Trade, Empire and British Foreign Policy, 1689-1815: Politics of a Commercial State (War, History and Politics Series)

Trade, Empire and British Foreign Policy, 1689–1815

This new volume examines the influence of trade and empire from 1689 to 1815, a crucial period for British foreign policy and state-building. Drawing on extensive research in British and foreign archives, Jeremy Black asks how far, and through what processes and to what ends, foreign policy served commercial and imperial goals during this period. The book is particularly interested in the conceptualisation of these goals in terms of international competition, and analyses how the contours and contents of this conceptualisation altered during the period. It also offers an assessment of how the relationships between trade, empire and foreign policy were perceived abroad and how this contributed to an analysis of Britain as a distinctive state, and with what consequences. This book will be of much interest to students of British imperial history, diplomatic history and international history in general. Jeremy Black is Professor of History at the University of Exeter. His books include The British Seaborne Empire (2004) and George III (2006).

War, history and politics series Series editor: Jeremy Black Professor of History, University of Exeter

Trade, Empire and British Foreign Policy, 1689–1815 The politics of a commercial state Jeremy Black

Trade, Empire and British Foreign Policy, 1689–1815

The politics of a commercial state

Jeremy Black

First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2007 Jeremy Black All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-96450-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0–415–39606–9 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–96450–0 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–39606–6 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–96450–7 (ebk)

For Steve Smith and Jeannie Forbes

Contents

Preface Note on dates, spelling and titles List of abbreviations 1 Introduction

viii ix x 1

2 Ideas of trade and empire

17

3 The shaping of policy

55

4 The government response

85

5 1689–1714

107

6 1714–39

121

7 1739–63

136

8 1763–83

161

9 1783–1815

175

10 Conclusions

197

Selected further reading Index

211 215

Preface

Trade, empire and foreign policy link key themes in the development of Britain and in its importance within the world. The link of trade and empire with foreign policy is one that has not received appropriate coverage in recent decades. Although with important exceptions, work on foreign policy has focused on power politics and Continental Europe, and imperial studies have concentrated on images of ethnicity, gender and sexuality, or on the politics of regulation of trade. This book, instead, focuses on the relationships between foreign policy on the one hand and trade and empire on the other. I am most grateful to bodies who have supported archival research, particularly the University of Exeter, which has provided both time and financial support for getting to archives. Bill Gibson helpfully commented on a section in draft; and I have also benefited from advice from Mark Overton and Chris Whatley. Thanks also to Wearset Pre-Press Book Services for all their help in the production of this book. I have been inspired by the work of Patrick O’Brien. It is a great pleasure to dedicate this book to two friends I much admire and whose company I greatly enjoy.

Note on dates, spelling and titles

The New Year is always taken as starting on 1 January. Until the reform of the calendar in 1752, Britain conformed to the Julian Calendar. Dates recorded in this calendar are referred to as old style and designated (os). All other dates are in new style, the Gregorian calendar, which was 11 days ahead. Spelling and punctuation have been modernised. Where possible, well-established anglicised forms have been used for both place and personal names. The length of noble titles and of titles of office has dictated their shortening. Place of publication is London unless otherwise indicated.

Abbreviations

Add. AE. AN. Ang. AST. Beinecke BL. Bod. C(H) Chewton Cobbett CP. CRO. CUL. CumbP. Dresden EcHR Eg. EHR FO. GK. HHStA. HL HMC Ing. KAO. LM. MD. MS Munich

Additional Manuscripts Paris, Ministère des Relations Extérieures Paris, Archives Nationales Angleterre Turin, Archivio di Stato New Haven, Beinecke Library, Department of Manuscripts London, British Library Oxford, Bodleian Library, Department of Western Manuscripts Cholmondeley Houghton papers Chewton Hall, Chewton Mendip, papers of James, 1st Earl Waldegrave W. Cobbett (ed.), Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England (36 vols, 1806–20) Correspondance Politique Country Record Office Cambridge, University Library Cumberland Papers Dresden, Hauptstaatsarchiv, Geheimes Kabinett, Gesantschaften Economic History Review Egerton Manuscripts English Historical Review Foreign Office Grosse Korrespondenz Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv San Marino, California, Huntington Library Historical Manuscripts Commission Inghilterra Maidstone, Kent Archive Office Lettere Ministri Mémoires et Documents Mount Stuart, papers of John, 3rd Earl of Bute Munich, Hauptstaatsarchiv, Bayr. Gesandtschaft

Abbreviations xi

NA. NAS. NLA. os Polit. Corr. RA. Sbornik SP.

London, National Archives, formerly Public Record Office Edinburgh, National Archives of Scotland Canberra, National Library of Australia, Department of Manuscripts old style R. Köser (ed.), Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen (46 vols, Berlin, 1879–1939) Windsor, Royal Archives Sbornik Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva (148 vols, St Petersburg, 1867–1915) State Papers

Chapter 1

Introduction

Every man who has the honour to be a representative in Parliament of any part of this nation ought to make it his business to understand the theory of trade. A Second Letter from a Hawker and Pedlar in the Country to a Member of Parliament (London, 1731), p. 6

The extent to which foreign policy served commercial and imperial goals is of major interest today, as the role of government policy and support in the rise of British power, and, more generally, the reasons for this rise are subjects of academic consideration. This aspect of foreign policy was also of interest to contemporaries, as the issue was rarely far from political contention. Foreign policy indeed was one of the most important aspects of state activity. Foreign policy was of concern to contemporaries, not simply because of its consequences, which ranged from national independence, in the face of repeated invasion attempts, to the price of goods affected by commercial competition, but also because it was thought to reveal the operations of the political system and what were believed to be the key factors influencing national policy and capability. In part, this was because foreign policy was also significant as the forcing house of notions of national interest and the prime sphere for their contest. The debate over policy led to the articulation of ideas, and helped associate them with political groups, although that association, in turn, made the analysis and articulation of concepts of national interest far more complex. For contemporaries, it was important to ask how far, through what processes, and to what ends, foreign policy served commercial and imperial goals, and these are also significant questions today. It is particularly instructive to consider the conceptualisations of these goals in terms both of international competition and the views of domestic society, and also how the contours and contents of these conceptualisations altered during this period. Trade and empire therefore served both as goals and as metaphors for wider anxieties and aspirations, in what were seen as an intensely competitive international system

2 Introduction

and a fast-changing domestic society and culture. The understanding of what this meant to contemporaries is important, as ‘realist’ issues were embedded within processes of policy formulation and discussion that were affected by the wider cultural context, broadly defined. In particular, policy formulation needs to be considered in terms of the contested field of what is now known as strategic culture. This area falls within the current interest in the emergence of a public sphere, or spheres, during the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, groups and interests mentioned in this book, such as mercantile lobbies and the press, have been the subject of research from this perspective. This study contributes to the discussion of their importance, and thus to an understanding of the ways in which strategic culture was moulded. In terms of perception, it is also instructive to consider how the relationships between trade, empire and foreign policy were perceived abroad, and how this contributed to an analysis of Britain as a distinctive state. As such, it is an important facet of the discussion about British exceptionalism which is so important to the evaluation of national history. This, however, also brings in another aspect of the realist dimension, as such apparent exceptionalism has to be considered alongside the situation in other countries. This was particularly the case with France. The French empire grew rapidly at the time under review and became Britain’s main competitor, clearly replacing the United Provinces (Netherlands), with which England had fought three wars in 1652–74. Traditional interpretations stress the French reliance on state-controlled colonial expansion, in contrast to British commercially driven laissez-faire. This is an approach conducive to eighteenth-century notions of British exceptionalism, and the conclusions drawn from them, but it is a comparison that has come under review recently and that benefits from re-examination. At the same time, amidst the multiple complexities of comparing French and British economic differences,1 it can be argued that the French state had to take a greater role because economic circumstances, social structures and social ethos were less favourable to consumer-driven economic growth than in Britain.2 French officials indeed were convinced that, thanks to agents, such as the industrial inspectorate created in 1669 and answerable to the Council of Commerce, they had more control over their commercial world than their British counterparts. Gerard de Rayneval, a key official in the French Foreign Office, who had served as envoy in London in 1782–3, talking to William Eden, the British commercial negotiator with France and a longserving MP, in 1786, ‘allowed that France had facilities in such a business which we had not; and that we were more bound to advert to prejudices; to adopt certain managements’. Two years later, William Pitt the Younger, the First Lord of the Treasury, noted that, whereas in France, the king could readily establish commercial regulations, in Britain it was necessary to rely on Parliamentary sanction.3 At the same time, there was also a sense that France only wielded so much control. In 1772, the British ministry displayed restraint in tackling what they regarded

Introduction 3

as illicit French trade in Gambia and, the following year, Emmanuel-Armand, Duke d’Aiguillon, the French foreign minister, assured William, Fourth Earl of Rochford, the British envoy, that French traders to Africa had been ordered not to act contrary to treaty, that if these people, who traded entirely upon their own bottom, did anything contrary to treaty, if they came among us, and interfered with our trade, we might seize them and punish them as we pleased, and might be very sure they were not supported from hence and would not be claimed.4 Policy as well as perception is important. There is an understandable sense that commercial and colonial considerations ought to be important in the formulation and execution of foreign policy, and that the role of commerce, and interest in its growth and in colonial expansion, were ‘structural’ features of policy that played a significant role in decisions. However, it is by no means easy to assess the importance of these considerations. Discussion of trade provides a way not only of looking at commercial policy and lobbying, but also of considering the impact of other aspects of government and politics, and this is even more the case with imperial policy. The implications of British strategic culture for foreign policy need to be considered alongside the consequences, for both mercantile and imperial policy, of diplomatic commitments and concerns. If the latter are not seen in the round, there is a danger that the role of trade or empire will be exaggerated. Indeed, that is a characteristic of some of the literature, with its understandable tendency to argue that the subject of research was necessarily the most important factor in policy. In this book, there is no such automatic assessment. Instead, there is an approach to policy that is more multifaceted. The analysis of chronological shifts then feeds through into an assessment of the nature of the British system. The multi-faceted character of policy is also displayed by the problems posed by the use of evidence, most pointedly in the case of selective quotation. For example, in 1729, James, Second Lord Tyrawly, the bellicose envoy in Lisbon, who had a military background, pressed for a firm response to Portugal in a commercial dispute, arguing that naval capability ought to be employed in order not simply to settle the dispute but also to ensure a more generally satisfactory outcome. He reported that it was impracticable for Portugal to do anything, that can prevent a squadron of the King’s [George II’s] ships from coming to an anchor at the King’s [John V of Portugal’s] palace, whenever His Majesty [George II] pleases . . . I think this business may be so turned upon the Portuguese as to be of great service to us to examine into our treaties with them . . . our treaty with them has for many years been in a manner set, and our merchants have no privileges, but such as the Portuguese please to allow them . . . the appearance of a squadron here would make them come into any terms.

4 Introduction

Tyrawly was keen that this should be a regular occurrence and that every British squadron sent to the Mediterranean should visit Lisbon ‘for these people are not to be trusted longer than the rod is held over them’.5 Thomas, Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, in contrast, urged compromise, arguing that the importance of the Portuguese trade was accentuated by Anglo-Spanish differences, which, indeed, were then serious.6 Tyrawly’s willingness to suggest force was unusual as far as relations with European states were concerned, but other envoys were happy to propose pressure through commercial intimidation. One form was by suggesting import substitution from within the British dominions. In 1728, John Snow wrote from Stockholm, the Swedes would in all likelihood now readily comply in redressing any reasonable complaints our Court should think fit to make, they being very much terrified by a report spread about here lately of there being a project now on foot at London for importing iron from our plantations in America.7 All could agree on the importance of trade in this period. It was, in effect, part of the official ideology of foreign policy, like maritime superiority and national security. This importance was the theme of ministerial speeches and of diplomatic instructions, and has been taken up by historians keen to explain the contours of foreign policy. Pro-government writers made much of ministerial care for trade,8 and merchants sought such backing. Thus, the loss of 13 of the American colonies in 1775–83 was followed by requests from British merchants for the establishment of a consular system there.9 And yet there were also frequent complaints by, and on behalf of, merchants about a lack of governmental support, both in general and with reference to specific issues. This contrast is an appropriate topic for study. Several sources of difficulties in the relationship readily emerge. First, mercantile issues were frequently complex, not least because they involved disparate lobbying. Second, and related to this, successive ministries faced the difficult problem posed by the Continental commercial policies confronting the British merchants in ways that varied, especially in response to the international political situation. The protectionism and rise of trading companies seen on the Continent had a definite political edge as it reflected resentment of the British position. It was difficult in the face of such challenges to reconcile mercantile and political interests, and usually ministers put the emphasis on the latter. In part, this reflected a degree of bias against merchants, whether social or arising from a frequent disinclination to respond automatically to lobbying, but, on the whole, the key factor was that political issues were regarded as primary. At the same time, there was a tendency to try to see political and commercial issues as in harmony, as, in 1738, when peace between Denmark and Hamburg was sought for the benefit of British trade and in order to ensure the peace of Lower Saxony.10

Introduction 5

Furthermore, ministers and diplomats could contrast British policy with that of other states on the basis of the British government’s need to respond to commercial interests. Thus, in 1735, Walter Titley, the envoy in Copenhagen, wrote of the Austrian envoy ‘his court has little concern in trade and is very willing to oblige the Danes, but we have an interest which leads us to look further into the matter’.11 At the same time, whatever their views on the particular political culture of individual foreign states, British ministers felt that they could appeal to the commercial interests of other powers. In 1725, Newcastle drew up a draft dispatch in which he instructed the envoy in Florence to persuade the Tuscan ministers to continue to offer support, reminding them ‘of the benefits their people enjoy by their trade with us’.12 Yet, despite this, there was a general view that foreign powers preferred to place difficulties in the way of British trade, rather than to search for mutual advantage. In 1729, Consul Edmund Allen complained from Naples about ‘the continual vexations and oppression the British navigation and commerce receive from Custom House officers’.13 As an instance of methodological problems, British neutrality in the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5) raises the wider issue of the general difficulty of assessing the role of commercial factors (or, indeed, any other individual criterion) in British policy, and it is instructive to consider the neutrality in this light. Due to the absence of any series of documents revealing governmental ideas comparable to the Mémoires et Documents of the French foreign ministry or the minutes of the Austrian Privy Council, it is difficult to substantiate contemporary, or later, claims or suggestions of influence. It is, for example, probable that British neutrality, in breach of its treaty obligations to Austria under the Second Treaty of Vienna (1731), owed at least something to a determination to preserve grain exports during a period of agrarian difficulties, fiscal problems and political uncertainty, but the evidence is only suggestive. Arable farming was badly hit by a structural disequilibrium between production and consumption that owed much to demographic stagnation and improvements in agricultural efficiency, a situation seriously exacerbated by a series of good harvests in 1730–3 followed by an average one in 1734. Higher production was reflected in falling grain prices, that of a quarter of wheat in Cambridge at Michaelmas falling from a high point of 54 shillings in 1728 to 47 in 1729, 34 in 1730, 24 in 1731, 20 in 1732 and 21 in 1733, before rising to 33 in 1734 and 36 in 1735. Low prices led to grave difficulties in the rural economy, with rents falling and arrears becoming common.14 In this context, the massive increase of British grain exports in the mid1730s took on great significance.15 The sustained and widespread conflict of the War seriously hit grain production in several areas of the Continent. One of the traditional sources of European grain exports, Poland, was badly affected by the conflict, which included wholesale devastation of large tracts of the country, particularly due to the Russian invasion. Furthermore, the protracted siege of the major Baltic port of Danzig (Gdansk) by the Russians in 1734 harmed trade.

6 Introduction

In the Mediterranean, the combination of bad harvests, particularly in Spain, and intensive warfare in Italy, hit local production and shipment of grain, for example, from Sicily to Spain. The increase in British grain exports was not simply linked to the conflict in Europe, as it preceded the outbreak of the war, but the increase of exports during the conflict attracted considerable newspaper comment in Britain, and also concerned the French government.16 Nearly all the grain was shipped in British vessels, such as the Pelican which sank off Cadiz in December 1733 while taking wheat from London to Livorno in Italy. British neutrality combined with the absence of a substantial Italian and Iberian mercantile marine to ensure a boom in shipping circles. The General Evening Post of 19 January (os) 1734 reported that 300 of the 519 foreign merchant ships that had entered Cadiz in 1733 were British. The Post Boy of 21 January (os) 1735 gave the comparable figure for 1734 as 596 out of 1002. The demand for British grain was not restricted to the south and east of England, and the press created a sense of national activity. Reports recorded exports from Dublin and Bristol. The press also noted an increase in wheat prices. The General Evening Post of 3 January (os) 1734 wrote of the rise in the price of wheat of Reading and Gloucester, adding ‘from whence is evident the benefit of this exportation’. A sense of national prosperity, and of resulting centrality in the international system, were captured in a piece printed on 8 October (os) 1734 in the General, London and Whitehall Evening Posts and the London Journal of 12 October (os) 1734, ‘Her [Britain’s] influence shall preserve, as her harvest sustains remote nations: for the produce of the mines of Peru is at present bartered for that of her fields, and wealth fetched from both Indies to enrich her farmers.’ That day, the Weekly Register offered an instructive guide to values when it declared that ‘the increase of trade is better news than a victory, and a merchant a more honourable character than a soldier’.17 Iberia and the Mediterranean also continued to be important markets for British cloth exports.18 This well-publicised export of grain had fiscal and political consequences. Though the government had to spend revenue on the bounty for grain exports, the high level of exports helped to keep the rural economy buoyant enough to pay taxes without too much difficulty. On 16 November (os) 1734, Wye’s Letter reported, ‘It is now computed that the article of corn only has brought this nation, in less than two years, above two millions sterling in specie.’ This was of particular significance because of the fiscal situation. The failure to pass the Excise legislation in 1733 had produced fiscal difficulties and these were exacerbated by the need to increase military preparedness in the troubled international system. In 1735, the land tax was raised by a shilling (five new pence in the £), and larger grain exports made it easier to pay this, while also increasing the amount of specie in Britain, making it easier for the ministry to borrow money. The political consequences are harder to evaluate. Ministerial vulnerability

Introduction 7

after the defeat of the Excise scheme, and in the face of the general election of 1734, may have made the government unwilling to harm the economy by declaring war on France, Spain and Sardinia for attacking Austria. Such a declaration would have made trade difficult. As it was, in November 1733, insurance premiums on all ships bound to the Mediterranean rose considerably. The 1734 elections were a major challenge for the government, and many of the contests were fought in the major grain-exporting areas, East Anglia and Sussex, the opposition Tories winning one of the county seats in Norfolk, although the opposition challenge to the county seats was seen off in Sussex. Both East Anglia and Sussex contained the seats of leading Whig politicians.19 There is no evidence that grain exports were a factor in the election, but the opposition made great play of their claim that ministerial policies were responsible for economic difficulties, while the press endlessly repeated the theme that grain exports were good for the economy. The political dimension is therefore inconclusive. In the absence of definite evidence, it is impossible to state that concern about the electoral implications of rural stagnation was a factor in persuading the ministry, particularly Sir Robert Walpole, the First Lord of the Treasury, who had major interests in Norfolk, to oppose royal pressure to intervene in the conflict. Nevertheless, the key role in the production and export of grain played by some constituencies whose vote was of particular importance to leading ministers, such as King’s Lynn, is notable. Across the period, those concerned with the landed interest tended to favour peace.20 The long-term economic importance of the exports is unclear, but the role of short-term political events in economic development should not be slighted. A buoyant foreign market presumably encouraged the planting of wheat, and possibly the money earned acted as a spur to agricultural innovation. The difficulty of assessing the relationship between trade and foreign policy in this episode offers a good instance of a wider problem. Analytical problems need to be borne in mind whenever connections are offered in this or other works, as there is not generally the space to discuss the evidence, which is frequently only suggestive. This can be demonstrated anew with grain exports, albeit in this case with the key issue being a refusal to countenance exports and contemporary disagreements over the causes. In 1789, when the poor harvest of 1788 led to bread riots in an increasingly volatile France, Jacques Necker, the leading French minister, wrote to William Pitt the Younger seeking the assistance of the British government,21 as the flour he sought could be obtained only if the British government suspended the corn laws. In Britain, in order to maintain the domestic supply, exports of wheat or flour were prohibited when the price of wheat climbed to 44 shillings a quarter. Due to the mediocre harvest of 1788, however, British grain stocks were low and the price was considerably higher. Discussed by the Board of Trade on 2 and 3 July 1789, Pitt being present at both sessions, the French request was rejected, the envoy, La Luzerne, being informed by Pitt that this was due to the situation in Britain, not least uncertainty during a wet summer about the forthcoming harvest.22 La Luzerne and

8 Introduction

Necker, however, were critical, and the decision was attacked in the House of Commons by William Wilberforce.23 On 14 July, the price of grain peaked in Paris and the Bastille was stormed. British policy was explained by ministers in terms of fears of famine at home,24 and indeed France had encountered difficulties for similar reasons elsewhere earlier in the century, when seeking to arrange grain supplies from abroad,25 but there was a widely held conviction in France that the British government was instigating disorder there.26 It is, indeed, unclear how far British policy reflected concern at the prospect of Necker strengthening France.27 The following year, it is similarly difficult to judge the reasons behind Britain’s firm line in the Nootka Sound Crisis with Spain over trade on the Pacific coast of the North Atlantic. The claim that this firmness was encouraged by domestic factors such as pressure from public opinion and the imminence of a general election, has been queried on the grounds that there is no evidence that Pitt held such anxieties, and that his policy can be accounted for without them.28 Another instance of the problem of assessing the roles of trade and empire occurs with the outbreak of war with the USA in 1812: the Americans declared war; the British government and public did not want it. It can be argued that the American declaration was largely due to disputes over trade, specifically American anger with the British government’s determination to prevent the neutral Americans from trading with hostile France, but there was also much American suspicion of relations between the Native Americans and the British in Canada, and this accentuated concern about an unsettled frontier. Furthermore, there was a more general sense, particularly among the Jeffersonians, that the Revolution was unfinished because Britain remained powerful and that this power threatened American interests and public morality, as Britain was a corrosive, but seductive, model of un-American activity. More generally, both in Britain and in foreign states, policy consideration rested largely on informal discussion, within government and also between government and outsiders; and evidence of either is scanty. References to the fact that matters could be cleared up in conversation and hence needed no notation are not encouraging for scholars.29 It was not normal in government circles to keep a diary, while correspondence discussing meetings was limited. As a result, the few surviving accounts are particularly valuable, not least because of what they indicate about wider processes. In 1719, Martin Bladen, an active member of the Board of Trade, was informed by a subordinate about the views of William Lowndes, Senior Secretary to the Treasury and like Bladen, an MP, Mr. Lowndes sent to speak with me this morning. I find by what he said to me that he has altered his mind, and is now against taking off the duties on American lumber or timber, upon a supposition that it is not properly naval stores, and that if it should be done it would ruin our trade to the Northern Crowns [Denmark and Sweden]; for if we do not take off their goods, they

Introduction 9

will not take off ours, and besides if we supply ourselves from our own plantations, there will of consequence the less come from the Northern Crowns, and so the duties on their timber will be considerably lessened to the prejudice of the revenue. Lowndes wanted to see Bladen at the Treasury.30 Popple’s account is of value as it shows a prominent civil servant taking a role, and also indicates the range of factors considered, including fiscal yield and the ability to keep bilateral trades going. What is not discussed is also interesting. There was no reference to colonial opinion, nor, more obviously and significantly, to foreign policy. The First Lord of the Treasury at this juncture, Charles, Third Earl of Sunderland, played a major role in foreign policy discussions, and, in 1719, George I was seeking to organise an anti-Russian alignment, and to secure the co-operation, for this and other reasons, of Denmark and Sweden. Thus, yet again, the documentary trace is, at best, indicative. More generally, the evidence of policy linkage is infrequent. Nevertheless, sometimes, the relationship between diplomatic moves and commercial and/or colonial goals could be presented from within government in an instrumental fashion, as in 1791, when Francis Drake, envoy in Copenhagen, argued that a subsidy be used to woo Denmark from Russia, and that this be made acceptable by an agreement to admit British manufactured goods.31 This proposal, however, came to nothing. In the case of empire, problems are also posed by important issues of language. The word empire was commonly used in seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury England to describe authority or control over trade and the sea, as much as, if not more than, colonial extent. Looked at differently, colonial value and security were largely dependent on control over trade and the sea, and this emphasis was therefore logical, as well as being an historical legacy. Trade was more commonly the focus of political and public attention than overseas territories, at least until the Seven Years’ War (1756–63) thrust colonial expansion, and, subsequently, governance, into the role. This reconceptualisation of empire to include an emphasis on trans-oceanic rule and jurisdiction brought forward tensions between commerce and empire, trade and territory, and yet also apparently offered ways to reconcile them, with empire seen as both market and revenue source, and trade as a way in which the imperial economy could be developed harmoniously and profitably.32 Both trade and empire were also politicised. The growing celebration, in particular from the 1730s, but with earlier anticipations, of the patriot merchant, essentially a self-reliant individual, helped make trade a potent political goal and platform, and was directly linked to the pursuit of maritime hegemony and imperial advantage. Nevertheless, however much they might accept mercantile advice, ministries rarely yielded to commercial lobbies if to do so would entail serious diplomatic difficulties. Yet ministers were also aware that trade was a potent political symbol and slogan and that it could lead to political complications. Foreign observers frequently saw Britain as being swayed by

10 Introduction

commercial considerations, rather than simply by mercantile influences. The French envoy Courtin reported in 1676 that London ‘gives a great impetus to the affairs of this kingdom’.33 In late 1761, Charles III of Spain argued, incorrectly, that mercantile opposition to the cost of war with Spain, at the same time as Britain was fighting France, would prevent the ministry from going to war.34 He was correct that the British government did not want to fight Spain, in part due to the state of public finances, but wrong that it would be unable to do so, and war broke out in January 1762. Commercial considerations certainly helped affect the parameters within which foreign policy was discussed, but it was equally true that the general direction of policy affected trade. This direction was one of seeking stability in Europe and expansion elsewhere. Britain was a ‘satisfied’ European power, not seeking territorial acquisitions there other than the naval bases of Gibraltar and Minorca. Her Continental interventions were essentially designed to resist or redress what were believed to be threatening developments, including the danger of war over the Spanish Succession (1698–1700), Peter the Great of Russia’s apparent threat to the Baltic balance of power (1716–21), Philip V of Spain’s attempts to overthrow the Utrecht Settlement (1718–20), French successes in the early stages of the War of Austrian Succession (1741–4), the danger that France and Prussia would threaten the subsequent peace (1748–53), the challenge posed by French influence in the United Provinces (1787), the threat of rising Russian power in Eastern Europe (1789–91), and the challenges from Revolutionary and Napoleonic France (1793–1815). Some of these challenges were seen as threatening British trade. This was particularly true of Peter the Great’s dominance of the Baltic,35 which led to a measure of public support for George I’s confrontation with Russia in 1719–21, a policy whose origins were not in fact commercial. Bourbon expansion into Italy also led to anxiety about commercial implications, including the argument that, if there was no need to fear Britain in Europe, there would be a readiness to thwart her transoceanic interests.36 Within Britain, there was widespread support for commercial growth outside Europe and for colonial acquisitions, although there was no blueprint for world conquest. Furthermore, the apparent drawbacks posed by colonies, especially the cost of defending them, and the possibility that migration to them might weaken Britain, were stressed. This combination of attitudes and policies was generally, but not invariably, beneficial to trade. Britain had the smallest army of the major powers, and, alongside the scholarly emphasis on Britain as a fiscal-military state and empire,37 she was at war with other European powers (including Turkey) for fewer years than Austria, France or Russia. British ministries were conscious of the economic value of keeping taxes low, although the burdens of war, in the shape of the national debt (the largest item of peacetime expenditure) and military expenditure (the second largest item), which included the high costs of shipbuilding and naval infrastructure, ensured that per capita taxes were higher than in more populous France. Had British policy been more aggressive, the

Introduction 11

situation would have been detrimental. Growing economic strength enabled Britain to finance increasingly heavy public expenditure, but war finance strained the monetary system, depressed general standards of consumption, and distorted trade and manufacturing, even though certain activities, such as metallurgy and shipbuilding, benefited. War also entailed the uncertainty that very much affected mercantile speculation. As the British Journal of 28 March (os) 1730 noted, ‘Trade is the life of this nation’s prosperity, so credit is the life of trade.’ When, in 1773, James, Second Earl of Fife wrote to his factor expressing his hope that British naval preparations should not lead to war, he observed ‘stock jobbers, Jews [who helped arrange loans to the government] and [government] contractors make by that, but you and I are out of pocket.’38 He could have added, to this list of those who did not gain from war, those merchants affected by privateers, convoying and higher insurance rates. The last were an indicator of international tension, as in 1770 when they rose during the Falkland Islands crisis with Spain.39 The problems posed by war indeed were such that some trades with hostile powers were occasionally allowed to continue in wartime, for example, that between Jamaica and the Spanish colonies in 1719 as a way to obtain silver.40 Applauding the ministry’s settlement of differences with Spain in the Treaty of Seville of 1729, the British Journal of 31 January (os) 1730 itemised the advantages of peace, No pressing our men [forcing them to serve in the navy], and putting us to the trouble and charge of protections to prevent it; no embargo upon trading vessels till the fleets are manned; no high premiums for insurance against enemies, no excessive demurrages, waiting in remote harbours for convoys, to the ruin of the voyage; no large freight to ships, high and extravagant wages to seamen. Indeed the settlement with Spain ensured that the freight charges per ton on goods from Jamaica dropped from £5 to £3 10 shillings.41 War was a problem even if Britain was not involved. There could be benefits from the sale of military supplies to combatants, but the disruption that hostilities brought to trade was more serious, although it could also provide opportunities for seizing opportunities, as in 1716 when Algiers and the Dutch clashed.42 In 1730, London manufacturers produced supplies for the projected Spanish expedition to Tuscany but, at the same time, fear of this expedition led British merchants to leave Livorno.43 Trade, foreign policy and government credit were all closely linked in a world of report in which suggestions of international difficulties speedily affected them. Officials could be sceptical, George Tilson, Under Secretary in the Northern Department, noting in 1718, ‘The jobbers have been running down the stocks; upon surmises, as they give out, of great troubles from France etc. I knew not where they got the secret, neither do I mind those chants of Exchange Alley.’44 In practice, the impact of bad news could be very damaging to government and to the wider

12 Introduction

mercantile and financial community. It also affected their dependents and the economy of shifts and expedients in which the poor found casual work, a point made in 1757 when the impact of the loss of Minorca on Turkey merchants was traced to chimney-sweeps and others in similar occupations.45 At the level of individual merchants, however, commitments could be spread, so that opportunities could be gained in both peace and war. For example, in 1757–8, John Tucker, the key political figure in Weymouth, and an MP, had interests both in the port wine trade and in privateering from Guernsey.46 In general, ministries were wary about the idea of colonial conquest, as they were aware of both the military costs and the likely diplomatic drawbacks. This was part of a reluctance to engage in war that was characteristic of many, but by no means all, ministers. Henry Legge, an MP who had experience of government, as first a Lord of the Admiralty and then the Treasury, threw attention on different views of fame when he wrote to Henry Pelham, First Lord of the Treasury, in 1748, a minister with your intentions and possessed of the means, as you are; who will take every opportunity of retrenching expenses, reducing interest, adding to the Sinking Fund, and paying our debts as fast as is at all consistent with public safety, will in a few years deserve better of Great Britain and make a much greater figure himself than all the heroes whose ashes repose in Westminster Abbey have ever done. Pelham himself argued that ‘it is not in my power to undertake another session of Parliament upon the foot of expense we are now going into’,47 a clear reference to his wish for an end to the war with France and Spain. In 1762, William, Second Viscount Barrington, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, warned that war with Spain would hit the economic and fiscal system, adding ‘commerce may eventually find its way into enemy lands but is always interrupted at the beginning of hostilities’.48 Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, there was more support for a policy of colonial expansion as interest increased in lands unoccupied by other European powers, largely around the Pacific. Nevertheless, it would be rash to identify mercantile opinion with publicists for colonial expansion, or politicians supporting such policies. Most merchants sought profit rather than a colonial presence that had to be protected. Indeed, the colonial disputes that exacerbated Anglo-Bourbon relations tended to arise from the actions of local colonial and military officials whom it was often difficult to control from Europe, as in the Anglo-French disputes over Tobago in 1749 and Turks Island in 1764, or from the actions of merchants and settlers who were not members or representatives of elite trading groups, for example the British traders of the 1730s who flouted the monopolistic aspirations of Spanish imperial authorities or the logwood cutters on the coasts of Honduras and Nicaragua who similarly exacerbated Anglo-Spanish relations.

Introduction 13

Foreign policy favoured trade without being the slave of traders. Colonial gains brought pride, but their acquisition was not a central theme of policy. Instead, the preservation of colonial possessions, really or apparently endangered, such as British North America in the early 1750s or British India in 1784–7, was a much more important objective, although this could lead to a dangerous ‘forward’ policy, as in North America in 1754–5. The bulk of colonial gains were acquired in the Seven Years’, French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, conflicts whose initial purposes were not major colonial conquests. This contrast between aim and outcome indeed acts as a reminder of the methodological difficulties glanced at in the discussion of grain exports. Moreover, naval strength had crucial economic consequences, not least in ensuring continuity in overseas trade,49 a point repeatedly made by contemporaries, but that is not the same as arguing that this was the sole cause or consequence of this strength. In particular, the strategic needs focused on national sovereignty were crucial to the need for naval strength throughout a period that in part was delimited, at least from 1689 to 1805, by continual threats of invasion. This indeed affected the force structure, doctrine and tasking of the navy. Robert, Fourth Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, argued in 1756 that the navy was the key defence of empire, the possessions of the crown of England are so extensive, so distant one from another, and from their mother country, and the land force of this kingdom, from the particular circumstances of our constitution, so little proportioned to the defence of such extended dominions, that the marine is necessarily employed to garrison, in a manner, its extended dominions.50 To advance this point is not to deny the role of trade, but simply to point out that unilateral patterns of exposition lack analytical depth and rigour. War brought not only foreign challenges to British trade, in the shape of privateering or trade restrictions, each of which entailed diplomacy as much as naval action or intimidation,51 but also challenges from within the British system, especially the seizure of sailors for service in the navy, which hit shipping hard.52 Far from an aggressive thrust to naval policy, there was, in peacetime, a cost-driven concern to keep the navy small and this even ensured a willingness to consider negotiating trans-oceanic naval reduction with the French and Dutch.53 Yet, peacetime discussion about the navy looked toward wartime competition and it was widely believed that Britain enjoyed a comparative advantage if it was possible to focus on a maritime struggle with the Bourbons,54 rather than having to face other international challenges and military commitments as well. Thus, in this particular strategic mindset, foreign policy was designed to ensure that such a struggle could be waged, and both strategic and commercial benefits were seen as likely to result. Whether made at the expense of Western or non-Western powers or people, colonial gains could be seen both as a security for British goals and yet, also, as a

14 Introduction

threat to good relations with other powers that could indeed challenge such goals. In part, this was a matter of the relationship between formal and informal empire, direct and indirect power, and, in part, timing played an important role. As far as expansion at the expense of other Western powers was concerned, peacetime ensured a reliance on empire-building via informal empire with such powers, and territorial gains only from non-Western powers. Wartime offered very different opportunities, which provided a basic narrative to imperial growth as far as conflict within the wider West was concerned. Yet, the results of these gains could make it difficult to consolidate the British position. This was seen in 1787 when James Harris privately suggested to Pitt the Younger that Britain moderate the terms it had forced on the Dutch in the recent War for American Independence, particularly ‘the free navigation of the Eastern seas’ and the acquisition of the Dutch base of Negapatnam. He argued that these terms led to Dutch concern about British intentions to share in the Dutch position in the trade of the Moluccas and in Sri Lanka, and that it was best to win support by easing fears and encouraging ‘affection’ through ‘gentle usage’.55 Paradoxically, French success in 1795–6 in forcing Spain and the Dutch into their camp removed this option and gave the British unprecedented opportunities for imperial expansion. Alongside these opportunities came a semi-Darwinian conviction that the British were best placed to benefit commercially from territorial expansion. Charles, Lord Hawkesbury, President of the Board of Trade, responded to the capture of Cape Town from the Dutch in 1795 by writing, ‘I am persuaded that the merchants of this country, will by their speculations, and by the force of their capitals, make in a short time this settlement more valuable to Great Britain than it ever was to the Dutch.’56 Hawkesbury expressed a sense of qualitative factors as affecting trade, not least the benefit enjoyed by a free society in that it attracted capital as a safe haven, a theme that repeated the argument made by Whig commentators discussing Bourbon France a century earlier. Commenting on the low price of bullion in Britain in 1795, and on the exchanges being in Britain’s favour, Hawkesbury attributed this to an inflow of capital and argued that, because the United Provinces was in French hands, it was no longer regarded as a safe place for investments and could no longer act as a general exchange.57 The political character and dimension of trade was a frequent theme of commentators who saw it as a crucial aspect of national identity as well as success.

Notes 1 See, for example, F. Crouzet, Britain Ascendant: Comparative Studies in Franco-British Economic History (Cambridge, 1990); N.F.R. Crafts, ‘Macroinventions, Economic Growth, and “Industrial Revolution” in Britain and France’, EcHR, 48 (1995), pp. 591–8. 2 P. Benedict, ‘More than Market and Manufactory: The Cities of Early Modern France’, French Historical Studies, 20 (1997), p. 538. 3 CUL. Add. 6958 no. 105; NA. FO. 27/20 fol. 327. 4 NA. SP. 78/285 fols 259, 264, 78/289 fols 7, 25, 35.

Introduction 15 5 Tyrawly to Newcastle, 26 June, 17 July, 7, 26 Aug., 1729, NA. SP. 89/35 fols 181–2, 192–3, 196, 204. 6 Newcastle to Tyrawly, 17 June (os), 8 July (os), 9 Sept. (os) 1729, NA. SP. 89/35 fols 179–80, 185, 212–13. 7 Snow to George Tilson, Under Secretary in the Northern Department, 3 Jan. (os) 1728, NA. SP. 95/40 fol. 49. 8 Hyp Doctor, 9 July (os) 1734. 9 Francis, Marquis of Carmarthen, Foreign Secretary, to Pitt, 8 Ap. 1786, NA. PRO. 30/8/151 fol. 36. 10 Harrington to Wych, 10 Jan. (os) 1738, NA. SP. 82/59 fol. 11. 11 Titley to Tilson, 10 May 1735, NA. SP. 75/67 fol. 55. 12 Newcastle to Francis Colman, 27 Aug. (os) 1725, NA. SP. 98/83. 13 Allen to Newcastle, 28 Jan. 1729, NA. SP. 93/5 fol. 140. 14 T.S. Ashton, An Economic History of England: The Eighteenth Century (London, 1955), p. 239; G.E. Mingay, ‘The Agricultural Depression, 1730–50’, Agricultural Historical Review, 8 (1955–6), pp. 323–38; E.L. Jones, Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1974), pp. 27, 74; A.J. Little, Deceleration in the Eighteenth Century British Economy (London, 1976), pp. 25–41. 15 For grain exports, see also D.J. Ormrod, ‘Anglo-Dutch Commerce 1700–1760’ (PhD, Cambridge, 1973), pp. 204–45, 408. 16 Maurepas, Minister of the Marine, to Silva, 29 Aug. 1733, AN. AM. B7145 pp. 379–80. 17 For trade to the Mediterranean in 1734, see Eg. day book of (?) George Proctor, Norwich, Norfolk CRO. Beauchamp Proctor papers, BEA 278, 438X. 18 Newcastle Courant, 11 Jan. (os) 1735. 19 Henry Pelham to Newcastle, 29 Sept. (os) 1733, BL. Add. 32688 fol. 421; B. Williams, ‘The Duke of Newcastle and the Election of 1734’, English Historical Review, 12 (1897), pp. 448–88. 20 Anne Worsley to Thomas Robinson, 26 Ap. (os) 1748, Leeds, Archive Office, Newby Hall mss 2833 no. 86. 21 Necker to Pitt, 25 June, La Luzerne to Pitt, 28 June, John, Third Duke of Dorset, British envoy in Paris, to Francis, Fifth Duke of Leeds, Foreign Secretary, 25 June, 6, 9 July 1789, NA. PRO. 30/8/161 fols 23–4, FO. 27/32 fols 191, 230, 260; Dorset to Pitt, 9 July 1789, KAO. C183; F. Aftalion, The French Revolution: An Economic Interpretation (Cambridge, 1990), p. 42. 22 Pitt to La Luzerne, 3 July 1789, NA. PRO. 30/8/102 fol. 180; D.G. Barnes, A History of the English Corn Laws, 1660–1846 (New York, 1961). For public sensitivity to prices, A. Jenkins, Bread and the British Economy c. 1770–1870 (Aldershot, 1995). 23 La Luzerne to Armand, Count of Montmorin, French foreign minister, 7, 28 July 1789, AE. CP. Ang. 570 fols 76, 173; Eden to Pitt, 27 Aug. 1789, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fols 147–8; Cobbett, 28, cols 226–30; Andrew Stewart to Sir William Pulteney, 19 July 1789, CUL. Add. 6958 no. 695. 24 Hawkesbury to Dorset, 16 July 1789, KAO. C182; La Luzerne to Montmorin, 1 Jan. 1790, AE. CP. Ang. 572 fol. 3. 25 Marquis de Clermont d’Amboise, French envoy in Naples, to Charles, Count of Vergennes, French foreign minister, 7, 14 Mar., 25 Ap. 1778, AN. KK. 1393. 26 La Luzerne to Montmorin, 29 Oct. 1789, AE. CP. Ang. 571 fol. 98; Dr Charles Blagden to Henry, Second Viscount Palmerston, 29 Jan. 1790, Beinecke, Osborn Shelves C 114. 27 R. Blunt (ed.), Mrs Montagu, ‘Queen of the Blues’ (2 vols, Paris, 1923) II, 237. 28 J.M. Norris, ‘The Policy of the British Cabinet in the Nootka Crisis’, EHR, 70 (1955), pp. 572–5; P. Webb, ‘The Naval Aspects of the Nootka Sound Crisis’, Mariner’s Mirror, 61 (1975), p. 135; J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt: The Years of Acclaim (London, 1969) I, p. 559 fn. 1. 29 Regarding Liverpool complaints about contributions levied on captured Caribbean islands,

16 Introduction

30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

Charles, Lord Hawkesbury, President of the Board of Trade, to John Tarleton, MP for Seaford, 28 Nov. 1794, BL. Add. 38310 fols 126–7. Popple to Bladen, 28 Jan. (os) 1719, BL. Stowe 246 fol. 214. Drake to James Bland Burges, Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, 5 Feb. 1791, Bod. Bland Burges papers, vol. 34 fols 8–9. N.F. Koehn, The Power of Commerce: Economy and Governance in the First British Empire (Ithaca, 1994). AE. CP. Ang. 119 fols 22–3. A. Christelow, ‘Economic Background of the Anglo-Spanish War of 1762’, Journal of Modern History (1946), p. 26. Charles Whitworth to Tilson, 29 Ap. 1719, NA. SP. 90/14. Henry Davenant, envoy in Genoa, to John, Lord Carteret, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 19 Nov. 1722, NA. SP. 79/14. J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783 (Berkeley, 1989); L. Stone (ed.), An Imperial State of War: Britain from 1689 to 1815 (London, 1994). A. and H. Tayler (eds), Lord Fife and His Factor (London, 1925), p. 78. Gentleman’s Magazine, 40 (1770), p. 440. Charles Delafaye, Secretary of Embassy at Paris, to James, Earl Stanhope, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, 16 June (os) 1719, NA. SP. 43/61. Norwich Mercury, 23 May (os) 1730. Bubb, envoy in Madrid, to John, Second Earl of Stair, 2 Nov. 1716, NAS. GD. 135/141/6; cf. Board of Trade to George I, 24 July (os) 1724, NA. SP. 35/50 fol. 312. Perceval newsletter, 27 June (os), 9 July (os) 1730, BL. Add. 27981 fols 157, 165. Tilson to Whitworth, 10 Jan. (os) 1718, BL. Add. 37366 fol. 390. Two Very Singular Addresses to the People of England (London, 1757), pp. 5–6. Tucker business papers, Bodl. MS. Don C. 125. Legge to Pelham, 24 May 1748, Nottingham, University Library, Clumber papers (hereafter Nec) no. 573; Pelham to Philip, Lord Hardwicke, Lord Chancellor, 21 Aug. (os) 1748, BL. Add. 35423 fol. 55; John, Fourth Earl of Sandwich, envoy in The Hague, to Pelham, 1 Aug. 1748, NeC 672. Barrington to Newcastle, 3 Jan. 1762, BL. Add. 32933 fol. 50. D.A. Baugh, ‘Naval Power: What Gave the British Naval Superiority?’, in L. Prados de la Escosura (ed.), Exceptionalism and Industrialisation. Britain and Its European Rivals, 1688–1815 (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 235–6, 256–7. Holdernesse to Andrew Mitchell, envoy in Berlin, 25 June 1756, NA. SP. 90/65. For diplomatic representation and privateering, 2 Feb. 1762, NA. SP. 75/114 fol. 39. Re. 1718, O. Wood, West Cumberland Coal 1600–1982/3 (Kendal, 1988), pp. 58–9; Richmond to Pitt, 5 July 1787, NA. PRO. 30/8/170 fol. 81. Carmarthen to Dorset, 1 Nov., Dorset to Carmarthen, 2 Dec. 1784, NA. FO. 27/13 fols 135, 220. Daniel Hailes, Secretary of Embassy at Paris, to Carmarthen, 11 Nov. 1784, BL. Eg. 3499 fol. 59. Harris to Pitt, 19 Oct., Harris to William Grenville, 21 Dec. 1787, Winchester, Hampshire CRO., Malmesbury papers, vol. 207. Hawkesbury to Commodore John Blankett, 13 Dec. 1795, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 146. Hawkesbury to Samuel Garbett, 17 Feb. 1795, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 134.

Chapter 2

Ideas of trade and empire

I need not insist on the attachment of the mercantile part of our nation to the present establishment, who, as they are the most useful, so they have the greatest sway and power of any distinction of subjects; their interest naturally leads them into principles of freedom . . . the more they are known to think, the greater is their horror of popery and absolute dominion. Whitehall Journal, 18 December (os) 1722

Trade greatly increased in this period. This was part of a major growth in European trade, but it was one in which the British share rose disproportionately. Statistics have to be used with care – allegedly half the tea and tobacco consumed in Britain was provided by smugglers, and indeed, in 1773–83, the flexibility and cost advantages offered by smugglers made it possible that the amount of tea smuggled in was twice that of the amount entering legally. Furthermore, diplomats complained about deficiencies in the customs statistics about exports.1 As a result of such issues, it was possible for contemporaries to disagree about the state of trade, let alone commercial trends. For example, in 1729, there was disagreement among the British Factory (merchant community) in Lisbon as to whether the balance of trade was on the British or the Portuguese side. This undercut the bold claim by the British envoy that ‘the balance is considerably on our side’.2 Foreign statistical records are also weakened by the deficiencies of their customs services, often more seriously so than for Britain.3 Furthermore, available statistics might provide scant information on the eventual destination or source of trade. Customs figures recorded direct trade, and they provided only limited indication about its indirect counterpart. This was particularly important in the case of trade with the Portuguese and Spanish empires. The lack of adequate Portuguese trade statistics makes it difficult to assess, for example, the British role in the trade with Brazil, Portugal’s most important colony, but it was clearly believed to be considerable, and the world of report was more important to contemporary policy discussion than more recent statistical research, valuable as the latter is. In 1716, a French report from Oporto claimed that three-quarters of the goods on the Portuguese ships

18 Ideas of trade and empire

bound for Brazil were British and that the British obtained the gold brought back from Brazil, which was then the leading world source of gold.4 The Post Boy of 21 February (os) 1723 reported that the Brazil fleet was to sail from Lisbon, ‘having on board large quantities of woollen goods, mostly manufactured in England’. Indeed, there was a sense of Portugal as an informal member of the British commercial empire. As the St James’s Journal of 23 February (os) 1723 pointed out, ‘whatever their laws may be against our carrying away their gold from Portugal, our merchants have always understood the Portuguese to be only their factors for bringing it to them from the Indies’. In this and other cases, the extent to which laws were broken or bent provides an important explanation of why customs statistics are frequently of limited value. Russian trade statistics are made problematic not only by smuggling, but also by the practice of recording goods by the nationality of the merchant handling them, a system made more troublesome for scholars by the extent to which British merchants took out Russian citizenship.5 Similarly, as the London Journal of 16 February (os) 1723 pointed out, many French goods entered Britain via Hamburg and were listed as Hamburg goods. The reliability of statistics was particularly problematic in wartime with bans on trade leading both to an increase in smuggling and to the reflagging of ships. In 1744, there were ostensible sales of British ships to Altona or Hamburg merchants so that trade could continue under the flags of Denmark or Hamburg. This was an advantage against French privateers and also for continuing trade with France.6 Whatever their faults, the available statistics provided indications of trends,7 and indicated growth. Exports rose from £4.1 million per annum in the 1660s to £6.9 million (1720), £12.7 million (1750), £14.3 million (1770) and £18.9 million in 1790, and that during a period of only modest inflation.8 See Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The marked revival of trade after the War of American Independence (1775–83) led to confidence in the British economy, to an improvement in public finances, and to a marked reduction in the overseas indebtedness that had grown sharply in the 1770s, peaking in the early 1780s.9 Imports rose from £6 million (1700) to £6.1 million (1720), £7.8 million (1750), £12.2 million Table 2.1 Destinations of exports, England and Wales (Figures in £ million. Annual averages for each five-year period)

North Europe Baltic Portugal and Spain Mediterranean Africa East Indies British West Indies North America

1701–5

1726–30

1751–5

1776–80

3.12 0.30 0.73 0.60 0.10 0.11 0.31 0.27

3.53 0.20 1.55 0.85 0.20 0.11 0.47 0.52

5.13 0.29 2.14 1.00 0.23 0.79 0.71 1.30

3.90 0.37 1.25 0.75 0.24 0.91 1.24 1.30

Ideas of trade and empire 19 Table 2.2 English re-exports (figures in £ million) 1700 1710 1720 1730 1740

2.13 1.57 2.30 3.22 3.09

1750 1760 1770 1780 1790

3.23 3.71 4.76 4.32 4.83

Note 1710, 1740, 1760 and 1780 were war years.

(1770) and £17.4 million (1790). More important than the numerical trends was the diversification of markets and products. The relative importance both of woollen exports and of trade with nearby areas of Europe declined, while that of oceanic trade increased. Average annual exports to North America rose from £0.27 million in 1701–5 to over £2 million in 1786–90, and this export growth helped in the process of industrial transformation.10 Trade was assisted by the degree to which the British Atlantic ‘shrank’, as a result of improvements such as the development of postal services and the invention of the helm wheel which dramatically increased rudder control on large ships.11 More trade meant more ships, because, thanks in large part to the protective system created by the Navigation Acts, the British very much made use of their own shipping for trade, this including colonial shipping. In wartime, however, the use of foreign-owned shipping revived if it enjoyed the advantages of neutrality.12 English shipping tonnage rose from 340,000 in 1686 to 421,000 in 1751, 523,000 in 1764, 608,000 in 1775, 752,000 in 1786 and 2,477,000 tons in 1815. There was also a marked rise in direct trade, rather than using intermediary traders, particularly the Dutch, or intermediary ports. The role of the Dutch remained long important, for example in Anglo-French trade in 1721, and, more generally, in the financing of the British Atlantic.13 Nevertheless, whereas trade with the Danish possession of Norway had been handled via the Dutch, a direct trade, particularly in timber imports to Britain, developed in the eighteenth century. Individual entrepreneurs played a key role, particularly the Collets and the Wallaces in Bergen.14 Similarly, new direct links with Germany were established in the linen trade, with direct shipments from Hamburg and Bremen.15 This shift, however, was threatened when the Dutch were neutral in conflicts involving Britain, a point made by the Tory Thomas, Third Earl of Strafford, a former diplomat, in the Lords in 1718, when he complained that banning the import of iron directly from Sweden would benefit Dutch intermediaries.16 The move away from intermediaries was important to the development and self-confidence of British commerce. Direct trading required more capital resources and expenditure, and a more sophisticated organisational structure, but it enabled the British to bear the bulk of the transaction costs themselves and also to take much of the profit. Growth more generally led to a sense of success and confidence. In 1728, Consul Edmund Allen reported from Naples,

20 Ideas of trade and empire

Our trade hither . . . never more flourishing in the most beneficial branches to Great Britain than at present, the quantity of our woollen manufactures and of our other products as well as of salt fish of all sorts exceeding considerably in this year and the last, the imports of former years, and our shipping also meets with good encouragement, being almost solely employed in the transport of all merchandize from this kingdom to other markets, the British colours being preferred to those of any other nation and the commerce of all the Mediterranean chiefly carried on under them.17 This was not simply a matter of diplomatic bombast. The following year, a French memorandum noted large British cloth exports to Italy, including Naples, at the expense of French products, while the French chargé d’affaires in London reported the same in Spanish, Portuguese and Italian markets.18 A sense of commercial power was also conveyed by many of the reports on trade carried in the press. The Flying-Post of 25 January (os) 1718, noted that, from the previous January to November, 180 British ships had arrived in the River Duero in Portugal (for which Oporto is the port), compared to 12 from France, 9 from the United Provinces and 20 from Portugal. Similar figures for Portugal were frequently printed, and conclusions were drawn. The Present State of Europe, in its issue of January 1730, provided a list of the merchant ships that had come into Lisbon in 1729, indicating that 301 out of the 534 were British (71 were Portuguese, 54 French), adding The reader may judge thereby of the trade of the several nations of Europe with the Portuguese, and be more and more convinced that it is the common interest of the English and Portuguese to cultivate and improve the friendship, commerce and good correspondence established between the two nations.19 Throughout the period, British merchants and diplomats actively sought to expand Continental markets, particularly by encouraging exports and direct trade. In 1734, it was even suggested that fish be exported to Ancona if Livorno could not be used.20 This was a striking instance of the role of trade, as Ancona, which had become a free port in 1732, belonged to the Papal States, which recognised the Jacobite (Stuart) claim to the British throne, and not the Hanoverian dynasty. The British background to expansion and efforts varied, not only with regard to economic circumstances but also with reference to political and cultural suppositions. In the reigns of William III (1689–1702) and Anne (1702–14), there was a sustained attack on what were presented as urban and mercantile pathologies incompatible with the true rural and agrarian values of Englishness. Although, in part, this attack drew on tensions between ideas of virtue and those of commerce, specifically the asserted incompatibility of civic humanism with the moneyed interest,21 focus and energy were provided by political issues

Ideas of trade and empire 21

and conjunctures. Thus, in 1696, the attempt to found a Land Bank using landed wealth as a credit source, was a politically linked (and unsuccessful) act directed against the Bank of England. More generally, this was a politicised argument, with the Tories, irrespective of the extent of Whig support among the landed order, deliberately associating themselves with rural and agrarian values, and Tory commentators seeing towns as reliant on the disruptive solvent of money and linked to both moral and religious dangers, including religious nonconformity. Tory commentators focused on the dangers of money, rather than trade, Jonathan Swift, in his key work on foreign policy, The Conduct of the Allies (1711), referring to a set of upstarts, who had little or no part in the [Glorious] Revolution, but valued themselves by their noise and pretended zeal when the work was over, were got into credit at court, by the merit of becoming undertakers and projectors of loans and funds: these, finding that the gentlemen of estates were not willing to come into their measures, fell upon those new schemes of raising money, in order to create a monied interest, that might in time vie with the landed, and of which they hoped to be at the head.22 Disquiet about the monied interest continued throughout the period, and helped fuel opposition to the prerogatives of the major chartered companies. Prompted by the national debt and other aspects of what would later be termed the Financial Revolution, the role of money proved a concern for many writers in the first half of the century.23 Criticism of trade as a whole, however, was marginal, and increasingly so after the reign of Queen Anne. It is indicative that in 1733 it was two exiled Jacobites who corresponded on the matter, the journalist Nathanael Mist distinguishing between money and wealth, and writing ‘Poverty is the sure consequences of trade . . . the produce of lands and the labour of cultivating and manufacturing them is the only riches of a nation, which trade draws away and barters for trifles.’ Mist also criticised the national debt.24 It was more common, however, for critical commentators to distinguish, in looking at London, between a corrupt Court and aristocracy at its West End, with their commerce in vice, and the more acceptable commercial metropolis with its emphasis on trade. This for example was the theme of the novelist Henry Fielding.25 Another Whig, the playwright Nicholas Rowe, in his The Tragedy of Jane Shore (1714), presented a London merchant acting an honourable part, in support of ‘the common ties of mankind’, in opposition to a vicious nobleman. The acceptability of trade, as opposed to what could be stigmatised as speculation or usury, was also seen in the extent to which ‘new men’ from trade and industry entered the elite. This became more pronounced in the late eighteenth century, as economic growth threw up more opportunities. Parliamentary entry helped register and confirm this process.26 Whatever their views on the ethics of merchants, politicians could agree in praising the virtues of trade, and they could see the advantage of expounding

22 Ideas of trade and empire

foreign policy in the light of commercial considerations. ‘Commerce, upon which the riches and grandeur of this nation chiefly depend’, claimed George I in the royal speech to Parliament in October 1721. The speech continued by seeing this essentially in terms of fiscal policy, arguing, It is very obvious that nothing would more conduce to the obtaining so public a good than to make the export of our own manufactures, and the import of the commodities used in the manufacturing of them as practicable and easy as may be; by this means the balance of trade may be preserved in our favour, our navigation increased, and greater numbers of our poor employed. In 1753, the royal speech to Parliament referred to ‘the security of the nation, and the support of its trade and commerce, on which the essential interests of this kingdom depend’. Such themes can be found so frequently in the Parliamentary speeches, diplomatic correspondence, and press and pamphlet literature of the period that they can be regarded as normative. ‘Trade is of that general use and importance to every country that whatever relates to it can never be unseasonable, nor too often discussed’, declared the Craftsman, the most influential opposition newspaper, on 28 December (os) 1728. In 1764, George Grenville, then First Lord of the Treasury, was warned that a change in linen tariffs would hit trade ‘and whenever that declines the wealth, power and influence of Great Britain must proportionably be weakened’. Adam Smith linked ‘riches and power’.27 Contemporaries were agreed that foreign trade served to increase the wealth of the nation. It was also seen as key to public finances, not least through customs revenue, and this led to great sensitivity toward foreign competition, as from the Ostend Company.28 The value of trade drew on prudential considerations but also on moral and intellectual concepts resting on organic notions of society in which trade appeared as a vital fluid and a means and expression of health. Prudential arguments used more mechanistic arguments, in which balance of trade and currency flows played a greater role, and the thrall of mathematics encouraged the calculation of advantage. These, however, were not competing interpretations, but, rather, different means of expressing a common body of ideas.29 Another idea was of ‘the chain of commerce’.30 The interacting role of trade, the circulation of money, and political stability, was captured in a draft letter of the late 1710s from William, First Earl Cowper, or his wife Mary, to Andreas Gottlieb von Bernstorff, a key adviser to George I. In this, it was argued that a fall in exports would lead to an economic stagnation that would, through a lack of the necessary circulation, produce a convulsion in the body politic; paper currency was seen as no substitute.31 A former Whig Lord Chancellor, Cowper opposed the interventionist nature of George I’s foreign policy. Foreign trade was also seen as fulfilling important social functions, particularly by providing employment. This was a traditional view, and one of the key

Ideas of trade and empire 23

examples was a long-established export trade, that of woollen cloth. Trade therefore was seen as providing employment to the poor, a point made by the Portuguese Secretary of State, Mendonça Corte-Real, in 1735 when he pressed for help in the crisis with Spain and drew a direct link from the trade, for which Portugal was a major British market, to the cloth industry and then both to employment of the poor and to help to navigation.32 Disruptions of trade in wartime led to unemployment rising, as in the East Anglian textile industry during the war with Spain in 1718–20. Sensitivity over the textile trade owed much to competition and the resulting weakness of textile prices in the face of imports from Central Europe and India.33 The French government similarly was very concerned about its cloth industry.34 Samuel Holden, Governor of the Russia Company, applauded exports, ‘as an employment for their subjects, and the turning so much of their natural produce into money, which would otherwise waste or lie useless’.35 The value of the cloth trade led to criticism both of the export of wool36 and of the import of calicoes from the East Indies. The former was a long-established theme and the latter a recent one, but both were combined in a petition from the Worcestershire weavers presented to the House of Commons in November 1718 and reported in the local newspaper.37 Furthermore, the cloth trade provided the worthy example of linking agriculture and industry. It thus served to contest claims of differences between the landed and the mercantile sections of society, and, instead, to suggest that they shared common interests. The value of land and the state of the rural economy, each of which was depressed for much of the period prior to the mid-eighteenth century, were held to depend on the ability of the manufacturing and mercantile sector to process and export rural products, principally wool and grain. Ministers were well aware of this, not least because they were also landowners. In 1730, Sir William Strickland informed Colonel Cathcart, a royal equerry, that ‘they never had so great a demand for their coarse cloths in Yorkshire as this year’ due to demand for the Russian army.38 Strickland was a Yorkshire landowner and a former Lord of the Treasury who was then Secretary at War. As an example of the interconnectedness of land and trade, his wife, Catherine Sambrooke, came from a family that was prominent in the East India trade and his brother-in-law was also an MP. A former MP, Sir Matthew Decker, a banker who had been Governor of the East India and South Sea Companies and an Assistant of the Royal African Company, asserted ‘the strong connection in point of interest between land and trade’, in a pamphlet published in 1749.39 The cloth trade also served to demonstrate the tensions latent in commerce between the desire to export, and thus limit foreign protectionism, and to import and thus restrict its domestic counterpart. Horatio Walpole, a key diplomat, captured the range of possibilities this posed when writing of France, then an ally, in 1728, ‘our neighbours are industrious to strip us of our woollen manufacture, so that I think it would be worth our attention to endeavour to make reprisals on the linen one’. John Hedges, an MP and former envoy to Sardinia, was at that time advocating another form of import substitution in the shape of

24 Ideas of trade and empire

introducing white mulberry trees so that production of raw silk could be established in Britain.40 Calls for economic support, including protectionist pressure, made much of the issue of employment. This was particularly so in the development of the silk industry. Building on the pioneering efforts of Thomas Cotchett, Thomas Lombe, who imported Italian silk-throwing machinery and patented it in 1718, erected a large water-driven factory on the River Derwent at Derby in 1721. He pressed the government for assistance in securing the supply of raw silk, but the British envoy was ready to see the variety of interests at play, not least employment in Piedmont. He referred to Lombe’s pressure as a mere private concern. It is true that the bad harvest of raw silk last year, and the extract by English merchants of what remained in the country of former growths had occasioned so great a dearth that most of the silk mills, and several thousands of poor people, were destitute of work: upon which His Sardinian Majesty [Victor Amadeus II], very wisely and charitably, forbid the exportation of unwrought silk, that his own poor might find employment; but at the same time took off the duty from thrown silk . . . perhaps our merchants are better pleased with this exemption from duties on the thrown silks, than with the liberty of exporting it raw. It is true that Mr. Lombe’s mills may want employment by it for some time, but, only so far as regards Piedmont silks . . . The Marquis del Borgo [foreign minister] further told me that this edict is but annual, according to a present exigency.41 The dependence of the industry on imports, however, ensured that it was affected by conflict in the Mediterranean, as in 1718.42 Fishing was seen as another key sphere of competitive employment, as well as a sign of maritime viability in home and North Atlantic waters. The latter reflected rivalry with France and acted as a parallel to that on land in North America. This was pushed hard in the press, as in the report of the richness of the Nova Scotia fishery carried in at least four London newspapers in 1724, ‘It is hoped that this fishery will increase and become a check to a neighbouring people, who use all imaginable artifices to dislodge us, that they may reap the profit to themselves.’43 In European waters, competition with the Dutch was the major theme. Ever free with his opinions, Cyril Wych, the envoy in Hamburg, in 1732 urged the development of the herring trade as it would let ‘several hundreds of His Majesty’s subjects get their livelihood and be trained up to navigation, to the great advantage of the Nation’. With the approval of government, Wych tried to get Hamburg to accept British herring imports.44 Fishing was seen as a particularly important way to employ sailors in peacetime, and thus maintain wartime naval capability.45 The possibilities of fishing were to be taken up, more generally, and in the public sphere at the end of the 1740s, while there was particular interest in the use of fishing to help Scotland benefit from being

Ideas of trade and empire 25

part of Britain.46 The benefit for the fishing industry was cited as a reason for retaining the island of Belle-Isle, off the coast of Brittany, captured in 1762. In the event, it was returned under the Peace of Paris of the following year. Subsequently, the advantages for fishing and whaling were themes when British commentators considered trans-oceanic activity, particularly in the South Atlantic and Pacific. After the capture of Cape Town from the Dutch in 1795, Hawkesbury wrote, ‘I shall not be forgetful of the advantage which may be derived to our fisheries.’47 Employment was not simply an issue in the textiles industry and fisheries. Prefiguring later themes, concern about employment was an important response to the competitive advantages increasingly enjoyed in Eastern Europe. The London Journal of 22 December (os) 1722 declared, our manufacturers of sail cloth finding that the great quantity of that commodity imported of late from Russia, has brought the price of their own lower than they can well afford to sell it at, have petitioned the Parliament for a farther premium on the exportation of sail cloth, of the manufacture of Great Britain, with an additional duty on the importation of any from foreign parts, and they are like to meet with the success that so public spirited and beneficial an undertaking deserves; for by the means of this they will be enabled to carry on that manufacture in this kingdom to much greater perfection than they could before; and whereas now not above twelve thousand poor people are employed, the trade lying under discouragements, were they removed, above fifty thousand men, women and children would be kept at constant work and provided for, by this means also the encroachment of the Dutch, and especially of the Russians, would be prevented, the last of which being a miserable poor people, work at a much cheaper rate than our poor can subsist by. Trade, however, could also be seen as a threat, particularly as a means of encouraging indulgence and luxury, and thus threatening individual health and social order. This argument was directed against those who imported luxuries from Continental Europe, which were seen as sapping the nation,48 as well as stimulants from the slave colonies, particularly sugar, and also against the trade with East and South Asia, which was financed with bullion, as Britain could not produce sufficient attractive exports to counter the negative trade balance.49 The inflow of luxuries and outflow of bullion greatly worried moralists, commentators and politicians, in a shifting debate that responded to the increased linkage in the eighteenth century of civilised hedonism and rational self-interest by trying to define both in terms that were seen as economically beneficial. Prudential considerations also played a role. Defending trade with Asia, the Weekly Journal: or the British Gazetteer of 31 January (os) 1730 argued that, despite the loss of bullion, re-exports ensured that the trade was profitable; while Chinese silk was presented as less expensive than that from Piedmont. However, the idea of

26 Ideas of trade and empire

competitive advantage vied with autarkic considerations, such as that in a letter published in the Flying Post of 25 October (os) 1718 urging the establishment of silk cultivation, ‘it has always been allowed as an uncontrovertible maxim in trade, in most cases, that no nation ought to buy from abroad what their own soil can produce or their own people can manufacture.’ Most of the criticism was of trades, not trade, and lacked a resonance in terms of party politics. Instead, the diet and clothing that were to accompany an ideology of improvement were open to debate. The writers (and politicians) Joseph Addison and Richard Steele presented the spice trade as a foreign threat; while, criticising tea consumption and smuggling, Joseph Danvers MP told the Commons in 1734, ‘I wish we would or could be made all to return to the good old way of our ancestors, in breakfasting upon good English ale and bread and cheese.’50 This was a fruitless cause, but Danvers was correct to note a major change in attitudes. A Leicestershire country gentleman and an independentminded MP who backed the ministry from 1732, Danvers’s career nevertheless indicated the insistent role of trade as he was an Assistant of the Royal African Company from 1729 to 1731. Tea-drinking was to be derided as decadent and effeminate during the agitation over imports into the American colonies in the early 1770s. Clothing was also an issue. There were frequent calls to wear British goods,51 and the import of textiles from Asia was often presented as a threat to domestic manufacturers. This set two British economic interests (East India Company and manufacturers) against each other, but the wider context set British merchants against foreign competition in the same trades. The latter was brought home to the British public by newspaper reports.52 Morality took a different form in the 1790s, when the consumption of luxuries was held responsible by abolitionists for the iniquities of the slave trade, leading to William Fox’s An Address to the People of Great Britain, on the Utility of Refraining from the Use of West Indian Sugar and Rum (1791) and to the abstention movement of 1791–2. The moralistic approach to trade contributed to protectionist attitudes and to a general hostility to imports. The Daily Post of 19 February (os) 1745 complained, By a moderate computation, it appears that the French have imported into England from January 1740 to January 1744, 250,000 pieces of cambric, 2000 tons of wine, 6000 tons of brandy and 1,200,000 lb of indigo [for cloth production], the greatest part of which goods are paid for in specie; thus does France drain England of its wealth, while our manufactures are neglected, our trade discouraged, and the two staple commodities of Britain, the wool and the fishery, lie neglected and unimproved to the enriching of France and the impoverishing of our country. Imports threatened not only health, morality and finances, but also jobs. Applebee’s Original Weekly Journal of 1 June (os) 1734 reported that the Dublin weavers intended to riot:

Ideas of trade and empire 27

The true cause of their assembling together is said to be owing to the great quantities of French woollen and cotton manufactures that have been of late clandestinely run into this kingdom, to the great prejudice of our English and Irish manufactures, and to the ruin and destruction of many poor miserable creatures, who are in a starving condition, by not getting employment to manufacture our own commodities. International competition was thus linked to social order through the sphere of trade and industry. Protectionism rested on popular support, the Evening Post of 10 June (os) 1727 reporting that the coopers [makers of casks] of Exeter having notice that a vessel from France was come thither with French hogsheads for sale to the cider trade, they got them condemned as prohibited goods, and assisted at the burning about 100 of them with music and rejoicing. However, in an anticipation of modern discussions about international competition, there was a concern that protectionism was not the answer and, instead, that it was essential to rely on matching foreign innovations. The Salisbury and Winchester Journal of 7 June 1790 complained, It is much to be lamented that the lower orders of manufacturers betray on every occasion such a propensity to fly in the faces of their employers, whenever any improvements are attempted in the manufactures of this country. For unless we adopt the same improvements which are adopted on the Continent, other countries will undersell us at market, and of course our manufactures will be inevitably ruined. Concern about trade encouraged regulation, which represented a symbiotic relationship between government and certain economic interests. It would be inaccurate to regard regulation as something imposed by government on the economy, or as stemming simply from ministerial ideas. Instead, regulation was central to most forms of agricultural, industrial and commercial activity, and was present at most levels of the economy, whether in the form of agreements over the use of common lands or regulations over markets. Regulation was rooted in both elite and popular attitudes, and reflected cultural notions of order and stability. However, the ambiguities latent in any symbiotic relationship were exacerbated by the continual struggle by interested parties for privileges. This was accompanied by a degree of ministerial uncertainty as to how best to attain agreed economic objectives. Differences of opinion over general policy, and quarrels over specific privileges, combined to produce disputes over how best to regulate economic activity. These were particularly acute over the economic regime for those parts of the British world not immediately represented in the Westminster Parliament.

