Japan's Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies Routledgecurzon)

Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises

Extensive news coverage of humanitarian crises, especially on television, has led to a strong public awareness of the importance of humanitarian activities. This is the first book to comprehensively examine the evolution of Japan’s response to humanitarian crises, placing it in the context of global debates on humanitarianism. Tracing developments from the Meiji period through to the present day, the book explores the broader cultural and historical framework within which Japanese humanitarian ideas and attitudes to human rights have developed. Taking a multidisciplinary approach the book analyses Japan’s humanitarian ideas, values and social practices, exploring the changing perceptions and attitudes to overseas assistance. Based on primary research including interview material, it provides a deeper understanding of the upsurge in Japanese involvement in humanitarian crises, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. The book includes a variety of case studies with a detailed consideration of Japan’s assistance in East Timor. Nishikawa analyses the case from historical, geographical and political perspectives, illustrating the strategic and political considerations that have influenced the shape of Japan’s humanitarian activities. There has been remarkably little in-depth scholarly writing on humanitarianism and human rights issues in Japan. Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises fills this gap, allowing us to understand humanitarianism in Japan from the comprehensive standpoint of its historically and culturally distinctive settings. Yukiko Nishikawa is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Asia Pacific Research Center, Kobe Gakuin University and a part-time lecturer at Kobe University in Japan.

Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series Series editor: Glenn D. Hook Professor of Japanese Studies, University of Sheffield

This series, published by Routledge in association with the Centre for Japanese Studies at the University of Sheffield, makes available original research on a wide range of subjects dealing with Japan and provides introductory overviews of key topics in Japanese Studies. The Internationalization of Japan Edited by Glenn D. Hook and Michael Weiner Race and Migration in Imperial Japan Michael Weiner Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area Pekka Korhonen Greater China and Japan Prospects for an economic partnership? Robert Taylor The Steel Industry in Japan A comparison with the UK Hasegawa Harukiyo Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan Richard Siddle Japan’s Minorities The illusion of homogeneity Edited by Michael Weiner Japanese Business Management Restructuring for low growth and globalization Edited by Hasegawa Harukiyo and Glenn D. Hook

Japan and Asia Pacific Integration Pacific romances 1968–1996 Pekka Korhonen Japan’s Economic Power and Security Japan and North Korea Christopher W. Hughes Japan’s Contested Constitution Documents and analysis Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack Japan’s International Relations Politics, economics and security Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher Hughes and Hugo Dobson Japanese Education Reform Nakasone’s legacy Christopher P. Hood The Political Economy of Japanese Globalisation Glenn D. Hook and Hasegawa Harukiyo Japan and Okinawa Structure and subjectivity Edited by Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle Japan and Britain in the Contemporary World Responses to common issues Edited by Hugo Dobson and Glenn D. Hook Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping New pressures, new responses Hugo Dobson Japanese Capitalism and Modernity in a Global Era Re-fabricating lifetime employment relations Peter C. D. Matanle Nikkeiren and Japanese Capitalism John Crump Production Networks in Asia and Europe Skill formation and technology transfer in the automobile industry Edited by Rogier Busser and Yuri Sadoi

Japan and the G7/8 1975–2002 Hugo Dobson The Political Economy of Reproduction in Japan Between nation-state and everyday life Takeda Hiroko Grassroots Pacifism in Post-War Japan The rebirth of a nation Mari Yamamoto Interfirm Networks in the Japanese Electronics Industry Ralph Paprzycki Globalisation and Women in the Japanese Workforce Beverley Bishop Contested Governance in Japan Sites and issues Edited by Glenn D. Hook Japan’s International Relations Politics, economics and security Second edition Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher Hughes and Hugo Dobson Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises Yukiko Nishikawa

Japan’s Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises

Yukiko Nishikawa

First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2005 Yukiko Nishikawa All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Nishikawa, Yukiko. Japan’s changing role in humanitarian crises / by Yukiko Nishikawa. p. cm. – (Sheffield Centre for Japanese studies/Routledge series) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Humanitarian assistance, Japanese. 2. Humanitarianism – Japan. I. Title. II. Series HV555.J3N58 2005 361.6⬘0952–dc22 ISBN 0-203-02932-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0–415–36902–9 (Print Edition)

2005002935

Contents

List of illustrations Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

ix x xi

Introduction

1

Global humanitarianism or Japanese humanitarianism? 2 Application of the East Timor case 5 Contribution of this book 6 Methodology 6 Limitations 7 Organization of the book 8 1

Discourse of humanitarianism in major political theories

10

Introduction 10 The concept of humanitarianism and humanitarian action 11 Theories and analysis of ethics and humanitarianism 13 New humanitarianism in the world 20 Politics in humanitarian action 25 Conclusion 28 2

Genesis of Japanese humanitarianism: ethics in Japanese society Introduction 30 Genesis of Japanese ethics 31 Japanese ethical system 42 Contemporary Japanese ethical system 53 Conclusion 58

30

viii 3

Contents Japanese humanitarian assistance since the end of the Second World War

61

Introduction 61 Social condition and assistance in post-War Japan 62 The Cambodia Crisis 84 The nature of humanitarianism 93 Conclusion 99 4

Japanese humanitarian ideas and practice: a study through the East Timor case

102

Introduction 102 Humanitarian Crisis in East Timor: background 102 An overall picture of Japanese assistance to East Timor 108 Japanese humanitarianism: the East Timor case 110 Politics for action in the East Timor case 121 Conclusion 128 5

The political dimension of Japanese humanitarianism

130

Introduction 130 Japenese diplomacy and politics 130 Politics in the Official Development Assistance 137 Japan’s role and international policies 148 Conclusion 155 Conclusion

158

The post-September 11 paradigm and Japanese humanitarianism 165 Appendices

170

Appendix A: Diet discussions on the issue of East Timor 170 Appendix B: Japan–Indonesia relations 171 Notes Bibliography Index

173 199 215

Illustrations

Figures 0.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 4.1 4.2

Findings of Public Opinion Polls on Japan’s role in the world Japan’s ODA total spending and ODA/GNP ratio Findings of Public Opinion Polls on economic cooperation Findings of Public Opinion Polls on reasons against economic assistance Trends in Japan’s ODA by region NGO support by the government Increase in the number of Japanese NGOs Findings on Public Opinion Polls on reasons for economic cooperation Public opinion survey about participation in PKOs Findings of Public Opinion Polls on PKOs

4 64 66 70 78 81 82 94 117 117

Tables 3.1 Japan’s assistance to Cambodia 3.2 Grass-roots grant assistance to Cambodia

88 88

Boxes 2.1 An explication through the idea of giri and ninjo 3.1 Accumulation of Japanese humanitarian assistance: refugee assistance through United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

51

85

Acknowledgements

This book results from study over a number of years. It is impossible to adequately acknowledge and thank all those who have influenced this volume. In its preparation, I received invaluable help from a number of people. I single out here only a few for special attention yet each has my heartfelt gratitude. I am deeply grateful to have been offered an opportunity to publish this book as part of the Routledge series, Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series. I greatly appreciated the in-depth and valuable comments from the series editor, Professor Glenn D. Hook. I have benefited enormously from the comment that he offered on revising the manuscript. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr Peter van den Dungen and Professor Oliver Ramsbotham who supervised me while writing the original thesis. I thank them for their instructions, valuable comments, generous support and encouragement. I appreciate advice from Dr Peter van den Dungen at the preparation stage of this book. I thank all the interviewees who offered me valuable comments and opinions to write this book. I also thank Richard and Adam for their patient proofreading. I would like to also express my gratitude to Ms Stephanie Rogers and Ms Helen Baker at Routledge, Taylor & Francis Books for their able support during the production of this book. Their prompt work enabled the smooth processing of publication. I would like to express my deepest admiration and gratitude for their marvellous work. Finally, thanks to my parents for their enduring support over the years.

Abbreviations

AMDA Association of Medical Doctors of Asia ARC American Red Cross Society ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ARI Asian Rural Institute ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations ASEM Asia–Europe Meeting CARE Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere CYR Caring for Young Refugees DAC Development Assistance Committee ECB Economic Cooperation Bureau EPA Economic Planning Agency EROA Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas Fretilin Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente GARIOA Government and Relief in Occupied Areas GNP Gross National Product ICORC International Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IRU International Relief Union JANIC Japanese NGO Centre for International Cooperation JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency JOCS Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service JRC Red Cross Society of Japan JSRC  SVA Japan Sotoshu Relief Committee JVC Japan International Volunteer Centre LARA Licensed Agency for Relief of Asia LDP Liberal Democratic Party MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry MOF Ministry of Finance MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs NGO Non-governmental organization NPO Non-profit Organization OCHA Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs

xii

Abbreviations

ODA OECD OECF OISCA OTCA PARC PICC PIJ PKO PKO Law PMC RDTL SCJ SDF SHARE UNAMET UNCTAD UNDP UNHCR UNICEF UNTAC UNTAET WHO WVJ

Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund Organization for Industrial, Spiritual and Cultural Advancement Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency Pacific Asia Resource Centre Paris International Conference on Cambodia Plan International Japan Peacekeeping operation International Peace Cooperation Law Post Ministerial Conference República Democrática de Timor-Leste Save the Children Japan Self-Defence Force Service for the Health in Asian and African Regions United Nations Mission in East Timor United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Development Program United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor World Health Organisation World Vision Japan

Introduction

The 1990s witnessed a number of so-called humanitarian crises. Our moral senses were touched by the cases in Bosnia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor. Japan’s involvement in international humanitarian crises in the 1990s was widely acknowledged, especially through its participation in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Japan sent its Self-Defence Force (SDF) to Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, the Golan Heights and elsewhere for humanitarian purposes as a part of UN PKOs in the 1990s. This came despite longstanding debates on the constitutional merits of such dispatches. While the public is deeply divided over dispatching the SDF, Japanese humanitarian involvement in international crisis situations have been commonly seen in the 1990s. In spite of its steadily expanded role, specifically in UN PKOs, there has been debate on the role of Japan in times of humanitarian crises. Several new steps that Japan took in response to the post-September 11 (2001) humanitarian crises, concerning Afghanistan and Iraq, illustrate continuing dilemmas. In the Iraq Crisis, in particular, Japan took a controversial step by sending its SDF, without a UN mandate, where there was a high risk of armed combat. In the 1990s, Japan never sent its SDF overseas without a UN mandate. In the past PKOs, no Japanese soldier has fired a gun in combat nor has been killed in action, partly because of these operations restricted to low-risk activities. The security situation in Iraq, indeed, became one of the focal points in domestic debates for the decision to dispatch the SDF.1 In many respects, the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq involved new challenges and controversial issues for not only high-level Japanese diplomacy but also for the entire country, which is characterized by strong pacifist sentiments. On the eve of the government’s decision to dispatch its SDF to Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi repeatedly commented that the Japanese SDF ‘is not going to war but goes for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities in Iraq’, emphasizing the ‘humanitarian’ purpose and the non-use of force by the SDF.2 ‘Humanitarian assistance’ and ‘humanitarian’ purpose have been key features of his comments and explanation on Japan’s stance on the dispatch. The Japanese public gradually changed its opinion regarding the government’s decision to dispatch the SDF to Iraq. Public opinion polls conducted by Asahi Newspaper show that while 34 per cent of respondents supported the dispatch in

2

Introduction

December 2003, this figure rose to 44 per cent in February 2004. Likewise, they showed that whereas 55 per cent of respondents were against the dispatch in December 2003, a mere two months later this figure had declined to 48 per cent in February 2004. A belief that the dispatch contributes to ‘international efforts’ was common among those in favour of such action (Asahi Newspaper, 12 January 2004).3 Though public opinion is profoundly divided, it displays a certain unity in its view as to the necessity of a non-military form of contribution, such as humanitarian and development assistance. This is often explained by the fact that since the 1980s, Japan’s political role befitting its economic clout has been a major focus in both domestic and international debates. Especially since the Gulf Crisis, Japan was forced to evaluate its political role in times of international humanitarian crises. Much of the argument about Japan’s political role has been in terms of the dispatch of the SDF. Yet, dispatching its SDF abroad involves prickly issues that may inflate emotional enmity among those who experienced Japanese atrocities during the Second World War. Owing to historical legacies, it may also affect Japan’s relations with its neighbours, particularly with China, Korea and Southeast Asian countries. However, the repeatedly emphasized ‘humanitarian’ purpose and ‘humanitarian’ role in explaining a major contribution of the SDF, and the role played by civilian assistance in UN PKOs seems to have influenced recent changes of opinion among the Japanese in favour of active involvement in humanitarian crises. In fact, as previously described, during the Iraq Crisis, Prime Minister Koizumi’s comment and his government’s stance on the dispatch of the SDF emphasized ‘humanitarian’ purpose and the ‘humanitarian’ role. The ‘humanitarian role’ emphasized by the government seems to offer grounds for a solution to longstanding debates on Japan’s political role, the constitutionality of the dispatch of the SDF, Japan’s relations with neighbours and the gap between Japan’s regional and international politics. This consideration fosters a question: whether the Japanese have become more ‘humanitarian’ than ever before or whether Japan is expanding its ‘hard’ power under the name of ‘humanitarianism’. For that reason, this book focuses on contemporary Japanese humanitarianism.

Global humanitarianism or Japanese humanitarianism? The growing focus on humanitarian issues and increasing use of the terms ‘humanitarian’ and ‘humanitarianism’ are not phenomena exclusive to Japan. It is, to a certain degree, perceived on a global scale. Contrary to expectations in the international arena during the post-Cold War period, what has been witnessed in the world is an expanding number of humanitarian catastrophes. The provision of humanitarian assistance and protection of human rights have become common and have provoked a wide range of debate on global humanitarianism, the idea of global ethics, the protection of human dignity and the universal idea of human rights, in the course of discussion on the content and form of intervention.4 Solidarist norms are gradually embedded in international fora, at any rate in rhetorical terms. Recent humanitarian trends show the increasing incorporation of

Introduction

3

key human rights principles into international laws and treaties. Thus, the idea that humanitarian assistance and the protection of human rights are part of the same struggle for a fairer and more peaceful world seems to be widespread. The idea is now termed as ‘new humanitarianism’. A similar upsurge of humanitarianism has been perceived in Japan. Extensive news coverage of humanitarian crises, especially on television, has led to a strong public awareness of the importance of humanitarian activities. There has been a noticeable change of opinion in favour of them, such as relief and volunteer works in recent years, particularly among the younger generation. On many different occasions in the 1990s, Japanese people have been involved in humanitarian assistance both within and outside the country. The number of people who engage in volunteer work in the field of international cooperation and emergency and in humanitarian activities both within Japan and in other countries has increased in the last two decades.5 A founder of a Japanese non-governmental organization (NGO) with extensive experience in humanitarian operations in Mongolia, Iraq, Kosovo, Indonesia and elsewhere commented:6 I have an impression that many people nowadays are interested in ‘international co-operation’ especially after the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake.7 As I’ve been working in NGOs before the Earthquake, I find differences before and after that event. That disaster was a threshold to attain the public awareness of volunteer works and humanitarian assistance from which, I believe, people started showing interest in NGOs, their work and international co-operation. He also added, ‘I think, the understanding of our work (NGOs and humanitarian relief operations) by the public drastically changed in these ten years’. A majority of NGO workers active in humanitarian and developmental assistance in East Timor in 2000 commented that they feel that more and more people in Japan understand their work. They also find that the number of people, especially among the younger generation, who are interested in their work and would like to participate in it, has increased in the last ten years.8 A Japanese student who was volunteering in one of the NGOs in East Timor remarked, ‘I am indeed volunteering and interested in humanitarian activities. There are many friends of mine who are also interested in international co-operation’.9 The Japanese involvement in humanitarian activities in such cases as Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan as well as the Hanshin Awaji Great Earthquake at home illustrates this new tendency. A public opinion survey conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office shows that the interests of the Japanese people in Japan’s role in the world has changed from the economic and environmental fields to a more profound concern with humanitarian considerations.10 The opinion that supports active Japanese involvement in diverse international humanitarian crises seems to have grown, particularly in the last decade. The tendency has become more prominent in the last couple of years, as shown in Figure 0.1.

4

Introduction 60

Support (%)

50 40 30 20 10 0 1988

1990

Human support

1992

1994 1996 Year

Economic support

1998

2000

Environment

2002 Culture/science

Figure 0.1 Findings of Public Opinion Polls on Japan’s role in the world. Source: The Prime Minister’s Office, Findings on Public Opinion Polls on Diplomacy, Surveys (1988–2002) on ‘The Role of Japan’, originally in Japanese, data available http://www8.cao.go.jp/ survey/index-gai.html (accessed 30 September 2003). Note The graph is drawn by the author on the basis of the data.

In response to changing public opinion, since the end of the Cold War, Japan has become increasingly involved in a global range of endeavours at both diplomatic and grass-roots levels. This is illustrated by its provision of assistance aid, participation in UN PKOs and involvement in humanitarian relief activities. Given the world trend of new humanitarianism embedded in such ideas as global ethics and universal human rights, the current change among the Japanese in favour of international cooperation and involvement in humanitarian activities could be considered merely as part of such a trend. However, considering the unique cultural and historical circumstances of the Japanese society, the phenomenon may originate from this background. Therefore, this book explores Japanese humanitarianism through its historical and socio-cultural perspectives as well as political perspectives with reference to humanitarian activities in practice. Socio-culturally, the study unveils Japanese humanitarian values and ethical principles and examines the type of Japanese society that guided ethical decisions and practices. What are the humanitarian ideals and principles prevailing in Japan? Do Japanese humanitarian ideas share the notion of universality? It attempts to grasp the nature and character of Japanese humanitarianism. Having looked at humanitarian ideas and values and social practice, the study explores

Introduction

5

the evolution of Japanese assistance (policy, system and actual activities) and changes in people’s perceptions and attitudes regarding assistance, in order to grasp social conditions in relation to humanitarian considerations after the Second World War. How did assistance policies change? How have historical experiences of humanitarian assistance influenced people’s perception and attitude? What major changes are perceived in the assistance system? What practical changes have occurred in the 1980s and the 1990s? By exploring these questions, both the roots and nature of Japanese humanitarianism in the post-Second World War period will be examined. Given the historical development of Japanese assistance policy and systems, this volume introduces actual Japanese assistance in the case of East Timor. Moreover, the study examines how the political process helped to form humanitarianism. How did the political process in Japan bring humanitarian policy into focus in its international relations? What were the domestic and international political circumstances that formed humanitarianism? By exploring these questions, the study examines factors that contributed to the upsurge of humanitarianism in Japan, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. The analysis in this volume will provide a closer comprehensive standpoint to understand Japan’s explanation for its participation in the most controversial mission – the assistance in Iraq – along with a thorough understanding of Japanese socio-cultural and political nature regarding humanitarianism. Accordingly, the volume ends with a discussion of Japanese humanitarianism in the context of the new international security paradigm, post-September 11, 2001. It contemplates current Japanese humanitarianism with reference to Japan’s decision to take its biggest stride – approving the dispatch of its SDF without a UN mandate – for humanitarian assistance in Iraq.

Application of the East Timor case This volume applies the East Timor Crisis as a case study in order to illustrate Japanese humanitarianism, people’s humanitarian ideas and how they are transferred into practice. The case was employed for three major reasons: first, historical and geographical considerations of Japanese humanitarian activities, second, the year of the crisis in East Timor and third, the reflection of Japan’s political position towards East Timor and Indonesia in addition to its regional relations. As for the first point, historically, it is widely acknowledged that Japanese humanitarian operations have been undertaken predominantly in Asian countries. This is largely because of historical and political relations with neighbouring countries. Therefore, at a certain point, due to its political history, Japanese assistance to the region illustrated a strong commitment to Asia. East Timor is one of the countries that Japan occupied during the Second World War. Therefore, it provides a specific and distinctive basis for understanding Japanese assistance to the country and the rationales that influence it. As for the second point, much of the arguments in Japanese studies highlight the social changes that Japan has experienced over the last two decades, which are referred to as ‘internationalization’. The East Timor Crisis, which occurred in 1999, will help to trace the changes. The case provides

6

Introduction

an appropriate picture of the role of humanitarianism during changes in both social and international circumstances. As per the third point, Japanese economic and political relations in the region, specifically those with Indonesia – Japan’s leading export partner and the biggest source of natural resources in the region – are particularly noteworthy in this case. More than in any other case, East Timor provides an important example of the strategic and political considerations that shape Japan’s humanitarian activities. The case provides elements critical for exploring the domestic, regional and international political goals. This study offers a crucial basis for a unique illustration of international power politics, national factional politics and humanitarian considerations.

Contribution of this book There has been remarkably little in-depth scholarly writing on humanitarianism and human rights issues in Japan that includes a thorough understanding of its history, social construction, system, tradition and customs. Relevant works on Japan and human rights issues are, in some ways, ahistorical. An absence of an understanding of the ways in which domestic assumptions and attitudes have been shaped makes it difficult to fully appreciate the approach to imported human rights strands. In order to understand humanitarianism in Japan from the comprehensive standpoint of its historically and culturally distinctive settings, concerted studies are crucial. This is particularly necessary when considering links with contemporary humanitarianism in the world. Therefore, this study attempts to appreciate the broader cultural and historical contexts within which Japanese humanitarian ideas and attitudes to human rights (humanitarianism) have evolved. This will help to fill a gap in the literature and serve as an important antidote to some of the assumptions made, often on the basis of only a superficial knowledge of the system. It will also aid to understand Japan’s future policies towards humanitarian crises in the changing international security paradigm.

Methodology One of the key issues in this study is the interpretation of what is in people’s minds: their conceptions of what is of value, reflecting their own attempts to create meaning in their lives. Possible ways of understanding one’s ideas are, first, to interview and record a person’s statements, second, to experiment and third, to observe behaviour. Therefore, the study employed a qualitative approach enabling it to be context sensitive. It places findings in social, historical and temporal contexts. This is particularly important in this study when examining how people’s perceptions on humanitarian ideals and the idea of human rights are constructed. In addition, qualitative methods are useful when investigating ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. This approach made it possible to gather information about how various actors interact while interpreting socio-political developments and changes. The triangulation of different methods was used in order to aid reliability in this process.11

Introduction

7

The methods employed in this study were: interviewing, observation, enquiry and archival data. A number of people representing different categories of professionals were interviewed. The information obtained from interviews was interpreted and analysed with accessible archival information and observation. Reliability was an issue, particularly in the study of Japanese humanitarian ideals and the idea of human rights. This difficulty was tackled by cross-referencing, employing different sources of archival information – from national myths to novels, language and literature – as well as using data gained from the interview and observation.

Limitations Although the key object of this study is humanitarianism, it is difficult to observe humanitarian ideas and values directly. Therefore, this research only applied observations through claims about ideas, and actions presumably based on ideas. A method of enquiry was used, which involved careful attempts at both description and causal inference. This made it possible to look at things from the informant’s point of view. It also avoided considering our own ethical categories as being universally held. These were the methods employed while researching the study of ideas. Throughout the study, a number of problems were also considered with regard to archival information and data. A general problem with archival information is how to determine the reliability and validity of the information obtained. The study, thus, made an effort to cross-reference among archival information and with data obtained with other methods. Another specific problem encountered was that efforts to obtain official information and data were not always successful. This was because some of the data or information were treated as confidential, particularly government documents and data relating to security issues. Apart from methodological limitations, there were other drawbacks to this research. One major limitation is the extent to which this research can analyse changes and developments of a certain social phenomenon. Changes and evolution of ideas involve multidimensional factors, ranging from the economy to the social tradition and cannot be understood without analysing social contexts from different aspects, that is, historical, cultural, economical, political and normative. However, because of the line of focus and constraints on space and time, some of the issues in each aspect are excluded or only briefly described in this volume. In particular, not all historical factors are included or placed in chronological order, instead only key issues or events related to changes affecting humanitarianism are presented. However, the study recognizes the importance of issues excluded from this volume, and these were duly taken into consideration in the process of analysis. Nevertheless, the roots and nature of changes are never fully understood since the change is a slow burning fuse underlying a social evolution and practice over time on the whole, as this study indicates. Therefore, it attempts to reveal possible explanatory factors for the development of humanitarianism while

8

Introduction

unveiling a suitable structure in order to comprehend the relevant social forces and their interactions.

Organization of the book The book consists of five chapters. Following the Introduction, Chapter 1 introduces some of the key terms, concepts and theories employed in this volume. It sets out an analytical framework for the study of humanitarianism. Chapters 2–5 explore the main theme, and a case study is included in Chapter 4. From these studies, the volume contemplates the development and characteristics of Japanese humanitarianism. The conclusion gives further consideration to Japan’s involvement with humanitarian crises in the post-September 11 international arena. Chapter 1 presents an explanation of terms used in this volume and reviews dominant interpretations of concepts, theories and literature relevant to this study. It sets out conceptual and theoretical frameworks for the study of humanitarianism. Theoretical discussion of ethics includes debating the political theory developed in Western countries and exploring concepts and theories of humanitarianism and humanitarian assistance.12 The discussion in this volume occasionally refers to the concepts, theories and literature developed in Western political thought, which are dominantly applied to the international debate on humanitarianism. The objective of referring to those ideas is to facilitate our understanding by using terms, theories or literature commonly employed in the field and also to identify distinctions and/or similarities between Western and Japanese contexts. The chapter aims to provide an analytical framework of the important concepts employed in this book, and introduces the most widely applied theories and literature that are used in the contemporary political debate. Chapter 2 explores ethics, humanitarian ideals and moral norms in Japanese socio-cultural and historical contexts. The chapter aims to understand ethics in Japanese society through an analysis of the social structure and systems within which Japanese attitudes and ideas are developed. It also illustrates the framework of Japanese society in which the meaning of humanitarianism (humanitarian ideas) is constructed and conveyed in its historical contexts. In so doing, it highlights a belief among the Japanese people that humanitarian ideas are both impartial and universal. These two ideas are prominent features in Western ethics. The chapter, above all, focuses on the social structure and socially constructed contexts of Japanese ethics that define both Japanese moral ideals and judgements. In order to understand the historical transformation of Japanese humanitarianism, the chapter includes a review of Japanese ideas on human rights and humanitarianism in practice from 1945 onwards. The chapter thereafter examines the nature of Japanese humanitarianism from a socio-cultural standpoint with reference to post-Second World War discussions. Chapter 3 looks at Japanese humanitarian assistance in practice since the end of the Second World War. The chapter explores Japanese assistance before and after the 1980s. This includes both governmental and non-governmental assistance. The latter period is particularly important in order to understand changes

Introduction

9

in Japanese assistance. The chapter employs some empirical data to illustrate a broader picture of changes in Japanese society. It considers how Japanese humanitarian ideas that developed through unique social traditions and contexts (explored in Chapter 2) are transformed into practice. From this investigation, it examines the values underpinned in actual humanitarian activities and policy, in addition to considering the characteristics and nature of Japanese humanitarianism. Chapter 4 focuses on actual Japanese humanitarian assistance in the case of East Timor. The chapter offers empirical data on issues explored in previous chapters. Having looked at the background issues surrounding the East Timor Crisis and the historical relationship between Japan and East Timor, this chapter introduces interview comments concerning Japanese humanitarian ideas. Some of the Japanese people who were interviewed were academics. Others were working in humanitarian fields and relief organizations. Some respondents worked for the UN or government agencies. The interviews of people working in the relevant fields include comments on humanitarian ideas and assistance in addition to ideas about human rights and their universality. By referring to interview comments, the chapter analyses the difference between the East Timor case and other assistances that had been previously undertaken. These analyses aim to enhance our understanding of both the ideas and practice of Japanese humanitarianism. The chapter then explores the political dimension of Japanese assistance with reference to the operational and practical considerations for assistance. The chapter aims to use empirical data from normative and political points of view in order to illustrate the diverse dimensions of Japanese humanitarianism. Through these explorations and analysis of the case study, the chapter probes more deeply into the characteristics, nature and values of Japanese humanitarianism. Following the studies in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 looks more deeply at the political dimension of Japanese humanitarianism. The chapter explores the domestic and international political contexts of humanitarianism. It aims to understand how the political process formed a humanitarian policy in the government and how the process led to humanitarianism in Japan. The chapter unveils international and domestic political processes that have impacted upon government policies. In order to clarify reasons for changes in Japanese government policy, the chapter begins by presenting features of the domestic political system and of Japanese diplomacy. It then explores the political process that decides the policy towards assistance. These explorations lead to an examination of how the Japanese political process formed humanitarian policy and how this policy was incorporated into Japan’s search for its role in responding to international humanitarian crises. The chapter aims to ascertain the true nature and characteristics of Japanese humanitarianism as well as to discover its origins. The conclusion draws on the findings and discussions of previous chapters. It examines the features of Japanese humanitarianism and emphasizes the factors that contributed to its formation in the Japanese society. In order to develop our understanding of possible changes in Japanese public opinion and political decision-making in terms of international humanitarian crises, the conclusion considers Japanese humanitarianism during the Iraq Crisis.

1

Discourse of humanitarianism in major political theories

Introduction The use of the term ‘humanitarianism’ has become increasingly common in the 1990s particularly in the context of crisis. It has indeed become ordinary to hear the term ‘humanitarian’ in the international news coverage at, for instance, BBC and CNN. Accordingly, the term is conceptually well acknowledged, yet, contrary to the wide recognition of the term, humanitarian actions or activities in practice in recent years led to some controversies. This is, to some extent, explained by the fact that the major interpretation of the term is being considered as culturally specific owing to the reliance on major political theories and philosophical debates developed in Western countries. In order to understand how the dominant discourse interprets the term and what alternative discourses have been developed, this chapter explores the literature on the concept, theories and research on key issues relevant to this study. The relevant literature will be referred to throughout the book. The key concepts are: ‘humanitarianism’, ‘humanitarian action’, ‘humanitarian assistance’, ‘human rights’ and ‘ethics’. The chapter aims to uncover the nature of these concepts and theories in major political and philosophical debates developed in Western countries from cultural, historical and political points of view. These findings will be applied in order to understand the nature of these concepts and theories in Japanese contexts and debates. It will help us to examine to what extent the mainstreamed interpretation of these concepts and philosophical debates in Western contexts are relevant or/and irrelevant to those in Japanese contexts. This chapter, thus, offers a framework for analysing Japanese humanitarianism in the following chapters. The chapter consists of four sections. The first section sets out definitions of key concepts employed in this study. Having given the definitions, the second section explores historical and cultural roots of ethics and moral philosophy developed in Western countries. This includes religious and cultural roots of the discourse. The third section introduces notion and practice of humanitarianism and relevant factors that have developed in humanitarian debates in the post-Cold War world. The discussion is further explored in the context of globalization debates. The last section looks at political dimension of humanitarianism. It sets out major debates in Western political philosophy with regard to morality and foreign policy.

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The concept of humanitarianism and humanitarian action Humanitarianism The precise meaning of the terms, ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘humanitarian’, is quite vague. There is no general definition for the term ‘humanitarianism’ even in the literature on international law (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 8). The well accepted idea of these terms suggests a broader sense, a benevolent feeling or activity for ‘common humanity’ or a philanthropic feeling towards humankind.1 More explicitly, it means helping and protecting victims irrespective of who and where they are and why they are in need. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse refer to four principles that humanitarianism encapsulates: the principles of ‘humanity’, ‘impartiality’, ‘universality’ and ‘neutrality’ (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 14–15).2 These are considered as core values that underlie international humanitarian law and the varied enterprises of international humanitarian assistance. Thus, studying those principles will facilitate our understanding of the term, humanitarianism. The principle of humanity is at the heart of humanitarianism – concern for the interests and welfare of human beings, particularly those who are threatened or are suffering, which is considered the spirit of Henry Dunant, founder of the Red Cross.3 The principle calls for the common humanity that lies beneath political divisions even in war. The principle of impartiality is explained as ‘no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions’.4 It illustrates a core value in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol I.5 The principle of universality permeates humanitarian action embedded in our common values and proclaims that ‘all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other’.6 It suggests that humanitarian action would be possible with universally shared values. The principle of neutrality consists of the idea that humanitarianism must be non-political, which is crucial to carry out humanitarian activities and to separate humanitarian considerations from political concerns as stipulated in the 1864 Geneva Convention (Best, 1994: 374). With those four underlying principles, humanitarianism affirms a philanthropic feeling towards humankind. These principles are, indeed, shared not only in the Red Cross movement but also in such activities as the International Relief Union (IRU) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the United Nations. Therefore, this volume employs the term, humanitarianism, implying these core values and in so understanding, it studies humanitarianism in diverse social, cultural and historical contexts. Besides, in recent years, use of the term ‘humanitarianism’ is more embedded in the defence of human rights7 in accordance with the changing nature of ‘complex emergencies’.8 The term ‘humanitarianism’ is, in the post-Cold War era, identified with the more specific terminology of ‘human rights protection’, helping to draw all world traditions ‘into a broader and more international definition of humanitarianism’ (Aga Khan, 1988: 156) in the course of examination of the form and contents of action. This clarifies an emerging solidarist norm in relation to humanitarian intervention aimed at protecting civilian populations

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threatened by civil war as well as relief supplies and the personnel delivering them. More strongly, it aims to coerce states and other parties involved in civil conflict to cease their violation of the individual and group rights of those living under their authority.9 For this reason, one of the important humanitarian principles, ‘neutrality’, shows the difficulty in humanitarian action due to increasing massive human rights abuses arising out of intrastate conflicts. The recent international trend of human rights abuse in crisis contexts, such as ethnic cleansing and large-scale massacres, has brought in a reconceptualization and re-examination of the use of the term. In the Western political field, the new trend is termed as ‘new humanitarianism’. Concerted efforts are made to clarify the conceptual confusion of the term and it gained attention on the requirements of action in contemporary complex emergencies. The new trend of humanitarianism relating to the protection of human rights is, thus, becoming increasingly an important dimension of humanitarianism in the new international security paradigm. Humanitarian action In keeping with the clarification of humanitarianism, actions termed ‘humanitarian’, that attempt to confirm a benevolent feeling towards human beings, are wideranging. For instance, humanitarian activities include diverse notions of aid, such as medical care, provision of shelter and food and reconstruction of infrastructures. Yet, for Ogata Sadako, the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘humanitarian activity is much more than relief and logistics.10 It is essentially and above all about protection – protection of victims of human rights and humanitarian violations’ (Ogata, 1998). Weiss and Minear distinguish humanitarian action into two major categories: the first being the provision of ‘emergency assistance’ and the second being ‘the protection of human rights’ (Weiss and Minear, 1993: 7–10). The former entails ‘humanitarian assistance’, associated with ‘the immediate needs of victims of disasters deriving from political or natural disasters’ (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 12).11 The latter is exemplified by the recent trend of humanitarian actions for the protection of human rights. Whilst emergency assistance remains common in scenes of complex humanitarian crises, the protection of human rights has become the more prominent action in contemporary humanitarianism. This is proved by the fact that real or perceived operational implications of ‘humanitarian’ action today often expose the difficulties of separating humanitarian concerns from political concerns and also that the contemporary humanitarian action is determined by states through traditional diplomacy.12 By the same token, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, for instance, argue, ‘the whole idea of separating “humanitarian” from “political” action is both conceptually and practically ambivalent’ (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 17).13 The process of bringing human rights and the protection from violence, into humanitarian action reinforces the idea that in practice humanitarian and political

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activities cannot be completely separated. There is a wide range of debate on the humanitarian action, domestic and international political considerations reflected by the fact that different emergencies and different groups affected by them have received the same assistance. Macrae and Leader argue, ‘the issue today is not whether humanitarian action is political but how’ (Macrae and Leader, 2000). Consequently, this volume considers both categories of humanitarian action and recognizes that addressing humanitarianism in contemporary complex emergency contexts necessitates an understanding of the political dimensions of humanitarian action. As the term humanitarianism implies, humanitarian actions include responding to so-called natural disasters as well as international or internal political turmoil and armed conflict. However, the discussion addressed in this volume mostly focuses on the latter. The objective is not to ignore humanitarian actions in other operational arrangements, such as those responding to droughts and floods. Humanitarian actions in response to political turmoil or conflict often manifest factors that are not well perceived in humanitarian actions in response to natural disasters. These factors are crucial in this study. Humanitarian assistance Humanitarian assistance is, as introduced earlier, concerned with ‘the immediate needs of victims of natural or political disasters’. Whilst the new humanitarianism demonstrates human rights deliberation in humanitarian actions, humanitarian assistance is not necessarily connected with explicit violations of human rights (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 12). However, according to Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, humanitarian assistance is linked to the international law of armed conflict and to human rights law.14 It designates the rightsbased approach with regard to humanitarian assistance in consideration of a right to access food, clothing, housing and medical care. Thus, the delineation is not entirely aloof from human rights considerations. Yet, in its classic form, humanitarian assistance is considered ‘to bring immediate aid to those who are suffering in humanitarian crises or emergencies’ (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 12). Therefore, the term, humanitarian assistance, in this study is employed to mean the classic form, yet it does not deny distinctive approaches in the exploration of the term in different social and cultural contexts. The term ‘assistance’ could be in any other form, such as development, financial, emergency and others. Therefore, when the term ‘assistance’ is used without any qualification, it implies diverse forms of assistance in general.

Theories and analysis of ethics and humanitarianism In the previous section, issues surrounding the concept of ‘humanitarianism’, ‘humanitarian action’ and ‘humanitarian assistance’ were discussed. These issues still relate to theories and analysis of the ethics that are relevant to the evolution of the humanitarian ideals. The current trend of a universal approach in humanitarian

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actions arouses debate as to whether such universal values exist or not. Whilst a loose similarity in humanitarian values is recognized across different cultures, the new complex emergencies in the post-Cold War era questioned the dominant interpretation of humanitarianism. Human rights considerations in this context are claimed to be culturally specific. This suggests that there is a specific need to re-examine the idea and practice of these values in different socio-cultural contexts. It requires an analysis of the ethical ideas, moral norms, social structure and ethical systems of each society as well as external influences in order to challenge such debates. The exploration of ethics helps us to understand historically, socially and culturally structured social conditions that influenced or helped shape the meaning of humanitarianism in a society. The analysis of social structure in this study is important in that it forms ‘rules and resources’ which are implicitly drawn upon by people in their daily activity and which are thereby reproduced, most often unintentionally.15 Two categories of structural elements are of concern: those elements which must be present in any society as they represent necessary conditions for the persistence of social life, and those elements which are necessary conditions for the continuation of a particular type of society.16 Therefore, in the analysis of ethics, exploring social, cultural, religious and historical contexts will help us to reveal the type of society and structured social environment that influence understandings of the term ‘humanitarianism’. This section reviews theories and analysis of ethics by exploring social structures (structural elements) in ethics developed in Western political philosophy in order to facilitate our understanding of this study. It attempts to reveal humanitarian principles, their application and the idea of human rights while examining social construction, ethical systems and current humanitarianism in the world. Social construction and ethics One of the important ways of understanding humanitarianism in this volume is to look at moral ideals or ethical principles in Japanese society. The basis of ethical principles is often found in religious teachings, which are embedded in social practices. Thus, ethical principles partially explain social construction, religious and cultural roots of the society. The section looks at ethical principles and their roots in the context of Western moral ideals, which are dominantly employed in current humanitarian debates and humanitarian activities in practice. Religious and cultural roots of Western ethics What are the sources of moral judgement and how do we live according to ethical standards? In classical Western ethics, ‘concern for the well-being of others’ is a primary ethical principle, which has profound historical roots in the Hebrew biblical teachings of love and sharing.17 Traditionally, religion was thought to provide a reason for doing what is right. Religion is a way in which people derive values from the way they live. Humanitarian ideas and principles have been

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frequently linked to religious beliefs and teachings.18 The roots of Western ethics are found in Judaeo-Christian traditions and values. The idea of ‘charity’, ‘. . . man’s reciprocal love for God expressed in acts of love for fellow men’ (Ross, 1968: 73; Constantelos, 1987: 224), is an example of the tradition. In the New Testament, ‘charity’ is called the highest good by Saint Paul.19 Early Christianity shows concern for the well-being of others.20 The beliefs and activities of radical religious thinkers before the twentieth century, thus, included the practice of charity.21 Francis de Victoria (1492–1546) argued, ‘since human beings were created by God and belonged to a common species, they had a duty to live according to certain moral and spiritual ideals. And since they were all “neighbours”, Christians owed a “duty of charity” to those unable to provide for their own spiritual salvation’ (Victoria, 1917 cited in Parech, 1997: 50). Among different religions, it is probably right to say that Judaism puts more emphasis on concern for those who are in need than any other religion in ancient times. It is perceived in the Old Testament (Hebrew Bible). One is required ‘to leave the concerns of the field, the cleanings of the harvest, and the crop of the seventh year for the poor’ in the biblical law (Leviticus 19: 9–10). Love can mean ‘concern for one’s fellow human being’ in the biblical sense (Deuteronomy 10: 17–18, 15: 7–10; Psalms 145: 15–16). In Judaism, there is reference to ‘act(s) of loving kindness’, meaning humanitarianism is considered to be one of the three foundations upon which the world was created (Aboth 1: 2). Therefore, the focus of the giving is on those in need. Yet, those who give also get benefits, such as forgiveness of sin and good health (Isaac, 1993). Christianity has inherited those values to a certain degree.22 An important teaching of the Bible, ‘love thy neighbour as thyself ’, means to give the same weight to the interest of others as one gives to one’s own interests. The same idea, ‘think yourself as in the position of another’ is another Christian formulation of the commandment. In Christianity, the poor are entitled to a share in wealth, and helping the poor is catalogued with prayer and fasting (Matthew 6: 1–18). Charity is placed at a higher position than faith and hope, two important Christian values, in Paul’s letter to the Corinthians. It meant that charity is in pure love (agapé), the love of God and the spiritual love of human beings. Christians owed a ‘duty of charity’ to the needy since they were all neighbours. Therefore, charity is not merely a social obligation but also a spiritual one. Humanitarian ideas or principles can be traced in the form of ‘charity’, ‘philanthropy’ or ‘almsgiving’ in Western tradition that stems from Christian teachings. As other religions, such as Judaism and Islam, share some core values, humanitarian principles are found in many religions as well as Christianity in varying degrees. Yet, social construction often contributes to draw distinctions in practice. Traditionally, in countries that have the Christian tradition, the application of humanitarian values demonstrates a universal claim in their social practice, as the truth of any moral values stems from God and therefore is applied irrespective of races and countries. The universal nature of humanitarian values is one of the important elements that social construction preserves in the JudaeoChristian tradition.

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Ethical systems: moral philosophy How do moral judgements differ from other practical judgements? The previous section illustrated that God is the source of right and wrong in the Christian tradition, which is also the case in Judaism and Muslim traditions. Western philosophers questioned such ‘divine-command’ theory and introduced moral truths independent of God, where human beings, their experiences, their interests and their rights have pre-eminent value as a moral resource. Viewed in this light, the study of moral philosophy from the time of Socrates and the Sophists to the time of Nietzsche at the end of the nineteenth century formed the doctrines and controversies of ethical systems, most of which have parallels with twentiethcentury theories.23 Many of the twentieth-century theories involve attempts to update and improve upon their predecessors (Arrington, 1998: 378). There are various approaches to explain ethical systems and moral judgements. Recent and contemporary moral philosophy takes us back into the history of the subject. The ethical system reveals the source of values in the society and the foundation of those value norms, such as universality or particularity. One of the contemporary debates in Western political and philosophical theories is whether reasons for action must make reference to desires or whether, on the contrary, they need only record objective facts about the circumstances or consequences of action (Williams, 1980; Dancy, 1993). At the centre of the controversy are two interrelated issues, one political and the other epistemological. The first sets out the question, whether the idea of freedom should be explicated primarily from the standpoint of individual rights or of the community’s shared norms.24 The second sets out the question, whether it is possible to articulate a formal, universalistic (deontological) conception of justice without presupposing a substantive (historically and culturally specific) concept of the good. This section looks at major controversial approaches to explain ethical systems developed in Western political and philosophical fields in order to understand various discourses of ethics. It provides an important standpoint when understanding Japanese ethics.

Cosmopolitan approaches to ethics Traditional ethics endorse the view that morality is rationally required over both egoism and pure altruism.25 The best-known interpretations of Western ethics are those of consequentialist (utilitarian) ethics and non-consequentialist (deontologist or Kantian) ethics.26 What is striking about these approaches is that they generally represent the main approaches to ethics in the political philosophy (Brown, 1992: 24). Consequentialism determines the rightness of actions by reference to the value or disvalue found in their consequences (Arrington, 1998: 379). Many philosophers admire consequentialist utilitarianism for its conception of instrumental rationality.27 Jeremy Bentham’s principle of utility explains that people will act out of self-interest, and therefore they should design laws accordingly, in which we should act to produce the general happiness – the greatest happiness of the

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greatest number. Thus, when utilitarians talk about serving the interests of the community, they are talking of promoting the interests, therefore the pleasure and absence of pain, of the individual members in the community. There is no more to a community than individuals who compose it. The principles of morality are derived from the greatest good – they consist of instructions in how best to obtain it. At the same time, utilitarianism requires an impartial, disinterested, benevolent spectator, a person who will give no preference to her own happiness over that of others and who will pursue the goal of happiness even if she herself does not stand to gain by the effort. Thus, admonition to love one’s neighbour as oneself, the Golden Rule of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, is perfectly consistent with utilitarianism. Society should inculcate in all citizens a desire for the common good and a sense of harmony between individual happiness and the happiness of all. Several writers adopt a utilitarian approach to the justification of the rules of war, and several adopt the utilitarian approach explicitly as a foundation of international ethics.28 One of the strengths of utilitarianism is its explicit global reach. It takes the position that all human beings are to count as having the same moral weight and that in coming to a decision we have to take into account the effects on anyone, however far away he is, geographically and physiologically. Yet, there are criticisms to this approach: first, it leads us to do what may simply be wrong,29 second, it fails to take proper account of special relationships like the duties and rights we have in relation to our parents, children or friends and third, it does not do justice to what Fishkin calls ‘the robust zone of moral indifference’ – the fact that we are not expected in all our actions to promote the greatest good since there is a significant space in our lives in which what we do is for our own good (Ellis, 1983; Fishkin, 1985: 2–6). The most obvious weakness among these is the first point, whether our judgements of what is right are to be understood in this way, which is what a non-consequentialist disputes. The non-consequential (deontological) approach focuses on respect for persons, or alternatively, on respect for their rights.30 The fundamental feature of this approach is the idea that all human beings are standing in an ethical relationship with one another on the basis of them being fellow rational beings or persons. As rational beings, we are required to act on certain principles (not based on consequences) in relation to fellow human beings.31 The unshakeable foundations of morality are the duties and obligations we have towards others, which exists in the minds of those theorists. Thus the foundation should not be subjected to the uncertainties and contingencies involved in calculations of utility. The requirements of justice must always be honoured if we are to maintain the dignity and integrity of persons. A focus on respect for persons or alternatively on respect for their rights, serves as the moral lynchpin of many of the theories. Respect for others is required of us at all times. It sees the respect for individual rights and it perceives individual autonomy, moral egalitarianism and universalism as inherent in the ideal of moral rights.32 Law and political decisions are binding to the degree that they respect individual rights, hence the priority of the right or justice over the good. Most deontologists are committed to the belief that ‘there are some things which a moral man will not do, no matter what . . .’ (Fried, 1986: 7).

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The point here is that any human being as a rational agent is the object of respect, and what is universalized is behaviour by any rational being. In this approach, one is intuitively aware that certain rules of obligation are binding on us. These are law-like in nature and universally accepted. Thus deontological moral philosophy has expressed the idea that ethical conduct is acceptable from a point of view that is somehow universal (Arrington, 1998: 384). Deontologists agree that an ethical principle cannot be justified in relation to any partial or sectional group. The principles take a universal point of view and this point is often addressed in the field of humanitarian assistance.33 The main approach to ethics, consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories, allow some standards and principles on rational and individual grounds. What is important for these approaches is a theory about what ought to be the case, not about what is the case. In this theory, we have duties, whether or not most people accept this. Thus, there are universal standards of moral value true for all human beings or universal principles of moral duty and obligation binding on all. The idea of universality regarding humanitarian impulses and institutions is one of the important elements in the humanitarian idea developed in the human-centred moral philosophy that has grown in those main approaches. Relativist approaches to ethics Besides those cosmopolitan ethics represented by utilitarian and deontological views, different approaches termed relativist theories were developed in the political field.34 The relativist approaches are polar opposites from the rationalist approaches. Relativist approach to ethics have been developed in such a claim that there are cultures, ideas and values that are not consistent with the universalistic approaches reviewed in the consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches to ethics. What counts as good in one society is not the same as what counts as good in another. The relativist views that moral values vary from culture to culture – or radical form of communitarianism – the view that moral relations are constituted by established community and shared traditions. Thus, there is no universal value and obligation across the world. Most contemporary relativists make the moral truth relative to the rules adopted by an individual or his society. These rules themselves need not be thought of as true or false. As the rules of an individual or a society vary, so too will moral values. Thus, there are moral values, but it is relative and variable – moral values arise through convention, agreement and shared traditions. For example, cultural relativists claim that different cultures and societies have in fact adopted different moral codes, and ethical relativists maintain that none of these codes can be shown to be valid for anyone other than those people who subscribe to them. In the thesis, moral propositions are relatively true, relative, that is, to their advocates. Some of the relativism suggest ways in which moral judgements can have a truth value (and hence are not just emotive or prescriptive utterances) but a truth value relative to a particular group (Harman, 1977; Wong, 1984). Thus, the relativist approach focuses on political community and particular norms.35 It is part of the relativist

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thesis that the duties and obligations which members of a community have are generally towards one another and not towards human beings in general. The relativist approach depicts that moral values for individuals vary from culture to culture, and thus there are no universal values or global obligations.36 The point has been addressed in recent debates on humanitarian practice in different traditions and cultures.37 The focus became more prominent at the end of the twentieth century, when places in different parts of the world required assistance, in which humanitarianism took on a new and growing significance in different ethical systems and social constructions. Communitarianism is often presented in a stronger form that links to ethical relativism, as its underlying idea of morality arises from both socially constituted community and the implications it has for the relations which individuals have to others in the rest of the world. Ethical relations exist in terms of how they are perceived to be and are embedded in social practices and traditions. Therefore, it criticizes the rights thesis focusing on its individualist presuppositions and universalist claims. Communitarians claim that individuals cannot have a firm basis for moral judgement without getting it from a community to which one is committed. Ethical norms are justified precisely by being embedded in custom, convention and tradition. The values of people’s identities are indeed constituted by the social context of their lives. The strongest argument from a communitarian perspective is that they represent views that there are no duties pertaining to all universally but only to members or group-members. Accordingly, the idea of moral rights is an empty universalism that mistakenly detracts from the only real basis of moral claims, the community. Only on the basis of the shared conception of the good, only within the framework of a substantive ethical political community (with a specific political culture) can we lead meaningful moral lives and enjoy freedom. Although communitarian thinking supports, and is linked with ethical relativism, it presents differences. Whereas relativism precisely denies what the cosmopolitan theory asserts, communitarianism has a different primary agenda, and allows for various possible accounts of values in the world as a whole.38 Communitarianism is seen as open to the possibility of being a layer of obligation we have towards fellow human beings along with the values that arise from society or community. This is why the communitarian approach is not fully identical to relativism. Conflict? Cosmopolitanism versus relativism There are several perceivable differences between the cosmopolitan approach and the relativist approach. First, they may be in conflict over the source of moral values. Second, they may be in conflict over the nature of moral values. While the cosmopolitan says that there are moral values that are universal and obligations which are global in scope, the relativist says that such values and obligations do not exist as there is no relevant global community. In other words, there is a disagreement both about the source or validation of moral norms and about whether they exist at all at the global level. As previously discussed, the disagreement at

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this point would not be as intense in such a case as the communitarian approach that grants the existence of global values in some forms. It is often pointed out that humanitarian ideas are associated with the cosmopolitan approaches derived from Judaism and Christianity. It is probably right to say that the concept of ‘humanitarianism’ is most fully developed and applied in the framework of a cosmopolitan approach introduced in the previous section along with the social practice of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Therefore, most relativists claim that the concept is developed in a cultural way (Pratt, 1992; Weiss and Minear, 1993; Sterba, 2001). The development of contemporary political theory depicts a variety of theories that try and account for ethics in an era of globalization. The relativist account is one that challenges the dominant cosmopolitan approach in which fundamental issues, such as the source and nature of values are in question. Yet, the communitarian approach, although sharing a fundamental argument with the relativist approach, illustrates the distinction. Therefore, it denies the straightforward dichotomy. Communitarianism can be seen as open to the universalistic approach we have towards fellow human beings by virtue of our humaneness, alongside the values that arise from established society. It explains that no one theory of these can be right because it deals with the ‘truth’. Thus, the understanding of ethics in any society will require examinations through different theories or approaches, as some ideas may be culture- and history-related, while others may be temporarily more universal.

New humanitarianism in the world The predominant application of universalist moral theory gives us an impression that we witness a global civic culture, institutions, practices and code of conduct. In recent years, humanitarian ideals and practice seemingly put forward a set of norms and values to guide our relations with the rest of the world, particularly in the post-Cold War period. The process is discussed with the growing awareness of globalization. The defence of human rights attained has effectively given justification to take action among Western powers. It has developed a new humanitarianism – promote democracy and respect for human rights. The idea of globalization, in part, accounts for the phenomenon. It advocated the development of interaction between states in the course of economic activities, while in addition has necessitated the intensification of consciousness regarding the world as a whole. Different ways of thinking about economics, politics and cultural change have required imaginative responses about the future possibilities and forms of effective political regulation. Therefore the section sets out the relevance between the new dimension of human rights considerations and one of the important strands in contemporary political debates, globalization. Protection of human rights and contemporary humanitarianism Growing actions against human rights abuse in the post-Cold War era led to debates in the context of our moral considerations. As with humanitarian ideas

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and ethics, the concept of human rights needs to be studied in the frame of contemporary international political circumstances. This section, thus, pursues how human rights matter in moral considerations in contemporary international politics. Human rights: theoretical foundation The protection of human rights has been an important element of humanitarianism since the end of the Second World War (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 6). In the consideration of humanitarian ideas and action, human rights have been a central concern in the international field.39 Despite the idea of universality under international law and a growing body of international conventions, human rights are controversial in political philosophy.40 The controversy lies in whether such universal rights exist or not. The claim to universalism is characterized by the cosmopolitan approach to ethics, there are basic rights common to all humankind, debate that centres on principles and criteria. The opposite idea to universalism, particularism, is characterized by the relativist approach to ethics: it focuses on the need to deal with specific issues in space and time. Aga Khan’s idea, introduced earlier, demonstrated ‘humanitarianism’ with the specific terminology of human rights (Aga Khan, 1988: 156). Although it aimed to illustrate the concept of humanitarianism with world traditions rather than with the Western tradition, the idea of human rights itself cannot avoid political and epistemological debates.41 As previously explored in the discussion concerning main approaches to moral philosophy, the major interpretation of human rights seems to be on the premise of a tradition of universalist moral reasoning based on the cosmopolitan approach. The approach exists in rights tradition on assumptions about human nature and the human good. Feinberg’s definition represents this view: ‘I shall define “human rights” to be generically moral rights of a fundamentally important kind held equally by all human beings unconditionally and unalterably’ (Feinberg, 1973: 85). A human right is contrasted with a legal or conventional right, which exists by virtue of the laws. Here, people have conventional rights as members of a legal community. The notion of a fundamental law has a long tradition in Western societies and its judicial guardians have often played a crucial role in securing rights. The idea in this understanding shows that a human right exists by virtue of a universal moral theory that postulates the whole world as one moral sphere or community. The theory of human rights, here, exists in theories, such as the natural rights tradition, global contract theory and a rational construction of morality theory. Deontologists, then, argue that all basic human rights have three duties: first, duties to avoid depriving, second, duties to protect from standard threats to deprivation and third, duties to aid the deprived (Shue, 1996: 52). Thus, contemporary human rights discussion is embedded in what is described as the deontological tradition which derives from duty or obligations.42 The appeal to duties and obligations has gained considerable ethical and political

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support in recent years, due to distaste with growing demands for rights without reference to the corresponding responsibilities of rights claimants.43 The genesis of this expanded concern lay in the reaction against war and evil political systems that had so grossly violated human rights. The idea of universal human rights and duties meets the need for human beings to establish a moral basis, and the search for the universal ideal has increased. The utilitarian perspective, which deontologists explicitly seek to counter, must be noted for the record.44 As mentioned earlier, utilitarianism is a consequentialist or teleological approach that ‘recommends a choice of actions on the basis of consequences, and an assessment of consequences in terms of welfare’ (Sen and Williams, 1982: 3–4). Utilitarians, in their many varieties, choose the course of action that yields the highest outcome in terms of aggregate social welfare, even if it harms some individuals. Deontologists criticize utilitarians for treating individuals as means rather than ends, and as mere units in a calculus; they reject utilitarianism’s sacrifice of individual justice for social welfare. The brief review of human rights discussions shows that current world practice is underpinned, politically and epistemologically, by the main approach to moral theory – cosmopolitan approaches, specifically the deontological approach. This has been challenged in the course of a growing realization of relativist approaches and communitarian views of moral theory. Thus, the idea of human rights will be a critical point in the exploration of ethics of a society. It needs to be examined along with the moral values and social structure of the society. A new humanitarianism? The contemporary humanitarianism During the Cold War, humanitarian action was closely related to the strategic aims of the two power blocs, which prevented its impartiality from materializing. The decisions to grant assistance were to quite an extent explained by the logic of the bipolar world. After the Cold War, the opportunities for humanitarian action have significantly changed. In this ‘New World Order’, the realization of truly universal human rights without the influence of political agendas was seen to have become possible.45 The UN, paralysed by power politics during the Cold War, was accorded a major role in this new development. This new vision has been called ‘new humanitarianism’.46 As previously mentioned, in the post-Cold War era, the term ‘humanitarianism’ more often advocates the idea of human rights protection in contemporary complex crisis situations. This resulted in generating a new set of values guiding humanitarian action. It searches for political solutions, the promotion of human rights or liberal order, such as democracy and capitalism. This demonstrates that assistance has, under some circumstances, become conditional on human rights and the achievement of wider political goals. The idea of new humanitarianism is discussed in such practices substituting the new set of values for the traditional humanitarian principles of universality, impartiality, neutrality and humanity. It illustrates the shift from needs to rights and more towards designating humanitarian action into a long-term strategy so that the universal right to assist in times

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of crisis is now a qualified one.47 The consideration for human rights protection consists of new humanitarianism in the form of the new humanitarian agenda, which is explained closely with the cosmopolitan approach, that is, based on the universal nature of values. Thus, the critics of this development, which consists, in part, of a relativist approach, see the new humanitarianism as being only a cover for world powers to pursue their national interests. In particular, the military aspect of humanitarianism raises many doubts on the motivation behind such action. The new humanitarianism is closely connected with the protection of human rights, both of which are embedded in the cosmopolitan approach. Thus, this also brings in political and epistemological debates. Globalization and humanitarianism There is little doubt that globalization has a significant impact on international humanitarianism. Globalization, generally, refers to processes whereby social relations acquire relatively distanceless and borderless qualities. This means that the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies and ensuing events in one part of the world can have greater impact on people and societies far away.48 Consequently, it has become increasingly difficult to define, for example, the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy. One of the many debates that globalization has raised is the question of whether some kind of global values are emerging along with the other processes that make up globalization. What is meant by ‘global values’ is ‘a commitment to humanity as a whole rather than to individual states and/or nations’ (Held and McGrew, 2002: 429). Thus, it penetrates the current humanitarianism in consideration of ‘common humanity’ or humanitarian values pursuing the universal idea of human rights. The globalization discussion is connected with moral responsibilities over borders, such as economic and political imperatives, that mandate action against large-scale human rights abuse. The action necessitates reconciling the established structure of international politics based on sovereign rights. Our sense of moral responsibility is the most connected with the effects of globalization in debates on humanitarian intervention.49 The section, therefore, looks at the effect of globalization with regard to moral norms and governance. Global ethics? The new humanitarianism and recent humanitarian practice illustrate that political events in the 1990s have brought the issue of human rights protection and promotion to the top of the political agenda. As the abuse of human rights has become a common scene in most disastrous situations in the world, people have become more familiar with actions under the name of human rights protection. Globalization has undeniably contributed to such debates on global values and global governance in the course of the emerging new humanitarianism. Therefore, a strong cosmopolitan human rights culture has obtained greater familiarity with the help of globalization.50

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The discussion on globalization touches on every aspect of academic disciplines, including moral foundations and implications. From the globalization perspective defined earlier, globalization clearly contributes to such an idea that it may touch moral foundations. However, there are also reasons to be cautious about this perspective with regard to a common humanity or common values. On one hand, there are well-established norms of the morality of international actors, such as ICRC, Amnesty International (AI) and the Catholic Church. Yet, on the other hand, not all these norms can be supported, partly because they are in mutual conflict with each other. While the existence of universal ideas or global values has been discussed regarding the progress on some philosophical issues, the world has witnessed several nationalist movements, claiming new identities in the past decades. Globalization, including the development of international institutions, is relevant to the question ‘do universal human rights exist?’ However, it is irrelevant, if we claim that such human rights have a moral claim, based on a moral theory, about the moral status of human beings. Human rights discourse has not only become a firmly established part of international law, including covenants, declarations and so forth, but has also influenced the public culture and moral thinking or habits of moral thought of very large numbers of people. Globalization and the changes caused by it are important for the realization of human rights, but it is not the reality yet. We are able to agree that the process of globalization makes a difference in such awareness that there exist great debates on the universal idea of human rights. But we must disagree, if we take the assertion that human rights do exist to be a claim about the kind of obligations fellow human beings have towards one another in principle. It is still the point that we can only say that the more human rights become established through globalization, the more likely there will be the overriding obligations to do something about them in terms of being accepted by those who make concrete decisions. Global governance? As has been discussed, globalization fosters the question as to what extent it influences our ideas or determines our culture. This is among the central issues discussed around global governance, which deals with mechanisms in upholding global ideas and values. The World Commission on Global Governance, in its 1995 report, Our Global Neighbourhood, defines governance as ‘the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions manage their common affairs’ and contrasted this strongly with government, where the latter implied a central authority with the power to enforce its decisions (World Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 2). It is evident that the world’s interdependence is becoming more opposed to the traditional idea of the nation-state. Given the extent of global problems – environmental degradation, poverty, violence, human rights abuses and refugee displacements – it is difficult to resist the impression that we are not organizing our global public affairs effectively. Yet, this is where a dilemma exists. It brings

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a dilemma between people’s awareness of transnational issues or cross-bordered considerations that necessitate global management (or global governance) and world politics based on the nation-state. The critical issue with regard to the globalizing world or governance exists in the unperceivable aspect, that is, values, cultures or ideas, which can come along with material globalization. Globalization connects countries in many ways. The most obvious and accepted aspect of it exists in the economic field. While such aspects as value, governance and ideas in the globalization process are not yet clear, some of the phenomena brought about by globalization have significant impacts on countries. Robertson points out, globalization involves a disagreement among four aspects: the idea of transnational values or generic sense (such as humanity); the structure of international politics (world system) that is based on nation-states; national societies; and individual selves (Robertson, 1992: 27).51 Overemphasis on one of those four aspects seems to form a particular attitude or view, ‘fundamentalism’, out of or in the precondition of globalization.52 These four aspects of globalization explain that it is possible to shape a view of accepting universal values on one side, and a view of accepting strong individual or national identity on the other. The scope and depth of consciousness of the world as a single place is a crucial variable in this consideration. The explanation regarding ‘global consciousness’ reinforces this point. There is the reality of distanceless and borderless activities in social relations – the media also enforces the idea of globalization. The role played by the media is, in this sense, significant and it consolidates the idea of global community and the realization of ideas and values on the transnational level.53 However, humanitarian action or practice in the 1990s exposed the dilemma between the idea of global governance and the foundation of international politics (nation-state), while it also demonstrated the growing idea of global or transnational values.

