix Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990, pp.320–39)

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Yamada Tatsuo (ed.), Nitchu¯ kankei no 150 nen [150 years of Japan–China relations] (Tokyo: To¯ho¯ Shoten, 1994) ¯ ta Katsuhiro (eds), Zo¯ho kindai Yamane Yukio, Fujii Sho¯zo¯, Nakamura Tadashi, O Nitchu¯ kankeishi kenkyu¯ nyu ¯ mon [Introduction to the Historical Study of Japan– China Relations in Modern Era: Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Kembun Shuppan, 1996) Yoshida Takashi, “A Battle over History: The Nanjing Massacre in Japan” in Joshua A. Fogel (ed.), The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp.70–132.

4

National mythmaking and the problems of history in Sino-Japanese relations He Yinan

The Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945 was unparalleled in either country’s history of external conﬂicts given its enormous scale, brutality and destructiveness. However, for thirty-seven years after the war’s end, the historical interpretation of that war was never a serious political issue between Japan and China. The turning point came in 1982 when a bilateral dispute erupted over Japan’s history textbooks. Since then, acrimonious disputes over perspectives of history have remained unabated. Since the 1990s the rise of Chinese economic power has been accompanied by rapidly increasing bilateral economic cooperation, and yet their political relationship is strained periodically by the problems of history.1 That the legacy of history continues to bedevil Japan–China relations into the twenty-ﬁrst century deﬁes two conventional wisdoms. First is the hope that time heals all wounds: the more distant the trauma, the more likely that painful memories would fade away. Second is the belief that increasing diplomatic, economic and social interactions between both nations would mitigate historical grievances. Why did China and Japan quarrel over history only from the early 1980s and not immediately after the war? This chapter addresses the question by introducing the concept of historical mythmaking. It ﬁrst outlines the key assumptions of historical mythmaking. Next, it examines the origins and evolution of historical myths in Japan and China before the 1980s. Following that is an explanation of how mythmaking patterns in both countries have shifted profoundly since the 1980s leading to disputes about history and casting a shadow over bilateral relations. I argue that the divergence of national memories created by élite historical mythmaking perpetuated and reinforced the problems of history in Japan–China relations. Throughout the postwar period, mythmaking about the history of the war has been prevalent in both countries. But before the 1980s, the mainstream historical narratives of both countries conﬂicted less with each other. The problems of history were subdued because both governments were willing to put aside emotional issues in order to concentrate on attaining some immediate geo-strategic interests against the backdrop of the Cold War. When the domestic political contexts changed in the early 1980s, ﬂagrantly nationalistic historical myths ﬂourished and the gap

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between the two countries’ war memories widened, causing serious political disputes over the issue of history. The hope of resolving the problems of history through bilateral ties hinges on joint and honest eﬀorts to “de-mythify” national histories and work towards a shared transnational memory.

The concept of historical mythmaking National myths are half-truth narratives and beliefs about the origins, identity and purposes of a nation. They form an integral part of the ideological and spiritual foundation for nation and nationalism. Anthony Smith writes: “what gives nationalism its power are myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritage and the way in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias.”2 Three types of national myths are particularly harmful to interstate harmony.3 The ﬁrst is the self-gloriﬁcation myth that inﬂates or fabricates claims of national virtue. Besides, past achievements, perceptions of victimization can also fuel self-gloriﬁcation because they create a “cult of national martyrdom” that bestows upon the nation moral superiority and legitimizes national missions and aspirations.4 The second is the self-whitewashing myth which denies or rationalizes past wrongdoing against others. The third is the maligning-others myth which denigrates others as culturally inferior, and accuses them of malicious intent or holds them responsible for past trauma. The political élite can create and nurture these myths in order to meet political needs such as enhancing regime legitimacy, mobilizing mass support or winning factional competition.5 If purveyed widely and perpetuated through textbooks and the media, these myths can shape the national collective memory and identity signiﬁcantly. Basing mainstream historiography on harmful historical myths often leads to bilateral disputes over historical “facts” and historical “responsibility.” Speciﬁcally, the two sides disagree on “who bears what kind of responsibility to whom for having done what during the past conﬂict.”6 Myths that glorify their own states’ beneﬁcent behaviour and ﬁne qualities, deny guilt for committing wrongdoing, and blame others for all the suﬀering create a chasm between two nations’ interpretations of the past. Such profound disagreement over the past undermines the obligation to fulﬁll one country’s historical responsibility to the other. This includes acknowledging and apologizing for past wrongs, oﬀering material compensation, and bringing culpable actors to justice. Unfulﬁlled obligations will then harden the perpetrator’s claim of its own innocence and the victim’s demand for payment of historical debts. So mythmaking begets mythmaking and the gap between national memories becomes wider, perpetuating bilateral conﬂict over the issue of history. However, mythmaking does not automatically result in historiographic

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clashes. It is possible that states, under certain political circumstances, may create national myths that converge with one another; two sides may agree on a false narrative of the past conﬂict. States may also expediently shelve their disagreement on historical interpretation in favour of more imminent political interests. In both cases, the problems of history became latent but not eliminated. When mythmaking patterns change in a new political environment, dormant problems might well erupt. To resolve these problems and foster mutual understanding and trust, states should avoid historical mythmaking and build shared memories honestly about their past conﬂict. H. Richard Niebuhr notes: “where common memory is lacking, where people do not share in the same past, there can be no real community, and where community is to be formed common memory must be created . . . the measure of our unity is the extent of our common memory.”7 Shared historical memory should ﬁrst be established through joint research and dialogue between independent historians of the relevant countries. Historical collaboration will not only help to set the record straight, but also bridge the gap between nationally bounded interpretations of history. Collaborative writing will help settle the past between former enemy states and foreclose further disputes over history.

Constructing historical myths in the pre-normalization years The aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war saw both countries trying to come to grips with their traumatic wartime experiences. In the process of remembering and forgetting their national past, political élites harbouring special political-ideological goals and interests constructed historical myths that tried to glorify or whitewash the actions of one’s own nation while blaming others for causing the tragedy. Owing to the structural imperative of the Cold War, the war memories of both countries converged on some interpretations while divergences were intentionally downplayed or side-stepped. Consequently, despite historical mythmaking by both countries and the non-settlement of the historical burden during this period, bilateral conﬂict over war historiography was by and large absent. Myths in Japanese war memory After the war ended, three political goals topped the immediate agenda of the Japanese ruling élite: to consolidate conservative control of state power in the face of the leftist challenge, to mobilize public support for economic recovery, and to justify collaboration with the United States. Reinventing history to boost the prestige and inﬂuence of conservative powers became an important political instrument in order to achieve these goals. Speciﬁcally, the conservative élites created three main national myths that embodied a minimalist approach to Japanese war guilt. First was the “myth of the military clique” which held only a small group of military warmongers

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responsible for the war of aggression and claimed that the rest of the nation (including the Emperor, the majority of the conservative ruling class, and ordinary Japanese people) were innocent victims of the war. Second was the Western-biased approach that held Japan responsible for opening hostilities against the Western powers but ignored its actions of aggression and its atrocities in Asian countries. Third is the notion of “sacriﬁce as heroic” that gave imperial soldiers special honour because they sacriﬁced themselves for the nation. From the end of war until the end of American occupation, Japanese the conservative élite took control of some important institutional tools in order to disseminate these self-glorifying and self-whitewashing myths. They were successful largely because their intention of historical mythmaking coincided with the American strategy of supporting a stable conservative government in Tokyo, ﬁrst to use it to achieve occupation objectives and, second to ensure that Japan would be an important anti-communist ally in Asia. The occupation authorities promoted a so-called Paciﬁc War View of History (Taiheiyo¯ Senso¯kan) that emphasized the overwhelming superiority of American military power as the main cause of Japanese defeat and held only the Japanese military clique accountable for the war.8 Designed to dismantle the ideological foundation of wartime militarist politics and set the parameters of Japanese public discourse on the history of the war, the Paciﬁc War View of History also satisﬁed the Japanese conservatives’ need to tone down the issue of war responsibility.9 First of all, the postwar punishment of individuals bearing responsibility for the war perpetuated the conservative historiography through legal measures. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial of 1946–48 did not indict Emperor Hirohito and ascribed war responsibility to only To¯jo¯ and a few top army oﬃcers. Moreover, the Trial focused on Japanese “crimes against peace” in the war with the Western powers while downplaying the atrocities committed mostly in Asian countries.10 The trial ended after convicting only twenty-ﬁve oﬃcials of the imperial government and sentencing seven of them to death, all seven being former army oﬃcers, except To¯jo¯. Thereafter, no further trials were carried out and all the other suspects were released immediately.11 In the realm of history education, supported by the occupation strategy of “indirect rule,” the Japanese government gradually regained central control of educational content through the textbook certiﬁcation system and publication of teaching guidelines.12 As a result, Japanese textbooks in the 1950s and 1960s purveyed “the myth of the military clique” and emphasized Japanese victimhood and paciﬁsm, while accounts of Japanese atrocities in the Asian nations were omitted.13 The institutional framework forged by the government to “bring settlement to the postwar” (sengo shori) also sustained the conservative historiography. The government took swift action to pay generous compensation to war victims associated with the Japanese military but dragged its feet in providing relief to the general Japanese victims of war, and its compensation to domestic victims by far exceeded its reparations to Asia victims.14 As for war commemoration, an oﬃcial ceremony dedicated to

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those who had sacriﬁced their lives for the country has been held annually on 15 August since 1963, and the government gave tacit support to the enshrining of the war dead at the Yasukuni Shrine.15 Other commemorative activities highlighted Japanese victim consciousness and unique paciﬁsm, such as the museums and memorial activities dedicated to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.16 Myths in Chinese Communist historiography In the ﬁrst few years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) had to address a politically unstable environment. Domestically, anti-Communist guerrilla forces supported by the Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taiwan and the US government still operated in various parts of the mainland; internationally, the United States appeared to be containing China by either direct military invasion or military encirclement in China’s surrounding countries. To enhance the legitimacy of the CCP regime and rally mass support against “American imperialism,” communist ideologues conducted a propaganda campaign extolling the CCP while blasting the KMT and the United States as the worst enemies of the Chinese nation. Thus, the national identity of the PRC was anchored on the “deﬁning fundamental ﬁssure” between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists (and their American ally), rather than the antagonism between the Chinese and Japanese nations.17 Chinese historiography praised the CCP as the sole leader of the “Great Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression” and highlighted the heroic PLA (People’s Liberation Army) and underground resistance campaigns led by the CCP. It accused the KMT of kowtowing to and actively collaborating with the Japanese aggressors; it branded the United States as a major threat which backed the KMT government in order to suppress Chinese communism. In school textbooks of the 1950s and 60s, the policies of the KMT and CCP were compared and contrasted to drive home the fundamental diﬀerence between the traitorous, reactionary KMT and the patriotic, progressive CCP.18 Besides textbooks, the government built various memorials to the Chinese revolution. The anti-Japanese war was not singled out for special commemoration but treated as one part of China’s hundred year struggle against foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary forces that ended with the CCP’s victory over the KMT in 1949. Unlike its outright demonization of the KMT and United States, Chinese oﬃcial historiography drew a clear line between “the small handful of Japanese militarists” and the ordinary Japanese people, who were considered as the Chinese people’s fellow victims of the militarists. This “militarists versus people” theme was consistent with Beijing’s diplomatic strategy toward Washington’s Western allies. Chinese leaders saw the world as not merely dominated by two superpower blocs, but also riven by contradictions between superpowers and smaller powers. If China could build a revolutionary

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United Front with socialist countries and smaller Western powers, it would erode international support for the US-led containment against China. Being the most important ally of the United States in Asia, Japan was treated as an important target of the United Front strategy. Diﬀerentiating Japanese militarists and ordinary people in remembrance of the war was deemed useful by the Chinese leaders in order to enhance a favourable impression of Communist China in Japanese society and to encourage Tokyo to abandon the US-Japan security alliance. Therefore, compared to the vivid, detailed description of the roles played by the KMT and CCP during the war, textbook treatment of Japanese policies and actions was rather cut-and-dried, rarely providing concrete data or examples. It did not mince words in condemning Japan for its long-held ambitions of imperialist expansion. But most textbooks focused their attack not on the Japanese nation as a whole, but on ridi (Japanese imperialism), rijun (Japanese military), or rikou (Japanese invaders). And Chinese oﬃcial statements throughout this period held that ordinary Japanese people were not responsible for the war because they did not want it and suﬀered tremendously themselves. Chinese propaganda urged the Japanese people to unite with the Chinese people to oppose Tokyo’s alliance with Washington, which might well drag Japan into another disastrous war.19 Noticeably, China’s diﬀerentiated approach to the question of war responsibility largely overlapped with the “myth of the military clique” in Japanese conservative historiography. Apart from this convergence, however, Chinese oﬃcial historiography diverged from the other two Japanese historical myths, the glorious image of the imperial army and the denial of Asian victimization due to Japanese aggression. To avoid engendering national hatred against Japan that would have confused it with China’s true archenemies, the KMT and the United States, the Chinese government chose to set aside its disagreement with Japan over history. One thing it did was to suppress domestic truth-telling about Japanese war crimes and Chinese suﬀering. Textbooks rarely mentioned Japanese atrocities and, when they did, blamed the failure of the KMT defense strategy just as bitterly as their condemnation of Japanese barbarism. Academic research on this topic was suppressed. In the early 1960s, historians at the History Department of Nanjing University had already conducted a comprehensive investigation of the Nanjing Massacre but it remained unpublished until 1979 when it was only printed for internal circulation. When the Chinese Judge at the Tokyo Trial, Mei Ruao, called for more historical research of the Nanjing Massacre in the 1960s, he was accused of “stirring up national hatred and revenge” against the Japanese people.20 Movies on the SinoJapanese war conspicuously avoided showing Japanese atrocities and the tremendous suﬀering of Chinese people because otherwise they would be disseminating sentimentalism and capitalist humanitarianism that would “dilute our hatred of imperialism” and “lower our morale” against the enemies.21

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Externally, Beijing was exceptionally generous when handling historical legacies with Japan. The CCP Central Committee decided in late 1955 on two principles of dealing with war criminals: no single war criminal should be executed or sentenced to life in jail, and verdicts of imprisonment should be limited to a very small number of people.22 By then about 1,000 Japanese war criminals were detained in China, of whom only forty-ﬁve were sentenced to prison in the 1956 war criminal trials while all the others were pardoned and quickly repatriated. And all those sentenced war criminals, except one person who died during the prison term, were released by March 1964.23 Regarding Japanese war reparations, although oﬃcially reserving the right to demand war reparations after Chiang Kai-shek renounced it in the 1952 Japan-ROC peace treaty, Beijing never made reparations a precondition or bargaining chip in order to establish good relations with Japan. In 1957, a member of a visiting Japan Socialist Party (JSP) delegation asked Premier Zhou Enlai if the Chinese government could adopt a generous policy on the reparations issue. This incident triggered an internal policy debate over reparations among the top leaders who subsequently decided that China would waive demands for reparations as a gesture of friendship to the Japanese people.24 The 1970s: tacit cover-up of the history issue Towards the end of the 1960s, Sino-Soviet confrontation escalated while China and the United States sought political rapprochement. Such profound changes in the US-USSR-PRC triangular relations compelled Beijing to forge a strategic alignment with Japan against the common threat from Moscow. Japan also found the alignment beneﬁcial because its conﬁdence in the US defense commitment weakened after President Nixon issued the Nixon Doctrine signifying American retrenchment in Asia. In order to obtain these immediate strategic gains, both China and Japan were willing to paper over diﬀerences on historiography. Symbolic gestures of contrition were not rare in Japanese diplomacy toward China in the 1970s. Even before becoming Prime Minister, Tanaka believed that Japan’s apology for the war was the ﬁrst precondition for a Sino-Japanese diplomatic breakthrough.25 During his visit to Beijing to sign the joint communiqué of diplomatic normalization, he spoke of the “unfortunate period” of bilateral history over which he expressed “deep reﬂection.” Nevertheless, such an apology was too ambiguous to settle the issue of history. In fact, Tanaka did not regard Japan’s actions clearly as aggression. At a 1973 Diet session, he said that whether the war with China was aggressive or not had to be left for future evaluation.26 Nor did the Japanese government intend to pay war reparations at the time of normalization. But Beijing quickly accepted Tokyo’s superﬁcial apology and conceded claims for war reparations in exchange for early diplomatic recognition. Shortly before Tanaka’s visit to China, Chairman Mao Zedong issued an internal policy instruction that Sino-Japanese normalization would

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“contribute to the struggle against the American and Soviet hegemonism, especially the Soviet revisionism,” but was also useful for opposing a Japanese militarist revival, liberating Taiwan, and mitigating tensions in Asia.27 So at the ﬁrst of the three Zhou Enlai-Takeiri Meetings, the preparatory meetings before reaching the joint communiqué, China had already oﬀered to forgo war reparations.28 Disagreements on the history problem did emerge when China took issue with the phrase that Prime Minister Tanaka used at the welcoming banquet, “Japan caused trouble to the Chinese people,” when referring to the war. While Zhou managed to have the joint communiqué include a more serious expression than Tanaka’s, he pointed out generously right away that both the Chinese and Japanese people were traumatized during the war.29 These goodwill gestures brushed aside the history issue and placed political factors such as the problems of Taiwan and anti-hegemony clause at the centre of normalization negotiations. Strategic interests continued to dictate ¯ hira the subsequent peace treaty negotiations. At the end of the 1970s, the O administration decided to extend low-interest yen loan programmes to China. While some Chinese perceived Tokyo’s economic aid as in lieu of reparations, geo-political and economic interests were the important considerations that ¯ hira to extend aid to China.30 Moreover, Tokyo did not make any prompted O oﬃcial statement explicitly linking the aid programmes to Japanese aggression. So the Chinese public tends to believe that Japan has never compensated Chinese war victims at all. 1982 and beyond: the problems of history erupted Shifting strategic agendas and domestic power struggles since the 1980s led to a reconstructed collective memory in both Japan and China. This process involved not only the ruling élite who shaped ideology but also dissident intellectuals, grass-root social groups and even ordinary people who subverted the standard state historiography with their own recollections and understandings of history. The easing up of Cold War tensions weakened the political incentives for both nations to cap private memories and restrain disputes over history. In Japan, the domestic debate over war history interpretation evolved into a focal point of international attention. In China, the grip of communist ideology on the public memory slackened gradually. More and more Chinese people have come to hold belligerent emotions about the entire Japanese nation rather than just the small military clique. Therefore, bilateral historiographic divergence escalated dramatically and became an outstanding source of bilateral political disputes and tensions. Re-negotiating Japanese national identity Contending forces from both the political left and right emerged and challenged the dominance of the old myths in Japanese collective memory. First,

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the progressive view of history held by the political left urged the Japanese people to face up to Japan’s wartime atrocities in Asia. Although many Japanese had been guilt ridden with regard to China since the end of World War II, it was not until the 1970s that Japanese society saw an outpouring of ﬁrst-hand testimony of Japanese war crimes in the mass media. Most notably, Asahi Shimbun reporter Honda Katsuichi published his book Cho¯goku no Tabi (The Journey in China) based on his visits to many areas in China where he interviewed surviving Chinese victims of the Japanese army’s war crimes.31 Honda’s writings were soon followed by the publication of other private war memoirs that presented candidly both Japanese suﬀering and atrocities. By the late 1980s, such activities had evolved into organized truth-telling campaigns spearheaded by citizens’ groups that involved testimony by not only Japanese people but also war victims in other Asian countries.32 By highlighting the long neglected Japanese individual and state responsibility to Asian victims and calling for genuine atonement, progressive historians sought to debunk the conservative myths that only a small number of militarists were guilty, that Japan was sorry to Western countries but not Asian countries, and that Japanese soldiers were heroes. Domestic left-wing actions were reinforced by protests against Japanese conservative historiography by other Asian countries like China and South Korea, bringing the issue of renegotiating the Japanese national identity to a wider international audience. This was how the 1982 textbook controversy broke out. Under concerted domestic and international pressure, the Japanese government took some conciliatory steps in allowing greater coverage of Asian victimization in school education. At the end of the textbook controversy, the Japanese government agreed to revise the problematic textbooks and promised to “pay full heed to this criticism (from Asian countries about descriptions in Japanese textbooks) in promoting friendship and good will with the nearby countries of Asia.”33 The second challenge to the mainstream conservative historiography was the right-wing, neo-nationalist view of history which emerged as a backlash to both the progressive and conservative narratives. Since the 1980s, the rightwingers have ﬁercely attacked the government for bending to foreign countries so as to include accounts of Japanese war atrocities in history textbooks. They believed that such a “masochistic” view of the nation’s history would hurt national pride and vitality. The past two decades also saw many neonationalist politicians making Freudian slips which gloriﬁed Tokyo’s war of aggression in Asia, claiming that Japan fought a good war to liberate the Asian colonies from the West. The right-wingers also advocated a revisionist perspective on the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, calling it victor’s justice and arguing that Japan should not be singled out for condemnation because other Western countries had done the same in wars. As far as the Japanese government is concerned, it did not try to hold back the right-wing inﬂuence on historical interpretation. To be sure, Tokyo’s conﬁdence on the US defense commitment to Japan had gradually recovered

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towards the end of the 1970s when there was a renewal of East-West confrontation. The US-Japan security alliance was particularly strengthened after Prime Minister Nakasone and President Reagan exchanged visits in 1983. With its geo-strategic interests reassured, Tokyo’s top priority now was to instill pride in Japan’s national identity and seek a leadership role for the nation in international aﬀairs commensurate with its economic power. In support of such internationalist diplomacy, some conservative leaders like Prime Minister Nakasone even propagated the neo-nationalist view of history. In his view, the humiliating defeat in World War II, seven years of foreign occupation, and Japan’s long-time status as a junior partner of the United States stripped a strong sense of national purpose away from the post-war generation. So Nakasone advocated “a transformation of national consciousness.” He remarked: “The ﬁrst necessity is a change in our thinking. Having ‘caught up,’ we must now expect others to try to catch up with us. We must seek out a new path for ourselves and open it up ourselves.”34 To challenge symbolically the post-war taboos that were supposed to have shackled Japan, Nakasone became the ﬁrst postwar Japanese leader to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in an oﬃcial capacity on 15 August 1985, the anniversary of the war’s end. Shortly before the visit, Nakasone openly expressed his disagreement with the Tokyo War Crimes Trial which he believed had “spread throughout Japan a self-torturing belief that our country was to blame for everything.” He asserted: “whatever happens, the state must continue to exist. It is the people who inevitably either bask in glory or are exposed to disgrace, because they are the people. Casting disgrace aside, advancing forward in the pursuit of glory—this is the essence of the nation and of the people.”35 In the 1990s, stung by the lack of international appreciation for its substantial ﬁnancial contribution to the US-led Gulf War, Tokyo sought to play a more active international role, including deploying its military abroad for UN peacekeeping. Given the political culture of paciﬁsm that emerged in Japan after its defeat in World War II, the conservative élites have glossed over Japan’s past militarism to win public support for this new international activism. In this decade, many Japanese cabinet ministers and Diet members visited the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August. Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ even repeated the Prime Minister’s visit in July 1996, a decade after Nakasone’s last visit. In recent years, Monbusho¯ (Ministry of Education) has retreated from a limited tolerance of the progressive historiography in school education. Textbooks approved in 2000 markedly deleted or watered down descriptions of military atrocities.36 In 2001, Monbusho¯ approved the textbook compiled by the ultra-nationalist Japan Society for History Textbook Reform. Not surprisingly, China and the two Koreas have vociferously denounced the new neo-nationalist inspired textbook.

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Old and new myths in Chinese historiography The Cold War constraints on Chinese foreign policy waned since the early 1980s. At the 12th CCP Congress in September 1982, Beijing formally endorsed an “independent foreign policy” that sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union, maintain good relations with the United States (but to avoid getting too close to it), and reinvigorate solidarity with the Third World. Although the continuing Soviet threat prevented China from becoming truly independent of US strategic support, at least rhetorically Beijing vowed to disengage from the superpower struggle and focus on domestic economic programmes. Deng Xiaoping and his protégés gave top priority to economic modernization, the success of which is largely hinged on a general strategy of reform and opening up to the West, including Japan. But the reform-oriented strategy confronted resistance from communist old guards. Economically, Party conservatives like Chen Yun questioned the wisdom of encouraging enterprise autonomy, free market mechanisms and private sectors, especially when the negative side eﬀects of reform and openness such as unemployment and inﬂation, commercialism and higher crime rates materialised.37 In the political domain, conservative old guards within the CCP blamed the reform leaders for a laxity in ideological indoctrination that had given rise to increasingly dangerous intellectual demands for political reforms. They found political allies among senior military leaders, who criticized Deng’s military modernization programme for mistakenly emphasizing “pragmatism over ideology” and undermining the role and prestige of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army).38 To build a broad support base for the general strategy of reform and openness, Deng compromised with conservative communist leaders, especially on certain political and ideological fronts. Deng’s move was not merely a tactical retreat because Deng himself was afraid that too much freedom in the ideological domain would undermine the Party’s power. Although Deng accepted international economic interdependence, he also insisted on protecting China from excessive foreign inﬂuence, especially if such inﬂuence seemed to threaten the ruling foundation of the CCP regime. Thus, the government began to foster a mixture of what Michel Oksenberg calls “conﬁdent nationalism” and “assertive nationalism”.39 It was more or less conﬁdent and aﬃrmative in the economic sphere but remained rigid and assertive in the ideological and cultural spheres where it depicted Western powers as a negative out-group whose interests conﬂicted with those of the in-group, the Chinese nation. This “assertive nationalism” was not only useful in appeasing communist hard-liners who opposed open-door economic reform, it could also strengthen national cohesion and divert public attention away from the negative side eﬀects of economic reforms such as social inequality, corruption, and lack of social welfare. With the inexorable decline of ideological appeal following the crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen movement, assertive nationalism now

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underpins the communist regime’s legitimacy. State propaganda accentuated the diﬀerences between China and other nations, trying to rally public support to the socialist state and keep out Western styles of democracy.40 Reﬂecting this transformation in the political environment, oﬃcial historiography changed considerably. The new historiography no longer centred on the ideological and political conﬂict between the CCP and KMT. Now that national uniﬁcation with Taiwan had become a lofty cause, the KMT (which represented the anti-independence constituency in Taiwan) became regarded as an ally rather than enemy of the mainland government. Rather, the “fundamental ﬁssure” deﬁning Chinese national identity now shifted to the conﬂict between the Chinese and those foreign nations that had invaded and humiliated China in the past, especially Japan. Since the mid-1980s, the government has implemented patriotic education using the past history of resisting foreign aggression in Chinese schools.41 The war of resistance against Japan was an indispensable source material of this education campaign. Rather than being buried in the long history of “revolutionary struggle,” the war was singled out as China’s most important external conﬂict because “China could claim its ﬁrst complete victory against foreign invaders.”42 While praising the leading role of the CCP in winning the war, the new narrative also eulogized Chiang Kai-shek for not abandoning military resistance and even aﬃrming the common ground of the KMT and CCP in opposing foreign aggressors. Textbooks published according to the 1986 Teaching Guideline for the ﬁrst time introduced detailed treatment of the conventional military campaigns fought by KMT troops. New war movies also portrayed the Nationalist government in an unprecedentedly positive light. The movie Xuezhan Taierzhuang (The Bloody Battle of Taierzhuang) particularly stood out as the ﬁrst ﬁlm made in the mainland that broke the taboo on military campaigns by KMT troops against the Japanese invaders.43 The new historiography substituted the “vicious Japanese imperialist aggressors” for the erstwhile KMT villains. Since the late 1980s, textbooks have covered a more comprehensive range of Japanese war crimes than before, providing vivid descriptions, concrete statistics, pictures, and even naming individual villages or persons victimized by Japanese atrocities.44 War movies made since the 1980s have also highlighted Japanese brutality and Chinese suﬀering.45 At the same time, war commemoration in China brought Japanese brutality into the centre of national memory. A memorial for victims of the Nanjing Massacre was completed on the 40th anniversary of the end of the war. On the front wall was inscribed “VICTIMS 300,000” (Beijing’s oﬃcial estimate of fatalities) in Chinese, English, and Japanese, and on the inner wall of the museum was written in large character “Never Forget National Humiliation” (wuwang guochi). Many other museums have also been constructed since mid1980s at the various sites of Japanese atrocities, and almost all of them were designated as sites of patriotic education for school children, the youth, and

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46

soldiers. Academics also conducted deeper investigations of Japanese atrocities in the mainland. The past two decades have seen an enormous amount of academic works, government documents released, and many international conferences held on the subject of the Nanjing Massacre.47 Societal challenges to oﬃcial myths The new oﬃcial focus on Japanese brutality and Chinese misery during the war stimulated victim consciousness among the Chinese public with regard to Japan. Ironically, many ordinary Chinese resented their government’s previous cover-up of Japanese atrocities and were disgusted by state propaganda on Sino-Japanese friendship. Although oﬃcial historiography still distinguishes between Japanese militarists and ordinary Japanese people, Chinese popular understanding of the war has blurred this divide. Best-selling books, Internet chat rooms and other private discussion forums on war history commonly attributed the invasion to the Japanese national character and traditional culture including Emperor-worship and the bellicose samurai spirit of Bushido. Many Chinese now believe that it was not just the small group of militarists but the entire Japanese nation that was brutal, aggressive, and unrepentant.48 Besides mass cynicism towards oﬃcial historiography, an avant-garde cultural élite has also rejected state propaganda. An early controversial ﬁlm on the war was the internationally acclaimed Hong Gao Liang (Red Sorghum) adapted from Mo Yan’s novel. Mo based his novel on orally transmitted stories in his hometown. It was indeed a ground-breaking work which successfully conveyed private memories of the war that had been expunged from the oﬃcial narrative. The main characters in the novel were ordinary men and women living in the countryside who “do not consider themselves to be part of any organized ﬁghting force, nor do they consider themselves to be ﬁghting on the side of righteousness. . . . For these ﬁghters there is no PLA, no Communist Party, no Chairman Mao. They ﬁght to survive, they ﬁght for their land, their native soil (xiangtu). To be a hero is to ﬁght the Japanese.”49 Similar stories in other literary works include the trilogy of novels by You Fengwei50 (one of which, Shengcun or “Survival” was later made into a movie), and Guizi Lai Le, or “Devils at the Doorstep”, by a vanguard Chinese actor-director, Jiang Wen.51 Adding his sarcastic touch, Jiang turned the original story to a farce that mocked the stupidity of those Chinese people who held to the illusion of peaceful negotiation with the Japanese invaders without realizing that the Japanese had no conscience but only greed and barbarism. You and Jiang’s works exempliﬁed a society-based intellectual attempt to smash the half century-long national myth about an honourable and triumphant war. Their narratives also challenged the politicized dichotomy between Japanese militarists and the Japanese people, and between Chinese patriots and traitors.

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Conclusion Since the 1980s, the war memories of the two countries have collided. While the Japanese and Chinese governments still maintain the “myth of the military clique”, public support in the mainland for this interpretation had crumbled. In the mid-1980s waves of anti-Japanese student demonstrations erupted in Beijing and many big cities. Although also motivated by public resentment against oﬃcial corruption and social inequality, student demonstrations revealed that genuine anti-Japanese sentiments were deeply entrenched among ordinary Chinese people. In fact, anti-Japan mass demonstrations routinely became a political concern for both governments on anniversaries of the war or at times of bilateral diplomatic disputes, such as during the 1996 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands incident. Also, societal demands for Japanese oﬃcial restitution, especially grass-roots campaigns demanding Japanese compensation of individual Chinese war victims, have grown since the early 1990s. When the public was agitated, the government faced a diﬃcult dilemma. On the one hand, Beijing attempted to restrain anti-Japanese popular nationalism in case it jeopardized the key interests in Sino-Japanese cooperation. On the other hand, the government has to maintain a hard-line policy towards Japan lest the public criticize its “soft-kneed” diplomacy and challenge regime legitimacy. For instance, during the Asian Cup soccer tournament held in China in summer 2004, driven by the deep-rooted sense of historical grievances against Japan, Chinese soccer fans aimed raucous booing at the Japanese team. When Tokyo lodged formal protests, Beijing replied that some Japanese media and politicians tried to politicize the issue by overreacting to the behaviour of a small number of radical fans. However, Beijing simultaneously urged Chinese fans to exercise self-restraint and deployed a large number of riot police outside the stadium during the ﬁnal game between China and Japan.52 So far the government has managed to suppress large-scale anti-Japanese mass movements, but doing so will be less and less successful with the bilateral problems of history erupting frequently and anti-Japanese popular nationalism brewing widely in Chinese society. Both countries have yet to take any signiﬁcant steps to promote a shared historical memory honestly that would help mitigate the problems of history. Moreover, increased bilateral exchanges did not necessarily forge a common understanding of history between the two neighbours. For example, the education exchanges held between the Chinese Teacher’s Union and the Japanese Teacher’s Union since the mid-1980s were mostly conﬁned to class visits and teachers’ meetings while critique of textbooks focused on Japanese textbooks only.53 The Chinese side insisted on Japanese soul-searching as the solution to bilateral history disputes but declined to reﬂect on its own distortion of historiography.54 Neither did the Japanese government feel obliged to incorporate results of such exchanges by authorizing new school textbooks.

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The burden of history will continue to weigh heavily in contemporary Japan–China relations in the twenty-ﬁrst century. Against the backdrop of China’s vibrant economy and Japan’s stagnation, the current nationalistic mythmaking patterns in both countries will only aggravate the Japanese perception of the “China threat” and Chinese suspicion of Japan’s jealousy and desire to stunt its growth. Without the two states abandoning mythmaking in national historiographies, bilateral relations are unlikely to improve signiﬁcantly even if Japan were to recover. It takes both vision and commitment to genuine reconciliation for China and Japan to take real steps in researching and writing about their common past in war and peace honestly.

Notes 1 Students of Sino-Japanese relations regularly cite the history factor as a serious point of concern in the 1980s and 1990s. See Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Aﬀairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (1996); Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Problem of Memory,” Foreign Aﬀairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (1998); Michael Green and Benjamin L. Self, “Japan’s Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism,” Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996). 2 Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.9. 3 In conceptualizing historical mythmaking, I draw on a number of studies that link hyper-nationalism (poisoned by mythologized national history) and war and conﬂict. They are Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/1991), pp.23–4, idem, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), David A. Mendeloﬀ, Truth-Telling and Mythmaking in Post-Soviet Russia: Pernicious Historical Ideas, Mass Education, and Interests Conﬂict, Ph.D. dissertation (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2001), Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conﬂict (New York: Norton, 2000); Ben Kiernan, “Myth, nationalism and genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2001). 4 On Japanese victim consciousness, see James J. Orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of peace and national identity in postwar Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); Kiichi Fujiwara, “Imagining the past, remembering the future,” Social Science Japan (April 1995), pp.3–5. On Chinese victimhood and nationalism, see Neil Renwick and Qing Cao, “China’s Political Discourse towards the 21st Century: Victimhood, identity, and political power,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter 1999). 5 Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War”, pp.30–2. 6 On war responsibilities, by progressive Japanese intellectuals, see Ishida Takeshi, Kioku to Bo¯kyaku no Seijigaku [The Politics of Remembering and Forgetting] (Tokyo: Akiishi Shoten, 2000), p.165; Ienaga Saburo¯, Senso¯ Sekinin [War Responsibility] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), pp.29–35; Mochida Yukio, “ ‘Senso¯ Sekinin. Sengo Sekinin’ Mondai no Suiiki [The Water Area of the Question of ‘War Responsibility, Postwar Responsibility’],” in Awaya Kentaro¯, Senso¯ Sekinin & Sengo Sekinin [War Responsibility and Postwar Responsibility] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1999). 7 Quoted in Donald W. Shriver Jr., “The Long Road to Reconciliation: Some Moral Stepping Stones,” in Robert L. Rothstein, After the Peace: resistance and reconciliation (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1999), p.210.

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8 For a succinct summary of the content of the Paciﬁc War View of History propagated by the American occupation authorities, see Yoshida Yutaka, Nihonjin no Senso¯kan [The Japanese Views of the War] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1998), pp.31–3. 9 It is worth pointing out that the above-mentioned national myths created by conservative élites were not entirely coherent and mutually supportive. The ﬁrst two aspects of mythmaking ﬁt the Paciﬁc War View of History nicely because they acknowledged the aggressive nature of the war. But the last point inherently contradicted the American indoctrination: if Japan had launched an unjust war, those who fought the war on behalf of Japan could be anything but glorious. Nevertheless, the occupation authorities tolerated the notion of a glorious imperial army told to Japanese domestic audiences, as long as Japanese government acknowledged externally that the war was wrong. ¯ numa, To¯kyo¯ Saiban kara Sengo Sekinin no Shiso¯ e [From the Tokyo 10 Yasuaki O Trial to Postwar Thoughts on War Responsibility] (Tokyo: Toshito, 1993); John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Co./New Press, 1999), Chapter 15. 11 All those sentenced to imprisonment were also set free with the agreement of the Western allies after the San Francisco Peace Treaty. George L. Hicks, Japan’s War Memories: Amnesia or Concealment? (Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookﬁeld: Ashgate, 1997), p.13. 12 See John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954 (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1979), pp.348–56. 13 Robert Fish, “From The Manchurian Incident to Nagasaki in 20 Pages: The Paciﬁc War as Seen in Postwar Japanese High School History Textbooks,” in Edward Beauchamp (ed.), Education in Modern Japan: Old Voices, New Voices (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, forthcoming, 2005); Orr, The Victim as Hero, pp.80–3. 14 Tanaka Hiroshi, “Nihon no Sengo Seikinin to Ajia: Sengo Hosho¯ to Rekishi Ninshiki [Japan’s Postwar Responsibility and Asia: Postwar Compensation and Historical Consciousness],” in Mitani Taichiro¯ (et al. eds), Ajia no Reisen to Tatsu shokuminchi ka [The Cold War in Asia and Decolonization] (Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1993); idem. “Why Is Asia Demanding Postwar Compensation Now?” Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Sciences, No. 28 (1996), p.9; Orr, The Victim as Hero, Chapter 6. 15 Tanaka Nobumasa et al., Izoku to Sengo [War Bereaved Families and Postwar] ¯ e Shinobu, Yasukuni Jinja [The Yasukuni (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); O Shrine] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1986); Itagaki Tadashi, Yasukuni Ko¯shiki Sanpai no So¯katsu [An Overview of Oﬃcial Worship of Yasukuni Shrine] (Tokyo: Tenden Sha, 2000). 16 See Ubuki Satoru, Heiwa Kinen Shikiten no Ayumi [The Steps of Peace Memorial Ceremony] (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, 1992); Lisa Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 17 Rana Mitter, “Behind the Scenes at the Museum: Nationalism, History and Memory in the Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 1987–1997,” The China Quarterly, No. 161 (2000), p.283. 18 The compilation of Chinese textbooks is subject to strictly centralized control by the government. The government exercises direct authority over the educational content through Curricular Standards, or called Teaching Guidelines, which are drafted by the State Education Commission (SEC) and updated every few years. The SEC then entrusts the People’s Education Press to organize textbook authors to prepare oﬃcial textbooks based on the Teaching Guidelines. The discussion in this section is based on an examination of the four editions of oﬃcial textbooks for both junior high and high schools produced in the 1950s and 60s.

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19 See, for example, People’s Daily Editorial on “Japan Being Dragged to the Path of Militarist Revival”, 27 November 1959; People’s Daily Editorial on No More Manchuria Incident in Asia, 18 September 1961; People’s Daily Editorial on “The Living Ambition of the Japanese Militarism”, 19 February 1965. See Tian Huan, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji [Documents on Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1996–1997), Vol. 1, pp.469–72, pp.590–3, pp.780–2. 20 Yang Daqing,“Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on the Rapes of Nanjing,” American Historical Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 (June 1999), p.858. 21 Chen Bo, “Genggao di Juqi Mao Zedong Sixiang Hongqi, Wei Chuangzuo Gengduo Genghao de Geming Junshi Ticai Yinpian er Nuli [Lifting Higher the Red Flag of Mao Zedong Thoughts, Striving for producing More and Better Revolutionary Military Movies],” Dianying Yishu (The Film Arts), August 1960, pp.5–6. 22 Jin Yuan, Qiyuan: Yige Zhanfan Guanli Suozhang de Huiyi [Unusual Destiny: Reminiscences of A Director of War Criminal Prison] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 1999), Chapter 25. 23 Jin, Qiyuan, Chapters 25–27; Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, pp.716–18. 24 The decision-making process of Chinese reparation policy from late 1950s to the 1960s is recollected by Zhang Xiangshan, an important member of Zhou Enlai’s inner group on Japan policy, in his anthology published in 1998. See Zhang Xiangshan, Zhongri Guanxi: Guankui yu Jianzheng [Sino-Japanese Relations: My Humble Opinions and Testimonies] (Beijing: Dandai Shijie Press, 1998), pp.66–70. 25 Tanaka made this point in his speech at a Diet hearing in March 1972. See Hayasaka Shigezo¯, Seijika Tanaka Kakuei [The Politician Tanaka Kakuei] (Tokyo: Shueisha, 1999), pp.400–1. 26 Yoshida, Nihonjin no Senso¯kan, pp.138–40. 27 Mao Zedong, Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao [The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the Nation] (Beijing: Central Documents Publishing Company, 1987–1990), Vol. 13, p.316. 28 The minutes of these meetings, the Zhou-Takeiri Memo, are included in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxian Ji, Vol. 2, pp.89–95. 29 Wang Taiping (ed.), Xingzhongguo Waijiao Wushinian [Fifty Years of Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1999), pp.443–5. 30 Tanaka Akihiko, Nitchu¯ Kankei 1945–1990 [Sino-Japanese Relations: 1945–1990] (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1991), pp.110–13. 31 Honda Katsuichi, Chu ¯ goku no Tabi [The Journey in China] (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1994). 32 A noted example was the Osaka-based Association of Remembering and Sympathizing with the War Victims in the Asian Paciﬁc Region, which holds public hearings on Japanese war atrocities throughout Asia and has put out twelve volumes of these hearing records from 1988 to 1999. See The Association on Remembering War Victims (ed.), “The Voice of Asia” book series (Tokyo: Toho Shuppan). 33 Caroline Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A case study in political decision-making (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), pp.113–15. 34 Quoted from Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and purpose in a new era (Washington, AEI Press, 1992), pp.90–1. 35 Nakasone believed that once the apology was made, no further actions of historical settlement were necessary. As he said in a newspaper interview in 1997, “we have been apologizing, and the act of contrition has been performed. It is all over and done with.” For quotes of Nakasone’s statements, see Wakamiya Yoshibumi, Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the political right delayed Japan’s coming

86

36

37

38 39 40

41

42 43

44

Japan’s Relations with China to terms with its history of aggression in Asia (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1998), p.171, p.182. Asahi Shimbun, 10 September 2000. Many of these changes were caused by the socalled “voluntary restraint” of textbook publishers during the textbook screening process, which was actually the result of political coercion by Monbusho¯ and the Oﬃce of the Prime Minister. See Tawara Yoshifumi, “Junior High School History Textbooks: Whither ‘Comfort Women’ and the ‘Nanking Massacre’,” Sekai (November 2000). On the intense rivalry between diﬀerent strategies of economic reform in the 1980s, see Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp.77–90. Among those most dissatisﬁed with the economic reform in the 1980s were many urban workers, who felt that reforms had generated highly unequal opportunities for them, reﬂected in oﬃcial corruption, striking income disparity between workers in private and foreign-owned ﬁrms and those in state-owned enterprises, and the rise of job insecurity after companies began to introduce layoﬀ as a management means. Another widely complained issue was inﬂation. The inﬂation rate jumped from 2.8 per cent per year during 1978–84 to 12 per cent during 1985–88. Although their living standard considerably improved since the reform began, urban wage earners saw the price hikes eating away a big part of their nominal income increase. A 1986 national sample shows that oﬃcial corruption and inﬂation were the two issues that citizens were most upset about. See Andrew G. Walder, “Urban Industrial Workers: Some Observations on the 1980s,” in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, State and Society in China: The consequences of reform (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations, pp.72–7. Michel Oksenberg, “China’s Conﬁdent Nationalism,” Foreign Aﬀairs, Vol. 65, No. 3 (1987). It is worth noting that during the 1980s and 1990s the Chinese government did not intend to provoke anti-West xenophobia among the general public, which would undermine its economic programs and even jeopardize the political stability. The agenda of the oﬃcial discourse of nationalism is primarily domestic. Nevertheless, in order to foster the oﬃcial nationalism the Chinese ruling élites resorted to the construction of pernicious national myths, including those that highlighted the conﬂict between the Chinese and Japanese nations. As illustrated later in this article, such a new pattern of historical mythmaking inadvertently stimulated an outburst of anti-Japanese popular nationalism. On the distinction between oﬃcial nationalism and popular nationalism in China, see Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 5, “The Oﬃcial Discourse of Nationalism: Patriotism and the Constraints of Nationalism.” For an overview of the government policy on patriotic education in Chinese schools since the 1980s, see Pu Weizhong et al., Aiguo Zhuyi Yu Minzu Jingshen [Patriotism and National Spirit] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000), pp.75–84. See “Jiang Zeming’s Speech at the Veterans’ Symposium Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, August 25, 1995,” in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, p.939. Yang Guangyuan and Zhai Junjie, “ ‘Xuezhan Taierzhuang’ Daoyan Yishu Zhongjie [Summary of Director Art on Xuezhan Taierzhuang],” Zhongguo Dianying Nianjian [China Film Yearbook] (Beijing: China State Administration of Radio and Television, 1987), pp.3–12 to 3–16. See the junior high school textbook 9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu 4 Nianzhi Chuji Zhongxue

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45

46

47

48

49 50 51 52 53

54

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Jiaokeshu Zhongguo Lishi (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 1992), Vol. 4; the high school textbook Gaoji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Jindai Xiandai Shi (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 1992), Vol. 2. For example, a number of ﬁlms made in this period were particularly dedicated to the Nanjing Massacre, including the documentary ﬁlm Nanjing Datusha [Nanjing Massacre] released in August 1982, and feature ﬁlms Tucheng Xuezheng [Bloody Testimony of Massacre in A Captured City] and Nanjing Datusha (Nuanjing Massacre] produced in 1987 and 1995 respectively. The Chinese government also partially subsidized the production of a horror ﬁlm that was shown to the public around 1988, Hei Taiyang 731 [Men Behind the Sun], on the germ warfare conducted by the secret Japanese Unit 731 in mainland China during the war. See Yang Daqing, “Contested History: The Nanjing Massacre in Postwar Japan and China,” in Fujitani Takashi (et al. eds), Perilous Memories: The Asia-Paciﬁc Wars (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001); “Yizhi, Jiuzhi, Jinian Sheshi [Ruins, Old Sites, and Memorial Facilities], in Zhang Shaosi (et al. eds), Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Dacidian [The Dictionary of Chinese War of Resistance against Japan] (Wuhan: Wuhan Chubanshe, 1995). For examples, see The Committee for Compiling Historical Records of the Nanjing Massacre, Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao [Historical Narratives on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1987); Zhu Chenshan (ed.), Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Xincunzhe Zhengyanji [Testimonies of the Survivors of the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China] (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1994); Chinese Second National Archives in Nanjing (ed.), Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Dangan [Archives on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China], (Nanjing: Jiansu Guji Chubanshe, 1997); Chen Anji (ed.), Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shi Guoji Xueshu Yantaohui Lunwenji [The Anthology of the International Symposium on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China], (Hefei: Anhui Daxue Chubanshe, 1998). For some examples of best-selling books with a sweeping anti-Japanese view, see Song Qiang et al, Zhongguo haishi nengshuo bu [China That Still Can Say No] (Beijing: Chinese Wenlian Press, October 1996); Sun Keqin, Ezhi Zhongguo [Containing China] (China Yanshi Press, 1996); Xiao Jiwen, Riben: Yige Bukeng Fuzui de Guojia [Japan: A Country that Refuses to Admit Its Crimes] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1998). Peter Li, “War and Modernity in Chinese Military Fiction,” Society, Vol. 34, No. 5 (July/August 1997), p.86. For You Fengwei’s war triology, see Xu Peifan, Cong “Shengcun” dao “Guizi Laile” [From Novel “Survival” to Film “Devils at the Doorstep”] (Beijing: Beijing Chubanshe, 1999). A movie made in 1999 that won the Grand Prix at the Cannes Film Festival, “Devils at the Doorstep” has been banned in China ever since it was completed. “Chinese riot after Japan victory,” BBC News, 7 August 2004; “In Soccer Loss, a Glimpse of China’s Rising Ire at Japan,” The New York Times, 9 August 2004. Hitaka Rokuro¯, Nihon to Chu ¯ goku: Wakamono-tachi no Rekishi Ninshiki [Japan and China: The Historical Views of the Youth] (Tokyo: Nasunokisha, 1995); Wang Hongzhi, “Zhongri Lishi Jiaokeshu de Jiaoliu [Sino-Japanese History Textbook Exchange],” Lishi Jiaoxue, No. 1 (1999). Amako Satoshi, Nitchu¯ Ko¯ryu¯ no Shihanseki [A Quarter Century of Japan–China Interaction] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinpo¯sha, 1998), pp.122–3.

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Ninshiki [Japan’s Postwar Responsibility and Asia: Postwar Compensation and Historical Consciousness].” in Mitano Taichiro¯ (et al. eds), Ajia no Reisen to Tatsu shokuminchi ka [The Cold War in Asia and Decolonization] (Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1993). —— “Why Is Asia Demanding Postwar Compensation Now?” Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies, No. 28 (1996). Tanaka, Nobumasa et al., Izoku to Sengo [War Bereaved Families and Postwar] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995). Tawara, Yoshifumi, “Junior High School History Textbooks: Whither ‘Comfort Women’ and the ‘Nanking Massacre’,” Sekai (November 2000). Tian, Huan, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji [Documents on Postwar SinoJapanese Relations] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1996–1997), Vols 1 & 2. Ubuki, Satoru, Heiwa Kinen Shikiten no Ayumi [The Steps of Peace Memorial Ceremony] (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, 1992). Van Evera, Stephen, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/1991). —— “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994). Wakamiya, Yoshibumi, Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the political right delayed Japan’s Coming to Terms with Its History of Aggression in Asia (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1998). Walder, Andrew G., “Urban Industrial Workers: Some Observations on the 1980s,” In Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum (ed.), State and Society in China: The consequences of reform (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). Wang, Hongzhi, “Zhongri Lishi Jiaokeshu de Jiaoliu [Sino-Japanese History Textbook Exchange],” Lishi Jiaoxue, No. 1 (1999). Wang, Taiping (ed.), Xingzhongguo Waijiao Wushinian [Fifty Years of Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1999). Whiting, Allen S., China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). Xiao, Jiwen, Riben: Yige Bukeng Fuzui de Guojia [Japan: A Country that Refuses to Admit Its Crimes] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1998). Xu, Peifan, Cong “Shengcun” dao “Guizi Laile” [From Novel “Survival” to Film “Devils at the Doorstep”] (Beijing: Beijing Chubanshe, 1999). Yang, Daqing, “Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on the Rapes of Nanjing,” The American Historical Review (June 1999). —— “Contested History: The Nanjing Massacre in Postwar Japan and China,” in Fujitani Takashi (et al. eds), Perilous Memories: The Asia-Paciﬁc Wars (Durham, NC: The Duke University Press, 2001). Yang, Guangyuan and Zhai Junjie, “ ‘Xuezhan Taierzhuang’ Daoyan Yishu Zhongjie [Summary of Director Art on Xuezhan Taierzhuang],” in Zhongguo Dianying Nianjian [China Film Yearbook], 1987. Yoneyama, Lisa, Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). Yoshida, Yutaka, Nihonjin no Senso¯kan [The Japanese Views of the War] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1998). Zhang Shaosi (et al. eds), Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Dacidian [The Dictionary of Chinese War of Resistance against Japan] (Wuhan: Wuhan Chubanshe, 1995). Zhang, Xiangshan, Zhongri Guanxi: Guankui yu Jianzheng [Sino-Japanese Relations: My Humble Opinions and Testimonies] (Beijing: Dandai Shijie Press, 1998).

National mythmaking and the problems of history

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Zheng, Yongnian, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, identity, and international relations (Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999). Zhu, Chenshan (ed.), Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Xincunzhe Zhengyanji [Testimonies of the Survivors of the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China] (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1994).