28 Ideas of trade and empire

After the Act of Union with Scotland, this meant, in particular, Ireland, and the North American and West Indian colonies. As with the political relationship, their economic subordination was seen as an aspect of a strongly centred, competitively effective system that would be weakened gravely if independent links with foreign states were permitted. Thus, Farley’s Bristol News-Paper, in its issue of 28 November (os) 1730, attacked illegal Irish wool exports to the Dutch. Assistance for, not competition with, Britain was sought. This, however, still left the terms of trade within the system unclear, not least the extent to which industrial and mercantile development was to be encouraged. Lobbies in Britain tended to argue at cross-purposes: as prohibitory regulations, while supported by some, in order to encourage British production, were opposed by others, on the grounds that the free entry of products into Britain would strengthen the competitive advantage of British manufacturers who could use these goods. Thus, in the 1730s, the Russia Company, confronted with Prussian competition for the key contract to clothe the massive Russian army, and facing the fact that Prussian wool was cheaper than that from England, pressed for the import of Irish wool into England in order to cut the price. This was not a measure favoured by English wool-producers.53 The Russia Company had itself faced mercantile competition from Scottish merchants who were unwilling to accept its position. In 1711, the Attorney General gave an opinion that, as a result of the Treaty of Union, Scottish merchants were bound by the (London-based) Russia Company’s Act of 1697 and could not trade without taking the freedom of the Company, and therefore paying its dues. In 1734, the Company sought to make an agreement with the leading Scottish merchants in the trade, appointing William Hogg the Company’s Collector in north Britain, but this agreement broke down and led to a serious dispute in which Hogg attacked the value of trading companies. The Company had to back down and accept the continuation of interloping, a practice encouraged by the poor state of the Scottish customs service and by the exigencies of Scottish political management, in particular the need to consider opinion in Parliamentary boroughs. The Union led to a more prominent role for the Scots, with George Baillie becoming a Lord of Trade in 1710–12. Scots played a major role in imperialist expansion, especially in India,54 while at home, Scottish lobbying increasingly reflected the sense of Britain as an economic space,55 although, in 1794, Hawkesbury argued that a petition to Parliament on behalf of a Scot should be presented by another Scot. In 1769, in a letter that was pretty typical of the correspondence that went to London, George Chalmers wrote to George Grenville MP seeking his support for protectionist legislation to benefit Scottish producers in the British market, and also reflecting the extent to which Parliament, print and personal lobbying were part of the same process. We are to make an application to Parliament this winter for several new matters regarding the table linen which is a staple in this part of the

Ideas of trade and empire 29

kingdom . . . I have much personal interest in one branch of the application viz the laying of an additional duty on foreign diapers or table linen, having an estate here surrounding Dunfermline which manufactures more of that species than any other place in Great Britain or Ireland . . . The principal manufacturers assure me that they are in a condition to supply a great part of the English consumption if they have a proper encouragement and have no doubt but the laying on of a small additional duty on foreign diapers will at least double or triple the value of the manufactures of this place . . . I shall . . . send you sometime before the House [of Commons] meets a state in print of what they propose to apply for.56 Ministers were mindful of the particular interests of Scotland. The important linen industry’s position began to be secured in the British context from around 1720. In 1786, discussing negotiations with France, Carmarthen informed Eden the admission of the silk gauzes, on duties of 12 per cent, is a point which we consider as absolutely necessary to be gained. It is almost the only instance in which any advantage is given to the industry of his Majesty’s subjects in Scotland, who are most liable to be affected by the importation of linens in general, and particularly of lawns and cambricks.57 There were also tensions in the relationship with Ireland, not least concern about it trading illegally with foreign states.58 There was also uneasiness in Britain about the role of Irish Catholics in British mercantile communities abroad, particularly in Spain where they were strongly represented.59 The Cattle Acts of 1666–7 hit Irish exports until they were suspended in 1758–9, giving the Scots an advantage in English markets. Irish trade was dominated by the British market, which absorbed about 75 per cent of Irish exports in the late eighteenth century, but the terms of this trade were set in London. Irish exports of wool and woollen textiles to foreign and colonial markets were banned in 1699. The percentage of Irish exports going to the New World colonies rose from about 6 in 1698 to nearly 20 in 1784, but most of this trade depended on English intermediaries and Irish expatriates, especially in London.60 Furthermore, Irish manufacturing was increasingly affected by British exports as its largely domestic and quasi-domestic structure was unable to compete with cheaper and better-finished goods produced by new methods. Thus, the Irish silk industry collapsed between 1775 and 1783. Linen manufacture, however, came to play a major role in the Irish economy and in the English market, affecting imports from the Continent, and leading to Irish concern at the liberalisation of trade with France suggested by the Eden Treaty of 1786.61 The role of the Irish Parliament added a complicating factor in commercial negotiations. Forwarding to London a draft for a trade treaty with France, Eden wrote in 1786,

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The seventh article refers to Ireland. I had originally proposed to point out the necessity of her specific accession to the Treaty, but on reflection it seemed preferable to give to her in general terms a full participation of the Treaty, and not to intimate a doubt how far the Irish Parliament may be disposed to take the requisite steps.62 Thirty years earlier, Robert, Fourth Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, had argued that ‘the extensive navigation of England . . . takes its source from those very American colonies, which France is now endeavouring forcibly and unjustly to invade’. Although the colonies also offered a useful market for British exports,63 the economic relationship with the colonies was a difficult one, with restrictions on their trade with foreign countries and colonies resented and evaded, leading to the suggestion from the Board of Trade in 1724 that this trade be connived in, with rice exported direct to the Mediterranean, in order to enable the colonies to pay what they owed Britain in their bilateral trade.64 The 1660 Act banning the export of raw wool and live sheep included the colonies and was confirmed by the Wool Act of 1699. In 1750, the making of steel, the refining of iron and the manufacture of finished articles from iron were prohibited in the colonies. Nevertheless, there was a common purpose between British and colonial lobbies and government as far as re-exports were concerned. British diplomats urged foreign powers to receive reexports and to keep taxes on them low.65 Furthermore, British commentators supported the Board of Trade in pressing for British colonies to receive goods from British North America rather than French colonies.66 The colonies were in a suppliant position, obliged, like British constituencies, to turn to Westminster and Whitehall for changes in the regulatory regime, and affected by legal opinions and political pressures there.67 In 1729, a petition on behalf of Virginia was presented to the Commons against a clause in the Act unifying the customs of England and Scotland which prohibited the import of tobacco shipped from the stalk, in 1730 one on behalf of New York, for allowing salt to be imported into it from Europe, and in 1732 another to encourage the growing of coffee in Jamaica, all of which led to Parliamentary Acts. Nevertheless, although legislation such as the Molasses Act appears rigid, in practice enforcement was often loose in order to lessen friction.68 The call for state action was particularly marked in the first half of the period and was characteristic of the economic thought subsequently described as mercantilism.69 In practice, this was not so much a common body of economic thought resulting in a coherent policy as, instead, a set of familiar biases and accustomed responses to frequent problems, within a context in which much lobbying and writing involved special pleading. Most writers did not favour a competitive market mechanism as the basis for the allocation of investment. There was little appreciation of the free market as an automatic adjusting mechanism, particularly because the pursuit of private profit was not unconditionally applauded, but seen, rather, by some commentators, as self-interested

Ideas of trade and empire 31

and opposed to communal prosperity. By regarding the individualistic pursuit of profit, or that by rival lobbies, as hostile to the public interest, writers revealed and strengthened their bias in favour of control and regulation. Further stress on state activity was provided by the belief that economic activity was both naturally, and actually, competitive. This belief was particularly appropriate in the fields of colonial activity, oceanic trade and bullion, in which the objects of competition were felt, with reason, to be essentially limited. There were also particular difficulties in specific international markets, which helped make foreign policy an issue, even if its role could be exaggerated. The nature of the difficulties varied. Import substitution hit British exports in some markets, and led to British sensitivity to protectionist legislation. There were also concerns about competition in less regulated markets. This was acute in the case of colonial re-exports. Thus, Britain competed with other sugarproducers, particularly France. In 1733, the consul in Naples reported that the cheapness of French sugar ensured that the British and Portuguese could not compete.70 Nevertheless, despite the stress on state support, there was scant interest in government playing a direct role in trade, and this was one of the major contrasts between trade and empire. Charles, First Earl of Liverpool (formerly Lord Hawkesbury), the experienced President of the Board of Trade, commented in 1799 on one of the major areas of state activity in Continental Europe, it has long been a question whether it was most adviseable that government should import grain on their own account; and, after having consulted great numbers of merchants, I find, that much the majority are of opinion, that government should not interfere; for it is asserted that, in such case, the merchants would not speculate and enter into contracts, with the same spirit, and in the same degree, that they will when left to themselves.71 It is indicative of the British system that, in this case, there was extensive consultation. International commercial competition led to pressure for diplomatic support and also to legislation to affect domestic markets. For example, taking forward an Act of Parliament of 1731, another Act in 1736 decreed that every British ship had to have one whole set of sails made of British cloth. Across Europe, economic writers, entrepreneurs and speculators pressed governments to take a role in the economy. Geronimo de Ustariz, the author of The Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs (Madrid, 1724), emphasized the need to use governmental power in order to help Spain catch up in the race for economic growth. Ustariz saw overseas trade as the key to development. Frederick II of Prussia, in his Essay on the Forms of Government, argued that it was essential to maintain a favourable balance of trade. The weakness of currency mechanisms led to a stress on bullion and therefore on a favourable balance of trade that would maintain bullion inflows.

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Concern about such a balance was linked to the notion that the volume of trade was essentially constant. The availability of bullion in Britain was reduced, however, because of the need to finance negative trade balances, particularly, but not only, with China and India, thus helping explain widely held concern about these trades. Bullion supplies were also reduced through use in non-monetary forms and through the continuous loss of metal from coins due to processes such as wear, reminting and fraudulent clipping. Despite the growth of Portuguese gold supplies from Brazil, and the production of Russian silver in the Amur valley and the Altai, there was an insufficient supply of bullion to meet the coinage needs of Europe, and the press encouraged the view that bullion flows were competitive, particularly that of Spanish silver to Britain or France.72 Shortages encouraged the use of paper money, and both banking and banknotes spread. Progress in development in the provision and means of credit was not, however, obtained without a cost in terms of periodic crises and instability. The precarious nature of most banking firms, and the vulnerability of much credit, created difficulties, the provision of long credit for trans-oceanic trade was responsible for many problems, and banks were affected by political crises. Nevertheless, an interregional credit structure based on London developed and, by European standards, the British banking system was reasonably stable. Banks were also a part of increasingly complex commercial mechanisms, including growing insurance and stock markets. Although prone to crises, these markets offered a form of regulation of activity different to that of government and Parliament. They were not, however, able to provide the legislative support and supervision required in the political and economic culture of the age. Government sought to create a protected home market and to encourage a positive balance of trade in manufactured products. The export of raw materials, such as raw wool and thus sheep, was prohibited, as was that of textile machinery, with legislation in 1696, 1750, 1774, 1781 and 1782, and the emigration of artisans, the last leading to repeated legislation, especially in 1719 and 1750.73 Manufactured imports were restricted or prohibited, for example silks and printed calicoes in 1700. Textile manufacture provided a particularly strong example of competing interests that were discussed in the context of protectionist pressures.74 Economies were widely seen as inherently competitive, and peacetime activity as the basis for wartime strength. Richard Rolt, a prominent Patriot writer and active xenophobe, claimed, in 1750, that in France ‘the peaceful arts of commerce were encouraged only that they might furnish the means of oppression’.75 Irrespective of this, most of the policies loosely termed mercantilist were, in their intention, aggressive. In a context where one state pursued such policies, it was necessary for others to reply in kind. Colonial competition was seen as related to its commercial counterpart, and assumptions focused on one reinforced the other. Such competition did not simply involve Britain. British

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diplomats and commentators noting clashes between foreign powers, for example, the French demolition of the Portuguese fort at Cabinda in 1784, reported on a situation in which conflict appeared normative. The demolition of the fort arose from the Portuguese expulsion of French slave-traders from what they had seen as free ports. The Portuguese, instead, claimed an exclusive right to trade.76 A sense of conflict as normative, fed, and was fed by, a world of report in which rumours of hostile moves by other powers were reiterated and magnified. This can be seen not only in private correspondence but also in the press and Parliament. Satirised by playwrights, including Henry Fielding in his The Coffee-House Politician (1730) and Richard Brinsley Sheridan in The Critic (1779), as well as by other writers, alarming reports, nevertheless, circulated widely. Although aware that many reports were unreliable, ministers, nevertheless, anxiously probed envoys on their accuracy, Carmarthen writing, with reference to the East Indies, to John, Third Duke of Dorset, envoy in Paris, in 1784 of ‘the absolute necessity of the most unremitting attention to the views and designs which France may adopt in regard to that part of the globe’.77 Four years later, William Dalrymple MP wrongly suggested to a fellow major-general that the sailing of the Spanish Cadiz fleet might indicate a sudden attack on the British colony of Jamaica, ‘as this age seems to be the age of enterprize’.78 Reports and rumours also had a major impact on the value of public funds, and news and the stock market were closely linked. The achievement of British goals was particularly important in this world of news, with rumours of peace particularly helping to lift the funds, as in April 1748. Calls for free trade, and criticisms, such as those advanced by the Glaswegian economist Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations (1776), of protectionist commercial systems, and of such devices as monopolistic national trading companies and colonial policies, were intellectually satisfying as indicators of how much better the world might be organised. However, it did not follow that any individual state would have necessarily done better unilaterally to abandon its protective tariffs, trading companies and colonies. The alternative to mercantilist policies was not free trade but, in many instances, no trade. The trading areas not colonised by one power were going to be colonised by another. Even Britain did not abandon many of its protectionist policies until the mid-nineteenth century. Confidence that other states needed British trade rested on a limited understanding of economic developments elsewhere. It was usually based not on an intellectual conviction of the value of free trade, but rather on a robust confidence in Britain’s strength, as in the dedication to The Herald (1758), Is it not strange then that we can be so abjectly submissive as to take every insult and injustice that Spain and Portugal please to offer to us, upon the sordid condition of being allowed to receive a little cash in payment for what they cannot do without?79

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Furthermore, free trade was not a simple alternative to protectionism. Instead, free trade represented a range of options. For example, pressure for the end of monopoly rights did not necessarily mean a wish to end protectionism. Indeed, the former pressure was far more pronounced, particularly by midcentury, than the latter. The arguments about the deficiencies of monopolies did, however, clarify some of the issues over free trade, and, more generally, ensured that the subject was very much in the public domain, rather than in one defined by Court politics. The principal practitioners of free-market initiatives – smugglers – were a surreptitious, not a vocal, group, their services used by many of the elite, including Sir Robert Walpole, but their profits depended on protectionism, and their activities were widely decried on the grounds that they purveyed foreign nonessentials, such as brandy and lace, and exported bullion. Nevertheless, the spread in tea and brandy consumption from the social elite to the middling orders encouraged, and was facilitated by, the development of large-scale smuggling, especially, by mid-century, in tea. Merchant capital financed much of the smuggling and the latter was insured in London. Substantial import duties encouraged smuggling, which was probably worth between £2 and £3 million annually in the late 1770s. In turn, the Commutation Act of 1784 greatly cut tea smuggling. Piracy was an equivalent, but one that was more difficult than smuggling to link in with the conventional economy. Privateering, in contrast, was both legal and very much a matter of independent initiatives. It reflected the opportunities offered by wartime, as in the overly optimistic report printed by the London Evening Post on 30 January 1762, As the Spanish colonies on the South-Sea [Pacific] are extremely ill fortified and badly garrisoned, depending for their preservation more upon their situation than strength, a company of merchants in Bristol and Liverpool are fitting out a large fleet of privateers, to sail immediately against them. There is scarce any risk but doubling Cape Horn . . . This once effected, nothing may hinder them from laying the whole coast under contribution, or taking possession of their settlements. Privateering caused diplomatic problems in relations with neutrals, and this also left legacy issues for peacetime. The scarcity of claret in Berlin in 1748 was blamed on British privateers acting like pirates.80 Free trade as a consistent principle, or indeed any notions of consistency, cut across the tendency to think in terms of particular interests. The latter was pointed out in 1786 by William Eden, the negotiator of a trade treaty with France: Our merchants and manufacturers are so open to the impression of partial interests that they have no uniform principle in their propositions: they desire to exclude all silks, but to have silk gauzes; to admit all compositions

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of any metals, but to exclude clocks and watches . . . I will not multiply the instances, though many more of a similar nature occur to me . . . they do not escape the attention of the French ministers.81 The concentration in economic thinking on long-distance trade, rather than on agriculture, accentuated the stress on government support. Such trade was felt to require state assistance, military, political, financial and regulatory. The heavy investment required to finance distant trade and to develop such features as colonial trading stations appeared best secured by granting monopolistic privileges, as to India or Hudson Bay and its fur-rich hinterland. Much government activity took the form of action to redirect the channels of commerce. This generally entailed restrictions on rival products, trade and traders, and greatly affected British trade. In 1724, for example, Sweden prohibited trade between Swedish ports in the ships of other powers. Five years later, landowners in the Austrian Netherlands sought to increase the sale of their wood, by having the use of British coal taxed, a measure that was to be presented as a consumption tax, not an import duty, in order to lessen the risk of British complaints.82 Although most European states had no colonies or, at most, some minor overseas trading bases, and were bereft of the spectacular benefits of colonial trade, there were, nevertheless, signs of appreciable development in their commerce. This owed much to the importance of European goods traded only on short sea routes. Though the value of trans-oceanic goods in Europe was high, profits were lessened both by the risk and cost of the trade, and by the delay in recouping the investment. In contrast, European trade was larger in volume and more secure, requiring a smaller investment and less political and military protection. Thus, whereas chartered trading companies, large consortia or wealthy merchants dominated ocean trade, generating much contemporary discussion, many records, and a lot of scholarly attention, the converse was the case with the bulk of European trade. As a result, the economic importance of this commerce has been underrated. Much of it centred around the movement of unprocessed products from areas of production to those of processing and consumption. British access to this trade was very much affected by foreign competition and regulation, and, as a result, there was a call in Britain for state action in the shape of diplomatic support. In response to restrictions by other powers, the call was not so much for free trade as a whole, but rather for bilateral trade agreements, as was urged with Prussia in 1724.83 William, Lord Harrington, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, and a former diplomat and MP, argued, eight years later, that ‘securing privileges in trade by way of a treaty is so much more desirable than any temporary and precarious edicts and concessions’.84 The British principle was trade ‘for the mutual convenience and advantage of both nations’,85 a formulation defined in terms of an equivalence that, given her maritime strength, meant a trade conducted largely on Britain’s terms. The emphasis on mutual advantage was therefore frustrating to foreign envoys.86

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In 1737, George Tilson, an experienced Under Secretary, wrote, The eagerness to trade to the East Indies is very violent in Europe at present and it will no doubt hurt us all; for at the bottom it is a pernicious drainer of our silver and fills us with fopperies instead of it. But to have continued, as we were, the chief furnishers of those toys would have been a rich fund to us. But since it is otherwise, we must scuffle as well as we can, and try who is strong enough to . . . break the other.87 Tilson captured the variety of attitudes that trade could give rise to. There was the sense of trade as constant, a matter of annual commercial rhythms, comparable to agriculture or long-distance fishing. This tended to lead to an assumption of continuity and fixity, such that greater prosperity would be gained only by taking a share of the trade of others. There was also a sense of growth88 and fluidity and, in particular, of a lack of predictability as to the likely direction and amount of trade. This led to an anticipation of change and an active quest to mould it by launching new initiatives. The continuing process of trans-oceanic exploration lent excitement to this quest, and part of the relationship between trade and foreign policy can be told in terms of government support for ‘voyages of discovery’ and the more mundane and necessary work of systematic charting, as well as the attempt to gain an understanding of weather systems. Yet in Europe there was also a background of political volatility, and of resulting opportunities, or problems, for trade. One major aspect of this was the struggle between Christian powers and the Ottoman Turks, and the resulting prospect of territorial changes that might create new trade routes, for example to Russia via the Black Sea. For the British from the 1780s, the prospect of change in the Turkish (Ottoman) empire was also increasingly linked to concern about the routes to India via Egypt and Southwest Asia, with anxiety, in particular, about French ambitions in Egypt,89 and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere, including Crete. Rumoured French pressure for the acquisition of the last was seen as an issue for the ‘commercial powers of Europe’.90 At the same time, the strategic threat posed by a French route to the Indian Ocean was also emphasized.91 There was also a sense of possibilities within Christian Europe. Generally these were political in character, for example the consequences of Russia under Peter the Great both gaining a Baltic coastline and introducing a policy of Westernisation. There was also, however, an interest in economic transformation. This was very much seen in terms of government-driven, top–down policies, especially those of Peter the Great, which were reported in the British press,92 rather than as the product of wider social structures but, precisely because of this, change seemed more possible. Plans for new transport routes were of particular interest as they appeared to offer new courses for trade. The (Holy Roman) Emperor Charles VI (1711–40), the ruler of Austria, was espe-

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cially noted for such schemes in the 1720s, and British diplomats reported on ideas to link the River Elbe to the River Danube and the latter to the Adriatic Sea.93 However, the potential of new maritime powers arising was questioned by the Westminster Journal of 21 January (os) 1748 on the grounds that they could not be a commercial threat unless they gained colonies of their own and that there was little sign or possibility of this. The development of the Austrian and Russian economies was part of a more general growth of industrial production and mercantile activity in Central and Eastern Europe,94 one that contributed to the eastward movement of power in Europe that was also seen in the political sphere. This encouraged political and economic links (as well as rivalries) between the powers of the region, and the links threatened to shut out Western European commerce from this area of opportunity. Thus, the Austro-Russian treaty of 1726 was followed by Austrian interest in selling Silesian (Silesia was not conquered by Prussia until 1740–1) woollens to Russia, while Prussia similarly sought from 1726 to exploit good political relations with Russia. At the same time, although good relations with one power could jeopardise relations with another,95 opportunities for Britain increased, leading to the Anglo-Russian trade treaty of 1734 and, three years later, to a loan to Charles VI on the Silesian copper mines. John Law, a Scot whose bank and Mississippi Company had become the basis of a massive financial bubble in France, before crashing in 1720, argued in 1725 that Austria could not benefit from the trade to the East Indies as most investment in it would be foreign, and profits would flow accordingly.96 This was an approach that focused on the flow of money, but not one that was easy to advance, as the public debate preferred to treat countries as distinct units. If this was a problem for British commentators, it was also one for foreign counterparts, who treated illicit trade, such as that by the British in Spanish America, as an aberration,97 rather than as a response to market possibilities. To the British commentators, the relationship between economic development and modernisation was an ambiguous one in terms of ideas of freedom, as modernisation in Central and Eastern Europe was driven by government dictation. At the same time, alongside concern about the competitive results, modernisation was seen as an opportunity for British trade, and thus as a good thing. Discussing whether Anna, the new ruler of Russia, would have her capital at Moscow or return the capital to her uncle, Peter the Great’s, new city of St Petersburg, the British Journal, in its issue of 21 March (os) 1730, argued that the former would possibly lead to a resumption of Swedish control over the Baltic provinces that would not hinder imports to Britain: But the inland trade of Muscovy for the consumption of British manufactures, that will never be restored, unless the Empire of Russia rouses itself from under the lethargic slumber which it is now fallen into; their furred gowns and long petticoats will return upon them; and all the sordid affectation of a singularity from all the world, which made them so truly

38 Ideas of trade and empire

contemptible before, will do the like again, and where shall our trade be carried on? In short, access to British goods was linked to modernisation. Furthermore, modernisation, rather than territorial expansion, was seen as what should be the key to Russian policy. Writing in 1756 about the ‘real interests’ of Tsarina Elizabeth, Robert, Fourth Earl of Holdernesse, the Secretary of State for the Northern Department, unrealistically focused on trade, which he saw as a link to Britain, not territory, Not an increase of dominion, the extent of her present possessions are sufficient; nor an increase of subjects, the numbers of her own set her above such views. It is the improving her own dominions by arts, and increasing her riches by commerce; and all her commercial interests contribute to unite her, in the strictest manner, to England.98 More generally, the extent to which foreign governments could alter social habits and, for example, overcome practices and beliefs that were believed to be antipathetic to trade, such as Catholicism or the national characteristics understood as Spanishness, was unclear to British commentators. Critics of British governmental complacency were apt to stress the possibility of such change in foreign countries, and thus to throw doubt on the Whiggish identification of government and social progress, and the related notion of British exceptionalism. A pamphlet of 1720 that discussed the threat that French expansion in Louisiana posed to the prosperity and security of the British colonies in North America and the West Indies argued that the death of Louis XIV in 1715 was largely responsible as it had led in some measure to a deliverance from heavy taxation and arbitrary power, and that the resulting security of property had encouraged industrial and commercial activity in France.99 Mist’s Weekly Journal, the leading Tory paper of the day, argued on 23 December (os) 1727 that there appears an extraordinary spirit in the Imperial [Austrian] ministers towards encouraging industry in the people, being convinced that kingdoms cannot subsist long in grandeur without traffic; and, if the designs formed should be pursued with the same diligence, it is to be feared, some other nations will feel the bad effects of them. The paper, in its issue of 2 February (os) 1728, also turned back against the Whigs (from 1714, until the party system fractured in the early 1760s, continually in government) their critique of autocratic government and added a particular attack on the French alliance: We know by many examples, that trade and manufactures have decayed in one country, and have risen and flourished in another; and, wherever these

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things have happened, the first causes of both have proceeded from the administration. Heavy taxes clog the wheels of industry, and, by a foolish alliance, another nation has sometimes crept into a share of this trade, and, by degrees, edged you out of it. More generally, a London report in the Newcastle Journal of 9 May 1752 claimed: There is a humour prevails among some people as if the poverty of certain nations was a sufficient bar to their endeavours in respect to manufactures and commerce, more especially in their views of any considerable extent . . . this is very ill founded. The poorer any nation is, the more dangerous rivals they must be. Want is a spur to industry, and natural wants pierce deeper than artificial ones. The talents of men are everywhere much the same, the means of employing them not hard to find, and the sea open to all. Referring critically to the trade treaty with France in 1786, Charles James Fox, the leader of the Whig opposition in the House of Commons, added a variant on the issue of national economic characteristics, claiming that, in the treaty, where France has the advantage (as in wines, brandies, vinegars etc) the advantage is permanent and certain; where we have it (as in cutlery, cotton etc) it is accidental and temporary; they may gain our skill, but we can never gain their soil and climate.100 In contrast, the Weekly Journal or Saturday’s Post of 23 February (os) 1723 noted that most arbitrary governments did not consult merchants, while Wych, the envoy in Hamburg, argued that Danish attempts to develop industry were likely to fail as ‘trade will not be forced, nor can it flourish in a country where property is not secured’.101 Adam’s Weekly Courant of 29 November (os) 1748 claimed that France’s commerce would not make it rich unless its governance changed, ‘for they who will take the cash circulating in trade out of the hands of the traders mar their industry and undermine the basis of commerce’. Trade therefore related to the wider character of freedom within society. This was given particular point by the degree to which merchants were often outsiders: foreigners and members of different religious groups. In Britain, the position of Huguenots and Jews was especially sensitive, but, despite domestic prejudice, particularly against Jews during the naturalisation controversy in 1753, part of Britain’s economic strength derived from toleration of religious minorities. If the Act of 1753 was rapidly repealed, that of 1740 naturalising Jews who settled in the colonies remained in force.102 The lack of freedom and security abroad was a particular problem to

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commerce given its dependence on credit and confidence. Arbitrary or, what was more to the point, apparently arbitrary, judicial systems did not provide adequate protection to any merchants or creditors and, as this included foreigners, it forced a particular duty of care on diplomats.103 Alongside arbitrary systems, there was the problem of the personal interests of officials in foreign countries; and diplomatic reports frequently made reference to these.104 There were also the questions of freedom versus freedoms in the national regulation of trade, both in Britain and abroad, particularly in the shape of the position of trading companies, and also in the international regulation of trade in the form of treaties. This was a matter not only of pressure from government but also of the views of merchants, such as those in 1737 who complained to the Spanish commercial agent in Britain that the Governor of Cadiz obliged them to sell their grain at a fixed price without letting them carry it on to other ports and see what price they could obtain there.105 Clashing principles played a role in the issue of trade freedoms, as prerogatives and privileges were defended and those of other states assailed. The call abroad for protectionism sometimes made reference to the British Navigation Acts,106 and it would be easy to argue that British ministers and commentators were hypocritical. The Swedes did so, with reference to natural law and British practice.107 Nevertheless, there was a measure of consistency in the British support, both for free access and equal rights in European markets and, in contrast, also for special privileges in their trans-oceanic counterparts. In 1733, the Board of Trade, in a report significantly forwarded to the envoy in Vienna, noted that the Austrians argued that they were obliged by their treaty of 1718 with Turkey to give the latter’s Greek subjects better commercial terms in Sicily (an Austrian possession in 1720–34) than those enjoyed by British merchants. In response, a universal claim to parity was made by the Board of Trade: equality between different nations with respect to advantages in trade, is the only foundation upon which general commerce can subsist and be preserved: and if a treaty like that of Madrid, which by a single stipulation settles the common interests of several different nations can be broke in upon by a subsequent treaty between one of the contracting parties and another prince, then it is in the power of every prince to take away from any nation the natural advantages of its products, manufactures or situation, according to his particular views or interest or affection; for partial duties may put a sterile country upon a level with the richest, as to the balance of trade, and deprive the most diligent people of the effect of their industry. In short, sovereignty was to be constrained by the requirements of the system, which was to be given moral worth by the notion that advantage reflected industry and should not be compromised. The report continued by responding to Austrian comments about British privileges in the Spanish empire:

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this is an exception which does not in the least impeach the general maxim here laid down, because the Spaniards have in all times been allowed the right of granting the privilege to what nation they thought proper . . . it was granted to the English with the express consent of his Imperial Majesty and all the powers concerned in the Treaty of Utrecht [of 1713].108 Thus support for equal rights did not preclude backing for particular British privileges in Europe. Indeed, in 1737, the envoy in Naples argued that British and Dutch ships should maintain their exemption from being visited by customs house officers, although French ships should be visited as they lacked such an exemption.109 Support for free trade was also displayed in the early 1780s when the Emperor Joseph II, ruler of the Austrian Netherlands, sought to end the prohibition, under the Peace of Westphalia (1648), of trade on the River Scheldt, a measure insisted on by the Dutch, in order to end competition from Antwerp. John, Third Duke of Dorset, envoy in Paris, wrote that ‘every maritime and commercial power (Holland alone excepted) would surely reap benefit from a free and more direct communication with the Emperor’s dominions’.110 The issue also captured the general either-or, zero-sum approach to commercial competition, one British diplomat writing, ‘if Antwerp flourishes, Amsterdam must fall’.111 Such a zero-sum approach was pushed particularly hard in discussion of Anglo-French relations, and that despite the efforts to improve them made by several French ministers and a few British counterparts. A teleological account might note Pitt the Younger’s attempt to better relations in the 1780s, not least by lessening commercial and colonial divisions, and then look forward to nineteenth-century improvements, particularly the 1860 Cobden trade treaty. Indeed, as relations deteriorated in late 1792, Charles de Talleyrand, then envoy of the Revolutionary government, and later Napoleon’s foreign minister, reported from London that France should seek industrial and commercial links with Britain as a way to improve relations.112 Yet, however prescient Pitt and Talleyrand might have been, there were powerful political causes of rivalry. Furthermore, the 1786 trade treaty was pushed through Parliament despite considerable opposition, and strong suspicion was also expressed from within government. Sir James Harris, a splenetic longserving diplomat, as well as an MP, argued in 1786 that being a peaceful neighbour with France was as impossible in execution as the Republic of Plato – If ever we cease to suspect France of being our enemy, if ever we suffer it (when it is in our power to prevent it) to increase its riches, its influence and strength, and if we ever omit an opportunity of sinking, distressing, and keeping it under, we shall be guilty of the highest political folly.113 Thus, any increase in French riches threatened the balance of power, an essentially static interpretation of a very dynamic situation, and improvements in French finances were seen as a preparation for war.114

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British diplomats argued that restrictions on British exports were not only harmful to British trade but also to local consumers, and claimed that this was apparent to foreign ministers.115 Foreign monopolies were held to be the cause of less efficient and more expensive production.116 Similarly, British commentators objected to limitations on useful imports to Britain (as opposed to luxuries). Constraints on trade were seen not only in regulations passed by other states, but also in unwelcome international political developments. The best example of the latter was Russia’s eventual success against Sweden in the Great Northern War (1700–21). This led to ultimately unsuccessful British intervention in the shape of an attempt to create a coalition to intimidate Peter the Great. The policy touched off a bitter public debate in which critics (correctly) argued that policy was motivated largely by the interests of George I as Elector of Hanover, while government supporters claimed that Russian success threatened British commercial interests. This was explained in theoretical and specific terms, as by the Weekly Journal or, British Gazetteer of 26 September (os) 1719, which argued that the more markets there are, for supplying any demand, the more easy and cheaper must be the purchase of the commodity . . . from the earliest period of our naval power, Britain has . . . looked upon a just balance between the Northern powers to be a fundamental interest of her state. Reliance on Russia for naval stores was seen as dangerous, and Russian commercial moves as part of a threatening, state-directed strategy.117 British pressure on behalf of free trade was clearly seen in attitudes towards trade with Hamburg, a key point from which the British traded into Germany. As a result, the British were keen on defending its position, as an Imperial Free City, and also trade to it and thereafter on the River Elbe, as well as its counterpart Bremen and the River Weser.118 This trade was challenged in particular by Danish pressure on Hamburg, arising from claims of overlordship and from expansionism, as the Danish government regarded Hamburg as if part of the king’s dominions.119 In 1728, for example, British interests were hit when Danish subjects were banned from trading with Hamburg,120 while, in 1734–5, when tension reached a high point, the envoy in Copenhagen pressed that no harm should come to any British merchant or citizen of Hamburg bound to or from Hamburg.121 The government pressed hard to get both sides to accommodate their differences as it saw British interests as involved,122 and indeed the ministry was aware of the insurance costs arising from Danish action against ships covered in London.123 The extent of government action devoted to the issue is impressive, Harrington, for example, writing several times a month in 1735.124 Harrington indeed was sufficiently well briefed to know why the trade was beneficial, not only its great extent but also the value of the ‘fixed state of money in Hamburg’, which reflected the fiscal stability of a city state.125 Conversely, across Europe and further afield, arguments on behalf of British

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privileges were challenged by the merchants of other states and these merchants found support from foreign diplomats and ministers. The French were particularly concerned that their trade with the Spanish empire via Cadiz was harmed by the special privileges to trade direct with Spanish America that the British won as a result of the War of the Spanish Succession, and that these privileges were extended by the British corruption of Spanish provincial officials.126 The argument that ‘the common interest of all trading nations’,127 and even of those little interested in the freedom of the sea and of commerce,128 was threatened by British ambitions, maritime hegemony and commercial privileges, particularly in the Spanish empire, was subsequently to be employed in order to claim that Britain’s position as the leading naval power was itself a threat to other states and their commercial interests, and that this needed to be countered.129 This argument made sense to British commentators who sought peace with France, such as John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, who, in 1761, warned of the danger that Britain would excite all the naval powers in Europe to enter into a confederacy against us, as adopting a system viz that of a monopoly of all naval power, which would be at least as dangerous to the liberties of Europe as that of Louis XIV [of France r. 1643–1715] was, which drew almost all Europe upon his back.130 The British government, however, tended to counter foreign complaints by reference to privileges, particularly those gained to trade direct with the Spanish empire. There was an awareness of the popular political dimension, John, Fourth Earl of Sandwich, the envoy to peace talks in 1748, having ‘no doubt but that I should shuffle in the words No Search, as well as any other explanations of that sort which you think would please the nation’.131 ‘No Search’ was a reference to the popular campaign in the late 1730s against the searching of British ships in the Caribbean by the Spaniards in order to maintain their commercial monopoly. At the same time, the wish to break the Franco-Spanish alliance led the government in 1748 to give serious consideration to a Spanish proposal for an equivalent to Britain’s right to the Asiento trade with Spanish America.132 This was a clear case of diplomacy and peace taking precedence as priorities over expansionism or, at least, over uncertainty and the prospect for fresh disputes that might be beneficial. The recruitment of British skilled workers for work abroad was seen as another aspect of the vulnerability of, and even attack on, Britain’s position. This was an attack mounted by ostensible allies, particularly France in 1716–31,133 as well as by opponents, although the British, at times, were not adverse to the same practice.134 It brought forward different and difficult issues of individual freedom and responsibility, and was seen as a particularly potent form of economic warfare that was designed to compensate for the social weaknesses of other systems. As a result, repeated efforts were made to thwart these

44 Ideas of trade and empire

attempts. Recruitment was designed to help not only industry but also trade, with efforts made to recruit sailors, naval officers and merchants. Envoys reported on attempts to recruit British workers.135 Concern about the transfer of skills led to interest in encouraging workers to emigrate back to Britain.136 Ironically, Charles III of Spain explained his delay in joining France against Britain during the Seven Years’ War by complaining that his ships had been constructed by dishonest British workmen.137 There were comparable foreign attempts to obtain machinery and also capital. British concern about these attempts was enhanced because of the opportunities they provided for networks of British traders who were apparently, or really, disaffected, particularly by being Catholic or Jacobite. This anxiety was especially focused on attempts by Spain to recruit support, as such networks were particularly important there,138 but it was also an issue elsewhere, particularly with Russia when relations were poor. Governmental concern about trade in part reflected the sense that industries in other countries could improve with time, and, more generally, this concern was expressed in correspondence with diplomats.139 Protectionism was indeed linked across Europe to attempts to strengthen the local economy, as in Tuscany in 1739 when the import of woollen manufactures was banned in order to encourage local production.140 Trade could serve to reform society and thereby render a state a more formidable rival to Britain, or could be used directly as a political device in seeking to affirm international alignments and harm rivals. Much of the press reporting of trade focused on the latter.141 So also did the foreign conviction that trade could be used in order to influence British policy. Thus, in the winter of 1717–18, Isodoro, Marquess of Monteléon, the Spanish envoy, was convinced that policy could be affected by the impact of Spanish moves on domestic opinion. He reported that a threat to confiscate British investments in Spain and to close ports to British ships would cause confusion and complaints in London. In his view, this lent credence to the argument that trade with Spain was too important to permit any anti-Spanish moves. Monteléon’s assessment was influenced by assurances from Spencer Compton, the Speaker of the House of Commons and then, as an opposition Whig, an opponent of the ministry, that any measures resulting in disruption of trade with Spain would meet with bitter opposition throughout the country. Monteléon followed Compton’s advice by warning the government that the arrival of a British fleet in the Mediterranean would be regarded as a declaration of war and would lead to a confiscation of British goods.142 The Dutch were also threatened.143 In the event, this strategy failed in 1717–18, despite press reports of the Spanish government licensing privateers,144 but the crisis testified to the difficulty that the maintenance of trade was believed to pose for British policy. British diplomats reported the foreign conviction that concern about trade could be made ‘the price of His Majesty’s neutrality’.145 The argument was made most forcefully by opponents, including Jacobites.146 They argued that diplo-

Ideas of trade and empire 45

matic demands on Britain, for example, for the return of Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain,147 could be exploited to create tensions between the government and merchant interests. While focusing on the ideas of opponents, the views of allies, including, in 1716–31, France,148 about British vulnerability to commercial pressure should not be forgotten. In 1723, Charles, Count of Morville, the French foreign minister, claimed that, because of trade, Britain had to be very careful about Portugal.149 The opinions of undecided powers were even more significant. In 1730, the Wittelsbach envoy in The Hague (members of the Wittelsbach family were rulers of Bavaria, Cologne and the Palatinate) predicted trouble for the British government if its trade with Spain and Spanish America was lost, and therefore suggested that Austria might be mistaken on counting on Britain to turn to her. In August 1748, his counterpart in London noted mercantile pressure on the government to lift the prohibition of trade with Spain, which was certainly seen as a possible factor in the pace of peace negotiations between the two powers.150 Eight years later, the Sardinian envoy reported that merchants trading to the Mediterranean were pressing for an increase in the naval presence there.151 At the same time, British commentators were also convinced that foreign powers were vulnerable and/or weak due to commercial considerations. Thus, in 1747–8, British naval successes against French convoys were seen as inhibiting France’s ability to sustain the War of the Austrian Succession, while, in 1784, the damage done to French trade and finances by the recent War of American Independence was regarded as likely to keep France at peace.152 Three years later, when war with France appeared imminent in the Dutch crisis, British ministers, diplomats, officials and commentators, who wanted France to back down, were pleased to note the dependence of French finances on peace.153 Aside from supposed British concern about specific trades, and a belief that this could affect bilateral political relations, there was also a conviction abroad that the general significance of trade to British society had implications for the direction of foreign policy. In part, this matched the critical Tory theme about the impact of merchants on British policy. Both Tories and hostile foreign diplomats were inclined to see the role of trade as a source of weakness, in part because they identified the role of credit in this light. Chammorel, the French chargé des affaires, was confident in 1732 that the size of the national debt and the weakness of trade were such that any report of war would be very dangerous.154 Nine years earlier, he had attributed British moderation in the dispute with France over St Lucia to the need for peace. In 1734, French ministers, diplomats and commentators thought that concern about trade would discourage Britain from going to war with France and Spain in the War of the Polish Succession.155 Reflecting the view that this concern was a matter of public as much as governmental sensitivity, Count Albert, the pro-French Bavarian envoy in Paris, suggested that France and her allies threaten the

46 Ideas of trade and empire

British government publicly as this would have greater impact.156 Frederick II of Prussia, in 1756 a very anxious and vulnerable ally, pressed the British envoy hard on the need to win the alliance of the Dutch, adding ‘that it was plainly our interest to postpone commercial considerations when our all was at stake’.157 The extent to which British trade was part of a multilateral system indeed encouraged its sensitivity to international developments. Thus, in 1734, when Denmark used commercial pressures in its disputes with Hamburg, British merchants were concerned not only with goods carried in British ships, but also with those carried in Hamburg counterparts. Wych reported that Charles Broughton, a merchant resident in Hamburg, ‘daily expects a very rich loading of fruit from Lisbon in a Hamburger’, and that the entire cargo belonged to him and his brother.158 This pattern of activity was widespread and encouraged a view of trade as ‘interwoven’,159 rather than the contrasting interests of polemicists. Thus, in 1735, Harrington argued that ‘the business of trade is so complicated that it is hardly possible to seize and confiscate the ships of that town without involving other nations in the losses’.160 The press, however, was more inclined to highlight commercial competition, and to argue that it was significant even between allies. In 1737, the Old Whig reported, By a private letter from Amsterdam, we learn, that, notwithstanding the strict union which subsists between Great Britain and the Republic, this latter omits no opportunity of promoting the interests of its subjects by commerce in Italy, however detrimental this may be to the former.161 While emphasizing commercial competition, critics could also argue that British trade was detrimentally affected by British foreign policy, a theme that was also taken up by foreign commentators, Edward Finch reporting the Swedish conviction ‘that Sweden might treat the trade of England as ill as it pleased with impunity, for that political considerations would always prevent on our side any returns in kind’.162 This provided a means to criticise the government, and the latter indeed tended to regret the extent to which peacetime disputes affected commerce. At the same time, however, there was a willingness to exploit such disputes when they affected foreign powers in order to derive commercial advantage. Thus, in 1733, Harrington ordered the British envoy in St Petersburg to exploit differences between Prussia and Russia over Poland in order to gain the contract to supply the Russian army with cloth.163 Whatever the concern about the details of policy, there was a general view that government could, as well as should, help trade, and that this aid was necessary in order to counteract the problems posed by selfish merchants. The contrast was also one put to the electorate, with voters seen, like government, as a support for good trade against its pernicious merchants. Thus, the Whig Flying Post, in its issue of 24 November (os) 1724, supported one candidate in the London by-election thus:

Ideas of trade and empire 47

It can’t be improper to take notice, that Sir Richard Hopkins was one of the merchants who opposed Mr. Godfellow’s attempt to bring in silk by way of Russia, to the destruction of the Turkey trade here, and only to the advantage of the Muscovites. Hopkins, a prominent Turkey merchant, and a Director of the South Sea Company, defeated Charles Godfellow three weeks later. An anonymous memorandum of 1741 sent to Martin Bladen, a key member of the Board of Trade, proposed a network of consuls in Russia, arguing that they were needed not only to counteract the nature of Russian governance, to ‘balance the effects of favour and arbitrary power’, but also to regulate the British there. This entailed resisting the porous nature of identity, to restore the reputation of the British Factories in Russia by healing their divisions, and giving the turn of the scale where it may be done with justice to Englishmen; or at least to discover and counteract the ill practices of those, who having got themselves naturalized only to enjoy the privileges of the Russia Company, and not having the real interest of England at heart, will trade with the manufactures of Holland, Germany and Prussia, whenever they can find the particular advantage in it.164 Concerned about mercantile self-interest, ministers might doubt the value of many of the proposals put to them, but there was no doubt about the principle of support. Indeed, this extended to a willingness to act in an underhand fashion, as with the Swedish East India Company in 1730, ‘The King does not see upon what foundation we can openly oppose such an establishment in Sweden; but if you can underhand give any discouragement to it you will not do amiss.’165 A robust view was taken by Edward Finch when, in response to Swedish protectionism, he threatened the non-renewal of subsidies.166 At times, an explicit cost–benefit analysis of support could be offered, as in 1719, when Britain was at war with Spain and The Lords of the Admiralty in their report upon the petition of the Turkey [Levant] Company took notice that the convoy they desired being, at least, two fifty gun ships, would cost the king more money than the Company could get by the adventure; and indeed the merchants in general, upon this head of convoys are and have ever been very unreasonable.167 The context within which support was discussed was a dynamic one, with the range, intensity and interaction of external activity growing. This challenged conventional assessments of commerce, making them appear redundant, as John Crookshanks, Secretary to the Commissioners discussing AngloSpanish commercial differences, noted in response to opposition criticisms in 1731,

48 Ideas of trade and empire

the balance of trade with a particular kingdom or upon a single branch cannot be ascertained, unless we trade in cattle as the patriarchs did. The consideration of the Guinea [West Africa] trade makes this plain. £500 from England to Africa produces £5,000 in Jamaica, which last sum merges in the returns from the English colonies, without any possibility of distinction.168 Many merchants, however, were concerned about a lack of government understanding of trade.169 A chapter without chronological divisions risks presenting an overly static impression. Equally, an emphasis on divisions can lead to a misleading stress on change. Compared to the equivalent subsequent period, 1815–1941, the years from 1689 to 1815 saw more consistency in commercial and colonial policies, and also in political and popular attitudes to trade and empire. If there was a shift toward the close of the period, with a greater interest in a ‘free navigation’ in the ‘Indian’ and ‘Eastern’ seas and the Pacific, in order to open new markets,170 that took up the theme from the outset of limiting and penetrating the colonial positions and commercial hegemonies of other European powers, rather than reflecting a major change in attitude. At the same time, whereas the trans-oceanic focus in the early decades of the period had been on the Atlantic world, not least as a result of the consequences of the Spanish Succession, which continued important in the outbreak of war with Spain in 1739, from the 1780s there was a stronger focus on the Indian Ocean. This linked trade, empire and strategic concerns. In 1784, the Foreign Secretary, Francis, Marquess of Carmarthen, wrote to the envoy in Paris in a fashion that would have been implausible 40 or 50 years earlier, about the need to focus on the general views of France with regard to the strengthening her own marine, and to her system of politics in the East Indies (perhaps the object the most important of all for us to be continually and repeatedly informed of) . . . matters which so deeply concern not only the present interests but, perhaps, the future existence of Great Britain as an independent; at any rate as a respectable power.171

Notes 1 D.C. Coleman, ‘Politics and Economics in the Age of Anne: The Case of the AngloFrench Trade Treaty of 1713’, in Coleman and A.H. John (eds), Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial England: Essays Presented to F.J. Fisher (London, 1976), pp. 196–9; G.N. Clark, Guide to English Commercial Statistics, 1696–1782 (London, 1938); E.B. Schumpeter, English Overseas Trade Statistics, 1697–1808 (Oxford, 1960); W.A. Cole, ‘Trends in Eighteenth-Century Smuggling’ and ‘The Arithmetic of EighteenthCentury Smuggling’, EcHR, 10 (1957–8), pp. 395–410, 28 (1975), pp. 44–9; H.C. and L.H. Mui, ‘Smuggling and the British Tea Trade before 1784’, American Historical Review, 74 (1968–9), pp. 44–73 and ‘ “Trends in Eighteenth-Century Smuggling” Reconsidered’,

Ideas of trade and empire 49

2 3 4 5

6 7 8

9

10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18

19

20 21 22 23 24

EcHR, 28 (1975), pp. 28–49; Ossorio, Sardinian envoy, to Victor Amadeus II of Sardinia, 27 Feb. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37. Charles Compton to Newcastle, 25 June, 6 Aug., Tyrawly to Newcastle, 26 June 1729, NA. SP. 89/35 fols 180, 194, 181. W. Kirchner, Commercial Relations between Russia and Europe 1400 to 1800 (Bloomington, 1966), p. 18. Bonal, memorandum, 18 Ap. 1716, AN. AM. B7 267. For British dominance of the export trade from St Petersburg in 1758, figures in NA. PRO. 30/8/88 fol. 243; H.H. Kaplan, ‘Russia’s Impact on the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century: The Significance of International Commerce’, Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte, 29 (1981), pp. 7–59. Lagau, French consul in Hamburg, to Maurepas, French minister of the marine, 10 Ap., 18 May 1744, AN. AM. B7350. H.E.S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade: A Study of Anglo-Portuguese Commerce 1700–1770 (London, 1971), p. 13. P.K. O’Brien and S.L. Engerman, ‘Exports and the Growth of the British Economy from the Glorious Revolution to the Peace of Amiens’, in B.L. Solow (ed.), Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 177–209. Robert Livingston to Keith, 25 Sept. 1787, BL. Add. 35539 fol. 161; R. Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade (Leicester, 1979), pp. 54–6; R.C. Nash, ‘The Balance of Payments and Foreign Capital Flows in Eighteenth-Century England: A Comment’, and ‘The Contribution of Overseas Savings to the Funded National Debt of Great Britain, 1750–1815’, EcHR, 50 (1997), pp. 110–29, 657–74, esp. p. 671. J. Cuenca Esteban, ‘The Rising Share of British Industrial Exports in Industrial Output, 1700–1851’, Journal of Economic History, 57 (1997), pp. 879–906. I.K. Steele, The English Atlantic 1675–1740. An Exploration of Communication and Community (Oxford, 1986). Re. Swedish trade, Snow to Tilson, 29 May (os) 1728, NA. SP. 95/48 fol. 97. C. Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 1941), p. 20; D.J. Ormrod, ‘English Re-exports and the Dutch Staple Market in the Eighteenth Century’, in D.C. Coleman and P. Mathias (eds), Enterprise and History: Essays in Honour of Charles Wilson (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 89–115, and ‘The Atlantic Economy and the Protestant Capitalist International, 1651–1775’, Historical Research, 46 (1993), pp. 197–208. H.S.K. Kent, ‘The Background to Anglo-Norwegian Relations’, The Norseman, 11 (1953), pp. 151–3. D.J. Ormrod, ‘Anglo-Dutch Commerce 1700–1760’ (Cambridge PhD 1973), p. 98. 22 Feb. (os) 1718, Political State of Great Britain, 15, p. 213. Allen to Newcastle, 24 Dec. 1728, NA. SP. 93/5 fol. 137. Anon. memorandum, 20 Ap., Chammorel, Secretary of Embassy, to Germain-Louis Chauvelin, French foreign minister, 28 Ap. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 368 fols 204–6, 366 fol. 69. See also Whitehall Evening Post, 6 Nov. (os) 1718; Flying Post, 17 Feb. (os) 1722, 14 Dec. (os) 1727; St James’s Evening Post, 5 Dec. (os) 1727; Daily Post Boy, 5 Dec. (os) 1727, 13 Feb. (os) 1730. William, Third Earl of Essex, envoy in Turin, to Newcastle, 27 Oct. 1734, NA. SP. 92/37. J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History. Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1985). H. Davis (ed.), The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift (16 vols, Oxford, 1939–68), VI, p. 10. C. Nicholson, Writing and the Rise of Finance: Capital Satires of the Early Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1994). Mist to Daniel O’Brien, 1 Jan. 1733, RA. Stuart Papers 158/69.

50 Ideas of trade and empire 25 W.A. Speck, Literature and Society in Eighteenth-Century England: Ideology, Politics and Culture, 1680–1820 (London, 1998), pp. 107–8. 26 I.R. Christie, British ‘Non-Elite’ MPs (Oxford, 1995); E.A. Wasson, ‘The Penetration of New Wealth into the English Governing Class from the Middle Ages to the First World War’, EcHR, 51 (1998), pp. 25–48, esp. pp. 39, 41, 44. 27 HL. Stowe papers, 21, pp. 69–70; A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (2 vols, Oxford, 1976), I, 372. 28 Charles, Second Viscount Townshend, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, to Robert Walpole, 8 Sept. 1723, W. Coxe (ed.), Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole, Earl of Orford (3 vols, London, 1798), II, 266; York Courant, 4 Jan. (os) 1732. 29 A. Finkelstein, Harmony and the Balance: An Intellectual History of Seventeenth-Century English Economic Thought (Ann Arbor, 2000). 30 Anon., undated, ‘An Impartial Enquiry’, CUL. C(H) mss 73/56. 31 Undated draft [1718–20], Hertford, Hertfordshire CRO., Panshanger papers, D/EP F199 fol. 43. 32 Tyrawly to Newcastle, 21 Mar. 1735, NA. SP. 89/38 fol. 18. 33 C. Shammas, ‘The Decline of Textile Prices in England and British America prior to Industrialization’, EcHR, 47 (1994), p. 497. 34 Table du Registre des orders du Roy et dépêches concernant le commerce, 1733, AN. AM. B7146. 35 Holden, memorandum, CUL. C(H) mss. 80/46/2. 36 Eg. St James’s Evening Post, 30 Jan. (os) 1733. 37 Worcester Post-Man, 27 Nov. (os) 1718. 38 J.M. Graham (ed.), Annals and Correspondence of the Viscount and the First and Second Earls of Stair (2 vols, London, 1875) II, 170. 39 Decker, An Essay on the Causes of the Decline of the Foreign Trade, consequently of the value of the lands of Britain, and on the means to restore both (Dublin, 1749), p. v. 40 Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 18 Oct. 1728, Norwich, Norfolk CRO., Bradfer Laurence papers, vol. 2. 41 John, Second Viscount Molesworth, envoy in Turin, to Carteret, 14 Oct. 1722, NA. SP. 92/31 fol. 147. 42 Worcester Post-Man, 22 Aug. (os) 1718. 43 Evening Post, Whitehall Evening Post, St James’s Evening Post, all 28 Nov. (os) 1724; British Journal, 5 Dec. (os) 1724. 44 Wych to Harrington, 4 Ap. 1732, Harrington to Wych, 23 Feb. (os) 1733, NA. SP. 82/49 fol. 70, 82/51 fol. 34. 45 London Journal, 13 June (os) 1724. 46 B. Harris, ‘Scotland’s Herring Fisheries and the Prosperity of the Nation, c. 1660–1760’, Scottish History Review, 79 (2000), pp. 39–60; A. Gambles, ‘Free Trade and State Formation: The Political Economy of Fisheries Policy in Britain and the United Kingdom circa 1780–1850’, Journal of British Studies, 39 (2000), pp. 288–316. 47 London Evening Post, 21 Jan. 1762; Hawkesbury to Commodore Blankett, 13 Dec. 1795, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 146. 48 Commonsense, 23 Dec. (os) 1738; London Evening Post, Jan. 1757; Anon., Proposals for Carrying on the War with Vigour . . . Intended to demonstrate that it is not the dearness of the labour of the poor . . . which are the real clog on the foreign trade (London, 1757), pp. 26, 54. 49 M. Berg and H. Clifford, Consumers and Luxury: Consumer Culture in Europe, 1650–1850 (Manchester, 1999). 50 Cobbett, IX, 261. 51 Evening Post, 5 Mar. (os) 1728. 52 Re. Prussia, St James’s Evening Post. 4 Oct. (os) 1722; London Journal, 26 Feb. (os) 1732.

Ideas of trade and empire 51 53 Undated memoire, ‘The Russia’s Company Answer to the Board of Trade’, CUL. C(H) mss. 89/31. 54 D. Armitage, ‘Making the Empire British in Scotland: The Atlantic World, 1542–1717’, Past and Present, 155 (1997), pp. 34–63; T.M. Devine, ‘Scottish Élites and the Indian Empire, 1700–1815’, in T.C. Smout (ed.), Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603 to 1900 (Oxford, 2005), pp. 213–29. 55 B. Harris, ‘The Scots, the Westminster Parliament, and the British State in the Eighteenth Century’, in J. Hoppit (ed.), Parliaments, Nations and Identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660–1850 (Manchester, 2003), pp. 124–45. 56 Hawkesbury to A. Lovat, 24 Feb. 1794, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 103; Chalmers to Grenville, 1 Nov. 1769, San Marino, California, Huntington Library, STG. Box 21(28). 57 Carmarthen to Eden, 12 Sept. 1786, NA. FO. 27/20 fol. 65. 58 Board of Trade to George I, 24 July (os) 1724, NA. SP. 35/50 fol. 306. 59 William Cayley, Consul in Cadiz, to Keene, 22 June 1728, George, Seventh Earl of Kinnoull, envoy in Constantinople, to Delafaye, 13 Jan. 1733, NA. SP. 94/218, 97/26 fol. 33. 60 R.C. Nash, ‘Irish Atlantic Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, William and Mary Quarterly, Third ser., 42 (1985), pp. 329–56. 61 C. Gill, The Rise of the Irish Linen Industry (Oxford, 1925); J. Horner, The Linen Trade of Europe during the Spinning-Wheel Period (Belfast, 1920); Carmarthen to Eden, 12 Sept. 1786, NA. FO. 27/20 fol. 66. 62 Eden to Carmarthen, 17 Ap. 1786, NA. FO. 27/19 fol. 8. 63 Holdernesse to Robert Keith, envoy in Vienna, 21 June 1756, NA. SP. 80/197 fol. 179; N. Zahedieh, ‘London and the Colonial Consumer in the Late Seventeenth Century’, EcHR, 47 (1994), pp. 239–61; B. Arneil, ‘Trade, Plantation, and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defence of Colonialism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 55 (1994), pp. 591–609; S.D. Smith, ‘The Market for Manufactures in the Thirteen Continental Colonies, 1698–1776’, EcHR, 51 (1998), pp. 676–708. 64 Board of Trade to George I, 24 July (os) 1724, NA. SP. 35/50 fols 306, 309–10, 312. 65 Edward Finch, envoy in Stockholm, to William, Lord Harrington, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, 4 Sept. 1733, NA. SP. 95/64 fols 55–6. 66 Board of Trade to Newcastle, 9 Feb. (os) 1728, C(H) mss. 86/12/2. 67 Nathaniel Torriano to Board of Trade enclosed in Bladen to Townshend, 20 Aug. (os) 1724, NA. SP. 35/51 fol. 62. 68 F.G. James, Ireland in the Empire 1688–1770 (Cambridge, Massachusssetts, 1973), p. 159. 69 R.L. Sickinger, ‘Regulation or Ruination: Parliament’s Consistent Pattern of Mercantilist Regulation of the English Textile Trade, 1660–1800’, Parliamentary History, 19 (2000), pp. 211–32. 70 Allen to Delafaye, 10 Jan. 1733, NA. SP. 93/15 fol. 178. 71 Liverpool to Messrs Hellicar, 16 Oct. 1799, BL. Add. 38311 fol. 27. 72 Weekly Journal: or Saturday’s Post, 1 Mar (os) 1718. 73 D.J. Jeremy, ‘Damming the Flood: British Government Efforts to Check the Outflow of Technicians and Machinery, 1780–1843’, Business History Review, 5 (1977); J.R. Harris, ‘The Transfer of Technology between Britain and France before the French Revolution’, in C. Crossley and I. Small (eds), The French Revolution and British Culture (Oxford, 1989), and ‘Movements of Technology between Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century’, in D.J. Jeremy (ed.), International Technology Transfer: Europe, Japan and the USA 1700–1914 (London, 1991), pp. 18–24; I. Inkster, ‘Mental Capital: Transfers of Knowledge and Technique in Eighteenth-Century Europe’, Journal of European Economic History, 19 (1990), pp. 403–41. 74 Anon., The Case of the Worsted and Silk Manufacturers (London, 1736). 75 R. Rolt, The Conduct of the Several Powers of Europe Engaged in the Late General War (4 vols, London, 1749–50), III, 6.

52 Ideas of trade and empire 76 Dorset to Carmarthen, 18 Mar. 1784, NA. FO. 27/11 fol. 254; Robert Liston, envoy in Madrid, to Dorset, 25 Oct. 1784, 8 Jan. 1785, Maidstone, KAO. U 269 C184; Robert Walpole, envoy in Lisbon, to Liston, 29 Jan. 1786, NLS. MS 5544 fol. 54. 77 Carmarthen to Dorset, 26 Mar. 1784, NA. FO. 27/11 fol. 262, cf. 2 July, reply Dorset to Carmarthen, 8 July 1784, 27/12 fols 133, 137. 78 Dalrymple to Major General Granville, 28 Ap. 1788, NAS. GD. 135/111. 79 The Herald; or Patriot Proclaimer (2 vols, London, 1758) I, viii. 80 Henry Legge, envoy in Berlin, to Sandwich, 10 June 1748, BL. Add. 15956 fol. 209. 81 Eden to Carmarthen, 30 Dec. 1786, NA. FO. 27/20 fol. 327. 82 Robert Daniel, envoy in Brussels, to Tilson, 23 Mar. 1729, NA. SP. 77/76 fol. 61. 83 Charles Du Bourgay, envoy in Berlin, to Townshend, 7 Nov. 1724, NA. SP. 90/18. 84 Harrington to Claudius Rondeau, envoy in St Petersburg, 28 July (os) 1732, Sbornik, 66, p. 486. 85 Re. Russia, Whitworth to Delafaye, 1 Feb. 1721, NA. SP. 90/13. 86 Prince Kantemir, Russian envoy in London, to Tsarina Anna, 13 Nov. 1733, V.N. Aleksandrenko, Reliatsii Kn A.D. Kantemira iz Londona, 1732–1733 (Moscow, 1892), p. 206. 87 Tilson to Titley, 26 July (os) 1737, BL. Eg. 2684 fol. 255. 88 R.C. Wiles, ‘Mercantilism and the Idea of Progress’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 8 (1974), p. 73. 89 William Fraser, Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, to Charles William Boughton Rouse, MP, Secretary to the Board of Control for India, 22 Aug. 1785, NA. PRO. 30/8/137 fol. 27; Captain John Blankett RN to Lansdowne, 26 Aug. 1785, BL. Bowood collection, Shelburne papers, Box 11. 90 Carmarthen to Dorset, 26 Mar. 1784, NA. FO. 27/11 fol. 263; Sir Robert Murray Keith, envoy in Vienna, to Dorset, 17 Mar. 1784, Maidstone, KAO. U269 C191. 91 Dorset to Carmarthen, 22 July 1784, NA. FO. 27/12 fol. 177. 92 Weekly Journal or Saturday’s Post, 3 Nov. (os) 1722. 93 Daniel to William Leathes, 29 Nov. 1724, Ipswich, East Suffolk CRO., HA. 403/1/3. 94 H. Freudenberger, ‘Industrialisation in Bohemia and Moravia in the Eighteenth Century’, Journal of Central European Affairs, 19 (1960), pp. 347–56, ‘The WoollenGoods Industry of the Habsburg Monarchy in the Eighteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History, 20 (1960), pp. 383–406; A. Klima, ‘Mercantilism in the Habsburg Monarchy – with Special Reference to the Bohemian Lands’, Historica, 11 (1965), pp. 95–119; P. Clendenning, ‘The Economic Awakening of Russia in the Eighteenth Century’, Journal of European Economic History, 14 (1985), pp. 443–72; A. Kahan, The Plow, the Hammer, and the Knout: An Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Russia (Chicago, 1985). 95 Joseph Kenworthy, consul in Danzig, to Tilson, 5 Jan. 1735, NA. SP. 88/45 fol. 1, re. impact of Anglo-Russian trade treaty on Prussian cloth industry. 96 Law to Townshend, 24 Oct. 1725, NA. SP. 81/91. 97 Reporting views of Spanish ministers, D’Arvillars, Sardinian envoy, to Victor Amadeus II, 11 Feb. 1729, AST. LM. Spagna 61. 98 Holdernesse to Keith, 21 June 1756, NA. SP. 80/197 fol. 179, cf. to Hanbury Williams, envoy in St Petersburg, 25 June, 91/63. 99 Anon., Some Considerations on the Consequences of the French Settling Colonies on the Mississippi (London, 1720), p. 3. 100 Fox to William, Duke of Portland, 18 Nov. 1786, BL. Add. 47501 fol. 88. 101 Wych to Harrington, 25 Mar. 1737, NA. SP. 82/58 fol. 41. 102 T.W. Perry, Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Politics in Eighteenth-Century England: A Study of the Jew Bill of 1753 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1962). 103 W. Kirchner, Commercial Relations between Russia and Europe 1400 to 1800 (Bloomington, Indiana, 1966), p. 18. 104 Snow to Tilson, 12 June (os) 1728, NA. SP. 95/48 fol. 102.

Ideas of trade and empire 53 105 Geraldino to Torrenuera, 17 June 1737, CUL. C(H) corresp. 2695. 106 De la Vie, French Consul in St Petersburg, memoire on Russian trade, 29 Ap. 1717, AN. AM. B7 272. 107 Jacques Le Coq, Saxon envoy in London, to Lagnasc, 9 Jan. 1725, Dresden, 2673 fol. 37. 108 Report of Board of Trade, 27 June (os) 1733, NA. SP. 80/97. 109 Allen to Newcastle, 3 Dec. 1737, NA. SP. 93/9 fol. 173. 110 Dorset to Carmarthen, 28 Oct. 1784, NA. FO. 27/13 fol. 129; cf. David, Viscount Stormont, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, to Keith, 20 Jan., 4 Feb. 1781, NA. FO. 7/1. 111 Daniel Hailes to Carmarthen, 11 Nov. 1784, BL. Eg. 3499 fol. 59. 112 Talleyrand, memorandum on French foreign policy, 25 Nov. 1792, AE. CP. Ang. 585 fol. 185. 113 Harris to Hugh Elliot, envoy in Copenhagen, 17 Jan. 1786, NLS, MS 12999 fol. 116. 114 John Gray to William Grenville, 21 Jay 1787, BL. Add. 59354 fol. 34. 115 Chamberlayne, consul in Messina, to Robinson, 19 Jan., Robinson to Harrington, 14 Feb. 1734, NA. SP. 80/104. 116 Snow to Tilson, 13 Mar. (os) 1728, NA. SP. 95/48 fol. 74. 117 Whitworth to Townshend, 3 May 1721, NA. SP. 90/14. 118 Townshend to St Saphorin, envoy in Vienna, 6 Nov. (os) 1722, NA. SP. 80/48. 119 Titley to Harrington, 17 Mar. 1731, NA. SP. 75/56 fol. 93; General Evening Post, 24 Dec. (os) 1734; Poussin, French consul in Hamburg, to Council of the Navy, 5 Nov. 1717, AN. AM. B7272. 120 Memoire, NA. SP. 35/65 fols 61–2. 121 Titley to Harrington, 2 Nov. 1734, NA. SP. 75/65 fol. 62. 122 Harrington to Wych, 30 Aug. (os), 3 Sept. (os) 1734, Harrington to Titley, 1, 4 Oct. (os) 1734, 3, 10, 28 Jan. (os), 25 Feb. (os). 14, 18 Mar. (os) 1735, NA. SP. 82/54 fols 27, 29, 75/65 fols 5, 12, 75/66 fols 3, 20, 41, 90, 136, 138, 151. 123 Harrington to Titley, 14 Mar. 1735, NA. SP. 75/66 fol. 147. 124 Harrington to Titley, 14, 21, 28 June, 5, 15, 22 July 1735, NA. SP. 75/67 fols 80, 104, 109, 146–7, 161, 177–8. 125 Harrington to Titley, 15, 22 July 1735, NA. SP. 75/67 fols 161, 177. 126 Maurepas to Champeaux, French consul general in Spain, 7 Mar. 1733, AN. AM. B7 144, p. 399. 127 Robert Trevor, envoy in The Hague, reporting the view of the Dutch envoy in Paris, to Harrington, 2 Feb. 1740, NA. SP. 84/383 fol. 167. 128 Chavigny, former envoy in London, memorandum on trade, 1 Ap. 1739, AE. MD. France 504 fol. 205. 129 Douglas, French agent in St Petersburg, reporting Russian views to Antoine-Louis Rouillé, foreign minister, 23 May 1756, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Nouvelles Acquisitions Françaises, vol. 22009 fol. 119. 130 Bedford to John, Third Earl of Bute, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, 9 July 1761, MS. 1761 papers no. 478. 131 Sandwich to Newcastle, 31 May 1748, BL. Add. 32812 fol. 220. 132 Sandwich to Andrew Stone, Under Secretary of State, 10 June, Stone to Sandwich, 12 June 1748, NA. SP. 43/38. 133 Worcester Post-Man, 28 Aug. (os) 1719; Daniel Pulteney to James Craggs, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 9 Jan. 1720 NA. SP. 78/166 fol. 99; Earl of Abercorn to John, Lord Perceval, 18 Feb. (os) 1720, BL. Add. 47029 fol. 17; Craggs to Stair, 14 Ap. (os) 1720, NAS. GD. 135/141/24 no. 31. 134 James Stanhope, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, to Stair, 3 June (os) 1715, NAS. GD. 135/147 no. 2. 135 Elliot to Carmarthen, 13 Jan. 1787, Eden to Carmarthen, 16 Mar. 1789, NA. FO. 22/9 fols 1–2, 72/14.