Politics in humanitarian action One of the important issues in most debates on humanitarian action exists between the humanitarian ideal and politics that decide humanitarian action in practice. Those two combine the caring for humanity and the risk involved for the interests of the state or organizations (Sukselainen, 2002). The issue touches the principle of impartiality: the rule that non-combatants are entitled to assistance and protection on the basis of need and not according to their political affiliation, religion, race or creed. More practically, humanitarian assistance is seen to observe the principle of neutrality, that is, not taking a political position with regard to the justness of any particular cause. Yet, the difficulty of a separation of what might be called ‘humanitarian politics’ from the partisan politics of the warring parties and the foreign policy interests of other states, demonstrates one aspect of humanitarian practice (action), which involves political processes within the country and processes in relation to other countries. It is often discussed in the realist literature in political philosophy. Though it is difficult to fully distinguish the political arena and moral considerations particularly relating

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to state action, one of the undeniable dimensions of humanitarian action in the past involved decisions from a political point of view. The contemporary trend of human rights protection in humanitarian practice made it more difficult to separate the purely humanitarian action from the political dimension. Humanitarian politics here, thus, refers to all political dimensions of humanitarianism in practical terms both at international and domestic levels. Though the political dimension is not all about humanitarian activities in the world, it is one of the important scopes of the practice. The section, therefore, looks at the political dimension of humanitarianism with a particular emphasis on humanitarian activities in conjunction with the current new humanitarianism. Morality in foreign policy To a certain extent, what governs humanitarianism in practical terms in reality (ideas for policies or actions) involves the ideas influenced by political considerations. Indeed, humanitarian action as state conduct has been influenced by the arrangement of national interests, in Somalia, for example. Political considerations decide what constitutes the primary importance for the country between conflicting issues, such as sovereignty and the protection of human rights. Thus in the study of humanitarianism, considerations of political interests are a part of ‘truth’. Ideas that decide domestic national interests are key factors to understand humanitarianism in practice: policies and actions. Yet, the definition of national interests and political interests is not fixed and they evolve with international circumstances and also with efforts by politicians, NGO workers, lobbyists and scholars. National and political interests are continuously being redefined as a consequence of international contexts and other domestic contexts (the relations with the public, lobbying groups or influence by the media). There are two major approaches in explaining the relation between moral conduct and political consideration: idealist and realist approaches. Idealist view on morality in foreign policy Moral values are sometimes articulated and expressed in international relations. The moral language, here, is often used as a projection for the values of power and may be a mask for the pursuit of vested interested. In the idealism of the dominant Western powers in the interwar period, morality was taken as a projection of values which served the interests of those powers (Carr, 1939). The analysis is associated with, but is by no means limited to, a Marxist understanding of international relations as imperialism. Idealism holds that ideas have important causal effects on events in international politics. Thus, moral values are seen to be the idea for the effective promotion of certain interests since the moral value of the society may be seen as the belief or ideal of the ruling class within the society. This could be perceived by the idea of ‘development’ as economic growth through free markets, preached as universal values for all. This may be taken as a way of promoting the values important to the leading players in the global market in the developing

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countries. By the same token, in idealist terms, moral considerations or morality are considered as interests of the nation or country in the long term. As a result, in the idealist approach, the protection of human rights has become a major consideration of state acts in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, the idealist view of moral consideration in foreign policy takes morality as the projection of interests. Realist view on morality in foreign policy The realist perspective depicts an amoral conception of humanitarian actions.54 For example, though there are varieties of realism, the strongest version of realism holds that morality does not apply at all to the conduct of states in their relations with other states (McMahan, 1996). Similarly, the basic idea of structural realism perceives that ‘states are motivated primarily by the fundamental imperative of military security and frequently subordinate other goals to that end’ (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998: 171). Therefore, according to it, there is no space to recognize such moral considerations in foreign policy. Another line of argument by the realist approach in political theory takes such a position whereby few countries can totally deny the idea, as we can prove by the situation even in the post-Cold War era, which has indeed been characterized by fluctuation to find consensus about underlying threats and interests. Decisions are, after all, a part of foreign policy, where ideas are ruled by power relations, interests and manipulated strategies. Thomas G. Weiss argues: ‘Decisions about humanitarian action reflect calculations by politicians in democratic societies about the immediate interests of their administrations as well as of more timeless raisons d’état’ (Weiss, 2000: 18–19). Weiss points out, humanitarian ideas explain what drives much of the ideas in Western foreign and defence policy (Weiss, 2000: 14). In reality, apart from the political interests of the parties to the conflict, the participation of external powers, donor states and organizations has relied upon ideas of political interest particularly during the Cold War. In fact, if donors do not see their vital interests as being threatened, they can be unwilling to accept risks and expenses for getting involved. Humanitarian action was closely related to ideas that guide strategic aims of the two power blocs, which prevented its impartiality from materializing. Decisions on humanitarian assistance were explained by ideas influenced by the logic of the bipolar world. It raises a complex moral issue, that is, political ideas or beliefs will be regarded as intervention justified under certain circumstances (Wright, 1979: 191). In addition, debates on humanitarian action during the Cold War received less attention at the expense of wider social and cultural considerations that particularly focused on the military-political discussion (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 47). Critics of this development share the realist view of the new humanitarianism as being only a cover for world powers to pursue their national interests, that is, based on military security. The military aspect of humanitarian interventions raises many doubts about the motivation behind such action. In reality, political and humanitarian aspects have become even more entangled in the new type of humanitarian crises.

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Conclusion Theoretical and conceptual bases of humanitarianism This chapter explored the nature of key concepts and theories in Western political and philosophical debates in order to obtain the analytical basis of humanitarianism. The exploration of humanitarian values and practices in the Western tradition offered an analytical framework to uncover humanitarianism in other cultural and social settings. In order to understand socially structured factors, the study requires the exploring of two elements of the society: ethical values and social construction. In addition, the study needs to look at humanitarian action in practice including the political dimension. This includes understanding a new dimension of humanitarianism, that is, human rights considerations. These explanations make it possible to reveal factors and forces that contribute to shaping humanitarianism in each society. The social construction will be studied through the cultural and historical development of ethical values in the society. Moral principles are explored in cultural and historical contexts of the society, where actors may innately exercise in their conduct. The ethical systems have been discussed in various approaches in political philosophy. Cosmopolitan approach including utilitarian and deontologist views and the relativist approach that covers communitarian view feature in debates to explain current humanitarianism. The contemporary humanitarianism in practice seems to be dominated by the cosmopolitan approach, specifically deontologists’ interpretation – moral obligations for the universally recognized humanity and human rights protection. Relativistic values tend to be excluded from consideration in the current humanitarian field. The discussion demonstrated that only a fraction of the contemporary humanitarian practices addresses these concerns and is relevant to communitarian societies. Exploration of humanitarian action is another important constituent of this study. Contemporary humanitarianism cannot be separated from the current world phenomenon, globalization. This is one of the important social circumstances in current world politics. The protection of human rights and the application of humanitarian values in the era of globalization brought a new humanitarianism in the post-Cold War era with the development of the New World Order. Thus, a crucial part of this study includes exploration of humanitarian action in the new world system and trends. This necessitates an examination of humanitarian action from both normative and political points of view. The exploration of humanitarian assistance explains practices of moral ideals whereas decisions for actions often demonstrate political considerations. Thus, the decisions for action often involve domestic and international political process and practice. State decisions for humanitarian action explain a part of humanitarianism with regard to morality in foreign policy. Political interactions within the country and in its international relations provide a critical way of revealing the humanitarianism of the country. In an important way, realism and idealism offer a practical view of this point: one offers what the other does not. Realism and

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idealism can be understood as two sides of a single debate: whether principles or consequences have priority in guiding the conduct of states. Humanitarian actions, thus, involve an important and continuing dialogue to examine humanitarianism in practical terms. The chapter clarified the subject matter of elements in given social contexts to analyse humanitarianism by highlighting some of the major issues and debates. It also raised various questions about humanitarian values, theories and practices dominantly employed from moral values and debates developed in Western countries. This emphasizes a clear need for philosophers to address the specific but varied issues of humanitarianism in diverse social and philosophical contexts in order to propose adapted frameworks and approaches that might be more relevant than existing theories on contemporary humanitarianism. This volume addresses humanitarian values, the idea of human rights and humanitarianism in the specific social contexts of Japanese society, which does not share cultural roots and political and philosophical debates with Western countries. It uncovers Japanese humanitarianism and reveals common features and distinctions. The exploration of humanitarianism in Western contexts and debates in this chapter channels the examinations and analyses of humanitarianism in Japanese contexts and debates.

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Genesis of Japanese humanitarianism Ethics in Japanese society

Introduction Chapter 1 showed that the dominant interpretation of humanitarian values and the practice arises from the socio-cultural characteristics of Western countries, where the concepts and theories of humanitarianism were first developed. One of the significant characteristics of Western humanitarianism exists in the global character based on the universal nature of humanitarian values and in the recent inclusion of the universal human rights idea. It fosters questions around whether the Japanese share ideas about humanity (humanitarian values) and universality and whether they put these ideas into practice. Also, it raises the question of whether Japanese humanitarian ideas hold unique features that stem from cultural origins and social practices that are specific to Japan. When considering the distinctive characteristics of Japanese society and social practice, it appears that Japanese humanitarian ideas contain several distinctive elements. Hence, an exploration of the historical and cultural development of humanitarian ideas in Japan is required in this study. It needs to consider the Japanese social structure in order to fully understand Japanese moral ideals, ethics and the social practices in their cultural contexts. By looking at Japanese thought, culture, social systems and traditions, this chapter will explore ethics in Japanese society. It aims to integrate an account of action with an analysis of social structure. The social structure was briefly explained in Chapter 1. It has two categories of elements: those that must be present in any society as they represent the necessary conditions required for the persistence of social life. It also comprises the conditions required for the continuation of a particular type of society. Thus, this chapter will examine relevant features of Japanese society in order to gain an understanding of Japanese humanitarian ideas and practice. This will make it possible to discover some of the indigenous and distinctive elements that are innately exercised by the people. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section considers Japanese social construction relating to the foundation of Japanese morality. This includes moral ideals, moral principles and the applicability of moral values to a form that is universal in nature. The second section explores the Japanese ethical system through an examination of the source of values and their application within Japanese social

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contexts. The section also looks at humanitarian activities undertaken by the Japanese during the modern period. The third section explores both Japanese social construction and the ethical system relating to the period following the Second World War. This aids an understanding of how the Japanese ethical system evolved and the nature of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism. The section includes discussions on the Japanese idea of human rights, thereby aiding our understanding of socially structured factors that influence contemporary Japanese systems of thought. From these examinations, the chapter attempts to reveal the genesis of Japanese humanitarianism and the structural elements of Japanese society.

Genesis of Japanese ethics From ancient times, Japanese society has had influences from both Buddhist and Confucian teachings in addition to the Japanese indigenous social tradition, Shinto.1 Shintoism stems from the explanation for the existence of the Emperor (Tenno) in which Japan was perceived both in abstruse literature and in popular mythology as the ‘land of the gods’ (Shinkoku). For example, the first constitution introduced in Japan in 604 was rooted in the ideas of Confucianism and Buddhism. The constitution was created by Prince Shotoku.2 Ideas from Confucianism and Buddhism were combined into the constitution. The Crown Prince personally drafted and promulgated a constitution consisting of seventeen articles. They outlined acceptable behaviour of the people. For example, Article 2 said ‘Worship Buddhism’, Article 14 said, ‘Not to be filled with envy at a person’s envy’ and Article 6 states, ‘. . . Men of this kind are all wanting in fidelity to their lord, and in benevolence toward the people. From such an origin great civil disturbances arise’. Thus, Japanese people were influenced by teachings of Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintoism concerning ethical values and the way of everyday living. Japanese core social traditions, such as familism, feudalism and gerontocracy prove the influences from these philosophies (Kamishima, 1997: 24).3 These indigenous values maintained since ancient times were more treasured in the Edo period, during which Japan took the closed-door policy for nearly 300 years. Under the closed-door policy, only limited places in Japan (Nagasaki) were open to foreign ships. Therefore the society was insulated from foreign ideas and cultures until the Meiji period. As a result, before ideas were introduced from Western countries in the Meiji period, Japanese indigenous ethical ideas were developed with Confucian and Buddhist influences and embedded in social practice. Thus, finding Japanese indigenous moral norms in society takes us back to the feudal period.4 In this period, social traditions were embedded in the feudal social system and practice. This section explores Japanese moral ideals, ethical ideas and their cultural and historical origin within its social system and practice. Foundation of Japanese ethics The teachings of Confucianism and Buddhism explain the origin of Japanese ethical and moral ideals. These teachings were integrated into the social practice

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through, for instance, the constitution in ancient times5 and a code of conduct among warriors in the feudal period. A dominant view in Japanese political philosophy notes that Japanese indigenous or traditional ideas were developed particularly in the Edo period (1603–1867) in feudal times during which Japan took a series of directives enforcing a policy of national seclusion, later called sakoku, and the society was insulated from foreign influences for almost 300 years.6 Therefore, the social practice and ideas developed in this period help us to understand its native elements. One of the records that clarifies moral ideals and ethical ideas among the Japanese in the feudal period is a code of conduct among warriors, called Bushido (the way of warriors).7 The Bushido arose from practices among the warrior class.8 The Bushido principles are based on the national tradition, Shintoism and the philosophy of Confucianism and Buddhism. Confucianism, specifically Neo-Confucianism – the official guiding philosophy of the Tokugawa time in the Edo period (1603–1867) – was introduced into Japan from China by Zen Buddhists in the medieval period. Buddhism was also introduced from China (Kudara) in the sixth century, which developed into the national Buddhism. In spite of being originally imported, Confucianism and Buddhism took on a marked indigenous hue in that they gradually reflected social practices over the centuries. Besides the indigenous religion of Shintoism, these religions have coexisted harmoniously and have wielded mutual influence over each other (Lehmann, 1982: 28). Thus, the combination of those schools of thought had formed the code of warrior values both behaviourally and morally. By the mid-nineteenth century, the Bushido standard had become the general ideal. According to Lehmann, the legal abolition of the samurai class in 1871 made the Bushido even more the property of the entire nation (Lehmann, 1982: 166). In the public educational system, with the emperor replacing the feudal lord as the object of loyalty and sacrifice, the Bushido became the foundation of ethical training among the Japanese. Nitobé Inazo who analysed the Bushido in the beginning of the twentieth century stated that it is the Bushido that underlay the traditional Japanese spirit, which seems to do more than just peer back into the past.9 Many works about Bushido agree that the teachings in the Bushido underlie even contemporary Japanese ideas including ethical ideas.10 Like most Japanese customs and traditions, moral values developed in the feudal period had great significance for the understanding of Japanese moral norms. Moral norms and ideals in the Bushido will help us to identify indigenous elements of Japanese ethical ideas. Bushido: an ethical construction Ethical ideas or moral values among the Japanese reflect the social system of the feudal period. Japanese society was overwhelmingly patriarchal in the feudal system. All warriors swore an oath of allegiance to the daimyo (the feudal lord of the Edo era). The relationship between daimyo and samurai was not contractual but moral (Nitobé, 1905). The social context in this period explains more about

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this relationship. Kamishima explains that as a result of the constant threat of famine in this period the warriors required the protection from the daimyo. As long as the warrior swore loyalty, the daimyo had a duty to protect him. The relationship is explicated as ‘obedience and protection’ in which ‘humanity’ worked (Kamishima, 1997: 51). This explains how the idea of ‘humanity’ arose in Japanese society and was practiced in the Japanese social system. Kamishima describes this relationship as a foundation of Japanese morality (Kamishima, 1997: 51). The moral relationship in the feudal period was employed to maintain the social order in the feudal social system. The relationship, ‘obedience and protection’, not only applied between warrior and daimyo but also to any other segment of the society (Kamishima, 1997: 51–2). According to Kamishima, this moral relationship represents all relations in Japanese social life in the feudal system. This relationship between warrior and daimyo was applied in all other classes in the feudal social system, for example, between employed farmers and their landlords and between upper and lower class warriors. Accordingly, Japanese moral ideals and principles were originally developed in the feudal social system represented by the ‘obedience and protection’ relationship between samurai and daimyo. Though Bushido is specifically for warriors and aimed to establish a moral order as a part of the Shogun (military command)11 settlement and often introduced in terms of its behavioural rules of fighting practice for samurai, it also pays as much importance to spiritual and ethical teachings as to the behavioural rules. In addition to the moral ideals in feudal times, moral norms in the Bushido are also products of the times when Japan was at peace at the end of the feudal period. In peace time, the role of the warrior became a major philosophical problem, since warriors had stationed themselves at the top of the socio-political hierarchy, and yet effectively did no real work, since there were no longer any wars. The warriors of this period were bureaucrats and administrators, not fighting men; the motivation held in common by all those who wrote about the Bushido was a search for the proper role of the warrior class in a society without war.12 Consequently, the Bushido is considered as a compilation of moral codes or principles developed in order to maintain an overall social order in both war and peace time. The moral norms and values in the Bushido were considered as universal among warriors. However, it is questionable whether principles in the Bushido were considered as universal to all Japanese. In Yamaga Soko’s analysis, warriors were upholders of social order who, by their example, kept the fabric of society intact (Yamaga, 1656). The concept of ‘duty’ or ‘righteousness’ was a key one in his writings on the Bushido. By acting righteously and fulfilling his duty in the microcosm of his own station in life, the warrior set an example for the common people, thus influencing favourably the macrocosm of the domain and the country at large. Therefore, it is from the late Edo period that the ethical norms of the samurai were imposed also on the wider population.13 Indeed, Japanese warriors were considered not only as good knights in terms of their fighting skills but also as knowledgeable individuals who have obtained

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high standards of education, manner and culture (Lehmann, 1982: 170). Yamaga’s analysis of the Bushido concludes that the warrior had two interconnected functions: to lead a life in which even the most insignificant gesture is dictated by his sense of righteousness and justice, and thus to constitute, in his person, a model of morally correct behaviour for the common people. Warriors were the top layer of society, far removed in every respect from the heimin (commoners), hence they carried the responsibility of setting a moral example. If we look at Nitobé’s work, he also argues that: Thus far we have brought into view only a few of the more prominent peaks which rise above the range of knightly virtues, in themselves so much more elevated then the general level of our national life. As the sun in its rising first tips the highest peaks with russet hue, and then gradually casts its rays on the valley below, so the ethical system which first enlightened the military order drew in the course of time followers from amongst the masses. . . . No social caste could resist the diffusive power of moral influence. (1905: 158) He analysed the influence of ethical ideas in the Bushido: although the warrior class kept themselves socially aloof from the people, they set a moral standard for the common people and guided them by their example (Nitobé, 1905: 160–3).14 Nitobé’s observation shows that Bushido teachings and principles filtered down to different social classes and acted as a leaven among the masses, furnishing the moral standard for the whole of Japanese society. Therefore, the feudal period, particularly the Edo period, developed and systematized public morality through the code of conduct for warriors, Bushido, to which it was incumbent upon every individual to adhere, ‘a universal soul of all Japanese citizens’, according to Nitobé, both at the level of various organizations and groups. In time, the warrior principles including ethical ideas became an aspiration and inspiration to the nation at large. As a result, ethical ideas and moral ideals in the Bushido were considered as universal values of all Japanese people. The ideas that developed in the Bushido owed very much to a strict and explicit code of ethics in addition to the behavioural norms of the warriors. For that reason, although the Bushido was supposed to establish a moral order as a part of the Shogun (military command) settlement, the moral code of conduct of the Bushido later became ethical principles that all sections of society adhered to when its final rationalization was made in the seventeenth century.15 Moreover, this basic pattern of morality remained operative in the modern period. Then what are the ethical principles of the Bushido? What conduct is considered as moral? The next section explores the principles of the Bushido. They have been analysed in many works in the past. Renowned works, such as Nitobé’s Bushido, Yamaga Soko’s ‘The way of the Samurai’ and Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s Hagakure, are helpful to understand the ethical principles of the Bushido.

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Bushido principles Factors which make up Bushido were few and simple. Though simple, Bushido created a way of life that was to nourish a nation through its most troubling times, through civil wars, despair and uncertainty. The wholesome unsophisticated nature of our warrior ancestors derived ample food for their spirit from a sheaf of commonplace and fragmentary teachings, gleaned as it were on the highways and by ways of ancient thought and, stimulated by the demands of the age, formed from these gleanings a new and unique way of life. (Nitobé, 1905: 20) As previously noted, the Bushido principles consist of Japanese national tradition, Shintoism and the philosophy of Zen Buddhism and Confucianism (Lehmann, 1982). As these religions have coexisted harmoniously and have wielded mutual influence over each other, exploring the ethical philosophy of these three religions, respectively, will help us to understand the overall ethical principles of the Bushido and Japanese morality developed in this period. Confucianism conferred the most powerful doctrines of moral philosophy on the Bushido. They gave Bushido beliefs in relation to the human world, the environment and family.16 The family is a major concern of Confucianism, as the family and kinship system provides the structure of the value application. The family and kinship relationship is the locus of most of Confucian values, such as filial piety and fraternal respect (McMullen, 1980: 280). In the Confucian view, harmony is maintained by a reciprocal relationship of justice between a superior, who is urged to be benevolent, and a subordinate, who is urged to be obedient and to observe propriety. The Japanese feudal social system illustrated that the idea of humanity was developed in this reciprocal relationship. This is why Confucian ethical ideas are group oriented, that is, focused on what one can do for the group, family, country or nation. In addition, Confucian ideas advocate virtue ethics that stress filial obligation – the state should be thought of as the family writ large. However, it is important to note that the Japanese kinship system largely retained its indigenous character in the society. The status of elders (those older than oneself ), particularly parents, was less elevated in Japan compared with China (McMullen, 1980: 280). The content of ethical values of filial piety is, therefore, also likely to differ as the Japanese kinship system largely preserved its indigenous character. The Confucian moral philosophy offers a negative version of the humanitarian ideas: ‘what you don’t want to be done to yourself, do not do to others’.17 An important teaching of Confucianism, Jen (great doctrine of humanity) represents a humanitarian principle:18 ‘all men are brothers’ (Inada, 1990: 100). In this sense, humanity is not a mere abstract concept but one that extends concretely throughout the whole of sentient existence and leads to a concern for the well-being of others. Therefore, the Confucian influence shaped a comprehensive system in the Bushido that stresses ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’. ‘Benevolence’ and ‘righteousness’ are two main principles interpreted as an obligation or a duty of the Bushido. Yamaga Soko’s writing on the Bushido stresses the importance of the samurai’s

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‘duty’.19 He analysed the concept of Bushido and gave an outline of the duty of the samurai: The way of the samurai is placing himself under the control of his lord, to follow absolutely unto death. (. . .) If he cannot give up treasures and finds pleasure in material possessions, then he is necessarily deficient as regards weapons and arms. In time of stress he will be almost unable to forget his home. (Earl, 1964: 40) Obedience to authority was stressed but duty came first even if it entailed violation of statue law (Nitobé, 1905). In the Bushido, serving one’s lord unto death (loyalty) was the supreme honour that required a filial piety originating in the feudal system. Here also, it is important to note a distinction between Chinese and Japanese Confucian ideas. In Chinese Confucian terms, the filial piety has priority over loyalty.20 In Japan, on the other hand, where the relationship between these two values was extensively discussed, the opposite view was usually taken (McMullen, 1980: 281). This view is summarized by the Tokugawa period scholar Kadano Azumamaro: The teachings of Japan attach great importance to the relationship between ruler and subject. In China, great importance is attached to the moral duties owed to parents and the relationship between father and son. In our country too it is not, of course, that we neglect the moral duties owed to parents, but we do attach a very special value to the moral duty owed to the ruler. Birds, beasts, insects and fish have fathers, sons and brothers. Only man has rulers and subjects. (Ota, 1968: 226) In this instance, a true samurai would prove his sincerity and expiate his crime against the government by subsequently taking his own life. This reversal of the Chinese Confucian priority of filial piety over loyalty is rooted in the nature of Japanese society. If we look at the level of the individual, the concern remains very much with social and family contexts (McMullen, 1980: 280).21 In the Confucian philosophy the individual has little moral meaning outside these categories. An individual is viewed as essentially a nexus of particularistic, interpersonal obligations and it is by the discharge of these obligations that he attains moral stature. Therefore, the precise content of the moral duties of an individual is determined by the social framework in which he lives. Thus, even if formally the same Confucian moral concepts are used in China and Japan, and although the two countries share the communitarian character for their moral conducts, the difference between these two societies is likely to impose a difference on the content of these concepts in practice. In this sense, understanding Japanese ethical ideas requires addressing the social framework, other religions and traditions. Buddhist ethics, which also explains Japanese moral philosophy, was introduced in Japan from China (Kudara) in the sixth century, which developed into the national Buddhism. It stresses on solidarity and a negative version of humanitarian

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ideas. In Buddhist teachings, there are five precepts that imply a code of behaviour and responsibility for the right treatment of others, whether these are humans or animals.22 A basic principle of Buddhist ethics is that ‘all beings are alike in disliking pain and in wanting to be happy, so that we should not inflict on another being what we would not like done to ourselves’ (Harvey, 2000: 120). To be more concrete, with regard to humanitarian ideas, an important part of the philosophical basis of Buddhist ethics consists of overcoming suffering (dukkha) both in oneself and others (Harvey, 2000: 33). It is a central preoccupation of Buddhism, and the one towards which the ethical action contributes. Consequently, the natural human feeling of sympathy (anukampa) for others – solidarity with them in a shared situation of suffering – is elicited and deepened (Aronson, 1980: 1–23; Keown, 1992: 73–7). Accordingly, the importance of ‘comparing oneself with others’ is emphasized, for both self and the other ‘yearn for happiness and recoil from pain’ (Harvey, 2000: 34). The happiness of self and other is intertwined, so that the concern to lessen one’s own suffering goes handin-hand with lessening that of others. Helping others means helping oneself (in terms of good qualities of mind that are developed), and helping oneself (by purifying one’s character) enables one to help others better. A native Japanese tradition, Shintoism, stems from the explication for the Emperor (Tenno) in which Japan was perceived both in esoteric literature and in popular mythology as the ‘land of the gods’ (shinkoku). The Emperor had been the symbolic embodiment of national independence, historic continuity, unity and harmony within the government and between rulers and ruled.23 Thus, Shinto is a purely indigenous religion with its stress on ancestor worship. One remarkable fact deserving notice at this point is that Shintoism, which is considered as the official embodiment of the national spirit of Japan, does not assert itself as doctrinally independent of either Confucianism or Buddhism. The most probable reason for this is that Shintoism has no philosophy of its own to stand on; its own consciousness and existence are awakened only when it comes into contact with one of the others, Confucianism and Buddhism, and thereby it learns how to express itself.24 Therefore ethical ideas or principles of the Bushido owe much to Confucian and (Zen) Buddhist teachings.25 However, Shintoism plays a role in furnishing a framework for the Japanese ethical system as a state system rather than providing its philosophical disciplines. This will be discussed in a later section. Those ethical ideas particularly from Confucian and Buddhist teachings obviously explain the ethical principles and moral values of the Bushido. In the Bushido, there are eight highly respected principles (Yamamoto, 1980): (1) to develop a sympathetic understanding of people (Jin), (2) to preserve correct ethics (Gi), (3) to show loyalty to one’s master (Chu), (4) to respect and to care for one’s parents (Ko), (5) to show respect for others (Rei), (6) to enhance wisdom by broadening one’s knowledge (Chi), (7) to be truthful at all times (Shin) and (8) to care for the aged and those of a humble situation (Tei). These Bushido codes that defined the conduct of the warrior class were bound by the concepts of giri and ninjo, which represent more indigenous social practices from the ancient times in Japan.26 Giri refers to the sense of social obligation that

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every individual is supposed to develop in life.27 Ninjo refers to the natural human feelings of love, sympathy and sorrow, which everyone is assumed to have from birth. Obligation and commitment to the lord of the clan (daimyo) took precedence over all other concerns, even the concerns of the warrior’s own life and personal family. Giri and ninjo ensured that a warrior would willingly sacrifice his life for the protection or security of the daimyo and his cause. If we look at ethical principles in the Bushido explored by Nitobé’s work and that of others who built upon it, all of the works stressed upon important principles that were impacted from Confucian and Buddhist teachings: justice, courage, benevolence, politeness, veracity, honour and loyalty (Yamaga, 1656; Nitobé, 1905; Yamamoto, 1980). Giri and ninjo are statements that encompass all concepts of loyalty, dedication and respect, through enforcing a sense of obligation. These expressions are still commonly used in contemporary Japanese society. This obligation (giri) becomes a binding ideal dedicated to the betterment of humanity (ninjo), whatever the cost to the individual. Therefore the supreme virtue or the princely act in the Bushido is ‘benevolence’, and the primary virtue exists in ‘loyalty’ from superior to inferior. Ethical ideas in the Bushido demonstrate benevolence to other people as an important moral conduct that stems from these ideas represented by giri and ninjo. Acts of benevolence are the highest form of virtue, which all people, particularly warriors, were expected to abide by. Referring to Nitobé’s and others’ works, ethical principles in the Bushido share the essence of humanitarian ideas developed in the Judaeo-Christian tradition introduced in Chapter 1. The idea of ‘concern for the well-being of others’ familiar in the Western tradition is found in the Bushido disciplines as, for example, ‘help or care for the aged and those of a humble situation’, particularly from the Confucian and Buddhist ethics of ‘human solidarity in the light of human suffering’ and ‘duties that we owe to all humans’. An act of benevolence is a duty or an obligation according to certain moral and spiritual ideals in the Bushido as well, applying to Nitobé’s words with regard to Bushido teachings, ‘looking after the welfare and happiness of the commonalty; emphasizing the practice of virtue for its own sake’ (Nitobé, 1905: 160). Therefore, the Japanese essentially do share the humanitarian ideas or moral principles developed in Europe. However, Japanese humanitarian principles were, as in most other Confucian-influenced societies, based on the practice in the community or social entity rather than that of individuals. This implies that, even among Confucian-influenced countries, the precise content of those values in practice depends on the social framework that is unique to each country. This point will be discussed in a later section. The next section looks at whether those ethical ideas developed in the feudal period were considered as a universal value among the Japanese. Did ideas in the feudal period die away in the modernization period? Were ethical principles replaced by new ideas or values from other countries in the course of modernization? The idea of universality Previous sections revealed that Japanese ethical principles developed in the feudal period and subsequently share the essence of humanitarian ideas developed in

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Judaeo-Christian countries. The questions for us, then, are: whether the Japanese humanitarian ideas share the idea of universality, and also whether the humanitarian values were considered as universal values applicable to humanity as a whole. Do humanitarian principles developed in Japan enjoy a duty of benevolence and service to humanity to all? In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, humanitarian ideas are considered as universal, from which Kantian duty is extracted. Fukuzawa Yukichi, a prominent thinker in the Meiji period and Nitobé are those who addressed the issue of duties of humanity as a whole and the idea of universality regarding humanitarian principles in Japanese society. This section looks at these two questions through some of the works written by Japanese thinkers: whether Japanese humanitarian principles enjoy a duty of benevolence to humanity as a whole, and whether the ethical principles were taken as universal, transhistorically and transculturally. Duty to humanity as a whole? During the Meiji period, when Western values entered Japan, there were leading thinkers and politicians who discussed Japanese morality and national moral philosophy in comparison with Western moral values.28 Fukuzawa Yukichi is one of the most renowned thinkers of this period. His works help us understand issues of universality and the duty as well as the principles of Japanese moral ideals. Exploring these issues also provides an insight into the social structure that explains Japanese humanitarian ideas as a whole. In the early Meiji period, Fukuzawa Yukichi,29 the most influential individual outside the Meiji government service, stated in An Outline of A Civilisation Theory that Japanese ethical ideas have not changed since ancient times (Fukuzawa, 1875: 93 cited in Maruyama, 1986: 165–7). This argument is firmly based on the work of Henry Thomas Buckle, The History of Civilisation in England (Maruyama, 1986: 93). In the explanation of ethics and human knowledge, Fukuzawa divided ‘morality’ into two types: private morality and public morality (Fukuzawa, 1875: 83 cited in Maruyama, 1986: 140–1). Private morality exists independently in one’s mind and refers to such virtues as faithfulness, purity and modesty. Public morality works in human relationships and refers to such virtues as justice, honour and bravery. Fukuzawa’s idea of universality exists in those principles, yet, according to him, how people apply those principles reveals distinctions between Japan and Western societies. Moral conduct should not depend on criticisms of the public or society, although Confucian ethics are based on social and family categories, that is, communitarian characteristics, where one’s private morality is effective only in accordance with the social values and units as a whole. Fukuzawa argued that the gap between private morality and public morality is filled with one’s knowledge (Fukuzawa, 1875: 89 cited in Maruyama, 1986: 157). Here, Fukuzawa’s observation on Japanese moral ideals explains that Japanese ethical ideas were appreciated by only limited close social units rather than having a wider application for benevolence to humanity as a whole. Japanese ethical ideas were valid in a small circle of immediate relationships, such as between family members or friends

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(Fukuzawa, 1875: 124–30 cited in Maruyama, 1986: 263–82).30 Fukuzawa’s argument was based on the assumption that the distinction between Japanese and Western morality stems from the difference in their knowledge that determines the expansion of one’s personal morality to the wider entity, that is, benevolence to humanity as a whole. He emphasized the importance of the knowledge that extends the private morality to the public morality that helps to civilize the society. Fukuzawa’s view explains that Japanese humanitarian ideas entailed duties owing to the particular immediate relationship, within family and friend relationship or further community and nation related circles. He pointed out the difficulties of applying Japanese humanitarian ideas to all in society since moral values in Japan, characterized by communitarian features, are primarily bound to the close relationship. The ethical ideas developed in communitarian societies entail great difficulties when one is required to apply them to all relationships in society. Referring to Fukuzawa’s arguments, the application of humanitarian ideas in Japanese society was liable to function, predominantly, in certain close relationships. This is one of the significant differences in the application and practice of humanitarian values between Western countries and Japan: whereas humanitarian ideas developed in Europe enjoy a duty of benevolence and service to humanity as a whole, Japanese humanitarian ideas are applied mainly within direct or close relationships. However, this discussion may not be applicable to the current Japanese society since the morality in the family system is no longer as effective as in the modern period. Nevertheless, Fukuzawa’s argument of Japanese morality was the foremost analysis in the early Meiji period and his view played a leading role in the national education of public morality by the Meiji government. Nitobé’s analysis of giri is comparable to Fukuzawa’s view. Explaining the giri as no more than a duty, Nitobé argued that its etymology, through love, should be the only motive in our conduct, for instance, towards our parents. There must be some other authority to enforce filial piety; and people formulated this authority in giri (Nitobé, 1905: 26). Therefore he added that since love does not rush into acts of virtue, alternatives must be held by one’s intellect to persuade one of the necessities of acting aright (Nitobé, 1905: 26). Nitobé confirmed that this is true of any other moral obligation. Thus, he concluded that, as a motive, Japanese ethical ideas are considerably inferior to the Christian doctrine of love (Nitobé, 1905: 26–7).31 Nitobé’s arguments also illustrate one of the characteristics of Japanese humanitarian ideas: the limited application of humanitarian values in their practice. Taking Fukuzawa’s statements and Nitobé’s discussion about giri into account, the application of ethical ideas among the Japanese was limited in scope unlike the fair and universal application of humanitarian ideas to humanity as a whole. Trans-national value? Both Fukuzawa and Nitobé considered that humanitarian principles are universal irrespective of race and nationality. In his work, An Outline of A Civilisation Theory, Fukuzawa expressed his idea of universality of moral principles.

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He argued the idea of universality and immutability of ethical principles from time to time in his work. He argued that whether it is Christian, Islamic or Confucian, ethical principles are almost matching (Fukuzawa, 1875: 92 cited in Maruyama, 1986: 168).32 In comparison with Christian humanitarian ideas, he added that the humanitarian principles are not exactly the same between Japan and Christian countries, yet, there is no considerable distinction between them in that both take right things as right and wrong things as wrong (Fukuzawa, 1875: 106 cited in Maruyama, 1986: 203). Nitobé also raised the question, whether the principles were identical to those developed in Western countries in his work Bushido (Nitobé, 1905: 168). His answer to the question was that: ‘In studying the various virtues instilled by Bushido, we have drawn upon European sources for comparison and illustrations, and we have seen that no one quality of character was its exclusive patrimony’ (Nitobé, 1905: 169). Similarly to Fukuzawa’s arguments, Nitobé explains that ethical principles in the Bushido are similar to those in Europe in its values. While he admitted the influences and roles played by the West (i.e. Christian missionaries) regarding moral education, he upheld moral teachings in the precepts of the Bushido (Nitobé, 1905: 172).33 He pointed out that Christian ideas introduced in Japan after the Meiji Restoration did not represent a new religion in the moral development of the people. Rather it is an ‘old story’ that is found in their hearts, irrespective of race and nationality.34 Nitobé’s view represents the ideas that although the influence from outside of Japan is substantial, the fundamental principles remain the same throughout the history and across nationality and race. Nitobé expressed important principles that permeate humanitarianism in his work, Bushido, that is the idea of humanity and impartiality, in particular. He recognized the existence of our common values for the benefit of all those who share humanity. As he argued, the ethical ideas and moral ideals governing the life and ideas of the Japanese warriors bear similarities to the European code of chivalry, such as ‘loyalty’, ‘morality’, ‘justice’ and ‘truth’, though they involve differences as well (Nitobé, 1905: 190).35 Yet, both European chivalry and Bushido share some common ethical or humanitarian ideas. In addition, his comparison of ethical ideas in Bushido with Christian teachings clarifies how those ideas are fundamentally shared at the primal point although it appears different on the surface (Nitobé, 1905: 190). Nitobé’s arguments emphasize that moral principles between them involve fundamental similarity in form; they are applicable to everyone and are general; they do not mention or refer to specific people.36 Whilst both Nitobé and Fukuzawa emphasized the similarity of ethical principles between Japanese and Western countries at the fundamental level and pointed out their universal character, both recognized the distinctive character of Japanese moral practice or application. As both of them clarified, Japanese ethical ideas in practice show that moral conducts worked out as communal duties rather than duties to humanity as a whole. It explains that those principles function as particular norms in the society. Moral values and ideals are and must be articulated within and by each community or social group based on its specific realities and needs.

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The Japanese practice of moral duties to only close relationships, specified by Nitobé and Fukuzawa (discussed in the former section), must be structured by shared values and mutual concerns. Communal duties rather than duties to humanity as a whole stem from particular norms rather than being rooted in the idea of universal humanity. However, this does not deny the possibility that society restrains those moral norms with some universal features in their shared values or public good, and also this does not deny the fact that Japanese humanitarian ideas share those principles developed in Western countries. It could be said that the application of those principles can change in the social contexts in each period of time. This leaves those principles to be temporarily universal in their common understanding or shared values. Nitobé’s analysis seems to take the universal elements in the shared understanding or common values as universal idea of humanity. Both Nitobé and Fukuzawa are recognized as cosmopolitan thinkers in that both had a thorough understanding of Western tradition and experiences in Western cultures. Thus, their ideas reflect ideals that a universal idea of humanity and the tradition are necessary to lead Japanese society to attain civilization. Nevertheless, their arguments are noteworthy in that there were those who recognized a universal character of humanitarian ideas in early Japanese history, and in that their ideas are widely referred to even in the current discussions of Japanese political philosophy.37

Japanese ethical system The explorations hitherto have revealed the very foundation and nature of Japanese humanitarian values. They highlighted the Japanese social structure, through which Japanese morality has developed and that shaped Japanese ways of applying these values into practice. A prominent distinction seems to exist between the moral judgements and practices of Japanese people compared with those in Europe. This is partly explained by Japanese social systems, an example of which being the Shogun system of the feudal period. As is often stated, there were two critical changes in Japan’s history that created distinctive structural elements within society. These were the Meiji Restoration and Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. Traditional patterns of interpersonal relations were hugely affected by these two events. In the Meiji period, Japanese people encountered foreign (Western) ethical values and practice. The Meiji Restoration heralded modernization by ending the closed-door policy and beginning the Westernization of Japan. Japan moved rapidly from medieval feudalism into the modern world. After opening its doors to the rest of the world during the mid-nineteenth century, Japan studied and absorbed scientific and technological advancements in addition to social institutions developed in the West. These were utilized in the building of a modern nation. Accordingly, Japanese modernization went hand-in-hand with Westernization (Kamishima, 1997: 181). It was undertaken by introducing systems and logic of a different cultural climate. Nevertheless, Japanese mass society is said to retain a certain cultural dimension of its own (Kamishima, 1997: 188).38

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This section, thus, explores the ethical systems and values of the modern period. It will portray the social system of the period and explain how the modernization process, specifically the inclusion of Western values, affected Japanese indigenous ideas and social practices. The first section investigates the social system that influenced ethical decisions among the people following the Meiji Restoration. Having considered the Japanese ethical system, it introduces an overview of Japanese moral values while encountering Western moral values and practices. By studying the humanitarian activities undertaken by the Japanese in this period, the link between ethical practices guided by domestic and imported social systems will become apparent. Additionally the last section explores continuation and changes of Japanese moral decisions from the feudal to the modern period through discussions of Japanese ideas of giri and ninjo. The source of values One of the outstanding characteristics of Japanese society throughout its history is thought to be the nation’s loyalty to its national authority, that is, the Shogun in the feudal period, and the Emperor before and after the feudal period (Maruyama, 1946). Earlier, this point was described as a unique social system in Japan in comparison with other Confucian-influenced societies. This is confirmed by foreign visitors to Japan during the first half of the nineteenth century. They almost invariably noted that the country was under the dual rule of the Mikado (Emperor), who was the spiritual sovereign, and Tycoon (Shogun), who held actual political power (Maruyama, 1946: 26). There was a unique relation between the sovereign power and the nation’s internal values in Japanese society since ancient times. Maruyama Masao, a critical scholar of ‘Japanese thought’, analysed this unique relationship between the state and the nation’s internal value in Japanese society in comparison with that of Europe, in his study of nationalism in Japan (Maruyama, 1946: 26). It revealed a distinction between Japan and Europe in their moral judgement and choice of all values. This explains where Japanese internal values exist in the society and why they are unique in comparison with those values in Europe. Maruyama analysed the idea of Ein neutraler Staat developed by Carl Schmidt as an outstanding characteristic of the modern state in Europe (Maruyama, 1946: 25).39 Maruyama argued that Ein neutraler Staat implies that a State in Europe maintains a neutral position on internal values, such as the problem of what truth and justice are. Thus, the judgement and choice of all values are left open to social groups (e.g. to the Church) or to the conscience of the individual. All questions of internal value are divorced from the sovereign power. This stems from the development of the modern state in Europe out of the post-Reformation wars of religion through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The struggle revolved around matters of faith and theology and resulted in two effects: on the one hand, it obliged the religious sects to give up the idea that they could realize their principles on the political plane. On the other, the monarchs of Europe, who had enjoyed the Divine Right of Kings and provided their own internal

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justification for ruling until then, were confronted with strong opposition. As a result, they were obliged to find a new basis for their rule in the external function of preserving public order. A compromise was effected between the rulers and the ruled, between the public and private domains. Questions of thought, belief and morality were considered to be private matters, while state power was absorbed into the legal system. In comparison, in Japan, particularly in post-Restoration Japan, Maruyama argued, ‘there was never any effort to recognise these neutral aspects of national sovereignty when the country was being built as a modern State’ (Maruyama, 1946: 26). Applying Maruyama’s analysis of nationalism, the Japanese way of thinking is predisposed by national sovereignty that involves both spiritual authority and political power. Until the Meiji Restoration those two powers, spiritual authority and political power, were divided between emperor and feudal lord. The Meiji Restoration united all authority in the Emperor from representatives of feudal control. In the process, it is perceived that prestige and power were brought together in the institution of the Emperor. Maruyama’s analysis showed that there was no force to assert the supremacy of any internal world over this unitary power in Japan. Compared with national power in Europe, the Japanese State never came to the point of drawing a distinction between the external and internal spheres. Maruyama argued: Accordingly, until 1946 when the divinity of the Emperor was formally denied in an Imperial Rescript, there was in principle no basis in Japan for freedom of belief. Since the nation includes in its ‘national polity’ all the internal values of truth, morality, and beauty, neither scholarship nor art could exist apart from these national values. They were, in fact, totally dependent on them. The dependence, moreover, was less external than internal; for the slogans ‘art for the nation’ and ‘scholarship for the nation’ were not simply demands that art and scholarship be of practical value to the country. (1946: 6) Therefore, the final decision about the content of definitions of what was actually for the good of the country was dependent on closeness to the emperor. This fact is confirmed by the clear line of demarcation between the public and the private domains. Maruyama’s consideration gives an explanation that there is no purely personal realm existing outside national order. If we look at the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyoiku Chokugo), proclaimed before the summoning of the First Imperial Diet in 1890, we are able to find an open declaration of the fact that the Japanese State, being a moral entity, monopolized the right to determine values.40 Japanese children had to repeatedly practice (Crump, 1992: 83): What is your dearest ambition? To die for the Emperor.

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In Japan, then, national sovereignty included both spiritual authority and political power. Moral judgement never superseded the nation (the ‘national polity’). Maruyama’s analysis of the characteristic of nationalist logic in Japan explains where Japanese internal values were attached. National sovereignty was the ultimate source of both ethics and power. Unlike the moral judgement in Europe, it could not derive from the depths of the individual but it has its roots outside the individual. We find a tendency, then, to estimate morality, not by the value of its content, but in terms of its power, that is, according to whether or not it had a power background. Ultimately, the locus of Japanese values including morality and ethical judgement were not in the conscience of the individual but in the affairs of the nation. To be concrete, the standard of values that determined a person’s position in the society and in the nation was based less on social function than on relative distance from the Emperor. Then, the identification of morality with power and the constant stress on proximity to the Emperor have an important effect on people’s attitudes to their duties. Since the personal issues or internal quality of private affairs could never be recognized, people tried to permeate those private issues with some national significances and thus to dismiss the impression of being insincere. This can be found even in the well-renowned Japanese novel Since Then:41 And what on earth did [father] find to scold you about today? That’s hardly the point. He always finds something. What really did surprise me was to hear that father has been serving the nation. He told me that from the age of eighteen until today he has gone on serving the country to the best of his ability. Yes’, if one can make as much money as father has by serving the nation, I wouldn’t mind serving it myself. (Sorekara (Since Then) by Natsume Soseki) In Japanese history, the Emperor was regarded as the embodiment of ultimate value (Maruyama, 1946: 7) since the ancient days of the Jimmu Foundation.42 The Emperor had been the centre of all authority and the fountainhead of all virtue, occupying the apical position in a hierarchy. It is illustrated by a circle whose centre is the Emperor and all the people who assist the Emperor. Japanese Shintoism plays its role in this social practice. It includes the ancestor-worship, which makes the Imperial family the fountainhead of the whole nation. It accords the emperor a godlike reverence. Within the society, the standard of values was the closeness to Emperor and everything was based on the idea of an absolute central entity. Even in the postmodern period, Professor Yamada Takao argued: ‘If we cut across the time axis, the events that occurred 2,600 years ago constitute the central layer . . . . The happenings in Emperor Jimmu’s reign are therefore no ancient tales but facts that exist at this moment’ (Sato, 1943: 54). In this logic, an entire national order is constructed like a chain, with the Emperor as the absolute value entity. The Prime Minister, General Tojo at the

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Eighty-first Diet session, represents Japanese rulers’ strong faith in this idea:43 People often refer to this as a dictatorial government, but I should like to make the matter clear . . . . The man called Tojo is no more than a single humble subject. I am just the same as you. The only difference is that I have been given the responsibility of being Prime Minister. To this extent I am different. It is only when I am exposed to the light of His Majesty that I shine. Were it not for this light, I should be no better than a pebble by the roadside. It is because I enjoy the confidence of His Majesty and occupy my present position that I shine. This puts me in a completely different category from those European rulers who are known as dictators. Japanese moral judgement reflects the unique relationship between the state and the nation that originated in Japanese social practices. Nitobé also pointed out an important fact comparing ethics between Japanese and Judaeo-Christian countries: ‘Bushido laid particular stress on the moral conduct of rulers and public men and of nations, whereas the ethics of Christ deal almost solely with individuals and His personal followers’ (Nitobé, 1905: 190). Therefore, ethics in the Christian tradition found more and more practical application as individualism, in its capacity as a moral factor, grows in potency. On the other hand, in Japan, all internal values belonged to state values in which individual decisions were considered self-interested. As a result, Japanese ethics or moral decisions had to be a public matter rather than a private issue. Japanese internal values were applied in a unique system. This explains why Japanese moral decisions were determined by the public domain. Humanitarian values in the modern period Adopting the slogan ‘Fukoku Kyohei’ (‘Enrich the country, strengthen the military’), the Japanese government sought to create a nation-state capable of standing equal among Western powers in the Meiji period. It was believed that Western countries depended on constitutionalism for national unity, on industrialization for material strength and on a well-trained military for national security. Thus, the Japanese government began actively to seek knowledge from Western countries after the Restoration. These efforts are proved by the Western science, technology and culture, from intellectual trends to clothing and architecture adopted under the posture of ‘Bunmeikaika’ (civilization and enlightenment) prompted in this period. The greatest concern for the Meiji government in this period was to revise the unequal treaties concluded in 1858.44 Intelligence was to be sought in the West, the goodwill of which, it was believed, was essential for revising the treaties. For that reason, Iwakura Tomomi led a large number of government officials on a mission to the United States and Europe (The Iwakura Mission).45 In the course of The Iwakura Mission in 1873, Ito Hirobumi and Iwakura Tomomi spent time studying humanitarian ideas in Europe and the nascent

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humanitarian movement there. The Meiji Emperor, by 1900 a powerful figure, undoubtedly obtained the humanitarian objective he had espoused (Checkland, 1994: 4). Ito Hirobumi had visited Geneva where it was reported that the Japanese ambassadors ‘paid serious attention to the explanations which we had provided, during several successive meetings’ (Checkland, 1994: 4).46 The Iwakura Mission, thus, encouraged the initiative to introduce humanitarianism that was based on Western ethics and Christian values in Japan. As a result, during the Meiji period, similar to most Japanese traditional culture and beliefs, Japanese ideas and values came into contact with foreign ideas and values, specifically those developed in Europe. Kamishima raises two significant conditions that had impacted on transforming Japanese values in this period (Kamishima, 1997: 180–7). The first point is that a cultural convergence put the people into a kind of value-uncertainty. Since the legal abolition of the feudal system in 1871, the people had lost the place for their internal values, which had precedence, in the form of ‘loyalty’ to one’s superior, over other values in the feudal class system. The moral system that had been effective in the feudal system was left open in an uncertain social order. Accordingly, the foreign values were introduced in such social circumstances. Kamishima characterized this period as showing ‘a lack of public morality’ and ‘withdrawal of patriotism’ (Kamishima, 1997: 182). Fukuzawa Yukichi called this period ‘a transitional phase of the moral tie’ (Fukuzawa, 1875 cited in Maruyama, 1986: 207). According to Kamishima, to fill such moral anarchy, traditional values of such principles in the Bushido, the loyalty oriented or self-sacrifice morality, were systematically revived through national education in the emperor system. The second point is that the cultural convergence inspired Japanese thinkers and intellectuals who experienced Western values and ideas. Those thinkers and intellectuals attempted to encourage a rudimentary education in order for the people to learn values and ideas independent from the emperor or state system. Kamishima argues that people’s ideas and values in this period derived from two elements: traditional values and new ideas and values under the new emperor system. While the traditional moral philosophy of the Bushido maintained its core values, those new ideas and values impacted on Japanese moral ideas in years to come. Kamishima further analyses this cultural convergence with acculturation (Kamishima, 1997: 183). By converging two cultures or values of different quality, common elements or similar elements between them became more prominent. Therefore, as a result of the cultural convergence, the core values in the Bushido were highlighted. Thus, whilst Japan was becoming increasingly Westernized, values and ideas developed in the feudal period, particularly Tokugawa Shogunate’s 268-year rule, retained a subconscious impact on Japanese behaviour. Accordingly, traditional values became more prominent in the process of modernization in Japan. The corruption of public order in this period proves that, in spite of the fact that what upheld the process of modernization in practice must have originally existed in Japan, the original or already existing Japanese elements and ethos had to be

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modified. In the upheaval period at the end of the Edo era, warrior’s loyalty-oriented or self-sacrifice morality lost its tie with the feudal lord. The modification of the Bushido principles was possible by replacing the feudal system with the emperor system. The latter was originally empowered by mythical and religious tradition, and therefore it took responsibility as a cultural symbol. Yet, it was used for applying Japanese internal values. The principles of humanitarian ideas developed in the feudal period, therefore, remained its core value. However, the convergence with different culture necessitated relocating the value system to apply the core value. In this sense, the Meiji Restoration was an important turning point, as Maruyama argued, for both Japanese ideas and values and for moral decisions including other internal values. The abolition of the warrior class did not mark the end of Bushido, but the value was spread to the whole Japanese population through the national education system. Nitobé and Ransome explained this idea. Ransome stated: ‘There are three distinct Japans in existence side by side today, – the old, which has not wholly died out; the new, hardly yet born except in spirit; and the transition, passing now through its most critical throes’ (Nitobé, 1905: 171–2). Nitobé added to this point that ‘fundamental ethical notions in the Bushido require some modification. The maker and product of old Japan, is still the guiding principle of the transition and will prove the formative force of the new era’ (Nitobé, 1905: 172). Wholesale Westernization was somewhat checked in the 1880s, however, when a renewed appreciation of traditional Japanese values emerged. This was the case in the development of a modern educational system, which though influenced by Western theory and practice, stressed the traditional values of samurai, loyalty, social harmony and moral values. This was summarized most succinctly in the Imperial Rescript on Education issued in 1890: Know ye, our subjects! Our Imperial ancestors have founded our empire on a basis of broad and everlasting asset and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; our subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of our empire, and herein also lies the source of our education. Ye, our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop your intellectual faculties and perfect your moral powers; furthermore, advance the public good and promote common interests; always respect the constitution and observe the laws; should any emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the state; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial throne, coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of our forefathers. The way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by our Imperial ancestors, to be observed alike by their descendants and subjects, infallible

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for all ages and true in all places. It is our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue. (The Imperial Rescript on Education, 1890) Therefore, whilst new humanitarian ideas were introduced in the modern period, the old principles and the ideas developed in the feudal period guided the new ideas. The conversion of two different values widened the traditional moral value particularly by cosmopolitan thinkers in the Meiji period. As Maruyama’s analysis specifies, after the Meiji Restoration, principles of the Bushido during the modern period were closely bound up with the notion of a Japanese ‘national essence’, and with those of the kokutai (Japanese national structure) and the cult of the emperor. The creation of tennosei (the emperor system) was consciously shaped and manipulated as part of an effort to forge a unified, modern nation out of a fundamentally feudal society. However, the formation and effectiveness of tennosei was continuous from the moment of restoration onwards and indeed before (Earl, 1964; Hall, 1968: 107).47 The era following the Meiji Restoration effectively advanced highly hierarchical ethical practices into the new social system, that is, the change from the feudal to emperor system. In this sense, the cultural conversion offered favourable conditions for introducing an alternative social system that can take over a place for internal values from the Shogun in the feudal system. Although the social systems differed, a broad framework of ethical practice was maintained among the Japanese even after the new emperor system was introduced. This was retained until the absolute emperor system was removed after the Second World War. This demonstrates that after modernization, indigenous and foreign as well as old and new coexisted in Japanese society. Japanese humanitarianism in practice during the modern period Having understood the changes and similarities in the Japanese ethical system and in practice after the Meiji Restoration, it would be worthwhile to explore the actual practice of Japanese humanitarianism by analysing the activities undertaken in the period. This will show how traditional Japanese ethical values and systems were linked with the Western moral values and ideals that were introduced during this period. In Japanese society, in the wake of the Meiji period, there emerged ideas about freedom, civil rights and social movements.48 In fact, the Meiji Constitution legalized rules on the nation’s basic human rights. Following the Meiji period, during the Taisho period (1912–26), there was a stage when the nation’s freedom and human rights were acknowledged, as the expression ‘Taisho Democracy’ illustrates.49 However, civil rights guaranteed in the Meiji Constitution were only valid ‘within conditions’. In this sense, the Meiji Constitution was far from being a rights-based document and did not provide for judicial review (Iwasawa, 1998: 304). Indeed, once the country faced the threat of war, the nation’s rights were restricted

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by other regulations, such as Chian Iji Ho (The Public Peace Regulations) and Kokka Sodoin Ho (Regulations of National General Mobilization). Human rights were eventually repressed in accordance with such ideas as Kokueki Yusen (Giving priority to State Interests) and Genji Boko (Reduce Self-Interest and Serve the State) (Jinken Kyoiku Centre, 2000). Even in this system, perceivable humanitarian activities were practiced during the Meiji period including those of the Red Cross. The forerunner of the Red Cross Society of Japan (JRC), the Hakuaisha, launched a benevolent society in 1877 when the South West Civil War, or Satsuma rebellion, broke out. The Hakuaisha became the JRC as Japan signed the Geneva Convention in 1886. During the rebellion, two parliament members, Sano Tsunetami and Ogyu Yuzuru, attempted to set up rescue groups similar to the Red Cross in Europe. They proposed the idea to the government with guidelines for the Hakuaisha. However, this proposal was rejected by the government as one of the articles in the guidelines required the rescue of all, whether enemy or ally. Nevertheless, Sano and Ogyu directly negotiated with the emperor’s family and consequently established the Hakuaisha.50 The idea of helping wounded enemies was appealing to the people at this time. Thus, activities by the Hakuaisha are considered to have proffered a basis for the Western ideas of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘benevolence’ among Japanese people. This illustrates that the impartial and universal notion of humanitarian ideas was not prevalent in Japan until this time. Accordingly, activities by the successor of the Hakuaisha, the Japanese Red Cross, represent humanitarian activities in this period and illustrate Japanese humanitarian considerations in practice. Since the creation of the Hakuaisha, impartial humanitarian activities were enacted through Red Cross activities. The JRC was associated with and encouraged by the imperial house51 and once was a widespread movement. In fact, by the early 1900s, the JRC had 900,000 members and was the largest such society in the world (Checkland, 1994: xii).52 The Meiji emperor encouraged the Japanese to adopt modern humanitarian ideas. This is proved during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5). The captured Russians were treated with care and consideration (Checkland, 1994: xiii). The imperial message had been carried through the officer corps to the common Japanese soldier: ‘do not maltreat the Russian prisoners of war’ (Checkland, 1994: 61–70).53 There was no Geneva Convention to protect war prisoners during the Russo-Japanese War.54 Therefore, the Japanese government, longing to exhibit its humanitarian ideas to the world, had to rely on those adopted by the peace conference at The Hague in 1899. Thus, the JRC flourished during the 1890s and the 1900s. Later in the First World War, it continued to grow. The Japanese reputation for demonstrating their faith in high humanitarian principles was praised at this time (Checkland, 1994: xiii).55 The achievement in caring for the Russians was widely acknowledged in international circles. The fine reputation, indeed, brought the International Conference of the Red Cross, which previously had always been held in Europe except for 1912 when it was held in Washington, to Tokyo in the 1930s.56 As a result of this, Japan emerged as more experienced in the practice of humanitarian ideas in time of war than any other nation at that time. The Japanese reputation for their high humanitarian principles

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was confirmed by Russian General Daniloff who was sent to Tokyo to supervise the repatriation of his fellow countrymen. He expressed profound gratitude to the Japanese authorities for the treatment extended to Russian territory. However, these modern humanitarian ideas have been discounted and submerged with the death of the Emperor Taisho in 1926. As the Second World War developed, all efforts undertaken by the JRC were nullified by the attitudes of Japan’s own military authorities. The JRC reverted to being a narrow nationalistic society, almost all of its efforts being geared to servicing the Japanese army and navy (Checkland, 1994: 63). The JRC had emerged as a subsidiary arm of the military authorities. During the Pacific War, the JRC reverted to its role as a patriotic society. It was coerced by the military authorities, certainly military behaviour made any humanitarian effort dangerous. Though Japan signed both conventions in 1929, dealing with the sick and wounded and prisoners of war, the conflicts involving Japan from the 1930s through to the Pacific War, culminating in defeat in August 1945, revealed a brutal dimension of Japan. Therefore, the spirit of ‘volunteerism’ was not the principle motivation in the JRC until after 1945 when the American Red Cross Society (ARC) introduced it in Japan. The JRC was a super patriotic society, into which local public service employers and others were drafted. As the practice of Japanese humanitarian activities showed, the JRC was never independent and was always subject to the will of the emperor: in reality, a state agency.57 In fact, before 1930, the JRC tried to act in terms of humanity, impartiality and universality but this never came into practice. As shown by Maruyama, prior to 1945, humanitarian activities were determined by the Japanese state. This is clarified by the fact that humanitarianism in times of war was approved as an official policy during the Russo-Japanese War. Then during the 1930s, and in the build-up to the Pacific War, humanitarianism was abandoned. Such control and conformism was the hallmark of Japanese humanitarian action even after the war. Japanese humanitarianism in practice before the Second World War clarifies Japanese ethical construction as being directed by a hierarchical social structure (or system) that is communitarian in nature. Though it does not categorically deny influences from Western moral values and ideals, explorations in this section confirm that the social construction after the Meiji Restoration continued to guide the hierarchical ethical system. This was an improvement of the system developed in feudal times and restored the nature of traditional Japanese humanitarian values (Box 2.1). Box 2.1 An explication through the idea of giri and ninjo At the time of the Meiji Restoration, the emperor system was formally established and came to constrain the traditional patterns of behaviour – those characterized by giri and ninjo in the feudal system. The giri–ninjo relation, introduced earlier, is not an old idea in Japanese society. It represents the utmost devotion in the communitarian society in Japan. There is a phrase in Japanese – ‘being warm in ninjo’ – which relates to a person who is thoughtful and kind. Being just thoughtful and kind is not enough, one must also keep up with one’s sense of moral obligation to be truly

accepted in society. Every member of a group is bound by ties of giri and ninjo. Both giri and ninjo have been of the utmost importance in Japanese society, and have maintained a sense of harmony for centuries. As the emperor was a deity, dedication and loyalty to him (loyalty was originally a feature of personal giri relations) became an absolute duty (gimu) that took precedence over giri and ninjo in ordinary human relations. Moral conduct is a national – country – matter, leading to what Maruyama has called the ‘exteriorisation of morality in Japan’ (Maruyama, 1946: 29). Yet, in Japan it is considered that what is legal, namely what is within the rules, is moral by definition. The ‘legal’ is not necessarily referring to written laws, but rather to official ideologies and codes of conduct or shared understanding (Smith, 1983: 46). In this sense, Edo Japan developed a systematic feudal morality, which every individual was expected to uphold. It was maintained both at the national level and at various levels of organizations and groups. The emperor system in the Meiji Era did not make a significant difference to the systematic communitarian morality. This basic pattern remained active until the end of the Second World War (Kamishima, 1997: 88). However, it is right to say that this emperor system contributed to a double function in terms of individualization in modern Japan. While it apparently promoted the individualization of the Japanese by giving a rallying point for all individuals, irrespective of social status, family, sex or education, it slowed down individuation since it subjected every individual to the emperor by a spiritual bond and did not allow him/her to establish an independent self apart from this bond. The idea is proved by the works of Watsuji Tetsuro, a prominent philosopher in the early twentieth century. His work provides an analysis of Japanese ethics, particularly on the self and others or individual and community discussions.a Watsuji’s work proves the importance of group and community in Japanese ethics. Watsuji privileged the community over the individual. He defined the individual as the negation of the community; the individual comes into being only by revolting against totality. Morality, thus, consists of a return to authenticity; the self arises by negating the whole in inauthentic revolt, but authenticity is again realized with the abandonment of the self, culminating in the non-duality of self and other (Watsuji, 1937: 21). Therefore, Watsuji had disavowed the individual as a legitimate basis of ethical action (Dilworth, 1974: 9–10). Given the high esteem generally accorded to ideas of community in public discourse in Japan, it is not surprising that Watsuji turned toward the community as the true subject of benevolence, compassion and morality. Watsuji’s dialectic shows that moral goodness lies with the negation of the individual in selfless return to wholeness. Watsuji’s ideas about Japanese ethics were above all concerned with the embrace of the whole by the individual, and the individual by himself or herself is not endowed with any intrinsic ethical value. The negation of the whole, through which the individual is born, ‘is goodness when it is pierced by the movement of coming back (to authenticity) but is badness in any by itself ’ (Watsuji, 1937: 284).