5

Japanese ODA policy toward China The new agenda David Arase

Japan’s ODA yen loans were cut in FY 2002 (starting April 1) by 25 per cent from the previous year’s level. Because yen loans make up over 90 per cent of Japanese ODA to China, this implies an overall reduction of over 20 per cent. In addition, new priority is being given to environmental and social welfare activities. These changes reﬂect a new approach in Japanese ODA policy toward China that was announced in October 2001 (See Appendix I). The key shifts may be brieﬂy summarized as follows: 1) from the creation of physical assets to human and institutional capacity; 2) from the support of coastal industrial and trade sectors to inland region social and environmental sectors; 3) from impersonal aid to “aid with a human face;” 4) from high spending to lower spending; and 5) from little political conditionality to greater political conditionality. This is not to suggest that there will be large movement in all dimensions; only that there will be movement with the extent to be determined in each case by organizational interests and evolving political circumstances. This shift in ODA policy toward China will likely inﬂuence the future of Japanese ODA, and it has implications well beyond the narrow conﬁnes of ODA as a functional policy area, because Japan’s change in ODA policy toward China reﬂects changes in Japanese thinking about its broader comprehensive security needs. The reduction of aid is a break from the pattern started in 1979 when Japan began giving ODA to China. Generally speaking, in the two decades following 1979 Japan devoted roughly 10 per cent of its growing bilateral ODA programme to China. From 1979 to 1999 Japan gave China 2.69 trillion yen in ODA loans and grant aid, or over $20 billion.1 Yen loans to ﬁnance trade and production related infrastructure projects such as ports, airports, railways, road transportation, and power generation and transmission, as well as urban water supply and sewage systems, accounted for a little over 90 per cent of this total. The balance of Japanese ODA, roughly a billion dollars, was given in grant aid, which includes construction projects such as hospitals and training centres, and technical assistance. Japanese ODA accounted for roughly two-thirds of all bilateral ODA to China from OECD countries in this period. The cumulative impact of the ﬁrst twenty years of Japanese ODA in China has been considerable, with the Japanese government

Japanese ODA policy toward China 93 estimating that its ODA funded 38 per cent of China’s railway electriﬁcation, 16 per cent of harbour improvement projects, 25 per cent of fertilizer production growth, and 3 per cent of electrical power generation achieved in China in this period.2 Nevertheless, the political impact of this contribution to China’s modernization has been small, simply because it is not widely known either in China or in the international community. Moreover, with the passage of time the economic signiﬁcance of Japanese ODA and indeed, ODA in general, to China’s modernization has diminished considerably. For example, in the 1989–1990 period Japan’s annual net ODA to China was $7.7 billion, or about 1.9 per cent of China’s GDP; but by the 2000–2001 period when China’s GDP hit the one trillion dollar mark, Japan’s annual ODA to China of $7.9 billion was only 0.8 per cent of China’s GDP. When one considers that over the same decade China gained increasing access to foreign capital and technology on a commercial basis, witnessed by the fact that net foreign direct investment as a percentage of China’s GDP grew from 1.0 per cent to 3.8 per cent, the waning signiﬁcance of Japan’s ODA is even clearer.

Japan’s new attitude toward China There are certain general factors now causing Japan reconsider the value of giving ODA to China. On the international front a conﬁdent United States is determined to press its advantages in every key region of the world in order to make itself the world’s “indispensable nation.” In East Asia this has created a conﬂict of ambitions between the United States on the one hand, and China (and North Korea) on the other. Within the newly restructured US-Japan alliance, Japan ﬁnds itself ﬁrmly on the US side in a strategic environment that has produced three signiﬁcant missile ﬁring events near Japan since 1995. Inevitably, as US-China relations have deteriorated due mainly to conﬂict over the Taiwan issue, so have Japan–China relations, leading Japan to take a serious look at China’s rapidly growing military capabilities and longer term intentions.3 On the domestic front, Japan has been, and will continue to be mired in economic and political diﬃculties that aﬀect its world view. A decade of no growth, “hollowing out” due to the export of production to low cost areas such as China, growing unemployment, a mounting ﬁscal crisis, and a rapidly ageng population has created profound anxiety about the future. Japan is in dire ﬁscal and ﬁnancial shape. Due to the high level of central government debt in Japan (currently about 130 per cent of GDP), a declining international credit rating, and over a decade of annual budget deﬁcits with no end in sight, the pressure in Japan to cut unwise spending is intense. The political crisis caused by these economic headaches feeds into the review of China policy. It is clear that the élite bureaucracy that led Japan during the postwar miracle has been unable to meet the new policy needs of Japan in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the bureaucracy has resisted

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change due to its entrenched habits, values, and self-interest. For this reason leadership initiative is passing to elected politicians, who are unaccustomed to this responsibility and still remain heavily dependent on the bureaucracy for information and analysis of policy issues. This group also has not yet risen to the occasion, but it will have to because there is no alternative. So far the LDP has had its share of failures, the most notable being its loss of power in 1993. But the LDP’s rivals have also failed to ﬁll the leadership void, leaving the LDP still the single largest party in the Diet. Nevertheless, as the politicians slowly ﬁnd their feet they will review and debate key national policies, prodded by the media, foreign criticism, and events. Attention will be given to issues that will allow politicians to blame the bureaucracy for failure in order to create space for political initiative and make a name for themselves. Foreign policy is a tempting target, with the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (MOFA) currently suﬀering the blame and approbation of the public for a multitude of sins, including misuse of funds, insubordinate behaviour toward former foreign minister Tanaka Makiko, and kow-towing to the corrupting inﬂuence of politicians such as Suzuki Muneo. China policy is now attracting great outside scrutiny and skepticism, with MOFA’s mishandling of the Shenyang consular incident (in which Chinese police forced their way into the diplomatic compound and arrested several North Koreans claiming political asylum) serving as a lightning rod for criticism of MOFA’s ODA-centred China policy.4 As Japan looks to the future, on balance China is now seen to be a problematic factor. This is partly a result of generational change as younger leaders with no memory of, or guilt about World War II take over from their elders. This younger generation may or may not believe an apology is due to China, but there is little evidence to suggest it feels Japan owes any more economic assistance to China given the amount Japan has already given China, that country’s obvious success in modernization, and its overtly negative attitude toward Japan. In the strategic dimension, China’s double digit growth in military spending for over a decade, its development and purchase of new weapons that can threaten Japan, and its lack of transparency leave Japan fearful for its long term security. In the economic dimension, if present trends continue China could match Japan’s GDP in twenty years, and in the process of China catching up, Japan’s manufacturing and agriculture could be adversely aﬀected, and Japan’s overall economic competitiveness could suﬀer. In the diplomatic dimension, bilateral relations have been marred by continuing Chinese criticism of Japan for not oﬀering an adequate apology for wartime aggression, not banning right wing history textbooks, and not ceasing visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by government oﬃcials. On top of this, the Shenyang consulate incident in May 2002 and the trade conﬂict in the Spring of 2001 have added new negative elements to a diﬃcult bilateral relationship. The last straw is that, at a time when Japan is giving China some 200 billion yen in ODA, China is reportedly giving some 60 billion yen in foreign assistance to support China’s ambitious foreign and security policies

Japanese ODA policy toward China 95 5

annually. The general feeling now is that Japan should not count on China to build relations of mutual beneﬁt, although in reality the jury is still out on this question. In view of the above perceptions Japan is changing its ODA to avoid subsidizing China’s ability to undermine Japan’s security and economic competitiveness, and to signal China that all is not well in their relationship, and that things could get worse if China does not change its behaviour. The turning point in Japan’s perception of China was probably marked by Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s unsuccessful visit to Tokyo in 1998 when he ruﬄed feathers by brusquely demanding a written apology for Japanese wartime aggression against China, as well as a formal endorsement of a “three no’s” policy toward Taiwan. Following this there were incursions into Japan’s exclusive economic zone by the Chinese navy and a circumnavigation of Japan by a Chinese warship that garnered much media attention. Last year when Japan restricted imports of Chinese leeks and mushrooms to protect Japanese small farmers, China angrily responded with 100 per cent tariﬀs on high value Japanese exports to China such as cell (mobile) phones and automobiles, despite the fact that Japanese ODA far outweighed the small loss of China’s exports to Japan. Many in Japan now doubt that China will ever accord Japan respect as an equal nation and regional partner unless there is some fundamental change in the direction of bilateral relations.6 Although mainstream Japan has not lost sight of the beneﬁts of engaging China and, therefore, there is no serious prospect of Japan abruptly ending ODA to China despite recent calls by conservative politicians and media to do so, Japan is now clearly trying to signal China by reducing and reorienting its ODA.7

The rationale behind Japan’s new ODA proﬁle Let us examine the thinking behind each of the ﬁve inter-related ODA shifts mentioned at the outset. As a general background note, the ﬁrst three shifts are not really new developments. They are key elements of the International Development Strategy endorsed by the international ODA community (including Japan) in 1996.8 Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯’s ODA Reform Council for the 21st Century issued a report in 1998 that strongly endorsed this new philosophy and called for Japanese ODA policy to focus on “human-centered development” and poverty alleviation. These concerns were then incorporated into Japan’s ODA Mid-Term Policy Outline published in 1999. Japan has been having diﬃculty actually implementing the new ODA philosophy, however, and it will be interesting to see whether Japan will use the need to change China policy to make progress toward meeting the new goals. It should be mentioned, however, that the Chinese side may not welcome the eﬀorts entailed, such as stimulating policy debate in civil society or empowering the disenfranchised poor to participate in setting ODA policy.

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Moving from physical infrastructure to capacity-building As is well-known, Japanese ODA traditionally has emphasized yen loans to ﬁnance trade and production-related infrastructure in Asia. Today, however, when China is ﬁnancially and technically able to build its own bridges, dams, ports, railways, and power plants, the Japanese feel this kind of aid not only is no longer needed, but may in fact subsidize China’s economic and security challenge to Japan by freeing up Chinese budgetary resources for industrial, military, and diplomatic uses. Instead of providing “hard” physical infrastructure, the Japanese now are shifting to such “soft” areas as building human capacity through education and training as well as institutional capacity in such areas as legal, technical, ﬁnancial, and commercial regulation in order to bring China into WTO compliance and improve the investment climate for Japan. The implication is that Japanese ODA will be reducing its emphasis on ODA loans and will increase its emphasis on grants and technical cooperation. Moving from boosting trade and industrial production to social and environmental concerns As indicated above, China is now doing quite well at expanding its trade and industrial capacity on its own, but it now faces the growing negative environmental consequences of this success. Pollution and environmental degradation as a result of industrial production; poverty and growing regional income inequality; and a growing population that tests the limits of China’s political and ecological systems are problems that can directly aﬀect Japan. For example, acid rain falling on Japan originates in China; competition with China for scarce resources can be expected to sharpen; and widespread poverty and ecological breakdown in China can increase the ﬂow of migrants toward Japan. Thus, it is in Japan’s interest to help China deal with the “3 Ps”, i.e., the problems of pollution, poverty, and population. This will require Japan to change the sector allocation of its ODA from industrial production to the environment, poverty alleviation, and population issues. This shift in sector emphasis may mean that the geographical distribution of Japanese ODA inside China will move from the coast to inland areas, but this possibility should not be exaggerated because in terms of actual environmental need, the coastal areas still must be considered a high priority. Moving from impersonal to personal aid relationships The eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of traditional capital-intensive loan and grant aid has been subject to criticism inside Japan. The degree of waste, corruption, and fraud in large capital intensive ODA projects in general, and in ODA to China in particular, has been the subject of increasing attention inside Japan.9 Moreover, this form of aid does not foster the kind

Japanese ODA policy toward China 97 of grass-roots, people to people contact that could build better mutual understanding and trust in bilateral relations, something that is badly needed at this point. It is believed that smaller scale projects carried out at the community level have less scope for waste and ineﬃciency. It is also believed that smaller but more numerous activities carried out by NGOs and local entities that have invested themselves in an aid programme will have greater eﬀectiveness in fostering human contact between donor and recipient, and will spread popular awareness of Japanese ODA activities more widely than large, impersonal aid monuments. Moving from high budgetary spending to lower budgetary spending As Japan looks for ways to cut its ODA budget, China is the single biggest target. In the past decade, more often than not China has been the single largest recipient of Japanese bilateral ODA accounting for roughly 10 per cent of total outlays. Cumulatively, it is second only to Indonesia, which started receiving Japanese ODA in the form of reparations two decades before the start of ODA to China in 1979. Add to this past favourable treatment the perception that Japanese ODA is subsidizing the rise of a Chinese economic and military threat, and you have a compelling argument to cut ODA to China. For these reasons Japan cut yen loans to China and switched from multi-year budget planning to single-year budget planning to facilitate future spending ﬂexibility. Moving from little political conditionality to greater political conditionality Implicit in the cut in Japanese ODA to China is the message that to some extent Japanese concerns regarding China’s military intentions and behaviour are not being met. And in the ODA Charter of 1992, Japan pledged to condition its ODA according to the recipients’ record in human rights as well as the development, production, and transfer of weapons. In the past, Japan has implemented symbolic ODA sanctions against China, notably by freezing a token amount of grant aid following a Chinese nuclear test in 1995. But the large cut in ODA lending this past year accompanied by loud complaints inside Japan about China’s growing military capabilities suggest that there will be continuing domestic debate and more Sino-Japanese tensions over the extent to which Japanese ODA should react to China’s growing military power.

The scope for Japanese environmental assistance to China The basic ecological problem is that China has one-ﬁfth of the world’s population living on one-ﬁfteenth of the world’s arable land. Per capita ownership of water, forest, and energy resources is only a small fraction of the world’s

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average. With this small per capita resource base China aims to quadruple its current low per capita GDP of $1,000 within twenty years. China’s State Environmental Protection Administration issued the 2001 Annual State of the Environment Report in May this year.10 It identiﬁed such problems as the pollution of lakes, rivers, and oceans; air pollution in major cities; deforestation; desertiﬁcation; and acid rain. As documented in this and other reports by Greenpeace11 and the World Bank,12 environmental stress is already chronic in China. For example, among China’s 600 cities over one half has insuﬃcient water supplies and over 100 have serious shortages, while coastal cities dump 10 billion tons of raw sewage into the ocean each year. There is now chronic ﬂooding due to deforestation in some areas, notably the Yangtze River region where the 1998 ﬂood caused some $36 billion in direct damage; and growing aridity in other areas illustrated by the Yellow River, whose water since 1978 has been depleted before it can reach the sea; dust storms and annual loss of farmland due to desertiﬁcation; air pollution in major cities that can exceed US minimum health standards by ten times; and acid rain that falls on 30 per cent of the country. Greenpeace China estimated that direct economic losses from pollution alone amount to 3–5 per cent of China’s GDP.13 There is also the problem of greenhouse gas emissions. China accounted for 13 per cent of the world total in 1998 (compared to 23 per cent for the United States and 5 per cent for Japan), but on a per capita basis it produced seven times as much CO2 to produce a dollar of GDP as in the advanced West. Thus, Greenpeace calls China’s continuing industrialization under present conditions an environmental threat to the world.14 There is a vast array of ways China can be helped to deal with these problems. For example, China’s water-related problems require projects in ﬂood control, irrigation, reservoirs, water puriﬁcation, sewage treatment, water conservation technologies, and pollution reduction eﬀorts such as the development of non-phosphate detergents. In the area of air pollution and greenhouse gases, there are many measures that can be taken such as developing cleaner coal burning technologies; alternative energy; cleaner gasoline and auto engine technologies; more urban public transportation systems; cleaner power generation (70 per cent of power generation is ﬁred by old coal burning technologies that are responsible for acid rain); more eﬃcient electricity transmission and usage; better refrigeration technologies; reforestation (that earns Japan carbon emission credits under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Treaty); and so on. As China develops, its consumption of resources and its production of pollutants will have a global impact, and Japan will bear the brunt of it. The impact is already evident in the fact that 40 per cent of the acid rain damaging Japan originates in China.15 Already there is sharpening competition for natural resources, and conﬂict brews over the energy resources that are believed to reside below the South China Sea and the East China Sea. It is safe to say that Japan will ﬁnd ample opportunities, and ample self-interested reasons, to direct its ODA toward environmental sustainability problems in China.

Japanese ODA policy toward China 99 Japan’s environmental cooperation with China has grown from only 2 per cent of yen loans in FY 1995 to 65 per cent of yen loans in FY 1999. The FY 1999 loans had thirty-three projects in the environment category featuring areas such as water supply, water pollution, ﬂood control, hydropower, a thermal power plant, power transmission, and urban air pollution monitoring and abatement programmes (the so-called model city project). It should also be noted that Japan is eager to assist China within [sic] multilateral frameworks such as the East Asian Acid Rain Monitoring Network established among ten countries in 2000 and the North-West Paciﬁc Action Plan to coordinate ocean pollution abatement in the Japan Sea region. Although the reasons for Japan’s declaratory policy shift toward the emphasis of “soft” aid with a “human face” targeted at the “3 Ps” may be understood as described above, its actual implementation will not be easy, and in fact, could exhibit a high degree of continuity with ODA as presently constituted. That is, aside from ruling out certain kinds of infrastructure projects and making ODA volume more responsive to changing circumstances, Japan’s eﬀort to meet the new ODA proﬁle for China could merely result in the repackaging of many existing projects and programmes. From an administrative viewpoint Japan’s ODA is characterized by a Tokyo-centred, one-size-ﬁts-all, build-and-transfer system in which virtually all main ministries and agencies have their own respective competencies, budgets, and programmes. Aid requests by recipient governments are submitted to overseas embassy personnel who send them to Tokyo for review. Decision-making takes place in Tokyo; there is a limited menu of stereotypical projects and programmes that Tokyo will actually approve; and implementation features the simple creation of a generic project in the recipient country. Once completed, it is up to the recipient to make sure it is put to good use. The result of this system is that ODA often does not match local needs, and there is little systematic post-completion support and evaluation. As a result Japan’s ODA has been marked by low impact and low sustainability. This pattern is compounded because each of the thirteen main ministries and agencies responsible for handling their respective functional competencies in ODA has its own formula for ODA. The result is an amazingly complex and opaque system that is resistant to change. It is doubtful this system can be reformed piecemeal to deliver all aspects of the new kind of ODA so long as the main structural elements remain unchanged. The new kind of ODA Japan wishes to implement features developmental partnerships, capacity building, and sustainability. The development partnership concept requires donor and recipient ODA stakeholders from all relevant levels of government and civil society to participate in project identiﬁcation, design, and implementation. For this kind of aid to be eﬀectively designed and delivered, however, a number of structural changes are needed. Decision-making authority should shift to the ﬁeld oﬃce; local staﬀ must be increased in number and must be conversant with local languages and culture; development experts must be continuously on location to help design

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and implement aid tailor-made to local circumstances; Japanese NGOs must be allowed into the process, as must government and civil society actors at the local level; and the whole system must be centralized and uniﬁed into a single agency run by development specialists responsible to a Cabinet-level minister. What is likely to happen is that only incremental change will materialize in the near future.16 In particular, we may see more involvement of certain kinds of NGO (i.e., those that have the favour of a supervising Japanese ministry or agency), and an improved ability of local staﬀ to interact with local society and other aid donors. But under the guise of partnership the Japanese private sector may now play a legitimate overt role as an aid stakeholder on the Japanese side. If this is the case, then existing kinds of capital intensive aid activity will simply be repackaged. The temptation on the Japanese side will be to continue to do the kinds of infrastructure construction they have been doing for the past thirty years, only moving them inland and reclassifying them as environmental projects. For example, electric power generation and transmission projects used to be called economic infrastructure, but they are now being called environmental projects. Water supply projects for years were called social infrastructure but now are reclassiﬁed as environmental projects.17 This is not to minimize the signiﬁcance of pilot projects such as the model cities programme intended to combat urban air pollution18 or small village level poverty alleviation eﬀorts in remote rural areas.19 But it must be recognized that for special interest as well as for ﬁscal reasons,20 yen loans for infrastructure projects will likely continue to be the largest component of Japanese ODA to China. From the viewpoint of maximizing environmental eﬀectiveness and spreading popular awareness of Japanese aid, substantial continuity with past patterns would not be optimal, but that might be beside the point. As in much of ODA, in this case what seems to matter most is the political symbolism. Japan’s cut in aid volume and shift in priority to environmental aid (rather than economic infrastructure) is meant to signal to China that Japan perceives China as a potential threat at worst, and at best, as a maturing industrial power that should be weaned from ODA. In other words, the days of generous Japanese ODA may be numbered. China has remained relatively quiet about this signiﬁcant change in Japanese policy, but Jin Xide of the CASS Institute of Japanese Studies has warned that the result may harm Japanese interests by fostering Chinese government prejudice against Japanese ﬁrms in all ﬁelds, including yen-ﬁnanced loan projects, and will damage China’s trust and regard for Japan.21

Concluding remarks On balance, the two decades of Japanese ODA to China had positive results. China beneﬁted from timely, large-scale, and useful help from Japan’s ODA during the Deng Xiaoping era of reform and opening up. One need only tour

Japanese ODA policy toward China 101 China’s coastal cities and view the results of Japan’s ODA loans to see this. Japan beneﬁted by helping China stay focused on modernization and peaceful relations with others, while helping to develop a new market for itself. Nevertheless, cynics on both sides can ﬁnd reasons to minimize the beneﬁcial impact of Japan’s ODA. From the Chinese side, one could complain that too much of Japan’s ODA came in the form of loans (over 90 per cent of total ODA). Japan’s yen denominated ODA loans, which grew in dollar terms as the yen strengthened after the Plaza Accord of 1985, will have to be repaid by China and so in this view, little gratitude is owed to Japan. In addition, much of Japan’s ODA has been tied (overtly in the case of grant aid, and covertly in the case of loan aid) and there are cases of ineﬀective and wasteful spending. These criticisms are valid, but they must be put in context. The most egregious cases of wasteful and inappropriate ODA have tended to be on the grant aid side, where strict aid tying and Japanese inexperience with grant aid target sectors contribute to this result. For example, in the new environmentally oriented Japanese ODA agenda, reforestation projects have a high salience, but the Chinese side reports the Japanese seem only interested in planting large numbers and care not enough about the actual survival of the trees. In contrast, Japan’s yen loans have focused on industrial and trade related projects where Japan has proven expertise. The long term value of this kind of loan aid in fact may have been better for China, given its industrialization priorities. It should also be noted that loan assistance is appropriate for the creation of large-scale, capital-intensive economic infrastructure that directly supports future trade, investment, and income growth, which is what China has needed. Japan’s ODA yen loans typically have a ten-year grace period followed by a twenty-year repayment schedule and carry an interest rate of 3 per cent or less. This is not the same as grant aid, but if Japan only gave aid grants it is unlikely that it would have contributed nearly as much to China’s development. The highly concessional ODA loan terms also mean the yen appreciation of the 1980s has not permanently impacted China’s ODA yen loan repayment burden. As China’s loan repayment periods begin to accumulate, the yen is weakening. At the same time, China is accumulating huge dollar-denominated trade surpluses and oﬃcial reserves, so the worry about the ODA loan repayment burden seems overblown. Even the tied-loan issue must be viewed in context. Japan’s tied ODA loans may have tended to be coordinated with the larger interests of Japanese capital, but this often led to additional concessional ﬁnancing such as oﬃcial Japanese trade credits, loans, and investment insurance to jump-start the economic development that ODA projects were intended to foster. Financing in China by the Export-Import Bank of Japan related to ODA projects amounted to 3.43 trillion yen before it merged with the OECF to form the Japan Bank for International Development (JBIC) in 1999. When added to

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the total of Japanese ODA loans in the 1979–1999 period this creates a total of 6.11 trillion yen in oﬃcial ﬁnancing that supported China’s successful opening to the world. On the Japanese side, cynics may say that the huge amount of ODA given to China has shown poor results because China shows little respect or gratitude toward Japan and Japan wields little inﬂuence over China in political or security aﬀairs. Even worse, Japan’s ODA may have only helped to create a threat to Japan’s own interests and security. These criticisms, too, may have some validity but they also need to be put into context. The Japanese may have hoped for more than disdain from China after giving it so much ODA for so long. Their disappointment today may be understandable, but they should not be surprised at the situation given the history of Japanese aggression against China from 1895–1945 and their own government’s unwillingness to make an unequivocal, oﬃcial apology for this history. Similarly, Japan may have hoped for political leverage over China as a result of its ODA, but it should not be surprised by its weakness in this area. China is an independent power with a strong geopolitical position. Japan is a semi-sovereign state dependent on the United States in key matters of politics and security with a very weak and exposed geopolitical position. Japan’s central aim in ODA was to strengthen China’s chances for successful reform, and to develop a new market for Japanese trade and investment. Japan succeeded very well in this area, and it was the best policy aim for Japan during the uncertain years of China’s economic reform. The irony now is that Japan’s success in this endeavour is the source of current misgivings. Japan sees China today about to surpass Japan’s GDP in purchasing power and continuing to advance quickly on all economic fronts. As China’s capital markets and ﬁnancial system mature, Japanese ODA to ﬁnance public infrastructure ceases to be a critical need, but China will still need Japanese trade, investment, and technology. As Japan proceeds with aid reductions, what will be the political eﬀect on bilateral relations? It is not likely that politically conditioned ODA will yield eﬀective leverage over China. Japan has tried to use aid sanctions against China in the past, notably in 1989 after Tiananmen and in 1995 after China tested a nuclear bomb. But in neither case was Japan very successful because it intended nothing more than symbolic action. Back then Japan could not seriously cut its ODA because it remained committed to fostering China’s economic reform and participating in China’s development. Today, however, Japan is looking for greater leverage over China. This would imply that Japan ﬁnally may get serious about using ODA as a sanctioning mechanism. The problem is that it is too late to do so. China is no longer critically dependent Japanese ODA, and overt politically motivated aid sanctions would only antagonize China and hurt Japanese commercial interests in China without yielding any real leverage. It is far more likely that as China strengthens Japan will graduate China from its ODA programmes, celebrating its arrival as a mature and equal partner with the advanced nations. This oﬃcial rationale

Japanese ODA policy toward China 103 for aid cuts will probably not cause a break between the two countries. It will be done without public bickering because it would be unseemly for China to beg for its continuation, and there is some indication that the fourth generation of Chinese leadership may realize how counterproductive it is to hector Japan about what historical debts it owes China. Japan will soft-pedal future cuts in this way because Japan simply can no longer aﬀord large ODA outlays, and it has no choice but to continue to participate in China’s development. The real danger in the bilateral relationship is that Japan will develop a carrot-and-stick approach to China that no longer employs ODA as its central policy tool. Japan may feel compelled to develop expanded security and political capabilities in order to begin a meaningful dialogue with China over mutual interests in these areas even as it continues to actively trade and invest in China. China may respond negatively to this kind of Japanese change of strategy, because of its far-reaching signiﬁcance. Therefore, whether Japan’s ODA cuts signify movement to a new equilibrium or a long downward slide in relations with China is for both sides to determine.

Appendix: Economic cooperation programme for China22 I. Key changes A. Shift from multi-year yen loan packages to annual loan reviews. B. ODA to be more responsive to domestic opinion in Japan and Japan’s national interests. C. Economic infrastructure in coastal regions no longer appropriate ODA priority. D. Budget levels to be set annually and projects to be selected from a list of numerous candidates. E. Raising awareness on the Chinese side that the 1992 ODA Charter is to be taken seriously. F. Evaluations of completed projects to feed into the design and approval of new projects. II. A. B. C. D. E. F.

Priority areas for ODA Environmental protection and other global issues. Transition to a market economy by building institutions and skills. Better mutual understanding through human exchanges. Poverty alleviation and social development of inland regions. Support for Japanese private sector activities. Support for joint assistance to third countries and multilateral cooperation schemes.

III. Implementation Issues: Observe the following aims as ODA is carried out A. Raise China’s awareness of the ODA Charter. B. Both sides to publicize Japan’s ODA contributions to China.

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C. Make greater use of both Chinese and Japanese NGOs, local governments, senior overseas volunteers, technical experts, Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers. D. Both sides to be active in project formulation. IV. Additional Aims A. Promote a model approach that integrates a variety of projects aiming to achieve a certain kind of developmental impact. B. Use mixed ﬁnancing and public-private sector collaboration in infrastructure and other areas. C. Increase coordination with other donors to make up for Japan’s shortage of expertise and manpower. D. Promote information technology development through provision of training, equipment, and standards. E. More transparency in aid policy and results through the use of aid evaluations conducted by Japanese private experts, other donors, and third country experts.

Notes 1 Up through 2004 Japan has pledged a cumulative amount of 3.33 trillion yen in ODA loans, grants, and technical cooperation to China. Since 2001, however, Japan has been cutting annual ODA pledges to China by an average 20 per cent per year. 2 See the Japanese Embassy in Beijing website: www.japan.org.cn 3 David Arase, “Sino-Japanese Relations: The View from Japan and Implications for US Policy,” China–Japan Relations: Old Animosities, New Possibilities, Asia Program Special Report No. 93 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, January 2001). 4 Following the Shenyang incident in April, the hawkish Sankei Shimbun editorialized as follows: “ODA to China has never produced any results in terms of friendship toward Japan . . . ODA to China, which continues simply due to bureaucratic inertia, should be abolished for the time being.” 5 Tomoyuki Kojima, “To Make China a Responsible Power: Japan’s ODA Programs for China as a Diplomatic Strategy,” Gaiko Forum, February 2001, pp.38–45. 6 Komori Yoshihisa, Nittchu kankei no maboroshi [The Illusion of Sino-Japanese Friendship] (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 2001). 7 In November 2004 Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯ articulated a strong consensus within the ruling parties and the bureaucracy when he said the time had come to “graduate” China from ODA. In early 2005 China reportedly agreed to Japanese requests to negotiate an end to ODA by 2008 (“China Will Accept Japan’s Request for Bilateral Talks on Japan’s Plan to Terminate Its Oﬃcial Development Assistance . . .,” Jiji Press Ticker Service, 7 February 2005). This new policy goal developed after rabidly anti-Japanese soccer fans attacked a Japanese embassy vehicle after the Asia Cup soccer ﬁnal match between Japan and China, which was hosted in China in August 2004. The incursion of a Chinese nuclear submarine into Japanese territorial waters around Okinawa in November just prior to Koizumi’s announcement also greatly dismayed the Japanese public and inﬂamed conservatives.

Japanese ODA policy toward China 105 8 Development Assistance Committee, OECD, Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation (Paris: OECD, 1996). 9 Aoki Naoto, Nihon no chugoku enjo—ODA Ikari o koete mohaya owarai [Japan’s ODA to China: It Is Beyond Scandalous] (Tokyo: Yotensha, 2001). 10 www.zhb.gov.cn/english/. 11 www.greenpeace.org/chinarepexsum.html. 12 World Bank, China: Air, Land, Water—Environmental Problems for a New Milennium (Washington, DC, 2001). 13 Greenpeace, op. cit. 14 Greenpeace, op. cit. 15 “Roundtable Discussion: Japan’s Former Ambassador to China Defend’s Japan’s ODA Policy,” Gaiko Forum, May 2002, pp.32–44. 16 The ODA advisory panel formed in May 2001 by the foreign minister to develop ODA reform proposals issued its ﬁnal report in March this year without recommending any major structural changes other than letting outside experts review aid policy. In addition, a diﬀerent committee to recommend reforms for MOFA issued its recommendations in July this year. Signiﬁcantly, a draft recommendation to form a single aid agency was dropped in its ﬁnal report. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko, a former MITI bureaucrat, recently revealed her intention to put a METI oﬃcial in charge of MOFA’s Economic Cooperation Bureau. 17 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/category/environment/pamph/2001/china.html. 18 Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo, 2001 (Tokyo, MOFA, May 2002), p.81. 19 Yasushi Akashi, “Japan Must Rethink ODA to China,” Daily Yomiuri, 22 July 2002, p.8. 20 Grant and technical aid require direct budgetary outlays and so its growth prospects are limited. In contrast, lending by JBIC is ﬁnanced by borrowing from Japan’s postal savings and national pension systems, and a signiﬁcant amount of new lending is reportedly being ﬁnanced by income derived from repayments of principal with interest from its maturing ODA loan assets. 21 Jin Xide, Tettei kensho! Nihon-gata ODA [Comprehensive Evaluation! Japanesestyle ODA] (Tokyo: Miwa Shoseki, 2002), pp.248–9. 22 This is a summary of key points of this report released by MOFA in October 2001. Refer to www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/index.html for the link to this document.

Bibliography Arase, David. Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Development Assistance Committee, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Development Co-operation 2000 (The DAC Journal) (Paris: OECD, 2000). Jin, Xide. Tettei kensho! Nihon-gata ODA [Comprehensive Evaluation! Japanese-style ODA] (Tokyo: Miwa Shoseki, 2002). Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Government of Japan. Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo [Oﬃcial Development Assistance], 2001 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, May 2002). The World Bank. China: Air, Land, Water—Environmental Problems for a New Millennium Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2001).

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Web Documents Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Government of Japan. Japan–China Relations. http:// www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/index.html. —— , Japan’s ODA, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/index.html. Greenpeace China. China Environment Report. Beijing: Greenpeace China, August 1999. (Executive Summary) www.greenpeace.org/chinarepexsum.html.

6

The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations Takagi Seiichiro¯

The evolving relationship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reﬂected the Cold War’s evolution closely. In its ﬁrst phase, the bilateral relationship was totally severed by the Cold War confrontation between the Western bloc, to which Japan belonged, and the Eastern bloc, to which the PRC belonged. Being the core of the US-PRC confrontation, the Taiwan problem was the fundamental factor constraining the growth of the Japan-PRC relationship, in terms of progress toward normalization. The USPRC rapprochement in 1971–72 removed a fundamental obstacle to the normalization, which was realized in September 1972. The Taiwan problem constituted the most serious issue in the negotiations for normalization. After normalization, however, it largely disappeared from the scene as the factor pulling the two countries apart. With the end of the Cold War the bilateral relationship went through another change, with several new factors emerging and some old factors assuming new features. Taiwan, totally transformed by impressive economic growth starting in the 1970s and gradual democratization staring in mid1980s, emerged as a factor again but with a diﬀerent nature. Although the governments of both Japan and the PRC have managed to prevent the Taiwan factor from seriously disrupting their relationship, uncertainty remains as long as China’s peaceful approach to reuniﬁcation is limited. This chapter traces the evolution of the Japan-PRC relationship with the focus on the ways in which the Taiwan factor aﬀected it. First, it examines bilateral ties before normalization. Next, it analyses relations after normalization during the Cold War. Following that is an examination of the Taiwan factor in bilateral ties in the post-Cold War era. Finally, it considers the saliency of the Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations in the years ahead, when bilateral relations are likely to be aﬀected by the rapidly shifting power balance between them.

The Cold War era (I): before normalization When the peace conference in San Francisco to end the post-World War II occupation by the Allied Powers was being planned in 1951, the extension of

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the Cold War division into Asia had been well established with the founding of the PRC in October 1949, followed by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, which led the United States to send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits. This act had an eﬀect of making the de-facto division of China into the Mainland governed by the Communist government in Beijing and Taiwan governed by the Nationalist government in Taipei a long-lasting phenomenon. Concerning the representation of China at the peace conference in San Francisco, there was a disagreement between the United States, which continued to recognize the Nationalist government as the sole legitimate government of China and the United Kingdom, which had switched recognition from the Nationalist to the Communist government. A compromise was worked out between them not to invite either government to the conference and let the Japanese government decide with which government to conclude the peace treaty after the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into eﬀect. However, given the already undeniable Cold War reality the choice was merely nominal. Although, on 8 September 1951, the Japanese government had signed the treaty, which the Eastern bloc nations boycotted, and concluded the Security Treaty with the United States, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru hoped for “emergence of a friendly relations and deepening of economic relations with Taiwan,” but “wanted to avoid going deeper (in the relationship with Taiwan) to the position of denying the Peking government,” as he recalled later.1 He was not as direct in public but he did say in the Diet deliberations in October 1951, that “it goes without saying that the problem of the Communist China should be determined, irrespective of ideology, independently from the viewpoint of realistic diplomacy,” and that he would consider opening a representative’s oﬃce in Shanghai to handle commercial matters. He also said that, as Japan decided with which government to conclude the peace treaty, “it should consider the objective realities and Chinese situation,” and that “the relationship between Japan and China should not be decided on lightly.”2 Surprised by these statements, the US government sent John Foster Dulles to Tokyo to meet Yoshida in mid-December. Yoshida tried to convince Dulles in vain that it was necessary to expand contact between Mainland China and the free world so that the Chinese public could experience the “air of the free world” and that Japan should lead the free world in this. Dulles demanded Yoshida write a letter assuring him that Japan would conclude the peace treaty with the Nationalist government, that the terms of the treaty would be applicable to all territories which were and might later be under the control of the Nationalist government and that Japan had no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist government. After several days of negotiations, the letter, which contained all these elements, was sent to the United States on 24 December. The peace treaty was signed on 28 April 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into eﬀect. Thus Japan–China relations

The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations 109 were severed by the Cold War confrontation between the United States and China, with Taiwan as the core component. Even in this situation, several factors pulled the two countries closer together. The period Geographical proximity remained a compelling reason for both to seek a friendly relationship with each other. Historical and cultural ties still provided a solid basis for the pursuit of a good bilateral relationship. On the Japanese side, the recent history of the invasion of China created strong feelings of guilt, which, combined with highly positive image of socialism, made pursuit of a normal diplomatic relationship with the Beijing government almost a moral obligation for many. On the other hand, China had a political motivation to lure Japan closer to its side for the purpose of eroding the position of “US imperialism” in Asia. The economies of the two countries were also highly interdependent, which made many, especially those in business circles, feel that the trade with China would be indispensable for Japan’s post-war recovery. Within this context, the Japanese government took the approach of separating politics from economy (Seikei Bunri) to promote economic and cultural relations with China. Correspondingly, the Chinese took a cumulative approach to bring about normal diplomatic relations gradually. Japan–China trade started with a private trade agreement in 1952 and grew during the mid1950s, repeating such agreements so as to provide a framework in lieu of governmental agreements. The second private trade agreement in 1953 stipulated for the establishment of representative oﬃces in the respective capitals. The third agreement in 1955 had a document attached that noted Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro¯’s expression of support and cooperation. It was also agreed at this time to hold a commodity fair in the other country in alternate years. These developments, however, were stalled severely with the inauguration of Kishi Nobusuke’s government in February 1957. He was more clearly pro-Taiwan than his predecessors. He visited Taipei, the ﬁrst Prime Minister to do so, in June and expressed support for the Nationalist government’s plan to ﬁght its way back to the mainland at his meeting with President Chiang Kai Shek. Naturally, China reacted with ﬁerce accusations against the Kishi government. In spite of these developments, the fourth private trade agreement was signed on 5 March 1958. The agreement provided for the establishment of representative’s oﬃce with a national ﬂag and the equivalent of diplomatic privileges for the members. Predictably, it caused severe repercussions from both Taiwan and the United States. Taiwan’s Nationalist government discontinued the on-going trade negotiations in protest and demanded that the Japanese government make clear that China’s commercial representatives had no oﬃcial status and would not be given diplomatic privileges and that it would not allow the raising of the Chinese national ﬂag. Although the Kishi government was not immediately negative about the agreement, it had to respect this protest. On 9 April the Japanese government announced that it had no intention of recognizing the Communist government, that the trade

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representative’s oﬃce had no oﬃcial status, and that it did not recognize raising the Chinese ﬂag at the representative’s oﬃce. Then, on 2 May an incident called the Nagasaki Flag Incident took place. A right-wing youth pulled down a Chinese ﬂag at the trade fair in Nagasaki. The local police did not treat the case as that of damaging a foreign national ﬂag since Japan did not recognize the Beijing government. Already frustrated by the Japanese government’s position on the fourth trade agreement, China reacted angrily to this incident and announced discontinuation of all nonoﬃcial exchanges between the two countries. This was not simply a reaction to Japan’s relationship with Taiwan. Behind this drastic reaction was the critical change in China’s domestic politics from the Hundred Flowers moderation to the Great Leap Forward radicalism in 1957 and the “anti-US imperialism” hard line symbolized by the bombing of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. With the return of a moderate policy line in order to recover from the disastrous Great Leap Forward programme, and with the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union in the background, private exchanges were resumed in late 1962. Two senior politicians, Takasaki Tatsunosuke and Liao Chengzhi, signed a semi-oﬃcial agreement called the Memorandum on the Comprehensive Trade between Japan and China. In 1963 bilateral trade went back to the level of 1957 and continued to grow in the following years. In 1964, a trade representative’s oﬃce called the Memorandum Trade Oﬃce, without diplomatic privileges, was established. But the Taiwan factor again dampened these positive developments. In July 1963, a textile company called Kurashiki Rayon concluded a contract with its Chinese counterpart for the export of a synthetic ﬁber plant, which was conditioned on Japan’s provision of the Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank credit.3 The government of Ikeda Hayato, who succeeded Kishi after the ratiﬁcation of the revised Japan-US Security Treaty in June 1960, had decided by 1962 to promote trade with China on conditions similar to those of Western Europe. It decided to approve the export of the vinylon plant with the Ex-Im Bank credit in late August. Taiwan protested vehemently that the Ex-Im Bank credit was tantamount to provision of economic assistance to China. President Chiang Kai Shek sent a telegram to former Prime Minister Yoshida, expecting Yoshida to sway Ikeda. They also approached Kishi and other pro-Taiwan politicians for help. But the Ikeda government had no intention of reversing the decision. Yoshida replied to Chiang that the credit was not an economic assistance and that the condition was no diﬀerent from that which was practiced by other countries. Other pro-Taiwan politicians took basically the same position. Taiwan recalled its ambassador in protest. There were further tensions between Tokyo and Taipei when Zhou Hongqing, an interpreter accompanying a Chinese delegation, defected in October 1963. He was put in the custody of the Japanese police on 7 October but vacillated about where he wanted to seek asylum. He mentioned several countries including Taiwan. But ﬁnally on 24 October, he expressed desire to

The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations 111 go back home and Japanese government decided to deport him. Taiwan’s harsh reaction against this decision, especially Chiang Kai Shek’s anger, led to a delay in Zhou’s deportation. He continued to be kept in custody and was not sent home till 9 January next year.4 Yoshida traveled to Taiwan at the request of Prime Minister Ikeda in late February 1964 and discussed the basic issues in bilateral relations with Taiwan’s leaders including Chiang Kai-shek. The shared understanding was summarized as the Five Principles of Policies Toward Communist China, one of which was that trade between Japan and the Chinese Mainland should be limited to private trade and that Japan should refrain from providing economic assistance to the Mainland. Then, after a few more exchanges caused by Taiwan’s uneasiness about the Japanese attitude, Yoshida wrote a letter, upon consultation with Prime Minister Ikeda, to Chief Secretary Chang Chun, ruling out the possibility of another plant export with the ExIm Bank credit to China in 1964 and promising that future plant export to China would be ﬁnanced by private institutions. Thereafter, this letter, often called the Second Yoshida Letter, bound the Japanese government and no ExIm Bank credit was provided for export to China. Japan–China relations deteriorated again after 1966 and Japan’s Taiwan policy, including the Second Yoshida Letter, was one of the major targets of China’s verbal attacks. However, the fundamental reason for deterioration was not Japan’s Taiwan policy but the radicalization of Chinese domestic politics caused by the Cultural Revolution.

The Cold War era (II): normalization and after5 In October 1970, the votes supporting the Beijing government’s right to represent China at the United Nations (UN) surpassed those opposing it for the ﬁrst time. Although representation of China in the UN by the Beijing government was not realized yet, because there was not the two-thirds majority required by the designation of this issue as an “important item”, this vote indicated clearly that it would be realized in the near future and encouraged those advocating normal diplomatic relations with the Beijing government. President Richard Nixon shocked Japan when he announced on 15 July 1971 that his National Security Advisor, Dr Kissinger, had secretly visited Beijing and that he had arranged for him to visit Beijing in early next year to start negotiations for diplomatic normalization. This clearly removed the fundamental obstacle to Japan’s normalization with the Beijing government. These and the following developments, Beijing’s victory over UN representation in October 1971 and Nixon’s China trip in February 1972, galvanized the political forces in Japan that had been advocating normalization. Prime Minister Sato¯ Eisaku began to consider negotiations for the normalization seriously. It was obvious that the major issue in the negotiations would concern the status of Taiwan. China had made its position on the Taiwan problem clear

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in July 1971 as the three-point “principles”: 1) the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the sole legitimate government of China; 2) Taiwan is a province of PRC and the inalienable part of Chinese territory; 3) Japan’s peace treaty with the Nationalist government is illegal and should be abrogated. According to the legal position of Japanese government, the ﬁrst point caused no problem but the second and the third points were diﬃcult to accept because the peace treaty with the Nationalist government was considered legal and concluded the war between Japan and China. In the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan renounced “all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores,” without specifying their ﬁnal aﬃliation. There were also signiﬁcant economic ties with Taiwan that needed to be maintained after the normalization of diplomatic relations with China. Moreover, there were a substantial number of pro-Taiwan Diet members within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, who opposed discontinuing relations with Taiwan. They shared the anti-communist credo of the Nationalist leadership of Taiwan and had been deeply impressed by Chiang Kai Shek’s tolerant treatment of Japanese nationals and the army after the end of the Second World War, as symbolized by the slogan, “Responding to hatred with virtue.” In early 1972 Prime Minister Sato¯ sent a favourable signal to Beijing by stating in the Diet that Taiwan was a part of the PRC, but was contradicted by Foreign Minister Fukuda Takeo, who took the legalistic approach. After some argument, the discrepancy was ironed out in the uniﬁed government position statement issued in early March, which stated that since Japan had renounced all the right, title and claim to Taiwan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty it was not in the position to comment on the aﬃliation of Taiwan, but that the assertion of the PRC that Taiwan was a part of its territory was fully understandable in light of preceding developments and the fact that the PRC was now represented by China at the UN. China made no response to Sato’s overtures but as the prospect of Sato’s resignation from presidency of the LDP became increasingly real, it indicated privately its willingness to negotiate with his successor. Sato announced his resignation from the LDP presidency in June after completing the Okinawa reversion in May. Tanaka Kakuei was elected the President and then the Prime Minister in July and immediately expressed a strong interest in starting negotiations with the Beijing government. On 18 July, Tanaka clariﬁed his negotiating position that Japan recognized the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of China and that it fully understood the three principles of the PRC including the aﬃliation of Taiwan. Sun Pinghua, the former Memorandum Trade Oﬃce representative who had been in Tokyo, expressed his appreciation for this statement and urged Tanaka to visit China for negotiation. After having examined the responses of the United States and Taiwan, the Japanese government accepted the invitation on 5 August. Tanaka’s intention had wide-ranging support within Japan but he had to deal with the resistance of pro-Taiwan members within the LDP, who did not

The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations 113 oppose normalization but were opposed to severing diplomatic relations ¯ hira with the Nationalist government. Tanaka and Foreign Minister O Masayoshi were especially worried that the faction led by Fukuda Takeo, who had lost to Tanaka in the party presidential election in July, might make a factional issue out of this because the Fukuda faction included most of the pro-Taiwan Diet members. In order to forge an intra-Party consensus, they formed the Council on the Normalization of the Japan–China Diplomatic Relationship, in which the numbers of pro-China and pro-Taiwan members were balanced. Then they led the Council to ﬁrst reach a decision approving normalization and Tanaka’s visit to Beijing in late September. The decision was made on 9 August. They then negotiated with the pro-Taiwan members on the speciﬁcs concerning the treatment of Taiwan, using both the informal channels and the formal process of the Council. Thus, on 8 September the pro-Taiwan group accepted a vague resolution that in the negotiations with the PRC “a full consideration should be given so that the preceding relationship (with Taiwan) be maintained.” The reason why they accepted it was because they were concerned with the general election which was expected after normalization, and thought that they could not aﬀord to divide the party.6 Tanaka visited Beijing from 25 to 30 September. In the negotiations for the content and wording of the joint communiqué to announce the normalization, there were two major issues to be settled concerning Taiwan: the status of Taiwan and the legality of the peace treaty with the Nationalist government. On the latter, the issue was whether the communiqué to be issued should declare the end of the state of war between the two countries. The Japanese side considered the treaty legal and had already formally ended the state of war and thus could not accept the Chinese position that the communiqué should declare the end again. The ﬁnal version of the normalization communiqué issued on 29 September reﬂected compromises on both issues. The preamble mentioned the end of the state of war without stating explicitly that it was realized by this communiqué and the main text declared only the end of “the abnormal state” between the two countries. On the status of Taiwan, the Chinese side stated its position that it is the inalienable part of the territory of the PRC and the Japanese side expressed “full understanding and respect” for the Chinese position and stated that it would maintain the position based on Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration. The Article only stipulates that Articles of the Cairo Declaration should be implemented. One Article of the Cairo Declaration says that Manchuria, Taiwan and the Pescadores should be returned to the Republic of China. Japan could accept this roundabout way of stating its position on the status of Taiwan because it was considered consistent with the peace treaty with the Nationalist government. The abrogation of the peace treaty was not mentioned in the communiqué but was stated by Foreign Minster ¯ hira at a press conference held after the signing of the communiqué. ConO tinuation of Japan’s relationship with Taiwan in non-diplomatic areas was

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not mentioned in the communiqué either but was accepted by the Chinese side in Premier Zhou Enlai’s statement. After normalization, when the institutional frameworks of the bilateral economic relations were formed, pro-Taiwan members of the LDP worked hard to constrain its negative impact on ties with Taiwan. Their eﬀort was focused on the negotiations on the air transportation agreement. The Japanese government tried to maintain the Taiwan route but China was opposed to a reciprocal agreement between the “ﬂag carriers” of Japan and Taiwan, Japan Airlines and China Airlines. When the negotiations were deadlocked, ¯ hira visited Beijing in January 1974 and presented a compromise that O involved establishing a separate private company to run the Taipei line. But China was still opposed to Taiwan’s use of the word, “China”, and ﬂying Taiwan’s national ﬂag. ¯ hira had the Ministries of Foreign Aﬀairs and After returning home O Transportation work out jointly a six-point proposal to present to the LDP. It included such provisions as concluding a private agreement with Taiwan, China Airlines using the Haneda Airport, which had stopped being the major international airport for Tokyo, instead of the newly built Tokyo International Airport at Narita, and demanding no change about the ﬂag but the Japanese government expressing its own understanding about it. Pro-Taiwan members of the LDP were vehemently opposed to this proposal. They held a mass protest rally in Tokyo and called for Tanaka’s resignation. But the Japanese government did not budge. When the air transportation agreement ¯ hira stated that he did not regard the Taiwanese ﬂag as a was signed in April O national ﬂag. Angered by this statement Taiwan suspended the service of the China Airlines, which had lasted more than a year. When the agreement was presented to the Diet in May it was ratiﬁed unanimously because around eighty pro-Taiwan members had walked out earlier. After normalization, the development of bilateral relations was not without friction. However, in most cases, the Taiwan factor was not involved. China’s lack of experience in the management of international economic relations was the critical factor in the cases of cancelled plant export contracts in 1979 and 1981. The unmanaged business cycle in China was the basic factor leading to the friction caused by its huge trade deﬁcit in 1985. China’s growing concern with Japan’s perceived intention to convert its economic strength into political, and eventually military, inﬂuence was manifested in its anti-Japanese protests about the description of modern history in Japanese textbooks in 1982 and 1986, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, and Japanese defence expenditure going over 1 per cent of GNP in 1987. The only exception was the Guanghua Dormitory issue that ﬂared up in 1987. The Guanghua Dormitory in Kyo¯to had been resided in and managed autonomously by Chinese students. The Nationalist government obtained ownership of it in 1952 because of rent problems. But since the students, who thought it should belong to the PRC, continued to manage it, the Nationalist

The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations 115 government ﬁled a civil suit in 1967. While the case was in the Kyo¯to District Court (DC), Japan normalized relations with Beijing and discontinued diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government. In 1977, the Kyo¯to DC ruled that with the change in diplomatic relations ownership was transferred to the government of the PRC. But the Nationalist government appealed it to ¯ saka High Court (HC), which denied the transfer and sent the case back the O ¯ saka to the Kyo¯to DC in 1982. The Kyo¯to DC followed the judgment of the O ¯ HC in 1986. The case was brought to the Osaka HC again but it upheld the decision of the Kyo¯to DC in February 1987. ¯ saka HC judgment and had Beijing showed great interest in the second O published a long legal argument for Chinese ownership in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily one month before it. When the judgment was given Beijing reacted strongly against it. Chinese vice foreign minister handed a memorandum of protest to the Japanese ambassador. In early March, State President Li Xiannian spoke critically of the judgment to a visiting Japanese politician. Later that month the People’s Daily ¯ saka HC judgment day after day. In carried long articles criticizing the O response, the Japanese ambassador presented a statement of his government’s position, which tried to explain the Japanese system of division of powers and how impossible it was for the government to be involved in the process. Unlike other cases of friction with China, the Japanese media mostly took sides with the government. And although Chinese oﬃcial protests against the judgment continued to follow the Japanese media paid little attention to them. This one-sided calm was broken when Deng Xiaoping involved himself in the case. In May, when he met a senior pro-China Japanese politician, he criticized the judgment, connecting it with the perceived tendency of reviving militarism in Japan and argued that Prime Minister Nakasone should be able to handle the case. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson also issued a statement warning of “a strong reaction” in case the Japanese courts and the government left the case unchanged. The Japanese media now started to cover the issue but they were still rather unsympathetic to Chinese position. In early June Deng Xiaoping became involved again. When he met a Komeito¯ party leader he severely criticized Japan, saying that the separation of powers in Japan should be diﬀerent from the United States, that the decision to raise Japan’s defence expenditure above 1 per cent of GNP met the desire of those who want to transform Japan into a military power, and that since Beijing renounced war reparations Tokyo should contribute more to China’s development. The problem was further complicated when a high oﬃcial of the Japanese foreign ministry remarked that Deng was out of touch with the more positive developments in bilateral relations, in economic and personal exchanges, to which Beijing reacted with indignation. The Japanese foreign ministry did not apologize for the comment immediately, which further angered the Chinese.