54 Ideas of trade and empire 136 137 138 139 140

141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150

151 152 153 154 155

156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170

171

Carmarthen to Hailes, 8 Oct. 1784, NA. FO. 27/13 fol. 81. A. Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et l’Alliance Espagnole (Paris, 1906), p. 165. Cayley to Newcastle, 26 Aug. 1732, NA. SP. 94/220. Tilson to Titley, 23 Jan. (os) 1736, BL. Eg. 2683 fol. 2. Mann to Waldegrave, 16 Feb. 1739, Chewton; H.P. Liebel, ‘Free Trade and Protectionism under Maria Theresa and Joseph II’, Canadian Journal of History, 14 (1979), pp. 355–73. London Evening Post, 28 July (os) 1737. Monteléon to Grimaldi, 7 Feb. 1718, Archivio General de Simancas, Etado, Legajo 6841; Bothmar, Hanoverian minister, to Whitworth, 1 Ap. 1718, BL. Add. 37367 fols 278–9. Cadogan and Whitworth to Craggs, 16 Aug. 1718, BL. Add. 37369 fol. 140. Post Boy, 27 Nov. (os) 1718. Robinson to Harrington, 16 Mar. 1732, NA. SP. 80/86. James Murray to John Hay, 14 May 1725, RA. Stuart papers 82/36. Macanas to Walef, 19 Oct. 1726, HHStA. GK. 150a. Chammorel to Huxelles, French foreign minister, 11 Feb. 1718, AE. CP. Ang. 312 fol. 50. Morville to Chammorel, 8 Nov. 1723, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 7 fol. 98. For an unsympathetic French agent, L’inventaire, 11, 21 Dec. 1719, AN. AM. B7 278. Gansinot to Törring, 9 May 1730, Munich, Kasten Schwarz 17313; Haslang to Preysing, Bavarian foreign minister, 16 Aug. 1748, Munich, Bayr. Ges. London 220; Breglio, Sardinian envoy in Vienna, to Charles Emmanuel III, 21, 28 Mar., 7 Nov. 1731, AST. LM. Autriche 61; De Löss, Saxon envoy, to Augustus III of Saxony-Poland, 3 Sept. 1737, Dresden 639 Vb fol. 86. Viry to Charles Emmanuel III, 1 Oct. 1756, AST. LM. Ing. 60. Dorset to Carmarthen, 22 July 1784, NA. FO. 27/12 fol. 176. Eden to Robert Liston, envoy in Madrid, 19 Aug. 1787, NLS. MS. 5547 fol. 181; Pitt to Charles, First Marquess Cornwallis, 28 Aug. 1787, NA. PRO. 30/8/102 fol. 77. Chammorel to Chauvelin, 4 Feb. 1732, Chammorel to Morville, 7 Oct. 1723, AE. CP. Ang. 376 fol. 188, 346 fols 113–14. Waldegrave to Newcastle, 10 Feb. 1734, BL. Add. 32784 fol. 21; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 9 Feb. 1734, AE. CP. Ang. 383 fol. 383; Champeaux to Maurepas, 26 Ap. 1734, AN. AM. B7 324; Feb. 1734, Chronique de la Régence II (Paris, 1857), p. 451. Albert to Törring, Bavarian foreign minister, 5 Feb. 1734, Munich, Kasten Schwarz 17132. Mitchell to Holdernesse, 30 Aug. 1756, NA. SP. 90/66. Wych to Harrington, 3 Sept. 1734, NA. SP. 82/54 fol. 23. Wych to Harrington, 31 Aug., Harrington to Titley, 1 Oct. (os) 1734, NA. SP. 82/54 fol. 22, 75/65 fol. 5. Harrington to Titley, 6 May (os) 1735, NA. SP. 75/67 fol. 49. Old Whig, 15 Dec. (os) 1737. Finch to Harrington, 12 Feb. 1739, NA. SP. 95/84 fol. 198. Harrington to Forbes, 27 Aug. (os) 1733, Sbornik 76, p. 77. Anon. memorandum, endorsed, sent to Bladen, 5 Aug. (os) 1741, NA. SP. 91/28 fol. 177. Harrington to Edward Finch, 28 July (os) 1730, NA. SP. 95/55 fol. 68. Finch to Harrington, 14 Jan. 1730, NA. SP. 95/54 fol. 20. Delafaye to Stanhope, 12 June (os) 1719, NA. SP. 43/61. Crookshanks to Newcastle, 10 Mar. (os) 1731, BL. Add. 32687 fol. 395. Samuel Garbett to William, Second Earl of Shelburne, 18 Nov. 1784, 13 Feb. 1785, BL. Bowood collection, Shelburne papers, Box 16. Hailes to Carmarthen, 30 Ap. 1784, NA. FO. 27/11 fol. 342; Henry Dundas, President of the Board of Control for India, to Grenville, 2 Sept. 1787, V. Harlow and F. Madden, British Colonial Developments 1774–1834: Select Documents (Oxford, 1953), p. 15. Carmarthen to Dorset, 9 July 1784, NA. FO. 27/12 fol. 149.

Chapter 3

The shaping of policy

If a merchant of London and one of Amsterdam were to be the ministers of the political conduct to be observed between England and Holland, instead of preserving an union between the Maritime Powers, the two nations would be constantly in a war with one another. Horatio Walpole, envoy in The Hague, 17351

Economic lobbying was insistent and continual. It was an aspect of an integral part of British political culture and government, namely the acceptance that government involved interests, that interested parties would lobby and that such lobbying could be a source of government policy. Indeed, it was assumed, or, at least, argued, that many activities that were subsequently to be seen as characteristic of government could and should be discharged by other bodies. Despite the importance of lobbying, it would be inappropriate to explain the degree of mercantile influence by reference to the political strength of trade interests and their application of pressure. That would imply a coherence of demands, and, even more, an automatic need for pressure, both of which were absent. In practice, important mercantile interests generally enjoyed easy access to ministers and officials, and this was assumed to be necessary and normal. Willing to support trade, ministries were confronted by complex issues, disparate interests, and contradictory lobbying, the latter a reflection both of very different and clashing interests, and of their associational character. This was true of trade and industry.2 Much Parliamentary time was spent in discussing commercial matters, but Parliament and ministries were not confronted by a united commercial lobby. The same was also true of foreign countries, but competing economic interests operated differently in states such as France that lacked a public politics comparable to Britain and, instead, relied on government favour as a privilege. Furthermore, the British case was different to that of the United Provinces (Dutch) where public politics were played out in a federal system and, to a considerable extent, in terms of local interests and privileges.3 In Britain, a form of federalism was expressed in the assemblies for Ireland and

56 The shaping of policy

the New World colonies and the separate arrangements for Scotland, but the relationships between these parts were regulated from London. In Britain, the disparate views of the various interests detracted from the general effectiveness of commercial lobbying, while, at the same time, contributing to the aggregate intensity of the process. Defending the Board of Trade against opposition attacks, the Daily Gazetteer, the leading London ministerial newspaper, claimed, in its issue of 30 October (os) 1740, that, such as are acquainted with these affairs know very well that merchants are seldom unanimous in prospects for promoting trade; that it too often happens what would benefit one would prejudice another set of men which occasions eager contentions . . . As to the disappointment of a Bill for prohibiting foreign linens, that sprang from an opposition made to it by traders. On 25 August (os) 1735, the same paper had commented on ‘how little hitherto we have been agreed in matters of trade’. An examination of press and pamphlet material reveals that such claims were correct. Protection and support were demanded by all, and projected legislation was rarely free from contention. This could extend to the same individual, as in testimony in 1799, when we examined one of the East India Directors, who is a member of one of the copper companies, before the Committee of Trade, he complained as loudly as any of the rest, of the extravagant price to which copper had been raised; but when he found that it was the intention of the Committee to limit the exportation of copper to the East Indies, I am informed that he altered his opinion, or at least objected to the remedy proposed.4 The great chartered trading companies, largely established in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries and given monopoly privileges, for example the East India Company, were in a particularly strong position readily to exercise influence and, indeed bring pressure, and they sought assistance, not least against rivals, both British and foreign. The interconnectedness of government, politics, finance and business was significant.5 Aside from their inherent importance, senior members of the companies were close to government. For example, Edward Harrison (1674–1732), who made his fortune in the service of the East India Company, becoming Governor of Madras (1711–17), returned home to become an MP (1717–26), a Director of the East India Company (1718–31), and its Deputy Chairman and Chairman for part of that period, and Postmaster General (1726–32), and had his daughter Etheldreda marry, in 1723, the heir to Charles, Second Viscount Townshend, the Secretary of State for the Northern Department, and the key minister in British foreign policy. This created a close link when, on behalf of the Company, he pressed Townshend for assistance against his Ostend rivals.6 Another government MP of the period, John Eyles,

The shaping of policy 57

Sub-Governor of the South Sea Company from 1721 to 1733 and the Company’s major representative in Parliament, was on dining terms with Sir Robert Walpole, the First Lord of the Treasury, and also provided information on trade for ministers, although his integrity was suspected.7 There was also considerable overlap between the companies. For example, Sir Gilbert Heathcote (1652–1733), a prominent London merchant, was not only a Whig MP from 1701 until his death, but also a Director of the East India Company from 1698 to 1709, and a Director or Governor of the Bank of England from 1694 until his death, as well as one of the trustees for the Silesian loan to Austria, and a key supporter in the establishment of the colony of Georgia. Under Secretaries sought audience with him.8 Sir William Hedges was engaged in the Turkey trade, Governor of Bengal from 1682 to 1684, and a Director of the Bank of England in 1699–1700. Overlap extended to colonial interests. Sir George Colebrooke, who inherited his father’s bank and was an MP (1754–74) and Chairman of the East India Company (1769–71, 1772–3), married an heiress who brought in plantations on the Caribbean island of Antigua. He purchased more land there, as well as in Grenada and Dominica, and also pursued land interests in the Ohio Valley. After bankruptcy in 1773 and, again, 1777, he unsuccessfully sought employment as a diplomat in 1783. The companies considered it perfectly reasonable to require meetings with ministers in order to communicate their views, as the Russia Company did with Charles, First Lord Hawkesbury, the President of the Board of Trade, in June 1787, on the subject of Britons becoming Russian citizens. Such closeness led critical foreign diplomats to argue that complaints from the companies about foreign moves were made at the instigation of the government,9 but, in practice, the latter would only have been able to do so had the companies been willing. Furthermore, there were tensions between individual companies and government, for example, over the extent to which Britain should take an expansionist role in the Indian Ocean, an issue over which the East India Company in London tended to take a more cautious and cost-conscious view, in contrast to a more forward ministerial policy from the 1780s. Sir James Harris, the envoy in the United Provinces, made clear his oft-expressed view of the commercial interest when he wrote to Francis, Marquess of Carmarthen, the Foreign Secretary, in May 1788, arguing the case for a garrison in Trincomalee in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), adding Your reasoning is victorious but it can only operate on reasonable minds and those of merchants, moneymongers and companies never are – our East Indian directors seem out of their senses and they ought to be flogged like children for their present nonsensical conduct.10 The privileges of the chartered companies represented an indirect form of government regulation, which helped make them contentious. Furthermore, there was rivalry between the companies. In 1724, the Royal African Company, a frequent demander of support, pressed the ministry for assistance against the

58 The shaping of policy

South Sea Company. Moreover, schemes for overland trade with Persia via Russia set the Russia Company (whose proposals included the establishment of a base in Russian Persia, in order to push the Armenians out of the trade)11 against the Levant and East India companies, which had alternative routes to Persia. The Russia Company’s plans were presented to government as a way to hit French competition, as trade via Turkey was seen as heavily dominated by France.12 The companies were also jealous of interlopers and expected ministerial support in maintaining their monopoly positions, which posed major problems for government as such support was a contentious political issue, while there was also concern about the impact of monopolies.13 The role of the Levant Company in the choice and payment of the envoy at Constantinople largely ceased from 1691, and its ability and willingness to bear extraordinary expenses was hit by commercial difficulties, but the Company continued to play a part in commercial policy, ensuring in 1798–9 that, in response to French military advances in the Mediterranean, regulations be changed to allow quarantine for ships lacking clean bills of health to be carried out in Britain.14 Chartered companies offered a valuable support to distant trades, particularly in providing a diplomatic and military infrastructure, not least in the shape of a number of bases. As such, companies exercised a function of sovereignty in a sphere where the state did not wish to do so, although it was one that entailed a considerable financial and organisational burden and, in 1730, the near-bankrupt Royal African Company petitioned for a subsidy towards the maintenance of its forts and settlements and, indeed, from 1730 to 1747 it received an annual subsidy from the government. The Company also sought the support of warships. This was an aspect of the sense of vulnerability felt frequently on the periphery, for example in the West Indies15 and North America, one that linked colonies and trade. The institutional role of the companies found favour with ministers who similarly tended to prefer order to independence. In 1724, Townshend expressed his hostility to Prussia giving commissions to trade to interlopers, whom he described as ‘unfair traders without settlements or Factories, who endeavour to undermine the fair merchants’.16 Aside from providing an infrastructure, companies were also better able to ensure financial reserves and ready money for trades that had to be financed for a considerable period before returns could be obtained. As such, they were more financially grounded than individual merchants. This helped the British in the Russia trade, which the Dutch tended to leave to individual traders.17 Samuel Holden, Governor of the Russia Company as well as a former Governor of the Bank of England, argued another case: The difference between the public and private merchants is very great, the latter must sell their commodities as high as they can, otherwise they cannot subsist; on the contrary the public as low as is necessary to prevent others interfering, and thereby lessening the export, which is obstructing so much wealth coming into the kingdom.18

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The sense of a clash between the short-term interests of merchants and the long-term interest of the public was also taken up by Claudius Rondeau, the consul general in St Petersburg, who claimed that the merchants’ concern with the short term was evident in their willingness to deliver bad cloth.19 It was not surprising that French commentators found value in the structure of AngloRussian trade, but it is worth noting the reasons. The value of a long-established trade was seen to lie in the provision of expertise – knowledge of language, society and economy – and also in the financial strength requisite for providing credit.20 The Russia Company provided such expertise, not least in 1737 when enlisting diplomatic pressure to oblige the Russian College of Commerce to abandon an attempt to defraud British merchants trading in hemp.21 In 1791, the Company provided a state of the trade with Russia to the Board of Trade.22 Many merchants, nevertheless, opposed and even acted against the companies. In 1698, hostility to the East India Company led to the establishment of a new East India Company, a rivalry linked to political tensions; although the two companies united in 1708.23 This was a period of major restrictions on the privileges of the companies, with the Hudson’s Bay, Royal African and Russia companies respectively affected in 1697, 1698 and 1699. In 1730, in an impressive display of national organisation, a petition signed by over 200 London merchants, pressing for a new regulated company in place of the current East India Company, was supported by petitions from Bristol and Liverpool. In his ‘Thoughts on the African Trade’, published in 1730 in number 76 of the Universal Spectator, ‘J.L.’ attacked the position of the East India Company in trade to the Indian Ocean and urged the establishment of a trade to the southeast coast of Africa, with textiles and pewter exported, helping British industry, whereas, he argued, the trade to India did not bring such advantages. Similarly, in France, there was pressure from Languedoc in the 1730s to open up the trade to the Turkish empire which was controlled by Marseille. The British East India Company was involved in differences not only over the organisation of trade in the Indian Ocean, but also because of attempts to expand its activities. There was particular tension over the situation in the British New World, most famously with the tea trade in the 1770s, but also in other spheres. In 1792, the West Indies interest lobbied hard and successfully against the attempt by the Company to export sugar from India to Britain, which might have led to a cut in the price of sugar.24 Rivalries were frequently related to geographical interests, with the companies powerful in London and interlopers strong elsewhere. The regulatory framework helped maintain London’s control over certain trades. In 1672, the Royal African Company had been granted by a royal charter monopoly rights over the British slave trade between Africa and the West Indies. However, the undermining of the Company’s position after the Glorious Revolution of 1688–9 hit its finances and resulted in a decline in both government support and the assertiveness of the Company, and led in 1698 to the

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Company licensing private traders, in return for a 10 per cent tax, as a key policy. This freeing of the African trade in 1698 legalised the position of interlopers who became private traders, although some preferred to continue as interlopers. The new arrangement could not save the Company’s poor finances, and in 1750 it was abolished by the African Trade Act, which opened the trade to all subjects willing to pay a fee. The Company’s bases were to be maintained by a successor company, ‘The Company of Merchants Trading to Africa’. The monopoly of the Royal African Company had become more unpopular due to its failure to meet rising demand for slaves in the New World.25 Criticism of the effectiveness of the Hudson’s Bay Company in upholding national interests in the face of French competition, and of its alleged lack of commitment to expansion into the interior of Canada, led, in 1749, to a Parliamentary enquiry and, in 1752, to an unsuccessful attempt by London merchants to obtain trading privileges in Labrador. Also, in 1752, the Steadfast Society of Bristol, a centre of opposition to London interests, agreed to spend up to £200 in lobbying Parliament against the monopoly of the Levant Company in the trade with Turkey.26 The Tory Steadfast Society was an example of the widespread overlap between commercial lobbying, politics and sociability, which was an aspect of the strong associational character of society. This was seen widely in towns and played a role in mercantile consciousness. Thus, in 1777, a West India Club was founded in Bristol. Although largely social, it also adopted a position over commercial issues, particularly trade negotiations with Ireland in 1785 and with France in 1786. The claim for free trade made by critics of the companies was in some respects a product of the arguments for flexibility sometimes made by the companies, for example, the argument by the Russia Company that it, as well as the Levant and East India companies, should be allowed to import Persian silk, because that would provide a choice of ways to import it, which would be valuable in the event of war with France or Spain.27 Such a conflict would challenge the trade routes through the Mediterranean used by the Levant Company. The argument for flexibility was more potent in the first half of the century, while that for freedom was increasingly so in the second half. Most trade was not controlled by chartered companies, and this was as true of areas of major expansion, such as North America and Iberia, as of those which were important even if their growth was less spectacular, especially northwest Europe. Quarrels between British merchants were matched by conflicts of interest between British and colonial merchants, and between British merchants and British manufacturers; and had counterparts abroad, for example in disputes within the United Provinces over projected tariffs. In 1753, Newcastle complained that Dutch ‘trading towns’ frequently consulted their particular, local interests.28 Divisions between British interests related not only to Britain but also to colonial opportunities. In 1739, British merchants supported agitation for the export of sugar from Britain’s West Indian colonies direct to European markets, a move resisted by the British sugar refiners. Pressure against Britain’s

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entrepôt role was designed to reduce costs and increase flexibility for merchants, but, as in this case, it challenged industrial interests involved in processing. Furthermore, issues of cost, flexibility and national self-sufficiency were involved in disputes over the source of raw materials. British merchants handling Swedish iron imports were opposed to moves to substitute the North American colonies as a source of iron. The British mining interest campaigned successfully to prevent the payment of a drawback when North African copper refined in Britain was re-exported, which copper importers campaigned for from 1727 to 1734. Such disputes could be waged through illicit as well as legal means. The cloth manufacturing lobby, supported by Parliamentary legislation, sought to keep British wool prices low and foreign cloth manufacturers weak by preventing the export of wool. Their opponents, British and Irish wool-producers, were unsuccessful, on the whole, in Parliament (although in 1739 the duty on Irish yarn imports to England was ended),29 but they indicated their views by smuggling vigorously. In turn, contention over smuggling reflected a more general concern about weakening the country through illicit trade. In the War of the Austrian Succession, in which Britain was formally engaged against France from 1744 to 1748, there was a fierce debate over grain exports to France. Trade versus manufacturing was a particular source of tension, providing a context for debates about regulation and taxation. The import of printed Indian silks and of printed and plain calicoes by the East India Company was fiercely opposed by textile manufacturers in Britain, leading to legislation in 1700 and 1721. That of 1721, introduced by Waller Bacon, MP from Norwich, after petitions from woollen manufacturers, including some in Norwich, and resisted by the Company, added plain white calico to the prohibition on printed silks and calicoes, and hit domestic calico printers. Thus, manufacturing interests were divided in this dispute.30 The role of the East India Company was again contentious in 1799 when, supported by Henry Dundas, as President of the Board of Control, the key figure in Indian policy, the Company pressed for permission to export 1,500 tons of copper annually to India. This was at a time when British production was about 6,000 tons and when, due partly to falling production in Sweden, for long the key European producer, there was a shortage of copper. Indeed the price had risen from £60 per ton in 1785 to £130, largely due to the export to Asia, although increased demand for copper in Britain, both for manufacturing and for sheathing ships, was also important. Charles, First Earl of Liverpool, the President of the Board of Trade, had supported exports in the 1780s in order to help the copper mines, but, by 1799, he was more concerned about the pressures on industry and shipping caused by the high price. He saw in particular a danger that a rise in the price of goods manufactured from copper would hit exports. As a result, in order to reduce the price, that year the export of all copper sheathing, bolts or nails, or any copper easily convertible into naval or military stores was banned.31 More generally, foreign envoys noted clashes between British economic interests, both in Britain and abroad.32

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Tension between trade and industry was not simply one relating to British markets, but also reflected Britain’s role as an entrepôt, not least, but not only, with reference to colonial markets. For example, domestic pressure helped lead to new duties on linen imports, but, despite pressure from domestic manufacturers, the drawback remained on re-exports of Continental linen.33 Alongside relatively well-known interests and differences, there were also more obscure ones, including that over the impact of legislation on transporting wine in bottles which domestic manufacturers wanted restricted to foreign bottles.34 Thus, irrespective of ministerial intervention, commercial interests were bitterly divided. Division existed at every level, from the pressure of individual creditors, who, if prominent, could expect ministerial support,35 to competing sectional interests. Rivalries placed the ministry in a difficult position, particularly since mercantile interests were well represented in Parliament. This was a reflection of the far greater representation there of boroughs over counties. The ministry was expected to protect commerce and were vulnerable to political attacks on the issue, and yet the divergence of commercial interests meant that domestic pressure on government was divided, and, therefore, both more strident and harder to satisfy. Ministerial defence of British commercial interests thus took place against a difficult domestic background. The international context also interacted with rivalries between mercantile and manufacturing interests. In 1720, John, Lord Perceval, an Anglo-Irish landlord, responded to the end of war with Spain that year, by considering its impact on Irish industry, via the consequences for English woollen textile manufacturing, I hope our linen manufacture will thereby escape the mischief threatened it by the weavers, it being possible that great quantities of our woollen manufacture will be exported, and the discouragement those people labour under be removed, without injury to so useful a manufacture as that of the linen. Perceval regarded it as necessary to show the English weavers that their grievances were largely due to a lack of foreign trade. The linen industry was particularly strong in Ireland.36 Diplomats were at the sharp end of representations to government about the cause of trade. Problems experienced by individual merchants abroad were commonly referred to British envoys and consuls. Thus, in 1723, John, Second Viscount Molesworth, the envoy in Tuscany and a former member of the Board of Trade, forwarded, with his support, a petition from the Factory in Livorno about the quarantine imposed in Britain on ships from the Mediterranean.37 Much was also dealt with by seeking the intercession of the native merchants with whom their British counterparts dealt. British diplomats also turned to merchants for advice, Charles Whitworth in 1722 obtaining details about sources of hemp.38 Because, however, of the limited value of pressing diplomats on matters of general policy, merchants felt that it was best to obtain support through political pressure in London, and they did this anyway if dissatisfied with diplomatic

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support. Thus, in 1736, Rondeau faced complaints to Harrington for failing to provide sufficient support in negotiations over the rhubarb trade with Russia: rhubarb was taken as a major help to digestion.39 Mercantile pressure in London was fairly continuous in what was a period of great political and Parliamentary lobbying. Mercantile groups were well organised and wealthy enough to take advantage of the accessibility of the system to lobbying. The ministry and Parliament expected to be lobbied, and professional lobbyists existed. Pamphlets and newspaper articles were produced in order to influence decisions and legislation. To a certain extent, this lobbying was welcome to the ministry. Seeking to aid commerce, it relied to a great extent for information and suggestions on advice from mercantile circles. Regulations and negotiations required information. Advice from the Russia Company played a crucial role in the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734, which was to regulate the trade for three decades, and the Company also pressed for its renewal in 1753. In 1797, Charles, First Earl of Liverpool, the President of the Board of Trade, complained that the pace of the ratification of a new trade treaty with Russia was being set by the Company without due consideration of the rights and interests of other bodies, not least those of the public in the shape of the Navigation Laws.40 Similar evidence of seeking advice, though not to the same extent, can be found elsewhere. In 1725, Spain’s response to the South Sea Company’s Asiento pretensions were sent to the Company for its comments, and the response was returned with marginal notes added.41 Commenting, in 1730, on the adverse effects of wool and yarn exports to France, Wye’s Letter noted: several of the most eminent traders in our manufactures have been sent for by Sir Robert Walpole to give their opinion in this matter, in order to lay the whole before the Parliament, which will be done by petition early in the ensuing session.42 In 1735, Walter Titley, the envoy in Copenhagen, ‘put every paper of our merchants’ into the hands of the Danish foreign minister, while the Board of Trade took the advice of London merchants involved in the American trade and of British manufacturers of iron when seeking to ascertain if the North American colonies could act as a substitute for Swedish iron imports.43 The Swedish information system, however, came to an opposite conclusion.44 In 1740, the ministry sought, and obtained, a meeting with senior figures from the East India Company. This was designed in part to influence the deliberations of the latter on the response to the activities of its Swedish counterpart, and they were asked to delay doing so until after the meeting. As a measure of the importance of the issue, those present included the Lord Chancellor (Hardwicke), the Lord President of the Council (Wilmington), and Walpole, as well as the relevant Secretary of State (Harrington).45

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Preparing for commercial negotiations with France in 1786, William Eden noted support for lowering duties on French imports, ‘We have the fullest evidence that it is not objectionable in the linen trade. The whole body of the London traders and factors have voted it; and the principal body in Scotland.’ The views of London and Yorkshire tanners on importing tanned leather from France were obtained, creating opportunities for discussions both ways, ‘Lord Effingham brought the paper from the Yorkshire tanners and can best explain the matter to them.’ The Manchester cotton merchants, the paper manufacturers, and the pottery king, Josiah Wedgwood, also gave evidence.46 Eden captured the immediacy of mercantile interest, ‘the people of Birmingham, Kidderminster, Glasgow, Bordeaux, and the French merchants who have dealings with England are every morning in my antichamber before my breakfast is finished . . . to learn . . . whether the Treaty will take place’.47 He noted the efforts he made on behalf of the Nottingham stocking industry, a major manufacturing interest.48 A former member of the Board of Trade, Eden saw government as dependent on merchant opinion, writing to Pitt in 1786, ‘I have not yet received any instructions from Lord Carmarthen [Foreign Secretary] upon the African business; I took the liberty to suggest the necessity of having some information upon it through the Board of Trade from the merchants’.49 Mercantile and manufacturing interests could clash, but they were closely linked in responding to market opportunities. As a result, success in gaining and retaining foreign markets could influence production methods and thus the process of economic change.50 This was also true of import substitution in domestic markets.51 Merchant pressure could owe something to foreign encouragement, as in the Ochakov Crisis of 1791, when the Russian envoy, Count Simon Vorontsov (and the Russia Company), helped stir up opposition to war with Russia.52 More generally, envoys and merchants met readily and were thus able to discuss politics. In 1788, prominent London merchants told the French envoy that they were against government schemes for changes in Polish frontiers that would see Danzig (Gdansk) become Prussian.53 Discussion could be linked to formal approaches to government. In 1727, Hamburg’s envoys in London agitated merchants to present a memorandum to George II, and similarly encouraged the major trading companies to press the government.54 Charles, Second Viscount Townshend, the Secretary of State for the Northern Department, told the envoys that he would back Hamburg’s interests. This was not simply, however, a case of mercantile pressure, as the request was supported by the then-influential envoy from Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel.55 Complaints about the freedom of trade to Hamburg from Danish pretensions did not, however, have to rely on diplomatic encouragement alone. In 1734, Harrington wrote of ‘our merchants here, from whom His Majesty receives daily complaints, and is very strongly pressed to procure the putting an immediate stop to those grievances’.56 Similarly, British merchants in Hamburg pressed the envoy.57 In 1730, Giuseppe Ossorio, the Sardinian envoy, took care to insinuate indi-

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rectly to London merchants that reports the latter had received from Turin that the government had increased the cost of British imports were inaccurate. He feared that these reports would lead to pressure on the British government, in part because of the strength of opposition sentiment in London and the search for ways to cause difficulties for the ministry.58 This dispatch drew attention to the different systems of information that existed within the trade policy system. Governments sought to direct this process, and the British ministry particularly tried to do so due to its sensitivity to political pressure. For example, in 1732, Newcastle responded to information from William, Third Earl of Essex, envoy in Turin, about the hardships British merchants suffered in the Sardinian dominions, by noting that he had spoken to Ossorio about it, and that the envoy had promised to send for a true state of case. This did not suffice for Newcastle: ‘I beg the favour of your Excellency to send me an authentic account of the whole affair from some of the merchants of the best credit residing at Turin.’59 Thus, two different information systems were to be employed to check on each other. Ossorio’s dispatch also highlighted the extent of discussions between merchants and foreign envoys. Similarly, in 1737, the Spanish agent was pressed over restrictions on the freedom to sell grain in Spain, supplementing the impact of British diplomatic representation there.60 Complaint and response could be near automatic. In 1734, merchants and sugar refiners in Bristol, the leading west-coast importer of sugar, and also in London petitioned George II to have revoked a new duty of 25 per cent (‘amounting to a prohibition’) on British refined sugars imported into Venice, a duty pushed by Venetian sugar-bakers concerned about the way in which British, French and Dutch traders were evading the spirit of the existing law. Orders were accordingly sent to the Resident in Venice, while the Venetian envoy was bullied, and reprisals were threatened on Venetian imports.61 The response to lobbying was also immediate on other occasions. A memorandum from the African Company in 1784 about the French establishing a post on the River Gambia, led at once to enquiries by the government. On 11 February 1791, the Governor of the Russia Company wrote to the Foreign Secretary about the need for a lightship in the Kattegat to warn ships sailing to or from the Baltic about a dangerous shoal. Four days later, orders were accordingly dispatched to the envoy in Copenhagen. In 1794, Sir Charles Whitworth, the envoy in St Petersburg, complained about an edict banning the import of striped woollens before receiving instructions approving his decision and telling him to continue.62 As complaints and representations were anticipated, the companies and, to a far lesser extent, other merchants, could rely on the government internalising their perspective. In 1732, Harrington reported to Thomas Robinson, envoy in Vienna, that there was concern, in part as a result of reports from the East India Company, about continuing illicit trade by the Ostend Company, adding that he expected a representation from the East India Company soon. Three days later, he wrote again, pressing for action to prevent ‘an infinite deal of ill

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blood’.63 In this particular case, the ministry indicated a preference for commercial interests, arguing that this was necessary because of the nature of the British political system. The inclination of George II was presented as correspondingly circumscribed: it will be absolutely impossible for the King, however well inclined to their interests, to secure the affections of this nation to them [Austria], or even to make the Guaranty [of the Pragmatic Sanction] he has already given, of so much use to the Emperor’s descendants, as His Majesty himself would wish, and desire, if some facility be not shown in points wherein our commerce is concerned.64 Robinson, in turn, told Prince Eugene, a leading Austrian minister, that he would not send a courier to London to communicate Austrian concern about Spanish military preparations, apparently aimed against Austrian interests in Italy, which were guaranteed by Britain, until there was a satisfactory solution to the dispute about continuing Austrian trade to the East Indies. Robinson also said that, particularly because Parliament was sitting, George II would be better able to help Austria if British interests were satisfied.65 The contrast between public and private interests was also deployed, as Harrington argued that the Ostend Company represented the private gain of a few which challenged the public interest in good relations.66 This, however, was an argument that, when applied, by foreign diplomats and ministers, or by critical British commentators, to Britain and British traders, represented an ambiguity about merchants that opened the way to political contention. Mercantile advice and participation were an integral part of the procedure by which commercial policies were evolved and legislation passed. For example, the 1726 Act against importing foreign plate was drawn up by the Goldsmiths Company. During the Excise Crisis in 1733, Walpole stated that he had talked with ‘several creditable distillers of London’ about French brandy imports. Considering, in 1796, how best to respond to the inadequacy of existing provisions for preventing the desertion of merchant sailors in the West Indies, Hawkesbury accepted the need for new measures, but was keen to seek specialist advice: these regulations should first be settled by a committee of merchants of the several ports from whence the trade to those parts are principally carried on. They can best determine what may be most proper and effectual. These regulations should first be laid before government for its approbation and afterwards be proposed to Parliament, to be passed into a law. He was not, however, keen to consult merchants involved in trade with the USA as he thought them ‘better friends to the commerce and navigation of the United States, than to those of Great Britain’.67 Given the often contrary interests of varied groups, seeking mercantile

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advice could produce contention. At the same time, not all spheres of trade and empire could be at the forefront of governmental or political attention, and it is important not to use the disputes with foreign powers that received attention in order to characterise the general situation. For example, the late 1730s are generally seen in terms of political contention over commercial negotiations with Spain, but there was far less dissension within Britain over commercial negotiations with Austria focusing on the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium). Instead, a lack of ministerial drive provided opportunities for concerned private interests. The principal negotiator, Colonel Bladen, a key member of the Board of Trade as well as an MP, wrote from Antwerp about the talks on the Austrian Netherlands, ‘It is a vanity, incident to human nature, to imagine whatever we are doing attracts the attention even of our superiors.’68 There was more optimism about the possibility of trade with Austria via the Adriatic Sea and the port of Trieste, and a scheme to develop such a trade was pushed from 1738, the initiative apparently coming from merchants active in Anglo-German trade, such as the Gore family, two of whom were MPs, while a third, John, a Hamburg merchant, was a former Director of the South Sea Company and later a leading government financier. The Gores were also linked by marriage, participation in the German trade, and, significantly from the viewpoint of government, Parliamentary membership, to the Mellishes.69 Harrington noted that he had a great deal of discourse with merchants about the trade,70 and his mention of it was a signal to Robinson to take it seriously. The very varied nature of commercial interests was important in the processes by which government policy was shaped, although their interaction with political pressures was such that the latter were a far from ductile partner. For example, in the 1730s, Britain and France did not take their differences over West African trade to the point of conflict, whereas Britain and Spain did over trade in the West Indies. In each case, there was a contentious background, but over West Africa the domestic pressure was far weaker. The Royal African Company was unpopular in Britain. It suffered from a widespread dislike of the monopolistic position of chartered companies, and its frequent demands for assistance led to further criticism. In contrast, those pressing for a firm policy in the West Indies were able to identify themselves with a strong image of the national interest. Yet political considerations were also crucial. If the government did not want war with Spain, it wanted conflict with France far less, and the French ministry, in turn, was skilful in its management of its British counterparts. The attitudes of the companies were important in the formulation of British policy, but they were not decisive. Much depended on their strength and their need for governmental aid. The Royal African Company, weak and endlessly soliciting ministerial and Parliamentary assistance, was in a feeble position compared with the powerful East India Company or, even more powerful, the largely self-sufficient Hudson’s Bay Company. In the 1730s, the East India Company’s determination to preserve peaceful relations with France,71 a policy

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in line with ministerial thinking, combined with its fiscal strength and role, to ensure that it was very influential. Moreover, in 1753, the British and French companies discussed whether they should have war or peace in India. At the same time, the importance of the companies to the national position overseas and to public finances, did not mean that there was not criticism of them from within government. This could occur at the highest reaches, as in 1778, when George III argued that the East India Company ought to bear the expense of the military assistance it received,72 a sensitive point given heavy military commitments elsewhere during the War of American Independence. When a company or pressure group advocated action that conflicted with ministerial views, then the extent of the imperviousness of the government to mercantile or colonial pressure was more clearly reflected. In 1753, aware that discussions between the British and French East India Companies might be used by the Dutch to justify neutrality in any conflict between the two powers, rather than support for Britain, as in the last three major wars, Newcastle was careful to explain that this negotiation was purely between company and company; – though the East India Company would (as became them) do nothing without His Majesty’s permission . . . You may assure the Princess Royal [regent for William V of Orange] that the king will not suffer anything to be done that may tend to secure France, in case of war, against the superiority of His Majesty’s fleet, in any part of the world . . . our Directors think that a neutrality confined to the other side of the Cape [of Good Hope], would be found more advantageous to us than to France; as the French East India ships in the Indies could easily be turned into ships of forces; which ours could not; and we should, by that means, be obliged to have a constant squadron there, in time of war, which would lessen our naval strength in other parts.73 Diplomacy and strategy were therefore carefully related, with the Secretary of State and the Directors of the East India Company carefully plotting their way through their interaction. Some trades lacked a company structure. This was true, for example, of the merchants trading with the West Indies. However, their pressure-group tactics, and their ability to mount well-organised petitioning and propaganda campaigns, were very important in persuading Parliament to pass a series of measures in their favour, such as the Molasses Act of 1733, and also to influence other legislation, such as the Sugar Act of 1764. Other relevant aspects of government policy were also scrutinised, as in 1749, when a general meeting of planters and merchants involved in the West Indian sugar trade held at the King’s Arms in Cornhill, London thanked John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, for ensuring that the Neutral Islands in the West Indies would be evacuated as part of the Anglo-French peace agreement. This lobby became even more organised and active with the problems posed by the American Revolution.74

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The lack of a company structure in the West Indies trade, however, could increase the prospect of quarrels with other powers, essentially Spain, by removing the potential for a regulatory and diplomatic institution to shape representations. As a result, there were signs from abroad that, far from admiring British free trade, there was support for regulation where it existed. In 1730, Charles Holzendorf, the secretary to the envoy in The Hague, reported from the United Provinces, in response to a debate in the House of Commons that February, The States [the Dutch States General] are very glad that the project for dissolving our East India Company and making that trade free, has been rejected, both because it has been done by so considerable a majority, and that the States expected that such a freedom would be the source of endless quarrels betwixt their [East India] company and the British subjects, who would no doubt for the sake of gain have attempted to drive a contraband trade in the Dutch settlements.75 Nevertheless, it was not a case of company structure or free-for-all. Aside from the West Indian interest, other merchants also grouped together and made representations. For example, Edward Finch, the envoy in Sweden, noted that, in response to new Swedish regulations on tobacco imports in 1733, ‘the Liverpool merchants have writ to their correspondents here to apply to me upon it’.76 The absence of a company structure had a varied political impact as far as representations were concerned. There was a difference between trading with states where the British were represented diplomatically, as was the case with the Factory at Livorno,77 and areas where there was no such representation, of which the Spanish colonies formed the key example. Pressure in the latter, instead, was focused through London. The role of the press reflected a means of expressing opinion different to that taken when companies privately lobbied ministers, although there could be a significant overlap. Newspapers clearly thought that commercial news was of interest. The London Evening Post of 30 March 1762 devoted much of its attempt to publicise its contents to its economic news, offering an exact table of the current price of merchandise . . . an account of the arrival of British ships at, and their departure from, the several ports of the habitable world . . . the several courses of exchange, the prices of gold and silver, of stocks of corn at the Corn Exchange. The movements of ships78 and the prices of stocks were regularly reported in the press, as were regulatory moves by other governments.79 Furthermore, news about trade was frequently reported from newsletters and other newspapers, the most common source of news, but one that gave newspapers considerable choice in what to report. This practice also ensured that provincial newspapers were able to carry items about international trade or about the related situation

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elsewhere in Britain. The Northampton Mercury of 25 February (os) 1723 carried the London report about the Brazil trade also printed in the Post Boy of 21 February (os), while the issue of 8 January (os) 1739 carried a London report mentioning the prohibition of imports of hides and tanned leather by Portugal, which was of importance to the local economy. The issue of 2 April (os) returned to the subject by reporting that the Portuguese attempt to substitute imports from Brazil for those from Britain had not worked. The Norwich Mercury of 4 March (os) 1732 reprinted an article from Wye’s Letter, the leading newsletter, noting that the traders to the Baltic were very concerned about the impact of a heavy tariff being imposed upon British woollen goods by the Prussian government at Königsberg.80 That 23 December (os), the paper offered news via London from Bristol: ‘the clothiers in and about that city came to a resolution to petition the Parliament, to take off the duty on oil used in the woollen manufactures, to enable them to sell their manufactures cheaper at foreign markets, and to prevent the running of wool’. Seven years later, the York Courant reprinted a London item about a Tuscan prohibition of imports of woollen goods.81 On 22 December 1787, the Newcastle Chronicle carried a London item alleging that the trade treaty of 1786 with France had cost Britain its preferential position in the Russia trade, an argument that was an important criticism of the ministry. Specialised newspapers also appeared. In 1696, Edward Lloyd, a London coffee-house keeper, published a tri-weekly, Lloyd’s News, which contained much shipping news. Other relevant newspapers were Proctor’s Price-Courant, the City Intelligencer, Robinson’s Price-Courant, and Whiston’s Merchants Weekly Remembrancer, all published in Anne’s reign (1702–14), and the Exchange Evening Post, the Weekly Packet, with the Price Courant, and Freke’s Price of Stocks, papers of the 1720s. The Weekly Miscellany for the Improvement of Husbandry, Trade, Arts and Sciences, a paper that ran for over two decades, was founded in 1720, while the Citizen, or, The Weekly Conversation of a Society of London Merchants on Trade, and other Public Affairs appeared in 1739. Campaigning periodicals were founded to engage in contentious economic debates, as with Daniel Defoe’s The Manufacturer (1719–21), which engaged in the issue of the import of textiles by the East India Company. Economic matters also played a major role in papers that did not specialise in them. This was also true of some monthlies, the Political State of Great Britain for January 1739 providing details of shipping that had entered Amsterdam, Cadiz and Lisbon the previous year, although the fashionable Gentleman’s Magazine significantly did not devote much attention to trade. Alongside the press, there were numerous pamphlets on mercantile issues, especially in the first half of the century, and also books pressing for particular interests and policies and reiterating the need for action on behalf of trade. Erasmus Phillips, an opposition Whig MP, argued the case for buying naval stores from New England rather than the Baltic, and thus saving bullion, although this was linked to his concern about a French threat to Britain’s

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colonies,82 while, in 1782, George Chalmers published The Propriety of allowing a qualified Export of Wool discussed historically. Four years later, he was appointed Chief Clerk of the revived Board of Trade. His expertise was more generally true of officialdom during the ministry of Pitt the Younger. Commercial information was also provided in book form, as with Sir Charles Whitworth’s State of the Trade of Great Britain (1776). Whitworth was Chairman of the House of Commons’ Committees of Supply and Ways and Means. The link between publications and controversy over foreign policy was frequently close, and commercial aspects were emphasized in the public debate. In 1718, the Lord Chancellor, Thomas, First Earl of Macclesfield, allegedly ordered the printing of 7,000 copies of A Letter from a Merchant to a Member of Parliament, Relating to the danger Great Britain is in of losing her trade, by the great increase of the naval power of Spain with a chart of the Mediterranean Sea annex’d. A further 2,000 copies were apparently produced by the author, Reeve Williams.83 The impact of the pamphlet was increased by press coverage, the Worcester Post-Man of 21 November (os) 1718 reporting, Last Saturday a notable book was delivered to the Members of Parliament, with a chart annexed of the Mediterranean Sea, whereby it demonstrately appears of what importance it is to the trade of Great Britain, that Sicily and Sardinia should be in the hands of a faithful ally, and if possible not one formidable by sea. That these two islands lie like two nets spread to intercept not only the Italian but Turkey and Levant trade . . . That should the naval power of Spain increase in the manner it has lately done, that kingdom may assume to herself that trade of the Mediterranean Sea, and impose what toll she pleases as the King of Denmark does at Elsinore. Reporting in several other newspapers reflected the arguments of the pamphlet.84 In the dispute of 1790 with Spain over settlement on the Pacific shores of North America, the publication of the unreliable account by John Meares of Spanish actions against British traders the previous year in Nootka Sound on Vancouver Island set the agenda for discussion in Britain, in the absence of any other British report. Meares’s memorial to William Grenville who, as Home Secretary, was responsible for colonial issues, was published, and was soon supplemented by two pamphlets by John Etches, An Authentic Statement of the Facts Relative to Nootka Sound and A Continuation of an Authentic. . . . The following year, in response to confrontation with Russia, pamphleteers offered contrasting accounts of the need to stick with Russia for commercial reasons.85 Foreign governments were also interested in British press reporting on trade.86 These opportunities to advance views also afforded chances to articulate prejudices. Of the 1754 pamphlets, An Inquiry into the Origins and Consequences of the Public Debt attacked Jewish stockbrokers, while An Address to Friends and Foes appealed to its Irish readership by claiming that Scottish influence in

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London was responsible for harming the Irish linen industry in order to benefit that of Scotland. The publication of such a pamphlet in Dublin served to underline the extent to which the culture of print offered relatively few sites for the expression of views, as, in England, political publishing of this type was largely restricted to London. The culture of print also provided much information on the colonies, a process taken further with the publication of large numbers of maps. Thus, the second edition of A New History of Jamaica (1740) included a map of the West Indies that showed the currents. One of the chief beneficiaries of this commercial world was the French navy which was able to purchase information from Britain by buying maps.87 Information on overseas trade and the colonies was sought by lobbies and interested parties, not least opponents of the slave trade, leading to Thomas Clarkson’s The Substance of Evidence of Sundry Persons on the Slave Trade (1788). In opposition, the Society of West India Merchants and Planters sponsored pamphlets in favour of the trade. Publications were designed for international as well as domestic audiences. The oleaginous and frenetic lawyer James Marriott sought favour by defending the British position on neutral trade during the Seven Years’ War, writing The Case of the Dutch Ships Considered (1758), a successful work that reached a third edition in 1759, and A Letter to the Dutch Merchants in England (1759). Marriott sought to write in an accessible fashion, feeling that, with the Dutch, ‘arguments of universal law and stated as much as possible like a mercantile account with a regular balance would have more weight than the most elegant composition’. Marriott became Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, Judge of the Admiralty Court, and an MP.88 Information and discussion about national economic developments in part reflected the increased prominence of economic lobbying, but, in the first half of the century, aside from at the time of the South Sea Bubble in 1720, when very lengthy reports were printed, press accounts of the great commercial companies were only occasional. They preferred to operate largely in private, benefiting from their close links with the ministries of Walpole and his protégé, Henry Pelham, First Lord of the Treasury from 1743 to 1754. Nevertheless, there was extensive press discussion of economic matters, such as policies towards the national debt, for example Pelham’s debt consolidation programme in 1749. Reports of lobbying, for example, in the St James’s Evening Post of 2 March (os) 1732, that saddlers, leathersellers, tallow-chandlers and cabinetmakers were petitioning to prevent the North American colonies from supplying foreign markets with their manufactures, helped create a sense that public discussion of commercial policy was normative. In the second half of the century, there was more press lobbying, as economic interests that had not hitherto appreciated the value of, or gained access to, the press, did so; as the close relationship between long-lasting ministries and powerful chartered companies weakened; as economic issues, particularly trade with America and the position of the East India Company, were pushed to

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the fore in domestic politics; and as the press expanded greatly in size. Despite the growth of the public sphere, the role of the companies remained important, as did their political and social links with government. The latter tend to be neglected, but were, nevertheless, significant. Newspapers provide valuable evidence, the Morning Post of 17 March 1786 noting ‘the Court of Directors of the East-India Company gave a very elegant entertainment at the London Tavern to the Boards of Excise and Customs’. The press devoted much attention to economic lobbying, partly as a result of payments and partly because it was news in its own right. Whether pressing for easier quarantine terms for the Turkey trade,89 enlarging the dock at Hull, resisting new taxation on tobacco, debating the Irish trade proposals in 1785 or the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1786, or proposing Parliamentary regulation of the price of sugar, the cause of particular interests received much attention. Local newspapers carried news not only of relevant metropolitan activities but also of those elsewhere in Britain. Under a local byline, the Gloucester Journal of 14 February 1791 reported on a Manchester meeting of cotton manufacturers intent on petitioning Parliament against competing Indian products. Complaints by the Leeds Chamber of Commerce over Spanish tariffs were reprinted in the Newcastle Courant of 15 January 1791, while the issue of 30 April 1791 reported on a Manchester meeting held ‘at the requisition of many considerable merchants, manufacturers, and others’ to protest against the possibility of war with Russia, and that of 7 May 1791 noted that similar meetings had been held at Norwich and Wakefield, both major manufacturing towns. The press helped underline the political and governmental dimension of concern and discontent about trade, as that made news. On 20 November (os) 1731, the Universal Spectator reported ‘The Swedes having . . . greatly discouraged our navigation, the merchants trading to that kingdom are preparing to lay a state of the case before the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations.’ Sometimes, the reports were of failed attempts to co-operate in complaint, as over trade with Spain in 1718.90 More generally, the press encouraged a sense of trade as a key national interest, which was designed to ensure that it played a major role in policy. For example, in 1737, Wye’s Letter made it clear that the ministry should be firm in the negotiations over trade to the Austrian Netherlands, ‘it may be hoped that his Imperial Majesty [Charles VI] will at least think it his interest not to disoblige the Maritime Powers [Britain and the United Provinces], his ancient and faithful allies, in a point so tender as that of commerce’.91 Newspapers reported and discussed issues as if there was a background of a public debate about trade. On 10 September (os) 1719, Thursday’s Journal began a long article with ‘a query which some people are very busy to set folks upon asking, How quarrelling with the Czar of Muscovy [Peter the Great] will agree with our trade?’ The role of the press was particularly sensitive when there was a conflict with ministerial views, and reporting was then politicised, with progovernment papers92 trying to counter opposition reports that challenged

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commercial confidence. In the 1720s, opposition newspapers attacked the ministry by calling attention to the improvements in the French colonial and commercial position. These attacks were matched in Parliament. Concern ranged from the specific to the general, the first helping substantiate the latter which, in turn, located the first. The press, for example, devoted much attention to the competing claims over the West Indies island of St Lucia, from which British settlers were expelled by the French in January 1723.93 For some, this crystallised a feeling that France was weakening the British colonial position, the London Journal of 27 April (os) 1723 claiming, The disappointment of St. Lucia having put people on enquiry into the state of the French power in the West Indies, it is agreed on all hands, that since the conclusion of the peace they have repaired their old fortifications, built new ones, and increased their colonies, insomuch that they seem to have some extraordinary view that way if a war should break out again. The press focused on the theme of rivalry. Co-operation, especially with the Bourbons, was not a frequent topic. Thus, on 20 September (os) 1718, the Weekly Medley warned that the planting of tobacco by the French in their new colony of Louisiana was a threat to the British tobacco trade and thus to the British colonies: Virginia and Maryland were major producers of tobacco. The following year, another paper noted that it would not address the issue lest it be accused of criticising the French alliance.94 The political sensitivity of colonial and commercial issues continued after the alliance ended in 1731. Some of the reporting employed a discussion format in which varied views were offered, although the political direction was clear. For example, the pro-government London Journal of 4 November (os) 1732 published a dialogue between Mr D’Anvers, the putative author of the leading opposition newspaper, the Craftsman, and the fictional Sir Harry Worthy, his name indicating his quality. The former called for war with Spain in response to arbitrary and hostile Spanish policing of British trade in the Caribbean, and argued that trade was damaged by the failure to fight. Worthy replied, ’tis true . . . suffered some affronts . . . our trade with Spain . . . now a very advantageous one . . . it seemed best upon the whole, and most for the interest of England, to submit to a few evils for a little time than inevitably throw ourselves into a war. This was an instance of the prudential views towards commercial and colonial interests frequently taken by ministries, but often decried by oppositions as weak and as betrayals of national interests. D’Anvers argued: ‘our merchants confess we have lost several branches of our trade as sugar etc’, the pragmatic Worthy responding,

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That may be; but we have got others: It is the nature of trade to be always fluctuating; and if foreign powers grow wise, cultivating the arts of peace and trade, and set up manufactures of their own, we shall lose other branches, or sell less quantities; but this can’t be helped: no ministry can prevent or alter the nature of things. Worthy claimed that peace was necessary, and that any conflict between Britain and Spain would be exploited commercially by France, a correct view that the opposition tended to neglect when relations between Britain and France were poor, but that was made use of when they were good. In 1729, Edward Vernon, a naval officer and vocal opposition Whig, claimed in the House of Commons that France could not be trusted to settle Anglo-Spanish differences, and he spoke of the danger of our alliance with France, both as to the security of our commerce and government, that France dealing in the very commodities we do ourselves, namely the woollen manufacture, it was a jest to think she will advantage us that way by the mediation of peace.95 More generally, commercial news was used in order to support or criticise the ministry. Thus, Mist’s Weekly Journal, in its issue of 2 February (os) 1728, used a report about the price of serges (a key new drapery) in Exeter market (a key site for the export trade) to suggest that the government’s failure to secure ‘an open and free trade’ with Spain was having serious consequences. Opposition papers tended to stress the difficulties affecting trade,96 and also mentioned imports of goods that were produced in Britain97 in order to contribute to the sense of crisis. Information and opinion circulated as a system within both government and the press, and officials proved increasingly willing to use the latter in order to advance their views. In 1733, Walter Titley, referring to Anglo-Danish differences over claims to the West Indian island of St Croix (the French had sold their claim to Denmark), suggested, I am persuaded, if our claim is well founded, this project may very easily be quashed by presenting a strong memorial to the Danish court, and publishing it afterwards in the gazettes, for no assurances the French can give will encourage merchants to venture their money upon a settlement which they see England, for just reasons, determined to oppose.98 Public assemblies were regarded as creating particular problems of management.99 Parliament acted as a focus of lobbying and discussion,100 as well as posing problems of presentation for government and opposition. Indeed, Charles James Fox, then leader of the opposition in the House of Commons, argued that the 1786 trade treaty with France was most vulnerable to

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Parliamentary attacks on commercial grounds, ‘the more I dread it politically, the more earnest I am that the commercial objections which are the only ones that will weigh should be brought forward’.101 In the event, the Commons approved the treaty by a handsome majority. At times, the processes by which pressure was exerted in Parliament can be detected, but this is not always clear. Frequently, there are reports that it is difficult to evaluate, and their repetition does not necessarily improve matters. An interesting suggestion of the role of foreign agents in mercantile lobbying was provided in 1748 when the government deciphered the report of a Spanish agent about discussions with London merchants concerning the need for bringing the conflict with Spain to a close. The agent told one merchant ‘that in order to give more weight to the instances of this City, they should endeavour to persuade Bristol to present a memorial likewise: He said, that might be easily done.’ The agent advised against Spain opening trade prior to the end of the war, as it would reduce the pressure for peace, and, instead, suggested that this link between peace and trade be made explicit in a declaration. This indeed was followed by a mercantile petition for the resumption of the trade.102 The picture that more generally emerges is of Parliament as an important player in the shaping of policy, a player whose potential role, or at least effectiveness, was enhanced by the expertise available among its members as well as that to which it had access. This included statistical information presented to its consideration.103 If much discussion and legislation was local in its concerns,104 Parliament also offered a way to legislate for the nation and to express opinions at a national level. In 1723, it was reported that the British merchants who were heavily involved in the movement of Portuguese tobacco to Hamburg, en route to German markets, were working to win the support of Parliament against an Austrian prohibition of their trade designed to help the Ostend Company.105 Townshend himself was concerned to have the necessary information to reply to any Parliamentary questions about the Company.106 Five years earlier, a report of alleged British governmental connivance in Ostend was fed by the Jacobites to a critical MP for use in Parliament.107 More generally, the ability to present petitions to Parliament contributed to the ventilation of complaints, which created an impression of problems, if not crisis.108 Foreign envoys noted the potential role of Parliament in commercial and colonial matters and followed relevant lobbying and debates carefully. In 1728, D’Aix, the Sardinian envoy, reported that mercantile circles were trying to have an Act passed to block the import of Piedmontese silks, a measure they had already attempted the previous year. Concerned that Parliamentary action would be a major restriction on the trade, Victor Amadeus II ordered his envoy to ensure that the issue was not raised there, and was accordingly willing to be accommodating.109 In 1754, the French foreign minister sought information on the British ministerial position in a recent debate on French cloth imports. In this instance, the prospect of referral to Parliament does appear to have had an impact. Hawkesbury believed in 1787 that the Portuguese envoy, in pursuing

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commercial issues with Britain, had links with the opposition and was only waiting ‘to see what will be the sense of Parliament and the disposition of the people’.110 That year, the Spanish envoy praised a speech by the Lord Chancellor, Edward, First Lord Thurlow, disclaiming any British right to settle on the Mosquito Shore (of modern Nicaragua).111 The role of Parliament appeared important not only because of its part in commercial regulation, but also thanks to its position in the debate over foreign policy. In Parliament, this frequently involved commercial and colonial issues, as in 1717 when a prohibition on trade with Sweden was debated. Political bite was added because there was believed to be a link between trade and political disaffection. In 1727, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Wager, the First Lord of the Admiralty and a MP for the port-city of Portsmouth, warned Townshend that, if there was no trade between Britain and Russia, but, in contrast, that Britain’s Dutch ally was able to trade with Russia, it ‘would raise the clamour of the disaffected at home’.112 Real or reported agitation could be more direct, as when Robert Walpole, in opposition during the Whig Split, allegedly promoted an Address to Parliament from merchants involved in the Swedish trade, or in 1729, when, trying to increase pressure on the government to act forcefully against Portugal over the treatment of British trade, John, Lord Tyrawly, the envoy in Lisbon, warned Newcastle that the merchants, feeling unsupported by the ministry at home, intended to make representations to Parliament, which, if supported by the opposition, could create difficulties there.113 Pressing the case for the import of Persian silk via Russia, Samuel Holden, an MP from 1735, neverthless noted that it ‘would meet with strong and popular opposition from the Turkey Company who purchase all their silk with cloath . . . were our ministers never so heartily for it, the opposition from the Turkey Company and the cloathing counties would be unsurmountable’.114 Indeed, in 1740, Sir William Joliffe, a wealthy Turkey merchant and Director of the Bank of England, as well as an MP, presented a petition from the Levant Company against the import of raw silk from Russia. Publications could be directly linked to Parliamentary discussions, Nicholas Paxton, the Solicitor to the Treasury, reporting in 1738, I have used the utmost diligence to find out the printer and publisher of the pamphlet entitled ‘The Interest of Great Britain in supplying herself with iron impartially considered’, but have not been able to discover them. No printer’s or publisher’s name is put in the pamphlet, nor have any of them been sold; but upon the best inquiry I could make the pamphlet was delivered by some private hand, whilst the bill relating to iron was depending in the House of Commons.115 In 1787, ministers tracked opposition arguments on the Eden Treaty before the Parliamentary debate by reading the pamphlets they were publishing.116 Furthermore, there was an overlap between manuscript letters, newsletters and

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newspapers, as indicated in the report from Wye’s Letter of protectionist pressure organised from London published in the Norwich Mercury of 5 December (os) 1730: The Committee of the Wool Combers of the City . . . sent circular letters to all their brethren throughout Great Britain, setting forth the great decay of their trade, and especially the exportation appears to be owing to our neighbouring nations getting our British and Irish wool, by which their manufacturers are enabled not only to make neat but much greater quantities of neater goods than otherwise they could; their workmanship being cheaper than ours, with other advantages, they undersell and rival us at foreign markets, notwithstanding we make and sell, to the half starving our poor, near 20% cheaper than years past; and therefore in love to our native country and posterity, they recommend to their brethren the following their example, in petitioning the Parliament the ensuing session for a redress; the woollen manufacturing for exportation being the staple trade of the nation, the source of our wealth and power, and a trade that gives life to all others. Related notices appeared in other newspapers, for example, the St James Evening Post of 24 October (os) 1730. By the following February, 40 petitions had been presented to Parliament.117 Petitions and press were not the sole methods of exerting pressure over this issue. As was reported in the press, Walpole also consulted ‘the most eminent traders in our manufactures’ for advice.118 Alongside episodic concern about the possible role of Parliament, there was an awareness of the impact of representative bodies in other states on commercial regulation. This was only the case in a few states, principally Sweden119 and the United Provinces (Netherlands), but it accentuated the unpredictability of commercial relationships. In 1739, the nature of the United Provinces as a ‘popular government’ was referred to when assessing the likelihood of Dutch reprisals against Danish and Swedish protectionism.120 The quality of the debates on trade and colonies in representative bodies is difficult to evaluate. Some governmental figures made critical remarks, the diplomat Stephen Poyntz commenting in 1730 on the Commons, ‘where I hear St. Lucia was mistaken as it had been before at the Board of Trade’.121 In 1786, William Morton Pitt, MP for the port constituency Poole, and a Dorset landowner keenly committed to economic improvement, complained about ‘the ignorance I meet with every day amongst all sorts of people with regard to foreign affairs and commerce more particularly’. He sought to educate himself on these matters, seeking information on Dutch trade and finance, while he had also ‘examined even into the detail of each manufacture’ during his visit to Sweden,122 but this was an unusual step. It was rare for parliamentarians to offer private reflections on why they spoke and voted on particular measures, but

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John, Viscount Perceval, MP for Harwich, did so in 1732, revealing a sense of international competition as outweighing sectional advantages, a Petition presented by Mr. Doddington for granting a bounty on bread exported from Poole to the West Indies was ordered to lie on the table, upon a division of 199 against 107. I voted with the majority, because all bounties on exportation of necessaries for life is only enabling foreign states to undersell us, by enabling their artisans to work cheaper and so undersell us.123 Dodington, formerly George Bubb, was a Lord of the Treasury and a former envoy to Spain, who had negotiated a trade agreement while there. MP for Bridgwater, his seat was in Dorset. Alongside the problems for the management and presentation of the commercial and colonial aspects of foreign policy posed by Parliament, there were aspects of the relationship that were beneficial. These included the need and ability to take mercantile advice in Parliament, the benign system of public finances that rested on the Parliamentary-guaranteed national debt, and the prospect of using Parliamentary pressure for policy purposes. In 1724, St Saphorin, the envoy in Vienna, suggested that the East India Company present to Parliament an Address over the Ostend Company. He argued that it would have an impact on Austria, particularly if the Company demanded the right to make seizures in India. Nine years later, Harrington responded to a Swedish move against the import of tobacco in British ships by writing ‘it must become a Parliamentary consideration how to retaliate on this side for all the disadvantages we suffer on that head’.124 Parliamentary debates benefited from the presence of merchants, some of whom made important contributions, as Joseph Herne, a Director of the East India Company, did in the debate over the dispatch of a fleet to the Mediterranean in 1718. Furthermore, ministers took pains to ensure relevant information for debates from diplomats.125 The existence of a public debate was certainly taken for granted by government, Carmarthen writing to Eden in 1786 about the trade negotiations with France, You must be sensible that in a business which must be a matter of much public discussion in this country, it is essential both to render the first impression as favourable as possible, and to appear to have guarded by sufficient securities the interests of those branches of our manufactures which are most concerned in this arrangement.126 The public debate was important not only because of its episodic intensity but also thanks to its range. Through the culture of print, discussion about trade and empire circulated in the anglophone world (and overlapped with its nonanglophone counterparts) in a fashion that was more regularised than private

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correspondence. Furthermore, this discussion interacted with the multiple loci of the public sphere, for example coffee-houses, in which a taste for news had grown from the mid-seventeenth century.127 The context of public discussion and contention were very important to the political dimensions of trade and empire.

Notes 1 Horatio Walpole to Harrington, 18 July 1735, NA. SP. 84/345 fol. 20. 2 Samuel Hartley to cousin David Hartley, who, in 1783, had tried to negotiate a trade agreement with the USA, 9 July 1784, Reading, Berkshire CRO., D/Ehy F92/25; E. Hughes, North Country Life in the Eighteenth Century – The North-East, 1700–1750 (London, 1952), pp. 290–303. 3 St Contest, French foreign minister, to Bonnac, French envoy in The Hague, 10, 14 June 1753, AN. KK. 1400 pp. 231, 233. 4 Liverpool to Dundas, 20 Oct. 1799, BL. Add. 38311 fol. 28. 5 L. Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics (Oxford, 1952), and Politics and Finance in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1984). 6 Harrison to Townshend, – Oct. (os) 1725, NA. SP. 35/58 fols 274–8. 7 Charles Delafaye, Under Secretary in the Southern Department, to Newcastle, 17 Oct. (os) 1725, NA. SP. 35/58 fols 149–51. 8 Delafaye to Newcastle, 2 Nov. (os) 1725, NA. SP. 35/59 fol. 20. 9 Gansinot, Wittelsbach envoy at The Hague, to Count Plettenberg, foreign minister of the Elector of Cologne, 1 Nov. 1726, Münster, Staatsarchiv, Deposit Nordkirchen, NB 259 fol. 64. 10 Harris to Carmarthen, 7 Mar. 1788, BL. Eg. 3500 fol. 72. 11 Undated memorandum, ‘The Russia Company’s Answer to the Board of Trade’, CUL. (CH) mss. 89/31. 12 Undated Russia Company memorandum, CUL. C(H) mss. 89/53. 13 Liverpool to Dundas, 20 Oct. 1799, BL. Add. 38311 fol. 29. 14 A.C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company (London, 1935), p. 133; Sir Everard Fawkener, envoy in Constantinople, to Horatio Walpole, 29 Nov. 1736, Fawkener to Sir Robert Walpole, 24 Jan. 1737, BL. Add. 74072; Liverpool to William, Lord Grenville, Foreign Secretary, 11 Aug. 1799, BL. Add. 38311 fols 15–16. 15 Address of Governor and Council of Jamaica to George II, 21 Nov. (os) 1730, NA. SP. 42/20 fols 359–60. 16 Townshend to Charles Du Bourgay, envoy in Berlin, 22 Dec. (os) 1724, NA. SP. 90/18. 17 D.K. Reading, The Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 (New Haven, 1938), p. 44. 18 Holden, memorandum, CUL. C(H) mss. 80/46/2. 19 Rondeau, envoy in St Petersburg, to Harrington, 7 Oct. (os) 1732, Sbornik, 66, p. 514. 20 Villardeau, memoire, 5 May 1726, AN. AM. B7 288. 21 D.S. Macmillan, ‘The Russia Company of London in the Eighteenth Century: The Effective Survival of a “Regulated” Chartered Company’, Guildhall Miscellany, 4 (1973), pp. 222–36. 22 Edward Forster, Governor of the Company, to Hawkesbury, 29 June 1791, BL. Add. 38226 fols 255–7. On the importance of this trade, H.H. Kaplan, Russian Overseas Commerce with Great Britain During the Reign of Catherine II (Philadelphia, 1995), and ‘Anglo-Russian Commerce during the 1790s’, Consortium on Revolutionary Europe Proceedings 1986, pp. 227–34. For customs statistics, J. Ehrman, The British Government and Commercial Negotiations with Europe 1783–1793 (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 216–21. 23 H. Horwitz, ‘The East India Trade, the Politicians and the Constitution, 1689–1702’,

The shaping of policy 81

24 25

26 27 28

29

30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

Journal of British Studies, 17 (1978), pp. 1–18; C. Jones, ‘ “A Fresh Division Lately Grown up amongst Us”: Party Strife, Aristocratic Investment in the Old and New East India Companies and the Vote in the House of Lords on 23 February 1700’, Historical Research, 38 (1995), pp. 202–17. D.J. Hamilton, Scotland, the Caribbean and the Atlantic World 1750–1820 (Manchester, 2005), p. 181. A.M. Carlos and J.B. Kruse, ‘The Decline of the Royal African Company: Fringe Firms and the Role of the Charter’, EcHR, 49 (1996), pp. 291–313; K. Morgan (ed.), The British Transatlantic Slave Trade. II. The Royal African Company (London, 2003). Bristol, Society of Merchant Venturers, Minutes of the Steadfast Society, pp. 56–7. Undated petition, Russia Company, CUL. C(H) mss. 80/483. Robert Trevor, envoy in The Hague, to Harrington, 3 Mar. 1739, Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, envoy in The Hague, 13 Feb. 1753, NA. SP. 84/378 fol. 201, 84/462. See, more generally, D.J. Ormrod, ‘Anglo-Dutch Commerce 1700–1760’ (PhD, Cambridge, 1973), pp. 131–2. M. Jubb, ‘Economic Policy and Economic Development’, in J. Black (ed.), Britain in the Age of Walpole (London, 1984), pp. 125–6. See, more generally, Jubb, ‘Fiscal Policy in England in the 1720s and 1730s’ (PhD, Cambridge, 1977). Calendar of Treasury Papers 1714–19, p. 487; P.J. Thomas, Mercantilism and the East India Trade (London, 1926); N. Rothstein, ‘The Calico Campaign of 1719–1721’, East London Papers, 7 (1964), pp. 3–21. Liverpool to Dundas, 20 Oct. 1799, BL. Add. 38311 fols 27–30. Colombs, ‘Memoire concernant l’établissement des paquebots d’Angleterre qu’on envoye à Lisbon’, 30 Nov. 1717, AN. AM. B7272. Ormrod, ‘Anglo-Dutch Commerce’, pp. 68–97. L’Hermitage, Dutch envoy in London, to States General, 1 June 1728, BL. Add. 17677 KKK10 fol. 262. Newcastle to Guy Dickens, envoy in St Petersburg, 1 June 1753, Sbornik, 148 (1916), p. 425. Perceval to his brother, 2 Feb. (os) 1720, BL. Add. 47029 fol. 8. Molesworth to John, Lord Carteret, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 20 Jan. 1723, NA. SP. 92/31 fols 171–3. Booth and Barnardiston to Whitworth, 31 Mar. 1722, BL. Add. 37388 fols 197–8. Rondeau to Harrington, 10 Jan. (os) and reply, 10 Feb. (os) 1736, NA. SP. 91/19. Russia Company memorandum to Townshend, 20 Ap. (os) 1729, NA. SP. 91/107; anonymous, undated memorandum, ‘The Russia Company’s Answer to the Board of Trade’, CUL. C(H) mss. 89/31; Board of Trade Journal 1728–34, pp. 300, 351, 379–80, 395–6; N.C. Hunt, ‘The Russia Company and the Government, 1730–42’, Oxford Slavonic Papers, 7 (1957), pp. 29–53; Company to George II, 9 Mar. 1753, Sbornik, 148 (1916); Liverpool to William, Lord Grenville, Foreign Secretary, 17 Mar. 1797, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 183. NA. SP. 35/56 fols 118–23. Wye’s Letter, 5 Jan. (os) 1730; HMC, Egmont, I, 341. Titley to Tilson, 9 Aug. 1735, Board of Trade to George II, 27 Aug. (os) 1735, NA. SP. 75/68 fol. 11, 95/132 fols 48–9. Edward Finch to Harrington, 12 Feb. 1739, NA. SP. 95/84 fol. 118. Newcastle to Harrington, 10 July (os) 1740, NA. SP. 43/91; C. Gill, ‘The Affair of Porto Novo: An Incident in Anglo-Swedish Relations’, EHR, 73 (1958), p. 63. Eden to Pitt, 13 Ap., 22 June, Samuel Garbett to Pitt, 11 June 1786, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fols 13–15, 57–8, 30/8/138 fol. 39. Eden to Pitt, 13 July 1786, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fol. 63. Eden to Carmarthen, 3 Oct. 1786, NA. FO. 27/20 fol. 215. Eden to Pitt, 25 May 1786, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fol. 39.