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The defeat in the Second World War removed the emperor system, which raised the question for the people of the validity of all traditional moral decisions including morals of giri and ninjo. Removal of the system had made people vulnerable to various ideologies that people had faced individually in Western civilization (Kamishima, 1997: 58). The communitarian morality in the form of codes, however, has been retained as a characteristic of most Japanese institutions, whether in business or at school. In this sense, Japanese people tended to be more socio-centric, which means that the Japanese were inclined to alter perceptions and values according to social demands (Kiefer, 1976: 280–1). As an important centre of self, the Japanese are inclined to think of outward role demands rather than inner feelings. Truth and morality were, therefore, socially constructed. Nonetheless, this long-lasting traditional thinking seems to face increasing individualism emerging from the conflicts over public values from around the 1960s and the 1970s. This seems to associate with individualism in Japanese ideas. The tendency of individualism may bring a difference in the moral judgement in contemporary Japanese thought that has been tied with the morality of giri to the traditional social system. Notes a Watsuji Tetsuro (1889–1960) was a prominent philosopher. He was a critique of Western individualism. His initial critical appropriation of Heideffer’s thought in Climate and Culture (Fudo) gave way to a wholesale rejection of it in Ethics (Rinrigaku). He produced early works on Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, before turning to a study of Asian tradition and thought. His work, Rinrigaku (Ethics) has been regarded as the definitive study of Japanese ethics for half a century. He proposed the East Asian idea of ningen (human-beings-in-relationship) as the basis for a philosophical anthropology.

Contemporary Japanese ethical system Another critical change in Japan’s history, creating distinctive structural elements within society was the defeat in the Second World War. In order to understand contemporary Japanese humanitarianism, the changes and social conditions resulting from that defeat must be considered. Japan was placed under the foreign rule after the War. It was indeed a time in which Japan experienced radical social change, similar to that of the Meiji period. Japan’s post-War change started when the emperor declared himself to be a human being (Ningen Sengen), which obviously had vast effects on the Japanese ethical system.58 While institutionally and materially various new systems were brought into Japan under the occupation rule, there must have been changes in the Japanese social structure and people’s ways of thinking that included moral ideas. In the next thirty years after the war, Japan made considerable societal development, having benefited from opportunities provided by the Korean War (1950–3).59 This section explores the Japanese ethical system during the post-Second World War period that relates more directly to current Japanese systems of thought. There are various studies on Japanese morality in post-War society. The section draws on several works that examined

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Japanese ethical practices and human rights ideas in the post-Second World War period and after. The post-War social structure and ethical system There is little doubt about the communitarian features and group-oriented character of Japanese society. The Japanese ethical system also illustrated these features and character, as exemplified by the idea of giri and ninjo. Katsube Mitake, a scholar of Japanese thought, argues that Japanese morality in the postSecond World War period was guided by communitarian characters. Having emphasized Japanese ‘social structure’ as a source of uniqueness that frames the Japanese system of thought, he highlighted the ‘boss and subordinate’ relations that exist as a number of sects in group-oriented (or communitarian) Japanese society (Katsube, 1976: 274–8). In other words, his analysis of the Japanese system of thought in the post-War society is based on two structural factors, which he termed as ‘vertical society’ and ‘groupism’. The former means loyaltyoriented moral ties and the latter indicates shared understandings as a moral standard. Thus, the social structure is a continuation of the pre-War system. Katsube notes that Japan’s economic development was possible owing to the structural factors that guided people’s system of thought (Katsube, 1976: 275). At the same time, these factors, he argues, eliminated a contract-based (or law-based) way of thinking among the Japanese. The idea that the Japanese lack a legal-based (or legal-oriented) frame of thinking is also stressed by Onuma Yasuaki, a renowned scholar of contemporary human rights issues (Onuma, 1998: 263). He stated that an undeniable dimension of Japanese people and society is an absence of a legal frame of thinking, compared with the Western world. He emphasized that empirical studies are required in order to prove that the Japanese dislike lawsuits and prefer moderate settlements based on discussions rather than legal settlements. Onuma adds that even though human rights ideas based on legal thinking have become prevalent in post-War Japanese society, a legal-based (or contractual) approach has not been fully settled in the primary system of Japanese thought (Onuma, 1998: 263). Katsube explains that the American democracy that was introduced into society during the post-War occupation brought the idea of universal values to Japan. He further observed that this brought two value natures to Japanese system of thought, looking at thirty years of post-War society (Katsube, 1976: 278). From observing Japanese society in the 1970s, he believes that people struggled between the two sets of values. While they increased a demand for universalism and thus expanded claims to individual rights, they could not remove their attachments to the traditional community-oriented value standard, relying on familystyle groupism (Katsube, 1976: 278). In other words, while post-War reform in Japan stimulated the demand for universalism within society, the traditional communitarian system of thought remained. Thus, Katsube notes that Japanese economic development was possible through these two contrasting systems of thought (Katsube, 1976: 273–4). He concludes that Japanese people have

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been moving between two extreme value natures: claims of universalism and particularism (Katsube, 1976: 278). Katsube’s analyses of Japanese systems of thought during the 1970s also explain Japanese humanitarian ideas in the post-War period redundant. Whereas universal ideas of humanitarian values and human rights gradually permeated Japanese society, traditional ways of ethical decision-making and practice still guided people’s behaviour in post-War society. As Katsube observed, in Japan during the 1960s and the 1970s, there were a number of universally based mass movements promoting individual rights, such as labour, women’s and human rights. However, actual humanitarian actions or human rights considerations were limited within social units. Thus, two ideas of universalism and particularism coexisted in the Japanese system of thought. Domestic and international circumstances seemed to influence which value system dominated society in each period of time after the War. For example, in the 1980s, when Japanese society experienced ‘internationalization’, following the country’s successful economic development, people’s ideas and values became universal in nature and consideration for humanitarianism and human rights began to dominate.60 By the same token, Japanese diplomacy also appeared to alternate between the two ideas of universalism and particularism. While it took parallel approaches with the Western world, which were often based on universalism and universal ideas of various values, it supported a distinctive approach (for instance, the Asian Way) in its regional relations, which were underpinned by a non-universal view. The following chapters contain more detailed studies on domestic and international circumstances. The nature and characteristics of Japanese ethical values and systems that directly relate to contemporary Japanese humanitarianism are clarified by Katsube’s analyses on post-War systems of thought and social structure. The idea of human rights Distinctive cultural origins and unique Japanese social practices shaped the historical development of Japanese humanitarian ideas. The Japanese idea of human rights also involves unique elements. There have been various studies on the idea of human rights in Asian contexts in the 1990s. Given the fact that Japanese humanitarian ideas were developed in the Shintoist, Confucian and Buddhist traditions, an emphasis on Asian contexts would aid an understanding of Japanese ideas on human rights. Human rights considerations have become prevalent in Japanese society during the 1990s. A recognition of this trend will assist in our understanding of the current Japanese ethical system. Therefore, this section considers the idea of human rights in Asia with particular reference to the Japanese idea of human rights. The Asian idea of human rights Chapter 1 provided a brief review of the concept of rights in the mainstream approach and the need to assess its relevance to Japanese ideas. Admittedly, the

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concept of human rights is relatively new to Asians.61 MacIntyre, citing Gewirth, observes that the concept of a ‘right’ lacked any means of expression in Japanese ‘even as late as the mid-nineteenth century’ (MacIntyre, 1981: 69). The concept does not go well with the basic cosmological outlook in Japan. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that the concept of ‘rights’ is alien among the Japanese. Finnis illustrates that anthropological studies of African tribal regimes of law show that ‘the English terms, “right” and “duty” are usually covered by a single word derived from the form normally translated as “ought”.’ He suggests that the best English translation in these cases is ‘due’ because ‘ “due” looks both ways along a juridical relationship, both to what one is due to do, and to what is due to one’ (Finnis, 1980: 209). Likewise, Japanese culture may possess the concept of ‘rights’ without having a vocabulary that expresses it. As most value designates, the idea of human rights among the Japanese seems to be influenced by Confucian and Buddhist ideas of human rights. Donnelly argues that traditional Asian societies, including Japanese society were structured around duties, not rights, and any rights held by individuals, families or communities were largely dependent on the discharge of duties (Donnelly, 1999: 65). Confucians have given priority to the ‘rite’ where people are educated by voluntarily observing the norms of conduct, as dealing more profoundly and incisively with basic human motivations through the ritual education. The Confucian idea of human rights could support universal ideas in accordance with the conception of rites. In both Buddhist and Confucian ideas, the concept of human rights exists in the form of a mutual respect and concern for people that stems from human nature. Japanese society, with the influence of Confucian and Buddhist teachings, takes human nature as a basic context in which all ancillary concepts, such as human rights, are understood.62 The concept itself is in harmony with the extended experiential nature of things. Therefore, before turning their attention to the ‘rights’ of individuals, the Japanese tend to be more reserved. However, they seek to understand the implications of human behaviour, which is believed to be based on the fundamental nature of human beings. Compatible with Buddhist ideas, the concept of rights in Japanese society is considered as implicit in the normative understanding of what is ‘due’ among and between individuals.63 However, as illustrated by the study of the Japanese social structure, Confucian and Buddhist culture developed the way that people apply their values in the hierarchical social structure. As previously explained, internal values, such as morality and humanitarian considerations, were customarily applied in the vertical social system, while Western society presents a horizontal social system in which people are considered equal. These internal values functioned in all human relationships. Similarly as in most Asian countries, in Japan too, people’s internal values are exercised towards one’s superior or a particular ruler without a contract or rule of law. Thus, such ideas as ‘freedom’ and ‘rights’ are not ruled by law, rather they are guaranteed by being loyal to the superior. As Finnis rightly suggests, ‘A right is a useful concept which provides a particular perspective on justice. Its correlative, duty, provides another. These may be thought of as

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separate windows onto the common good which is justice . . .’ (Finnis, 1980: 210). Human rights are an important issue but are considered as secondary to the larger or more basic issue of human nature. It would therefore be going too far to claim that the notion of human right is ‘alien’ to the Japanese or that the Japanese deny that individuals have ‘rights’. Few would disagree with the proposition that human rights are grounded in human nature. Inada Kenneth suggests that human nature is the ‘ultimate source’ of human rights based on the view that the ultimate ground is the ‘dynamic relational nature of persons in contact with each other’ (Inada, 1990: 95). In other words, it is in the interrelatedness of persons rather than in the persons themselves that the justification for human rights is to be found. Therefore, the concept of human rights is in harmony with moral values in Japan, in that they are an explication of what is ‘due’. Henry Shue shares this view when he says: ‘[b]asic rights are the morality of the depths. They specify the line beneath which no one is to be allowed to sink’ (Shue, 1996: 18). The idea of human rights seems to have a distinctive cultural origin, but its underlying preoccupation with human good makes it fundamentally a moral issue. The scope of humanitarian considerations goes beyond rights discourse and the coverage of specific human rights treaties and covenants. Rights are a partial but incomplete expression of duty. Issues concerning human rights in Japan are placed at the point of practice and in ethical or moral considerations. These ideas were explored in the previous section. The contemporary Japanese ethical system: an examination from attitudes to human rights The previous section showed that Japanese ideas and attitudes towards human rights partly mirror their ethical system and practice. Onuma highlighted five factors that characterize Japanese ideas and attitudes towards human rights, two of which seem to be relevant to Japanese ethical construction and the system of thought.64 The first characteristic is a lack of legal-based thinking among the Japanese. As in the previous discussions, Onuma pointed out a tendency for Japanese people to think in a non-legal manner, this being one of the prominent characteristics that influences their attitudes towards human rights. The second point is that, in general, Japanese ideas and behaviour are receptive and lack an evangelistic approach, an issue that was explained earlier in this chapter. In comparison with the United States and countries in Western Europe, Onuma argues that nowadays, the idea of human rights has come to be widely considered in Japan as an important value. However, he argues that attempts to bring these ideas to other societies and countries have been very limited (Onuma, 1998: 263). Onuma’s analysis concerning the Japanese ideas on human rights is reminiscent of several characteristics of Japanese ethical system and practices. His analysis illustrates that in contemporary Japanese society, the idea of human rights, as a rights-based universal value, is not alien, as the idea is prevalent. Yet, at the same time, traditionally exercised ethical practices are perceived in people’s conduct. Katsube’s analyses aid our understanding of Onuma’s examination. Current

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Japanese attitudes towards human rights also show the inclusion of two contrary features. They demonstrate how socially structured systems of thought that are communitarian in nature, guide ethical practice. However, the growing prevalence of ideas around human rights increases universalism and rights-based thinking. It proves and explains the existence of two value-based characters in contemporary Japanese humanitarianism.

Conclusion This chapter attempted to reveal Japanese social construction in order to understand the type of society that guided Japanese ethical decisions and practices. In so doing, it discovered the nature of Japanese humanitarian ideas (moral norms and ethical ideals). It found that Japanese humanitarian ideas permeate the heart of humanitarianism – concern for the interests and welfare of others, particularly those who are threatened or suffering. Although its religious origin is distinctive, the idea is consistent with humanitarian ideas developed in Judaeo-Christian societies. One of the principles that imbues humanitarianism, that is, acting for the benefit of all those in need (humanity), exists in Japanese traditional values and ideas. The chapter also showed that Japanese ethical judgement and the idea of moral duty involve several unique conditions that stem from its social construction. With the influence of Confucian and Buddhist traditions, Japanese society consists of communitarian social construction. This means that as in most Confuciusinfluenced countries, the individual in Japanese society had little moral meaning outside social and family categories. Rather than individuals, the source of moral values in communitarian societies exists within community, society or other social entities. Consequently, moral values are embedded in a shared understanding and particular norms in those entities unlike the cosmopolitan ideas grounded in universal humanity. However, communitarian construction is merely one element that explains the broad framework of moral decision and duty in the social structure. The precise content of moral decisions and the idea of practical moral duty depends on another social framework. It is a unique Japanese social system even compared with other countries that share the communitarian social construction. One of the most important contents stems from the feudal system in which Japanese moral ideals and practice were developed. It states that Japanese moral values work in loyalty-oriented or loyalty-generated situations, which are called ‘morality of lord and retainer’ or ‘self-sacrifice morality’ (Kamishima, 1997; Okuma, 1998: 63–4). Thus, the Japanese tend to look for a place to relate their morality to the relation of ‘loyalty’ – it was the daimyo for the warrior class during the feudal period and the emperor after the Meiji Restoration. This explains why Japanese moral values were confined to narrower entities, such as family, communities or nations rather than be applicable to humanity as a whole. In contrast to other Confucian influenced countries, loyalty supersedes all other rules within Japanese social relations. Communitarian social construction

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limits the application of moral values towards one’s superior, family and friends. In addition to this, Japanese humanitarian ideas are ruled by loyalty-oriented social relationships, whether within a company, school or any other social network that a person belongs to. This is a key feature to the consideration of Japanese moral decisions in practice. The features and practice developed during the feudal period continued under the emperor system, which was maintained until the end of the Second World War. The framework developed in the feudal period effectively transferred to the emperor system whereby the hegemonic character of Shintoism could absorb Japanese loyalty-generated morality. A combination of morality, power and an emphasis on closeness to the Emperor (loyalty-generated morality) affected people’s attitudes towards their duties even after the abolition of the emperor system. The system enabled the people to apply their moral principles and values. Japanese moral values function in a network of mutual obligation that is highly specific in nature, that is, hierarchical structure and hegemonic integrity. The removal of the emperor system after the Second World War brought about a radical change in the system of moral decision-making among the Japanese. They now have wider opportunities for individual moral decision-making, whilst the traditional loyalty-oriented character remains superior in the interpersonal relationships. The examination of the nature of Japanese society in this chapter illustrates the distinctive characteristic of Japanese humanitarian practice. It is explained by communitarian social construction and unique Japanese social practices that often seem to be implicitly drawn by the people in their ideas and actions. Structured social conditions made Japanese humanitarian practice less universal in character. This relates to the origin and development of Japanese moral ideals, those with a membership and loyalty-oriented basis. This also explains the Japanese human rights idea as a duty stemming from human nature rather than from rights and the rule of law. The review of humanitarian activities in practice shows that Japanese humanitarian ideas are a combination of indigenous and imported ideas. The humanitarian activities that were undertaken by the Japanese before the Second World War demonstrated deep humanitarian considerations of a universal nature. This resulted from The Iwakura Mission that brought Western humanitarian ideas to Japan. Japanese humanitarian activities during this period received praise from the world. Although the humanitarian activities of this time reflected imported Western values, Japanese humanitarianism was overseen by the government (under the emperor’s name) and its traditional moral ideals were developed within this hierarchical social structure. This is illustrated by the fact that the ideas were simply discarded in the course of the intensifying war situation. Overall, Japanese humanitarian practice before the Second World War comprised two distinctive elements, those of indigenous and those of Western humanitarian ideas. As the Red Cross Movement illustrated, the idea was thoroughly synchronized with the government’s (or emperor’s) policy whereby loyalty-oriented morality must function effectively.

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Contemporary Japanese humanitarian ideals and practice are directly related to the systems of thought, social system and conditions that grew after the Second World War. Yet, there seems to have existed two opposing outlooks of humanitarian values in the society, universalism and particularism. This explains contemporary Japanese ideas and attitudes towards human rights, ethical ideas and practices. Although major changes occurred within the society following the Second World War, including a growth in universal values, Japan still retained traditional decision-making practices. Contemporary Japanese humanitarianism would, therefore, encompass two natures of ethical ideals and decisions. Which one dominates Japanese systems of thought and conduct seems to depend on other factors, the most sensibly on social system and conditions, such as domestic and international circumstances, in each decade. These are explored in the following chapters.

3

Japanese humanitarian assistance since the end of the Second World War

Introduction Explorations in the previous chapter showed the normative dimension of Japanese humanitarianism. Through the study of Japanese social structure, we discovered the type of society that defined the basis of Japanese humanitarianism. It is now necessary to study other dimensions in order to unveil both the roots and nature of current Japanese humanitarianism. In post-Second World War Japanese society, it seems that Japanese humanitarian values contained universal and relativistic features, stemming from both indigenous elements and imported ideas. As social conditions and systems played key roles in ethical decisions and practices among the Japanese before the Second World War, a further study on these influences in postWar Japanese society is crucial. The social conditions and systems that shaped ethical decisions and practice would be most clearly illustrated by the Japanese approach to assistance (policy, system, perception and attitudes). Looking at both the changes and evolution in the Japanese approach to assistance and the people’s perceptions and attitudes towards it would, more or less, reflect social conditions including domestic and international circumstances relevant to humanitarian considerations. Thus, this chapter explores the evolution of Japanese assistance policy, systems, actual practices and Japanese attitudes to assistance. This aids an understanding of the social conditions and systems that explain the nature of current Japanese humanitarianism. In so doing, it introduces the topic of humanitarian assistance carried out by the Japanese. It attempts to portray how humanitarian activities were affected by policy changes that transformed assistance systems, and what impact these had on the Japanese system of thought. As the social conditions and systems changed during two eras, the chapter looks at the evolution and changes that took place during two periods: since the end of the War up to the 1970s and since the 1980s until the present day. Exploring the evolution of state policy towards humanitarianism is especially important in that, as the previous chapter showed, a state domain has been a significant benchmark for Japanese ethical decisions and practices. Government policies, more or less, guided people’s ethical decisions and attitudes even after the emperor system was officially removed. The period after the 1980s is of particular importance in understanding social and contextual changes in addition to changes in the Japanese assistance

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system. These explorations lead to an examination of which value nature (whether universalistic or relativistic in character) underpinned Japanese humanitarianism and how this nature evolved in decades before and after the 1980s. The first two sections of this chapter explore Japanese humanitarian assistance since the end of the Second World War, while considering the social conditions and environment in each period. The third section introduces Japanese humanitarian activities in the actual case of Cambodia. The case is often considered as a catalyst in Japanese assistance history. Thus the section explores what changes were perceived and what impacts they had upon Japanese perceptions and attitudes. Subsequently, the fourth section examines the underlying nature of Japanese humanitarian values before and after the 1980s. From these explorations, the chapter attempts to investigate the nature of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism and the aspects, which contributed towards its formation.

Social condition and assistance in post-War Japan Japanese aid assistance and humanitarian considerations did not become abruptly prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, the government started its foreign assistance as early as the 1950s. There were several examples of aid assistance and humanitarian activities being undertaken by the Japanese in the post-Second World War period. Grass-roots activities illustrated by the assistance of NGOs were also perceived as early as the 1960s. Reviewing the social and contextual changes of the last fifty years will be crucial in order to reveal developments in the nature of Japanese humanitarianism. Post-War social contexts are illustrated by the Japanese assistance system and activities that were in practice until the 1970s. There were several perceivable social contextual changes in the 1980s and the 1990s. For example, the main concern of post-War Japan, that is, economic development, entered a new phase in the 1980s. During this period, the Japanese economy scaled huge heights and Japan was expected to take a political role deemed befitting of its status. Behind such contextual developments, a number of changes were noted in Japanese assistance. Thus, the section looks at the evolution of both Japanese assistance and the assistance system. To begin, it views humanitarian assistance and assistance policy until the 1970s at both governmental and non-governmental levels. Given the overall situation before the 1970s, the second section looks at social and contextual developments and changes in the Japanese assistance system from the 1980s. Japanese assistance in the 1950s–70s Japan started the foreign assistance as early as the 1950s while it received humanitarian and development assistance from other countries for the country’s post-War reconstruction. It is a unique position as a recipient and a donor of assistance at the same time. The unique experience is, indeed, often referred to in explaining characteristics of Japanese motives for assistance. The foreign assistance in the early post-War period was predominantly economic and technical assistance.

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The foreign assistance by the government was started as a form of the Official Development Assistance (ODA). Activities by NGOs were perceived in the 1960s for the purpose of international humanitarian assistance. The assistance by NGOs was perceived in the 1970s, yet, the actual activities were started at the end of the 1970s. As the Japanese economy grew and flourished, the assistance underwent changes in form, quantity and quality. This section takes an overview of Japanese assistance at both governmental and non-governmental levels in its early period until the 1970s. Governmental assistance Foreign assistance by the Japanese government was initiated in 1954 to support neighbouring countries. It was a time when Japan became a member of the Colombo Plan, which was launched to facilitate economic and technical cooperation among member countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations. This marked the commencement of Japan’s official assistance to developing countries. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the scale of assistance expanded and the form of this was diversified into technical and other forms of assistance. The ODA includes all forms of governmental assistance, such as funding, the provision of goods, technology, human resources, training in both bilateral and multilateral bases that include assistance through international organizations, etc.1 In the early period of Japanese assistance history, the economic and technical cooperation in developing countries were the two major types of assistance from which the term ‘development’ assistance takes roots. In the period, there was no clear delineation of the terms ‘humanitarian’, ‘development’ and ‘emergency’ assistance even at the practical level. In fact, in most official documents issued during this period, the term ‘development assistance’ or ‘emergency assistance’ includes humanitarian rationales and there was no such expression as ‘humanitarian assistance’ in the way that recent documents specify.2 The use of the term ‘humanitarian assistance’ was not common until the 1980s, yet, it was by some means included in the ODA scheme.3 ‘Humanitarian assistance’ had been broadly included in the development assistance or integrated into international cooperation policy that defined the ODA policy. On the whole, Japanese ODA has been shaped by the country’s unique experience as the world’s largest aid recipient after the Second World War and its conversion into becoming the world’s top donor (Kusano, 2000: 41). In Japanese ODA history, while the 1980s is considered as a catalyst decade in that its quantity and quality made significant changes, the years until the end of the 1970s are regarded as being a foundation period of Japanese ODA (Kusano, 2000: 41–2) (Figure 3.1). The characteristics of Japan’s development assistance founded on the unique background in the first two decades are illustrated through the pivotal years: 1954 and 1978.4 1954: BEGINNING OF JAPANESE ODA TO ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Japan was literally in ruins when the Second World War ended with its unconditional surrender in 1945: industrial facilities were destroyed, farming villages were

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60 ODA total spending ODA/GNP ratio

0.35 0.3

40

0.25 0.2

30

0.15 20

ODA/GNP ratio (%)

ODA total spending ($100 million)

50

0.1 10 0.05 0

0 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Year

Figure 3.1 Japan’s ODA total spending and ODA/GNP ratio. Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1961–99. Note The graph is drawn by the author on the basis of the data.

impoverished and the streets were filled with homeless children and unemployed adults. The people lived in poverty and were vulnerable to infectious diseases. In this period, Japan received food, clothing, medical supplies and other assistance from the US government under emergency humanitarian aid programmes for six years known as Government and Relief in Occupied Area (GARIOA) (1946–8) and EROA (1949–51).5 In addition, United Nations (UN) organizations, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), international NGOs, such as the Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the Licensed Agency for Relief of Asia (LARA)6 and others also provided humanitarian assistance, especially in improving the health and nutrition of children and infants. Over the next decade, from 1952 through to the middle of the 1960s, Japan worked to rebuild its industry and social infrastructure with loans from the World Bank.7 While rebuilding its own economy as a recipient of international assistance, Japan began to provide assistance to neighbouring countries in the form of technical cooperation. It included the provision of agricultural guidance in areas, such as rice cultivation, and training in areas, such as electrical machinery and automobiles (Editor, 1994). This resulted in Japan’s membership to the Colombo Plan. Thus, in 1954, Japan broke away from the recipient country status of emergency humanitarian aid, but was still receiving loans for the reconstruction of its own infrastructure from the World Bank. This unique situation is illustrated, for instance, by the fact that Japanese technical cooperation was carried out with financial assistance from the technical cooperation budget of the UN. In other

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cases, when Japan did not have sufficient foreign currency to cover the costs to invite trainees from neighbouring countries to provide technical advice for projects, such as rice cultivation and machine maintenance, the costs were covered under the aid budget of the United States at the outset (Editor, 1994). This developed a form of assistance at that time, which is now popularly called ‘South–South cooperation’ (Editor, 1994).8 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) noted that this was one of the bases of the current Japanese support for the promotion of South–South cooperation between Asia and Africa (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998a). 1978: EXPANDED EFFORTS UNDER THE NEW ODA PLAN

Technical cooperation that began in mid-1950s was expanded to thirteen Asian countries as a consequence of post-War peace agreements.9 Following the first reparation to Burma, Japan started paying reparations to other Asian countries, which became the central principle of Japan’s economic foreign policy towards Asian countries until the middle of the 1960s.10 In the 1960s, a government-affiliated organization was set up to implement the yen loan (the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, or OECF), and another organization was then established to implement technical cooperation (the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency, or OTCA, predecessor of the Japan International Cooperation Agency, or JICA). Grant aid was also started as a follow-up to reparation payments during the decade. Under the administration of Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, economic cooperation became a more important Japanese government initiative, with more clearly defined strategies and goals established at the end of 1976. In 1978, the administration launched a plan, ‘The Medium-Term Target of Official Development Assistance: Three Year Doubling Plan of ODA’. The government announced the initiative in Japan and abroad, and redefined its allocation of the ODA budget in general expenditure.11 Prior to this, the ODA had competed with other categories of government expenditure – it had been constrained by the fact that any increase in the ODA expenditure by the MOFA (which together with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), is responsible for over 90 per cent of the ODA budget) had to be offset by decreases in expenditure in other areas. After the drafting and implementation of this three-year plan, successive administrations endorsed the draft and implemented four five-year plans for the expansion of ODA. The efforts of expansion enabled Japan to become the world’s top donor country in terms of total spending in 1989, a position it recaptured in 1991. THE ODA PHILOSOPHY AND THE JAPANESE IDEA OF ASSISTANCE

Some of the Japanese ODA philosophy is illustrated in Japan’s experience as an aid recipient in the early decades of its history. For example, the purpose of economic assistance is to build self-reliant economies and respect the sovereignty of the recipient country, both of which are appreciated above all else in building the economic cooperation between the donor and recipient nations. In addition, Japan’s

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Japanese humanitarian assistance 50 45 40 Support (%)

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Year It should be promoted It should be reduced

The present level is sufficient It should be stopped

Figure 3.2 Findings of Public Opinion Polls on economic cooperation. Source: Public Opinion Polls conducted by The Office of the Prime Minister. Note The graph is drawn by the author on the basis of the data.

own experience of rebuilding its own infrastructure by loans from the World Bank is often cited as the basis for the use of Japanese yen loans, which account for 30–40 per cent of Japanese bilateral aid and for the building of economic infrastructures in developing countries.12 Besides, the fact that the country’s reconstruction was achieved with international assistance during difficult times may explain the people’s strong support for international assistance. Figure 3.2 shows that throughout the last three decades economic cooperation has obtained wide support. In this sense, Japan’s history as a recipient played an important part in shaping the Japanese idea of foreign assistance and humanitarian considerations.13 The magnitude and coverage of the ODA grew towards the end of the 1970s (see Figure 3.1). This led to a debate to redefine the philosophies and objectives of the ODA. ‘The Current State of Economic Cooperation, and Its Outlook: The North–South Problem and Development Assistance’ published by the MOFA in 1978 sums up the consensus view that had emerged from the debate. In the report, the Ministry pointed out the following two points as significant in Japan’s economic cooperation (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994): 1

Japan can ensure its security and prosperity only in a peaceful and stable world. One of the most appropriate means for Japan to contribute to the peace and stability of the world is giving assistance to developing countries.

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Japan is closely interdependent with developing countries since it is able to secure natural resources only through trade with those countries. Therefore, it is essential to maintain friendly relations with developing countries for Japan’s economic growth.

The first three decades of Japan’s assistance history is characterized by the provision of vast yen loans to recipient governments, which were used for the development of mines, energy, railroads, ports and other infrastructures. In the 1960s, the predominant form of ODA was yen loans, aiming at assuring markets for Japanese products. In the late 1960s, until the oil shock at the end of the period of high economic growth, major concerns of Japanese industries were to secure the access to raw materials needed for growing production. The so-called ‘imports of raw materials as a means of development of exporting countries’ became one of the major ODA schemes. In the 1970s, a new form of ODA was added: investment finance. This is a finance of low-interest rate to Japanese enterprises that invest in developing countries. Thus, the assistance in this period was characterized by the ‘hardware’ field, by which Japan succeeded in promoting its own reconstruction after the war.14 This explains that the experiences of having been a recipient of assistance, as well as culture and traditions, have made impacts on the idea and the form of assistance required at the practical level. ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE UN

The Japanese government has paid special attention to assistance through the UN. In general, the UN gains wide support from the people in Japan as well as in the political field.15 Since Japan became a member of the UN in 1956, the government has paid special attention to the UN as providing one of the three principles of its diplomacy, together with an alliance with the West and Japan being considered as an Asian nation. This is called ‘the UN-centred diplomacy’.16 However, the UN-centred diplomacy was only an abstract principle in the early period: it had no substance, unlike the other two principles.17 The focus on the alliance with the West was substantiated by the Japan–US Security Treaty, while the principle of being an Asian nation was substantiated by growing economic links with neighbouring Asian countries, initially with payment of War reparations and later with ODA and private investments. On the other hand, the UN-centred diplomacy did not take any concrete shape. The UN became a stage for the North–South confrontation as well as the East–West confrontation.18 Accordingly, the late 1960s and the 1970s became the decades of active diplomacy among states in the context of both East–West and North–South confrontations. However, Japan was not a particularly prominent actor, in spite of the fact that it adhered to the UN-centred diplomacy (Yokota, 1999: 86).19 For instance, in 1958 during the conflict in Lebanon, the then UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, requested the dispatch of an SDF from Japan, yet the government declined the request by reasoning that it may breach the law even if it was not against Article 9 of the Constitution itself. In 1960,

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participation in UN PKOs was discussed at the Diet, but it was immediately excluded from the discussion (Tanaka, 1992: 38). It is often pointed out that Japan in this period was exclusively concentrating on its own economic growth (Inoguchi, 1991: chapter 1; Yokota, 1999). As pointed out by many observers, until the 1980s Japan’s UN diplomacy was generally passive and was preoccupied with its own industrial development. Yet, Japan was a good apprentice from the standpoint of the UN’s core objective of maintaining international peace and security in that it consistently honoured the Charter’s requirements that member states should settle conflicts by peaceful means and refrain from the use of force. For this reason, Japan is considered to have been following UN-centred diplomacy, adhering faithfully to the Charter. However, given the fact that Japan made no active contribution to political initiatives and conflict resolution in the world, most analysts consider Japan during this period a passive actor. Non-governmental assistance DEVELOPMENT OF NGOs IN JAPAN

Unlike international NGOs, Japanese NGOs were less developed in terms of number, scale and history.20 Japanese NGOs gradually became active on the occasions of Indo-Chinese refugee relief and Africa famine relief campaigns in the late 1970s.21 It was only in the 1980s that the expression ‘non-governmental organization’ was introduced and often used by the media in Japan (JANIC, 2002). However, even then the term ‘non-governmental’ was employed as a negative expression among the public (JANIC, 2002). In this sense, the acceptance of the non-governmental sector made slow progress in Japan. In the early years, Japanese NGOs were mainly citizen’s groups characterized by anti-government and anti-corporate movements. The NGO movement in this period was sometimes referred to as the ‘citizen’s movement’, and comprised labour and consumer movements and movements against environmental pollution and atomic weapons (Yamamoto, 2000: 101). Yet, there were a few NGOs which started working for development cooperation in Asian countries, such as the Asian Rural Institute (ARI) and the Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service (JOCS) in 1960 and the Organization for Industrial, Spiritual and Cultural Advancement (OISCA) International in 1961. According to the data from the Japanese NGO Centre for International Cooperation (JANIC), there were only seven NGOs established in Japan for the purpose of international cooperation at the end of the 1960s but there were around 33 at the close of the 1970s (JANIC, 1998).22 According to the NGO Directory, those early NGOs were linked to religious bodies and were public-interest corporations (JANIC, 1998). The 1970s witnessed the establishment of a variety of NGOs, including branch offices in Japan by international NGOs, such as Amnesty International. For instance, in 1972, Shapla Neer (formerly the Help Bangladesh Committee) was established by young people who joined volunteer activities in Bangladesh just after the independence from Pakistan for the purpose of supporting poor children and farmers. The Pacific Asia Resource Centre (PARC) was established in 1973 for the purpose of

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contributing to the development of Asian countries through research and publishing activities. The PARC is the precedent of advocacy-based organizations, which became active in the latter half of the 1980s. More NGOs were born in the latter half of the 1970s (Enokida, 1996: 64).23 The number of NGOs, which had been increasing relatively slowly, started growing rapidly after 1979 when the issue of IndoChinese refugees came into focus. Most documents that explain the development of Japanese NGOs indicate that the Indo-Chinese refugee problem was a trigger for the increase in the number of Japanese NGOs for the purposes of humanitarian and relief work.24 In fact, a number of major Japanese NGOs currently referred to as experienced organizations were founded in this period. These included the Japan Sotoshu Relief Committee (JSRC  SVA, 1979), the Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC, 1980) and Caring for Young Refugees (CYR, 1980). In the early development period of NGOs in Japan, they mainly engaged in development activities and most documents used the term ‘development assistance’ rather than ‘humanitarian assistance’ regarding non-governmental activities. Major sectors of NGO activities in the early period were, for example, refugee support, support for educational and medical institutions and local government. A wide range of activities from welfare and education to human rights, peace and international cooperation already existed in the 1970s.25 However, because of their short history, these NGOs were considered less skilful with lack of sufficient knowledge and techniques, information and experience on organizational management, and also lack of effective project planning, implementation and evaluation (JANIC, 1998).26 In addition, cooperation with other sectors, such as government, research institutions, the media, private foundations and companies, was very limited. Some of the interviewees working in NGOs in East Timor indicated these points, which are introduced in Chapter 4. In the first two decades since NGOs started emerging, Japanese NGOs were involved predominantly in domestic activities or activities in Asian countries. The period is recognized as the groundwork years for NGOs with relatively small scale and limited funding. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ASSISTANCE AND JAPANESE SOCIETY

NGO activities in the early period remained small scale and less advanced. JANIC points out some characteristics of Japanese NGOs in the NGO Directory (JANIC, 1998). The following points are considered as some of the reasons why Japanese NGOs remained small. First, society in general, had had little active practice to apply humanitarian ideas. This is likely an outcome of the type of Japanese social construction discussed in the former chapter. JANIC explains that Japanese humanitarian activities are less evangelical – evangelism was one of the important characteristics of humanitarian ideas developed in Western countries, which has given rise to many Western NGOs. Thus, it remarks that unlike the general public in Western countries, which shows intense interest and suggests ideas, the public in Japan had little practice and awareness in the field of humanitarianism. Therefore, one of the distinctions between Japanese and Western societies is the strong support of NGOs by the private sector that includes religious bodies and private corporations. The idea of relief and

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humanitarian activities in Japanese society was considered limited and NGOs had not been socially understood or recognized. Iokibe explains at this point that the public had little interest in international cooperation or assistance during the course of its own social development and thus the Japanese tended to stress mutual assistance within the society before extending help outside (Iokibe, 2000: 80). The tendency was perceived even in public opinion about the governmental assistance (see Figure 3.3). Though economic cooperation gained popular support throughout three decades, the opinion poll shows that the majority of people who have said that economic cooperation should be reduced or stopped, reasoned that domestic issues should be dealt with first. Hence, it is not far from reality to say that: in the process of economic development, any young people who showed serious interest in philanthropic and/or volunteer activities for the common good of the people would have been criticised and ridiculed by followers of the people’s democracy as indulging in intellectual naiveté. (Iokibe, 2000: 80) This idea is further supported by such opinion as ‘there are many people who are suffering within the country, is it necessary to do overseas activities?’27 A second reason why Japanese NGOs remained less advanced is that people tended to have reservations about the private or non-governmental sectors. The public relied more on governmental organizations or institutions than private

80 70 Support (%)

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Year It should be self-effort Need focus on domestic issues There is little appreciation It is not effective without functional political system

Figure 3.3 Findings of Public Opinion Polls on reasons against economic assistance. Source: The Office of the Prime Minister. Note The graph is drawn by the author on the basis of the data.

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ones. This is proved by such comments as ‘we should leave these matters to the government’.28 The idea is traced even in the 1990s. This confirms that in Japanese society private activities did and do not easily earn credit from the general public. It is considered as one of the reasons why the development of Japanese NGOs was slow, in that the lack of public support and awareness prevented the accumulation of membership fees and donations from individuals and groups, which are critical for NGO activities.29 The government and public institutions have been considered as primal organs in the field of international cooperation including humanitarian activities. This deep-rooted idea among the Japanese is illustrated in the public opinion data. The point is also explained by the social construction and social practice explored in the previous chapter. These reasons explain some of the characteristics of Japanese society and also the people’s views on ‘voluntary’ and ‘charitable’ activities. Most Japanese NGOs are voluntary organizations, which did not have judicial status at the time.30 It made it more difficult for them to raise funds. Japanese NGOs had difficulties in undertaking a broad range of projects on a stable financial basis with no social arrangement that supported non-governmental and voluntary activities as a fixed system.31 Indeed, there was a debate in Japan in the 1970s about whether people working in charitable organizations should be paid or not. It was a general idea that those who engaged in charitable activities made a living from their own money and therefore should not receive money from these activities (JANIC, 1994: 26–9).32 The application of the concepts of charity and voluntary work and the overall considerations of humanitarianism, under which Western NGOs were developed, were limited in philosophy and actual practice in Japanese society. Social contexts since the 1980s The 1980s are widely acknowledged as representing a decade of change in both domestic and international contexts. In broad terms, domestically, Japan recovered from its wartime destruction and became a true economic superpower in 1991. This was achieved after repaying loans to international organizations that had been used for reconstruction following the Second World War. Internationally, the world witnessed increasing problems that required addressing at a global level. These contextual changes have a bearing in explaining the recent upsurge of humanitarianism. Thus, the section briefly looks at the contextual changes surrounding Japan, especially in domestic and international terms. Among various occurrences in the 1980s and 1990s, the Gulf Crisis of 1991 marked a noteworthy change in Japanese approaches towards humanitarianism. Therefore, the section explores pivotal issues and events that relate to Japanese perceptions and attitudes towards humanitarianism. Increasing global issues and changing perceptions The pattern of changing international relations during the 1980s is emphasized well by the number of UN conferences, including the UN Conference on

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Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the creation of the Committee on Sustainable Development, the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna and the UN Environmental Development Summit in 1993. In addition to these were the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994, the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995 and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. Issues discussed in those conferences demonstrated the necessity of a multitrack approach and as a direct result increased the involvement of non-governmental actors. Indeed, a growing awareness of the importance of NGOs in the international field is perceived in various assistance decisions made by the UN and national governments. The growth of a collaborative network to address global issues, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, contributed towards an enhanced conception of conditions for members to share a commitment to a certain set of values or ideas among people in the world with international networks at diverse levels of society and between different countries. These issues included some of the many other global problems and intensifying conflicts, encompassing poverty and sudden natural disasters in the world which resulted in appeals in many fields made to the world. It is an undeniable fact that Japan has been acutely influenced by such global issues and dialogues. For example, it is widely acknowledged that the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro was a watershed event for Japan’s NGO movement (Yamamoto, 2000: 99). In addition to the changes in the international field in this period, there was a certain change in the domestic field. The economic condition that has been a major consideration of government policy turned out to be the highest level in the world. Accordingly, Japan became the leading donor in the world in terms of ODA spending.33 A survey conducted in this period shows that people who emphasized material well being in life accounted for 41 per cent in the middle of the 1970s (1974–6), while those who emphasized spiritual well being were 36–37 per cent. After 1980, the latter’s proportion surpassed the former and reached 59 per cent in 1996, while the percentage of the former dropped to a mere 28 per cent.34 This indicates that the perceptions and ideas among the people also entered a new phase. By this time, economic motives were largely supported as confirmed by the motives indicated by the ODA. However, what we can infer from the survey result is that when the Japanese economy reached the mature stage, people’s concerns gradually shifted. Several circumstantial changes, including global and domestic issues, possibly reinforced such changing social recognition and considerations among the people. The Gulf Crisis: turning point for political consensus? The Gulf Crisis in 1991 is one of the events that enhanced awareness about international collaboration. It is recognized as an important threshold time for Japan to reconsider its role in times of an international humanitarian crisis (Akaha, 1998: 478; Inoguchi, 1998: 17; Spruyt, 1998: 372). The crisis triggered

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a widespread discussion in Japan not only in the political field but also among the media, academia and the public. The debate brought recognition of Japan’s role other than economically in times of international crises or security problems. The comment that ‘Japan’s response to international humanitarian crises following the Gulf Crisis arose from the desire to avoid the repeat of 1991’ (The Guardian, 20 September 2001) illustrates the debates brought about after the Gulf Crisis.35 Japan has established its international role as a financial contributor in times of international humanitarian crises. Even in the assistance field, the ODA’s total spending marked the largest among donor countries in the world in 1989 (cf. Figure 3.1). However, politically Japan took a very limited role or, some may say, Japan did not take any political role in the international efforts concerning crises. Throughout the 1990s, Japan faced increasingly serious demand to take a certain political role that fits with its economic power. Considering the historical contexts before and during the Second World War, the government contributed to international efforts for global issues in a financial form. In the 1960s and the 1970s, it was not common for the Japanese to participate politically in any international effort. This is partly because the debate on political contributions tended to be exclusively concerned with the dispatch of its SDF. Thus, it often resulted in a debate about the constitutional implications of such contributions. The Gulf Crisis became a threshold in that the public and the government formed a broad consensus that Japan should take a political role and contribute in terms of personnel, though the form and content of their involvement were not agreed upon. The experience of the Gulf Crisis provided an opportunity for the country as a whole to review its political role that was not necessarily limited to military involvement. The following changes came about after the Gulf Crisis: First, within the government, serious discussions on the contribution by personnel and the political role were held as a result of the harsh criticism of its financial contribution, amounting to US$ 13 billion as ‘chequebook diplomacy’.36 During the Gulf War, in April 1991, two months after the fighting in the region had ended, Japan sent four minesweepers and two support ships to the Gulf to clear shipping lanes. Though important as the first overseas non-training mission for Japan’s military force, this naval dispatch occurred during peacetime outside a UN framework and had political and economic as opposed to military objectives. This resulted in the criticism that Japan had been too slow in offering too little assistance to a multinational struggle.37 As a result of government discussions, though there was no consensus on how Japan could contribute in such crises, debates later resulted in the view that Japan’s contribution to similar crises should not just be in a financial form. Second, while the dispatch of the SDF abroad had been a major topic of discussion in the government and among the people, other forms of assistance by personnel under the multilateral security cooperation of the UN authority gradually obtained recognition and endorsement in such humanitarian situations. The idea about international cooperation diversified and Japan gradually valued faceto-face efforts in addition to providing assistance in financial form (cf. Figure 0.1

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in Introduction). Public opinion showed that since the early 1990s, the support for adopting an economic role has gradually reduced and instead, expectations by the public of adopting a political role to include such issues as the environment and the provision of human resources have progressively gained popularity. While the dispatch of the SDF brought divided opinions (to support this or not), the necessity of taking a political role became a prevalent idea. On the whole, the Gulf Crisis generated a realization of the country’s politically uncertain position in times of international humanitarian crises and security problems. The realization was epitomized by such debates based on how Japan’s contribution to world peace would be, or what role Japan could and should take in these crises both in civilian and non-civilian terms. The debates resulted in two distinctive opinions: supporting a military form of assistance, that is, the dispatch of the SDF on the one hand, and on the other, supporting a non-military form of assistance, that is, humanitarian relief operations and election monitoring. No determined answer on how Japan contributes to those crises was formed at that time. Nevertheless, the fact that the Gulf Crisis initiated such debates in many fields in Japanese society marked an important step with regard to the Japanese contribution in times of international humanitarian crises. Enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law) Within two years after the Gulf War, the Japanese government took an initiative to create a legal framework enabling it to participate in international efforts in the form of establishing PKOs under the UN, which are of a civilian nature, where no domestic constitutional controversy would arise. The new law concerned cooperation with a UN PKO, involving international humanitarian relief operations and international election monitoring activities. The focus of the International Peace Cooperation Law – so-called, PKO Law, has tended to be the dispatch of its SDF to participate in the logistical aspects of a PKO.38 However, it also empowered the government to dispatch personnel for other purposes, which took roots in the official name of the law. Since the enactment, Japan has sent its personnel to join in UN PKOs in Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, the Golan Heights and others. The process of enacting the law had a certain impact on peoples’ views on the Japanese contribution in times of humanitarian crises. The debates on the participation of PKOs under the UN for contributions by personnel were presented in a politicized nature as it reflected foreign pressures that Japan had experienced during the Gulf Crisis and in international circumstances in the beginning of the 1990s. The first bill of the PKO Law submitted in 1990 was not passed by the Lower House partly because the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), failed to obtain support from the second largest opposition party and also the government could not satisfy the legal requirements of the Constitution. At the same time, public support for the law remained less than 30 per cent (Asahi Newspaper, October 1990). The government’s first attempt to enabling the participation in PKOs by enacting the PKO Law, failed. This would have also allowed Japan’s SDF

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and the Maritime Safety Agency to join the multinational force. The failure of the first bill brought five principles of the PKO to the second bill, which made it possible to enact it under the constitutional framework.39 However, the public had only a vague knowledge about the matter. In fact, majority opinion showed that it supported a PKO, yet, only for non-military operations. The public and even parties within the government had different opinions about supporting the law. Thus, the approved law consisted of not only performing PKOs under the UN, but also making contributions to international humanitarian relief operations and international election monitoring activities.40 The enactment of the PKO Law in June 1992 took the form of a forcible passage through parliament under the extraordinary circumstance of 141 members of the opposition parties being absent.41 Seventeen members of the opposition still opposed the motion but 329 members of the LDP and another two opposition parties passed the bill. The situation in Cambodia is often referred to as accounting for the forcible passage. The crisis situation in Cambodia exposed a humanitarian needs situation and the implementation of a possible PKO in the near future. Japan wanted to avoid the nightmare it had experienced at the time of the Gulf Crisis. Therefore, the government needed to take a certain role in the Cambodia Crisis, as a country that was committed to the peace process from the early stage of the conflict. However, both public opinion and opinions in the government were still divided about whether Japanese people should participate in PKOs or not. Since the Gulf Crisis, the critical issue has been the division between military and non-military roles, while a firm consensus was established on the idea that taking a political role was necessary as Japan was now one of the superpowers in the world. This was confirmed by the fact that the new law covered both roles. The Cambodia Crisis, which had been in the government’s consideration throughout the process, defined the direction of the new legal framework and changing public opinion on Japan’s contributions. Japanese assistance since the 1980s As discussed earlier, the provision of Japanese assistance until the 1970s proved that Japan’s own experience after the Second World War certainly influenced the policy, philosophy and ideas of assistance among the people. The expansion efforts of the ODA during the 1970s led to large increases in the total spending of the ODA in the late 1980s. As international circumstances exposed increasing humanitarian crises in different parts of the world, Japanese assistance evolved in quality and ideas as well as in quantity. The section explores the shifts of its assistance policy and systems during the changing domestic and international circumstances. Governmental assistance The 1980s were recognized as a turning point for the Japanese ODA and even Japanese assistance in general since the end of the Second World War (Inada,

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1987: 60). In fact, the assistance underwent major changes in many respects. Two major changes in the ODA in the last two decades are explained by the fact that: first, it expanded the geographical areas it was concerned with, which had originally been dominated by Asian countries, and second, the quantity of the ODA input dramatically increased (cf. Figure 3.1). In addition to these visible changes, in the 1980s, some key ideas and principles about assistance were introduced, and also the form of assistance was diversified. When the first Medium-term ODA Target was drafted in 1978, the domestic debate on the philosophy and principles of the ODA was at its peak (Fujita, 2000: 17). A report published by the MOFA in 1980, Keizai Kyoryoku no Rinen (The Ideas of Economic Cooperation), presents the philosophy and principles of Japanese assistance in the new decades.42 It states that economic cooperation is guided by two motives: first, ‘humanitarian and moral considerations’ and second, ‘the recognition of interdependence among nations’.43 It defines Japan’s aid philosophies based on its own experience and surroundings44 combined with aid rationales commonly held by donor countries. It concludes that the overseas development assistance is a necessary cost to preserve the stable international environment for Japan’s comprehensive security. The government pronounced these philosophies and objectives of the ODA on various occasions through statements in Japan and abroad by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. For example, in 1991, the Japanese government announced four ODA guidelines about its assistance to developing countries, recognizing changes in international circumstances. More specifically, the government made it clear that it would pay full attention to the following four points in the decision to implement its assistance (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994): 1 2 3 4

the trends of the military expenditure of recipient countries, the trend of their development and production of mass destruction weapons and missiles, their export and import of arms, their efforts for promoting democratization and the introduction of a marketorientated economy, and the condition to secure basic human rights and freedom.

The four ODA guidelines were pronounced on account of the significant increase in Japan’s total spending and also as a result of the recognition of the end of the Cold War.45 It incorporates the philosophies with objectives of Japan’s foreign assistance, which have evolved over the years. At the end of the Cold War, on the domestic front, the Cabinet announced and adopted the ODA Charter. The Charter takes into account a broad range of views through the Advisory Council for the Prime Minister on Foreign Economic Cooperation (Fujita, 2000: 34).46 1992: THE ODA CHARTER

The ODA Charter presents the broadening provision of the ODA by clarifying the focus and the approach, and also by providing the building blocks for future ODA

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policy, that is, the basic philosophy, principles, priorities, measures for effective implementation and strategies to promote public support (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992). In the basic philosophy of the ODA, the Charter lists four guidelines: (1) humanitarian considerations, (2) the recognition of interdependence among nations of the international community, (3) the recognition of environmental considerations and (4) the support for self-help efforts of recipient countries. The Charter also lists the four principles that include the above-mentioned four ODA guidelines for the implementation of the ODA. The basic philosophy and principles explain Japan’s assistance approach, reflecting the experience of reconstruction and development it underwent after the Second World War, and the experiences it has gained from a series of assistance programmes to developing countries over the past forty years.47 The support for the self-help efforts of developing countries represents the basic spirit of Japanese cooperation in practice on the basis of requests from developing countries (Nishigaki and Shimomura, 1993: 137).48 The principles of the ODA Charter are not implemented automatically, but upon comprehensive considerations of the bilateral relations with each relevant country.49 This has often stirred considerable debate in relation, for example, to nuclear testing in China, India and Pakistan and to human rights issues in Myanmar. The basic philosophy is an outcome of Japan’s unique experience, while it incorporates international trends of foreign assistance by donor countries. NEW TRENDS AND ‘GLOBALIZATION’ OF JAPANESE ASSISTANCE

In addition to previously referred philosophy and ideas of foreign assistance, there were several developments in the geographical distribution and the form of assistance in the 1980s and the 1990s. Geographically, though Asia remains as the dominant target region of Japanese assistance, the target region was expanded in the 1970s and throughout the 1980s in accordance with the increase in total spending of Japanese ODA. This expansion included the assistance to Africa, the Middle East and Central and South America. Thus, the 1980s was referred to as ‘the globalization of Japanese ODA’ (Nishikawa, 2000: 25) (see Figure 3.4). In addition, one of the important changes in the assistance programme is the introduction of assistance, specifically economic assistance, to countries around conflict areas. It was launched at the beginning of the 1980s in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The government, for the first time, announced assistance to the countries whose neighbours are under conflicts in order to stabilize the region (Tanaka, 1995: 126). The new assistance was analysed as: (1) a part of Japan’s burden sharing and (2) Japan’s recognition of assistance as an important method of foreign policy (Tanaka, 1995: 126). This assistance was implemented at the beginning of the 1980s and it expanded Japan’s assistance from countries in Asia to those in other regions.50 The assistance to neighbouring countries of conflict was also considered as one of the driving forces for the globalization of Japanese assistance (Tanaka, 1995: 126). The term ‘humanitarian assistance’ was gradually used to emphasize the difference in meaning from the

78

Japanese humanitarian assistance 100 90 80

Region (%)

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1970 Asia

1980

1990

Middle East

1992

Africa

1993 1994 Year

Latin America

1995

Oceania

1996 Europe

1997

1998

Unspecified

Figure 3.4 Trends in Japan’s ODA by region. Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Note The graph is drawn by the author on the basis of the data.

term ‘development assistance’. The 1992 ODA Charter backed this up by clearly declaring humanitarian and human rights considerations as one of the pillars of Japan’s foreign assistance. There was a major change in the basic concepts and ideas of the ODA in the 1990s. The government repeatedly called for ‘human-centred’ and social development to strengthen human security. For example, in 1995, the then Prime Minister, Maruyama, declared at the UN Summit for Social Development that Japan should become a ‘caring society’.51 Similarly, in 1998, addressing the notion of human security, which Japan declared to strengthen, the then Prime Minister, Obuchi, explained the relevant factors: poverty, environment, drugs, international crimes, AIDS/HIV, population, health care, human rights, emergency relief, anti-personnel mines, refugees, restoration after conflicts and others (Nishikawa, 1999 in Nikkei Weekly, 29 August 1999). As such, the 1990s was the decade that the debate on quality rather than quantity became an issue. Nishikawa wrote at the end of the decade, ‘the period of big spending of loans for large infrastructure was forever over and qualitative amelioration and efficient use of ODA has been put on the agenda of ODA reform’ (Nishikawa, 2000: 27). The government took an initiative for human security in the framework of human-centred development. In fact, the White Paper on ODA, published by the MOFA, focused on human-centred development in its 1996 edition, on Human Security in the 1997 edition, and on health

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care, transitional economies and regional conflicts in its 1998 edition. These subjects show new trends in Japanese assistance. The idea was highlighted in contrast to the decrease in Japan’s ODA budget by 10 per cent annually for three years from the fiscal year 1997 to 1999 reflecting Japan’s economic depression period. The new orientation of Japanese ODA is summarized in the Mid-Term Policy on ODA. It was published in August 1999 by the MOFA. It was the first Mid-Term Policy (five years): in the 1980s, the Ministry fixed several ‘Mid-Term Targets’, which indicated quantitative objectives to be attained in four to five years. The wording of ‘policy’ instead of ‘target’ explains that the basic concepts of ODA put more emphasis on its quality than quantitative growth. The Policy states that it will follow the new development strategy adopted by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1996 and stresses that it emphasizes the notions of humancentred development as well as human security. It states that it would eliminate established interests, revising the actual assistance system. It will also promote ‘face-to-face’ assistance, which reflects Japan’s experience, as well as promote the understanding of recipient nations.52 In the first two decades since Japanese assistance began, it has been characterized by big projects for developing infrastructures and construction projects financed by loans (Nishikawa, 2000: 30). However, the new trend necessitated strong initiative, firm commitment and deep understanding of local conditions. As a result, these became crucial factors in order to achieve the objectives of Japanese assistance. In fact, the government started considering the ‘software’ field, such as human resource development and institutional building, as a ‘caring state’.53 The idea is confirmed by the current debate that may conflict between ‘request-basis’ and the new area that requires subjective action to address the issues of human rights, good governance and democratization. It also brings challenges to human rights issues in the domestic field that did not come into practice in the catch-up economy period. ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE UN

Japan became the second largest economic power in the 1980s following the United States and it also turned out to be the second biggest contributor to the UN budget. Having achieved this position, Japan gradually began to conduct its own brand of diplomacy. For example, it played a key role in setting up an 18-member committee on UN reform and displayed initiative in the establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms in the 1980s. In the field of human rights, too, where Japan had previously engaged in little visible activity, it campaigned successfully for membership on the Commission on Human Rights.54 Similarly, it recommended experts to sit on the commission’s Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and succeeded in getting Japanese experts appointed. In the 1990s, Japan continued its commitment to different fields: it held the Third Symposium on Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region, attaching

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importance to the mutual understanding of human rights as a universal value in the region; it participated in peacekeeping in such places as Cambodia, Mozambique and the Golan Heights. These practices show that the nature of Japanese contribution to the UN contrasts with that of the 1960s and the 1970s. It is considered as a new step in Japan’s UN-centred diplomacy. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT MEASURES FOR NGOs

There is another government action relevant to the new approach. The importance of cooperation with NGOs was highlighted in the Fourth Medium-Term Targets for Japanese ODA promulgated in 1988. Government support for NGOs was introduced in the late 1980s. Several measures by the government to support NGOs with ODA funds have been implemented since 1989, broadly in two measures: (1) the funding support and (2) the cooperation dialogue. Because of the relatively short history of Japanese NGOs, the cooperation between government and NGOs slowly developed from the end of the 1980s, as the opportunities for NGO operations increased and their recognition improved among the general public. The funding support includes the provision of subsidies, grant assistance for grass-roots projects by the MOFA since 198955 and Postal Savings for International Voluntary Aid by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications since 1991.56 The cooperation dialogue includes having regular conferences with NGOs and NGO support seminars with the MOFA since 1996.57 In addition, other Ministries, such as the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries started giving financial assistance to NGOs through their related organizations (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996). Furthermore, in 1999 the MOFA introduced the new scheme of grant assistance for Japanese NGOs specifically for emergency relief projects (the so-called ‘Direct Fund’) as a result of increasing emergency assistance in the world.58 The measures for governmental support of NGOs have been widened and simplified throughout the process in order to meet the demand in emergency situations, in which Japanese NGOs started expressing their comparative advantages and reputation. The government support for NGOs has steadily increased since its introduction (see Figure 3.5).59 As the scale of funding support increased, communication and dialogue between NGOs and government also developed. Indeed, during the author’s field interviews in Japan and East Timor, regular meetings between NGOs and the government were held to develop mutual understanding and to exchange information. Such governmental support was initiated as efforts were made to enhance face-to-face assistance in the course of implementing a humancentred assistance policy. NGO activities, in fact, played a complementary role in cases where the government could not achieve and also when the government could not take action due to legal and other limitations. Also, it can be said that the process has contributed to the development of public understanding of international cooperation, specifically in the areas of humanitarian and

Japanese humanitarian assistance 1,400

81

250

1,200

Budget (¥ million)

1,000 150

800

600

100

400

Number of projects approved

200

50 200

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Year NGO project fund

0

The number of projects approved

Figure 3.5 NGO support by the government. Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Note The graph is drawn by the author on the basis of the data.

emergency assistance through the direct involvement of the public, such as the Postal Saving scheme. Non-governmental assistance INCREASE IN JAPANESE NGOs

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a considerable increase in Japanese NGOs (see Figure 3.6). Besides Japanese NGOs, a number of branch offices of International NGOs were established in Japan in the 1980s, such as Save the Children Japan (SCJ), CARE Japan, World Vision Japan (WVJ) and Plan International Japan (PIJ). Several NGOs, currently active in the emergency relief field were established in this period, such as the Association of Medical Doctors of Asia (AMDA) and Service for the Health in Asian and African Regions (SHARE). In the latter half of the 1980s, network type NGOs were founded, for example, organizations, such as the Kansai NGO Council and the JANIC in 1987 and the Nagoya NGO Centre in 1988. These particular organizations provided information services, thus strengthening NGOs, and contributed to the creation of a link

82

Japanese humanitarian assistance 450 368

400

391

321 350 302 Number

300 250 200

132

150 100 50 0

7

33

1960s 1970s 1980s

1993 Year

1995

1998

2001

Figure 3.6 Increase in the number of Japanese NGOs. Source: JANIC, NGO Data Book, 1994 and 1998 Editions, Tokyo JANIC. Notes The graph is drawn by the author on the basis of the data. Various sources cited different numbers of NGOs. This data is based upon information used by JANIC. Other sources were utilized in order to illustrate various changes and the overall figure.

between NGOs and the government. The period between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s saw an increase in the number of Japanese NGOs. EMERGENCY AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BY NGOs

Japanese NGOs started actively engaging in emergency and humanitarian relief activities in the first half of the 1990s. The role of NGOs on humanitarian and emergency grounds was expanded in such cases as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the provision of disaster relief in Turkey and Taiwan. The activities of Japanese NGOs rapidly developed in the emergency and humanitarian fields in the 1990s (JANIC, 2002). Public support increased and NGOs and their activities were popularized eventually through these emergency and humanitarian activities (JANIC, 2002). In reality, these activities made a clear impact on and appealed to the general public in comparison with development assistance that requires certain periods of time before the effects are perceived. The funding support by the government partially explains the expansion of NGO activities, especially in the field of emergency and relief. As the number of NGOs and their activities increased throughout the 1990s, various aspects of their work were analysed on the basis of empirical data. Some of the analyses conducted by the JANIC illustrate characteristics and changes in NGO activities during the decade. For example, similar to government assistance, countries in Asia dominated the targeted work of Japanese NGO activities.