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The issue ﬁnally subsided when the Cabinet Secretary and then Foreign Ministry oﬃcials expressed regret for the statement in mid-June. The Chinese side appealed the case to the Supreme Court but the judgment has not been made to this day. As the developments described above indicate, even when the Taiwan problem became a factor for bilateral friction, it had to converge with other factors to worsen the bilateral relationship seriously.

The post-Cold War era The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, in itself, did not have much of a direct impact on Japan–China relations, since the US-China Cold War was already over. However, China’s reduced strategic weight, or the importance of the “China card,” for the United States as a result of the end of the Cold War did impact indirectly on Japan–China relations. Rather, the most signiﬁcant impact on bilateral ties in recent years was the 1989 Tiananmen incident. The incident seriously damaged China’s image in Japan. Moreover, Tiananmen and its aftermath taxed Japanese policy-makers with the delicate task of management of bilateral relations.7 While they could not ignore mounting negative Japanese public opinion towards Beijing, they also sought to avoid “dual isolation”: the international isolation of China leading to its domestic instability, and Western diplomatic isolation of Japan if it was perceived to be too soft on China. In addition to the impact of the Tiananmen incident, Japan–China relations since the 1990s have been aﬀected by several new factors as well as some old factors, including Taiwan, which came to function in new ways. There are at least four factors that were not salient in the previous era. First, the economies of the two countries became clearly interdependent after two decades of exchanges, providing a higher bottom line of the relationship while causing occasional yet acrimonious friction. This interdependence has been strengthened by China’s phenomenal economic growth since 1992. Second, the international standing of the two countries became relatively equalized because of the gradual expansion of Japan’s international political and, to a lesser extent, security role, and China’s high economic growth. There was also a delicate change in the moral dimension. China’s one sided moral superiority caused by the history of Japan’s invasion was cancelled to some extent by the impact of the Tiananmen incident. Third, Japan’s commitment to “western” values of human rights and democracy became far more pronounced than before. Fourth, with the Tiananmen incident as the watershed, the international environment ceased to have a one-directional impact on the bilateral relations. Bilateral relations came increasingly to be governed by their own dynamics and be considered as the factor shaping the regional situation. Besides the Taiwan factor (which marked a dramatic change, as explained below), the perennial issue of history went through a subtle but important change. There emerged an annoyance on the part of some Japanese about

The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations 117 China’s persistent demand for an apology. China became ambivalent about Japan’s expanding international political role. While China’s apprehension never disappeared, which underpinned their continued protest over the history issue, there emerged a thinking in China that it was a historical necessity and was not necessarily inimical to China’s interest.8 Among the old factors, Taiwan went through the most dramatic change. After the normalization of relations with China, Japan’s relationship with Taiwan was limited to non-oﬃcial exchanges in the economic and cultural area, with China’s understanding. Most countries, which switched recognition around this time, also had similar arrangements, which led to the serious international isolation of Taiwan. Back then it did not seem to matter much for the international community. However, Taiwan has achieved impressive economic development while being isolated diplomatically. Although China’s phenomenal economic growth since 1992 seemed to have overshadowed Taiwan’s solid economic achievements, the importance of Taiwan as an economic entity is nevertheless much more substantial than during the Cold War days. China is now Japan’s Number Two trading partner; Taiwan is its Number Four. Moreover, Taiwan’s impressive democratization since the mid-1980s was undeniable. In 1991 the law which had limited democratic rights of the Taiwanese on the pretext of the need to suppress rebellion was repealed. In December 1992, voters in Taiwan elected all the Legislative Yuan members, ending the ﬁction that it was the legislature for the whole of China. And in 1994, constitutional revision enabled voters in Taiwan to directly elect their President. In sharp contrast to China’s bloody suppression of the protest movement during the Tiananmen incident, peaceful democratic change clearly enhanced Taiwan’s international prestige. In 1992, Taiwan also started to expand its “international space of activities” with pragmatic “ﬂexible diplomacy”, which was aimed at deepening substantive relationships even with countries that recognized China. In 1993, it even started to seek a seat in the United Nations. Moreover, the United States, which was not as worried about the Chinese response as in the Cold War days, announced the sale of 150 F-16 ﬁghters and sent a cabinet member, the US Trade Representative, to Taiwan in 1992. Other countries recognizing China also increased cabinet-level contacts with Taiwan. This kind of Taiwan was not what had been anticipated at the time of normalization with China and does not ﬁt comfortably in the framework of the normalization communiqué of 1972. There were important changes to the informal, inter-personal relations that forged social and political bridges in two sets of bilateral relations: TokyoBeijing and Tokyo-Taipei. It became increasingly clear that there were no longer the kind of close personal ties between the senior politicians of both Japan and China, called “pipes”, which served as important communication channels, especially in the case of crises. In Taiwan, the generation of senior leaders who had been educated during the colonial period and had various

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personal ties with Japan ascended with the progress of democratization, which also meant the Taiwanization of politics. Their rise expanded communication channels with Japan, which had been monopolized by the senior Nationalist Party members in Taiwan and senior conservative politicians in Japan. More recently, there has emerged a Japanese pop culture craze among Taiwanese youngsters who call themselves Harizu (Crazy for Japan tribe).9 The Japan-(Nationalist) China Diet Members Forum (Nikka Giin Kondankai) which was established in 1973 by 160 LDP members became nonpartisan in 1997 to include the Democratic Party and Komeito¯ (Clean Government Party) now has a membership of more than 300.10 Many of them have dual membership in the pro-PRC Japan–China Friendship Diet Members League (Nicchu ¯ Yu ¯ ko¯ Giin Renmei) which has a membership of about 430. It is reported that the meetings of the former now often record higher attendances than the latter. The Democratic Party, which is now the largest opposition party, takes pride in its ties with the Democratic Progressive Party. It established the Japan-Taiwan Friendship Diet Members Forum (Nihon Taiwan Yu ¯ ko¯ Giin Renmei) which now has a membership of about ﬁfty.11 Reﬂecting these changes, Japan’s “respect and understanding” for the Chinese position on Taiwan became increasingly qualiﬁed, though it remained careful not to completely antagonize China. In summer 1994, the Olympic Committee of Asia invited Taiwan’s president Lee Tung-hui to the Asian Games to be held in Hiroshima in October. China immediately expressed a demand not to issue a visa for him. Since the invitation was not issued by Japan, the Japanese government contemplated issuing a visa for him. In the end, it decided to handle the issue of Lee’s entry into Japan “based on the normalization communiqué of 1972.” But when the OCA decided to withdraw the invitation to a “political ﬁgure,” and Taiwan accepted the decision and requested the dispatch of Vice-Premier Hsu Li-teh (who was also chairman of the committee to invite the 2002 Asian Games to Taipei), the Japanese government issued a visa to him. China again protested through various channels, but it did not budge this time. However, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi told President Jiang Zeming at the APEC (Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation) summit in Indonesia in November 1994 that Japan had no intention of inviting President Lee to the 1995 APEC ¯ saka. summit in O After Chen Shui-bian succeeded Lee Teng-hui as President in May 2000, a pro-Taiwan group in Japan tried to invite Lee to a symposium, arguing that he was now a private citizen. Beijing opposed the plan, arguing that Lee was still a “political ﬁgure” and that his expected visit must have a political motive. Tokyo was unwilling to issue a visa for him out of concern about repercussions from Beijing, causing Lee to decline the invitation. But when he requested to visit Japan in January 2001 for medical treatment, pro-Taiwan forces in Japan succeeded in forcing the government to issue a visa, though with a condition that he not be involved in any political activities. Japan also became more willing to voice concern and sometimes even

The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations 119 criticism of China’s treatment of Taiwan. In December 1995, when China conducted military exercises just before Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan election in an attempt to check the expansion of pro-independence forces, Foreign Minister Ko¯no Yo¯hei, who was visiting Beijing, expressed concern explicitly. When China conducted military exercises near Taiwan in March 1996, attempting to inﬂuence Taiwan’s ﬁrst presidential election, in which Lee Teng-hui was widely regarded as the deﬁnite winner, Japan’s reaction was even stronger. Reacting to signs of rising tension over the Taiwan Strait, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ told Premier Li Peng at the bilateral summit on 1 March that he hoped strongly for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem. Totally ignoring this and other international expressions of concern, China announced on 5 March that the People’s Liberation Army would conduct a missile-ﬁring exercise in the waters near Taiwan. This led to an immediate expression of concern by Japan’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson who said that “the rise of tension in Taiwan Strait is not desirable for peace and stability in East Asia.” When the exercise started on 8 March, Prime Minster Hashimoto noted that things were developing in an unfortunate direction. When China conducted a live-ammunition exercise in the oﬀ-shore Fujian province of the Taiwan Strait, Prime Minister Hashimoto expressed “a very strong concern” repeatedly in the Diet sessions. Some in the LDP even argued that measures including freezing a part of the Oﬃcial Developmental Assistance (ODA) should be considered. Although this did not lead to an actual freezing these developments were perceived in China as constituting a strong reaction, second only to the United States, which stationed two aircraft-carrier battle groups near Taiwan.12 After the tension was defused, the Asia-Paciﬁc Subcommittee of the Foreign Aﬀairs Committee of the House of Councilors (Upper House) took an unprecedented step, expressing a mild but clear support for Taiwan. It adopted a resolution on 16 May, expressing concern over the military tension in the Taiwan Strait and welcoming institutional developments in Taiwan’s democracy including the popular election of its President. Partly because of these developments, the Taiwan dimension became even more salient in China’s serious concern with the reaﬃrmation of the JapanUS security alliance for the post-Cold War era, which was announced in the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security of 17 April, 1996, shortly after the tension over the Taiwan Strait. Their concern became more clearly focused on Taiwan as the revision of the Defense Cooperation Guideline, announced in the Joint Declaration, progressed, because the New Guideline was expected to spell out speciﬁc measures of cooperation to deal with “the situation in the area surrounding Japan,” which would have an important inﬂuence on Japan’s peace and security. The existing Guideline, which had been signed in 1978, mentioned this category only as the subject of future study. China demanded that the United

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States and Japan make clear that Taiwan was not included in “the area surrounding Japan,” and their exhortation was focused on Japan. Although opposition parties and some pro-China members of the LDP expressed an interest in accommodating Chinese demands with varying strength, the Japanese government stuck to the explanation that “the situation in the area surrounding Japan” was not a geographical concept, but whether or not certain situations in certain areas fall in the category should be determined according to the nature of the situation, i.e., the extent to which it aﬀects Japan’s security. Needless to say, this was no consolation to China. Following the interim report of the working group on the revision issued in June 1997, Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku said on a TV news show in August that if the emergency in Taiwan led to US military involvement and Japan did not supply even water and food to the US forces, it would be diﬃcult to maintain the alliance with the United States. China reacted with anger to this statement. The People’s Daily carried a commentator’s article stating that this constituted “a serious situation” that damaged the bilateral relationship.13 Despite the warning, however, the bilateral relationship recovered quickly towards the end of the year even though the ﬁnal report on the Guideline revision was released in September. When Prime Minister Hashimoto visited Beijing in November 1997, both sides agreed on the enhancement of defence exchanges, including Defence Minister Chi Haotian’s visit to Japan in February 1998. After the government submitted the bills for the implementation of the new Guideline to the Diet in April 1998, the issue came up again but it did not seriously damage the bilateral relationship. Bilateral relations deteriorated seriously again towards the end of the year after Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in November 1998. In the course of preparation for the visit, the Japanese government rejected the Chinese demand to make an oﬃcial statement of “Three No’s” on Taiwan,14 which the US President Clinton had stated during his visit to China earlier that year.15 However, this was not what brought about the deterioration this time. It was Jiang Zemin’s persistent reference to Japan’s need to reﬂect on the history of invasion of China that alienated those who had been involved in promotion of friendly bilateral exchanges and angered the anti-China forces, which, in turn, frustrated the Chinese.16 Another aspect of the reaﬃrmation of the Japan-US alliance became a matter of serious concern for China partly because of its Taiwan dimension toward the end of 1990s. The cooperation on ballistic missile defence,17 mentioned earlier as a joint feasibility study in the Joint Declaration on Security of 1996, advanced one step further after North Korean test launch of the Taepodong missile over Japanese territory in August 1998. Japan and the United States agreed in December to start joint technical research next year. The reason for Chinese concern had to do with the fact that the system the two countries were trying to develop was the so-called Navy Theater-Wide Defense system, which was to use the Aegis destroyer as the platform for

The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations 121 launching missiles to shoot down the enemy’s missiles. Since the platform was a ship, China had reason to worry that it could be moved near Taiwan and shoot down China’s missiles ﬁred against Taiwan. Even if they were not going to actually attack Taiwan militarily, they were concerned about this possibility because it could neutralize their threat of missile attack, which they counted on as a deterrent against Taiwan’s move toward independence.18 Needless to say, it would be even more disastrous for China if the United States and Japan decided to share the product of joint technical research with Taiwan. However, even though joint technical research, which was formally started in August 1999, made good progress, leading to the recent Japanese decision to start the next development phase, it never became the matter of serious contention between Japan and China. In December 2003 Japan made a small symbolic step toward treating Taiwan like any other state. The Taipei oﬃce of the “private” Exchange Association, which handles semi-oﬃcial relations with Taiwan under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, held a reception to celebrate the Emperor’s birthday, which was attended by Taiwan’s Foreign Minister and the Secretary General of the Presidential Oﬃce. Predictably, the Chinese foreign ministry expressed a “strong frustration” about this and demanded that similar acts not be repeated. However, these developments should not be considered as representing Japan’s one-directional leaning toward Taiwan. Although low-key and ostensibly unoﬃcial, Tokyo got involved in Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election campaign in a way Beijing could appreciate. Concerned with potential instability in the Taiwan Strait, the Japanese government was critical of Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s intention to introduce the mechanism of a referendum which could be used in future to decide on the issue of de jure independence for the island. Tokyo’s position was similar to the United States, which had earlier criticized President Chen’s “unilateral alteration of the status-quo” (by pushing for a referendum) in the US Presidential statement to the visiting Chinese Premier in mid-December 2003. On 29 December 2003, the day after the last oﬃcial working day of the year, the director of the Taipei oﬃce of the Exchange Association told the chief secretary of the Presidential Oﬃce that Chen’s fruitless words made the situation tense and demanded prudence for the sake of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as well as the region as a whole. Although the Japanese government also made clear that Japan would support neither the Chinese use of force nor Taiwanese independence, the Chinese vice foreign minister, who was visiting Japan a few days before the election, expressed his appreciation for the position Japan took. The result of the March 2004 presidential election was received in Japan with relief, Chen’s narrow victory and the mysterious shooting incident notwithstanding. The referendum conducted simultaneously with the election, even with changes in wording that left out references to steps which could be considered as preparations for the referendum on independence and

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focused on Taiwan’s security, did not manage to collect enough votes to validate the result. Equally reassuring for the Japanese was President Chen’s inaugural address, in which he promised to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Chen Shui-bian made another attempt to exploit Taiwanese identity in the campaign for the Legislative Yuan election in December 2004 by explicitly discussing the timetable for constitutional reform, which the Chinese side considered to be a critical step toward independence. In this context, when a Chinese nuclear submarine intruded into Japanese territorial waters in mid-November, leading to the Japanese government’s strong protest, Chen Shui-bian claimed that it was Taiwan that had provided the information to Japan, an obvious attempt to impress the Japanese on Taiwan’s signiﬁcance vis-à-vis China. However, it did not have any visible impact on Japan. The election result, which was a narrow defeat for the “Pan-Green” governing coalition, was again greeted with relief in Japan. After the Legislative Yuan election, the Taiwan problem surfaced again in Japan–China relations. Lee Teng-hui requested a visa for a sightseeing tour in Japan. The Japanese government granted it again, in spite of Chinese opposition, again with the explicit condition that he engage in no political activities. While resisting Chinese demands the Japanese government was very strict about the condition. It even issued a request to politicians not to see him during his tour. Although Lee Teng-hui’s visit from late December to early January 2005 did not involve any explicitly political activities it did sour the already tense bilateral political relationship. The visit to Beijing by a delegation of Japan’s governing coalition planned for mid-January was postponed at the last minute at the request of the Chinese, which was suspected to be their protest against Lee Teng-hui’s visit. As the opening of the Aichi Environmental Expo in March 2005 approached, Japan began to consider a visa waiver for Taiwanese tourists ﬁrst during the Expo, and permanently if the “experiment” was successful, while maintaining strict visa control for Chinese tourists. This diﬀerential treatment involved no political consideration and was based on the diﬀerence in potential crime and defection between the two peoples. But the Chinese were predictably critical and their protest did have the eﬀect of slowing down the legislation, though not stopping it. The Japan-US Security Consultative Committee meeting between Japan’s Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs and Director General of Defense Agency and the US Secretaries of State and Defense, or the 2+2 meeting, in mid-February 2005 created another case that made the Taiwan question a source of friction between Japan and China. Prior to its conclusion it was reported that Japan was going to join the United States in declaring, for the ﬁrst time, that Taiwan was a “mutual security concern” in the joint statement to be issued upon conclusion of the meeting.19 Clearly alarmed and oﬀended, the Chinese had indicated their resolute opposition. The actual joint statement, issued on 19 February, resolved to “encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue” as one of twelve “common strategic objectives.” In spite of its ostensibly innocuous wording and content

The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations 123 directed both to Beijing and Taipei, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson expressed a resolute opposition to the inclusion of the Taiwan question, which involved “Chinese national sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security,” in the joint statement. However, although it is likely to have enhanced perceived pressure on the Chinese side, at least in the short term, this was more an addition to the list of problems which had already strained the Japan–China relationship rather than a critical factor that would deteriorate it seriously. Although it was certainly the ﬁrst time that Japan and the United States jointly expressed their expectations for the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question, they had expressed their expectations separately on a number of occasions. At the press conference to coincide with the National People’s Congress in early March 2005 Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing started his discussion of the relationship with Japan by saying that developing a “long-term, stable, neighbourly and friendly relationship” was already an “established policy,” although he did mention problems, including the joint statement. Prime Minster Wen Jiabao also said a few days later that the China-Japan relation was “the most important bilateral relation” and made a three-point proposal for its improvement. Chinese adoption of the Anti-Secession Law at the National People’s Congress prompted Prime Minister Koizumi to call for a “mutual eﬀort for a peaceful solution” but it did not lead to any noticeable negative reaction from China. Around the turn of the century it became increasingly clear that the changes in Japan and China, which had brought about relative equalization of the international standing of the two in the early post-Cold War days, had been taking a new turn. Although gradual expansion of Japan’s international security role continued, especially after 11 September, what attracted broad international attention was the contrast between China’s continued phenomenal economic growth and Japan’s seemingly never-ending post-bubble economic stagnation. The contrast, however, did not lead to a generalized perception of a threat from China in Japan, which could have been a natural consequence. To the extent that the growing China was perceived as a threat, it led to a concern that the growing China would damage the Japanese economy by absorbing manufacturing operations and thus hollowing-out Japan. However, the concern was quickly replaced by the enthusiasm for linking at least a part of Japanese economic recovery to Chinese dynamism, by focusing on designing and global marketing and taking advantage of China’s rapidly growing domestic market. Although the enhanced activism of some anti-China forces could be attributed to this contrast and they tend to be simultaneously sympathetic to the Taiwanese, this did not make the Taiwan factor any more signiﬁcant in over-all Japan–China relations.

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Conclusion After Taiwan has achieved impressive economic growth in the 1970s and 80s and steady progress in democratization since the mid 1980s, many Japanese view the island in a very diﬀerent light. The 1990s saw the emergence of greater sympathy toward Taiwan in Japan, and when this sympathy manifested itself in Japanese governmental actions it led predictably to tension in its relationship with China. However, its impact on the overall bilateral relationship has been rather limited, basically because of prudence on the Japanese side. Japan’s moves closer to Taiwan have been carefully calibrated while gauging possible China’s reactions. And in the case of Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election, Tokyo did criticize Taipei for destabilizing the cross-strait situation unnecessarily especially by introducing the new system of a referendum. Conceivably, if Taiwanese leaders were to utilize the referendum to declare de jure independence, it would probably trigger a military response from China, a scenario which is inimical to the interest of Japan. Of course, Japanese prudence is conditioned by China’s basically peaceful approach to international issues in general and to the reuniﬁcation issue in particular. If China were to use force against Taiwan, it is unlikely that Japan would intervene alone. However, if the United States chooses to intervene militarily, Japan is likely to provide logistical support to its ally. If such a scenario unfurls, Japan–China relations will surely suﬀer a serious blow. Even though possible Japanese involvement in the Taiwan Strait contingency can only be secondary, China has several reasons to react to it ﬁercely. First of all, they never forgot the history of Japan’s colonization of Taiwan as the result of Qing China’s humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. Second, the communist claim to the legitimacy of their rule derives signiﬁcantly from their claim to have led the Chinese victory in the war against Japanese invasion of China in the early 1930s, which, of course, is considered in China to be the phase in the process starting with their defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95.20 Finally, they tend to consider Japan as constituting the weaker link in the joint operation. The contrast between China’s phenomenal economic growth and Japan’s stagnation in the 1990s did not make Japan preoccupied with the notion of the China threat except for a small number of persistently anti-China commentators. But if Beijing were to use military force against Taipei to prevent the latter from edging towards de jure independence, it is likely to convince the Japanese mainstream that China is indeed a threat to not only its interests in Taiwan but also to national security. Consequently, the strategic signiﬁcance of Taiwan would be more widely recognized not only for its location on Japan’s critical sea lines of communication (SLOC) but also as the stronghold to check Chinese southward expansion. The Taiwan factor alone would not seriously disrupt Japan–China relations. But if bilateral relations deteriorate for other reasons and China takes threatening or narrow-minded

The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations 125 approaches to Taiwan the Taiwan factor can bedevil the relationship by aggravating the situation.

Notes 1 Ishii Akira, “Taiwan ka Pekin ka—Sentaku ni kuryosuru Nihon” [Taiwan or Beijing—Japan faces an agonizing choice], in Akio Watanabe (ed.), Sengo Nihon no Gaiko¯ Seisaku [The Foreign Policy of the Post-War Japan] (Tokyo:Yuhikaku, 1985), p.69. 2 Ibid., pp.69–70. 3 The following description draws heavily on Shimizu Urara, “ ‘Dainiji Yoshida Shokan (1964)’ wo meguru Nicchu¯tai Kankei no Tenkai” [The Development of the Japan–China-Taiwan Relations Surrounding the “Second Yoshida Letter (1964)”], Chiiki Kenkyu¯ (Area Studies), University of Tsukuba, No. 19 (2001), pp.175–87. 4 For a detailed study of this incident, see Ishii Akira, “1960nendai Zenhan no Nittaikankei—Shu¯ Ko¯kei Jiken kara Hankyo¯ Sanbo¯honbu Setsuritsuko¯so¯ no Suishin e” [The Japan-Taiwan Relations in the Early Half of the 1960s—From the Zhou Hongqing Incident to Promotion of the Concept of Establishing an Anti-Communist Staﬀ Oﬃce], Kokusaiho¯ Gaiko¯ Zasshi [Journal of International Law and Diplomacy], Vol. 101, No. 2 (August 2002), pp.1–29. 5 Unless noted otherwise, this section is based on relevant parts of the following two books: Ogata Sadako, Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988); Tanaka Akihiko, Nitchu¯ Kankei: 1945–1990 [Japan–China Relations: 1945–1990] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1991). 6 For a detailed study of this and preceding processes within the LDP, see Takemi Keizo¯, “Jiyu¯minshuto¯ to Nicchu¯ Kokko¯ Seijo¯ka—Fukugo¯teki seisakukettei niokeru dakyo¯ no ko¯zo¯” [The Liberal Democratic Party and the Normalization of Japan–China Diplomatic Relationship: The structure of compromise in a complex policy-making process], Ho¯gaku Kenkyu ¯ [Journal of Jurisprudence], Vol. 54, No. 7 (July 1981), pp.32–70. 7 For a detailed analysis of this process, see Takagi Seiichiro¯, “Human Rights in Japanese Foreign Policy: Japan’s Policy Toward China After Tiananmen,” in James T.H. Tang (ed.), Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Paciﬁc Region (London: Pinter, 1995), pp.97–111. 8 For a more detailed examination of the new factors and new features of old factors, see Takagi Seiichiro¯, “In Search of a Sustainable Equal Partnership: Japan–China Relations in the Post-Cold-War Era,” Japan Review of International Aﬀairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp.24–31. 9 For more extensive examination of the contemporary ties between Japan and Taiwan, see Lam Peng Er, “Japan-Taiwan Relations: Between Aﬃnity and Reality,” Asian Aﬀairs, Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 2004. 10 “Kikikanri Bunsekishuho¯ ni kansuru Cho¯sa: Taiwan Kiki wo Jirei toshite” [Investigation into Analytical Methods for Crisis Management: Taiwan crisis as a case], Rippo¯ to Cho¯sa [Legislation and Research], special edition, March 2001, p.53. 11 Ibid. 12 Tanaka Akihiko, “Tainichi Kankei” [The Relationship with Japan] in Chu¯goku¯ goku So¯ran [Survey of China], Kazankai, 1998, so¯ran Henshu¯iinkai, ed., Chu pp.139–40. 13 Benbao Pinlunyuan [Commentator], “Weihai Zhongri Guanxi de Yanzhong Shitai” [The grave situation that threatens the China-Japan relations], Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), August 22, 1997.

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14 They are 1) no support for Taiwanese independence, 2) no support for two Chinas or one China one Taiwan, and 3) no support for Taiwanese membership in the international organizations whose membership requires statehood. 15 For an analysis of the Japanese decision, see Lam, “Japan-Taiwan Relations”. 16 For the details, see Takagi Seiichiro¯, “In Search of Sustainable Equal Partnership,” pp.34–7. 17 This refers to what had been called the Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Since the term, TMD, with implied distinction from the national missile defense (NMD), only makes sense for its originator, the United States, the more generic term, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), is used here. 18 Takagi Seiichiro¯, “Reisengo no Nichibei Do¯mei to Hokuto¯ Ajia” [The Post-Cold War Japan-U.S. Alliance and Northeast Asia], Kokusai Mondai (International aﬀairs), No. 474 (September 1999), p.13. 19 Anthony Faiola, “Japan to Join U.S. Policy on Taiwan,” Washington Post, 18 February 2005, p.A01. 20 For the importance of these two factors in Japan’s “Taiwan problem,” see Daojiong Zha, “The Taiwan Problem in Japan–China Relations: An Irritant or Destroyer,” East Asia, Vol. 19, No. 1–2 (Spring/Summer 2001), pp.203–24.

Bibliography Ishii, Akira, “Taiwan ka Pekin ka—Sentaku ni kuryosuru Nihon” [Taiwan or Beijing—Japan faces an agonizing choice], in Akio Watanabe (ed.), Sengo Nihon no Gaiko¯ Seisaku [The Foreign Policy of the Post-War Japan] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1985). Ishii, Akira, “1960 nendai Zenhan no Nittaikankei—Shu¯ Ko¯kei Jiken kara Hankyo¯ Sanbo¯honbu Setsuritsuko¯so¯ no Suishin e” [The Japan-Taiwan Relations in the Early Half of the 1960s—From the Zhou Hongqing Incident to Promotion of the Concept of Establishing an Anti-Communist Staﬀ Oﬃce], Kokusaiho¯ Gaiko¯ Zasshi [Journal of International Law and diplomacy], Vol. 101, No. 2 (August 2002). Lam Peng Er, “Japan-Taiwan Relations: Between Aﬃnity and Reality,” Asian Aﬀairs, Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 2004. Ogata, Sadako, Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988) Shimizu, Urara, “ ‘Dainiji Yoshida Shokan (1964)’ wo meguru Nicchu¯tai Kankeino Tenkai” [The Development of the Japan–China-Taiwan Relations Surrounding the “Second Yoshida Letter (1964)”], Chiiki Kenkyu¯ [Area Studies], University of Tsukuba, No. 19 (2001). Takagi, Seiichiro¯, “Human Rights in Japanese Foreign Policy: Japan’s Policy Toward China After Tiananmen,” in James T.H. Tang (ed.), Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Paciﬁc Region (London: Pinter, 1995). Takagi, Seiichiro¯, “In Search of a Sustainable Equal Partnership: Japan–China Relations in the Post-Cold-War Era,” Japan Review of International Aﬀairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1999). Takagi, Seiichiro¯, “Reisengo no Nichibei Do¯mei to Hokuto¯ Ajia” [The Post-Cold War Japan-U.S. Alliance and Northeast Asia], Kokusai Mondai (International Aﬀairs), No. 474 (September 1999). Takemi, Keizo¯, “Jiyu¯minshuto¯ to Nicchu¯ Kokko¯ Seijo¯ka—Fukugo¯teki seisakukettei niokeru dakyo¯ no ko¯zo¯” [The Liberal Democratic Party and the Normalization of Japan–China Diplomatic Relationship: The structure of compromise in a complex

The Taiwan factor in Japan–China relations 127 policy-making process], Ho¯gaku Kenkyu ¯ [Journal of Jurisprudence], Vol. 54, No. 7 (July 1981). Tanaka, Akihiko, Nicchuu Kankei: 1945–1990 [Japan–China Relations: 1945–1990] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1991). Tanaka, Akihiko, “Tainichi Kankei” (The Relationship with Japan), in Chu¯gokuso¯ran Henshu¯iinkai, ed., Chu ¯ goku So¯ran [Survey of China], Kazankai, 1998. Zha, Daojiong, “The Taiwan Problem in Japan–China Relations: An Irritant or Destroyer,” East Asia, Vol. 19, No.1–2 (Spring/Summer 2001).

7

Forging new bilateral relations Japan–China cooperation at the sub-national level Purnendra Jain

Bilateral relations between nations today are no longer conﬁned at the national level; neither are the national governments sole players in forging and nurturing these relationships. This chapter examines bilateral relations between Asia’s two most powerful nations at the level of sub-national government (SNG),1 relationships which have recently become prominent and evidence suggests that they are growing and likely to play an important role in shaping the future course of relationships between the two nations. Particularly from the late 1980s, connections between, and facilitated by, government actors from other than the central governments of both nations, have ﬂourished. Indeed, these relationships have spawned a range of other relationships, particularly commercial and many beyond any level of government, that have helped to strengthen and extend the links between people from the two nations. Yet this development at the sub-national government level has drawn little scholarly attention.2 Despite their increasing signiﬁcance in the bilateral relationship and the important consequences for policy management on both sides, sub-national governments have been overlooked generally as independent international actors and as initiators of oﬃcial and semi-oﬃcial connections between these two powerful Asian neighbours. This chapter opens the window on the bilateral relationship at the level of sub-national governments. The focus here is on the actions of Japanese subnational governments, their incipient role as international actors and the consequences of their actions for Japan’s international diplomacy. In the bilateral example under the spotlight here, we ﬁnd that despite their considerable diﬀerences in national politics, Japan and China both have highly centralized political structures within a unitary-state system. Domestic and international circumstances have forced the central governments of both nations to allow sub-national governments increasing autonomy, particularly to pursue economic beneﬁts abroad independently of central-government direction. Greater autonomy from their central-government masters is precisely what the SNGs are keen to develop, especially when it then enhances their economic independence. This is the political underlay that has enabled and compelled some SNGs on both sides to pursue connections with each other for mutual beneﬁt. For

Forging new bilateral relations 129 many Japanese SNGs, China has a lot to oﬀer. Much of this beneﬁt is economic, derived from complementarity between China’s labour-rich and Japan’s capital-rich economies, and is enhanced by geographic proximity. Other beneﬁts ﬂow from cultural, technical, and other exchange programmes and some from bilateral aid programmes at local levels. Thus, the connections that Japanese SNGs have pursued in China are not exclusively with counterpart SNGs but are sometimes with other actors such as from the private sector. While recognition of shared interests prevails, and while scope for further mutual beneﬁt remains, Japanese SNGs are likely to continue pursuing activities with SNGs and other actors in China independently of their central government, with important consequences for commercial and other dimensions of the bilateral relationship. As this chapter will demonstrate, the bilateral relationships between SNGs of the two nations have hitherto been highly cooperative and are conducted on a consultative basis. There are few signs of apparent tensions and disagreements between SNGs of the two sides. The national level politics creating tensions arising out of Yasukuni Shrine visits, occasional textbook and war apology issues and China’s missile tests over Taiwan have had little impact on the ever-growing relationship at the SNG level. While cooperation and good-will prevail in the bilateral relationships at the sub-national level, it is also the case that there are some emerging conﬂict of interests and competition in some areas. Some local leaders have even raised political questions that have implications for the national governments of the two nations. For example, Tokyo’s Governor Ishihara Shintaro¯ has been a vocal critic of the government in Beijing and has even criticized its record on human rights and China’s increasing militarization. His administration has substantially scaled down the activities of Tokyo’s sister-city relations with Beijing which the two cities have maintained for about quarter of a century. Also, some rural communities in Japan are particularly concerned about the adverse impact that China may pose to Japan’s agricultural sector. Many farmers in Japan do not approve of the transfer of Japanese agricultural technology to China because they believe that it would give Chinese farmers the opportunity to ﬂood the Japanese market with cheaply produced agricultural products.3 However, at the present stage, signs of stresses and strains are small compared to the vast and rising nature of cooperation. Indeed, the phenomenon of “China rising, Japan stagnating” and the unease that it has generated among many Japanese has not hindered the intensifying relations between the SNGs of both nations. The chapter considers brieﬂy, for the comparative insights that it oﬀers here, the worldwide trend among SNGs to pursue international activities independently of central governments—a trend that has already ﬂourished in many nations in response to shifting power relationships within national and international contexts. It then considers Japanese SNGs as international actors generally and overviews circumstances in China, before focusing on what

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Japanese SNGs are doing there, where, and why. The analysis focuses on three of the major types of linkages that Japanese SNGs have forged in China: (1) formalized sister relationships between prefectures/provinces, cities, towns and other localities; (2) trade promotion and overseas oﬃces; (3) technical and economic cooperation.

SNGs in international aﬀairs: towards a comparative perspective For several decades and particularly in the era of globalization, various powerful entities have eroded the sovereignty of nation states. Nations represented by national governments are no longer necessarily the main international actors, and pursuit of “national interest” is by no means the motivation behind many international actions. One type of international actor that has become increasingly active is SNGs and an expanding literature examines this development in many national contexts, mostly in Western nations where the trend is strongest. Today many SNGs in industrialized nations play a vital self-sustaining role by pursuing their own interests abroad through cultural, educational, and other cooperation programmes at the grassroots level. Clearly, however, the major motivation for their actions is to gain economic beneﬁt for the locality of their administration, usually through promoting trade and attracting foreign investment. In Europe, a number of regions have opened “embassies” abroad and negotiate their own trade agreements, some have linked themselves in stateof-the-art transportation networks to attract foreign business, and some local governments are claiming new ground in EU decision-making.4 Almost all ﬁfty US states have trade oﬃces abroad, and all have oﬃcial standing in the World Trade Organisation (WTO).5 Some SNGs in Asian nations are taking a similar role in promoting their economic interests through overseas trade and attracting foreign investment in both traditional manufacturing sectors and new economic areas such as IT. They indeed now pursue their local interests internationally and voice concern independently of their national governments in such matters as international trading rules and agreements.6 Not only commercial and economic interests, but also sometimes altruism and ethics motivate the international activities of SNGs. Some SNGs, especially in Europe, have become involved in delivery of foreign aid. Municipal international cooperation (MIC) serves as a mechanism for SNGs to become involved directly in development assistance, providing SNGs of developing countries uninterrupted access to technical assistance and ﬁnancial support from their partners in the industrialized world.7 Some SNGs, particularly in North America, take action against abuses of human rights internationally, through punitive actions such as imposing economic sanctions and establishing laws banning state agencies from signing contracts with companies doing business with the blacklisted nation. The laws imposed by the state of Massachusetts against Burma are one renowned example.8

Forging new bilateral relations 131 What explains this increasing interest of SNGs in independently pursuing international relations? The literature reveals that the following circumstances are usually implicated. First, SNGs have learned to speak for themselves to protect their speciﬁc interests since the localized interests of SNGs may be in conﬂict with what their national governments recognize internationally as national interests. For example, decisions that national governments make at international organizations like the WTO and the UN can impact profoundly on local economies and their governance, as farmers and SNGs in rural Japan learned while suﬀering the consequences of their national government’s accession to the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT), concluded in December 1993. Second, central governments often lack administrative or other resources necessary to carry out alone huge responsibilities such as developing national commercial potential to its fullest and implementing foreign aid programmes.9 SNGs may have necessary resources, including expertise and personal or other contacts, and may be better placed to pursue international action since they do not necessarily have the diplomatic baggage attached to the central government. Third, SNGs have the political will to undertake these activities since international linkages can contribute to SNGs’ policy and some ﬁnancial independence from their central governments. SNGs are generally very eager to achieve this outcome, as the Japanese case illustrates well. SNGs in many nations therefore have the imperative to search for new areas where they can assert their autonomy by introducing innovative policies independently and ahead of the national government and ideally generate sources of income for themselves. The international arena can provide multiple opportunities as we see in the Japan–China example. In international aﬀairs the interests of SNGs may be in conﬂict with interests pursued by their central governments on some issues. But the interests of both may also be very much in alignment, particularly in pursuit of economic and diplomatic gain that can beneﬁt both locality and nation. The same may also apply to aid delivery, exchange programmes that generate goodwill, and in some cases where SNGs’ overseas actions can reinforce the centre’s political position or even express it explicitly when the centre is unable to. In the case of Japanese SNGs in China, the interests of national and sub-national governments generally coincide since pursuit of economic beneﬁt drives many of these relationships. However, SNGs do not get involved in political issues and thus their relationship continues unhindered despite occasional tensions at the national level on issues of history and contemporary diplomatic matters. The following brief section considers Japanese SNGs as international actors that will serve as an essential backdrop to understand their actions in China.

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The external relations of Japanese SNGs Like their counterparts in North America and Europe, Japanese SNGs are increasingly active internationally. But their involvement has barely registered in most analyses of Japan’s international relations. Outdated assumptions about Japan’s highly centralized state have blocked proper recognition of emerging actors like SNGs that also operate beyond the centre. Some academic studies are available,10 but most accounts have come from government and semi-oﬃcial publications and practitioners—governors, mayors, local oﬃcials,11 or have focused on a few distinctive SNGs or a particular sub-region of Japan.12 Japanese SNGs do not have the legal and constitutional power of their counterparts in the United States, and have not been active in political issues like promoting human rights and democracy overseas.13 More signiﬁcant for Japanese SNGs, and for understanding the Japan–China case, they have long struggled for more autonomy from the central government and are now using the opportunity aﬀorded by relations outside Japan to cultivate ﬁnancial independence and enhanced status. Japanese SNGs were late starters with international action when compared with their Western counterparts. The centralized structure of Japan’s political system locked SNGs in the ﬁnancial and administrative embrace of the central government, under the protection of a highly regulated, protected market. This arrangement hobbled SNGs’ need, desire and ability to seek economic beneﬁt from overseas sources. But as the consequences of globalization began to threaten local economies particularly from the late 1980s, Japan’s SNGs were forced to confront the much broader economic competition that their central government had allowed upon them. Thus, SNGs began to think strategically about strategies for their own economic survival independently of the central government; the unity of interests between the nation’s levels of government had begun to erode. The international actions of SNGs in mostly western nations oﬀered precedents that Japanese SNGs could follow or modify to help secure their own economic survival in the highly competitive global economy to which they were now exposed. Although the attitude of the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and other national actors has changed recently and they have become much more accommodative of other actors than before, in their early attempts at international economic pursuit, SNGs confronted resistance from the central government, which was unwilling to relinquish its hold on both the operating scope of SNGs and what appeared to be “diplomatic” activities abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs initially refused to allow SNGs to open oﬃces overseas14 and it was with support from overseas oﬃces of JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization, a quasi-government body charged with promoting Japanese trade) that SNGs began to make contact with foreign businesses and traders. Given the SNGs’ struggle for freedom from their central government, international economic linkages are particularly important for

Forging new bilateral relations 133 weakening SNGs’ ﬁnancial dependence on the centre. This recognition helps to explain much of the Japanese SNGs’ interest in China, since China presents them with many opportunities for economic beneﬁt.

China as an attractive destination for Japanese SNG activities Before we turn to Japanese SNGs in China it is useful to brieﬂy consider the Chinese side for what it presents to Japanese SNGs. Irrespective of historical and cultural linkages, opportunities for economic linkages appear to be considerable, as Japanese SNGs have demonstrated in the 1990s. It is well documented that as the Chinese economy is transformed by marketization, Chinese provinces and cities have actively sought investment and other economic assistance in their areas and have focused on exporting goods to neighbouring countries.15 Pursuit of international trade and investment independently of Beijing is a crucial part of China’s regional decentralization since it impacts on the economic growth of the regions.16 Cheung and Tang in their study have observed how Chinese provinces conduct their external relations ‘through an elaborate set of organizations and mechanisms’, with the provincial Foreign Aﬀairs Oﬃce serving as the key organ responsible for conducting provincial foreign aﬀairs.17 Chinese provincial and city administrations have discovered that trade and other economic links with Japanese counterparts are a prime method for swift economic development since Japan is close and relatively rich in the capital and technological capacity and is willing to supply what the Chinese side needs. In 1990 Japan ranked ﬁrst as the destination for exports from four Chinese provinces (Liaoning, Shandong, Qinghai and Xinjiang) and second for twenty provinces, with relations also very strong in the Shanghai/Jiangsu region. As for foreign direct investment (FDI), in 1992 half the FDI in Liaoning came from Japan, as did two-thirds of all foreign investment in Dalian, partly because of Japanese expertise in the region and a large population in Dalian still with Japanese language ability after their colonization experience in the 1930s and 1940s.18 Yoshida’s study of Liaoning Province outlines the strategies that this provincial government pursued to attract trade, investment and economic cooperation from Japanese prefectures and cities.19

Examples of Japan–China cooperation SNGs have been players in Japan–China relations since the diplomatic relationship was normalized in 1972. Indeed, Governor Minobe Ryo¯kichi (1967–79) of Tokyo played a crucial role in normalizing the relationship between the two nations by visiting the People’s Republic as head of Tokyo Metropolis, one of Japan’s forty-seven prefectures. Supported by leftist parties, Minobe carried a letter on behalf of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to the PRC government, hence apparently commanding more clout in the Chinese capital than did Japan’s national leaders of the time. Particularly

134 Japan’s Relations with China from 1978 with the Peace and Friendship Treaty, Japanese SNGs began to shift the focus of their foreign relations from the United States to China, recognizing China as a rising power with great economic potential, almost on Japan’s doorstep.20 In the 1980s and 1990s Japanese SNGs developed multifaceted relationships with their Chinese counterparts at a speed not observed elsewhere. The main motivation was usually to serve economic and other interests in the medium to long-term, though for some SNGs these linkages were more copycatting their Japanese counterparts than pursuing a foreign policy strategically. However, Japanese SNGs are today becoming more strategically minded in their initiatives towards China, with a range of programmes linking Japanese and Chinese SNGs in innovative ways. Let us turn here to explore three of the main types of linkages to illustrate the nature of these relationships and some new directions. Sister friendship ties One of the ﬁrst forms of sub-national diplomacy in Japan was the sister-city (shimai toshi) relationship begun in the mid-1950s, establishing oﬃcial contacts with SNGs overseas to rekindle and extend relationships.21 The concept of sister city relations in Japan was based on the American model as espoused by President Dwight W. Eisenhower in the 1950s which was “to increase international understanding and foster peace by furthering international communication and exchange at the person-to-person level through city-to-city aﬃliations”.22 Nagasaki City and St Paul in Minnesota were the ﬁrst to form a relationship in 1955 and most relationships since then were with American cities and states. For example, no Japanese prefecture established a relationship other than with an American state until 1969 when Hyogo Prefecture established its ties with Khabarovsk, a region of the former Soviet Union. However, with the growth in the Japanese economy and increasing international contacts at all levels, Japan’s SNGs had the opportunities to expand their programmes into other continents and regions. As of April 2003, Japanese SNGs had some 1,475 aﬃliations with their counterparts in ﬁfty-seven countries across North and South Americas, Europe, Africa, Asia and Australasia. Although a latecomer as a destination for sister-city ties, now China occupies number two position, after the United States, on the table of Japan’s sister-city relationships.23 Kobe City was the ﬁrst to establish a sister-city link in China with Tianjin in May 1973, followed six months later by Yokohama City with Shanghai.24 It is noteworthy that these ties were established much prior to the signing of the 1978 friendship treaty between the two nations. Tianjin and Shanghai were the ﬁrst two Chinese cities to link oﬃcially with foreign counterparts since China became a communist state. “Normalization” of the relationship with China presented with opportunities for Japanese SNGs to establish links with their counterparts in China to pursue various agendas. Political factors were at work, especially as progressive mayors and governors (supported by the

Forging new bilateral relations 135 Communist and Socialist parties) were keen to redirect Japan’s focus from the United States and the West. Revival of historical links and genuine cultural exchange were some of the other motivations.25 While it cannot be denied that political and other motivations were at work in forging relations with Chinese cities and provinces, commercial opportunities were then, and are still, the major motivation for these oﬃcial couplings. It is therefore not surprising that Japan’s two most internationalised, commercial cities—Kobe and Yokohama—with a long history of trade through their ports were ﬁrst to forge these relationships. Oﬃcial ties were developed remarkably quickly during the 1990s and continued into the 2000s with 290 by April 2003. At this time China was number two after the United States for the total number of its relationships (435 in 2003) and the number of its municipal relationships (256: about 19 per cent of Japan’s total). On other indicators, however, China was clearly the frontrunner, with the most prefecture-province relationships (thirty-four, one third of all Japanese sister relationships at prefectural level); and 290 (65 per cent) of Japan’s 445 sister-city relationships in Asia.26 Budgetary allocations also conﬁrm Japanese SNGs’ strong focus on China. In ﬁnancial terms, over 25 per cent of the total sister-city programmes budget in 1998–2000 went to programmes with Chinese SNGs, well ahead of programmes with the United States despite the US lead in the total number of sister-city relationships.27 What types of SNGs form these links? Larger cities in Japan and China have been most pro-active, with prefectural and provincial governments sometimes following their lead. For example, Niigata City linked with Harbin (Heilongjiang) in 1979 and Niigata Prefecture linked with Heilongjiang in 1983; Naha City in Okinawa established ties with Fuzhou (Fujian) in 1981 and Okinawa Prefecture linked with Fujian in 1997. But counterpart links between cities and their prefectures are not always the case. Hokkaido’s capital city Sapporo linked with Liaoning’s capital Shenyang in 1980 but in 1986 Hokkaido Prefecture linked with Heilongjiang province; in Fukuoka, Kitakyushu and Fukuoka cities signed agreements with Dalian (Liaoning) and Guangzhou (Guangdong) respectively in 1979, and Fukuoka Prefecture signed an agreement with Jiangsu Province in 1992. Kobe City in Hyogo Prefecture linked with Tianjin in 1973, but a decade later Hyogo Prefecture linked with Guangdong Province. What motivates these linkages? The vast majority of links is the result of both sides seeking new economic and other opportunities through grassroots cooperation, based on economic complementarity, geographic proximity, historical connections or other shared feature. The Chinese side has also been keen for technological spin-oﬀs from such contacts. While the relationship retains its oﬃcial signiﬁcance, its real worth to both sides is often the work of private-sector bodies whose own commercial interests coincide with the interests of their SNG. Japanese survey ﬁndings reveal that while education was the most favoured programme for Japanese sister connections worldwide, in programs with China administrative exchange topped the list, indicating

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Chinese local leaders’ top priority of learning about local administration and local economic management from their Japanese counterparts.28 Sister linkages are also motivated by both sides seeking to foster mutual goodwill, interest and knowledge—strategic cache that is usually sought from this type of oﬃcial linkage, through programmes ranging across various types of shared interests in culture, sport, education, agriculture and other common concerns. The example of linkages undertaken by Nagasaki, on Japan’s western edge and close to the Chinese mainland, illustrates how and why these oﬃcial arrangements work. Nagasaki has close oﬃcial links with Fujian. In 1980 the port cities of Nagasaki and Fuzhou (capital of Fujian Province) established a friendship tie; in 1982 Nagasaki Prefecture formed a tie with Fujian Province and in 1983 the prefecture’s second port city, Sasebo, established ties with Xiamen, a major port city in Fujian.29 Nagasaki’s interests in China well precede these oﬃcial link-ups. Fishing disputes required Nagasaki to interact with China even in early postwar years and in 1955 a Japan-China Citizens Fisheries Agreement was arranged through Nagasaki in the absence of Japan-China diplomatic relations. The Nagasaki Chamber of Commerce had formed a China Trade Promotion Society in 1952 and Nagasaki sent a City Assembly member to a trade fair in Shanghai in 1956. A local incident in 1958 known as the Nagasaki Flag Incident in which a rightwing youth dragged down a Chinese ﬂag at a Chinese products fair held in a department store in China caused a major diplomatic row between the governments of two nations, it had very little impact on the local community and Nagasaki’s plan to develop relationships with China. Indeed, Nagasaki City administration worked with prefectural governments for years lobbying the central government to resume diplomatic relations.30 This example clearly illustrates that national-level tensions do not necessarily aﬀect local-level cooperative relationships. Until normalization of relations in 1972, most exports from Nagasaki to China were food since COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export Control) restrictions on exports to socialist nations debarred exports of the machinery that China particularly wanted. Since 1972 the economic relationship has been developed through exhibitions, trade promotion oﬃces and economic survey teams. Trade in marine products is especially strong and includes used ﬁshing vessels. Department stores in the sister cities have formed special friendship ties, with Japanese stores receiving Chinese trainees and selling Chinese goods. A Chinese Consulate opened in Nagasaki in 1985. A direct cargo-shipping route from Nagasaki to Fuzhou opened in 1990 and eﬀorts are in place to reopen the route to Shanghai with local banks and industry in Nagasaki forming a “Shanghai Club”. Nagasaki Prefecture opened its oﬃce in Shanghai in 1991. Beyond the strong economic ties, medical, academic, sports and artistic exchanges have been developed to cultivate and extend these relations. Nagasaki SNGs may be exceptional in the range and depth of their linkages with China; the prefecture’s geographical perch on Japan’s western seaboard

Forging new bilateral relations 137 makes China the obvious target for their bilateral relations. Nevertheless, all of Japan is close to China and surveys have revealed a groundswell of desire among Japanese for cultural exchange with Asian neighbours, mainly China.31 Sister-city ties are initiated via many media. McConnell cites an example of the revival of historical and cultural links and sister-city ties between two cities in Japan and China through the JET (Japan Exchange and Teaching) programme. When a coordinator of international relations (CIR) from China arrived in Kagawa in 1992, his arrival symbolized only the most recent in a long line of exchanges between Kagawa Prefecture and Shaanxi Province. Ties between the two can be traced back to some 1,200 years ago “when Kukai (Kobo Daishi) studied at Quinlong Temple in the T’ang capital of Chang’an (now Xi’an) and brought back to Japan something of Chinese Buddhist culture and art.” The governor of Kagawa and other high-ranking oﬃcials in the prefecture took interest in his stay, and after returning to China the CIR “was closely involved in preparing for the 1994 signing of a friendship agreement between the two SNGs. Since that time, Shaanxi and Kagawa have sponsored at least ten exchange events each year.”32 As evident in the case of Kagawa Prefecture, one of the aims of sister-city friendship ties is to revive historical relationships that were frozen throughout the cold war era and rebuild the cultural and geographical identities of local areas. This is certainly also an acknowledgment by the Japanese that China is a very powerful and increasingly wealthy nation at Japan’s backdoor. A key reason for growth of local interest in China is Japan’s desire to expand business in Asia. Given SNGs’ economic and business interests, it is not surprising that about half of Japanese SNG sister relationships in China are in coastal provinces such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hebei, Shandong and Liaoning, which have all experienced phenomenal economic growth. Trade promotion and overseas oﬃces Recognizing these economic goals driving much of Japanese SNGs’ relations in China, it is also not surprising to note the ﬂourish of oﬃces representing Japanese SNGs in China, especially in places where prospects for mutual beneﬁt from trade and investment are strong. SNGs recognize these oﬃces as a constructive way to promote SNGs’ economic interests in China by facilitating international trade, helping their local industries to establish in China with Japanese outward foreign direct investment, and for generally cultivating commercial opportunities. Overseas oﬃces enable greater mutual access to information and interaction at the local level, which help establish links with business and industry groups independently of national government and business associations. These oﬃces in China collect information about local economic conditions, arrange reciprocal visits by local oﬃcials, business groups and trade missions, promote investment from their locality, oﬀer advice to business groups from their locality that seek to do business in the Chinese destination, and facilitate