82 The shaping of policy 50 J. Smail, Merchants, Markets and Manufacture: The English Wool Textile Industry in the Eighteenth Century (Basingstoke, 1999). 51 R. Burt, ‘The Transformation of the Non-ferrous Metals Industries in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, EcHR, 48 (1995), pp. 23–45, esp. pp. 29, 42. 52 A. Cunningham, ‘The Oczakov Debate’, Middle Eastern Studies (1964–5). 53 La Luzerne to Montmorin, 13 May 1788, AE. CP. Ang. 565 fol. 161. 54 Le Coq, Saxon envoy in London, to Augustus II, 13 Oct. 1727, Dresden 2676 fol. 300. 55 Le Coq to Augustus, 4 Nov. 1727, Dresden 2676 fol. 334. 56 Harrington to Titley, 11 Oct. (os) 1734, NA. SP. 75/65 fol. 21. 57 Wych to Harrington, 31 Aug. 1734, NA. SP. 82/54 fol. 22. 58 Ossorio to Victor Amadeus II, 4 Sept. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37. 59 Newcastle to Essex, 12 Oct. (os) 1732, NA. SP. 92/34 fol. 152. 60 Geraldino to Torrenuera, 17 June 1737, CUL. C(H) corresp. 2695; Benjamin Keene, envoy in Spain, to Newcastle, 27 May 1737, BL. Add. 32795 fol. 62. 61 Representation of the merchants and sugar refiners of Bristol, Newcastle to Elizeus Burges, 29 Ap. (os), Burges to Newcastle, 4, 25 June 1734, NA. SP. 36/31, 99/80, 63 fols 258–60; Imberto to the Senate of Venice, 14 May 1734, Venice, Archivio di Stato, LM. Ing. 100. 62 African Company memorandum, 14 Aug., Evan Nepean to William Fraser, 18 Aug. 1784, Forster to Leeds, 11 Feb., Leeds to Drake, 15 Feb. 1791, NA. FO. 27/12 fols 262–4, 30/8/136 fols 182–4; Hawkesbury to Robert Harvey, 6 Feb. 1794, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 101. 63 Harrington to Robinson, 18, 21 Jan. (os), 11 Feb. (os) 1732, NA. SP. 80/84–5. 64 Harrington to Robinson, 1 Feb. (os) 1732, NA. SP. 80/84. 65 Robinson to Harrington, 10 Mar. cf. Robinson to Tilson, 8, 12 Mar. 1732, NA. SP. 80/86. 66 Harrington to Robinson, 11 Jan. (os) 1732, NA. SP. 80/84. 67 HMC, Egmont, I, 341; Hawkesbury to John Cragg, 29 Mar. 1796, and to Dudley Ryder, Vice-President of Board of Trade, 29 May 1797, BL. Add. 38310 fols 155, 194. 68 Bladen to James, First Earl Waldegrave, envoy in Paris, 13 Oct. 1737, Chewton. 69 P.G.M. Dickson, ‘English Commercial Negotiations with Austria, 1737–1752’, in A. Whiteman, J.S. Bromley and Dickson (eds), Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants (Oxford, 1973), pp. 81–112. 70 Harrington to Robinson, 15 Dec. (os) 1738, NA. SP. 80/132 fol. 154. 71 Delafaye to Waldegrave, 10 Feb. (os) 1732, Chewton. 72 George III to John Robinson, 12 Sept. 1778, BL. Add. 37834 fol. 13. 73 Newcastle to Yorke, 26 June 1753, NA. SP. 84/463. 74 R.B. Sheridan, ‘The Molasses Act and the Market Strategy of the British Sugar Planters’, Journal of Economic History, 17 (1957), pp. 62–83; Meeting at King’s Arms, 23 Jan. (os) 1749, London, Bedford Estate Office, papers of Fourth Duke; A.J. O’Shaughnessy, ‘The Formation of a Commercial Lobby: The West India Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution’, Historical Journal, 40 (1997), pp. 71–95. 75 Holzendorf to Tilson, 17 Mar. 1730, NA. SP. 84/307 fol. 55. 76 Finch to Harrington, 1 Aug. (os) 1733, NA. SP. 95/64 fol. 26. 77 Draft [Newcastle] to Brinsley Skinner, consul at Livorno, 3 Aug. 1730, NA. SP. 98/83 fol. 274; Colman, envoy in Florence, to Waldegrave, 13 Oct. 1730, Chewton. 78 Eg. London Journal, 4 Jan. (os) 1735, sources of ships arriving in Amsterdam in 1734. 79 London Evening Post, 13 Feb. (os) 1728 re. Sweden. 80 Cf. York Courant, 29 Feb. (os) 1732. 81 York Courant, 13 Mar. (os) 1739. 82 E. Phillips, The State of the Nation in Respect of her Commerce, Debts, and Money (1725; 2nd edn, London, 1726), p. 10. 83 CUL. C(H) mss. 73/4/1. 84 Whitehall Evening Post, 2 Dec. (os) 1718.

The shaping of policy 83 85 Anon., Serious Enquiries into the Motives and Consequences of our Present Armament against Russia (London, 1791), pp. 25, 40, 44; Anon., A Comparative Estimate of the Advantages Great Britain Would Derive from a Commercial Alliance with the Ottoman in Preference to the Russian Empire (London, 1791), pp. 5–7. 86 Eg. extract from London Evening Post of 13 Dec. 1756 on Franco-Spanish trade, AE. CP. Ang. 400 fols 497–9. 87 M.S. Pedley, The Commerce of Cartography. Making and Marketing Maps in EighteenthCentury France and England (Chicago, 2005). 88 Marriott to Bute, 24 Ap. 1761, MS. 4/58. 89 Stanley’s News Letter, 15 Aug. (os) 1728. 90 Whitehall Evening Post, 8 Nov. (os) 1718. 91 Wye’s Letter, 17 Dec. (os) 1737. 92 St James’s Post, 8 Oct. (os) 1718. 93 Loyal Observator, 9 Mar. (os), Weekly Journal, 9 Mar. (os), London Journal, 13 Ap. (os) 1723; Chammorel to Dubois, French foreign minister, 5 Ap., Destouches to Dubois, 29 Ap. 1723, AE. CP. Ang. 344; CUL. C(H) mss. 86/4–10. 94 Weekly Packet, 26 Sept. (os) 1719. 95 HMC, Egmont, III, 331. 96 Champion, 15 July (os) 1740. 97 Grub Street Journal, 12, 19 May (os) 1737. 98 Titley to Harrington, 20 June 1733, NA. SP. 75/61 fol. 182. 99 Re. South Sea Company, Keene to Newcastle, 13 Aug. 1736, NA. SP. 94/126. 100 E. Robinson, ‘Matthew Boulton and the Art of Parliamentary Lobbying’, Historical Journal, 7 (1964), pp. 209–29. 101 Fox to Portland, 12 Dec. 1786, BL. Add. 47561 fol. 90. 102 Le Man to Duke of Huescar, Spanish envoy in Paris, 16 Feb. 1748, BL. Add. 32811 fol. 169; Alt, Hesse Cassel envoy in London, to William VIII of Hesse-Cassel, 12 Mar. 1748, Marburg, England 249. 103 J. Hoppit, ‘Political Arithmetic in Eighteenth-Century England’, EcHR, 49 (1996), pp. 521–3. 104 P. Langford, Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689–1798 (Oxford, 1991). 105 Cortanze, Sardinian envoy in London, to Victor Amadeus II, 25 Jan. 1723, AST. LM. Ing. 32. 106 Townshend to St Saphorin, envoy in Vienna, 29 July 1723, NA. SP. 80/48. 107 Hugh Thomas to John, Eleventh Earl of Mar, 22 Dec. 1718, RA. Stuart Papers 41/13. 108 Eg. petitions to Parliament about decay of woollen trade, Wye’s Letter, 13, 16 Feb. (os) 1731. 109 D’Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 8 Mar. 1728, reply 1 Ap., AST. LM. Ing. 35. 110 St Contest to Mirepoix, 1 Jan. 1754, AE. CP. Ang. 437 fol. 7; Hawkesbury to Eden, 19 Jan. 1787; BL. Add. 38309 fol. 137. 111 Carmarthen to Robert Liston, envoy in Madrid, 9 Ap. 1787, NLS. MS. 5546 fol. 109. 112 Wager to Townshend, 1 Jan. (os) 1727, HMC, Townshend (London, 1887), p. 116. 113 Charles Whitworth, envoy in The Hague, to William, Lord Cadogan, 18 Mar. 1718, BL. Add. 37367 fol. 172; Tyrawly to Newcastle, 17 July 1729, NA. SP. 89/35 fols 191–2. 114 Holden, memorandum, CUL. C(H) mss. 80/46/2. 115 Paxton to [Harrington?], 16 May (os) 1738, NA. SP. 36/45 fol. 284. 116 Hawkesbury to Eden, 19 Jan. 1787, BL. Add. 38309 fol. 136. 117 Norwich Mercury, 27 Feb. (os) 1731. 118 Norwich Mercury, 10 Jan. (os) 1730. 119 Snow, envoy in Stockholm, to Tilson, 22 May (os) 1728, NA. SP. 95/48 fols 91–2. 120 Trevor to Harrington, 3 Feb. 1739, NA. SP. 84/378 fols 117–18. 121 Poyntz, Plenipotentiary to Congress of Soissons, to Delafaye, 1 Ap. 1730, NA. SP. 78/194 fol. 75.

84 The shaping of policy 122 W.M. Pitt to Harris, 8 Jan. 1786, 6 June 1788, Winchester, Hampshire CRO., Malmesbury papers, vol. 163. 123 HMC, Egmont, I, 231. 124 St Saphorin to Townshend, 20, 26 Feb., 12 Ap., 6 May, Townshend to St Saphorin, 17 Jan. (os), 28 Ap. (os) 1724, Harrington to Finch, 17 Aug. (os) 1733, NA. SP. 80/48, 52, 95/64 fol. 28. 125 Hawkesbury to William Fawkener, envoy in Lisbon, 27 Nov. 1786, Hawkesbury to Eden, 19 Jan. 1787, BL. Add. 38309 fols 128, 136. 126 Carmarthen to Eden, 12 Sept. 1786, NA. FO. 27/20 fol. 64. 127 S. Pincus, ‘ “Coffee Politicians Does Create”: Coffeehouses and Restoration Political Culture’, Journal of Modern History, 67 (1995), p. 834.

Chapter 4

The government response

I have had some private intelligence that the South Sea Company thinks my memorials not strong enough, but if I speak the language the greater part of those gentlemen would dictate to me, the South Sea agent would soon drive His Majesty’s Minister out of Spain. Benjamin Keene, who held both positions1

Foreign commentators referred to Britain as ‘being governed by a parcel of merchants’.2 The role of trade is such that it is unsurprising that several historians have argued that commercial issues were crucial to British foreign policy. The key considerations have been seen as a search for markets, colonial and European, and a firm opposition to commercial competitors. Indeed, Geoffrey Symcox claimed that there was a close relationship between the two fundamental elements in British foreign policy, so often treated as separate and unrelated: the pursuit of a strategic and political balance of power in Europe, and the thrust toward commercial expansion. I would argue that successive British governments in this period saw war as a means of promoting commercial growth and sought to achieve a military and diplomatic equilibrium as the essential condition for maintaining and extending trade.3 From their public pronouncements and private writings, there is no doubt of ministerial support for trade and concern for commercial considerations. This was a regular feature in bilateral relations, as well as one that became particularly important when the parameters shifted, whether due to war or to changes in control over a particular territory. Seeking, in the winter of 1734–5, to produce a mediated settlement to the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5), a struggle in which Britain was neutral, Horatio Walpole, the diplomat involved (and also the first minister’s brother) added a clause ensuring that Anglo-Dutch trade to Naples and Sicily should not be affected by their acquisition from Austria by Don Carlos, son of Philip V of Spain, who had conquered the

86 The government response

territories in 1734.4 Although the mediation failed, the consul, Edmund Allen, reported from Naples that its conquest had not had a detrimental consequence for British trade,5 which offered an instructive comment on the seriousness of such territorial shifts for commercial negotiations, and thus a qualification of much public comment. In this particular case, the government was eager to be informed of any new regulations that might harm trade.6 The ministry indeed argued that a change of ruler should not affect commercial treaties and pressed the Spanish envoy accordingly ‘often’.7 Nevertheless, the consequence of changes in the control depended on the ruler and the territory. Don Carlos, later Charles III of Spain (1759–88), was not close to France in the late 1730s, and was willing to be accommodating to British commercial issues, for example the situation in Messina, which was less propitious for British trade than that in Naples.8 Indeed, there was far more concern that French acquisition of Corsica, which then seemed a prospect, would threaten British trade in the event of war.9 However, despite Allen’s optimism in the late 1730s, the Neapolitan situation subsequently proved less propitious, in part due to the circumstances of the change of ruler, in particular to the fact that Britain had not been a party to the treaty. At times, the disappointment over territorial changes could prove far more acute. During the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13), the British had made a major effort to keep the Bourbons out of the Spanish Netherlands (essentially modern Belgium). However, in commercial and political terms, their efforts on behalf of their then ally, Austria, which gained the territory at the close of the war, had swiftly proved a disappointment, as the Ostend Company indicated. In 1728, Robert Daniel reported from Brussels, the capital of the Austrian Netherlands, that there was support there for war with Britain as it was seen as an opportunity to improve the economy by developing the textile industry, not least through importing wool from Austria’s then leading ally, Spain.10 British ministers were frequently attacked for being allegedly opposed to trade and to merchants. They were hounded for their supposed failure to defend British commercial and imperial interests. Ministers were also blamed for poor economic conditions. Criticism of the government focused, in particular, on the trades that received most public attention, those to Spain and the Spanish empire,11 but this by no means circumscribed the range of criticism. The sensitivity of the issue, and indeed a sense of betrayal, were both repeatedly exploited by opposition spokesmen. Government was seen not only as negligent but also as actively hostile to merchants. The opposition press could portray a ministerial gang shouting ‘No Merchants’ and, claiming that Sir Robert Walpole had said ‘that he hoped to make all the merchants of England as poor as so many German princes’, concluded ‘Things seem to be come to a kind of crisis betwixt him and the merchants . . . either he or they must fail.’12 The comparison with the German princes was instructive, as the suggestion was clear that Walpole’s policies were, in a way, un-British and, related to that, designed to deny the

The government response 87

nationality of the merchants, who were in fact clear exponents of British identity and interests. In thus, allegedly de-nationalising the merchants, they would be made unable to defend their own liberties, for, in their poverty, they would have to take government handouts, like the German rulers subsidised by the British government to provide troops for the support of the Electorate of Hanover. Ministers could be irritated by commercial issues but, nevertheless, they felt it necessary to support them. Francis, Marquess of Carmarthen, the Foreign Secretary, wrote in 1787, ‘though heartily tired of the word commerce and the technical jargon my ears have been worried with for many months past, I still am anxiously desirous of concluding a commercial treaty with Spain’.13 British envoys were frequently instructed to remonstrate about commercial issues, and they knew what they were expected to say. In 1734, William, Third Earl of Essex, envoy in Turin, wrote that he ‘ever looked upon it as one of the most essential parts of my duty to protect as much as possible His Majesty’s trading subjects’.14 In 1755, Onslow Burrish reported from Munich, ‘although I have never received any immediate commands upon this subject, yet as the utility of the thing was self-evident, I have continued my endeavours to introduce the use of our tobacco into this Electorate, and I have now succeeded’. He followed this up by pressing for the import of sugar from the British West Indies.15 Diplomatic assistance may, indeed, in practice be under-reported in the documents. Cyril Wych wrote from Hamburg in 1734, the ordinary business of my station, such as the affairs of shipping and trade keep me generally employed . . . the adjusting of differences betwixt merchants, masters of ships and sailors are such disagreeable occupations, that I believe your Lordship will willingly dispense with my troubling you with accounts of such matters.16 This was not solely the case for envoys based at port-cities, even if they had royal courts, as did Constantinople, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Naples, St Petersburg, and Stockholm. In addition, the role of the jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Empire ensured that disputes over Hamburg’s trade were pursued in Vienna, while, at Paris in 1722, the envoy, Sir Luke Schaub, was embroiled in a number of small mercantile affairs.17 However, it is unclear how far British diplomatic moves reflected mercantile pressure. Two different structural factors can be noted. First, domestic moves were usually subordinated to political considerations, and, indeed, often suppressed in their favour. Second, it is clear that the related concern about mercantile pretensions that was fairly common in the British diplomatic service sometimes extended to antipathy. The work was certainly both difficult and repetitive, requiring a mastery of detail and a need to return to the same points. Tyrawly wrote from Lisbon in 1733 about the ‘usual and constant mercantile scrapes’.18

88 The government response

Tension can certainly be discerned in the official and private correspondence of many diplomats. This was particularly so where mercantile communities were well established. Successive envoys to Spain drew attention to the detrimental consequences for Anglo-Spanish relations that support for mercantile claims would produce. George Bubb was scathing about the South Sea Company.19 Benjamin Keene, who went to Spain first as agent for the South Sea Company, and became consul in 1724 before being appointed envoy in 1727, was particularly clear about the detrimental consequences. His supposed failure to protect mercantile interests from the Spanish government led to domestic criticism and to difficulties with merchants, and indeed to his being nicknamed Don Benjamino. French counterparts in Spain were also scathing about merchants.20 Tensions between French diplomats and merchants were more wide-ranging. Envoys in Constantinople, such as Louis, Marquis of Villeneuve, criticised the Marseille Chamber of Commerce over its role in the organisation of the Turkey trade. Tyrawly was biting in his comments from Lisbon about British merchants. In 1728, he complained that the Factory (the mercantile community) claimed excessive privileges, and, in 1729, wrote of them ‘excepting Mr. Stert, and some 4 or 5 more, they are a parcel of the greatest jackanapes I ever met with, fops, beaux, drunkards, gamesters, and prodigiously ignorant even in their own business’. Similar views were expressed, albeit less pungently, by other diplomats, and Claudius Rondeau, consul general in St Petersburg, was not alone in claiming that the merchants devoted too much energy to trying to ruin each other,21 while William Eden, a keen supporter of trade, was worried in 1786 about the impact on France of the ‘overbearing speculations and energy of our manufacturers’. The blunter James Harris argued that ‘trade narrows the mind’.22 The consequences of such critical views are difficult to assess. Tyrawly added a particular criticism of merchants that reflected a more general lack of sympathy for merchants from diplomats. Explaining a fall in the sale of British goods, he claimed, ‘some of the Factory, in order to undersell one the other, have for some time past, imported goods much worse in quality than they used formerly to be, which has very much discredited our manufactures’.23 Diplomats’ disdain for competition, and for the search of market share through price-cutting and/or varying the product, reflected a wider uncertainty about the fluidity of trade. Alongside criticism of British merchants, there were frequently bitter attacks on the integrity of foreign counterparts, both for their dealings with the British and for imposing on their own governments, the latter a charge thrown at the directors of the Ostend Company.24 At times, criticism of British merchants could be related to disputes between British diplomats. This reflected the extent to which they identified with the governments to which they were accredited. While complaining about merchant pressure,25 Wych emphasized the problems for British commerce posed by Danish pressure on Hamburg, and justified the position of the latter,26 but, while noting ‘all the clamour made in England’, Titley, from Copenhagen, emphas-

The government response 89

ized that Danish action was designed not against British shipping but against Hamburg, which he held responsible for the crisis. Titley also hinted that the British merchants trading with Hamburg complained not on their own account, but because of pressure from Hamburg.27 This was an aspect of the widespread extent to which merchants ‘went native’, identifying in particular with the markets with which they traded.28 Consuls were apt to be closer to merchants, both literally and figuratively, than envoys, and to be readier to support their interests, although William Cayley, the consul in Cadiz, noted, in 1733, ‘merchants are apt to complain, and sometimes without cause’.29 In 1754, the Attorney General, Sir Dudley Ryder, had to listen to mercantile complaints about the situation in Portugal, ‘he says our present consul Crowle is ignorant of mercantile affairs and has taken part with the Portuguese against his own country. And he thinks this disturbance must at last be attended with his being recalled.’ George Crowle had possibly obtained the consulship to escape his creditors. He held the post until he died in July 1754.30 Nevertheless, most consuls provided support without crisis. In 1724, Brinsley Skinner, the consul at Livorno, pressed for the protection of British commercial privileges there in the negotiations at the Congress of Cambrai, arguing that a stipulation to that effect should be included in any agreement over the Tuscan succession.31 Envoys could turn to consuls for advice,32 and consuls were particularly responsible for preserving commercial rights and privileges.33 Sensitivity over closeness to trade was revealed in 1730 when Claudius Rondeau, who was soon to be appointed consul general in Russia, where he was already working, criticised his predecessor, Thomas Ward, who became Minister Resident that year, I was very much surprised to hear from England, that some people thought Mr. Ward would soon have a character sent him, though he is a very honest man and a good merchant, being actually engaged in a considerable trade. I believe nobody who knows him thinks he will make a good minister, and that if such a step was made by our Court it would be his ruin, and that of our interest here, for it would be but a bad beginning to name a person who is now contracting to buy and sell goods.34 The last was a very clear expression of the social politics of diplomacy, and was related to the distinction between acting as envoy and as consul.35 At the same time, there could be close personal links between those concerned with trade and courtiers or ministers. Thus, in 1732, Charles Compton, the consul in Lisbon, wrote to his relative Spencer, Lord Wilmington, the Lord President of the Council, to press for a change in the duty on imported cut diamonds in order to transfer that trade to England.36 Charles Compton went on to become envoy in Lisbon (1742–5), Paymaster of Pensions (1745–55) and an MP (1754–5). Alongside criticism of merchants could come that of Parliamentary agitation on behalf of trade. In 1731, John Crookshanks, Secretary to the Commissioners

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appointed to discuss Anglo-Spanish differences, expressed his dissatisfaction to Newcastle: It is evident that the merchants of Bristol and Liverpool were spirited up by some malevolent persons in London . . . the Spaniards would certainly say these were strange and unaccountable proceedings in Parliament, upon the bare allegations of a few discontented men, without any legal proof . . . the King of Spain will not easily allow the Commons of England any part of the legislative power in the Spanish West Indies.37 There was also some critical public discussion of the extent to which the British system provided opportunities for the politicisation of commercial issues, leading to inappropriate decisions and contrasting with the situation in France: considering the uniformity of the views of hereditary arbitrary monarchies, like France, and the unsteadiness of British councils relating to trade; in former times, both in and out of Parliament, when popular clamour hath carried all before it, as in the law against importing cattle, and against exporting horses and many others we could instance; we say, considering these disadvantages on the part of Great Britain, it is not to be imagined that she could have maintained her sovereignty to the Narrow Seas, if she had not some advantages over France, which are natural and perpetual.38 Criticism of merchants in part reflected a more general sense, in part resting on Classical norms, that the calling of government was to pursue the public interest while the job of merchants was to pursue their own. This was captured by Benjamin Hoadly, a key writer for the Walpole ministry, who, in the London Journal of 16 May (os) 1724, wrote, whilst men who are themselves concerned in the particular branches of our trade, are every one of them naturally biased and drawn into one particular set of maxims, by that particular interest which lies always before their eyes, those who are to frame and amend the laws relating to this great good, can compare all the private opinions of interested men together; can have recourse to the true and genuine foundations of trade; can consider it, in its universal and large comprehension, and its good and bad consequences as to the whole; and can without the temptation others lie under, who are traders themselves, adapt all their regulations to the interest and advantage of the whole, in its utmost national extent and latitude. For this is properly the work of government – to consider the whole, and not a part only. For the government, situations in which views advanced by influential sections of the mercantile community were challenged by other sections, were less

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serious than the clash between trade and the ministerial wish to further good diplomatic relations with particular states. Nevertheless, whatever the context, a basic dynamic was of ministers responding to pressure brought in Britain by, at the least, instructing envoys to find out what was going on and, if necessary, remonstrate, so that an answer could be given to those ‘who apply upon this affair’.39 With weak states, the ministry could afford to adopt a high, almost bullying, tone. Venice is a good instance. In response to Venetian attempts to enforce and extend protectionist legislation, the British ministry attempted to protect trade. In 1731, Newcastle responded to reports of a new Venetian duty on British fish exports by instructing the Resident, Colonel Elizeus Burges, to have it removed. Burges was told, in no uncertain terms, to protect trade and to send reports on his progress.40 Such an approach could not be adopted with most trading partners. Reprisals could be threatened, but they were not easy to implement. In 1739, Edward Finch suggested that the Swedish government needed to have its eyes opened by Parliamentary legislation affecting Anglo-Swedish trade. Sweden was threatened with substitution by American iron imports, but, in the end, no steps were taken to limit Swedish imports, and their bulk seemed to produce British dependence on Sweden, rather than vice versa.41 At the same time, a memorandum of November 1739 noted that mercantile pressure for action against Austrian commercial legislation had been both strong and long-lasting and that Parliament would have taken measures in the session of 1739 to end the important tariff concession on Silesian linen imports had not the government yielded to Austrian diplomatic pressure.42 Threats rang hollow when Britain needed diplomatic support, and it was difficult to pursue commercial disputes with Denmark, Sardinia and Sweden when Britain was seeking to prevent them from siding with diplomatic rivals: for example, Russia in 1719–30, Austria in 1725–30, and France thereafter. Nevertheless, the government also felt constrained by domestic political pressures to support commercial interests. Seeking Swedish accession to the Treaty of Hanover in 1726, and concerned that the Swedes might openly exclude obligations to act against the Ostend Company, Townshend claimed, ‘It is certain that we cannot publicly depart from the affair of Ostend . . . that would disgust our Parliament, and exasperate a great number of merchants of wealth and interest here in England.’43 Few issues, however, were this sensitive. Moreover, in general, rather than pursuing issues through diplomacy, it was simpler, instead, to claim that new industries and trades in these countries would collapse for socio-economic reasons. Wych wrote in 1737 concerning new manufacturing industries in Denmark, ‘I believe we shall find in a little time that all will come to nothing; it being a very sure rule that trade will not be forced, nor can it flourish in a country where property is not secured, and where the credit of the subject is as slender as his riches are uncertain.’44 However complacent the political and social assumptions upon which these views rested, there was a certain degree of

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truth in them. Many of the feared Continental industrial and commercial schemes were not feasible, collapsed, or proved less competitive than anticipated. This was true, for example, in the first half of the century, of the projects for Tuscan trade to the East Indies, a Russian colony in South America or the West Indies,45 a Russian trade from Archangel to the Pacific,46 the Spanish Philippines Company,47 Swedish plans for colonies in Madagascar and South America,48 and many of the Danish schemes. Furthermore, Daniel Defoe argued that it was hard to match British quality in textile manufacture.49 To critics, however, relying on the weakness of foreign schemes was not plausible as government policy. To mix the metaphors brutally, in trade and the dominion of the seas, it was not acceptable to rely on letting sleeping dogs lie. Yet ministers had to consider complaints about foreign initiatives and British inaction within wider contexts. In part, these were diplomatic, namely the effects, both likely and unforeseen, of commercial and colonial disputes on international relations, but others also played a role. For example, demands for naval support had to be assessed in terms of the availability of warships, the likely cost of the operation, the dangers that it would elicit a hostile response or become normative, and the likely impact in other areas in which trade protection could be demanded. Warships played the crucial role in relations with the Barbary states of North Africa, as their privateers hit British trade in the Mediterranean and to Portugal, the latter in the case of a rupture with Sallé in 1716.50 For example, in the 1700s, Captain George Delaval was sent on two missions to the Emperor of Morocco: in 1700, he negotiated a treaty for the redemption of English captives, a longstanding problem in relations, and, in 1708, an agreement not to molest each other’s ships. Captain Padden concluded a truce with Morocco in 1713, while Commodore Sir Roger Curtis was ordered in 1783 to renew the Anglo-Moroccan treaty of friendship. A new treaty was concluded in 1791.51 The use of force was not only contemplated in relations with those treated as semi-barbarians. It was also at issue in relations with Christian powers, including those regarded as allies. In 1722, George Tilson, a long-experienced Under Secretary in the Northern Department, wrote about ‘the squadron which is now laid aside and was ordered to make the Portuguese judge right in a very essential point, which was the letting us enjoy a trade there as we have had it for many years’.52 Conversely, in 1735, the issue was the dispatch of a fleet, which was in fact sent, in order to support Portugal against a possible Spanish attack. Newcastle was at pains to argue that this rested on a broadly based concern about trade, ‘It is of the utmost concern to the King, and the nation, to defend and support the King of Portugal [John V], for the sake of the commerce, which is so advantageous to us’.53 The crisis itself led to a reiteration of the value of the Portugal trade, and also to a concern that a failure to provide support would lead Portugal to turn to France, which might hit trade.54 The wider contextualisation of trade was seen with Anglo-French commercial and colonial rivalries during the period of the alliance from 1716 to 1731.

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These rivalries were not pressed by either government, not because they were not concerned, but, rather, because the diplomatic and security benefits of the alliance were paramount. Noting the threat to British colonies from the expanding French colony of Louisiana, the Weekly Packet of 26 September (os) 1719 claimed it was ‘a time when other circumstances oblige us to favour the interest of France’. Four years later, the French chargé d’affaires ascribed the British government’s passive response to the St Lucia crisis to their need for a French alliance in order to maintain peace, essential both in order to ease the national debt and to lessen the Jacobite threat.55 In the 1730 session, when the two old chestnuts of competing claims to the West Indian sugar-producing island of St Lucia and French repairs to the harbour of Dunkirk were revived by the opposition, Charles Howard reported that many of his fellow MPs, although suspicious of French intentions, felt that they could not jeopardise the alliance with France by defeating the ministry on these points.56 British envoys in Paris were regularly instructed to complain over commercial and colonial matters, and French envoys in London were pressed likewise by British ministers, but there was an absence of urgency in these instructions, and complaints were often followed up in a perfunctory manner. This was also the case after the alliance came to a close, for, in the 1730s, neither government wished to convert the mistrustful neutrality of the other into outright hostility. In wartime, however, the equation of trade and politics shifted. Although the views of neutrals were an issue, far from worrying greatly about causing tension with other powers, the pursuit of commercial advantage was made more immediately necessary by the need to sustain funds and credit. Trade protection became a matter of direct support for shipping and one, in particular, to be maintained against hostile privateers. This concern was shown at the highest level. In 1777, during the War of American Independence, George III wrote to John Robinson, Secretary to the Treasury, I trust the different vessels that hover round the island will be put on their guard particularly to protect Liverpool, Whitehaven, the Clyde, and even Bristol, for I do suspect that the rebel [American] vessels which have been assembling at Nantes and Bordeaux mean some stroke of that kind which would undoubtedly occasion much discontent among the merchants.57 The king’s concern about mercantile discontent was striking as he was busy at this juncture overseeing British military strategy in North America. Two months earlier, he had ‘suggested that a few vessels stationed on the coast of Virginia’ might be able to control the tobacco trade from the Chesapeake,58 an important source of revenue to the Americans and of profit to British and French merchants. In 1765, however, George expressed his support for Captain Palliser, the naval officer in command at Newfoundland, ‘both against the complaints that his judicious conduct will draw on him from the French and our own merchants, as impartiality will ever make a man odious in the eyes of traders’.59

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The absence of much correspondence by George I and George II ensures that their views on trade, and on its relationship to foreign policy, are far more difficult to discern than those of George III. If a diplomatic instruction notes ‘His Majesty commended your being so attentive to the business of trade’, it is unclear what to make of it. It could simply be a form, but most instructions did not include such a remark.60 The same is the case with ministerial comments to foreign envoys about royal concern.61 There are some indications, nevertheless, of royal interest. In 1717, Friedrich Wilhelm von der Schulenburg, a key Hanoverian courtier, reported to Friedrich Wilhelm von Görtz, then effectively head of the government in Hanover, that George I was angry with Denmark over the seizure of merchantmen on the Elbe and that, as a result, subsidies destined for Denmark had been stopped.62 However, the need to agree with Denmark over the fate of the Swedish empire took precedence. George I was more directly linked to plans for British trade through his keen support for the development of a port at Harburg, on the opposite bank of the River Elbe to Hamburg. This attracted some attention in diplomatic circles as a way to win British support for George’s interest as Elector of Hanover in the acquisition of the Duchies of Bremen and Verden from Sweden.63 However, the Harburg Company, founded, with high hopes, to carry on trade between Britain and Hanover, and with George’s grandson, Frederick, as Governor of the Company, became involved in controversy in 1722 over an attempt to launch a lottery in London, which was declared fraudulent and illegal by the House of Commons. George I had been more heavily involved in the scandal caused by the South Sea Bubble in 1720, as he had become Governor of the South Sea Company in 1718. Thereafter, he did not play much of a role in directly sponsoring commercial initiatives, and, in this, he was followed by George II. The Harburg initiative did not take off, as it was seen as a challenge to Hamburg,64 the commercial interests of which were already closely linked with those of Britain. At the beginning of George II’s reign, there was interest in improving commercial links with Hanover and this could be related to the general burst of initiatives associated with the new king, a burst that was, however, to be shortlived.65 Dining in Paris with Horatio Walpole, the envoy, in January 1728, James, Lord Waldegrave, newly appointed to the Vienna embassy, was told by an Hanoverian colonel that it was a pity that the people of England were not made a little sensible of the advantages the King’s German dominions might be to England in point of trade, that it certainly might be a mutual advantage to the subjects of both states for that there were several commodities that were used in England which were Hanoverian manufactures, and were brought in to England by the Dutch who made all the advantage . . . that such were linens of all sorts, canvasses . . . he said further that he had mentioned something of it to the King and Queen (for he is just come out of England), and that they seemed desirous enough to encourage such a project, he said

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that what had prevented it was the division there is at Hanover amongst the German ministry there, that the Hamburgers, who dread nothing so much as a trade being carried on from Hanover directly to England, obstruct this project, and have got some interest in the Hanover Council that oppose it to the great disadvantage of Hanover especially.66 The account, which continued by explaining the impact on Hanover, is an instructive one, as it provides evidence of the sort of topics that could be raised in discussion, and also of the need to probe as many sources as possible. There are no relevant records in Hanover or in the papers of Horatio Walpole. Little came from the idea. Instead, as an instance of the difficulties that Hanoverian issues laboured under, a memorandum of 1729 about lessening the duties on Hanoverian linen claimed that the import of linen to Britain was very badly hit by import duties that were even higher than those for Russian linen. The memorandum directed attention to a key sphere in fiscal policy as it wanted Parliament to cut the duties.67 There was, however, no real interest in improved economic links: Hanover was not seen as a key market nor as a major source of imports. As a result, Hanover could not gain the enclave status that was so valuable to certain foreign territories and so important to Britain. This status was not so much that of free ports, although that was important, but rather of commercial centres that were not under the control of a major power, and therefore unlikely to be involved in hostilities with Britain. Hamburg and Livorno, the fate of each of which concerned British ministers, and trading conditions in which were of major importance to diplomats68 were prime instances of such centres, while Lisbon also served this function as far as the Portuguese empire was concerned, providing, in particular, a means of access to the Brazil trade. In considering government bodies involved with trade, the direct role of the Crown was modest. Indeed, ministers sought to explain the manner in which royal authority was constrained. A Prussian attempt in 1756 to settle the issue of neutral trade in the event of war between Britain and France by means of a declaration by George II was rejected on the grounds that this could only be settled by a treaty of commerce and that a Prussian project for the latter required a report by the Board of Trade before the Secretary of State could give advice.69 Indeed, as far as officialdom was concerned, it is necessary to give due weight to other than solely the Secretaries of State. The role of officials in their offices could be important, and this was mentioned by foreign observers, Titley being told by a Danish minister in 1735 ‘that our opposition to the Danish measures proceeded only from a secretary in the office’.70 The opinion of the Board of Trade, Treasury or Admiralty could also be crucial, and views were readily exchanged between relevant bodies. In 1786, George Aust, the Senior Clerk of the Foreign Office, was pleased when the department moved to larger premises next door to the Treasury, ‘besides the advantage of being in the midst of the other offices of state with which we have constant business’.71

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Given the loosely structured nature of administration, and the small number of overworked officials who played key roles, it is not surprising that much depended on circumstances, both the particular issue at stake and the individuals involved. The formal mechanism of consultation came into play more often when issues dragged on, as the Hamburg one did in 1734–5, Harrington writing, ‘the points in debate are, by the King’s order, under the consideration of the Board of Trade, who will report their opinion to His Majesty how far the interests of his own subjects may be concerned therein’.72 The more usual informal nature of consultation was indicated in 1728, when Tilson wrote to the envoy in Vienna about grain that had been taken from British merchants at Messina, a Habsburg possession, adding ‘Mr. Scrope of the Treasury particularly recommended that part to me’.73 John Scrope was the Senior Secretary there. Merchants regularly lobbied not only the Board of Trade but also senior ministers, and indeed the two were seen as complementary, as in 1729, when Thomas Lowndes presented proposals on the potash trade both to the Board and to the Duke of Newcastle.74 Ad hoc consultative processes also took place at the higher reaches of government. Spoken to in 1793 by William, Lord Grenville, the Foreign Secretary, about the possibility of adding commercial clauses to a new alliance with Austria, Hawkesbury read over past advice on the same subject given to Grenville’s predecessor, Leeds, in 1791 and then suggested that, before proceeding, Grenville read it ‘in order to see whether you, Mr. Pitt and I agree on the material points’.75 In 1799, pressure from copper manufacturers led to action in both Parliament and the ministry. Having failed to get legislation limiting exports, in part because the session came to an end before the very long examinations before a Commons’ Committee were complete, the manufacturers told Pitt that they would need to raise prices, only to be dissuaded by his holding out hopes of relief, which materialised in the shape of an Order of Council. The East India Company sought an exemption, leading Dundas and Liverpool to take opposing positions favouring Company and national views respectively.76 To take another example, the change in the quarantine regulations for Mediterranean trade ensured by pressure from the Levant Company on Parliament in 1799 had been prefigured when a member of the Company raised the issue with Liverpool in 1798, but it also reflected the deficiencies of a very busy government, as Pitt had not then replied to a letter from Liverpool on the issue, and, in 1799, Parliament repealed the requirement to perform quarantine in the Mediterranean without making any provisions for where it should be performed in Britain. Liverpool argued that this would need to be settled by the Privy Council, as it was too important to be regulated just by him, and that there were points which required the concurrence of both Treasury and Admiralty. He pressed for a discussion with the Foreign Secretary before the meeting, and subsequently for another with Pitt about the permanent regulations that should be issued.77 The Board of Trade generally pressed the case for supporting trade. Thus, in

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1715, after advice from the Board, Charles Whitworth was instructed by the Secretary of State to oppose a possible move at the Imperial Diet that might affect British ribbon exports to Germany, while, in 1728, having been asked by Townshend to consider the new Swedish import duties, the Board urged opposition, and, in 1732, it pressed for import substitution from North America. That year, when Samuel Holden, the Governor of the Russia Company, presented Harrington with the heads of articles for a draft commercial treaty with Russia, he referred it to the Board of Trade. It, in turn, took care to consult with the Company before advising Harrington.78 The Board acted as an institution for the collecting and systematisation of information, as, in 1724, when it consulted customs accounts, merchants and planters in responding to the request for a report on the sugar and tobacco trades.79 In 1733, Harrington sent Wych a report from the Board about encouraging herring exports to Hamburg, and instructions to act accordingly, while, in 1752, Newcastle was responsive to the Board when sending instructions to the envoy in Russia.80 The Board also keenly supported the cause of colonial security, warning, for example, about threatening French developments.81 This was to be particularly the case under George, Second Earl of Halifax (1748–61), but had already been a prominent part of Board business. The influence of the Board depended greatly on the role of particular members. The leading member was frequently an aristocrat noted more for social status or connections than professional dedication. This description matches William, Lord Berkeley of Stratton (1714–15), Henry, Earl of Suffolk (1715–18), Robert, Third Earl of Holdernesse (1718–19), Thomas, Earl of Westmorland (1719–35), Benjamin, Earl Fitzwalter (1735–7), and John, Lord Monson (1737–48). The last had been an MP but his sole earlier national office had been as Captain of the Gentleman Pensioners. Social status, however, was not incompatible with ability and dedication, as shown by George, Second Earl of Halifax (1748–61), Wills, Second Viscount Hillsborough (1763–5, 1766 and 1768–72), William, Second Earl of Dartmouth (1772–5), Lord George Germain (1775–80), Frederick, Fifth Earl of Carlisle (1780) and Thomas, Second Lord Grantham (1780–2). Halifax was responsible for a marked rise in the political importance and centrality of the Board which had hitherto lacked such weight. The Board was suppressed in 1782 as part of the opposition’s campaign to abolish sinecures in order to save money and to weaken government: the Board was particularly unpopular with the opposition due to its role in colonial policy. In 1784, however, William Pitt the Younger revived the Board in a new guise as a Committee of Privy Council for Trade and Plantations. A member from 1784, Charles Jenkinson (from 1786, Lord Hawkesbury and, from 1796, First Earl of Liverpool) was a key figure and its President from 1786 to 1804 when he left the Cabinet. As such, helped by his diligence, connections and long experience of government, Jenkinson played a key role, while his colleagues, as George III complained, did far less. He was seen by Samuel Garbett as the sole person of real ability advising Pitt on trade.82 Jenkinson’s support was indeed helpful in

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commercial negotiations.83 The extent to which the Board gathered key men of business in these years was indicated by its Vice-President from 1786 to 1789, William Grenville. He also demonstrated the overlapping character of officeholding in this sphere, as, in these years, Grenville was also a member of the Board of Control for India and Joint Paymaster-General. In 1784–6, a similar overlap of Trade and Control was seen in Henry Dundas’s portfolio of places; while he was also Treasurer of the Navy. Dudley Ryder, the Vice-President from 1790 to 1801, was a former member of the Board of Control, as well as Paymaster-General (1791–1800) and then Treasurer of the Navy (1800–1). He was to be Foreign Secretary (1804–5) and President of the Board of Control (1809). Like Hawkesbury, Grenville and Dundas, Ryder sat in Parliament. Liverpool was succeeded as President in 1804 by James, Third Duke of Montrose. An experienced politician, he had been an MP (1780–90), a Lord of the Treasury (1783–9), Vice-President of the Board of Trade (1789–90) and Commissioner for Indian Affairs (1791–1803). Henry, Third Earl Bathurst, who was President from 1807–12, had been an MP (1783–94) and a Lord of the Admiralty (1783–9). Alongside key heads, members of the Board could play a more important role than its President. This was particularly true of Martin Bladen (?1680–1746). Having followed a military career from 1697 to 1710, he was a member from 1717 until his death, and played a major part, being known as Trade, while his colleagues were known as the Board. An MP from 1715 until his death, Bladen spoke frequently in the Commons on commercial matters. His colleagues included, from 1741 to 1744, Keene, an experienced diplomat. Other former diplomats also served on the Board. Robert Molesworth, envoy in Denmark from 1689 to 1692, was on the Board in 1714–15, being succeeded by his son John, who had served as an envoy in Florence. Daniel Pulteney, who had been envoy to Copenhagen in 1706–15, was on the Board in 1717–21, and in 1719 went as one of the commissioners to France. Another former envoy, John Chetwynd, who had served at Turin, a key posting during the War of the Spanish Succession, was a member from 1714 until 1728, as well as an MP. During that period, he went to Spain in 1717–18 to negotiate on commercial issues. However Chetwynd’s replacement, Sir Thomas Frankland (1728–30), although an MP and the brother of a merchant, had no diplomatic experience and his administrative background was in the Ordnance and in Irish revenues. Edward Ashe (1720–46), another MP, seems to have brought little to the proceedings and owed his place on the Board to his loyal kinship to Townshend. Another MP, the elderly Paul Docminique (1714–35), brought his experience as a prominent merchant. He had also been Proprietor of New Jersey from 1692 to 1707. He was replaced by Richard Plumer (1721–7, 1735–49), an MP and the son of a prominent London merchant. Andrew Stone (1749–61) came from a banking background, had been an Under Secretary of State (1734–51), was an MP (1741–61) and had close links with Newcastle, whose factotum he was. Another talented member was William Eden (1776–82), who had experience of

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foreign policy as an Under Secretary of State (1772–8) and was also an MP. He was subsequently to be responsible for the commercial negotiations that led to the 1786 trade treaty with France. Eden’s background was as third son of a country gentleman and he initially followed a legal career. Bladen’s career, however, indicated the interrelationship of government and trade. From 1717 until 1726, he was a Director of the Royal African Company, although he sold his stock so that his Parliamentary advocacy should not appear self-interested. His second wife, Frances, whom he married in 1728, inherited a substantial sugar holding on the island of Nevis, and, as a result, Bladen was an active supporter of the West Indians in Parliament, pushing the Molasses Act of 1733 that sought to make the North American colonists purchase sugar, molasses and rum from the British colonies. In 1744, he also helped defeat Pelham’s plan for a supplementary duty on sugar. The interpenetration of commercial interests with government was amply revealed by Bladen’s career, as were differences within government. These extended to contrasting views over colonial expansion. Like other West Indians, Bladen did not support conquests in the West Indies, as he feared that they would lead to competition in British sugar markets. This view was to play a major role, in 1762, in encouraging the return of Guadeloupe and Martinique, rather than Canada, to France, and, in the 1800s, in ensuring that conquests were not more favourably treated in terms of access to new slaves, a key issue in discussion over suppressing the slave trade. The interrelationship of government and trade was also indicated by the frequency with which the Board consulted experts on mercantile and colonial matters, such as Micajah Perry, who handled the affairs of the Virginia planters in London in the 1720s.84 Merchants and others could also write to members of the Board, as in 1787, when Henry Wilckens wrote from Liverpool to Hawkesbury about his concern over French competition in the Guinea trade.85 The Board of Trade was not the sole body to play a role. Consultation by the Secretaries of State with the customs service could be detailed and lead to advice, as in the banning of particular exports to Sweden that might help it compete. This provided an example of the clash between particular and general interests, ‘I received your letter . . . enclosing extract of advices from Sweden, giving an account of the measures taken there in setting up a woollen manufacture, which cannot be carried on with success without English wool and workmen’.86 The Secretary of State for the Southern Department had a major role in colonial oversight, particularly in the first half of the century, but, as Secretary from 1724 to 1748, Newcastle paid relatively little attention to the colonies, and his period in office has been seen as one of salutary neglect. A sense of inadequate ministerial supervision had earlier led to the report in 1717 that Joseph Addison would cease to be Southern Secretary and, instead, be a Secretary of State for the Plantations,87 but this did not happen until 1768, when a Secretaryship of State for the Colonies was created and given to Hillsborough, who also became President of the Board of Trade again. By the 1760s,

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the experience of recent imperial conflict and the need to address the governance of newly acquired territories, was forcing expertise and attention on more than the handful of officials who had hitherto been responsible.88 The Admiralty had a more direct interest in the colonial situation, as the issue of overseas bases and commitments played a role and were crucial to naval capability.89 The protection of trade was seen as a key issue and not only in wartime.90 Peacetime protection was also a role urged on the Admiralty, both from outside government and from the ministry, for example in the Portuguese91 crisis in 1735. The need to satisfy merchant views was cited,92 and the merchants pressed the Admiralty directly as in 1728 when, ‘On Tuesday the merchants of this city [London] trading to Portugal, Spain and the Mediterranean, waited on the Lords of the Admiralty with a petition for some men of war to be ordered away to protect our navigation from the Salee and other rovers’ [Barbary pirates].93 Wartime demands for assistance were more pressing, and included proposals for the fixing of squadrons on foreign stations in a ‘settled regular plan’. Trade was not differentiated from colonial protection: ‘in order to secure our colonies abroad . . . and . . . that our merchantmen need not be obliged to make great delays in tarrying for convoys . . . our convoys should be fixed to certain periods’.94 However, the Admiralty could adopt a critical attitude toward merchant complaints, arguing, for example, in 1728 that complaints by the Royal African Company,95 and especially by their factors, about the Dutch were unjustified.96 Although the Admiralty had a role, it was largely in the application of policy and at the peripheries of British power. There was no equivalent to the role of the French Council of Marine, which directly concerned itself with trade, colonies and the navy, and also provided a degree of direction to envoys.97 Institutional differences within Britain have to be considered alongside those of personalities, although these were not stark alternatives. Politicians who focused on Parliamentary management, such as Walpole, Pelham and Pitt the Younger, all three of whom were longstanding First Lords of the Treasury (1721–42, 1743–54, 1783–1801, 1804–6), were more concerned about commercial issues than socially grander counterparts who preferred the scope of diplomacy, such as Carteret and Carmarthen. The former indeed referred to ‘vexing of your neighbours for a little muck’.98 In contrast, although Garbett thought Pitt the Younger lacked extensive ideas on trade, he was certainly very interested in its fiscal aspects, and Eden felt able to ask him to talk to ‘the plate glass people’ in order to conciliate them about the duties negotiated in 1786. Pitt’s instructions on commercial matters were sought by Carmarthen.99 The latter, nevertheless, revealed his attitudes when, in 1786, he wrote to Alleyne Fitzherbert, envoy in Russia, that he was ‘infinitely more anxious’ to see a political rather than a trade treaty with Russia, adding I have all along represented to Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Grenville, as particularly concerned in the commercial part of government, the necessity

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of strictly attending to our political, at the same time that our commercial interests are the more immediate (though certainly not more important) objects of discussion. Both of them appear fully sensible of the necessity of this caution, and assured me they will never lose sight of this object in any commercial stipulations they may think proper to recommend . . . The present rage for commercial treaties affording so many plausible grounds for flattering speculations to a trading nation like ours, ought to be continually and narrowly attended to, nor should any advantage, however specious in its outset, or even demonstratively beneficial in its progress, lull us into that degree of fatal security as to make us give up either the smallest atom of domestic or even remote security, or any way sacrifice our political weight upon the Continent which ought to be still felt and respected. There was a harsh social note to this argument, as Carmarthen soon after complained ‘now we are dwindled down to tradesmen’.100 The counterpart of negotiations and pressure abroad to develop trade and empire were efforts at home within a context of domestic pressures101 and international challenges. These efforts ranged from protectionist legislation to shipbuilding for the navy, and from the sponsoring of exploration and beneficial scientific enterprise102 to attempts to influence consumption habits. Protectionism was a key response and, far from being a legacy from a previous age, legislation remained an active response to problems and their perception. Thus, the international competitive pressures from both Continental Europe and India facing the British textile industry led, in the 1690s and early eighteenth century, to a series of measures designed to limit imports and help exports. The former entailed customs increases on European linens and banning the import of printed Indian silks and printed and plain calicoes. Exports were helped by removing export duties on woollen cloth and ensuring that the East India Company annually exported £100,000 of domestic manufactures.103 Through legislation and fiscal policy, government helped shape, or at least affect, consumption patterns. Thus, tax advantages for tea ensured that, having risen to 1720, coffee consumption fell and did not revive until the 1820s. At the same time, there were other economic and international factors, including a preference for growing sugar on the part of West Indian planters due to its greater profitability, and also the competition from French West Indian coffee production.104 There was no equivalent to the large-scale regulation of manufacturing seen in many Continental states including France.105 Direct government intervention in the economy in the shape of purchasing was also important. This was particularly so in the case of military expenditure, but, by modern standards, was less significant in other spheres. Transport improvements, for example, were not dependent on government finances, however much they might require Parliamentary approval. As a result, the development of the transport system did not reflect any governmental plans. There was, however, a major development in response to the possibilities and

102 The government response

needs of overseas trade. In Liverpool, a wet dock (1715) was followed by the Salthouse Dock (1753), St George’s (1771) and Duke’s (1773). The role of the city council, many of its members interested in trans-oceanic trade, was important, and this was enhanced by the new charter granted in 1695.106 In London, the London Dock was excavated in 1801, followed by the West India Docks in 1802, and the East India Docks in 1805, and work began on the Surrey Commercial Docks in 1807. If the focus is directed to central government, it encourages the re-examination of the ‘tipping point’, or points, toward the synergy of trade, empire and policy discussed in this book. Emphasis on the Revolution Settlement, the new politics, institutions and assumptions following the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688–9, can be qualified by drawing attention to the earlier changes of the midseventeenth century including the Navigation Acts, administrative innovations, the robust use of an expensive and powerful navy, the Western Design of the 1650s, which left England with the gain from Spain of Jamaica, and, more generally, the increased prominence of a commercial ethos linked to a notion of the public good.107 The achievements of these years, however, can be qualified. Neither navy nor war with Spain could really be afforded, and the latter did not yield the hoped-for conquest of Hispaniola. Furthermore, there was a reaction against Interregnum policies after the restoration of monarchy in 1660. Nevertheless, there was also important continuity in policy terms between Interregnum and Restoration, not least with protectionist legislation. The background, however, in 1660–89 was a high level of political instability, and this affected the nature of lobbying and the pursuit of commercial interest. Far from there being an abrupt change in 1688–9, and a rapid switch to stability and newmodel governance, the ‘Glorious Revolution’ was part of this sequence of instability, with the Jacobite threat an important question mark against any sense of order and predictability. Furthermore, the impact of the ‘Glorious Revolution’, in the shape of British entry into the Nine Years’ War in 1689, led to severe difficulties for Britain’s foreign trade, as well as a sharp fiscal crisis including a major fall in the value of the pound in 1695–6.108 Nevertheless, the achievement of a measure of stability, particularly with the peaceful accession of George I in 1714, the suppression of the ‘15 (the Jacobite rising of 1715–16), the maintenance of established political practices in face of the ministerial division of 1717, the contentious politics of 1717–20, and the South Sea Bubble in 1720, as well as the suppression of the Jacobite Atterbury Plot in 1722, and the peaceful accession of George II in 1727, all anchored a new political order. Involved in war, or a level of international commitment and confrontation that required a significant degree of military expenditure, this order was one that was committed to economic development; as indeed was the norm across much of Europe in the 1710s and 1720s, as governments struggled to cope with the consequences of the heavy burdens incurred in fighting recent conflicts, and also responded to ideas of state-directed action. In Britain, the political and governmental practices, institutions and systems that had consti-

The government response 103

tuted the Revolution Settlement became established through continuity and use. This helped stabilise the action–reaction processes of policy formation and also shape both lobbying and government responses. For example, as meetings of Parliament became regular, there was a major rise in the amount of legislation and more consistent procedures. This made recourse to Parliament more predictable and that, in turn, increased its appeal.109 Such a degree of fixing of processes and procedures provided a context for the pressures that arose from international commercial and imperial competition, and also for the need to respond to domestic and colonial issues. One measure of stability was provided by a fall in interest rates despite the unprecedented and continuing rise in the national debt driven by repeated wars. Whereas the loans of 1693 and 1694 were at 14 per cent, and in 1710 the government had to offer rates of 9 per cent, rates subsequently fell. In peacetime, they fell to 4 per cent in the late 1720s, at or below 3 per cent in the late 1730s, and, after a wartime rise, back down to 3.5 per cent in 1750. Wartime created serious pressure, but the comparative advantage over France was significant. In 1757, Newcastle, then First Lord of the Treasury, anticipated no difficulty in meeting new commitment ‘all this money will be borrowed . . . something under 3 per cent; when France gives 11 per cent and cannot fill the subscriptions’.110 The relative strength of economy and state, and their linkage in public finances, provided a key structural resource for the government in its response to challenges, but the periodic occurrence of fiscal crises in large part reflected the importance of policy decisions as well.

Notes 1 Keene to Delafaye, 10 Jan. (os) 1731, NA. SP. 94/107. 2 Keene to James, First Earl Waldegrave, envoy in Paris, 18 Jan. 1734, NA. SP. 94/119. 3 G. Symcox, ‘Britain and Victor Amadeus II’, in S. Baxter (ed.), England’s Rise to Greatness, 1660–1763 (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 151–2; G. Niedhart, Handel und Krieg in der Britischen Weltpolitik, 1738–63 (Munich, 1979). 4 Horatio Walpole to Harrington, 30 Dec. 1734, NA. SP. 84/337 fol. 4. 5 Allen to Naples, 8 Jan., 8 Oct. 1735, 31 Aug., 5 Oct., 3 Dec. 1736, NA. SP. 93/9 fols 86, 93, 159, 167, 173. 6 Newcastle to Allen, 25 Aug. (os) 1737, NA. SP. 93/9 fol. 181. 7 Newcastle to Keene, 24 Mar. (os) 1737, NA. SP. 94/129. 8 Allen to Newcastle, 31 Mar. 1739, NA. SP. 93/10 fol. 10. 9 Arthur Villettes, envoy in Turin, to Newcastle, 12 June 1737, NA. SP. 92/41. 10 Daniel to Townshend, 28 July 1728, NA. SP. 77/75 fol. 168. 11 Eg. poem ‘Probus to Philartes’, in Anon., A New Miscellany for the Year 1738 (London, 1738), p. 16. 12 Weekly Courant, 1 Mar. (os) 1739; Common Sense, 17 Feb. (os) 1739; Craftsman, 20 July (os) 1728; Old England, 24 Dec. (os) 1748. 13 Carmarthen to Liston, 9 Ap. 1787, NLS. MS. 5546 fol. 109. 14 Essex to Newcastle, 13 Sept. 1734, NA. SP. 92/35; cf. Bagshaw, consul in Genoa, to Newcastle, 13 Ap. 1737, in response to Newcastle’s of 17 Mar. (os), NA. SP. 79/18. 15 Burrish to Holdernesse, 12 Aug. 1755, NA. SP. 81/105.

104 The government response 16 Wych to Harrington, 17 Aug. 1734, NA. SP. 82/54. 17 William, Sixth Lord Paget, envoy in Vienna, to Daniel, Second Earl of Nottingham, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, 23 Mar. 1690, NA. SP. 80/17; John Balaquier to Schaub, 5 July 1722, New York, Public Library, Hardwicke collection, vol. 67. 18 Tyrawly to Delafaye, 12 June 1733, NA. SP. 89/27 fol. 238. 19 Bubb to Stair, 19 July, 5 Oct. 1716, NAS. GD. 135/141/6. 20 Jean Baptiste D’Aubenton, French envoy in Spain for commercial affairs, to Maurepas, French minister of the marine, who had oversight of consuls, 1 Dec. 1729, AN. AM. B7 299; Brancas to Chauvelin, French foreign minister, 23 Feb. 1730, AE. MD. Espagne 158 fol. 111. 21 Tyrawly to Newcastle, 25 Sept. 1728, Tyrawly to Delafaye, 25 Feb. 1729, NA. SP. 89/35; William Cayley, consul at Cadiz, to Keene, 22 June 1728, NA. SP. 94/128; Rondeau to Harrington, 22 Jan. (os), 6 May (os) 1732, Sbornik, 66, pp. 409, 455. On the merchants there, A. Cross, By the Banks of the Neva: Chapters from the Lives and Careers of the British in Eighteenth-Century Russia (Cambridge, 1996). Walpole to Townshend, 2 Oct. (os) 1725, W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole, Earl of Orford (3 vols, London, 1798), II, p. 485. 22 Eden to Pitt, 22 Oct. 1786, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fol. 90; Harris to Carmarthen, 8 Nov. 1785, Third Earl of Malmesbury (ed.), Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, First Earl of Malmesbury (4 vols, London, 1844), II, p. 166. 23 Tyrawly to Newcastle, 26 June 1729, NA. SP. 89/35 fol. 182. 24 Robinson to Tilson, 5 Mar. 1732, NA. SP. 80/86. 25 Wych to Harrington, 10 Aug. 1735, NA. SP. 82/56 fol. 14. 26 Wych to Harrington, 11 Jan. 1735, NA. SP. 82/55 fol. 5. 27 Titley to Harrington, 5, 9 Oct. 1734, NA. SP. 75/65 fols 10, 14–15. 28 Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 22 Oct. 1736, AST. LM. Ing. 36. 29 Cayley to Newcastle, 6 Ap. 1733, NA. SP. 94/220. 30 Ryder diary, 5 Jan. 1754, Sandon Park, Harrowby mss; R.R. Sedgwick (ed.), The House of Commons 1715–54 (2 vols, London, 1970), I, pp. 596–7. 31 Skinner to Molesworth, 7 Ap. 1724, BL. Add. 41504 fol. 3. 32 Mann to Newcastle, 29 Oct. 1748, BL. Add. 32815. 33 Bedford to Goldsworthy, 28 Nov. (os) 1748, NA. SP. 98/55. For the French situation, A. Mézin, Les Consuls de France au Siècle des Lumières, 1715–1792 (Paris, 1997). 34 Rondeau to Tilson, 30 Mar. (os) 1730, NA. SP. 91/11. 35 Eden to Pitt, 10 May 1787, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fol. 96. 36 Compton to Wilmington, 12 Jan. 1732, HMC, Townshend, p. 351. 37 Crookshanks to Newcastle, 10 Mar. (os) 1731, BL. Add. 32687 fol. 395. 38 Weekly Oracle (London, 1734–6), p. 89. 39 Newcastle to Keene, 20 Jan. (os) 1732, BL. Add. 32776 fol. 88. 40 Newcastle to Burges, – Ap. (os) 1731, NA. SP. 99/80. 41 Finch to Harrington, 27 Feb. 1739, 7 Oct. 1735, Sparre, Swedish envoy, to Frederick I of Sweden, 13 Nov. 1733, NA. SP. 95/84, 72, 107/18. 42 16 Nov. (os) 1739, NA. SP. 80/227. 43 Townshend to Poyntz, envoy in Stockholm, 12 July (os) 1726, BL. Add. 49891 fol. 130. 44 Wych to Harrington, 25 Mar. 1737, NA. SP. 82/58. 45 Tilson to Titley, 26 July (os) 1737, BL. Eg. 2684 fol. 255. 46 V.N. Aleksandrenko, Reliatsii Kn. A.D. Kantemira iz Londona, 1732–1733 (Moscow, 1892), pp. 62–5. 47 Eg. Cayley to Newcastle, 26 Aug., 16 Sept., 4 Nov. 1732, NA. SP. 94/200. 48 C. Konickx, The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company (Kortrijk, 1980), p. 37. 49 Daniel Defoe, A Plan of the English Commerce (1728; Oxford, 1928 edn), p. 136. 50 William Poyntz, envoy in Lisbon, to Stanhope, 10 Mar. 1716, NA. SP. 89/24 fol. 26.

The government response 105 51 M.S. Anderson, ‘Great Britain and the Barbary States in the Eighteenth Century’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 29 (1956), pp. 87–107. 52 Tilson to Whitworth, 16 Feb. (os) 1722, BL. Add. 37388 fol. 70. 53 Newcastle to Keene, 25 Ap. (os) 1735, BL. Add. 32787 fol. 157. 54 Horatio Walpole to Robert Walpole, 29 Ap. 1735, Coxe, Walpole, III, p. 243. 55 Chammorel to Morville, French foreign minister, 7 Oct. 1723, AE. CP. Ang. 346. 56 HMC, Carlisle, p. 67. 57 George III to John Robinson, 24 May 1777, BL Add. 37833 fol. 200. 58 George III to John Robinson, 6 Mar. 1777, BL Add. 37833 fol. 143. 59 BL. Eg. 982 fol. 6. 60 Harrington to Edward Finch, 31 Aug. (os) 1733, NA. SP. 95/64 fol. 40. 61 Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 20 Nov. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37. 62 Schulenburg to Görtz, 30 Nov. 1717, Darmstadt, Staatsarchiv, Gräflich Görtzisches Archiv, F23 fol. 134. 63 Eg. Huxelles, French foreign minister, to Iberville, envoy in London, 23 Jan. 1797, NA. SP. 107/1C. 64 John Sprögell to Görtz, 25 May 1726, 20 Feb. 1727, Darmstadt, Staatsarchiv, F23 155/23. 65 J. Black, The Hanoverians (London, 2004), pp. 89–91. 66 Waldegrave journal, 11 Jan. 1728, Chewton. 67 16 Jan. (os) 1729, NA. SP. 36/10 fols 36–9. 68 Re. Livorno, Townshend to St Saphorin, 20 Nov. (os) 1724, NA. SP. 80/48; Horace Mann, envoy in Florence, to Newcastle, 12, 19, 26 Nov. 1748, BL. Add. 32815 fols 166–9, 185–6, 213–14. 69 Holdernesse to Andrew Mitchell, envoy in Berlin, 11 May 1756, NA. SP. 90/65. 70 Titley to Tilson, 16 Aug. 1735, NA. SP. 75/68 fol. 17. 71 Aust to Liston, 20 Ap. 1786, NLS. MS. 5544 fol. 118. 72 Harrington to Wych, 29 Ap. 1735, NA. SP. 82/155 fol. 100. 73 Tilson to Waldegrave, 22 Nov. (os) 1728, Chewton. 74 Lowndes to Newcastle, 7 Aug. (os) 1729, NA. SP. 91/107. 75 Hawkesbury to Grenville, 3 Nov. 1793, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 95. 76 Liverpool to Dundas, 20 Oct. 1799, Liverpool to Richard Crawshay, 1 May 1799, BL. Add. 38311 fols 27–30, 9. 77 Liverpool to Grenville, 11 Aug., Liverpool to William Fawkener, 3 Dec. 1799, BL. Add. 38311 fols 15–16, 36. 78 Harrington to Board of Trade, 27 May (os) 1732, BL. Stowe 252 fols 1–4; Board of Trade to Harrington, 8 Aug. (os) 1733, NA. SP. 36/30 fol. 82. 79 Board of Trade to George I, 24 July (os) 1724, NA. SP. 35/50 fols 302–17. 80 Townshend to Whitworth, 1 July 1715, BL. Add. 37362 fol. 45; Board of Trade to George II, 20 Nov. (os) 1728, 29 Aug. (os) 1732, Harrington to Wych, 23 Feb. (os) 1733 and enclosed report, NA. SP. 95/131, 82/51 fols 34–6; Newcastle to Dickens, 19 Dec. 1752, Sbornik, 148 (1916), p. 399. 81 Board of Trade to Newcastle, 9 Feb. (os), 19 Dec. (os) 1728, C(H) mss. 86/12/2, 86/13/1–3. 82 Garbett to Lansdowne, 21 Sept. 1786, BL. Bowood collection, Shelburne papers, box 17. 83 Eden to Pitt, 13 Ap. 1786, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fol. 13. 84 E. Donnan, ‘Micajah Perry’, Journal of Economic and Business History, 4, pp. 70–98. 85 Wilckens to Hawkesbury, 4 Oct. 1787, BL. Add. 38222 fol. 133. 86 Carkesse to Tilson, 14 Nov. 1728, NA. SP. 36/9 fol. 41. 87 Schulenburg to Görtz, 17 Sept. 1717, Darmstadt F23 fol. 101. 88 N.F. Koehn, The Power of Commerce: Economy and Governance in the First British Empire (Ithaca, 1994). 89 C. Buchet, Marine, économie et société: Un exemple d’interaction: l’avitaillement de la Royal Navy Durant la guerre de sept ans (Paris, 1999).

106 The government response 90 Instructions for Admiral Norris re. Baltic trade, 14 Ap. (os) 1718, NA. SP. 43/61. 91 Tyrawly to Newcastle, 19 May 1735, NA. SP. 89/38 fol. 32. 92 Newcastle to James, Third Earl of Berkeley, First Lord of the Admiralty, 16 July (os) 1725, NA. SP. 35/57 fol. 91; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 11 Ap. (os) 1735, BL. Add. 32787 fol. 122. 93 Craftsman, 9 July (os) 1728. 94 Anon., A Letter from a Merchant of the City of London to . . . Pitt (Second edn, London, 1757), pp. 63–4. 95 Royal African Company to Newcastle, 6 Aug. (os) 1728, CUL. C(H) mss. 89/8. 96 Wager to Delafaye, 14 Aug. (os) 1728, NA. SP. 42/19 fol. 60. 97 St Saphorin to Townshend, 29 Mar. 1724, NA. SP. 80/52 fol. 93. 98 21 July 1755, J. Carswell and L.A. Dralle (eds), The Political Journal of George Bubb Dodington (Oxford, 1965). 99 Garbett to Lansdowne, 21 Sept. 1786, BL. Bowood collection, Shelburne papers, box 17; Eden to Pitt, 21 Sept., Carmarthen to Pitt, 8 Ap. 1786, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fol. 83, 30/8/151 fol. 36. 100 Carmarthen to Fitzherbert, 12 Nov., Carmarthen to Harris, 14, 21 Nov. 1786, BL. Eg. 3500 fols 16–17, 28–30. 101 L. Davison, T. Hitchcock, T. Keirn and R.B. Shoemaker (eds), Stilling the Grumbling Hive: The Response to Social Economic Problems in England, 1689–1750 (Stroud, 1992). 102 J. Gascoigne, Science in the Service of Empire: Joseph Banks, the British State and the Uses of Science in the Age of Revolution (Cambridge, 1998). 103 R. Davis, ‘The Rise of Protection in England, 1689–1786’, EcHR, 19 (1966), pp. 306–17; N.B. Harte, ‘The Rise of Protection and the English Linen Trade, 1690–1790’, in Harte and K.G. Ponting (eds), Textile History and Economic History (Manchester, 1973), pp. 74–112; P.K. O’Brien, T. Griffiths and P. Hunt, ‘Political Components of the Industrial Revolution: Parliament and the English Cotton Textile Industry, 1660–1774’, EcHR, 44 (1991), pp. 395–423. 104 S.D. Smith, ‘Accounting for Taste: British Coffee Consumption in Historical Perspective’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 27 (1996), pp. 183–214, and ‘Sugar’s Poor Relation: Coffee Planting in the British West Indies, 1720–1833’, Slavery and Abolition, 19 (1998), pp. 68–89. 105 J.K.J. Thomson, Clermont-de-Lodève, 1633–1789: Fluctuations in the Prosperity of a Languedocian Cloth-Making Town (Cambridge, 1982); W.O. Henderson, Manufactories in Germany (Frankfurt, 1985). 106 M. Power, ‘Councillors and Commerce in Liverpool, 1650–1750’, Urban History, 24 (1997), pp. 301–23. 107 J.S. Wheeler, ‘English Financial Operations during the First Dutch War, 1652–4’, Journal of European Economic History, 23 (1994), pp. 329–44; S. Pincus, ‘Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth’, American Historical Review, 103 (1998), pp. 705–36. 108 M.H. Li, The Great Recoinage of 1696 to 1699 (London, 1963); D.W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford, 1988). 109 J. Hoppit, ‘Patterns of Parliamentary Legislation’, Historical Journal, 39 (1996), pp. 109–31; J. Hoppit (ed.), Failed Legislation, 1660–1800 (London, 1997). 110 Newcastle to Andrew Mitchell, envoy in Berlin, 8 Dec. 1757, BL. 6832 fol. 31.