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Throughout the 1990s, more than 70 per cent of NGOs were working for Asian countries including Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Bangladesh and others (JANIC, 2000). Although assistance to other regions, particularly Africa, marked a gradual increase in countries receiving aid, it is expected that Asia will remain a priority area in the future. The target fields of NGO activities diversified in the 1990s.60 Yet, three target fields – education, health and medical assistance and occupational training – maintained supremacy in NGO activities (JANIC, 2000). In addition to these fields, in the late 1990s, such fields as relief aid and refugee support marked a significant expansion. This accounts for the increase in emergency and humanitarian assistance in the period. JAPANESE SOCIETY AND THE CHANGING AWARENESS OF NGOs

Despite the limitations that Japanese NGOs used to have, as pointed out earlier, there was a steady growth in their number, scale and quality over the decades. Three factors contributed to this substantial growth of NGOs: (1) financial support by the government since 1989, (2) increasing global issues in the 1980s and the 1990s and (3) the media’s attention to NGO activities as a result of the first two points. The attention received by the NGO activities reached its peak in mid1990s when such humanitarian crises as Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the Great Hanshin Earthquake in Kobe demonstrated NGOs’ promptness and flexibility of actions, demonstrating the volunteer spirit in relief activities. Those three reasons were important in that these were elements critical for the removal of limitations that NGOs in the early period were under. Additionally, the following reasons promoted public awareness of NGO activities and their importance. First, the government support has provided a firm basis for NGOs in terms of their funding, which resulted in wider opportunities for undertaking new projects and building a stable organizational structure.61 The support also helped to obtain credit from the general public in that the government support gave confidence in terms of financial stability. Thus, these NGOs backed by the government gained support from the public. Second, increasing global issues in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated the importance of non-governmental actors. A similar tendency was perceived in the international field. The flexible and prompt action, particularly in times of emergency whether as a result of human-action or natural disasters, proved their importance. NGO activities developed in this period and covered the areas that the government could not become directly involved in due to constitutional and historical limitations. The two decades witnessed international issues that necessitated transnational involvement that NGOs attained. The world conferences in many different fields in the 1990s, which were noted earlier, show the increasing role of NGOs. Japanese people were exposed to information and knowledge about these issues and NGOs either directly through travel or indirectly through the mass media. In such cases as former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the volunteer spirit and

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Japanese humanitarian assistance

emergency relief activities, particularly among youth, gained attention from the general public. Thus, the ever-increasing necessity of assistance to satisfy basic human needs in humanitarian conditions called for self-initiated voluntary activities among the people. Emergency situations often termed as humanitarian crises have become common through the media with the scenes of relief activities by NGOs. In fact, they transformed legislative initiatives to protect Non-profit Organizations (NPOs) and volunteer activities. After long debates since the middle of the 1990s, a legal system to support NPOs was established by approving the NPO Law in 1998.62 In the same way, a system to support volunteer activities was launched in society. For instance, some of the Japanese corporations introduced the volunteer holiday system, encouraging people to take part in volunteer activities. By the same token, the volunteer insurance system was introduced for security during volunteer activities.63 In schools it encouraged volunteer activities and included them in the curriculum. The introduction of various systems to support these activities in different sectors of society confirms the growing awareness of non-governmental activities. Conversely, such social awareness and increasing activities created social and legal systems to support such activities. Whilst governmental assistance gave a broad picture of growing humanitarian considerations as a state policy, activities by the non-governmental sector reflected public ideas on the volunteer spirit and humanitarian considerations. The people’s awareness or understanding and the establishment of a social system for assistance seemed to have mutually supported each other. For non-governmental activities diverse external factors, that is, global problems and the international trend are considered to have promoted the awareness of humanitarian situations (Box 3.1).

The Cambodia Crisis The Cambodia Crisis has become an important case in the history of Japanese humanitarian assistance. It was not only because the crisis provided the first opportunity for Japan to dispatch its SDF abroad to participate in PKOs since the end of the Second World War. It was also because Japanese involvement in the crisis served as reference to its assistance history and its political initiatives. In fact, Japanese foreign policy makers paid special attention to the Indo-Chinese peninsula,64 particularly to Cambodia, where they saw an opportunity for Japan to take a political role (Tomoda, 1992: 49). This section introduces Japanese humanitarian activities in the crisis in order to illustrate examples of changes through an actual case. Accordingly, it examines what impact the case had on the history of Japanese humanitarian activities. The background: Japan and the Cambodia Crisis The situation in Cambodia has been one of the regional issues that the government has paid attention to since its independence. Historically, Japan invaded IndoChina during the Second World War and later supported the United States during the Indo-China War. Thus, Japan had a certain responsibility towards the situation

Japanese humanitarian assistance

85

Box 3.1 Accumulation of Japanese humanitarian assistance: refugee assistance through United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Japanese assistance to refugees began in 1978 when the Indo-China refugee problem emerged, following the collapse of the Saigon Government in South Vietnam. Japanese non-governmental sectors also began to assist in international humanitarian situations. During the 1980s and 1990s, assistance for refugees has received particular priority from both Japanese governmental and NGOs. The development of, and changes within Japanese humanitarian assistance, are well represented by the assistance provided by the UNHCR. The government explains, ‘From a humanitarian point of view, refugee assistance is a bounden duty’ that, on balance, contributes to the peace and stability of the world. Thus, it has contributed to both the funding and staffing of the UNHCR; providing more than $100 million each year during the late 1990s. This involved the provision of relief supplies, and the dispatch of personnel for refugee assistance. The former High Commissioner for Refugees, Ogata Sadako, is a symbolic representation of Japan’s commitment to providing refugee assistance. It also gives strong support to the UNHCR as well as other UN agencies in Japan. Among young Japanese people who apply for positions at the UN, the UNHCR is one of the most popular agencies. Consequently, the UNHCR remains popular among the Japanese people. The government places particular emphasis on supporting NGOs that are engaged in refugee assistance. In addition to ODA support of NGOs, a subsidy system for NGO projects and grant assistance, the ‘Direct Fund’ of grant assistance for NGOs’ emergency relief projects, was introduced. This related to NGO assistance for refugees of emergency and humanitarian crises. Japanese NGOs have developed with the different humanitarian cases of refugee assistance, as particularly demonstrated by those in the 1990s. Japanese NGOs also work closely with the UNHCR. Occasionally, Japanese NGOs have engaged in humanitarian activities as a partner of the UNHCR. Japanese humanitarian assistance is well demonstrated by its provision of refugee assistance. This is reflective of Japanese humanitarian considerations, which are confirmed by the strong support for and popularity of the UNHCR.

in Cambodia. Though the historical dimension was rarely addressed in the Japanese process of commitment in the crisis, this had a great bearing on the peace process at a high level. In spite of the history, the relationship between Japan and Cambodia has been consistently amicable. The main reason for this stems from the fact that when Cambodia achieved independence from France in 1953, the monarch Prince

86

Japanese humanitarian assistance

Norodom Sihanouk took a friendly attitude towards Japan, and renounced all claims regarding war reparations. Japan did not cut diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol regime, which overthrew Sihanouk in a coup d’état in 1970 and in 1975, when Pol Pot seized power, Japan immediately recognized the Khmer Rouge government. The main concern in Japan’s Indo-China policy was Vietnam during this period and the interests in Cambodia were secondary. All major countries in Asia and the rest of the world including the United States, China, the Soviet Union, France, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Australia were involved in the peace process in Cambodia. Between 1979 and 1988, Japan did not take an independent peace initiative, and conformed to the Cambodia policy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).65 The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia obliged Japan to review previous policies towards the two countries. Japan used economic assistance as a method to improve relationships with Vietnam. This Japanese government’s intention was confirmed by the decision to make financial provision through the ODA, amounting to ¥4 billion (about £20 million) and a direct government loan of ¥10 billion (about £50 million ) in the first half of 1978. When the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, visited Tokyo in December 1978 on the eve of the Vietnamese army’s invasion of Cambodia, Japan pledged to extend a similar amount of aid over the following fiscal year (beginning in April 1979). However, when Phnom Penh fell in January 1979, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately unofficially notified Vietnam that it would freeze assistance. Japan withheld recognition of the Heng Samrin government, established in Phnom Penh with the support of the Vietnamese army, and maintained its opinion that the exiled government of Democratic Kampuchea was the legitimate government. From July 1982 this was to become a coalition government comprising the followers of Sihanouk [as President], Son Sann and the Khmer Rouge – later the ‘national government of Cambodia’. The Japanese government went on to vote to this effect in the UN General Assembly. During this period, Japan opposed Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia for the reason that it posed a potential threat to regional security in the ASEAN region. From 1988 to 1990, Japan began to prepare for its own peace initiative regarding Cambodia. The government invited Sihanouk to Tokyo as a guest of the Foreign Ministry in August 1988. A series of talks with Sihanouk were held by Japanese high officials of the Foreign Office prior to the peace agreement.66 Therefore, at such a high level there was an obvious application to make a commitment to the peace process and consider possible peacekeeping and reconstruction activities after the crisis. At the same time, the crisis was an opportunity for Japan to show the political role that it should take, which has been questioned since the Gulf Crisis. In this sense, the case involved more vital elements regarding Japan’s role in maintaining peace and security in Asia. It has been a top priority in foreign policy since the end of the Second World War.67 During the first meeting of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) in July 1989, Japan co-chaired the Third Committee that focused on postpeace assistance for reconstruction and refugee relief.68 Based on a Japanese

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proposal, the establishment of an International Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) was also adopted. Since 1990, Japan has played an active role in efforts to settle the Cambodian conflict.69 The government carried out a major revision of its policy and took action for peace. One of the high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials in charge of Indo-China affairs visited Phnom Penh in February 1990 to meet with members of the government of President Heng Samrin. Subsequently, Japan sent invitations to the four Cambodian factions – the Phnom Penh government, the Khmer Rouge and groups headed by Sihanouk and Son Sann – and convened the Tokyo Conference on Cambodia on 4 and 5 June 1990. It was the first major attempt for Japan to be directly involved in the Cambodian peace process. The initiative then moved to the UN.70 The countries that had participated in the PICC a year earlier continued to discuss the proposed framework in a series of meetings, and in November 1990 a draft peace treaty was officially released – the Proposed Structure for the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict. Since then, Japan focused on what individual action it could take to make the proposal effective. There was a negative reaction to the draft peace treaty, which prompted Japan to conduct shuttle diplomacy with the four Cambodian factions. This took place from February to March 1991 in order to alleviate the opposition to the draft treaty in Hanoi and Phnom Penh and to suggest revision. Though the revised proposal was soon abandoned, such Japanese endeavours were innovative in times of international crisis in its history. Japanese humanitarian assistance in the crisis Concerning the high-level commitment illustrated, there were serious attempts by the government to enhance Japanese assistance at both governmental and grassroots levels. Japanese assistance to Cambodia after the crisis was agreed in 1989, when a positive sign of ending the conflict emerged. However, genuine assistance was actually resumed in 1991. Assistance was particularly focused on refugee relief and medical assistance at an early stage and then transferred to development assistance, such as education and agricultural development. The crisis was also the turning point for non-governmental activities, which increased in number and scale, partly because of the government’s initiative to enhance NGO participation. This section looks at Japanese assistance in the case. Governmental involvement ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Japan has been a chief donor to Cambodia among the major donor countries.71 Regarding economic assistance, Japan held a meeting in Tokyo for donor countries and co-chaired with the World Bank. Even before the turmoil, Japan carried out a certain level of assistance to the country. For instance, Japan’s yen loan programme to Cambodia started in 1969.72 After Phnom Penh fell to the

88

Japanese humanitarian assistance

Khmer Rouge in 1975 and Kampuchea was established during the following year, the Pol Pot regime defaulted on the yen loans. Partly because of the political turmoil, Japan did not offer any new yen loans. During the turmoil, assistance was halted, yet, in 1989 assistance was resumed in the form of accepting trainees from Kampuchea. After the peace agreement was concluded in 1991 Japan resumed grant aid and technical assistance in earnest in line with the resumption of international assistance to Cambodia (Teramoto and Ezaki, 2000: 1–2). However, it was only after 1992 that systematic assistance commenced. The main areas of assistance were in economic infrastructure, medical support, agricultural support, human resource training and others (see Table 3.1). Grant assistance has been the main form of Japanese assistance to Cambodia. Among grant assistance, agriculture has been the most important target area and the government has carried out a variety of agricultural surveys concerning development. Between 1991 and 1997, in grant assistance, assistance to improve food crops amounted to a total ¥4–500 million over the whole period. This reflects the fact that Japanese assistance to Cambodia has focused mainly on the agricultural sector since the 1960s.73 In addition to this assistance, the government supported nongovernmental activities through the grass-roots fund in the ODA. Table 3.2 shows the enormous growth in the middle of the 1990s. Table 3.1 Japan’s assistance to Cambodia (¥100 million)

Until 1990 1991–7 Total

Non-grant assistance

Grant assistance

Technical assistance

Total

15.17 8.03 23.20

26.37 422.87 449.24

17.06 95.26 112.32

58.60 526.16 584.76

Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on ODA, 1998 Edition, pp. 61–3. Note The table is drawn by the author on the basis of the data.

Table 3.2 Grass-roots grant assistance to Cambodia Year

Number of projects

Assistance (US$1,000)

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

3 10 41 34 11

130 460 2,000 1,800 600

Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on ODA, 1998 Edition. Note The table is drawn by the author on the basis of the data.

Japanese humanitarian assistance

89

NON-ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Non-economic assistance was carried out in line with the UN PKO. As a co-chair country of the Third Committee, Japanese non-economic assistance consisted of mainly reconstruction and refugee assistance, and the government sent legal specialists to promote democratic systems. Assistance through the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) Japanese governmental assistance has attracted a great deal of attention due to its participation in PKOs, both in domestic and international fields. It attracted, in fact, most attention from the media as this was the first opportunity for Japan to send its SDF abroad since the end of the Second World War. However, as the PKO Law suspended participation in the main activities of military PKOs, such as the patrolling of neutral zones and carrying arms, Japan’s engagement was mainly civilian in nature, in a supportive role. In addition to PKOs, young Japanese participated in UN activities as volunteers, mainly for election monitoring. In response to the request from UNTAC, in September 1992, Japan provided cease-fire observers, electoral observers and civilian police officers, as well as logistic support, such as the repair of roads and bridges.74 From the SDF, the uniformed members were dispatched to UNTAC as ceasefire observers. The first dispatch between September 1992 and March 1993 included eight personnel and the second dispatch, between March and September 1993 also included eight personnel. The mission was to monitor the cease-fire and to supervise encampments storing weapons collected from disarmed Cambodian soldiers of all factions. On the other hand, two 600-member engineer units of the Japanese Ground SDF were sent between September 1992 and April 1993 (the first) and between March and September 1993 (the second) to reconstruct roads and bridges damaged during the civil war. At the request of UNTAC, the mission was expanded to include the providing of water, fuel, food, medical services and lodging facilities. Additionally, one SDF maritime supply ship and two transport ships were sent. The Air SDF provided six C-130H carriers for transporting SDF engineer units and their vehicles. From among the civilian personnel, five national government officers, thirteen local government officers and twenty-three individuals from the private sector were sent to UNTAC in May 1993 to support National Assembly elections required to enact the Cambodian Constitution. The electoral observers supervised and observed the fair execution of the election. In addition, they monitored ballot-counting from May to June in 1993. For the support of the Cambodian police force, seventy-five civilian police officers were sent to UNTAC between October 1992 and July 1993 to advise and supervise the police force. They also supervised the local police in the investigation of actual criminal cases as well as surveyed and monitored police activities to ensure fairness and impartiality. The first case of Japanese participation in the PKO is often referred to in current discussions regarding PKOs. It was questioned whether the situation in

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Cambodia satisfied the five principles that Japan had stipulated for the enactment of the PKO Law since the cease-fire was ruined already in October 1992 after Japan had sent its SDF and its personnel. There were numerous debates at this point. In addition, the operation resulted in a Japanese victim (civilian police officer) and also victims from the UN Volunteer members, which stirred up debate for and against participation in such operations. NGO involvement NGO ACTIVITIES AND SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

The activities by NGOs in the Cambodia case reflected the condition in each stage of the political situation at a higher level, that is, negotiation stage, peace agreement stage and post-peace agreement stage. Not only Japanese NGOs but also other international NGOs have been challenged and influenced by the political situation in Cambodia (Mysliwiec, 1994: 106). A few Japanese NGOs were working in Cambodia in the 1980s. For instance, the Japan Volunteer Centre was working in the areas of medical assistance and rural development in Cambodia as early as in the 1980s. However, activities by Japanese NGOs in Cambodia were not outstanding during the decade. Most Japanese NGOs started working in Cambodia after 1991. From 1979 to 1982, after the Pol Pot regime collapsed in 1979, a small number of NGOs started emergency programmes in Cambodia. Few Japanese NGOs began operating on the Thai–Cambodia border carrying out refugee relief activities, with the number of refugees estimated around 700,000. In 1982, the UN acknowledged the emergency situation in Cambodia and the international community imposed the aid embargo in order to end the Vietnamese occupation. UN agencies left the country and there were only 15 NGOs (including international NGOs) working within the country for humanitarian purposes (Mysliwiec, 1994: 106–7). Thus, throughout the decades, only a few Japanese NGOs were working within the country. After 1988, when the political situation demonstrated an anticipation for settlement of the crisis after the meeting between Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the Prime Minister, Hum Sen, in France in 1987, and also the final withdrawal of Vietnamese troops that occurred in 1989, the number of NGOs, including international NGOs, that started working within the country significantly increased (Mysliwiec, 1994: 106).75 For Japanese NGOs the approaching 1990s was also an important period in that the government’s NGO support scheme was initiated and the funding support widened NGOs’ operations into mid- and long-term reconstruction and development work. At the time of 1992, as a result of this support, six major and other small Japanese NGOs were working in Cambodia. The highlevel initiatives enforced the growth of grass-roots activities by the Japanese.76 Besides the high-level commitment, Japanese presence at grass-roots level was crucial for the government to demonstrate the seriousness of its commitment to contribute to Cambodia’s reconstruction efforts by offering other forms of assistance in addition to financial assistance.

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THE CAMBODIA CRISIS AND JAPANESE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ASSISTANCE

The development of Japanese NGOs was stimulated by the situation of the Cambodia crisis. Indeed, the growth of Japanese NGOs for the purpose of international cooperation in the 1980s was outstanding. The Cambodia Crisis was the first opportunity for most of the NGOs to have worked in the post-conflict area or emergency and humanitarian areas, and it provided new ground for Japanese NGOs to open up emergency and humanitarian operations. Their actions in these two areas later provided evidence of one of the major roles that Japanese NGOs play in growing international humanitarian crises. The grant support for grass-roots projects given by the MOFA introduced in 1989 proved to be one of the elements that stimulated the development of Japanese NGOs in the case. Whether the NGO support scheme was introduced as a consequence of the crisis or not, non-governmental assistance was significantly expanded and diversified since the Cambodia Crisis. Grant assistance itself started in 1992 in Cambodia and covered different sectors dealing with nongovernmental projects. Not only overall NGO activities have increased in number but also, according to the data on targets and forms of assistance given by Japanese NGOs, there has been a significant rise in development assistance, which includes education, vocational training, relief and refugee assistance. The increase of relief and refugee assistance since the beginning of the 1990s illustrates activities related to the crisis. The impact of the Cambodia Crisis on Japanese humanitarianism The section has, hitherto, explored Japanese assistance. The case is often referred to as the first instance of Japanese active commitment to international humanitarian crises. Apart from the high-level attempts to take an active role, the actual assistance in the case demonstrated several changes at both governmental and non-governmental levels. There were noteworthy changes in people’s and government’s attitude towards Japanese humanitarian activity, during and after the Cambodia Crisis. This section attempts to examine the impact of the crisis on Japanese assistance by looking at the changes in the government and the public. Changes in the government For the government, one of the issues of concern was to show its presence in the region and to demonstrate its political attendance after it had established an economic role in the world. Japan’s involvement in the Cambodia peace process was motivated by the desire to fulfil its political responsibilities. It was clearly stated by the then Prime Minister, Kaifu Toshiki, in Singapore in May 1992, that the Japanese government had a new conception of its responsibilities. Kaifu added unequivocally that Japan would assume a more active political role, and referred to Japan’s efforts to seek a political solution to the Cambodia conflict (Tomoda, 1992: 50). In this context, the introduction of the PKO Law was discussed in the domestic field.

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It was acknowledged that sending the SDF would be crucial after the peace agreement. The government contemplated its political role exclusively in the context of this participation in the PKO. A typical idea on this point was that if Japan could not send its SDF for the UN PKO after the peace agreement, Japan would end up losing face in the world. It was considered that, for the government, sending the SDF was inevitable whether the Law would be enacted or not, or even whether the people consented or not (Watanabe, 1993: chapter 3). In fact, the process of the enactment depicted government motivation. After the Peace Conference for Cambodia in September 1989, within the domestic field, the government handed in the framework of the new law in 1991. In March 1992, the Prime Minister, Hun Sen, visited Japan to request the dispatch of a contingent of the Japanese SDF to Cambodia. The fairly quick action until the enactment of the law in June 1992 explains the process. Though active involvement in the crisis stemmed from highly political reasons arising from geographical considerations, the government’s active involvement in the peace process since the 1980s was exceptional. The political role has become the main theme for the Japanese government since the Gulf Crisis. It was reinforced by considerations of the quality of Japanese economic assistance and the idea of human-centred development assistance throughout the 1980s. Changes in the public Changes in the public after the crisis were more prominent than changes in the government. The most important change is probably the one in the overall opinion on the participation of peacekeeping activities in international crises. It does not necessarily relate to sending the SDF, yet, even the opinion on sending the SDF, which the majority of people had opposed in the past, changed after the crisis. At the time of the enactment of the PKO Law, a public opinion survey showed that 36 per cent of the people supported the assistance by SDF, while 36 per cent were against this form of assistance. Contrary to the survey conducted during the Gulf War, the percentage that supported the assistance increased, yet, the public was divided on sending in the SDF.77 However, after participation in the operation in Cambodia, a public opinion survey showed changes: those who supported the dispatch marked 56 per cent, while those who were against the dispatch were 28 per cent (Asahi Newspaper, September 1993). The survey particularly focused on the dispatch of the SDF. However, overall public opinion shows that from the early 1990s people started supporting different forms of assistance using the personnel. The tendency was also perceivable in the Public Opinion Survey by the Office of Prime Minister (see Figure 0.1 in Introduction). What was important about the changes in public attitude as a result of the Cambodia Crisis was that most opinion polls clearly showed that more and more people supported assistance in terms of personnel in addition to economic and material assistance. In this sense, assistance to Cambodia had a significant appeal to Japanese society that resulted in reinforcing humanitarian considerations and active involvement in

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those crises that is not necessarily in military or economic form. The opinion change and the growth of NGOs were often referred to as the growth of civil society in Japan (Yamamoto, 2000: 58). It could be said that the Cambodia Crisis influenced both government and non-governmental activities to form new approaches that obviously impacted on public opinion. This is why the Cambodia case is considered to be a significant one in Japan’s history of assistance.

The nature of humanitarianism By reviewing the Cambodia case, it is clear that there were indeed various changes in the Japanese assistance system as well as in the perceptions and attitudes towards it. Given an overall picture of the evolution of Japanese assistance since the end of the Second World War, this section examines which value nature Japanese humanitarian considerations encompassed in each period (before the 1970s and thereafter) and how social and contextual changes explain or relate to the nature (universal or relativistic influence) of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism. The nature of humanitarian values in post-War social contexts Considering Japanese attitudes to economic assistance in the post-Second World War period (cf. Figure 3.2), it is clear that there were humanitarian considerations among the Japanese. Even though the actual assistance policy and aid demonstrated that methods were limited to an economic form, underlying motives did include humanitarian thoughts (see Figure 3.7). The findings of public opinion polls proved that the high percentage of people who supported economic cooperation considered it a ‘humanitarian imperative’ following the notion of ‘contributing to world peace and stability’. As noted earlier, public opinion showed wide support for economic cooperation as a part of its foreign assistance and international cooperation policy. Similarly, according to a public opinion survey conducted in the 1980s, 41.2 per cent of those who agreed to the acceptance of Indo-Chinese refugees had reasoned it as ‘imperative’ as one of the members of the international community, and 46.4 per cent of them considered the move as a ‘humanitarian imperative’.78 Thus, the question now concerns the nature of humanitarian values that underpinned Japanese considerations during this period. As the previous chapter showed, ideas about both the universal and relativistic nature of humanitarian values existed among the Japanese people. Yet, the idea of relativism seems to have been central in shaping people’s attitudes. As explored in the earlier section, the trends of the government’s assistance policy, actual aid provision, assistance system and situations of non-governmental sectors until the 1980s illustrated a focus more concerned with domestic issues. Figure 3.3 highlights this tendency. It is possible to explain why the communitarian nature of humanitarian values

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Japanese humanitarian assistance 50 45 40 Support (%)

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Year Humanitarian imperative Establish favourable relation

Contribute to world peace and stability To avoid international isolation

Figure 3.7 Findings of Public Opinion Polls on reasons for economic cooperation. Source: The Office of the Prime Minister. Note The graph is drawn by the author on the basis of the data.

dominated people’s perceptions and attitudes during this period. Due to appalling social conditions in Japan and severe domestic hardships, a widespread belief in the communitarian nature of humanitarian values grew. First and foremost, the economic situation in post-War Japan made economic development the priority of it’s people. This obviously shaped Japanese attitudes, as shown by Japan’s policy, the assistance system, its aid trends and the mindset of its people, which are perceived in Figure 3.3. The human rights situation in post-War society more obviously illustrates the domestic conditions that directed people’s perceptions and attitudes, and thus explains the communitarian nature of their underlying values. The human rights situation in post-War society was appalling in areas, such as labour conditions and the treatment of both disabled people and foreign residents. In spite of the poor conditions, human rights issues tended to be treated as secondary or tertiary matters because of the prominence of the issue of economic development. Indeed, during the 1960s and 1970s, the prevailing unsatisfactory domestic human rights conditions were publicized by different social movements. For example, women’s movements were active in forcing the implementation and granting of civil and human rights to women for their political participation and their right to free expression. These ideas were extended to the household with the revision of the Civil Code. The rise of ‘Women’s Lib’ in the 1970s represented the movements and developed as a critique of patriarchy within society. Such issues as wage inequality between

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genders, the income gap, discrimination against women in employment and poor labour conditions were all examples of ill treatment, and demonstrated the nature of human rights conditions in Japan. Given this context, it is understandable that people’s concerns were with domestic and community situations. By the same token, as a country, Japan could not provide precedence in speaking out about human rights conditions in other countries. The international human rights discussion was of very little relevance for Japan in its early post-War period. During international human rights fora, Japan has long been defensive in relation to issues around its treatment of people in both mental institutions and prisons, in addition to the practice of discrimination against Koreans and burakumin. Japan was also reluctant to adopt a critical stance towards human rights violations committed by its Asian neighbours.79 Its historical record has also come back to haunt it in a number of contexts. The Japanese government, often in response to international and internal pressure, undertook measures to improve problematic human rights areas at home by applying international criteria. For example, various international labour conventions were organized and efforts were made to improve conditions (Yokota, 1995: 138). This indicates that until the late post-War period, Japan was not actively confronting and dealing with issues of human rights. Mainly as a result of dire situations in various domestic fields, it is considered that the communitarian nature of humanitarian values dominated during the development period. Yet, this does not deny that the universal nature of humanitarian values was present in Japanese ideas during the period. For instance, even during such harsh domestic economic situations, Japan carried out economic assistance to other countries. However, Japan’s own economic concerns, as well as humanitarian considerations may well have underpinned these actions. As demonstrated by public opinion polls (cf. Figure 3.2), support among the people was high for granting economic assistance to other countries. More prominently, although the social situation regarding human rights was appalling and was an external imposition, Japan enacted a new constitution based on the principles of respect for human rights, pacifism and popular sovereignty. The Constitution includes an elaborate bill of rights in the form of Chapter III – ‘Rights and Duties of the People’. These principles were extensively supported by the people. During this period, there were, at least conceptually, recognitions of the universal nature of humanitarian and human rights values among the people. Moreover, at this time, people were the beneficiaries of universally based humanitarian values. They received aid assistance from other countries that was provided for Japan’s own reconstruction. Thus, Japan herself benefited from the fair treatment of international humanitarian work that aided its post-War reconstruction. For example, the operations that were undertaken by the Red Cross as an international organization were grounded in principles of impartiality and nondiscrimination. In light of the objectives proclaimed by the Red Cross at the Twentieth International Conference in Vienna in 1965, Japan could receive adequate treatment soon after the war. Additionally, during the occupation of Japan by the Allied Force, the JRC was rehabilitated, largely by the devoted service of

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members of the ARC. As a result of these activities, people in post-War Japan experienced the universal nature of humanitarian and human rights ideas as practiced by international organizations. Though the communitarian nature of values seems to have dominated the society, the impact of the experience was huge. The experience is, even nowadays, referred to in discussions concerning the motives of Japanese humanitarianism. The government referred to the fact that Japanese humanitarian considerations are influenced by humanitarian ideas received from other countries in the post-War period.80 For example, throughout the history of ODA, the government has referred to humanitarian work in the postWar period as a significant influence in promoting active Japanese support towards international efforts to promote global humanitarian and development activities.81 In sum, although people had ideas about the universal nature of humanitarian values, the social conditions prevented active engagements in humanitarian activities on a universal scale. Given the social conditions in Japan during the post-War development period, human rights conditions, poverty and environmental problems within the country, attitudes were underpinned by communitarian social construction and remained domestically focused. However, the period was important as Japan experienced the universal nature of humanitarian activities as a recipient, therefore influencing future social practice. This experience is often referred to as one of the important factors that motivated universally based Japanese assistance based on the universal nature in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, the underpinning of Japanese social practice and attitudes in post-War society may well be explained by the communitarian nature of humanitarianism, although the universal nature of humanitarian values already existed in Japanese systems of thought. The nature of humanitarian values in world globalization As previously described, from the end of the 1970s, a number of changes were perceived in both domestic and international circumstances. The impact of contextual and social changes is confirmed by the transformation of new assistance policy, actual systems, people’s awareness on humanitarian work and an expansion of the non-governmental sector. The Cambodia case indeed illustrated several changes and their impacts on the perceptions of the people. Various changes in favour of humanitarian and human rights considerations on a domestic and global scale, during the 1980s and 1990s, led to shifts in people’s perceptions and the underlying value nature. Whereas a communitarian nature dominated in the post-War society, the nature of the next two decades demonstrated perceivably universal characteristics. For instance, from the 1980s, Japanese ODA extended its target globally (cf. Figure 3.4). During the 1990s, debates on humanitarian assistance and human rights considerations in the Japanese diplomacy became more prominent (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999).82 The 1992 ODA Charter highlighted a humanitarian approach and human rights considerations as part of its international cooperation policy. Similarly, the 1980s and the 1990s were decades marked by significant increases in the number of NGOs that undertook

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humanitarian operations in various countries (cf. Figure 3.6). The general public showed their support to NGOs, volunteer activities and humanitarian operations. Therefore, it is considered that the universal nature of humanitarian values grew significantly in the 1980s. There are several circumstantial factors that increased the universal nature of Japanese humanitarian values. One of the major factors was Japan’s economic development. A chief consideration in post-War society were the appalling domestic conditions, especially those arising from its economic situation. Japan’s economic success, its recovery from wartime destruction and repaid debt used for its own reconstruction, to a large extent, explain changes in people’s perceptions and attitudes. In relevance to this, the experience of receiving aid assistance during the reconstruction period also had a certain impact on the changes that came with Japan’s recovery. An increase in consideration for those suffering similarly in other countries would have occurred as the domestic situation improved. By the same token, there were also improving conditions in other fields, such as the environment and rights for women and labour. These resulted from the growth in social movements that characterized the 1970s. In order to protect people’s rights, several legal frameworks were introduced during the 1980s.83 International circumstances also influenced domestic changes. As a result, the approach demonstrated a universal character, which was widely supported by the public. Consequently, during this period, Japanese humanitarian considerations demonstrated universalistic character than relativistic character. Perceptions and attitudes towards human rights also illustrated the changing nature of Japanese humanitarian values. One of the obvious changes was the Japanese government’s declaration of human rights as a universal value in 1993. Since the adoption of the ODA Charter of 1992, particularly during the late 1990s, Japan expressed its interpretation of human rights with a concise policy using an approach based on ‘human-centred development’. The government expressed its position on human rights and the rationale behind it. It pledged strong support for UN engagement in the human rights field and endorsed the universality and indivisibility of human rights at the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna. This position, with the idea of human rights as a universal value, has been maintained since then.84 For instance, the Diplomatic Bluebook, 2001 edition notes: With the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War, the freedom, democracy, and fundamental human rights that Japan has adopted as its principles are becoming more broadly shared as universal values for the international community of the 21st century. Thus promoting democracy and reinforcing respect for freedom and fundamental human rights have become pivotal issues for the international community. (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chapter II) Having expressed the idea of universal human rights, in practice, Japan has begun to focus and speak out in relation to international events. The government has

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expressed a clear-cut stance and views on conditions in other countries. In the 1990s, Japan clearly expressed its views and criticisms on the human rights conditions in other countries. This includes government’s disapproval of China’s oppression of pro-democracy activists in Beijing Tianamen Square during 1989. The government also demanded the release of Aun San Suu Kyi, who was under house arrest in Myanmar. In 1994, it also suspended, in principle, due to its military rule, all new aid to Nigeria, except in offering assistance for emergency and humanitarian purposes. The idea of protecting human rights has seemingly obtained a universal quality and Japan undertook a parallel approach with other industrialized countries by taking action in several cases. However, although it demonstrated the universal basis of Japanese humanitarian considerations in certain fields, it cannot be considered that contemporary Japanese humanitarian values are fully universal in nature. Inconsistent attitudes exist in the Japanese government’s approach to human rights issues, and, on closer inspection, a communitarian nature still remains. Although Japan supported the idea of universality regarding human rights values in the international field, at a gathering of Asian states, it approved certain articles that contained insufficient considerations to such concerns. For example, the Bangkok Declaration that Japan signed in 1993 ruled out any form of political conditionality:85 Every member state has the right to its own development, to its own goals and priorities as well as the right to decide, without intervention from outside, what means and ways it selects to achieve them. (Article 4) Respect for human rights should not be made into a condition for economic cooperation and development assistance. (Article 5) Consequently, differences emerged between Japan’s approach to human rights in Asia and the international arena. In practice, Japan cannot ignore the reaction from Asian countries, particularly those of ASEAN members, as this is the main area for its economic activities. There were human rights organizations from ASEAN states that advocated the idea of universal human rights (Renaldo, 1997: 23). However, Japan’s difficult position between the international approach and regional political reality illustrates the situation. As far as human rights issues are concerned, there are several different opinions and the Japanese approach falls between those of ‘idealists’, ‘realists’, ‘globalists’ and ‘Asianists’. Even within the country, such plurality exists, and it may influence Japan to be receptive on discussions around human rights issues. Therefore, the dilemma between a policy of self-help and one that considers human rights issues depicts the existence of two opposing value sets. Overall, whilst domestic social conditions influenced the relativistic nature of values enacted in post-War society, domestic affairs during the 1980s and 1990s enhanced the universalistic character of values. However, it is important to note that these changes before and after the 1980s were only

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possible because both values already existed in the Japanese system of thought. In this sense, Katsube’s ideas that there are both universal and relativistic natures of humanitarian values among the Japanese, as introduced in Chapter 2, illustrates a vital feature of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism. Yet, as both Cambodia case and Japanese attitudes towards human rights illustrated, political consideration underlay humanitarian concerns.

Conclusion This chapter considered the changing nature of Japanese humanitarian assistance in practice, how it evolved and how Japanese humanitarian ideas were transferred into practice. From this investigation, it attempted to examine the nature of Japanese humanitarianism since the end of the Second World War. In so doing, the chapter explored international and domestic social conditions since the end of the Second World War. In the post-War period, when Japan was catching-up economically, Japanese humanitarian considerations reflected appalling domestic conditions. During this period, humanitarian considerations were applied to mounting domestic issues. During the social and economic development period of the 1960s and 1970s, which saw mounting problems within society, the target of humanitarian considerations were on domestic matters. The 1980s saw Japan’s social and economic development reach new heights, while global problems drew international attention. Thus, a number of changes were evident in both domestic and international circumstances. These circumstances linked with the introduction of a human-centred approach were consistent with the universal nature of humanitarian ideas and human rights considerations. Increasing global problems formed a trend of tackling international challenges through the sharing of certain values. In the 1990s, various global crises raised an awareness that the world must tackle issues by utilizing global networks and by undertaking diverse approaches. This was emphasized by the emergence of new actors, such as NGOs, who demonstrated both their effectiveness and the importance of their transnational activities. As the Japanese economy grew to international levels, a survey revealed the diversity of ideas among the people. During Japan’s own economic development, the concept of providing foreign assistance, in forms other than financial, was not widely considered among the public. The political role tended to be exclusively connected with the dispatch of the SDF. However, a recognition of the diversity in potential political roles has widened debate not only among the politicians but also among the public, media and within academia. The Gulf Crisis provided an important opportunity for Japan to forge changing domestic and international opinions on its role in the world. The economic standing, hitherto established by Japan was questioned, following Japanese contributions to the crisis. Whilst no strategy existed during the early 1990s, there emerged a consensus of opinion that Japan ought to contribute more fully during times of international humanitarian crises. In practice, there were changes in the levels of foreign assistance that were donated by the Japanese government during

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the 1980s. In comparison with the assistance that was donated prior to the 1980s, the government undertook a new policy approach. This involved taking initiatives in providing human-centred and face-to-face assistance efforts; as is shown by the ODA Charter that was issued in 1992. The issue surrounding the quality of assistance to be provided was widely discussed at this time. The contribution in terms of Japanese personnel in addition to financial support was one of the changes arising from the implementation of a human-centred approach. In this respect, the enactment of the PKO Law was symbolic. Japanese non-governmental assistance also developed significantly in the new international arena. Increasing opportunities for NGOs to work in emergency and humanitarian areas demonstrated clear disciplines; in addition, appeals to the public were made through the media. The growth of NGOs is itself proof of an increase in considerations about humanitarian issues. Similarly, the growth in humanitarian considerations is illustrated by the creation of appropriate social systems to support volunteer and non-governmental activities. The promulgation of the NPO Law in 1998 was a manifestation of the change in the non-governmental sector. Changes in assistance policy became more prominent, particularly during the 1990s, as illustrated by the ODA policy. The Cambodia Crisis is now considered as a test case coming as it did, so soon after changes and a newly established system within society. The case is considered as the first one in which the Japanese government took an active role in settlement and reconstruction. It was also a noteworthy case in Japan’s history of assistance as it was the first time since the Second World War that, under much controversy, Japan sent its SDF abroad. The case provided scope for further debate on the nature of Japanese assistance and its role in international humanitarian crises. During the last two decades, domestic and international circumstances have provided the necessary conditions for active involvements in international humanitarian crises. Shifts in the government’s international cooperation policy during the 1980s illustrated an expanding application of external humanitarian considerations, while self-initiated (voluntary) activities among citizens responding to global problems emphasized changes at grass-roots level. The Cambodia case represented a threshold during the course of these changes. Japanese humanitarian activities that are currently in practice are explained by the historical development of Japanese assistance and the assistance system. The imported element is explained by the experience of Japanese people receiving humanitarian assistance during the post-War reconstruction period. Japan’s own nation-building experience has impacted upon its own humanitarian activities. Indeed the recent comment by Prime Minister Koizumi clearly supports this idea. Coinciding with the opening of an international conference on Afghanistan reconstruction, he noted in a Newsweek article that conditions in Afghanistan today resemble those that beset Japan at the end of the Second World War. He also said that the international humanitarian assistance had been essential for Japan’s rebuilding. The exploration in this chapter revealed that humanitarian activities demonstrated various changes at both governmental and non-governmental levels. Since

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the 1980s, the development of an assistance system and a concrete policy approach has reflected domestic social change, especially in terms of the economic situation. During Japan’s own development period, humanitarian considerations were applied to the country from the outside donors. The gradual expansion of humanitarian considerations within Japan has been perceptible since the 1980s when Japan’s economy started to reach the levels of the world economy. This chapter illustrates the domestic and international changes that impacted upon Japanese humanitarian considerations. This is shown by the development of the assistance system and the new approaches adopted by Japan in the last two decades. A consideration now is what nature of values underpinned Japanese humanitarian considerations after the Second World War. The study of social situations before and after the 1980s explains both the universal and relativistic nature of values. During the post-War period, Japanese humanitarian considerations were relativistic in character as they focused on mounting domestic problems. Yet, the universal ideas existed among the Japanese people during the period. Public opinion polls showed the importance of economic assistance even before Japan succeeded in its own development. As domestic conditions improved during the 1980s, Japanese society promoted humanitarian considerations that were global in scope. This was illustrated by the assistance policy and system that effected various changes during the 1990s. Moreover, during the 1980s and 1990s, international events contributed to a change in people’s perceptions and attitudes. The Gulf Crisis was an important cause of further changes within society. The Cambodia case also demonstrated a number of prominent changes in both Japanese actions and the assistance system. Various humanitarian crises occurred during the 1990s which adjusted social conditions and the assistance system. Each case helped to expand the universal nature of humanitarianism. Yet, as inspection of attitudes and approaches to human rights issues illustrated, a relativistic character was perceptible during actions. Thus, contemporary Japanese humanitarianism encompasses both universal and relativistic natures. Unlike the post-Second World War period, the former seems to be promoted as a consequence of domestic and international forces. Therefore, an understanding of the social conditions surrounding Japan at both domestic and international levels is crucial in order to grasp the nature of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism. As the Japanese stance towards human rights showed, decisions that are made to implement humanitarian actions are often influenced by political considerations. It is necessary to examine these political dimensions in order to reveal more precisely the nature of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism.

4

Japanese humanitarian ideas and practice A study through the East Timor case

Introduction This book, hitherto, explored Japanese humanitarian ideas and humanitarian activities from cultural and historical points of view. This chapter looks at Japanese humanitarian ideas and assistance in a specific case; humanitarian assistance in East Timor after 1999. The purpose is to examine whether the explorations in previous chapters fully explain Japanese humanitarian ideas and assistance. The chapter is, thus, based on comments and information obtained through field interviews carried out in East Timor and Japan as well as observations during the interview periods.1 Interviews were conducted with Japanese nationals who have been working in humanitarian areas: in relief organizations including NGOs, UN agencies, government agencies and academia.2 The chapter aims to illustrate humanitarian ideas, the idea of human rights, the idea of universality and the application of these ideas among Japanese people who engage in humanitarian activities. Professionals from different fields were interviewed for the purpose of capturing a wide representation of opinion and perceptions on the issue.3 The case of East Timor focuses on the situation after the turmoil in 1999 in order to look at Japanese humanitarian activities and actions. Findings from the field study are utilized to assess the application of Japanese humanitarian ideas to empirical practice.

Humanitarian Crisis in East Timor: background This section introduces a brief history of East Timor and some background issues. It presents the historical background in order to aid the understanding of the crisis in East Timor during 1999. It also provides information about how Japan has related to the country in the past, particularly since the Indonesian occupation of the 1970s. The section will help us to understand broader contexts of the crisis in East Timor and facilitate our understanding of how the historical background interacts with current Japanese humanitarian activities in East Timor. History of East Timor East Timor – official name, the República Democrática de Timor-Leste (RDTL)4 – is the eastern half of Timor Island, 300 miles north of Darwin,

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Australia, with a population of around 800,000.5 The western half of the island is part of Indonesia. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), it is the poorest country in Asia.6 East Timor has been colonized for hundreds of years.7 The Portuguese reached the coast of Timor on what is now the enclave of Oecussi in around 1515. Since then Portugal has made huge profits from sandalwood, coffee, sugar cane and cotton from the island. East Timor remained largely underdeveloped with an economy based on barter. Prior to the Second World War, the capital, Dili, had no electricity or water supply and there were few roads. Even so, before the War, East Timor was considered as strategically important. For example, when the Second World War started, the Australians and the Dutch, aware of Timor’s importance as a buffer zone, landed in Dili in spite of Portuguese protests. The Japanese, protesting against the presence of the Australians, used it as a pretext for an invasion in February 1942 and stayed until September 1945. Approximately 50,000 Timorese lost their lives as a consequence of the Japanese invasion and occupation of East Timor.8 People were also forced to give food tributes to the Japanese during the occupation. By the end of the War, Timor had been ruined by the Japanese. After the war, Portugal regained its rule over the territory. Meanwhile the UN General Assembly placed East Timor on the international agenda in 1960, when it added the territory to its list of Non-self-governing territories under Portuguese administration.9 In 1974, Portugal sought to establish a provisional government and a popular assembly that would determine the status of East Timor. However, the political climate in Portugal shifted to the left for the first time as a result of the ‘Carnation Revolution’ and the East Timorese were given freedom to form their own political parties. On 11 August 1975, the more conservative East Timorese parties launched a coup in an attempt to seize power from the Portuguese and prevent the ascendancy of the left-wing Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente (Fretilin). Clashes between the two main East Timorese contenders, those who favoured independence and those who advocated integration with Indonesia, escalated into violence resulting in more than 2,000 deaths. On 28 November 1975, Fretilin declared the independence of East Timor as the RDTL. RDTL was short-lived and was recognized by just a few countries, mainly former Portuguese colonies. Ten days later on 7 December 1975, Indonesia intervened militarily and later integrated East Timor as its 27th province in 1976. The United Nations never recognized this integration, and both the Security Council and the General Assembly called for Indonesia’s withdrawal.10 From then until 1982, the General Assembly called for Indonesia’s withdrawal. Some 60,000 people lost their lives in the early years of Indonesian annexation – contributing to a total of about 200,000 deaths for the whole period of their administration.11 Indonesia invested considerable funds in East Timor leading to a more rapid economic growth.12 Unlike the Portuguese, the Indonesians ruled in a strong and direct manner.13

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Beginning in 1982, at the request of the General Assembly, successive Secretary-Generals held regular talks with Indonesia and Portugal aiming to resolve the status of the territory. In 1991, the Indonesian military gave permission for a parliamentary delegation from Portugal to visit East Timor. However, the visit was cancelled at the last minute and the Indonesian military went on the attack immediately. On 12 November 1991, thousands of East Timorese marched towards the Santa Cruz cemetery for the memorial mass of Sebastiao Gomes, a pro-independence student who had been killed at that same church by Indonesian soldiers two weeks earlier. The Indonesian Army opened fire and killed more than 200 people, an incident which is known as the Santa Cruz Massacre. The ‘Santa Cruz Massacre’ marked a turning point in the Indonesian occupation of East Timor as the shocking images were beamed around the world (Scott, 2001: 5). Individuals and organizations started to put increasing pressure on their governments and on international organizations on behalf of East Timor. The imprisonment of resistance leader Xanana Gusmão in 1992 also put the spotlight on the human rights situation in East Timor. Indonesia found itself in an increasingly difficult position, culminating in October 1996 when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two Timorese leaders, Bishop Ximenes Belo and José Ramos Horta, adding to the growing assertiveness of the independence movement. In 1997 and 1998, Suharto’s New Order was shaken by a severe economic crisis, leading to widespread demands for political change. Suharto resigned and was replaced by his vice-president, Dr Habibie. In June 1998, Indonesia proposed limited autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia. In light of this proposal, the talks made rapid progress and an agreement on popular consultation in East Timor was finally reached on 5 May 1999 under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.14 The two Governments entrusted the Secretary-General with the task of organizing and conducting a ‘popular consultation’ in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accepted or rejected special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia. To carry out the consultation, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999.15 The 5th May agreements stipulated that, after the vote, UNAMET would oversee a transition period pending implementation of the decision of the East Timorese people. The voting took place on 30 August 1999. The consultation resulted in majority support for independence. Following the announcement of the result, pro-integration militias, at times with support from elements of the Indonesian security forces, launched a campaign of violence, looting and arson throughout the entire territory. The Indonesian authorities did not respond effectively to the violence, despite clear commitments made under the 5th May agreements. Many East Timorese were killed and as many as 500,000 were displaced from their homes, in some cases by force (Scott, 2001: 18).16 The Secretary-General and the Security Council undertook diplomatic efforts to halt the violence, pressing Indonesia to meet its responsibility of maintaining security and order in the territory. The Government of Indonesia agreed to accept

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the offer of assistance from the international community. The Security Council then authorized the multinational force (INTERFET) under a unified command structure headed by a Member State (Australia), to restore peace and security in East Timor to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. On 19 October 1999, the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly formally recognized the result of the consultation. Shortly thereafter, on 25 October, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established as an integrated, multidimensional PKO fully responsible for the administration of East Timor during its transition to independence.17 The human rights violations suffered by the East Timorese, including those during the past 25 years of the Indonesian occupation period were widely acknowledged by many countries in the world throughout the year. Extensive humanitarian operations were carried out by international, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, which included the Japanese government, civilian police and other organizations. Japan and East Timor As a brief history shows, Japanese commitment to East Timor resulted from strategic considerations that developed before the Second World War. The historical connection between Japan and East Timor cannot be appreciated without understanding the relationship between Japan and Indonesia. This may explain Japan’s historical and regional constituents that influence current Japanese assistance to East Timor. From pre-War to post-War period Japan demonstrated extensive interests in the land of East Timor before the War. Having left the League of Nations, Japan attempted to take full control of Asia. In the course of such attempts, it realized the strategic importance of East Timor. The then Japanese minister stationed in Lisbon emphasized the strategic significance: ‘because of its geographical location, i.e. between Australia and Asia, for its military base and transportation’ (Goto, 2000a: 210).18 According to Goto, the expression ‘Aust-Asian Mediterranean Sea’ defined Japan’s strategic interests in the region in relation to military and transportation purposes (Goto, 2000b: 51–2). The government, indeed, opened the airway to Dili before the war started.19 This increased caution towards Japan from Western colonial powers in the region. In the same period, Japan set up a consulate in Dili, which was maintained until the end of the Second World War (Goto, 1990: 51). Japanese occupation of East Timor (de facto) lasted for three and a half years. During the occupation, around 10,000 Japanese troops were sent to the island (Goto, 2000a: 210). The number of East Timorese during the War was, approximately 45,000. Considering the population of East Timor, the number of Japanese troops sent to the island was relatively large. East Timor was considered as a military base for the War against Australia, yet as the War intensified, the troops

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were short of supplies of food and material (Goto, 2000a: 210). Therefore, the Japanese troops had to rely on the East Timorese. According to Goto, newspapers issued in Japan during the war cited the dispatch of 10,000 troops as evidence of Japan’s interest in East Timor. The Japanese occupation was portrayed as a positive influence on maintaining the Portuguese colonial system. By the end of the war, East Timor no longer received attention in Japan, as it became reintegrated into the Portuguese colonial system (Goto, 2000a: 211).20 Thus, until the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975, the relationship between Japan and East Timor had been latent since the end of the War (Goto, 2000a: 211). Japan and the Indonesian annexation of East Timor As an important partner to Indonesia, Japan’s commitment to the region was critically shaped by the Indonesian invasion of East Timor at the end of 1975 (Goto, 2000a: 212).21 The Indonesian invasion of East Timor is considered as a reflection of international circumstances in the region during the midst of the Cold War. While three Indo-China countries established communist systems after the United States withdrawal from Vietnam, the then Indonesian president, Suharto, who took a strong anti-communist stance, considered the independent movement in East Timor as a critical threat to security in the region. Thus, in the Cold War international arena, Western powers turned a blind eye to Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor. The East Timorese people declared their independence, aiming for a radical socio-economic reform (Goto, 2000a: 212).22 The Indonesian invasion took place after Indonesia was assured that the United States, Australia and Japan, not to speak of Indonesia’s ASEAN neighbours, would not protest if Indonesia moved into East Timor (Cray and Bentley, 1995: 64). Between 1975 and 1982, the UN General Assembly issued annual resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops. Japan voted against the resolutions in each of these seven years.23 Since 1983, the ‘issue of East Timor’ was removed from the UN table because of the efforts made by Western powers. Japan was considered as one of those Western powers that had important diplomatic relations with Indonesia (Goto, 2000a: 214).24 Japan’s support was strong both politically and diplomatically since Japan has been the biggest donor, investment and trade partner for Indonesia. Such supportive attitudes were proved by the fact that Japan voted against the ‘criticism of Indonesia’ at the Fourth Committee in the UN General Assembly at the end of 1975 while Western powers, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France and West Germany abstained from voting (Goto, 2000a: 215). Japan’s ‘pro-Indonesian government’ stance was maintained until the last moment in September 1999. In the Committee, Japan explained the reason for its voting against the resolution thus: ‘Japan does not permit any military intervention and request Indonesian power to withdraw to restore peace and security in the region’, yet also stated that ‘Portuguese nonfulfilment of its responsibility resulted in increasing armed disputes, thus the Indonesian intervention should be considered in consideration of Portuguese failure’.