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Japan’s Relations with China

relocation of Japanese production units. Kanagawa Prefecture’s Economic Trade oﬃce in Dalian (Liaoning) provides oﬃce space at rock bottom prices to its enterprises investing directly in China, with economic information, interpreting, secretarial, transport and oﬃce equipment included.33 Japanese SNGs have oﬃces in forty-two major cities outside Japan. China tops the list of nations with thirty-four Japanese SNG oﬃces and the United States comes a distant second with twenty-two. More than half of all Japanese prefectures and designated cities have at least one oﬃce in China. These oﬃces are not necessarily in the SNGs’ oﬃcial partner cities or provinces, some of which were formed on the basis of historical ties or to conduct cultural exchange rather than to pursue economic opportunities. Since Japanese SNGs site their oﬃces in China—as elsewhere—in locations with strong potential for economic beneﬁt, Shanghai and Hong Kong are popular destinations. These oﬃces are established to deal primarily with hard-core economic matters, and goodwill generated through them is an incidental, though still welcome, outcome.34 Japanese SNGs are so convinced about the central role of China for Japan’s economic future that some SNGs are now closing their oﬃces in such countries as Singapore and Thailand and relocating them to China.35 Technical and economic cooperation Between 1989 and 2001 Japan was the world’s largest donor of Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA), also known in Japan as keizai kyoryoku (economic cooperation).36 Increasingly actors other than central government organisations such as SNGs are becoming involved in Japan’s ODA delivery and some even speak of a “local ODA” program in Japan.37 SNGs have knowledge and expertise in areas such as city planning, transportation, curbing industrial pollution, environmental management, garbage disposal, sewerage, and water supply, all of which can be highly useful to local institutions in recipient nations. One area where Japanese SNGs have reported wide-ranging cooperation with friendship cities and provinces in China is caring for the physical environment.38 A particular concern of Japanese SNGs has been to assist Chinese counterparts in pollution control and other environmental management. The damaging eﬀects on its own environment drive Japan’s interest in China. One report conﬁrms “that pollution from China is adversely aﬀecting certain areas of the country, notably Kyushu. In 1992, a reported 30 per cent of the total amount of acid compounds released into the air by Chinese industries fell on the region.”39 The Appendix shows the range of environmental cooperation between Japanese and Chinese SNGs. Note that there are many other such cooperative arrangements outside the framework of the sister-city relationships. The Kitakyushu-Dalian case oﬀers an egregious example of cooperation in this area within the sister-city framework. Kitakyushu City is linked to Dalian City through a friendship programme established in 1979. Kitakyushu is renowned internationally for improving its

Forging new bilateral relations 139 water and air quality after severe pollution problems in the 1960s. When rapidly industrializing Dalian found itself facing similar environmental degradation, Kitakyushu helped Dalian to formulate its environmental protection plan that included transfer of technology from Kitakyushu to Dalian in a range of areas including water-quality improvement and waste-disposal management. This project was so successful that Dalian received a UN Environment Program award in 2001. Further, in the wake of Kitakyushu’s environmental cooperation, the Japanese national government chose Dalian as one of three Chinese cities (with Chongqing and Guiyang) for the Japan– China Model City Plan.40 Here a cooperative aid relationship in environmental protection between the two cities led to a larger oﬃcial aid grant from Japan’s central government, setting a precedent in Japanese ODA history for bottom-up rather than top-down policymaking. Mutual interest in environmental cooperation is also evident in the ﬂow of Chinese SNG employees to learn from Japanese SNGs (42 per cent of the total inﬂow in 2000). Japanese SNGs are generally keen to help their Chinese counterparts, yet their motivation is not entirely altruistic. Japanese SNGs recognize that pollution in China causes acid rain to fall on Japan so they have a vested interest in environmental clean-up in China. Japanese SNGs are also well placed to assist in this area as they have considerable expertise in dealing with pollution problems after their own experience following high economic growth in the 1960s. Japanese SNGs also receive trainees from developing countries and dispatch technical staﬀ to provide training in recipient countries for a range of programmes beyond environmental management, through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). China’s domination here, too, is clear: in 1994, Japanese SNGs received some 3,253 trainees (41 per cent from China) and dispatched 439 technical personnel to developing countries (53 per cent to China).41 While some cooperation programmes including certain types of personnel training form part of the central government’s ODA programme and are funded from the national budget, for some of these cooperation programmes SNGs are using their own resources. A 2001 survey of all Japanese prefectures for the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) identiﬁed nineteen prefectures involved in a range of development projects using their own resources. Here, too, China has strongest representation. Of the nineteen prefectures with projects in developing countries such as Nepal, Indonesia Thailand, Ghana, and Brazil, seventeen prefectures had one or multiple projects in China.42

Conclusion Despite their relatively late start as international actors in areas other than sister-city relationships on a modest scale, Japan’s SNGs in the last two

140

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decades have spent millions of dollars annually and have committed other resources inside and outside Japan, pursuing international activities very similar to those pursued by their Western counterparts. The United States and other western nations occupied Japanese SNGs’ attention initially, but now China features strongly in Japan’s span of international activity. Sister city friendly relationships oﬀer an important vehicle for Japan to re-establish historical and cultural links and develop a range of programmes at grassroots level with its powerful neighbour. Moreover, China’s swift move towards a market economy, increasing its economic strength and international status, coincided with Japanese SNGs’ recognition of their capacity as international actors and their need to take action, as the interests of Japan’s national and sub-national governments began to collide. The Japanese SNGs have therefore focused much of their attention on economic programmes that help increase their pursuit of greater economic independence from the central government. Since China is geographically close, and its abundance of cheap labour complements Japanese industrial needs, it is an attractive destination for Japanese SNGs in their economic pursuits. These pursuits appear very likely to be at least continued or expanded further in China by Japanese SNGs, but with an approach more strategically astute than during previous decades. As mentioned before, SNGs have recognized the huge economic potential of China for Japan and are now even in the process of closing their oﬃces in some parts of Asia and relocating them to China thus making China as the focus of their main economic pursuit. In pursuing these relations in China, Japanese SNGs generally act independently but also have the support of their central government. The centre resists their push for independence, but it has an obvious interest in the economic wellbeing of the administrative units for which it is responsible, and both national and sub-national levels of government in Japan have a huge interest in the well-being of relations with their powerful neighbour China. Furthermore, the relationship at the sub-national level apparently does not suﬀer from the kinds of tensions and conﬂict that arise from time to time between the two national governments, as observed in the case of the Nagasaki Flag Incident. Cooperation rather than competition and conﬂict have hitherto deﬁned these relationships. Despite fears in some quarters about China’s adverse eﬀect on the Japanese agricultural sector and other non-competitive sectors, SNGs in Japan and China are convinced of the mutual beneﬁts emanating through their cooperative arrangements. Despite the so-called “lost decade” of Japan and the anxiety among many Japanese towards the rise of China, good and mutually beneﬁcial relations between the SNGs of both nations appear to have a momentum of its own. The case above of Japan–China ties at the sub-national level illustrates a huge change in the mind-set of SNGs and their leaders as to what they can achieve through their activism in the international arena. However, SNGs have not gained the recognition they deserve for their current contributions to

Forging new bilateral relations 141 international relations, particularly in the case of Japan-China bilateral relations. But now as part of a strong trend among internationally active SNGs, and in conjunction with their counterparts in China, Japanese SNGs are proving that they can do much—and sometimes more and better than the central government—in cultivating close and valuable ties with one of Japan’s most important and powerful Asian neighbours.

Appendix: SNG bilateral environmental cooperation Prefectures and provinces SNG

Friendship SNG

Project

Hokkaido

Heilongjiang Province Jilin Province

Environmental Protection Exchange Promotion Project, Overseas Technical Trainees Hosting Jilin Province China Friendship Exchange Promotion Project (Pollution Prevention Technical Trainee Hosting) Shanxi Province Environmental Protection Technical Trainee Hosting Project Environmental Protection Exchange Group Dispatch and Hosting

Miyagi Prefecture Saitama Prefecture Tokyo Metropolitan Government Kanagawa Prefecture

Shanxi Province Beijing

Niigata Prefecture

Heilongjiang Province

Toyama Prefecture

Liaoning Province

Ishikawa Prefecture Fukui Prefecture Shizuoka Prefecture Aichi Prefecture Mie Prefecture

Jiangsu Province Zhejiang Province Zhejiang Province Jiangsu Province Henan Province Shaanxi Province Shanghai

Kyoto Prefecture Osaka Prefecture

Liaoning Province

International Cooperation Project Promotion (Joint Tripartite Research and Training with Kyonggi Province, Korea) International Cooperation Project Survey, Trainee Hosting, Exchange Relating to the Japanese Crested Ibis Liao River Water Quality Joint Environmental Research Survey, Environmental Technical Trainee Hosting Trainee Hosting Project Zhejiang Province Technical Trainee Hosting Promotion Project Trainee Hosting, Periodic Survey Team Dispatch and Hosting Employee Dispatch, Trainee Hosting Henan Province Environmental Protection Support Project Environmental Technical Trainee Hosting Project Water Quality Protection Joint Research (Supporting the Enactment of the Shanghai District Water Environment Plan)

SNG

Friendship SNG

Project

Hyogo Prefecture Tottori Prefecture Shimane Prefecture

Guangdong Province Jilin Province

Hyogo-Guangdong Environment Protection Technical Exchange Conference Jilin Province River Water Quality Improvement Joint Project Jilin Province River Water Quality Improvement Joint Project

Okayama Prefecture Hiroshima Prefecture

Jilin Province Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Jiangxi Province Sichuan Province

Okinawa Prefecture

Fujian Province

Takasaki City Kashiwa City

Chengde City Chengde City

Meguro Ward Kawasaki City

Chongwen Dist, Beijing Shenyang City

Niigata City

Harbin City

Yokkaichi City

Tianjin City

Osaka City

Shanghai

Kobe City

Tianjin City

Hiroshima City

Chongqing City Qingdao City

Shimonoseki City Kitakyushu City Fukuoka City Nagasaki City

Dalian City Guangzhou City Fuzhou City

International Cooperation Specialist Technical Staﬀ Dispatch and Hosting Project Environmental Protection Cooperation Project (Dispatch and Hosting of Specialist Technical Staﬀ) Okinawa-Fujian Exchange Project (Provision of Air Pollution Measurement Equipment, Trainee Hosting) Five City International Exchange Programme Friendship Forest Construction Project, Kashiwa Japanese Botanical Gardens Project Carbon Dioxide Concentration Measurement Project Environmental Protection Observation Group Exchange, Air Pollution Permanent Observation Telemeter System Construction Support, Environmental Protection Trainee Hosting Environmental Protection Observation Group Exchange, Air Pollution Continual Observation System Construction Support, Environmental Protection Trainee Hosting Waste Disposal and Recycling Technology Trainees, Environmental Technology Trainees Water Service Technology Exchange, Municipal Garbage Disposal Technology Exchange Hosting of General Municipal Policy and Technical Trainees Environmental Protection Exchange East Asia Pan Yellow Sea Conference (Coordinator of Environmental Protection Conference) Environmental Model Area Plan Construction Support Environmental Management Exchange Project SNG Employee Cooperation Exchange Project

Source: Kaigai Kankyo¯ Kyo¯ryoku Sentaa, “Chiho¯ ko¯kyo¯ dantai no kankyo¯ kyo¯ryoku” in Nitchu¯ kankyo¯ kyo¯ryoku jirei jo¯ho¯ shiryo¯ shu ¯ : Heisei 11 nendo kankyo¯cho¯ itaku cho¯sa (Documents information on Japan–China environmental cooperation: results of the Environment Agency survey commissioned in 2000), Kaigai Kankyo¯ Kyo¯ryoku Sentaa, March 2001, Ch. 3, pp. 17–20.

Forging new bilateral relations 143

Acknowledgement This is part of a larger research project that the author is undertaking on Japan’s sub-national governments and their role in foreign aﬀairs, with funding from the Australian Research Council Large Grants Scheme (2001–03). The author would like to thank Carol Lawson and Maureen Todhunter for their research support. Many scholars and local and national oﬃcials in Japan and elsewhere have generously given their time and provided materials without which this project would not have progressed. Yoshida Hitoshi of the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia in Niigata and Menju Toshihiro of the Japan Centre for International Exchange in Tokyo have been particularly helpful with this paper. Thanks also to Lam Peng Er, He Baogang, Andrew Watson, David Goodman and Glenn Hook for their suggestions on the earlier draft of this paper. The usual caveat applies. The author would also like to thank the editors of Global Change, Peace and Security for their permission to reproduce sections of my paper published in 16:1, 2004.

Notes 1 To avoid confusion I use a generic term “sub-national government” instead of the constitutional terms “local self-government” (chiho¯ jichi), “local public entity” (chiho¯ ko¯kyo¯ dantai), or “local autonomy” (chiho¯ jichi). The terms used commonly in academic writing are “local government” in English and “chiho¯ jichitai”, “chiho¯ jichi” and “jichitai” in Japanese. The term “local government” is potentially confusing here since in a federal system it refers to administrative units below, and not including, states or provinces. This could imply exclusion of prefectures, which are their equivalent in Japan’s unitary political system. However, prefectures have a status similar to that of states or provinces in a federal system and no Japanese prefectural government would establish a sister relationship with other than a state or province in a federal system. Hence a generic term “sub-national government” is more appropriate. In the case of Japan, sub-national governments include all government bodies below the national government: forty-seven prefectures (to, do¯, fu, ken), thirteen designated cities (seirei shitei toshi) and all other municipal bodies from large cities to small towns and villages (shi, cho¯, son). Altogether there are some 3,200 sub-national governments in Japan. 2 A recent book in English edited by Michio Muramatsu, Farrukh Iqbal and Ikuo Kume, Local Government Development in Post-war Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), does not even mention this development in Japan’s local government. Similarly books in English on Japan international relations make no mention of Japan’s local governments as international actors. See for example, Glenn Hook et al., Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economic and Security (London: Routledge, 2001). 3 Interviews with a group of Japanese local oﬃcials in January 2001 at the Japan Intercultural Academy of Municipalities (Zenkoku Shicho¯son Kokusai Bunka Kenshu¯jo) in Karasaki, Shiga Prefecture, who came to JIAM for a short training programme. 4 In Europe, the term sub-national political authorities or sometimes sub-national authorities is used rather than sub-national governments. On developments in Europe see for example, Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift”, Foreign Aﬀairs, 76:1, 1997, pp. 50–66; John Newhouse, “Europe’s Rising Regionalism”, Foreign Aﬀairs,

144

5

6

7 8 9

10

11

12

Japan’s Relations with China

January-February 1997, 76:1, pp.67–84; Elizabeth Bomberg and John Peterson, “European Union Decision Making: The Role of Sub-national Authorities”, Political Studies, 2, June 1998, pp.219–35. Mike Clough, “Consulates Belong to Yesterday’s Diplomacy”, Los Angeles Times, reprinted in Daily Yomiuri, 17 August 1998. On developments in the United States, see for example, Earl H. Fry, The Expanding Role of State and Local Governments in US Foreign Aﬀairs (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1998); Heidi H. Hobbs, City Hall Goes Abroad: The Foreign Policy of Local Politics (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994); Mike Clough, “Grass-roots Policymaking”, Foreign Aﬀairs, January/February 1994, 73:1, pp.2–7; Mathews, “Power Shift”. See Peter T.Y. Cheung and James T.H. Tang, “The External Relations of China’s Provinces”, in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp.91–122; Kripa Sridharan, “Federalism and Foreign Relations: The Nascent Role of the Indian States”, Asian Studies Review, 27:4 December 2003, pp.463–89; Carla P. Freeman, “Province, Center, and the World Trade Organization: Liaoning and China’s WTO Accession”, Issues and Studies: An International Quarterly on China, Taiwan and East Asian Aﬀairs, 38:3, September 2002, pp.1–32. See Gerrit Jan Schep, et al. Local challenges to Global Change: A Global Perspective on Municipal International Cooperation (The Hague: Sdu Publishers, 1995). See Terence Guay. “Local Government and Global Politics: The Implications of Massachusetts’ ‘Burma Law’ ”, Political Science Quarterly, 115:3, 2000. pp.353– 76. Although not discussed in this chapter, Japanese SNGs now are actively involved in foreign aid issues. See Hitoshi Yoshida and Purnendra Jain, “Japan’s Subnational Governments and their International Cooperation Programs”, Asian Proﬁle, 31:5, October 2003, pp.375–88. See, for example, Matsushita Keiichi (ed.), Jichitai no kokusai seisaku (International policy of sub-national governments) (Tokyo: Gakuyo¯ Shobo¯, 1988); Yabuno Yu¯zo¯, Rokaru inishiatibu (Local initiative), Tokyo: Chu¯o¯ko¯ronsha, 1995; Purnendra Jain and Mizukami Tetsuo, Gurasuru¯tsu no kokusai ko¯ryu¯ (Japan’s internationalisation at the grassroots level) (Tokyo: Habestusha, 1996). See for example, Niigata City’s former chief of international oﬃce account, Ichioka Masao, Jichitai gaiko¯: Niigata no jissen: yu ¯ ko¯ kara kyo¯ryoku e (Local diplomacy: the Niigata case—from friendship to cooperation) (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyo¯ronsha, 2000); Kanagawa prefecture’s record of international actions in Kanagawa Ken, Minsai gaiko¯ 20 nen: sekai ni hirakareta Kanagawa o mezashite (Commemorating twenty years of local diplomacy: opening Kanagawa to the world) (Kanagawa: Po¯tosaido Insatsu, 1995); also see Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR) publications such as its monthly Jichitai Kokusaika Fuoramu. Published works in English include David Arase, “Shifting Patterns of Japan’s Economic Cooperation in East Asia: A Growing Role for Local Actors?” in Marie Soderberg and Ian Reader (eds), Japanese Inﬂuences and Presences in Asia (Richmond: Curzon, 2000); Purnendra Jain, “Japan’s Urban Governments, their International Activities and Australia-Japan Relations: An Exploratory Essay”, Policy Organisation and Society. No. 4, Summer, 1991; Purnendra Jain, “Emerging Actors in Japan’s International Aﬀairs”, in T. Inoguchi and P. Jain (eds), Japan’s Foreign Policy Today: Beyond Karaoke Diplomacy? (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Gilbert Rozman, “Backdoor Japan: The Search for a Way Out via Regionalism and Decentralization”, Journal of Japanese Studies, 25:1, 1999, pp.3–31; Tsuneo Akaha, “Despite the Northern Territories: Hokkaido’s Courting of the Russian Far East”, Paciﬁc Focus, 18:1, Spring 2003, pp.89–122.

Forging new bilateral relations 145 13 Some high-proﬁle local political leaders such as Tokyo’s Governor Ishihara Shintaro¯ have raised concern over China’s human rights conditions and its growing defence budgets. See Purnendra Jain, “Japan’s 1999 Uniﬁed Local Elections: electing Tokyo’s Governor”, Japanese Studies, 19:2, September 1999, pp.117–32. 14 Interview with Professor Takashi Ebashi of Hosei University, Tokyo, 22 April 2002. 15 David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). 16 Gerald Segal, “Deconstructing Foreign Relations”, in Goodman and Segal (eds), China Deconstructs, p.345. 17 Cheung and Tang, “The External Relations of China’s Provinces”, pp.91–122. 18 Segal, “Deconstructing Foreign Relations”, pp.334–5. 19 Liaoning established exchange with two Japanese prefectures (Kanagawa and Toyama) and with fourteen Japanese cities at municipal level including Kitakyushu and Sapporo. See Yoshida Hitoshi, Kokusaitekina jichitai no genjo¯ to tenbo¯: Chu ¯ goku Riaoninsho¯ de no jirei kenkyu ¯ (Sub-national government international cooperation: challenges for the future—case study of Liaoning Province in China) (Tokyo: Kokusai Kenkyu¯ Sho¯gaku Zaidan) (The Tokyo Foundation, formerly the Global Foundation for Research Scholarship), 1999. 20 In its two reports on regional internationalisation, the Japan Foundation Centre for Global Partnership points out clearly the shift from the US to Asia, particularly China, in the 1990s. See The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership. The Survey Reports on Regional Internationalization and U.S.-Related Exchange Activities in Japan (Vol. 1). (Tokyo: CGP, 1994), pp.13–15; The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership. The Survey Reports on Regional Internationalization and U.S.-Related Exchange Activities in Japan (Vol. 2) (Tokyo: CGP, 1997), pp.7–9. 21 Shimai toshi is a literal translation of “sister city”, an American term. The term used in Britain is “twin city” (futago toshi), which is gender neutral. The Japanese favoured the American term since their ﬁrst relationship (Nagasaki) was with an American city (St Paul), formed in 1955. 22 Quoted in Kevin O’Toole, “Kokusaika and Internationalisation: Australian and Japanese Sister Type Relationships”, Australian Journal of International Aﬀairs, 55: 3, p.403. 23 Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, Japanese Local Government International Aﬃliation Directory 2003 (Tokyo: CLAIR, 2003). 24 Yoshida notes that for the Chinese side, the term shimai toshi connotes a relationship between senior and junior (shimai means literally older and younger sisters). The Chinese side prefers the term yu ¯ ko¯ (friendship) which is gender neutral and conveys a relationship between equals. Yoshida prefers to use the term yu¯ko¯shimai toshi (friendly sister city relationship). See his work Chiho¯ jichitai no kokusai kyo¯ryoku: chiiki ju ¯ min sankagata ODA o mezashite. (Local government’s international cooperation: ODA and citizens’ participation) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyo¯ronsha, 2001), p.58, note 8. 25 Both Menju Toshihiro and Yoshida Hitoshi who have conducted numerous surveys on Japanese SNGs and various facets of their international programmes have emphasised political, historical and cultural motivations in my several conversations and correspondence with them. 26 These ﬁgures have been taken from the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, Japanese Local Government International Aﬃliation Directory 2003 (Tokyo: CLAIR, 2003). 27 The combined budget of SNGs on sister-city programmes in 1998 was 8.7 billion yen, which was decreased to 7.9 billion in 1999 and 7.04 billion yen in 2000.

146

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40

41 42

Japan’s Relations with China

Jichitai Kokusaika Kyo¯kai, Shimai jichitai no katsudo¯ to gaikyo¯ 2001 (Activities and status of sister-city relations) (Tokyo, CLAIR, 2002), section 4, pp.10–11. Jichitai Kokusaika Kyo¯kai, Shimai jichitai no katsudo¯ to gaikyo¯ 2001. Nihon Toshi Sentaa (ed.), Toshi gaiko¯: jichitai no kokusai ko¯ryu¯ senryaku (Municipal diplomacy: sub-national government international relations strategy) (Tokyo: Gyo¯sei, 1995), p.28. For details of Nagasaki’s contacts with China from the 1950s see ibid, pp.10–31. The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership. The Survey Reports on Regional Internationalization and U.S.-Related Exchange Activities in Japan (Vol. 2) (Tokyo: CGP, 1997), p.8. David McConnell, Importing Diversity: Inside Japan’s JET Program (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.234. Yoshida, Kokusaitekina jichitai no genjo¯ to tenbo¯: Chu ¯ goku Riaoninsho¯ de no jirei kenkyu¯, p.9. Yoshida, Chiho¯ jichitai no kokusai kyo¯ryoku, p.49. Interviews in CLAIR, Singapore, 24 February 2004. Japan lost its number one position in overseas aid as it reduced its aid budget in 2001 while the United States is increasing its budget in this area. Jichiro¯ Jichiken Chu¯o¯ Suishin Iinkai, Jichitai no kokusai kyo¯ryoku to jichitai ODA (SNGs’ international cooperation and local ODA) (Nagano City: Kenmin Bunka Kaikan, 1995). See Kaigai Kankyo¯ Kyo¯ryoku Sentaa, “Chiho¯ ko¯kyo¯ dantai no kankyo¯ kyo¯ryoku” in Nitchu¯ kankyo¯ kyo¯ryoku jirei jo¯ho¯ shiryo¯ shu ¯ : Heisei 11 nendo kankyo¯cho¯ itaku cho¯sa (Documents information on Japan–China environmental cooperation: results of the Environment Agency survey commissioned in 2000), Kaigai Kankyo¯ Kyo¯ryoku Sentaa, March 2001, pp.17–20; Jichitai Kokusaika Kyo¯kai, “Chiho¯seifukan ni okeru kokusai kyo¯ryoku”, in Chu¯goku no kankyo¯ mondai to chiho¯ jichitai no kokusai kyo¯ryoku (Subnational government international cooperation and China’s environmental problems) (CLAIR Report No. 213, June 2001), pp.40–7. Energy Information Administration/Japan, Japan: Environmental Report, [email protected] (June 1995) accessed 11 July 2002. This was part of a 1997 agreement by Prime Ministers Hashimoto and Li Peng supporting programs to enhance the environment in Chinese cities. Daily Yomiuri, 6 February 2000. For details of the plans for each city see Yoshida, Chiho¯ jichitai no kokusai kyo¯ryoku, pp.49–53. See Table 3 in Jichi Fuoramu, 461, February 1998, p.6. See Table, p.24. Heisei 13-nendo chiho¯ jichitai renkei cho¯sa ho¯kokusho (The 2001 Survey Report on Cooperation with SNGs), Prepared by a private consultant for JBIC, March 2002.

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Jichitai Kokusaika Kyo¯kai, Shimai jichitai no katsudo¯ to gaikyo¯ 2001 (Activities and status of sister-city relations) (Tokyo, CLAIR, 2002). Kaigai Kankyo¯ Kyo¯ryoku Sentaa, “Chiho¯ ko¯kyo¯ dantai no kankyo¯ kyo¯ryoku” in Nitchu¯ kankyo¯ kyo¯ryoku jirei jo¯ho¯ shiryo¯ shu ¯ : Heisei 11 nendo kankyo¯cho¯ itaku cho¯sa (Documents information on Japan–China environmental cooperation: results of the Environment Agency survey commissioned in 2000) (Kaigai Kankyo¯ Kyo¯ryoku Sentaa, March 2001). Kanagawa Ken, Minsai gaiko¯ 20 nen: sekai ni hirakareta Kanagawa o mezashite (Commemorating 20 years of local diplomacy: opening Kanagawa to the world) (Kanagawa: Po¯tosaido Insatsu, 1995). Matsushita Keiichi (ed.), Jichitai no kokusai seisaku (International policy of sub-national governments) (Tokyo: Gakuyo¯ Shobo¯, 1988). McConnell, David, Importing Diversity: Inside Japan’s JET Program (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). Muramatsu, Michio, Farrukh Iqbal and Ikuo Kume, Local Government Development in Post-war Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Mathews, Jessica T., “Power Shift”, Foreign Aﬀairs, 76:1, 1997. Newhouse, John, “Europe’s Rising Regionalism”, Foreign Aﬀairs, January–February 1997. Nihon Toshi Sentaa (ed.), Toshi gaiko¯: jichitai no kokusai ko¯ryu¯ senryaku (Municipal diplomacy: sub-national government international relations strategy) (Tokyo: Gyo¯sei, 1995). O’ Toole, Kevin, “Kokusaika and Internationalisation: Australian and Japanese Sister Type Relationships”, Australian Journal of International Aﬀairs, 55: 3, 2001. Rozman, Gilbert, “Backdoor Japan: The Search for a Way Out via Regionalism and Decentralization”, Journal of Japanese Studies, 25:1, 1999. Segal, Gerald, “Deconstructing Foreign Relations”, in Goodman and Segal (eds), China Deconstructs (London: Routledge, 1994). Schep, Gerrit Jan, et al., Local Challenges to Global Change: A Global Perspective on Municipal International Cooperation. (The Hague: Sdu Publishers, 1995). Sridharan, Kripa, “Federalism and Foreign Relations: The Nascent Role of the Indian States”, Asian Studies Review, 27:4 December 2003. Yabuno Yu¯zo¯, Rokaru inishiatibu (Local initiative) (Tokyo: Chu¯o¯ko¯ronsha, 1995). ¯ goku Riaoninsho¯ de no Yoshida Hitoshi, Kokusaitekina jichitai no genjo¯ to tenbo¯: Chu jirei kenkyu ¯ (Sub-national government international cooperation: challenges for the future—case study of Liaoning Province in China) (Tokyo: Kokusai Kenkyu¯ Sho¯gaku Zaidan (The Tokyo Foundation, formerly the Global Foundation for Research Scholarship), 1999). Yoshida Hitoshi, Chiho¯ jichitai no kokusai kyo¯ryoku: chiiki ju ¯ min sankagata ODA o mezashite. (Local government’s international cooperation: ODA and citizens’ participation) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyo¯ronsha, 2001). Yoshida Hitoshi and Purnendra Jain, “Japan’s Subnational Governments and their International Cooperation Programs”, Asian Proﬁle, 31:5, October 2003.

8

Building Yellow Sea Bridges Kyushu’s role in Japan–China relations Glenn D. Hook

The ending of the global Cold War, even if not as complete in East Asia as in Europe, with a divided China and Korean peninsula containing the seeds for renewed conﬂict, has opened up new opportunities for substate actors to play an increasingly important role in forging crossborder political, economic and cultural links between Japan and China. Whether the spatial scale of analysis is the regional, as in the case of the Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC),1 the subregional, as illustrated by the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three (China, Japan and South Korea),2 or the microregional, as addressed in this chapter,3 Japanese substate actors are actively carving out new international roles in response to the dynamic intersecting of the globalization and regionalization processes unleashed by the crumbling of Cold War structures. At the microregional level, bridges are now being built across the once “frozen seas” oﬀ Japan’s shores, with the Cold War thaw providing the impetus to view the sea as a “liquid continent”, where Japanese prefectural and city political authorities, local businesses, and other substate actors, are promoting crossborder bridges of cooperation, as in the links being built across the Yellow Sea to Dalian and other Chinese cities in the region. This is not to ignore the role of the state. As elucidated elsewhere, even on the microgional level, the state plays a vital role, most often as a facilitator of crossborder economic activity.4 Within the wider context of the emerging Pan-Yellow Sea Zone, which at its most ambitious aims to embrace sub-national parts of Japan, China, South Korea and North Korea, agents of the Japanese state are similarly involved in promoting crossborder economic activity. The case of the bilateral economic links being promoted between Japan and China at the substate level by the Kyushu Bureau of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, until 2001 Ministry of International Trade and Industry, MITI) is illustrative. As a representative of the Japanese state, METI supports Kyushu businesses seeking to develop crossborder trade and investment links with China. Thus, this chapter directs attention to METI’s role in promoting Sino-Japanese economic cooperation as well as to the wider role of substate actors in crossborder cooperation: the prefecture of Fukuoka; the city of Kitakyushu; and local businesses.

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Speciﬁcally, the chapter examines the bridges these actors in the industrial and commercial centres of northern Kyushu (southern Kyushu is mainly agricultural) are building across the Yellow Sea to sub-national parts of China, especially the industrial port city of Dalian, one of China’s open coastal cities and the “gateway” to Beijing. Its purpose is empirical as well as theoretical. Empirically, the chapter maps the types of links being built, identiﬁes the actors involved, and contributes to a fuller understanding of the interests, strategies, identities and attitudes at the base of these crossborder activities between sub-national parts of Japan and China. This is seen as an antidote to the overly statist approach of much of the literature on SinoJapanese conﬂict and cooperation, which is viewed overwhelmingly from the bilateral perspective of inter-state or inter-governmental relations, as well as an antidote to viewing the impact of the rise of China as uniform throughout Japan. That is to say, by analyzing the case of Kyushu the chapter provides concrete evidence of how China is perceived as an opportunity, not as a threat, as is often the case at the national level and by national politicians lobbying for protectionist measures for a constituency where the economic rise of China is spurring the hollowing out of industry. At the same time, by disaggregating the state we seek to shed light on the wider theoretical question of the meaning of these emerging substate, crossborder links and the role of the state in them; their implication for the restructuring of the microregional political economy; and the potential for them to contribute to the emergence of new spatial scales of governance and a new regional order in East Asia.5 Whilst in no way denying conﬂict in crossborder substate as well as inter-state Japan–China relations, the focus here is on crossborder cooperation as an illustration of how, depending on the level of interaction between Japan and China, both cooperative and conﬂictual relations can be identiﬁed. In a sense, the chapter shows that, despite the ascendance of the “China threat” in the national discourse on Sino-Japanese relations in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, Kyushu illustrates how local actors are at the same time taking advantage of the opportunities to link localities across the Yellow Sea, thereby nurturing crossborder interests as well as identities based on cooperation.

Setting the scene The Cold War divide between East and West separated Kyushu from the links it had maintained with China historically. In 1951, as part of the postwar settlement, the government of Yoshida Shigeru recognized Taiwan, not the Mainland, as the legitimate government of China. As a result, even though the Cold War did not preclude entirely a certain amount of Sino-Japanese trade, which until normalization of relations in the 1970s took place under the government’s policy of separating politics and economics (seikei bunri),6 thereby giving a role to nonstate actors even at the height of the Cold War, the position of Kyushu as the “gateway” to China was no longer tenable. In

Building Yellow Sea bridges 151 the ﬁrst place, the defeat in the war brought an end to Japanese colonial rule in Dalian, which had replaced that of Russia following the empire’s victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5. As part of Manchuria, which subsequently became the puppet state of Manchukuo (1932–45), the Japanese had built up the infrastructure and established Dalian as a centre for heavy industry and developed the ice-free port as a crucial transportation link to Japan. With the loss of the war and the subsequent 1949 communist victory in China, however, a fundamental reorientation of the Japanese political economy took place, away from the Communist Mainland and towards the United States and non-Communist parts of East Asia. Kyushu (Kitakyushu) remained, along with Keihin, Nagoya and Hanshin, as one of the four main industrial pillars of the Japanese economy in the postwar era, but its geographical location was at the “far west” of the national political economy, not a gateway for Japan as part of an East Asian regional economy under the binding embrace of the so-called “Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere”. As a consequence of Japan being locked into the Western camp in the Cold War divide between East and West, moreover, the Paciﬁc seaboard was consolidated as the core of the Japanese economy. Similar to the prefectures along the Japan Sea borders of Japan, which are stigmatized as the “ura” or the “back” (backward) part of Japan, Kyushu was severed from links across the sea and embedded increasingly in the national economy oriented across the Paciﬁc. As with northern Kyushu, the prefectures of ura Japan, such as Niigata, are also involved in attempts to develop a crossborder zone of economic cooperation focused on the sea.7 Second, as a sub-national part of an imperial power, Kyushu played a vital role in the expansion of the Japanese empire into East Asia. Whilst the legacy of Japanese imperialism in China and the Korean peninsula is usually viewed at the national level, the role of the ports of Fukuoka and Yamaguchi prefectures (Moji and Shimo no Seki), as the staging posts for an imperial grab for land, resources and markets, forged deep-rooted links between Kyushu and China. The legacy of imperialism right next door serves both to constrain and provide opportunities for building bridges across the Yellow Sea to China in the contemporary era. The constraints can be seen, for instance, in the sensitivity over the naming of the putative Zone. Although the Chinese are not as sensitive as the South Koreans in insisting on their own name for the Zone, with the East Sea preferred to the Japan Sea in the case of the economic zone promoted by Niigata, the preference is still to use the Bohai Sea rather than the Yellow Sea. In other words, the abstract legacy of Japanese imperialism at the national level is a concrete legacy at the sub-national level in terms of the way Kyushu and Dalian are forging links across the sea in terms of identity building. Third, as one of the four main pillars of the Japanese economy, northern Kyushu, especially the area around Kitakyushu and Yahata, has been a key site for the production of steel and chemical products. Its position as one of the centres of heavy industry was established in the context of the move from

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coal to oil as the main source of energy for Japan and the decline of Kyushu’s role as the national economy’s coal supplier. Yahata steel mills, which were built at the turn of the twentieth century, have been the backbone of the local economy. Thus, rather than the gateway to China, Kyushu was reintegrated into the Paciﬁc seaboard economy as a key pillar of Japanese heavy industry. With the decline in Japan’s heavy industry, especially steel, the aim at the local level now is to strengthen the role of knowledge-intensive industries and technology, nurturing an economy tied to other parts of the Pan-Yellow Sea Zone as well as to other parts of the national economy. Fourth, the revolution in transportation and communication technology, especially the extension of the bullet train from Tokyo to Fukuoka, linked Kyushu both psychologically and physically into the national economy radiating out from Tokyo. The advances in air transportation, with the main terminals for air traﬃc located in Tokyo (Haneda and then Narita) and later Osaka (Kansai airport), eroded even further the role Kyushu could play as a gateway to China, as air transportation came to replace sea. Thus, even with the normalization of diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965 and China in 1972, the change in the nature of the transportation infrastructure meant that, despite the historical links built up in the era of empire, it was diﬃcult for Kyushu to reestablish its position as the gateway to East Asia. In essence, the structure of the Cold War divide was such that, without a thawing in the overall relationship between East and West, Kyushu was unable to reorient its economy towards China and other parts of the Pan-Yellow Sea Zone. Fifth, the dynamics of globalization and regionalization spurred on with the ending of the Cold War, together with the decade-long economic downturn at home, have put the central government in Tokyo under pressure to move forward with some degree of decentralization.8 Although modernization in Japan has been pursued centred on Tokyo, as part of the strategy of Japan as a developmental state, the central government’s new emphasis is on promoting the revitalization of the economy at the local level. Indeed, some argue this is essential in order for Japan to overcome the long-term stagnation of the national economy.9 In this context, the prefectures can no longer rely on Tokyo to provide the resources needed to revitalize the economy at the local level. This implies the need for sub-national political authorities to take on an increasingly active role in spurring growth at the local level. As northern Kyushu is a lower cost area within Japan’s urbanized centres of economic activity, some revitalization of the local economy has come about as a result of ﬁrms from other parts of the country relocating to the region as part of domestic cost-cutting, but this alone does not suﬃce as a long-term strategy for Kyushu’s economic revitalization. Rather, Fukuoka and other prefectures and cities are playing an increasingly important international role as part of the wider strategy pursued by the state in the face of the nation’s long-term economic downturn and the need to generate initiatives at the local level. In this sense, the Pan-Yellow Sea Zone oﬀers a vision for Fukuoka prefecture

Building Yellow Sea bridges 153 and Kyushu more generally to reorient the local economy towards East Asia, and China in particular. Finally, the move to a “socialist market” economy in China in the wake of the 1978 “open door” policy and the creation of economic “zones” in Dalian and elsewhere in Liaoning province, which aim to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), have acted as a “pull” for Japanese businesses seeking to exploit the opportunities of land, labour and markets across the Yellow Sea. Nearly half of these zones are located in the Yellow Sea coastal region of China, with Dalian’s Economic and Technical Development Zone having been established in 1984.10 The end of the Cold War and the economic downturn at home have provided even greater incentives for Kyushu businesses to invest in these zones. At the same time, the possibility of gaining Japanese investment and technology is attractive to the Chinese oﬃcials in Dalian and elsewhere in Liaoning province, as they have been faced with the task of combating unemployment and stagnant growth following the restructuring of the less eﬃcient state-owned enterprises which dominate the region. In other words, incentives exist on the Chinese side to build cooperative links with Kyushu which belie the image of China as a rising power and threat dominant at the national level.

Rebuilding microregional links: transportation, investment and trade Transportation The opportunities for Kyushu businesses created by the economic changes in China following the move to a socialist market economy and then the end of the Cold War could not be exploited fully without the development of a transportation system within the microregion. As domestic transportation costs within Japan are high, forging links across the sea and the creation of a microregional division of labour and production system provides Kyushu with an opportunity to reposition itself at the heart of the microregional political economy centring on the Yellow Sea. The historical links between Kyushu and China which were severed as a result of the loss of the war and the divisions of the Cold War era have been gradually rebuilt following the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1972 and the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. Transportation links were given a major boost in 1999 with the opening of a new international terminal at Fukuoka airport, making it the third largest passenger terminal in Japan after Narita and Kansai. Eighteen airline companies serve the airport, including a number of Chinese airliners. It oﬀers ﬂights to nine Chinese cities, including Dalian, approximately two hours away, Beijing and Shanghai as well as to Hong Kong, Taipei and a number of other cities in Asia. As far as shipping is concerned, a container line links Fukuoka (Moji) and Dalian ﬁve times a month. Ships also operate to Tianjin and Weihai once a

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month, Tsingtao four times a month, and Shanghai seven times a month. A number of other routes to Chinese ports, which make up nearly three quarters of all of the foreign ports served by northern Kyushu, are similarly in operation. In this way, manufacturing parts produced in Kyushu can be supplied for processing in China and other goods as well as “reverse imports” brought back to Japan, thereby linking the two sub-national economies together. K Transportation An example of the type of transportation links that have been forged is illustrated by K Transportation. K Transportation was set up in 1987 as a joint-venture by a Fukuoka shipping company in order to carry container cargo across the Yellow Sea between Moji and Dalian. This route was started after the visit of the Mayor of Dalian to Fukuoka in 1986 in search of a Japanese shipping company willing to set up a route between Kyushu and his city. The container line is used for the import from Dalian of footwear, apparel and general cargo, and the export from Moji of chemicals, resin and paper. The weight and value of the cargo is thus diﬀerent, with high value goods exported from Japan but low value goods imported from China. This lack of balance between supply and demand is one of the reasons for the lack of proﬁtability on the route, as is the severe competition from Chinese container ﬂeets and general over-capacity. Despite the tight economic situation in operating the route, the company is reluctant to pull out due to the strong historical and cultural links Kyushu has maintained with Dalian. Although business was obviously needed in order to make the transportation link viable, the existence of a sister-city agreement between Dalian and Kitakyushu was a key reason for the start of this particular route. Indeed, Chinese oﬃcials from Dalian exploited the existence of cultural links with Kyushu and the identity of the Yellow Sea Zone in trying to establish the container route. In this way, Chinese oﬃcials were able to use the shared Yellow Sea identity as a political resource in negotiating with Japanese sub-national actors, such as companies, thereby appealing to their common interests in competition with other Chinese sub-national actors seeking to develop links with Kitakyushu. Foreign direct investment The businesses of Kyushu invest overwhelmingly in East Asia. During the period 1986–98, for instance, 79.3 per cent of all investment was in East Asia (ASEAN, the NIEs and China), with China making up 44.2 per cent of total East Asian investment.11 In the period between 2001–2003, Kyushu’s appetite for investing in the region remained strong, with 78.3 per cent of the total invested in East Asia. In this way, East Asia and China have emerged as the most important destination for Kyushu investments, with the Yellow Sea

Building Yellow Sea bridges 155 region, and Dalian in particular, being important as a sort of high growth “northern Hong Kong” of China.12 The number of investments made in the Yellow Sea region of China has ﬂuctuated, starting with two cases in 1986 and a peak of twenty-six in 1995. There was a drop in the late 1990s and early 2000s to a handful, but then an increase again to eleven cases in 2002 and the same again in 2003, suggesting the renewed move of Kyushu businesses into the Yellow Sea region of China. The case of S electric in Dalian illustrates the way Kyushu companies are taking advantage of opportunities to invest in China and exploit the Chinese market. S electric S electric is a Fukuoka electric company established in the 1920s and has been a publicly listed company since 1990. It employs over six hundred. Like many other small- and medium-sized companies in Kyushu, S electric has a technical support agreement with one of Japan’s large multinational corporations (MNCs), in this case Toshiba. It mainly produces switchgear and switching equipment for electric power companies, and control and computer systems for national and sub-national governments as well as industry. The factory in Fukuoka produces overwhelmingly for the domestic market, with only around one per cent of output for export. With the increase in the value of the yen following the 1985 Plaza Accord, S electric began to relocate production facilities overseas, ﬁrst setting up plants in Malaysia (1989), next Singapore (1993), and then Dalian (1995). The factory in Dalian was established as a joint venture with the electronic giant Sanyo acting as the go-between in introducing S electric to its Chinese counterpart. The location of Sanyo in Dalian oﬀered the possibility of an additional market, as S electric makes products complementary to Sanyo’s products. S electric found localization was essential in order to develop sales in China. In this sense, the creation of a joint venture and the employment of local staﬀ were necessary in order to make inroads into the Chinese market. The company’s electrical devises help to provide a stable ﬂow of electric power to the local users, both Japanese and Chinese, thereby preventing black outs and brown outs. Their design (100 per cent) and the production of the parts making up the equipment (almost 100 per cent) are carried out in Fukuoka. The joint company in Dalian employs approximately eighty staﬀ with about twenty engineers. Productivity is three times the Chinese standard. Approximately 90 per cent of the parts used are procured in China, although the company does not purchase parts from Chinese state enterprises. It thus has no need to import parts from Japan. Approximately 20 per cent of the total production in China is exported back to Japan. Whilst the rise in the value of the yen and the existence of a market were a necessary condition for S electric’s investment in China, they are not suﬃcient to explain the choice of Dalian. Other cities in China promised

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S electric’s management similarly attractive opportunities for investment and proﬁt-making. Certainly, the location of Sanyo in the city provided S electric with local knowledge and the potential to develop business links with a major Japanese electronics ﬁrm. But this is not the only reason. In the ﬁrst place, the close historical and contemporary links through the sister-city agreement between Kitakyushu and Dalian were crucial, similar to the case of K transportation. In addition, a Chinese engineering student who had graduated from Kyushu University was vital in negotiating the joint venture with the Chinese counterpart and in supporting the decision to locate in Dalian, his home town. And ﬁnally, as in the case of K transportation, the Chinese oﬃcials in Dalian used the identity of the Pan-Yellow Sea Zone as a way to “pull” investment to the city rather than to elsewhere in China. Thus, the location of the factory in Dalian was a result of both economic and cultural factors, with the “Yellow Sea” identity serving as a political resource for Chinese oﬃcials keen to attract Japanese investment to their own city and province. This suggests how, in crossborder economic cooperation at the sub-national level, Chinese oﬃcials are competing with other sub-national parts of the Chinese economy to attract Japanese FDI and the relocation of manufacturing plants. The above examples serve to illustrate the way in which history and identity can be used by sub-national actors in the pursuit and realization of their own interests. Whilst in many cases the motivation for Japanese investment in China is to take advantage of cheap labour costs, and increasingly in the early twenty-ﬁrst century to exploit the Chinese market, the history of Japan–China relations appears both to constrain and to provide opportunities for business. The evidence is insuﬃcient to draw wide-ranging conclusions, but these examples indicate that, at the least, the location of investment is not determined solely in terms of proﬁt, but in the context of the wider historical and cultural links between Kyushu and China. These historical links can include personal experience. For instance, the president of a Kyushu company may have been motivated to invest in Dalian as a result of his family having been born in the city. At the same time, Chinese oﬃcials can use cultural links and the concept of the Zone as a way to try to attract Japanese investments. The existence of sister-city links are frequently used by Chinese oﬃcials in order to exert pressure on Japanese substate political authorities and businesses to move from crossborder “exchange” to “economic cooperation”.13 Trade The transportation routes and investments in Dalian have been crucial for the development of trade between Kyushu and China. In 1998, the top ﬁve exports from Kyushu to China were respectively general machinery (31.5 per cent), organic compounds (17.4 per cent), steel (14.7 per cent), plastics (4.7 per cent) and semiconductors and other electrical parts (4.5 per cent). In

Building Yellow Sea bridges 157 2003, the top ﬁve exports were machinery parts (49.3 per cent, with semiconductors taking up 13.5 per cent of the total following a 60 per cent increase over the previous year), chemicals (19.3 per cent), steel (17.6 per cent), energy sources (4.3 per cent) and textiles (1.9 per cent). The growing importance of semiconductors in the trade between Kyushu and China reﬂects the way that Japanese companies are taking advantage of the opportunities created by increased Chinese production of electrical goods requiring high-tech parts. In terms of value, exports to China shot up from 47 billion yen in 1991 to 254 billion yen in 1999. In 2003 exports reached their highest value ever at 334 billion yen, reﬂecting a 3.2 times increase over the last decade. The top ﬁve imports from China in 1998 were marine products (13.2 per cent), electrical machinery (11.4 per cent), food (7.9 per cent) and textiles (5.4 per cent). In 2003, the top ﬁve exports were machinery parts (20.4 per cent), textiles (20.0 per cent), food (17.7 per cent), coal and other fuel (9.5 per cent) and metal (5.1 per cent). In terms of value, imports from China increased from 140 billion yen in 1991 to 357 billion yen in 1999. In 2003 imports reached their highest value ever at 560 billion yen, reﬂecting a 3.5 times increase over the last decade.14 In this way, the trade relations between Kyushu and China have been strengthened during the 1990s. The trade links between Kyushu and the Yellow Sea coastal region of China reﬂect a classic vertical division of labour between the two economies, with Japanese industry in the superior position in the relationship, particularly in terms of technology. Even in the late 1990s and early twenty-ﬁrst century, the trade pattern points to the role China plays as a supplier of food and low-technology items, such as apparel and footwear, to the Japanese market. At the same time, however, China is becoming increasingly important in the production chain for hi-tech products, pointing to the emergence of a crossborder division of labour and production system. Whilst major investments in Dalian and neighbouring areas are indeed made in order to take advantage of the cheap cost of the factors of production, especially land and labour, as in the case of the apparel industry, others symbolize the deterritorialization of the Japanese production process and the emergence of a microregional production system across the Yellow Sea. Increasingly, Dalian is playing a part in the production of electrical goods and machinery and is emerging as a key market for these products. Thus, although simple assembly of electrical products for export to the Japanese market is a key reason for Japanese manufacturing companies to invest in China, the demands of the Chinese economy are attracting large-scale investment from hi-tech players, too. The integrated circuit maker, Hitachi, for instance, aims to boost output in China over the next ﬁve years by eight times, investing 100 billion yen in order to meet the needs for such products as telecommunications equipment and information networks, thereby weakening the practice of keeping hi-tech production in Japan.15 As a result, a more horizontal division of labour is starting to emerge with some Japanese electronics makers aiming to exploit the Chinese market.16 This trend has emerged in the wake of Japanese

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investments in the Yellow Sea coastal regions of China and the development of transportation links centring on Dalian.

METI’s role Within this emerging microregional political economy, the central government has been encouraging Fukuoka prefecture to revitalize the local economy by strengthening economic links with China and South Korea; that is, to take actions in order to build bridges across the Yellow Sea. This strategy is illustrated by the role played by the Kyushu Bureau of METI in promoting the Pan-Yellow Sea Zone. The bureau acts for the central government, but the oﬃcials are locally recruited, except for the director, and claim to act independently in promoting the interests of Kyushu.17 In so doing, the oﬃcials are now seeking to reinterpret the political and economic interests and activities of Kyushu in such a way as to reconstitute the prefecture’s spatial location and economic importance within East Asia and the world, not just as part of Japan. In a pamphlet entitled an “Outline of Economic Conditions in the Kyushu Region”, for instance, the Kyushu Bureau of METI creates an identity for Kyushu globally and regionally as a national economy, rather than as a subnational part of the Japanese economy. Thus, in order to relocate the Kyushu economy on a diﬀerent spatial scale to the territorial sovereign state, Japan, where it appears as a periphery to the three economic power houses of Kansai centring on Osaka, Tokai centring on Nagoya and Kanto centring on Tokyo, and to create a new identity for it in the global political economy, the pamphlet provides a comparative table for 1995 of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), total area, and population for Kyushu, the Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium and Spain. This shows Kyushu ranking third in GDP (US$439 billion) after ﬁrst-ranked Spain (US$559) and secondranked South Korea (US$455). Its land area and population are similar to the Netherlands, with Kyushu’s population of 13.4 million slightly smaller than the Netherlands’ 15.4 million and the land area slightly larger at 42,000km2 versus 41,000km2. METI could, of course, have chosen to compare Kyushu with developing economies in Africa, Latin America or elsewhere to locate Kyushu globally, but this would have hindered the creation of an identity for Kyushu as an advanced economy in the global context. In this way, METI is seeking to relocate Kyushu in size and importance as part of the strategy to create a new identity for it at the core of the East Asian political economy. This reconceptualization of the economy’s location can be seen especially in the case of a METI map of Kyushu in the wider East Asian region. In essence, it seeks to spatially locate Fukuoka at the centre of an East Asian zone of two concentric circles. The ﬁrst circle of 1,000 kilometres from Fukuoka embraces parts of China, South Korea and North Korea as in the Yellow Sea Zone, and takes in the key cities of Pusan, Seoul, Pyongyang,

Building Yellow Sea bridges 159 Dalian and Shanghai. It clearly shows how Tokyo is about the same distance from Fukuoka as Shanghai, thus suggesting the possibility of Shanghai as a key economic player with which Kyushu could develop crossborder links. The second circle of 2,000 kilometres from Fukuoka includes as well Tianjin, Beijing and Taiwan as well as parts of Mongolia, Russia, and the Philippines. In this way, Kyushu appears as a global player at the centre of the Pan-Yellow Sea Zone, with an economy about the same size as South Korea and a land mass and population about the same size as the Netherlands. The other economic statistics listed in the pamphlet seek to establish an identity for Kyushu as an advanced industrial economy, making the motivation for the comparison with the economies of Europe clear. In the case of integrated circuits (ICs), for instance, the nineteen key factories located in Kyushu produce 30 per cent of the national total and 10 per cent of the world total output of ICs. Car giants Honda, Nissan and Toyota combine to make a “one-trillion yen” industry in Kyushu. By in this way creating an identity for Kyushu as an advanced economy on the spatial scale of a national economy, this increases the opportunity for the local bureau of METI and substate political authorities to deal directly with national oﬃcials in China and South Korea. Indeed, instead of these oﬃcials visiting Kyushu via the central government in Tokyo, reinforcing interstate relations, many increasingly utilize the direct transportation links and pay a visit directly to Kyushu.18 In this way, Chinese central and provincial government oﬃcials are prepared to negotiate directly with oﬃcials in METI’s Kyushu bureau and substate political authorities in the prefecture, breaking down the image of Japan–China relations as solely interstate relations with only the problem of a “rising China” determining the nature of the relationship.