Chapter 5

1689–1714

Let them get it as have most interest in it. For our trade is the main point. Otherwise a Bourbonite or an Austrian might be extremely indifferent. George Tilson, Under Secretary in the Northern Department, on the Spanish Succession, 17111

The strategic culture of the period was set by the concatenation of two factors. First, there was the imaginative construction of a Europe, of which Britain was part, that was dominated, or in danger of dominance, by international Catholicism and, more specifically, Bourbon France. Second, the seizure of the throne from James II and VII by William III of Orange in the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688–9 created a new order that was under challenge from Jacobite hopes of a return to the old order. The Jacobites were backed in wartime by France and, since Britain was at war with France for most of this period, indeed from 1689 to 1697 and from 1702 to 1713, this posed a serious security challenge. Transoceanic expansion by Britain was not at variance with this situation and strategic culture, but it appeared less relevant in practical and imaginative terms. However, the global commercial opportunities tapped by such expansion were important to Britain’s ability to play a role on the Continent. This was particularly the case in the 1700s, and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13 for Britain) was, in part, a case of Germany and the Low Countries won by Britain through the trade of India.2 This looked toward the later situation in which accumulated credits from Indian balance-of-payments transfers helped pay for the conflicts in the last half-century covered by this book.3 Success in war ensured that the Revolution Settlement that followed the ‘Glorious Revolution’ was entrenched. This was crucial to the political-governmental, and, indeed socio-economic, fundamentals of the development of the national economy. These included what became a relatively stable political system, legal conventions that were favourable to the free utilisation of capital, especially secure property and contracting rights, a social system able to accommodate the consequences of economic change and join trade with land, an increasing degree of economic integration and interdependence, and a degree of

108 1689–1714

religious toleration, particularly favourable to the Protestant dissenters and Jews, who were instrumental to Britain’s position in the international financial system. Furthermore, belief in the stability of political and economic arrangements encouraged crucial long-term investment, not least in the national debt which grew markedly due to the reliance on credit to fight wars that were unprecedently expensive. This success in war was clear when victory at Blenheim in 1704 ended the French threat of knocking Austria out of the war, and thus wrecking Britain’s alliance system, while, checked off Malaga, the French fleet left the British navy dominant in the western Mediterranean, enabling Britain and its allies to take the initiative in Italy and Spain. The commercial background to the major expansion in British trade from the late seventeenth century was protectionist. In the mid-seventeenth century, protectionism focused on the Dutch, who were the dominant commercial force of the period.4 The Navigation Acts of 1650 and 1651, which had excluded other powers from the trade of the English colonies, and had restricted most of the trade of England, Wales and Ireland to nationals, were reprised, after the restoration of the Stuarts in the person of Charles II, in the Navigation Act of 1660 and the Staple Act of 1663. A sense of imperial commercial identity was reflected by the prohibition of exports direct from the colonies to foreign markets and, instead, the requirement that they be exported to England or one of its colonies. Until the Navigation Act of 1660, 85 per cent of the sugar and 42 per cent of the tobacco from the colonies of Bermuda, Virginia and Maryland had been shipped directly to Continental European markets.5 It was also laid down in 1660 that all foreign-built ships in English ownership should be registered and, in 1662, the purchase of Dutch ships was hindered when an Act decreed that ships of foreign build not registered by that date were to be deemed alien and to be subject to alien duties.6 Union with Scotland in 1707 ended its exclusion7 from what had been an English empire, as the Navigation Acts now encompassed Scotland, and this was to be very important to the dynamic of British commercial and colonial expansion. Economic motives were important in winning support for Union, particularly in Glasgow.8 The Union created opportunities for Scottish shipbuilding: the number of ships from Glasgow rose from 30 in the late 1680s to 70 by the 1730s, and, with Liverpool, Glasgow was to take over from Bristol the key role of port to the British Atlantic. Protectionism was a matter not only of barriers to foreign trade, but also of an emphasis on monopolistic companies. These were seen as particularly effective in international competition, a theme continued by Tory writers in subsequent decades.9 The role of such companies was seen in a French memorandum of 1716 discussing how best to break the British hold over the Portugal trade. It was argued that France could compete only if it had a company that could command large funds and be in a state to sell goods on long terms and at a low price to match those of the British.10 This comment, however, indicated that the key to British success was the

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availability of capital rather than the company structure itself, and this was a testimony to the liquidity of the British economy in the early eighteenth century. This liquidity owed much to international alignments. Two were particularly important. The link with the United Provinces that followed William III’s seizure of power in 1688–9, and that continued after his death in 1702, brought access to Dutch capital11 and also strengthened British relations with the Huguenot diaspora, which had become far more important in 1685, when Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes granting limited toleration to the Huguenots (French Protestants). Second, the alliance with Portugal, which led, from 1703, to co-operation against Spain in the War of the Spanish Succession, ensured British access to the supplies of bullion from the newly discovered gold mines at Minas Gerais in the Brazil interior. This access would be crucial to Britain’s ability to pay for the war,12 and was likewise vital in maintaining her role in international trade. The ability to extend credit was crucial to trade, not least with countries where currency was in short supply and financial institutions limited, for example, Russia. The British were far more able, and therefore willing, to do so than their French rivals. Extending credit meant an ability to immobilise capital temporarily for the sake of future profit, and this was particularly important for distant trades. These commercial considerations were indeed significant, but the French foreign minister was not wrong to argue in 1750 that the alliance between Britain and Portugal essentially stemmed from the accession of a French prince to the Spanish throne as Philip V in 1700. British commercial advantages ensured that this political alignment brought important economic benefits, but the key steps in sustaining it were political.13 Liquidity was linked to the multifaceted character of international trade. Access to capital permitted merchants to play more roles in this trade, and thus ensured the centrality of Britain’s role. In this, Britain came to share with, and then supersede, the Dutch. This was seen, for example, in the Russia trade. This became more important as Russia, under Peter the Great (r. 1689–1725), gained a Baltic coastline by conquest from Sweden in 1709–10, and was complicated by the Russian prohibition on bullion exports. This did not initially greatly trouble the British or the Dutch because they purchased more in Russia than they sold, and then re-exported much that they bought. The impact on other states, however, was serious, because they received Russian goods via the British or Dutch, which affected their own ability to increase their direct imports from Russia in order to make possible large exports. By 1713, the French could complain that the British had a monopoly over the tobacco trade with Russia.14 War with France ensured that it was not necessary, for most of the period, for Britain to consider commercial relations with her, although commercial tensions preceded the wars. French protectionism from the 1660s, particularly the tariffs of 1664 and 1667, had led to a response in England. In 1678, the import of French wine, silk, linen, cloth, salt and paper was prohibited. This measure was repealed by James II’s Parliament in 1685, but the prohibitions were

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reimposed in 1689, after James II had been forced into exile, and were extended in 1695–7.15 The role of commercial competition in rivalry with France was less significant than that of political factors, but trade issues certainly played a role in diplomacy16 and also in exacerbating tensions, for example, encouraging the ebbing of peace in 1701–2. Queen Anne told Parliament in October 1705, ‘Nothing can be more evident than if the French king continues master of the Spanish monarchy, the balance of trade in Europe is utterly destroyed; and he will be able in a short time to engross the trade and wealth of the world’. In particular, the granting by Philip V, the new king of Spain, to France of commercial concessions in the Spanish empire had led to much anger in Britain. The replacement of the Dutch garrisons in the Barrier fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands (modern Belgium) in February 1701 suggested that they would become part of the French sphere. French merchants were granted better conditions in Spain, ‘the thoroughfare from the West Indies to all the neighbouring nations’,17 and the French Guinea Company was given the Asiento contract to transport slaves from West Africa to Spanish America for ten years, a lucrative opening into the protected trade of the Spanish empire. In March 1701, French warships were granted permission to sell goods in Spanish American ports, which was to be the basis of extensive and unregulated sales of French goods. This was a major challenge to the British contraband trade with Spanish America, which provided Britain with a crucial infusion of bullion.18 In turn, most English manufactures were banned in France (by an arrêt of 6 September 1701) and Spain. Sensitivity over these moves reflected the competition of Britain and France in their leading export sectors, a competition which sprang essentially from their similarities. Both states possessed West Indian islands which exported large quantities of highly profitable tropical goods, particularly sugar, for which it was necessary to find markets, especially as plantation agriculture spread. Neither Britain nor France could absorb all the colonial production, while substantial profits could be made through re-exports, particularly of tobacco from the Chesapeake and sugar from the West Indies, which led to competition in centres of consumption and distribution, such as Hamburg and Livorno. War provided an opportunity to hit at the competition by disrupting trade and attacking the islands. The value of London’s imports from the East India Company and the English plantations nearly doubled from the 1660s to the end of the century, while imports of tobacco through Liverpool rose in weight from 1.49 million pounds in 1689–96 to 2.86 million pounds in 1703–12.19 Imports from the colonies also affected life in Britain. Sugar and tobacco came from the colonies and were seen as beneficial to the domestic economy, as they helped to finance colonial imports of British manufactured goods. Although sugar was initially a luxury item, the average retail price fell considerably in the second half of the seventeenth century and it became important to the diet, partly replacing honey as a sweetener for food and drink. In 1702, John Evelyn had at Falmouth ‘a small bowl of punch made with Brazil sugar’.20 The addition

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of sugar to hot drinks increased their popularity, so raising demand for the commodity. The slave trade provided a key sphere in which trade, empire and force were closely related. The expansion of New World exports, particularly sugar and tobacco, drove a major growth in the Atlantic slave trade, and helped accentuate the importance of port-cities on the Atlantic seaboard. The English had established lasting colonies on Barbados in 1627, Nevis in 1628, and Antigua and Montserrat in 1632. These were no mere adjunct to the colonies in North America. Instead, they generated more wealth, and, until the 1660s, attracted more settlers than the possessions on the North American mainland, Barbados proving the most popular destination. The islands were rapidly used for commercial agriculture, and the labour-intensive nature of the resulting economy led to a need for settlers. A mixed economy that was not particularly capitalintensive was initially dominant, but sugar exports became increasingly important. Sugar was profitable, but it also meant slaves. Plantation work was arduous, ensuring that labour availability and control were issues. The labour regime in sugar and rice cultivation was particularly arduous and deadly; tobacco and cacao less so. Hacking down sugarcane – crucial to the production process – was backbreaking work. Slavery provided the large labour force more effectively than (white) indentured labour, which was not only less malleable but also less ecologically attuned to the working environment. Partly as a result, there was a marked increase in the slave population. On Montserrat, 40 per cent of the 4,500-strong population in 1678 was non-white, but this grew to 80 per cent of the 7,200-strong population in 1729.21 There was also a move toward slavery in the tobacco-based Chesapeake labour system of Maryland and Virginia, but most labour needs there were met by white indentured servants. Anglo-French competition was not restricted to the sugar islands. Partly due to the inability of the domestic market to absorb industrial production, and partly to the cult of foreign trade that dominated most discussion of economic matters, British and French governments vied to facilitate exports.22 They competed in a large number of markets, particularly the Spanish and Ottoman (Turkish) empires, and also across Europe. When Peter Macskásy, a Transylvanian landowner, but not an aristocrat, died in 1712, his effects included ‘fourteen measures of English cloth with collars of marten . . . a fine saddle blanket made of English cloth . . . a pair of London summer gloves, and a lined black English mantle’.23 The British and, to a lesser extent, Dutch replaced the French in the Portugal trade.24 The Methuen Treaty of 1703 opened the country for British cloth and gave Portuguese wines a considerable advantage in the English market. The treaty was underwritten by the alliance of the two powers in the War of the Spanish Succession and by military assistance to Portugal when she was threatened (1735) and attacked (1762) by Spain. French inability to take Portuguese wine exports made it hard for the French to supplant Britain in the Portuguese trade.25 In 1761, the Spanish foreign minister referred to Portugal as a British province yielding her immense resources.26

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The reality of significant Anglo-French competition in some fields, in turn, affected the perception of economic activity in others, such as fishing, where, in fact, competition was often less intense or shared with other states, particularly the United Provinces. Protectionism was, in part, a matter of wartime trade production, which entailed policy choices and different levels of commitment. Naval protection became more regular and consistent with time, with convoys for defence and squadrons for attacking opposing naval forces, including privateers. In the Mediterranean, this tasking was fully operational by the time of the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–7) and thus became normative, encouraging naval commitment to these waters, the retention of Gibraltar and Minorca after they had been seized in the War of the Spanish Succession, and a public awareness of their value.27 Naval protection cut shipping losses, as well as raising the efficiency of the commercial system by creating a clear distinction between mercantile and military shipping, and thus increasing the appeal of investing in trade.28 Nevertheless, British trade suffered serious blows from privateering. French bases, especially St Malo and Dunkirk, proved difficult to contain, and this led to higher insurance premiums, danger money for sailors, and the need to resort to convoys. The damage to the economy and public finances helped cause the financial crisis of 1696. Privateers were a threat to the trade of the empire not only in home waters, but also across the world, so that the East India Company lost the Samuel off Cape Town in 1692 and the Canterbury in the Straits of Malacca in 1703. Concern about privateering helped explain the (unsuccessful) attack on St Malo in 1692, as well as the bombardment of the port in 1693 and 1695 and of Dunkirk in 1695. The French used regular warships as well as privateers to attack British trade, and, in 1693, over 80 merchantmen were lost when the Smyrna (Izmir) convoy bringing home goods from Turkey was intercepted by the Brest fleet off Lagos in Portugal, a blow that sparked a political crisis.29 The Peace of Utrecht of 1713 was followed by a major attempt to improve Anglo-French commercial relations with a treaty liberalising trade from the punitive tariffs imposed during the previous half-century of confrontation and conflict. Parliament, keen to welcome the peace, nevertheless, in June 1713, rejected Henry, Viscount Bolingbroke’s commercial treaty with France. There was particular criticism of the eighth clause, which established the reciprocal granting of most-favoured trading concessions, and of the ninth, which reduced the general tariffs between the two countries to the level of 1664, making exceptions that were held to favour the French. The Whig opposition’s attack on the treaty was aided by mercantile representations, particularly hostile to the export of wool to France that might be used to the benefit of the French cloth industry, and concerned about the impact of French competition on Britain’s trade with Portugal and the Mediterranean, and also by strong doubts among Tory parliamentarians concerning the agreement. The defeat of the treaty was due to the willingness of close to 80 moderate Tory MPs to break ranks. They

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were exposed to a generally hostile public debate. Publications such as the journal The British Merchant, or Commerce Preferred, in which the rising Whig politician James Stanhope played a prominent role,30 presented the government as failing to protect trade, not least by being willing to permit the export of French woollens to Spain, while the cause of easier commercial relations with France was championed by the specially launched tri-weekly Mercator: or, Commerce Retrieved, much of which was the work of Daniel Defoe. Mercantile opinion was formally sought by Parliament, and its criticism of the treaty31 led Richard Warre, one of the Under Secretaries, to reflect the customary government distinction between merchants and the national interest, The Commons in a Grand Committee have for 2 or 3 days sat late in hearing what some merchants had to say upon the Treaty of Commerce, wherein some have shown they little understand trade as to the nation’s interest, how able so ever they may be in their private concerns, which may have misguided them, and made them lay a greater stress on some parts of trade than the things will bear. A critic of the treaty, in contrast, presented opposition as careful, systematic and informed, Never was any matter managed with more deliberation and candour; the numerous petitions which were sent up from all parts of the nation against this treaty, were all read and examined, the merchants and tradesmen were heard in both Houses; and, though great numbers appeared against the Bill, no one appeared for it. This was very much a Whiggish account of how the public discussion of trade should work, one that presented Parliament as operating in accordance with informed opinion. In contrast, Erasmus Lewis, Warre’s colleague, drew attention to the emotive nature of a populace he regarded as ignorant, There having been no open trade between Britain and France these five and twenty years I find the treaty now made is not comprehended by the generality of people. It is natural where people are ignorant they should be different and that is the state of our case. The adverse party is against it, because the present ministry made it, but the misfortune is our friends are much divided . . . the cry of Popery or woollen manufacturing will raise this nation into a ferment at any time. In the event, the Bill was defeated on 18 June (os) 1713 by 194 to 185 votes, the vote being attributed by Warre in part to a concern over electoral opinion: ‘Many boroughs are strangely possessed with an opinion, of great prejudice threatened by this Treaty to our woollen manufactures abroad . . . some may

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think that by voting against it, they have the better secured their interest in the next election.’32 In contrast, on 13 February 1787, the vote on the next AngloFrench trade treaty was 252 to 118 in favour. The 1713 commercial treaty, as well as the clauses of Utrecht, continued to play a role in Whig propaganda, Sir Gilbert Heathcote, a major London merchant as well as a Director of the Bank of England, telling the Commons in 1715 that at present where we used to return cloth for our wines to Calais, we now are forced to send specie . . . He said our Newfoundland trade is lost, and concluded that if men had sat down to conclude the worst peace imaginable, they could not have made such another.33 The dispute over the treaty was a key episode in the developing role of foreign trade in political debate.34 This was in part a consequence of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ and the resultant developments. The relationship between government and trade no longer focused on the royal Court. Instead, mercantile business and merchant representation played a growing role in the House of Commons, as part of a close relationship between trade and government in which merchants influenced policy and, even more, sought to do so. The political contours and context of economic policy were now very different to those of Court-focused and directed oligarchy. The idea of privileged trading companies declined, together with that of royal authority unconstrained by Parliamentary supervision. At the same time, companies remained important and this interacted with political interests and tendencies. The Tories backed the South Sea Company, established in 1711 as a way to secure British opportunities from Spanish weakness, and also as an alternative to the politicalfinancial interest represented by the Bank of England and the East India Company, both of which were close to the Whigs. More generally, the major overseas traders of London tended to be Whig, while their counterparts in London dealing with trade within Britain were usually Tory.35 The fate of the Spanish empire was not only a matter of trade preferences and related methods of commercial organisation. There was also the question of commercial and, even territorial, gains, which excited not only English attention, but also, in the shape of the Darien venture of the late 1690s, great enthusiasm in Scotland. Alongside longstanding English ambitions in and around the Caribbean, more recent travel literature, such as William Dampier’s Voyage to New Holland in the Year 1699 (1703–9), William Funnell’s A Voyage round the World (1707) and Edward Cooke’s A Voyage to the South Sea and round the World (1712), helped create a sense of the Pacific and its surrounds that could be seized from the real and imagined grasp of Spain.36 In large part, however, this issue could only be approached indirectly because, as far as the Spanish empire was concerned, the war was a succession dispute and Britain was involved as an ally of ‘Charles III’, one of the claimants. There was therefore no basis for demanding territory for, if conquered, it should be viewed as a gain for the

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British-backed Habsburg claimant. To do otherwise would risk fostering support for his Bourbon rival. Possibly the situation would have been very different had the British been able to overrun part of the Spanish American empire, as the conquests of Gibraltar in 1704 and Minorca in 1708 were to lead to their acquisition in the subsequent Peace of Utrecht of 1713. However, the British lacked the capability for such conquests, and even an attack on peripheral St Augustine in Florida failed in 1702. British military and naval resources, instead, were focused on Europe. It was appropriate in talk about the eventual peace to press for the Asiento, but commercial access was all that could be hoped for from Spanish America. The case with French America was different, but it did not play an important role in inter-Allied diplomacy which, instead, focused on Europe. So also did strategy, and this was contentious in terms of the domestic political debate with the focus used as a charge with which to accuse the government of failing to heed national interests. Instead, the War of the Spanish Succession saw the formulation of a Tory ‘blue water’ argument in favour of a concentration on maritime hegemony and the benefits that it was claimed it would produce: commercial and colonial dominance. This provided a strategic theme that was to be reiterated throughout the period, but one that was difficult to pursue due to Continental European commitments. The theme was in no way restricted to Tories and, instead, was to be taken up by opposition Whigs, particularly in the 1730s-50s. A call to focus on maritime hegemony was a way to define national interests and to accuse government of neglecting them. The call to empire was frequently a critique of the state, or, at least, of the ministry. The sea was seen as the source of Britain’s ‘great and natural strength’,37 and therefore a failure to adopt such a policy was seen as both evidence and cause of failure. In the event, the attempt made, as part of the blue-water strategy of the new Tory government, to capture Quebec in 1711 failed, just as the expedition against Cartagena in 1741 was to. In 1710, however, Port Royal, the major French base in Nova Scotia, was captured, and the Utrecht Settlement of 1713 left Britain with Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Hudson Bay. These, nevertheless, were not key issues in the negotiations. There had been far more concern about how to ensure that the Crowns of France and Spain should not be linked if the infant Louis XV died. The territorial gains in North America in part reflected the importance of commercial considerations, but policy was driven by the Board of Trade, rather than by commercial pressure groups.38 As far as Spain was concerned, Britain gained the Asiento for 30 years, as well as a limited, although potentially profitable, right to trade in Spanish America in the shape of sending a ship to trade at the time of the great annual trade fair, but did not secure any territorial gains in Spanish America.39 The Asiento was presented as a particularly good example of the trade that should be sought: This trade is truly national being carried on entirely in British shipping, and managed by British merchants both in Africa, and America, and the

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goods sent out are principally the product and manufactures of Great Britain, or such goods as have been purchased with the product, and manufactures of Great Britain, the returns are made either in gold or silver, or in commodities necessary for the carrying on our own manufactures, or in other useful and valuable commodities.40 The ‘Glorious Revolution’ was also followed by important political, governmental and fiscal changes that played a major role in fostering trade. The stabilisation of financial markets in London after the foundation of the Bank of England in 1694, combined with Britain’s success in gaining access to South American bullion, were crucial in developing the finance and infrastructure for credit. By providing the funds, instruments and political context for long-term credit, the so-called Financial Revolution41 underwrote participation in an Atlantic economy that ran on borrowed capital. This was important to the growth of shipping, as well as to the development of tobacco production round the Chesapeake, sugar production in the West Indies, and the slave trade. Financial strength and economic development were not simply a matter of top–down policy. The growth in numbers, assets, skills and functions of the business community was also very important. This was particularly so in London, where many members were closely linked to the workings of government, while the growth in the professions was also linked to the expansion of the state.42 Regulation of this economy was furthered by the establishment of the Board of Trade and Plantations in 1696. It provided a focus for lobbying and also a means of accountability. Ministers proved receptive to mercantile pressure. In July 1699, James Vernon, the Secretary of State for the Northern Department, wrote to William Blathwayt, then with William III on the Continent, urging action in response to mercantile complaints about Savoyard innovations, and separately informed him that the merchants concerned in the tobacco trade with Russia had delivered a memorial to the Lords Justices, the ministers left in charge of the government in London. These officials thought it very reasonable they should have a consul at Moscow and that if His Majesty pleased they should be recommended to the Czar [Peter the Great] in general terms only as to the enlargement of their trade and that they be not obliged to bring in more tobacco than the country will take nor pay duties for more than what they bring. We have accordingly prepared the draught of a letter. For this, as for the appointment of the merchants’ choice as consul, the king’s approval was sought. Two months later, the process of consultation was still close, Vernon writing, ‘We are preparing answers to the letter from the Czar and in the meantime I have spoke with some concerned in the Russia trade.’43 Accountability and trade interacted in political calculation. This was seen in

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calls for pressure on allies. For example, in 1703, the government was urged to insist that the Dutch stop trading with France and Spain, while, the following year, Robert Harley, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, wrote to George Stepney, the envoy in Vienna, about a petition from Exeter and several other West Country Parliamentary boroughs complaining about Austrian tariffs on their woollen cloths – there is the greater reason to consider the petitions, and endeavour to obtain redress herein, because, besides the general interest of the nation, the members from the West have a great influence in the resolutions of the House of Commons, and especially in the granting of money.44 Tory critics of the Dutch alliance were apt to emphasize commercial competition. There were certainly important tensions in the economic relationship and, indeed, from 1708, there was a major drop in cloth exports to the United Provinces.45 It had been hoped that alliance with Austria would lead to improved trade. In October 1705, Blathwayt wrote to Stepney, I shall be very glad to find out some medium that may be of certain advantage to both nations, which may be by settling a general trade between the Emperor’s dominions and the rest of Germany (with the parts adjacent) and those of Her Majesty . . . so profitable a trade which must be created and nourished by signal concessions from the Emperor, and through his high office, from the lesser princes.46 This hope was to prove deceptive. Indeed the war left a longstanding source of grievance in the shape of the loan to Austria, secured on the revenues of Silesia, to enable Austria to carry on the conflict. Having conquered Silesia in 1740–1, Frederick II of Prussia took on the debt but, in the early 1750s, refused to pay it in retaliation for British privateering during the War of the Austrian Succession.47 The politicisation of economic issues and forces was not new, but it was readily apparent, in part due to the extent to which Whig and Tory commentators found it possible and appropriate to focus on these subjects. Indeed, commentators claimed that ‘trade’ and ‘public credit’ were used as cant terms.48 They were certainly linked in enabling Britain to pay for her wars. A financial revolution was appropriate in order to deal with the major costs of the wars of 1689–97 and 1702–13. The funded national debt, guaranteed by Parliament and based on the Bank of England, established in 1694, enabled the borrowing of hitherto unprecedented sums and at low rates of interest. Over 30 per cent of the total government expenditure during the two wars was financed by public borrowing. The national debt rose to £36.2 million in 1714, but there was a major contrast with the debacle of the last Stuart war, the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–4), for which there had been no sound financial base. Whereas, in the early 1690s, the government was paying up to 14 per cent for long-term loans,

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the rate of interest fell to 6–7 per cent for much of 1702–14. Customs and excise revenue met part of the burden, excises providing 27 per cent of total government revenues in 1698–1701, while customs duties provided 25 per cent during the War of the Spanish Succession.49 This emphasis on indirect taxation put a major premium on economic activity. Concern about trade led to a process of governmental development, including, in 1696, the establishment of the Board of Trade, the Inspector Generalship of Customs and the Register of Shipping.

Notes 1 Tilson to John Chetwynd, envoy in Turin, 7 Dec. (os) 1711, Stafford CRO. D 649/8/7/10. 2 D.W. Jones, War and Political Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford, 1988). 3 J.C. Esteban, ‘The British Balance of Payments, 1772–1820: India Transfers and War Finance’, EcHR, 44 (2001), pp. 64–8. 4 J. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (Oxford, 1989). 5 J. Kepler, ‘Estimates of the Volume of Direct Shipments of Tobacco and Sugar from the Chief English Plantations to European Markets, 1620–69’, Journal of European Economic History, 28 (1999), pp. 115–38. 6 C. Wilson, Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars (London, 1957), pp. 97–102; R. Davis, A Commercial Revolution (London, 1967); R. Conquest, ‘The State and Commercial Expansion: England in the Years 1642–1688’, Journal of European Economic History, 14 (1995), pp. 155–72. 7 E.J. Graham, A Maritime History of Scotland 1650–1790 (East Linton, 2002), pp. 14–18. 8 C.A. Whatley, ‘Taking Stock: Scotland at the End of the Seventeenth Century’, in T.C. Smout (ed.), Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603 to 1900 (Oxford, 2005), pp. 122–4. 9 [John Shebbeare], A Sixth Letter to the People of England, on the Progress of National Ruin (London, 1757), pp. 25–7. 10 Bonal, memorandum, 18 Ap. 1716, AN. AM. B7 267. 11 C. Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Finance in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1941). 12 Walef to Eugene, 17 May 1726, HHStA. GK. 150a. 13 Louis, Marquis of Puysieulx, French foreign minister, to Vaulgrenant, envoy in Spain, 20 Jan. 1750, AE. CP. Esp. 506 fol. 62; D. Francis, Portugal 1715–1808. Joanine, Pombaline and Rococo Portugal as Seen by British Diplomats and Traders (London, 1985). 14 W. Kirchner, Commercial Relations between Russia and Europe 1400 to 1800 (Bloomington, Indiana, 1966), pp. 19, 135. 15 M. Priestley, ‘Anglo-French Trade and the “Unfavourable Balance” Controversy, 1660–1685’, EcHR, 4 (1951), pp. 37–52; V. Barrie, ‘La Prohibition du commerce avec la France dans la politique anglaise à la fin du XVIIème siècle’, Revue du Nord, 59 (1977), pp. 343–64. 16 W.T. Morgan, ‘Economic Aspects of the Negotiations at Ryswick’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th ser., 14 (1931), pp. 225–49. 17 Weekly Register, 19 Oct. (os) 1734. 18 N. Zahedieh, ‘The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655–1692’, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 43 (1986), pp. 570–93; G.V. Scammell, ‘ “A Very Profitable and Advantageous Trade”: British Smuggling in the Iberian Americas, c. 1500–1750’, Itinerario, 24 (2000), p. 167. 19 P.G.E. Clemens, ‘The Rise of Liverpool, 1665–1750’, EcHR, 29 (1976), p. 212. 20 BL. Evelyn papers 49 fol. 37. 21 D.H. Akenson, If the Irish Ran the World: Montserrat, 1630–1730 (Montreal, 1997). 22 Crafsman, 8 Nov. (os) 1729.

1689–1714 119 23 K. Verdery, Transylvanian Villagers (Berkeley, 1983), p. 157. 24 Memorandum for Livry, 29 Jan. 1724, AN. AM. B7 283. 25 Mirepoix, French envoy in London, to St Contest, French foreign minister, 24 Jan. 1754, AE. CP. Ang. 437 fol. 30. 26 Ossun, French envoy in Spain, to Choiseul, French foreign minister, 3 Ap. 1761, AE. CP. Esp. 532 fol. 10. 27 Newcastle Courant, 12 Mar. (os) 1748. 28 G. Pagano de DiVitiis, English Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Italy (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 62, 184. 29 C.A. Whatley, Scottish Society, 1707–1830: Beyond Jacobitism, towards Industrialisation (Manchester, 2000), pp. 39–40. 30 A. Newman, The Stanhopes of Chevening (London, 1969), p. 46. 31 Anon., A Letter to a West-Country Clothier and Freeholder, Concerning the Parliament’s Rejecting the French Treaty of Commerce, By Way of Advice, in the Ensuing Elections, with a List of Those That Voted for the Bill (London, 1713), p. 5. 32 Warre to Robert, Second Lord Lexington, envoy in Spain, 12 June (os), Lewis to Lexington, 16 June (os), Warre to Burch, Lexington’s secretary, 19 June (os) 1713, BL Add. 46546 fols 71, 22, 74; Anon., A Letter to a West-Country Clothier and Freeholder (London, 1713), p. 5; D.A.E. Harkness, ‘The Opposition to the 8th and 9th Articles of the Commercial Treaty of Utrecht’, Scottish Historical Review, 21 (1923–4), pp. 219–26; E.C. Bogle, A Stand for Tradition: The Rejection of the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of Utrecht (PhD, University of Maryland, 1972); D.C. Coleman, ‘Politics and Economy in the Age of Anne: The Case of the Anglo-French Trade Treaty of 1713’, in Coleman and A.H. John (eds), Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial England: Essays Presented to F.J. Fisher (1976), pp. 187–211; G. Holmes and C. Jones, ‘Trade, the Scots and the Parliamentary Crisis of 1713’, Parliamentary History, 1 (1982), pp. 47–77; T.J. Schaeper, ‘French and English Trade after the Treaty of Utrecht: The Missions of Amission and Fénellon in London, 1713–1714’, British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 9 (1986), pp. 1–18. 33 John, Lord Perceval to his brother Philip, 24 Mar. (os) 1715, describing the debate on the Address the previous day, BL. Add. 47028 fol. 17. 34 P. Gauci, The Politics of Trade: The Overseas Merchant in State and Society, 1660–1720 (Oxford, 2001). 35 G.S. de Krey, A Fractured Society: The Politics of London in the First Age of Party, 1688–1715 (Oxford, 1985). 36 G. Williams, The Great South Sea: English Voyages and Encounters, 1570–1750 (New Haven, 1997). 37 Owen’s Weekly Chronicle, 31 Oct. 1761. 38 E.E. Rich, ‘The Hudson’s Bay Company and the Treaty of Utrecht’, Historical Journal, 11 (1954), p. 201. 39 L. Batchelor, ‘The South Sea Company and the Asiento’, Bulletin of the Institute for Historical Research (1925–6), pp. 128–30. 40 Anon., undated memorandum. CUL. C(H) mss. 88/139. 41 P.G.M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688–1756 (London, 1967). 42 R. Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1995); P. Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in London, 1660–1730 (London, 1989); G. Holmes, Augustan England: Professions, State and Society 1680–1730 (London, 1982). 43 Beinecke, Osborn Shelves, Blathwayt, Box 19. 44 Harley to Stepney, 10 Nov. (os) 1704, BL. Add. 7059 fol. 45. 45 D.J. Ormrod, ‘Anglo-Dutch Commerce 1700–1760’ (PhD, Cambridge, 1973), p. 144. 46 Beinecke, Osborn Shelves, Blathwayt, Box 21.

120 1689–1714 47 Newcastle to Sir Charles Hanbury Williams, 13 Feb. 1753, Newport, Public Library, Hanbury Williams papers; E Satow, The Silesian Loan and Frederick the Great (Oxford, 1915). 48 M. Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain. Partisanship and Political Culture (Oxford, 2005), pp. 194, 254, 287, 319. 49 J. Hoppit, A Land of Liberty? England 1689–1727 (Oxford, 2000), p. 124.

Chapter 6

1714–39

The European situation was difficult for Britain in this period for two particular reasons. First, there was serious Continental resentment of the position Britain had entrenched in the terms of the agreements at the close of the War of the Spanish Succession. Second, there was a rise or revival in Continental commercial and colonial competition. The peace settlement had recognised the British gains of Gibraltar and Minorca from Spain during the course of the war, in 1704 and 1708 respectively. These acquisitions were important for the protection of the Mediterranean commerce, which was significant to British imports and, even more, exports. Southern Europe was the major market for the lighter ‘new draperies’, and growing British trade there was regarded as important by diplomats and other commentators,1 and as hitting French exports.2 Britain had also been granted important concessions in the Spanish New World, both the Asiento, the contract to supply African slaves to the Spanish colonies,3 and the right to send an annual ship of 500 tons to the commercial fair at Porto Bello. These concessions reflected the position of maritime supremacy Britain enjoyed at the close of the war. They were important in their own right and because they symbolised British maritime dominance. The British position was widely resented on the Continent. France and the United Provinces were envious, while Philip V of Spain, who sought to reverse much of the Peace of Utrecht, was determined to limit British commercial penetration of his empire. These tensions were fed into a British public sphere that emphasized natural competitiveness and interpreted real, or reported, moves by others in this light. This was seen for example in attitudes towards the Dutch. The legacy of economic competition and political alignment with the Dutch was a mixed one, but, once wartime co-operation had ended, then it became easier to focus on rivalry. The Occasional Writer, a pamphlet of 1727, found no difficulty in writing of ‘how envious an eye the Dutch beheld the separate privileges in trade, and the sole possession of Gibraltar, and of the island of Minorca, which we obtained at the last peace’.4 Public discussion was matched by governmental anxieties. There was no doubt that the Dutch mercantile community was jealous of the British position, both in Europe and elsewhere. Diplomatic reports noted Dutch envy of the British position in Portugal and Spain;5 while

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the Dutch also resented the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 and Britain’s subsequent dominance of Russia’s Baltic trade. There was also a more focused concern linked to central issues in British diplomacy. In British ministerial eyes, their Dutch counterparts seemed hesitant in supporting British commercial interests. In 1727, the ministry was concerned about the amount of Dutch diplomatic assistance they could expect in pressing Spain to satisfy British demands over Caribbean trading conditions. Tension continued at the Congress of Soissons in the following year. Although some British ministers privately supported the return of Gibraltar to Spain, the government responded harshly to the suggestion from Simon van Slingelandt, the leading Dutch minister, that this happen. A sense of competition was also seen in the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5), when British ministers and diplomats replied to Austrian demands for intervention by stating that Britain would not intervene if the Dutch were to be neutral, as this would entail the loss of British trade. This argument was a convenient one for a ministry disinclined to intervene anyway, but it also reflected a genuine anxiety about Dutch competition in European markets, and an awareness of the political dangers it represented. There was scant suggestion that the European trading world was anything other than finite and limited. As a result, it was widely assumed that Dutch gains would be at Britain’s expense. The reality of commercial rivalry between Britain and the United Provinces, as well as the weakness of their traditional alignment, were revealed in the 1730s. In 1735, the Dutch refused to participate in the British dispatch of a fleet to the Tagus to protect Portugal, and Portuguese trade, from threatened Spanish attack. Furthermore, the two powers did not co-operate in subsequent commercial negotiations with Spain, although both suffered from Spanish depredations on their Caribbean trade. The Convention of the Pardo with Spain was negotiated by Britain alone, and British diplomats gleefully hoped that it would damage the Dutch position. When, however, war broke out in late 1739, the Dutch resisted strong British pressure to provide assistance, and British concern about Dutch commercial links with Spain extended to those with Naples.6 Anglo-Dutch commercial animosity was therefore an important factor in diplomatic relations.7 The two governments could usually co-operate only in preventing others from intruding into their preserves, as they conspicuously did when supporting their East India Companies from the Austrian Ostend Company. Otherwise, the position was one of conflict, sometimes open, as on the coast of West Africa, but more usually a background source of tension. Spanish resentment at humiliating peace terms was understandable. Relations had been improved by the 1715 commercial treaty negotiated on the British side by George Bubb. However, political differences superseded mercantile considerations. In 1718–20 and 1725–9, confrontation and conflict interrupted trade. In addition, the Spaniards’ determination to protect and increase the profitability of their American empire conflicted with the interests of British merchants determined to exploit these markets and to secure Spanish

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bullion. The resultant contraband trade, and Spanish moves to prevent it, exacerbated relations. This was not to say that trade and empire were responsible for poor diplomatic relations. Instead, relations that were naturally bad as a result of Spanish anger over the Utrecht Settlement were further harmed by the issue of Caribbean trade. Spanish resentment at frequent diplomatic pressure, supported at times by naval armaments, was clear. In 1727, the influential Queen of Spain, Elisabeth Farnese, attacked the British who ‘pretended to lord it over everybody’.8 Further problems were posed, both for British trade and for the ministry, by the adoption by many Continental states of protectionist policies. Aiming to improve their economy and, in particular, revenues, they sought to further trade and industry by making the import of manufactured products more difficult and by establishing oceanic trading companies. These state-sponsored and -directed initiatives presented problems for British trade.9 In 1728, Wych warned that the attempt to develop a textile industry at Altona in Holstein, a territory then linked dynastically to Russia, would hit the British East India Company’s export of calicoes to Hamburg and Bremen, an important re-export trade.10 Several states with which Britain had important commercial relations established or increased import tariffs. This was especially so with Austria, Denmark, Sardinia (the kingdom of Sardinia was the title from 1720 of the state that centred on Savoy-Piedmont), and Sweden, the actions of the last repeatedly seen as an unsuitable return for support.11 British cloth exports in particular were hit, with Fog’s Weekly Journal of 16 July (os) 1737 claiming, ‘all the world grow fond of the woollen manufactory’. In 1732, Edmund Allen, Secretary in Turin, wrote to the Under Secretary in the Southern Department of our trade, which, as you justly observe, may be considered as the very blood and vitals of our country, and which at this time lies here expiring, and at its last gasp, except some proper remedy and that soon be found out and applied, in order to restore it to its usual strength and vigour.12 Concerns about European protectionism were, however, overshadowed in the late 1710s and early 1720s by anxieties about the intentions of Peter the Great, ruler of Russia from 1689 to 1725, under whom rapid economic development was combined with a territorial ambition that was more unpredictable than that of other rulers. Russian dominance of the Baltic, as a result of victory over Sweden in the Northern War (1700–21), threatened to create a monopoly supply for naval stores (timber and hemp in particular), with consequences for prices and terms of supply, and also to make it easier for Russia to turn to other sources for its imports of manufactured goods.13 Having initially deployed warships to the Baltic to protect Anglo-Russian trade from Swedish privateering,14 the government, as policy changed into hostility to Russia, was able to use these concerns when seeking domestic support in 1717–21 for its efforts to organise opposition to Peter.

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Diplomatic failure in this confrontation, however, forced a rethinking of the relationship, although only after in the 1720s when serious diplomatic hostility was bolstered by fears of Russian commercial schemes.15 Once diplomatic relations had improved with Russia in 1730–3, then a major effort was made to improve their commercial counterparts, not least in attempts to get duties on British cloth exports cut.16 Trade negotiations with Russia were presented in an inherently competitive fashion, with the British envoys reporting that Prussia was trying to block them,17 while Harrington argued that, although no harm was intended to Sweden politically by Britain beginning these negotiations, there was a very clear economic lesson, ‘if they [the Swedes] continue to use His Majesty’s subjects ill . . . they will force us to strike out new channels of commerce’.18 The extent to which, in turn, the argument of disadvantage leading to policy change could be applied against British dominance was not discussed, although British diplomats were made readily aware of it by irritated foreigners.19 European states used a variety of methods to aid their commerce and industry. These included moves against trade in foreign shipping, many very similar to the British Navigation Acts, outright prohibitions on imports, high tariffs, and, as in Sardinia in the mid-1720s, pressure on merchants to handle local produce. The British response was to refer to past precedent. This approach gave very little room for policy changes to foreign states, but was a product of Britain’s status as a ‘satisfied state’, both in terms of its maritime, commercial and industrial strength, and with reference to existing trade agreements. The same was also true of the British diplomatic position in Europe. In 1726, when Newcastle complained about a new Sardinian tax on cloth imports designed to help the Piedmontese woollen industry, he argued that it was not only harmful to good relations but also to the treaty of 1669. The following year, repeated British pressure led to the response that Victor Amadeus II was master in his own dominions. The possibility of countervailing British steps against imports of Sardinian silk, which John Hedges, the British envoy, had mentioned in 1726, was discounted on the grounds that British manufacturers needed these silks.20 New Sardinian restrictions followed in the early 1730s, and these badly hit imports of British woollen textiles.21 In 1728, however, the far more vulnerable Imperial Free City of Bremen yielded to stiff complaints by the British envoy about attempts to use only local shipping for trade with Britain.22 The oceanic trading aspirations of other states were a particular problem. A number of states, including Austria, Denmark, Prussia, Russia, Sweden and Tuscany, founded, revived or considered founding companies trading to East and/or South Asia.23 These threatened the existing effective monopoly enjoyed by Britain, France and the United Provinces, and were blamed when the East India Companies of these countries suffered diminished profits.24 This was serious in Britain where the East India Company enjoyed great political influence, partly because of its important position in the state’s fiscal machinery. There was also competition in the West Indies. The purchase in 1733 of St Croix as a base for the Danish West India and Guinea Company was followed

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by the revival of the Company, and it provided sugar and cotton, not only to Denmark but also for re-export to Danzig, Königsberg, Lübeck and Kiel. However, the scale was inconsiderable: 15 million pounds of sugar imported from the Caribbean in 1730–45, compared to 1,494 million pounds by the British; and for cotton 616,000 pounds compared to 29 million.25 Nevertheless, this was competition, with a margin for future growth, and there was suspicion that the Danish Company was reliant on British investment.26 Limiting the activities of new East Indies companies posed serious diplomatic problems that reflected the mismatch between commercial aspirations and public debate on the one hand, and political realities and diplomatic exigencies on the other. Pressing Frederick I over the Swedish East India Company, which had received its charter in 1731, the envoy, Edward Finch, ‘told him that nobody pretended to dispute his right, as an independent sovereign prince, not tied up by any previous treaty, to trade where he pleased’.27 The British kept a watchful eye on the attitudes of foreign powers in this sphere,28 but, with most companies, it was only possible to attempt to prevent their using British capital, seamen and offices, which was the method followed with the Swedish Company. In 1740, an agreement was reached under which no British subjects should serve the Swedish Company. In international law, Britain could not seek to prevent these new companies trading, just as she had little legal basis for complaint when Continental states enacted protectionist legislation, particularly when it emulated that of Britain herself, a point made by foreign powers.29 There was no comparison between the position over trade with Spain’s American possessions, which was supposedly regulated by treaty, and that over trade with the East Indies where European powers did not hold sway. Nevertheless, one foreign company the British made major efforts to hinder was that founded, in December 1722, in order to trade to the Indies, at Ostend, by the Emperor (ruler of Austria) Charles VI, a keen supporter of industrial and commercial enterprises, who sought not only to develop overseas trade from Ostend and Trieste but also industrial production in his dominions. The Ostend Company was a challenge to the British East India Company (and its Dutch counterpart) not only in Continental markets but also because of the prospect of smuggling into Britain goods brought back from Asia. The competitiveness and sensitivity of the British textile market had been shown with the 1721 ban on the wearing of imported printed fabrics, passed in order to protect native manufactures of wool and silk stuffs from the competition of Indian calicoes imported by the East India Company. This stimulated the growth of a British cotton industry. As yet, British producers did not enjoy the advantage over Indian rivals that machinisation was to bring the following century, but they were able to profit from printing the imported fabrics.30 The prospect of large-scale smuggling, however, challenged this situation. Initially, the Ostend Company was very successful, despite major British and Dutch efforts to suppress it. These were directed not only at Austria, but also at other powers that might offer support or commercial opportunities. Thus, in

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1723, the British pressed Portugal hard not to receive Ostenders in its bases in China and India, particularly Macao and Goa. These efforts were lent new intensity when the Company became part of the Austro-Spanish alignment negotiated with the Treaty of Vienna in 1725. The alliance included a commercial treaty, presented to the House of Commons as destructive to British trade, by which Spain promised to allow the Company to trade in some of her possessions and to give Charles VI’s subjects the same privileges as those enjoyed by the British and Dutch.31 This encouraged Anglo-Dutch efforts against the Company, and, indeed, the British government considered the forcible seizure of its ships in European waters. Pro-government writers argued that, aside from the specific dangers posed by the Company’s competition, there was also the threat that it would lead to the Austrian Netherlands becoming a significant commercial and maritime rival. Pressure led to the Company’s suspension in 1727, and its suppression four years later, as part of the price the two powers demanded in their negotiation of an alliance with Austria.32 Meanwhile, however, relations had been very difficult, and this had led to moves against British trade with Charles’s dominions. As he had gained Lombardy, Naples and, more crucially, the Spanish Netherlands (essentially Belgium and Luxembourg) in 1713–14, at the close of the War of the Spanish Succession, and Sicily in 1720, at the end of the War of the Quadruple Alliance, this was far more serious than clashes with Austria would have been 30 years earlier. Moves against British imports were made in 1726 and 1727,33 and in July 1728 imports of products manufactured from wool and silk faced a new prohibitory tariff. The British envoy argued that this measure was chiefly aimed at Britain and proposed, in response, the banning of imports of lace and linen from Austrian lands, although this led to the suggestion that British cloth exports would be banned.34 Austrian commercial schemes were widely criticised in Britain, and, in 1730, one pamphleteer noted, ‘We have all seen the irresistible propensities of the Imperial Court to promote a commerce, as by way of emulation, to the great prejudice of the mercantile interest of this nation and the diminution of the royal revenue.’35 Ministerial speakers in Parliament, pamphlets and newspapers all used Austrian commercial policies to vindicate the government’s anti-Austrian policy in the late 1720s, and even sought to argue that Austrian policy was more of a threat than that of Spain.36 Edward Finch described the Ostend Company ‘as the source of the present misunderstanding’ with Austria.37 Yet, a consideration of relations suggests a degree of ministerial ambivalence on the British part. Prior to 1725, indeed, it was possible for the opposition to claim that the ministry was failing to take sufficient steps against the Company. Ministerial connivance was suggested in 1718 and in the early 1720s.38 The future of the Company moreover played only a small role in the secret Anglo-Austrian negotiations in 1729. Furthermore, the ministry not only failed in 1731 to obtain revocation of Austrian protectionist legislation, but made no real effort in this direction, even though the suppression of Austrian industries had been discussed by the Dutch.39

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A similar policy characterised the British stance for the rest of the Walpole ministry. Major efforts were made in 1731–3 to prevent Ostend trade, directly or via Hamburg, but less effort was made over other aspects of Austrian trade. Attempts to continue the activities of the Ostend Company threatened British tea sales in Hamburg. Angry over supposed Austrian connivance in trade to the East Indies from Hamburg, the ministry threatened that it would harm relations, Harrington writing in 1732 that it ‘would extremely alienate people here from an alliance with the Emperor, and consequently make it much less practicable for the king to support upon occasion the interests of that prince and his family so powerfully as he himself would be desirous to do’.40 Fresh pressure was exerted in 1733.41 In practice, however, the state of Anglo-Austrian trade, which continued to be poor,42 played no role in the decisions not to aid Austria against attack in 1733 but, conversely, to provide assistance in 1741. Suggestions that assistance to Austria would be rewarded by commercial considerations,43 and warnings from Austria of the danger that British trade would be shut out of Europe, were to no avail. Equally, by failing to play a key role in ensuring a negotiated end to the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5), the British were unable to guarantee their commercial rights in Naples and Sicily when the territories changed hands, and this affected their subsequent treatment.44 In the late 1730s, Anglo-Austrian commercial relations were marked by both hope and disappointment, the latter owing to clearly differing positions in negotiations on the tariffs in the Austrian Netherlands that began in late 1737. The British and Dutch governments were determined to preserve the region as an economic colony, and rejected Austrian attempts to improve its position, especially by raising taxes on British imports.45 Righteous indignation was a British response, Horatio Walpole writing of Charles VI in 1738, ‘does he expect that the Maritime Powers should hasten to his aid, and he still keep up his pretensions of not executing the Barrier Treaty, or of insisting upon unreasonable terms of trade in the Low Countries, which they conquered at the expense of so much blood and treasure?’46 The legacy of bitterness involving Anglo-French commercial relations was far graver than in the case of Austria. High tariffs had been imposed during the seventeenth century and the attempt to liberalise trade in 1713 had failed (see pp. 112–14). The political storm that had greeted this proposal probably helps account for the fact that, during the Anglo-French alliance of 1716–31, successive Whig ministries made no attempts to revive it. High tariffs remained on both sides of the Channel, and the mercantile communities of each country, supported by their governments, considered themselves in active competition. French European and oceanic trade, and the French navy and mercantile marine, were all in a poor state at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. Thereafter they recovered, albeit unevenly. This recovery implicitly challenged the British colonial, maritime and commercial position, and was explicitly seen in these terms despite the alliance between the two states. During the regency of Philip, Duke of Orléans for the young Louis XV, from

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1715 to 1723, there had been rivalry, particularly in relation to the financial, colonial and commercial schemes of Orléans’ fiscal adviser, the Scot John Law. However, neither government had sought to push these issues of rivalry. The situation became more difficult in the 1720s, with increasing signs of commercial and colonial rivalry straining relations. In part, this reflected a new activism in French policy. Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, Count of Maurepas, the Secretary of State for the Marine from 1723 until 1749, launched an ambitious programme of naval construction, and actively sponsored projects for colonial and mercantile growth.47 Concern that France was seeking to supplant Britain in Spanish, Spanish American48 and Mediterranean trade was expressed frequently in press and pamphlet literature. It was also matched by increasing ministerial unease, particularly in late 1727, when France negotiated a temporary settlement of Anglo-Spanish differences unacceptable to the British ministry, and in 1728 at Soissons. The British ministry resented French failure to provide adequate diplomatic support over Gibraltar and over British commercial privileges in the Spanish empire. In contrast, French ministers argued that British insistence on these points was selfishly jeopardising the interests of the AngloFrench alliance.49 There is little sign that either government regarded this active competition as unnatural, and there were singularly few proposals to improve trade links. Instead, the two governments largely sought to avoid the worst consequences of colonial rivalry. A few proposals were made to improve direct trade links. One such, in the papers of John, Third Earl of Stair, envoy in Paris from 1715 to 1720, advocated the encouragement of imports of French alcohol in return for French concessions on British fish. The fisheries were seen as a way to employ the poor, and any agreements as an opportunity to divert profits from smugglers to customs’ duties. William, Lord Cadogan, envoy in The Hague, pressed for a French declaration in favour of British trade in order to still domestic complaint. In 1724, it was rumoured that a commercial treaty was being considered.50 Nothing, however, came of such proposals and rumours, and it was widely accepted during the period of the alliance that both powers were in active competition. That was certainly a theme in the diplomatic instructions. For example, in 1730, Germain-Louis de Chauvelin, the French foreign minister, wrote that France hoped that better Anglo-Russian relations would have good consequences for the alliance, but was opposed to Britain gaining commercial concessions in the Russia trade.51 There was particular tension over trade with Spain and its colonies.52 Envious of the British gains at Utrecht, French ministries resented British commercial concessions in these areas, and were under strong pressure from mercantile groups to improve the French position, while Jacobites and others hostile to British governmental interests sought to exploit the situation.53 In May 1728, the Bayonne Chamber of Commerce sent a memorandum to Chauvelin arguing that British possession of the Asiento limited markets for French industry. Similar representations were frequent, and the French government claimed,

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with some justice, that these affected negotiations with Spain.54 For manufacturing towns, such as Elbeuf, the Spanish empire was an important market, and the population of Nantes rose considerably after 1730 as the New World market for its cheap silks grew, but a serious negative trade balance led to towns like Toulouse becoming major centres for dealing in Spanish coin.55 The British government, subject to domestic pressures on trade with the Spanish empire, feared that their position was being eroded by French competition. Indeed, in 1733 the Franco-Spanish treaty, the First Family Compact, included an agreement that France should henceforth enjoy most-favoured nation treatment and that a commercial treaty should be concluded as soon as possible. There was also concern in Britain about French competition in the Turkish empire. George, Seventh Earl of Kinnoull, the envoy, wrote in 1731 that this was the greatest challenge to the British commercial position, and he returned to the charge in 1733. The French were pleased by their success in reducing British cloth exports there.56 There was also more direct competition between Britain and France, in the West Indies, West Africa, North America and the Indian Ocean. Levels of tension, however, varied, and in the Indian Ocean in the 1720s and 1730s competition was not particularly serious. The second French East India Company, founded in 1719, ensured that France became more active in the trade. Whereas one French ship had been sent to India on average every two years in 1600–64 and three or four annually in 1664–1719, the annual average in 1720–70 was ten or eleven. Furthermore, a major home base was developed in Lorient from 1724, and especially in the 1730s.57 The Company was willing to co-operate with the British in excluding new commercial rivals, Ostenders and Swedes, from Indian waters. In late 1733, the Governors of Madras (British) and Pondicherry (French) jointly seized the cargo of the Swedish East Indiaman, the Ulrica Eleonora, in the Indian roadstead of Porto Novo. However, the French government tried to blame the seizure on the British, while the attitude of the latter’s government was affected both by a desire for Swedish goodwill and by the realisation that most of the cargo belonged to British individuals breaking the law.58 Although there was British concern over the expansion of French commercial activities in the Indian Ocean, particularly the development of the French position in the Île de France (Mauritius) and the Île de Bourbon (Réunion) in the late 1730s, tension did not rise to the levels it reached in the western hemisphere.59 West Africa, the source of slaves for the Americas, and of other valuable products such as gum, which played a role in cloth production, was a major area of tension involving not only Britain and France, but other European states as well, particularly Portugal and the United Provinces. In the 1720s, the principal rivals of the British were the latter two, both allies of Britain. Considerable violence characterised the competition, and the Royal African Company frequently complained of attacks. In October 1723, the Portuguese destroyed its trading settlement in Cabinda; in 1725, the Company complained about French

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action on the Guinea coast; and in 1728, Dutch attacks upon its ships led to demands for naval protection, and the dispatch of a British warship. The government in 1726 ordered diplomatic pressure on the Dutch.60 As with the Dutch and Portuguese, so with the French, colonial competition was compatible with European alliance, particularly when, as in this case, the issue did not arouse much domestic interest. In the 1730s, tension in West Africa centred on Anglo-French competition, but was not noticeably different in type to the period when the two had been allies. Determined to protect their gum trade from the River Senegal, the French sought to limit the establishment of a British position on the River Gambia. In March 1733, Chauvelin complained to the British envoy that Britain was planning to invade the property of the French Company and claimed that France would regard such a step as an act of hostility. In turn, the British stated that French settlements on one section of the coast did not give the French a right to the trade of the entire coast, over part of which the British indeed had claims. The profit element was clear: ‘the French would engross the gum trade because they buy that for £5 a ton which sells for £100, if they can exclude others’.61 Disagreements persisted, but conflict was avoided. Anglo-French colonial tension in this period was strongest in the Western hemisphere. In North America, expansion produced rivalry, particularly as each sought influence with the Native tribes. This led to press comment62 and diplomatic representations.63 The situation was commercially more serious in the West Indies, where British and French colonies competed actively in the production of sugar for European markets,64 and in trade, often illicit, with Spanish America and with Britain’s North American colonies. Furthermore, relations were harmed by competing claims to several islands, particularly St Lucia.65 The French made complaints about British moves in the West Indies66 and concerning intrigues among the Native tribes threatening the French colony of Louisiana.67 In turn, the British position in North America was challenged by the establishment of French bases that anchored territorial interests and commercial possibilities. To the north of the British mainland possessions, a new French colony was founded at Île Royale (Cape Breton Island) in 1713, as a replacement for the loss of Acadia (Nova Scotia) to Britain, and large sums were spent on developing a major military and naval base there at Louisbourg, which was founded in 1720. Further south, Fort Toulouse, founded on the Alabama River System in 1717, was designed to limit British expansion from the Carolinas. In 1736 and 1739, French forces from Louisiana and New France (Canada) attacked the Chickasaws, who traded with the British, showing that they could use the Ohio Valley as an axis of power.68 A sense of interacting challenges from France was captured by Robert Dinwiddie, Collector of Customs at Bermuda, in a memorandum in Sir Robert Walpole’s papers. After drawing attention to the challenge from French sugar production, and arguing that this would be weakened by stopping the export of Irish provisions to the French West Indies, he wrote, ‘There is not anything that

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gives the French and Dutch so great an opportunity to rival us in our trade with the Spaniards in the West Indies, as the encroachments they are daily making on our settlements on the coast of Guinea’ in West Africa, from which slaves were transported, and he therefore pressed for the dispatch of British troops there.69 Walpole’s papers also included memoranda looking toward themes of midcentury rivalry, including one on Nova Scotia that drew together ideas of imperial rivalry and colonial governance. In support of the idea of settling Nova Scotia, it was seen as a province that would ‘raise a considerable revenue to the Crown, make a frontier against our French neighbours, and drain a great number of inhabitants from New England where they are daily aiming at an independency, and very much interfere with the trade of their mother kingdom’.70 The failure to be seen publicly defending commercial and colonial interests against French competition harmed the ministry domestically, and helped the opposition in its attempt to associate the Anglo-French alliance with the surrender of British interests. This was not too serious in the late 1710s as France, gravely weakened by the War of the Spanish Succession, was less credible as a major threat. There was criticism of France for taking over some of Britain’s carrying trade during the 1718–20 war with Spain, but this did not become a major issue. In the early 1720s, the primacy of domestic issues, particularly the South Sea Bubble and the Atterbury Plot, and the relatively uncontroversial nature of foreign policy during a period of European peace, led to a low level of opposition attack on the alliance. This changed in 1725, and thereafter, the ministry was attacked every Parliamentary session over foreign policy. General denunciations for following the French diplomatic lead were less successful politically than specific attacks on supposed failures to defend British interests. Commercial and colonial issues, and the retention of Gibraltar, provided the best opportunities. Trade thus became a major issue in the public debate of foreign policy (as it rarely was in the 1720s in ministerial circles), because, unlike the balance of power, it was a concrete issue that could be readily understood. Commercial and colonial relations with Spain were more contentious in the 1720s and 1730s than those with France, although they were not inherently different to those. Spanish disquiet about the new colony of Georgia (where the first British settlement was established in 1733),71 was matched by AngloFrench territorial disputes elsewhere in North America. The smuggling in breach of monopoly commercial privileges that angered the Spaniards, was in fact a problem for all states with West Indian colonies. Indeed, the British ships in the Channel that sought to prevent contraband trade with France (principally wool exports and alcohol imports) were even called in the British press guardacostas,72 the term used to describe Spanish ships ordered to prevent contraband trade in the West Indies. With the important exception of quarrels over the Asiento and the permission ship, British contraband trade with the Spanish possessions was no different to Dutch and French trade, and both these powers had significant quarrels with Spain as a result. Indeed a Dutch–Spanish conflict was believed imminent in 1738.

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Not only were the Anglo-Spanish disputes similar to others, they were also capable of diplomatic solution, and a settlement was reached with the Convention of the Pardo of 5 January 1739. Nevertheless, alongside the interdependencies of trade, including the extension of credit to the Spanish-American buyers of slaves, there was an important legacy of differences, and also of hopes of gains from Spain. A sense of Spain and particularly the Spanish empire as being weak and vulnerable had a long pedigree. Conflict, for example in 1718–20, or the prospect of war, led to an upsurge in hopes and plans. In 1720, ‘Publicus’ in the London Journal pressed for gains in South America whether Britain was at war or peace with Spain, suggesting that, if the latter, there should be a treaty clause permitting Britain to settle wherever the Spaniards did not have a settlement.73 The previous year, Martin Bladen, the key member of the Board of Trade, had argued for the capture of St Augustine, the leading French base in East Florida.74 In the 1730s, illegal British settlements on the Caribbean coast of Central America led to tension, with the Spaniards attacking Belize in 1733 and 1737. Clashes with other powers in part testified to the dynamism of British overseas trade and colonial expansion. This dynamism was impressive because these were years in which the domestic economy was, at least in relative terms compared to the latter half of the century, depressed. This was particularly true of demographic trends and of the agrarian economy. The extent to which it was still possible to see growth in the population of British North America that was greater than that in French North America was therefore striking. It also served as a crucial base for subsequent success in the mid-century conflicts in both North America and the West Indies. Canada had only about 56,000 inhabitants of French origin in 1740, whereas, by then, British North America had nearly 1 million people of European background, reflecting the willingness to accept both a high rate of migration from the British Isles and immigrants from elsewhere. Empire was etched more strongly in the British consciousness in this period than in the previous half-century, and increasingly played more than a markedly subordinate role to trade. The two were not contrasted because the British empire was seen as distinctly commercial. Indeed, the vision and, increasingly, reality of a maritime commercial empire identified the success of trade with trans-oceanic power as well as with the liberty of British politics. There was a clear sense of superiority over other empires which were presented as defined by territorial conquest and a lack of freedom. For the British, this contrast was a matter of past example and present capability. The corruptions and debilities discerned in other empires past and present were associated with a lack of liberty, and, in contrast, the British were seen as a chosen people clearly superior to other empires. Spain was increasingly seen as offering a model of imperial rule that should not be emulated.75 This contrast was taken up in the influential L’Esprit des Lois (1748) by Charles-Louis, Baron of Montesquieu, who visited England in 1729–31 and praised its constitution.76 The direct

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impact of such views on British government policy was limited, but the indirect impact, in terms of the climate of opinion, was more influential. In affecting the public parameters of debate, such ideas created a context within which government policy would be judged.

Notes 1 Molesworth to Carteret, 2 Dec. 1722, 6 Jan. 1723, NA. SP. 92/131 fols 155, 167. 2 Anon., memorandum, 20 Ap. 1729, AE. CP. 368 fol. 206. 3 G. Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700–1789 (London, 1978); C.A. Palmer, Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700–1739 (London, 1981). 4 Anon., The Occasional Writer (London, 1727), p. 25. 5 Horace Walpole to Harrington, 29 Ap. 1735, NA. SP. 84/342 fol. 157. 6 Trevor to Harrington, 13 Nov. 1739, NA. SP. 84/382 fols 91–2. 7 Horatio Walpole to Harrington, 19 July 1735, NA. SP. 84/345. 8 Waldegrave Journal, 10 Nov. 1727, Chewton; J.O. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750: A Study of the Influence of Commerce on Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1940). 9 Cobbett, vol. 9, col. 808, 14 Feb. (os) 1735; Tilson to Titley, 8 Ap. (os), 26 July (os) 1737, BL Eg. 2684; Political State of Great Britain, Jan. 1739, pp. 38–9. 10 Wych to Townshend, 13 Feb. 1728, NA. SP. 85/46 fols 42–3. 11 Townshend to Finch, 17 Dec. (os) 1728, Harrington to Finch, 17 Aug. (os) 1733, NA. SP. 95/51 fol. 32, 95/64 fol. 28; report on British complaints, 1732, Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Diplomatica, Anglica 260. 12 Allen to Delafaye, 9 Sept. 1732, NA. SP. 92/34. 13 Whitworth to Townshend, 3 May 1721, NA. SP. 90/14; R.G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy 1652–1862 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1926). 14 Re. coal exports to Russia, William Cotesworth to Edward Mawson, 6 June 1717, Gateshead, Public Library, Cotesworth papers, CP 4 no. 16. 15 Tilson to Whitworth, 16 Mar. (os) 1722, BL. Add. 37388 fols 168–9. 16 Harrington to Forbes and Rondeau, 15 Jan. (os) 1734, NA. SP. 91/16. 17 Forbes and Rondeau to Harrington, 7 Dec. 1733, Sbornik, 76, p. 149. 18 Harrington to Edward Finch, 17 July (os) 1733, NA. SP. 95/63 fol. 183. 19 Re. Ostend Company and East India trade, Robert Daniel to Waldegrave, 20 Ap. 1732, Chewton. 20 Newcastle to D’Aix, Sardinian envoy, 17 Sept. (os) 1726, Hedges to Newcastle, 21 Dec. 1726, 7 June, Newcastle to Hedges, 6 July (os) 1727, Essex to Newcastle, 13 Sept. 1734, NA. SP. 100/32, 92/31–2; G.H. Jones, ‘English Diplomacy and Italian Silk in the Time of Lombe’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 34 (1961), pp. 184–91. 21 Allen to Newcastle, 17 Feb. 1731, 9 Sept. 1732, NA. SP. 92/33 fol. 527, 92/34 fols 95–100, 92/135 fol. 170. 22 Wych to Townshend, 10 May 1728, NA. SP. 82/46 fols 85–6. 23 C. Gill, ‘The Affair of Porto Novo: An Incident in Anglo-Swedish Relations’, EHR, 73 (1958). 24 York Courant, 4 Jan. (os) 1732. 25 E. Gøbel, ‘Danish Trade to the West Indies and Guinea, 1671–1754’, Scandinavian Economic History Review, 31 (1983), pp. 21–48. 26 Titley to Harrington, 9 Feb. 1734, NA. SP. 75/63 fol. 56. 27 Finch to Harrington, 2 Jan. (os) 1739, NA. SP. 95/84; C. Koninckx, The First and Second Charters of the Swedish India Company, 1731–1766 (Courtrai, 1980).

134 1714–39 28 Harrington to Titley, 15 Oct. (os) 1734, NA. SP. 75/65 fol. 31. 29 Le Coq to Lagnasc, 9 Jan. 1725, Dresden 2673 fol. 37. 30 M. Morineau, ‘The Indian Challenge: Seventeenth to Eighteenth Centuries’, and D. Rothermund, ‘The Changing Pattern of British Trade in Indian Textiles, 1701–1757’, in S. Chaudhury and Morineau (eds), Merchants, Companies and Trade: Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 243–86. 31 Abstract of treaty and anonymous remarks on it, NA. SP. 103/107. 32 M. Huisman, La Belgique Commerciale sous l’Empereur Charles VI: La Compagnie d’Ostende (Brussels, 1902); G. Hertz, ‘England and the Ostend Company’, EHR, 22 (1907); Anon., The Importance of the Ostend Company Considered (London, 1726), p. 32. 33 Mist’s Weekly Journal, 30 July (os) 1726; Le Coq to Augustus II, 24 Dec. 1726, Dresden, 2675; Edmund Allen, consul in Naples, to Newcastle, 4 Ap. 1727, NA. SP. 93/5 fol. 121. 34 Waldegrave to Townshend, 17 July, 28 Aug. 1728, NA. SP. 80/61; Waldegrave to Horatio Walpole, 16 July 1728, Chewton. 35 Anon., The Pretensions of Don Carlos Considered (London, 1730), p. 13. 36 Anon., memorandum [1733–4], Morpeth, Northumberland CRO. 650/c/18/3 p. 19. 37 Finch to Townshend, 9 Ap. 1727, NA. SP. 88/34. 38 Hugh Thomas, Jacobite agent in London, to John, Eleventh Earl of Mar, 22 Dec. (os) 1718, RA, Stuart Papers 41/13; Townshend to Poyntz, 12 July (os) 1726, BL. Add. 49891. 39 Chesterfield to Harrington, 1 May (os) 1731, NA. SP. 84/312. 40 Harrington to Robinson, 18, 21 Jan. (os), 1, 11 Feb. (os), 4 Ap. (os) (quote), Robinson to Harrington, 23 Jan. 1732, NA. SP. 80/84–6. 41 Harrington to Robinson, 20 July (os), 17 Aug. (os), 6 Nov. (os) 1733, NA. SP. 80/97, 98, 100. 42 Robinson to Harrington, 20 Aug. 1733, NA. SP. 80/98. 43 Robinson to Harrington, 10 Mar. 1734, NA. SP. 80/104. 44 Sir James Gray to Robinson, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 2 July 1754, NA. SP. 93/13. 45 Re. coal imports, Harrington to William Finch, 9 July (os) 1734, NA. SP. 84/329 fol. 61. 46 Horatio Walpole to Trevor, 29 Sept. (os) 1738, Trevor, 14; Bladen, ‘The Matters which gave rise to the conferences at Antwerp’, NA. SP. 80/136 fols 138–47; P.G.M. Dickson, ‘English Commercial Negotiations with Austria, 1737–1752’, in A. Whiteman, J.S. Bromley and P.G.M. Dickson (eds), Statesmen, Scholars and Merchants (Oxford, 1970), pp. 81–112. 47 R.D. Bourland, Maurepas and His Administration of the French Navy on the Eve of the War of the Austrian Succession (PhD, Notre Dame, 1978). 48 Craftsman, 15 Feb. (os) 1729. 49 Horatio Walpole, Stanhope and Poyntz to Newcastle, 10 Aug. 1727, BL. Add. 32757. 50 Anon., undated memorandum, Cadogan to Stair, 4 Dec. 1716, NAS. GD. 135/147 no. 23, 135/6; Le Coq to Lagnasc, 15 Aug. 1724, Dresden 2676 III. 51 Chauvelin to Magnan, 12 June 1730, Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchevstva (148 vols, St Petersburg, 1867–1916) vol. 81, p. 47. 52 For the Canary Islands, Duc de St Aignan to Council of Marine, 15 Nov. 1717, AN. AM. B118 fol. 206. 53 George Flint to James III, 10 Mar. 1732, RA. Stuart Papers 152/23; Waldegrave Journal, 16 Oct. 1729, Chewton. 54 Chamber of Commerce to Chauvelin, 22 May 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 364; undated memoire of Mr Gregoire, deputé du commerce de Provence, AN. AM. B7 294. 55 R. Gaston, ‘La France et la politique commerciale de l’Espagne au XVIIIe siècle’, Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 6 (1959), p. 287. 56 Kinnoull to Newcastle, 6 Aug. 1731, 21 May 1733, NA. SP. 97/26 fols 239, 363; Anon., memorandum, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Nouvelles Acquisitions Françaises 7192 fol. 7.

1714–39 135 57 O. Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-colonial India (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 255–6; P. Haudrère, ‘The Compagnie des Indes Orientales’, in R. Vincent (ed.), The French in India (Bombay, 1990), p. 37. 58 Gill, ‘The Affair of Porto Novo’, pp. 53–6. 59 P.D. Hollingworth, A Study of the Policy of La Bourdonnais 1735–47 (MA, Durham, 1957). 60 Royal African Company memoranda, 4, 18 Dec. (os) 1724, 9 Sept. (os) 1725, 13, 28 Feb. (os), 4, 18 Mar. (os) 1726, Townshend to William Finch, 10 June (os) 1726, NA. SP. 35/48, 54–5, 58, 61, 84/290 fol. 194; African Company to Josiah Burchett, Joint-Secretary of the Admiralty, 28 May (os), 6 June (os), 3 Aug. (os) 1728, NA. ADM 1/3810. 61 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 29 Mar. 1733, BL. Add. 32781; Couraud to Waldegrave, 25 June (os) 1733, enclosing ‘Observating Relating to the Gum Trade’, Chewton. 62 British Journal, 11 (os) July 1724, reporting a representation from the General Assembly of South Carolina; London Evening Post, 8 Jan. (os), 5 Feb. (os) 1737; Chammorel to Dubois, 21 Jan. 1723, AE. CP. Ang. 344. 63 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 10 July 1728, Waldegrave to Chauvelin, 13 June, Waldegrave to Newcastle, 27 June 1732, BL. Add. 32756, 32777 fols 283–6. 64 Craftsman, 8 Nov. (os) 1729. 65 Bladen, then a Commissioner to the French Court, to Delafaye, 28 Oct., Daniel Pulteney to Craggs, 24 Dec. 1719, NA. SP. 78/166 fols 50, 94. 66 French memorandum, Aug. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 fols 339–46. 67 French memorandum, Feb. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 fols 89–94; Robinson to Delafaye, 4 Mar. 1730, NA. SP. 78/187. 68 D. Miquelon, New France, 1701–1744: A Supplement to Europe (Toronto, 1987); M. Giraud, A History of French Louisiana. II: Years of Transition, 1715–1717 (Baton Rouge, 1993), pp. 162–79; P.D. Woods, French-Indian Relations on the Southern Frontier, 1699–1762 (Ann Arbor, 1980), pp. 1211–46. 69 CUL. C(H) mss. 84/82. 70 CUL. C(H) mss. 84/75. 71 J.T. Lanning, The Diplomatic History of Georgia: A Study of the Epoch of Jenkins’ Ear (Chapel Hill, 1936). 72 Post Boy, 26 Mar. (os) 1731. 73 London Journal, 23 Jan. (os) 1720. 74 Bladen to James Stanhope, 16 Oct. 1719, NA. SP. 78/166 fol. 38. 75 D. Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, 2000). 76 J. Shklar, Montesquieu (Oxford, 1987), pp. 65–6. See also S. Mason, ‘Montesquieu, Europe and the Imperatives of Commerce’, British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 17 (1994), pp. 65–72.