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Accordingly, Japan stressed the Portuguese failure to fulfil its responsibility. This stance of the Japanese government has been maintained since the 1970s. In 1978, on the eve of the UN General Assembly meeting, Japan issued an official comment on the status of East Timor. It states that Japanese government representatives had an opportunity to visit East Timor and the government understands that the Indonesian government, in effect, rules the area (Goto, 2000a: 216). Since 1979, Japanese representatives at the United Nations led the pro-Indonesia stance by reason of Indonesian ‘de facto rule’ of East Timor (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984). The 1983 Diplomatic Bluebook notes that at the UN discussion in 1982, Japan succeeded in reducing the gap between those who supported and those who were against the Indonesian occupation of East Timor (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1983). Consequently, the issue of East Timor that had been discussed at the United Nations every year until 1983 was removed from the debate at the United Nations following agreement between the parties (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984). Japan in the midst of international pressure Since 1975, Japan has supported Indonesia on different occasions in the international field. An East Timorese wrote in 1994 that Japan has consistently stood by Indonesia since the annexation in 1975 and has been one of the most supportive countries to Indonesia (Goto, 2000a: 216). Therefore, he adds that when its important economic partner, Japan, changes its policy, Indonesia will face economic difficulties. It illustrates that Japan had a critical influence on Indonesia’s decision and on its action with regard to East Timor.25 However, Japan’s position has not changed, even after the Santa Cruz Massacre and a review of policies among Western powers towards Indonesia at the end of the Cold War.26 In the beginning of the 1990s, when most Western powers started taking a position against the Suharto government, Japan was hostile to sanctions against Indonesia and maintained its stance to leave the issue of East Timor as an internal matter.27 Also, Japan reaffirmed the importance of the relationship with Indonesia in the Diplomatic Bluebook issued in 1991. The Bluebook noted that Indonesia is a very important country for Japan since both countries have been mutually dependent economically through trade (supplies of oil, natural gas and investment). It is also an important region for transportation, in addition to the country’s political influence in Southeast Asia.28 Conversely, in 1996, the Diplomatic Bluebook noted that the issue of East Timor gained international attention due to the two Nobel Peace Laureates, Bishop Ximenes Belo and José Ramos Horta (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996). However, on the occasion of the visit of José Ramos Horta to Japan in the beginning of 1997, the Japanese government declined his request for a meeting due to concern about the relationship with the Indonesian government (Goto, 2000a: 217).29 On the other hand, the government took a new stance towards the Portuguese government from the end of the 1990s. Contrary to the criticism of Portuguese management regarding the issue of East Timor in the 1970s, the Japanese government began to appreciate

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diplomatic efforts made by the Portuguese government at the end of the 1990s. For example, the 1998 Diplomatic Bluebook stated that the Portuguese government was making efforts to solve the issue of East Timor as an important diplomatic matter for the country in cooperation with other Portuguese-speaking countries (such as Brazil, Angola and Mozambique) (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998a). In the midst of increasing democratic movements in Indonesia and growing international pressure regarding ‘the issue of East Timor’ in 1998, the Indonesian government began radical change concerning the status of East Timor following the removal of the Suharto system. It was an unexpected change for the Japanese government that had been dealing with the issue of East Timor on the assumption of ‘de facto rule’ by the Indonesian government (Goto, 2000a: 218).30 After popular consultation to decide the status of East Timor in 1999, the security situation within East Timor became an issue. Whereas major Western powers called for the suspension or reduction of ODA to Indonesia, as was the case after the Santa Cruz Massacre, the Japanese government made it clear that they would not reduce or suspend ODA to Indonesia.31 It was an isolated attitude, in comparison with other major donor countries. For instance, the United States expressed its intention to review its economic assistance to Indonesia unless security in East Timor was restored. The Japanese government took the position of not considering any change in its ODA to Indonesia.32

An overall picture of Japanese assistance to East Timor Japan’s humanitarian assistance to East Timor started in 1999. After agreements were reached in May among Indonesia, Portugal and the UN, Japanese humanitarian assistance to East Timor at both governmental and non-governmental levels was actively implemented. The following section sets out a brief overview of assistance in this case. This will be further studied, in the later sections, in order to understand how the actual activities and actions impacted on people’s perceptions and ideas. Governmental assistance Japanese governmental assistance to East Timor began with popular consultation for special autonomy within Indonesia organized by the UNAMET. The assistance included financial and material aid. Financially, Japan pledged assistance to the UN Trusteeship Fund for around US$10 million to support the mission, while it provided 2,000 radios for information purposes in response to the request from the United Nations. Also, in response to the request from the United Nations, the government dispatched its personnel and three civilian police officers to UNAMET (two civilian police officers stationed at the UNAMET headquarters in Dili and the other in the UNAMET office in Jakarta). After the dispatch of the multinational force (INTERFET) resulting from turmoil after the national consultation, the government pledged financial support,

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yet this time, no assistance in terms of personnel was considered. The then foreign minister, Kono Yohei, at a press meeting stated the possibility of financial support and the impossibility of government providing personnel for the multilateral effort – specifically from the SDF. While he stated the government’s consideration of other forms of assistance by its personnel, he also commented on the difficulty of this assistance under the multinational force, which was not within the legal framework.33 This government position materialized with the provision of funding support of US$2 million in total, for the UNHCR and WFP, for emergency and humanitarian purposes on 16 September 1999.34 Following the UN decision to set up the UNTAET in October, Japanese humanitarian assistance to East Timor was expanded. The government expressed, on different occasions, its intention to provide further assistance and participate in international efforts including sending personnel as well as financial and material assistance. A large part of governmental assistance was carried out through the United Nations. In the early stage of the UN transitional administration, the government, in response to the request, pledged material support within the framework of the PKO Law.35 While Takahashi Akira was appointed as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation of the UNTAET,36 the government expressed its enthusiasm to grant different forms of support since the establishment of UNTAET.37 Four Japanese people served as senior officers in the UNTAET.38 At the December donors’ meeting, held in Tokyo, the government pledged US$130 million over three years for rehabilitation and development assistance (Kusano, 2000: 154).39 As governmental assistance, the JICA was delegated with organizing technical assistance.40 A development research group from JICA conducted research and was involved in reconstruction of the water supply system and roads. Also, some of the JICA’s fund was used for community empowerment projects implemented by four Japanese NGOs.41 Furthermore, the JICA carried out various researches on education, vocational training and other youth training programmes. Other forms of assistance by the government included financial assistance, called ‘emergency humanitarian assistance projects’, as part of the NGO assistance scheme.42 It included US$44 million for the support of NGOs in the framework of the NGO assistance scheme for emergency, humanitarian, medical and food support for displaced people, which were implemented by five NGOs.43 In addition to this support at a very early stage, towards the end of 2001, the Japanese government decided to let the SDF participate in the PKO in response to the UN request.44 After much discussion within the country, the government began preparations for the requested dispatch of SDF Engineering Units to the new PKO after East Timor’s independence. However, Japan’s participation in the UN PKO had to wait until 2001. It is stated that the operation in East Timor (UNTAET) was authorized ‘to use all necessary means’ (Security Council Resolution, 1272). This involved the possibility of armed combat by peacekeepers, which was considered as unconstitutional (Shiobata, 2003: 214). The engineer

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group consisted of 680 personnel and the government also organized the maritime and air transport units.45 In addition, ten SDF personnel were sent as UNTAET military component headquarters staff, and were involved in the planning and coordination of engineering tasks in addition to managing logistical tasks. The PKO is scheduled to stay for two years.46 Non-governmental assistance Emergency and humanitarian assistance by Japanese NGOs began at the end of September 1999. A small number of Japanese NGOs started emergency and humanitarian assistance in end September.47 Japanese NGOs received financial support from the government and other international organizations. From an early stage, Japanese NGOs undertook a role specific to providing medical support and emergency material distribution for internally displaced persons.48 Most Japanese NGOs began operations in early 2000. According to an NGO worker, it was after 2000 when a number of NGOs including international NGOs started operations.49 There were ten major Japanese NGOs by September 2000 (during the field interview) that engaged in humanitarian operations. An NGO worker commented, ‘the increase of funding assistance to NGOs by the government multiplied the number of emergency and humanitarian projects and enhanced the quality of projects by NGOs in comparison with those during the Cambodian crisis’ (Interview comment, 15 September 2000).50 Another NGO worker stated:51 The new funding scheme for NGOs introduced by the government in August 1999 made it possible for NGOs to start projects on time at emergency situations or at the early stage of humanitarian assistance. The scheme eliminated complex measures to obtain funds, which allow us to start projects at the early time when most international NGOs start operations. (Interview comment, 15 September 2000) In comparison with the early stage of assistance, most NGOs that started working in early 2000 were involved in market and school reconstruction projects as well as other infrastructure and long-term development projects within education, health care and agriculture. The transitional phase from emergency assistance to long-term development assistance was considered to have occurred at the end of 2000, which was when the fieldwork was undertaken (Interview comment, 3 November 2000).52

Japanese humanitarianism: the East Timor case By the time that the East Timor Crisis occurred in 1999, Japanese international assistance policy, such as ODA was taking a new approach, that of a human-centred or humanitarian path. As explored in Chapter 3, there was increasing activity in the non-governmental field. Under UN authority, Japan, in fact, offered various assistance despite its earlier attitude towards Indonesia. By the same token, Japanese NGOs actively undertook assistance activities in the case, epitomizing

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their growing capacity for emergency and humanitarian activities. Consistent with an increasing use of the term, ‘humanitarian’, in Japan, there have been active involvements in different cases. In order to obtain more concrete ideas about Japanese humanitarianism, this section introduces interview comments obtained from Japanese people who have engaged in humanitarian activities. It includes comments on humanitarian ideas and considerations among those people who have had experiences in the fields of humanitarian, relief and development assistance. The interview comments are used to illustrate Japanese humanitarian ideas and practice (humanitarian assistance). The section introduces people’s ideas concerning humanitarian values including their roots and application. Moreover, it presents interview comments and a study of humanitarian assistance in practice in the East Timor case. Given the interview comments on humanitarian values and actual practice, the third section examines the nature of Japanese humanitarianism with reference to the interview comments. Japanese humanitarian ideas: an empirical study Whilst the precise meaning of the term is neither defined nor agreed upon among the media in Japan and is used distinctively in different contexts, there are common interpretations and attitudes among the Japanese that indicate a growing awareness about humanitarian situations. The field interviews aimed to obtain opinions from Japanese people about trends in humanitarianism over recent years within Japanese society, in addition to their interpretation of the terms ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘humanitarian’. Growing humanitarianism A number of Japanese people who currently or previously engaged in humanitarian work agreed that there is growing interest in humanitarian activities among the Japanese. This was explained by recent Japanese trends that favour helping other people in harsh situations, with reference to increasing use of terms, such as ‘volunteer’, ‘international cooperation’, ‘NGOs’ and ‘relief’. These terms were increasingly used by Japanese people. Some of the interviewees perceived the phenomenon as humanitarianism. Similarly, interviews conducted in Japan presented a broad consensus on the interpretation of the phenomenon. For instance, a field officer who was working in a governmental organization said that Japanese humanitarianism is probably more obvious in the nongovernmental sector than in the governmental sector because of an active involvement by younger generations (Interview comment, 21 September 2000).53 A UN officer also commented that compared with ten years ago, he sees more Japanese people working in humanitarian areas, which he takes as a positive change and interprets as a manifestation of growing humanitarianism among the Japanese (Interview comment, 20 September 2000).54 One interviewee said, ‘there is such a tendency that Japanese people concern themselves more about what is called humanitarian catastrophe than ever before

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because of the media and actual practices, though if they take action or not depends on individuals’ (Interview comment, 13 February 2001).55 A foreign officer commented,56 it highly depends on what is meant by humanitarianism. Yet, in general terms, as it is also the case in the world in general, there is a common tendency among the people to be concerned about human sufferings regardless of the cause such as natural disasters and human-made misery, and of the place, within the country or out of the country. (Interview comment, 28 March 2001) These interview comments explain that people’s awareness of and concerns for human suffering developed in Japanese society, particularly in the 1990s.57 This is confirmed by the general trend within the country and also at a practical level in the humanitarian field, as both the interview comments obtained in Japan and in East Timor introduced here illustrate. Yet, the precise content of the term needs to be explored. Thus, further interviews were conducted about humanitarian ideas among the Japanese. Japanese humanitarian ideas As one of the interviewees pointed out, it is necessary to understand how Japanese people interpret the term ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘humanitarian’. In further interviews, some interviewees commented on how they understand the term by including traditional ideas and social practices. Most Japanese people who were working for humanitarian and development assistance in East Timor explained the term ‘humanitarian’ in the context of their work. By using the context of humanitarian relief assistance, an NGO officer said:58 The term humanitarian probably means our concern for other people especially those who are suffering. This feeling leads to actions to help those people whatever the cause is and wherever it is. Humanitarianism is something that grows with more interaction of feeling and action. (Interview comment, 24 August 2000) Similarly, a Japanese UN Humanitarian Affairs officer commented, ‘. . . humanitarian designates the benevolent feeling that all human beings share’ (Interview comment, 20 August 2000).59 Both interviewees have been involved in humanitarian and relief work for decades. On another occasion, younger interviewees working in NGOs responded: The term probably comes from other countries. The term [in Japanese] literally means ‘our morals as human beings’. Thus, I understand the term, humanitarian, to mean something that human beings share or should have.60

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The interviews revealed that the term is mostly acknowledged as a value that all human beings share and that people working in the humanitarian field consider the idea to be applicable whatever the cause and wherever suffering happens. Thus, the humanitarian idea as interpreted by the interviewees touches the principles of ‘humanity’ and ‘universality’. It is considered as a universal value. On this point, a Japanese UN officer commented:61 The term ‘humanitarian’ should be taken as a universal value. Yet, in practical terms, it involves difficulties when we engage in humanitarian work as the form and content of action differ from country to country and from society to society. Though we gather for ‘humanitarian’ purposes, we often face disagreements on the methods of action. Also, at the international level, politics exist in any action most of the time. This is probably a dilemma for most of those who engage in this work. (Interview comment, 25 August 2000) In sum, the field interviews in East Timor suggest that the idea of ‘humanitarian’ is shared by interviewees at the most fundamental level. The term is considered to imply the care of others and is applicable to all human beings particularly in times of suffering. Yet, as a practical term, interviewees addressed distinctions, especially when it comes to application as an action, which some of them called ‘politics’.62 Another UN officer commented:63 Humanitarian ideas will explain our motivation to participate in humanitarian work. Yet, it does not necessarily mean we agree on everything afterwards. The idea gives us an incentive to help other people but how and even how much we feel so, in order to take action probably highly depends on the individual. I should say the difference sometimes comes from our background and partially cultural and social differences like Japanese people are more hesitant to interfere in other’s business while others are not. But in recent years, the degree to which Japanese people feel like taking action seems to have increased. That is why we confirm the upsurge of humanitarianism in Japanese society. (Interview comment, 25 September 2000) This comment clearly explains that the recent humanitarianism in Japan is analysed in relation to the connection between humanitarian ideas and action; more people apply the ideas in practice through such activities as volunteering and NGOs. The comment also suggests that though humanitarian ideas fundamentally contain common elements among the people, as other interview comments show, there are distinctive points when it comes to practice (or application). The distinction is considered by the difference in culture and society as well as individual experiences. This point was indeed revealed in Chapter 2, with reference to how Japanese social construction and systems have formed unique ethical practices.

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In addition to the Japanese moral ideals explored in Chapter 3, its historical contexts must also be taken into consideration in order to understand fully Japanese humanitarian ideas. Thus, further questions were raised with regard to historical factors that may be relevant to cultural and social practices. Japanese social practice and humanitarian ideas While interviewees explained their ideas regarding humanitarian values and practice, there was little comment on the ideas from historical and social points of view. A common understanding of the origin of Japanese humanitarian ideas is that it was introduced from other countries, specifically Western ones. Some of the interviewees referred to the post-Second World War humanitarian assistance carried out for the Japanese by other countries,64 while others mentioned the period of Civilization and Enlightenment (Bunmeikaika) in the early Meiji era during which many ideas, values and materials were imported from Western countries as a result of the Meiji Restoration.65 At the interview in Japan, a university lecturer commented on Japanese humanitarian ideas or moral ideals in the context of their longstanding social practices before Western ideas were introduced in Japan.66 He explained that Japanese society was highly structured by the class system in which Japanese loyalty from lower class to upper class was developed. Indeed, the influence of the idea of loyalty from lower to upper still remains in every corner of society be it in the company, school or any other human relationship within Japanese society. Thus, he stated that the indigenous humanitarian ideas and practices of the Japanese people are found in the social system and practices that existed even before the Meiji era. In a further discussion, he explained that Japanese humanitarian ideas evolved over decades and intermingled with imported ideas from Western countries.67 However, he noted that the traditional morality among the Japanese developed in the class system through its practice of Confucian and Buddhist teachings. Japanese moral teachings are found in the first Japanese Constitution introduced in ancient times. The teachings illustrate Japanese indigenous humanitarian ideas or moral philosophy. The characteristics of this traditional Japanese morality were explained in the context of Japanese social practice in which care and concern were applied within the close relationship, due to traditional practice in the class system and Confucian and Buddhist traditions. This partially explains the comment introduced earlier that ‘Japanese are hesitant to interfere in other’s business’. Also, the comment illustrates the distinctive ethical practices among the Japanese that were explored in Chapter 2. Most comments in the field interviews from those who engage in humanitarian work do not acknowledge the traditional ideas, whereas their conduct may be influenced or innately take the traditional route. Current humanitarian ideas appear to be influenced by imported humanitarian ideas from other countries and have been maintained over decades even after the Second World War. However, the comments obtained from the academic field confirm that historically and socially constructed elements shaped ethical practices in Japanese society.

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Japanese assistance in practice One of the key issues in understanding contemporary Japanese humanitarianism is that of humanitarian action in practice. Turning to Japanese humanitarian assistance in practice, this section considers the major changes and differences affecting humanitarian assistance in the case of East Timor. This will be compared with other examples of humanitarian assistance, particularly those that were undertaken during the 1990s, prior to the East Timor case. While considering the Japanese humanitarian assistance and activities in the East Timor case, this section illustrates the factors that comprise the changes by using some of the empirical comments and information obtained in field interviews. It attempts to trace the factors that explain the disparity between conceptual recognitions and actual practice in Japanese humanitarianism. New features of Japanese assistance: the East Timor case A Japanese UN Civil Officer commented on Japanese assistance in the East Timor case as follows:68 As widely acknowledged, governmental assistance to East Timor involves political issues to quite an extent because of the connection with Indonesia. However, when it comes to emergency and humanitarian assistance in practice after the UN was authorised, the government expressed its zeal to contribute to the international efforts by sending its personnel, once UN authorization had been received. From the experiences in the past, the government realises the degree of external or international expectations or pressures, especially when a case in Asia is concerned. (Interview comment, 29 October 2000) He also added: Japanese NGOs also learned from experiences in the past. They understand the government’s red tape measures, which made it difficult for the government to deliver timely emergency and humanitarian action other than when providing financial forms of assistance. As some of the NGOs were active as early as the September of this case, they are now very aware of their complementary role in Japanese humanitarian assistance. Assuming an emergency humanitarian role prior to the dispatch of governmental assistance will be a feature of Japanese NGOs. A UN Humanitarian Affairs officer commented:69 The reaction of the public within the country is quite different when compared with the Cambodian case. The Cambodia case was the first time that Japan participated in a peacekeeping operation. Because of that experience and others that followed, people are aware that peacekeeping operations are quite

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The East Timor case different from military actions. It facilitates such works as humanitarian relief and election observation under the International Peace Co-operation Law. When it comes to humanitarian relief assistance, the public have shown their understanding and support. The peacekeeping operation in Cambodia and in other places, during the last ten years have established a good reputation by repairing roads, building bridges, hauling food and providing relief for refugees, in the context of humanitarian assistance. (Interview comment, 31 October 2000)

These comments illustrate several new features of Japanese humanitarian assistance and public understanding of humanitarian activities that are demonstrated by the East Timor case. The interview comment implies that Japanese emergency and humanitarian assistance includes some new features that derive from lessons learned from past cases. UN officers pointed out lessons from the past, specifically from the Cambodia case and others during the 1990s. Based on interview comments and other information, major changes are identified as follows. First, in the last ten years since Japan began participating in UN PKOs, the public have begun to see peacekeeping missions abroad in quite a different light. If we look at public opinion concerning participation in PKOs during the 1990s, a gradual change is perceived chronologically over three different international humanitarian crises, the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodia Crisis and the East Timor Crisis. This is well articulated in Chapter 3. According to a survey conducted by the Asahi Newspaper, nearly 60 per cent of Japanese people said that they opposed Japanese participation in such PKOs in 1991 because such involvements could lead to the dispatch of the Japanese SDF abroad (Asahi Newspaper, December 1991).70 However, after the PKO in Cambodia, public opinion has changed. After the first participation in PKOs in Cambodia, those who supported such activities increased to 56 per cent whereas those who opposed them decreased to 28 per cent (Asahi Newspaper, September 1993). During the East Timor Crisis, about 80 per cent of public opinion supported SDF involvement in PKOs. Those who felt that Japan should not be involved in such missions declined to about 2 per cent (see Figure 4.1). By the same token, a public opinion poll on PKOs conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office also shows gradual change in public opinion concerning PKOs during the 1990s (see Figure 4.2). In the decade since the first participation of the PKO in Cambodia, Japan has taken part in twelve foreign missions including humanitarian operations, international humanitarian relief and election observation under the provisions of the International Peace Co-operation Law.71 As one of the interviewees’ comments show, the public opinion survey regarding humanitarian assistance to East Timor demonstrated public support for active humanitarian assistance through the sending of personnel and financial forms of assistance (Asahi Newspaper, October 1999). The dispatch of the SDF still causes domestic debates, yet, humanitarian relief operations and election observation gained great support. The interview comment confirms that the increase in support resulted from people recognizing the importance of PKOs in the context

90

Support

80

Oppose

Percentage

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1991 the Gulf Crisis

1992 the Enactment of PKO Law

1993 after the 1999 the East Cambodia Crisis Timor Crisis

Figure 4.1 Public opinion survey about participation in PKOs. Source: Asahi Newspaper, December 1999, September 1993 and October 1999, Tokyo: Japan. Note The graph is drawn by the author on the basis of the data.

60

Support (%)

50 40 30 20 10 0 1994

1995

1996

1997 1998 Year

It should be promoted It should be reduced

Note The graph is drawn by the author on the basis of the data.

2000

2001

The present level is sufficient It should be stopped

Figure 4.2 Findings of Public Opinion Polls on PKOs. Source: The Prime Minister’s Office, Tokyo.

1999

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of humanitarian relief assistance. The public opinion survey indicates that great criticism of the government would have resulted from inactivity or non-involvement in missions to provide humanitarian and emergency assistance. To a certain degree, the government was aware of such domestic and international expectations. In fact, the government occasionally expressed its contribution towards international efforts by sending its personnel. In most press conferences since the beginning of 1999, there were questions about Japan’s personnel contribution in relation to East Timor.72 Questions raised at different press conferences illustrated the expectations that existed upon Japan to send personnel and assistance, not only from the media and public, but from outside of the country as well. Thus, the awareness of such expectations (or pressures) on the government impacted upon decisions that were made in this case regarding the form and content of assistance. Second, in the East Timor case, the government expressed the idea of contributing personnel that did not include involvement of the SDF. On 17 September 1999, in response to a question regarding personnel contributions, a spokesperson of the government said: There are various kinds of personnel assistance. If it is under the International Peace Co-operation Law, it includes ‘humanitarian relief activities’ within the situation that is conditioned by Law. All possible ways will be considered with reference to examples in the past. (Comment at the Press Conference, 17 September 1999) This comment depicts a diversity of ideas around how the dispatch of personnel could be called contributions. As ideas around contributions diversified, debates on dispatching the SDF were still an unavoidable part of discussion with regard to burden sharing. Third, on the non-governmental side, activities undertaken by NGOs during early stages of the case illustrate the important role that such organizations can play. This is especially so in relation to emergency and humanitarian assistance where activities by the government are limited due to legal restraints (Shiobata, 2003: 214).73 It increased opportunities for the government to support NGO activities by funding their activities. Indeed, as illustrated in Chapter 3 the government’s financial support of NGOs has increased since the middle of the 1990s.74 This has resulted in increasing communications between the government and NGOs. A foreign officer commented, ‘activities by NGOs in East Timor are admirable and Japanese assistance in the future would be ideal if both government and NGOs can mutually cooperate and implement in the form of “all Japan from both high level and grass-roots level” ’ (Interview comment, 28 April 2001).75 An NGO worker said:76 In Cambodia, NGOs and the government did not have much communication with each other and neither side was recognized as cohesive Japanese assistance, or as united multi-track assistance, yet in this case [East Timor], I feel that our work is a part of ‘Japanese assistance’. (Interview comment, 16 September 2000)

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The comments indicate that the cooperation between the government and NGOs in this case led to a certain arrangement. The three features identified from the case and from interview comments show that a certain form of Japanese emergency and humanitarian assistance was established. Past experiences have greatly influenced change, both within government and NGOs. A new dimension of Japanese humanitarian assistance Further questions on humanitarian ideas revealed that the term ‘humanitarian assistance’ used among the people also involves some common tendencies. An officer of a Japanese development agency said: When Japanese people use the term ‘humanitarian assistance’ or ‘humanitarian activities’, most of the time, it means assistance to satisfy the basic needs for food, clothes and shelter, which are called ‘basic human needs’. It is probably similar to the idea behind the humanitarian activities that followed the Great Hanshin Earthquake which were acknowledged as the provision of what all human beings require for their survival. (Interview conducted in Dili, 11 October 2000) Similarly, an NGO officer commented, ‘I think humanitarian assistance is to provide what is most needed for the people like food and shelter and it helps the people to live in a human condition’ (Interview comment, 25 September 2000).77 In most Japanese official documents, the term ‘humanitarian assistance’ is often used synonymously with such terms as ‘emergency assistance’ and ‘development assistance’. Thus, the term is interpreted, and used, broadly within the larger framework of ‘international cooperation’. Another NGO worker said that the distinction between ‘development assistance’ and ‘humanitarian assistance’ is not clear even among workers and that they sometimes use them interchangeably and vaguely, partly because the distinction is not clear in practical terms during the project implementation (Interview comment, 25 October 2000).78 Yet, he stated that use of the term, ‘humanitarian assistance’, is, from his recent experiences, more closely connected with ‘emergency assistance’ whereby the primary purpose of assistance, the provision of food, shelter and medical support, is to satisfy the immediate need for people’s survival. The term ‘development assistance’ refers to long-term assistance. However, the distinction is not concise because development assistance often involves elements, such as basic human needs, which humanitarian assistance aims to satisfy. As Chapter 3 noted, the term ‘humanitarian’ has been used in most governmental documents since the 1980s in accordance with the increase of emergency situations in the world.79 In reality, the early stage of the assistance was called ‘humanitarian assistance’ by the Japanese. The so-called humanitarian work is undertaken mainly to satisfy basic human needs, such as shelter, medical and food assistance. An NGO officer noted that assistance to satisfy basic human

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needs forms part of human rights protection.80 Further discussions revealed that other interviewees shared the idea that humanitarian assistance, which aims to provide the so-called basic human needs, contributes to the protection of human rights. Thus, ‘the provision of emergency assistance’ and ‘the protection of human rights’ are not distinct within humanitarian assistance.81 However, other comments did not deny the new tendency of actions for the purpose of human rights protection,82 In recent years, there was a tendency for NGOs and some of the parliament members to highlight limited human rights considerations in government policies. In the case of East Timor, there was a movement consisting of NGOs and some parliament members. They denounced human rights abuses in East Timor in order to oppose Japan’s policy of supporting the Indonesian government. (Interview comment, 20 October 2000) Her comments indicate some new trends concerning the protection of human rights in Japanese humanitarian action. Exploring the idea of human rights among Japanese people is critical in order to aid a fuller understanding of humanitarian action by the Japanese. At the practical level, the idea of humanitarian assistance as the provision of emergency assistance is commonly held, yet, it is considered as a part within human rights protection. In addition, new trends of human rights thinking are not alien among the people who worked in East Timor. Findings from the empirical study: the nature of Japanese humanitarianism The empirical study highlighted several features relating to Japanese humanitarianism, some of which were discussed in previous chapters. A core value of humanitarianism, that of ‘humanity’, featured prominently in interview comments and was studied closely. Similarly, the interview comments portrayed the idea of ‘universality’ with regard to humanitarian values. Thus, conceptually, contemporary Japanese humanitarianism depicts similar characteristics to the major interpretation of humanitarian values. Yet, distinctive features are perceived in the ways that people act and also the degree to which people are motivated to do so. What we can infer from the interview comments is that there is a gap between conceptual recognitions and actual conducts. Some non-universal characteristics are recognizable during certain actions. The non-universal (relativistic) characteristics appear to be shaped innately by the people, thereby stemming from Japanese social construction and practice (the type of Japanese society). Yet, conversely, some of the non-universal features seem intentionally designed and are referred to as ‘politics’. In fact, the East Timor case shows that humanitarian action connected to human rights protection was not applied universally. In this case, the government explained that it would not terminate or suspend official assistance to Indonesia despite the obvious human rights violations visible in

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Indonesia during the 1990s.83 It demonstrates that at a governmental level, although the ODA and human rights issues are linked in recent practices, it is not universally applied in all cases. This proves that, in practice, there is a gap between humanitarian ideals and actions. Overall, the idea of humanitarian values as universal in nature is prevalent and seems to be supported. However, given interview comments regarding actual humanitarian actions, the ideal does not fully explain Japanese humanitarianism. The relativistic nature partly guides humanitarian actions, being influenced by political considerations and various Japanese socio-cultural practices. The latter seems to be innately exercised. From the analysis of the interview comments, in the East Timor case, the gap between the two natures of value is partly explained by political considerations. Thus, political factors would explain some of the changes in Japanese humanitarian assistance during the 1990s. As human rights considerations become increasingly embedded in international humanitarianism, the importance of the political dimension will increase because human rights issues are highly politicized matters. Thus, the inclusion of human rights strands into humanitarian actions would have increased the influence of political considerations on humanitarian actions. Therefore, political factors are central to explaining the changes and evolution within the universal and relativistic natures of Japanese humanitarianism. The relativistic nature will vary in degree as the politics behind humanitarian actions alter in accordance with domestic, international and regional relations. However, a certain level of relativism will remain, being that which arises from Japanese social construction and practices. In this sense, Japanese humanitarianism includes the potentials for further changes. The political dimension is a key in order to understand changes. An investigation of the political dimensions behind Japanese humanitarianism will clarify how such considerations related to both the Japanese ideal of humanitarianism (i.e. the universal nature) and Japanese humanitarianism in practice (i.e. relativistic features) during the 1990s and afterwards. As an example, the following section illustrates the political dimensions of the East Timor case.

Politics for action in the East Timor case The practical assistance revealed some distinctive features in the East Timor case that are useful in the consideration of political and operational efficacies. As the historical background illustrates, international politics, particularly those of the Cold War rivalry, defined the status of East Timor for nearly twenty-five years. Japan’s stance was also a manifestation of regional and international politics. Japanese government policy has consistently supported Indonesia as the country is a significant trading partner. In contrast, after the status of East Timor became clear, the Japanese government expressed its eagerness to provide assistance. In this case, Japanese humanitarian action was considered as being politically influenced by concerns about its own economic security. In the field study, interviewees further discussed these political issues at greater length.

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International humanitarianism and humanitarianism in Japan After the idea of human rights became the central debate concerning humanitarianism and humanitarian action in the world, Japan began applying human rights considerations into practice during the 1990s. The idea of human rights has developed recently in Japan, reflecting the Asian concept of human rights, as a University Professor commented:84 Japan’s human rights diplomacy has been dormant partly because of its historical acts and domestic human rights situation, which were often highlighted and criticised in the international arena. In this sense, the current so-called international ‘humanitarianism’ centred on human rights promotion has not been fully integrated into actual policies or actions, rather it is in the process of development. There are possibilities that human rights protection will become part of policy direction. As Japan maintains the Peace Constitution, it can aid an increase in expectations from other countries and even within the country. Yet, human rights issues involve highly political dimensions that divide domestic opinions. (Interview comment, 21 March 2001) In fact, at a meeting that discussed the situation and relations with Indonesia and East Timor in October 1999, one of the foreign officers said, ‘when NGOs claim human rights issues, I feel tired of it’.85 On the other hand, an officer working in a governmental agency commented:86 Apart from domestic debates on human rights issues, it is fair to say that most people working in the field felt that it became unavoidable for Japan, as a largest donor, to express its stance on human rights issues and assistance. The level of assistance, for example the official development assistance, is too influential both morally and politically for Japan to ignore contemporary global issues. (Interview comments, 11 October 2000) Chapter 3 introduced examples whereby the Japanese government terminated or suspended ODA to several countries in the 1990s due to internal human rights violations. The point is officially expressed in the 1992 ODA Charter.87 Thus, human rights considerations were not without influence in setting recent government policy. A university lecturer commented:88 The amount of ODA and its influence has been increased with the help of economic development. Given the limitation of its military assistance in crisis contexts, the ODA has been the only method at Japan’s disposal to express its position with regard to human rights issues. (Interview comments, 1 November 2000) He referred to the military assistance of other countries that was provided in relation to human rights considerations. Japan’s human rights considerations are

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realized through its assistance, most often by the termination or suspension of ODA. Several cases were found, in which the government terminated or suspended its ODA due to the human rights situation of the country concerned. The interview comments partially illustrate both contemporary Japanese official assistance and human rights considerations. The comments on Japanese humanitarian ideas and their application show Japanese humanitarianism as providing both assistance and action for the purpose of human rights protection. New international humanitarianism draws a parallel between human rights issues and actions (as it does with Japanese government action and human rights issues). Japanese action that is designed to protect human rights involves distinctive features that concern the legal limitations on military forms of assistance. The following section considers the case of East Timor, in order to provide a fuller insight into the issues. The political dimension of humanitarian action in the East Timor case Interviewees highlighted a certain degree of political consideration that has influenced Japan’s action or inaction on the issue of East Timor.89 Political considerations clearly influenced governmental action and inertia both before and after the crisis. Interview comments illustrated that Japan’s decision to undertake humanitarian action in East Timor was widely considered as arising from considerations of economic security. How, then, are political considerations integrated into humanitarian practice at a governmental level? What domestic and international political processes exist and how do they merge with moral considerations in the formation of foreign policy? Some of the interviewees’ comments and information from field study documents offer a clue in answering these questions. Japanese government position on the status of East Timor Since 1976, during Diet discussions, the Japanese position regarding East Timor’s status has been expressed several times.90 For example, in response to a question concerning the status of East Timor, on 11 March 1986, the then Minister of State, Abe Shintaro, replied: As for East Timor, in a way, Indonesia rules the region in effect. Yet, the former suzerain, Portugal, claims the sovereign power. At the moment, Indonesia and Portugal have negotiations with regard to the sovereignty. Therefore, Japan studies and awaits the discussions and negotiations since Japan has a friendly relationship with Indonesia. (‘Diet discussions on the issue of East Timor’, The National Archives) The basic position of the government was that Indonesia effectively ruled East Timor.91

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Several interviewees comprising different categories of people (government officials, NGO workers and UN officers) said that the government’s position was a manifestation of Japan’s strategic considerations.92 An NGO officer stated, ‘It is an undeniable fact that Japan supported the Indonesian position if we look at the relationship with Indonesia, which is crucial for Japan’s economic security’ (Interview comment, 18 September 2000).93 In fact, a government official stated that the relationship with Indonesia was one of the most important factors in Japan’s diplomacy, not only relating to bilateral relations but also in terms of regional relations within Southeast Asia (Interview comment, 26 September 2000).94 Thus, the government’s main political consideration was the relationship with Indonesia. This view was shared among interviewees and they understood that the governmental approach towards East Timor could not depart from the policy towards Indonesia. Since the 1960s, when Japan began to provide assistance, it has established a ‘friendly relationship’ with Indonesia (Interview comment, 16 September 2000).95 The government officials who were stationed in Dili during the field interviews in 2000 were officials from the Embassy of Japan in Jakarta.96 All of the interviewees who worked for NGOs highlighted the relationship with Indonesia as a significant political influence on Japanese policy towards East Timor.97 Therefore, the field interviews revealed a shared understanding among different categories of people that the relationship with Indonesia strongly influenced Japanese decisions and policy that affected East Timor. The interviewee’s comments are supported by certain documents and records, which show the stance of the Japanese government. A Japanese government official argued that ‘the issue of East Timor’ has become defined by its relationship with the regional superpower, Indonesia, specifically concerning the maintenance of a secure political and economic relationship between the two countries (Interview comment, 28 March 2001).98 In fact, a foreign officer, Ishii Masafumi, wrote, ‘Though finding an urgent solution for the issue of East Timor is important, we shouldn’t destabilize Indonesia, which is the most imminent issue’ (Ishii, 2000: 37).99 Ishii adds that supporting a ‘unified, stable and strong ASEAN’ is the ‘strategic purpose of Japanese diplomacy and that Indonesia bears a central status among these states’ (Ishii, 2000: 37–8). Ishii’s arguments affirm that the government’s approach towards East Timor is founded in its ASEAN policy. This view has been maintained since the end of the 1960s and as expressed in the 1991 Diplomatic Bluebook, the Japanese government believes that ‘Indonesia is an extremely important country’ (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991). Interviews conducted in East Timor and in Japan revealed that this idea is widely acknowledged among people who engaged in humanitarian work at both governmental and non-governmental levels. Since its first discussion at the Thirtieth UN General Assembly meeting in 1975, the Japanese government voted against the resolution that requested both the immediate withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor and the dispatch of a fact-finding mission. Since then, until 1982, the government voted against

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the resolution seven consecutive times at General Assembly meetings. The government explained, in 1986:100 the government voted against the resolution for reasons that 1) the immediate need is the restoration of normal life for the people in the region [East Timor], 2) the government needs to pay appropriate consideration to the fact that the Indonesian government rules East Timor in effect and also, 3) the resolution condemns Indonesia and is a one-sided view, which won’t necessarily result in solving the problem. (‘Diet discussions on the issue of East Timor’, The National Archives) On another occasion in 1999, at the UN Human Rights Committee, Japan abstained from the voting to form an international investigation committee concerned with crimes in East Timor.101 Japanese foreign policy and the East Timor case During the 1980s, in parliamentary discussions, members addressed the government’s position with regard to the status of East Timor. By the 1990s, the debate concerned the government position and ODA to Indonesia. While most donor countries started reviewing their official assistance to Indonesia in response to the Santa Cruz Massacre, the Japanese government maintained its position of continuing ODA to Indonesia. Several parliament members occasionally addressed the issue of East Timor and the suspension of the ODA to Indonesia with reference to underlying principles within the Charter. For instance, in 1992, a parliament member, Akiba Tadatoshi, challenged the government with reference to four principles of the ODA Charter, saying:102 the fourth principle pays attention to human rights and democratisation. The situation in East Timor presents enough reasons to review Japan’s ODA policy to Indonesia . . . yet, governmental response to the issue of East Timor does not show any consideration to the principle addresses. Please explain the four principles of ODA and any recognition from government on the issue. (Comment at the Committee on the Budget, The House of Representatives, 11 March 1992) A government representative responded, there is no current intention from the government to change its ODA policy towards Indonesia since ODA has been undertaken for the purpose of Indonesia’s economic and social development. Japanese ODA plays a critical role for the stability and prosperity of Indonesia.103

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At Diet discussions from 1990 until 1999, several parliament members highlighted the human rights situation in East Timor while demanding a review of the government’s economic assistance to Indonesia. However, the government’s response to this challenge has remained constant since the 1990 discussion. Behind this approach, there lies key government diplomacy. It is confirmed by the then Minister of State’s comment in 1990. During discussions at the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Councillors on 29 March 1990, in response to the situation in East Timor and Japan’s assistance to Indonesia, the then Minister of State, Nakayama Taro, said:104 Japan is a technological and trading country. I consider that the most fundamental issue for the nation is its survival. We strengthen a friendly relationship with Indonesia as a basic strategy of our diplomacy . . . it is important to strengthen the relationship with Indonesia in view of restoring our source of energy. It is an important country for Japan as it provides natural gas and oil. (Comment at the Committee on Foreign Affairs, The House of Councillors, 29 March 1990) A government official commented that the economic relationship with Indonesia was critical for Japan who otherwise had to rely on other countries for its natural resources. It was also seen as vital to maintain good trade links. It was highlighted that, throughout the 1980s, the largest importer of Indonesian goods had been Japan.105 Therefore, Indonesia is of great importance to Japan, as it has the largest population in the region and encompasses a huge part of Southeast Asia.106 This point is consistent with the comment by the then Foreign Minister, Komura Masahiko, on 22 September 1999:107 At the present time, it is important to support both the efforts of the Indonesian government and attempts to restore security in East Timor through international force. The government needs to carefully refrain from implying a connection between economic cooperation and the issue of East Timor. (Comment at the G7 Foreign Ministers Conference, 22 September 1999) Alternatively, Indonesia’s acceptance of international force after the turmoil of 1999 was considered a result of ‘Japan’s persuasion efforts under the table’ (Watanabe, 1999: 58).108 This came ‘with support through ODA’ (Yomiuri Newspaper, 30 December 1999). From an analysis of fieldwork interviews and documents, it appears that since 1975, the relationship with Indonesia has hugely influenced Japan’s stance on the ‘issue of East Timor’. This is illustrated by the Japanese inaction that was designed in order to maintain a friendly relationship with Indonesia. This was confirmed both through interviews with government officials and by relevant

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sections of The National Archives. As portrayed by the Minister of State’s comments, the relationship with Indonesia forms part of key government foreign policy that is concerned with Japan’s economic security. In conclusion, Japanese action in relation to East Timor was defined by political considerations. These were mainly economic in nature and they arose from issues surrounding the relationship with Indonesia. The case illustrated key strategic and political considerations that were central to Japanese policy. Since the 1970s, maintenance of a stable economic relationship with Indonesia and a need for natural resources considered vital to Japanese national interests and form core values within foreign policy. Changing expectations of Japan’s role: moral considerations in foreign policy There were some perceivable changes in the stance of the Japanese government concerning East Timor during Diet discussions. For instance, at the Committee of Foreign Affairs on 29 March 1990, a parliament member, Takeshita Yasuko, stated:109 Japanese diplomacy has been an economy-based diplomacy at the expense of such issues as human rights. It is obvious that Japan, which is now an economic superpower, will, or may already be excluded, from the international arena if it maintains a foreign policy based only upon its economic interests. Peace, the environment and human rights are, now, the three major global themes that transgress national border. (The National Archives, Records on 29 March 1990) One political dimension of the East Timor case was illustrated as a concern for the relationship with Indonesia. However, when placed within the larger context of foreign policy, it was designed to maintain its economic security – a concern that is believed vital to the national interest. The relationship with Indonesia was examined in this context, as one of securing access for natural resources and huge economic opportunities. The East Timor case illustrates how Japan’s economic considerations shape both national interests and foreign policy. This position was addressed several times in parliament and, during the 1990s, questions were raised about the government’s economy-based approach. A UN officer commented:110 Prior to the turmoil, Japanese occupation during the war was rarely addressed as it does not support the government position. Yet, to be consistent with its policy towards other former colonies in Southeast Asia, it could and should have taken a leading role in the international field to improve the human rights situation in East Timor. (Interview comment, 25 September 2000)

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He also added, ‘the occupation was cited to justify dispatching the SDF in addition to the provision of material assistance’. Wartime Japanese aggression was often mentioned in criticism of the governmental approach towards East Timor. This comment and the reality demonstrate expectations of Japanese government’s moral considerations in its foreign policy. Indeed, at the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Councillors in 1990, a parliament member, Takeshita Yasuko, stated:111 Japan occupied East Timor during World War II for three and half years. Since then, the Timorese have been observing Japanese attitudes. Japan became an economic superpower and maybe a military superpower – not may be but already it is. The former occupier is now a big sponsor of the current occupier. (Comment in discussions at the House of Councillor, 29 March 1990) Non-governmental sectors and opposition groups refer to wartime Japanese acts in criticism of the government’s position. This case illustrates Japan’s political motivation in the framing of its foreign policy. The words and actions that oppose their government’s stance represent the moral expectations of Japanese people in relation to foreign policy. They are mindful of the atrocities that were committed by Japan during the Second World War. The historical factor has a propensity to increase domestic expectations of a moral approach towards foreign policy making. If this is the case, then what influenced the apparent changes within Japanese attitudes during the 1990s? Which political factors increased moral considerations in Japanese politics during the 1990s? These questions have to be examined through the political dimension of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism.

Conclusion This chapter presented interview comments and information obtained in East Timor and Japan in order to illustrate Japanese humanitarian ideas and practice in the East Timor case. The interview comments and information illustrated the themes of this study and contributed to a further understanding of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism. Comments by interviewees that concerned humanitarian ideas provided several findings in previous chapters. Interview findings illustrated that the key humanitarian principles of universal humanity are shared by Japanese people. One of the interviewees cited the universal nature of humanitarian ideas as a motivation for participating in humanitarian work. Further discussion revealed that the application of these ideas differs due to differences both in individual and social practices. This feature portrays the relativistic nature of practical Japanese humanitarian actions. Although some of the values and ideas that were introduced into Japan from abroad share interpretive ideas, it is the traditional elements that influence the current application of humanitarian ideas

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among Japanese people. The relativistic nature is shaped innately by the people during their activities. However, another dimension exists in the relativistic nature of Japanese humanitarianism. This became apparent through an analysis of the humanitarian actions in East Timor, which illustrated a new feature of practical Japanese humanitarian assistance. Despite a growing awareness of new trends including the human rights protection that was associated with ODA, the East Timor case illustrated that action was not always forthcoming. Therefore, the political considerations which underpin practical assistance illustrated a certain level of relativism in Japanese humanitarianism in the East Timor case. Political considerations tend to influence foreign policy. Therefore, this case was a useful illustration of the political influences that turn humanitarian ideas into practice. While the government pledged ‘humanitarian considerations’ as a cornerstone of the ODA Charter during the early 1990s, the East Timor case proved that political considerations were central to policy formation. Economic security represented significant government concern, as was illustrated by Japan’s relationship with Indonesia, an important trading partner and a source of natural resources. This backs the idea of the realist position in explaining state acts and moral considerations. Other domestic and international expectations of Japan’s role accord to the idealist explanation of morality in foreign policy. Japanese wartime aggression seems to have prejudiced expectations of contemporary Japan’s actions and its moral considerations. This emphasizes the need to study foreign policy and humanitarian considerations in order to understand fully the historical, social and cultural contexts of current humanitarianism. As human rights issues are now included in humanitarian considerations, the importance of political dimension becomes more apparent. Therefore, the political dimension, especially with regard to historical and regional concerns, becomes a vital factor in attempting to understand the nature and roots of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism. The humanitarian activities that were illustrated in this case showed that Japanese humanitarian assistance is now formed by one unified structure. In Japanese assistance system, a growing degree of conformity was noticeable among the different categories of actors. These included the United Nations, the government and NGOs. Interviewees referred to this as a lesson learnt from the past. From the analysis of interviewees’ comments and through the observation of practice, it is apparent that there are changing perceptions among actors in relation to their roles in Japanese humanitarian assistance. The public opinion surveys that were introduced in this chapter clearly highlighted the existence of such a trend. Japanese humanitarian assistance in East Timor certainly met with existing international trends of humanitarian action. These included active involvement in humanitarian assistance and the undertaking of actions designed to protect human rights. This confirms that, during the 1990s, there were several changes in both political practice and consideration that aided the expansion of Japanese humanitarianism. Consequently, Chapter 5 will explore the political dimension of Japanese humanitarianism.

5

The political dimension of Japanese humanitarianism

Introduction The dominant discourse of humanitarianism reviewed in Chapter 1 informed us that the political dimension is an important aspect in understanding humanitarianism. In fact, Japanese assistance in the case of East Timor showed that there were various political conditions that had certain influences on Japanese humanitarian actions. It became clear that it is vital to consider the political dimensions when examining the nature and roots of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism. This chapter, therefore, explores the political processes and considerations that underlie Japanese assistance and humanitarian actions in practice. The chapter attempts to reveal how humanitarian considerations earned favour in the political and decision-making process, and how the country’s humanitarian policy is linked with considerations of its own role in the world. From these explorations, an examination of the nature and roots of Japanese humanitarianism is undertaken in relation to political considerations. The chapter consists of three sections. The first section outlines Japanese diplomacy and politics. It aims to understand the circumstances and conditions that influenced Japanese diplomacy in recent years. The second section explores the Japanese domestic political process with reference to policy-making of the ODA. This will illustrate how the political process transformed those policies that favouring humanitarian considerations. The ODA has been a major source of governmental assistance, among other forms of Japanese assistance. Thus, a consideration of these policies, trends and changes will help us to understand Japan’s diplomatic stance, State interests (objectives) and even its moral considerations. The third section examines how humanitarian and political considerations came to interact coherently in relation to Japan’s political decisions. In so doing, the section considers two distinctive expectations that surround Japan and its role in the world. From these analyses, the chapter attempts to unveil contemporary Japanese humanitarianism.

Japanese diplomacy and politics There were several political developments that altered Japanese diplomacy in the last two decades, especially in the post-Cold War period. Changing political

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circumstances surrounding Japan have influenced certain shifts within Japanese diplomacy. Thus, an understanding of changing international and domestic settings would enable us to perceive the overall direction and perspectives of Japan’s political stance regarding humanitarian action. Japanese diplomacy: from reactive to proactive? Since the end of the Second World War, it has been argued that Japanese diplomacy has been reactive in nature. Japanese diplomacy often encounters such criticisms that Japan is driven by external pressure: it does not change its course unless it is criticized by foreign countries, it lacks independence and always does what is dictated by the United States and it lacks leading personalities.1 The reactivity is not only highlighted in the political field but also in the economic arena. For example, on matters of trade negotiation Japan often yields, at the last minute, to US pressure as well as other external pressures. However, there were several changes in the international and domestic arenas especially after the Cold War. The following section explores the changes in recent years. The international political environment and public opinion in the post-Cold War period Japan faced many challenges in the field of foreign policy after the Cold War owing to important security issues in the world. According to Kohno, in the postCold War era Japan faced three major security issues (Kohno, 1999: chapter 1). First, there were considerations on how to establish a new security order in the Asia-Pacific region. In this period, while Japan jointly began to redefine the US–Japan security framework, it played an independent role in helping to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to foster confidence-building in the region and complement regional bilateral security arrangements. Second, there was a concern for the government on the restoration of a stable peace in Cambodia. This was part of the consideration of regional security in Southeast Asia. The stability of Southeast Asia was part of the long-term vision of Japan–Southeast Asia relations from 1977, when the then Prime Minister, Fukuda Takeo, presented his vision (Fukuda Doctrine). Third, there were issues stemming from the Second World War contexts. Along with the Northern Territories issue with Russia, normalization of relations with North Korea remained a problem for Japan. Therefore, security issues especially in the Asia-Pacific region were considered guiding factors for Japanese diplomacy in the beginning of the 1990s. During the post-Cold War period, coinciding with its economic success, Japan’s political role in the region as well as in the world generally became an issue in domestic discussions. The Gulf Crisis triggered a debate and various opinions on Japan’s contribution, and a new role emerged with the development of the Cambodia Crisis. In both cases, Japan’s response has been an international focus, especially regarding the United States. Thus, there were certain political circumstances that necessitated Japan to actively commit itself to

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international security issues. Spruyt explains the point, suggesting that Japan is likely to pursue a more activist foreign policy in the future: Given the complexities of the post-Cold War, Japan will wish to have a greater say in solving the security issues of East Asia and beyond, and the US is likely to demand greater Japanese co-leadership to meet potential instabilities in the region, and even help address crises outside the region. (1998: 380) The Japanese public also emphasized the necessity of Japanese active involvement in post-Cold War security issues. The public gradually developed ideas on international affairs. Kohno, for instance, argues that the end of the Cold War happened to coincide with a time of heightened awareness of foreign affairs among the Japanese people (Kohno, 1999: chapter 1). According to a public opinion poll on diplomacy, the share of the Japanese people who thought ‘it is Japan’s duty as a major player in the international community to promote the internationalization of Japan’ went up from 43.1 per cent in 1989 to 45.7 per cent in 1993. During the same period, those who supported ‘Japan’s political contribution to the settlement of regional disputes’ went up from 12.9 to 28.8 per cent (Data source: the Prime minister’s Office).2 Japanese public opinion on foreign relations during the post-Cold War period illustrates the shifts, reflecting the international political circumstances in addition to demographic and generational change. Cairncross (1995: 12–14), for example, observes the shift in the context of various changes in society at large. These include generational change, changes in the role of women in society and family system and the growing proportion of older people. Japan’s mapping of its future course Since many other countries began to recognize Japan as an ‘economic superpower’ in the 1980s, Japan has been increasingly expected to play an active role in the world. Accordingly, debates on its role in the world emerged in line with discussions on its ‘international contribution’ in times of international security problems. The discussions were thus on the premise that Japan should take an active role and be involved in international activities by providing personnel, rather than making financial contribution, which has been Japan’s traditional methods of contributing to international efforts. In the 1980s, the Japanese government had serious internal discussions on the direction of its international contribution based on the partnership with the United States. Being one of the most important partners of the United States meant that, methods for international contribution were discussed. In fact, Japan’s response to the international issues was more reflective of US policies and strategies. Kohno (1999) argues that Japan continued to explore the methods to play a more active role in the world as an allied partner of the United States throughout the 1980s.

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The three so-called ‘Takeshita Principles’ announced at the end of the 1980s were a reflection of Japan’s search for its role during the decade. The then Prime Minister, Takeshita Noboru, announced: (1) the strengthening of cooperation to achieve peace. Given the limitation of military cooperation, Japan should extend cooperation to the utmost of its ability from a political and moral viewpoint, which includes positive participation in diplomatic efforts, the dispatch of necessary personnel and the provision of financial cooperation aiming at the resolution of regional conflicts; (2) the strengthening of international cultural exchanges; and (3) the expansion of Japan’s ODA.3 The Takeshita Principles were well received by the public (Kohno, 1999: chapter 1). The changes in international political circumstances and security issues, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, brought a major shift in Japan’s search for its role during the 1990s. Since the Gulf Crisis, in the domestic field, a consensus that Japan should share burdens with other countries in times of humanitarian crises has been formed among the people as well as in the government.4 However, precise contents or methods of the contribution or its role were examined in actual humanitarian crises that occurred during the 1990s, such as the Cambodia Crisis. The actual humanitarian crises in the 1990s showed that Japan’s search for its role involved many challenges. A number of factors arising from historical and regional politics as well as international politics restricted Japan’s diplomatic choices. Soeya, for instance, observes, ‘The memories of the brutality of the Japanese Imperial Army, still vivid in the minds of many Asians, have often deprived post-War Japanese governments of significant freedom of action’ (Soeya, 1995: 229). The so-called ‘historical legacies’ limited, above all, Japan’s choice of military role or military form of contribution. In a legal sense, the Constitution of Japan promulgated in 1946 renounces war and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes (Article 9 or the ‘pacifist clause’) and thus it obviously poses a restraint on Japan’s military role.5 Though Japan enacted the PKO Law in June 1992, which permitted the deployment of the Japanese SDF overseas so that it could engage in a restricted range of UN PKOs in Cambodia, it still left debates regarding the prohibition of soldiers from engaging in armed combat. In addition to the legal limitation, there are regional considerations that rein in Japan’s military form of contribution. The former Japanese colonial countries, especially China, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, express great concern over Japan’s military activities outside its borders due to Japanese aggression before and during the Second World War. A number of unresolved issues, such as the screening of school textbooks, the official visit by the prime minister and other parliament members to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honours fourteen ‘Class A’ war criminals among millions of other war dead and other incidents raised critical voices from these countries, reflecting their high expectations of Japan’s moral responsibilities. Therefore, historical and regional contexts not only limit its military role but also impose moral responsibilities on Japan in Japan’s diplomatic choices.6

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The concept of moral responsibility has been developed especially in the regional and historical contexts and also in the strong domestic public voices along with its pacifist culture since the end of the Second World War. Consequently, in the course of Japan’s mapping of its future role, the security issues in Asia in the post-Cold War era were particularly important, and clarified both its limitation and its responsibility in its choices. Domestic politics: politicians and bureaucracy Besides the international political environment, domestic politics is one of the important factors that explains diplomatic policy for any country. In Japanese politics, decision-making and policy-making process is a complex dynamics played by pluralistic actors (Kusano, 1993: 53–4). Therefore, as one of the important defining factors of Japanese diplomacy, this section explores politicians and bureaucracy. The decision-making process in Japanese politics and diplomacy has been described as an accumulation of slow actions based on precedents. The view approves that Japan has refrained from unnecessarily overturning precedents because of general restraint in its foreign policy decisions and various other considerations (Cairncross, 1995: 4–8).7 The idea stems from the nature of Japanese politics, ‘government by bureaucracy’, which consists of government offices that are closely connected with powers and benefits that influence domestic politics. The Japanese political system creates a pattern of behaviour throughout the Japanese bureaucracy.8 However, domestic political process and politics also showed differences in the post-Cold War era. This section explores Japanese politics and diplomacy and their changes during the 1980s and 1990s. Japanese politics and diplomacy: a new dynamism Traditionally, interests in and attitudes to diplomatic issues or foreign affairs were relatively low in Japanese politics.9 Due to the predominant party politics by the LDP since 1955 (‘1955 System’), the relationship between Dietmen (parliamentarians) and bureaucrats has been unique: bureaucrats have to follow the objectives of the party that they belong to.10 Moreover, the ideological rivalry among major political parties has existed for over forty years in Japanese politics. The Japanese political system and process present complex interest adjustment measures and competition among parties as well as many actors, such as administrative organs, political parties, interest groups from the business field and mass media. Cairncross (1995: 6–7) explains that many people took the view that ‘money policy’ was promoted by the faction system in Japanese domestic politics. However, many analysts point out that since the beginning of the 1990s, a new dynamism between politics and diplomacy has emerged (Cairncross, 1995: 7; Kohno, 1999). It is explained, first, by the fact that political leaders began to seek a new political alignment. A number of foreign policy issues, such as regional security issues and international humanitarian crises played a catalytic role in

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connecting politicians or political parties (Kohno, 1999). These issues included Myanmar, North Korea and Cambodia. For example, the trip to North Korea by a bipartisan delegation worked as a driving force behind political realignments during the 1990s.11 Similarly, in 1991, when Cambodian issues began to draw attention in the government, Diet members launched the bipartisan Parliamentary League on Japan–Cambodia Peace and Friendship.12 The issue united politicians from different political parties. A few months later, a new political party (the New Frontier Party) was launched in a move strongly supported by founding members of the League. Second, the ‘1955 System’ came to an end with the inauguration of an eightparty coalition government in 1993.13 The traditional one party dominant system often blocked effective decision-making owing to ideological rivalry between parties (Cairncross, 1995: 6–7).14 Thus, the decision-making and policy approach often resulted in an ineffective solution not necessarily because of differences in their policy approaches but often because of antagonism between parties. In the 1990s, the emerging security considerations necessitated the removal of the traditional approach of the old system, that is ideological differences among the political parties. The new coalition government discarded such conventional decision-making mechanisms and brought a wider opportunity for parties to hold policy discussions. As a result of realignment, every political party became involved in the discussions on security issues as a government party during the 1990s. Discussions on revising the 1978 US–Japan Defence Guidelines were good examples. Discussions have been active since 1997. In 1999, the formation of a coalition between the LDP and the Liberal Party activated discussion. Opposition parties joined in the discussions. This shows that the political realignment process helped instigate meaningful foreign policy debate in Japan. Such specific foreign policy issues as UN PKOs, nuclear proliferation, global environment, the Asian economic crisis, human rights and terrorism required various discussions between the opposition parties to find a meaningful foreign policy. Thus, it is considered that the new political alignment in Japanese politics was established due to the regional security environment in addition to international political circumstances in the post-Cold War era.15 An effective policy-making process required discussions with less competition, greater accommodation of others’ interest and better coordination among actors. The political realignment brought a new dynamism in overall Japanese politics. Changes in policy-making functions of the bureaucracy The bureaucracy has a significant influence on governmental decision-making in Japanese politics since administrative organs are given the right to plan and draft policies.16 In addition to the changes among the politicians, changes in the bureaucracy were also important factors that impacted on Japanese foreign policy-making. Similar to the changes among politicians, the Japanese bureaucracy began functioning in close coordination with the political sector. The role and responsibility assumed by the bureaucrats has become more important.

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Traditionally, the Japanese bureaucracy had strict disciplinary boundaries between Ministries, especially concerning domestic matters and foreign issues. For example, the MOFA has been responsible for diplomatic decisions, from their inception to implementation, because of the lack of policy staff among politicians. Activities of think tanks and academia are generally not influential in diplomatic decisions in Japan, whereas in many countries like the United States and the United Kingdom these activities can influence public opinion and affect government decision-making. Consequently, the MOFA had a dominant authority over diplomatic issues. During the economic development period, diplomatic issues were incorporated in its economic policy. This is proved by the fact that the most influential actors in the decision-making process of diplomatic matters during the 1970s and 1980s were those organizations from the business field, such as Keidanren (the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations), Nikkeiren (the Japan Committee for Economic Development) and others.17 However, increasing security issues in the political field required a firm approach in Japan’s foreign policy, departing from economic policy. This is proved by the ideas in administrative reform initiatives developed during the 1990s that included various measures for politicians to participate in the process of policy formulation.18 The reform initiatives included: (1) increasing political posts in the Ministries and Agencies in order for politicians to take part in the process of policy making, (2) limiting the role of bureaucrats in the Diet debate session so as to stimulate debate among politicians, (3) increasing the number of policy advisor posts for the prime minister and (4) empowering the prime minister to propose important policy guidance at the cabinet meeting. As a result, politicians and MOFA officials became mutually interdependent to make sound decisions. For the strategic approach in the post-Cold War era, the political leadership was always expected to make sound decisions and provide right answers with correct timing. The reform allowed the voices of political leaders to become decisive in defining foreign policy direction. Consequently, after the reform, politicians share more responsibilities for the policy-making process and have a greater influence on the process (Yomiuri Newspaper, 17 February 2001). Mobilizing elements in Japanese diplomacy In contrast to criticisms of Japanese diplomacy during the Cold War, some point out that Japanese post-Cold War diplomacy has outgrown its passivity. Some argue that Japan is more and more self-confident as the Japanese people seek a more assertive role in the world.19 Others argue that Japanese politicians have finally begun to widen their scope of interest from domestic affairs to international ones.20 The exploration in the former sections helps us to understand some of such comments on changes in Japanese diplomacy. Three major elements that explain changes in Japanese diplomacy are: (1) global and regional security issues, which include the Cambodia Crisis and the relationship with North Korea, as well as other international crisis situations,

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(2) changes in society at large, and the public awareness of foreign affairs and Japan’s diplomatic role specifically and (3) pressures (mainly from the United States) for change, especially to share burdens. A major change in the domestic political dynamism – a new alignment – proves the altering approach in Japanese diplomacy following the changing international and regional political environment. In reality, these elements explain the major challenges in Japanese diplomacy in actual cases during the 1990s. Many cases witnessed in the 1990s necessitated Japan to pursue active policies and initiatives. Specific foreign policy cases in which Japan played a proactive role during the 1990s include the Cambodia peace process and the contribution to the birth of the ARF. Japan’s proactive approach is also identified in a number of ministerial or summit-level international conferences that called for high-profile Japanese participation, such as various kinds of G7 (G8) meetings, the G8-Summit, the Asia–Europe meeting (ASEM), APEC, the ASEAN-Post ministerial Conference (PMC), the ARF and Quadrilateral Trade Ministers’ Talks (United States, European Union, Japan and Canada). Apart from its leadership, which is considered still weak on the international level, gradual shifts in Japan’s diplomatic approach were perceived in the postCold War circumstances, particularly in the regional contexts. Therefore, the changing political environment and altering domestic public opinion were key conditions, by which Japan was required to find its role in the world.

Politics in the Official Development Assistance The ODA has been a key source of Japanese assistance. Thus, the policy focus and trends depict what Japan aims to pursue as its contribution or actions for burden sharing. The ODA Charter introduced in 1992 puts emphasis on humanitarian considerations and a human-centred approach for the implementation of ODA. The idea of humanitarian considerations and a human-centred approach made a radical change in Japanese assistance history. Thus, this section explores the politics behind the change regarding the ODA policy. It sets out how the ODA has developed on the basis of political concerns and how and why the ODA policy changed during the 1980s and 1990s following general changes in Japanese diplomacy. The first section examines defining elements of the ODA in its early period in order to understand key characteristics of the ODA at the time. The second section explores political and moral considerations in the overall changes of the ODA policy during the 1980s and 1990s. The section attempts to understand how Japanese assistance policy and approach have been changed and how political considerations interacted with moral considerations in the diplomatic and domestic political processes for the ODA. The third section explores the domestic political process in decision-making regarding the assistance policy within the country and also analyses the domestic assistance system. It will help us to understand how the domestic political process worked for the changes in the ODA policy and approach.

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Defining elements of Japanese ODA from the 1950s to the 1970s There were two important factors that influenced Japanese ODA between the 1950s and 1970s. One of the factors stemmed from Japan’s post-Second World War policy. The other derived from an international trend of development assistance throughout the decades. From the 1950s towards the 1960s, Japan followed a strong economic development policy as a part of post-War diplomacy. Under the Yoshida administration, the post-War Japanese diplomacy promoted economic development policy for its own reconstruction under the US security umbrella.21 With the help of the strong pacifist movement within the country, the economycentred policy was supported by the public throughout the 1950s and the 1960s. In fact, until the 1970s, different regimes made Japan’s own economic development the priority and the policy was one of the important courses of Japan’s action in this period.22 On the other hand, internationally the Western powers launched a development assistance strategy from the 1960s owing to the widening North–South imbalance problem. The UN development decade that started in 1961 was a manifestation of such international trends. Japanese ODA, having made a significant increase in the middle of the 1960s, was influenced by (and also on) international trends of assistance. The following sections look at those two influential factors in Japanese assistance policy in its early period.