The role of substate political authorities The role of substate political authorities in developing links across the Yellow Sea can be seen in the role played by Fukuoka prefecture and the city of Kitakyushu. To start with, during the Cold War no contact was maintained between Fukuoka prefecture and Chinese provinces, although contact did take place between Japanese and Chinese labour unions. The establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972 facilitated crossborder ties between substate political authorities, but it was not until 1992, when China and South Korea normalized relations, that the coastal regions of the three key economies at the centre of the Pan-Yellow Sea Zone could forge closer links. As far as China is concerned, the prefecture in 1992 set up a sister relationship with Jiangsu Province and began to play a role in promoting the Zone’s concept in the same year. As with business links, these crossborder contacts were facilitated by the legacy of historical and cultural contacts. This can be seen, for instance, in the role pre-war Chinese graduates of Kyushu University played in helping to establish Fukuoka’s sister relationships and other links after the Cold War ended.

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These eﬀorts made at the prefectural level are connected with the strengthening of Fukuoka’s identity as an “Asian” prefecture. In a similar way to METI’s relocation of Kyushu’s identity as part of a wider East Asian economy, Fukuoka has been relocating the identity of the prefecture as a cultural part of East Asia, drawing on the historical links between Kyushu and other parts of East Asia in this endeavour. In September 1997, for instance, the prefecture held a Modern Asian Festival, which sought to promote an understanding of other Asian countries. The links with China were an essential ingredient in promoting this festival. In the wider context, this and other festivals, musical events, museum exhibitions, and other cultural activities linked to Asia, are being widely promoted as a way to build up understanding of Asia and to relocate Kyushu’s identity within the wider East Asian context, not simply as a peripheral prefecture located at a great distance from Tokyo. As far as Kitakyushu is concerned,19 Mayor Sueyoshi Ko¯ichi has played a key role in promoting cooperation with China through the summit of Yellow Sea (East Asian) mayors, which was established in 1991 on the city’s initiative. These meetings bring together on an annual basis the mayors of the six key cities in the coastal regions of the Yellow Sea, including Fukuoka and Kitakyushu, on the Japanese side, and Dalian and Qingdao, on the Chinese. The meetings include academic and business leaders from both Japan and China, a sort of “track II” on the sub-national level. The inaugural summit in 1991 is representative of the focus the meetings place on developing the existing crossborder links into an economic zone, with wider areas of cooperation helping to promote a greater horizontal division of labour. The 1991 meeting included, for instance, proposals to push ahead with trade and the hosting of trade fairs, the promotion of technical cooperation, the strengthening of transportation links, and joint eﬀorts to tackle pollution. At the same time, the summit called for greater cultural exchange amongst the cities of the PanYellow Sea Zone, suggesting how Sino-Japanese cooperation is developing in a wide range of areas. The role Kitakyushu is playing in promoting links with China and further aﬁeld is part of the city’s attempt to revitalize the local economy as a result of the decline in the steel industry. The oﬃcials of Kitakyushu have a clear sense of economic crisis, calling for the revitalization of the local economy by greater internationalization.20 As part of the city’s strategy to revitalize the local economy and establish itself as a key part of the emerging microregional zone, for instance, a deep port for containers is being built, with operations scheduled to commence in 2005. Similarly, the city will host a major new international airport, which is presently being constructed oﬀshore, for opening in 2005. Yet again it would be wrong to view these initiatives as purely motivated by economics. The city maintains sister relationships with Dalian and Inchon, with an oﬃce in the former being established in 1991. The four employees posted to Dalian gather economic information, help Japanese companies

Building Yellow Sea bridges 161 make local investments, and promote cultural exchange and events in the city. In all of these endeavours, the prewar links between Kitakyushu and Dalian have been important in promoting trade and other forms of Sino-Japanese cooperation.21 Signiﬁcantly, the city is a pioneer in promoting cooperation with China in dealing with a range of problems associated with rapid economic development. As China develops and urbanizes, Dalian and other cities in the Yellow Sea coastal region face problems of pollution, congestion, overcrowding and the need for sanitation—the same sorts of problems faced by Japan in its own rapid economic development. The expertise to deal with these problems is often held at the local level, with oﬃcials of substate political authorities such as Kitakyushu being able to oﬀer the technical skills needed by the Chinese side. This can be seen, for instance, in the city’s transfer of technology to help Dalian deal with industrial pollution, drawing on the experience the city has gained in dealing with its own environmental problems caused by heavy industry. In this way, the environment provides a way for the city to develop cooperative links with Dalian, building up a sense of a shared environment between Kyushu and the coastal regions of the Yellow Sea, whether in terms of combating air or sea pollutants. The concept of the Pan-Yellow Sea Zone thus plays a role in building a sense of common interests between Chinese and Japanese people in terms of the environment they share in common.

Conclusion The above discussion of economic and cultural cooperation between Kyushu and Dalian has illustrated the role substate actors, along with the local representative of the Japanese state, the Kyushu bureau of METI, play in developing cooperative relations with China at the same time as the national image of China is that of a rising power and “threat”. Their activities are imputing Sino-Japanese crossborder space, more narrowly Kyushu-Dalian space, with political, economic and cultural meaning as part of the strategy of both state and substate actors to re-map the location and identity of Kyushu within the wider East Asian political economy. This has a number of implications. To start with, whilst some of these crossborder activities are clearly pursued for the purpose of promoting and realizing the interests of speciﬁc actors, as in S electronics’ investment in Dalian, the empirical evidence suggests that a close relationship exists between and amongst the political, economic and cultural linkages, with their boundaries being porous and subject to “spill over”. As seen in the case of the deployment by Chinese oﬃcials of the Pan-Yellow Sea Zone identity, identities can serve as political resources for realizing speciﬁc interests. A focus on the purely material aspects of the bilateral economic relationship at the level of the state misses this dimension of Sino-Japanese cooperation. Second, at the national level Japan–China relations are dominated by the rise of the “China threat”. Whilst the evidence here is limited it does indicate that, despite this national discourse, Chinese and Japanese oﬃcials

162

Japan’s Relations with China

and business people are developing closer economic ties at the local level, taking advantage of the opportunities crossborder trade and investment oﬀer. In this context, prewar cultural and personal links can and do provide opportunities for forging new cooperative relationships. This points to the potential for disparate interests to emerge at the national and sub-national levels in Japan and China and for these to lead to diﬀerent patterns of crossborder activities. Clearly, during the Cold War, national interests dictated that Kyushu would be largely severed from its historical links with China. In the post-Cold War period, however, these links are now being rebuilt as part of the wider reshaping of the microregional political economy, even though the rise of Chinese power and the China “threat” have grown in salience. Whilst the example of substate actors functioning on behalf of the state in promoting Sino-Japanese cooperation in the wake of the 1989 crushing of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square is illustrative of the intertwining of national and sub-national interests, as when representatives from Kyushu and Oita visited Beijing ahead of central government oﬃcials,22 the potential for substate actors to seek to promote and realize their own local interests, even if at odds with those of the central government, clearly exist. At the least, this implies the potential for divergence of interests to lead to a greater degree of decentralization in the Yellow Sea coastal regions of both Japan and China. The theoretical implications of Kyushu’s role in promoting Sino-Japanese cooperation are less clear cut, but they seem to imply the following. First, in terms of the spatial scales of regionalism, it is simply not enough to pay attention to regional and subregional initiatives promoted by the state. This chapter clearly points to the multivarious ways in which actors at the substate level in Kyushu are involved in crossborder cooperation with substate actors in China. This analysis of the microregional level of regionalism points to the potential for the state to be complemented by substate actors in deﬁning and shaping the overall nature of Sino-Japanese cooperation. As seen above, in order to solve problems which cross the sovereign territorial boundary of the state, as in the case of air- and water-borne pollutants carried from China to Japan, substate political authorities can play a crucial role. In this way, local oﬃcials have the potential to inﬂuence the overall nature of Sino-Japanese cooperation based upon their competency to deal with problems such as pollution. Second, Kyushu’s role in Sino-Japanese cooperation is illustrative of its part in an emerging Pan-Yellow Sea microregional political economy. Although the focus here has been on bilateral relations, these form only one part, albeit one crucial part, of the microregion. The development of political, economic, cultural and other links between and amongst the Yellow Sea coastal regions of Japan, China and South Korea demonstrates how multilateral, crossborder links are emerging in East Asia as part of the reshaping of the production system. What should not be lost sight of, of course, is the complex links between and amongst the microregional, subregional, regional and the global spatial scale of political economy. For even today, the healthy

Building Yellow Sea bridges 163 development of Yellow Sea microregional cooperation depends ultimately on the global level, as the end of the manufacturing process is the absorption of the products in the global market place, especially the advanced economies of the West. In this sense, microregionalism is simply the “lowest” level of regional cooperation at the heart of the process of restructuring and reshaping spatial relations in the wake of the Cold War’s ending. The ﬁrst and second point relate to the ﬁnal one: the potential for the need to deal with crossborder problems and the emergence of deterritorialized processes of production to lead to the emergence of new sites of governance and new regional scales of order in East Asia. Whilst the ﬁrst two scales of regionalism point to the potential for new sites of governance centring on the state to emerge, the microregional level points to the potential for the state to be complemented by substate actors in the emerging new order in East Asia. It can be argued that, due to competence on the local level, as in the case of the possession of technical skills to deal with crossborder pollutants, authority and legitimacy may move down from the state in dealing with certain of these sorts of crossborder issues. This may begin as the delegation of speciﬁcally circumscribed technical tasks to substate political authorities. True, in the early part of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the state continues as the core site of governance as well as government, but the potential for the carrying out of these tasks by sub-national political authorities to spill over into the political sphere, and then into questions about the location of the authority and legitimacy to carry them out, cannot be ruled out. In other words, new sites of governance may emerge on diﬀerent spatial scales involving substate political authorities and other nonstate actors. In this can be found the potential longer term implications of Kyushu’s role in building bridges across the Yellow Sea.

Notes 1 Glenn D. Hook, “Japan and the construction of the Asia-Paciﬁc”, in Regionalism and World Order, Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (eds) (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp.169–206. 2 Glenn D. Hook, “The East Asian Economic Caucus: a case of reactive subregionalism?” in Subregionalism and World Order, Glenn D. Hook and Ian Kearns (eds) (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp.223–45. 3 This chapter focuses only on the links between China and Japan, although the microregion includes the Korean peninsula. See Glenn D. Hook, “the PanYellow Sea Zone, in Microregionalism and World Order, Shaun Breslin and Glenn D. Hook (eds) (London: MacmillanPalgrave, 2002), pp.95–114; Also see Glenn D. Hook, ‘Responding to Globalization: Okinawa’s Free Trade Zone in Microregional Context,’ in Okinawa and Japan: structure and subjectivity, Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle (eds) (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp.39–54 and Glenn D. Hook, ‘Japan and microregionalism: Constructing the Japan Sea Rim Zone,’ in Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism. Asia in Search of its Role in the 21st Century, Yoshinobu Yamamoto (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwells, 1999), pp.126–41. 4 Shaun Breslin and Glenn D. Hook, “Microregionalism and World Order,” in

164

5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Japan’s Relations with China

Microregionalism and World Order, Shaun Breslin and Glenn D. Hook (eds) (London: MacmillanPalgrave, 2002). For a discussion on governance in East Asia, see Glenn D. Hook “Japan’s Role in Emerging East Asian Governance: regional and national implications,” in Glenn D. Hook (ed.) Contested Governance in Japan: sites and issues (London, Routledge Curzon, 2005). Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), pp.238ﬀ. Gilbert Rozman, “Backdoor Japan: the Search for a Way out via Regionalism and Decentralization,” Journal of Japanese Studies, 25, 1, Winter (1999): pp.3–31. Brendan F. D. Barrett, “Decentralization in Japan: Negotiating the Transfer of Authority,” Japanese Studies, 20, 1 (2000): pp.33–48. Kaneko Masaru, Cho¯ki Teitai (Tokyo: Chikuma, 2002). Katsuhara Takeshi, “Towards Economic Cooperation in the Pan-Yellow Sea Economic Region”, East Asian Economic Perspectives, 8 March, (1997): pp.108–20. Figures from Kyushu bureau of METI available on line at: http://www.kyushu. meti.go.jp, accessed 5 December 2004. Seki Mitsuhiro, Nihon Kigyo¯ Chu ¯ goku Shinshutsu no Shinjidai (Tokyo: Shinhyo¯ron, 2000): pp.12–18. Interview. Ministry of Home Aﬀairs (now Ministry of Public Management, Home Aﬀairs, Posts and Telecommunications) 18 April 2000. Figures from Kyushu bureau of METI available on line at: http://www.kyushu. meti.go.jp, accessed 5 December 2004. Financial Times, 24 October 2001. Interview. S electric 20 April 2000. Interview. Kyushu Burea of METI 19 April 2000. Interview. Kyushu Burea of METI 19 April 2000. It should be noted that, as Kitakyushu is specially recognized by the central government as a seirei toshi (usually a city with over one million inhabitants), the city enjoys status similar to a prefecture. Interview. Kitakyushu city oﬃcial 20 April 2000. Interview. Kitakyushu city oﬃcial 20 April 2000. Interview. Kyushu Burea of METI 19 April 2000.

Bibliography Barrett, Brendan F. D., “Decentralization in Japan: Negotiating the Transfer of Authority,” Japanese Studies, 20, 1 (2000): pp.33–48. Breslin, Shaun and Glenn D. Hook, “Microregionalism and World Order,” in Microregionalism and World Order, Shaun Breslin and Glenn D. Hook (eds) (London: MacmillanPalgrave, 2002). Hook, Glenn D., “Japan and the construction of the Asia-Paciﬁc”, in Regionalism and World Order, Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (eds) (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp.169–206. —— “The East Asian Economic Caucus: a case of reactive subregionalism?” in Subregionalism and World Order, Glenn D. Hook and Ian Kearns (eds) (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp.223–45. —— “The Pan-Yellow Sea Zone”, in Microregionalism and World Order, Shaun Breslin and Glenn D. Hook (eds) (London: MacmillanPalgrave, 2002). —— “Okinawa’s Response to Globalization,” in Okinawa and Japan: structure and subjectivity, Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle (eds) (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

Building Yellow Sea bridges 165 —— “Japan and microregionalism: Constructing the Japan Sea Rim Zone,” in Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism. Asia in Search of its Role in the 21st Century, Yoshinobu Yamamoto (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwells, 1999), pp.126–41. Johnson, Chalmers, Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). Kaneko, Masaru, Cho¯ki Teitai (Tokyo: Chikuma, 2002). Katsuhara, Takeshi, “Towards Economic Cooperation in the Pan-Yellow Sea Economic Region”, East Asian Economic Perspectives, 8 March, (1997): pp.108–20. Rozman, Gilbert, “Backdoor Japan: the Search for a Way out via Regionalism and Decentralization,” Journal of Japanese Studies, 25, 1, Winter (1990): pp.3–31. Seki, Mitsuhiro, Nihon Kigyo¯ Chu ¯ goku Shinshutsu no Shinjidai (Tokyo: Shinhyo¯ron, 2000): pp.12–18.

9

Japanese NGOs in China Akio Takahara

This chapter aims to shed light on the activities of the Japanese NGOs in China and explore their potential in improving further the relations between the two nations. Japanese NGOs are a relatively unknown subject. Compared to their counterparts in Europe, their development is relatively new, and their sizes and scale of operation are generally smaller. Therefore, it is small wonder that little is known to the outside world about them; how many there are, who they are, or what they do. Not surprisingly, Japanese NGOs in China are hardly recognized by the general public in China, and are only beginning to be known in Japan. The 2000 Directory of International NGOs Supporting Work in China, published by China Development Services (Hong Kong), does not list a single Japanese NGO, although it was published with grant support from the Japan Foundation.1 Research on Japanese NGOs in China is not easy even for a Japanese scholar. Statistical data is scarce, and although large-scale surveys have recently been conducted, the results published so far do not provide a complete picture of their activities. In this chapter, therefore, I can only gather and present what is available at the moment. As I will demonstrate, however, this turns out to be quite suﬃcient in order to understand the surprisingly impressive scale and content of the exchange already conducted at the grassroots level. Recently published data indicate that, as of mid-2001, there were 988 Japanese NGOs engaged in exchange and/or cooperation with China, and their activities covered a wide range of social and economic topics.2 Among the 988 Japanese NGOs, however, there is great variety. In this limited study, I shall present a case study of one NGO, the Green Earth ¯ saka and engaged in the greeniﬁcation of Network (GEN). GEN is based in O the Loess Plateau in Datong, Shanxi province. I chose GEN not only because of the personal contact I have, but also because greeniﬁcation is one of the popular areas of cooperation for Japanese NGOs in China. In addition, GEN has been active for 13 years, which is perhaps long enough to make a decent evaluation of their achievements and a fair analysis of their problems. The ﬁndings of this preliminary study indicate that, although the activities and even the existence of Japanese NGOs are hardly known, they are actually larger in number and engaged more actively in international exchange and

Japanese NGOs in China 167 cooperation than one might think. The stagnation of the Japanese economy notwithstanding, there has been a growing tendency for Japanese civil society to extend its linkages with the developing world, including China. Despite their institutional weaknesses, Japanese NGOs can play a very constructive role in China’s society and economy if they can ﬁnd eﬀective and committed counterparts. Their activities have had a positive impact on the relationship between the Japanese and the Chinese who have been involved. There is also potential for interaction between the civil societies to prove to be an important channel for promoting the relationship between the two nations, although civil society in China is still in its infancy.3 This development can probably be promoted by better publicity for the Japanese NGOs in China. In the ﬁrst part of this chapter, I shall introduce the general situation of Japanese NGOs and their activities in China. One of the important sources of information is The National Directory of NGOs and NPOs Engaged in International Cooperation and Exchange (2002 version), which basically covers information up to June 2001.4 This is available in CD-ROM as well as book form, which greatly facilitates the processing of the raw data of the NGOs, the result of which is displayed in Tables 9.1 to 9.4. The latter part of this chapter is devoted to the case study of GEN. Relying on their newsletters and interviews both in Japan and at their site in China, and consulting an MPhil thesis written by one of the members,5 I shall try to elucidate their motives, goals, speciﬁc activities, achievements and problems. In exploring the impact in terms of the relationship between the two nations, I shall pay special attention to the issue of the Chinese counterpart and to the change that GEN’s activities have brought to the perceptions of the Chinese public.

Japanese NGOs in China Initially, Japanese charities and citizens’ voluntary organizations in general were active mainly in areas such as social welfare, consumer protection and anti-pollution. In the ﬁeld of international exchange and cooperation, it was in 1965 that the Japanese version of the Peace Corps, the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV), was established as a governmental institution. Although some NGOs that engage themselves in international cooperation were organized early,6 they have increased rapidly in number particularly since the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when the North-South problems and the Indo-China refugee issue became the focus of media attention. The number of NGOs active in the area of international cooperation and exchange vary according to their deﬁnition. The National Directory of NGOs and NPOs Engaged in International Cooperation and Exchange (2002 version) includes 3,435 NGOs, while in 2001 the Japan Foundation identiﬁed 8,016 NGOs engaged in international exchange, to whom they sent questionnaires about their activities.7 According to the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), there are around 400 NGOs in the area of international cooperation (excluding exchange).8

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As for the geographical areas in which they are active, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia stand out as the regions where a great number of Japanese NGOs are engaged in cooperation and/or exchange work. There were 1,277 of them in Northeast Asia, and 1,062 in Southeast Asia (Table 9.1). However, a substantial number of them are also active in Southwest Asia (667 of them), Latin America (499), Africa (339) and Central Asia (148). Amongst individual countries, China is by far the most favoured target for Japanese NGOs. There are 988 Japanese NGOs engaged in work with China, while there are 573 of them working in South Korea, the second most favoured nation. The reason of the great popularity of China has not been investigated, but it seems natural to me that the greatest attention is paid to the neighbouring, largest developing country, with which Japan has an history of exchange for over 2,000 years. Japanese NGOs are categorized into seven groups in terms of their legal status and type of organization: the two legal persons for public welfare deﬁned by the civil law, i.e. foundations and incorporated associations; four legal persons deﬁned respectively by speciﬁc laws, i.e. social welfare corporations, religious corporations, special corporations, and NPOs;9 and voluntary organizations which are not legal persons. Table 9.2 provides a matrix of these and the roughly deﬁned areas of their activity. By far the largest group is the voluntary organizations, which are often small in size (Table 9.3). According to JANIC, 10 per cent of citizens-based NGOs that are active in international cooperation have legal status, while 90 per cent of them do not.10 Since it was only in late 1998 that the NPO Law was promulgated, it is expected that more voluntary organizations will gain NPO status in the future.11 As far as China is concerned, the ratio of Japanese NGOs engaged in cooperation to those engaged in exchange is roughly 3 to 5 (Table 9.2). There are more NGOs engaged in the latter probably because exchange work, which includes activities such as the exchange of students, trainees and teachers, holding exhibitions, publishing, speech contests, translations, development education in Japan, and exchange with the Chinese living in Japan, etc., are generally less costly and easier to implement than cooperation projects, which often involves the arduous work of large-scale fund raising, complex negotiation with the counterpart, and the backbreaking process of trial and error in implementation. As for the ﬁnances of the citizens-based NGOs engaged in international cooperation, according to JANIC, 66 per cent of the income comes from donations, membership fees, and income-generating activities, while 14 per cent is subsidies from governmental bodies including the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and the Postal Services Agency.12 Another 5 per cent is contract funds from government and UN agencies, 4 per cent is grants from private foundations, and 10 per cent is from other sources.13 One should note that it is perhaps imprecise to include the funds allocated by the Postal Services Agency in the category of government subsidies. In 1991 the Agency introduced the so-called Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid. This is a

Table 9.1 Countries/regions with which Japanese NGOs are engaged in international cooperation/exchange (2001) Country/Region China Republic of Korea Taiwan Mongolia Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Northeast Asia (country unspeciﬁed) Total of Northeast Asia Thailand The Philippines Indonesia Vietnam Malaysia Cambodia Singapore Myanmar Laos Brunei East Timor Southeast Asia (country unspeciﬁed) Total of Southeast Asia

Number of Japanese NGOs 988 573 353 258 94 19 1277 549 505 419 361 333 302 249 233 207 90 6 25 1062

India Nepal Bangladesh Sri Lanka Pakistan Butan Maldives Southwest Asia (country unspeciﬁed)

381 343 273 241 180 78 58 23

Total of Southwest Asia

667

Total of Central Asia

148

Total of Africa

339

Total of Latin America

499

Source: The National Directory of NGOs and NPOs Engaged in International Cooperation and Exchange (2002 version) (Nihon Gaiko¯ Kyo¯kai: 2002)

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Japan’s Relations with China

Table 9.2 Japanese NGOs engaged in international cooperation/exchange (2002) Total Number

Foundations Incorporated Associations Social Welfare Corporations Religious Corporations Special Corporations NPOs Voluntary Organizations Total

Those Engaged in China

Those Engaged in China & in Cooperationa

Those Engaged in China & in Exchangeb

410 148

150 56

89 38

149 53

11

4

4

4

14

2

2

2

2

1

0

1

287 2352

83 640

72 344

72 620

3223

988

547

901

Source: The National Directory of NGOs and NPOs Engaged in International Cooperation and Exchange (2002 version) (Nihon Gaiko¯ Kyo¯kai: 2002) Notes a Including support in education, health and sanitation, environment and greeniﬁcation, relief and emergency assistance for refugees, rural and urban development, gender, human rights, fare trade, etc. (See Table 9.4.) b Including exchange of students, trainees and teachers, exhibitions, publications, speech contests, translations, development education in Japan, exchange with Chinese living in Japan, etc.

system that citizens depositing money at the post oﬃce can choose to donate automatically 20 per cent or more of the interest earned for the use of NGOs implementing overseas aid programmes. Thus, although the Agency decides the allocation to the NGOs, the fund itself stems from public donations. After 12 years of implementation, the total amount of donations has approached 18 billion yen, and the number of projects carried out has reached 2,761.14 In 1989, that is two years before the advent of the Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid, the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs started to provide ﬁnancial support to NGO activities. In order to strengthen support, it was announced in June 2002 that the Ministry would streamline the funding schemes and increase the allocated budget to a total of 2 billion yen. From the viewpoint of the Ministry, they would be able to provide ODA more eﬀectively by cooperating with the NGOs that are more familiar with the grassroots of society. Initially there were debates among the NGOs about the wisdom of receiving government funding. Considering the weak ﬁnancial basis of many NGOs, however, government support has proved eﬀective

Japanese NGOs in China 171 Table 9.3 Size of the operational expenses of the NGOs engaged in cooperation with China Below ¥1 mn Foundations Incorporated Associations Social Welfare Corporations Religious Corporations Special Corporations NPOs Voluntary Organizations Total

¥1~3 mn

¥3~5 mn

0 2

1 1

2 6

0

0

0

¥5~10 mn

¥1~50 mn

¥50~100 mn

Beyond ¥100mn

n.a.

2 0

11 7

12 6

53 12

9 3

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

8 8

11 63

6 28

12 42

16 35

5 8

4 9

8 30

18

77

43

56

70

32

79

51

Source: The National Directory of NGOs and NPOs Engaged in International Cooperation and Exchange (2002 version) (Nihon Gaiko¯ Kyo¯kai: 2002)

and handy, particularly the scheme called the grant assistance for grassroots projects which has a ceiling of 10 million yen per project but decided and provided practically and swiftly by the local embassies and consulate generals.15 As regards the staﬃng of the citizens-based NGOs engaged in international cooperation, there are about 1,200 paid staﬀ members, of which 25 per cent are on a part-time basis, while the total membership of these NGOs amounts to 280,000.16 Since JANIC estimates that the number of such NGOs amounts to about 400, this means that on average there are about three paid staﬀ members in one NGO. Available data suggest that there is a good variety of cooperative activities by the Japanese NGOs in China (Table 9.4). In terms of areas of work, they are particularly active in education, especially primary education in the countryside, environment, welfare, relief and emergency assistance, and medical and health services. In order to attain a proper assessment of their work, however, there is a need to scrutinize these activities one by one. Although that is not possible in this preliminary study, judging from the number of the NGOs involved and the amount of their operational expenses (Table 9.3), I think I can safely surmise that they are making a wide range of substantial contributions. Thus, we have found that one distinct characteristic of the Japanese NGOs, particularly those citizen-based NGOs active in international cooperation, is the weakness of their institutional foundation. Only about two-thirds of their

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Japan’s Relations with China

Table 9.4 Top twenty cooperative activities by Japanese NGOs engaged in Chinaa Type or area of activity

Number of NGOs engaged

Collecting donation money Donation of goods School education Environment Developmental cooperation/aid Dispatching volunteers Greeniﬁcation Human rights Welfare Dispatching engineers/technical experts Relief and support Disaster/emergency assistance Medical service Institution building Health and sanitation Literacy education Refugee relief Rural/ﬁshing village development Foster parent Working camps

190 157 155 145 144 123 97 96 86 84 81 79 69 69 59 56 56 50 44 44

Source: The National Directory of NGOs and NPOs Engaged in International Cooperation and Exchange (2002 version) (Nihon Gaiko¯ Kyo¯kai: 2002) Note a This means, for example, that among the NGOs engaged in China, 190 of them conducted collections as part of their activities. It does not necessarily mean, however, that the collection was for China.

expenses are self-generated, while the average number of their paid staﬀ members is only around three. This brief overview of the Japanese NGOs shows, however, that contrary to the widely shared belief that Japanese NGOs hardly exist, many do engage in international cooperation/exchange in all parts of the world. Their most favourite country is China, where they are active in a variety of areas closely related to the wellbeing of the Chinese public. Although the amount of their operational expenses may be small compared to large-scale NGOs in other parts of the world, their impact on Chinese society should not be belittled by just looking at their size and institutional immaturity.

Japanese NGOs in China 173

A Japanese NGO in China: the case of the Green Earth Network (GEN) ¯ saka. It has been The Green Earth Network (GEN) is an NGO based in O engaged in the greeniﬁcation of the Loess Plateau in Datong, Shanxi province for thirteen years since 1992.17 GEN gained its NPO status in January 1999, immediately after the promulgation of the NPO Law. As of January 2005, GEN had 655 members. Currently there are three paid staﬀ members, including the Secretary General, who is the founder of GEN and the centre of activity. GEN has two separate budgets, one for the running of the organization, and the other for their operation in China. In the ﬁscal year 2003 (April 2003– March 2004), the former expenditure was ¥15,896,000, while the latter was ¥30,816,000.18 It is stipulated in their charter that the running costs of the organization will be borne by membership fees, subscription to their publications, donations and other income from commercial undertakings, such as the sales of videos and pamphlets. Annual membership fees vary: ordinary members, ¥12,000; family members (of ordinary members), ¥6,000; student members, ¥3,000; junior members (those of and under junior high school), ¥1,000; group members, ¥12,000; patron members, ¥100,000. Their operation is ﬁnanced mainly by external funds, including the Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid, the Global Environmental Funds of the Environmental Agency, the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects of the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, the Japan–China Greeniﬁcation Exchange Fund (the Obuchi Fund), and so on. Some of these are governmental, and others are private, including the Obuchi Fund and the Keidanren Nature Protection Fund. GEN’s reliance on external funding, which is usually provided on an annual basis, means that the continuation of their operations is not guaranteed. In their institutional frailty, they share the general characteristic of Japanese NGOs. The aim of GEN, according to its charter, is to promote beyond national boundaries people’s cooperation for global environment. The Secretary General ﬁrst went to China in 1971 as a Maoist, and regularly visited the country every year or two. In the 1980s, he became involved in environmental issues in Japan, and began to see society from the viewpoint of environmental protection. In 1991, he began to consider embarking on a greeniﬁcation project in cooperation with China. Through personal contacts in the Communist Youth League (CYL), he was introduced to Datong. This location suited the Secretary General, who wanted a place that was poor, and not very far away from Beijing so that it would be easier for the Japanese to come and visit. GEN’s cooperation started from project ﬁnancing, and gradually developed into implementing its own operations, calling in a few Japanese experts on botany for technical support. They are now retired or semi-retired professors, who come and stay at the site as volunteers. For instance, the former director

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of the Botanical Garden of To¯hoku University stays on the site for about four months a year. Currently, the speciﬁc activities of GEN include: (1) planting palm trees, along with shrubs, to grow “global environmental forests”; (2) planting fruit trees and donating orchards to primary schools;19 (3) breeding young plants and conducting experiments and training at the Global Environmental Forest Centre, which now has an area of 23.5 hectares; (4) the construction of the Lingqiu Natural Botanical Garden, with an area of 86 hectares, where longterm experiments and search for plants suitable for local conditions are conducted; (5) organizing working tours for new members of GEN and other volunteers, each tour consisting of twenty to thirty people and organized at least twice a year; (6) developing the Magpie Forest, with an area of six square kilometres (600 hectares), which is owned and run by the Datong Oﬃce of GEN. Establishing the Datong Oﬃce and purchasing the rights to use the land for activities (3), (4) and (6), needs an explanation, which must start with the problems that GEN faced in its initial operations. The problems, besides the technical diﬃculties involved in planting trees where the land was dry and poor, included the following points. First, there was a lack of the environmental consciousness among the Chinese in general. There was even resentment against a Japanese preaching the importance of the environment, which sounded to them like a self-centred argument of a developed nation. There has been a dramatic improvement regarding the environmental consciousness of the Chinese, however, especially after the large-scale ﬂooding of the Yangtze and in the Northeast of China in 1998. Second, the Chinese counterpart, the CYL in Datong, not only completely lacked experience in greeniﬁcation, but also proved to be an institution in which there were frequent personnel changes. For greeniﬁcation, what is more important than planting the trees is looking after the planted trees, which requires the willingness and readiness to apply special care. In the words of a Chinese counterpart, failure is caused more by managerial problems than by technical problems.20 The Secretary General found bureaucratism to be the toughest obstacle to success, and when he thought he met the right person to work with, he strongly requested the establishment of a permanent organization specializing in the cooperation with GEN. The CYL agreed, and the Datong Oﬃce of GEN was established as an institution aﬃliated to the CYL.21 The Datong Oﬃce comprises eight staﬀ members, of which two, the director and the deputy director, receive their salaries from the CYL. Although the Oﬃce receives no money from the state coﬀer except for the salaries of those two, the size of their staﬀ is still under the control of the government. That is, the Datong Oﬃce of GEN cannot decide on the number of its staﬀ freely. The establishment of the Datong Oﬃce did not solve the question of personnel change at the township and county levels, however. Through experiences of failure and frustration caused by the irresponsible leadership of local cadres, GEN moved to purchase their own land, that is, to be precise, the right to use that land, where they could possess full control of the operation.

Japanese NGOs in China 175 Gradually, however, frequent personnel change became less of a problem. This was because capable members of the CYL soon occupied inﬂuential posts in the local governments, which meant that leaders sympathetic to GEN’s activities were emerging in more townships and counties. A serious problem arose, however, when it turned out that the new secretary of the Datong CYL was a son of some high-ranking Party cadre with no interest in greeniﬁcation. He ﬁrst attempted in 2002 to replace the members of the Datong Oﬃce with his followers. After that failed, in early 2003 he sought to establish a Party branch within the Oﬃce and appoint a Party secretary who would concurrently serve as vice-director of the Oﬃce, and demanded that the Japanese side should provide a car for this person. At this point, the secretary general of GEN had lengthy negotiations with the Datong Party Committee, which ﬁnally decided to switch the Chinese counterpart from the CYL to the Datong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU). The Datong Party Committee agreed to increase the staﬀ quota of the FTU by two, so that the FTU could pay the salaries of the director and the vice-director of the Datong Oﬃce of GEN. According to interviews both with the Japanese and the Chinese involved in GEN’s activities, there has been a signiﬁcant impact on the villagers’ view of the Japanese. Datong had suﬀered serious damage during the Sino-Japanese war, and some villagers did not hide their animosity towards the Japanese when the Secretary General ﬁrst visited their villages. The plants were sometimes subject to sabotage. The Chinese experts did not listen to the Japanese professors. It was only after numerous visits to the homes of the villagers and after making visible achievements that the Japanese were trusted, and even respected, by the villagers, experts and the cadres of Datong. According to the current director of the Datong Oﬃce, it was unthinkable in the beginning that the members of the working tour would be accepted as guests in the homes of the villagers, as they do now. So far, as of January 2005, GEN has planted 16 million trees over an area of 4,500 hectares.22

Conclusion The activities of GEN have brought about signiﬁcant changes in the local people’s attitude towards the Japanese. Although GEN is an NGO, whose aim is to think and act beyond national boundaries as global citizens, its activities cannot be free from its nationality. For better or worse, the Chinese locals see its achievements and failures as those of the Japanese. For the Datong CYL and FTU members, the GEN projects are none other than projects of Sino-Japanese cooperation, and fortunately, they turned out to be successful. One important point in the activities of foreign NGOs in China is the Chinese counterpart. It seems clear from the experience of GEN that if you are not in the position to receive the approval and support of the party and/or government, you cannot succeed, or even operate, in China. No doubt,

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however, we can observe a budding group of Chinese NGOs close to the true sense of the term, and maybe the Datong Oﬃce of GEN will become one of them. The members of this oﬃce are well aware of the need to build their own institutional strength. This is partly because ﬁnancial assistance from the FTU may be curtailed or cancelled as part of the governmental reform in progress. The success of GEN is not necessarily shared by other NGOs operating in China. GEN itself is not free from problems in their organization and operation, such as its dependence on external funds and on the personality of the founder and central operator. There are also other points of concern, such as the stagnation in the number of members, who have not much to do back home and are feeling somewhat alienated. In 2003, the number of applicants for the tree-planting tours diminished because of the outbreak of the SARS epidemic. Despite these problems, however, I was truly impressed when I saw the rows and rows of young plants grown in the vast, arid land of Datong, where there is tap water only during the middle of the night if you live on the sixth ﬂoor of an apartment. This was impossible without the unity of minds between the two sides. What will happen to the Japanese NGOs in China, though, if Japan continues to stagnate and China continues to rise? The members of the Datong Oﬃce of GEN know that they have to seek ways to become ﬁnancially independent, because GEN’s project operation has been dependent on ad hoc external funding, for which GEN’s Secretary General has had to apply each year. Despite Japan’s economic diﬃculties, however, the number of Japanese NGOs engaged in international cooperation is increasing. The oﬃcially registered NPOs that have listed international cooperation as an area of activity in their charter has risen in number, from 510 as at the end of 2000 to 1,186 at the end of 2001, and then to 2,248 at the end of 2002.23 But will China continue to be their favourite partner for cooperation? Some may have doubts about this, due partly to the supply side factor, i.e. the rising anti-Chinese feelings among some Japanese, and partly to the demand side factor, i.e. China’s rapid economic and social development. According to the annual survey by the Japanese government, the percentage of those who feel close towards China has dipped in the past three years, from 49.6 per cent in 1999 to 45.6 per cent in 2002.24 However, the percentage of those feeling friendly to the Southeast Asian countries has also declined each year, from 39.2 per cent in 1999 to 38.0 per cent in 2002. Despite the slight rise in 2002 to 18.3 per cent, the trend is also downward for the Southwest Asian countries. These ﬁgures indicate that, among the developing countries, the Japanese public still maintain a relatively favourable image of China. In addition, one cannot detect a strong correlation between the ﬂuctuation in the close feeling towards a particular country and that in the number of Japanese NGOs working there. As for the demand side question, even if China achieved its target of quadrupling the size of their economy in the twenty

Japanese NGOs in China 177 years between 2000 and 2020, there is no doubt that China, with enormous environmental problems and widening income gaps between regions and sectors, will remain a fertile ground for foreign NGOs cultivating cooperation projects. At GEN’s project site in Datong, I was told by a botanical expert that there were two ways to achieve greeniﬁcation. It was easy to guess the ﬁrst method, which was to plant trees. The second method, he told me, was to do nothing. That is, just build a fence around the area you want to greenify and do not let any sheep and human beings in there. If no grass is eaten and no trees cut, the Loess Plateau will greenify naturally. This inspired the following thoughts. In order to greenify the relationship between the Japanese and the Chinese, planting trees is indispensable. That is, the government must design and implement exciting events and joint projects between the two nations, such as the establishment of the Asian Monetary Fund or a joint training facility for UN Peace Keeping Operations. But at the same time, the state should not intervene in the natural rise of exchange between people, but promote it only by indirect support. We have seen that Japanese NGOs’ activity in China as global citizens is greenifying not only the Loess Plateau, but also the relationship between Japan and China, where cynical people thought no plant would bear fruit. While the rise of China has caused concern among some Japanese opinion shapers, lawmakers and business interests, it has not impacted on the activities of Japanese NGOs in China. Indeed, ﬂourishing Japanese NGOs in China, a form of people-to-people diplomacy, so to speak, have the potential to help mitigate any occasional state-to-state tension between China and Japan. In the case of GEN, it has, in a modest yet signiﬁcant way, enhanced cooperation and trust between the two sides. Its motivation are neither proﬁts nor national security, but environmentalism and humanism, which, as we have observed, transcend state boundaries, narrow national interests and emotional barriers.

Notes 1 Feng Ku, 2000 Directory of International NGOs Supporting Work in China (Hong Kong: China Development Research, 2000). 2 Nihon Gaiko¯ Kyo¯kai, National Directory of NGOs and NPOs Engaged in International Cooperation and Exchange [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Nihon Gaiko¯ Kyo¯kai, 2002). 3 In this short chapter, I am not going to dwell on the present situation and the likely development of civil society in China. Suﬃce it to say that there is an expanding space for non-governmental, non-proﬁtable and autonomous organizations, which however are generally not mature enough yet to be eﬀective partners for foreign NGOs. On NPOs in China, see Wang Ming, Li Yanyan and Okamuro Mieko, Chinese NPOs [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Daiichi Shorin, 2002). 4 Nihon Gaiko¯ Kyo¯kai, National Directory of NGOs and NPOs Engaged in International Cooperation and Exchange. As I will explain later, some Japanese NGOs have gained NPO status under the Law to Promote Speciﬁc, Non-Proﬁt Activities. In the Japanese context, therefore, NPO is a legal term, while NGO is a general term.

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5 Kuramochi, Sachie, Problems and Potential of the Activities of Japanese NGOs in China: Taking a Greeniﬁcation Cooperation Organization as an Example [in Japanese], MPhil thesis, Graduate Studies Department of Human Culture, Ocahnomizu University, January 2001. Also, the Secretary General of GEN has written a book based on his writings in the newsletters. See Takami Kunio, Apricots Have Borne Fruit in Our Village: 10 Years of Tree Planting Project in China [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2003). 6 One example is the 1972 establishment of Shapla Neer (the Help Bangladesh Committee), which supports mutual support activities by the villagers in Bangladesh and Nepal. 7 Japan Foundation, The Current Situation of Japanese NGOs Engaged in International Exchange Activities (Tokyo: Japan Foundation, 2001). 8 JANIC, ed., NGO Guide 2002 [in Japanese] (Tokyo: The Preparatory Committee for the Joint NGO Campaign, 2002). 9 The Law to Promote Speciﬁc, Non-Proﬁt Activities (the NPO Law) was promulgated in December 1998 to make it easier for the non-proﬁt organizations to become legal persons. 10 JANIC, NGO-DATA (27 July 2002). http://www.janic.org/en/data.html. 11 For example, Shapla Neer, mentioned in footnote 2, which happens to be a very large organization with about 3,200 members as of June 2001, is listed in The National Directory of NGOs and NPOs Engaged in International Cooperation and Exchange (2002 version) as a voluntary organization, but it actually gained NPO status in August 2001. 12 Postal Services Agency used to belong to the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, which is now the Ministry of Public Management, Home Aﬀairs and Post and Telecommunications. 13 JANIC, NGO-DATA. 14 The website of the Postal Services Agency http://www.yu-cho.yusei.go.jp/volunteer-post/index_e.htm (accessed on 4 February 2003). 15 Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, NGO Support Schemes in Japan (in Japanese) (29 July 2002). http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/category/ngo/assis.html. 16 JANIC, NGO-DATA. 17 Unless speciﬁed otherwise, information in this section relies on the website of GEN http://homepage3.nifty.com/gentree/index.html (accessed on 2 January 2005), and interviews conducted in Datong, July 2002. 18 The end ﬁgures are rounded oﬀ. Cf. the corresponding ﬁgures in the ﬁscal year 2001 (April 2001–March 2002), which were ¥20,415,000 and ¥54,717,000, respect¯ saka, 22 June 2002.) ively. (Obtained at the 8th General Assembly of GEN, O 19 This has been done in over 40 villages so far. 20 Takami, Apricots Have Borne Fruit in Our Village, pp.246–7. 21 To be precise, it was aﬃliated to the China Youth Federation (CYF). CYF is oﬃcially aﬃliated to the CYL, but there is a substantial overlap in their personnel. 22 Private correspondence with the Secretary General, February 2005. 23 See the NPO home page on the website of the Quality-of-Life Policy Bureau of the Cabinet Oﬃce of the Japanese Government http://www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/ npo/data/b_history.txt. (accessed on 30 January 2003). This means that, as at the end of 2002, 24.1 per cent of the 9,329 NPOs are engaged in international cooperation, according to their charter. As was the case with Shapla Neer, however, it can be surmised that this increase is caused partly by the registration of formerly existing organizations. 24 For the survey results, see the website of the Government Public Relations Oﬃce of the Cabinet Oﬃce of the Japanese Government http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/ h14/h14-gaikou/2–1.html (accessed on 30 January 2003).

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Bibliography Feng, Ku (2000) 2000 Directory of International NGOs Supporting Work in China (Hong Kong: China Development Research Services). JANIC (2002a) (ed.) NGO Guide 2002 [in Japanese] (Tokyo: The Preparatory Committee for the Joint NGO Campaign). JANIC (2002b) NGO-DATA (27 July 2002). http://www.janic.org/en/data.html. Japan Foundation (2001) The Current Situation of Japanese NGOs Engaged in International Exchange Activities (Tokyo: Japan Foundation). Kuramochi, Sachie (2001) Problems and Potential of the Activities of Japanese NGOs in China: taking a Greeniﬁcation Cooperation Organisation as an Example [in Japanese] (MPhil thesis, School of Humanities and Sciences, Ochanomizu University, January). Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (2002) NGO Support Schemes in Japan [in Japanese] (29 July 2002). http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/category/ngo/assis.html. Nihon Gaiko¯ Kyo¯kai (2002) National Directory of NGOs and NPOs Engaged in International Cooperation and Exchange (2002 version) [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Nihon Gaiko Kyokai). Takami, Kunio (2003) Apricots Have Borne Fruit in Our Village: 10 Years of Tree Planting Project in China [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha). Wang, Ming, Li, Yanyan, Okamuro, Mieko (2002) Chinese NPOs [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Daiichi Shorin).

10 Deputy and debutante The new geometry of East Asia Brad Glosserman

The trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and China may be the most important strategic triangle in the world; it is certainly the most dynamic and perplexing geometry. The United States is the world’s sole superpower. Japan, America’s sometime surrogate within the region, is suﬀering from a crisis of conﬁdence after more than a decade of economic stagnation; China, buoyed by its rapid economic growth and brimming with conﬁdence, is emerging as a great power in East Asia. While there are uncertainties aplenty, the trend of China rising and Japan stagnating is undeniably transforming the region’s geopolitical landscape. The thoughts that follow assume that current trajectories generally continue.1 For US strategists, this new international environment requires a substantial change in perspective. The instruments of US foreign policy in Asia can and should continue. A continued US forward presence in the region that rests upon America’s bilateral alliances will continue to play an essential role in guaranteeing peace and stability throughout the Asia-Paciﬁc. The survival of those alliances will depend upon an equally important change in US thinking about relations with its treaty partners. First, Washington will have to treat them more like partners and less like subordinates. Burdens, responsibilities, and yes, credit will have to be more evenly shared. This means those partners will have to act responsibly as well. Second, the alliances themselves will have to change. In the twenty-ﬁrst century, alliances will have to be based upon shared values and interests, rather than mutual threat perceptions. Quite simply, alliances will have to be for something rather than merely against some external threat. Finally, the alliances will have to reach out to other nations, both friends and potential adversaries, to build a framework for strategic dialogue and create ad hoc coalitions when situations warrant. This chapter ﬁrst examines US interests and strategic concerns in the AsiaPaciﬁc region. It then assesses Japan’s prospects and concludes that they are not good. This poses particular problems for Washington since a pillar of its presence in Asia is its alliance with Tokyo. Next, it turns to China, and US approaches to dealing with Beijing. While hard-liners and the media appear eager for a ﬁght, in fact the United States is hedging: hoping for the best, but

Deputy and debutante 181 being prepared for the worst. The chapter then looks at two arenas of geopolitical competition between Japan and China, Northeast and Southeast Asia. In both cases, Beijing’s diplomacy appears more dynamic and Japan merely responding to Chinese initiatives. The chapter concludes by examining the trilateral relationship shared by the United States, China and Japan. The three countries have to escape the zero-sum thinking that has dominated strategic calculations during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.

US Interests in Asia The United States is a Paciﬁc power. Indeed, Hawaii gives the United States a physical presence in the region. Secretary of State Colin Powell pledged: “America’s commitment to Asia’s security and stability is an enduring one. . . . We are a Paciﬁc power. We will not yield our strategic position in Asia.”2 The United States has many reasons to remain engaged. The ﬁrst is economic. Powell explained: “Under the protection of America’s security umbrella, two-way trade between the United States and East Asia and Paciﬁc has risen to $700 billion annually, larger than our trade with Europe. Between 1990 and 2000, exports of American products to Asia grew by over 80 per cent and imports to the United States from Asia and went up 150 per cent. United States direct investment in Asia nearly tripled during the past decade to over $200 billion, roughly equal to the amount Asians have invested in the United States.”3 Economic concerns have always been a powerful force in US foreign policy. Admiral Michael McDevitt noted: “The primary motivation behind US statecraft in all of its manifestations of the past 200 odd years has been to be included in—or perhaps more aptly, not to be excluded from—East Asia. America’s policy prescriptions for Asia— in other words, its strategic choices—have revolved around that simple objective.”4 Not only does the United States want to secure access to those markets. Washington also wants to ensure that no other nation can utilize that wealth, and the power that it confers, against US interests and allies. A study by the Rand Corporation, which reportedly had some inﬂuence on the administration’s thinking, aﬃrmed: “The United States must begin to formulate a strategy aimed at a pivotal long-term objective: preventing the worsening of the security situation in Asia. Central to this objective is the need to preclude the rise of a regional or continental hegemon. This is important for two main reasons: to prevent the United States from being denied economic, political, and military access to an important part of the globe; and to prevent a concentration of resources that could support a global challenge to the United States on the order of that posed by the former Soviet Union.”5 In addition, there are the values shared by the United States and many regional states. While hard-bitten realists may denigrate “values” when discussing strategic interests, governments underestimate them at their peril. Mutual concerns for democracy, human rights, and other forms of individual

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expression have created a political and philosophical community. There is a shared desire for market-based economic systems and the wealth and prosperity they create. The United States and other Asian nations are convinced that these values perpetuate peace and stability, and are committed to their spread throughout the region. The Rand authors concluded: “The overall long-term US objective for the region should be to preclude in Asia the growth of rivalries, suspicions, and insecurities that could lead to war. This overall objective necessitates, in turn, three subordinate goals: prevent the rise of a regional hegemon; maintain stability; manage Asia’s transformation.”6 In practical terms, that has meant active US engagement with governments of the region and the creation of an alliance system that locks in the US presence in the region. The US has preferred bilateral engagement and the linchpin of its presence is Japan.