Chapter 7

1739–63

The power and influence of this country depends upon the extent of our trade. It is that consideration that engages us in the support of the Continent; and it is for that reason that we are so strictly and I hope ever shall be united to the House of Austria. Duke of Newcastle, 17531 a war begotten of true British principles, pure commercial views. Anon., Occasional Reflections on the Importance of the War in America (London, 1758), p. 12

Attention in this period focuses on trans-oceanic issues, from the war with Spain that broke out in 1739 to the conquest of the colony of New France which culminated with the surrender of French forces at Montreal in 1760. This provides a unity to the period, but also suggests an emphasis that, while reasonable in terms of the politics of the period and its long-term significance, should not detract from the continued importance of commercial relations with Continental Europe, nor from the analytical problems they pose for the study of mid-century foreign policy. While commercial relations with Continental Europe were indeed important, the key developments, as far as trade, empire and the relevant public debate were concerned, nevertheless took place over comparable relations with the trans-oceanic world. At the outset of the period, Anglo-Spanish disputes appeared settled with the Convention of the Pardo. Neither the British nor the Spanish ministry wanted war, and Spain agreed to pay £95,000 to satisfy British claims over depredations, while the points at issue were to be settled by plenipotentiaries. The agreement, however, posed many problems. Spain had only signed it on condition that the South Sea Company paid £68,000, which was admitted to be owing to Spain, but which the Company, angry at Spanish conduct, refused to pay. This was not the first time that the Company had played a troublesome role in negotiations,2 and José Patino, the Spanish first minister, reasonably pointed out in 1733 that it would be better for Britain to

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accept an equivalent for its rights,3 although that overlooked the benefits believed to flow from the direct access to the Spanish empire. Townshend had proposed the same solution in 1728, but he was aware of its sensitivity.4 The issue of contraband in addition to the rights the British had gained under the Utrecht Settlement was particularly problematic. Given a peaceful domestic situation in Britain, a compromise could well have been made, but a diplomatic solution of commercial problems was no longer the key to the situation. Instead of being a commercial issue, the dispute became one about trade as a political weapon. The opposition was intent upon using the issue of trade both to discredit the ministry and to provoke, if possible, the weakening or disintegration of the Spanish empire. As a result, the opposition fostered unreasonable expectations, while drawing on a bitterness about Spain that reflected a quarter-century of reports of cruel Spanish depredations upon British trade in the West Indies, as well as a longer legacy of national animosity. Spain focused the political concerns of anti-Catholicism. Referring to the cases of British traders in the Caribbean, the Spanish foreign minister warned ‘we ought not to take the noise and clamour of our subjects for well-founded complaints’.5 However, a crucial element was not simply the widespread popular agitation, but, rather, its relationship to strains within the ministry and doubts within ministerial ranks in Parliament, an element that tended to be forgotten as the issue was to be presented as an instance of effective popular pressure.6 Indeed, trade with the Spanish empire was a successful political issue mainly because it could be used to focus widespread dissatisfaction and because the ministry’s field of manoeuvre was limited. As a result, the ministry felt it necessary to reverse an earlier order and to keep Admiral Haddock’s squadron in Spanish waters, the final issue that wrecked the Anglo-Spanish negotiations by leading Spain to abandon the path of compromise and negotiation.7 The outbreak of the war revealed not so much the importance of commercial considerations in the conduct of foreign policy, as the strength of defending trade as a political issue. National honour was a key opposition theme, one book, which adopted the view of a bellicose periphery, declaring the war an event so desirable and long wished for by all true Britons and particularly by the people of this island [Jamaica], who wanted nothing more than to be left at liberty to revenge the cruelties and the depredations they have so long suffered from the insulting Spaniards, through the great lenity and forbearance of the gentleman [Sir Robert Walpole] at the helm of affairs. Instead, the West Indies was seen as the place to defeat Spain.8 From the narrow commercial view, however, the opposition in 1738–9 advocated a foolish policy. In contrast, foreign policy in the 1730s had sought to favour trade by encouraging peace. This was one of the bases of Walpole’s position and he believed that peace was beneficial to the whole economy. In 1739, indeed, Walpole stated with regard to mercantile pressure for war with Spain, ‘however

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some private persons might suffer, with whatever reason they might call out for justice upon Spain, yet our pacific forbearance was the safest and wisest conduct for the general interest of a trading people’, in which view he was justified by the succeeding war. War with Spain wrecked the Old Spain trade (the trade to Spain and the Spanish empire via Spain) and did not produce the expected collapse of the Spanish empire. The war also endangered relations with France: Spain was France’s leading export market,9 as well as a dynastic partner. During the war, although attempts to strengthen Franco-Spanish commerce encountered difficulties,10 much British trade was lost to other powers;11 many British ships were taken by privateers, insurance premiums rose;12 and convoying proved difficult to arrange and contentious.13 The sailing of the merchant fleet to Portugal arranged for late 1739 was delayed for nearly a year.14 More generally, the need to offer defence against privateering affected naval deployments.15 The war led not only to a quantitative impact on trade but also to an organisational shift. The intermediary role of the Dutch revived, as trade was handled via Amsterdam.16 The war was bad for commerce, as well as being a serious challenge in both political and fiscal terms. Furthermore, Anglo-Spanish commercial differences were not settled to Britain’s satisfaction in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle that ended the war. Instead, they were left to separate negotiations that resulted in a treaty in 1750.17 Yet, however much damage the war inflicted on British trade, it was more destructive for that of its opponents, France and Spain. For example, the conflict cut short a recent increase in Franco-Russian trade,18 as the Seven Years’ War, War of American Independence, and French Revolutionary War were again to do. In 1747, the British navy inflicted serious losses on the French maritime trading system. British espionage reports noted the crisis in French commerce,19 and French ministers cited fiscal exhaustion as the reason for policy decisions.20 Government commentators made much of this issue, presenting it as an aspect of government effectiveness. In 1748, William Murray, the Solicitor General, asked in the Commons, Was not the destruction of the enemy’s commerce of great consequence to this nation in particular, as well as to the war in general? Was not the protection of our own commerce, by destroying the enemy’s privateers, of great consequence.21 Alongside the focus on empire and conflict, a good instance of the need to consider British commercial relations with Continental Europe is furnished by those with Austria, a subject generally ignored, but one of importance because of the hopes placed in it and the possible interaction with foreign policy. As such, the aspirations and negotiations provide an instance of the unpredictability of developments. In the late 1730s, it was hoped that Austria might become a major area of opportunity for British trade. In particular, there was a wish to replace the disparate tariffs of the Habsburg hereditary lands by one duty,

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payable at Trieste, and to develop the area both as a market for colonial reexports, such as sugar, and for manufactures, particularly woollen cloth, as well as a source of raw materials, particularly minerals. In 1739, a determined effort to improve the situation was made. The envoy, Thomas Robinson, supported by the specialist advice of the merchant, James Porter, pressed the Austrians to permit the development of trade between Britain and the hereditary Habsburg lands (Austria, Bohemia, Moravia) through Trieste. This would be a direct trade carried on in British ships, and would replace the indirect trade, through Hamburg and the Low Countries, and middlemen in towns such as Frankfurt, Nurnberg and Augsburg. The British hoped to export indigenous products, such as woollens, as well as colonial goods, such as sugar and tobacco. Had the scheme succeeded, it would have made Austria part of the ‘informal empire’ of British commerce, as Portugal had been since 1703. In 1736, Robinson wrote to George Tilson, ‘Believe me you may look upon Hungary as a new world’, to which the more phlegmatic Tilson replied, pointing out that increased trade depended on Austrian willingness to accept British goods.22 Britain would have purchased for a low price Austrian raw materials, such as copper and silver. The silver would have helped to finance British trade to areas with which there was a negative balance of trade, such as Russia and the East Indies. In turn, by providing a secure market for British colonial exports, British colonies would be helped against French competition. Negotiations in Vienna in 1739–40, however, revealed Austria’s determination to protect its own woollen industry, and initial British enthusiasm had waned in early 1740. Despite the desperate Austrian need for British diplomatic, financial and military assistance in 1741, first against Prussia and, then, in the face of Bavarian, French and Saxon attack, the government did not attempt to make the assistance it was willing to give, which included a substantial subsidy, conditional upon the granting of commercial concessions. The need to secure Austrian acceptance for Prussian territorial gains, in order to detach Frederick II from the French alliance system, reduced the leverage enjoyed by Britain, but this crisis also demonstrated a more general truth in Anglo-Austrian relations in the 1730s and 1740s, that commercial considerations were not foremost. Negotiations revived in 1742–3, but there was an unenthusiastic response from Vienna. The Austrians were unwilling to consider concessions. The limited impact of trade on relations was also true of British opposition to the development of new trading companies to South and East Asia,23 which did not take precedence over diplomatic priorities. Nor did competition with the Dutch East India Company play a major role in Anglo-Dutch relations, although British envoys were ready to support their own company.24 New entries challenged the profitability of existing companies, helping to depress prices and making goods from the Orient more affordable. Already, by 1730, the Dutch market for re-exports had become completely saturated.25 Hamburg was one of the leading markets for colonial products,26 and in 1753 the price of tea

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there fell as a result of sales there of cargoes imported by the Danish, Prussian and Swedish companies. Investors in the Swedish Company received high dividends. Competition was heightened by the increase in imports brought by British traders. Whereas, in the 1720s, almost 9 million pounds of tea were landed by the East India Company, by the 1750s, more than 37 million pounds came to Britain. In early 1740, the government pressed for Dutch co-operation against Dutch interlopers in this trade, who had obtained Prussian support, and thus could present themselves as benefiting from the international trading privileges of a sovereign state.27 This move, however, was swept aside in 1740 as the death of Frederick William I led to an attempt to gain the alliance of Prussia. Concern about Prussian intentions and activity strengthened from 1744 when Frederick II acquired East Friesland and, with it, Emden, a port with access to the North Sea. This indeed became a major irritant in Anglo-Prussian relations, Newcastle claiming in 1752, ‘Everybody here, and particularly the trading people of all kinds, are most zealous for taking all possible measures for discouraging, at once, the new Emden Company, as far as the Law of Nations will justify us in so doing.’ Concern led to action against insuring foreign ships sailing to the Indies and an attempt to block borrowing in London on behalf of the Company.28 Indeed the first four ships of the Emden Company were purchased in Amsterdam and England. Newcastle argued that Britain could not compromise its interests as giving up on one point would lead to a need to yield on all.29 Such quotations could be repeated, but, however, were modest in number compared with concern about Prussian opposition to Anglo-Hanoverian diplomatic intentions in Germany. Furthermore, the situation there was presented as inhibiting the prospects for action against the Emden Company, the Whitehall Evening Post of 7 April (os) 1752 carrying a Berlin report: ‘there is a very good security on the Continent that the English shall never do us any great injury at sea’. Newcastle indeed was concerned that British firmness over commercial issues would lead to a Prussian attack on Hanover.30 At the same time, the impact of political shifts on trade was complex. Given that Austria had been a difficult commercial partner in the 1730s, it was unclear that Prussian success would necessarily be detrimental for Britain as far as trade was concerned. The fate of Silesia, which Frederick II conquered in December 1740, was discussed by the British government in political terms, but there was also an important economic dimension. The linen industry had been greatly developed in recent decades in Bohemia (part of the Austrian empire) and Silesia, and competed with British linen production, affecting exports to northern Germany. Wartime disruption had an impact on British trade. It could be helpful. Silesia, for example, was the main conduit for Bohemian linen exports and, if this was closed by Austro-Prussian confrontation, then the results might well be beneficial to Britain. On the other hand, war affected the strength of the market for British exports and also the security and stability of commercial and financial arrangements. Furthermore, Anglo-Austrian trade continued to be

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an unresolved issue of difficulty despite the need to co-operate in political and military matters.31 The interrelationship of commercial and political considerations was also shown in Anglo-Swedish relations.32 These deteriorated in the late 1730s, as Sweden moved closer to France, and were broken off in 1741–2, a period in which Sweden attacked Russia. At that time, there was particular interest in Britain in the long-discussed idea that naval supplies from the North American colonies could replace imports from Sweden, particularly tar, the production of which had been built up in the 1730s, in part as a result of the granting of subsidies to New England production from 1729.33 However, despite concern in Sweden about imports from North America, there was no such chance of comparable substitution for Swedish iron,34 while the transport costs of colonial tar were far higher and, as a result, the navy, which preferred Swedish tar, opposed the subsidies. This ensured that there was a major dispute over policy within Britain, with the Board of Trade subject to contrary pressures. Bristol merchants, for example, supported colonial production. Further complications included concern about the quality of colonial tar, with the government unable to ensure that it was satisfactory, while privateering during the war made the trade less profitable as freight rates and insurance rose. Instead, it became more profitable to export indigo from South Carolina, as it was a lighter good for the same value, while production there developed as a substitute for imports from the French West Indies.35 The difficulties of substitution have to be set alongside the readiness to use it as a threat in negotiations with foreign powers.36 Once peace had been negotiated with France and Spain in 1748, it was necessary to respond to foreign attempts to strengthen economies by protectionism while, at the same time, seeking to strengthen the British economy by a great range of legislation, including measures to encourage fishing and manufacture and to naturalise foreign Protestants.37 In the Austrian dominions, Charles VI’s plans for commercial growth, based on protectionism and economic integration, were revived, to the detriment of foreign merchants. Most protectionist legislation was not aimed specifically against Britain but, instead, reflected a general competitiveness. Keene reported from Spain in 1749 his suspicion that ‘here is more inclination to lop off as many privileges as they can, from every nation that has trade and treaties with them, than to show any partiality or predilection to them’,38 and indeed the French complained about moves against their trade.39 Furthermore, there was a widespread reluctance to abandon restrictions. This reflected both the authoritarian character of government and a lack of belief in the merits of free trade. Involved in intractable commercial negotiations with the Dutch, the French foreign minister wrote in 1754 that cutting duties never increased consumption.40 Furthermore, in a clear contrast to the situation in Britain, works on economic matters that irritated its French counterpart, in 1754 an Essai sur les intérêts du commerce maritime, could be banned.41 British co-operation with other commercial powers against protectionist legislation was generally implausible in light of competition and of hostility

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towards British commercial strength. The weakening of Anglo-Dutch political links made such a strategy impossible. Commercial issues played a role, and the British envoy Joseph Yorke noted that the French government treated Dutch commercial interests favourably,42 and the Dutch were keen to negotiate a trade treaty with France,43 although the French found the Dutch difficult to deal with. Again, however, political issues were foremost in British policy, not least the tensions in Anglo–Dutch–Austrian relations over the Austrian Netherlands.44 Newcastle was concerned about the possible political consequences of Dutch–French trade talks, particularly the issue of wartime neutral shipping rights.45 This was to play a major role in tensions between Britain and Continental powers, especially during the War of American Independence, but also with the USA during the conflicts with France in 1793–1815, helping cause the War of 1812. The seizure of Dutch shipping without compensation for trading with France in the War of the Austrian Succession was, despite governmental efforts,46 contentious at the time and rankled with the Dutch thereafter.47 Conversely, British commentators complained about neutral trade, the Royal Magazine of January 1761 claiming that, while the national debt mounted, neutral ‘Holland and Denmark, and other states, have been avoiding such expenses and enriching themselves by commerce, often enlarged to our prejudice, and sometimes even by the greatly serving of our declared enemies’.48 Five years earlier, Robert, Fourth Earl of Holdernesse, the Secretary of State for the Northern Department, outlined the British view that neutral trade was crucial to French and, therefore British warmaking: The support of the freedom of navigation, as artfully insinuated and coloured by France, is an argument by which that power means to lead all neutral states to carry on her commerce, and enable her to increase her military marine force, or to engage them, if that should be prevented, in an open opposition to the English fleet. In a war with France, the greatest hope of successes we can have arises from the distress which the superiority of our navy may give to the commerce, and consequently to the resources of France. You cannot but see how French insinuations will operate in regard to all trading powers.49 The issue of neutral trade helped weaken Britain’s diplomatic position. Colonial conquests accentuated this problem. Indeed, in the crucial Council meeting held to discuss war with Spain in 1761, William, Lord Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, opposed any declaration of war on the grounds that it would make all neutral maritime powers think that Britain was trying to destroy them.50 This issue was ventilated in public. For example, the Monitor of 7 November 1761 reported that France was trying to gain allies ‘by instilling into them jealousy and fear; alleging that Britain will engross all the trade; all the wealth, and thereby be able to give laws to all Europe’. British diplomats were frequently instructed to protect merchants and their

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interests. In 1748, for example, the consul at the important Italian port of Livorno was ordered to preserve British commercial privilege from any innovations whatever, and his efforts were supplemented by Horace Mann, the envoy in Florence. The following year, John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, instructed Benjamin Keene, envoy in Madrid, to ‘insist that the trade between the two nations should be on the same footing, as it was before the war’.51 In 1752, complaints by the Factory in Lisbon about Portuguese attempts to prevent the export of specie led to the dispatch of Tyrawly on a special mission. He reported that the merchants had been unduly concerned,52 but merchant complaints about Portuguese restrictions and competition continued and the press picked up the theme.53 That year, Newcastle moved to protect the export of paper hangings to Russia. The following year, he noted the impact of domestic pressures, when, writing to the envoy in Vienna, concerning the situation in the Austrian Netherlands, ‘our manufacturers in Yorkshire are already full of complaints upon this head; and if they were, by such a convention, to be precluded from all hopes of redress, there would be no standing their importunities’.54 Passing through Brussels on his way back from Hanover in 1752, Newcastle had been very dissatisfied in his discussions with ministers there about the tariff.55 Trade and foreign policy were brought into another relationship by the government’s use of subsidy treaties in order to establish and strengthen an international system, a policy championed by Newcastle. This required not only buoyant public finances that, in part, were dependent on customs revenue, but also the availability of the specie required for these treaties. Thus positive trade balances were necessary for foreign policy. In turn, the fiscal demands created pressure both within the ministry and in the public debate. The link between trade, finances and the ability to pursue a foreign policy was a given, not only for Britain but also for other states.56 Within Britain, expenditure on foreign subsidies was a sensitive topic, suggesting to critics a false politics driving public finances.57 Newcastle, in contrast, presented his interventionist European system and the subsidies it entailed as part of a system whose goals included the preservation of colonial ‘trade and possessions’.58 Once in office during the Seven Years’ War, and responsible for defending the alliance with Prussia, William Pitt the Elder was also to push this interpretation, but, as a peacetime policy, it was at best controversial. In the long term, Britain gained from her colonial struggles in the mid-eighteenth century. They entailed large-scale conflict, but there was also a related aggressive commercial dimension. For example, the British used the Portuguese colony of Sacramento on the north bank of the Plate estuary as a base for contraband trade with Spanish America.59 Thanks to success in mid-century conflicts, by the Peace of Paris in 1763, Canada was British, India in the British sphere of influence, and Spain humbled. The benefits of empire are difficult to evaluate. Not all contemporaries thought these conquests worth the heavy cost while, more commonly, people wanted others to bear the burden. The decision

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to fight Spain in 1739 was a mistake, as Britain was not strong enough to confront both Spain and her French ally successfully, and as these powers could play the Jacobite card, as France did in 1744 and, in response to Jacobite action, 1745–6. More generally, British commerce suffered losses but also won opportunities from gaining trade and empire through conflict. Rivalry and confrontation had led to conflict. Public interest in, and understanding of, colonial and commercial issues owed much to a strong sense of rivalry with France and Spain, and this sense helped frame the public debate over policy. A perspective focused on rivalry provided the way to interpret developments across the world, not only on the oceans and their coasts, but also far from them. In the interior of North America, merchants trading among Native groups West of the Appalachians competed with the French. This became a more insistent process from the 1720s, when the British established temporary posts on the upper Ohio River and on an eastern tributary of the Wabash River, while, in 1725, the Iroquois permitted the Governors of New York to construct a stone fort at Oswego, the first British base on the Great Lakes. This trade, which expanded the imperial presence and was crucial to the outbreak of Anglo-French hostilities in 1754–5, was possible thanks to an oceanic commercial system. The inexpensive rum available at Oswego had come from the West Indies. The ability to profit from multiple links was central to the success of European trading systems. To a considerable extent, effective imperial regulation sought to foster such multiple linkages, albeit within a political context that placed a high premium not only on the role of government, but also on a regulatory system that presumed international competition and therefore sought to foster protectionism. Part of the system was underpinned by the slave trade, and this brought commerce and empire closely together, the trade indeed acting as an enabler of empire. From the 1740s, Liverpool took the leading position in the trade from Bristol, and by 1752 it had 88 slavers, with a combined capacity of over 25,000 slaves. For British merchants, the core trade was that of selling slaves to their own colonies. Most slaves transported by the British went to the West Indies, but many also went to North America. The number of slaves there rose from about 20,000 in 1700 to over 300,000 by 1763, particularly as first South Carolina and then Georgia were developed as plantation economies, supplementing those on the Chesapeake. In South Carolina and Georgia, rice became an additional plantation crop. The slave trade was integral to the commercial economy and shipping world of the British Atlantic, crucial to entrepreneurial circles in Britain, and to the financial world there, and had a range of influences elsewhere in Britain, particularly, but not only, in the ports. For example, profits accumulated in Glasgow from sugar and tobacco trading helped fund the development of the chemical industry in west central Scotland, and also increased the liquidity of Scottish banks. It would not have benefited the slaves to know that they were part of a more dynamic economic system in which consumerism, capital accumulation, and investment in industrialisation were all linked. Not

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only were the large ports of Liverpool, Bristol, Glasgow and London involved in the trade, but also smaller ports, such as Barnstaple, Bideford, Dartmouth, Exeter, Lancaster, Plymouth, Poole, Topsham and Whitehaven. The role of the smaller ports helped spread the impact of the slave trade on the British economy. Returns from slave-trading ventures were risky, but also sufficiently attractive to keep some existing investors in the trade and to entice new investors to join up; and the returns could enable men of marginal status to prosper sufficiently to enter the merchant class. Furthermore, the triangular pattern of Atlantic trade – goods, both British manufactures and imports, such as East India Company textiles, from Britain to Africa; slaves thence to the New World; and colonial products, such as sugar and tobacco, back to Britain – was practicable for small-scale operators, as the outlay of funds required was less than for the trade to the more distant East Indies. The triangular trade also offered considerable flexibility, so that, for example, when sugar became harder to obtain from the West Indies, Lancaster’s traders found other imports in which to invest their proceeds from slave sales, particularly mahogany, rum and dyewoods, each of which was in demand in Britain. This enabled them to maximise their profits on each leg of their enterprise, which was particularly important for marginal operators trading in a competitive field, while, when competition did eventually make the slave trade less viable at Lancaster, the contracts and experiences forged by the African trade meant that other opportunities were on offer to merchants. The triangular trade was not the sole commercial system that was developed to help finance and exploit slavery. Supplying food and other products to the slave plantations was also important, and, for the British, this included the development of a trade in salt cod from Newfoundland, both to the West Indies and to Charleston, the port for South Carolina. Food was shipped from the Thirteen Colonies to the British West Indies. The colonial contribution included slaving from Rhode Island. The slave trade, nevertheless, involved serious commercial risks, created for example by a lack of sufficient slaves or, alternatively, by the glutting of markets. The trade was expensive to enter while, on the whole, it did not bring great, or even any, profits, which may explain why the majority of British ships involved made only one voyage in the trade, and, indeed, for Britain, as for other countries, the individual merchant and voyage is a key context for consideration. Bristol merchants in the early 1730s were hit by shortages of slaves, falling profits on colonial re-exports, as prices dropped, and deteriorating relations with Spain. Whitehaven merchants largely abandoned the trade after 1769. More generally, concern about the profitability of the trade was a major factor in the pronounced variation in the number of voyages per year from individual ports. Profitability was also hit by the human cost of slavery, in the shape of the frequently (although not invariably) high death-rate on the Atlantic crossing. If, with time, the percentage who died fell appreciably, this was owing to shorter journey times, rather than improved conditions. Slaver captains were

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less interested in slaves’ survival than slave-owners were. There was little interest in costly medical care. Many of the officers and crew involved in the trade also died, in part as a consequence of their exposure to tropical disease.60 This was a commercial system that profited from expansion as it brought new areas into the system of multiple linkages. A functional interpretation of imperial expansion, however, would be misleading as, despite the memoranda received from projectors, there was no master-plan on the part of government, nor indeed of major politicians. The War of Jenkins’ Ear began with bold talk about gains from the Spanish empire, but these were proved fruitless by failure in 1741. Instead of conquests from Spain, ideas of gains from France in Canada developed in the aftermath of the capture of Louisbourg in 1745; only to fall victim in 1746–7 to a concentration on goals in the war with France on the European Continent. This extended to the peace settlement, with Louisbourg returned in 1748 as part of an agreement in which French gains in the Low Countries, as well as of Madras in India from the East India Company, were restored to the Allies. This restoration clashed with the public call for ending the North American question. The Westminster Journal of 6 February (os) 1748, a copy of which was acquired by the French government, argued that, thanks to its island character, Britain was safe from French attack, but that North American colonies were not, Whatever the creed of some persons may be, mine, that of the British Americans, and of all Englishmen who judge with knowledge and impartiality, is that to people and secure New Scotland [Nova Scotia], to reduce Canada, and open a communication betwixt our settlements in Hudson’s Bay and those on the Ocean, should be one of the principal objects in view in a war against France. Let us turn out these bad neighbours while we have power and lawful authority . . . It is of much more concern to us than who has the possession of Italy, I had almost said of the Netherlands.61 Indeed, although the French government remained focused on Europe, there were also signs of increased French interest in the strategic issues of the New World, not least in the possibilities of attacking there in order to harm British interests.62 Because the War of the Austrian Succession had ended without victory for either power, the peace settlement encapsulated compromise not only in its clauses but also in a more general acceptance that difficult issues should be postponed, in part by leaving them to Commissioners. St Severin, the key French negotiator, told Sandwich, his British counterpart, ‘that if we are to ascertain our right to our possessions in particular, they must do the same with regard to theirs, which will lead us into a discussion too tedious for our present circumstances’.63 While necessary in the short term, this expedient, however, sowed the ground for further dispute, not least because a ‘forward’ policy was to be followed by both sides in North America, eroding the basis for any buffer zone of ambiguity. In 1748, this issue focused on the Neutral Islands in the

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West Indies, with an Anglo-Spanish equivalent in the Asiento,64 but, in the event, the North American interior was the eventual cause of conflict. In the Seven Years’ War, initial British hopes in 1754–6 of gains were more modest than they had been against Spain in 1739, necessarily so because Britain was not formally at war with France. In turn, the outbreak of formal hostilities in 1756 led to an initial stage of failure in both the Mediterranean, where Minorca was lost that year, and in North America. Failure in Minorca in 1756 provoked a political crisis, with London presenting an Address critical of the government to George II on 20 August, and this climaxed with the fall of the government. The opening stage of the war thus appeared to demonstrate the validity of pre-war concerns about French strength and developments. Peace and war combined to suggest a serious shift in relative position as well as a crisis in British society and governance.65 The severity of the anxieties helps explain the joy with which eventual success was greeted, and also the inclusive nature of a patriotism that was far less partisan than the earlier use of patriotic arguments and images to attack the Walpole ministry. From 1758, there was a synergy of success in the war and the articulation of hopes for territorial gains, a synergy exploited by Pitt, a Secretary of State from 1757 to 1761, not least in the fashioning of his reputation both then and subsequently,66 with trans-oceanic successes seen as crucial to a strategy for the defeat of France that encompassed diplomatic and military policies toward the Continent. This was a strategy pressed by Frederick II of Prussia when, in 1756, he urged an attack on the French in the West Indies in order to divert their attention.67 Success and hopes joined to create political and public expectations that helped drive foreign policy, as was seen in 1761 in the abortive peace talks with France. The response to these expectations, however, was important to the division of the ministry over peace terms with France and Spain in 1761 and 1762. Furthermore, the claim that the terms had been too generous to the defeated Bourbon powers provided the main charge against Bute’s ministry in 1762–3 and helped discredit the reach by the new king, George III, for the Patriot cause. Empire thus became a major theme in foreign policy in this period in a way that it had certainly not been in 1714–38, and had only been to a limited extent thereafter. Discussion of imperial issues was made more difficult because the ministers and officials in London had no direct experience of the empire. Nor was there a plethora of information, although there were important improvements, for example in cartography and in publications about the transoceanic world. The lack of information made it difficult to assess ideas and probe options and left government exposed to those who claimed expertise, whether pressing their case from London or from the periphery. Considering in 1755 how best to settle disputes with Spain over the cutting of logwood on the Caribbean coast of Central America, Benjamin Keene could not conceive any other method than that of calling for such people as Alderman Baker and his friends who know by practical experience the

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whole scope and nature of this logwood business, recommending to them the form of as many proposals as they can prudently imagine or to serve instead of another in case the more advantageous ones can not pass. That these projects after being examined in Council may be remitted to me with proper instructions and authority.68 Baker (1705–70) was a prime example of the London merchant-politicians who played a major role in linking the worlds of government, trade and empire. The eldest son of a London draper, he was very active in trading with North America, not least with New York, and was also a major entrepreneur, buying land in Georgia and South Carolina. A Director of the East India Company with short gaps from 1741 to 1753, he was its Chairman in 1749–50 and 1752–3, as well as Deputy Governor of the Hudson’s Bay Company from 1750 to 1760, and its Governor from then to his death. An Alderman of London from 1739, and an MP from 1747 to 1768, he bought a country estate in 1757 and was knighted in 1760. Baker played a role as a government contractor, victualling and paying troops in Nova Scotia from 1746, and was regularly consulted by Newcastle on colonial matters. Considered by Charles, Second Marquess of Rockingham, head of the ministry in 1765–6, as a possible head of the Board of Trade in 1765, he advised Rockingham on the repeal of the Stamp Act. Some advisers can be considered more on the lines of projectors, and indeed imperial expansion proved a key focus for such individuals. This was true in particular of land speculation on the American frontier, a major source of tension in relations with the French and the Native Americans, and eventually between the colonists and the British government. Latin America was another sphere for projects. In 1762, Arthur Dobbs, Governor of North Carolina since 1754, offered a scheme for the improvement of the New World under the aegis of Britain and to her profit, a project he had backed in various forms for years, to publish manifestos in the Spanish tongue on landing . . . declaring the Spanish colonies free states to be governed by laws framed by themselves after the model of British liberty under the protection of Britain as a perpetual ally with a free trade most favourable to Britain . . . and to retain, as cautionary pledges of the future friendship and fidelity of those colonies, Vera-Cruz, Havana, Portobello and the isthmus of Darien, Carthagena, Hispaniola and the other Spanish islands. Spanish Florida to be entirely ceded to Britain . . . to send missionaries to civilize and Christianize the natives where the Spaniards have no settlements and to form them into regular polities under the direction of governors truly Christian and educated for that purpose in Britain at the expense of the public.69 Such plans reflected the problem of colonial expansion involving the acquisition of already-settled European colonies. The prime example was the gain of

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Quebec in 1759–60, where indeed there were to be important compromises with the local politico-religious culture, although not in the shape of the independence envisaged by Dodds for Spanish America. The presence of established European settler colonies serves as a reminder of the variety of problems faced in British colonial expansion. It was possible to evict the Acadians from Nova Scotia,70 but nothing on that scale could be envisaged for large colonies. Territorial expansion in India brought a different form of compromise, but again one that was varied in character. The gain of tax-gathering authority in Bengal was an important example of the overlapping interests of money, trade and empire, interests that joined distant lands to the hub of speculation, debate and power in London. Governmental and public sensitivity to imperial issues rose in mid-century, with a conscious echo being offered of the rivalry of Carthage and Rome, one indeed picked up in France.71 Economic competition led to the foundation of the Anti-Gallican Association in 1745, a body that joined manufacturing and trade in its goals. Through design, this competition was linked to aesthetic rivalry which was given economic point through a conscious process of public support, particularly by the Society of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce.72 Enthusiasm for imperial expansion reflected both political positioning, and the strengthening of the public engagement with such expansion as a way to ensure commercial strength and maritime destiny. In part, this running together of ‘an empire of the seas’ with territorial empire represented a conflation that posed serious problems in policy as well as conception, and it is necessary to be cautious in presenting an undifferentiated account, not least because pre-war interest in territorial expansion was relatively limited.73 Indeed war helped foster ambitions, not only at the governmental level, but also in terms of public discussion. This argument is not intended to deny the value of linking expansionism to socio-cultural shifts, including a growing assertiveness on the part of the expanding middling orders and the accompanying repositioning of trade as a political interest and sphere of discussion.74 However, there is a need for specificity, specifically chronological, but also with respect to particular spheres for expansion and different mercantile interests.75 The relationship between the latter and expansion was complex, not only due to these differences, but also because merchants were wary of the burdens that might arise. The extent, therefore, to which rivalry with France provided a common issue, linking diplomatic, mercantile, imperial and cultural anxieties and themes, and resonating them with a strong context of popular assumptions, was important, as it made it possible to minimise tensions between these different themes. In part, this reflected France’s greater prominence. Her commercial and colonial revival, and the failure of the Dutch or Spain to match these, was important; as was the extent to which an easing of Anglo-Spanish political and commercial tensions after the War of the Austrian Succession helped throw the focus on France and thus encourage an important shift in the public imagination of Britain as an imperial power.

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In 1752, instructions were sent to complain about depredations on British trade in the West Indies, but the government blamed independent initiatives by the Spaniards there, rather than the policies of the Spanish government.76 More seriously, despite an interest in the Pacific, seen for example in the publication of Thomas Astley’s New General Collection of Voyages and Travels (1745), and complaints about Spanish policy, for example in the Old England of 30 May (os) 1752,77 as well as Newcastle’s concern about ‘a great noise . . . will have a very bad effect, if not timely prevented’,78 the public agitation failed to take over the political agenda. The same article in the Old England tried to revive memories of past Dutch cruelties to British merchants in the East Indies and India, but this argument now lacked potency. The focus, instead, was on France. Indeed, on 8 August (os) 1752, Old England carried an extract from a letter from ‘a person of note in Nova Scotia’ discussing the danger of French schemes. The theme of conquering the Spanish Main declined and, instead, the focus was on North America. There, the apparently imperilled fate of the British colonists ensured that themes of liberty, Protestantism and Britain under challenge, could lend popular interest to the more abstruse issues of borders and Native American allegiances. The energies of the colonists thus led British governmental and public concerns into the interior of North America,79 at the same time that the ability of the British state to direct activities there was limited. Indeed the latter created a major geographical tension within the British empire (one that was to be confirmed in 1783),80 adding a spatial dimension to the regulatory disputes that were to become increasingly important. The theme of liberty under challenge even extended to non-British Catholics, for commentators agreed that, once conquered by France in 1756, Minorca was oppressed, in contrast to ‘the [earlier] mildness and freedom of the English government’.81 Chronological precision is usually provided by charting shifts in popular attitudes towards the trans-oceanic world. There has been particular interest in the consequences of the fall of Louisbourg in 1745, with optimism, opportunity and then, with its return to France as part of the peace settlement, disappointment, combining to lend popular enthusiasm and political point to interest in North America and, specifically, the Anglo-French axis of confrontation that spanned Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Island. This provided a key focus of post-war attention.82 If conflict was to break out in the Ohio Valley in 1754, it followed, in 1755, in this region, and much of the background of tension occurred there. Alongside this populist, and thus apparently democratic, approach to imperial ambition, comes another suggesting a more top–down direction, with the key element being the 1745 Jacobite rising. This altered the relationship between metropole and periphery, pushing authority, borders and force to the forefront and leading to a militarisation of aspects of the imperial presence associated in particular with the army under William, Duke of Cumberland, an opponent of the ‘Patriot’ politicians who had earlier pressed for ‘blue water’ conflict with Spain. The army’s prestige rose as a result of its role in defeating

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the Jacobites while, in Highland Scotland, a state-directed attempt was made, under the Annexing Act of 1752, to use sequestered estates to fund economic and social modernisation. Protégés of the Duke were given authority in Gibraltar, Minorca and Nova Scotia, and Cumberland’s support for a forward policy in North America proved important in the escalation of tension with France in 1755.83 In 1749, Captain Robert Hodgson, an army officer, was appointed the first Superintendant of the Mosquito Shore, and thus the first British official on the Latin American mainland. This argument prefigures the comparable emphasis on the role of the military and associated landed values in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic period.84 Cumberland’s interest in 1748 in putting a British garrison into Ostend as part of a peace settlement was symptomatic of his concern with security not trade. To him, Ostend was important as part of the ‘Barrier’ system of fortifications for the Austrian Netherlands against French attack, and also as a possible port for an invasion of Britain, and not as a commercial centre. He argued that Britain could have won Dutch consent to the scheme ‘if we had engaged ourselves that it should not be looked upon as a port of trade, but considered only as a barrier’.85 A focus on Cumberland ensures that trade and empire are disaggregated, just as are navy and army (although the distinctions are not co-terminous). Furthermore, this interpretation serves as an important reminder that Scotland and Ireland served as seedbeds for empire and, more particularly, imperial careers; just as expatriate Scots had played a similar role for foreign empires, particularly that of Sweden in northern Europe.86 For those who could accommodate themselves to the Hanoverian regime, the British empire offered unprecedented opportunities. However, both in terms of British governmental policy and with reference to English entrepreneurship, Scotland and Ireland were not comparably significant for trade. Nor did they act as seedbeds for a particular trajectory in trans-oceanic trade. An either/or approach focusing on populist or governmental trajectories for imperialism is inappropriate, as different narratives of power, intention and activity were enacted at the same time and within a context of adversarial domestic politics and unpredictable international tensions. In the 1740s, 1750s and 1760s, this left Britain with a legacy of gain that appears more coherent in retrospect than was the case at the time. Indeed, this was made readily apparent by the divisions in 1762 over whether to retain Canada or the West Indian sugar islands Martinique and Guadeloupe when making peace with France. A different instance of variety challenging coherence is provided by the concern about Spanish depredations in 1752–3. It is easy to ignore such concern because it led ‘nowhere’. The two powers did not go to war again until 1762, and then because of dynastic and geopolitical, not commercial, factors. Pressure on space and an implicit teleology ensures that this concern is ignored and, instead, that the focus is on Anglo-French differences, which, indeed, were to be more important. This neglects the attempt by opposition commentators to exploit the issue, Old England calling on 30 September 1752 for a petition to

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Parliament by the West India merchants. The political resonance was explicit. The issue provided Old England with an opportunity to present the Pelham ministry as a continuation of that of Walpole and also to charge it with betraying national interests in the peace negotiations in 1748 and in the commercial treaty of October 1750, in which the Spanish claim to a right to search British merchantmen had not been explicitly denied.87 The ministers had already been attacked unsuccessfully by the opposition on this point in the Commons in January 1751. To underline the charge of failing to defend interests, Old England on 14 October 1752 published the 1670 Anglo-Spanish treaty.88 The issue was linked to the British presence in Central America, which was not accepted by Spain. Sir Thomas Robinson, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, warned that any Spanish attack there would wreck relations. Indeed, he claimed that if the ministry showed confidence in the Spanish foreign minister, it would be ‘misconstrued here by the many’.89 The failure of this public campaign echoed that in 1729 and contrasted with the success of public pressure in helping limit government options in 1739. The role of political circumstances emerges clearly in contrasting these episodes. These circumstances focused on tensions within the ministry, and the extent to which domestic and international developments interacted to pose embarrassment for government. In 1752, there was no such interaction: the ministry was too strong, while Spanish policy was not particularly hostile to Britain. Newcastle himself was determined to have ‘redress’ and ready to consider letters of reprisal.90 An ability to assuage mercantile complaints was considered important in achieving the ministerial goal of preventing complaints to Parliament.91 As far as Anglo-French relations were concerned, there was a mismatch between public concerns and those of British diplomacy. Newspaper agitation about trans-oceanic competition was strong from the late 1740s, the return of Louisbourg providing a particular issue of contention. In contrast, the focus for George II and Newcastle, the key figures in foreign policy, was on Europe, specifically policy in Germany, particularly the Imperial Election Scheme and the nature of Franco-Prussian relations.92 This was accentuated by George’s visits to Hanover in 1748, 1750 and 1752 and by the panic about a possible Prussian attack there in 1753. In comparison, concerns about the Canadian frontier seemed very distant. If the Board of Trade report in July 1753 of news of French moves to build forts on the Ohio River represented a quickening in tone, the pressure of reports, rumours and concerns continued to ensure a focus on Central Europe. Furthermore, North America was but one sphere of concern about French moves: the re-fortification of Dunkirk and the status of the Neutral Islands in the West Indies also caused concern in 1753, and the former seemed more immediate than developments in North America.93 The crisis of 1756, when British policy was overturned by the collapse of the diplomatic system, and by naval and military failure in the Mediterranean and North America, amply revealed the interaction between European and transoceanic policies, an interaction that created problems of understanding for min-

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isters and commentators, and that revealed faultlines in British politics. This interaction had already been indicated, however, by the possibility that transoceanic difficulties would weaken the British position in Europe. In 1753, the Austrian Chancellor told the British envoy that France was to send forces to India and was also thinking of attacking Britain’s North American colonies and of sending firearms to the Native Americans.94 As far as foreign policy was concerned, the British approach both in Europe and in the colonies was fundamentally defensive. So was that of France. Nevertheless, particular interest groups felt that the status quo was inherently unstable, and, once war had broken out, this view became more general. The pressure for colonial gain, for what the Westminster Journal, on 1 April (os) 1749, termed ‘the principle of take and hold in America’, was indeed wider in its origin than a governmental shift in favour of a foreign policy of imperial strength. London newspaper reports about commercial and colonial interests were spread across the country by their circulation and by being reprinted in provincial newspapers.95 The theme was one of competition. The Newcastle Journal of 15 August (os) 1752 carried a London item that included ‘We see some considerable branches of our commerce decaying, a great spirit in foreigners to invade others, and a strange relaxation where the utmost vigour ought to be wished.’ Provincial newspapers added items of their own. Offering an account of attempts to discover the North-West Passage to the Pacific, to the north of North America, a route that would be free of Spanish pretensions of ownership, the Newcastle Journal of 19 January 1754 declared, As nothing is of greater service to nations whose strength and riches depend on commerce, than an exact description of the sea-coasts and ports of the habitable world; we cannot in justice but own our obligation to every discovery that contributes anything towards it: and we heartily wish the example of the industrious captain in the following account, may animate every English sailor to exert all his endeavours in the improvement of that, on which his own preservation so much depends, as well as the trade and honour of his country. The Seven Years’ War was about not only what Voltaire termed the wastes of Canada, but also its furs, the fish of Newfoundland, and, eventually, the sugar of the West Indies, and the trade of West Africa and India. Colonial and commercial interests were seen as mutually dependent. Newcastle emphasized the need to regain Minorca on the grounds that it was necessary for British trade,96 while the slave stations in Africa were seen as ‘the vitals of our West Indian islands’.97 This was the war of a society that understood the politics of economic competition. Conquests served the interests of state and nation, with commercial groups important in the articulation of benefit.98 The policy of navy, trade and empire was also popular. The well-connected Sardinian envoy reported that George II and many of the ministers wanted peace, but that the nation regarded North

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America as the key branch of trade, not least because it took a lot of British manufactures. A critical Newcastle referred to ‘popular maritime expeditions’.99 Nevertheless, pressure for gain had to overcome governmental anxiety about international consequences, particularly the vulnerability of Hanover, and also concern about financial implications.100 It was fear about loss, not the drive for gain, that was crucial in leading to the eventual decision for hostilities. Frederick II offered a self-interested perspective, but one that had political weight, when he claimed early in 1754 that British concerns about French intentions in India and French works at Dunkirk would direct British policy because the government would have to refer these ‘national’ issues to Parliament.101 At that stage, conflict appeared most likely as the result of a dispatch of warships to the Indian Ocean, and newspapers focused on this issue.102 The French foreign minister pressed for the British government to fulfil its peaceful assurances over the issue.103 The dependence of trade and credit on peace was shown by the major fall in the stocks of the French East India Company when news arrived of British naval preparations.104 Diplomats saw the issue as demonstrating the willingness of merchants to pursue unreasonable fears and interests,105 but concern over the intentions of rivals was the key element. In the event, hostilities were to arise because of tension in another area where the indirect imperial presence became an issue of state power and public concern – the lands across the Appalachians. Ministers did not appreciate that maintaining British interests would lead to a protracted war, and, at that stage, there was no goal other than protecting rights and possessions,106 within a context in which French policy could be seen in terms of a desire to seize the trade of North America as a stage in dominating all the world’s foreign trade.107 By 1761, in contrast, bold commentators could respond to the issue of whether Britain should retain Canada or Caribbean gains by calling for the retention of both.108 Indeed there were calls for additional conquests, including Louisiana.109 Naval dominance and colonial conquest had transformed the situation, and were seen as likely to force France to a disadvantageous peace. The public sensitivity toward maritime issues was underlined in the early 1760s by demands that France be excluded from the Newfoundland fisheries, demands that the British negotiator of the eventual treaty, John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, did not accept.110 These fisheries were widely presented as a nursery of seamen and a source of wealth, and also served for the raising of serious charges about past concessions on the issue. Aside from references to ‘treachery’ at the time of Utrecht,111 there was the wider question of the ability of the executive to concede national rights, a clear contrasting of Crown and nation.112 In comparison to the attention devoted to the New World, far less note was taken of developments in India. There, after Robert Clive’s victory at Plassey in 1757, the East India Company with difficulty consolidated its position in Bengal, while the French were defeated in southern India. In December 1761, John Johnstone wrote from Calcutta, ‘The Company are now in the highest pitch of glory, possessors or lords of almost half Hindostum!’113

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The prospect, and then, in 1762, reality, of Spanish entry into the war on the side of France helped expand the range of British ambition, but also posed the question of the purpose of any gains. John Molesworth, a Tory politician in Cornwall, regarded conquests in Spanish America as a ‘wild’ project, as ‘we could neither hold nor cultivate them without exhausting and depopulating the Mother Country’. Instead, he saw the capture of leading positions there as designed to force Spain to abandon France. Molesworth also offered an organic image of the role of trade: ‘I consider Spain as having a dominion so extensive to defend, every part of that . . . no less essential to the general system of her trade than arteries to the human frame.’114 Robert, Fourth Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, referred in 1761 to the profit that is made by the almost total annihilation of the trade of France, and the great probability there is, by the decided superiority of His Majesty’s force at sea, that many valuable conquests might still be made upon the enemy, so as to reduce her to seek for peace, from an inability of carrying on the war.115 The crucial character of trade and credit to the continuation of the conflict was a theme that was fairly widespread, and led to the conviction that France would have to leave the war.116 Indeed, financial problems helped lead France to press Spain for a loan117 as a central part of the new alignment between the two powers in 1761. As a vindication of the British emphasis on naval success, the Spanish government refused to agree until the silver shipments from Spanish America arrived.118 In the event, it refused.119 Trade’s importance to this alliance was further demonstrated by plans to undermine the trade on which Britain’s credit depended by putting pressure on Naples, Tuscany and Portugal. Choiseul, the French foreign minister, argued that if this entailed an attack on Portugal, there should be one on Brazil’s major port, Rio, at the same time.120 These ideas looked toward the Continental blockade on Britain imposed by Napoleon. There was a clear intention to damage the British economy, and John, Third Earl of Bute, George III’s key adviser, remarked of the Spanish threat to Portugal, ‘the safety of Portugal is most essential to the interest of this country’.121 Choiseul wanted Spain to enter the conflict as soon as possible in order to make it difficult for the British government to raise the funds necessary for 1762.122 There was also support for an attack on Jamaica, a key British colony.123 In Britain, during the Seven Years’ War, as a result of government politics and strategic policy, commitment to the Continent was placed alongside interest in empire, in an allegedly mutually supportive relationship. This commitment was also supported for commercial reasons, and these were given strategic weight. The Monitor claimed on 26 December 1761 that the commerce of Great Britain would suffer very much were the Northern Seas and the great rivers in Germany interrupted and shut to our merchants

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and manufactures. Was this once effected, would not France, our rival in trade and navigation, and the natural enemy of our power and commerce, engross the German markets, and raise up an immense employ for those manufactures and a consumption of goods, which the Germans have now from Britain? Such an additional wealth would necessarily add to the strength of France; give them an opportunity and enable them to seize and reduce the northern nations to their own terms; and to overthrow the liberties of Europe: which, in the end, would open a way into Great Britain, and to complete that scheme of universal empire . . . A nation of merchants cannot thrive except they have sufficient vent for their goods, which might be easily cut off by France and her allies, did not the state protect their commerce. Newcastle followed on 8 January 1762, by arguing that, if the Bourbons dominated Europe, it would ‘enable them to oblige every neutral power to submit to such conditions as they should think proper to impose’, including stopping trade with Britain.124 A linkage of Europe and empire, politics, trade and finance, was proposed by the Monitor in its issue of 30 January 1761: If Holland and Portugal should fall to the arms of the Bourbon family, their connections in the East Indies will follow, and enable the French to replace themselves and to destroy our interest and property in those countries and sea. The addition of the gold and diamonds from Brazil and Congo will supply the wants of every force they shall keep on foot. And the vicinity of the Spaniards in Florida, and of the French in Louisiana, is capable of rekindling a war greatly to the hazard of our plantations. The year 1762 indeed witnessed a crisis, with France and Spain far less distracted by Continental opponents than when they had jointly fought Britain in 1743–8, but, in contrast to 1743 and 1778, France had already been repeatedly defeated and was also exhausted. Repeating the crisis in 1748,125 fighting on proved a major burden for British public finances,126 helping lead to pressure for peace. Imperial success led to the capture of Havana and Manila from Spain and Martinique from France, all in 1762, and to a moment of exuberance; but also to a sense of imperial overstretch that was to lead directly to the post-war crisis in colonial finance and governance.

Notes 1 Newcastle to Keith, 20 Ap. 1753, NA. SP. 80/191. 2 Bubb, envoy in Madrid, to Stair, 19 July 1716, NAS. GD. 135/141/6. 3 Patino to Sir Thomas Geraldino, Spanish commercial agent in London, 8 May 1733, NA. SP. 107/12. 4 Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 24 June (os) 1728, Norwich, Norfolk CRO. Bradfer Lawrence papers.

1739–63 157 5 Keene to Newcastle, 27 Jan. 1738, NA. SP. 94/130. 6 Westminster Journal, 19 Nov. (os) 1748. 7 P. Woodfine, Britannia’s Glories: The Walpole Ministry and the 1739 War with Spain (Woodbridge, 1998). 8 Anon., A New History of Jamaica (2nd edn, London, 1740), pp. 284, 299, 336. 9 G. Rambert, ‘La France et la politique commerciale de l’Espagne au XVIIIe siècle’, Revue d’Histoire moderne et contemporaine, 6 (1959), p. 287. 10 Trevor to Harrington, 4 Mar. 1740, NA. SP. 84/384 fol. 47; Anon. comparison of French trade in Cadiz in 1739 and 1740, May 1741, anon., memoire on French trade in Spain, 4 Sept. 1747, AN. AM. B4 344, B3 341. 11 Northampton Mercury, 26 Nov. (os) 1739. 12 Ledger of Peter Du Cane, 1740, Chelmsford, Essex CRO. D/DCA 10 fols 142–3. 13 Newcastle Courant, 30 Jan. (os) 1748. 14 H.E.S. Fisher, The Portugal Trade, p. 120. 15 Newcastle to Cumberland, 1 Mar. (os) 1748, RA. CumbP. 32/144, 152. 16 C. Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1941), p. 19. 17 J.O. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667–1750: A Study of the Influence of Commerce on Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1940). 18 W. Kirchner, Commercial Relations between Russia and Europe 1400 to 1800 (Bloomington, Indiana, 1966), p. 63. 19 Information from Lyon, 24 Feb. 1748, NA. SP. 84/445 fol. 73. 20 Puysieulx to Marshal Richelieu, 22 July 1748, AN. KK. 1372. 21 20 Nov. (os) 1748, Cobbett, XIV, 336. 22 Robinson to Tilson, 22 Sept. 1736, NA. SP. 80/123; BL. Add. 23799 fol. 176. 23 Re. a Tuscan East India Company funded by Genevan and Huguenot capital, Birtles, consul in Livorno, to Bedford, 26 Aug. 1748, NA. SP. 98/54 fol. 71. 24 Sandwich to Anson, 19 Mar. 1748, BL. Add. 15957 fols 55–6. 25 D.J. Ormrod, ‘Anglo-Dutch Commerce 1700–1760’ (PhD, Cambridge, 1973), p. 36. 26 Lagau, French consul in Hamburg, to Council of Marine, 13 May 1748, AN. AM. B7 365. 27 Harrington to Trevor, 26 Feb. (os), Trevor to Harrington, 1 Mar. 1740, NA. SP. 84/384 fols 36, 40. 28 Newcastle to Yorke, 4 Feb. (os) 1752, NA. 84/458; Alt to William VIII of Hesse-Cassel, 18 Feb. 1752, Marburg, 4f England 253; Newcastle to Holdernesse, 2 Aug. 1752, NA. SP. 36/119 fol. 166. 29 Newcastle to Münchhausen, 3 Mar. 1752, Hanover, Cal. Br. 11 Nr. 2244 fol. 52. 30 Newcastle to Yorke, 6 Mar. 1753, NA. SP. 84/462. 31 Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 3 Ap. 1744, AST. LM. Ing. 50. 32 H.S.K. Kent, War and Trade in Northern Seas: Anglo-Scandinavian Economic Relations in the Mid-Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1973). 33 Calendar of State Papers Colonial Series 1728–9, p. 66; Board of Trade memoire, 20 Mar. (os) 1728, C(H) mss. 84/17; Finch to Harrington, 12 Feb. 1739, NA. SP. 95/84 fol. 146. 34 Snow to Tilson, 3 Jan. 1728, NA. SP. 95/48 fol. 49; K.G. Hildebrand, ‘Foreign Markets for Swedish Iron in the Eighteenth Century’, Scandinavian Economic History Review, 6 (1958), pp. 3–52 and Swedish Iron in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Export Industry before Industrialization (Södertälje, 1992). 35 K. Hautala, European and American Tar in the English Market during the Eighteenth Century and Early Nineteenth Century (Helsinki, 1963). 36 Rondeau to Harrington, 11 May (os) 1734, Sbornik, 76, p. 218. 37 R. Harris, Politics and the Nation: Britain in the Mid-Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2002), p. 248. 38 NA. SP. 94/135 fol. 53.

158 1739–63 39 Anon., ‘Observations . . .’ [May 1761], AE. CP. Esp. 532 fol. 92. 40 St Contest to Bonnac, 4 Feb. 1754, AN. KK. 1400 p. 68. 41 President of the Council of Marine to Christian-Guillaume de Malesherbes, Directeur de la Librarie, 5 Ap. 1754, AN. AM. B100. 42 Yorke to Newcastle, 25 Jan. 1752, NA. SP. 84/458. 43 Bonnac, French envoy at The Hague, to St Contest, French foreign minister, 15, 18 Dec. 1752, 18 Jan. 1753, AN. KK 1400 pp. 2, 5–6, 49. 44 Joseph to Philip Yorke, 15 Dec. 1752, BL. Add. 35363 fol. 314. 45 Newcastle to Joseph Yorke, – May, 22 May 1753, NA. SP. 84/463. 46 Newcastle to Keith, 15 Mar. (os) 1748, NA. SP. 84/443 fol. 67; Newcastle to William, Duke of Cumberland, 15, 22 Mar. (os) 1748, RA. CumbP. 32/294, 33/24. 47 Bonnac to St Contest, 19 Jan. 1754, AN. KK. 1400 p. 37; Joseph Yorke to Keith, 21 Sept. 1756, BL. Add. 35481 fol. 88. 48 Cf. Owen’s Weekly Chronicle, 14 Feb. 1761. 49 Holdernesse to Robert Keith, envoy in St Petersburg, 21 June 1756, NA. SP. 80/197 fol. 186. 50 Council minute, 2 Oct. 1761, BL. Add. 32929 fol. 20; R. Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739–1763 (Oxford, 1938). 51 Bedford to Goldsworthy, 28 Nov. (os) 1748, NA. SP. 98/55 fol. 96; Mann to Bedford, 16 July 1748, BL. Add. 32813 fols 41–2; Bedford to Keene, 19 Jan. (os) 1749, NA. SP. 94/135 fol. 8, cf. 12 Jan. (os), fol. 1. 52 Tyrawly to Newcastle, 16 Ap. 1752, BL. Add. 32835 fols 153–4. 53 Alt to William VIII of Hesse-Cassel, 18 Dec. 1753, Marburg, 4f England 254; London Chronicle, 6 Jan. 1757. 54 Sbornik, 148, p. 399; Newcastle to Keith, 20 Ap. 1753, NA. SP. 80/191. 55 Newcastle to Yorke, 1 Dec. 1752, NA. SP. 84/461. 56 Re. Dutch, Bonnac to St Contest, 12 July 1753, AN. KK 1400 p. 250. 57 Protester, 14 July 1753. 58 Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 Sept. 1753, BL. Add. 32732 fol. 699. 59 Vaulgrenant to Puysieulx, French foreign minister, 5 Jan. 1750, AE. CP. Espagne 506 fol. 5. 60 K. Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy, 1660–1800 (Cambridge, 2000). 61 Copy in AN. AM. B7 359. 62 Pelletier, memorandum, 14 Feb. 1748, AE. CP. Ang. 424 fols 156–62. 63 Sandwich to Newcastle, 28 Ap. 1748, NA. SP. 84/433 fol. 486. 64 Sandwich to Newcastle, 5 May 1748, NA. SP. 84/434 fol. 20; Sandwich to Anson, 7 Aug. 1748, BL. Add. 15957 fol. 78. 65 P.N. Miller, Defining the Common Good: Empire, Religion, and Philosophy in EighteenthCentury Britain (Cambridge, 1994), p. 167; B. Harris, ‘War, Empire and the “National Interest” in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain’, in J. Flavell and S. Conway (eds), Britain and America Go to War. The Impact of War and Warfare in Anglo-America, 1754–1815 (Gainesville, 2004), pp. 20–5. 66 M. Peters, ‘The Myth of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Great Imperialist. I, Pitt the Imperial Expansion 1738–1763’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21 (1993), pp. 31–74. 67 Mitchell to Holdernesse, 23 July 1756, NA. SP. 90/65. 68 Keene to Robinson, 3 Mar. 1755, Leeds Archive Office, Vyner papers, 11850. 69 Richard Dobbs to Bute, 29 Jan., Arthur Dobbs to Bute, 2 June 1762, MS., papers from Cardiff, 2/74. For an undated earlier memorandum by Dobbs in Walpole’s papers, C(H) mss 84/69. See also D. Clarke, Arthur Dobbs, Esq., 1689–1765 (London, 1958). 70 G. Plank, An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia (Philadelphia, 2004).

1739–63 159 71 London Evening Post, 9 Jan. 1753, AE. MD. Ang. 51 fols 171–3. 72 D.G. Allan and J.L. Abbot, The Virtuoso Tribe of Arts and Sciences. Studies in the Eighteenth Century Work and Membership of the London Society of Arts (Athens, Georgia, 1992); M. Berg, ‘From Imitation to Invention: Creating Commodities in Eighteenth-Century Britain’, EcHR, 55 (2002), pp. 1–30. 73 Harris, Politics, pp. 105–47. 74 K. Wilson, The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715–1785 (Cambridge, 1995). 75 Eg. B. Harris, ‘Patriotic Commerce and National Revival: The Free British Fishery Society and British Politics, c. 1749–58’, EHR, 114 (1999), pp. 285–313. 76 Newcastle to Holdernesse, 26 May 1752, NA. SP. 36/118 fols 299–300. 77 Cf. re-depredations, Old England, 6 June (os), 23 Sept. 1752. 78 Newcastle to Holdernesse, 11 June 1752, NA. SP. 36/118 fol. 344. 79 A. Kulckoff, From British Peasants to Colonial American Farmers (Chapel Hill, 2000). 80 S.J. Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America (Lebanon, New Hampshire, 2005), p. 234. 81 George, Second Earl of Bristol, envoy in Turin, to Henry Fox, Secretary of State, 8 Sept. 1756, NA. SP. 92/64. 82 Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, pp. 122–39. 83 G. Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire (Philadelphia, 2006); A.M. Smith, Jacobite Estates of the Forty-Five (Edinburgh, 1982). 84 C.A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780–1830 (Harlow, 1989). 85 Cumberland to Newcastle, 11 Ap. 1748, RA. CumbP. 33/188. 86 S. Murdoch and A. Mackillop (eds), Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers, c. 1600–1800: A Study of Scotland and Empires (Leiden, 2003). 87 Old England, 5 Nov. (os), 24 Dec. (os) 1748; Protester, 23 June, 28 July 1753; Alt to William VIII of Hesse-Cassel, 18 Sept. 1753, Marburg, 4f England 254. 88 Cf. e.g. Evening Advertiser, 6 Ap. 1754. 89 Keene to Robinson, 17 June, and reply, 8 July 1754, Leeds, Archive Office, Vyner papers, nos 11855, 11858. 90 Newcastle to Keene, 15 Jan. 1753, BL. Add. 32842 fol. 153. 91 Mirepoix to St Contest, 17 Jan., 14 Feb. 1754, AE. CP. Ang. 437 fols 26, 54; Alt to William VIII, 15 Jan. 1754, Marburg, 4f England, 255. 92 Newcastle to Yorke, 17 Ap. 1753, NA. SP. 84/463. 93 Council minutes, 21 Aug. 1753, BL. Add. 32995 fol. 26. 94 Keith to Newcastle, 19 Sept. 1753, NA. SP. 80/192. 95 Eg. Adams’s Weekly Courant (Chester), 28 Ap. (os) 1752. 96 Viry to Charles Emmanuel III, 12 May 1756, AST. LM. Ing. 60; Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 July 1756, BL. Add. 32866 fols 211–12; cf. Holdernesse to Robert Keith, envoy in St Petersburg, 11 May 1756, BL. Add. 35480 fol. 175. 97 Anon., A Letter from a Merchant of the City of London to . . . Pitt (2nd edn, London, 1757), p. 44. 98 J.L.A. Webb, ‘The Mid-Eighteenth Century Gum Arabic Trade and the British Conquest of Saint-Louis du Sénégal, 1758’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 25 (1997), pp. 37–58. 99 Viry to Charles Emmanuel III, 15 Ap. 1756, AST. LM. Ing. 60; Newcastle to Yorke, 14 May, 7 Sept. 1762, BL. Add. 32938 fol. 245. 100 French memorandum on British government, 31 Jan. 1754, AE. MD. Ang. 51 fols 200–1. 101 Frederick II to Lord Marshal, 5 Feb. 1754, Polit. Corresp., 10, p. 233. 102 Newcastle Journal, 9 Feb. 1754; Frederick II to Michell, envoy in London, 9 Feb. 1754, Polit. Corresp., 10, p. 239. 103 St Contest to Mirepoix, 11 Mar. 1754, AE. CP. Ang. 437 fol. 78.

160 1739–63 104 Joseph Yorke to Hugh Jones, 19 Feb. 1754, BL. Add. 32432 fol. 232. 105 Haslang to Preysing, 17 May 1754, Munich, Bayr. London 229; Mirepoix, French envoy in London, to St Contest, 19 June 1754, AE. CP. Ang. 437 fol. 230. 106 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 14 May, 29 June, Cabinet minute, 26 June 1754, BL. Add. 32735 fols 269, 597, 33029 fol. 124. 107 John Thomlinson, London merchant and colonial agent for New Hampshire, to John, Earl Granville, Lord President of the Council, 13 Dec. 1756, in S. Pargellis (ed.), Military Affairs in North America 1748–1765 (New York, 1936), pp. 257–8; Anon., A Letter from a Merchant (1757), p. 25. 108 Bath Chronicle, 1 Jan. 1761. 109 Gentleman’s Magazine, 31 (1761), pp. 123–4; Dobbs to Bute, 2 June 1761, MS. 2/73. 110 Bedford to Bute, 9 July 1761, MS, 1761 papers no. 478. 111 Owen’s Weekly Chronicle, 18 Ap. 1761. 112 Owen’s Weekly Chronicle, 26 Sept. 1761. 113 Johnstone to James Balmain, 23 Dec. 1761, HL. Pulteney papers, no. 671. 114 Molesworth to Bute, 8 Oct 1761, MS. 4/121. 115 Holdernesse to Mitchell, 18 Jan. 1761, NA. SP. 90/77. 116 Mitchell to Bute, 13 Ap. 1761, NA. SP. 90/77. 117 Ossun, Spanish envoy in France, to Choiseul, 17 Aug., 7 Sept., Choiseul to Ossun, 25 Aug., 1 Sept. 1761, AE. CP. Esp. 533 fol. 322, 382, 343, 355. 118 Ossun to Choiseul, 7 Sept. 1761, AE. CP. Esp. 533 fols 282–3. 119 Ossun to Choiseul, 28 Sept. 1761, AE. CP. Esp. 533 fol. 472. 120 Ossun to Choiseul, 17 Sept., Choiseul to Ossun, 22 Sept. 1761, Ossun to Choiseul, 1 Feb. 1762, AE. CP. Esp. 533 fols 436–7, 452, 535 fol. 141. 121 Bute to Edward Weston, 25 Dec. 1761, Farmington, Lewis Walpole Library, Weston papers vol. 5. 122 Choiseul to Ossun, 29 Sept. 1761, AE. CP. Esp. 533 fol. 475. 123 Ossun to Choiseul, 5 Oct. 1761, AE. CP. Esp. 534 fol. 26. 124 Newcastle to Yorke, 8 Jan. 1762, BL. Add. 32933 fols 113–14. cf. London Chronicle, 16 Jan. 1762. 125 Newcastle to Cumberland, 11 Mar. (os) 1748, RA. CumbP. 32/245. 126 Memorandum, 3 Dec. 1761, BL. Add. 32931 fol. 383.

Chapter 8

1763–83

Her fondness for conquest as a warlike nation, her lust of dominion as an ambitious one, and her thirst for a gainful monopoly as a commercial one (none of them legitimate causes of war) will all join to hide from her eyes every view of her true interests; and continually goad her on in these ruinous distant expeditions, so destructive both of lives and treasure, that must prove as pernicious to her in the end as the Crusades were to most of the nations of Europe . . . the true and sure means of extending and securing commerce is the goodness and cheapness of commodities and the profits of no trade can ever be equal to the expense of compelling it, and of holding it by fleets and armies. Benjamin Franklin, July 17761

By 1763, Britain was the most powerful European state in the world. ‘Blue water’ had been transformed into Britain’s destiny. Thereafter, whether at peace or war, she struggled to retain and strengthen this position in the face of a troubling imperial rivalry with France, and an accentuation of longstanding calls for a diminution of Britain’s profile and, instead, a balance of advantage in transoceanic trade and colonies.2 The defence of the 1763 settlement was largely a struggle that took place outside Europe, because Western Europe, the part of the Continent with which British politicians and the public were most concerned, was relatively stable, and Britain had no Continental allies to protect when war broke out there, as it did in Eastern Europe in 1768 and Central Europe in 1778: in the Russo-Turkish War and the War of the Bavarian Succession respectively. The Western (European) question, indeed, had been settled for over 40 years by the 1748 peace settlement and, thereafter, there were to be no territorial shifts in the Low Countries, the Rhineland or northern Italy until the 1790s. Largely as a result, it was possible, within a context of rivalry and competing alliance systems or attempted diplomatic alignments, for Britain and France to work out a modus vivendi in Western Europe, a process eased by the extent to which France no longer had to fear her Continental neighbours. It proved impossible, however, to make comparable progress over extra-European differences, and this helped keep Anglo-French relations volatile from the 1750s until the serious check the French received in the Dutch crisis of 1787.