Domestic economic development and assistance Japan’s post-War policy for its own economic development explains its development assistance in that the assistance functioned or resulted in benefiting its own economy. It is a well-accepted argument that Japanese foreign assistance in the early period was used as a method to promote its security. Inada, for example, analyses Japanese foreign assistance in the early period as a method of expanding its own export market and refers to it as ‘economic security’ (Inada, 1985: 185). By the same token, Miyashita (1999: 696) argues, ‘Japan’s post-war foreign assistance grew out of war reparations payments, designed primarily to help rebuilding Japan’s industrial capacity and re-establish economic ties with its wartime “Co-Prosperity sphere” in Asia’.23 In fact, during the 1950s and 1960s, the objective of Japan’s foreign assistance was essentially economic and much of its assistance money was explicitly tied to the purchase of Japanese goods and services (so-called ‘tied assistance’) (Cairncross, 1995: 25).24 The MOFA made clear, ‘the payment of reparations and extension of yen loans Japan had made in those early years were aimed at promoting friendly relations with Asian countries’.25 The regional allocation of Japanese assistance proves the fact that Japan used its assistance to develop overseas markets and obtain a secure and stable supply of foreign raw materials in the early period.26 As most analysts point out, since its commencement of foreign assistance, specifically the ODA, during the 1950s and throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the

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strategic considerations of the ODA have been: (1) to expand its own export market and (2) to preserve the secure access of raw materials through development investments. As Miyashita’s argument explains, the strategic considerations are proved by the fact that Japanese assistance money was firmly tied to the purchase of Japanese goods and services. This is evident in that the first institution for foreign assistance in Japan was the Export and Import Bank of Japan, and also the central role to establish Japan’s assistance scheme was played by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the MOF rather than by the MOFA (Hashimoto, 1999: 340). Consequently, the economic policy had a great bearing on Japan’s official assistance on the early period. This is also explained by the fact that Japan’s actual economic cooperation started in 1965 when its trade balance had turned to be in the black. The strategic considerations illustrate the fact that the foreign assistance in those periods was a domestic matter rather than a diplomatic matter. It was a part of the policy for the domestic economic development plan. Therefore, the domestic economic situation is considered as one of the defining elements of foreign assistance in those periods. International circumstances favouring assistance From the 1960s, in the international field, major industrialized countries focused on development assistance to reduce the economic gap between the North and the South. The international development assistance policy was developed among Western countries with the intensifying complex East–West rivalry. The UN Development Decade started in 1961 and also the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) set up in 1964 were examples of the international trend of assistance. Throughout the 1960s, Japan was gradually included in the international assistance system led by Western countries, which was characterized by ideas, such as the UN Development Decade. Unlike the early 1960s, the Japanese government’s positive attitude to foreign assistance was recognized at around the time when Japan’s trade balance turned to be in the black and showed stability in the middle of the 1960s. The government claimed to provide assistance of up to 1 per cent of its Gross National Product (GNP) in this period.27 While the second UN Development Decade started in the 1970s, the international situation showed a trend of ‘aid fatigue’ among industrialized countries. The assistance from the United States (the biggest donor) and other Western developed countries decreased during the decade. It increased other countries’ expectations of Japan’s assistance because of the continuous increase in its trade surplus since the 1960s (Hashimoto, 1999: 350). The situation put pressures on Japan’s assistance. Japan’s involvement in the DAC and requests to Japan in the DAC to expand its assistance made the country a major contributor in the assistance field. As a result, Japan was gradually included in the international system centred on the international development assistance policy. In response to the international expectations of Japan’s assistance, the government increased its foreign assistance by raising the ODA ratio of the GNP

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in 1971. Japan’s promotion of its assistance was comprehensible in that a major consideration in this period was for its own economic security and that the assistance could assure the security. This is evident from the two oil shocks when Japan doubled its ODA at the end of the 1970s.28 Both domestic interest considerations and the international situation encouraged enhancing its assistance in the period and defined the direction of Japanese assistance. Thus, national interests, that is, economic development, were pursued coherently by increasing its assistance in this period. Political dimension of ODA in the 1980s and 1990s The ODA system and scheme established in the early period were preserved in the subsequent decades, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, when assistance was authentically promoted. In the previous chapter, the study showed that there was a radical change in the ODA approach since the 1980s. The section explores the ODA policy and approach during the 1980s and 1990s in order to find out what political factors brought changes in the ODA policy and what major political considerations were identified in the changes. Politics of assistance policy in the 1980s As the amount of ODA increased from the end of the 1970s, there emerged various criticisms from both domestic and international fields. The 1980s is considered as a decade of mounting criticisms. The criticisms were pointed at the quality of ODA, which led to major changes in ODA in the later period. One of the reasons for the criticism stemmed from the ‘tied assistance’ (aid money tied to the purchase of Japanese goods and services). The tied assistance was termed as ‘commercialized assistance’ and thus deviated from the purposes of development for less developed countries.29 Such criticism arose mainly from the domestic field, such as NGOs and the media. In addition, even if Japan’s aid money was untied to Japanese goods and services, Japanese corporations or companies were deeply involved in the process of planning the ODA projects. As a result, in most cases, the actual assistance benefited Japan, specifically Japanese corporations or companies, irrespective of the fact that the aid money was ‘tied’ or ‘untied’ assistance. By the same token, from the international fields, there were voices that criticized the export-oriented assistance of Japanese ODA (Hashimoto, 1999: 352–3). During the 1980s, Japan’s trade surplus that was continuously in the black was criticized by the world especially by the United States. In particular, after the Plaza Accord concluded in 1985, Japan was called upon to reduce its trade surplus. In the midst of criticism of trade imbalance from the world, particularly from the United States, the policy to employ export-oriented assistance had to be discarded. The government indeed promoted ‘untied’ assistance to show its effort in response to the criticisms. Eventually, by the end of the 1980s, the tied assistance

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was drastically reduced (Nishigaki, 2000: 59–60).30 On the whole, the assistance policy started diverging from the export-oriented approach due to the increasing criticisms from domestic and international fields. Accordingly, Japanese official assistance made various changes from the 1980s. Politics of assistance policy in the 1990s In the world generally, the 1990s was a period of reviewing the quality of assistance. Such new ideas as human development index and human-centred development in the international field by the UN and the DAC illustrate the trend. As one of the prominent donor countries, Japan’s assistance required various changes. The criticisms of Japanese ODA that emerged during the 1980s have increased with concrete cases and ideas in the 1990s. The quality of assistance, for example, was linked with global environmental problems (Hashimoto, 1999: 353). The shift from quantitative and export-oriented assistance to quality and recipient-concerned assistance provided grounds for examining the assistance that had been criticized because of self-benefiting methods. There are several political causes that explain the change towards environmental considerations in the ODA. The first condition exists in the evaluation of the ODA by the non-governmental sector. Behind the scenes, as mentioned in Chapter 3, NGOs became active in this period. Most criticism of the ODA at the beginning of the 1990s was based on the argument that the official assistance resulted in damage to the country or the region concerned. For instance, Japanese ODA affected the environment of recipient countries. The criticism became stronger with the development of the nongovernmental sector that conducts field surveys at the grass-roots level (Hashimoto, 1999: 356).31 The strong criticism that Japanese official assistance did not help the people, rather affected them negatively urged the government to review its assistance policy. As a consequence of the criticism, the government introduced evaluation schemes with the cooperation of non-governmental specialists, which increased the influence of non-governmental bodies on the ODA policy. In fact, major points of criticism raised by NGOs and the media, such as environment and human rights issues, represent some of the four guiding principles in the ODA Charter. The guidelines also concern, for instance, the recipient country’s military expenditure. It reflected the domestic and international situation in the beginning of the 1990s, during which Japanese official assistance to Iraq was criticized because it resulted effectively in assisting their invasion of Kuwait. As a result, the final guidelines included two points that relate to military affairs of the country assisted by the ODA.32 This was also the reflection of public criticism towards the assistance during the 1980s and 1990s. Another condition was the inevitability of having to reduce the trade surplus for the government during the 1990s.33 Nearly a decade of friction since the 1980s, particularly with the United States, urgently prompted measures to reduce Japan’s trade surpluses. Thus, assistance that obviously supported Japan’s industry

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(as had been a main characteristic of official assistance) had to be discarded. The assistance policy in this period was influenced by the idea of removing traditional export-oriented assistance. This is proved by the number of ‘untied’ assistance projects in the period that had no involvement of Japanese companies. By the middle of the 1980s, 96.3 per cent of Japan’s assistance was untied and also the involvement of Japanese companies in the process of project planning and implementation was reduced by the middle of the 1990s. By mid-1980s, 70 per cent of all ODA projects was carried out by Japanese companies, yet in 1993, only 29 per cent of the projects was carried out by Japanese companies (Hashimoto, 1999: 352–3). Furthermore, there was a domestic political condition responsible for changes in the Japanese ODA policy. The government had to urgently review its policy, facing action by the Parliament to set up the basic law of assistance (Hashimoto, 1999: 358). The initiative by Parliament is considered an important factor in instigating the formulation of a new policy. It was at the beginning of 1992 that the movement to set up the basic law of assistance under the leadership of the Parliament came into reality. Since Japan started the ODA, the assistance policy had never had influence from the legislative body, rather it had been led by the administrative organs.34 Thus, Hashimoto (1999: 358) argues that the ODA Charter was drafted directly by the agencies and ministries that had been involved in the decision-making process for the ODA, including the MOFA. Those agencies and ministries distrusted an intervention from the legislative body in the field of assistance. There was an urgent necessity for the relevant ministries and agencies to decide assistance policy and to introduce clear assistance guidelines before the legislative body intervened. Therefore, the politics in the policy-making of the ODA within the country played a vital role in forming the ODA Charter. Given the fact that Japan had been called upon for an active involvement in international issues and to make concrete contributions after its economic success during the 1990s, its assistance was an important method for the government to contribute to international issues in its limited position in terms of its military contribution. The ODA policy and approach were developed in the context of this increasing necessity for its contribution and active involvement in international issues in the last two decades. This is proved by the fact that the ODA Charter expresses the idea that Japan uses the ODA as ‘an important means of foreign policy’.35 It explains that its assistance directly relates to Japanese foreign policy, which has been searching for its role in the world. Accordingly, in comparison with characteristics of assistance policy up to the 1970s, there emerged a distinctive character during the 1980s and 1990s, that is, ‘the diplomatic dimension’ of assistance. One of the examples shows that from the late 1970s to the early 1980s Japan used a portion of its ODA to help resolve the Third World debt problem (Yanagihara and Emig, 1991: 62–8). In most of the early decades, the assistance policy did not bear a specific diplomatic purpose. It is because the issue of assistance had been a domestic matter (a part of Japan’s economic policy). This is proved by the method of project implementation and also by the budget allocation at the time. However, various conditions

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led the government to express its own standpoint in its foreign assistance policy and increasing criticisms along with changes in the international arena especially when the regional as well as international political situation demonstrated uncertainty. For instance, Japan’s stagnating economy towards the end of the 1990s reduced its total ODA spending (cf. Figure 3.1, Chapter 3). The reduction of ODA bore certain impacts on the strategic use of ODA. Certain level of criticism was anticipated, as international expectations of Japan have remained high. Thus, the government had to express a clear standpoint in its policy to fill the gap between decreasing economic assistance and international and domestic expectations. In fact, the government’s emphasis on humanitarian policy expanded at the same time as decreasing ODA spending from 1992. The ODA/GNP ratio marked the lowest in 1997 since 1980. In the next year, the then Prime Minister, Obuchi, announced an initiative and perspectives on assistance under humanitarian and human rights considerations.36 The humanitarian approach was a way for Japan to retain its role in the world and thus it brought major changes in Japan’s assistance since the introduction of the ODA Charter.37 Consequently, contrary to its early period, the ODA became ‘strategic aid’ in these two decades. Domestic political process and the ODA This section shows the domestic political process of the ODA in order to obtain concrete ideas on decision-making process of the ODA. The exploration in this section illustrates the various changes in the ODA policy and approach by looking at changes in the actual domestic political process during the 1990s and thereafter. ODA system and its players Even though the policy focus has shifted over the years in the 1980s and 1990s, Japan’s assistance system established in the early period remained relatively unchanged until the 1990s.38 A number of actors play a part in the ODA system other than the MOFA, yet, many commentators tend to fail to remember other key players.39 These include bureaucratic organs that include several ministries and agencies, the private sector and a wide range of public corporations sponsored by the ministries (including associations and foundations in the private sector). The main line of the system is the ‘four-ministry system’: discussions and negotiations between the MOFA, the MOF, the MITI and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA). Other players have active participation in the system through the interest accommodation process. The complication of the system exists in the multiple actors participating in the process. The rest of this section explores the system by looking at the key roles played by main actors in the system in order to understand the actual process of decision-making in the ODA system.

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THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY: THE FOUR-ENTITY SYSTEM

As it is called, ‘four-ministry system’, four ministries (MOF, MOFA, MITI and EPA) are the most important players in the ODA system and are central organs in the decision-making process. Those four ministries discuss overall policy, review project proposals and make decisions on the use of assistance money.40 The MOF has a dominant role because of its authority over the budget and disbursements. It exercises constraint through its control of access to the budget. MOF’s regular budgetary processes determine the total volume of ODA. Each ministry or agency presents its ODA budget proposal to MOF. MOFA defines the overall foreign policy, which takes into account Japan’s domestic and international interests. In the MOFA, the Economic Cooperation Bureau (ECB) has the primary responsibility for the ODA. Also, MOFA assumes a coordinating role within the government for matters relating to the ODA because of the interest and activities of the other ministries in the ODA. MITI works with Japanese industry in ways that promote Japanese private sector interests nationally and internationally, which involves the perspective of private business and international trade and investment. The MITI favours combining official aid with direct private investment, distribution of aid to countries in close economic relations with Japan (Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, 1999: chapter 2). This shows that the interests of the private sector also weigh heavily in the use of the ODA. The EPA is a public corporation under the Prime Minister’s Office. The EPA plans, drafts and carries out basic policies and plans for Japan’s economy, which are submitted first to the prime minister and then to the Cabinet for approval. The EPA conducts basic research on economic development and ODA policies. The Agency aims to coordinate intragovernmental differences in the setting of aid strategies. Yet, in reality, differences in opinion among MOF, MOFA and MITI are resolved by higher political authorities (Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, 1999: chapter 2). The central decision for the ODA policy is made by dialogues among those four entities on which other players including ministries, agencies, the private sector and a wide range of public corporations, have an influence. As the four-ministry system employs a consensus structure, the four need to agree to launch a policy. In practice, the system is a veto style and it is rare for other ministries to oppose an initiative or ideas that one of the four strongly recommends (Rix, 1980: 34–7). THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT AND PARLIAMENT MEMBERS

The parliament has little influence in the process of policy-making for the assistance policy. Instead, the bureaucracy has supremacy. The parliament participates in the process for the budget deliberation: decision and approval for the total budget of the ODA and for the budget of each ministry. The precise contents of the allocation of the budget are not addressed in discussions in parliament.41 This is because official documents exchanged for the assistance are dealt with as an administrative arrangement. Thus, in the parliament, there are general questions regarding the ODA, yet, the pros and cons of each issue or project are rarely addressed.42 However, this does not deny the possibility of holding meetings for

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questions and requests regarding geographic allocation and methods of assistance at the budget meeting in the parliament.43 Even so, as the allocation of ODA budget is almost fixed, the detail is usually not addressed (Inada, 1985: 198).44 Irrespective of the parliament commitment, it is often the case that the prime minister, the foreign minister or particular parliament members are involved in the process of decision-making for the ODA. Also, there are other exceptional cases, that is, political arrangements. This includes such cases where the prime minister or the foreign minister receives a request at an official conference or a talk and decides the provision of assistance, and that particular politicians request economic assistance for a project in a specific country.45 In another case, the Research Council of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Policy Commission in the LDP had influence on the decisions for the ODA. However, it has been compatible with government under the LDP’s dominant party system for decades in Japan. On the other hand, it is often pointed out in Japanese politics that individual parliament members (MPs) often exercise their power on decisions for ODA. Nakajima explains, Politicians, who always aim at winning the next election to maintain power, represent the interest of their supporters by exercising their political power over bureaucrats. Bureaucrats, who cannot be indifferent to success and fame, accept those requests made by politicians in exchange for political support for their promotion. (1999) MPs on the Special Committee for International Economic Cooperation in the LDP are often referred to as such examples. The commitment of particular politicians to the decision-making process explains the corruption relating to the ODA during the 1970s and 1980s. This contributed to the ODA reform during the 1980s (Inada, 1985: 199).

INVOLVEMENT OF CORPORATIONS AND PRIVATE SECTOR

Private-sector firms also exercise their influence on the ODA policy-making and the project implementation. Most analysts specify those firms that have interest in Japan’s export, such as export companies and trading companies. Apart from having its interests defended by MITI and having its voice heard in the ministries, the private sector has a direct form of access to policy formulation. The view of the private sector is included in the process through officially sponsored advisory councils. For instance, prominent private-sector leaders were members of the Foreign Economic Cooperation Advisory Council that designed the framework of the ODA system. One of the examples of the involvement of the private sector is the role played by associations, such as Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) – the most influential business organization in Japan. It plays an

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important role in shaping ODA policies and the structure of the ODA system. Its Standing Committee on Economic Cooperation engages in regular dialogue with the government and its policy papers often lead the way for changes adopted within the ODA system.46 Another major example is the trading companies. They are better positioned placed so as to identify and formulate projects as their network of offices, and the size and range of their activities overseas provide them with access to information and to government officials. In history, in fact, trading companies played a key role in the post-War period as primary importers of food and raw materials and were at the forefront of the export drive.47 Their interests had an impact on government policies, which resulted in a number of ‘tied’ projects (Inada, 1985: 199–201). Consequently, the expansion of Japanese ODA led to the growth of Japanese corporations. Inada (1985: 200) explains the process: ‘Japanese companies propose specific projects to the government while they lobby for the project in Tokyo. The government approves them in response to the avocation by influential politicians’. The idea of ‘commercialized assistance’ with regard to Japanese ODA came mainly from the private-sector transactions and it had to be reduced, as Japan’s trade imbalance became a target of international criticism during the 1980s. The ODA policy in the assistance system The ODA system shows several features of Japanese assistance and the policy. For instance, Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook (1999: chapter 2) point out, ‘The lack of focus in the ODA policy is explained in the system as each entity has its own vision and aid-policy definition’. In fact, the MOF has a vision as a financial bureau, while the EPA has a vision for overall economic policy. Also, the MITI has a vision for Japan’s export policy and secure access to natural resources while the MOFA has a vision for Japan’s foreign relations. Each of those four ministries and agencies has distinctive organizational interests in accordance with its own jurisdiction. Therefore, the ODA policy could be considered as an outcome of exchanges and routines of the four-ministry system. To be more concrete, the system necessitated interest negotiations among the four ministries. There was no clear delineation of responsibilities, overlap and competition occurred among them and also the long bureaucratic processes of approvals within the Japanese government to achieve consensus in the system prove the complication of policymaking.48 Therefore, the system also bore one of the elements that govern the ODA and the policy. Criticisms of Japanese ODA – the incremental decisions, time-consuming decision-making and inflexibility of ODA policies – explain the practice of the system.49 As previously presented, the promotion of Japan’s own trade was a principle objective of the ODA in its early period. From this origin, the assistance, specifically loans, has been used primarily to provide a mutual economic support implemented by the OECF and supervised by the MITI, the EPA and MOFA. In addition, the Export-Import Bank of Japan provided loans and export guarantees

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on commercial terms.50 Both were supervised by the same ministries and were therefore guided by shared philosophies and objectives, that is, to create conditions favourable for economic growth in the region and not to interfere in political matters. The structure of the system suggests that Japan’s assistance was synonymous with assistance for the purpose of its own economic development and as the system has been maintained, policies and decisions for other forms of assistance, such as technical and non-economic, also proceeded in the same line. It is probably right to say that the system and the practice mutually enforced the assistance in economic terms. This explains why the Japanese tended to take the concept of assistance from an economic point of view only and overlook the diversity of aspects.51 Changing influences among players and the assistance system The criticisms with regard to the quality of Japanese ODA brought a major turning point for the government to review the policy at the end of the 1980s. Specific measures for the criticism were discussed in the MOFA, particularly during the 1990s, which also brought several changes among the players in the ODA system as well as changes in the policy focus. The major shift was from the country’s commercial interests and its own security to the so-called human-centred approach represented by such major concerns as basic human needs, the protection of the environment, poverty reduction, population growth, AIDS, conflict prevention and assistance in post-conflict reconstruction.52 The shift in the major focus of the policy brought several changes in the relationship among the players in the ODA system itself. It resulted in a reduction in the the role played by the MITI and the EPA. Similarly, the shift reduced the commitment from the private sector, particularly export and trading corporations, which had already shown a gradual decrease since 1978, when the government decided to promote ‘untied’ assistance.53 Because of untying loans, the interests of the private sector decreased, which brought to a halt the commercialization of assistance. As a result, the influence of corporations in the decision-making process was reduced, instead the relations between Japanese corporations and recipient countries were improved.54 The shift in the policy focus is confirmed by the reduction of the commitments to the policy-making process by export-related sectors and institutions. The shift also brought changes in relations between ministries. The influence from ministries and agencies that used to have authority over economic assistance lessened. The major shift in the ODA policy is confirmed by the indication of the increasing influence of the MOFA.55 The policy focus on diplomatic dimensions necessitated the MOFA to bear the weight in setting the tone and direction of assistance policy. The change in relation among players required a reform of the ODA system itself. For example, because of the change in the policy focus, the perceived roles of the OECF and the Export and Import Bank were changed and the two were consolidated into the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in October 1999.56

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The structure of the consolidation made it clear that assistance and export promotion would remain clearly separated (Nishigaki, 2000: 64).57 Therefore, it clarified that the primary purpose of ODA was the promotion of the development of developing countries and was not linked to Japan’s export promotion activities. Such institutional changes prove and explain the change in the relations between ministries. It confirms the shift in the assistance policy and the focus. From the analysis in this section, it is confirmed that there was a major change in Japanese ODA in the last two decades. Unlike its early period, the ODA was used as a method of pursuing its diplomatic goals in the later period. The shift was proved by the changes in the decision-making process of the ODA, that is, the role of actors and influential players. Along with changes in Japanese diplomacy to more human-centred and humanitarian considerations, the ODA was used to pursue humanitarian objectives to promote Japan’s diplomatic strategy. The shift emerged concurrently with Japan’s search for its role in the world in the post-Cold War period. The following section, therefore, explores Japan’s changing role and its international policy.

Japan’s role and international policies The trend in the world in favour of humanitarian considerations and human rights protection during the 1990s seems to be influential in international public policies. Given the fact that international circumstances have had significant impact on Japanese diplomacy in its history, the current world trend of humanitarianism has had definite impact on Japan’s diplomacy and its policy. Indeed, the previous sections revealed that Japanese assistance policy and diplomacy in general started to take on a humanitarian form, which is consistent with international trends. In the midst of such international trends of humanitarianism, generally, there are two major opposing expectations of Japan’s role in times of humanitarian crises and security problems. This section aims to explore the link between Japan’s international policies and its search for its role in the world. The first section focuses on international and domestic expectations of Japan and its role. The latter section examines how such expectations are integrated into Japan’s international policies or political responses to international humanitarian crises. From these explorations, it also examines the nature of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism from political perspectives. Expectations of Japan and its role: hard power versus humanitarianism? Since the end of the 1980s, Japan’s strong economic power has drawn increasing attention to a greater role in the political field. While there is a common expectation that Japan should take an active role in international security issues, there seem to exist two apparently conflicting views with regard to Japan’s political role befitting its economic power. One view backed by the realist approach explains that the economic power will be converted into military power,58 while the other

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view anticipates the economic power to be applied in non-military areas, such as science, technology, development, environmental conservation and humanitarian fields, which is strongly supported by Japanese pacifists and minimalists.59 Domestically, the political situation and public opinion also remain divided between those who favour the realist approach and those who are prone to minimalism. In addition to domestic debates, the issue of Japan’s role in the world is increasingly discussed in the international field, addressing how Japan’s economic power is to be applied in the political field, whether Japan remains simply one of the economic and technological superpowers or eventually builds up its military power, often referring to Japanese pre-Second World War diplomacy.60 Thus, world opinion also shows a dichotomy between realist and minimalist views. The following sections introduce such international and domestic expectations of Japan that may help us to unveil politics behind Japanese humanitarianism. Realist expectations of Japan’s role Japan’s difficult position regarding its military role has been often referred to with its strong commitment to the ODA (Soeya, 1995: 231). Japan relied primarily upon economic assistance, quiet diplomacy and diplomatic moderation in its foreign relations before and during the Cold War period, especially with countries in Asia.61 During the Cold War, Japan seldom had to choose between advancing its politicalmilitary role or techno-economic role (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998: 197). Concerning Japan’s power in the world, Samuel P. Huntington, for example, argues: For decades Japan has acted in a way totally consistent with the ‘realist’ theory of international relations, which holds that international politics is basically anarchic and that to insure their security states act to maximize their power. Realist theorists have focused overwhelmingly on military power. Japan has accepted all the assumptions of realism but applied them purely in the economic realm. (1993: 311) Similarly, Heginbotham and Samuels (1998: 171–2) argue, ‘Japanese foreign policy is organized around the goal of an advancing techno-economic position’. They add that Japanese foreign policy demonstrates that techno-economic values take precedence over military security (what they term ‘alternative realism’ or ‘structural realism’). Accordingly, instead of military considerations, Japanese foreign policy puts precedence on technology and economic considerations in the realist theory of foreign policy. In fact, the previous sections revealed that Japanese diplomacy took economy-centred diplomacy for its own economic development and its power was proved by its economy and technology during the Cold War period. However, Japanese leaders had to face difficult choices about how to contribute to international security issues in the post-Cold War period. The post-Cold War international political circumstance became grounds for international and domestic

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criticism because of the lack of political commitment under the ‘cheque-book diplomacy’. Given the economic power that Japan has established since the end of the Second World War and also given the fact that strong military states are often wealthy states with advanced technology, realists expect Japan to transform its economic power into military power and become a military superpower. Even structural realists have to address, in this context, how economic and technological powers are further applied in political actions. The realist expectation became a focal point during the Gulf War in 1991. In that crisis, Japan focused on economic tools in order to bridge the gap between the system of the Peace Constitution and the system of the Japan–US alliance. Despite being the single largest contributor of funds to the war, the international (and particularly the US) evaluation of Japan’s role in the crisis was not favourable. Western powers have sharply criticized Japan for its contribution in ways commensurate to its economic power, referring to the necessity of ‘burden sharing’. The criticism presented a certain level of international expectations of Japan in many ways synonymous with its military cooperation. In the international field, since the Gulf Crisis, Japan has been called upon to contribute more actively to global affairs in the form of military cooperation, specifically UN PKOs backed by regional security issues. The experience, therefore, made it possible for the government to introduce the PKO Law in 1992, which opened the way to dispatch its SDF abroad. This illustrates international expectations of Japan as a potential military superpower. In realist terms, the implication of the role befitting a country of its economic clout gives rise to the reason for building military power in the post-Cold War contexts. In the domestic field, there is also such an expectation of its military role. The wartime legacy of Japanese aggression leaves no alternative for this view other than to seek its military role through multilateral processes and arrangements (Soeya, 1995: 223). This is confirmed in such cases as Japan’s search for a role in the Cambodian peace process, Japan’s strong support of and participation in the ASEAN regional political and security dialogue and Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Indeed, the discussion of Japan’s role in international crises became mired in domestic high-level debates exclusively in terms of the dispatch of the SDF and the rise of various interpretations of the Constitution. Thus, there is one dimension of international and domestic expectations of Japan in the form of military power, which resulted in big debates on the Constitution and regional animosity towards Japan’s hard power. Idealist expectations of Japan’s role Contrary to realist expectations, idealists expect Japan’s power to be used for moral purposes. This includes tackling the global problems, development, human rights issues, environmental conservation and poverty reduction, as well as scientific and technological roles. As a matter of fact, in comparison with the expectations of other countries, such as China, there is a tendency for Japan to create stronger expectations from

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other countries with regard to a humanitarian and moral role. In the domestic field, such expectations arise from among the public, which shows people’s preference for non-military contributions in times of international and regional security problems.62 The strong support for humanitarian and development assistance rather than military assistance among the public is an example of public expectations of moral considerations in Japan’s actions. Besides the public, there are some governing elites who have a strong preference for Nye’s notion of ‘soft power’ (1990: 153–4). Japan’s historical and regional contexts support the idealist ideas. The historical legacy, the Article 9 of the Constitution and the concerns from neighbouring countries, place an apparent limitation on Japan’s full military role without sorting out the controversial interpretation of the Article and attitudes to former colonial countries over their acts in the past, both of which require a long-term approach. The language of Article 9 seems explicitly to limit the military role of the country, which is well supported by the populace.63 Even if the legal limitation is removed, it would still need profound effort to gain the understanding of neighbouring countries, especially from China and South Korea. Those points are understood internationally as well as domestically. The idealist expectations of moral considerations in Japan’s actions tend to be greater than those of other countries. The experience of nuclear horror as well as its aggression in its colonial countries raised such idealist expectations of moral considerations in Japan’s choice of action. The expectations are, thus, transferred into ideas that Japan’s role in the world could be found in non-military form, such as in developmental and humanitarian fields. The idea fits in with the fact that the country’s own experience, recovering from the ashes in the post-Second World War period, should be applied in the current humanitarian and development fields. In regional politics, Furukawa (1993: 52) argues, ‘Japan’s presence in Southeast Asia has grown to the point where it cannot avoid responsibilities in both the economic and security spheres’. Yet, there were voices that Japan seems to be limiting its definition of such contribution to the military sphere (Kitamura, 1997). A plethora of other global concerns are in need of attention apart from PKO, including human rights issues. This divides public opinion on the form of Japanese contributions to the world, while active contributions by sending its personnel obtain strong support. In fact, Fujita (1995: 442) notes, ‘Japan should quell criticism of its overall military role’, in which, he adds, ‘Japan has great potential to bring much to the international community’.64 The beginning of the 1990s illustrates Japan’s expanding global and regional role while it still relies on the US security umbrella and its economic means of cooperation remain as a compensation for its military limitations. On the other hand, the role reflects the diplomatic stance, which gradually demonstrates a clear position for the country, that is, a human-centred approach and humanitarian considerations. While there remain limitations and difficulties in keeping up the position, the trend illustrates Japan’s attempts to mirror international and domestic expectations of Japan in humanitarian and moral activities whereas expectations

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of its military role remain contentious. Though realists expect Japan to transform its wealth into military power, other international and domestic expectations of moral considerations in Japan’s actions continue to highlight the potential and capabilities of the country. Hence, Japan’s choice based on moral grounds remains as one dimension of international and domestic expectations. Japan’s role and global humanitarianism Japan has become more politically active and self-confident at both the regional and global level. At a diplomatic level, the Japanese government officially expressed the idea of universal human rights at Vienna in 1993. Since then, it has developed diplomatic policies grounded on the universal nature of human rights ideas and a shared humanity. Globally, the search for coherence between humanitarian and political action reflects the broader trends of public policy within industrialized countries. The trends were shaped by the force of globalization and a need to demonstrate the legitimacy of governmental actions. As a country, which is culturally distinct in origin, yet is one that expresses the universal nature of human rights ideas, Japan has been compelled to form international policies that are consistent with its own. The section explores both how Japan employs humanitarian values in the political process and how its humanitarian policy and political actions feature in the search for its role in the world. Coherence of humanitarianism and political considerations Various changes in Japanese policy during the last two decades were made whilst overcoming several difficult issues. These particularly include the historical and regional concerns that have hindered both Japan’s own assumptions and the international expectations of a role appropriate to the country’s economic power. A careful approach and much consideration are required in order to expand Japan’s proactive role in international politics. The moral responsibility befalling Japan, owing to its actions of the past, coincides with an increasing global moral awareness that affects domestic and international exceptions of Japan’s role in the world. Japanese foreign policymakers have shown signs of overcoming not only Japan’s post-Second World War foreign policy inertia but also the trauma of the Gulf War.65 This has included the assumption of regional and global roles within the political arena. Large responsibilities accompany great power status and are expected to fulfil both moral principles (e.g. the protection of human dignity) and political aspirations. The culture of global human rights seeks to protect human rights and humanitarian values. Wheeler (1998: 405) argues that this culture is a product of the post-holocaust world. In Japan’s case, current humanitarianism could partly be considered as stemming from remorse for its wartime conduct. In fact, historical legacies from Japan’s pre-war and wartime actions have shaped both Japanese diplomacy and international and domestic expectations of Japan’s role in the world.

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The new emphasis from government on a human-centred and ethical approach to its foreign policy has sought to eradicate the old dichotomy between realism and idealism. The current humanitarian policy in Japan may represent a search for its original role in the world, pertaining to the idea of good international citizenship both at a social and governmental level. The idea that, by assuming a regional and global role, Japan could and should act for the benefit of itself and the world, illustrates the moral-based expectations of its enhanced role. This supports the idea that, in Japan’s experience of development, human rights and humanitarian assistance there is much of relevance to the world’s search for peace and development. The Japanese government has repeatedly expressed its aim ‘to contribute actively to the formation of world peace and prosperity’ with reference to its ODA since the 1980s (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999: foreword). Japan’s ODA policy in 1992 subsequently included ‘humanitarian considerations’ as its basic philosophy.66 This advocates the idea that the promotion of humanitarian considerations and a respect for human rights could actually serve the self-interest of states. The idea grew from the demands of globalization and contributes to the aim of global ethics. Japan’s new policy included such considerations during the search for its role in international crises. It took an approach that was not limited to either realist or idealist considerations. Japanese politics and the nature of humanitarianism It is now clear that the Japanese political process helped to create conditions that favoured humanitarian considerations. The humanitarian considerations are universal in nature. Explanations for this existed in circumstances surrounding Japan during the 1990s. These included Japan’s economic development, the security situation in Asia and various international events, including the Gulf Crisis. It is considered that these factors contributed to increased awareness among Japanese people for a review of approach towards humanitarian crises. As Japan’s redefinition of its approach was carried out in response to its search for a political role in the world, the policy essentially took an universal approach. The analysis into the political dimension of humanitarianism reveals that there existed certain national circumstances and trends within society, particularly in the 1990s. From these influences there developed a shared-recognition among the public that Japan required a different approach in times of international humanitarian crises and that the approach should be based on universal humanitarianism. Such a national mood is often linked with remorse for historical human rights violations in Japanese colonies and occupied territories. Consequently, a shared-recognition merged with universal humanitarian and human rights considerations. They were increasingly noted in Japanese diplomacy and received widespread support among the public. However, in practical terms, the Japanese have not developed an approach that is based on the universal nature of humanitarian and human rights values. Although Japan has endorsed the idea of universal human rights, there are doubts surrounding which criteria should be universally applied. The ODA Charter

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refrained from specifying the measures, methods and justifications that Japan would use to enforce its stated political conditionality. There was a belief that, historically, the practical Japanese approach towards human rights had been selective and opportunistic. For example, Nuscheler and Warkentin stated: Japan has suspended ODA to countries such as Haiti, Guatemala, Kenya, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Gambia, where it was in no danger of inflicting damage to its own economy. In contrast, in the case of politically important countries in Asia, it has restricted its measures to ‘quiet diplomacy’. (2000: 77) It is not only Japan that practices double standards. Other members of the DAC act similarly whenever hard economic interests are involved, as illustrated in the cases of China and Indonesia. In the East Timor case, human rights issues were sacrificed on the altar of economic or geo-strategic interests. The global nature of problems does not absolve Japan from the commitment it gave in the fourth principle of the ODA Charter, that is, using ODA for stronger contributions to democratization and the protection of basic human rights. Japan’s human rights policy was not inaugurated until the 1990s. The challenge of promoting human rights was one which Japan shared with other nations. During the 1990s, there was a rethink of approaches towards humanitarian and human rights issues. This enabled Japan to develop its considerable potential for tackling humanitarian and human rights issues, conflict prevention and other global problems through the distinctive approaches of universalism and relativism. Indeed, these two distinctive views were utilized on different occasions; one which pertained to Japan’s global position, and the other relating to its approach in Asia. Therefore, the indigenous humanitarian ideas that developed under an authoritybased hierarchical social system were incorporated into a law-based universal humanitarianism that was received following the Second World War. On other occasions, the latter would be incorporated into the former. This is explained by the communitarian character of society. In communitarian societies, the source of values exists in shared-understandings. Thus, at certain times, political circumstances or conditions enforce the universal nature of values, thereby reflecting a shared-understanding among people. On other occasions, circumstances portray a shared-understanding around the non-universalistic nature of values. Therefore, society can be considered as open to both universal and relativistic views. For that reason, political circumstances bear great importance for the definition of the nature of Japanese humanitarianism. Given the socio-cultural features of Japanese society, current Japanese humanitarianism is largely explained by the political circumstances and considerations that surrounded Japan during the 1990s. These influenced the common perception of Japan’s role in the world that consider humanitarian and human rights values. The shared-view influenced a universalistic approach towards fellow human beings. Yet, it recognizes the potential for relativistic Japanese approaches in certain situations.

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Conclusion This chapter has illustrated some of the political dimensions that surround Japanese humanitarian assistance. Japan’s economic development was possible as a result of both its domestic development policy and the international circumstances that followed the Second World War. The ODA was used to expand export opportunities during the period of economic development. During the 1980s, this resulted in an expanding economy and a growing influence on the global economy. This success influenced realist expectations of a Japanese shift from economic to military power. The Gulf War prompted intense debate around the overseas dispatch of SDF. The level of contribution towards international security in relation to Japanese economic standing was an issue in focus. Realist expectations were encouraged by the introduction of the PKO Law in 1992, which permitted the foreign dispatch of Japanese SDF. Since the 1980s, Japanese assistance has increasingly become an instrument of foreign policy. The enhancement of economic security continues to be an important rationale. Indeed, ODA has become a prime tool in both shaping Japan’s regional environment and contributing to non-military forms of burden sharing. This helped to recycle Japan’s huge trade surplus. There were also significant changes in the basic concepts and ideals of Japanese official assistance. The ODA illustrates a shift in assistance philosophy that moved from domestically based economic interest policy formulated in a period of high economic growth, towards human security-centred concerns. These became a prime principle of Japanese diplomacy. Therefore, humanitarian assistance was now a critical component of foreign policy. Recent examples include the suspension or termination of official assistance to countries that commit human rights violations or proliferate nuclear arms. This includes the 1995 assistance in building a nuclear waste treatment plant in Vladivostok to prevent Russia from dumping in the Sea of Japan. There was also a partial suspension of aid to China in 1995 and to India and Pakistan in 1998 in protest against their nuclear testing. Japan has also used ODA to seek support from developing countries in its quest for permanent membership in the UN Security Council (Miyashita, 1999: 666). Only in the last decade of Japanese official assistance policy have explicit principles and policies emerged, which represent the diplomatic dimension of assistance. This change demonstrates a new feature of Japanese foreign policy that is enacted through the provision of assistance. This assistance was incorporated with a human-centred approach, which during the 1990s became the main feature of Japanese diplomacy. The report ‘Challenge 2001 – Japan’s Foreign Policy toward the 21st Century’, submitted to the MOFA in January 1999, states:67 Promoting broader acceptance of these principles [freedom, democracy and respect for basic human rights] is one way of ensuring a better future. Assistance that includes poverty alleviation and conservation of the global environment will also help these principles permeate the world.

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The human-centred approach is now considered to be a popular concern. As a result of media and NGO activities, grass-roots organizations have forced the government to review its assistance policy. In recent years, financial support from the government has enhanced the ability of ODA to address global issues, such as environmental degradation, human rights, AIDS, poverty and women’s rights issues. These were concerns that became the centre of international attention during a series of UN-sponsored World Conferences during the early 1990s. This chapter has illustrated the entire political dimension of ODA, including its policies and operational procedures. It is apparent that Japan’s assistance programme has adopted a humanitarian approach, which mirrors the shifts that have occurred in its domestic and diplomatic system. With an increase in Japan’s economic strength, there came a sense that this power should be utilized towards an enhancement of world peace and prosperity. Although still reliant upon the United States to maintain its security interests, during the last two decades Japan has gradually expanded both its regional and global roles. Although Japan began to enact policies in the international relations field, they related to a long-standing security policy framework. This involved active diplomacy within the limits of Article 9 of the Constitution, which Soeya (2000: 117) calls a ‘moderate approach’. A striking contrast is apparent in using economic powers to shape both non-military and autonomous approaches, Japan adopted new methods of diplomacy in response to international expectations. This approach was partly influenced by Japan’s economic recession in the 1990s. Therefore, with consideration towards domestic expectations, Japanese contributions towards humanitarian and human rights concerns compensated for decreasing levels of both financial and military assistance. Therefore, during the 1990s, there were clear changes within the political dimension of humanitarianism. Domestic and diplomatic policies were influenced by an increase in public consideration for humanitarian issues. The ‘moderate approach’ has acquired growing support among the general public (Shiobata, 2003: 210). This chapter illustrated how various political circumstances have affected Japanese approaches towards the implementation of humanitarian action. Domestic influences, such as the media and NGOs also raised awareness around humanitarian considerations, which eventually transferred into the domestic political process. As Japanese history illustrates, international circumstances and foreign pressures have significantly influenced changes in Japan. In addition to foreign influences on its politics, domestic forces that favour human rights considerations were employed in the defining of interests. Both domestic and international forces influenced diplomacy that favoured humanitarian policies. The main stream of realist thinking has not denied the importance of moral considerations in the implementation of foreign policy. Realists acknowledge that the primary goal of foreign policy is to protect the state and the interests of its citizens. However, they also acknowledge that these goals should be defined in such a way that they are consistent with the common good. In Japan, during the 1980s and 1990s, international influences that favoured humanitarian considerations were consistent with both the interests of the state and the people.

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Japanese humanitarian considerations have become the prime choice in political decisions, arising from both domestic and international pressures. It shows that humanitarian considerations and the needs of the country are not necessarily incompatible and that they often coincide. Japan redefines the concepts of contribution and cooperation for world peace and prosperity in the course of its search for its role in times of international humanitarian crises. That is why it took the universal nature approach, which facilitates Japan to find its global role. The political conditions and circumstances of the 1980s and 1990s, with particular reference to globalization, have prompted a public awareness that Japan’s role requires a different approach to that of other industrial democracies. Consideration of Both humanitarian and human rights issues were considered as vital to these ends. Japan’s search for its role in the world has made this consideration (contemporary Japanese humanitarianism) as being universally natured in its scope. However, as is indicated by Japanese socio-cultural conditions, this consideration as a shared-recognition contains the potentials for shifts in various political contexts.

Conclusion

This book focused on contemporary Japanese humanitarianism. In order to unveil contemporary Japanese humanitarianism, two questions were raised in this volume; what influenced the increase of Japanese humanitarian considerations? Are the values that underpin contemporary Japanese humanitarianism universal or relativistic in nature? By considering these questions, it attempted to reveal the roots and nature of Japanese humanitarianism. In so doing, it explored both Japanese humanitarianism in practice and its development from a cultural, historical and political perspective. The exploration was anchored on the premise that among the Japanese people, during the 1990s there were changing perceptions and attitudes towards international humanitarian crises. Much of the Japanese humanitarian assistance during the 1990s illustrated a growth in the system and structure that supported such undertakings. It demonstrates the upsurge of humanitarianism within Japanese society. The volume first considered Japanese indigenous humanitarian ideas and social construction in order to understand the socio-cultural dimension of Japanese humanitarianism. Japanese humanitarian values were developed according to Buddhist and Confucianist moral philosophy. Similarly, the idea of human rights among the Japanese is clarified by Buddhist and Confucianist interpretations. Yet, Japanese humanitarian ideas do share the core value of humanity which is also perceived in Western humanitarian thought. Although the socio-cultural origin differs, this core value is shared with major discourses of humanitarian values that developed in Western countries. This is confirmed by comments in interviews that were introduced in this volume. However, a major distinction exists between Japanese ethical decisions and practices and those of Western societies. A study of Japanese ethics revealed historically and culturally structured social conditions that shaped the meaning of humanitarianism within Japanese society. One structural element illustrated the communitarian character of Japanese society, in which moral values arise through shared traditions. The idea of human rights manifests the communitarian character of Japanese society. In Japanese society, personal bonds were sacred, and contractual relationships did not exist. While the Japanese vocabulary abounds with terms for obligations, in Japan, humanitarian activities are considered as part of human rights protection that arose from considerations grounded in human

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nature. The concept of rights was alien to Japanese tradition and had to be invented. The term ‘right’ was neither understood, nor entirely trusted. Society was perceived, not in terms of individuals enjoying rights, but of individuals bestowed with a strong sense of obligation. The singular nature of Japanese ethics was formed by a structural element that decides the rules and resources of Japanese moral considerations. In Japanese society, moral considerations were developed through reciprocal relationships of benevolence (from above) and loyalty (from below). The ethical construction was based on highly hierarchical (feudal and emperor) social systems. It is considered that these social systems maintained a particular type of Japanese society. This explains why Japanese humanitarian actions tend to be limited to narrow entities and why there is a reticence among the Japanese to apply the ideas. There are distinctions between the ethical practices in Japanese society and of those countries that share Buddhist and Confucianist traditions, such as China. They are explained by unique social systems in which ethical practices developed over centuries. The analysis of ethics in Japanese society revealed that indigenous humanitarian ideas and their application uniquely stemmed from Japanese social systems and practices. From the exploration, it became clear that traditionally, the Japanese ethical standard was relative to the rules adopted by society. Yet, two major historical events, the Meiji Restoration and the defeat in the Second World War created new ideas (universal nature of values) in the Japanese thought system. Consequently, two contrasting values have coexisted in the Japanese system of thought. In relation to practice, the changes and evolution within assistance systems and policies aided our understanding of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism. Japanese humanitarianism was influenced by the country’s experience as both a recipient and a donor of assistance. Japan’s post-War experience of receiving humanitarian assistance from the international community certainly shaped its role as a donor in later years. Indeed, during the Afghan Crisis in 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi explained Japan’s active involvement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, comparing the situation to that in Japan soon after the Second World War.1 Japan’s assistance policy encouraged self-reliant economies within recipient countries as well as the concept of ‘South–South cooperation’. This idea arose from Japan’s experience following Second World War. The strong support from the Japanese public for providing international assistance illustrates the influence that Japan’s experiences had on people’s perceptions. Thus, the universal nature of Japanese humanitarianism is perceived through practical assistance. The evolution of Japanese assistance systems and policy illustrates the political climate in which contemporary Japanese humanitarianism grows. In the first two decades after Japan began providing international assistance, the aim was to increase the level of assistance. The amount of Japanese assistance aid significantly increased in the 1970s. Nevertheless, there was no clear approach or philosophy concerning the provision of assistance during this period. However, the nature of this assistance changed noticeably during the 1980s and 1990s. The 1980s is considered as a ‘catalyst’ decade in the history of Japanese assistance

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provision. During this period, a clear policy emerged. This coincided with a period, when, in terms of total spending, the levels of Japanese assistance aid began to approach those of the world’s leading donors. The Gulf Crisis became a watershed in Japanese assistance history. It provoked questioning of Japan’s approach in the early years of its assistance history, that is, economic assistance without having any policy or philosophy. Japan’s sole contribution of providing financial assistance in times of security problems, was termed ‘chequebook diplomacy’ during the Gulf Crisis. It is often seen as a leaning curve in relation to Japanese assistance in the humanitarian crises of the 1990s. The quality of the assistance provided has become cornerstone in Japanese policy. During this period, many official documents started employing such terms as ‘humanitarian considerations’ and ‘human-centred approach’ in explanation of the country’s assistance policy. The approach was clarified in the 1992 ODA Charter. The experience of the Gulf Crisis affected perceptions as it caused a public reconsideration of the Japanese role. Ideas about assistance included consideration of the manner in which Japan could contribute both financially and politically. For that reason, the issue of assistance in times of international humanitarian crises was discussed in the context of its political role (or contribution) at a global level. At the grassroots level, during the 1990s, there was a drastic increase of NGOs. During the 1980s, gradual societal change was illustrated by an increased volunteer activities and the establishment of various social and legal systems to facilitate humanitarian activities. The Cambodia Crisis illustrates several changes within not only the Japanese assistance system, but also in policy and perceptions. In addition to active involvement in the peace process, Japan sent its SDF abroad to participate in a UN PKO for the first time since the end of the Second World War. Although the dispatch of the SDF was controversial, the crisis raised public awareness of the different forms that Japan’s personnel contribution could take. There were different views, as seen from several public opinion surveys, on Japan’s contribution before and after the crisis. A consensus was established on the necessity for taking action in times of such international crises, although its precise form and content was not clear. Whilst the 1980s saw the introduction of assistance policy and philosophy, the 1990s witnessed the implementation of a practical assistance system. The humanitarian assistance that was given in East Timor illustrated various changes when compared with previous cases of Japanese assistance. It confirms that the Cambodia case, among others in the 1990s, contributed to the formation of a Japanese assistance system for responding to crisis situations. This was clarified by the comments of different interviewees’ and also by the fact that the official assistance system removed its traditional structure. Some of the interview comments revealed that the assistance experiences of the 1990s helped to establish a system at the governmental and non-governmental levels. The East Timor case illustrated a growth in mutual cooperation between the government and NGOs during the provision of practical assistance. In recent years, another form of humanitarian action was highlighted by governmental assistance. It relates to Japan’s consideration of human rights that

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is incorporated within development assistance. The government suspended or terminated its assistance in some cases during the 1990s because of the human rights situation in recipient countries. Political considerations influenced certain actions; therefore the idea was not applied universally, but in only certain cases. The East Timor case illustrated such political considerations in action. It demonstrated that political interests often underlie humanitarian considerations, particularly when the course of action is being considered. Given that often the normative framework had little bearing on practice during the economic development period, various problems or inconsistent approaches were revealed in this study. This shows the difference between the actions in early assistance history and those of the 1990s. From a realist perspective, a move from Japan’s economic to military power was expected. In response to humanitarian crises, a new form of Japanese assistance was demonstrated with the dispatch of the SDF. However, this should not diminish idealist perspectives on the issue. Rather, the study revealed that Japan’s unique history does not remove it from an obligation to consider humanitarian issues. This history includes its wartime aggression and the experience of postWar social and economic development. It is argued that due to its historical actions, Japan should respect moral considerations in deciding the dispatch of its SDF. Such actions may increase concern of neighbouring countries. The political dimension of humanitarian actions illustrates how humanitarian policy has developed support as part of the national interest. It is apparent that, during times of international humanitarian crises, a sharedunderstanding has become established among the public. It fits conceptually with dominant world humanitarian theory, of which there are two components; universal values applicable to all human beings and a set of obligations and responsibilities. Therefore, contemporary international humanitarianism is favourably received in the society. This is shown by interview comments and the various systems introduced into society that support volunteer work and NGOs that undertake humanitarian operations. Prevailing ideas about the universality of humanitarian values are explained by the fact that contemporary Japanese humanitarianism has developed in consideration of Japan’s role in the world. Here, the universal nature of humanitarian and human rights values would be a necessary ingredient. However, the ideas are often applied in distinctive ways, as explained by the traditional ethical practices that are underpinned by Japanese social construction. This informs us that some ethical practices are innately applied by the people and government, while others are politically and strategically employed. This illustrates both natures of the humanitarian values that underlie Japanese humanitarianism. These may bring further changes in relation to political process and socio-political circumstances surrounding Japan. Considering the nature of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism, various factors that explain its upsurge are illustrated. The strongest influences are found in the political realm. Although most of the historical and socio-cultural factors existed within society during the early 1980s, the upsurge of Japanese humanitarianism was not perceived until the late 1980s. Yet, this does not ignore the

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influence of socio-cultural and historical factors. They certainly offer key foundational conditions in explaining the expansion of Japanese humanitarianism. It is considered that the political conditions and processes of the 1980s and 1990s contained key aspects that were central to the expansion of Japanese humanitarianism. They can be distinguished into three aspects; international (or external) circumstances, domestic (or internal) circumstances and Japan’s search for its own role in the international field. These factors are considered to be both closely linked to and interacting with each other. Socio-cultural and historical factors interacted in each segment of these political factors, and have greatly shaped the face of contemporary Japanese humanitarianism. Particular international circumstances contributed to the upsurge of humanitarianism in Japan. The force of globalization is an important factor in explaining this growth. Globalization aided in the conveyance of international influence and trends towards Japan as well as spreading Japan’s influence to the world. During the 1980s and 1990s, globalization increased awareness around several crossborder issues including environment problems, poverty, conflicts and international humanitarianism. International movements that aimed to tackle these issues reinforced domestic awareness around these global issues. Thus, the effect of globalization demonstrates the influence of the international arena on Japan. But simultaneously, globalization increased Japan’s influence on the world. For example, Japan became the biggest economic superpower in the 1980s. Whether through assistance aid, trade or financial activities, Japan’s stability and actions became inseparable from the world’s stability. Therefore, globalization also illustrates Japanese influence in the international arena. Overall, globalization removed the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy. This explains why global problems posed new challenges for bureaucracies in Japanese domestic politics that previously adhered to relatively strict disciplinary boundaries. The domestic political process that tackled domestic and international issues through separate departments was no longer effective. It became necessary for departments to act in a co-ordinated and complimentary manner. Since the end of the Cold War, moral considerations have received increasing international attention. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, a set of global ethics is yet to be established. Globalization removed boundaries, which increased Japanese awareness of external influences, in addition to aiding the spread of its own. The choice between acting both in accordance with one’s conscience and with the needs of the country used to pit humanitarian objectives against national objectives. Now, the two can fit together. Although conflicts between the ethical and practical remain in the international arena, moral considerations are generally considered necessary parts of the national interest.2 There were international circumstances that supported humanitarian considerations and morally based actions. Globalization influenced Japan to include moral considerations in its policy making. On the other hand, the force of globalization obliged Japan to become morally considerate due to its influence in the international arena. As a consequence of globalization, external circumstances encouraged Japan to consider the effects of its actions.

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There were also domestic circumstances that influenced changes among the Japanese people. The establishment of the assistance system and other similar ventures to support volunteer activities and NGOs within society is evidence of such changes. While the domestic economy was recovering following Second World War, the Japanese people concentrated on domestic issues. Conversely, with an improvement in the economy, came a gradual increase of moral or humanitarian considerations among the Japanese people. This volume illustrated that when Japan’s economy reached the international level during the 1980s, the form and content of assistance began to change and there was an increase in the number of NGOs. Similarly, in the 1990s, as Japan’s economy scaled global heights, the Japanese assistance system gained a solid structure, guided by its own principles and philosophy. Therefore, the domestic situation, particularly that of the economy, was central towards an expansion in humanitarian considerations. A public opinion survey illustrated a gradual change in people’s perceptions. Since the early 1990s, people have favoured the provision of human support during humanitarian crises, as opposed to economic assistance. During the 1990s, Japan’s assistance system varied in its approach, reflecting the changes in public opinion. The establishment of an assistance system illustrates a growing level of humanitarian consideration among the Japanese people. It is considered that this opened the way for Japanese participation in humanitarian activities and contribution towards international humanitarian crises. Interview comments illustrated an increasing interest in international cooperation and participation in volunteer and NGO activities. Therefore, changing domestic circumstances contributed towards an upsurge of humanitarianism in Japan. The third factor concerns Japan’s search for a role during the post-Cold War era. Japan’s experience of nuclear horror, of being an aggressor during the Second World War and limits on the external dispatch its SDF influenced Japan’s search for alternative methods of international action. One of the methods utilized by Japan was the provision of international assistance. Considerations of Japan’s role are often undertaken in the context of the Second World War. Japan’s experience of receiving international assistance is often cited in explanation of Japan’s active involvement in assistance. This was demonstrated by Prime Minister Koizumi’s comments at the time of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. Internationally, normative components were more influential in the 1990s than in the Cold War era. These contents, including such collective values as conflict resolution, the protection of human rights and to some extent, the promotion of democracy, began to gain influence. These were previously incompatible with political objectives that were purely based on self-interest. This led to the prominence of humanitarian issues during the 1990s. In relation to practice, the action that was undertaken during humanitarian crises suggested that pluralist political interest continued to play a significant role in decision-making. However, the nature of this interest is quite different to that of the Cold War era.3 Humanitarian action is, in this sense, a means of responding to domestic political challenges as much as one of managing the international system. The coherence agenda has

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been reinterpreted so that humanitarian action has become a primary form of political action, rather than merely a substitute for it. In reflection of its geographical position, many Japanese social and political practices reflect regional contexts and culture. The idea of moral responsibility among Japanese people increased both in regional and international contexts. In the search for its role, owing to its aggression during the Second World War, Japan was under significant pressure from neighbours. The regional contexts not only limited Japan’s military role but also emphasized the moral responsibility that Japan should take in humanitarian situations. In this sense, the regional contexts had a critical impact on Japan’s search for its role. Indeed, Japan’s previous responses to humanitarian crises in Asia illustrated its increasing humanitarian role, especially during the 1990s. In addition to regional pressure, the Japanese public themselves emphasized the moral responsibility and need for a humanitarian role. Various public opinion surveys strongly supported humanitarian activities and a humanitarian role. Public recognition of regional contexts and a pacifist culture born of historical legacies gave influence to a Japanese role that would not be shaped at the expense of moral considerations. Japanese humanitarianism grew with the force of globalization, particularly during the 1990s, in the search for its role as a world economic superpower and as a country that experienced Second World War both as an aggressor and a victim. In reflection of international trends of moral considerations, humanitarian activities undertaken by the Japanese in East Timor portrayed the components of Western moral theory. However, it must be emphasized that Japanese humanitarianism involves distinctive elements stemming from indigenous social tradition and ethical practice in addition to regional and historical rationales. Japan has been susceptible to external influences, pressures and circumstances that have affected major historical changes within the country. In consideration of the Taika Reform, the Meiji Restoration and allied occupation after the Second World War, it could be said that Japanese humanitarianism developed from external influences that demanded Japanese sensitivity. However, Japan undertook internal reform in search of its own role, albeit encouraged by external circumstances. The change from within is important when explaining the current humanitarianism as not simply an imported phenomenon. Germany and Japan share similar historical backgrounds having experienced comparable circumstances as losers of Second World War and as receivers of international assistance provided to aid development. However, there seem to be higher international and domestic expectations of moral responsibility and humanitarian role among the Japanese than in the German population. In the 1990s, the international roles taken by Japan and Germany are different. This illustrates that the key elements comprising contemporary Japanese humanitarianism involve unique contexts within and around the country. The geographical setting of the country, historical legacies and influences from recent international trends partly explain the uniqueness of Japanese

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humanitarianism. There was a basis within both Japanese society and thought that embedded and utilized the universal and relativistic nature of humanitarian values. Consequently, both international and domestic circumstances merged to enhance humanitarian considerations in Japan’s inimitable socio-cultural and historical context. Hence, contemporary humanitarianism in Japan is not simply imported from the international arena but has developed within domestic social structures and practices that entail cultural, historical and regional rationales. Japan redefined its role in relation to the humanitarian crises of the 1990s. The Gulf Crisis formed a domestic consensus, which expected a Japanese political role that was relative to its economic status. The Cambodia Crisis developed a public belief that a diverse approach in assistance and action was required in relation to Japan’s role and contribution. In the process of redefining its own role in times of international security problems, the undertaking of a burden-sharing humanitarian role with other industrialized countries has become Japan’s primal choice. As Japanese humanitarianism grew whilst searching for its role in the world, the universal outlook of humanitarian values was supported and promoted in Japan’s policy and permeated in the society. The current stream of global cosmopolitanism, although controversial in Japan, nevertheless, cleared a way to take further steps. It overcame several burdens of the last fifty years including public oppositions, historical legacies and emotional enmity from neighbouring countries. This is demonstrated by the position of current Japan. Questioning the Japanese government’s controversial decision to send its SDF to Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance without a UN mandate despite domestic opposition will aid our understanding of the issue.

The post-September 11 paradigm and Japanese humanitarianism In the post-Cold War period, various changes have occurred in the international security paradigm. Above all, a new dimension was added to international security following September 11, 2001. In the wake of fresh hostilities that resulted from the 2001 attacks on the United States, Japan began to display a new direction in its policy. The Koizumi administration’s quick decision to send support ships and peacekeeping troops to Afghanistan reawakened a divisive debate over Japan’s role in the world. Prime Minister Koizumi described the terrorist attacks as a grave challenge not only to the United States but also to ‘international society’, referring to the idea of common humanity and condemning the terrorist attacks as an act against all of humanity.4 Thus, the government swiftly introduced to the Diet the ‘Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill’.5 As American Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, commented, it was undertaken with remarkable speed. An international conference on Afghan reconstruction was also held in Tokyo.6 Similarly, during the Iraq Crisis, on 21 April 2003, Japan expressed its intention ‘to promptly play a concrete role in providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq’.7 While the government was mired in domestic debates on

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a new bill for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by the SDF in Iraq, it contributed US$100 million for humanitarian assistance. Subsequently, on 25 July, the government passed a law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (the so-called ‘Iraq Legislation’). This allowed the dispatch of Japanese SDF to Iraq to carry out humanitarian and reconstruction activities.8 At the end of 2003, the government explained its stance that ‘Japan must fulfil its responsibility . . . as a responsible member of international community’.9 In relation to security policy, Japan gradually expanded the role of its SDF in crisis situations following the Gulf and Cambodia Crises. The 1992 PKO Law opened the way for SDF participation in UN PKOs around the world. The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Law, established in the wake of September 11, 2001, went further, allowing the SDF to be deployed in areas close to a combat zone – the Indian Ocean. The Iraq Legislation allowed the Japanese SDF to participate in PKOs in areas of expected combat without first receiving a UN mandate. Opinions are divided among both the government and the public in relation to the dispatch of its SDF in Iraq. Apart from the cause of war, opinions are divided because the deployment differs from past operations mainly for two reasons. First, Japanese SDF involvement in current Iraq may violate the Constitution. In fact, on the eve of approval for this dispatch, there were debates in parliament concerning the constitutionality of sending the SDF to a country or region where the delineation of combat and non-combat areas is not clearly defined (The Yomiuri Newspaper, 16 June 2000 and 18 June 2003; Nihon Keizai Newspaper, 23 June 2003).10 Second, the nature of this Japanese PKO is changeable as the activity is not sanctioned by the UN. The largest opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan, opposed Japan’s stance, since they were not backed by a UN resolution. The PKO Law allows SDF engagement ‘under UN mandate’ in postWar countries only if the host country ‘requests’ international troops. Even the Iraq Legislation assigns its SDF to ‘non-combatant areas’, noting that the deployment should be in areas where potential combat is not expected throughout the operation.11 The provision of assistance in the current Iraq Crisis obviously contains many problems. It prompted debates over outstanding issues in both government policy and the entire Japanese society. Various reasons explaining why Japan took the controversial step of providing assistance to Iraq have emerged. Some refer to domestic politics while others focus on Japan’s political and economic interests. As the case of East Timor illustrated, political considerations influenced the decisions to take action. However, no one of these factors alone explain the reasons. There is some truth in all of the explanations. Indeed, in his instruction speech to its Air SDF on 24 December 2003, the Director General of Defence Agency, Ishiba Shigeru, highlighted five reasons as to why Japan decided to dispatch of its SDF to Iraq.12 They were: (1) to assist Iraqi people in the shared experience of post-War reconstruction, (2) to protect values, such as freedom and democracy, by not yielding to terrorism, (3) to support UN efforts, (4) a crucial need to protect nation’s energy reserves, which largely depend on the Middle East and

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(5) to enhance trust in the Japan–US alliance by sharing the risk. Overall, these five issues could be considered as national interests. The Director General’s speech indicates that Japan had political interests in providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Iraq. This is well illustrated through ‘burden-sharing’ as both a US ally and as a member of the international community. Japan’s traumatic experience in the 1991 Gulf Crisis increased its political ambitions in participating in international efforts. More precisely, Japan’s political interests for involvement in the current Iraq Crisis are explained by the new security paradigm, in which the United States is playing a major role. At a press conference concerning Japan’s assistance activities in Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi stated that in order to restore Japan’s peace and security, ‘Japan’s foreign policy must lie in the maintenance of both the Japan–US alliance and international coordination’.13 The Director General’s speech on 24 December 2003 also explains Japan’s policy in a similar manner. Behind the scenes, Japan may have considered a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. It is no secret that Japan aspires to a permanent seat. Prior to the Iraq Crisis, US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, apparently referred to Japan as an economic superpower that was aiming to gain a permanent seat in UN Security Council. He said that Japan should give the United States active support when it strikes Iraq (Mainichi Newspaper, 8 September 2002). Overall, the political interest could be explained as pertaining to Japan’s foreign and security policy. Perhaps, another sensible analysis relates to its economic interests. Japan’s heavy dependence on the Middle East for its energy resources (90 per cent of its energy resources is from the Gulf region) supports this idea. In his speech, the Director General of the Defence Agency often referred to Japan’s total reliance on energy resources from the Middle East.14 Reconstruction contracts in Iraq could also boost the Japanese economy, which has been ailing for years. In fact, Mitsubishi and other trading companies are said to be analysing ‘commercial possibilities’ in Iraq.15 Prior to the 1990 Gulf War, trading houses, such as Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Marubeni, had significant dealings with Iraq that concerned infrastructure, construction machinery, energy and pipelines. Therefore, the influence of Japan’s economic interests in providing PKOs in Iraq is very strong. The government may also use the current commitment in Iraq to handle domestic burdens, public and historical legacies. In future cases, convincing the public of the need to breach the Constitution, will be easier with a precedent having already been set. The Iraq experience may well lead to future involvement in places, such as North Korea, for example. If a security threat emerged in the Korean peninsula, Japan would be well placed for committing its SDF. Considering the security situation in East Asia, it may be crucial in order to handle domestic burdens. Strong opposition from both the public and neighbouring countries may be reduced in future as a result of current experiences with the Iraq crisis. Future activities that are hampered by domestic opposition could be supported by using this experience as an example.