The setting sun Ever since former Ambassador Mike Mansﬁeld declared the Japan-US alliance to be “the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none,” that language has become the diplomatic boilerplate for any ambassador departing for Tokyo. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Paciﬁc James Kelly provided the standard view of the relationship when he testiﬁed to the House International Relations Committee in 2002: “Japan is our linchpin Asian ally of over 50 years, and a nation with which we share a vibrant and multifaceted relationship based on common ideals and interests . . . Our presence in Japan is crucial not only to our commitment to help defend Japan, but also to having forward deployed forces that foster regional stability and security throughout the Asia Paciﬁc region.”7 The relationship has had its ups and downs. The 1990s were a particularly tumultuous decade as Japan showed a newfound determination to challenge US leadership on economic issues and the United States became increasingly frustrated with what it considered to be Japan’s unwillingness to share the burdens of the alliance. The iconic image of the times was then Trade Minister Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ holding a kendo sword to the throat of his US counterpart Mickey Kantor during particularly contentious trade negotiations. Within a few years, though, the dismal state of the Japanese economy became apparent, in contrast with the booming US economy. Japan-bashing gave way to “Japan passing” when President Bill Clinton went to China on a week-long state visit and ﬂew over Japan without stopping on either leg. If the economic dimension of the relationship was changing, so was the security component. The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 1998 Taepodong missile test by North Korea reminded the Japanese that the end of the Cold War had not ushered in a new era of peace and stability, that military weapons maintained their utility, and that Northeast Asia remains a dangerous corner of the world. The result was a shift in Japanese strategic thinking

Deputy and debutante 183 and the embrace of greater realism in security planning. Most important, there has been convergence in strategic thinking in Washington and Tokyo. This convergence has become much more visible in Japan’s relations with China. The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis was an important factor in this process. It focused Japanese policymakers on Beijing’s willingness to ﬂex its muscles in a crisis and reminded them of the utility of an alliance with the United States. While it was still too politically sensitive to speak openly of a “China threat,” the tone shifted. Japanese defence oﬃcials often acknowledged (oﬀ the record, of course) that references to “North Korean threats” in documents were usually a surrogate for China. Even without painting China as openly hostile to Japan, recent Defense White Papers note its unrelenting military modernization programme, the People’s Liberation Army’s growing power projection capabilities, and the rising number of Chinese scientiﬁc vessels in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. Oﬃcial Japanese reports ask whether China’s defence budget is expanding beyond that absolutely necessary for defence.8 Many in the United States applauded and encouraged this new thinking. Many of the most fervent advocates of a higher proﬁle for Tokyo assumed a prominent role in the new Bush administration. These same individuals criticized the Clinton administration for bypassing Japan in 1998, and for strengthening ties with China at Tokyo’s expense. They viewed China as a potential threat rather than a potential partner, and vowed to rebuild the USJapan alliance both for its own sake and to counter “the China threat.” Michael Green (scholar and Senior Asia director at the National Security Council) explained: “The alliance was not necessary as an instrument of containment, but it was an essential backdrop to the policy of engagement. Strong ties between Tokyo and Washington would increase US leverage vis-à-vis China by deterring Beijing from any attempt to increase its own hegemony in the region through a strategy of separating the US from its allies.”9 For this group, the vision for US-Japan relations is captured best by the Armitage Report,10 which called for a radical transformation of the alliance. It invoked the Anglo-American alliance as its model, and Japan would, accordingly, become the “U.K. of Asia.” It is noteworthy that the document’s namesake, Richard Armitage, was number two at the State Department. The Bush administration took oﬃce determined to build better relations with Japan and to make that vision a reality. By and large they have succeeded. The natural aﬃnity toward Japan that many in the administration feel, Japan’s unprecedented response to the tragic events of 11 September and the personal relationship that President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯ have built have made the alliance as strong as it has ever been. Observers say the relationship may even be more solid than the “Ron-Yasu” era of the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro established a high-water mark for the Paciﬁc alliance. During his Tokyo visit in February 2002, President Bush underlined the solidity of the relationship: “For half a century now, America and Japan have

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formed one of the great and enduring alliances of modern times. . . . The bonds of friendship and trust between our two peoples were never more evident than in the days and months after Sept. 11. . . . Your response to the terrorist threat has demonstrated the strength of our alliance, and the indispensable role of Japan—a role that is global, and begins in Asia.”11 While many of the policymakers who work on Japan want it to play a larger role within the region, they also understand the limits of US inﬂuence in Tokyo. Their natural caution is reinforced by an aversion toward anything that the previous administration had done; the Clinton administration’s very public “Japan bashing” is deﬁnitely to be avoided. The result has been policy consistency—always highly regarded in Tokyo—and positive reinforcement of Japan. Japan’s response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September validated the views of the Japan-hands. Not only in terms of content—a package of diplomatic, ﬁnancial and, yes, even military measures that eventually included the ﬁrst ever postwar dispatch of Maritime Self-Defence Forces vessels to support a military eﬀort—but in speed as well. There was none of the handwringing and prevaricating that the world has come to expect of Japan in a crisis. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro immediately condemned the attacks and declared that Japan would help the United States in whatever ways it could. This time, timely action, strong words of support and photo opportunities helped shape public opinion in a favourable way both in Japan and in the United States. After passing the antiterrorism legislation, the Japanese government maintained its high-proﬁle eﬀorts by hosting an international conference on the reconstruction of Afghanistan. On 26 March 2003, the Cabinet voted to extend SDF support for the war in Afghanistan for an additional six months past the original 19 May deadline. Assistant Secretary of State Kelly put these developments in perspective: “The steps that Japan has taken since Sept. 11, 2001 suggest Japan is interested in redeﬁning its role in Asia and conﬁrming to the world that Japan can participate meaningfully and responsibly and legitimate international military operations. . . . We look forward to strengthening further the US-Japan security relationship, using the experience gained over the last few months and build on it to encourage further cooperation security and defense matters.”12 Despite this encouraging start, Japan may be reaching the limits of its ability to contribute. On one hand, there are the perennial political obstacles to a higher international proﬁle. It is revealing that the “emergency measures” legislation, which was one of the Prime Minister’s priority pieces of legislation, was shelved after a scandal in the Defence Agency. It appears that the political momentum created by the events of 11 September has been exhausted. Traditional politicking has reasserted itself.13 Not only is there the postwar aversion to involvement in military matters, but there is also no domestic consensus that the country should assume a

Deputy and debutante 185 leadership role in any matter. It is little exaggeration to say that Japan is in the midst of a national identity crisis. Old policy options do not seem to be working and traditional answers to fundamental questions about national purpose no longer provide reassurance. For all the soul-searching, there is little reason to think that Japan will look beyond its shores for answers. Rather, it will focus its energies inward and tolerate gradual decline.14 That view has been conﬁrmed by a new study of Japanese opinion that concludes: “the Japanese do not see themselves as world leaders either economically or politically. . . . The Japanese accept that they have limited world power and they expect their future to be no diﬀerent from the present, if not worse.”15 Conversations with Japanese oﬃcials and inﬂuential foreign policy analysts indicate that a growing number of the élite share this view. Advisors to the current government have declared that Tokyo must stop “punching above its weight,” and that Japan must accept that it is a “middle power.” Even more critical is the fact that the call for Japan to take a higher proﬁle has occurred at a time when Tokyo’s resources are diminishing. It is diﬃcult to appreciate the depth of Japan’s economic problems, but the fact that the 1990s are now known as “the lost decade” is a good start. Analysts noted: “The growth of the Japanese economy during the last decade has been the slowest 10-year performance of any large industrial country in the postwar period, averaging about 1 per cent a year . . . Between 1992 and 2000 (except for 1996), the growth rate each year has been less than 2 per cent . . . the worst in the postwar history of Japan. Land and stock prices, which had risen threeand four-fold between 1985 and 1990, subsequently plunged by as much as 50–60 per cent in a few years. The gains in stocks and land between 1985 and 1990 were completely wiped out between 1990 and 2000. Oﬃcial National Accounts statistics indicate that Japanese households lost approximately (Y)500 trillion (more than 100 per cent of GDP) of their net wealth between 1990 and 2000.”16 This situation is not improving. Unemployment remains at postwar highs; bankruptcies continue to climb; Japan’s national debt is estimated at 130 per cent of GDP. David Asher, special advisor in the State Department on Japan, noted: “currently nearly 65 per cent of tax revenue is needed to service debt, while long term debt exceeds revenue by more than 15 times.”17 More signiﬁcant still are the demographic trends that limit Japan’s ability to clean up the economic mess. The Japanese government estimates that the working age population peaked in 1997 and the total population will decrease from 2007. That means Japan’s debt must be ﬁnanced by a dwindling pool of workers. Those same trends will force real estate prices down, which will hit banks (who hold land as collateral on loans) and homeowners hard. It is a disturbing picture, especially given the high hopes that the US has for Japan’s assumption of a higher role within East Asia. When contrasted with the rosy future most envision for China, the talk of a tectonic power shift makes some sense.

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The ascending dragon The administration of President George W. Bush has made no attempt to hide its concern about China. From the beginning of his campaign for the presidency, Bush spoke of China as a “strategic competitor,” and accused the Clinton administration of weakness toward Beijing. It is a mistake to attribute those views solely to the new administration. Indeed, in late 2000, Joint Chiefs Gen. Henry H. Shelton remarked that the United States must do all it could to ensure that China did not become “the 21st century version of the Soviet bear.”18 Taiwan is a key source of friction in Sino-US ties. The Bush administration has been more outspoken in its defence of Taiwan, a product of longstanding ties to the island, a respect for Taiwan’s democratic and economic achievements, and concern about the strategic advantage that would be conferred if Beijing gained control of the island. Many in China see the Bush administration as supporting, both emotionally and substantively, independenceminded politicians in Taiwan. And many of those politicians in Taiwan claim to see US support for their policies. In fact, however, the United States remains committed to its “one China policy,” and condemns any action by either side of the Taiwan Strait to unilaterally change the status quo. Indeed, the remarkable development at the inauguration of the second Bush administration was the amount of political capital Taipei had lost in Washington during the ﬁrst Bush term. Distrust among the two governments is high. Nevertheless, Beijing continues to see the United States inﬂuencing Taiwanese behaviour, and continues to demand that Washington do more to silence the separatists and push Taipei to negotiate more seriously with China. On 19 February 2005, the US secretaries of State and Defence met their Japanese counterparts from the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Agency at the Security Consultative Committee, known more colloquially as the “2+2 meeting.” After the meeting, the two governments released a Joint Declaration that breaks important new ground in the US-Japan alliance.19 It speaks bluntly about regional national security threats and explicitly identiﬁes Japan’s national security interests with regional and global developments. Traditionally, Japan has construed national security narrowly, essentially limiting it to homeland defence. The willingness to identify common interests implies (at least) that Japan will work more actively with the United States to protect those interests; that is historic, for both the country and the alliance. Given the potential impact of the document, it’s fair to say that “history starts here.”20 The explicit identiﬁcation of China in the list of common regional interests represents a departure from the past. (Early in the document, “military modernization eﬀorts” are identiﬁed as a source of concern, but China is not named there.) Previously, Japan had gone to great lengths to avoid naming China as a direct national security concern. The readiness to do so in the SCC statement signals a shift in Japanese thinking about China.

Deputy and debutante 187 Still, it is important to understand what the SCC declaration actually says. The two countries seek to “develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.” That part has been largely overlooked: instead, most commentary focused on the two countries’ desire to “encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.” Beijing would do well to focus on the oﬀer and take the two countries up on it. The three countries share far too many common interests and objectives to let a statement of the obvious—the stake that Washington and Tokyo have (along with other countries in East Asia) in a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait problems—get in the way of needed and desired cooperation. Yet even without the Taiwan problem, relations with Beijing would be problematic. The list of US concerns is a long one: China’s growing military capabilities, its willingness to trade with “rogue nations,” the export of missile technology, Beijing’s human rights record, and “unfair” trade practices that are depriving American workers of jobs. The administration’s hard-line views were seemingly conﬁrmed by the maladroit handling of the EP-3 crisis in April 2001. The midair collision between a US reconnaissance plane and a Chinese jet ﬁghter brought tensions to a boil and put the relationship in deep freeze. The eventual resolution of the crisis and Chinese eﬀorts to move beyond the incident had limited success. China’s handling of the crisis appeared to conﬁrm the conclusion of the Rand strategists who pointed in thinly veiled terms to the emergence of a “China threat.” “At the moment, no nation in Asia is close to becoming a regional or continental hegemon, but this is not to say that such a threat could not arise. In fact, one major power in Asia or coalition could readily choose to devote maximum eﬀort to building up armed might in eﬀorts to challenge the United States in the region. Although currently only a remote possibility, the outcome of such a buildup will be suﬃciently adverse to US interests to warrant priority.”21 Bilateral cooperation in the war against terrorism in the wake of the 11 September tragedy has taken some of the sharper edges oﬀ the bilateral relationship. President Bush has gone out of his way to extend an olive branch to Beijing; he called Chinese President Jiang prior to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty to give him advance notice, and insisted on visiting China during his Asian tour in February 2002 even though he had visited China several months before for the APEC leaders’ summit in Shanghai. Similarly, the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea’s ongoing challenge to the viability of the global nonproliferation regime, have reinforced the need for coordination and cooperation with Beijing. The issue has not been settled. Debate continues and the hawks have countered with two new reports. The ﬁrst is a Pentagon report on China’s military power.22 It concludes that China is making signiﬁcant eﬀorts to improve its military capabilities, with a Taiwanese contingency clearly in mind. Chinese military training exercises increasingly focus on the United

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States as an adversary. The second document is the report of the US-China Security Commission, a bipartisan congressional inquiry into the state of the bilateral relationship.23 While the Commission purports to take a balanced view, the tone of the report is not. It considers Beijing to be hostile to democratic reform and a potential challenge to US leadership in the Asia Paciﬁc region. However, Paul Wolfowitz, number two at the Pentagon, played down the “China threat” idea and explained: “historically, the emergence of a major new power has frequently threatened the stability of the existing order, but we can be much more hopeful of a positive outcome in China’s case because all the countries of the region are prepared to welcome a strong Chinese role in a constructive regional order.”24 Clearly there is a debate in Washington over how to deal with China. Secretary of State Powell explained: “A strategic partner China is not, but neither is China our inevitable and implacable foe. China is a competitor, a potential regional rival, but it is also a trading partner willing to cooperate in areas where strategic interests overlap. China is all of these things, but China is not an enemy, and our challenge is to keep it that way.”25 The only certainty in relations with China is that treating Beijing like an enemy will guarantee that it becomes one. Some in the United States would welcome that outcome. The hawks are eager to relive the “victories” of the Cold War. The lesson they learned from that tumultuous period—and the Reagan years in particular—is that the failure to go toe-to-toe with an adversary is equivalent to capitulation. For them, “peaceful coexistence,” or “engagement” in the Chinese context, merely helps the enemy survive. Drawing on the Soviet experience, they welcome an arms race. They are convinced that it would send an unmistakable signal of US intentions to allies and adversaries alike. More important, China could not keep up. Diverting resources to the military would slow economic development and deprive it of the means to develop the comprehensive national security that is the foundation of its regional aspirations. The hard-liners are convinced that China could never match US capabilities and, in the end, the eﬀort would bankrupt Beijing—just as it broke the Soviets. But it is important to recognize that the hawks are merely one part of the US strategic community and are by no means dominant, even though they sometimes appear to have the upper hand. The proper characterization of US strategy is that Washington is hedging. It is impossible to foresee how China will develop in the future. Not only are socio-economic and political developments uncertain, but divining intentions is always hazardous. If China attains its coveted great major power status, will it become more secure or more arrogant? Will China focus on acquiring more wealth and prosperity, or seek redress for past grievances, real and imagined? Given the many uncertainties, the only prudent strategy is to be prepared for every contingency. Thus, the United States is strengthening relations with its allies, particularly Japan, and keeping a close watch on Chinese military developments.

Deputy and debutante 189

Squeezed out of the Korean Peninsula? The impact of the changing fortunes of Japan and China is becoming apparent in Northeast Asia. Traditionally, Seoul has looked reluctantly to Tokyo for its benchmarks and despite the colonial past, many postwar South Korean governments turned to Tokyo for economic and regional leadership. Japan was the guidepost: its economic accomplishments set the standard; its corporate and business model shaped Korean thinking and the development of the chaebol. But the combination of Japan’s decline and China’s rise are reorienting the Korean compass. Since the end of the Cold War, governments in Seoul have turned increasingly toward China as they contemplate the future. Ten years after normalizing diplomatic relations between Seoul and Beijing, South Korean businesses view China as the market of the future. South Korea was China’s sixth largest trading partner in 2001; total trade reached $39.9 billion. China passed Japan in 2001 to become South Korea’s second-largest trading partner and surpassed the United States as South Korea’s number one destination for foreign investment; ROK investment in China reached $2.15 billion in 2001. It is estimated that trade between the two countries will top $100 billion by the Beijing Olympics in 2008.26 In April 2002, the number of ﬂights between South Korea and China surpassed the number of ﬂights between South Korea and Japan for the ﬁrst time.27 Just as important has been the recognition that Seoul needs Beijing on its side to maximize its leverage when dealing with North Korea. While it is unclear whether Beijing in fact can inﬂuence Pyongyang, China has historically had both inﬂuence over and interest in developments on the peninsula. It makes sense for South Korean policy makers to hedge their bets. Thus, “. . . for Korea, the ‘rise of China’ has been real and concrete in economic, military, diplomatic, cultural and perceptual terms.”28 The shift in South Korean attentions toward China leaves Seoul with a lesser stake in maintaining good relations with Japan. The primary objective is securing better relations with North Korea. The critical question is what Beijing will demand in return. China is unlikely to be happy with a continued US military presence on the Korean Peninsula post-uniﬁcation. Given the diﬃculties in the US-Korea relationship and the belief among segments of the South Korean public that the United States is the chief obstacle to better relations with Pyongyang, the long-term prospects for positive trilateral relations among Seoul, Washington and Tokyo look increasingly slim.

Southeast Asia: turf war The real competition for inﬂuence between Japan and China is taking place in Southeast Asia. Like Northeast Asia, the region has traditionally been considered part of Japan’s “sphere of inﬂuence.”29 Since the 1960s, Japan has worked to build solid relations with Southeast Asian states. Originally, Japan

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saw the region as a source of raw materials. As Japanese businesses moved up the production ladder and Southeast Asia developed, the region became the natural location for Japanese investment and the outsourcing of production. “Japanese leaders have long viewed the country’s Asian regional base, within which the national economies were seen as a ’ﬂock of geese with Japan in the lead, as a source of competitive advantage.”30 The United States encouraged Tokyo to engage Southeast Asia. Japan was to serve as the American deputy—without the six-shooter—when the sheriﬀ was otherwise occupied. Throughout the Cold War, Washington saw the Japanese presence as a bulwark against communism. Unable to contribute militarily to the ﬁght, the United States looked to Japan to shoulder its share of the burden in other ways. Japanese aid and investment helped these countries develop, and economic development was thought to be the best vaccine against the communist virus. Over time, however, those countries became signiﬁcant economic powers in their own right and US interests shifted accordingly. Jim Kelly pointed out: “ASEAN is our third largest overseas market after NAFTA and Japan. Americans shipped exports worth $43 billion of ASEAN countries last year and imported $76 billion worth of goods.”31 The United States has other reasons to be concerned about the region. With a population of over 500 million, Southeast Asia could be a major voice on the international stage. The US State Department has identiﬁed the region as a “site of potential al-Qaeda hubs” and is considered the second front in the war against terror. Southeast Asians and Americans worry about economic stability, counterterrorism, human smuggling, narcotics traﬃcking, infectious diseases and environmental degradation. Now Beijing is encroaching on Japan’s turf. China has relentlessly pursued diplomacy to build better ties with Southeast Asian states. China’s economic dynamism has shifted the terms of Beijing’s engagement with Southeast Asia. Before 1997, Southeast Asia was the preferred destination for foreign direct investment. After the Asian economic crisis, China is now number one. China is now the world’s second largest recipient of FDI, trailing only the United States. John Wong observed: “China has become the world’s most favored destination of all developing countries since 1993. From 1988 to 2000, China’s realized FDI grew at an average rate of 23 per cent per annum, to reach a cumulative total of $339 billion. In fact, China in recent years has captured about 70 per cent of all FDI in Asia. Currently, still more FDI is ﬂowing into China in anticipation of its World Trade Organization membership. In the ﬁrst nine months of 2001, the FDI inﬂow to China went up by 21 per cent to $32 billion.”32 China is Asia’s twenty-ﬁrst century debutante, the apple of every investor’s eye. As the funds ﬂow to the mainland, Southeast Asian governments are reaching a new accommodation with Beijing. The most far-reaching initiative is the free trade area China has proposed with ASEAN that would solidify the association’s ties to China. Michael Marti noted: “China’s ultimate goal is to create a yuan-based sphere of inﬂuence, dominated by its economic and

Deputy and debutante 191 military power. In short, China is intent on establishing itself as the regional hegemon, thereby ending US pre-eminence in the Paciﬁc.”33 Robert Sutter paints a slightly less menacing picture: “China wants to be in a position of suﬃcient strength (with both positive and negative incentives— carrots and sticks) so that other countries in the region will routinely take China’s interest in equities into account in determining their own policies. Beijing wishes to be seen as the leading power in Asia and not as lower in prestige or regional inﬂuence than its neighbors. It also wishes to project military capability suﬃcient to counter hostile naval and air powers.”34 China’s rise has been facilitated by Japan’s own diﬃculties. A decade of stagnation has taken the shine oﬀ the Japanese economic model. A focus on domestic politics has prevented Japan from matching China’s initiatives. In January 2002, Prime Minister Koziumi toured the region and was expected to make a counteroﬀer to the China-ASEAN FTA. Instead, the Prime Minister was blocked by the Japanese agricultural lobby, which opposes any broad trade deal that might open the country’s markets to foreign competition. Economic woes have forced the banks, a critical instrument of the Japanese presence, to scale back. According to the Bank of International Settlements, “the balance of Japanese bank loans to Asian borrowers dominated in foreign currencies stood at some $50 billion as of the end of 2001. That’s about 10 per cent less than a year earlier, marking the ﬁfth year on year decline and a 57 per cent drop on 1996.”35 As a result, “Japan is generally (although not universally) disregarded as a force in Southeast Asia, certainly in the near term. Its continued economic weakness and its reluctance to deploy military strength to support international security initiatives are noted as indicating that the country has little to oﬀer (or threaten) the sub-region.”36

Moving beyond competition While most observers believe that China does not pose an immediate threat to US primacy in East Asia, the evolving geopolitical landscape will necessitate adjustments in US policy. Radical shifts are not needed. The regional alliance system that currently exists is an important foundation for US involvement within the region. Those alliances must be modiﬁed, however, to reﬂect new international realities. The US-Japan alliance is an essential element of regional peace and security, serving the interests of both nations and all the other countries of the region. The United States will need to lower its expectations of what Japan can deliver, however. The country is in a period of soul-searching and its energies will be focused inward for the foreseeable future. Japan should not get a free ride during the period—and the US public and Congress would not support one—but a recalibration of what the United States wants from Japan is needed. Japan can do more than it currently does, but it cannot adopt the role that more ambitious proponents of the alliance would like to see

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Tokyo embrace. Washington must accept the limits of Japanese capabilities and ambitions. A division of labour that accepts Japanese contributions in the diplomatic, ﬁnancial and economic realm—and subordinates military issues—is vital. The task is complicated by Japan’s new willingness to speak more forthrightly about its interests. This “new vocalism” is an intriguing element of the bilateral relationship. That readiness to speak out is easily confused with the question of Tokyo’s reliability. The two are not the same. Japan has proven to be a reliable ally. Tokyo may be becoming more assertive but the Japanese government and the Japanese people still appreciate the alliance. The challenge is ensuring that both governments and both publics continue to understand the value of their ally and of the alliance itself. In Northeast Asia, the task is more complex. The “virtual alliance” of the United States, Japan and South Korea37 has served the three nations well, but it must adapt to a post-Cold War world if it is to survive into the twenty-ﬁrst century. The governments need to give their alliances a meaning and identity beyond the Cold War. NATO has done that: an organization that was once designed to counter the Soviet threat has evolved into a regional security institution. For the United States, Japan and the ROK, the key is consolidating and strengthening their relationships by focusing on the interests and concerns that unite them. They should adopt a “values-based relationship” that stresses their common outlook and the liberal-democratic values, norms and institutions they share.38 This evolution would give the alliances a resiliency they do not currently have. It would stress what the three countries stand for, rather than what they are against. It would give citizens in each country positive values with which to associate their alliance—regional peace and security, the propagation of freedom—rather than seeing the bilateral relationships as something to deﬁne themselves in opposition to, as is often the case in Korea and Japan.39 In Southeast Asia, the United States needs to work with Japan to guarantee regional peace and stability as well as access to regional markets and government councils. In this area, the division of labour is important—and easier, since there is less overt hostility to Japan in the region. There needs to be engagement across a spectrum of issues and interests. Continued economic aid and assistance, access to Western markets and technology, and a less strident approach on human rights and governance will pay dividends. All of these elements are natural elements of Japanese foreign policy and diplomacy. In particular, the United States must avoid the temptation to focus narrowly on the question of terrorism. Political discussions must be real discussions, with appropriate sensitivity to regional concerns. A high US proﬁle can generate a backlash. Washington must accept that Southeast Asian governments are more insular than expected; that outlook will shape regional responses to US requests. In all these dimensions, coordination with and perhaps even learning from Tokyo will be especially valuable.

Deputy and debutante 193 The United States must also embrace regional economic groupings. The China-ASEAN FTA is only the most recent incarnation of the desire for some more concrete regional identity; the ASEAN Plus Three dialogue is another possible institutional building block. While the United States has traditionally been wary of such groups, Washington’s opposition to them, on top of recent unilateral trade measures and the formation of its own regional bloc, looks hypocritical. To its credit, the current administration has been more supportive of such eﬀorts than have its predecessors. Given the region’s economic circumstances, the United States has little to worry about from a regional group. If East Asian economies are to grow, East Asia must embrace open regionalism since those countries need access to Western markets to sell their goods. Moreover, it is also clear that Tokyo now recognizes that it prefers a broad deﬁnition of any East Asian group to ensure that China does not dominate. Once again, the United States needs to trust Japan to act in both nations’ interests.

Balancing the strategic triangle Managing the trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan and China will be the core challenge in the years ahead. Given the interests and concerns shared by the three governments, that is not impossible. Mutual suspicion will ensure that it is not easy either. China’s leaders understand that they need a peaceful and stable international environment to pursue their goal of economic development. Since the EP-3 collision, Beijing has done its best to smooth relations with Washington. Its desire for stability and predictability is plain. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September, some US-China watchers say cooperation between the two countries has reached “unprecedented” levels and argue that the governments have laid the foundation for a more stable relationship in the future. On the eve of President Jiang Zemin’s October trip to the United States, which included the much coveted invitation to President Bush’s Crawford ranch, US Ambassador to China Clark Randt observed “that our bilateral relations have never been better and this trend will continue.”40 Relations with Japan are more complicated. As historian Akira Iriye has noted, “The Chinese and Japanese have lived as Asian neighbors for nearly 2,000 years. Being geographically so close and yet psychologically quite remote, despite their common cultural roots, the two peoples have developed a sense at once of commonality and disparity, independence and autonomy, mutual respect and suspicion, attraction and repulsion, and admiration and condescension toward one another. They have talked of their shared heritage and their identity as Asians, but did not hesitate to seek outside assistance to ﬁght against one another. They have contributed to each other’s cultural and modern transformation, but the patterns of development have been vastly dissimilar. Throughout, the fact of their existence and the patterns of their

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association had been among the most enduring features of the history of East Asia.”41 Although the mainstream view in China is that Japan has no role to play in regional security aﬀairs, there is a slowly emerging realist strand in Chinese thinking that accepts an enhanced presence in East Asia.42 But China is confused about what Japan wants—and rightfully so, as it is not clear that Japan knows what it wants. There is an opportunity for strategic dialogue between the two governments, and a trilateral discussion would make the most sense given the role the United States plays in Japan’s national security policy. Such a dialogue would be a conﬁdence building measure in its own right and could provide the foundation of a broader strategic framework for the three governments. Every government has a stake in seeing the incipient rivalries—Japan– China, China-US—contained. Neither Japan nor China has any desire to spend more money than necessary on the military. Both need to channel precious resources to more eﬃcient sectors of the economy. Most Asian governments do not want to be caught between the eagle and the dragon. They want to stay on good terms with Beijing, while enjoying the beneﬁts of US trade, investment and its security presence. Ultimately, cooperation is the only real option. Japan and the United States account for about 40 per cent of the global economy, and China’s entrance into the WTO and its rapid development will give it a larger role in the regional economy. The United States and Japan can help Beijing cope with the stresses created by WTO membership. The United States and China are nuclear powers with permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, a status that Japan is trying to claim for itself. Cooperation among the three is a must. North Korea’s recent admission that it has pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme is both a challenge and an opportunity for trilateral cooperation and coordination. All three nations have a shared interest in seeing that the Korean Peninsula remains free of nuclear weapons. All want to see the situation defused peacefully and the nuclear nonproliferation regime reinforced, with Pyongyang returning to the community of nations, opening its nuclear programme to international inspections, and reforming its economy so that the possibility of implosion is minimized. The North Korean negotiations pose special risks for the Japan-US relationship. When the United States disclosed that the North admitted to cheating on the Agreed Framework, questions were immediately raised about Prime Minister Koizumi’s attention to the nuclear issue during his historic 17 September summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. An aide to the Prime Minister is reported to have admitted that they “didn’t take [the US information about North Korean cheating] so seriously.”43 That compounded concern in the United States—and among some Japanese—about Tokyo’s priorities. Japan is obsessed with the fate of the fourteen people that Pyongyang has admitted abducting from Japan and therefore the nuclear issue will not get the attention it deserves. The danger—and this risk also exists with South Korea and China—is that

Deputy and debutante 195 Japan’s willingness to negotiate with the North could put it at odds with the United States. The Bush Administration seems to consider the very act of negotiating with North Korea to be a concession—a reward. For this administration, North Korea has to dismantle its nuclear programme before Washington will talk. North Korea’s Asian neighbours are unlikely to go that far. For them, the insistence on a peaceful resolution to the nuclear weapons issue requires negotiations. There is the additional danger that Japan—like South Korea—will acquire a stake in the negotiating process and be willing to continue talking long past the breaking point of US tolerance. Yet trilateral coordination is the best—if not the only—way to get North Korea to come back into compliance with its international obligations. The United States is the only country that can give the North Korean regime the security guarantees it desires. Only Japan can provide the economic assistance necessary for long-term stability. And China has inﬂuence that will help diminish North Korean suspicions about the price of compliance with those international commitments. Pursuing the shared goal of eliminating the North Korean nuclear threat illustrates a key point. There needs to be a renewed appreciation of what constitutes a “normal” relationship among nations. It is all too easy—and too common—to couch the various bilateral relationships in terms of cooperation or competition, rivalry and conﬂict. In fact, there will be elements of all four in any normal relationship. Even close allies, such as the United States and Britain, do not agree on all issues at all times. The trick is managing the relationship to ensure that the disagreements do not overshadow shared interests and objectives. That is easier among allies as they have regularized contacts and have established mechanisms for dispute resolution. This brings us back to the structural imbalances in the trilateral relationship. As allies, the United States and Japan will be better capable of managing the diﬃculties that arise between them. Neither country has a similar shock absorber when it comes to dealing with China. It is therefore imperative that the three countries create more regular channels for dialogue and the exchange of views. Fortunately, it appears that those eﬀorts are already beginning. Unfortunately, there is a long way to go.

Notes 1 In fact, these are debatable propositions. The US commitment could be shaken by an economic crisis or lessened by new military technologies that eliminate the need for forward bases. Japan’s decline seems inevitable, given the scale of the changes needed to arrest the current slide, the Japanese public’s aversion to such change, and the demographic forces that make incremental adjustment increasingly nonviable. China’s rise is the most easily challenged given the magnitude of the problems it faces and the diﬃculties that have already been encountered. 2 Colin Powell, Asia Society Annual Dinner, 10 June 2002. 3 Ibid. 4 Paul D. Taylor (ed.), Asia and the Paciﬁc: U.S. Strategic Traditions and Regional Realities (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2001), p.101.

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5 Zalmay Khalilzad et al., The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 2001), p.43. 6 The United States and Asia, op cit., p.xiii. 7 Testimony of James Kelly before the House International Relations Subcommittee of the Foreign Aﬀairs Committee, 14 February 2002. 8 James Przystup, “Japan–China Relations: Spiraling Downward,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 3, No. 3, October, 2001. 9 Michael J. Green, “The Search for an Active Security Partnership” in Partnership: The US and Japan 1951–2001 (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2001) pp.146–7. 10 The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC, October 2000. 11 Speech of President George W. Bush’s to the Japanese Diet, 18 February 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020218–2.html. 12 Testimony of James Kelly, 14 February 2002. 13 The momentum had been regained. The emergency legislation passed the Diet and even more remarkably, Japan had dispatched Self Defence Forces to participate in eﬀorts to help rebuild Iraq. For details see, Brad Glosserman, “US-Japan Relations: Still on a Roll,” Comparative Connections, Vol 5. No, 2, July 2003, and Brad Glosserman, “US-Japan Relations: Mr. Koizumi’s Mandate,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 5, No. 4, January 2004. 14 Brad Glosserman, “Japan’s ‘Swiss’ Option,” PacNet, March 15, 2002. See also George Wehrfritz, “Japan: What to Wear,” by, Newsweek, 13 May 2002, p.14. 15 Mindy Kotler, Seth Drewry and Daisuke Okayama “Generational Change and the Japan-U.S. Security Relationship: Returning to the Future,” Japan Information Access Project, Winter 2001, p.2. 16 C. Fred Bergston, Takatoshi Ito and Marcus Noland, No More Bashing: Building a New Japan-United States Relationship (Washington DC: Institute of International Economics, 2001), p.67. 17 David Asher,“The Bush Administration’s Japan Problem”, American Enterprise Institute, March 2001. 18 Andrew Scobell, “Crouching Korea, Hidden China: Bush Administration Policy toward Pyongyang and Beijing”, Asian Survey, March/April 2002, p.356. 19 United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Statement, 19 February 2005, Washington DC. 20 “History Begins Here,” Brad Glosserman, Comparative Connections, April 2005. 21 The United States and Asia, op cit., p.43. 22 “Annual Report on The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” Report to Congress, Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, Department of Defense, 12 July 2002. 23 “The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China,” Report to Congress of the US-China Security Review Commission, 15 July 2002. 24 Paul Wolfowitz, Speech to the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 1 June 2002. 25 Scobell, op cit., p.364. 26 Scott Snyder, “China-Korea relations: Transit, Traﬃc Control and Telecoms: Crossing the ‘T’s’ in Sino-Korean Exchange”, Comparative Connections, Vol. 4, No. 1, April 2002. 27 Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Clash, Crash and Cash: Core Realities in the Sino-Korean Relationship”, Comparative Connections, Vol. 4, No. 2, July 2002. 28 Jae Ho Chung, “Korea Between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma”, Asian Survey, Sept/Oct. 2001, p.785. 29 See, for example, Lam Peng Er, “Japan-Southeast Asia Relations: Trading Places? The Leading Goose and Ascending Dragon,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 4, No. 1, April 2002.

Deputy and debutante 197 30 Kenneth B. Pyle and Eric Heginbotham, “Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose 2001–02,” National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001, p.106. 31 James Kelly, “Some Issues in U.S.-East Asia Policies”, Speech to the Asia Society, Washington DC, 4 April 2002. 32 John Wong, “The Rise of China: Challenges for the ASEAN Economies”, a paper prepared for the conference on “ASEAN and the Emergence of East Asia Regionalism,” Hanoi, Vietnam, 27–29 May 2002. 33 Michael E. Marti, “The Seduction of Japan,” The Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol. 2, No. 1, 3 January 2002. 34 Robert Sutter, “China’s Recent Approach to Asia: Seeking Long-term Gains,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2002). 35 “Falling Loans Threaten Asian Currency Initiatives,” Asahi Shimbun, 11 July 2002, online edition. 36 Dr Jim Rolfe, “Security and Southeast Asia: It’s Not about the War on Terrorism.” Asia-Paciﬁc Center for Security Studies, Asia-Paciﬁc Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, June 2002. 37 Ralph A. Cossa (ed.), U.S.-Korean-Japan Relations: Building Toward a “Virtual Alliance”, Washington D.C., CSIS Signiﬁcant Issues Series, November, 1999. 38 For more on this see, Tae-hyo Kim and Brad Glosserman (eds), The Future of US-Korea-Japan Relations: Balancing Values and Interests, CSIS Signiﬁcant Issues Series, 2004. 39 For a more detailed explanation of this process, see Victor D. Cha, “Values After Victory: The Future of U.S.-Japan-Korea Relations,” Comparative Connections, Special Annual Edition, July 2002. 40 US Ambassador Randt: US welcomes emergence of strong, peaceful, prosperous China. http:www.china-embassy.org/eng/36296.html. The view that US-China relations are “the best ever” was widespread among US oﬃcials and China watchers. See for example, Bonnie Glaser and Jane Skanderup, “US-China relations: Disharmony Signals End to post-Sept. 11 Honeymoon”, Comparative Connections, Vol. 7, No. 2, July 2005. 41 Akira Iriye, The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays and Political and Cultural Interactions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p.3. 42 Brad Glosserman, “Becoming ‘Normal’ in Exceptional Times”, PacNet, 25 January 2002. 43 New York Times, 29 October 2002.

Bibliography “Annual Report on The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” Report to Congress, Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, Department of Defense, 12 July 2002. Asher, David, “The Bush Administration’s Japan Problem”, American Enterprise Institute, March 2001. Bergston, C. Fred, Takatoshi Ito and Marcus Noland, No More Bashing: Building a New Japan-United States Relationship (Washington DC: Institute of International Economics, 2001). Bush, George W., Speech to the Japanese Diet, Feb. 18, 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020218–2.html. Cha, Victor D., “Values After Victory: The Future of U.S.-Japan-Korea Relations,” Comparative Connections, Special Annual Edition, July 2002. Chung, Jae Ho, “Korea Between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma”, Asian Survey, Sept/Oct 2001. Comparative Connections, a quarterly electronic journal, various issues.

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Cossa, Ralph A. (ed.), U.S.-Korean-Japan Relations: Building Toward a “Virtual Alliance”, Washington DC, CSIS Signiﬁcant Issues Series, November, 1999. “Falling Loans Threaten Asian Currency Initiatives,” Asahi Shimbun, 11 July 2002, online edition. Glosserman, Brad, “Becoming ‘Normal’ in Exceptional Times”, PacNet, 25 January 2002. Glosserman, Brad, “Japan’s ‘Swiss’ Option,” PacNet, 15 March 2002. Green, Michael J., “The Search for an Active Security Partnership” in Partnership: The US and Japan 1951–2001 (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2001). Iriye, Akira, The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays and Political and Cultural Interactions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). Kelly, James, “Some Issues in U.S.-East Asia Policies”, Speech to the Asia Society, Washington DC, 4 April 2002. Kelly, James, Testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee of the Foreign Aﬀairs Committee, 14 February 2002. Khalilzad, Zalmay et al., The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 2001). Tae-hyo Kim and Brad Glosserman (eds), The Future of US-Korea-Japan Relations: Balancing Values and Interests, CSIS Signiﬁcant Issues Series, 2004. Kotler, Mindy, Seth Drewry and Daisuke Okayama, “Generational Change and the Japan-U.S. Security Relationship: Returning to the Future,” Japan Information Access Project, Winter 2001. Lam, Peng Er, “Japan-Southeast Asia Relations: Trading Places? The Leading Goose and Ascending Dragon,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 4, No. 1, April 2002. Marti, Michael E., “The Seduction of Japan,” The Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol. 2, No. 1, 3 January 2002. “The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China,” Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission, 15 July 2002. Powell, Colin, Asia Society Annual Dinner, 10 June 2002. Pyle, Kenneth B. and Eric Heginbotham, “Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose 2001–02,” National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001. Rolfe, Jim, “Security and Southeast Asia: It’s Not about the War on Terrorism.” AsiaPaciﬁc Center for Security Studies, Asia-Paciﬁc Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, June 2002. Scobell, Andrew, “Crouching Korea, Hidden China: Bush Administration Policy toward Pyongyang and Beijing”, Asian Survey, March/April 2002. Sutter, Robert, “China’s Recent Approach to Asia: Seeking Long-term Gains,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Analysis, Vol. 13, No.1 (March 2002). Taylor, Paul D. (ed.), Asia and the Paciﬁc: U.S. Strategic Traditions and Regional Realities (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2001). The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC, October 2000. Wehrfritz, George, “Japan: What to Wear,” by Newsweek, 13 May 2002. Wolfowitz, Paul, Speech to the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 1 June 2002. Wong, John, “The Rise of China: Challenges for the ASEAN Economies”, a paper prepared for the conference on “ASEAN and the Emergence of East Asia Regionalism,” Hanoi, Vietnam, 27–29 May 2002.

11 Japan–China relations A Malaysian perspective Lee Poh Ping

The evolution of Japan–China relations has important geopolitical and economic implications for Malaysia and the rest of Southeast Asia. This chapter analyses various Malaysian views of Japan–China relations including those garnered from interviews of a select group of Malaysians with a professional interest in East Asia’s development. It also considers Malaysian perspectives of the economic rise of China and the stagnation of Japan. Many Malaysians are concerned that Japanese investment destined originally for Malaysia could be diverted to China and that China would emerge as a formidable competitor for Malaysian goods in the Japanese market. I argue that while statistics show that such fears are exaggerated, there is nevertheless some basis for such Malaysian apprehension in the near future. From a geopolitical perspective, Malaysians hope for cooperation between both giants. This is deemed necessary for the success of East Asian regionalism, an important policy objective of Malaysia. Malaysians view a rising China as presenting both opportunities and challenges. The huge Chinese market oﬀers opportunities to Malaysian exports; China is also a potential source of investment in Malaysia. However, the Chinese economic juggernaut is a potential competitor for Malaysia. In contrast, Japan’s economic stagnation has aﬀected the hitherto Malaysian view of Japan as a rising economic power. Nevertheless, Malaysians have not written oﬀ Japan as an important power in Southeast Asia. Malaysia believes that Japan should undertake political and economic structural reforms for it to remain an important and viable player in Southeast Asia. A revitalized Japan will balance a rising China in the region. Moreover, cooperation between the two Asian great powers will enhance regional stability, a condition which is beneﬁcial for smaller Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia. However, closer Sino-Japanese economic integration might, conceivably, be at the expense of Malaysia. This chapter ﬁrst considers various Malaysian perceptions of the economic impact of Japan–China relations on Malaysia. Next, it examines the cooperative and competitive aspects of this bilateral tie and its implications for Malaysia. Finally, it analyses the phenomenon of “China rising, Japan stagnating” seen from Malaysia.

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China rising, Japan stagnating: economic impact on Malaysia Malaysians worry about the “threat” China poses to Japanese investment in Malaysia and to the export of Malaysian goods to Japan. This concern is found not only among the élites interviewed but also in the mass media, which highlights the relocation of Japanese industries in Malaysia to China.1 Before one discusses the Malaysian response to this Chinese economic challenge, it will be useful to ﬁnd out whether there is really any basis to this perception by examining recent investment and trade ﬁgures (Table 11.1). The ﬁgures from 1990 to 2000 show the years when Japanese investment in Malaysia rose but dipped in China (1996 to 1997), and went up in China while down in Malaysia (1992 to 1995) and (2000). There were also years in which it went up and down simultaneously in both Malaysia and China (1990 to 1991) and (1997 to 1999). Indeed, the ﬁgures show no consistent correlation between decreasing Japanese investment in Malaysia and increasing Japanese investment in China in the 1990s. Thus, the ﬁgures suggest that there is no zero-sum game: rising Japanese investment in China does not necessarily lead to declining Japanese investment in Malaysia. What about future trends? Two authoritative reports about the intent of Japanese ﬁrms are worrisome to some Malaysians. The ﬁrst is a survey of Japanese transnationals (TNCs) by JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) about their relocation plans after China joins the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see Figure 11.2). According to JETRO, around 21 per cent of the TNCs plan to relocate to China. The majority of those planning to move to China are from Japan (67.5 per cent) but 7.8 per cent are from ASEAN 5 countries (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand). The second survey of Japanese companies in Malaysia was undertaken by the Japanese Chamber of Trade and Industry (JACTIM). (Figure 11.2). Table 11.1 Japanese direct investment in China and Malaysia from 1990 to 2000 (in 100 million yen) Year

China

Malaysia

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

511 787 1381 1954 2683 4319 2828 2438 1363 838 1099

1067 1202 919 892 772 555 644 971 658 586 256

Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan.

Japan–China relations 201

Figure 11.1 Planned relocation of production sites of Japanese TNCs to China as a result of China’s accession to the WTO Source: JETRO, International Economic Research Division. Note: 645 responses among the 720 Japanese TNCs surveyed by JETRO in October 2001. Based on 136 of the 645 responses (21.1 per cent) from TNCs planning to relocate their production to China.

If one looks at 2001, 19.4 per cent of the respondents (155) planned to move to another country while 21.9 per cent intended to invest partially in Malaysia and also another country. Of signiﬁcance is the fact that an overwhelming number of those respondents planning to invest outside Malaysia chose China. The reasons for their intended relocation to China were: plentiful labour, cheap wages, a huge domestic market and incentives for foreign investors. These two surveys suggest that Malaysia has some cause for concern about the diversion of Japanese investment from Malaysia to China in the future.2 What about Chinese competition with Malaysian goods in the Japanese market? This fear is less extensively mentioned by the interviewees compared to that of investment diversion but it is there nevertheless. Again it is instructive to look at the statistics. Table 11.2 gives the numbers for Japanese imports from China and Malaysia from 1992 to 2000. The ﬁgures above show increasing Japanese imports from Malaysia though of lesser magnitude than the increase in Japanese imports from China. The only years of decline for Malaysia were from 1997 to 1999. But there were also years when Japanese imports from China declined, only to pick up again like Malaysia in 2000. These statistics suggest that Malaysian and Chinese penetration of the Japanese market was due to Japanese capacity for absorbtion rather than competition between Malaysia and China. Some interviewees argued that there is no real competition here as most of the Malaysian exports (especially machinery and electronics) to Japan are

202

Japan’s Relations with China

Figure 11.2 Japanese companies looking beyond Malaysia: future investment strategy of Japanese companies in Malaysia Source: The Edge (Malaysia), 13 May 2002.

Japan–China relations 203 Table 11.2 Japanese imports from China and Malaysia (in 100 million Yen) Year

China

Malaysia

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

21448 22780 28114 33809 43997 50617 48441 48754 59414

8328 8516 8417 9917 12785 13751 11332 12414 15627

Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance and ASEAN-Japan centre.

of an intra-ﬁrm nature. This means that most of such exports come from Japanese companies in Malaysia to their counterparts in Japan and not from exports by local Malaysian ﬁrms.

China attracting Japanese investments: the Malaysian reaction Although Malaysia has made rhetorical appeals to both China and Japan to consider Malaysia and Southeast Asia in their economic policies,3 it has accepted pragmatically the economic logic of Japanese investments in Malaysia diverted to China. If the Japanese are attracted to China it is simply because China is more economically attractive. Nevertheless, many Malaysians believe that there is still time for Malaysia to counter the appeal of China and to retain Malaysia’s attractiveness to Japanese investors. They believe that Malaysia should upgrade the technical skills of its workers in order to meet the challenge of Chinese low wages. By moving up the value chain Malaysia could attract Japanese investment in those areas where China may not have the requisite skills. There is therefore a great need for Malaysia to retrain its workers and ensure that its educational system produces more engineers and technicians. Malaysia should also improve its “hard” and “soft” infrastructure. The “hard” aspects pertain to transport and communication facilities while “soft” refer to the rule of law, transparency in government and ﬂuency in English. All these are important to Japanese investors. China, in the throes of a transition from a command economy to a market-oriented one, is somewhat behind Malaysia in this respect. Malaysia could counter the huge market appeal of China by strengthening the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). By making AFTA (with a market of more than 500 million people) a reality, Japanese investors would reconsider diverting the lion’s share of their investments to China. Some Malaysians believe that the Japanese are unlikely to place all their eggs in one Chinese

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Japan’s Relations with China

“basket” and will shrewdly pursue diversiﬁcation: a “China plus others” policy. Malaysia hopes to remain as another “basket” for Japanese investors. However, not all Malaysians are sanguine about Malaysia’s ability to counter the Chinese appeal. Some are sceptical about Malaysia’s ability to climb the technological ladder quickly. They note that some Japanese perceive that Malaysians have a poor work ethic which is not conducive to technical upgrading; they also doubt whether the Malaysian educational system can produce suﬃcient technical people needed for industrial upgrading.4 They also wonder whether political stability, a “soft” advantage, could be jeopardized by the rise of religious extremism in Malaysia. Many Malaysians are sceptical whether AFTA will be suﬃciently viable to counter the lure of the Chinese market. While the doubters do not deny the Japanese desire for diversiﬁcation, they are unsure whether Malaysia will remain an attractive market for Japan to invest in; there are also other competitive non-Chinese markets for Japanese investments in Asia. One interviewee argued that the rise of China could profoundly upset Japanese economic relations with Malaysia and the rest of Southeast Asia. He believed that stability in Japanese-Southeast Asian economic relations had been based on a “ﬂying geese” pattern with Japan as the leading goose. However, the rise of China appeared to have rendered this pattern of development obsolete.