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In Britain, hope and anxiety, ambition and identity, were increasingly focused on imperial, colonial and maritime issues. In 1754, hostilities began over control of the Ohio River basin in North America; and in 1778 over French support for the American revolutionaries. In the aftermath of the mid-century conflicts, there was a continuing close concern with the actions of other states that were seen as competitors. The implementation of the terms of the Peace of Paris in 1763 was a particular cause of contention, and helped underline continual hostility toward France and Spain. Gunboat diplomacy was employed to obtain a satisfactory settlement of disputes with France over Turks Island in the West Indies and the Gambia in West Africa (1764–5), and with Spain over logwood cutting on the Caribbean coast of Honduras (1764). Each of these was a longstanding source of dispute, but the recent prominence of trans-oceanic issues helped ensure that government was now expected to demonstrate that British interests were being secured, not least in comparison with the political overhang represented by Pitt’s reputation. Another continuation of earlier tensions, but one that was now much more serious in terms of international and domestic impact, was demonstrated by the Falkland Islands dispute with Spain in 1770. Initial French backing for Spain threatened to touch off a major conflict, ostensibly over the British base in the Falklands, Spanish claims to sovereignty and British access to the Pacific, which Spain sought to block, but, in practice, over maritime strength.3 These crises lent political point to the energetic management of naval capability which in Britain included an important improvement of the dockyards and in shipbuilding, with for example a building-up of timber stocks.4 The range of differences in Anglo-French relations was further demonstrated by the fate of Corsica. This colony of the republic of Genoa was affected by a rebellion against Genoese rule; and longstanding French interest in its acquisition, which culminated in its purchase in 1768, and the suppression of a subsequent rebellion, led to concern in Britain. This was presented not so much as a threat to the balance of power or as a reprehensible overturning of Corsican liberties, although the latter theme was advanced,5 but, instead, as a challenge to the British commercial position in the Mediterranean. Opposition newspapers had long focused on this prospect as an alleged instance of ministerial failure to protect trade. The London Evening Post of 21 January (os) 1737 pressed ‘the interest of our Turkey Company and Italian merchants, consequently the interest of Great Britain’, and stressed the importance of Corsica ‘by its situation to the woollen manufacture of England’. In 1762, the paper suggested that Britain acquire Corsica. Sardinian envoys had for long pressed British ministers on the importance to Britain’s Mediterranean trade of keeping Corsica out of Bourbon hands, although with limited success. However, in 1768, William, Second Earl of Shelburne, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, told the Sardinian envoy that the government might be forced into war by mercantile anxiety over the consequences of the French acquisition of Corsica for British trade with Italy and the Levant. However, conflict was avoided.6

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It was not only such anxiety that reflected more general concerns about French intentions. In addition, the continuation in commercial regulations of patterns of animosity was both indicative, and a cause, of continuing anger, including at the highest level. In 1767, Choiseul, the leading French minister, commented to the British envoy on our affecting to lay continually more and heavier duties upon French manufactures, and when indulgencies were meant to be shown to manufactures from other countries, our affecting particularly by except by name such as should come from France. This he said in time of peace was odious and abominable, and showed notwithstanding our professions how ill disposed we were to them.7 In practice, popular animosity to French imports, which were seen as a cause of unemployment,8 would have made it difficult to free trade from its burdens. It is easy to appreciate why the emphasis came to be on this period as an inter-war one, with an expectation that conflict with France and Spain would resume and that commercial and colonial competition were an innate part of this situation. The context of the perception of trade had shifted as a result of the mid-century wars with Spain and France. The opposition conviction that conflict was central and that colonial expansion was an aspect of this had become normative. The defence of government policy in the London Journal of 27 April (os) 1734, ‘the greatest blessing to a nation who would trade with all the world is to be at peace with all the world . . . we cannot increase our power, but must diminish our wealth, by all the conquests we are able to make’, now seemed highly inappropriate. Although there was an emphasis on competition from France and Spain, particularly maritime rivalry, the challenge facing Britain was far wider. In particular, commercial issues could not be simply defined in terms of rivalry with the Bourbons. There was also a major shift in international trade toward the merchants of countries not hitherto regarded as major commercial powers. This was particularly the case with various German states, Sweden, Denmark and the Austrian Netherlands. In 1767, of the 6,495 vessels that passed the Sound, 2,779 were Swedish or Danish. The Hansa ports, particularly Hamburg, also enjoyed a rise in activity. From mid-century, Hamburg, Bremen and the Prussian port of Stettin, rather than Britain, increasingly supplanted the Dutch in the trade between Bordeaux and the Baltic. As another instance of the limited British impact in growing European trades, a comparison of the olive oil exports from Gallipoli in Apulia in 1744 and in the 1780s reveals that the oldestablished markets, such as Britain and the United Provinces, had declined, neither being used any longer as an entrepôt while, instead, there had been a considerable growth in exports to Hamburg, Stettin and the Baltic in general. The expansion in the commercial activity of a number of states outside Western Europe was accompanied by a measure of industrial growth in certain regions

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and by competition with Western European products. By 1780, there were significant structural changes in the economy of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, as larger, more concentrated enterprises began to take a more important role.9 The extent to which the British government was aware of these and other economic developments varied and, in part, government operated in an information vacuum, despite periodic calls for the accumulation of information on trade and on circumstances abroad.10 In 1765, John, Fourth Earl of Sandwich, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, wrote, The Board of Trade, having represented to me that the orders which, in consequence of a proposal from that Board in 1715, were sent to all the King’s Ministers and Consuls in foreign parts, to transmit, under certain regulations, states of the British commerce within their respective departments, have not been executed for several years, by which the great public advantages proposed thereby have been entirely frustrated.11 The issues of trade with Continental Europe continued to play a role in the routines of diplomacy and were sometimes very important. A trade treaty with Russia was signed in 1766, its terms being seen as particularly favourable by the British merchants.12 However, Anglo-Portuguese relations deteriorated due to Portuguese protectionism and the British government was criticised for failing to maintain commercial privileges. The growth of Portuguese trade was recorded in the British press. The list of shipping arrived at Lisbon in 1787, published in the Morning Herald of 28 January 1788, showed that 332 of the 1,045 ships were British, but 300 were Portuguese. There was also concern that better relations between Portugal and the Bourbons would have negative consequences for British merchants.13 European protectionism was a general problem for British exports, and one that helped ensure a growing role for imperial markets.14 In 1763, Joseph Yorke was assured by merchants that tariffs in the Austrian Netherlands amounted to ‘very near a prohibition of some of our best manufacturers’.15 This was more serious than revived plans for oceanic trade under the protection of Scandinavian and German powers, for example Austria, which agitated several diplomats, such as Robert Walpole in Lisbon in April 1776, although such competition challenged Britain’s re-exports, which expanded with a rise in those of China tea, Carolina rice, and West Indian coffee. Peacetime issues in trade with Continental Europe were accentuated after war broke out with France in 1778. War brought concern about neutral trade, and British attempts to prevent it from benefiting opponents. Catherine II of Russia issued a Declaration of Neutral Rights in March 1780 that was designed to protect neutral shipping from British maritime pretensions, which were widely disliked. That July, Sweden and Denmark joined the Armed Neutrality she established, and the British, aware of negotiations for Dutch accession, declared war on the Dutch that December, hoping to end their supply of naval

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stores to France before they could accede and thus acquire a Russian guarantee. An enormous amount of diplomatic effort was devoted to the issue of neutral rights, while neutral traders enjoyed a trade boom during the War of American Independence. For ships owned by Brussels’ merchants, the boom occurred in 1780–2.16 Despite European protectionism and neutral rights, the focus of British public and political attention was trans-oceanic rather than European. In part, this was a matter of the theme of competition in the New World that had played such a major role in 1738–9 and 1754–6. As then, competition with the Bourbons became a symbol of national vitality and an issue of governmental credibility. These were major themes in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, and they culminated in the Falklands crisis of 1770–1. Victories resonated in public culture and were extensively memorialised. They encouraged the depiction of warships and other maritime themes. Richard Paton exhibited paintings of recent successes, displaying Boscawen’s victory over the French Toulon fleet off Lagos in 1759 and the capture of the Foudroyant in pictures exhibited with the Society of Artists in 1762. Victories on land were the theme of paintings produced between 1760 and 1764 by Francis Hayman for Vauxhall Gardens. The victory and heroic death of James Wolfe at Quebec were extensively presented, not so much in statuary, but in paintings that could be readily reproduced through engraving.17 At the same time, from 1763, there was a far stronger engagement than in the two previous inter-war periods with the internal problems of Britain’s imperial possessions. The focus was no longer on protecting trade in the Caribbean or the Ohio Valley, but, instead, on the nature of authority and financing of power in the North American and West Indian colonies and the territories of the East India Company. Far from following a quest for territorial expansion, much of the struggle to maintain Britain’s position involved the attempt to consolidate and enhance Britain’s overseas presence by means of a beneficial direction of the trade of colonies for their benefit and for that of the Exchequer. This was most obviously seen with the attempt to sell Indian tea in order to improve the finances of the East India Company. As a result, the relationships between government, policy, trade and empire changed. The politics were particularly different. Although the future of empire and the fate of trade were still understood in a competitive environment, the emphasis on foreign threats became less pronounced. Fear of French revanche underlay the government’s contentious desire to build up the defensive strength of the North American colonies, and there was also a fear of French revanche in India in alliance with hostile local powers, particularly the Marathas and Mysore. International rivalry and, even more, a perception of such rivalry, was the basic condition of thought about empire, as it led to urgent concern about how best to strengthen it. Yet these issues were increasingly set alongside serious divisions within the British political world over how best to organise empire. In this light, this world extended to include the North American and West Indian

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colonists, as well as officials in India, but the terms of the resulting relationships were unclear. The ways in which policy, and regulation as an aspect of it, were to be framed, formulated and enforced, were themselves matters of contention to a far greater degree than before, or during, the mid-century wars. As a result, the importance of foreign policy in framing discussion about trade and empire, or in expressing views about them, declined in importance. It would not, however, be appropriate to leave this period essentially unremarked, because these shifts are themselves of importance. They help account for the degree to which foreign policy declined in public attention and, albeit to a lesser extent, in its governmental counterpart. The latter may indeed play a role in the relative disengagement of British policy toward Continental Europe, although other factors were also important.18 In the case of empire, however, there was a more vigorous engagement by government and public that reflected a greater interest in the British world outwith the British Isles. The framing of policy was contested widely, and this was related to its extension. For example, the policy of the Crown in limiting the westward expansion of the North American colonies became a matter of resented authority, while the grant of civil recognition to Quebec’s Catholics by the Quebec Act of 1774, intended to strengthen imperial stability there, also accentuated New England concerns about the intentions of the British government.19 The politics of imperial consolidation and expansion were very varied in character, both in the metropole and on the periphery, and this related to controversy over the nature of this consolidation and expansion. British ministers might see the strengthening of Westminster’s imperial authority as a means to share burdens and to ensure peace,20 but it is not surprising that critical commentators discerned an authoritarian prospectus although this was seen in terms of colonial rule, not imperial expansion. Modern scholarship also takes differing views on this issue, as it does on the extent to which imperialism, British and otherwise, was a syncretic system, dependent on the co-operation of local elites, most obviously in India. In contrast, there has also been an emphasis on its coercive character. The former approach stresses consensus and continuity, the latter force and discontinuity. This range is appropriate not only for relations with native peoples,21 but also for discussion over the character and process of economic and fiscal links. For example, in Bengal, the enlargement of a market economy, a goal and a means for the British, and the entry of the East India Company into regional trade, involved force or the consequences of force. A prolonged contest over the habits, terms and meanings of goods, markets and people has been discerned. Once Company power was forcibly established in mid-century, a process that began in 1757 and was complete by 1765, there was an alteration in the political economy of trade as control over customs was monopolised. The authority of local landed chiefs was banished from rivers, ferries and tollways, and intermediate units over markets were ended. As a consequence, in an anticipation of what would later be called globalisation, the colonial marketplace was opened

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up to the freer flow of imperial commodities and investment. The gathering of information was central to this policy. Long-distance trade rose and prices became more uniform. Published lists of prices challenged the immense variety of wholesale and retail rates that had once characterised markets where trade was subject to different political authorities.22 The role of the Company also facilitated British commodity exports to India, particularly woollen textiles, and these rose in the 1760s and, even more, from the late 1780s.23 The government’s position with the Company was generally close. In 1782, Shelburne wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Thomas, Second Lord Grantham, as the sacrifices for peace and the chief risk of the war now lie with the India Company, and as the Cabinet left it to your Lordship to settle with them, would it not be prudent for your Lordship to see the Secret Committee [of the Company] without delay to know how much farther they would be inclined to go?24 Nevertheless, concern about the Company was expressed from within government. In 1764, Joseph Yorke, the experienced envoy in The Hague, complained of the East India Companies, who seem to me to be both in the wrong and to require some superior power to interfere and keep them in order; they certainly live in Asia in a perpetual state of warfare, and are always complaining in Europe as if they were both innocent.25 More generally, far from proving a cash cow, the viability of the conquests in India, and indeed of the entire position of the Company, were challenged by the combination of dividend demands by the shareholders, the costs of defence, the difficulties of revenue collection in India, and weakness in the market for tea, a major source of Company finances. This hit governmental fiscal expectations, particularly when, in 1772, the Company sought both the rescheduling of customs payments and a loan. Tea imports into North America apparently offered a way to tackle Company finances.26 Tea was both reality and symbol of the process by which India became an integral part of the empire in tandem with attempts to integrate America more firmly into it.27 In 1778, Spiridion Roma was commissioned by the Company’s directors to paint the ceiling of their Leadenhall Street headquarters. His East Offering Its Riches to Britannia showed India and China, both as women, presenting their riches. There was also an important local dimension in particular British towns. The Company brought major benefits to Portsmouth, with new employment and investment possibilities bringing wealth and activity into the town. There was also local investment in the Company. The range of relationship included growing numbers of Company officers gravitating towards Hampshire’s coastal communities for rest and recuperation, while retired officers followed suit and

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took up permanent residence. More widely, the Company helped to change the culture of Portsmouth, making it more aware of the outer world, an instance of a process taking place more generally in British society but one that was most marked in ports. Food, clothing and furnishings were all affected, and the religious character of Portsmouth became more varied. There were naturally tensions, not only between town and Company but also, at times, difficult relations with the navy. This owed much to clashes over the use of naval facilities. Furthermore, the navy could be difficult over its convoying responsibilities, a more general problem in the relationship of trade and state, but the relationship with the Company was essentially co-operative. The Company had its own forces and this could cause tension in Portsmouth, with issues of recruiting, housing and logistics, but it is important to note the degree to which disputes were essentially contained.28 The gain of an Indian-based Oriental empire, however, encouraged comparison with imperial Rome because, unlike Britain’s North American empire, but like that of imperial Rome, the new empire in India had no ethnic underpinning and was clearly imperial. Power in the Orient produced a number of disturbing cultural and political resonances. It seemed to position Britain as the descendant not of republican Rome, with what was seen as its virtues and vital energies, but of Imperial Rome, with its self-indulgent decadence. Anxieties about the effects of empire upon metropolitan culture were frequently expressed. The figure of the nabob, as in the extortionist Sir Matthew Mite in Samuel Foote’s play The Nabob (1772), was particularly troubling, because of the potential impact of their great wealth, not least in purchasing Parliamentary influence. The nabob also encapsulated longstanding anxieties about new money.29 If the position of the East India Company was contentious, there was also continuing controversy over that of other trading companies. In 1763, Sir Ellis Cunliffe, MP for Liverpool, who had inherited important trading interests in this leading slaving port, wrote to the first minister, John, Third Earl of Bute, about post-war colonial arrangements, Being informed a message from His Majesty would come to the House of Commons ‘for granting seven thousand pounds for the maintenance of the forts and settlements in the River Senegal’ my duty to my constituents, as well as their instructions to me, engaged me to take the liberty to enquire of the Chancellor of the Exchequer how or under whose management this money was to be employed; suggesting at the same time it was the sense of the commercial part of the nation that ‘The Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa’ who had been appointed and approved by Parliament in the care of the other forts, were the properest persons to have the care of these. The Chancellor answered ‘He did not doubt they would be the persons employed, but wished me not to make any motion, or mention anything about it in the House’. Now, My Lord! as I am desirous

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always to concur with government, and have the greatest confidence in your Lordship’s administration, I am content to remain silent on this occasion, provided proper assurances be given that the forts and settlements in Senegal will not be put into private hands, but placed under the direction of the African Committee. But should a contrary measure be intended, this appears to me so destructive of the commerce of this nation in general, and of that of my constituents in particular, that I must think myself obliged to oppose it. Cunliffe informed Bute that he would wait on him in order to ascertain his views ‘and to give any farther information I can’.30 More generally, discussion of commercial and colonial issues became more public and more frequent in this period. In part, this was due to sustained contention over the treatment of American colonies and Indian interests. In part, there was an increased ability to formalise such discussion, both because it was considered appropriate and also in order to affect policy. At times, this produced a system of parallel discussion, with Parliament having less time to consider commercial and related issues than other bodies whose proceedings were also fully reported in the press. Indeed, they were made more effective because the press coverage was generally sympathetic. This process became normative in part because it was one in which discussion of colonies and overseas trade took place alongside domestic commercial issues. Public politics was to be constrained by the response to radicalism during the French Revolutionary War (1793–1802) but, prior to that, it developed rapidly. The press helped ensure that the resulting scope of public discussion and agitation was national. A good example was provided by opposition to proposed fiscal legislation in 1783, opposition that helped explain the care the ministry was to take three years later when preparing the way for a trade treaty with France. The Edinburgh Advertiser of 17 June 1783 carried a report ‘from the London papers, June 10’, This day, at one o’clock, a meeting of the Livery was held at Guildhall, to take into consideration how far it might be proper to instruct their representatives in Parliament to oppose the tax on receipts from passing into a law, which tax must prove in the highest degree oppressive, injurious and partial. The Lord Mayor, with the Aldermen Bull, Sawbridge, Sir Watkin Lewes, Hart, Burnell, Kitchen, Turner, Gill, Sanderson, and the two Sheriffs, were present. The Lord Mayor having read the request for a CommonHall, Mr. Smith, who led the business at the former meeting, began by commenting on the propriety of instructing their representatives on the present occasion, which he urged as indispensably necessary. Alderman Turner then introduced the instructions, which were unanimously adopted. These being agreed to, the four members declared their intention to adapt their conduct to what the Livery had conveyed to them as their sentiments, which they said were agreeable to their own feelings.

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Alderman Sanderson made an excellent speech, in which he recited the various difficulties that were likely to occur, should the present tax pass into a law. . . . Alderman Picket also spoke to the partiality and ruinous tendency of the bill, advising the Livery to be firm in using every constitutional exertion to oppose it. He remarked in particular that this offensive tax was in contemplation with the late ministry, who durst not bring the same forward, though he was sorry to find a Whig ministry had adopted those measures a Tory administration dared not pursue. The thanks of the Livery were given to the Lord Mayor, for his readiness in calling a Common-Hall, and to the four City members for their attendance. Last night there was a very numerous meeting of the merchants and traders in the city of Westminster, at the Shakespeare Tavern, CoventGarden, to take into consideration the most effectual method of convincing the ministers how very prejudicial the putting a stamp on receipts would be to trade in general, when a variety of resolutions were agreed to respecting the same, and a committee appointed to carry them into execution. The proposed tax on receipts is likely to create the most serious opposition: it is well for the ministers that it is objected to in time: if they are wise they will abandon it, and prepare some other, which may better suit the constitution of the country and the temper of the people. The inhabitants of Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Lewes, Rochester etc. have all agreed to oppose the receipt tax. The paper went on to report the Parliamentary debates on 11 and 12 June. In them, however, extra-Parliamentary pressure had only limited resonance. It was ironic that a period in which government devoted far more attention than earlier in the century to the strengthening of empire should have been one in which it witnessed an acute crisis. Whereas the crisis of 1745–6 had been rapidly overcome, and had led to the further integration of Scotland into the empire, and that of 1798, the rebellion in Ireland, was to be followed, in 1800–1, by Union with Ireland; the crisis with the Thirteen Colonies that turned continually violent in 1775 was longstanding and spread, thanks to successful foreign intervention, to encompass the entire empire. It also influenced a wider anxiety about the nature of British society and, in particular, the extent to which it had been corrupted by success and luxury. The origins of the American War of Independence owed much to the terms of benefit within the imperial political economy as mediated through a series of disputes, particularly those over taxation. Trade proved one of the ways in which, first, confrontation and, then, conflict were waged, with peacetime colonial boycotts of British trade followed by wartime privateering. Yet, underlining the variegated nature of the empire, whereas in America, Nova Scotia and the Leeward Islands there was marked opposition to the Stamp Act of 1765 and,

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specifically, the sense that the levying of taxation for revenue purposes by a Parliament that included no colonial representatives was a dangerous innovation, this was not true of the major West Indian colonies.31 The latter, particularly Jamaica, were the wealthiest British colonies in the New World.32 Repealed in 1766, the Stamp Act was followed in 1767 by a Revenue Act that imposed customs duties in the colonies on a variety of goods, most valuably tea. This taxation was designed to pay the costs of civil government and thus end dependence on colonial assemblies, a longstanding complaint on the part of governors. The American colonies responded with fury, but the West Indian colonies accepted the legislation.33 The tea duty was retained in 1769 when the other duties introduced in 1767 were repealed. The duty symbolised Parliament’s right to tax, and public finances benefited. Smuggled Dutch tea, however, challenged East India Company sales and, in 1773, the government passed a Tea Act that abolished British duties on the tea re-exported to America and allowed the Company to sell its tea directly to consignees to the American colonies, a measure designed to cut the cost of tea there and thus boost sales. The Americans were still to pay the duty on the imported tea. This was condemned by Patriot activists, unwilling to accept Parliament’s right to impose direct taxes on the colonies. Opposition culminated in the Boston Tea Party on 16 December 1773, in which tea was seized and thrown into the harbour. This action, and the government response, including the Boston Port Act of 1774, which closed the port and moved the customs house until the Company was reimbursed for the tea, dramatised the breakdown of imperial authority. The crisis also indicated divisions within the empire/trade nexus, in particular merchants’ longstanding reluctance to accept the disruption and other costs of war.34 British merchants hit by American boycotts of British imports, including those in 1768–70 and from 1774, tended to prefer commercial continuity to the defence of imperial authority. As with previous fiscal-political crises, such as the Excise Crisis of 1733 in Britain, that in America was not inherently linked to foreign policy, but there was a relationship. As a result of the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1775, Britain, internationally, was weakened and apparently vulnerable. The 1733 crisis had encouraged Britain to remain neutral in the War of the Polish Succession and led to French thoughts of invasion. Had the American crisis also been shortlived, then the consequences for foreign policy, and indeed the cohesion of the entire empire, might have been similarly limited. The length of the conflict in North America led, instead, to a wide-ranging conflict which compromised and then became foreign policy, and to significant changes in imperial governance for both Ireland and British India. If wars in 1739 and from 1754 had stemmed from imperial disputes, the terms of the British response had then been set by political divisions in the metropole, conflict had rapidly extended to European waters, and the implications for Britain’s alliances became a key issue in foreign policy. From 1775, in contrast, the empire was the source and site of war as the conflict focused on

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imperial authority, and not protection from external challenges. Hopes from many of the colonists, and on the part of Britain, particularly with the Howes’ instructions in 1776 and the Carlisle Commission in 1778, that it might be possible to settle the crisis by adjusting governance proved misplaced and, instead, the conflict in North America became one both for independence and for the allocation of imperial dominions. French entry made the entire situation seem more desperate. In 1778, Joseph Yorke, still envoy in The Hague and an MP, and recently considered as a Secretary of State, proposed a new approach to foreign policy, ‘it is plain that no moderation will content them [the French], they must annihilate you or go on quarrelling, for which reason I would not for the future make anything but truces, to sit down as we were when both had enough, till we had had time to break and then go to it again’.35 The war was also regarded as a fight to ensure the future of British trade. This was seen to lie not only in the control of British colonies, but also in the struggle over the rights of neutral trade. If enforced, as intended by the Armed Neutrality of neutral powers established by Russia in 1780, then this threatened to end the prospect of any British blockade of France and Spain and also to weaken British trade.36 As, with the exception of small-scale subsidy allies, Britain was isolated, foreign policy became a matter of responding to this issue, of trying to limit and divide the opposing alliance, and, eventually, of negotiating peace. This pushed imperial issues to the fore, as control over particular territories became the bargaining chips of peace. Unlike in 1761–3, however, when the government sought to negotiate an end to the Seven Years’ War, the British were now in a weak state and, as a consequence, the influence of mercantile lobbies’ shaping the peace settlement was limited.37 That, however, did not mean that they were not consulted. Shelburne, head of the ministry in 1782–3, took the advice of Francis Baring, a director of the East India Company, on a number of topics, including the value of the Senegal River position whose return France successfully pressed for.38 The peace settlement saw empire and, even more, trade subordinated to an attempt to end the war and, in particular, to shelve issues in dispute with America and France, both in order to bring the conflict to a close and to divide the opposing coalition. Nevertheless, there were limits as to what could be conceded. Sensitivity over the imperial trading system led, in March 1782, to the failure of an ‘American intercourse bill’ designed, at least for a while, to give American ships the right to carry American goods to British possessions, and also to export from them, both at the preferential tariffs of British-owned goods in British ships. Instead, protectionist principles were entrenched by Orders in Council of 14 May and 2 July 1782 which, respectively, allowed free access to Britain for American raw materials only, and banned American ships from carrying West Indies goods to America. This measure was unpopular in the West Indies, but the active lobbying of Parliament in 1783–5, both by the Society of West India Merchants and Planters in London and in the West Indies, was unsuccessful. Instead, the second measure was strengthened by an Act in 1788,

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and Hawkesbury, President of the Board of Trade from 1786 to 1804, was a keen advocate of banning American trade with the West Indies.39 The context for imperial protectionism, however, was very different as a consequence of the loss of the Thirteen Colonies. A dynamic new state posed not only a challenge to Britain but also an important issue for the relationship between foreign policy and commercial and colonial interests. Furthermore, the breakdown of the imperial link in 1775–6 indicated that the British government and political system, with its overlapping and interacting systems of policy discussion, formulation and execution, was unable to deal with the serious issues of management posed by the nature of the empire and the politics of the period. It was unclear in 1783 that the system would be more successful in confronting pressing issues of management in Britain and Ireland, issues that included the governance of British India. The longer-term consequences for the shaping of colonial and commercial policy were also uncertain.

Notes 1 L.W. Labaree et al. (eds), The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (New Haven, 1959–), XXII, 520–1. 2 Königsegg to Pentenridter, 7 Mar. 1728, HHStA. Frankreich Varia 12. 3 N. Tracy, Navies, Deterrence, and American Independence (Vancouver, 1988). 4 C. Wilkinson, The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2004). 5 London Evening Post, 5 Oct., Old England, 7 Oct. 1752. 6 London Evening Post, 30 Jan. 1762; Viry to Charles Emmanuel III, 11 Mar. 1756, AST. LM. Ing. 60; Henry Fox, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, to George, Second Earl of Bristol, envoy in Turin, 19 Mar. 1756, NA. SP. 92/64. 7 William, Fourth Earl of Rochford to Shelburne, 10 Dec. 1767, NA. SP. 78/273 fol. 264. 8 Bristol Gazette and Public Advertiser, 16 Jan. 1772. 9 J.T. Lindblad, Sweden’s Trade with the Dutch Republic, 1738–1795 (1982). 10 Eg. Memorandum sent to Bladen, 5 Aug. (os) 1741, NA. SP. 91/28 fol. 177. 11 Sandwich to Alexander Burnet, in charge of affairs in Berlin, 15 Jan. 1765, NA. SP. 90/84. For an instance of the earlier orders, Townshend to Whitworth, 1 July 1715, Whitworth to Factory in Königsberg, 22 Aug. 1716, BL. Add. 37362 fol. 45, 37363 fol. 42; Instructions for Count of Forfar as envoy to Prussia, – June (os) 1715, and of Sir Luke Schaub as envoy to Saxony-Poland, 22 Sept. (os) 1730, NA. SP. 90/105, 88/38. 12 M. Roberts, Macartney in Russia (London, 1974), p. 31. 13 Robert Liston, envoy in Madrid, to Robert Murray Keith, envoy in Vienna, 24 Oct. 1783, BL. Add. 35530 fols 120–1. 14 R. Davis, ‘English Foreign Trade, 1700–1774’, EcHR, 15 (1963), pp. 300–3. 15 BL. Add. 58213 fol. 204. 16 R. De Peuter, ‘Note sur le Grand Commerce à Bruxelles à la fin de l’Époque Autrichienne’, Etudes sur le XVIIIe Siècle, 4 (1977), p. 29. 17 A.E. Wolfe-Aylward, The Pictorial Life of Wolfe (Plymouth, 1933); A. McNairn, Behold the Hero: General Wolfe and the Arts in the Eighteenth Century (Montreal, 1999); N. Rogers, ‘Brave Wolfe: The Making of a Hero’, in K. Wilson (ed.), A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660–1840 (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 239–59. 18 M. Roberts, Splendid Isolation 1763–1780 (Reading, 1970). 19 P. Lawson, The Imperial Challenge: Quebec and Britain in the Age of the American Revolution (Montreal, 1989).

174 1763–83 20 E.H. Gould, ‘Fears of War, Fantasies of Peace: British Politics and the Coming of the American Revolution’, in Gould and P.S. Onuf (eds), Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World (Baltimore, 2005), p. 20. 21 M. Daunton and R. Halpern (eds), Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600–1850 (London, 1999). 22 S. Sen, Empire of Free Trade: The East India Company and the Making of the Colonial Marketplace (Philadelphia, 1998); P.J. Marshall, East India Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1976). 23 H.V. Bowen, ‘Sinews of Trade and Empire: The Supply of Commodity Exports to the East India Company during the Late Eighteenth Century’, EcHR, 55 (2002), pp. 466–86. 24 Bedford, Bedfordshire CRO., Lucas papers 30/14/306/6. 25 BL. Add. 58213 fol. 343. 26 H.V. Bowen, Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics 1757–1773 (Cambridge, 1991), and ‘Tea, Tribute and the East India Company c. 1750–c. 1775’, in S. Taylor, R. Connors and C. Jones (eds), Hanoverian Britain and Empire (Woodbridge, 1998), pp. 158–76. 27 P.J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1750–1783 Oxford, 2005), e.g. p. 378. 28 J. Thomas, The East India Company and the Provinces in the Eighteenth Century: I Portsmouth and the East India Company 1700–1815 (Lampeter, 1999). 29 P. Lawson and J. Phillips, ‘ “Our Execrable Banditti”: Perceptions of Nabobs in Mid-Eighteenth Century Britain’, Albion, 16 (1984), pp. 225–41; J. Raven, Judging New Wealth. Popular Publishing and Responses to Commerce in England 1750–1800 (Oxford, 1992). 30 MS. papers from Cardiff, 9/93. 31 J.L. Bullion, A Great and Necessary Measure: George Grenville and the Genesis of the Stamp Act, 1763–1765 (Columbia, Missouri, 1982); W.B. Kerr, ‘The Stamp Act in Nova Scotia’, New England Quarterly, 6 (1933), pp. 552–66; A.J. O’Shaughnessy, ‘The Stamp Act Crisis in the British Caribbean’, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., 51 (1994), pp. 203–26. 32 T.G. Burnard, ‘ “Prodigious riches”: the wealth of Jamaica before the American Revolution’, EcHR, 44 (2001), pp. 520–2. 33 A.J. O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean (Philadelphia, 2000), pp. 104–5. 34 R. Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1995). 35 Yorke to General Jeffrey Amherst, 13 Nov. 1778, NA. War Office 34/111 fol. 183. 36 I. de Madariaga, Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (London, 1962). 37 A. Stockley, Britain and France at the Birth of America: The European Powers and the Peace Negotiations of 1782–1783 (Exeter, 2001), p. 226, fn. 38. 38 George III to Shelburne, 20 Sept. 1782, J. Fortescue (ed.), The Correspondence of King George the Third 1760–1783 (6 vols, London, 1927–8), VI, 137. 39 Hawkesbury to William, Lord Grenville, Foreign Secretary, 17 Oct. 1794, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 122.

Chapter 9

1783–1815

At this time there was an English ship in the harbour [Naples], the Euphrates, Captain Gooch, bound for Smyrna [modern Izmir]. The cabins were all fitted up like shops, with all sorts of English manufactories, particularly clocks, watches and hardware. It was astonishing with what eagerness the Neapolitan ladies and gentlemen of every rank and degree crowded on board, some to satisfy their curiosity only, some to haggle about the prices, and others to purchase, if it were only a penknife or pair of scissors. This traffic was carried on above a month, when the captain proceeded on his voyage. Thomas Jones, 17831

In 1783, W. Morton Pitt forwarded to the Foreign Secretary, Thomas, Second Lord Grantham, a former diplomat, a memorial from some of his constituents, the mayor and merchants of Poole, opposing the idea of concessions in Newfoundland to France during the peace negotiations at the close of the War of American Independence. Poole played a role in the crucial Newfoundland fisheries. Pitt asked for an answer to quiet their fears, but added that he was not ‘so unreasonable as to expect any confidential information, nor so presumptuous as to suppose you want any information from Poole touching the importance of Newfoundland to this country’. Grantham’s overt reply, stating a readiness to receive information, was accompanied by a private note, ‘You are fully sensible how impossible it is for me to say more or less to them. I wish they could be at all convinced of the impropriety of their interference.’2 This was very much the standard ministerial attitude. Advice would be accepted only if judged suitable. Trade and empire are emphasized differently for the period 1783–1815. The focus on trade and foreign policy is on its early peacetime years, specifically because there is an excellent book on commercial negotiations,3 although such negotiations and a keenness to ensure commercial treaties continued during the subsequent wars.4 A stress on empire and foreign policy, in contrast, is found across the period, although, again, there is a contrast between the peace years and those of war with France, which began in 1793. Both before and after 1793, there was interest in territorial expansion but, prior to the war with France, it was largely at the expense of non-European powers, and there was caution

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about pushing colonial claims against European states.5 From 1793, in contrast, there were also the tempting prizes of the colonies of France and her allies. Furthermore, policy towards non-European states from 1793 was affected by the likely interaction with the war. In methodological terms, there is also a parallel, with work on trade discussing the respective role of mercantile interests and government, and that on empire considering periphery and metropole. These are not co-terminous because governmental and mercantile interests were present both on the periphery and in the metropole. Nevertheless, there is an instructive comparison because, in each case, it is clear that the term policy can sometimes provide a misleading sense of coherence. The range of trade limited the feasibility of consistent policy-making. Furthermore, despite the loss of the Thirteen Colonies after the War of American Independence, empire became more extensive. However, this greater scale did not preclude or limit metropolitan control. Indeed, the contrary was the case. A combination of the greater importance of trade and empire, a sense that they were of more significance, a determination to provide control, and a concern about initiatives on the periphery, all ensured more of a stress on government oversight, and this was to be taken further after war broke out in 1793. The key debate over trade policy and, specifically, over its relationship with foreign policy, occurred prior to the war. As with the abortive Anglo-French trade treaty of 1713, the episode emerged in the aftermath of war with France, and was a product of the attempt to secure the peace. Unlike in 1713, however, the trade treaty won approval in Parliament. This invites attention to the extent to which the public debate over trade and/or Anglo-French relations had altered since 1713. Ironically, the failure to secure a trade treaty in 1713 did not preclude the negotiation of an alliance with France, whereas success in achieving such a treaty in 1786 did not lead to an alliance. The need for the treaty arose from the peace treaties of 1783–4, which provided for the selection of commissioners to reach new commercial arrangements, based on reciprocity and mutual convenience, between Britain on the one hand, and France, Spain and the Dutch on the other, and, in the case of the first two, stated that these should be completed by 1 January 1786. Shelburne was interested in better commercial relations as a means to further political reconciliation between the two powers, but, once he had lost power in 1783 (he never regained it), the drive for such negotiations came from the French. Rayneval told the diplomat Daniel Hailes in May 1784, ‘that the wish of the French ministry was to establish their trade with England on the broadest basis possible and to open all their ports’.6 However, ministerial instability, more pressing problems and a lack of enthusiasm led the British to do nothing. If, under French pressure, the government finally nominated, and then eventually sent, George Craufurd to Paris in 1784, the choice of such an inconspicuous figure indicated a lack of interest; and this aroused French anger.7 The negotiations themselves made no progress, and also indicated the diffi-

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culty of establishing an amiable context. Rayneval, the French Commissioner, suggested in September 1784 that reciprocity serve as the basis for negotiations, but the British did not respond. Having lowered duties on some British goods as an encouragement to get talks going, the French took the opposite tack in 1785. Raised duties and outright prohibitions indeed had a considerable impact in Britain, and, in the House of Lords’ debate on the Address of Thanks on 24 January 1786, William, Second Earl Fitzwilliam referred to Britain as being ‘in an hostility of commerce’ with Austria and France. French actions helped push the government towards serious negotiations, thus apparently demonstrating that British policy could be influenced through trade. In October 1785, William Pitt the Younger argued that it was necessary to show that Britain was in earnest. Two months later, Carmarthen ordered Craufurd to extend the date by which a settlement had to be made from 1 January to 1 June 1786, and informed him that he would be replaced by an envoy with greater status and powers.8 This was an aspect of Pitt’s general determination to step up the pace of commercial negotiations throughout Europe. As after the Seven Years’ War, the financial burdens of great power status and war led to a search for new sources of revenue and for greater effectiveness in utilising those that already existed, but there was now a determination to expand commerce by means of trade treaties. The political and diplomatic importance of Anglo-French relations lent special urgency to the prospect of a trade treaty with France. The choice of William Eden as the negotiator was controversial as he was seen as a turncoat for abandoning the opposition, but it also reflected the decision to seek expertise. An MP, Eden had been an Under Secretary of State and a member of the Board of Trade. The choice of Eden is an interesting comment on the claim made by a pamphleteer two decades later, I should suppose, that after negotiating with the respective courts where ministers are accredited, the next point of duty would be to study the commerce, genius, and locality of the country they often reside in during so great a part of their lives; but many of our English . . . ministers leave the country with little more local knowledge than they brought into it. The French government, aware of this, have now their commercial agents, who, being paid for the office they hold are not (like our consuls) necessitated to follow trade, but apply their time and talents in investigating the political and commercial nature of the country they live in, whilst the ambassador has only to look to the formal part of the business, and do the honours of his office.9 Eden could fulfil the role of commercial agent, and also sought to undertake that of envoy. He devoted himself, with his usual energy, to seeking the opinions of merchants and manufacturers in formal hearings, before setting out for Paris in March 1786. The importance of mercantile pressures had been

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demonstrated the previous year when Pitt, influenced by the ideas of Adam Smith, sought to introduce free trade between Britain and Ireland. He was defeated because of Irish political circumstances, but the plan also aroused considerable opposition in Britain. Manufacturing interests were organised into a ‘Great Chamber of Manufacturers’ by the pottery entrepreneur Josiah Wedgwood, a great exporter, and the Commons received over 60 petitions from manufacturing and mercantile centres. Philip Yorke MP noted the industrialists’ fear of Irish rivalry in foreign markets, their conviction that lower taxes and cheaper labour and food made Ireland more competitive, as well as the fall in the ministerial majority on the issue.10 Daniel Pulteney recalled Walpole’s remark that ‘the trading interest’ was like a hog, that cried out loudly if it was touched.11 Eden was enthusiastic about the prospect for a trade treaty with France and, pressing Pitt to move fast, critical of British hesitation and protectionist sentiment. He wrote to the minister on 13 April 1786, this French negotiation takes the turn that we wished and even beyond our speculations . . . France shows a disposition to encourage our trade if we remove the senseless and peevish distinctions which fill so many lines in our Book of Rates . . . We shall derive extensive and solid advantages from the alteration which the French ministers will immediately make in the restrictions which affect our trade . . . this treaty may form a new epoch in history . . . temporary considerations are trifling when compared first with the importance of avoiding the farther embarrassments which were prepared, and would actually have been put in execution against our trade, if I had not arrived: but more especially when compared with the advantage of instituting a system of right understanding between the two empires. Four days later, Eden transmitted the French project for a treaty to London.12 A statement of principle, it envisaged negotiations in detail after the ratification of an agreement, but the Pitt ministry wanted all details to be part of any agreement, and Carmarthen responded to Eden by seeking detailed information on specific duties and commercial regulations.13 This problem could not be solved by talk, such as Eden’s, of Britain and France uniting ‘in some solemn plan of permanent peace’, nor was there evidence to support the Austrian envoy’s claim that a more conciliatory British line towards France was designed to preserve the British position in India and to allow George III a free hand in Germany.14 Eden was unhappy at what he saw as a hesitant British response, and feared that this was making the French ministers more cautious, and his own position more difficult.15 He saw the role of mercantile lobbying in Parliament as crucial, whilst the Parliament was sitting it was very possible that any body of men whose interests were not included to their satisfaction in the treaty might have raised among themselves some expression . . . but this would not be

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the case during the prorogation; we should have the advantage of information from any body of men, who might think their interests capable of being forwarded.16 Although Eden did not approve, it was necessary to delay the signature of the main treaty, while negotiations took place over specific tariffs, because of the ably articulated character of British mercantile and industrial opinion and the need to defuse press and political criticism. Certain economic interests, such as the West Indian planters and merchants, who feared that French brandy would compete with their profitable rum exports to Britain,17 opposed the treaty. Newspaper attacks underlined the sensitivity of the negotiations, the Daily Universal Register of 22 August 1786 declaring that The demands of each country militate so much against the staple manufactures of both, which are rivals to each other, that the policy of either must be injured by a surrender of the advantages they at present enjoy. Most countries have articles of which we stand in need, and without injury exchange them for ours they have not; but England and France have the same manufactures . . . How then can we take off duties from foreign commodities to undersell our own, or vice versa. It was necessary to demonstrate that British industry would not suffer, and, with Pitt receiving expert opinion from Hawkesbury, the head of the Board of Trade, the British took a firm line in the negotiations over duties and prohibitions.18 Eden’s support for Rayneval’s argument that there should be an understanding that neither power would insist on the rigid enforcement of unforeseen advantages that created ‘a sudden and mischievous revolution in commerce’, was sensibly rejected in favour of precision, clarity and detail.19 The British determination, despite French complaints, to continue the exclusion of French silk imports was successful in the final treaty,20 as was pressure for favourable terms for some of the principal British exports, and the demands made on behalf of Ireland. The French, however, gained one important goal, the reduction of duties on their wines to a rate no greater than that on Portuguese wines, which had enjoyed a marked preference since the Methuen Treaty of 1703. The terms of the treaty signed at Versailles on 26 September 1786 were so good for Britain that Eden, who argued that Britain must open to France ‘some means of payment’ so that she could pay for British exports,21 feared the treaty would not be sustainable for the French. Indeed, the treaty was to be blamed for the problems that affected French industry in the late 1780s. British textile exports were to be especially competitive. Hawkesbury remarked, ‘The navigation of this country is so well protected at present by the laws that are made to favour it, as well as by the excellence of our ships and sailors that nothing in my judgement is to be apprehended from the rivalship of the French in this respect’.22 In Britain, the opposition’s attempt to stir up feeling against the

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treaty on economic grounds was generally unsuccessful, and they were forced to fall back on political arguments, which had a wider resonance. Political developments anyway ensured that the commercial potential of the treaty was not realised. Its political benefits, including an agreement to lessen tension in the Indian Ocean, were outweighed in the longer term by the adverse impact of the treaty on French public opinion.23 In the short term, the political benefits from the treaty were negligible in any case and, in 1787, the two powers nearly went to war in the Dutch crisis, the culmination of a rivalry for control of the United Provinces, which included competition in the Indian Ocean. British concern about French intentions there were acute. LieutenantColonel Charles Cathcart MP, who was to die in 1788, en route to negotiating a trade treaty with China, was in no doubt of French ‘systematic views both military and commercial’, and he discussed the possibility of seizing the French base of Mauritius.24 Cathcart, who had served in the army from 1776, in 1781–3 and from the mid-1780s in India, was typical of the degree to which military experience and attitudes affected imperial ideas. Concern over the situation in the Indian Ocean encouraged a forward policy, with naval interest in a base to the east of India leading to the acquisition of the Andaman Islands in 1789, while the East India Company in 1786 backed the initiative by a merchant, Francis Light, that had led to the occupation of the island of Penang off the west coast of Malaya. A base there was seen as an important challenge to Dutch claims to exclusive control of the region, as well as a potentially valuable assistance to Britain’s growing China trade. In the late 1780s, Pitt was far from keen on war with France, but was also anxious to strengthen the British role in the Indian Ocean. He expressed interest in 1788 in a settlement with France in which Britain gained Mauritius, Réunion and France’s positions in India in return for support for French gains from the Turkish empire,25 although nothing came of the idea. Furthermore, at least in discussions with the French envoy, Pitt argued that there was potential for expansion in trade with Asia and therefore enough for the European powers to share.26 In the negotiations of the period, diplomats supported trade, but only in so far as it did not clash with political interests. Eden, now Lord Auckland, complained in 1790 that commercial issues could not ‘force themselves to attention’ amidst political ‘bustles’.27 The attitude of government was considerably more cautious, more responsive to political and financial considerations, and more aware of the sectional, and often contradictory, self-interest of commercial and industrial lobby groups, than might be suggested by any stress on the pursuit of commercial advantage. The latter indeed posed problems, Hawkesbury warning, with reference to trade with Spain, that the negotiation of a treaty risked dissatisfying merchants.28 Envoys found progress in trade negotiations hard,29 in part because it was difficult to counter protectionist sympathies. If this was true of Britain, it was even more the case abroad; although Robert Woodford implied in 1786 that the authoritarian nature of French government lent itself to commercial reform,

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France you see prefers filling her coffers by duties, to letting the profits escape to smugglers, and to the ruining her finances for a set of soi-disants manufacturers, whom if a countervailing duty cannot protect, had better turn their hands to something else.30 Although trade with France did not grow after the Eden Treaty as had been anticipated, Britain remained an important trader within Europe. This was a matter not only of the pursuit of commercial treaties, but also of an attempt to ensure a new order in Eastern Europe that served both diplomatic and commercial goals. This new order focused on opposition to Russia, which became more marked in the late 1780s and nearly led, in the Ochakov Crisis of 1791, to war. Anglo-Russian commercial relations had also been compromised by increased signs of developments in Franco-Russian trade, which included a trade treaty in 1787. The Anglo-Russian trade treaty of 1766 expired in 1786, and was not renewed, despite British efforts.31 Although trade with Russia continued after the treaty expired,32 poor political relations with Russia encouraged a British attempt to develop trade with Prussia, an important ally in 1788–91, and, in particular, with Poland. Such a development offered an opportunity to broaden and redirect the important Baltic trade. Carmarthen noted British concern about Baltic stability: ‘The commercial and maritime interests of these kingdoms are so intimately connected with the preservation of tranquillity among the several powers of the Baltic’.33 The Sound Toll accounts for 1784–95 reveal that the goods most frequently exported westwards out of the Baltic were hemp (for rope), tallow (for lighting, lubricants, soap manufacture and tanning), and iron, these going mostly to Britain; linseed (for dyes and soaps), mostly to the United Provinces; flax (for linen), mostly to Britain and Portugal; and wheat, rye, potash (for bleaching), soap and glass, mostly to Britain, France, the United Provinces and the Austrian Netherlands. Poland, which was a major source for these goods, was not in a position to compete industrially with Britain. Instead, its economy was complementary, and this was especially valuable given the problems that protectionism was placing in the way of exports to northern Europe. Joseph Ewart, the activist envoy in Berlin, argued that Britain could become the principal market for Prussian and Polish exports and that, if Prussia lowered her often crippling transit duties, Britain would be able to export manufactured goods not only to her, but also to Poland and Saxony. Interest in the possibility of a new commercial role for Poland was pushed by Alexander Gibson, consul in Danzig, and was aroused by James Durno, consul in Memel, a timber merchant who spent over six months in Britain in 1789 and influenced the government with his ideas for a new focus on Anglo-Prussian relations.34 Once returned to Poland, Durno began to correspond directly with Pitt,35 while the evolution of British policy was seen in the new pressure on Prussia to arrange a satisfactory commercial arrangement with Poland, Leeds, the Foreign Secretary, writing in July 1790 concerning

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points in which the interest of this country and its future security in a connection with Prussia is deeply concerned: and with a view to which His Majesty has been desirous . . . to contribute to a commercial arrangement between Prussia and Poland under such a system of transit duties as would secure the free importation into Poland of British manufactures and the free exportation from thence of those articles which are produced in the dominions of the Republic [Poland], and in the countries bordering upon it. We should have a very direct and material interest in support of the independence of that country, and in keeping it out of the hands of Russia, to whom it would, in that case, be a powerful commercial rival; and the facility of drawing our naval stores and other materials of manufacture from thence instead of from Russia, would render the friendship of the latter less important to us in fact, and much less an object of attention with the public in this country.36 The concern with public views was instructive, and the remedy in the shape of a major shift in trade was striking. In addition, Leeds made it clear that, while the ministry did not wish Polish trade to be forced ‘into those channels which depend entirely on Russia’, Polish territorial cessions to Prussia were supportable only as part of a commercial treaty that guaranteed Poland trade via Prussia on moderate transit duties and gave Britain ‘the right of free import and export of such articles as shall be agreed upon on such duties’.37 Thus, in place of territorial gain, which was the basis for Prussian schemes for equivalence, the British government sought commercial equivalents, as both ends in themselves and as the basis of closer political links. In addition, improved trade with the Turkish empire, including the possibility of arms exports,38 attracted some commentators. A commercial treaty was indeed considered, while it was rumoured in January 1791, though without cause, that the Turks would cede Cyprus to Britain, and thus provide her with a major commercial base in the eastern Mediterranean.39 In the event, Cyprus was not acquired until 1878 and there was no trade treaty. Commercial considerations played a role in the focusing of British attention on the Turkish fortress of Ochakov, a Russian conquest in 1788 that the British insisted, in 1790–1, must be returned as part of any Russo-Turkish peace settlement. Ochakov was held to control the entrance of the River Dnieper, and it was argued that what was termed the district of Ochakov also controlled the mouths of the Bug and the Dniester. This was seen as crucial to British hopes of a stronger Poland. Alexander Straton, Secretary of Legation in Vienna, wrote to Leeds in February 1791, Ochakov and its district . . . would render her [Russia] mistress of the mouths of all the rivers which run into the Black Sea, and of course of almost the whole commerce of the southern part of Poland, several articles of which, such as hemp, pitch, timber etc. are of infinite consequence to a

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maritime power. Besides, thus situated relative to Poland, Russia might so far cramp the trade, and have such a local influence over the former as to make her feel that a connection with the Empress might be more advantageous to the Republic than an alliance with Prussia.40 Thus political factors were seen as likely to constrain trade, a sensible response to the commercial prospectus of this fast-changing region. However, in the subsequent public debate over policy within Britain, the value of the Russia trade, which was stressed by the opposition, made more of an impact than the prospectus offered by the government. Their speakers stressed the general threat posed by Russian ambitions. Robert Ainslie, the envoy in Constantinople, had already warned in 1787 of Russia’s ‘golden dreams of conquest and commercial advantages towards the Caspian and Black Seas’. Pitt, in April 1792, looked to the future and warned that a Russia dominant in the Black Sea would challenge British interests in the Indian Ocean.41 Thus, one of the key themes of the following century was already being clarified, with trade and geopolitics both linked in the equations of power. In contrast, there was to be no such politico-commercial rivalry with the USA. There were important causes of tension under both heads (and Jefferson’s embargo of December 1807 hit the growth of British exports to the USA), but not to the sustained degree of tensions with Russia. If Britain did not fight Russia until 1854–6, and only then, while it fought the USA in 1812–15, there had been earlier episodes of serious confrontation with Russia, most obviously in 1801, and concern about Russian ambitions played an important role in an interlinked diplomatic and imperial system that registered moves and anxieties in Eastern Europe, the Turkish empire and the lands of the incipient Great Game, more powerfully than those in the New World. As far as trade was concerned, the swift resumption of trade links with the newly independent United States greatly lessened the potential damage from the war, and also indicated the extent to which rule, and the commitments and costs that went with it, were not necessary for commercial benefit and development. American ambitions created concern, not least in the Pacific, while Hawkesbury, from 1796 First Earl of Liverpool, who was angered by American restrictions on British shipping, was a keen defender of the limitations on American trade to the West Indies. He saw this in part in political terms: ‘Our West India islands will never be safe if the subjects of the United States are allowed to have a free intercourse with them, and to import, among other articles, their democratical principles.’42 Hawkesbury also presented the limitations as a way to protect Britain as a naval and maritime power, a linked description in his eyes that focused on the need to keep up the number of sailors. Linking this to restrictions on foreign trade was a well-established theme and indicated the conservative nature of his attitudes. In 1797, Liverpool stressed the need to maintain commercial prerogatives:

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This is not a time therefore when we should make a concession which will tend to the diminution of our maritime strength. When peace is made 100,000 British sailors will be turned out of the King’s service, and some employment must be found for them, for otherwise they will not be able to subsist, or they must go into foreign service.43 There were trade-offs in terms of the impact of restrictions on foreign trade on Britain’s role as an entrepôt, but Liverpool put the emphasis on maritime strength, which would otherwise be harmed vis-à-vis neutrals by Britain’s combatant status. In 1797, he responded to the argument that imposing a tonnage duty on American shipping might damage Britain’s role as an entrepôt for rice and tobacco, both of which were exported from America, reasoning that this would be an appropriate response to American duties on British ships as Britain had lost this trade since America became independent, and that ‘the extent of our navigation is to be preferred in general to the extent of our commerce, for on the first depends the security of every thing’.44 This policy hit America hard, for British conquests of the colonies of other states, for example Surinam from the Dutch, ended the right of the Americans to trade there.45 The prohibition of bringing goods from Surinam in neutral shipping had been used as a reason to encourage the surrender of the colony: then British shipping could be used.46 Ironically, such conquests also led to complaints from British merchants angry with the policy of British officers.47 The government abandoned the emphasis on British shipping only in the direst need, as when grain was in very short supply and its import in any shipping was permitted.48 Nevertheless, serious differences and additional rumours, for example, of American attempts to obtain a trading station from the Portuguese in Africa,49 proved an inaccurate guide to a generally mutually beneficial relationship. Average annual British exports to North America, which had been £1.3 million in 1751–5, rose to over £2 million in 1786–90. The new state was populous, still needed access to Britain’s credit (often generously supplied), and lacked the range of British industrial production. As a result, the business networks that had developed in range and intensity prior to the war, as Britain took a greater role in the Atlantic economy, reknit swiftly. This was particularly fortunate, as Western and Central Europe experienced difficult industrial and commercial conditions in the 1780s. However, thanks in part to the recovery of trade with North America, the value of British exports rose from £14.3 million in 1770 to £18.9 million in 1790. Remittances between France and the USA were generally made through Britain, a relationship Hawkesbury was keen to continue once war had broken out.50 Relations improved in 1794–5 with the negotiation of Jay’s Treaty which settled, or at least eased, commercial and territorial disputes while America was involved in the ‘Quasi War with France in 1798–1800 as the French sank or captured over 300 American merchantmen in response to the American role in maintaining British trade routes: France did not accept that neutral ships could carry British goods. In response, even Liverpool warmed

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to the Americans, seeing the crisis as an opportunity to reknit relations, with the British navy playing a key role – they must depend on our fleet for the general protection of their commerce, and this circumstance will tend, I think, to unite the two countries in a closer bond of union: their armed vessels however will afford us a considerable degree of assistance in destroying the small French privateers.51 Jay’s Treaty kept Anglo-American relations pretty calm until the Chesapeake affair of 1807 when the dispute over British warships forcibly enlisting British nationals serving as sailors on American ships led to violence. Impressment of seamen from American ships was seen in the USA as a particular outrage, as it represented an infringement of the national sovereignty of American vessels and a denial of America’s ability to naturalise foreigners. This was not only a naturalisation problem: British naval officers also impressed many native-born American seamen.52 If relations with the United States indicated that trade did not necessarily depend on empire, it was still widely expected to flow from it: there was a oneway relationship alongside the more difficult one with independent states. This encouraged interest in South and East Asia and the Pacific, for they seemed to offer new opportunities for both types of trade. The focus generally is on spreading territorial empire – in India, Australia and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere, for example Malaya – but a desire for trade was as crucial. This was very much seen in an increased engagement with China, from which tea imports grew greatly, to more than 13 million pounds in 1788 and 17.25 million of the 19.5 million sold at Canton in 1791, stimulating, in turn, exports from India to China, particularly of opium.53 A more direct engagement included plans in 1787 to negotiate for the establishment of a commercial base in China, but, although the Qianlong emperor was impressed by the model of the British warship he was shown, the Maccartney mission of 1792–4 failed to realise hopes for an enhanced commercial relationship. Instead, that had to wait until after the victories of the First Opium War (1839–42). Similarly, in 1788 the East India Company drew up a project for an agreement with the Spanish Royal Philippine Company, in which Manila was to become a free port, enabling the British both to trade indirectly with South America and, as a result, to obtain silver that could be used in the China trade. The negotiations, which were conducted for some time, were unsuccessful,54 but they reflected British interest in China and the Pacific. The Nootka Sound Crisis of 1790 made this more apparent as it directed diplomatic, political and popular attention to the Pacific, and led to speculation about commercial possibilities there. This expanding and energetic commercial world was to be put under serious pressure by successive challenges during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Just as spreading trans-oceanic British power affected the commercial options for other states, so Britain found that the habitual problems

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of confronting protectionism were made greatly worse by spreading French power and influence. Napoleon indeed saw an assault on British trade as key to the defeat of Britain, and thus a way to make invasion unnecessary. The Berlin decree of 21 November 1806 (its place of issue under French occupation), launched his Continental System. It decreed a blockade of Britain, the confiscation of all British goods and the arrest of all Britons. The System was expanded in 1807 by the Edict of Fontainebleau and the two Decrees of Milan. Although it was a unilateral policy, formulated and executed without consultation with client states, allies and neutrals, the System was for France’s allies as much as France. However, attempts to enforce the blockade helped make alliance with France unpopular and was repeatedly challenged by the continuation of trade under the shelter of British naval power. The System also hit France’s seaports, although in 1807–10 it brought prosperity to Paris, Alsace, the Lyonnais and Belgium, before serious economic problems became pressing. The System collapsed with Napoleon’s alliances in 1813.55 More generally, naval power protected British trade. Already, in 1788, William Grenville had warned that France could begin a war by capturing the homeward-bound East India fleet, which he valued at £8 million, and he pressed, as a result, for maintaining an equivalent naval force in the Indian Ocean.56 In the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, effective British convoying ensured that ships could be constructed more efficiently with reference to the goods to be carried, rather than their defensive characteristics: reestablished in 1793, convoys were made compulsory in 1798, and, although the Convoy Act of that year expired in 1801, it was subsequently revived. Furthermore, although war led to a heavy burden in taxation,57 the profits from trade enabled Britain to finance her war effort and to make loans and grants to European allies. Far from Britain being brought low by the French blockade,58 a strategy of economic warfare based on the naval blockade of France and her allies became feasible for Britain, and the precariousness of the French economic system was exposed. Naval power was also important in particular areas. It led to the spread of British influence around the Mediterranean, and also round the Indian Ocean. Commercial penetration of Southeast Asia and the Far East was also aided by naval strength. Occupation of Java in 1811–16 was important, but developing trade was not just a production of conquest, as the growing penetration of the Manila market showed. At the same time, war in Europe opened up the possibilities for the direct trade with the colonies of other states that had been called for earlier in the period.59 For example, the settlement of the Nootka Sound dispute of 1790 with Spain had left the British able to trade with Pacific coastlands not already occupied by Spain, but there was still an exclusion from direct trade with Spanish America. This changed with the Napoleonic conquest of Spain in 1808 and the consequent alliance between Britain and Spain. As a result, first of the disruption of links between Spain and Latin America, and, subsequently, after the

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Napoleonic Wars, of the unsuccessful attempt to recreate the Spanish American empire, direct links with Britain became of considerable importance. Indeed, much of Latin America became part of the world of British informal empire, with important trading and financial interests bringing Britain profit and influence. This was not, however, the situation Arthur Dobbs had envisaged in 1762 (see p. 148). There were no British military bases, and indeed the British attempt to capture Buenos Aires in 1807 had been humiliatingly defeated. Nor was there a direct relationship between the British and the Native (Indian) population, other than on the Caribbean coasts of Honduras and Nicaragua. Yet, the important role Britain played in Latin America during the nineteenth century, with exports there matching those to the USA by the late 1810s, was a testimony to the longstanding relationship of trade and policy, and its implications for empire, formal or informal. Domestic politics could play a major role in the relationships between trade, empire and government policy, most obviously with the abolition of the slave trade. Christian assumptions about the unity of mankind, and the need to gather Africans to Christ, played a major role in influencing British opinion; although, to supporters of slavery, an acceptance of blacks as fully human did not preclude slavery. Commercial benefits from the abolition of the slave trade were also predicted by some commentators, Malachy Postlethwayt arguing, in his The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce, that the trade stirred up conflict among African rulers, and thus obstructed both British trade and ‘the civilising of these people’.60 The ruling, in the Somersett case in 1771–2, that West Indian slave-owners could not forcibly take their slaves from England made slavery unenforceable there. In 1787, the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, a national lobbying group, was established. Its pressure helped lead to the Dolben Act of 1788, by which conditions on British slave ships were regulated. Abolitionist sentiment affected the arts, leading to the production of visual and literary images of the horrors of slavery, such as the medallion of the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, designed by William Hackwood and manufactured at Josiah Wedgwood’s factory, as well as a mass of pamphlet literature and discussion of the issue in humanitarian novels. On 7 April 1789, the Leeds Intelligencer reported the collection of £18 for supporting the application to Parliament for repeal of the trade ‘raised by voluntary contributions in a small part of the high end of Wensleydale . . . The contributors (being chiefly farmers) were informed of the injustice and inhumanity of the slave trade by pamphlets circulated previous to the collection.’ The press resounded with the battle: for example Swinney’s Birmingham and Stafford Chronicle of May 1791 included a poem by ‘H.F.’ praising Pitt’s recent Parliamentary speech on the slave trade. In addition, Sierra Leone, established by the British in 1787, was the first colony for free Africans, many freed slaves, to be established: both the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor and key government supporters appear to have been motivated by humanitarianism springing from Christian convictions,

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gratitude towards Loyalist blacks from the former North American colonies, and abolitionist sympathies; and the settlement explicitly forbade slavery.61 Pressure to abolish the slave trade was hindered by the importance of the West Indies to the British economy, as well as by the opposition of George III, several ministers and the House of Lords,62 and, in 1792, William Wilberforce’s motion for immediate abolition was unsuccessful. In part, opposition to abolition reflected the conservative response in Britain to reform agitation after the French Revolution. There was also a populist tone to opposition to abolition, one that is too often overlooked. In William Dent’s cartoon ‘Abolition of the Slave Trade, or the Man the Master’, published in London on 26 May 1789, produce is shown waiting for a purchaser because its price has gone up, while a slave in Western clothes beats a semi-clothed white, saying ‘Now, Massa, me lick a you, and make you worky while me be Gentleman – curse a heart’. Whites are depicted at work in the sugar fields while blacks feast under the words ‘Retaliation for having been held in captivity’. As a reminder of international competition, a foreigner remarks ‘By gar den ve sal have all de market to ourselves, and by underselling we sal send Johnny Bull’s capitall and revenue to le Diable’, while a Briton comments, ‘Why, if I have my rum and sugar and my tobacco at the old price – I don’t care if the slave trade is abolished.’63 After the boom in sugar exports from the British West Indies caused by the chaos in the French colony of Saint-Domingue, which was affected by a major slave uprising from 1791, there was an upsurge in abolitionism in Britain in the 1800s, leading to the formal end of the British slave trade.64 The end of both this slave trade, and, subsequently, of slavery itself, has been ascribed by some commentators to a lack of profitability caused by economic development, rather than to humanitarianism.65 Some economic problems in the West Indies certainly stemmed from the impact of the American Revolution, and subsequent protectionism, on the trade between North America and the West Indies that was so important to the supplies for, and markets of, the latter.66 There are, however, indications that slave plantations in the West Indies remained profitable,67 while the plantation economy anyway remained an important asset base, and the limited convertibility of assets did not encourage disinvestments from slavery: too much money was tied up in mortgages and annuities that were difficult to liquidate in a hurry, and the planters had a good case for the generous compensation they pressed for and received. Instead of problems within the slave economy, it is more appropriate to look at the outside pressures towards abolition. These included, and contributed to, a marginalisation of groups, especially West Indian planters, that had encouraged and profited from British, and indeed European, demand for tropical goods. The domestic context for discussion of trade and empire was far from static. The reforming, liberal, middle-class culture that was growing in importance in Britain regarded the slave trade and slavery as abhorrent, anachronistic, and associated with everything it deplored. Pitt profited from his appeal to this constituency, and in 1805 the ministry issued Orders in Council banning the

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import of slaves into newly captured territories after 1807 and, in the meantime, limited the introduction of slaves to 30 per cent of the number already there. This legislation was taken much further by the next government, the more reformist Ministry of All the Talents, that took power after Pitt’s death in early 1806. That year, the new ministry supported the Foreign Slave Trade Act, ending the supply of slaves to conquered territories and foreign colonies. This was presented on prudential grounds, as a way to limit the economic strength of these territories when some were returned to opposing powers at the end of the war as they would be. The high point of the abolitionist process occurred when the Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade of 1807 banned slave-trading by British subjects and the import of slaves into the other colonies. Furthermore, in 1811, participation in the slave trade was made a felony. Britain also used its international strength to put pressure on other states to abolish or limit the slave trade, for not only did the trade now seem morally wrong, but it was also seen as giving an advantage to rival plantation economies. Naval power, amphibious capability, and trans-oceanic power projection ensured that the British were in a dominant position. Once war resumed with Napoleon in 1803, the British seized St Lucia, Tobago, Demarara, Essequibo (now both in Guiana), and Surinam in 1803–4, following with the Danish West Islands – St Croix, St Thomas and St Johns, in 1807, Martinique and Cayenne in 1809, and Guadeloupe, St Eustatius and St Martin in 1810. Fort Louis, the last French base in Africa, fell in 1809. The British were therefore in a position to make demands. In 1810, pressure was exerted on Portugal, then very much a dependent ally, protected from Napoleon by British troops, to restrict the slave trade as a preparation for abolition. Because Brazil, a key slave economy, and Angola, its major supplier, were Portuguese colonies, its position on the slave trade was important. In 1815, the returned Bourbon regime in France, another dependent ally, was persuaded to ban the slave trade and, under British pressure, the Congress of Vienna issued a declaration against the trade.68 In 1817, an Anglo-Portuguese treaty limited the slave trade in Brazil to south of the equator, and an Anglo-Spanish treaty contained similar provisions. In 1814, with effect from 1818, the Dutch slave trade was abolished. Again, this reflected British influence, as the Netherlands was also a dependent ally. In 1807, with effect from 1 January 1808, the slave trade was also banished by the United States, although scant attempt was made to enforce this. Orders in Council issued on 11 November 1807 were used by the British to justify the seizure of American slavers. It is very easy to move from the abolition of the slave trade to that of slavery, but it is important to note that these were not simultaneous, and that there were crosscurrents. Indeed, there is a sense that the slave world was being strengthened at the same time that the slave trade was being ended. This was true not only of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, seized from France in 1810, but also of the colonies of Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice on the Guiana coast of South America, seized by the British from the Dutch in 1803. Plantation

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agriculture, the large-scale importation of African slaves, and a switch from cotton and coffee to sugar, all followed British conquest there, as they did on Trinidad, seized from Spain by Britain in 1797. Thus these colonies were more like those of the late seventeenth-century West Indies than the more mature slave societies of the West Indies of the period, where a lower percentage of the slaves were African-born and where the work regime was less cruel. In Britain, the Whig ministry that pushed through the Great Reform Act of 1832 revising the electoral franchise (right to vote) to the benefit of the middle class, also passed the Emancipation Act of 1833, with slaves emancipated from August 1834. The former plantation societies of the West Indies and British Guiana became far less important to the British economy, a process accentuated by the equalisation of the sugar duties in 1846, under which protection for British sugar was progressively reduced. This further encouraged imports into Britain from Brazil and Cuba. As the exports of the former British plantation economies declined, so they became less able to attract investment, afford imports from Britain and elsewhere, and develop social capital; and this had an impact on the living standards of the bulk of the population of these colonies. In 1815, the West Indies had been the leading market for British exports, but by 1840 it had been passed by India, Australia and Canada, in that order, and the role of the West Indies in British shipping needs also declined. The decline of the plantation economies indeed helped ensure that the share of the empire in British trade declined, although the expansion of trade with other countries was also important. In the former slave colonies, the problems centred on slavery had changed, not ended, as was to be made clear in Jamaica by the harsh (and illegal) suppression of the Morant Bay Uprising in 1865. The campaigns against both the slave trade and slavery were national, not metropolitan. This reflected not only the moralism bound up in the issue, but also the extent to which commercial and other lobbying campaigns were increasingly wide-ranging. The growing sensitivity of government to provincial concerns, principally the manufacturing interests of the north of England and the midlands, was apparent from the 1780s. Indeed, in 1784, Carmarthen complained about an Austrian regulation against the import of manufactured goods, writing ‘the towns of Manchester and Sheffield have taken the alarm and have applied to government on the subject’. Robert Murray Keith, envoy in Vienna, was instructed to threaten reprisals in the face of ‘daily increasing’ alarm in Britain.69 The following year, Joseph II was ‘very freely attacked by the Birmingham manufacturers on account of his late prohibitory edict’.70 The manufacturing interest had changed politically and economically, with the rising prominence of the now far more populous and affluent north of England and the midlands, and the growing role of metallurgy. Manchester was the centre of the manufacture of cotton textiles. Travellers noted a new and vivid landscape of industrial power. The woollen textiles interests of the west of England and East Anglia remained important, but as, a result of the major rise of production in Yorkshire, were less so in relative terms and, in particular, were of declining political significance.

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Shifting government concern was shown in 1786, when Carmarthen wrote to Eden, ‘I am obliged to direct you to press to the utmost the lowering the duties on the heavy articles particularly those made of iron’.71 Two years later, he wrote, when Eden was envoy in Spain, forwarding representations from committees of the Chambers of Commerce at Leeds and Exeter about difficulties British trade with Spain was experiencing. Spain was a key market for the lighter ‘new draperies’. Eden was instructed to press the Spanish government on the matter.72 Interest in the issue was more widespread, with Sir George Yonge, the Secretary at War and an MP for Honiton, seeking advice from the Foreign Office about the pressure from nearby Exeter.73 Mercantile sensitivity to international developments was taken for granted by government. In 1784, when the Austrian envoy, citing the likely benefit to British trade, sought to win support for the opening of the Scheldt, the river on which Antwerp sits, which had been closed by treaty to trade since 1648 in response to Dutch concerns about competition, Carmarthen asked Keith whether it would procure solid and permanent advantages to the British commerce. I cannot but think that had the proposed scheme been likely to have produced any fatal consequences to our trade, the English merchants would ere this have been alarmed at the mere report of the plan and would have already communicated their apprehensions to government.74 The war with France that broke out in 1793, ended in 1802 and resumed in 1803 was to lead to major British colonial gains although, as with the Seven Years’ War and World War I, that was not the purpose of the conflict and, indeed, unlike the Seven Years’ War, the source of the war for Britain was in Europe not on the colonial periphery. Nevertheless, success in the struggle was to define Britain as a state that was the great imperial power and the director of marine trade and, with its warships, ‘masters of the sea’.75 The war destroyed or weakened the imperial systems of the other European states and provided military and diplomatic incentives for Britain to seize their territories, so that the period 1793–1815 marked the apogee of one method of territorial gain – the acquisition of the colonies of other European powers – even though the other method, the gain of non-European-ruled territories, continued, especially in India and Australasia. The seizure of the extra-European territories of other European powers was bound up with foreign policy, understood as the formal diplomacy of the state. This was less the case with the acquisition of non-European-ruled lands, with initiatives taken by local officials and by non-governmental bodies, most importantly the East India Company. However, British military strength and reputation was very important to this expansion during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic period. Strategic considerations, particularly vulnerability and opportunity, were key to this expansion, and were more urgent than the earlier

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tendency, seen during the inter-war period of 1783–93, to regard territorial expansion as necessary to consolidate commercial positions. Thus in 1786, a mercantile corresponding committee in Liverpool sent a memorial to Pitt underlining the importance of the trade with Africa to the city and arguing that French interest in building a fort on the Gold Coast challenged British rights in an area where they were based on treaties with the Natives.76 Western territorial expansion, however, made such treaties an increasingly uncertain basis, and thus encouraged further expansion. Prefiguring concern about the Portuguese empire in the late nineteenth century, there was also anxiety about the security of apparently weak Western powers. In the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, this concern was to encompass all other European colonial empires, but, prior to then, it had already focused on the Dutch, Harris writing in 1787, I wish instead of the production of the Moluccas you would instruct me to ask for the Moluccas themselves. If we do not get them the French will, as it is impossible, in its present state of disorder that the Republic should preserve its distant settlements. For the same reason, Carmarthen thought that the Dutch ought to transfer their Sri Lankan base of Trincomalee to Britain, an idea very unwelcome to France.77 At the same time, the American Revolution encouraged another approach to trade and geopolitics, that of sponsoring the independence of other peoples. Although this approach owed something to the example of French encouragement of the American Revolution, it would be misleading to neglect longstanding interest in this policy which owed much to antipathy to Spain and to the conception of British imperialism as superior to that of Spain precisely because it did not rest on territorial control. In 1787, Hawkesbury was pressed by Jack Hood, as Lord North had been when in office, to support the cause of independence for Spanish America. He was assured that this would ‘open the ports of Mexico and Peru to the commerce of Great Britain which would be attended with more real advantage than that of conquest or colonizing’. Hood also claimed that Africans could be taught to grow tobacco, sugar, cotton, coffee and indigo, which could be obtained by Britain by providing, in return, manufactured exports. He saw this as a means to end the need to grow these crops in the New World, and thus the slave trade.78 The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic War brought more specific demands on government for the support of trade and empire. These were seen in particular with the protection of trade, which involved the navy in the defensive duties of convoying and the blockading of French ports, but also the offensive task of supporting amphibious operations, for example the seizure of Mauritius and Réunion, the French bases in the Indian Ocean, in 1810. Trade protection was vital to public finances, and not only because of customs revenue. Liverpool noted in 1798, in what was also a riposte to the importsequal-corrupting-luxuries argument, that

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the great importation of sugar and coffee from the West Indies by the last fleets, amounting in value, as I am informed, to £4,000,000 was sold instantly at a very high price in a very few days, to be carried to Hamburg and other foreign markets, and very little was left for the consumption of this kingdom, which makes the present price of these articles at present so high. The return for this vast exportation will be principally in gold and silver bullion. The London market is said to be full of money, which sufficiently manifests itself by the rise of the stocks.79 Although commercial opportunity was seen as an important factor in colonial expansion, not all ideas and initiatives bore fruit. In 1793, Sir Erasmus Gower, the captain of HMS Lion, which had conveyed the first British envoy to Beijing, reported that, en route, he had stopped in Cochin China, in what is now South Vietnam, adding ‘I think we shall establish an advantageous trade with these people . . . and there is a very proper place for a settlement which we have called New Gibraltar’.80 This, however, remained only an aspiration, evidence indeed of the extent to which trade and empire were constrained by practicality, even as they were exalted by hope and power. War, nevertheless, transformed this relationship, not least by enhancing military strength and exigencies and reducing concerns about cost. In 1786, Charles James Fox had been worried about ‘sacrificing political importance to gain and peace’, as, he claimed, the Dutch had long tended to do,81 but the last combination was no longer an option for Britain from 1793. A structural or systemic account of British empire-building can make war, naval power, imperial expansion and maritime hegemony appear not only as obviously linked, but also as inevitably leading to a synergy of success. This is misleading and, in particular, underrates the multiple difficulties posed to Britain’s domestic and international situations. Even if the synergy appeared clear-cut overseas after the major defeat of the French and Spanish fleet at Trafalgar in 1805, there was still the danger that defeat on the European Continent or simply the collapse of Britain’s alliance system would lead to a return of colonial gains in order to obtain peace, as occurred in 1748 and 1802. The possibility that Austria might settle with Napoleon as late as early 1814 made this a continuing danger. Trade and empire had to be fought for, by Britain, both on its own and as part of an often complex and difficult foreign policy.