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The dispatch of the SDF in the Iraq Crisis was only possible through the repeated emphasis on ‘humanitarian’ roles during crisis situations from the 1990s onwards. The humanitarian role secures political and economic interests as well as ease several domestic burdens. Japan’s long-term political and economic interests can be satisfied by participating in assistance activities in Iraq. Yet, this had to be accompanied by ‘burden sharing’. The dispatch of the SDF was, therefore, a centrepiece of Japan’s commitment. Considering historical experiences and emotive relations with neighbouring countries, the burden sharing would not consist of a military role alone. This provides a dilemma in the case of Iraq, whereby the civilian nature of humanitarian assistance, strongly supported by the Japanese public, has been curtailed due to the security situation. The Iraq Crisis certainly represents huge symbolic meaning for the Japanese people. Both supporters and opponents of the dispatch face respective dilemmas in their stance that prevent a coherent approach. Those who support the dispatch face the same dilemma that the Japanese government encountered. Government justifications for dispatching the SDF contain several inconsistencies. While the Iraq Legislation demands that the SDF operates in ‘safe areas’, it is debatable to assert that, in the current climate, such areas exist. On 9 December 2003, the prime minister spoke pertinently on this point. When stressing the non-use of force by the SDF, he described awareness that ‘the current conditions in Iraq are severe ones and the situation cannot always be described as being safe’. Despite national interests, the dispatch of the SDF to UN PKOs in East Timor was delayed until 2001 due to the possible armed combat. In the Iraq Crisis, the government promptly decided both to participate in PKOs and to dispatch the SDF. On the other hand, the justifications of those who opposed the dispatch also contained inconsistent points. Despite demands for non-military form of personnel involvement in times of humanitarian crises, there is no coherent approach as to how contribution can be made in countries where high risks of fighting exist. When the Japanese Constitution was outlined following the Second World War, sending the SDF abroad was not considered in order to prevent a revival of Japanese militarism. For that reason, gradual alteration or change, such as enacting the PKO Law, was required in order to dispatch the SDF. By the same token, when Japan introduced the PKO Law, the dispatch of the SDF into possible combat areas was, perhaps, not under consideration.16 That is why, in the East Timor case, Japan delayed its deployment of the SDF until the possibility of using force was removed. Yet, this was not the case in the Iraq Crisis. One critical factor that explains the distinction between the cases of East Timor and of Iraq among others, is the international security paradigm. During the East Timor Crisis, the international security situation was dominated by a post-Cold War context, in which Japan retained a certain level of independence in its decision-making while maintaining the US alliance. Though the United States remained an influential factor in Japan’s decision-making process, there was certain independence, especially on regional security issues, such as the Cambodia peace process, and in assisting the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Conversely, the current international security situation involves allies of the United States

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contributing to the, so-called, ‘fight-against-terror’. Indeed, at the 58th General Assembly meeting on 23 September 2003, in reference to the international context, Secretary General Koffi Annan stated that ‘. . . a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty eight years’. Under the new security paradigm, Iraq has become the frontline in the US ‘fight-against-terror’. This evidently obliges Japan, as a firm US ally, to contribute to the ‘fight-against-terror’. Apparently, Japan was expected to participate in PKOs in the current Iraq. Consequently, Japan was required to undertake a new approach that unavoidably included the dispatch of the SDF to areas that contain high risks of armed combat. Yet, the approach had to be in a form that could reduce domestic burdens, that is, public opposition, constitutional limits and historical legacies. Japan’s current standing is well illustrated by Kofi Annan’s statement; contemporary international circumstances could fundamentally challenge Japan’s approach on which, however imperfectly, Japan’s peace and stability has rested for sixty years since the end of the Second World War. In this context, the assumption of a ‘humanitarian role’ may have been considered a solution, whilst enabling the control of obstacles and a restoration of national interests.

Appendices

Appendix A: Diet discussions on the issue of East Timor1 6 February 1976: The Committee on the Budget (The House of Representatives) ‘Arm Export to Countries under Conflict or Potential Conflict Areas’. 2 June 1982: The Committee on Foreign Affairs (The House of Representatives) ‘The Treaty of Environmental Change Technology and the Treaty to Ban Environmental Weapons’. 11 March 1986: The Committee on the Budget (The House of Councillors) ‘The Current Situation in East Timor and the Japanese Government Response’. 9 April 1986: The Committee on Foreign Affairs (The House of Representatives) ‘The Government Recognition and Deal with regard to East Timor Region’. 17 October 1986: The Committee on Foreign Affairs (The House of Representatives) ‘The Basic Attitude of the East Timor Region’. 26 November 1986: The Committee on Education (The House of Representatives) ‘The Textbook examined by the Ministry of Education and The Expression of East Timor in Map’. 29 March 1990: The Committee on Foreign Affairs (The House of Councillors) ‘The Current Situation in East Timor and the World Map in Deputy’s Room in the Asia Division’. 20 November 1991: The Committee on Commerce and Industry (The House of Representatives) ‘The Santa Cruz Massacre and Four Principles of ODA Charter’. 11 March 1992: The Committee on the Budget (The House of Representatives) ‘Four Principles on ODA and the ODA Policy to Indonesia’. 18 October 1994: The Committee on the Budget (The House of Councillors) ‘Four Principles on ODA and Mistranslation by Embassy Officer’. 21 February 1995: The Committee on the Budget (The House of Representatives) ‘Self-Determination of East Timor’. 14 March 1995: The Committee on Communications (The House of Councillors) ‘The Examination Process for Projects of International Volunteer Saving’.

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10 November 1997: The Investigation Committee on International Affairs (The House of Councillors) ‘The Application of ODA Charter’. 28 November 1997: The Committee on Foreign Affairs (The House of Representatives) ‘Human Rights Situation in East Timor and Japan’s Response’. 11 March 1998: The Investigation Committee on International Affairs (The House of Councillors) ‘Democratisation in Indonesia and Re-examination of Principles in the ODA Charter’. 9 September 1999: The Committee on Audit (The House of Councillors) ‘The “Turmoil” after the Popular Consultation and the Temporal Suspension of ODA to Indonesia’. 30 September 1999: The Committee on the Budget (The House of Councillors) ‘The Dispatch of Self-Defence Force, specifically Emergency Assistance Force’.

Appendix B: Japan–Indonesia relations2 Economic relations Trade Import: Oil, Natural Gas, Minerals, Sea Food, Plywood Export: Machines, Chemicals, Steel Trade balance (US$ million) Year

Import

Export

Balance

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

7,672 9,971 9,052 10,188 4,301

12,917 14,214 15,186 14,269 10,841

5,245 4,243 6,134 4,441 6,531

Economic cooperations Economic assistance from Japan Total Official Development Aid Loans (1966–8) Grant (1966–8) Technical (1966–8)

¥108,661,000,000 (£543,305,000) ¥3,432,273,000,000 (£17,161,365,000) ¥189,630,000,000 (£948,150,000) ¥196,514,000,000 (£982,570,000)

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Bilateral ODA total (1997/ US$ million) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Japan Germany Australia UK Austria Spain Canada France Norway Swiss

498 125 98 75 62 55 43 32 21 18

Cultural relations Indonesian Students in Japan: Approximately 827 (1999 December) Bali Cultural Centre/Japan Cultural Centre The number of Indonesians in Japan 10,581 (1999) The number of Japanese in Indonesia 11,660 (1999) Bilateral treaties 1958: Japan–Indonesia Peace Treaty/Japan–Indonesia Reparation Treaty 1963: Japan–Indonesia Friendship, Commerce and Trade Treaty Japan–Indonesia Agreement of Aviation 1981: Japan–Indonesia Agreement on Science and Technology 1982: Japan–Indonesia Tax Agreement

Notes

Introduction 1 Various discussions with regard to the security situation in Iraq were held in parliament before the decision was made to dispatch the SDF. Cf. Prime Minister’s comments at the press meeting of 9 December 2003 are available in Japanese http://www. kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2003/12/09press.html (accessed 20 April 2004). 2 Prime Minister’s comments at the press meeting of 9 December 2003 from Prime Minister Koizumi Mail Magazine, 11 and 18 December 2003. This is a weekly online magazine, in which Prime Minister Koizumi’s comments on a wide variety of issues (both domestic and international) are introduced. Available in Japanese http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/m-magazine/backnumber/index.html (accessed 30 November 2004). 3 According to a public opinion survey of 23 June 2003 concerning the new bill for reconstruction activities undertaken by the SDF in Iraq, 43 per cent expressed support, 41 per cent opposed it. Cf. Nihon Keizai Newspaper, Tokyo, 23 June 2003. 4 See, for example, Kofi Annan (1999). Also, see his statement to the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on 24 April 2003. 5 For example, the number of UN Volunteers from Japan in 1990 was 36. The number increased in the following years: 54 in 1991, 73 in 1992, 72 in 1993 and 80 in 1997. See, ‘UNV to Nihon (UNV and Japan)’, available in Japanese http://www.unv.or.jp/ jouhou/nihon.htm (accessed 15 April 2003). 6 This interview was conducted in Japanese, at Tokyo, in September 2002 with a student who volunteered in a Japanese NGO. 7 The Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake occurred in January 1995 at Kobe (in the western part of Japan). 8 Interview comments by NGO workers, conducted in Dili in September 2000. Seven NGO workers from six different organizations were interviewed. One of them explained that applications from university students for internship or voluntary service visibly increased from the middle of the 1990s. 9 From an interview conducted in Dili on 24 September 2000. 10 The Prime Minister’s Office annually conducts a survey on issues pertaining to foreign relations. The survey includes questions regarding the role of Japan in the international community and the idea of internationalization. 11 There are four basic types of triangulation: investigator triangulation (multiple rather than single researchers are used), data triangulation (involves time, space and persons), theory triangulation (more than one theoretical scheme is employed in the interpretation of the phenomenon) and methodological triangulation (involves the use of more than one method and may consist of within-method or between-method strategies).

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12 In this study, the terms ‘Western’ and ‘West’ are used in the geo-political sense intended to designate western part of Europe and Anglo-America, mostly characterized by the Judaeo-Christian tradition in which wide-ranging political and philosophical theories, concepts, moral reasoning and fundamental values of ‘humanitarian’ or ‘humanitarianism’ were developed. 1 Discourse of humanitarianism in major political theories 1 For example, the Geneva Conventions assume the definition of humanitarianism as ‘principles of humanity’. 2 The four principles were cited from the seven principles in Red Cross humanitarianism. The other three include the principles of ‘independence’, ‘voluntary’ and ‘service and unity’. Those three were omitted as they designate the inner integrity of the movement. 3 Henry Dunant devoted himself to the organization of relief at the battlefield of Solferino, in which 38,000 men died or were wounded in 1859. Cf. Dunant, H. (1862), A Memory of Solferino, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), cited in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996: 15). 4 From the definition by the Red Cross. 5 The Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol I lay down that protection is to be afforded ‘without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or any other similar criteria’. 6 Definitions by the Red Cross. 7 For example, Ramsbotham argues, ‘The purpose of humanitarian intervention is identified with the protection for fundamental human rights threatened by the host government’ (see Ramsbotham, 1997: 448). 8 The term ‘complex emergencies’ has until very recently been used in such situations as natural disasters. Yet, the end of the Cold War has brought the realization that these types of disasters are not solely caused by the vagaries of the climate but by the way human beings interact with it. 9 Solidarism implies that states accept a responsibility not only to protect the security of their own people but also to defend human rights universally (see e.g. Welsh, 2002). 10 In this book, Japanese names are cited in Japanese order, that is, surname and then first name, while non-Japanese names are cited in normal order, that is, first name and then surname. 11 Other example, for instance, Minear and Weiss define ‘humanitarian assistance’ as ‘encompassing activities covering a full spectrum, from the supplemental feeding of infants during famines to longer-term measures such as the strengthening of indigenous social and institutional coping mechanisms to avoid future crisis’ (Weiss and Minear, 1993: 9). 12 Greenway, for instance, argues, ‘one of the ironies associated with contemporary humanitarianism is that, despite the extent to which private actors have laid claim to it, the legal clothing of humanitarianism has always been determined by states . . . and has always been Westphalian in form’ (see Greenway, 1999). Available at http//www.jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/c/c077.htm 13 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse point out the politics that crosses humanitarian principles, such as neutrality, particularly in the course of massive human rights abuse. 14 The former is through the work of the Red Cross and the latter is through Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 15 For the discussion of social structure, see Giddens (1976), also, Giddens (1979, 1984). 16 For instance, production may be a necessary feature of any society but production by means of capital and wage-labour is not. Thus, latter elements define the institutions of a society as capitalistic.

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17 It is important to note that the origin of Christianity is not in the, so-called, West. It is Judaism that influenced early Christianity and eventually the concept of charity. Humanitarianism in Western tradition is discussed in, Isaac (1993) and also see Sterba (2001). 18 ‘Concern for the destitute and the less fortunate’ in Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, ‘giving food and water to the hungry and thirsty, clothing the naked’ in the Egyptian Book of the Dead are the examples (see Isaac, 1993). 19 It needs to be noted that it is not clear as to what exactly St Paul meant by this term, though. 20 Founding institutions for the poor, sick, aged and orphans is one of the examples. 21 Those thinkers include John Bellers (1654–1725), Thomas Chalmers (1780–1847) and also Quakers, Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge (1698) and Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (1707). Cf. Weiss and Minear (eds) (1993). 22 Islam also has inherited those values to a certain degree. Cf. Isaac (1993). 23 For the historical development of Western ethics, see Arrington (1998). 24 The controversy is represented by the question: who was right, Hume or Kant? 25 There are various ways to interpret morality as a compromise between self-interested and altruistic reasons to determine what morality requires. 26 There are a variety of approaches to ethics other than those two, such as contractarianism and virtue ethics. Yet, I introduce the most influential approaches among them. For other approaches, see, for example, Arrington (1998: 380–2). 27 Utilitarianism is the best known of the consequentialist theories. This consequentialist utilitarianism includes Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–73). 28 For example, Elfstrom (1999) and also Hare and Joynt (1982). 29 For example, the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were justified on the grounds that the war was shortened with overall reduction in loss of life. 30 The label ‘Kantian’ is often used as a way of describing the non-consequentialist approach. It stems from the great eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1742–1804). The approach includes Joseph Butler (1692–1752). 31 For more information on Kantian theory, see Thompson (1992) Justice and World Order, chapter 2, London: Routledge. 32 The rights thesis is predicated on the following assumption: (1) there is no authority other than human reason for judging moral claims; (2) all individuals must be seen as equal partners in the moral dialogue when it comes to asserting and defending rights claims – moral reasons have to be given; (3) any tradition, prerogative or claim is open to critique and (4) the values that individuals defend, including rights, are valid because they can be argued for vis-à-vis other moral systems. All values are values for individuals. If something is valuable for a community, it must be shown to be a value for the individual as well. See Kis (1989) L’Egale difnite: Essai sur les fondements des droits de l’homme, Paris: Seuil, cited in Cohen and Arato (1999: 9). 33 For example, the Red Cross explains that all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other. The movement’s ‘universality stems from the attachment of each of its members to common values’. Cf. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996: 17). 34 One of the most widely discussed theories of moral relativism is that of Harman. He characterizes the general theory as follows: ‘We can define social custom theories loosely as theories that say that morality derives from the rules or customs that society enforces in a certain way’ (see Harman, 1977). Also, one of the recent major attempts to develop a relativistic theory of morality is seen in Moral Relativity by David Wong (see Wong, 1984). 35 For relativist approaches, see Dower (1998).

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36 Referred to as global scepticism and linked to postmodernist denial of a standpoint of universal reason. 37 In mainstream approaches to ethics, it is assumed that only human beings have the moral status of persons. One of the examples show, American Indian culture takes interests of non-human living beings into account. American Indian tribes consider non-human living beings, such as animals, plants and other natural things, as having the moral status of persons. Here, altruism is attributed to the higher form of religion and not limited to human beings but is an attribute of humanity that other animals share as well. Thus, people here share values and moral ideas in the very essence of activities of nature. 38 For instance, communitarianism does acknowledge the existence of global values in some form, for example, if people generally within one’s own community shared concerns for the outside world, the value could become part of the traditions of the society. 39 In contemporary theories of rights, the concept of a right has been analysed in a number of ways, as evidenced by the extensive interdisciplinary literature on the subject across diverse fields, such as politics, law, philosophy and history. However, this section omits the rights discussion. The concept of a ‘right’ has a long intellectual history in Western political philosophy and has raised some controversy. For ‘right’ discussion, see Dagger (1989: 292–308), also Finnis (1980). 40 Universal standards are to be found in, for example: the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two international Covenants and 1993 Vienna Declaration etc. 41 See, for example, Bell (2000), also Bauer and Bell (eds) (1999). 42 Deontological and rights approaches discussed in Dworkin (1977) and Miller (1976: chapters 1–2). 43 For example, Commission on Global Governance (1995: chapter 2). 44 Miller discusses various types of utilitarianism in Social Justice, Miller (1976: 31–40). 45 There are several characteristics in international humanitarian action in the 1990s, which have been greatly exposed with large numbers of conflicts breaking out around the world. One of the significant characteristics in this action has been that military action has become part of it in a new way. It is also different from traditional peacekeeping, which only aims at securing a peacemaking process without attempting to become itself part of the solution. Another is that the role of non-state actors, mostly NGOs grew in importance. Although the role of nation-states remained crucial, they are often the only ones able to provide the resources and material necessary to get humanitarian assistance through to the conflict scene. 46 For the discussion on new humanitarianism, see for example, Sukselainen (2002). 47 A talk given by George Farlkes at the Overseas Development Institute on 21 March 1998 supports the idea. He discussed the recent trend of humanitarianism in terms of a shift from need-based humanitarianism to rights-based humanitarianism. Cf. ‘International Development: Beyond the White Paper – UK policy on conflict and humanitarian assistance, questions for a new humanitarianism’. 48 For the definition of globalization, I referred, Robertson (1992); also, McGrew (2000). 49 Globalization in sociological analysis and its cultural and subjective are discussed in Robertson (1992). 50 See The Economist, 17 September 1999. In this article, Kofi Annan explained globalization as one of the forces that influenced the redefinition of state sovereignty. He argued, ‘state sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not only by the forces of globalization . . . ’. 51 For an analysis of globalization from those four aspects, see Robertson (1992). 52 Robertson gives an example of fundamentalism: the trends towards economic protectionism in the early 1990s paralleled by a certain kind of ‘fundamentalism’ concerning identity and tradition. Cf. Robertson (1992: 26).

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53 The media plays a crucial role in bringing an issue to the general awareness of the public and public opinion in its turn influences the political leadership. The media, however, does not usually affect political decision-making itself, but rather the media looks to the political leadership for issues to fix the agenda. The media rarely affects public opinion significantly, unless the issue has been taken up by the political leadership. This was, for example, discovered by Jonathan Mermin in his study on the role of the media in the public support for the operation in Somalia (see Mermin, 1997). 54 For realist ideas on morality, see, for example, McMahan (1996: chapter 4), also, Mapel (1996: chapter 3). 2 Genesis of Japanese humanitarianism: ethics in Japanese society 1 In Japanese mythology, Jimmu (Emperor) was descended from the sun-goddess Amaterasu. He was born of the male deity Izanagi and the female deity Izanami who between them created the land of Japan. Thus all descendants of the imperial line are ultimately born from the deity at the apex of the Shinto pantheon. Cf. Lehmann (1982: 13). 2 Prince Shotoku (574–622), a member of the imperial clan, exercised political leadership from the end of the sixth century to the beginning of the seventh century. After Empress Suiko ascended the throne in 593 as Japan’s first female monarch, Shotoku took over the reins of political power as her regent. 3 In addition to those three, Kamishima argues that the Japanese social order is based on Shintoism and mental autarky (see Kamishima, 1997: 24). 4 The feudal period in strictly political terms extends from 1185 to 1869 (the year that feudal lords ‘returned’ their domains to the emperor). 5 As previously mentioned, the first constitution in 604 included ethical teachings from Buddhist and Confucius philosophies. 6 The sakoku (literally, ‘closed country’) policy lasted from the 1630s until the Meiji Restoration in 1867. For nearly 300 years trade was only allowed with certain countries (Dutch and China). The seeds of this policy had been sown in trade control and in measures against Christianity by the Nobunaga and Hideyoshi regimes. Decrees prohibiting Christianity were promulgated in 1612 and 1614, and the persecution of its adherents began immediately thereafter. Persecution became much more severe under Hidetada and Iemitsu, until, eventually, it became official policy to eradicate Christianity even at the expense of trade. This policy became manifest with the seclusion orders of the 1630s. Thus, in 1635, in a severe blow to Japan’s traders, Japanese people were forbidden to make overseas voyages or to return to Japan from overseas. Trade was limited and its only open port was at Dejima (Nagasaki). Scholars continue to debate the effect that this period had on Japanese society but its overall impact was profound. Many works state that this period gave rise to popular culture but it was also a narrowly chauvinistic culture with no international dimension. Certainly, one viewpoint is that it produced in the Japanese a unique sense of insularity. 7 There are many translations of the term ‘Bushido’, such as ‘the way of the samurai’, ‘the way of the warriors’ or ‘the warrior principles’. It means literally ‘MilitaryNight-Ways’. 8 The first use of the term, Bushido, occurred during the civil war period of the sixteenth century. Furukawa Tesshi found it first in the sixteenth-century works but considers the Koyo gunkan to be the first text to articulate something called Bushido as a behavioural pattern. The final rationalization of Bushido thought occurred during the Tokugawa period (the seventeenth century), when Yamaga Soko (1622–85) equated the samurai with the Confucian ‘superior man’ and taught that his essential function was to exemplify virtue to the lower classes. For historical development of Bushido, see Blomberg (1993).

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9 Nitobé Inazo (1862–1933), the author of Bushido: The Soul of Japan, originally written in English while he was in California. It was translated into Japanese in 1908. Nitobé, himself, is the third son of a samurai retainer of Nanbu Han (feudal domain). The book is still read in the Occident by those in search of traditional Japanese values. Nitobé served as Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations from 1920 to 1926, and thereafter as an officer in the Institute of Pacific Relations. For Nitobé’s brief biography, see Burkman (1990: 191–216). 10 Cf. Yamamoto (1980), Yamaga (1656) and Nitobé (1905). 11 Shogun was the chief military figure in the Heian era. He came to exercise a greater decree of temporal power, until finally the authority of the imperial court was eclipsed. The last of the Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu, abdicated in 1867. 12 For information on warrior values, see Ikegami (1995). Also see Hurst (1990) and Hurst et al. (1997). 13 Maruyama Masao also argued that throughout the Edo period the ethos of upper class infiltrated to the lower class (commoners) (see Maruyama, 1986: 208–9). 14 Nitobé explained it by referring to Mallock’s work, Aristocracy and Evolution, which stresses that a small section of the community leads, directs and employs the majority in the best way. 15 Some argue that rationalization was made in the seventeenth century while some others argue that it was made throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 16 Although there is a strong influence from Confucianism, there are several writings of Confucius with which the samurai disagreed strongly, for instance samurai believed that man should not sit and read books all day, nor shall he write poems all day, for an intellectual specialist was considered to be a machine. 17 As for Confucius teachings, see Suzuki (1959). 18 Two important teachings of Confucius are Jen and Li. Jen is a concern for the well-being of others, filial piety and respect for elders. Li is rites of sacrifice to spirits and ancestors. 19 Yamaga Soko (1622–85) wrote the first treatises analysing the concept of Bushido while at the same time coining the term itself (see Yamaga, 1656). 20 It is one Confucian value where conflict could and did occur between filial piety and loyalty that, according to Confucianism, an individual owed to his ruler (see McMullen, 1980: 280). 21 Similar arguments can be found in Sen (1997) ‘Asian Values and Human Rights’, Hans Morgenthau Memorial Lecture, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, New York, 1 May 1997, published in The New Republic, 14 July 1997, pp. 33–40, cited in DeBary (1998: 25). 22 Those five precepts are: (1) non-injury, (2) avoiding theft and cheating, (3) avoiding sexual misconduct, (4) avoiding lying and other forms of wrong speech and (5) sobriety. Cf. Harvey (2000). 23 Traditionally, Japanese monarchs were supposed to act as intermediaries between the world of mortals below and the heavens above. The position of the Emperor (Tenno) had developed in such a fashion that his sacerdotal role was of much greater importance than his administrative role. It was held that the Tenno should be superior to these vulgar ordinary matters. Until the twelfth century, when power was controlled by the dynasties of Shogun (military commanders), Tenno enjoyed its greatest power. Even during Shogun rule from the twelfth century to 1867, there were a number of movements favouring ‘restoration’ of the rule of Tenno. 24 For this reason, ethical principles in the Bushido are considered to have stemmed largely from a Confucian and Buddhist viewpoint. A similar view is found in Lehmann (1982: 84). Lehmann argues that Bushido’s emphasis on the futility or evanescence of human existence was largely a product of Buddhism, while the moral principles of Bushido were Confucianist.

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25 Zen (Buddhist) teaching comprises Taoist idea of practice and Confucian teaching of morality. Both came from China. Shintoism is the only teaching of Japanese origin. 26 In the discussion of Japanese society, giri and ninjo are important concepts of relationships. Explanation of the concepts can be found in many works, for example, see Smith (1983: 36–45); Door (ed.) (1967: 327–34) and Masatsugu (1982: 89–92). 27 Literally giri translates into ‘interrelated social duty’. It exemplifies a relationship of interdependence created by ‘a favour, or debt of gratitude as a result of receiving a favour’. According to the dictionary, it is also the moral duty of all Japanese people (see Masatsugu, 1982: 69). Nitobé translated it as ‘the Right Reason’, yet, he added that it came to mean a vague sense of duty which public opinion expects ‘an incumbent to fulfil’ (see Nitobé, 1905: 25). 28 It was in the 1890s that the history of Japanese ideology in the context of national moral philosophy was discussed. Inoue Tetsujiro was one of those thinkers. There were others in the later period, such as Muraoka Noritsugu and Watsuji Tetsuro whose works are still popular. 29 Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1904) is a renowned thinker of the Meiji period. He was a participant in the first Japanese Embassy in the United States in 1860. He led the struggle to introduce Western ideas in Japan in order to extend Japanese ‘strength and independence’. He wrote more than 100 books, advocating parliamentary government, popular education, women’s rights and a host of other issues. 30 Fukuzawa stated that ethical ideas worked only in the family. 31 Nitobé regarded the giri as a ‘monstrous misnomer’ and ‘the most suspicious mask of other feelings’ in that it often stooped to casuistry and has even generated cowardly fear of censure. 32 Fukuzawa compares moral idea and knowledge. Then he concludes that moral idea is universal and does not change with time whereas knowledge evolves in history. 33 Nitobé expressed this point that: ‘The great statesmen who steered the ship of our state through the hurricane of the Restoration and the whirlpool of national rejuvenation, were men who knew no other moral teaching than the Precepts of Knighthood.’ 34 Nitobé stressed three main points: The first is that ‘. . . the spiritual values of every nation on earth are rooted in that nation’s traditional culture’. Therefore, we need to recognize the diversity of teachings about truth so as to respect the irreplaceable value of the nation. This assigns a forceful argument in favour of a certain type of attitude that we should maintain in today’s world, where globalization is proceeding apace and different nations and ethnic groups live in constant contact with each other, for Bushido calls upon us to recognize the value of each nation’s existence, to humble ourselves, to learn from each other and support each other. The second is that ‘no matter how different any two cultures may appear to be on the surface, they are still cultures created by human beings, and as such have deep similarities . . .’. Nitobé’s work focused on Japanese Bushido and Western chivalry, but the same could be used in looking at any aspect of any other pairs of cultures. As a result, the same basic human spirit is shared by all of mankind, and this shared spirit is the foundation of the world. And third, Nitobé expressed his belief that by combining with greater teachings, Bushido would make a great contribution to all of humanity. Therefore he stated that the way of the warrior is not something peculiarly Japanese, but is something universal to the entire human race. As a result, the people of other nationalities are also capable of appreciating its worth. The analyses acknowledge that the Bushido is not just the Japanese spirit in the past instead it has deep relevance to current Japanese thought, and even to the entire world. 35 As for European chivalry, see Blomberg (1993: chapter 4). Nitobé pointed out the difference in terms of moral conduct of public men and of nations in Bushido whereas that deals with individuals and Christ’s personal followers in Christian tradition.

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36 Not only in the book of Bushido, Nitobé expressed his idea of universal human commonality. He elaborated this idea in 1926, when he resigned from his League Office, ‘Fundamentally human nature is identical’, ‘if one be scratched only deep enough he will show common humanity’. This commonality applies to intellect, morals, religion and art. He spoke of universal genius of ‘the global character of the moral world’. 37 For example, Sato Masahiro argues that he believes that the book (Nitobé’s Bushido) contains arguments that have relevance to twenty-first-century Japan and to the entire world (see Sato, 2000). 38 According to Kamishima, real mass society emerged following the end of the Second World War, when a total convergence of cultures happened. 39 This section referred to Maruyama’s study on nationalism in Japan. For Maruyama’s analysis of modern state in Europe, see Sato (2000: 25). 40 The Education Rescript (Kyoiku Chokugo) in the Imperial Rescript on Education, which until Japan’s defeat in 1945 had the force of holy writ, was a statement issued in 1890 enunciating traditional moral principles and stressing Confucian virtues, such as filial piety and obedience, and also the need for loyalty and self-sacrifice in service of the emperor. The Rescript was regularly read aloud with great ceremony in schools and colleges. During the entire period of Japan’s modernization it served to inform people that the State should exercise an absolute authority over their ‘internal’ behaviour (thoughts, belief, etc.) as over their external actions (see Maruyama, 1946: glossary). 41 Natsume Soseki (1857–1916) is a renowned novelist who was born in Tokyo, the year before the Meiji Restoration. His novels still enjoy immense popularity even today in Japan and have also been translated into other languages. 42 The first occupant of the imperial throne was Jimmu in 660 BC. Two well renowned works, Kojiki (Record of Old Things) and Nihon-shoki (Chronicle of Japan), portray the myth of national foundation. In these works, the transformation of the Japanese state is considered as occurring at a time when imperial rule began. 43 This session lasted from December 1942 to March 1943. The façade of constitutionalism was maintained throughout the militarist period. Quoted from Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), 6 February 1943. 44 These treaties were called Ansei Go-kakoku Joyaku (Ansei Treaties with five countries). These are five commercial friendship treaties that were undertaken with the United States, Holland, Russia, the United Kingdom and France. These treaties made it possible for Japan to trade with the aforementioned countries from June 1886. However, they were unequal in that Japan did not have the tariff autonomy and had to allow the extraterritorial right to these countries. Cf. The National History Education Research Committee (ed.) (1987). 45 Iwakura was one of the most powerful leaders of this period. He was appointed to head a group of about fifty leading government figures on a mission to the United States and Europe in 1871. This mission was designed to repeal the unequal treaties. The members were divided into teams who were to study Western systems of education, administration, finance and law. This mission returned to Japan in 1873. The revision of those treaties succeeded in the abolishment of extraterritorial right in 1894, and the tariff autonomy in 1911. 46 Bulletin International de Sociétés de secours aux militaires blessés publié par le Comité International, No. 17, October 1873, p. 13. As quoted in Abercrombie et al. (eds) (1990: 107). 47 Some of its roots were in the Shinto revivalism, nativism and scholarly political theory of the late Tokugawa period. This is fitting, given the centrality of the emperor during emergent anti-shogunate struggles. 48 For the situation of human rights and freedom in Meiji and Taisho periods, see Jinken Kyoiku Centre (The Centre of Human Rights Education) (2000: 7–8).

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49 Taisho Democracy featured the dissemination of democratic and liberal ideas. 50 For the origin and activities of the Hakuaisha, cf. Japan Red Cross Society (2002). 51 In the emperor’s name, the society and movement could command in Japan absolute obedience from all its members. 52 Even in times of peace, membership levels of Red Cross Societies in other countries could slump but this did not happen in Japan, where membership remained high. 53 Within seven days of the outbreak of war, the Japanese issued, under imperial ordinance, a series of regulations for the treatment of Russian war prisoners which were carefully worded, detailed and generous. The text, ‘Japanese Regulations for the Treatment of Russian Wounded and Prisoners of War, Russo-Japanese War 1904–5’. 54 The first Geneva Prisoners of War Convention was agreed in 1929. Prisoners were nursed by the Relief Detachments of the Japanese Red Cross (JRC). Russian government sent a substantial donation to the JRC in recognition of the high standard of treatment. 55 In addition, during the First World War, the Japanese also well treated some 5,000 Germans in German enclaves in Shantung in China and elsewhere. 56 The four-yearly Conference was held in Tokyo in 1934. 57 At least, until the Pacific War, the JRC was a government agency. 58 Until the end of the war, the emperor was a godlike figure, whose ideas of good and bad decided the ethical standard among the Japanese. Ningen Sengen, which literally means a ‘declaration of human being’ is a 1946 Japan national radio broadcast in which Hirohito renounced his divinity and declared that Japan’s sovereignty rested with the people. Delivery of this speech was to be one of Hirohito’s last acts as the imperial sovereign. Thus, bringing an end to ‘emperor’s Japan’. 59 The war economy brought by the Korean War is considered a primal opportunity for Japan’s economic development. 60 For more detailed discussions of Japan’s internationalization, see Hook et al. (2001). 61 For discussions about human rights in Asia, see Scoble and Wiseberg (eds) (1985) and also see Inada (1990: 91–103), also, Keown (1992) and Traer (1988). 62 DeBary argues that Confucian does not fit with the modern understanding of human rights (see DeBary, 1998: 90). 63 In Buddhist thinking, there are no reservations in subscribing to charters or manifestos that seek to secure universal human rights. Contemporary human rights were originally termed ‘natural’ rights; being rights that flow from human nature. 64 The other three factors are: post-Second World War Japan’s development policy, legacies of the War and preferences for moderate approaches even if a violation of human rights becomes an issue. These two factors relate to the domestic and international circumstances that followed the Second World War and they are explored in the following chapters. 3 Japanese humanitarian assistance since the end of the Second World War 1 The official classification of ODA is: (1) bilateral grants, (2) bilateral loans and (3) financial subscriptions and contributions to international organizations (multilateral aid). Bilateral grants are further divided into technical cooperation, whereby technology is transferred to a developing county, and grant aid, which provides funds with no obligation for repayment. 2 Official documents mostly issued by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs started using the term ‘humanitarian’ assistance from the middle of 1980s. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ODA Reports, 1977–2002, Tokyo: MOFA. 3 Few official documents show the term ‘humanitarian’ until the 1980s. However, the government carried out assistances as a part of development assistance and emergency

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Notes assistance, which is now commonly perceived as ‘humanitarian’ assistance, such as food and medical assistances to fulfil basic human needs. There are three commonly recognized pivotal years in the development of Japanese ODA: 1954, 1978 and 1992 (see e.g. Fujita, 2000). GARIOA: Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (1946–8). EROA: Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas (1949–51). Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998a). CARE was established in 1945 and LARA was established in 1946. LARA was set up by Japanese Americans for the relief of Asian refugees. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998a). This included transportation projects, such as the Tokaido Shinkansen (blue train), the Tomei, Meishin and Tokyo metropolitan expressways, as well as hydraulic power facilities, such as the Kurobe Hydraulic Dam No.4. There were several episodes regarding the situation of Japan in its early period of assistance. For example, upon their arrival in Japan, trainees from Asian countries were surprised at the sheer poverty evident in the country, which was yet to escape its period of post-War financial difficulty. When sharing their impressions, trainees wrote that they felt living conditions and other circumstances were better in their own countries. Cf. Editor (1994). For example, Japan signed the peace treaty with Burma (now called Myanmar) and agreements on reparations and economic cooperation and started paying reparations to the country in 1954. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1994). The reparations were completed in 1976. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1994). In the Fiscal Year 1978 budget compilation process, a separate process for ordinary expenditure was set up to request the ODA. Also, in actual budget allocations, ODA was always allowed comparatively high levels of increase. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1994). In 1958, Japan started yen loan (ODA loan) to India – the first of its kind, making a start to Japan’s economic cooperation. The payment of repatriations and extension of yen loans that Japan had made in those early years were aimed at promoting friendly relations with Asian countries. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1994). ‘The Opinion Survey on Foreign Relations’ is a public opinion poll conducted annually (usually in October) since 1977 by the Office of the Prime Minister. The survey is based on interviews of 3,000 (aged above 20 years) randomly selected adults. Average valid answer rates between 1977 and 2002: 71.46 per cent. ‘Hardware’ is meant to be physical infrastructure, such as constructing roads, bridges and irrigation. For instance, the public opinion survey on the support of UN activities conducted in five countries (Japan, China, the United States, France and Thailand) by the Tokyo Newspaper Agency in 2000 shows: for Japanese people, Strongly support (40 per cent), Support (30 per cent), Little support (21 per cent) and Do not support (8 per cent). The UN-centred policy was noted in Japan’s first Diplomatic Blue Book in 1957 together with other two. Saito, for example, argues, ‘the UN centred policy was not established with a clear principle and philosophy’ (see Saito, 1992) ‘Zoku, UN no Atarashii Choru (The New Approach to the UN)’, quoted in Kawabe (1992: 46). In the 1960s, when the international situation surrounding the UN underwent a major change as a consequence of the independence of many Asian and African countries that had been colonies and had joined the UN; major powers that had once dominated the UN were no longer able to ignore the views of those countries. This is evident from the number of resolutions passed by the General Assembly, which follows the principle of one country, one vote. The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the 1962 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, the 1964 resolution establishing the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other General Assembly

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resolutions reflecting the standpoint of newly independent nations were the result of common interests of these states, whose influence in the General Assembly increased as the number of member states swelled. In 1967, developing countries formed the Group of 77, which was instrumental in the adoption, in 1974, of the Declaration and Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Yokota argues that Japan refrained deliberately from standing out under the circumstances. According to Johan Galtung, in 1910 there were already 135 internationally oriented NGOs. Layons notes that 466 international NGOs were established between 1815 and 1914. Whichever figure we choose, it is noteworthy that the vast majority of these organizations were created towards the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Galtung, J. (1975) ‘Nonterritorial actors and the problem of peace’, in Mendlovitz, H. S. (ed.). As NGOs are NPOs, they are presumed to be non-profit as well as non-governmental. Thus, it is almost equivalent in concept to ‘non-profit organizations’. In Japan, however, the term NGO is used distinctive from the NPOs. NGOs involved in international cooperation or exchange tended to refer to the more restricted meaning of ‘a group active in international relations’, or even more specifically ‘a civic group active in international development cooperation’. They are thus distinguished from civic groups active mainly within Japan, which are called NPOs in the narrower sense. The data shows the number of NGOs that fit the definition ‘citizens’ organizations for international cooperation’ that are mainly active in such fields as development, the environment, human rights or peace. Cf. NGO Directory 1998 (JANIC biennial). In addition to detailed entries on the NGOs, the Directory is useful; it introduces related private organizations of various types and also has contact information for government offices, a bibliography, a directory listed by prefecture, a general index and indexes of projects arranged by field or type and by country of location. Enokida gives economic growth as one of the reasons for the increase of NGOs. In addition to the NGO Directory, other documents and books point to the Indochinese refugee issue as an opportunity for the increase of Japanese NGOs (see e.g. Kitagawa, 1998). For an overview of NGOs, containing a chronology of trends among Japanese NGOs, see the Japanese NGO Centre for International Cooperation (1996). Similar arguments are found in documents on Japanese NGOs and the history issued by the MOFA, for example, ODA Report. A comment cited in the Public Opinion Survey by the Prime Minister’s Office in 1995. For example, the Office of the Prime Minister carried out a survey on people’s support of volunteer and non-governmental activities engaging in international cooperation in 1995 and 1996. The survey showed that 43.5 per cent (1995) and 41.8 per cent (1996) of those who think those activities are not important or not really important, were of the opinion that ‘the country or government should do it’; 38 per cent (1995) and 40.4 per cent (1996) of them supported the activities ‘because the country or government already engages in the international cooperation. Other opinions show; ‘non-governmental activities are small scale’ (25 per cent) and ‘non-governmental activities have little effect’ (25 per cent) (see The Office of Prime Minister, Public Opinion Poll in 1995 and 1996, ‘The Opinion Survey on Foreign Relations’). According to the NGO Directory 2002 Edition, Japanese NGOs income averaged from: Donations, membership fees and income generating activities (60 per cent); Subsidies from governmental bodies (14 per cent); Grants from private foundation (4 per cent); Contract funds from government and UN agencies (5 per cent) and Others (10 per cent).

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30 Until recently, most Japanese organizations found it difficult to get corporation status. To obtain the corporation status, the organization required a fund of at least ¥300 million (£1.5 million) for becoming a foundational juridical organization. Besides complex official procedures prevented them from applying. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1996). According to the NGO Directory 2002 Edition, 10 per cent of NGOs had legal status, 90 per cent did not have legal status by 2001. 31 For instance, most staff from among small voluntary organizations were not able to be members of social insurance policies. Also, welfare of staff was poor compared with the general standard. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1996). 32 Even in recent years, the idea seems to be prevailing: 80 of 183 organizations, 44 per cent of the total, do not pay any personnel expenditure. These organizations were run by unpaid volunteers. 33 Its economy produced more than 10 per cent of total GNP of the world. 34 Data from the Prime Minister’s Office. People who responded that they could not judge in general term dropped also from 20 per cent in 1974 to 11 per cent in 1996. The survey is conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office (see the Prime Minister’s Office (Division of Public Relation) (1997) Opinion Survey, (monthly) February, The Nation’s Life, Chart 33 (in Japanese)). 35 Critical comments on Japan’s response in the Gulf Crisis are often discussed in the context of current discussion on the war against terrorism (see for instance, Watt (2001) ‘Japan revisits the Gulf War’, The Guardian, 20 September 2001). 36 Japan pledged US$13 billion to the Gulf coalition, including US$11 billion in support for multinational forces and US$2 billion in economic assistance for countries affected by the Gulf War. PR Newswire, 24 January 1991. 37 For those criticism, for example, see Funk (1992). 38 The PKO Law was enacted in 1992 and revised in June 1998. The original Law was composed of five chapters. It enabled the SDF to participate in offshore PKOs. Under the revised law, cooperation in kind to international humanitarian relief activities is made possible even if a formal cease-fire has not been established as long as such activities are carried out by appropriate international organizations. 39 The five principles are: (1) agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts, (2) consent for the undertaking of UN PKOs as well as Japan’s participation in such operations has been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts, (3) the operations shall strictly maintain impartiality not favouring any of the parties to armed conflicts, (4) should any of the requirements in the above mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw SDF Unit and (5) the use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the personnel’s lives etc. 40 Some of the criticisms point out that in spite of the fact that the official name, ‘the International Peace Cooperation Law’ indicates that it includes operations for international cooperation as a whole as well as PKOs by its troops, throughout the process of discussion on the new law the government tended to focus only on the dispatch of the SDF (see Watanabe, 1993). 41 The PKO Law came into being on 15 June 1992. 42 The discussions were held within the government, academia, the media and business circles. 43 For detailed explanations, see Economic Cooperation Bureau, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.) (1980). 44 The ‘surroundings’ includes having a peace Constitution, being an economic power, economically highly dependent on other countries, having accomplished modernization as a non-Western country. 45 The guideline argues that there are increasing world-wide efforts in developing countries for the democratization and introduction of a market economy system. Also, it argues that there is a rising level of military spending and an acquisition of mass

Notes

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47 48 49 50 51

52

53

54 55

56

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destruction weapons by some developing countries, which are posing a serious threat to peace and stability of the world as demonstrated by the eruption of the Gulf War. The four ODA guidelines were aimed at implementing Japan’s ODA in the way that it encourages their democratization efforts and at the same time discourage military build-up in the developing countries. Official title: the ODA Charter, adopted by the Cabinet in June 1992. In ‘Development Cooperation Review: Japan 1996’, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/DAC calls the Charter ‘Japan’s most deeply significant policy decision on overseas assistance following the decision to set medium-term targets in 1978’. These two experiences are remarked in the History of Japanese ODA in ODA Report issued by the MOFA. The author emphasizes that ‘support for self-help efforts’ should be given priority in Japan’s aid philosophy. Each year, the ODA white paper provides a detailed description of assistance implementation in relation to the provision of the ODA Charter. For instance, between 1980 and 1983, Suzuki regime implemented yen loan to East Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Cuba. Prime Minister Maruyama assisted in the UN Summit for Social Development and declared Japanese commitment to the Declaration and Programme of Action, pledging to adhere to 20/20 principle (20 per cent of total ODA should be directed to social expenditure in countries where social expenditure accounts for 20 per cent of total governmental budget) with partnership of NGO/civil society. United Nations World Summit for Social Development (1995) Declaration and Programme of Action, New York: UN Publications. The major fields of assistance include: poverty and social development (basic education, health care, WID/gender), support to economic and social infrastructure (partnership with private sector), development of human resource (education and training, intellectual support, democratization) and global issues, such as environmental conservation, population/AIDS, food, energy, drugs, support to structural reform in Asian countries who were hit by currency and economic crisis, conflicts and disasters (including prevention of conflicts, good governance and restoration from conflicts and disasters) and debt issues. Cf. Nishikawa (2000: 30). The MOFA uses the term ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ in its annual ODA report. For example, in the 1994 ODA Report pledged a balanced approach: (1) between conventional areas (development of economic infrastructure and providing basic human needs) and new areas of assistance (global issues, such as environment and population), (2) between large aid projects (development of economic infrastructure) and small ones (projects at grass-roots level) and (3) between ‘hardware’ type of assistance aimed at developing physical capital and ‘software’ type of assistance aimed at human resources development and institutional building. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Perspectives of Japan’s ODA Towards the 21st Century’, in ODA Annual Report 1994, Tokyo: MOFA. Nishikawa uses the term ‘software’ to mean, for example, resolving social gaps, which might hinder basic human rights, freedom and human well being. Japan has participated in the Commission on Human Rights as a member since 1982 and increased its contribution to the Voluntary Fund for Advisory Services and Technical Assistance. In the fiscal year 1989, for example, thirty grant assistances for grass-roots projects were utilized to assist NGO activities in the developing world. In the same year, an additional thirty-one international volunteer subsidy framework has been set up to pay the insurance premiums for volunteers who take part in disaster relief or rescue missions overseas. Under the Postal Saving for International Voluntary Aid, holders of ordinary post office saving accounts can declare their intention to donate 20 per cent of their

186

57

58

59 60

61

62 63 64 65

66 67

68

Notes accrued interest for international cooperation purposes. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications collects the donations for distribution to NGOs in order to assist in their efforts to improve the welfare of people living in developing countries and regions. The government held seminars, for example, at seven locations across Japan in the fiscal year 1996 and at four locations in 1997 to brief NGOs on the availability of project subsidies and grant assistance for grass-roots projects. The fact-finding survey on NGO activities and the hosting of the Asia–Africa Development Forum of experts aimed to provide a venue for exchange between NGOs – the budget allocated for the measures amounted to approximately ¥29.95 million (£149,750). Regular conferences between development assistance-oriented NGOs and staff of the ECB are held by the Ministry to exchange opinions on an equal footing and discuss strategies for providing information about ODA. The major strength of this government support for NGOs are: (1) remove the funding limitation for NGO support: until then, funding support by the MOFA was limited to a maximum of ¥10 million (£50,000) for the grass-roots fund and up to ¥15 million (£75,000) for the NGO project fund, (2) the processing time of application, examination and decision-making for the funding support to NGOs are shortened (within a month) and (3) expand the availability of funds for staff travel, insurance and other office management requirements. Since the introduction, the budget for NGO assistance has increased towards 1997. In 1989, the budget allocated was ¥112 million (£56,000). In 1997, it was increased to ¥1,200 million (£6,000,000). For example, in the early 1990s, such fields as environmental protection, women in development and relief aid started emerging in NGO activities. The target field survey was conducted by multiple answers by each targeted organization. Cf. JANIC (2000). Those government supports include grant assistance for grass-roots projects and an international volunteer subsidy framework by the MOFA, funding support by the Voluntary Postal Saving for International Aid of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and financial assistance by the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Government support to NGOs has been discussed in the earlier section. The NPO Law includes the improvement of the corporation system and tax deductive mechanism as well as the arrangement of supporting organizations for voluntary activities and the reform of the social structure. Cf. Yamamoto (2000: 111–23). The number of people who used volunteer insurance reached 1 million in 1995. Indeed, influential and vocal politicians, such as former Deputy Prime minister, Michio Watanabe, and former Foreign Minister, Kakizawa Koji, began to pay great attention to Indo-China. Kohno argues that throughout the 1980s, Japan kept a low profile in its Cambodian policy, supporting the ASEAN position because Southeast Asia was a region where the memories of Japanese militarism during the Second World War was very much alive, thus Japan was hesitant to play any political role beyond the minimum level necessary. Cf. Kohno (1999). For detailed talk, see Tomoda (1992: 44–5). Kohno explains, Japan’s active involvement in the crisis stems from: (1) geographical reason – proximity to Japan, (2) a growing awareness among the Japanese people that Japan should make a greater contribution to the international community, (3) the access to information as it is an Asian issue and (4) no lingering animosity from The Second World War. Cf. Kohno (1999). Japan and Australia co-chaired the Third Committee on reconstruction and refugee relief.

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69 Kohno argues that Japan realized that the traditional indirect approach of simply supporting ASEAN would not be sufficient and thus Japan should go a step further and play both an independent and active role for peace. Cf. Kohno (1999). 70 On 28 August 1990, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the United States) proposed a framework for the comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict. 71 Japan has maintained the top position since the beginning of assistance to the country. In 2000, Japan contributed 25.2 per cent of bilateral support, a far larger donation than the second donor country Australia (3.9 per cent). Cf. Data from material distribution at the fourth Consultative Group Meeting held in Paris in May 2000. 72 The yen loan started when the then OECF extended a yen loan for the construction of the Prek Thnot Dam. 73 In the 1960s, Japanese government carried out development plan survey for crops (1963–4), irrigation survey (1964–6) and other agricultural surveys. 74 For details on Japanese UN PKO in Cambodia, see ‘Japan’s Contribution to International Peace’, available at http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/cambo_e.html (accessed 29 November 2002). 75 According to Mysliwiec, the number of foreign NGOs established aid programmes increased two-fold after 1989. 76 Most analysts resonate government’s intention to enforce assistance to Cambodia stems from political motivation as a result of the role that Japan took in the course of peace process and for the reconstruction of the country including sending a representative in UNTAC (see e.g. Watanabe, 1993). 77 These public opinion surveys were conducted by the Asahi Newspaper Agency. During the Gulf War: 21 per cent supported the dispatch of SDF and 58 per cent was against the dispatch. Asahi Newspaper, December 1991. Also, Asahi Newspaper, July 1992. 78 Other opinions: for the stability of the region (13.6 per cent), for its own trade in the region (6.0 per cent), Japan’s need for assistance (17.8 per cent) and others. Cf. The Office of Prime Minister (1980). 79 The buraku people are a group of Japanese people who are historically despised because its members used to engage in occupations that were wrongly regarded as unclean. They are the victims of several human rights conditions breaches within the country that are based on deep-rooted prejudice against them. 80 For instance, in the Afghan Crisis in 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi justified Japan’s support for humanitarian and reconstruction activities with reference to post-Second World War Japan. 81 See for instance, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998b). 82 The policy of humanitarian assistance developed through the introduction of the concept of human security, that is, ‘the protection of the life and dignity of every human being from regional conflict, refugee exodus, anti-personnel mines, natural disasters, drug abuse, and various other threats’. The then Prime Minister Obuchi’s speech in December 1998, entitled the Obuchi Initiatives, clarified the idea of human security and perspectives on assistance under humanitarian and human rights considerations. It focused on humanitarian crises as the result of many natural disasters and armed conflicts, which were considered major threats to human security. The Prime Minister, Obuchi Keizo delivered a policy speech entitled ‘Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia’, in Hanoi during December 1998. The speech is available in Japan’s ODA Annual Report, 1999, Section 2, ‘Human Security and ODA’, Tokyo: MOFA. 83 One example of these is the Danjo Koyou Kikai Kinto-Ho (A Legal framework for Equal Employment Opportunities for Men and Women) introduced in April 1986. 84 On another occasion, at a press conference in 1997, when asked about human rights issues in the People’s Republic of China, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson

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replied, Japan and the Japanese people are very hesitant to talk about a situation which is specifically related to the internal affairs of any third county. At the same time, the Japanese people regard human rights and freedom of speech as very important, which has been very clearly stated in the Japanese Constitution. However, the extent we can voice specific issues should be debated in our society. Still, the Japanese people’s interest in this subject has been increasing every year and the Japanese government has been stating that the general principle of human rights should be observed in all countries, even if their political systems are different from each other. (Comment at the Press conference by the Press Secretary on 15 April 1997.) Cf. ‘Human Rights Issues in the People’s Republic of China’, at the Press conference by the Press Secretary 15 April 1997, available in Archives on Press Conferences, Tokyo: MOFA. 85 Charter approved by the states of the ASEAN following the Vienna Conference. Cited in Nusheler and Warkentin (2000). 4 Japanese humanitarian ideas and practice: a study through the East Timor case 1 Interview comments are included with the consent of the interviewees. However, the comments are cited anonymously. 2 The interviews in East Timor were carried out between July and December 2000 while those in Japan were conducted between January and July 2001. The interviews were mainly face-to-face, although on a couple of occasions, group discussion and interviews were held (the group discussion was held only in East Timor). During the fieldwork in East Timor, interviews were conducted while working in a Japanese NGO that engaged in humanitarian operations. Interviews were conducted in Japanese and comments cited here are translated into English by the author. The total number of interviewees is 34 (UN related persons: 9, government related: 11, NGO related: 14). In East Timor, the following categories of people (Japanese) were interviewed: government officials (officials from the MOFA and the JICA), UN officers (from UNTAET, UNDP, WFP and FAO), NGO officers (from eight organizations) and academics (who were visiting East Timor for a short period of time). In Japan, government officials from the MOFA and the International Cooperation Agency were interviewed. The interviews were directed towards obtaining information and comments from those people currently or previously engaged in the division (department) of humanitarian assistance and relief operations. Those interviewed were people from four major NGOs, which particularly target refugee assistance, post-conflict reconstruction and emergency relief, development assistance in the Asia-Pacific region and medical assistance. These NGOs were chosen because their experience and target areas are relevant to this study. Interviews were undertaken with professors who specialize in the following areas: sociology, international relations, international law, humanitarian intervention, development assistance and Japanese politics. 3 However, these distinctions were loose and included people who belonged to more than one category, or who were experienced or non-experienced. 4 Throughout this book, the name East Timor is employed, to mean the RDTL. 5 For the basic data about East Timor, see United Nations Development Programme, available at http://www.undp.east-timor.org (accessed 3 October 2002). 6 ‘More than 40 per cent of the people live on less than 55 cents per day, life expectancy is as low as 57 years, only 57 per cent of the country is literate and many young people are unskilled and unemployed’. Cf. UNDP in East Timor, ‘National Human Development Report’, available at http://www.undp.east-timor.org (accessed 3 October 2002). 7 For the history of East Timor, see, for example, P. Cray and C. Bentley (eds) (1995).

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8 Cf. Action Network, ‘East Timor: a history’, available at http://www.actionnet.htm (accessed 3 October 2002). Taylor states that 14 per cent of the pre-War population had died, which according to him numbered about 60,000 see Taylor (1995) ‘The Emergence of a Nationalist movement in East Timor’ p. 32, in P. Cray and C. Bentley (eds), pp. 21–35. 9 The General Assembly 4371 (1960) ‘Report of the Committee on Information from Non-self-governing territories’, May. For the history of the United Nations and East Timor, cf. East Timor – UNTAET, Background, available at http://www.un.org/ peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm (accessed 3 October 2002). 10 Security Council Resolution 384 on 22 December 1975. Also Security Council Resolution 389 on 22 April 1976. 11 Most printed documents put the number of people killed at 200,000 during Indonesian rule. See, for example, Scott (2001). 12 The growth averaged 6 per cent per year over the period 1983–97. UNDP data, available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB. htm (accessed 3 October 2002). 13 Portugal governed East Timor with a combination of direct and indirect rule, managing the population as a whole through the traditional power structures rather than by using colonial civil servants. 14 The set of agreements between Indonesia and Portugal was signed in New York on 5 May 1999. 15 The Security Council Resolution 1246. 16 According to Scott, at least 150,000 people fled to West Timor as refugees and a further 300,000 people hid in remote areas. 17 The United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1272 (1999). 18 The then minister, Kasama’s comment on the Japanese government’s view of East Timor, while stationed in Lisbon. 19 The Japanese government got permission to extend its airway to East Timor from the Portuguese government two months before the war in 1941. The airway was from Yokohama to Dili via Palau. 20 In the beginning of the 1960s, an anthropologist, Umeoki, who conducted research in East Timor during the War, remarked, ‘There were a number of people who know East Timor as the name was often found in newspapers during the war. However, nowadays, there are few people who know such an island’ (originally written in Japanese, translated into English by author). Cf. Takahashi, T. Wasurerareta Minami no Shima (A Forgotten Southern Island ), cited in Goto (2000a: 211). 21 Cf. Appendix B: Japan–Indonesia relations. 22 It is well known that the United States turned a blind eye to the Indonesian invasion. The fact is illustrated in that two days before the invasion, the then US President Ford and Kissinger visited Jakarta officially and they knew the invasion was planned. Also, Australia sent its stance to hold back on the issue (see Goto, 2000a: 212). 23 For instance, at the Thirtieth General Assembly in 1975, Japan voted against the resolution to request Indonesia’s immediate withdrawal from East Timor. Japan was among 11 countries who voted against the resolution, while 65 countries voted for the resolution. 24 According to Goto, Indonesia’s lobbying activities to Western powers was also one of the important reasons that removed the issue of East Timor from the UN table. 25 The influence of Japan on Indonesia was also perceived in the message from Aoyama Morito who has been reporting on independence movements in East Timor. Aoyama sent a message requesting the Japanese government to pressurize the Indonesian government to withdraw from East Timor and observe the UN resolution. Cf. The Association of East Timor, Tokyo (1994) East Timor Newsletter, 2(2). 26 For example, United States that has been a major military supporter of Indonesia could not ignore the public that calls for the termination of its assistance and the review of its policy to Indonesia after the Santa Cruz Massacre.

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27 The 1991 Gaiko Seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook) states that Japan distanced itself from the human rights diplomacy taken by Western power. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1991). 28 The idea is reflected by the comment by former Foreign Minister, Komura Masahiko. Komura commented in 1999, ‘the turmoil in East Timor with the population of 800,000 shouldn’t be brought into Indonesia with a population of 240,000,000’. Comment in Yomiuri Newspaper, 17 November 1999. 29 Ramos Horta was invited to Japan by a Japanese NGO at this time. Although Horta sought to meet with Japanese Foreign Minister, Japanese government declined the offer. 30 The government repeatedly stated that the Indonesian government has ruled East Timor effectively since 1975. The stance can be confirmed by discussions in the parliament since 1976, in which several parliament members addressed the issue. This government position is found in the following discussions in parliament: on 17 October 1986, 26 November 1986, 29 March 1990, 11 March 1992, 18 October 1994 and 11 March 1998. 31 The Chief Cabinet Secretary’s official comment on 11 September 1999. 32 The government position was explained at the Budget Committee on 9 September 1999 in the House of Representatives. 33 The Foreign Minister’s comment on 14 September 1999. The Foreign Minister, Koumura Masahiko, responded to the question on Japanese support by its personnel at the press meeting: there are various kinds of assistance by the personnel, yet the government does not consider any support by the personnel under the multinational force since it is not within the legal framework. However, this does not deny the possibility of assistance by the personnel in other form for the restoration of peace and order (with referring to the past experiences) and also the possibility in the future under the UN authority. The comment is available at http://www.mofa.go.jp (accessed 9 May 2001). 34 A financial support of US$1 million was distributed to the UNHCR and the WFP, respectively. 35 The material support was conducted in response to the request from the UNHCR. These included tents (500), blankets (9,000), water tank (2,000), vinyl sheets (5,120) and others. Also, the government provided aircrafts from the SDF to transport materials from East Timor to West Timor. Those include SDF aircrafts (150), airplane (C-130H/U-4) and others. 36 Takahashi was appointed on 10 November to the position. 37 The then Foreign Minister, Kono’s comment and government announcement has consistently focused on the contribution from personnel in various forms since September. Cf. Kono’s comment on 17 September, government’s announcement on 6 November (‘The initiation of preparing for dispatching a SDF Engineer Unit to PKOs in East Timor’) and government announcement on 16 December (‘Japan’s Contribution for Assistance to East Timor’). 38 The positions include: Senior Civil Officers, District Administrator and others. 39 The financial assistance accounted for 24.85 per cent of the total financial assistance from donor countries. Much of the assistance was used through UN agencies, such as the UNDP, the UNHCR, the World Bank and others. This is because it is regulated that Japanese ODA should be used via government or via international organizations. 40 JICA is a governmental organization launched in 1965 to help nation-building in developing countries through personal contacts, mainly by means of technical cooperation. Projects introduced here were referred: unofficial document, the JICA, Dili Office (2000) A Glance of Project Implementation by JICA East Timor Office, JICA, obtained on 4 October 2000.