Conﬂict and cooperation in Japan–China relations: Malaysian views Besides the saliency of economics, Malaysians in the main have only a very general view of the geopolitical aspect of this bilateral relationship. At the heart of this view is that both Asian giants should cooperate because a breakdown of Japan–China relations will impact adversely on economic and political stability in Asia. This stability is indispensable to Asian regionalism. Malaysia has promoted the idea of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG).5 Envisaged for the EAEG is not an entity similar to a tightly-knitted European Union but a loose regional grouping for Asian countries. According to Prime Minister Dr Mahathir, this group should take advantage of the “regional synergies and opportunities for the cooperation in order to maximise the short, medium and long-term economic advancement of the region. Second, to build a productive coalition for the sustenance of the open multilateral global trading system and other non-trade goals that is productive of regional and global economic interests.”6 While the exact manner in which both giants can cooperate is not spelt out in detail by Malaysia,7 it is nevertheless clear that the participation of China and Japan is critical to Malaysia’s attempt to bring such a regional grouping into fruition. Thus far, the EAEC is conceived neither as a customs union nor a preferential trading arrangement. Closest to the Malaysian conception is the ASEAN Plus Three forum of Asian leaders from the ten Southeast Asian

Japan–China relations 205 countries, China, Japan and South Korea. The ASEAN Plus Three format has now gone beyond summit meetings to cooperation on currency matters involving ﬁnancial monitoring and currency swap arrangements. It has to be said, however, that there was some initial diﬃculty in getting both Asian giants to cooperate on currency matters as their early response to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis showed. Immediately after the crisis broke out in Thailand in 1997, the Japanese were keen to establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) of US100 billion dollars to help the stricken countries. China objected as it thought this could lead to Japanese domination in Asia. In part because of this Chinese objection but mostly because the Americans insisted on the International Monetary fund (IMF) taking the dominant role, the AMF did not get oﬀ the ground. But China relented subsequently in 1998 to a Japanese proposal, called the Miyazawa Plan, which was some form of an AMF. This Plan involved the allocation of US30 billion dollars by Japan to help the aﬀected Asian countries. While it is not clear if Malaysia had any role in persuading China not to object to Japanese initiatives in helping to alleviate the Asian crisis, it nevertheless is quite happy to see both giants agreeing to currency cooperation through the ASEAN Plus Three format. Though quite happy with the ASEAN Plus Three group, Malaysia is keen to pursue further integration. A step in this direction came when it was decided at the ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos, in 2004 that an East Asian Community be established which will include the ASEAN Plus Three members and perhaps others like Australia and New Zealand. Despite the potential for conﬂict in Japan–China relations, most Malaysians do not see a fundamental breakdown in bilateral ties. Their growing mutual interests, especially in economics, will provide the incentives for both countries to manage and settle their disputes peacefully. The one issue, according to one interviewee, that can unravel this relationship is Taiwan. His fear is that Japan may be dragged into a war between the United States and China over Taiwan because Japan has a bilateral security treaty with the United States. In such an outcome, the economic and political interests of Malaysia and the rest of Southeast Asia will be greatly aﬀected. Malaysians do not perceive initially that recent Sino-Japanese disputes over sovereignty and trade have a direct impact on them or on Southeast Asia. Many Malaysians will be hard put to know what the fuss over the Senkaku islands (Tiaoyutai) is all about. They also view such disputes as the Chinese exports of leeks, mushrooms and tatami into Japan and the North Korean asylum seekers in Shenyang as primarily bilateral issues which are not serious enough to disrupt regional stability. Nevertheless it has to be said that the recent marked deterioration in the political relations of the two giants could be making many Malaysians, and indeed many Asians, apprehensive as to where this will lead. There is, however, one bilateral issue that has some resonance in Malaysia: the Japanese attitude to their war record in China and Southeast Asia. In particular, the revision of Japanese textbooks to sanitize their war record

206

Japan’s Relations with China

in Asia, and Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2001 have provoked a reaction in Malaysia, particularly among certain segments of the Malaysian Chinese population. In reality, the Japanese war record is not only a bilateral Sino-Japanese issue but one which also involves the two Koreas and Southeast Asia. Many Chinese in Malaysia (Malaya then) were persecuted by the Japanese invaders because the Japanese believed that the overseas Chinese were helping China to resist Japan. As punishment, the Japanese extracted from them the then huge sum of 50 million Malayan dollars. Much cruelty was also inﬂicted on ethnic Chinese in Malaya by the Japanese occupiers. Concerning reparations, the Japanese government aﬃrmed that it had already done so under the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 to the then Malayan government. However, the Malaysian Chinese have argued that the bulk of the reparations went primarily to the British and very little to the Chinese.8 The textbook controversy and Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2001 also led to many demonstrations in Malaysia. Some demonstrators also demanded that Japan repay the 50 million Malayan dollars extracted from the Chinese in Malaysia.9 Given the fact that Japan and China are the only two giants in East Asia, Malaysians believe that there would be some rivalry for inﬂuence in Asia. Two examples can be adduced. The ﬁrst consists of the steps taken by Japan to strengthen relations with ASEAN, especially after China has agreed to form a free trade area with ASEAN, which were perceived by many Malaysians as evidence of Japan trying to counter Chinese inﬂuence in Southeast Asia. Such steps, they believe, began with Koizumi’s visit to Malaysia and a few other ASEAN countries in early 2002 where Koizumi made clear he wanted to have close relations with ASEAN and where he outlined his vision of an East Asian community of nations,10 with ASEAN as a core participant. Further, Japan hosted an ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit at the end of 2003 where among other things, Japan agreed to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation or TAC (an agreement that binds both sides not to use force in the settling of disputes) with ASEAN and also to initiate talks on Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, or Comprehensive Economic Agreements, with Malaysia, Phillipines and Thailand. (The Japanese have already concluded agreements with Singapore and Thailand.) While none of the oﬃcial ASEAN and Japanese participants would say explicitly that these Japanese moves were meant to counter China, it seems clear that a rising China served as a backdrop. The Japanese agreement, for example, to sign the TAC came after China agreed to sign only a short while earlier. And most likely, the bilateral FTA moves by Japan, which may involve the Japanese government taking on its powerful agricultural interests) could not have been undertaken with such alacrity if not for the proposed China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. Malaysia on its part is of course pleased with the TAC signing and with the bilateral free trade initiative. But Malaysia has some reservations concerning this proposed bilateral Free Trade Agreement as it is not keen to accede to

Japan–China relations 207 Japanese demands that Malaysia open its automotive market to Japan as it has its own national car, Proton, to protect. Nor is Malaysia enthusiastic to another Japanese demand that Malaysian government tenders be open to Japanese bidders. Nevertheless what Malaysia hopes for from this bilateral FTA, apart from a freer access to the Japanese market for some Malaysian goods, is an atmosphere that will encourage Japanese investment in Malaysia. A second example, which pertains more to the negative impact of Sino-Japanese rivalry, concerns the weakening of the yen relative to the US dollar in 2001 and early 2002. (Since then it has been the other way around with the dollar dramatically weakening against the Yen. In 2004, it was almost 100 Yen to a dollar). At one stage, rapid yen devaluation led to fears that the Chinese might respond by devaluing their yuan. Both giants do not want their currencies to appreciate to the extent of blunting their export competitiveness. Alarmed by a potential vicious cycle of Asian currency devaluation, Malaysia said that the yen should not weaken to the extent of triggering a Chinese devaluation and, in turn, aﬀecting the competitiveness of Malaysian exports.11

Malaysia views the economic rise of China The most salient aspect of the rise of China has been economic. China’s economy today is perhaps the second or third largest in the world, if measured by purchasing power parity (PPP). China’s rapid economic development naturally has an impact on the regional and global economy. It also has implications for the strategic and geopolitical position of China in Northeast and Southeast Asia.12 One interviewee hoped that China would develop into a power strong enough, like the USSR during the Cold War, to check the United States. Although Malaysian leaders are worried about the negative impact of China’s economic rise on the region, they also highlighted the positive aspects of its ascendance. Dr Mahathir believes that, on balance, the world will share the wealth generated by China.13 Dr Mahathir’s description of China as posing both challenges and opportunities essentially sums up the Malaysian view of that nation. Malaysians see China as a growing market for Malaysian exports and a place for their investment. The main challenge lies in the diversion of foreign investment from Malaysia to China, and Chinese products competing with Malaysian goods both at home and abroad. However, Malaysian exports to China have increased in recent years, thanks to a growing Chinese economy (Table 11.3). With China’s accession to WTO and its growing manufacturing capacity, the question remains whether Malaysia can continue increasing its exports to that country. Investing in China is good for Malaysia especially when it rides on the back of rapid economic development in China. However, some Malaysian Malays believe that, among Malaysian citizens, Malaysian Chinese are the main investors in China. They appear resentful that Malaysian Chinese are

208

Japan’s Relations with China

Table 11.3 Total trade between China and Malaysia Year

Total Exports (RM)

% of Malaysia’s Total Exports

1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

1,675,174,075 4,904,429,121 4,801,774,717 5,256,737,645 7,767,136,634 8,804,173,832 11,507,250,665

2.1 2.65 2.44 2.8 2.71 2.74 3.08

Source: External Trade Statistics, Department of Statistics, Malaysia.

diverting investment from Malaysia to their ancestral homeland. However, this view has weakened because many Malaysian Malays have also been investing in China in recent years. The Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) announced recently a proposed Chinese investment project of a large-scale pulp and paper mill worth 2,707.8 million ringgit. If this project were to be implemented (which did not turn out to be) then China could well become a very important foreign investor in Malaysia in the long run, just like Japan before.

Malaysia views Japan in stagnation For much of the period after World War II, Malaysia viewed Japan as a nation that has not only successfully rebuilt its war-shattered economy but also developed the second largest economy in the world. In this regard, Malaysia viewed its relations with Japan in the context of how Japan can help to develop Malaysia and the rest of Southeast Asia. Japanese assistance and involvement were welcomed in three areas: economics, culture and regional diplomacy. In the economic sphere, Malaysia hoped that Japan would move away from a neo-colonial economic relationship where Japan only extracted raw materials and minerals and then sold only value-added manufactured goods in return. It wanted Japan to help Malaysia modernize its economy, through investment, opening of the Japanese market (especially for Malaysian manufactured goods) and ODA (Oﬃcial Development Assistance). Japan did in some measure meet these expectations. Beginning in the 1970s, especially with the restructuring of Japanese industry because of the rising value of the yen, Japan increased its investment in Malaysia and relocated some of its industries (made uncompetitive by the yen revaluation) to Malaysia. From the 1980s onwards, Japan increased its imports of manufactured goods (in terms of their percentage of total imports) from Malaysia. Japanese aid started to ﬂow from the late 1960s

Japan–China relations 209 onwards, much of it directed to the building of infrastructure in Malaysia. All this reinforced in Malaysian minds the important and positive role Japan has in the modernization of the Malaysian economy. The hope was that Japan would remain an engine of growth for Malaysia. The most signiﬁcant cultural development was the adoption of the Japanese model for Malaysia as exempliﬁed by Dr Mahathir’s Look East policy in 1982. There were two aspects of this policy. One was the dispatch of Malaysian students and trainees to Japanese factories and universities to acquire the work ethics of the Japanese. The other, the more signiﬁcant, was the actual adoption of the Japanese model. This adoption had two features. The ﬁrst was adopting the Japanese corporatist model of harmonious governmentprivate sector relationship while rejecting the Western model, deemed to be confrontational. (This was given in Malaysia the label “Malaysia Incorporated” after “Japan Incorporated”). The second was encouragement from the Malaysian government to the private sector to adopt Japanese business institutions and practices. These included trading companies to facilitate exports, quality control circles and the “just-in-time” system of industrial production. In regional diplomacy, Malaysia urged Japan to play a political role commensurate with its economic status. Malaysia wanted Japan to take the lead, with or without American objections, in defending Asian interests in the international arena such as speaking up for Asia in places like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and G-7 summit meetings, and support an Asian regional grouping like the EAEG. However, the more than a decade long economic stagnation in Japan since 1991 has aﬀected the Malaysian view of Japan as a rising power. Yet Malaysia has not completely written oﬀ Japan as an important factor in Southeast Asia. Japan remains an important trading partner. While Japanese investment has declined somewhat in the late 1990s, it may also be due to attractive investment destinations elsewhere and not simply due to the weakness of the Japanese economy. Aid from Japan is still ﬂowing. Nevertheless, Malaysia believes that Japan must embark on structural reforms if it were to continue playing an important role in East Asia. Dr Mahathir, on the occasion of Koizumi’s visit to Malaysia, encouraged Japan to reform and said diplomatically that Koizumi would be successful in his reforms.14 Malaysian think-tanks have also called for Japan to reform its economy, particularly the ﬁnancial sector, not only because this will strengthen the Japanese economy but also prevent the yen from devaluating sharply leading to a vicious cycle of Asian currency devaluation which will aﬀect the Malaysian economy.15 Japan’s economic stagnation has not forced the abandonment of the Look East policy though it has greatly removed the shine from the Japanese model. Dr Mahathir himself said that Malaysia will still strive to learn from Japan if only to ﬁnd out where Japan has gone wrong! Also, Malaysia will continue dispatching Malaysian students to Japan under the policy except this time

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Japan’s Relations with China

perhaps with a more hi-tech and speciﬁc aims, instead of trying to absorb some vague Japanese spirit of hard work. Malaysians have also shifted the focus of the Look East policy from one of emphasizing the growth aspect of the model (obviously not very evident now) to the social and political aspects of it. Dr Mahathir states that “Malaysia Incorporated” has greatly aided race relations in Malaysia.16 “Malaysia Incorporated” has facilitated government involvement in business and gave ethnic Malays opportunities and a stake in business. This approach has helped to narrow the income gap between the Chinese and the Malays in Malaysia, a condition that enhances ethnic harmony and political stability in this nation. Malaysia has continued exhorting Japan to play an important role in the region.17 Yet there is concern that its stagnant economy will aﬀect Japan’s ability to do so. Malaysia, unlike the Philippines and Indonesia, is less dependent on Japanese ODA and has not complained about the Japanese intent to reduce its ODA by 10 per cent. There is nevertheless concern that this cut in foreign aid might be a harbinger of things to come: a weakened economy will undermine Japan’s ability to play a larger role in the region. Indeed, some Malaysian élites are concerned that a Japan in relative decline would not provide a suﬃcient counter weight to a rising China.

Conclusion Malaysians are increasingly aware of the importance of Japan–China relations for Malaysia and Southeast Asia. Thus far, this awareness, except for the concern among many Malaysians about Chinese trade competition and the diversion of Japan investment from Malaysia to a rising China, is found primarily in a small group of Malaysians with some professional interest in East Asia. Nevertheless this economic concern about being displaced by China pertains more to the future; statistics for the past decade show that there is not much basis for such a view. Geopolitically, Malaysia would not like to see any fundamental breakdown in relations between the two Asian giants. It wants both to cooperate in constructing an Asian regional grouping that would include Malaysia and the rest of ASEAN. Malaysia sees the rise of China as posing both an economic competition and an opportunity to tap into the huge Chinese market. It viewed Japan as a model of development for Malaysia and an important actor in Southeast Asia. The economic stagnation of Japan has tempered this view somewhat but has not forced any fundamental reassessment of the role Japan can play in Southeast Asia. I conducted interviews with a cross section of Malaysians who have professional interest in East Asia. Drawing from the ranks of diplomats, businessmen, academics and people in think tanks, they were either inﬂuential in policy making or were in a position to inﬂuence the Malaysian view of these two Asian giants. None would wish to be quoted but would not have any objection to being listed at the back of this paper as people who had been

Japan–China relations 211 interviewed. The interviews were basically unstructured though I tried to focus the discussions primarily on Japan–China relations.

Persons interviewed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Mohd. Jawhar Hassan, Director-General, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Kuala Lumpur, 8 May 2002. Tan Sri Khatib, Malaysian Ambassador to Japan, 1989–1999, 22 April 2002. Dr Stephen Leong, Director, Centre for Japan Studies, ISIS, 14 May 2002. Dr Mahani Zainal Abidin, Head, Globalization Unit, NEAC, Malaysia, 21 April 2002. Dato Majid Ahmad Khan, Malaysian Ambassador to China, 13 March 2002. A. Razak Baginda, Head Malaysian Strategic Research Centre, MSRC, 21 April 2002. Tham Siew Yean, academic specialist on Malaysian Economic Relations with China from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 16 May 2002. Banker from Bank Bumiputra, Kuala Lumpur, 13 May 2002.

Notes 1 See, for example, the Edge Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur) 13 May 2002. It has a cover story on the changing landscape of foreign direct Investment in Malaysia, and the challenge China poses. 2 JACTIM had another survey in March 2002, which found that 91 per cent of Japanese companies “are of the opinion that Malaysian workers lack morale, common sense and discipline”. This of course provoked outrage especially among trade unionists which forced JACTIM to clarify that their survey was “mistranslated”. Malaysia Kini, 21 March 2002. See also “Japanese ﬁrms critical of local work ethic, survey shows” Straits Times (Singapore) 6 March 2002. 3 One example is the appeal made by the head of UMNO Youth and Minister of Sports, Hishamuddin Tun Hussein Onn. When addressing a visiting Chinese delegation led by Hu Jintao, he expressed concern about the rise of China. He urged China to consider the interests of other countries like Malaysia. He did not mention the diversion of Japanese investment to China explicitly but such concerns were implied in his speech. 4 There is some basis for this scepticism. A recent report shows that there are around 44,000 unemployed graduates, 94 per cent of whom are ethnic Malays. The political leaders acknowledged that such unemployment resulted from Malay students opting for non-technical courses like Islamic and Malay studies, making them not very employable in the economic mainstream. 5 Malaysia ﬁrst proposed the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) in 1990. But due to strong US opposition, Malaysia changed the wording to East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). The term “caucus” is less exclusive then a “grouping”. However, Malaysia has recently resurrected the original East Asian Economic Grouping term. See “Push for formal EAEC” in New Straits Times (NST) (Kuala Lumpur) 22 May 2002. 6 Speech by Dr Mahathir to the Asia Society Conference on “Asia and the Changing World” in Tokyo in May 1993. Quoted in “the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC): ‘Formalized’ Regionalism Being Denied” by Stephen Leong in National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the South, edited by Bjorn Hettne, Andres Inotal and Osvaldo Sunkel, a UNU/WIDER Study, London, 2000, p.59.

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7 Stephen Leong suggests China could be the “natural” political leader while Japan the “natural” economic leader in such a grouping. See ibid, pp.30. When asked whether China and Japan might team up to dominate Asia, none of those interviewed thought that this is a plausible scenario. They believe that the diﬀerences between the two Asian giants and US opposition would prevent a joint SinoJapanese domination of Asia. 8 For an account of the reparation payments which went to the British after the war, see Fujio Hara “Japan and Malaysian Economy: An analysis of the Relations started with Reparations after the End of World War II” in Formation and Restructuring of Business Groups of Malaysia edited by Fujio Hara, Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo 1993. 9 For accounts of the reaction of some Malaysians, see “Chinese group to ask for RM500 mil payback from Koizumi” 11 January 2002, Malaysia Kini and “Malaysians demand apology from Japan for wartime atrocities”, 29 August 2001, Malaysia Kini. 10 See “Wanted: An East Asian ‘community’ ”, Straits Times, 15 Jan 2002. 11 Dr Mahathir was quoted as telling Koizumi during his visit to ASEAN in January 2002 that he was watching with interest whether the sharp fall on the yen will have an eﬀect on the Chinese Yuan and the ASEAN currencies. The Business Times Online Edition, 11 January 2002. 12 For a Malaysian perspective on the rise of China, see Amitav Acharya, “containment, engagement or counter dominance? Malaysia’s response to the rise of China” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds), Engaging China (London: Routledge, 1999). 13 “PM wrong to regard China as ‘black hole’ ” in New Straits Times, 7 May 2002, Dr Mahathir has also called for a formal EAEG as it would help resolve potential problems posed to Southeast Asia by China. See “Push for formal EAEG” in NST, 22 May 2002. 14 See “PM conﬁdent Japan will pull through” in NST, 11 January 2002. 15 See “Japan must tackle structural reforms by Mohamed Ariﬀ, executive director, Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, NST, 16 February 2002. 16 See “PM: Malaysia Incorporated helps ease racial tensions”, NST, 22 January 2001. 17 See, for example an article by A. Razak Baginda, head of the Malaysian strategic Research Centre, on the need for Japan to play a greater role in the international arena. “Japan must play independent global role” in The Sun, 13 January 2002.

Bibliography Acharya, Amitav, “Containment, engagement or counter dominance? Malaysia’s response to the rise of China” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds), Engaging China (London: Routledge, 1999). Edge Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur). Hara, Fujio, “Japan and Malaysian Economy: An analysis of the Relations started with Reparations after the End of World War II” in Formation and Restructuring of Business Groups of Malaysia edited by Fujio Hara, Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo 1993. Malaysia Kini, 21 March 2002. Straits Times (Singapore). New Straits Times(NST) (Kuala Lumpur). The Sun (Malaysia). Leong, Stephen in Bjorn Hettne, Andres Inotal and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds), National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the South, (UNU/WIDER Study, London).

12 Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow Gilbert Rozman

Since the mid-nineteenth century the vast expanse of Russia has loomed menacingly above one or both of the two modern-day powers of Northeast Asia, China and Japan. Moscow’s weight has been felt not only in bilateral relations, but also through direct or indirect eﬀorts to reconﬁgure the entire region. Its role, even today, should not be overlooked for at least four reasons. One, it has remained a principal neighbour of both countries: occupying with lingering controversy the longest land border with China and part or all of the islands closest to Japan, Sakhalin and the Kuriles.1 Two, its forward presence for over a century has shaped Japan–China relations as part of a triangular pattern, and it continues to have the potential to inﬂuence ties.2 Three, as the voice of a messianic power, for a time a superpower, and even today the second nuclear power and an undeniable energy power, Moscow has played a large role in deﬁning the international context in which Japan– China relations operate.3 Finally, the Russian Far East stretches to the north as a frontier capable of joining parts of China and Japan along with Korea in a Northeast Asian regional community, should newly emergent forces of integration gain ground.4 Evolving Russian strategies for these two states in combination and for Russia’s place in Northeast Asia have shaped the evolution of Japan–China relations and are likely to have further impact over the next decade as well, now that the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the search for energy security have become urgent. Whether governing the imperial-size Soviet Union or the still unrivalled Eurasian colossus of the Russian Federation, the leadership in Moscow has long recognized China and Japan to be the two dominant inﬂuences shaping the environment to the east. It has sought either control over both or a balance of the two. At the start of the twentieth century when competition with Japan took centre stage, at mid-century when support for China temporarily prevailed, and also today when hopes focus on preventing either country from taking advantage of a vacuum, Moscow has kept a close watch on the relative power of its two formidable neighbours. It has multiple motives for playing an active role in Northeast Asian diplomacy. Along with the United States and the Koreas, it puts its national interests on the line whenever the balance between China and Japan changes and would be most

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aﬀected should the two overcome their rivalry to advance along a path of joint leadership in building regionalism. Unlike the others, it still fears that part of its own territory will be lost if a favourable geopolitical mix is not achieved with China and Japan.5 After the trauma associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, its foremost concern these days is for a stable balance to be achieved that allows it to concentrate on pressing internal problems as well as on threats to security to its south. Yet, it would be incorrect to view President Vladimir Putin as having shifted his country from multipolar balancing to economic revival and reorientation. Interest in Northeast Asia continues to include strong aspirations to shape the region’s power structure and to foster a climate in which Russian energy and great power standing would give it substantial inﬂuence.

The central argument and structure of the chapter If in the past Russia has put pressure on China and Japan, for the next decades China and Japan should be roughly in balance as regional powers and are likely to turn increasingly to Russia to tilt the balance their way as well as to boost regionalism. This puts a newly weakened Russia in the enviable position of being pursued by both powers. As in recent years, China and Japan are likely to seek Russian cooperation more than Russia desires their attention. The longstanding tendency for Russia to overshadow Northeast Asia is ending. More than splitting the region, Russia has the potential to help bring it together. It can supply energy to a thirsty region heavily dependent on the Middle East. It can also play a constructive role in diﬀusing the security threat from North Korea which, after a showdown with the United States, required multilateral diplomacy through six-party talks involving also China, Japan, and South Korea. Even if the territorial dispute with Japan remains unsettled and Japan–China relations await a clear framework for Russo-US and Sino-US relations, views of the next decade are looking a lot diﬀerent from the transitional image of the past ﬁfteen years in which no stable pattern emerged. This chapter looks ﬁrst at how “new thinking” altered views of China and Japan in the Gorbachev era and impacted relations in a new way. Then it turns to views of Japan–China relations in the Yeltsin era, when initial “Atlanticism” shifted to a mixture of “Euasianism” and “great power nostalgia.” A third section covers images of relations in the ﬁrst years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, characterized by priority to the economy and a combination of coordination with the United States in the war against terror and continued search for leverage. Fourth is treatment of views in 2004 and the beginning of 2005, as the pace quickened for a new order. The chapter concludes by looking ahead to Russia’s role in the coming years, comparing it to Russia’s earlier presence. A pattern of change is apparent, reﬂecting an evolving power balance as well as Russia’s new priorities caught between power politics and economic opening. Putin has started his second term as President

Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow 215 by accelerating centralization of power and becoming more assertive about national interests, but he has also shown willingness to compromise on foreign policies.

Views of Japan–China Relations in the Gorbachev era There were already hints of challenges to the old thinking on China and Japan on the eve of Gorbachev’s rise to power. After all, in 1982 after two decades of heated mutual accusations during the Sino-Soviet split, Moscow had at last arranged talks with Beijing in order to normalize relations. Moreover, following ever more preposterous charges about Japan, there had at last been some admissions of the success of its model and the dynamism of the region where its economic inﬂuence was greatest. It was becoming increasingly diﬃcult to accept the lingering oﬃcial propaganda: 1) Japan’s domestic situation is perilous, as opposition forces led by socialists enjoy wide popularity and are poised to take power and overturn the exploitative system even as past economic luck is running out; 2) Japan’s foreign policy is increasingly militaristic, causing divisions in the region and leading to intensiﬁed competition with the United States that cannot be resolved by idle proclamations about Asian-Paciﬁc regional cooperation;6 3) China’s domestic situation is not improving because of the introduction of capitalist elements, although after talks on normalization began in 1982 the tone of Soviet criticisms was no longer critical that China had “Maoism without Mao” or that its reforms were only making matters worse;7 and 4) China’s foreign policy remains hostile to the victory of socialism in the world, despite acknowledgement of an awakening to the problems of dependence on the United States and Japan. Such reasoning had long failed to contribute to realistic policies capable of transforming relations with these two countries. Experts at Moscow think tanks were beginning to introduce new themes with the potential for shifting public perceptions.8 On China, one group in deﬁance of the overseers who enforced conformity grasped the import of reforms early. Having throughout the Cultural Revolution pointed to the extremes to which a system founded on socialism could be carried in the hope that readers would recognize parallels to their own society, they now looked for ways to hint at the reforms that could begin to transform such a system. They would have to wait until 1986 under a new Soviet leadership to portray in detail the vitality of a special economic zone drawing foreign capital and experimenting with market-oriented reforms.9 Some who bridled at the stiﬂing impact of censorship also explored ways in which to show that China’s foreign policy was capable of distancing itself from the United States and looking for common interests with the Soviet Union. Advice was oﬀered to Soviet leaders on more than one occasion that patience and more vigorous diplomacy could appeal to Beijing, and in 1982 this subject ﬁnally could be broached more openly after China shifted to equidistance between the United States and the Soviet Union and the two socialist states

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agreed on talks aimed at normalization. Yet, the hardliners remained on top until 1986, pressing for censorship. On Japan too, an entrenched old guard could not suppress a rebellion of reform scholars anxious to present the truth and to redirect Soviet domestic policy and foreign relations. Increasingly, Japan gained popularity as a technological marvel with a rare degree of social harmony in contrast to the bleak image presented in Pravda. Also, its interest in foreign policy alternatives as well as its commitment to military restraint cast the country in a more positive light. Many Soviet citizens were eager to break the logjam that left bilateral ties so strained. As Soviet isolation and stagnation became more acute, Japan looked more appealing.10 When experts gave public lectures, they attracted a large crowd. It would take, however, until 1987 to overcome the controls of the hardliners. A third dimension to Soviet rethinking was more diﬃcult to introduce in the years before Gorbachev’s glasnost. Given the tight censorship over foreign policy focused on the Soviet Union, scholars found it diﬃcult to present a picture of relations with China and Japan that had overcome the existing territorial disputes and integrated their country’s economy with the newly integrated economy forming in East Asia. No image arose of regionalism based on foreign investment, market economics, and subordination of security and territorial concerns for mutual economic advantage. If Moscow linked Tokyo and Beijing to Washington’s coordinated strategic containment, it failed to picture them within an emerging world and regional economy favourable to all.11 The diplomatic aim became to drive Beijing and Tokyo apart on strategic matters, but it was not joined by the goal of welcoming their cooperation on economic ties and seeking to bring the Soviet economy into the arrangement too. As late as 1985 Soviets did not envision an economic triangle despite the success of burgeoning Asian export-oriented economies.12 Mikhail Gorbachev’s July 1986 speech in Vladivostok signaled the beginning of a regional approach that treated China and Japan together and brought economics to the fore. In July 1986 after he had shaken up the foreign policy establishment, Gorbachev took a fresh approach to China, Japan, and Russia’s place in the Asia-Paciﬁc region. Apart from oﬀering encouragement to accelerate the normalization of relations, he dangled at least three incentives before the Chinese and Japanese. First, he tried to play his strongest hand by pressing for regional security talks. (With Soviet forces still heavily represented in the region, he aimed to ﬁnd a parallel to the securitycentered agenda with the United States and the Europeans and leave a foundation of regional forces in balance.) This failed since both Japanese and Chinese considered their countries so far behind the unreasonable Soviet buildup that they did not contemplate oﬀering anything in exchange, while the United States saw no need to broaden its vital strategic agenda with the Soviet Union to encompass conventional forces in Asia. All that was left for Gorbachev was to start unilaterally dismantling the Soviet military

Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow 217 juggernaut, a process that turned into a freefall over the next decade. Indirectly, the removal of this threat proved to be Moscow’s principal contribution to transformation of military relations between China and Japan. China could redirect its forces to the southeast coast opposite Taiwan, and Japan would grow nervous over the increasing threat to the status quo with possible impact on its essential sea-lanes. Gorbachev’s overtures for a new strategic relationship eventually drew much more interest in Beijing than in Tokyo, leading to a shift in that direction.13 The second incentive oﬀered by Gorbachev was the opening of the Soviet economy to the producers and investors of the world. At the peak of its bubble economy, Japan was ﬂush with capital and scouring the globe for investment opportunities. Russian observers assumed that the natural resources of Siberia and the Russian Far East would entice Japanese ﬁrms and as Vladivostok opened a large Japanese presence would follow, as in the 1910s. They would come for commerce, intellectual and cultural exchanges, and tourism. If Japanese hesitated, the explanation must be that the government was holding normal contacts hostage to the territorial dispute. Although less was expected of Chinese traders and investors, they were welcomed in part as a way to spur competition that would arouse the Japanese. Given the legacy of Soviet thinking, it seemed obvious that countries as much as ﬁrms would compete energetically to capture new markets and expand their access to raw materials or production networks. After allowing the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet dispute to leave it on the fringe of the booming regional economy, the Kremlin longed for a piece of the growing pie. By no means did they imagine that their isolated command economy would start at the bottom and simply ﬁt into the existing pattern of relations. They approached the region as a great power, even a superpower, which could negotiate with the powers in Nagata-cho and Zhongnanhai to set the terms for a new regionalism. Such delusions of grandeur faced a stunning rebuke, as Moscow never overcame its peripheral status. Its strategies of regional integration proved ﬂawed, as did those of other states in Northeast Asia.14 Gorbachev chose Beijing over Tokyo for normalization of relations. Beijing was more compromising on its territorial dispute, agreeing to set the three most sensitive islands aside and later to compromise on them as opposed to Tokyo’s insistence that the two most sensitive islands be addressed prior to signing a peace treaty.15 With its rhetoric critical of the United States and its desire for an equidistant foreign policy, Beijing oﬀered more of a geopolitical payoﬀ—helpful with nationalists at home and leverage on Washington. Great power reasoning drove Moscow. It was an ideological plus to overcome differences in short order with the main capitalist and socialist adversaries of the past quarter century. With lower priority, Tokyo seemed likely to fall in line as a new global order took shape. After normalizing relations with one country when Gorbachev visited Beijing amidst the turmoil of demonstrations and failing to do so with the

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other, Moscow did not pay much attention to Japan–China relations over the next few years. China’s repressive image after the carnage of the student demonstrations made it diﬃcult for Moscow to sustain reform at home while boosting bilateral ties. Tokyo’s insistent demand for the four islands became a subject of dispute from 1990 between Boris Yeltsin’s assertion of Russian nationalism and Gorbachev’s eﬀort to keep the Soviet Union intact.16 As the Cold War was ending and Moscow’s ﬁnancial requirements soared, relations with the United States and the West European states overshadowed foreign policy in Northeast Asia.

Views of Japan–China relations in the Yeltsin era Although Gorbachev had tilted towards China in order to achieve normalization in 1989, Yeltsin had an opportunity to achieve balance by normalizing ties with Japan in 1992 or even tilting towards Japan at a time when there was uncertainty in Sino-Russian relations. The case for favouring Japan seemed obvious in the ﬁrst year of the Russian Federation. First, the adoption of a pro-western foreign policy linked to large-scale ﬁnancial assistance from the G-7 states and the international institutions under their control brought Japan into all of the critical negotiations over Russia’s future. Satisfying its objectives promised to open the door to greater funding as well as direct investment. Second, the Yeltsin regime was eager to show that it was serious about becoming a member of the club of democratic and market-oriented countries. Not only was Japan one of the club, its experience after World War II of engineering a transition from a mobilized state-centred economy oﬀered some of the most promising parallels to Russia’s transition.17 Finally, Yeltsin sought to solidify his legitimacy through foreign policy. Since Gorbachev failed to normalize relations with Japan, the opportunity presented itself to outdo the previous regime. Yeltsin would not have to forsake China by adding Japan to create a balanced regional approach. The advantages for a ﬂedgling government of gaining a strong sponsor in the country second in industrial might and ﬁrst in balance of trade and capital would seem to be obvious. In the fateful months of 1992 when the direction for the Russian state was set Yeltsin opted for China instead of Japan. First, he attempted to make a deal by returning the two islands promised in 1956, but Tokyo refused. Relations failed to gain momentum because Tokyo was determined to put pressure on Moscow to yield. Second, deputies in the Supreme Soviet chose to launch their attack on a weak foreign policy that reputedly neglected Russia’s national interests by holding hearings over the summer on Japan. Just as Yeltsin was distancing himself from one-sided dependency on the West by announcing a two-headed foreign policy pointing east as well as west, the richest power in the east was becoming a symbol of what was wrong with the policy to the west. Third, Yeltsin in September lashed out by abruptly cancelling his planned summit in Tokyo, setting back bilateral relations. Finally, after a trip to Seoul, which proved that South Korea could not

Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow 219 replace Japan as the centre of Moscow’s eastern strategy (Moscow was already failing to repay the loans oﬀered when Gorbachev agreed to normalization), Yeltsin reaﬃrmed the 1989 decision to lean toward China when he went to Beijing in December. Why had Yeltsin preferred a communist-led state with little economic payoﬀ for his country in the near future to a rich capitalist state expected to reward Russia well? We can ﬁnd at least three answers to this question. One, it was Japan’s fault. That country’s narrowly nationalist foreign policy showed insuﬃcient ﬂexibility. Reasoning that Russia’s commitment to return all four islands had to be secured quickly, Japanese leaders forced the decision. There is some truth to this criticism of Japanese inﬂexibility, but Russia could have agreed patiently to negotiations on the two remaining disputed islands. If Yeltsin had traveled to Japan and sounded forthcoming on some sensitive issues, such as making available data on the Japanese prisoners kept long after the war as he had promised in his visit in October 1993, he could have created a mood for compromise. His drastic action—seen as a diplomatic snub—suggests that more was at stake. Two, some have argued that Yeltsin felt vulnerable to Russian nationalists on foreign policy and decided to sacriﬁce Japan in order to rebuild his credentials. This is a recurrent theme; through the remainder of his term observers kept arguing that Yeltsin made a show of preempting nationalist causes while displaying moderation when necessary. The very fact that policy to Japan was selected ﬁrst and a mood of deﬁance toward that country was never entirely overcome indicates that the approach did not put Moscow’s priorities in Asia at risk. Improving relations with Japan was not a high priority. Three, the cause for Yeltsin’s preference for China over Japan can also be sought in foreign policy based on calculations of national interest having much continuity with the Gorbachev era. When geopolitics easily trumped economics, China far outranked Japan. Taking its longer and more strategic border with China much more seriously than its short maritime border with Japan, Moscow showed great interest in stabilizing it. Also, having devoted far more attention to the Sino-Soviet split than the Japanese-Soviet downturn, Russians were more alert to preventing a setback. Leaders acted promptly after 4 June 1989 and 25 December 1991 to keep relations with China from deteriorating, while in September 1992 they displayed little restraint and no rush to remedy the situation as Yeltsin provoked a sharp deterioration in relations with Japan. In the ﬁrst years of the new Russian state the government showed little interest in creating conditions to attract investments. They had no strategy for free economic zones, foreign ownership of industrial enterprises, or joint development of resources with the exception of the Sakhalin oﬀshore oil and gas projects, which had been well under way. Meanwhile, foreign assistance came largely through organizations in which the United States had the leading voice and Germany could be expected to press Russia’s case. There was no need to curry favor with Japan when others would press Japan to join the consensus.

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In contrast, China proved increasingly useful to Russia as a geopolitical partner to shape the Northeast Asian region and, even more, global relations. Just as Russian oﬃcials and public opinion remained deeply concerned about the balance of power in Europe as NATO was being enlarged, they perceived Northeast Asia as a vital region that needed to be stabilized through a balance. Considering the US-Japanese security treaty to be the dominant regional force, Russians pictured a partnership with China as a step toward equilibrium. Despite occasional rhetorical ﬂourishes, the goal was limited to a balance in which Moscow was able to magnify its voice. In 1994–96 when Moscow felt unfairly excluded from the KEDO agreement and four-power talks on Korea, boosting ties with Beijing looked like a good way to catch US attention. Above all, the expansion of NATO seen through a global great power lens drove policy toward China much more than regional considerations. While overtures to China also impressed Japan that Russia should not be taken for granted and satisﬁed many anti-US nationalists at home, their prime objective was to shape foreign relations in Russia’s favour. Given the recurrence of warnings that the balance of power was tilting towards China, however, Moscow kept hesitating on how far to press its pro-China stance and kept alive an interest in improving ties to Japan as long as Tokyo took the initiative.18 Although Yeltsin had snubbed Tokyo in September 1992, his visit a year later sent a diﬀerent message. Relations could be improved, including discussions over all four islands, if Japan was serious about compromising. Over the following years Japanese heard various messages that indicated that Russia was more supportive than China: approval for the US-Japan Security Treaty, approval of Japan’s entrance as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, encouragement of military exchanges. The Russians signaled their readiness to balance their relations with China, but they did not suggest much compromise in territorial negotiations. Clearly, they did not feel that their position was so weak that they had to make this concession. In addition, their strategy remained to boost relations with China in order to counter US dominance, relegating Japan to a secondary priority. Yet, when Tokyo showed enthusiasm for talks in 1997, Moscow reciprocated. Russian leaders wanted a breakthrough too, but through a compromise.19 Public opinion inside Russia did not warm to China as partner for a new era or to Japan as potential benefactor. In fact, fear of China acquired a more immediate form, especially in the Russian Far East.20 Repeatedly criticizing Japan for pressuring their country, the Russians insisted that Japan should prove its goodwill through large-scale economic support before there would be reason for the Russians to let down their guard.21 When the Japanese government in 1998–99 indicated that its economic energies had to follow a deal on all four islands, the Russian side drew back. With Sino-Russian ties concentrating on rhetoric against US hegemonism, there was no deepening of ties with either East Asian great power.22 Moscow had no strategy for economic regionalism. The buildup of ties with Beijing left a solid foundation,

Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow 221 and even the energy spent in talks with Tokyo in 1997–98 could be reanimated if there was new will on both sides. In the heat of public arousal over US unilateral power, many analysts in Russia anticipated wishfully a balanced triangle with China and Japan. They played up the prospect of multipolarity, ignoring the problem of Russia’s weakness in Asia and its lack of any programme to boost the Russian Far East’s integration into Northeast Asia.23 In contrast, foreign observers looking at Russian aspirations in the region concluded that a fundamental domestic change of direction would have to be the starting point if Russia were not to be ignored.24 More needed to be done to make relations with China the centrepiece of Russia’s long-term strategy in Northeast Asia and ties with Japan were weak.25 To revive Russia’s role, a new leader with a long-term strategy was needed.

Views of Japan–China relations in Putin’s early years When Putin suddenly had the presidency thrust on his shoulders, Chinese and Japanese leaders greeted him with high expectations mixed with uncertainty. While the world watched closely his every move in relations with ﬁrst the Clinton administration and then the new Bush administration, there was also drama in his responses to President Jiang Zemin and Prime Ministers Mori Yoshiro and Koizumi Junichiro. On the surface, Putin was conducting bilateral diplomacy. In the background, he was exploring triangular and global great power relations without losing track of the legitimacy he needed from Russian national identity. In the ﬁrst year of his ﬁrst term as President, the triangular balance scarcely changed, but potential was mounting for a major adjustment putting Russia more at the pivotal position than the other two states. Japan had planned to become the pivot, as appeared likely in the ﬁrst part of the 1990s, and China had high hopes of gaining the pivotal position in the second half of the decade. Now it was Russia’s turn to at least explore this notion, as it became the object of intense wooing in 2000 and early 2001. Obviously, at the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century Moscow was a pale shadow of the leviathan that had driven Northeast Asia through the past century of imperialist land grabs, Communist expansionism, Cold War polarization, and Communist schism. Its Paciﬁc Fleet was rusting in port, and the Far Eastern Command struck fear only in those drafted to serve but escaping through any possible ruse. Its economic ties with China and Japan were paltry and declining despite the dynamism of intra-regional trade exclusive of Russia. Why then did Moscow have the audacity to imagine that it could gain a pivotal role? The most important reason was that Chinese and Japanese leaders encouraged it. They pursued Moscow prior to Putin’s ascent to power and intensiﬁed their appeals when they recognized that he would set the course for his country for a long time. In addition, there were conditions that could be turned in Russia’s favour, such as the uncertain status of North

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Korea’s nuclear weapons programmes and the extreme dependency in the region for oil and gas supplies from distant sources. Above all, a high degree of ﬂux in a region moving toward a new security and economic framework gave Russia its opportunity. China’s quiet expectations in 2000 contrasted with Japan’s loud pitch for reaching a breakthrough quickly, but that should not deceive us. After losing conﬁdence in its strategy to draw the United States into triangular great power balances in 1997–98, Beijing needed Moscow more than ever. While Yeltsin was still in power, Jiang Zemin could ﬁnd satisfaction in joint opposition to US-led military operations such as in the former Yugoslavia, in a consensus against expanding military alliances whether NATO or the US-Japan security agreement, and in growing weapons sales and transfers from Russia to China. As the year 1999 ended with Russian troops renewing the war against Chechen separatism, the Chinese could equate this struggle with their own rejection of Taiwan’s independence and insist that a shared worldview was solidifying the strategic partnership in opposition to US hegemony. Yet, there were frequent signs of Chinese nervousness that Russia’s reliability was questionable. As president, Boris Yeltsin kept cutting deals with Bill Clinton, including the arrangement to pressure Belgrade to end the war in Kosovo and accept a peacekeeping force including Russian troops. China was rebuﬀed not only in attempts to coordinate more closely, but even in eﬀorts to put economic ties on a more even keel. Aware of frequent nationalist accusations against it inside Russia and of Putin’s background as a KGB agent living in Germany, China sought reassurance. Putin’s ﬁrst months in oﬃce were disappointing to China’s leaders. There was no early summit demonstrating the special signiﬁcance of this partnership. No clear statement from the Russian leader reaﬃrmed a common worldview. In fact, remarks such as that Russia might in some circumstances be prepared to join NATO came as a shock. If increased attention to North Korea, and frequent resort to nationalist symbols, suggested that Putin would stand strongly behind Russia’s national interests in Northeast Asia, they were insuﬃcient to relieve Chinese nervousness. With little point in boosting ties with the lame duck Clinton administration and good reason for caution in the face of the tough-talking Bush administration, Putin did not do anything overt to damage ties with China. Indeed, he agreed to go forward in July 2001 with a treaty pledging closer cooperation, seen in some circles as a quasialliance. In Beijing this step was appreciated even as new doubts arose over the personal rapport that already seemed to be forming between Putin and Bush. China’s leaders waited patiently for Putin. While China was hoping that Russia would not distance itself, Japan sought eagerly to draw Russia closer. Despite the loss of momentum in bilateral talks after the November 1998 summit in Moscow, Japanese oﬃcials kept pressing for an accelerated pace in order to meet the timetable in the countdown to 2000 set at the Krasnoyarsk summit. It was important for Japan’s prime minister to be the ﬁrst foreign leader to meet with Putin after

Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow 223 his election, and a summit was hurriedly scheduled in St. Petersburg late in April 2000.26 While the Japanese media often gave the impression that the purpose of this intense pursuit that culminated with the Irkutsk summit of March 2001 was to sign an agreement for the return of four islands, there were multilateral elements along with the strictly bilateral ones. After all, Hashimoto had started the process in July 1997 with a speech about Japan’s new “Eurasia diplomacy,” identifying great power issues along with the territorial and economic ones as the driving forces in negotiations. Few in Tokyo or Moscow doubted that a breakthrough would give Japan leverage against China’s rise. Putin was not oblivious to the possible beneﬁt to Russia from a partner in Northeast Asia that could balance China. His compromise oﬀer in Irkutsk to recognize the 1956 treaty left no doubt that Russia would return two islands if a deal could be reached. Yielding to Japan on all four islands, however, would have jeopardized his standing as a nationalist at home and even encouraged China to intensify its appeal for Russia to hand over three islands still in dispute. Holding the line at two islands could be justiﬁed as acknowledging an existing commitment, while solving a vexing bilateral problem. It would be consistent with an assertive Russia regaining its inﬂuence in the region, while yielding to Japan would expose a weak Russia of little consequence. The oﬀer also gave Japan a chance to seek a compromise, as it started to do before Koizumi replaced Mori as Prime Minister and repudiated the “soft” policy. This softer approach accepted the mechanism of parallel talks on each set of two islands, but critics charged that it would lead to a peace treaty based on the return of only two. With Koizumi ﬁrmly in charge of Japan from April 2001 and showing no sign of yielding on the demand for the return of “four islands in a batch,” Putin turned his attention elsewhere. 11 September 2001 changed the regional as well as the global international environment. Putin’s decision to cooperate with the US war on terrorism left both China and Japan on the sidelines. For Beijing this was a big blow, weakening its drive to build a multipolar world. After Putin acquiesced to the US abrogation of the ABM treaty and to NATO expansion, the Sino-Russian partnership was exposed as having little impact in limiting US hegemony. The Chinese were worried that the partnership had lost its global and regional signiﬁcance, as they tried to boost economic ties in order to solidify its bilateral signiﬁcance.27 For Tokyo the new US-Russian strategic bonds brought uncomfortable memories of the late 1980s and early 1990s when Japan appeared to be on the sidelines as Moscow mended relations with other states and reached one historic agreement after another with Washington. Just when Japanese ties to Russia had soured again, Putin was the man of the hour in calling Bush to oﬀer support on 11 September and providing indispensable assistance in the war against the Taliban. Japan’s dispatch of ships in a logistical capacity drew little world notice. After months of hostile coverage of the way the politician Suzuki Muneo and oﬃcials in the Foreign Ministry had “hijacked” policy toward Russia that fed nationalist thinking in

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Japan, Russia’s State Duma signaled its anger by rejecting in a non-binding vote the return of even two islands. Only months after Koizumi had given an interview claiming that bilateral ties were better than ever,28 both sides were left with no indication of when or how they might resume serious talks. In the middle of 2002 Russia’s relations with China and Japan were more doubtful than when Putin had taken oﬃce. Yet, few regarded this as a setback for Russian diplomacy. The quadrangular context with the United States had eclipsed the Northeast Asian great power triangle. Moscow’s improved relations with Washington meant that Beijing needed it more than ever. For the time being Tokyo was too preoccupied with internal scandals disruptive of foreign policy (in June Suzuki Muneo, the architect of the initiative to Russia, was sent to jail after months of accusations of pursuing foreign policy for personal proﬁt, and Tanaka Makiko, the Foreign Minister who reversed Suzuki’s policy to Russia, was ousted from the ruling LDP for failing to answer questions about improper use of oﬃce funds). Japanese fears of the rise of China continued to grow as manufacturing ﬁrms kept moving across the Yellow Sea. Clearly, Japan’s interest in balancing China would not diminish. The Russians counted on energy to rekindle interest. Despite having been pursued, Russians feared that they could easily be ignored. They felt frustrated at how shallow the interest in their country was in Japan. When Suzuki was viliﬁed across Japan the Russians asked if any other Japanese politician would show interest in their country.29 They should also have been asking if their interest in China in 1996 and in Japan from the time of the Denver G-8 summit in June 1997 had really reﬂected a strong commitment to normalization or was it little more than a sign of pique at NATO expansion. Yet, as Putin directed attention to Russia’s strategic interests and Bush pressed ahead with unilateralism in Iraq, new possibilities would arise. In the midst of despair over relations between Japan and Russia in 2002, the academic scholar Hakamada Shigeki found some hope. He argued that the Japanese should not turn away in disappointment, but needed rather to convey a message of increased interest in Russia. Unlike 1997 when pursuit stemmed largely from hope for the return of the islands, new attention should signify strategic thinking. For instance, with increased uncertainty about stability in the Middle East, the Japanese should be debating Russia’s role in Japan’s energy security. Hakamada added that the logic of Putin’s decision in 2001 to draw closer to the United States and Europe applied also to relations with Japan.30 Already in September 2000 Putin conﬁrmed boldly the 1956 declaration with Japan. Once the stakes are clear to both sides he might again make independently a bold decision towards Japan. Only by changing the context of bilateral relations would this be possible. Yet, in 2004 the Japanese took the opposite line: They charged that Koizumi’s message of support for an energy partnership backed by large-scale investment in an oil pipeline had convinced the Russians that the territorial issue no longer mattered.31 They had no strategy to replace the one abandoned in 2001.

Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow 225 Chinese analysts were ﬁnding reason for conﬁdence in Russia’s reorientation to domestic economic development.32 As big energy projects were being planned with Moscow, arms sales continued to rise, and expectations mounted for more economic ties, the Chinese insisted that their country would also play a large role in Russia’s economic revival, which would eventually lead to a more independent foreign policy. Indeed, trade rose steadily from 2000, and China succeeded in forging both national and cross-border economic ties of a more lasting sort. Yet, its primary focus after arms was energy, and this did not proceed as planned; it did not stop China from persisting patiently. Despite initial distress at losing their closest partner for global and regional power balancing, Chinese analysts had no choice but to embrace Russia as an economic partner. Many articles appeared in the Spring of 2002 on how bilateral economic ties must be expanded geometrically and why China’s new emphasis on multilateralism and regionalism would be furthered by Russia. A new image had been created of Russia as a raw materials great power vital to China’s interest in energy and resource security.33 This image called for allaround cooperation, accepting Japan as well as South Korea (and eventually a uniﬁed Korea) as partners. Under WTO China was preparing not only for full-scale economic globalization but also for multi-faceted regionalism in competition with the EU and NAFTA as well as for managing the pressures from US unilateralism.

Views of Japan–China relations in 2004 and early 2005 Japan–China relations deteriorated in 2004. Russia appeared closer to China in most respects, such as in its posture on the North Korean nuclear showdown. Yet, there was a danger that relations with Japan and even the United States would deteriorate to the point that Moscow would lose leverage over Beijing. Fear of China’s rise could not be squared with growing dependence as China’s “junior partner.” Given some deterioration in Russo-US relations and a lack of progress in Russo-Japanese relations, drawing closer to China sent a message to Japan that it could stay on the sidelines or make its own oﬀer. In the fall of 2004 Putin moved ahead on territorial disputes. In October he signed a compromise with China on the remaining three islands in dispute, proving that long-expected ﬂexibility by Beijing would be matched by Moscow, for instance to split up two islands so that the less settled areas would go to China. Within weeks the Russian President announced to the Russian people that he was prepared to hand over two islands to Japan, as promised in 1956 before Russia reneged in 1960.34 This reminded the Japanese of Putin’s indications along the same lines in September 2000 and March 2001, which were still awaiting a Japanese response. Having repudiated his own negotiators when he took oﬃce in 2001, Koizumi now faced the prospect that Putin would not visit Tokyo in 2005, as planned, if Japan did not present a new strategy.35

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Moscow’s desire to play a balancing role between China and Japan ran afoul of Japan’s willingness to rely on the United States and keep its distance until the territorial issue was settled. In one of his ﬁrst major speeches, the new Russian ambassador Alexander Losyukov warned Japanese politicians of the danger in pressuring Russia and stepping back from the January 2003 agreements when Koizumi visited Moscow.36 He stressed that relations with China were Russia’s closest outside the area of the former Soviet Union, and that Russia mattered in resolving the North Korean problem and supplying energy. As bilateral trade was at last climbing rapidly and Russia was preparing to start construction of the pipeline route favoured by Japan, the ambassador’s warning raised the prospect of a sharp setback to relations. On energy, after two years of dangling a pipeline from Western Siberia before Chinese and Japanese oﬃcials, Putin decided in the fall of 2004 to select the option favoured by Japan—the Taishet-Perevozkaia Bay oil pipeline. Russia also sent the CEO of Gazprom to Pyongyang in January 2005 to discuss a gas pipeline through the Korean peninsula. Newly developed deposits of Sakhalin gas had long been expected to be sent to Japan by pipeline or at least as LNG (liquid natural gas), but that country’s slow response left Russian oﬃcials looking for a diﬀerent option. While energy decisions reﬂected planning to maximize access to outside investment and the highest purchase prices, geopolitics were not far in the background. In 1973 during the oil crises the Japanese had ﬁrst explored construction of an oil pipeline across Siberia, when China was opposed. In the late 1990s when China was stunned to realize that its dependency on imported oil, which had only begun a few years previously, would soon be skyrocketing, the Chinese explored a shorter pipeline from Russia. Both countries were less concerned about the aﬀordability of oil than secure access to it. As competition heated up, there was talk that Japan sought to keep Sino-Russian relations from drawing much closer and to prevent the Russian Far East from falling under China’s control. At stake in this triangular tug-of-war over oil was a struggle over the regional balance of power.37 While some on the left end of the political spectrum argued for the importance of improving ties with Russia for energy, the North Korean crisis, and the rise of China,38 this view was being harshly criticized by a growing oﬀensive against sending the wrong signal. The counterargument was that any approach in stages would simply leave Japan with two islands, a peace treaty, and no leverage. With this reasoning, in February a group of eminent Japanese, including former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro warned the Japanese leadership of the danger of sending the wrong message. The unmistakable meaning was that Japan must go forward with economic cooperation only in parallel with Russian concessions on the two big islands.39 Whereas China presented a consistent appeal to Russia, Japan on several occasions, including 1997, 2000, and 2003 sent signals that suggested eagerness and compromise, while retrenching at other times. By the summer of 2004 the Russian media called attention to this change in tone, charging that

Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow 227 plans were advancing to put pressure on their country, stepping back from the 2003 “action plan.”40 In early 2005 the shape of the triangle awaited a decision in Tokyo on resolving the contradiction between wanting a partnership with Moscow and wanting the return of all four islands. A spate of articles in the Japanese media weighed this challenge, bringing into the open at last more realistic assumptions. After all, Sino-Russian relations had strengthened and showed signs of stabilizing as a regional force.41 Having reaﬃrmed its ﬁrm line on behalf of four islands in a batch, the Koizumi administration was told in response in January 2005 that Putin was ready to return only two islands in the case of a peace treaty and none without the treaty.42 After months of doubt about whether Koizumi would go to Moscow for the sixtieth anniversary of the end of World War II and whether Putin would come to Tokyo, the two sides agreed to at least maintain the semblance of working together, even if substantive talks were missing and the oil pipeline was now likely to end with a spur to China while continuation to the Paciﬁc remained in doubt. Russo-Japanese relations paled before the new intensity in SinoRussian relations. The logic of great power relations may point to Japan shifting from one-sided dependence on the United States and Russia from excessive dependence on China to a framework of Asian multipolarity, but in 2005 Koizumi showed no sign of reasserting Japan’s Asian diplomacy and Putin stayed close to China in the face of sharp diﬀerences with the Bush administration. The meeting of US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 5 February 2004 in advance of a scheduled summit of Putin and Bush indicates that the United States will more openly criticize Russia’s growing disregard of democracy.43 Meanwhile, the softening of criticisms of China demonstrates that Japan cannot count on one-sided US support. In these circumstances, China’s rise is all the more apparent, as is the reason for Russo-Japanese relations to be upgraded. The Sino-Japanese competition for regional inﬂuence is likely to shape relations across Asia from north to south over the coming decade, and Russia will ﬁnd room to manoeuvre, using its energy resources ﬁrst of all, as it reasserts itself as a secondary, but not insigniﬁcant, power in the region. Even more, Russia is counting on complex regional security needs to make it a welcome partner for some, if not all of the Northeast Asian countries, as they look for leverage as well as stability in the years ahead.