Notes 1 T. Jones, Memoirs of Thomas Jones (London, 1951), pp. 122–3. 2 Pitt to Grantham, 8 Oct., Grantham to Pitt, 11 Oct. 1782, Bedford CRO. L 30/14/308/3–6. 3 J. Ehrman, The British Government and Commercial Negotiations with Europe 1783–1793 (Cambridge, 1962), although see critical review by A. Ryan, History, 49 (1964), pp. 88–9. 4 Re. Naples, Hawkesbury to Mr Macaulay, 28 Oct. 1794, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 124. 5 Liston to Dorset, 19 Ap. 1786, Maidstone, KAO. U269 C184.

194 1783–1815 6 Draft to Fitzherbert, 9 Jan. 1783, Hailes to Carmarthen, 20 May 1784, NA. FO. 27/5 fol. 125, 27/12 fol. 34. 7 Instructions for Craufurd, 2 Sept., Dorset to Carmarthen, 1 July 1784, NA. FO. 27/13 fols 2–5, 27/12 fol. 131. 8 Pitt to Carmarthen, 13 Oct. 1785, BL. Eg. 3498 fol. 136; Carmarthen to Craufurd, 9 Dec. 1785, NA. FO. 27/17. 9 Anon., General Remarks on Our Commerce with the Continent (London, 1806?), p. 48. 10 BL. Add. 35534 fol. 177. 11 Pulteney to Duke of Rutland, 19 Ap. 1785, HMC, Rutland III (London, 1894), p. 202. 12 Eden to Pitt, 13 Ap., Eden to Carmarthen, 17 Ap. 1786, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fol. 16, FO. 27/19 fols 13–18. 13 Carmarthen to Eden, 20 Ap., 11 May 1786, NA. FO. 27/19 fols 25–39, 46. 14 Eden to Carmarthen, 25 Ap. 1786, NA FO. 27/19; Kageneck to Kaunitz, 9 May 1786, HHStA. EK. 125. 15 Eden to Carmarthen, 25 Ap. 1786, Eden to Pitt, 6, 25 May, 1, 6, 8 June 1786, NA. FO. 27/19 fol. 41, PRO. 30/8/110 fols 26, 38, 43–5, 49–50. 16 Eden to Pitt, 17 June 1786, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fol. 56. 17 Bristol Gazette and Public Advertiser, 7 Dec. 1787. 18 Eden to Pitt, 23 Aug. 1786, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fol. 73. 19 Eden to Carmarthen, 27 Aug., Carmarthen to Eden, 4, 12 Sept. 1786, NA. FO. 27/20 fols 4–5, 21–7, 64, 68–9. 20 M. Donaghay, ‘Textiles and the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786’, Textile History, 13 (1982), pp. 210–16. 21 Eden to Pitt, 6 June 1786, NA. PRO. 30/8/110 fol. 46. 22 BL. Add. 38309 fol. 146. 23 Eden to Pitt, 29 Nov. 1787, CUL. Add. 6958 no. 431. 24 Cathcart to Pitt, 29 Sept. 1787, BL. Add. 58906 fols 31–4; François de Barthélemy, French minister, plenipotentiary, to Montmorin, 1 Ap. 1788, AE. CP. Ang. 565 fols 4–6. 25 Pitt to Eden, 7 Jan. 1788, NA. PRO. 30/8/102 fol. 115. 26 La Luzerne to Montmorin, 22 July 1788, AE. CP. Ang. 566 fols 89–90. 27 Auckland to James Bland Burges, Under Secretary in the Foreign Office, 27 Oct., 15 Dec. 1790, Bodl. Bland Burges papers, 30 fols 71, 86. 28 Hawkesbury memorandum, – Aug. 1791, Bodl. Bland Burges papers, 61, p. 21. 29 Eg re. Portugal, Robert Walpole to Liston, 4 Oct. 1787, NLS. MS. 5548 fol. 129; re. Spain, Liston to Dorset, 28 Ap., 1 July 1787, Maidstone, KAO. U269 C184. 30 Woodford to Liston, 24 Oct. 1786, NLS. MS. 5545 fol. 118. 31 Fitzherbert to Dorset, 21 Ap. 1787, Maidstone, KAO. U269 C188/1. 32 William, Second Viscount Barrington to Earl of Huntingdon, 8 Dec. 1786, HL. Hastings corresp. box 100. 33 Carmarthen to Elliot, 22 Oct. 1788, NA. FO. 22/10 fol. 354. 34 Ewart to Fraser, 5 Dec. 1786, BL. Eg. 3501 fols 57–8; Gibson to Harris, 26 Feb. 1788, Winchester CRO. Malmesbury papers, vol. 175; Gerhard, Aufstieg Russlands, pp. 292–308; Ehrman, Commercial Negotiations, pp. 118–20; J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt: The Years of Acclaim (London, 1969) I, pp. 507–8. 35 Durno to Pitt, 26 May, 3 Aug. 1790, CUL. Add. 6958 nos 807, 842. 36 Leeds to Ewart, 20 July 1790, NA. SP. 64/18 fol. 127. 37 Leeds to Ewart, 20 July, Leeds to Hailes, 23 July 1790, NA. FO. 64/18 fols 127–8, 62/3 fols 137–8; Ewart to Pitt, 24 Nov. 1790, Williamwood, Ewart papers, vol. 147. 38 Robert Ainslie, envoy in Constantinople, to Carmarthen, 25 Sept. 1787, NA. FO. 78/8 fol. 199. 39 Ehrman, Commercial Negotiations, pp. 140–4; Gentleman’s Magazine, 61 (London, 1791), p. 85; Anon., A Comparative Estimate of the Advantages Great Britain Would Derive from a

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40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

53

54 55

56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

70

Commercial Alliance with the Ottoman in Preference to the Russian Empire (London, 1791), pp. 5–7. Straton to Leeds, 9 Feb. 1790, NA. FO 7/24 fol. 88. Ainslie to Carmarthen, 28 Dec. 1787, NA. FO. 78/8; Pitt’s speech, NA. PRO. 30/8/195 fols 50–1. Hawkesbury to Charles Bond, 4 Jan. 1796, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 148. Liverpool to Dudley Ryder, Vice-President of the Board of Trade, 29 May 1797, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 195. Liverpool to William Ludlam, 17 June 1797, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 197. Liverpool to Alderman Shawe, 1 Nov. 1799, BL. Add. 38311 fol. 31. Liverpool to H. Fagel, 14 Mar. 1799, BL. Add. 38311 fol. 4. Hawkesbury to Dundas, 28 June, Hawkesbury to John Tarleton, MP for Seaford, 2 Sept. 1794, BL. Add. 38310 fols 110, 114. Liverpool to Thomas Booth, 3 June 1797, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 196. Eden to Carmarthen, 17 June 1786, NA. FO. 27/19 fol. 127. Hawkesbury to Pitt, 12 June 1794, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 110. Liverpool to Phenias Bond, 23 May 1798, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 221. B. Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795–1805 (Philadelphia, 1955); B. Spivak, Jefferson’s English Crisis: Commerce, Embargo and the Republican Revolution (Charlottesville, 1979). H.C. and L.H. Mui, The Management of Monopoly: A Study of the East India Company’s Conduct of Its Tea Trade 1784–1833 (Vancouver, 1984); R. Connors, ‘Opium and Imperial Expansion: The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Asia’, in S. Taylor, R. Connors and C. Jones (eds), Hanoverian Britain and Empire (Woodbridge, 1998), pp. 248–66. B. Atkins, ‘Australia’s Place in the “Swing to the East”, 1788–1810: Addendum’, Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand, 8 (1957–9), p. 316. F. Crouzet, ‘The Impact of the French Wars on the British Economy’, in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution, 1789–1815 (Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 189–209; G. Ellis, Napoleon’s Continental Blockade: The Case of Alsace (Oxford, 1981). Grenville to Pitt, 1 Sept. 1788, NA. PRO. 30/8/140 fol. 36. Hawkesbury to Mrs Johnson, – Oct. 1794, BL. Add. 38309 fol. 118. F. Crouzet, L’Economie britannique et le blocus continental 1806–1813 (Paris, 1987). Eg. Tyrawly to Newcastle, 17 July 1729, NA. SP. 89/35 fol. 192. M. Postlethwayt, Universal Dictionary (4th edn, 2 vols, London, 1774), I, no pagination, entry for Africa. S.J. Braidwood, Black Poor and White Philanthropists: London Blacks and the Foundation of the Sierra Leone Settlement, 1786–1791 (Liverpool, 1994). Hawkesbury to Dorset, 4 July 1788, Maidstone KAO. U269 C182. Library of Congress, Washington, British caricature collection, 2-575. D. Turley, The Culture of English Antislavery, 1780–1860 (London, 1991); C. Midgley, Women against Slavery: The British Campaigns, 1780–1870 (London, 1992). E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill, 1944). An influential work, particularly thanks to its 1960s’ reissues in 1961, 1964 and 1966. S.H.H. Carrington, The Sugar Industry and the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1775–1810 (Gainesville, 2002). S. Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition (London, 1977). R. Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760–1810 (London, 1975). Carmarthen to Keith, 26 Oct., 2 Nov. 1784, NA. FO. 7/9; W. Bowden, Industrial Society in England: Towards the End of the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1925), pp. 181–91; J.M. Norris, ‘Samuel Garbett and the Early Development of Industrial Lobbying in Great Britain’, EcHR, 2nd ser. 10 (1958). Lansdowne to Keith, 24 June 1785, BL. Add. 35534 fol. 245.

196 1783–1815 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

78 79 80 81

Carmarthen to Eden, 12 Sept. 1786, NA. FO. 27/20 fol. 63. Carmarthen to Eden, 16 Dec. 1788, NA. FO. 72/13. Yonge to Fraser, 25 Jan. 1789, NA. FO. 72/14. Carmarthen to Keith, 11 May 1784, NA. FO. 7/8. Liverpool to Mr Turnbull, 9 June 1788, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 224. Samuel Green to Samuel Galton, 31 Aug. 1786, BL. Bowood collection, Shelburne papers, Box 17. Harris to Carmarthen, 6 Feb. 1787, Carmarthen to Harris, 4 Mar. 1788, BL. Eg. 3500 fols 38, 66; memoire for instructions to new French envoy to United Provinces, 14 May 1788, AN. AM. B7 454. Hood to Hawkesbury, 11 Dec. 1787, BL. Add. 38222 fols 176–7. Liverpool to Sylvester Douglas, 11 Sept. 1798, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 234. Sotheby’s Sale, 6–7 Dec. 1984, item 477. Fox to Portland, 18 Nov. 1786, BL. Add. 47561 fol. 87.

Chapter 10

Conclusions

I am quite broke and worn out with squabbles upon trade and navigation for ten years together; if ever I have another commission in my days it shall be in a country where there are no sea ports. Benjamin Keene, 17361

The audiences at Birmingham’s New Street theatre were left in little doubt about Britain’s spreading power. The ‘pantomimical interlude’ on 17 August 1791 was ‘a grand serious pantomime in one act called Soldiers’ Festival, or The Night before the Battle . . . with an exact representation of the siege of Quebec, an engagement between the English and French armies, and the death of General Wolfe’. The events of 1759 clearly still resonated, but, five days later, something more recent was promised, A pantomime exhibition called Botany Bay; or, A Trip to Port Jackson, with entire new scenery, painted for the occasion . . . in which will be introduced a picturesque view of the coast of New South Wales . . . arrival of the Grand Fleet [in 1788], landing, reception, and employment of the convicts. To conclude with the ceremony of planting the British flag, on taking possession of a new discovered island, with a dance by the convicts, and the grand chorus of ‘God Save the King’. Distant events were thus staged far from the sea in a major manufacturing centre whose prosperity in part rested on exports. Economic growth, mercantile expansion, frequent wars and imperial apotheosis. All seemed, and seem, connected, as indeed they were, but the nature of this connection, and the extent to which there was a series of synergetical relationships, are open to debate, as they also were to contemporaries. Indeed, in considering whether war with Peter the Great of Russia was a good idea, Thursday’s Journal, in its issue of 10 September (os) 1719, at first argued ‘there is no disputing against this maxim, viz. that all war is in some degree an interruption of trade; and if we must so far keep our trade sacred, that it must not be

198 Conclusions

touched, we must enter then into no war at all, however just, however necessary’. Having taken the argument to that absurd point, the anonymous writer then explained why such a war would not wreck British trade, although part of the argument rested on a promise of success that was to be proved wrong. Four years earlier, Daniel Pulteney had reported a lack of success in his complaints about the treatment of British trade in Denmark, I should only have prostituted myself and the service I am employed in by continuing to threaten to no purpose. I have never neglected to solicit in favour of British subjects to the utmost of my power; had I been less zealous in this respect, I might have met with more kindness from the Danes. I might say less trouble and vexation, than I have met with; but I can only solicit and not force; and these people are not to be won by reason and persuasion.2 Force was not to be made available to support complaints such as Pulteney’s. The fleets sent to the Baltic in the late 1710s were instructed to protect trade against privateers, and not against protectionism, but their primary purpose was political, namely supporting Anglo-Hanoverian goals over the future of the Swedish empire. Indeed, critics claimed with reason that commercial factors were cited as a pretext in order to win domestic support.3 When, during the Seven Years’ War, the dispatch of a fleet to the Baltic was considered by ministers, the issues were diplomatic and military, not commercial. Alongside such particular political controversies, war itself was a cause of instability for trade, not least as shown in merchant bankruptcies.4 In focusing on government, policy, regulated trade and authorised expansion, this book repeats the emphasis generally shown in the literature, but it is important also to devote due attention to illicit or semi-authorised activity, the worlds of smugglers, pirates, privateers and others,5 as well as to those who, whether or not engaged in illicit activity, did not conform to the standard narrative. For example, trade continued between Britain and France even during periods of bad relations. British newspapers that decried France as a commercial rival, also noted grain exports to France. Indeed, these exports were important to France. In 1740, Cardinal Fleury, the French first minister, questioned Waldegrave on the possibility of importing British grain in order to help with the poor French harvest.6 As relations deteriorated, however, the British press increasingly attacked the grain exports. As with the condemnation of the upper orders for consuming French products and hiring French servants, and thereby denying work to the poor, there was an element of social criticism as well as xenophobia in the press reports.7 The Craftsman of 24 May (os) 1740, an opposition newspaper, attacked grain exports for ‘half starving all the lower classes of people to fatten those, who have been known our enemies time out of mind’.8 In early 1748, exports to France during wartime led to a storm of protest and a bitter debate about the ethics and wisdom of such trade,9 while, at the same time, a French memorandum claimed that the British were not scrupulous

Conclusions 199

with their neighbours in affairs of trade.10 More generally, grain exports also caused sensitivity in relations between other states.11 The continuation of trade with France was not only the basis of an extensive smuggling industry that calls trade statistics into serious question. It also suggests that many did not accept, or could not afford to accept, the adversarial rhetoric of the press. The agrarian sector, particularly the grain-producing regions, was seriously depressed in the first half of the century, and grain exports, as Henry Fielding pointed out in his Pelhamite (pro-government) newspaper, the Jacobite’s Journal, were essential if rents were to be paid. Most public discussion of the economy and of trade, however, favoured industry, manufactured exports and colonial trade, and paid scant attention to agrarian problems. In practice, the continued importance of agricultural exports, the grain ships noted by William Mildmay in Marseille in 1748, and the wool and sheep exports condemned by the press throughout the period,12 all suggest that the French market was of significance to British agriculture, and, in some cases, an integral part of the local rural economy. The issue of grain exports came up in the Commons in 1748, while Britain was still at war with France, and trying to stop Dutch trade with France. Newcastle noted, There has been an unlucky accident happened in the House of Commons, relating to the exportation of corn. Some officious, designing fools had given out that, in order to prevent carrying corn to France, there must be a total prohibition of all exportation. The country gentlemen and some others were so alarmed at this that, without considering the consequences, or knowing what had passed in Holland, they came to a resolution against prohibiting the exportation of corn; but this is only general, and can’t authorize the carrying it to France; which, as all commerce is, is prohibited by the Declaration of War. This has given me a good deal of concern; but we will try, if we cannot find out some method to get it right by strengthening the prohibition of France.13 Sandwich replied that the impact on Britain’s Dutch ally was very negative, ‘The Resolution of the House of Commons about the exportation of corn has done much hurt . . . absolutely necessary for you to remove the ill impression’.14 Neutral shippers made any prohibition difficult,15 but Sandwich, in a memorial to the States General presented on 19 February 1748, argued that a ban on trade with France would weaken it, and also denied that Britain was exporting anything bar tobacco to France. The pressure on the Dutch was part of an attritional strategy designed to force France to peace, one that also led to moves in Britain against insuring French shipping and goods.16 At the same time, British policy-makers were sensitive to agitation within the United Provinces about British naval pressure on Dutch trade.17 In 1789, during peacetime, the British refusal to export grain to France, a decision taken because of concern about supplies in Britain, was seen in France as a hostile and destabilising decision.

200 Conclusions

In its issue of 23 May 1771, the Bristol Gazette and Public Advertiser reported ‘A correspondent from Devonshire informs us that for some years past the French have been supplied with large quantities of wool, from these parts, for which they give brandy, tea etc. in exchange.’ The same newspaper, a week earlier, had revealed some of the ambiguities in economic relations with France. Commenting on rejoicing in east Kent at the passage of an Act prohibiting the export of live cattle, it noted that so many had been purchased by the French, irrespective of price, that there had been no meat that ‘the middling sort of people’ could afford to purchase. At Sandwich and Dover, the poor had assembled to prevent the export of cattle before the Bill was signed. The newspaper typically did not present the views of the beef farmers and the exporters. As so often, it was the view of one particular group of the articulate ‘middling sort’ which dominated the means of expressing public opinion. Alongside British exports to France, French exports to Britain also continued, both in peace and war. On 13 April 1762, when the two powers were at war, the London Chronicle reported ‘The Anna Maria from Bordeaux is arrived at Plymouth, with French brandy for the use of the men of war there.’ In the mid-1780s, sales of French brandy and wine to Britain via Denmark were estimated at £30,000 annually.18 Smuggling did not only occur with enemy or hostile countries. Instead, it was a more general response to protectionism19 and indicated the limited ability of protected industries and trades to satisfy markets. This could hit British producers, but could also benefit them. For example, British cloth exports to the Danish possession of Norway were handicapped in order to help Danish manufacturers. This led to a smuggling that was different in character to the illegal grain exports to Norway.20 More generally, smuggling was seen as the antithesis to the less restricted trade that commercial negotiations were designed to encourage, and it provided a measure of their success or failure. This was the case during the negotiations with France in 1786, as it was argued that smuggling would continue in those trades in which restrictions were maintained. Carmarthen pressed, for example, for the right to import British goods into all French ports, rather than a privileged few: our manufacturers have uniformly stated the entry into the different ports of France to be one of the greatest advantages which they should acquire by the Treaty, when compared with the present mode in which their goods are illegally imported into France.21 Restrictions elsewhere on British imports were seen as likely to encourage illicit trade.22 The prohibitions on trade that followed the outbreak of war with France in 1793 encouraged smuggling, but the blockade of France, especially the construction of a chain of naval signal stations on the English coast, hit smugglers hard, while the establishment in 1810 of a Preventine Water Guard did not help. Another alternative strand was provided by those who served foreign com-

Conclusions 201

mercial and colonial interests. Again, as with smuggling (with which there were links, as with the Ostend Company)23 and piracy, this was not simply a matter of a distinct subculture, but rather of an activity that extended, like legitimate trade, deep into British society, as investment and activity provided multiple linkages. For example, the plan for a Russian colony in California in the 1730s drew heavily on links within the London financial world where it originated, and, as a result, led the Russian envoy, Prince Kantemir, to mix with these circles.24 It was reported in 1733 that much of the money behind the Swedish East India Company, and most of the officers on its ships, were British,25 which, nevertheless, answered the requirement, under a Swedish edict of 1731, that only if the majority of the crew were of Swedish nationality might the ship be loaded free of taxation. In 1752, London investment in the Emden Company was noted.26 Such reports were frequent and were not simply a matter of diplomatic correspondence. Eager to detect enemies within, the press also provided details of the same process. Thus, the London Journal of 11 July (os) 1724 noted, ‘There is an account that three of the Ostend East India Company’s ships from China, lately passed by Romney in Kent. The commanders and most of the men, are said to be English.’ Such reports suggested that, if only the British behaved, or could be encouraged or made to behave, differently, then the potential economic threat from foreign interests would be lessened. Concern on this head was an aspect of the general conviction that collusion played a role in foreign competition,27 in short that competition was unfair. As the British were believed best in the field of trade, this was a potent belief. It also focused the view that Britain was being weakened by a selfish greed for luxury. The international movement of funds and talent did not only affect the British. Instead, the ability of capital and skilled labour to evade controls ensured that there were competitive markets in both. That in funds was influenced by governments keen to retain liquidity and attract money,28 and offered a ready contrast to the means of protectionism. Concern about the flow of money also led to wartime interest in blockading Spanish silver shipments, as during the confrontation with Spain in 1726, when the treasure fleet was blockaded in Porto Bello. Another blockade was considered in 1729. The more general interpenetration of financial interests was amply shown in 1731 when delays in the delivery of the effects carried on the Spanish flota led to the failure of Woodward, one of the leading London bankers, who had advanced money on the credit of the effects, which, in turn, hit financial interests in France. This was fully reported in the British press.29 The range of illicit or semi-authorised activity encompassed not only trade and wartime privateering that crossed the bounds into piracy,30 but also transoceanic settlements. Government tended to show scant support for those involved and, instead, in a top–down system of consultation, preferred to align with those who were regulated. Even then, there were problems. In 1732, the envoy in Paris was instructed that the Directors of the East India Company

202 Conclusions

desire that your Excellency may assure the French directors that no insult was ever intended to their Company by what has been done in Bengal, out of meer necessity and prudence; and say they have written in such strong terms to prevent any further misunderstanding abroad, as they flatter themselves must be effectual and satisfactory provided the French Directors have done the same; and they have sent orders to their settlements, to cooperate with the French and Dutch in any legal measures for discouraging and disappointing all unlawful traders.31 This tension affected both chartered companies, the South Sea Company being hit by illicit trade by its agents and ships masters,32 and the government. It was also true of foreign states, with the British aware that, to a certain but unclear extent, Spanish depredations on British trade reflected not government decisions but the difficulty of making local officials enforce policy.33 Allowing for the major role of illicit or semi-authorised activity, formal policy in Britain was set by ministers in a milieu in which official and private representations from those engaged in legal trade played a key role. This was also true of France, whose commentators and diplomats also emphasized the importance of maritime trade.34 Nevertheless, France was dominated by the values of land. The landed nobility was crucial, and the role of land in elite identity was underlined under Napoleon by his reliance on a new service aristocracy, who were provided with estates. As in Britain, the landed elite were far more interested in the army than the navy, but the emphasis on land, rather than trade or empire, was less pronounced in Britain. There, although the peerage was a relatively closed group and, across much of the country, few new men acquired substantial landed estates, there was a significant moneyed interest based on, but not restricted to, London. This interest was neither socially nor politically distinct from the landed elite. Intermarriage, the careers of younger sons, the financial and economic affairs of the elite, and the weakness of traditions of urban political independence, all combined to produce a relative harmony of interests between land and trade.35 Mercantile groups were well represented in the House of Commons. Of the 2,041 MPs elected from the dissolution of 1715 to that in 1754, there were (there is some overlap of categories), 198 ‘merchants’, 43 industrialists, 31 London aldermen, 29 directors of the East India Company, 28 of the South Sea Company, 27 of the Bank of England, and 27 owners of estates in the West Indies, the latter an important part of the influential West Indies lobby in London. Of the 1,964 MPs returned between the dissolutions of 1754 and 1790, there were 31 London aldermen, 16 directors of the South Sea Company, 10 of the Bank of England, and 9 colonial agents. The French envoy suggested in 1754 that the number of London merchants (he gave a figure of 74) and owners of West Indian estates elected to Parliament would make it difficult for the government to manage the House of Commons over commercial issues.36 Of the 558 MPs in the Parliament of 1784–90, there were 45 ‘East Indians’ (Directors

Conclusions 203

of the Company or ‘nabobs’ who had returned from India with wealth) and 9 West Indians, compared with 26 and 14 in that of 1774–80.37 Replying to the suggestion from the Austrian envoy that disagreements over the Ostend Company be settled by a treaty, Townshend in 1723 argued that in Britain, instead of depending on the will of one, it was necessary to respond to the views of 700–800.38 A large number of these had colonial and commercial interests. Many of the Parliamentary seats they sat for were rural, but the sense of a sharp urban/rural divide was stronger in literary than in political circles. In contrast, landed values affected French society as a whole, although that did not equate to agrarian entrepreneurship and new agricultural methods, for which the French looked to Britain.39 The tension between trade and land was greater in France than in Britain, while there was no comparable toleration of the religious minorities that were so important to Britain’s international financial position. The loss of Canada (to Britain) in 1760 and of Louisiana (to Spain) in 1763 was criticised in mercantile circles in the Atlantic ports, but had only limited impact elsewhere, not least because they were seen in fashionable circles as barren and profitless. The dynastic and territorial ambitions of the French elite were focused on France and nearby areas; a cultural and social emphasis not stemming from the limited opportunities for gain arising from war with Britain. Aristocratic families had scant presence in French North America. There was also no focus, comparable to that provided by Parliament and the press, for the political expression of mercantile opinion. Thus in 1762, there was no French public debate equivalent in scale to that in Britain over the merits of retaining Canada versus Guadeloupe and Martinique. Repeated victories led British commentators to express a strong sense of benign exceptionalism, a pointed demonstration of a more general conviction of the extent of progress.40 In the Royal Magazine of June 1760, Oliver Goldsmith proclaimed ‘Hail Britain, happiest of countries! happy in thy climate, fertility, situation, and commerce; but still happier in the peculiar nature of thy laws and governance.’ The exceptionalism extended to ideas, and British ecclesiastical culture and practices played a major role, not simply with the extent of toleration, but also the nature of Anglican theology, which extended to a role in the creation of the discipline of political economy.41 Earlier, the cleric most prominent for his writing on economic issues, Josiah Tucker (1712–99), Dean of Gloucester from 1758, had argued in favour of naturalising Jews and foreign Protestants, as well as declaiming, on economic grounds, against war for the sake of trade, and criticising monopolies.42 The political weakness of the public sphere in France was linked to a situation in which commercial policy was essentially ‘top–down’, and therefore greatly affected by the interests of government. There was indeed a powerful legacy of commitment. A strong belief in the importance of the economy to the strength of the state, of the international competitiveness of economies, and of the need for state intervention and support, led to the policies and attitudes later described as mercantilism. They had become well entrenched under

204 Conclusions

Jean-Baptiste Colbert, economics minister from 1661 until his death in 1683,43 and, at that point, the governmental infrastructure for trade and colonies was stronger than in Britain. At the risk of adopting a teleology, France, and other Continental states, however, did not benefit from changes comparable to those that followed the Glorious Revolution of 1688–9 in Britain.44 Comparable to, not in the sense of identical, because the political trajectory was very different, but comparable to in that a similar capability might have emerged as a result. Thus, France by 1710 did not have a state bank, nor a financial infrastructure sufficient to fund and sustain large-scale imperial and trans-oceanic activity, whether government or private. In the long term, moreover, the seizure or destruction by the British, in numerous wars, of the accumulated assets of France in trans-oceanic trade and imperial enterprise was a major drawback.45 However, the weakness of the French financial sector emerged primarily from domestic causes. Marked oscillations of national credit in the early eighteenth century, especially the collapse in 1720 of John Law’s government-backed Mississippi Company, ended a major experiment with paper credit; and there was not the political skill or financial strength and institutional width able to ensure a response comparable to that which hit Britain with the contemporaneous South Sea Bubble. In France, unlike Britain, the crisis sapped confidence in the idea of national financial institutions and ensured that public banking, thereafter, played little part in pre-Revolutionary France, a major contrast to the situation in Britain. The discount bank established in France in 1776 was a relative failure partly because it was compelled to make excessive loans to the government. Credit in France was provided by private individuals or consortia, neither of which were particularly interested in long-term investment, especially in infrastructure. Significant commercial activity tended to look for its credit, as for its political support, to Paris, thus helping to increase its dependence on the vicissitudes of national credit, especially state-borrowing. While Mediterranean commerce at the start of the eighteenth century remained largely a monopoly of Marseille, Parisian financiers were significantly involved in, or actually dominated, almost all the other commercial companies. In the 1780s, merchants in the French ports relied on Parisian financiers for credit and basic banking facilities. There was not the network of provincial banks seen in Britain, where credit networks, although fragile, were relatively sophisticated. In Britain, the integration of economic and financial interests with government was much further advanced. The ability to raise long-term loans on favourable terms increased in importance as the national debt rose substantially after each war, reflecting the serious and lasting financial burdens from conflict.46 Economic expansion, liquidity and credit helped in the raising of taxation,47 but major wartime difficulties were experienced, not least in 1748, 1762 and 1797, and from 1798 the war was fought largely with revenue from taxation, including the first income tax, rather than by borrowing.48 Ministries found that loans were easier to fill if there was a prospect of peace, and this was

Conclusions 205

understood by foreign commentators.49 Diplomats and ministers carefully noted the state of the public funds in wartime.50 The nature of both the French financial system and the public finances had more harmful political and economic consequences. The weakness of public credit in France, and the shifts and expedients of wartime finance, helped encourage the government to peace in 1748 and badly hit the navy during the Seven Years’ War.51 The weakness of public credit in France led to pressure to raise taxation in an economy that was growing but not growing rapidly and where the tax system was widely criticised, and this increased political tension.52 Much French investment was short term, hitting, for example, marine insurance, while interest rates varied greatly, a major disincentive to long-term investment, and government borrowing drove up the cost of credit. In 1786, interest rates of 10 per cent for commercial loans to French merchants were normal. Much of the French economy was undercapitalised, and British diplomats frequently reported on problems with credit.53 The link between trade, finance and the ability to pursue a foreign policy became increasingly powerful in French public discussion from the 1760s.54 In the 1780s, many of the Bordeaux merchant firms trading with the West Indian colonies were financially weak, with a limited margin of security and little liquid money; and this was the most profitable large-scale French trans-oceanic trade. Britain and the Dutch, in contrast, boasted more sophisticated credit systems, and this enabled British merchants from the mid-1740s to make substantial long-term loans on mortgages, financing a marked boom in sugar-planting, and thus the slave trade.55 Although French overseas trade increased greatly during periods of peace in the eighteenth century, especially from the Atlantic ports, investment and profitability at the level of individual traders and companies were frequently low. Unlike Britain, internal tariffs made it difficult to think in national terms in many countries, including France and the United Provinces.56 These tariffs affected the flow of exports and imports, as well as profitability and investment. They also lessened any sense of national identity. In the late seventeenth century, economic links between the Dutch and Brittany were closer than those between Brittany and Paris. French cider-based liqueurs could be sold only in Normandy and Brittany, lest they compete with the wine brandies which alone could be sold to Paris and the French colonies. Norman requests in the mideighteenth century for permission to sell to the colonies were rejected. Due also to the internal tariffs, the impact of the Atlantic trade on the rest of the French economy was limited. Thus La Rochelle, with its restricted network of communications into the interior, had an enclave economy, while, in the 1780s, the major industrial centre of Lyon did not benefit greatly from the activity in the Atlantic ports. Again, the contrast with Britain was striking. In the latter, the absence of internal tariffs helped strengthen the importance of imperial goods and markets.57 The nature of French policy-making reflected and sustained this lack of

206 Conclusions

unity. Thus, the Council of Commerce established in 1700 sought specific privileges for individual ports, rather than free trade,58 while representations could be made directly to the government, rather than through the Council of Commerce. Commercial interests were represented in the Council, and its counterparts, but these Councils had a patchy history, and there was no equivalent to the British Board of Trade. The Council created in 1664 was dominated by administrators and financiers, not merchants, and ceased to meet in 1676.59 French foreign ministers had links with merchant interests. In 1764, César, Duke of Praslin consulted the St Malo deputies about the Newfoundland fisheries.60 French merchants abroad could also seek to influence policy through the consular system, and the mercantile community at Cadiz was especially powerful. However, the scope of such groups reached to little more than details of commercial regulation, and did not contribute to a powerful impact on foreign policy. In late 1727, despite great pressure from mercantile circles to reach an agreement with Spain,61 the government refused to satisfy Spain at the expense of her leading ally, Britain. French ministers were seen as able to ignore mercantile complaints.62 Commercial interests were most important where serious political issues were absent, as for example in relations with Ragusa (Dubrovnik). Compared to many British and Dutch envoys, their French counterparts mostly devoted relatively little attention to trade. The weakness of trade in French political culture, and as a symbol of national interest, was, in part, responsible for the degree to which Austrophobia increasingly overshadowed Anglophobia in Court and public debate about foreign policy in the 1780s and early 1790s: Austria to many appeared more of a threat than the commercial rival, Britain. Throughout the period covered by this book, the French Crown had little real interest in matters maritime. Louis XIV only once went to sea, in 1680, and then briefly, while Louis XVI only once visited a port, Cherbourg in 1786. Rulers living in Versailles were much less exposed to the dynamic forces of European economics and overseas activities than a government and Parliament located in London, a growing centre of world trade. When the Count of Broglie arrived in London as ambassador in 1724, he was astonished by the innumerable quantity of shipping in the Thames.63 The maritime theme in British national culture, seen for example in ship and port paintings, such as those of Samuel Scott,64 or in the singing and publication of sea shanties, was far less pronounced in France. For geographical, cultural and political reasons, France was different to Britain as an economy, a society and a state. This affected but did not determine, policy choices, resource availability and international responses. There were, for example, powerful French ministers, such as Maurepas, who were committed to naval power and colonial expansion, and there was nothing preordained about French priorities or policies. The role of conjuncture also emerges in the conflicts by which Britain ensured maritime primacy and colonial expansion. Her trans-oceanic presence, particularly in India and the West Indies, and the related capital inflows, were crucial to the ability to finance war with

Conclusions 207

France. In 1798, the Earl of Liverpool noted that major imports of sugar and coffee from the West Indies were being re-exported to Hamburg and other Continental markets, producing a major inflow of bullion, that was helping the stocks to rise.65 As an alternative to the reliance of trade, it would have been difficult to tax more in Britain or to borrow more there or in Europe, although taxation and borrowing were key financial resources, as, irrespective of the famed bullion from the New World, they also were for the Spanish empire in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Whatever the source of funds, international success was important not only in terms of affecting commercial links and currency inflows and borrowing, but also because of the credit that came from success. Wartime failure for Britain would have led to the devaluation of government loans and, possibly, had the government been overthrown, by Jacobites in the early decades of the period or by French-backed radicals toward the close, by their repudiation. Risk, in contrast, was lessened by success, and both military victory and diplomatic triumph contributed to this success. Foreign policy indeed was a key resource if it could help weaken opposing alliances or construct alliances that might deter, distract or defeat opponents. This interconnectedness was asserted by British ministers keen to defend policies publicly, as with Pitt the Elder in 1758–61, but was also seen in their confidential correspondence. Seeking a defensive, but secure, settlement of colonial issues in any peace with France, to secure to Britain, ‘the safe and unmolested possession’ of colonies in the West Indies and North America, including Nova Scotia, Newcastle in 1748 wanted the French government reminded of the likely implications of the advance of British-subsidised Russian troops, as well as of operations that might be undertaken in Italy.66 Accepting French commitment to trade, and, more generally, aspects of convergence between the two states,67 it is, however, apparent that an important degree of difference existed between Britain and France. It was crucially present in the nature of the public/private mix,68 which worked better in Britain. The relationship of that to the governmental and public backing of trade and empire in their own right, and also as issues in foreign policy, was not generally one of clearly defined lines of influence and readily measured degrees of influence, but it was important and helped direct the rise of British power. Furthermore, in Britain, the efficiency of the private sector of the economy may have been as important as state action,69 although, looked at differently, the willingness of government to accept only loose regulation for this sector was crucial. The key reconciliation was that of state, commercial bourgeoisie, and landed orders, and the ability of government to link these different interests, and of them to mould policy formulation and execution, gave much of the particular character to British governance and political economy. Considering France assists greatly in providing an understanding of British developments in the same period; and the key word is developments because the interaction of trade, empire and policy proved particularly dynamic and successful in the case of Britain. This helps

208 Conclusions

explain the degree and consequences of British exceptionalism. The results, in the shape of the leading position in global trade, manufacturing, naval power and imperial extent, were certainly exceptional, and it is therefore appropriate to focus on difference and distinction when considering how best to explain them. Materialist interpretations for economic change and exceptionalism, in terms for example of coal-based technology, and their cultural, social and institutional counterparts,70 can be seen as given pace and chronological precision by a discussion of domestic and international politics.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Keene to Waldegrave, 4 Dec. 1736, Chewton. Pulteney to Townshend, NA. SP. 75/35 fols 29–30. Görtz to Gyllenborg, 29 Dec. 1716, NA. SP. 107/1B fol. 325. J. Hoppit, Risk and Failure in English Business 1700–1800 (Cambridge, 1987). M. Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American World, 1700–1750 (Cambridge, 1987); P. Linebaugh and Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (2000); G. Morgan and P. Rushton, Eighteenth-Century Criminal Transportation: The Formation of the Criminal Atlantic (Basingstoke, 2004). NA. SP. 78/223 fol. 267. G. Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740–1830 (London, 1987). Cf. Newcastle Journal, 17 May (os) 1740; Public Register, 7 Feb. (os) 1741. Aberdeen Journal, 5 Jan. (os), Daily Gazetteer, 7 Jan. (os), Newcastle Courant 16 Jan. (os), Jacobite’s Journal, 30 Jan. (os), 13 Feb. (os), 14, 28 May (os) 1748. AN. K. 1373 no. 26. St Contest, French foreign minister, to Bonnac, envoy in The Hague, 18 Feb. 1753, AN. KK. 1400, pp. 74–5. Mildmay, 1 Nov., 9 Dec. 1748, 1 Jan. 1749, Chelmsford, Essex CRO. D/DM 01/19; ViceAdmiral John Byng to Edward Allen, 16 Jan. (os) 1748, NA. 93/12 fols 6–7; Anon., tourist, NAS. GD. 26/VI/233 p. 10; Ipswich Journal, 28 Jan., 1 Sept. 1764, 12 Jan. 1765; Bristol Gazette and Public Advertiser, 22 Aug. 1777; Newcastle Courant, 15 Mar. 1788. Newcastle to Sandwich, 29 Jan. (os), 16 Feb. (os) 1756, BL. Add. 32811 fols 125, 220. Sandwich to Newcastle, 16 Feb. 1756, BL. Add. 32811 fol. 179. Zamboni, Hesse-Darmstadt agent, to Landgrave Ludwig VIII, 9 Feb. 1748, Darmstadt, Staatsarchiv E1 M10/6. Alt to William of Hesse-Cassel, 1 Mar. 1748, Marburg, 4f England 249. Sandwich to Newcastle, 5 Mar. 1748, NA. SP. 84/433 fol. 316. J. Johnstone, secretary to Hugh Elliot in Copenhagen, 1 Ap. 1787 (1 Ap. 1786 on back), Maidstone, KAO. U269 C188/4. Ormrod, ‘Anglo-Dutch Commerce’, pp. 284–320. H.S.K. Kent, ‘The Background to Anglo-Norwegian Relations’, The Norseman, 11 (1953), p. 153. Carmarthen to Eden, 12 Sept. 1786, NA. FO. 27/20 fol. 62. Re. Spain, William Fraser to Liston, 6 Dec. 1787, NLS. MS. 5549 fol. 109. Townshend to St Saphorin, 8 Feb. (os) 1723, NA. SP. 80/48. John Opie to Zamboni [1737?], Bod. Ms. Rawl. letters 123 fol. 286. Enclosure from Gothenburg in Titley to Wace, 10 Feb. 1733, NA. SP. 75/61. Yorke to Newcastle, 29 July 1752, NA. SP. 84/461.

Conclusions 209 27 Harrington to Titley, 20 July (os) 1733, NA. SP. 75/62 fol. 30. 28 W. Lormier, Hesse-Darmstadt agent in The Hague, to Landgrave Ludwig VIII, 26 Dec. 1747, Darmstadt, Staatsarchiv, E1 M 42/3. 29 York Courant, 30 Mar. (os), 6, 13 Ap. (os), 18 May (os) 1731. 30 Newcastle to Capello, Venetian envoy, 28 Jan. 1748, Venice, Archivio di Stato, LM. Ing. 107 fol. 374. 31 Delafaye to Waldegrave, 10 Feb. (os) 1732, Chewton. 32 Geraldino to the Court of Directors, 31 July 1733, BL. Add. 32782 fol. 230. 33 Vandermeer, Dutch envoy in Spain, to Horatio Walpole, 11 Aug. 1727, NA. SP. 94/98. 34 Memorandum, 12 Jan. 1726, AN. AM. B7 123, p. 39. 35 J. Cannon, Aristocratic Century: The Peerage in Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1984); J.V. Beckett, The Aristocracy in England, 1660–1914 (Oxford, 1986). 36 Mirepoix to St Contest, 2 May 1754, AE. CP. Ang. 437 fol. 187. 37 R.R. Sedgwick (ed.), The House of Commons 1715–54 (2 vols, London, 1970), I, 148–53; L. Namier and J. Brooke (eds), The House of Commons 1754–1790 (3 vols, London, 1964), I, pp. 131–62. 38 Townshend to St Saphorin, 8 Feb. (os) 1723, NA. SP. 80/48. 39 A.J. Bourdle, The Influence of England on the French Agronomes, 1750–1789 (Cambridge, 1953). 40 D. Spadafora, The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain (New Haven, 1990). 41 A.M.C. Waterman, Revolution, Economics and Religion: Christian Political Economy, 1798–1833 (Cambridge, 1991). 42 G. Shelton, Dean Tucker: Eighteenth-Century Economic and Political Thought (London, 1981). 43 C.W. Cole, Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism (New York, 1939); J. Meyer, Colbert (Paris, 1981); G.J. Ames, Colbert, Mercantilism and the French Quest for Asian Trade (Dekalb, 1996). 44 D. Winch and P.K. O’Brien (eds), The Political Economy of British Historical Experience 1688–1914 (Oxford, 2002), p. 264. 45 J.C. Riley, The Seven Years’ War and the Old Regime in France: The Economic and Financial Toll (Princeton, 1987). 46 J.F. Wright, ‘British Government Borrowing in Wartime, 1750–1815’, EcHR, 52 (1999), pp. 355–61. 47 P. Mathias and P.K. O’Brien, ‘Taxation in Britain and France, 1715–1830: A Comparison of the Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the Central Governments’, Journal of European Economic History, 5 (1976), pp. 601–50; W. Fritschy, ‘Taxation in Britain, France and the Netherlands in the Eighteenth Century’, Economic and Social History of the Netherlands, 2 (1990), pp. 57–79. 48 Newcastle to Sandwich, 16 Feb. (os) 1748, BL. Add. 32811 fol. 220; Frederick Frankland, a merchant, a former Director of the Bank of England, and MP for Thirsk, to Thomas Robinson, 23 Feb. (os) 1748, Leeds Archive Office, Newby Hall mss. 2833 no. 75; P.K. O’Brien, ‘Public Finance in the Wars with France 1793–1815’, in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution 1789–1815 (Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 165–87. 49 Haslang to Preysing, 5 Mar. 1748, Bayr. Ges. London 220. 50 Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 5 Mar. 1748, AST. LM. Ing. 54. 51 J. Pritchard, ‘Financing the French Navy in the Seven Years War: Beaujon, Goosens et Compagnie in 1759’, Business History, 28 (1986), pp. 115–33 and Louis XV’s Navy, 1748–1762: A Study of Organization and Administration (Montreal, 1987). 52 M. Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France: liberté, egalité, fiscalité (Cambridge, 2000); J.F. Bosher, French Finances 1770–1795: From Business to Bureaucracy (Cambridge, 1970); J. Félix, ‘The Financial Origins of the French Revolution’, in P.R. Campbell (ed.), The Origins of the French Revolution (Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 35–62.

210 Conclusions 53 Yorke to Newcastle, 6 Ap. 1753, NA. SP. 84/463. 54 E. Dziembowski, Un nouveau patriotisme français, 1750–1770: La France face à la puissance anglaise à l’époque de la guerre de Sept Ans (Oxford, 1998). 55 S.D. Smith, ‘Merchants and Planters Revisited’, EcHR, 55 (2002), p. 460; L.S. Pressnell, Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1956). 56 For the latter, Bonnac to St Contest, 31 Aug. 1753, AN. KK. 1400, p. 273. 57 J. Clark, La Rochelle and the Atlantic Economy during the Eighteenth Century (London, 1982). 58 T.J. Schaeper, The French Council of Commerce, 1700–1715: A Study of Mercantilism after Colbert (Columbus, Ohio, 1983). 59 H.T. Parker, An Administrative Bureau during the Old Regime: The Bureau of Commerce . . . 1781–1783 (Cranbury, 1993). 60 AE. CP. Ang. 455 fol. 38. 61 Waldegrave Journal, 3 Jan. 1728, Chewton. 62 Keene to Newcastle, 13 Dec. 1737, NA. SP. 94/128. 63 AE. CP. Ang. 348 fol. 56. 64 G. Quilley, ‘ “All Ocean Is Her Own”: The Image of the Sea and the Identity of the Maritime Nation in Eighteenth-Century British Art’, in G. Cubitt (ed.), Imagining Nations (Manchester, 1998), pp. 132–52. 65 Liverpool to Sylvester Douglas, 11 Sept. 1798, BL. Add. 38310 fol. 234. 66 Newcastle to Sandwich, 29 Mar. (os) 1748, BL. Add. 32811 fol. 434. 67 Dziembowski, ‘Pitt l’Ancien, la politique britannique et l’espace franco-britannique au XVIIIe siècle’ (Dossier d’habilitation, Paris IV, 2004). 68 R. Szostak, The Role of Transportation in the Industrial Revolution: A Comparison of England and France (Montreal, 1991); F. Crouzet, Britain Ascendant: Comparative Studies in FrancoBritish Economic History (Cambridge, 1990). 69 D. Winch and P.K. O’Brien (eds), The Political Economy of British Historical Experience 1688–1914 (Oxford, 2002), pp. 180–1. 70 E.A. Wrigley, ‘The Divergence of England: The Growth of the English Economy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th ser. 10 (2000), pp. 117–41; K. Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: Europe, China and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, 2000); J.A. Goldstone, ‘Efflorescences and Economic Growth in World History: Rethinking the “Rise of the West” and the Industrial Revolution’, Journal of World History, 13 (2002), p. 379.

Selected further reading

For reasons of space, this is a very selective list which can be supplemented both from the notes of this book and from the notes and bibliographies of works cited. Unless otherwise stated, place of publication is London. J.O. Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978). D. Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, 2000). D. Armitage and M.J. Braddick (eds), The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800 (Basingstoke, 2002). F. Armytage, The Free Port System in the British West Indies: A Study in Commercial Policy, 1766–1822 (1953). A. Attman, American Bullion in European World Trade, 1600–1800 (Gothenburg, 1986). D.G. Barnes, A History of the English Corn Laws, 1660–1846 (New York, 1961). S. Baxter (ed.), England’s Rise to Greatness, 1660–1763 (Berkeley, 1983). M. Berg, The Age of Manufactures, 1700–1820 (2nd edn, 1994). R.J. Bonney (ed.), Economic Systems and State Finance (Oxford, 1994). R.J. Bonney (ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815 (Oxford, 1999). H.V. Bowen, Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics, 1757–1773 (Cambridge, 1991). H.V. Bowen, Elites, Enterprise, and the Making of the British Overseas Empire, 1688–1775 (1996). H.V. Bowen, War and British Society, 1688–1815 (Cambridge, 1998). F. Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce (1982). J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783 (1989). N. Canny (ed.), The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1998). J. Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (2nd edn, Stroud, 1993). K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660–1760 (Cambridge, 1978). G.N. Clark, Guide to English Commercial Statistics, 1696–1782 (1938). D.C. Coleman (ed.), Revisions in Mercantilism (1969). D.C. Coleman and A.H. John (eds), Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial England: Essays Presented to F.J. Fisher (1976). N.F.R. Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1985).

212 Selected further reading F. Crouzet, Britain Ascendant: Comparative Studies in Franco-British Economic History (Cambridge, 1990). P. Crowhurst, The Defence of British Trade, 1689–1815 (Folkestone, 1977). L.M. Cullen, Anglo-Irish Trade, 1660–1800 (Manchester, 1968). M.J. Daunton, Progress and Poverty: An Economic and Social History of Britain, 1700–1850 (Oxford, 1995). K.G. Davies, The Royal African Company (1957). R. Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (1962). R. Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade (Leicester, 1979). T.M. Devine, Scotland’s Empire, 1600–1815 (2003). P.G.M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688–1756 (1967). N. Digby, H.V. Bowen and M. Lincoln (eds), The Worlds of the East India Company (Woodbridge, 2002). M.M. Edwards, The Growth of the British Cotton Trade, 1780–1815 (Manchester, 1967). R. Floud and D. McCloskey (eds), The Economic History of Britain since 1700. I, 1700–1860 (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1994). H. Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600–1800 (Minneapolis, 1976). P. Gauci, The Politics of Trade: The Overseas Merchant in State and Society, 1660–1720 (Oxford, 2001). N. Glazier, The Culture of Commerce in England, 1660–1720 (London, 2006). J. Glete, Nations and Navies: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1860 (Stockholm, 1993). E.H. Gould, The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 2000). R. Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1995). D. Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785 (Cambridge, 1995). L. Harper, The English Navigation Laws: A Seventeenth-Century Experiment in Social Engineering (New York, 1939). B. Harris, Politics and the Nation: Britain in the Mid-Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2002). N. Harte (ed.), The New Draperies in the Low Countries and England, 1300–1800 (Oxford, 1997). J. Hoppit, Risk and Failure in English Business, 1700–1800 (Cambridge, 1987). T. Hutchinson, Before Adam Smith: The Emergence of Political Economy 1662–1776 (Oxford, 1988). D.W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford, 1988). P. Lawson, The East India Company: A History (Harlow, 1993). P. Lawson (ed.), Parliament and the Atlantic Empire (Edinburgh, 1995). P. Lawson, A Taste for Empire and Glory: Studies in British Overseas Expansion, 1660–1800 (Aldershot, 1997). B. Lemire, Fashion’s Favourite: The Cotton Trade and the Consumer in Britain, 1660–1800 (Oxford, 1992). B. Lenman, Britain’s Colonial Wars, 1688–1783 (Harlow, 2001). W. Letwin, The Origins of Scientific Economics: English Economic Thought, 1660–1776 (1963). P.K. Liss, Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution, 1713–1826 (Baltimore, 1983).

Selected further reading 213 J.J. McCusker and R.R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607–1789 (Chapel Hill, 1985). J.J. McCusker and K. Morgan (eds), The Early Modern Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, 2000). N. McKendrick, J. Brewer and J.H. Plumb, The Birth of a Consumer Society (1983). J.J. Malone, Pine Trees and Politics: The Naval Stores and Forest Policy in Colonial New England, 1691–1775 (1964). P.J. Marshall (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, II: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1998). R.L. Meek, Precursors of Adam Smith, 1750–1775 (1973). W.E. Minchinton (ed.), The Growth of English Overseas Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (1969). K. Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1993). K. Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy (Cambridge, 2001). L. Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason (Cambridge, 1990). G. Niedhart, Handel und Krieg in der Britischen Weltpolitik 1738–1763 (Munich, 1979). P.K. O’Brien, Power with Profit: The State and the Economy, 1688–1815 (1991). P.K. O’Brien and R. Quinault (eds), The Industrial Revolution and British Society (Cambridge, 1993). R. Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739–1763 (Oxford, 1936). L. Prados de la Escosura (ed.), Exceptionalism and Industrialisation: Britain and Its European Rivals, 1688–1815 (Cambridge, 2004). J.M. Price, Capital and Credit in British Overseas Trade: The view from the Chesapeake 1700–1776 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980). E.H. Pritchard, The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750–1800 (New York, 1970). D.K. Reading, The Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 (New Haven, 1938). J. Rule, The Vital Century: England’s Economy 1714–1815 (1992). T.J. Schaeper, The French Council of Commerce, 1700–1715 (1983). E.B. Schumpeter, English Overseas Trade Statistics, 1697–1808 (Oxford, 1960). S. Sen, Empire of Free Trade: The East India Company and the Making of the Colonial Marketplace (Philadelphia, 1998). C. Shammas, The Pre-Industrial Consumer in England and America (Oxford, 1990). J. Smail, Merchants, Markets and Manufacture: The English Wool Textile Industry in the Eighteenth Century (Basingstoke, 1999). I.K. Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in Colonial Administration, 1696–1720 (Oxford, 1968). L. Stone (ed.), An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815 (1994). L.S. Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics (Oxford, 1952). L. Sutherland, Politics and Finance in the Eighteenth Century (1984). R. Szostak, The Role of Transportation in the Industrial Revolution: A Comparison of England and France (1991). J. Thirsk, Economic Policy and Projects: The Development of a Consumer Society in Early Modern England (Oxford, 1978). K. Tribe, Governing Economy: The Reformation of German Economic Discourse, 1750–1840 (1988). S.P. Ville, English Shipowning during the Industrial Revolution (Manchester, 1987).

214 Selected further reading A.P. Wadsworth and J. de L. Mann, The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire, 1600–1780 (Manchester, 1965). J. Walvin, Fruits of Empire: Exotic Produce and British Taste, 1660–1800 (1997). C.A. Whatley, Scottish Society, 1707–1830: Beyond Jacobitism, towards Industrialisation (Manchester, 2000). C. Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Finance in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1941). K. Wilson, The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture, and Imperialism in England, 1715–1785 (Cambridge, 1995). D. Winch and P.K. O’Brien (eds), The Political Economy of British Historical Experience 1688–1914 (Oxford, 2002).

Index

Addison, Joseph 26, 99 Admiralty 100 Africa 3, 48, 65, 67, 99, 122, 129–30, 153, 168–9, 172, 192 Africa, West 67 Aiguillon, Emmanuel-Armand, Duke d’ 3 Algiers 11 Allen, Edmund 5, 19, 86, 123 American, Independence, War of 14, 18, 166, 170–2 Ancona 20 Anne, Queen 20–1, 110 Antwerp 41 Asiento 43, 63, 110, 115, 121, 128, 131, 147 Australia 185, 197 Austria 5, 36–7, 40, 126, 138–9 Austrian Netherlands 35, 67, 73, 86, 126–7 Austrian Succession, War of the 117, 146 Baillie, George 28 Baker, William 147–8 Bank of England 21, 57–8, 77, 114, 116–17, 202 banking 32, 204 Barbary States 92, 101 Barrington, William, 2nd Viscount 12 Bedford, John, 4th Duke of 43, 68, 143, 154 Belle-Isle 25 Birmingham 64, 190, 197 Bladen, Martin 8–9, 47, 67, 98–9, 132 Blathwayt, William 116–17 Blenheim, battle of 108 ‘blue water’ policy 115, 150, 161 Board of Trade 8, 30–1, 56, 59, 62–4, 67, 95–9, 118, 152, 164, 206 Bolingbroke, Henry, Viscount 112 Bordeaux 64, 205 Brazil 17–18, 32, 70, 95, 109

Bremen 19, 42, 123, 124, 163 Bristol 34, 59–60, 65, 70, 76, 90, 93, 141, 144–5 Broglie, Count of 206 Broughton, Charles 46 bullion 14, 18, 25, 31–2, 109–10, 155, 201, 207 Burges, Elizeus 91 Burrish, Onslow 87 Bute, John, 3rd Earl of 168–9 Cadiz 40, 43, 70, 89, 206 Cadogan, William, Lord 128 calicoes 23, 32, 61, 123, 125 Canada 8, 60, 99, 132, 136, 143, 146, 151, 154, 190, 203 Cape Town 14, 25 Carmarthen, Francis, Marquess of, later 5th Duke of Leeds 33, 48, 57, 64, 79, 87, 96, 177–8, 181, 190, 192, 200 Cattle Acts 29 Cayley, William 89 Chalmers, George 71 Charles III of Spain 10, 44 Charles VI, Emperor 36–7 Chauvelin, German-Louis de 128, 130 Cherbourg 206 China 25, 32, 180, 185, 193 Church of England 203 civic humanism 20 Clarkson, Thomas 72 Clive, Robert 154 cloth industry and cloth exports 23, 26–7, 32, 46, 65, 75, 117, 123, 124, 126 coal 35, 208 Cobden, Richard 41 coffee 30 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste 204

216 Index Compton, Charles 89 Compton, Spencer 44, 63 convoys 45, 47 copper 61, 96, 139 Corsica 162 Cotchett, Thomas 24 cotton 125 Cowper, William, 1st Earl 22 Craftsman 22 Crete 36 Crookshanks, John 47, 89 Crowle, George 89 Cumberland, William, Duke of 150–1 Danvers, Joseph 26 Danzig (Gdansk) 5 Decker, Matthew 23 Defoe, Daniel 70, 92, 112 Denmark 4–5, 18–19, 39, 42, 46, 63, 75, 88, 91, 94, 125, 163–4, 198, 200 Derby 24 Dinwiddie, Robert 130 direct trade 19 Dobbs, Arthur 148–9, 187 docks 102 Doddington, George Bubb 79, 88, 122 Dorset, John, 3rd Duke of 33, 41 Drake, Francis 9 Dundas, Henry 61, 96, 98 Dunkirk 93, 112, 152, 154 East India Company 23, 26, 56–7, 59–61, 63, 65, 67–9, 73, 79, 110, 114, 122–3, 124–5, 140, 148, 166–8, 180, 202–3 East Indies 23 Eden Treaty 29 Eden, William 2, 29–30, 34, 64, 77, 79, 88, 98–9, 100, 177–8, 180–1 Egypt 36 Essex, William, 3rd Earl of 65, 87 Etches, John 71 Exeter 27, 75, 117, 145 Eyles, John 56–7 Falkland Islands 11, 162, 165 Falmouth 110 Fielding, Henry 21, 33, 199 finance 204–5, 207 Financial Revolution 21 Finch, Edward 69, 91 fisheries 24–6, 36, 128, 175 Foote, Samuel 168 Fox, Charles James 39, 75, 193

France 18, 26–7, 31, 33, 37, 39, 41, 43, 127, 202, 203–7 Franklin, Benjamin 161 Frederick II of Prussia 31, 46, 117, 139–40, 147 free trade 33–4 Gambia 3 George I 22, 42, 94, 102 George II 94–5, 102, 147, 152 George III 93–4, 97, 147, 155, 178, 188 Georgia 131 Gibraltar 10, 45, 112, 115, 121, 128–9, 131–2, 136–8, 151 Glasgow 64, 144 Glorious Revolution 21, 59, 102, 107, 116, 204 Goldsmith, Oliver 203 grain exports 5–8, 65, 96, 198–9 Grantham, Thomas, 2nd Lord 167, 175 Great Northern War 42 Grenville, George 22, 28 Grenville, William, Lord 71, 96, 98, 100, 186 Guadeloupe 203 Hailes, Daniel 176 Halifax, George, 2nd Earl of 97 Hamburg 4, 18–19, 24, 39, 42, 46, 64, 76, 87–9, 94, 95–7, 123, 127, 139–40, 163, 192, 207 Hanover 42, 94–5, 140, 152 Hardwicke, Philip, 1st Earl of 63 Harley, Robert 117 Harrington, William, 1st Earl of 35, 42, 46, 63–4, 65–6, 79, 96–7, 124, 127 Harris, Sir James 14, 41, 57, 88, 192 Harrison, Edward 56 Hawkesbury, Charles, Lord see Liverpool, Charles, 1st Earl of Hayman, Francis 165 Heathcote, Sir Gilbert 57, 114 Hedges, John 23 Herne, Joseph 79 Hillsborough, Wills, 2nd Viscount 97, 99 Hoadley, Benjamin 90 Hogg, William 28 Holden, Samuel 23, 58, 77, 97 Holdernesse, Robert, 4th Earl of 13, 30, 38, 142, 155 Honduras 12 Hudson Bay 35 Hudson’s Bay Company 59–60, 67, 148

Index 217 Huguenots 39, 109 Hull 73 India 23, 32, 35–6, 59, 65–7, 79, 107, 143, 146, 153–4, 165–7, 169, 202 Indian Ocean 36, 48, 59, 129, 180, 192 insurance 7 interest rates 103, 117–18 Ireland 26, 28–30, 61–2, 71–2, 73, 170, 178 iron 19, 61, 63, 91, 141 Italy 10, 20 Jacobites 20–1, 44, 76, 102, 128, 144, 150–1, 207 Jamaica 11, 30, 33, 48, 72, 137, 155, 171, 190 Jefferson, Thomas 8, 183 Jews 39, 71, 108 Joseph II, Emperor 41 Keene, Benjamin 85, 88, 141, 143, 147, 197 La Rochelle 205 Lancaster 145 Law, John 37, 128, 204 Leeds 73 Legge, Henry 12 Levant Company 58, 60, 77, 96 linen 19, 23, 29, 62, 64, 72, 91, 95, 140 Lisbon 17–18, 20, 70, 77, 87, 143, 164 Liverpool 34, 59, 69, 90, 93, 99, 102, 108, 144, 168, 192 Liverpool, Charles, 1st Earl of 14, 25, 28, 31, 57, 61, 63, 66, 76, 96–8, 100, 180, 183–4, 184–5, 192, 207 Livorno 6, 11, 20, 62, 69, 89, 95, 143 lobbying 4, 28, 55, 63, 172 logwood cutters 12 Lombe, Thomas 24 London 21, 46–7, 62, 64, 70, 76–7, 102, 110, 116, 147–8, 169–70, 172 Louis XIV of France 38, 43, 206 Louis XVI of France 206 Louisiana 38, 74, 93, 130, 154, 156, 203 Lowndes, William 8–9 Lyon 205 Macclesfield,Thomas, 1st Earl of 71 Manchester 64, 73, 190 Manila 156, 185 Mansfield, William, Lord 142 Marriott, James 72 Marseille 88, 199, 204

Martinique 203 Maurepas, Jean-Frédéric, Count of 128, 206 Meares, John 71 mercantilism 30–1 Messina 86, 96 Minorca 10, 12, 45, 112, 115, 121, 147, 150–1, 153 Mississippi Company 37, 204 Mist, Nathanael 21 Molasses Act 30, 68, 99 Moluccas 14 moneyed interest 20 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, Baron of 132 Montrose, James, 3rd Duke of 98 Morville, Charles, Count of 45 Mosquito Shore 151 Naples 5, 19–20, 31, 41, 86–7, 127, 155, 175 Napoleon 41, 155, 186, 189, 193, 202 national debt 117, 204 naval stores 70, 123, 141 Navigation Acts 19, 40, 63, 108, 124 navy 13 Necker, Jacques 7 Negapatnam 14 neutral trade 72, 142, 164–5, 172 Newcastle, Thomas, 1st Duke of 4–5, 60, 65, 68, 77, 90–1, 96, 98, 99, 103, 136, 140, 142, 148, 150, 152–4, 156, 199, 207 newspapers 69–75, 77–8, 152–3, 162, 169–70 Nicaragua 12, 77 Nootka Sound Crisis 8, 71, 185–6 Norway 19, 200 Norwich 61, 73, 77 Nottingham 64 Nova Scotia 24, 130–1, 146, 148–51, 170, 207 Ochakov Crisis 64, 73, 181–2 Oporto 17, 20 Ostend 151 Ostend Company 22, 56, 65–6, 76, 79, 88, 91, 122, 125–7, 201, 203 Oswego 144 Pacific 12, 34, 48, 71, 92, 162, 185–6 pamphlets 70–2 Papal States 20 Paris, Peace of 25, 143 Parliament 22, 26, 28, 30, 32, 55, 63, 67, 73–7, 79, 103, 109–10, 112–14, 117, 137, 152, 202–3 Paxton, Nicholas 77

218 Index Pelham, Henry 12, 72, 99–100 Perceval, John, Lord 62, 79 Perry, Micajah 99 Persia 77 Peter the Great of Russia 10, 36–7, 42, 73, 109, 116, 123, 197 Philip V of Spain 10 Phillips, Erasmus 70 Pitt, William, the Elder 143, 147, 207 Pitt, William, the Younger 2, 7, 14, 41, 64, 71, 96–7, 100, 177–8, 181, 183, 187, 188–9, 192 Poland 5, 46, 64, 181–3 Polish Succession, War of the 5–7, 45, 85, 122, 127 Poole 78–9, 175 poor, the 23–5, 27, 39 Porter, James 139 Portsmouth 77, 167–8 Portugal 3–4, 17–18, 20, 23, 31–3, 70, 76–7, 89, 92, 95, 108–9, 111, 112, 121–2, 126, 138–9, 155–6, 164 Praslin, César, Duke of 206 privateering 12, 18, 34, 112, 117, 123, 138, 169 protectionism 27, 34, 40 Prussia 28, 35, 37, 70, 181–2 Pulteney, Daniel 98 Quebec 115, 149 Ragusa 206 Rayneval, Gerard de 2, 176–7 Robinson, Thomas 65–6, 139, 152 Rochford, William, 4th Earl of 3 Rolt, Richard 32 Rondeau, Claudius 59, 63, 88–9 Rowe, Nicholas 21 Royal African Company 23, 26, 57–9, 67, 99, 100, 129–30 Russia 5, 9–10, 18, 25, 36–8, 42, 46–7, 71, 77, 89, 92, 95, 100, 109, 116, 124, 143, 164–5, 162, 181–3, 207 Russia Company 23, 28, 58–9, 60, 63–4, 65, 97 sail cloth 25, 31 Sandwich, John, 4th Earl of 43, 146, 164, 199 Sardinia, Kingdom of 23–5, 76, 124 Scotland 24, 28, 30, 56, 64, 108, 114, 144, 151, 170 Scott, Samuel 206

Secretaries of State 99 Seven Years’ War 9, 44, 138, 147–55, 198, 205 Shelburne, William, 2nd Earl of 162, 167, 173, 176 Sheridan, Richard Brinsley 33 Sicily 40 Silesia 37, 91, 117, 140 silk 24–6, 29, 60, 76–7, 124 slavery 26, 33, 111, 116, 121, 131, 144–6, 187–90 Smith, Adam 22, 33, 178 smuggling 17, 34, 143, 200–2 Snow, John 4 South Sea Bubble 72, 85, 94, 131, 136 South Sea Company 23, 57–8, 114, 203 Spain 6, 8, 10–12, 14, 23, 43, 44–5, 47, 63, 65, 71, 73, 76, 86, 90, 92, 111, 112–13, 155, 180, 202, 206 Spanish Succession, War of the 86, 107, 111, 115, 121, 131 Sri Lanka 14, 57, 192 St Lucia 45, 74, 93, 130 St Petersburg 37 Stair, John, 3rd Earl of 128 statistics 17–19 Steadfast Society 60 Steele, Richard 26 Stepney, George 117 Stockholm 4 Stone, Andrew 98 Strickland, Sir William 23 sugar 31, 59, 60, 65, 73, 93, 110–11, 116, 125, 130, 151, 192 Sweden 9, 19, 35, 37, 40, 42, 46–7, 61, 63, 69, 73, 77, 79, 91, 97, 99, 123, 124–5, 141, 163–4, 198, 201 Swift, Jonathan 21 Talleyrand, Charles de 41 tariffs 205 taxation 6, 10, 205, 207 tea 17, 26, 34, 140, 164–5, 167, 171, 185 Thurlow, Edward, 1st Lord 77 Tilson, George 11, 36, 92, 96, 107, 139 Titley, Walter 5, 63, 75, 88–9, 95 tobacco 17, 73–4, 76, 79, 93, 109, 116, 192 Tobago 12 Tories 7, 21, 38, 45, 60, 108, 112, 114–15 Townshend, Charles, 2nd Viscount 56, 58, 64, 76–7, 91, 97–8, 137, 203 trading companies 40 Trieste 67

Index 219 Tucker, Josiah 203 Turkey 12, 36, 58, 59, 71, 73, 88, 97, 129, 182 Turks Island 12 Tuscany 5, 11, 44, 62, 70, 92, 155 Tyrawly, James, 2nd Lord 3–4, 77, 87, 143 United Provinces (Dutch) 10, 14, 19, 24–5, 28, 78, 121–2, 139–40, 164–5, 199, 205 USA 8, 66, 72, 142, 172, 183–5, 189 Utrecht, Peace of 112, 114–15, 121, 128 Venice 65, 91 Vernon, Edward 75 Vernon, James 116 Victor Amadeus II, Kingdom of Sardinia 24, 76, 124 Virginia 30, 74, 93, 99, 111 Wager, Sir Charles 77

Walpole, Horatio 23, 55, 85, 94–5, 127 Walpole, Sir Robert 7, 34, 57, 63, 66, 72, 77–8, 86, 90, 100, 130–1, 137, 147 Wedgwood, Josiah 64, 178 West Indies 38, 57–8, 59, 68, 74–5, 79, 92, 99, 110, 111, 116, 124, 130–1, 137, 141, 144, 150, 151–2, 153, 172, 190, 202 Weymouth 12 Whigs 21, 38, 114–15 Whitehaven 145 Wilckens, Henry 99 William III 20, 107, 109, 116 Williams, Reeve 71 Wolfe, James 165 wool 19, 23, 26, 28, 30, 32, 61, 78 Worcestershire 23 Wych, Cyril 24, 39, 46, 87–8, 91, 97, 122 Yorke, Joseph 142, 164 Yorkshire 23, 64, 143, 190