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41 Funding for development welfare projects implemented by the NGOs amounted to US$2.8 million. The projects include health care projects, agricultural projects, market projects and others. 42 The NGO assistance scheme is part of governmental funding assistance for Japanese NGO projects. The scheme consists of three categories of financial assistance: (1) NGO project fund, (2) grass-roots grant assistance and (3) support measures for emergency humanitarian assistance projects by the Japanese NGOs. The third category was introduced in August 1999. 43 Those five NGOs are CARE, World Vision, AMDA, SHARE and ADRA. 44 The government announced the decision on 6 November 2001. 45 The advance party of the SDF left on 2 and 4 March 2003 aboard six C-130H aircraft and arrived in East Timor on 4 and 6 March. The main party, transported by an MSDF transport ship, a destroyer and merchant ships and commercial airplanes, went to East Timor. The transportation of all the members of the engineer group was completed on 27 April. 46 This PKO became the first time that females took part in the PKO. Seven women were among the force. 47 Information on the early stage was obtained from interviews with a Japanese NGO’s workers and a Japanese officer working in an International NGO, based in Dili. The section introduces NGO activities based on the interviews conducted in East Timor with seven NGO officers (Japanese NGOs: 4 and International NGOs: 3) that had projects in September 2000. 48 Comment from an officer working in a Japanese NGO. Interview conducted in Dili on 10 September 2000. 49 According to an NGO officer who started working in East Timor for assistance in September 1999 there were only three Japanese NGOs. The number increased from the beginning of 2000 after a certain level of security was restored. Interview was conducted in Tokyo on 28 June 2000. 50 Interview conducted in Dili. 51 Interview conducted in Dili. The new funding scheme by the government provides a larger amount of funding and removed conditionality for the funding and measures that NGO had to take to obtain. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999) ‘The assistance scheme for the humanitarian operations by Japanese NGOs’, Memo from the Economic Bureau of the MOFA, December 1999. 52 Interview with NGO officers conducted in Dili. 53 Comment obtained in Dili from an officer working for the JICA. 54 Interview conducted in Dili. 55 Interview with a university professor of sociology in Osaka. 56 Interview conducted in Tokyo. 57 Most interviewees referred to the last ten years as the period of change. 58 Interview conducted in Dili. 59 Interview conducted in Dili. 60 From informal conversation with three NGO workers who are all under the age 35 in Dili, August 2000. 61 Interview conducted in Dili. 62 At the informal gathering, NGO worker and UN workers discussed the issue and found broad agreement on this point. 63 Interview conducted in Dili. 64 Two interviewees referred post-Second World War contexts, that is, humanitarian assistance from Western countries to the Japanese. Interview conducted in Dili September 2000. 65 The Meiji era is from 1868 to 1912. With the opening of the port cities (discarding the closed-door policy), in the beginning of the Meiji era, Japan received influences from Western countries in fields ranging from education to thought, completely independent of traditional Japanese thoughts while ushering in civilization and

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66 67 68 69 70 71

72

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

88 89 90

Notes modernization. Three interviewees referred to the idea. Interviews conducted in Dili in September 2000. Interview with a lecturer of Japanese history and ideology conducted in Osaka on 20 April 2001. He explained that Japanese people accept foreign ideas or values, which gradually become ‘Japanized’ and are no longer foreign ideas or values. Interview conducted in Dili. Interview conducted in Dili. In a survey conducted by Asahi Newspaper, in December 1991, 21 per cent supported the PKO whereas 58 per cent opposed the idea. This includes POKs in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador and East Timor. Details on Japanese participation in peacekeeping missions until the year 2000 are available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pamph2000/pko.html (accessed 28 June 2003). Inquires about contributions from personnel at press conferences were raised at conferences on 17 September, 26 October and 10 November 1999. In response to those questions, the foreign minister replied, ‘the government would like to contribute actively’, to which he added, ‘contributions of which Japan is capable of through sending its personnel’. Cf. The press conferences of 26 October 1999 and of 17 September 1999. As discussed earlier in comparison with previous humanitarian crises, the East Timor case involved new aspects, which prevented the government from taking prompt action. For example, the number of projects funded by the government in 1992 was 53. It rose to 137 in 1995. In 1997, there were 224 projects. Data source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview conducted in Dili. Interview conducted in Dili. Interview conducted in Dili. Interview conducted in Dili. For example, such documents as Development Bluebook, White papers on Foreign Affairs and ODA Report. From conversations with an NGO worker in Dili, September 2000. As introduced in Chapter 3, Weiss and Minear divided ‘humanitarian action’ into two categories: (1) the provision of emergency assistance and (2) the protection of human rights. Cf. Weiss and Minear (eds) (1993: 7–10). Interview conducted with an officer of the JICA in Dili. This point is explained in ODA Report of the 1990s. Interview conducted in Osaka. Comment at a meeting with a press foreign officer and a cabinet deliberator on 29 October 1999 at The Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. Interview conducted in Dili. The government introduced the first ODA Charter which includes four principle points that shape its implementation: (1) environmental conservation, (2) non-use of ODA for military purposes, (3) full attention to trends in the military expenditure of recipient countries and (4) full attention to the promotion of democratization and the securing of basic human rights and freedoms. Interview conducted in Dili. All interviewees (UN officers, government officials and NGO workers) agreed and described the political considerations that influenced Japan’s assistance in the East Timor Crisis. The interviews were conducted in East Timor and Japan. Since the first Diet discussions, in 1976, on the issue of East Timor (both at the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors), there were fifteen occasions that dealt with the issue of East Timor. The government reply has consistently taken this

Notes

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92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

100 101

102 103 104 105 106 107

108 109 110 111

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position. See Appendix A: Diet discussions on the issue of East Timor (cf. The National Archives). Records obtained at the National Diet Library. Following the turmoil in East Timor, owing to the result of popular consultation at the discussion in the House of Councillors on 9 September 1999, the government expressed its intention not to change its position and policy towards Indonesia. Cf. Diet discussions on the issue of East Timor (The National Archives), records obtained at the National Diet Library. Cf. Appendix A). All interviewees agreed on the political considerations in connection with policies towards Indonesia. Interviews conducted in East Timor in October 2000 and in Tokyo in March 2001. Interview conducted in Dili. Interview conducted in Dili. A government official based in Dili commented on the relationship between Indonesia and Japan, which he argued had a significant impact on the government’s stance towards East Timor. Comments from a government official stationed in Dili. At the time of field interview, Japanese government had an office in Dili. In the short-term, government officials were sent from the embassy of Japan in Jakarta (based there for around 2–4 weeks). Comments from Japanese NGO workers representing five organizations working in East Timor and three organizations based in Tokyo. Interview conducted in Tokyo. A foreign officer, Ishii Masafumi, who was in charge of the Southeast Asian Section in the MOFA. The article was written in Japanese and was issued in 2000. In this article Ishii values Japan’s efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia. This enabled Japan to strongly urge Indonesia to quickly settle the issue of East Timor. This would bring stability to Indonesia itself. Cf. Appendix A: Diet discussions on the issue of East Timor (The National Archives). In Geneva on 27 September 1999, a UN Human Rights Committee, EU representatives requested that the Secretary General should form a committee to investigate crimes in East Timor. The request was approved by thirty-two countries including the United States and other major Western countries. Twelve countries opposed the idea (including China, Indonesia and India). Japan was among six countries that abstained from on this voting issue. Cf. The National Archives (Appendix A). Cf. The National Archives, from records of 11 March 1992 (Appendix A). Cf. The National Archives. For information on Japan–Indonesia relations, cf. Appendix B: Japan–Indonesia relations. Comments from a government official. Interview conducted in Tokyo on 2 April 2001. Foreign Minister’s comment. The situation in East Timor and Japan’s assistance to Indonesia had been discussed in the Diet since 1990. The government consistently expressed its intention not to change the assistance policy to Indonesia. Cf. The National Archives. The National Archives, records of 11 March 1992. The National Archives, records of 29 March 1990 (Appendix A). Interview was conducted in Dili. The National Archives. Cf. Appendix A.

5 The political dimension of Japanese humanitarianism 1 For criticisms raised in this section refer to: Hashimoto (ed.) (1999). 2 Cf., ‘Findings on Public Opinion Polls on Diplomacy’ (available in Japanese, 1977–2003), Public opinion surveys conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office.

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3 This policy speech was delivered in London in conjunction with his official trip to Europe in May 1988. 4 This argument is perceived in many works that discusses Japan’s reconsideration of its role. For example, Araki (1991); Toyama (1995); Spruyt (1998). 5 The full text of the Article 9 (Renunciation of War) states: ‘Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the national and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes’. ‘In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.’ 6 On this point, Akashi Yasushi, Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and then Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cambodia commented in 1996 at a symposium, ‘Japan needs to find a delicate balance between consideration of the past and assumption of responsibilities in the present and future’. On 6 November 1996, the Japan Society in New York City hosted a symposium entitled, ‘In Quest of a New Role: The United Nations and Japan in the 21st Century’, to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Japan’s admission to the UN. It was attended by an array of distinguished panellists: Owada Hisashi, Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN; Irie Akira, Harvard Professor and Director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, James Sutterlin, Yale lecturer as well as Akashi Yasushi. 7 Cairncross explains the tendency by personal relationships and hierarchical loyalties in Japanese politics. 8 For Japanese political system and diplomacy. Cf. Sone (1993). 9 Sone, for instance, examines several reasons that explain why diplomatic issues have been unpopular in Japanese political fields. He explains that diplomatic issues are not advantages to obtain votes at elections compared with issues in agriculture, postal matters or construction, so that special interest Dietmen are not well acquainted with diplomatic issues. Cf. Sone (1993). 10 The LDP was founded by uniting the Liberals and Japan Democratic Party in 1955 and held power from 1955 to 1993. In usual party politics, Dietmen are based on the unstable basement, that is, elections, for the bureaucrats. However, the constant existence of the particular party changes the system. 11 The delegation was led by a senior LDP politician and the chairman of the Japan Socialist Party in 1990. The delegation ignited government level interaction between Japan and North Korea that paved the way toward normalization talk. 12 The group aimed to confirm members’ view on the Cambodian peace and UN PKOs, and to work towards common action. 13 The coalition government was led by Hosokawa Morihiro, founder of the Japan New Party. The eight-party coalition government that was set up in 1993 consisted of the Japan New Party, New Party Sakigake, Renewal Party, Democratic Socialist Party, Clean Government Party, Japan Socialist Party and Social Democratic League. 14 Cairncross argues that a failure of the LDP government in 1993 helped to reform the traditional system that can result in a system which is better able to respond to popular wishes. 15 Kohno argues that since the end of the Cold War, a number of foreign policy issues have become the topics of daily conversation among the people, and political leaders are more obliged than before to assume responsibility for ‘public-diplomacy’ – explaining their policy outlook to the people. Cf. Kohno (1999). 16 The only restrictions in the Constitution that relates to foreign relations is that: (1) the Prime Minister submits bills, reports on general national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet (Article 72) and (2) the Cabinet shall obtain prior, or depending on circumstances, subsequent approval of the Diet to conclude treaties (Article 73-3).

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17 One typical example of the influence from economic fields in the policy and decisionmaking process is seen in the policy-making process for the ODA. The Keidanren was considered as the most influential organization for the ODA policies. Cf. Inada (1987). 18 The reform (Gyokaku – Administrative reform) measures came into force in the beginning of 2001. 19 Drift argues that Japan’s foreign and security policy has certainly become more active and assertive, many of which would have been considered unthinkable ten years ago. Cf. Drift (2002). 20 For instance, James Reilly argues in Foreign Policy in Focus, ‘Instead of quiet, moderate diplomacy combined with economic assistance, Japanese leaders are slowly becoming more reliant upon displays of military might’. Reilly explains this through the government’s active support of the US military attacks in Afghanistan and Japan’s subsequent policy trajectory. Cf. Reilly (2002). 21 The Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, made economic development the priority. He assumed office five times since 1946. His post-Second World War diplomacy is often compared with that of German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, who also took the same priority in post-War diplomacy. Both used the economic development policy for their own country’s reconstruction rather than rebuilding its military power. 22 Five consecutive regimes Yoshida: (1948–54) and following Hatoyama (1954–6), Ishibashi (1956–9) and Kishi (1959–60) regimes took economy-centred policy though each regime took different approaches on the defence policy. 23 Assistance and reparation are extremely different in nature. There is no space for the latter to take account of ‘policy’. Yet, those two are often introduced in the same line in Japan’s case. This is partly because the assistance carried out until the 1980s was aimed to expand export opportunities, which is explained in the same framework with reparations carried out in the early post-War period. 24 Cairncross argues, ‘since 1945 Japan’s presence in the area has been primarily economic, initially as a customer for Southeast Asian raw materials and as a large and growing supplier of manufactured goods’. 25 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1994), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ oda/html (accessed 10 March 2003). 26 Japan’s foreign assistance since its start until 1972 was almost 100 per cent limited within Asia. Even afterwards, the region of Japanese assistance was largely dominated by Asia. Cf. Asia Keizai Kenkyu-sho (1992). 27 Japan has been taking a passive attitude on the target of 1 per cent assistance of its GNP and the preferential tariff treatment to developing countries since the first meeting of the UNCTAD. Japan’s trade balance marked a deficit since the end of the Second World War until the middle of the 1960s. 28 The first Mid-Term ODA Plan introduced in 1977 included a plan to double its ODA in three years. Since then, Japan’s ODA increased in the second Mid-Term ODA Plan (1981–5) and the third (1986–92). 29 For criticism against Japanese assistance, see, for example, Hashimoto (1999: 352–3). 30 In the 1990s, the percentage of tied assistance was reduced at the lowest level among developed counties. According to the 1995 statistics, majority (96.3 per cent) of Japan’s yen loan assistance became untied. This marked low level among DAC countries. DAC average of tied assistance is 77.7 per cent. Also, the government extended a considerable amount of grant aid (in the form of grant fund and technical cooperation). In 1998, the grant aid alone exceeded total ODA spending by the United Kingdom. 31 Particularly environmental problems that Japan’s ODA caused in Indonesia (Kduon Onbo Dam construction plan), in India (Narmada Dam construction plan) and in Brazil (Great Karajas Project) increased criticisms of Japan’s ODA projects later on. 32 For instance, the ODA Charter stressed Japan’s consideration of trends in military expenditure, the development of and production of mass destructive weapons and

196

33 34 35

36 37

38

39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Notes missiles, export and import of arms etc. for the possibility of providing assistance. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ODA Charter, 1992. Throughout the 1980s, the trade imbalance, for example, between Japan and the US had become a critical issue. To avoid any further trade problems, the government was urged to reduce the trade surplus. Hashimoto argues that the ODA, specifically the economic assistance, has been a unique field in that the parliament itself had little critical influence on the policy-making. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The ODA Charter, Tokyo: MOFA. More concretely, the ODA Summary 1998 argues: (1) ‘Providing aid to the developing world and working on global issues can be expected to earn Japan better ties with other countries, bolster its status in the eyes of the international community, and contribute to broader global understanding of and support for Japan and its people’, and (2) ‘In a world that has been brought closer together by trends in trade and investment, and as a country heavily dependent of the rest of the world for its own supplies of resources, energy, and food, Japan stands to gain in economic terms by utilizing aid to promote economic progress throughout the developing world’. The Obuchi Initiative was announced in December 1998. Nakajima, for example, argues, ‘. . . it took almost forty years to officially announce a basic set of principles concerning ODA’. Cf. Nakajima (1999) ‘Problems and Solutions of Japan’s ODA’, available at http://www.geocities.com/kenshoki/ e-oda.htm (accessed 27 March 2003). For example, Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook describe that the ODA system remains unchanged to date. The creation of the system dates back to the cabinet order of 1953 that established economic cooperation as the policy area governing ODA. Cf. Beaudry-Soncynsky and Cook (1999: chapter 2). For instance, David Arase noted, ‘Because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main spokesperson on ODA policies, foreigners tend to forget the role played by other powerful actors in Japan’s ODA system’. See Arase (1994: 171–2). For the role of each ministry, the section referred Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook (1999: chapter 2). The government is responsible for the precise content. There was a discussion on Japan’s ODA to the Philippines in the parliament at the time of the Marcos scandal in 1987. There are discussions after the implementation of the ODA and the problems. However, there was little parliamentary discussion on projects or issues regarding the assistance before the implementation. For example, there was a discussion on the military assistance and the prohibition of assistance to conflict countries at the Committee of Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives (April 1978). Inada explains that 99 per cent of the ODA budget allocation is almost fixed and there will be discussions only for the 1 per cent. In the latter case, for instance, a corporation that carries out a project in specific country requests the economic assistance to the government through politicians or a local politician requests assistance through a Japanese politician. For instance, it played an active role in developing the ODA Charter adopted in 1992. Cf. Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook (1999: chapter 4). Rix argues that the complication of the system exists partly in the four-ministry arrangement since no entity is responsible for administering the ODA. See Rix (1989). Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook raise some of those criticisms. Cf. Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook (1999). The information on the structure of assistance is based on reports in the Asahi Shinbun, The Daily Yomiuri and The Japan Times.

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51 Inada argues that Japanese people’s idea of assistance is mostly an economic point of view and diplomatic and strategic dimensions of assistance have been ignored. Cf. Inada (1985). 52 The major shift in the ODA focus also includes the geographic focus (albeit slowly) with an increase in allocations to Africa and to Latin America and the Caribbean and the inclusion of countries of the former Soviet Union. 53 Inada explains that the decision by the government to reduce the ‘tied’ assistance for its yen loan in 1978 was designed to reduce the influence from Japanese corporations. Therefore, since the end of the 1970s, ‘untied’ projects were brought into the international open-bidding and the country has the order rights. Cf. Inada (1985). 54 The relation between Japanese corporation and the recipient county became an issue as it reduced the effect of untied assistance. Cf. Inada (1985). 55 Sone argues that the status of the MOFA had a weak influence in its early period as most of the diplomatic issues were economic matters, over which other ministries had authority. Cf. Sone (1993: 93–124). 56 The consolidation came after a process of assessment and debate. 57 Nishigaki explains that those two are separated, with separate budgets for ODA and other official flows. Also, there is no extension of support that combines the two. 58 The realist view here represents the idea that states are motivated primarily by the fundamental imperative of military security, and frequently subordinate other goals to that end. Thus, it focuses overwhelmingly on military power. 59 The so-called minimalists often cite Japan’s wartime aggression to justify and defend their approach. For minimalist approach, Cf. Soeya (1995). 60 In the pre- and during the Second World War periods, Japan attempted to forge an empire in Asia with its military power. 61 In general, for instance, Huntington argues, ‘Japan has accepted all the assumptions of realism but applied them purely in the economic realm’. See Huntington (1993: 311). For the regional approach, see, for example, Kitamura (1997). 62 The idea that Japan’s international contribution need not be limited to participating in PKOs – there is a need for humanitarian assistance to refugees and victims of civil wars, famines and natural disasters, which is often provided in conjunction with PKOs – is often discussed even in the academic field. See, for example, Shimura (1996: 137–44). 63 The Constitution states that the use of force for the resolution of international disputes cannot be justified. 64 Fujita considers Japan’s ‘soft power’ influence as the world’s largest foreign aid donor. 65 The Gulf War is often referred to as an agonizing experience. See, for instance, Kohno (1999). 66 As introduced in Chapter 4, the 1992 ODA Charter included four aspects of the basic philosophy: (1) humanitarian consideration, (2) recognition of the interdependence of nations within the international community, (3) environmental conservation and (4) consideration for recipient countries’ practices in relation to military expenditures, production of weapons of mass destruction and arms export. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The ODA Charter, 1992, Tokyo: MOFA. 67 Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/challenge 21.html (accessed 24 March 2003). Conclusion 1 Koizumi’s comments were introduced in Newsweek. Cited in Hamai and Mauch (2002). 2 For example, Gelb and Rosenthal argue, ‘We have passed from an era in which ideals were always flatly opposed to self-interests into an era in which tension remains between the two, but the stark juxtaposition of the past has largely subsided’ (see Gelb and Rosenthal (2003), and also for the similar arguments, cf. Macrae and Leader (2000)).

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3 For example, MacFarlane argues that the interests that influenced great power intentions in the 1990s tended to be more diffused (e.g. the prevention or control of migration and efforts to limit sources of conflict and to address problems of criminality). 4 Cf. The Prime Minister’s policy speech in the Diet of 27 September 2001 soon after the terrorists attack. 5 The Bill was introduced to the Diet on 5 October and passed on 29 October 2001. On 9 November, two destroyers and a supply ship departed for the Indian Ocean. They were charged with the transporting and supply of fuel for American ships, the transportation of personnel, goods, repair and maintenance, medical activities and the provision of seaport services. 6 The conference was chaired by Ogata Sadako who served as the UNHCR from 1990 to 2000. The conference secured pledges exceeding US$4.5 billion in foreign assistance to help rebuild Afghanistan. Japan pledged US$500 million in aid over a two-and-a-half-year period, second in amount only to the US. 7 The MOFA issued statements with the following fundamental ideas: (1) mindful of the importance of the peace and stability of Iraq and its surrounding region, Japan will cooperate in re-establishing and enhancing it, (2) Japan supports the position that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq should be preserved and that Iraq’s future be decided as early as possible by the people of Iraq themselves and (3) Japan will apply its experience by undertaking a continuous and uninterrupted process of humanitarian to reconstruction assistance. Ideas and labour will be provided through this process. Cf. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan’s Assistance for the Reconstruction of Iraq’, issued on 21 April 2003. 8 The Iraq Legislation that authorizes the dispatch of 1,000 armed SDF passed the full Upper House of Parliament after midnight on 25 July. The bill was backed by Prime Minister Koizumi’s three-party coalition. 9 Press Conference by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, ‘The Basic Plan regarding the measures based on the Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq’, 9 December 2003. 10 An announcement by the Democratic Party of Japan based on the party’s visit to Baghdad. This explains reasons behind the party’s opposition to the participation in PKO by Japanese SDF. The delineation between combat areas and non-combat areas is not clear. The party supports active participation in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction of the country. 11 Cf. The Iraq Legislation, 1–3. Available in Japanese, http://www.11.ocn.ne.jp (accessed 12 May 2004). 12 The instruction is available on website in Japanese, at http://www.jda.go.jp/j/ iraq/kunji/tyoukan01.htm (accessed 23 May 2004). 13 Press Conference of 9 December 2003 by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (‘The Basic Plan regarding the measures based on the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq’). 14 These speeches include those of 24 December 2003, January and February 2004. Available in Japanese at http://www.jda.go.jp/j/iraq/kunji/tyoukan.html (accessed 23 May 2004). 15 Cf. http://www.FT.com (accessed 28 July 2003). 16 The chairman for the National Institute of Defence Studies wrote that although Japan has offered the contribution of its SDF with public support, no such case as Iraq has previously involved such high security risks. Cf. Yanagisawa (2003). Appendices 1 Cf. The National Archives. Originally in Japanese (translated by the author). 2 Data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available of Gaiko Frrun (Diplomatic Forum), 2000, 3: 41.

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Index

Abe, S. 123 Abercrombie, N. 180 Aboth 15 Adenauer, K. 195 administrative reform initiatives 136 ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency) 191 Advisory Council for the Prime Minister on Foreign Economic Cooperation 76 Afghan Crisis 159, 187 Afghanistan 1, 3, 159, 163, 165; reconstruction, international conference on 100, 165 Africa: assistance 77; countries, independence of 182; famine relief 68; tribal regimes of law 56 Aga Khan, S. 11, 21 agricultural surveys 88 aid: budget of United States 65; ‘fatigue’ among industrialized countries 139; Japan’s experience as recipient 64–5 AIDS/HIV 78 Akaha, T. 72 Akashi, Y. 194 Akiba, T. 125 almsgiving 15 alternative realism 149 altruism 16, 176 Amaterasu 177 AMDA see Association of Medical Doctors of Asia American democracy 54 American Indian culture 176 American Red Cross Society (ARC) 51, 96 Amnesty International (AI) 24, 68 An Outline of A Civilisation Theory 39–40 Annan, K. 104, 169, 173, 176 Ansei Go-Kakoku Joyaku (Ansei Treaties with five countries) 180

anti-personnel mines 78 Anti-Terrorism Law 166 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill 165 Aoyama, M. 189 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) 137 Araki, K. 194 Arase, D. 196 Arato, A. 175 ARC see American Red Cross Society ARF see ASEAN Regional Forum Armitage, R. 165 Aronson, H. B. 37 Arrington, R. L. 16, 18, 175 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 86, 188; members 98; policy 124; Post ministerial Conference (PMC) 137; regional political and security dialogue 150 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 131, 137, 168 Asia: concept of human rights 122; countries, independence of 182; economic crisis 135; idea of human rights 55; traditional societies 56 Asia–Africa Development Forum of experts 186 Asia–Europe meeting (ASEM) 13 Asia-Pacific region 133; new security order in 131 Asian Rural Institute (ARI) 68 Asian Way 55 assistance: aid, provision of 4; commercialized 140, 146; diplomatic dimension 142; establishment of system 163; evolution of systems and policy 100, 159; major fields of 185; through the UN 67–8, 79–80, 89; from United States 139; see also Japanese assistance

216

Index

Association of Medical Doctors of Asia (AMDA) 81, 191 Association of Southeast Asian Nations see ASEAN Aun San Suu Kyi 98 Aust-Asian Mediterranean Sea 105 Australia 86, 186 Babylonian Code of Hammurabi 175 Bangkok Declaration 98 Bangladesh 68, 83 basic human needs 147 Bauer, D. 176 Beaudry-Somcynsky, M. 144, 146, 196 Bell, D. 176 Bell, D. A. 176 Bellers, J. 175 Belo, Bishop X. 104, 107 benevolence 35, 159 Bentham, J. 16, 175 Bentley, C. 106, 188–9 Best, G. 11 Blomberg, C. 177, 179 Bosnia 1 British Commonwealth of Nations 63 Brown, C. 16 brutality of Japanese Imperial Army 133 Buckle, H. T. 39 Buddhism 31, 158–9, 177; ethics 36–7; five precepts 37, 178 ‘Bunmeikaika’ (civilization and enlightenment) 46 buraku people 187 burden sharing 150, 168 bureaucracy: changes in policy-making functions of 135–6; role in four-entity system in ODA 144 Burkman, T. W. 178 Bushido 32–8, 41, 47; ethics 178; modification of principles 48; translation of term 177 Butler, J. 175 Cairncross, D. 134, 138, 194–5 Cambodia 1, 62, 74, 80, 83, 135; changes in the public 92; crisis 75, 84–99, 116, 131, 133, 136, 160, 165; impact on Japanese humanitarianism 91; independence from France 85; Japanese assistance 87–91; peace process 150, 168 Canada 137

CARE (Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere) 64, 182, 191 CARE Japan 81 Caring for Young Refugees (CYR) 69 caring state 79 Carnation Revolution 103 Carr, E. H. 26 Catholic Church 24 Central America, assistance for 77 Chalmers, T. 175 charity 71; concept of 175 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 183 Checkland, O. 47, 50–1 cheque-book diplomacy 150 Chi, broadening one’s knowledge 37 Chian Iji Ho (The Public Peace Regulations) 50 China 2, 32, 77, 86, 133, 150–1, 154, 159, 179; human rights issues in People’s Republic of 187; Kudara 36; partial suspension of aid to 155; Tianamen Square 98 Christianity 20; ideas 41; measures against 177; origin of 175; tradition 16 Chu, loyalty to one’s master 37 Civil Code 94 civil rights 49 Civilization and Enlightenment, period of (Bunmeikaika) 114 Cohen, J. L. 175 coherence: agenda 163; of humanitarianism and political considerations 152–3 Cold War 76, 159; international arena 106; rivalry and status of East Timor 121 Colombo Plan 63–4 colonial countries, former Japanese 133 Commission on Global Governance 176 Commission on Human Rights 79, 173, 185 Committee on Sustainable Development 72 communitarianism/communitarian 18–20, 176; character of Japanese society 158; nature of humanitarian values 94; societies 154 complex emergencies 11 Confucianism 31–2, 37–8, 114, 158–9, 177–9; family and kinship system 35; ideas of human rights 56; societies influenced by 43 consequentialist (utilitarian) ethics 16 Constantelos, D. J. 15

Index 217 Constitution of Japan 133; Article 9 151, 156 contemporary humanitarianism 22–3; international 161; Japanese, strongest influences 161 contractual relationships 158 Cook, C. M. 144, 146, 196 Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere see CARE Co-Prosperity sphere 138 corporations and private sector involvement in ODA 145 corruption of public order 37 cosmopolitanism 28; versus relativism 19–20 Cray, P. 106, 188–9 Crump, T. 44 Cuba 185 cultural relativists 18 culture of global human rights 152 DAC see Development Assistance Committee Dagger, R. 176 daimyo 32–3, 38, 58 Dancy, J. 16 Daniloff, Russian General 51 DeBary, W. T. 178, 181 Declaration and Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order in Group of 77 183 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1962 182 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 1960 182 Defence Agency 166 Dejima (Nagasaki) 177 democracy 20 Democratic Party of Japan 166 demographic and generational change 132 deontological moral philosophy 18 deontologists 22, 28 Deuteronomy 15 ‘development’ assistance 63 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 79, 139, 141, 154 Dili 103, 105, 124, 173 Dilworth, D. 52 Diplomatic Bluebook 97, 107–8, 124, 190 Direct Fund see emergency relief discourse of humanitarianism in major political theories 10

discrimination: against Koreans and Burakumin 95; against women in employment 95 Divine Right of Kings 43 domestic economic development and assistance 138–9 Donnelly, J. 56 Door, R. P. 179 Dower, N. 175 Drift, R. 195 drugs 78 dual rule of Mikado (Emperor) and Tycoon (Shogun) 43 Dunant, H. 11, 174 duty 35–6; to humanity as whole 39–40 Dworkin, R. 176 dynasties of Shogun (military commanders) 178 Earl, D. M. 36, 49 early Meiji era 114 early post-War period 95 East Africa 185 East Asia, security situation in 167 East Timor 1, 3, 160–1, 164, 166 East Timor Crisis 5, 102, 105–8, 125–7, 154; application of 5; Diet discussions on issue of 170–1; history of 102; Japanese assistance, new features of 115; from pre-War to post-War period 105–6 East–West confrontation 67 East–West rivalry 139 economic assistance: to countries around conflict areas 77; and technical assistance 62 Economic Cooperation Bureau (ECB) 144 Economic Planning Agency (EPA) 143–4, 146–7 Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas (EROA) 64, 182 economic superpower 162 Edo era in Japan 31–3, 48, 52 Education Rescript (Kyoiku Chokugo) in Imperial Rescript on Education 180 egoism 16 Egypt 185 Egyptian Book of the Dead 175 Ein neutraler Staat 43 El Salvador 1, 74 elders, status of 35 electrical machinery 64 Elfstrom, D. 175 Ellis, A. 17

218

Index

emergency assistance 12, 63 emergency relief 78; Direct Fund 80, 85 Emig, A. 142 Emperor (Tenno) 31, 43; explication for 37; after Meiji Restoration 58; position of 178; system 49, 52, 59, 159; see also Mikado and Tycoon, dual rule of energy resources, dependence on Middle East 167 Enokida, K. 69, 183 EPA see Economic Planning Agency EROA see Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas ethics: in Bushido 178; contemporary Japanese 53–8; cosmopolitan approaches to 16–18; foundation of 31–2; genesis of 31–42; and humanitarianism, theories and analysis of 13–20; international 17; judgement 58; non-consequential 16–17; practices in Japanese society 159; systems 16–20, 42–53 Europe: code of chivalry 41; monarchs of 43 European Union 137 evangelism 69 expansion of Japanese humanitarianism, key aspects 162 Export and Import Bank of Japan 139, 146–7 export-oriented assistance 140 Ezaki, H. 88 familism 31 family 36 famine 33 FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) 188 Farlkes, G. 176 Feinberg, J. 21 feudal period 177 feudal social system, social order in 33, 159 feudalism 31 fight-against-terror 169 filial piety 35 Finnis, J. M. 56–7, 176 First Imperial Diet 44 First World War 181 Fishkin, J. 17 foreign NGOs see NGOs foreign policy: assistance as instrument of 155; changes in functions of bureaucracy 136; and East Timor 105–8, 125–7; economic 65; human-centred 153; mobilizing elements in diplomacy 136–7; morality in 26–8, 127–8, 156;

post-Cold War 131–2, 194; techno-economic values 149; see also MOFA; ODA Foreign Policy Commission 145 foreign raw materials 138 foreign visitors to Japan 43 four-ministry system 143 Fourth Medium-Term Targets for Japanese ODA 80 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing 72 France 86, 106, 180 fraternal respect 35 freedom 49 Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente (Fretilin) 103 Fried, C. 17 Fujita, H. 151 Fujita, K. 76, 182 ‘Fukoku Kyohei’, slogan 46 Fukuda, T. 65, 131 Fukuda Doctrine 131 Fukuzawa, Y. 39, 41–2, 47, 179; on universality of moral principles 40 Furukawa, E. 151 Furukawa, T. 177 G7 meetings 137 G8-Summit 137 Gaiko Seisho see Diplomatic Bluebook Galtung, J. 183 GARIOA see Government and Relief in Occupied Areas Gelb, L. H. 197 genders 95 generational change 132 Geneva Convention 11, 50; and Additional Protocol 11, 174 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention 181 Genji Boko (Reduce Self-Interest and Serve the State) 50 Germany 164 gerontocracy 31 Gi, correct ethics 37 Giddens, A. 174 giri 37–8, 179; see also ninjo giri and ninjo 43; explication through idea of 51–3 global and regional security issues 136 global environment 135 global ethics 2, 23 global governance 24–5 global humanitarianism 2–5 global issues 156; increasing and changing perceptions 71–2

Index 219 global scepticism 176 globalization 24; definition of 176; force of 152, 162, 164; and humanitarianism 23; of Japanese ODA 77 Golan Heights 1, 74, 80 Goto, K. 105–7, 189 Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) 64, 182 government support for NGOs 80, 186 governmental assistance 63 grant assistance 88 Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake see Hanshin Awaji Earthquake Greenway, S. 174 Gross National Product (GNP) 139 Group of 77 183 groupism 54 Gulf Crisis 2, 71–4, 86, 99, 101, 116, 131, 133, 153, 160, 165–6, 184 Gulf War 150, 152, 155, 167; survey during 92 Hagakure 34 Hakuaisha 50, 181 Hall, J. W. 49 Hammarskjöld, D. 67 Hanoi 87 Hanshin Awaji Earthquake 3, 83, 173 hard power versus humanitarianism 148 ‘hardware’ physical infrastructure 182 Hare, J. E. 175 Harman, G. 18, 175 Harvey, P. 37, 178 Hashimoto, K. 139–40, 142, 193, 195–6 Hatoyama 195 health: care 78; and nutrition of children and infants 64 Hebrew biblical teachings of love and sharing 14 Heginbotham, E. 27, 149 Held, D. 23 Heng Samrin government 86–7 Hidetada 177 Hideyoshi regime 177 Hiroshima 175 The History of Civilisation in England 39 Holland 180 Hook, G. D. 181 Hosokawa, M. 194 human-centred approach 147, 151, 156, 160; in development 97, 141; to foreign policy 153 human development index 141 human dignity, protection of 2

human rights 78; attitudes to 57; defence of 11; idea of 55, 158; ideas based on legal thinking 54; in People’s Republic of China 187; protection of 12; and terrorism 135; theoretical foundation 21; universal idea of 2, 152–3; violations suffered by East Timorese 105 human solidarity 38 humanitarianism/humanitarian: action 11–13, 28; assistance 1, 13, 63, 28; crises 13; growing 111; imperative 93; Japanese, findings on nature of from empirical study 120–1; nature of 93–9; new 3, 12, 20–5; purpose 1–2; relief activities 4; role 2; theoretical and conceptual bases of 28–9; use of term 10; values 30, 46–9, 96 humanity 113 Hume, D. 175 Hun Sen, Samdech Prime Minister 90, 92 Huntington, S. P. 149, 197 Hurst, G. C. 178 ICRC see International Committee of the Red Cross idealist expectations of Japan’s role 150–2 Iemitsu 177 Ikegami, E. 178 impartiality, principle of 25 Imperial family as fountainhead of nation 45 Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyoiku Chokugo) 44, 48–9 imperialism 26 imported humanitarian ideas 114 Inada, J. 138, 145–6, 195, 197 Inada, K. 35, 57, 75, 181 income gap 95 India 77, 155 indigenous humanitarian ideas 154 Indo-China refugees 85, 93; relief 68 Indo-China War 84 Indonesia 3, 86, 103, 154; ASEAN neighbours of 106; invasion of East Timor 104, 106; People’s Consultative Assembly 105; and Portugal, agreements between 189; Suharto’s New Order 104; suspension or reduction of ODA to 108; withdrawal of troops from East Timor 124 Inoguchi, T. 68, 72 Institute of Pacific Relations 178 INTERFET 105, 108 International Campaign to Ban Landmines 72

220

Index

international circumstances favouring assistance 139 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 24, 50, 174 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo 72 International Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) 87 international crimes 78 international humanitarianism: action in 1990s, characteristics in 176; and humanitarianism in Japan 122 international law, part of human rights 24 international NGOs see NGOs International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law) 89, 100, 109, 116, 118, 133, 150, 155, 166, 168, 184; enactment of 74–5; five principles 184 international political environment and public opinion in post-Cold War period 131–2 International Relief Union (IRU) 11 international security: issues 148; new paradigm 12 International Voluntary Aid 80 internationalization 5, 55 Iokibe, M. 69 Iraq Crisis 1–3, 165, 168–9; Japanese official assistance to 141 ‘Iraq Legislation’ in Japan 166, 168, 198 Irie, A. 194 Isaac, E. 15, 175 Ishiba, S. 166 Ishibashi 195 Ishii, M. 124 Islam 175 Ito, H. 46–7 Iwakura, T. 46 The Iwakura Mission 46–7, 59 Iwasawa, Y. 49 JANIC see Japanese NGO Centre for International Cooperation Japan: action in relation to East Timor political considerations 125–7; aggression before and during the Second World War 133; approach to human rights in Asia 98; bureaucracy 134; Cambodia Crisis see Cambodia; Cold War see Cold War; constitution 95, 114, 168; corporations 140, 147; defeat in Second World War 42; East

Timor see East Timor; ethics see ethics; feudal social system 35; foreign missions 116; foreign policy 136; foreign policymakers 152; Gulf Crisis see Gulf Crisis; hard power 150; Indo-China, invasion of 84; and Indonesia 106–7, 110; industrial capacity 138; international pressure 106–7; kinship system 35; loyalty-generated morality 59; mapping of future course 132–4; military role, limitation on 151; monarchs 178; moral considerations 159; moral practice or application, distinctive character of 41–2; motives for assistance 62; NGOs see NGOs; non-governmental assistance 110; ODA see ODA; pacifists and minimalists 149; people, socio-centric 53; PKO see PKOs and Japan; politics see politics/political conditions; Shintoism see Shintoism; ‘soft power’ influence 197; trade see trade; traditional methods of contributing to international efforts 132; volunteer holiday system 84 Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) 147 Japan Democratic Party 194 Japan–Indonesia relations 171–2 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 65, 109, 190 Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC) 69 Japan New Party 194 Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service (JOCS) 68 Japan Sotoshu Relief Committee (JSRC) 69 Japan–Southeast Asia relations 131 Japan–US alliance, system of 150 Japan–US Security Treaty 67 Japanese Americans 182 Japanese and Western countries, similarity of ethical principles between 41 Japanese assistance: in the 1950s–70s 62; accumulation of 85; attitudes to 61; diplomatic dimension of 142; to East Timor 108–10; evolution of 5; ‘globalization’ of 77; governmental, since the 1980s 75–81; history 67; as instrument of foreign policy 155; new dimension of 119–20; new trends and policy 61; non-governmental since 1980s 81–4; politics of assistance

Index 221 policy 140–3; in practice 115–20; regional allocation of 138; system 129 Japanese diplomacy: choices 133; mobilizing elements in 136; and politics 128, 130; from reactive to proactive 131; relationship with Indonesia 124 Japanese economy/economics: assistance in Cambodia 87; depression period 79; development 153; interests 167; to military power 161; own concerns 95; relationship with Indonesia 126; situation 97; stagnating 143; strength 156; superpower 132, 167 Japanese global and regional role 151; and global humanitarianism 152; and international policies 148–54; during post-Cold War era search for 163; in world, findings of public opinion polls on 4 Japanese government: declaration of human rights as universal value 97; policy on East Timor 108, 121, 123–5 Japanese humanitarianism 2–5; changes in government 91; in East Timor 102, 110–21; genesis of 30; ideas, an empirical study 111–14; ideas and practice 102; politics and nature of 153–4; in practice during modern period 49; upsurge of 163; values and ethical principles 4 Japanese human rights policy 154; ideas and attitude, five factors 57; values in international field 98 Japanese NGO Centre for International Cooperation (JANIC) 68–9, 81–2, 183, 186 Japanese Red Cross (JRC) 50–1, 95, 181 Japanese Regulations for Treatment of Russian Wounded and Prisoners of War, Russo-Japanese War 181 Japanese SDF see Self-Defence Force Japanese society 177; change in 137; class system 114; communitarian character of 158; ethics in 30, 159; humanitarian values 94; social construction and practice 120; social practice and humanitarian ideas 114; socio-cultural conditions 121, 154, 157; women, role in family system 132 Jen (great doctrine of humanity) 35, 178 JICA see Japan International Cooperation Agency Jimmu (Emperor) 177

Jimmu Foundation 45 Jin, sympathetic understanding of people 37 Jinken Kyoiku Centre (The Centre of Human Rights Education) 50, 180 Joynt, C. B. 175 JRC see Japanese Red Cross Judaeo-Christian societies 38, 58; comparing ethics between Japanese and 46; tradition 15, 17, 20 Judaism 16, 20, 175 Kadano Azumamaro 36 Kaifu, T. 91 Kakizawa, K. 186 Kamishima, J. 31, 33, 42, 47, 52–3, 58, 177, 180 Kampuchea 88 Kansai NGO Council 81 Kant, I. 175; on duty 39 Katsube, M. 54, 99; analyses of Japanese systems of thought 55, 57 Kawabe, I. 182 Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) 136, 145, 195 Keizai Kyoryoku no Rinen (The Ideas of Economic Cooperation) 76 Kenya 185 Keown, D. 37, 181 Khmer Rouge 86, 88 Kiefer, C. 53 Kis, J. 175 Kishi 195 Kitagawa, T. 183 Kitamura, M. 151, 197 Ko, care for one’s parents 37 Kobe 173 Kohno, M. 131–5, 186–7, 194, 197 Koizumi, J. 1–2, 100, 159, 163, 165, 173, 187, 198 Koizumi administration 165 Kojiki (Record of Old Things) 180 Kokka Sodoin Ho (Regulations of National General Mobilization) 50 Kokueki Yusen (Giving priority to State Interests) 50 kokutai (Japanese national structure) 49 Komura, M. 190 Kono, Y. 109 Korea 2, 167 Korean War 53, 181 Kosovo 1, 3 Kusano, A. 63, 134 Kuwait 141

222

Index

labour conditions 95 ‘land of the gods’ (Shinkoku) 31, 37 LARA see Licensed Agency for Relief of Asia lawsuits 54 Layons, E. L. S. 183 LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) 74, 134, 145, 194; 1955 System 134–5 Leader, N. 13, 197 Lebanon, conflict in 67 Lehmann, J.-P. 32, 34–5, 177–8 Leviticus 15 Li 178 Liberal Democratic Party see LDP Liberal Party 135, 194 Liberia 1 Licensed Agency for Relief of Asia (LARA) 64, 182 Lon Nol regime 86 lord of the clan see daimyo loyalty 58, 159; social relationships oriented by 59 MacFarlane, D. R. 198 McGrew, A. 23, 176 machine maintenance 65 MacIntyre, A. 56 McMahan, J. 27, 177 McMullen, I. J. 35–6, 178 Macrae, J. 13, 197 Mallock 178 Mapel, D. R. 177 Maritime Safety Agency 75 Marubeni 167 Maruyama, M. 39–41, 43–4, 48–9, 51–2, 178, 180; analysis of nationalism 44–5, 180 Maruyama, Prime Minister 78, 185 Marxist understanding of international relations 26 Masatsugu, M. 179 Matthew 15 media 156; role in awareness of public 177 Meiji period 31, 39–40, 46, 191; Constitution 49; Emperor 47 Meiji Restoration 41–4, 48–9, 51, 114, 159, 164, 177, 180 Mendlovitz, H. S. 183 mental autarky 177 Mermin, J. 177 Middle East, assistance for 77 Mikado (Emperor) and Tycoon (Shogun), dual rule of 43 military cooperation 150

military power 148 Mill, J. S. 175 Miller, D. 176 Minear, L. 12, 174–5, 192 Miner, L. 20 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 80 Ministry of Construction 80 Ministry of Finance see MOF Ministry of Foreign Affairs see MOFA Ministry of International Trade and Industry see MITI mission to the United States and Europe 180 MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) 139, 143–4, 146–7 Mitsubishi 167 Miyashita, A. 138–9, 155 MOF (Ministry of Finance) 65, 139, 143–4 MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 65–6, 96, 107, 124, 155, 188; on assistance 76, 138–9; on diplomatic issues 136, 197; Economic Cooperation Bureau 144; in four-entity system 143–4; grant support for grass-roots projects 80, 91, 186; ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ 185; human-centred development 78; ODA see ODA Mongolia 3 moral values/morality: application towards one’s superior, family and friends 59; conduct of rulers and public men 46; considerations in Japan’s actions 151; duty 58; education 41; in foreign policy 26–7, 39–40, 47; philosophy 16–20; purposes 150; relativism, theories of 175; responsibility, idea of 164 Mozambique 1, 74, 80 Muslim traditions 16 Myanmar 77, 98, 135 Mysliwiec, E. L. 90, 187 Nagasaki 175 Nagoya NGO Centre 81 Nakajima, T. 145, 196 Nakayama, T. 126 nation: basic human rights 49; loyalty to national authority 43 nation-state, traditional idea of 24 National History Education Research Committee 180 national interests 26 national sovereignty 45

Index 223 nationalism in Japan 43 Natsume, S. 45, 180 Neo-Confucianism 32 New Frontier Party 135 New Testament 15 New World Order 22, 28 NGO Directory 68–9, 183–4 NGOs 113, 160, 163, 176, 183, 185, 188; activities by 62–3; assistance scheme 101, 109; development in Japan 68; emergency and humanitarian assistance by 82; foreign 187; grass-roots organizations 156; importance of cooperation with 80; increase in 81; international 64, 81; involvement in Cambodia 90, 110; movement 72; support by government 81; three factors in growth of 83 Nguyen Duy Trinh 96 Nietzsche, F. 16 Nigeria 98 Nihon-shoki (Chronicle of Japan) 180 Nikkeiren (Japan Committee for Economic Development) 136 Ningen Sengen 53, 181 ninjo 37–8, 179; see also giri Nishigaki, A. 77, 141, 148 Nishikawa, J. 77–9, 185 Nitobé, I. 32, 36, 38, 42, 46, 48, 178; analysis of giri 40; on Bushido 34, 41 Nobel Peace Laureates 107 Nobel Peace Prize 104 Nobunaga regime 177 non-governmental assistance 68–71; and Japanese society 69–71; see also NGOs non-governmental organizations see NGOs Non-Profit Organizations see NPOs non-state actors, role of 176 Norodom Sinhanouk 86 North Korea 131, 135–6, 167 North–South confrontation 67 North–South imbalance problem 138 NPO Law 84, 100, 186 NPOs 84, 183 nuclear horror 151, 163 nuclear testing 155 Nuscheler, F. 154, 188 Nye, J. S. Jr 151; on ‘soft power’ 151 obligation 35 Obuchi, K. 78, 143, 187 Obuchi Initiatives 187, 196 Occupation of Japan by the Allied Force 95

ODA (Official Development Assistance) 63, 75, 142–4, 146–7, 153, 181; from the 1950s to the 1970s, defining elements 138; to Asia and the Pacific 63–5; budget 79; changing influences among players and assistance system 147–8; criticisms of Japanese 140–1, 146; domestic debate on philosophy and principles of 76; domestic political process 143–8; environmental considerations in 140, 195; export-oriented assistance of 140; globalization of 77; to Indonesia 108, 125; Medium-Term Target 65, 76; Mid-Term Plan 79, 195; New Plan 65; official classification of 181; philosophy and Japanese idea of assistance 65–7; policy in 1992 153; policy in assistance system 146–7; politics in 137–48; by region, trends in 78; as ‘strategic aid’ 143; strategic considerations of 139; system and its players 143–4; total spending 64; see also White Paper on ODA ODA Charter 76–8, 96–7, 129, 137, 141, 153, 160, 185; four principles of 76–7, 125, 185 ODA/GNP ratio 64, 143 OECF see Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund Official Development Assistance see ODA Ogata, S. 12, 85, 198 Ogyu, Y. 50 Okuma, K. 58 Old Testament (Hebrew Bible) 15 older people, growing proportion of 132 Onuma, Y. 54, 57 opinion surveys: on Foreign Relations 132, 173, 182–3; on humanitarian assistance 92–3, 116, 118, 163; on PKOs 117; on SDF 92, 173 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/DAC 185 Organization for Industrial, Spiritual and Cultural Advancement (OISCA) International 68 Ota, S. 36 Our Global Neighbourhood 24 Overseas Development Institute 176 Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) 65, 146–7 overseas markets 138 Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA) 65 Owada, H. 194

224

Index

Pacific Asia Resource Centre (PARC) 68–9 Pacific War 51 pacifist sentiments 1 Pakistan 68, 77, 155 PARC see Pacific Asia Resource Centre Parech, B. 15 parents 35 Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) 86–7 Parliament: basic law of assistance 142; members role in ODA 144–5 Parliamentary League on Japan–Cambodia Peace and Friendship 135 particularism 21, 55 peace conference: for Cambodia 92; at The Hague in 1899 50 Peace Constitution 150 peace treaty with Burma 182 peacekeeping operations see PKOs and Japan people’s perceptions see opinion surveys; Public Opinion Polls personal bonds 158 philanthropy 15 Philippines 83 Phnom Penh 86–7 PICC see Paris International Conference on Cambodia PKO Law see International Peace Cooperation Law PKOs and Japan 84, 110, 151, 169, 197; in Cambodia 116; females in 191; public opinion on 116–17; see also United Nations peacekeeping operations Plan International Japan (PIJ) 81 Plaza Accord 140 Pol Pot regime 86, 88, 90 politics/political conditions: conditionality 98; consensus 72–4; dimension of Japanese humanitarianism 130; in East Timor case 121–8; new dynamism 134–5; ODA in 1980s and 1990s 140–3; politicians and bureaucracy 134; relationship with Indonesia 129 population 78 Portugal 103–4, 189; colonial system 106; failure of fulfil responsibility 106–7 post-Cold War era 11, 14, 20, 22, 27–8, 130, 148–9, 162, 168; three major security issues in Japan 131 post-Restoration Japan 44 post-Second World War in Japan: development policy 181; diplomacy

138; domestic conditions in society 96; financial difficulty 182; humanitarian assistance from international community 159; reconstruction 62; social contexts, nature of humanitarian values in 93; social structure and ethical system 54–5; society 61; see also Second World War post-September 11 (2001) 5; humanitarian crises 1; and Japanese humanitarianism 165 Postal Saving for International Voluntary Aid 185 poverty 78 Pratt, M. L. 20 pre-Second World War diplomacy 149 Prime Minister’s Office surveys: diplomacy 132; foreign relations 173, 192; Japan’s role in the world 3–4; on PKOs 116–17; see also Public Opinion Polls Prince Norodom Sihanouk 90 Prince Shotoku 31, 177 prisoners of war 51 protection of human rights and contemporary humanitarianism 20 Psalms 15 public corporations 143 Public Opinion Polls: on economic assistance, reasons against 70; on economic cooperation, findings of 66, 94; on Foreign Relations 132, 173, 182–3; on humanitarian assistance 92–3, 116, 118, 163; on PKOs 117, 173; on SDF 92; on support of volunteer and non-governmental activities 183; see also Prime Minister’s Office surveys Quadrilateral Trade Ministers’ Talks 137 Quakers 175 Ramos Horta, J. 104, 107, 190 Ramsbotham, O. 11–13, 21, 27, 174–5 Ransome, J. 48 RDTL see East Timor; República Democrática de Timor-Leste realism: expectations of Japan’s role 149–50; ideas on morality 177; thinking 156 Red Cross 11, 50, 59, 174, 175; humanitarianism, seven principles in 174; Twentieth International Conference

Index 225 in Vienna 95; see also Red Cross Society of Japan Red Cross Society of Japan (JRC) 50 refugees 78 regional relations 55 Register of Conventional Arms 79 Rei, respect for others 37 Reilly, J. 195 relativist approaches to ethics 18–19 religious and cultural roots of Western ethics 14–15 Renaldo, R. T. 98 República Democrática de Timor-Leste (RDTL) 102–3 Research Council of Foreign Affairs 145 restoration after conflicts 78 rice cultivation 64–5 righteousness 35 rights: as concept 56; contemporary theories of 176; thesis assumption 175 Rix, A. 144, 196 Robertson, R. 25, 176 Rosenthal, F. A. 197 Ross, A. D. 15 Russia 131, 155, 180 Russo-Japanese War 50–1 Rwanda 1, 82–3 St Paul 15, 175 Saito, S. 182 sakoku policy of national seclusion 32, 177 Samuels, R. J. 27, 149 samurai class, legal abolition of 32 Sano, T. 50 Santa Cruz Massacre 104, 107–8, 125, 189 Sato, H. 45 Sato, M. 180 Satsuma rebellion 50 Save the Children Japan (SCJ) 81 Schmidt, C. 43 school textbooks, screening of 133 Scoble, H. 181 Scott, C. 104, 189 SDF see Self-Defence Force Sea of Japan 155 Second World War 5, 21, 51–2, 59–60, 71, 75, 77, 93, 103, 105, 150, 154, 164, 186; aggressor in 163; allied occupation after 164; contexts, issues from 131; defeat in 159; humanitarian assistance since end of 61; removal of emperor system 53; see also post-Second World War in Japan

security: issues in political field 136; situation in Asia 153 Self-Defence Force (SDF) 1, 67, 73, 84, 89, 92, 109–10, 150, 155, 160–1, 190–1; air 89, 166; engagement ‘under UN mandate’ 166; in Iraq 166, 168; ‘non-combatant areas’ 166; overseas 133; see also PKOs and Japan; United Nations peacekeeping operations Sen, A. 22, 178 September 11, 2001 165 Service for the Health in Asian and African Regions (SHARE) 81, 191 Shapla Neer (formerly the Help Bangladesh Committee) 68 SHARE see Service for the Health in Asian and African Regions shared-recognition 157 shared-understandings 154 Shimomura, Y. 77 Shin, truthful at all times 37 Shintoism 31, 35, 37, 45, 177, 179; hegemonic character of 59; pantheon 177; revivalism 180 Shiobata, A. 156 Shogun (military command) 33, 42–3, 49; settlement 34 Shue, H. 21, 57 Sierra Leone 1, 3, 82 Smith, R. J. 52, 179 social construction 28; and ethics 14 social movements 49 society: change in 137; communitarian character 158; contexts since the 1980s 71; ethical practices in 159; nature of humanitarian values 94; societies 154; socio-cultural context 154, 158, 165; vertical 54; women, role in family system 132; see also Japanese society Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge 175 Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 175 Socrates 16 Soeya, Y. 133, 149–50, 156, 197 ‘software’ field 79 Solferino 174 solidarism 174; norms 2, 11 Somalia 177 Sone, Y. 194, 197 Sophists 16 South America, assistance for 77 South Korea 133, 151

226

Index

South–South cooperation 65, 159 South West Civil War see Satsuma rebellion Southeast Asia 2, 133, 151 Soviet Union 86; former, countries of 197; invasion of Afghanistan 77 Special Committee for International Economic Cooperation 145 Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq see ‘Iraq Legislation’ in Japan Spruyt, H. 72, 132, 194 Standing Committee on Economic Cooperation 146 Sterba, J. P. 20, 175 structural realism 149 Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 79 Sudan 185 Sukselainen, S. 25, 176 Sumitomo 167 Sutterlin, J. 194 Suzuki, D. T. 178 Suzuki regime 185 Taika Reform 164 Taisho, Emperor 51; Democracy 49, 181; period 49 Takahashi, A. 109, 190 Takahashi, T. 189 Takeshita, N. 133 Takeshita, Y. 125, 128 Takeshita Principles 133 Tanaka, A. 68, 77 Taoist idea of practice 179 Taylor, J. G. 189 technical cooperation 64 Tei, care for the aged and those of a humble situation 37 tennosei (the emperor system), creation of 49 Teramoto 88 Thailand 83, 86 Third Committee on reconstruction and refugee relief 186 Third Symposium on Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region 79 Third World debt problem 142 Thompson, J. 175 Tianamen Square 98 tied assistance 138, 140, 146 Tojo, General 45 Tokaido Shinkansen (blue train) 182

Tokugawa Shogunate 37, 177 Tokyo Conference on Cambodia 87 Tomoda, S. 84, 91, 186 Toyama, K. 194 trade: balance 139; control 177; imbalance 146, 196; surplus 139–41, 155, 196 trading companies 146, 167 Traer, R. 181 transportation projects 182 triangulation, four basic types of 173 Turkey and Taiwan, disaster relief in 82 Umeoki 189 UN see United Nations UN PKO see United Nations peacekeeping operations UNAMET see United Nations Mission in East Timor UNCTAD see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP see United Nations Development Programme UNHCR see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Kingdom 106, 180 United Nations (UN): activities, public opinion survey on support of 182; centred diplomacy 67, 182; Development Decade 138–9; Environmental Development Summit 72; Fourth Committee in General Assembly 106; Framework Convention on Climate Change 72; Humanitarian Affairs officer 115; Human Rights Committee 125, 193; mandate 1; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 11; organizations 64; Security Council 150, 155, 167, 187; Summit for Social Development 78; technical cooperation budget of 64; Thirtieth General Assembly meeting 124; Trusteeship Fund 108; Universal Declaration of Human Rights 176; Volunteers from Japan 173; World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, 1993 97 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 64 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 72 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 139, 182; Japan’s trade balance 195

Index 227 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 103, 188 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 12, 109, 190; refugee assistance 85 United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) 104, 108 United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) 1, 4, 68, 74, 89, 92, 109, 150, 160, 194; in Cambodia 187; Japan in 89, 116, 166, 168–9; nuclear proliferation 135; see also Self-Defence Force United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 105, 109–10, 188 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 89 United Nations World Summit for Social Development 185 United States 79, 84, 86, 131, 137, 140–1, 180; aid budget of 65; government under emergency humanitarian aid programmes 64; influential factor in Japan’s decision-making process 168; military support of Indonesia 189; policies and strategies 132; security umbrella 138, 151; withdrawal from Vietnam 106 United States–Japan Defence Guidelines, 1978 135 United States–Japan security framework 131 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25 of the 175 universalism/universality 21, 38, 55, 113; humanitarian impulses and institutions 18, 120; idea of humanity 42; principle of 11; and relativistic natures of Japanese humanitarianism 121 ‘untied’ assistance 140, 147 US see United States utilitarianism 17, 22, 28, 176 utility, principle of 16 values 30, 46–9, 96; global 23; humanitarian, (non-universal relativistic) characteristics of 120; non-universalistic nature of values 154; people’s internal 56; source of 43; techno-economic 149; trans-national 40; universal nature of 159 Victoria, F. de 15 Vienna Declaration 1993 176

Vietnam 86; occupation 90 ‘voluntary’ and ‘charitable’ activities, people’s views on 71 Voluntary Fund for Advisory Services and Technical Assistance 185 Voluntary Postal Saving for International Aid of Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 186 volunteerism 3, 51, 113, 163, 173 wage inequality 94 wage-labour 174 war, rules of 17 Warkentin, B. 154, 188 warriors: and daimyo, relationship between 33; loyalty-oriented morality 48 Watanabe, M. 186 Watanabe, T. 126 Watanabe, Y. 92, 184, 187 Watsuji, T. 52; ideas about Japanese ethics 52 Weiss, G. T. 12, 20, 27, 174–5, 192 Western ideas: chivalry 179; ethics 175; humanitarianism 30, 158 Westernization of Japan 42 WFP (World Food Programme) 109, 188, 190 Wheeler, N. H. 152 White Paper on ODA 78, 88, 185 Williams, B. 16, 22 Wiseberg, L. 181 women, role in society family system 132 Women’s Lib 94 Wong, D. 18, 175 Woodhouse, T. 11–13, 21, 27, 174–5 World Bank 64, 87, 190 World Commission on Global Governance 24 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 72 World Health Organization (WHO) 64 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen 72 World Vision 191 World Vision Japan (WVJ) 81 Wright, M. 27 Xanana Gusmão 104 Yamada, T. 45 Yamaga, S. 33, 35, 38, 177–8; analysis of the Bushido 34

228

Index

Yamamoto, T. 34, 37–8, 68, 72, 93, 178, 186 Yanagihara, T. 142 Yanagisawa, K. 198 Yasukuni Shrine 133 yen loan 65, 187, 195, 197; to Africa 185; to Cambodia 87–8; Cuba 185; to India 182

Yokota, Y. 67–8, 95, 183 Yoshida, S. 138, 195 Yoshida administration 138 Yugoslavia 82–3 Zen Buddhism 32, 35, 37; teaching 179 Zimbabwe 185