Conclusion At the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century Japan–China relations are freer of Russian interference than they have been in a century and a half. As an imperialist power for three-quarters of a century and a Communist state for another three-quarters, Russia sought to forge a region it could guide if not dominate. It developed the Russian Far East as a militarized overhang to

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Northeast Asia. In the transitional 1990s while optimists talked of a new frontier that would attract the economic energies of neighbouring countries and show the way to cooperation, Russian politicians were more interested in remaining a great power able to shape the political evolution of the region. By giving priority to multipolarity over regionalism, Moscow joined Beijing in keeping the logic of the twentieth century alive. In this way it fortiﬁed Beijing’s inclination toward nationalism and pressure on Tokyo, and simultaneously it buttressed scepticism in Tokyo that the Cold War had never ended in Northeast Asia. Only after 9/11 was the Russian shadow ﬁnally lifted, although both Beijing and Tokyo are groping for the correct response. As Russia’s concern about the United States persists, will there be a new impact on Japan–China relations more unfavourable to regional cooperation? The literature on Japan–China relations has considered the Russian eﬀect, but not emphasized it suﬃciently nor discussed how it might change.44 Much more interest has been shown in the eﬀects of US policy.45 If in 2002 some could anticipate a Russian pump energizing triangular cooperation with energy at the centre, by 2005 Russia’s closeness to China gave Japan reason to draw even closer to the United States and threaten to put a further brake on regionalism. The Russians are ambivalent about China’s rise. In the Russian Far East and elsewhere among groups on both ends of the political spectrum, China is branded a potential threat with even more intensity than is usually expressed in the United States. After all, Russian fears are fuelled by stories of “quiet territorial expansionism” and rumours of “mass illegal immigration” that may lead to a Chinese majority in sparsely settled Asiatic Russia. Such concerns boost interest in Japan as a counterweight, a more welcome partner for regions nervous about becoming too dependent on China. Yet, the level of interest in Japan has yet to rise to what would be expected if China were really regarded as a threat. This results from preoccupation with antiAmericanism and a tendency to link Japan to the United States as well as from suspicions aroused by Japan’s territorial claims. Until 9/11 Russians embraced the language of multipolarity. Since the Chinese expressed the same rhetoric fervently, Moscow naturally turned to Beijing to promote this path. In contrast, Japan only revealed their sympathy quietly without casting doubt on continued alliance with the United States. Talk of Russo-Japanese cooperation on international issues did not rise to the level of encouragement for Moscow’s ambitions to check US power. After 9/11, for a time the term “multipolarity” faded. As Russo-Japanese relations were reviving in the fall of 2002 after the lull produced by Koizumi’s rejection of Japan’s prior approach, new pressure from US unipolar tendencies gave fresh impetus for Russia to look to Japan as well as China for joint, if low-key, resistance. Putin smoothed the way for Koizumi to make his historic journey to Pyongyang in September 2002 and looked favourably on anticipated progress, although Pyongyang’s admission under US pressure that it was developing nuclear weapons again cast a dark shadow on Japan’s

Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow 229 diplomacy. The upbeat mood did not last much beyond the summit of January 2003. The Russians have been slow to visualize regionalism in Northeast Asia. Rather than seeing this as a means to invigorate the Russian Far East and avoid dependency on just one neighbouring country, they preferred the concept of the Asia-Paciﬁc Region in order to involve much of the globe. This fear of being left alone with China and Japan reveals primarily a lack of conﬁdence not only in their own economic potential, but also in their cultural and political potential in a populous, dynamic, and culturally distant region. After being dismissed by many as inconsequential in Northeast Asia, Russia has made a notable comeback under Putin. While parts of its Paciﬁc Fleet are still rusting in port, Putin has bolstered the military budget and ﬂown to the area to take part in naval exercises aimed at demonstrating Russia’s strategic relevance. Although governors and local assemblies still express from time to time concern over Moscow’s policies in the region, centralization and the elimination of elections for governor have made local authorities wary of challenging Putin. Clearly, internal Russian developments have made a diﬀerence in raising Moscow’s proﬁle in Northeast Asia. Yet, three other factors should be taken into account: 1) the energy market and new concerns over energy security; 2) the Korean nuclear crisis and Putin’s relationship with Kim Jong-il; and 3) China’s eager support for Russia’s role in the region. Inside Russia ambitious pipelines are being planned with great optimism about their impact on Northeast Asia. It is assumed that trade with China will multiply through infrastructure development followed by energy supplies to fuel China’s rapid growth and a new level of cooperation not only in military sales but also in high-tech projects.46 The attitude toward Japan is also optimistic, although it is accompanied by protestations that the Japanese side just does not seem to understand that only an obsession with the islands stands in the way of a dramatic improvement in ties with decisive security and economic consequences. Scattered voices in Japan may believe that Putin wants Japan for leverage in countering the power gap with the United States as well as for regional objectives,47 but Putin has failed to make a great deal of progress in redeﬁning Russia’s image as a country concerned above all with economic development and restructuring as part of globalization. Six-party talks over North Korean nuclear weapons are likely to resume in 2005 with Russia having a role and expecting that its special relationship with North Korea would give it an essential place in any security and development programme that emerged. Next to China’s support for Russian involvement, the decision by Kim Jong-il in 2000 to lean on Russian ties in diplomatic manoeuvring has raised Russia’s proﬁle in the region. Russian experts on the region recognize that Russia needs the east as well as the west.48 They argue that: international relations remain essential for development of the Russian Far East; China is a reliable partner with a promising future that will maintain a practical friendship with Russia even

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after mirages on both sides have faded; and economic ties will deepen considerably. Yet hopes are slow to turn from great power manoeuvring centered on multipolarity to acceptance of globalization with room for economic regionalism. There is little sign of a shared strategy with China as well as Japan and also South Korea to meet basic security needs, develop an energy grid, and work together to form Northeast Asian regionalism on a solid economic foundation. Although Putin’s priority will be in the west, he could seize the opportunity to add a secondary pocket of growth and strategic cooperation in the east. China will beckon, and Japan may eventually recognize the inevitability of a compromise on the territorial issue and the advantages of progress on regionalism including Russia. For the next decade China and Japan should be roughly in balance as regional powers while mixing cooperation and competition in their strategies for advantage. In these circumstances, they are likely to turn increasingly to Russia to tilt the balance their way as well as to boost regionalism. This puts a weak Russia at the fulcrum of one triangle, being pursued by both powers. The recent pattern will continue of China and Japan wanting Russian cooperation more than Russia desires their attention. The dynamic of Russia overshadowing Northeast Asia for 150 years is ending. A new dynamic has begun. Rather than splitting the region, Russia has a chance to help to bring it together. Yet, if Russian leaders are much less reluctant than Japanese and Chinese leaders to embrace the rules of economic globalization and are more determined to take advantage of the unsettling tactics of North Korea, then the impact on regionalism could be as much negative as positive. The possibility of Sino-Russian cooperation to thwart some eﬀorts to boost global values that could help to make the region and world more secure also persists. Japan will face the challenge of checking its own nationalism in order to shape the triangle with China and Russia as well as coordinating with the United States in the region to overcome these negative possibilities.

Notes 1 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo–Japanese Relations: Vol. 1, Between War and Peace, 1697–1985; Vol. 2, Neither War Nor Peace, 1985–1998 (Berkeley: IAS, University of California, 1998); Georgi F. Kunadze, “Border Problems Between Russia and Its Neighbours: Stable for Now, But Stubborn in the Long Run,” and Hiroshi Kimura, Shaojun Li, and Il-Dong Koh, “ ‘Frontiers are the Razor’s Edge’: Russia’s Borders with Its Eastern Neighbours in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe (eds), Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp.133–49, and 150–71. 2 This is a neglected triangle in comparison to the triangles of China, Russia, and the United States and China, Japan, and the United States. An exception is Gilbert Rozman, “China, Japan, and the Post-Soviet Upheaval: Global Opportunities and Regional Risks,” in Karen Dawisha, (ed), The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp.147–76. For a Russian view on this triangle after

Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow 231

3 4

5

6 7 8

9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

the Cold War see M.A. Titarenko, Rossiia i vostochnaia Aziia: voprosy mezhdunarodnykh i mezhtsivilizatsionnykh otnoshenii (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 1994). Jerry F. Hough, The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options (Washington: The Brooking Institution, 1986). John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); Gilbert Rozman, “Troubled Choices for the Russian Far East: Decentralization, Open Regionalism, and Internationalism,” The Journal of East Asian Aﬀairs, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer/Fall 1997, pp.537–69. The Russian press has often conveyed concern over territorial ambitions on the Russian Far East. Gilbert Rozman, “The Crisis of the Russian Far East: Who Is to Blame?” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 44, No. 5, September/October 1997, pp.3–12. Gilbert Rozman, “Moscow’s Japan-Watchers in the First Years of the Gorbachev Era: The Struggle for Realism and Respect in Foreign Aﬀairs,” Paciﬁc Review (1988), Vol. 1, No. 3, pp.257–75. Gilbert Rozman, A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). Vilia Gel’bras, Sotsial’no-politicheskaia struktura KNR 50–60-e gody (Moscow: Nauka, 1980); Alexander Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003); Semyon Verbitsky, “Perceptions of Japan in the USSR During the Cold War and Perestroika,” in Semyon Verbitsky, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, and Gilbert Rozman, Misperceptions Between Japan and Russia (Pittsburgh: The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies, No. 1503, 2000). Gilbert Rozman, “Chinese Studies in Russia and their Impact, 1985–1992,” Asian Research Trends, No. 4 (1994), pp.143–60. Semyon Verbitsky, “Factors Shaping the Formation of Views on Japan in the USSR in the Postwar Period,” in Gilbert Rozman, Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949–1999 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp.253–71. Gilbert Rozman, “Rising Soviet Expectations for the Asian-Paciﬁc Region” (Ajia-taiheiyo chiiki e mukete takamaru Soren no kitai), Soren no kiki to Nisso kankei (Tokyo, 1991), pp.86–96 and 243–69. M. I. Krupianko, Iaponiia-KNR: Mekhanizm ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva (Moscow: Nauka, 1986). Charles E. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.69–76. Gilbert Rozman, “Cross-National Integration in Northeast Asia: Geopolitical and Economic Goals in Conﬂict,” East Asia: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring/Summer, 1997, pp.6–43. Hiroshi Kimura, Distant Neighbors: Volume 2. Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000). Georgi Kunadze, “A Russian View of Russo-Japanese Relations, 1991–1993,” in Gilbert Rozman, ed., Japan and Russia, pp.151–65. The Japanese even funded a series of pamphlets on the relevance of the Japanese experience for Russian reforms. See Iaponskii opyt dlia Rossiiskikh reform (Moscow: Assotsiatsiia Iaponovedov, 1995). Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp.5–39. Konstantin Sarkisov, “Russo-Japanese Relations after Yeltsin’s Reelection in 1996,” in Gilbert Rozman, Japan and Russia, pp.215–27. V.L. Larin, Kitai i Dal’nii Vostok Rossii (Vladivostok: Dal’nauka, 1998).

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21 A.P. Markov, Rossiia-Iaponiia (Moacow: Informatsionno-izdatel’skoe agenstvo “Russkii mir,” 1996). 22 Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-Russian Relations in the 1990s: A Balance Sheet,” PostSoviet Aﬀairs, Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1998, pp.93–113. 23 M.L. Titarenko, Rossiia litsom k Azii (Moscow: Respublika, 1998). 24 Chikahito Harada, Russia and North-east Asia (London: Adelphi Paper 310, The Russia and North-east Asia (London: Adelphi Paper 310, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997). 25 Sherman W. Garnett (ed), Rapprochement or Rivalry? Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000). 26 Gilbert Rozman, “A Chance for a Breakthrough in Russo-Japanese Relations: Will the Logic of Great Power Relations Prevail? Paciﬁc Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2002, pp. 325–57. 27 Huanqiu shibao, 30 May 2002, p.7. 28 Kommersant’, 22 December 2001, p.1. 29 Hakamada Shigeki, “ ‘Suzuki gensho’ go no Nichiro kankei,” Ajia jiho, June 2002, pp.21, 23. 30 Hakamada Shigeki, “ ‘Suzuki gensho’ go no Nichiro kankei,” Ajia jiho, June 2002, pp.30–8. 31 Sankei shimbun, 6 August 2004, p.11. 32 Jiang Yi, “Eluosi de guoji diwei yu waijiao zhengce xuance,” Dongou Zhongya yanjiu, No. 3, 2003, pp.2–9. 33 Hsueh Chun-tu and Lu Nanquan (eds), Eluosi xiboliya yu yuandong: guoji zhengzhi jingji guanxi de fazhan (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2002). 34 Sankei shimbun, 18 November 2004, p.3. 35 Yomiuri shimbun, 19 November 2004, p.4. 36 A. Losyukov, “Puchin daitoryo no honichi to kongo no Nichiro kankei,” Ajia jiho, December 2004, pp.4–12. 37 Nihon keizai shimbun, 7 January 2003, p.8. 38 Asahi shimbun, 24 November 2004, p.3. 39 Sankei shimbun, 6 August 2004, p.11. 40 Kommersant, 23 June 2004, p.10. 41 Jeanne Wilson, Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). 42 Sankei shimbun, 2 February 2004, p.1. 43 The New York Times, 6 February 2005, p.A10. 44 Tanaka Akihiko, Nitchu kankei 1945–1990 (Tokkyo: Tokyo University Press, 1991); Wu Xuewen, Dangdai Zhongri guanxi: 1945–1994 (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1995). 45 Qingxin Ken Wang, Hegemonic Cooperation and Conﬂict: Postwar Japan’s China Policy and the United States (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2000). 46 Krasnaia zvezda, 21 June 2002. 47 Shiroyama Tatsue, “Tonaerarehajimeta hoppo ryodo ‘santo henkan,’ ” Foresight, July 2002, pp.38–39. 48 Krasnaia zvezda, 21 June 2002.

Bibliography Garnett, Sherman W., ed., Rapprochement or Rivalry? Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000). Harada, Chikahito, Russia and North-east Asia (London: Adelphi Paper 310, The

Japan–China relations in the Russian shadow 233 Russia and North-east Asia (London: Adelphi Paper 310, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997). Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Vol. 1, Between War and Peace, 1697–1985; Vol. 2, Neither War Nor Peace, 1985–1998 (Berkeley: IAS, University of California, 1998). Kimura, Hiroshi, Distant Neighbours: Volume 2. Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000). Lukin, Alexander, The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003). Lukin, Alexander, “Russia’s Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1999. Rozman, G., A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). —— , “Chinese Studies in Russia and their Impact, 1985–1992,” Asian Research Trends, No. 4 (1994). —— , “Cross-National Integration in Northeast Asia: Geopolitical and Economic Goals in Conﬂict,” East Asia: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring/ Summer, 1997. —— , “Troubled Choices for the Russian Far East: Decentralization, Open Regionalism, and Internationalism,” The Journal of East Asian Aﬀairs, Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer/Fall 1997. —— , “The Crisis of the Russian Far East: Who Is to Blame?” Problems of PostCommunism, Vol. 44, No. 5, September/October 1997. —— , “Moscow’s Japan-Watchers in the First Years of the Gorbachev Era: The Struggle for Realism and Respect in Foreign Aﬀairs,” Paciﬁc Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1998. —— , “Sino-Russian Relations in the 1990s: A Balance Sheet,” Post-Soviet Aﬀairs, Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1998. Rozman, G., Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe, eds, Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999). —— , “China, Japan, and the Post-Soviet Upheaval: Global Opportunities and Regional Risks,” in Karen Dawisha, ed., The International Dimension of PostCommunist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). —— , “A Chance for a Breakthrough in Russo-Japanese Relations: Will the Logic of Great Power Relations Prevail?” Paciﬁc Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2002. Verbitsky, Semyon, “Factors Shaping the Formation of Views on Japan in the USSR in the Postwar Period,” in Gilbert Rozman, Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949–1999 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). Verbitsky, Semyon, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, and Gilbert Rozman, Misperceptions Between Japan and Russia (Pittsburgh: The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies, No. 1503, 2000). Wang, Qingxin Ken, Hegemonic Cooperation and Conﬂict: Postwar Japan’s China Policy and the United States (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2000). Wilson, Jeanne, Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). Ziegler, Charles E., Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.69–76.

Index

Afghanistan 25, 184 agriculture, free trade 131; protectionism 22, 95, 191, 205; technology 129 Akihito (Emperor of Japan) 16, 39 Al-Qa’eda 25, 190 Amako Satoshi 53, 60, 61 Ando¯ Hikotaro 53, 55 Ando¯ Masahi 56 apology, historical issues 22, 30, 39, 42, 58, 75, 94, 95, 102, 116 Arase, David x, 11, 92–106 armed forces, EP-3 collision (2001) 25, 187, 193; logistical support 41, 223; navies see naval operations; Taiwan Straits; People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 79, 183; Self Defence Forces 17, 25, 32, 184; Soviet Union 216–17; weapons see missiles; nuclear weapons; see also militarism Armitage, Richard 183 Asahi Shimbun 40, 42, 43, 55–6, 77 Asher, David 185 Asia, East see East Asia; Northeast Asia 14–15, 213–33; Southeast see Southeast Asia; US interests 181–2 Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) 118, 149, 187 Asian Games (1994) 118 Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 177, 205 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Commemorative Summit (2003) 297; East Asian Community 205, 206; Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) 33, 46, 191, 193, 203, 204, 206–7; Plus Three 33, 149, 193, 204–5; transnational corporations (TNCs) 200; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 206; United States 190 Association of War Bereaved Families 40, 42, 44, 62 aviation, air transport agreement (1974) 26, 114; EP-3 collision (2001) 25, 187, 193; Kyushu 153, 160; South Korea 189

banks, Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) 101, 139; Bank of International Settlements 191; Export-Import Bank of Japan 101, 110, 111; foreign currency loans 191 Banno Masataka 52 bilateral ties, agreements see JapanChina agreements; conﬂict/cooperation 204–7; cultural/historical 109, 137, 162; Diet members 28, 113, 118; diplomatic normalization (1972) 1, 23, 26, 28, 31, 58, 107, 111–14, 159; economic see economic cooperation; education exchanges 82, 168; “friendship” 23, 26–30, 42, 60–1, 134–7; generational changes 10, 28–31, 34, 57; interdependence 10, 26–8, 33–4, 109, 116; non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 9, 12–14, 166–79; “people’s diplomacy” 50; reasons 109; sister-city relationships 134–6, 138–40, 156, 160–1; socio-economic 46; staﬀ exchanges 135–6, 137, 139, 160–1; sub-national governments (SNGs) 9, 13, 128–48; technical cooperation 138–9; Tokyo 13, 129, 133; Track Two 34, 160; trainees 60, 136, 139, 168, 209; visitors/tourism 27, 50, 55; Yellow Sea mayors 160 bilateral trade, agreements 26, 29, 109–10; balance of trade 27; Chinese provinces 133; Coordinating Committee for Export Control (COCOM) 136; Kyushu 156–8; promotion 137–8; protectionism 22, 95; trade oﬃces 109–10, 137–8, 140; value 3–6, 16, 27, 157, 203 bubble economy, collapse 21, 217 Bush, George H. (41st President) 38 Bush, George W. (43rd President) 25, 45, 183–4, 186, 187, 193, 227 bushido 81

Index 235 Cairo Declaration (1943) 113 Chen Shui-ban 31, 118, 121–2 Chen Yun 79 Chi Haotian 120 Chiang Ching-kuo 31 Chiang Kai-shek 31, 32, 80, 109, 110, 111, 112 China, anti-secession law 123; ascending dragon 14, 17, 186–8; capitalist/market economy 1, 3, 21, 58, 61, 79, 140, 153; cheap labour 26, 140; cities 98, 101, 138–9; corruption 22, 96; Cultural Revolution (1966–76) 3, 24, 50–1, 54, 55, 63, 111, 215; decentralization 133; economic development 1–3, 61, 94, 116, 207–8; foreign aid 94; generational changes 10, 28–31, 34, 57; Great Leap Forward (1958–60) 3, 63, 110; gross domestic product (GDP) 2, 21, 93, 98; history textbooks 29, 73, 74, 80; Hundred Flowers Movement (1956–57) 110; illegal migrants 27; interdependence 10, 26–8, 33–4, 109, 116; Japanese aid (ODA) see Oﬃcial Development Assistance; legal system 44; manufacturing 1, 3, 4, 16–17, 61, 155–7, 200–1; Marxist-Leninism 56, 58; militarism 40, 58, 61, 72, 93, 94, 97, 129, 183, 187–8; missile tests 22, 40, 93, 119, 129; modernization 24, 25, 26, 29, 79, 94, 100–1; nationalism 17, 44, 61, 79; naval operations 22, 24, 40, 47, 95, 119, 122; nuclear weapons 24, 40, 41–2, 55, 58, 97, 102; PRC formation (1949) 108; State Environmental Protection Administration 98; stateowned enterprises 61; structural change 10, 23–6; superpower politics 59, 73–4, 79; textiles 3, 110; trilateral relations 14, 23–4, 33, 188–99; United Front strategy 74; US-China détente 23, 31, 107, 111, 187, 193; war see Sino-Japanese War; war reparations renounced 28–9, 75, 76; World Trade Organization (WTO) 16, 25, 26, 27, 34, 42, 61, 96, 190, 194, 200, 207 China School 10, 37, 38, 43, 44–5, 46 China threat theory, “China rising, Japan stagnating” 12; local actors 13, 162; Malaysia 200; nationalism 11; necessary elements 22; “North Korean threats” 183; public opinion 3, 22; publications 11, 61; United States 24, 187, 188; see also Japanese sentiments to China Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,

Institute of Japanese Studies 22 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 11th Party Central Committee, Third Plenum (1978) 26; 12th party Congress (1982) 79; conservatives 79; historiography 73–5, 79–81; history 29–30; ideology 56, 48, 76; patriotic education 22, 30, 57, 58, 80–1 Chinese Research Institute 53 Chinese sentiments to Japan, apology 22, 30, 39, 42, 58, 95, 102, 116; football hooliganism (2004) 17, 82; mass protests (2005) 17; militarism 17, 44, 73, 74; “new thinking” 16, 30, 32; Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) 30, 100, 102; patriotic education 22, 30, 57, 58, 80–1; public opinion 22, 32–3, 61; Sino-Japanese War 13, 61, 80, 81; suspicions of jealousy 11; Yasukuni Shrine 16, 22, 25, 62, 94, 114, 129 cities, bilateral ties 134–6, 140; China 98, 101, 138–9; see also Dalian Clinton, William Jeﬀerson (42nd President) 24, 25, 40–1, 42, 120, 182, 184, 186, 222 Cold War era, after normalization 111–16; before normalization 107–11, 150; international relations 1, 24, 33, 79, 107–16, 162 comfort women 51 Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS) 54 corruption, China 22, 96; Japanese politics 44, 94, 224 Cultural Revolution (1966–76) 3, 24, 50–1, 54, 55, 63, 111, 215 currencies, devaluation 207, 209; foreign currency loans 191; Plaza Accord (1985) 26, 155; yen-based loans 12, 29, 38, 76, 92, 99, 101–2 Dalian, Economic and Technical Development Zone 153; foreign direct investment (FDI) 133, 153, 155; gateway port 13, 150; K transportation 154; sister-city relationships 138–9, 160–1 Datong (Shanxi), Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) 175, 176; greeniﬁcation 13–14, 166, 173–7; loess plateau 13, 14, 166 decentralization, China 133; Kyushu 152–3, 162 Deng Xiaoping 1, 24, 27, 28, 34, 79, 100, 115

236

Index

Diet members, bilateral ties 28, 113, 118 diplomatic relations, severance (1952) 108–9; Taiwan 12, 107; see also international relations diplomatic relations normalized, China/Japan (1972) 1, 23, 26, 28, 31, 58, 107, 111–14, 159; Joint Communiqué (1972) 24, 75–6, 113, 117, 118; Soviet Union/China 217–18 Doko¯ Toshio 29 Dulles, John Foster 108 East Asia, Economic Caucus/Grouping (EAEC/EAEG) 149, 204, 209; foreign direct investment (FDI) 154–5; political geometry 14, 180–99; regionalism 14, 59, 151; see also Southeast Asia economic cooperation, agricultural technology 129; FDI see foreign direct investment; Japanese industry 29; ODA see Oﬃcial Development Assistance; sub-national governments (SNGs) 130, 138–9; Ten-Year Economic Plan (1978) 26 Eisenhower, Dwight David (34th President) 134 Enoki Kazuo 52 environment, acid rain 96, 98, 99, 138, 139; air pollution 98, 99, 100, 139; Datong (Shanxi) greeniﬁcation 13–14, 166, 173–7; desertiﬁcation 98; greenhouse gas emissions 98; marine pollution 98, 99; Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) 96, 97–100, 138–9, 141–2; water 98, 99, 100, 139 Eto¯ Shinkichi 51–2, 53 Export-Import Bank of Japan 101, 110, 111 ﬁsheries 26, 136 ﬂying geese model 3, 190, 204 foreign aid, China 94; Japanese see Oﬃcial Development Assistance; Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid 168, 170, 173; subnational governments (SNGs) 130, 131 foreign direct investment (FDI), Chinese provinces 133; Dalian 133, 153, 155; East Asia 154–5; growth/value 3, 7, 27, 46; Malaysia 14, 200, 203–4, 207–8; skepticism 44; South Korea 189; Southeast Asia 190; value 190, 200 foreign trade, free trade see free trade; Japan-China see bilateral trade; Malaysia 201, 203, 208; South Korea

189; WTO see World Trade Organization free trade, agriculture 131; ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) 33, 46, 191, 193, 203, 204, 206–7; bilateral agreements 206; Malaysia 206–7 friendship, bilateral ties 23, 26–30, 42, 60–1, 134–7; Peace and Friendship Treaty (1978) 23, 26, 28, 29, 42, 50, 134, 153; Sino-Japanese Friendship Associations 60 Fukuda Takeo 28, 112, 113 Fukuoka prefecture, METI 158–9; Modern Asian Festival (1997) 160; ports 151; substate political authorities 13, 159–61; see also Kyushu Funabashi Yoichi 45 G-7/G-8 37, 38, 209, 218, 224 General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) 131 generational changes, bilateral ties 10, 28–31, 34, 57; China 10, 28–31, 34, 57; Japanese politics 10, 28–31, 34, 45, 58, 94 Gilpin, Robert 4 Glosserman, Brad x, 14, 180–99 Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich 14, 37, 214, 215–18 Great Leap Forward (1958–60) 3, 63, 110 Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere 151 Green Earth Network (GEN), Datong (Shanxi) greeniﬁcation 13–14, 166, 173–7 Green, Michael 41, 183 Greenpeace 98 gross domestic product (GDP), China 2, 21, 93, 98; Japan 1, 2, 21; Kyushu 158 Guanghua Dormitory issue (1987) 114–16 Gulf War, ﬁnancial contribution 78 Hakamada Shigeki 224 Hashimoto Ryu¯taro¯ 24, 40, 41, 42, 43, 78, 95, 119, 182 Hata Tsutomu 39, 40 Hatoyama Ichiro¯ 109 He Yinan x, 11, 69–91 hegemony 23–4, 26, 76, 220, 223 Hirano Ken’ichiro¯ 51 Hirohito (Emperor of Japan) 72 historical issues, 1982 and beyond 76; apology 22, 30, 39, 42, 58, 75, 94, 95, 102, 116; Jiang Zemin 16, 22, 30, 42, 57, 58, 95; national mythmaking 11,

Index 237 69–91; tacit cover-up 75–6; Yasukuni Shrine 16, 22, 25, 30, 41, 42, 43–4, 47, 62, 73, 78, 94, 114, 129, 206; see also Sino-Japanese War historiography, burdens of history 9; Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 73–5, 79–81; conservatism 77; national mythmaking 70–1 history textbooks, certiﬁcation 72; China 29, 73, 74, 80; controversy (1982) 29–30, 43, 44, 58, 69, 77, 82, 114; guidelines 72, 80; invasion justiﬁed 22; Malaysia 26–7, 205–6; military clique myth 72; right-wing/neo-nationalist 62, 77, 78, 94; Society for History Textbook Reform 30, 78 Hitotsubashi University 53 Honda Katsuichi 77 Hong Kong 3 Hook, Glenn D. x–xi, 13, 149–65 Hosokawa Morihiro 39, 40 Hsu Liteh 118 Hu Jintao 16, 22, 30, 32 Hu Yaobang 32 human rights, international relations 24; sub-national governments (SNGs) 130 Hundred Flowers Movement (1956–57) 110 Ikeda Hayato 110 Ikei Masau 52 Inayama Yoshihiro 29 Indonesia 3, 97 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 205, 209 international relations, Cold War 1, 24, 33, 79, 107–16, 162; Five Principles of Peace 56–7; future prospects 16–18; “golden age” 1, 15; interdisciplinary study 51; interpretations 56–62; Japanese economic stagnation 9, 10, 14, 61; Japanese scholarship 50–68; norms 56–7, 59; North Korea 10, 17–18, 46; Northeast Asia 14–15, 213–33; post-1945 50–68; post-Cold War 21–36, 59, 116–23, 163, 192; pragmatism 15, 16, 17, 18; public discussions 53–6; “quiet” diplomacy 38; rising/declining powers 4; Russian Federation 10, 213–33; “shock absorber” 14; “smiling” diplomacy 16; strategic inﬂuence 41; structural change 10, 23–6; sub-national governments (SNGs) 130–3; superpowers see superpower politics; Taiwan factor 107–27, 186, 187;

Tiananmen Square Incident (1989) 1, 24, 37–8, 57, 117, 162; widening gap 21–3; World Trade Organization (WTO) 18, 130; see also diplomatic relations investment, FDI see foreign direct investment Iokibe Makoto 40 Iraq, Japanese Self Defence Forces 25, 32 Iriye Akira 193–4 Iriye Keishiro¯ 51 Ishihara Shintaro¯ 13, 45, 129 Ishii Akira 51, 56 Ishikawa Shigeru 53 Ishikawa Tadao 52, 53, 58–9 Iwanami Shoten 56, 58 Jain, Purnendra xi, 13, 128–48 Japan, Aichi Environmental Expo (2005) 122; avant-garde culture 81; ballistic missile defence 120; Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) 101, 139; budget deﬁcits 93, 185; bureaucracy 38, 45, 58, 93–4; business practices 209; Chamber of Trade and Industry (JACTIM) 200; Defence Agency (JDA) 41, 45, 184; demography 185; diversiﬁcation of society 10; economic recovery 17; ex-servicemen 62; Exchange and Teaching (JET) programme 137; Export-Import Bank 101, 110, 111; External Trade Organization (JETRO) 132, 200; FDI see foreign direct investment; gross domestic product (GDP) 1, 2, 21; immigrants 27, 96; Institute of International Aﬀairs 53; interdependence 10, 26–8, 33–4, 109, 116; International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 139; international role 116, 117; manufacturing 21, 27, 93, 151, 155–7, 208; militarism 17, 23, 42, 44, 72, 73, 74, 81, 114; national identity 76–8, 185; nationalism 11, 16, 17, 30, 58–9, 61; neo-nationalism 77, 78; new vocalism 192; NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) 167, 168, 171; Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) 167; paciﬁsm 59, 72, 73; political/economic frustration 10; popular culture (J-pop) 46; Security Consultative Committee (2+2 talks) 12, 122, 186; Self Defence Forces 17, 25, 32, 184; setting sun 14, 182–5; structural reform 27, 43, 209; subnational governments (SNGs) 132–42;

238

Index

territorial disputes 213, 217, 218, 219, 223, 225; transnational corporations (TNCs) 200, 201; trilateral relations 14, 23–4, 33, 188–99; ura Japan 151; US-Japan Security Treaty (1951) 23, 24, 34, 40, 55, 74, 78, 108; war see Sino-Japanese War; World War II; Western values 116 Japan Foundation 166, 167 Japan-bashing 25, 61, 182, 184 Japan-China agreements, air transport (1974) 26, 114; ﬁsheries 26, 136; long-term trade (1978) 26, 29; Memorandum on Comprehensive Trade (1962) 110; navigation (1974) 26; Peace and Friendship Treaty (1978) 23, 26, 28, 29, 42, 50, 134, 153; private trade 109–10; Ten-Year Economic Plan (1978) 26; trade (1974) 26; see also bilateral ties Japan-China Economic Association 29 Japan-China Model City Plan 139 Japanese constitution, Article Nine (no war clause) 17 Japanese economic stagnation, bubble economy 21, 217; “China rising, Japan stagnating” 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 22, 129, 180; envy/fear 11, 16; hollowing out of industry 3, 27, 93, 150; international relations 9, 10, 14, 61; Japan Passing 61, 182; land/stock prices 185; Malaysia 200–3, 208–10; national debt 93, 185; political economy 1, 3; structural reform 27, 43, 209 Japanese politics, coalition government 39, 40, 45, 47; conservatives 39, 40, 42, 71, 72, 77; corruption 44, 94, 224; Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 47, 118; domestic politics 37–49; generational changes 10, 28–31, 34, 45, 58, 94; Koizumi era 43–5, 46; Komeito party 28, 42, 115, 118; LDP see Liberal Democratic Party; political parties 1, 10, 28, 31, 38, 40, 43, 118; populists 44, 45, 47; Social Democratic Party (SDP) 42; Socialist Party (JSP) 38, 39, 40, 46 Japanese scholarship, Chinese scholars 62; international relations 51; languages 54, 63; mass media 54; sentiments to China 50–1; strengths/weaknesses 62–3; University of Tokyo 51, 52; writing 11, 50–68; see also publications Japanese sentiments to China, ambivalence 3–4, 8, 38; “China rising, Japan stagnating” 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 22,

129; hollowing out of industry 3; military threat 40, 61, 183; ODA 12, 93–5; public opinion 3, 21–2, 38–9, 40, 43, 46, 47; scholarship 50–1; seeds of negativism 10; sympathy to Taiwan 12; threat see China threat theory; Tiananmen Square Incident (1989) 21, 37–9, 58, 116 Jiang Wen 81 Jiang Zemin 16, 22, 30, 42, 57, 58, 95, 118, 120, 187, 193, 221, 222 Jin Xide 100 Jo¯chi Daigaku 53 Joint Communiqué (1972) 24, 75–6, 113, 117, 118 Kaifu Toshiki 38, 59 Kaizuka Shigeki 54 Kajiyama Seiroku 41, 120 Kamachi Noriko xi, 11, 50–68 Kanda Nobuo 52 Kato¯ Ko¯ichi 41, 45 Kawai Ryoichi 29 Kawakami Tamio 38 Kawata Tadashi 53 Keidanren 29 Keio¯ Gijuku Daigaku 52 Kelly, James 182, 184, 190 Kennedy, Paul 4 Kim Dae-Jung 42 Kim Jong il 17, 194, 229 Kishi Nobusuke 109, 110 Kissinger, Henry 23, 46, 111 Kitakyushu, economic revitalization 160; sister-city relationships 138–9, 160–1; substate politocal authorities 13, 159–61; see also Kyushu Kobayashi Yoshinori 43, 45 Koizumi Jun’ichiro¯ 16, 22, 30, 43–7, 123, 183, 184, 191, 194, 206, 209, 221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228 Kojima Reiitsu 56 Kojima Shinji 56 Kojima Tomoyuki 52 Kokubun Ryo¯sei xi, 10, 52, 63 Komori Yoshihisa 44 Kono Yohei 43, 119 Korea see North Korea; South Korea Korean War (1950–3) 108 Kuriles 213 Kuroda Atsuo 61 Kyushu, acid rain 138; advanced economy 158–9; bilateral trade 156–8; bridging role 13, 149–65; communications technology 152; decentralization 152–3, 162; heavy

Index 239 industry 151–2; imperialism 151; microregional links 153–8, 162–3; S electric 155–6; transportation 152, 153–4; see also Kitakyushu Lam Peng Er xi Latimore, Owen 54 Lavrov, Sergei 227 Lee Poh Ping xi, 14, 199–213 Lee Teng-hui 22, 31, 32, 43, 119, 122 Li Peng 43, 119 Li Xiannian 115 Li Zhaoxing 123 Liao Zhengzhi 28, 110 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), coalition government 39, 40; economic policy 1; factions 45; failures 94; pork barrel politics 43; Taiwan 112, 113, 114 Losyukov, Alexander 226 Lu Xun 55 Ma Licheng 30 McDevitt, Michael 181 Mahathir bin Mohamad 204, 207, 209, 210 Malaysia, China threat theory 200; Chinese economic development 207–8; economy 3, 208–9; foreign direct investment (FDI) 14, 200, 203–4, 207–8; foreign policy 14; foreign trade 201, 203, 208; free trade 206–7; geopolitics 204–7; Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) 208; Japan/China relations 199–213; Japanese economic stagnation 200–3, 208–10; “Learn from Japan” 10; Look East policy 209, 210; Malaysia Incorporated 209, 210; Malaysian Chinese 206, 207; Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) 208–9, 210 Manchuria 151 Mansﬁeld, Mike 182 manufacturing, China 1, 3, 4, 16–17, 61, 155–7, 200–1; hi-tech products 157; hollowing out of industry 3, 27, 93, 150; Japan 21, 27, 93, 151, 155–7, 200–1, 208; Japanese relocation 16, 21, 200–1, 208 Mao Zedong 23, 24, 28, 46, 75–6 Marti, Michael 190 Maruyama Nobua 56 Matsumoto Yoshimi 54 Mei Ruao 74 Meiji era 3 memorials, Hiroshima bombing (1945) 73; Nanjing (Nanking) Massacre (1937)

80; Yasukuni Shrine 16, 22, 25, 30, 41, 42, 43–4, 47, 62, 73, 78, 94, 114, 206 militarism, capping 23; China 40, 58, 61, 72, 93, 94, 97, 129, 183, 187–8; Chinese sentiments to Japan 17, 44, 73, 74; Japan 17, 23, 42, 44, 72, 73, 74, 81, 114; military clique myth 71–2, 74, 82; weapons see missiles; nuclear weapons; see also armed forces Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 2001 White Paper 3; Kyushu Bureau 149, 158–9 Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs (MOFA), Bureau of North American Aﬀairs 38, 45; Bureau of North Asian Aﬀairs 38; China School 10, 37, 38, 43, 44–5, 46; ﬁnancial scandals 44, 94, 224; ODA 44, 94, 168; “situations in areas surrounding Japan” 41 Minobe Ryo¯kichi 133 missiles, Chinese tests 22, 40, 93, 119, 129; North Korea 24, 120; Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 24, 25, 120–1; see also nuclear weapons Miyazawa Plan 205 Mo Yan 81 modernization, China 24, 25, 26, 29, 79, 94, 100–1; four modernizations 29; Meiji era 3 Mori Kazuko 56, 59 Mori Yoshiro 43, 221, 223 municipal international cooperation (MIC) 130 Murata Ko¯ji xi, 10, 37–49 Murata Ryo¯hei 43 Murayama Tomiichi 39, 40, 118 Mushako¯ji Kinhide 53 mythmaking see national mythmaking Nagano Kamon 39 Nagasaki Flag Incident (1958) 110, 136, 140 Nakagane Watsuji 53 Nakai Yoshifumi 59 Nakasone Yasuhiro 41, 78, 114, 115, 183, 226 Nakayama Taro¯ 38 national mythmaking, Chinese historiography 79–81; concept 70–1; construction 71–81; facts/responsibility 70; historical issues 11, 69–91; military clique 71–2, 74, 82; pre-normalization years 71–81; sacriﬁce as heroic 72; self-gloriﬁcation 70, 72; self-whitewashing 70, 72; societal challenges 81; Western-bias 72

240

Index

nationalism, China 17, 44, 61, 79; conﬁdent/assertive 79; Japan 11, 16, 17, 30, 58–9, 61; neo-nationalism 62, 77, 78; Russian Federation 219, 220, 222, 223 naval operations, Japanese waters (1998) 95; Japanese waters (2004) 47, 122; logistic 223; Straits of Taiwan see Taiwan Straits Newly Industrialized Economies, (NIEs), ﬂying geese model 3 Niebuhr, H. Richard 71 Niida Noboru 54 Niijima Atsuyoshi 53, 55 Nixon, Richard Milhous (37th President) 23, 55, 75, 111 Nogami Yoshiji 44 Nomura Ko¯ichi 53, 56 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), activities in China 167–72; bilateral ties 9, 12–14, 166–79; cooperative activities 172; directories 166, 167; ﬁnances 168, 170, 171; geographical activity 168, 169; legal status 168, 170; Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) 100; operational expenses 171 Non-Proﬁt Organization (NPO) Law (1997) 45, 168, 173 Nonaka Hiromu 42, 45, 46 North Korea, asylum seekers 44, 94; international relations 10, 17–18, 46; missile development 24, 120; nuclear weapons 17–18, 25, 187, 194–5, 228–9; Six Party Talks 46 Northeast Asia, international relations 14–15, 213–33 nuclear weapons, China 24, 40, 41–2, 55, 58, 97, 102; North Korea 17–18, 25, 187, 194–5, 228–9; see also missiles Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA), budget planning 97; capacity-building 96; Charter (1992) 97, 103; Chinese sentiments to Japan 30, 100, 102; decision-making 99; developing countries 139; developmental partnerships 99–100; environmental assistance 96, 97–100, 138–9, 141–2; human-centered development 95; Indonesia 97; infrastructure 92–3, 96, 101; Japanese sentiments to China 12, 93–5; leverage 102; Malaysia 208–9, 210; Mid-Term Policy Outline (1999) 95; new agenda 11–12, 92–106;

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 100; personal aid relationships 96–7; policy-making 92, 95, 103–4, 139; political conditionality 97, 102; pollution control 96, 138; population issues 96; poverty 96; rationale 95–7; reduction 44, 92, 97, 102–3; repayment 101; restoration 16; soft aid 96, 99; Southeast Asia 190; sub-national governments (SNGs) 138–9; suspension 12, 40, 58, 119; trade ﬁnance 96; volumes 92–3; waste 96, 101; yen-based loans 12, 29, 38, 76, 92, 99, 101–2; see also economic cooperation Ogata Sadako 53 ¯ hira Masayoshi 28, 29, 31, 76, 113, 114 O Oka Yoshitake 51, 52 Okabe Tatsumi 51, 56–7 Okazaki Hisahiko 39 Okazaki Kaheita 29 ¯ kita Saburo¯ 29 O Oksenberg, Michel 79 Olympic Committee of Asia (OCA) 118 Olympic Games (2008) 12, 189 ¯ ta Katsuhiro 56 O Owada Hisashi 38 Ozawa Ichiro¯ 41 Paciﬁc War View of History 72 Pan-Yellow Sea Zone 149, 152, 154, 155, 158–62 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 79, 183 People’s Republic of China (PRC) see China Philippines 3, 206, 210 Plaza Accord (1985) 26, 155 post-Cold War, international relations 21–36, 59, 116–23, 163, 192; subnational governments (SNGs) 149, 163 Postal Services Agency 168 Potsdam Declaration (1945) 112 Powell, Colin 181, 188 public opinion, Chinese sentiments to Japan 22, 32–3, 61; Japanese sentiments to China 3, 21–2, 38–9, 40, 43, 46, 47 publications, China threat theory 11, 61; Japanese scholarship 11, 50–68; textbooks see history textbooks purchasing power partity (PPP) 207 Putin, Vladimir 14, 15, 214, 221–7 Randt, Clark 193 Reagan, Ronald Wilson (40th President) 78, 183, 188 regions, cooperation 33; East Asia

Index 241 regionalism 14, 59, 151; microregional links 153–8, 162–3 Rice, Condoleeza 227 Ro¯yama Michio 53 Rozman, Gilbert xii, 14, 213–33 Russian Federation, “Atlanticism” 214; energy 213, 214, 224, 226; “Eurasianism” 214; international relations 10, 213–33; Japanese prisoners 219; nationalism 219, 220, 222, 223; “new thinking” 214; Putin era 221–7; terrorism 214, 223, 225; Yeltsin era 218–21;see also Soviet Union Russo-Japanese war (1904–5) 151 Sakhalin 213, 219, 226 Sakurai Arata 39 San Francisco Peace Conference 107, 108 San Francisco Peace Treaty (1952) 75, 108, 112, 206 Saneto¯ Keishu¯ 52 Sankei Shimbun 44, 52 Sasajima Masahiko 38 Sato¯ Eisaku 111, 112 Sekai 54, 55, 56, 61, 62 Selden, Mark 54 Senkaku Islands 41, 82, 205 Shanghai Accords (1972) 41 Shelton, Henry H. 186 Shenyang consulate incident (2002) 44, 94, 205 Shi Yinhong 30 Shimamura Yoshinobu 40 Shin Saihin 62 Shiraishi Bon 56 Shu Ken’ei 62 Singapore 3, 206 Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) 124 Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), aggressive war 39–40, 59, 62, 72, 75, 77; apology 22, 39, 75, 94, 95, 116; atrocities/war crimes 39, 61, 72, 74–5, 77, 80–1; Chinese sentiments to Japan 13, 61, 80, 81; compensation 72, 76; invasion 22, 30, 81; Japanese war memory 71–73; Nanjing (Nanking) Massacre (1937) 39, 61, 74, 80; national mythmaking 70, 71; patriotic education 22, 30, 57, 58, 80–1; reparations 28–9, 75, 76; textbooks see history textbooks; truthtelling 77; Xuezhan Taierzhuang 80 Smedley, Agnes 54 Smith, Anthony 70 Snow, Edgar 54 Soeya Yoshihide 52, 53, 59 Soka Gakkai 42

Sonoda Shigeto 60 Sonoda Sunao 28 South Korea, economy 3; foreign trade 189 Southeast Asia, ASEAN see Association of Southeast Asian Nations; foreign direct investment (FDI) 190; Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) 190; turf war 189–91 Soviet Union, armed forces 216–17; Cold War see Cold War era; collapse (1991) 1, 23, 24, 116; Gorbachev era 215–18; hegemony 23–4, 26, 76; territorial disputes 213, 217, 218, 219, 223; see also Russian Federation steel industry 29 Strong, Anna Louise 54 sub-national governments (SNGs), autonomy 128, 132; bilateral ties 9, 13, 128–48; economic cooperation 130, 138–9; environmental assistance 138–9, 141–2; examples of cooperation 133–9; foreign aid 130, 131; human rights 130; international relations 130–3; Japan 132–42; Kyushu 149–65; non-commercial motives 130; Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) 138–9; politics 131, 134–5; post-Cold War 149, 163; sanctions 130; United States 130, 132, 134, 140 Sun Pinghua 112 superpower politics, China 59, 73–4, 79; United States 1, 10, 14, 17 Sutter, Robert 191 Suzuki Muneo 44, 94, 223, 224 Taiwan, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 31, 118; democratization 22, 31–2, 40, 107, 117; diplomatic normalization 12, 107, 117; economic development 3, 117, 124; Exchange Association 121; factor in international relations 107–27, 186, 187; ﬂexible diplomacy 117; intimidation 22, 40; Kuomintang (KMT) 31–2, 73–4, 80; Legislative Yuan elections 119, 122; Matsu bombed (1958) 110; Nationalist government 108, 109, 112, 113, 114–15; peace treaty (1952) 75, 108, 112, 113; presidential elections (1996) 24, 31, 117, 119, 121–1; Quemoy bombed (1958) 110; referendum 121; Republic of China (ROC) 31, 75; situations in areas surrounding Japan 41, 119–20; “three no’s” 95, 120; three-point principles 112; transformation 31–2

242

Index

Taiwan Straits, crisis (1958) 55; missile tests/crisis (1996) 22, 24, 40–1, 119, 183; US Carriers (1996) 41, 119; US Seventh Fleet 108 Takagi Seiichiro¯ xii, 12, 56, 107–27 Takagi Yasaka 51, 52 Takahara Akio xii, 13–14, 61, 166–79 Takasaki Tatsunosuke 110 Takeiri Yoshikatsu 28, 76 Takeuchi Minoru 56 Takeuchi Yoshimi 54–5 Tanaka Akihiko 51, 56, 57–8 Tanaka Kakuei 28, 40, 75, 112–13, 114 Tanaka Kyo¯ko 56, 59–60 Tanaka Makiko 43, 44, 94, 224 Tanigaki Mariko 56 Ten-Year Economic Plan (1978) 26 terrorism, 9/11 attacks 25, 184, 187, 193, 223, 228; Al-Qa’eda 25, 190; antiterrorism 17, 25, 184, 187, 190, 214, 223 Thailand 3, 206, 210 Theater Missile Defense (TMD) 24, 25, 120–1 Tiananmen Square Incident (1989), impact 1, 37–9, 79; international relations 1, 24, 37–8, 57, 117, 162; Japanese sentiments to China 21, 37–9, 58, 116; loss of life 32; ODA sanctions 102; pragmatism 16 To¯jo¯ Hideki 61, 72 Tokyo, bilateral ties 13, 129, 133; University of Tokyo 51, 52 trade oﬃces 109–10, 130, 137–8, 140 transportation, air see aviation; K transportation 154; Kyushu 152, 153–4, 160; shipping 153–4 United Nations, Chinese representation 111; Environment Program 139; Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) Law (1992) 39; Security Council membership 18, 194 United States, 9/11 attacks 25, 184, 187, 193, 223, 228; ABM Treaty 187; armed race 188; Axis of Evil 17; China threat theory 24, 187, 188; containment of China 73–4, 188; global terrorism 17, 25, 184, 187, 190, 214, 223; hawks 188; “indispensable nation” 93; New Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (1997) 41, 119–20; Security

Consultative Committee (2+2 talks) 12, 122, 186; sub-national governments (SNGs) 130, 132, 134, 140; superpower politics 1, 10, 14, 17; trade oﬃces 130; trilateral relations 14, 23–4, 33, 188–99; US-China détente 23, 31, 107, 111, 187, 193; US-Japan Security Joint Declaration (1996) 24, 41, 119, 120; US-Japan Security Joint Declaration (2005) 186–7; US-Japan Security Treaty (1951) 23, 24, 34, 40, 55, 74, 78, 108; virtual alliance 192 Uno Shigeaki 56 Uruguay Round (1993) 131 Wakabayashi Masahiro 56 Waseda Daigaku 52 weapons, missiles see missiles; nuclear see nuclear weapons; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 213; see also armed forces; militarism Wen Jiabao 123 Wolfowitz, Paul 188 Wong, John 190 World Trade Organization (WTO), China 16, 25, 26, 27, 34, 42, 61, 96, 190, 194, 200, 207; international relations 18, 130 World War II, China/Japan see SinoJapanese War (1937–45); Malayan Chinese 206; Paciﬁc War View of History 72; War Crimes Tribunal (1946–48) 72, 74, 77, 78 Yamada Tatsuo 52 Yamanouchi Kazuo 56 Yasukuni Shrine 16, 22, 25, 30, 41, 42, 43–4, 47, 62, 73, 78, 94, 114, 129, 206 Yellow Sea 13, 149–65 Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich 14, 214, 218–21, 222 Yoshida Hitoshi 133 Yoshida Shigeru 108, 110, 111 Yoshikawa Kojiro 54 You Fengwei 81 Yugoslavia, NATO bombing (1999) 24 zero-sum thinking 11, 16, 47, 181, 200 Zhao Ziyang 32 Zhou Enlai 24, 28, 29, 56, 75, 76, 114 Zhu Rongji 16

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Nikkeiren and Japanese Capitalism (Sheffield Centre for Japanesestudies Routledgecurzon)

Representing the Other in Modern Japanese Literature: A Critical Approach (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies RoutledgeCurzon)

Japan's Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledgecurzon)

Contested Governance in Japan Sites and Issues (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies RoutledgeCurzon)

Japan and the G7 8: 1975-2002 (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledgecurzon Series)

The Steel Industry in Japan: A Comparison with Britain (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge Series)

Japan's International Relations, 2nd Edition (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge)

Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge)

Japan's International Relations, 2nd Edition (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge)

Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge)

Japanese Interfirm Networks: Adapting to survive in the Global Electronics Industry (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledgecurzon)

Globalisation and Women in the Japanese Workforce (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge)

Political Economy of Japanese Globalization (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge Series)

Japanese Education Reform: Nakasone's Legacy (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge Series)

Rising China: Power and Reassurance

Grassroots Pacifism in Post-War Japan: The Rebirth of a Nation (Sheffield Centre for Japanesestudies Routledgecurzon)

Japan and Britain at War and Peace (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge Series)

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Japan and Asia Pacific Integration: Pacific Romances 1968-1996 (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge Series)

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Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge Series)

Japan's Subnational Governments in International Affairs (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledge Series)

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